


THE FEASIBILITY AND POTENTIAL
DESIRABILITY OF INCORPORATING
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES
INTO THE MARINE CORPS'
LEADERSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM.

Timothy Norman Farlow

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THESIS

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by

Timothy Norman Farlow

September 1977

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The Feasibility and Potential
Desirability of Incorporating
Organization Development Techniques
into the
Marine Corps' Leadership Training Program

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

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September 1977

ABSTRACT

Numerous social and political changes of the past two decades have affected the quality and quantity of personnel assets available to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has been subject to an increasing number of society-born problems and internally-generated conflicts. New and increased demands have been placed upon Marine Corps leadership to: 1) Assimilate today's young Marine into the corps' values and culture; 2) Remedy negative incidents that erode existing assets and threaten vitally-needed political support; and 3) Maintain combat effectiveness.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the feasibility and potential desirability of incorporating certain organization development techniques into the Marine Corps leadership training program. The author proposes that particular OD techniques, limited in scope and carefully designed so as to take into consideration the uniqueness of the Marine Corps as an institution, can be successfully incorporated into the leadership training program in order to reduce potential sources of unit dysfunctions and Corps-wide embarrassments. Specifically, the thesis recommends that open discussions of local unit conflicts through the utilization of discussion leaders trained in the OD techniques of team-building and conflict-resolution could result in strengthened esprit d'corps and increased combat effectiveness.

This thesis holds the basic premise that the Marine Corps is a microcosm of the larger American society. In the past two decades, the Marine Corps' supporting society has undergone fundamental changes which have altered the values and priorities of American life and consequently the norms and needs of the personnel pool from which recruits are acquired. Such phenomena as increased minority self-awareness, the war in Vietnam, the emergence of a cynical and politically aware "youth culture", demographic changes, and the opinion-shaping power of the mass media have

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In the second section, the author outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze the data. This includes both primary and secondary data collection techniques. The primary data was gathered through direct observation and interviews, while secondary data was obtained from existing reports and databases.

The third section details the statistical analysis performed on the collected data. This involves the use of descriptive statistics to summarize the data and inferential statistics to test hypotheses. The results of these analyses are presented in a clear and concise manner, highlighting the key findings of the study.

Finally, the document concludes with a summary of the findings and their implications. It discusses the limitations of the study and suggests areas for future research. The overall goal is to provide a comprehensive overview of the research process and its results.

contributed to sweeping social, moral, and economic changes. Consequently, the quality and quantity of personnel and material assets available to the Marine Corps have been affected so as to present new challenges to the Corps' leadership. Moreover, due to increased social and political pressures, the Marine Corps can ill-afford negative and embarrassing incidents which threaten to undermine its national support base.

This thesis accepts Gross' (1964), Katz and Kahn's (1966), and Robbins' (1974) convictions that conflict is an intrinsic part of organizational life. [Refs 31, Ch. 1; 42, Ch. 1; 68, pp. 12-13] Conflict in the Marine Corps is either society-born or internally-generated. While this conflict has resulted in significant disciplinary problems and erosion of personnel assets, the Marine Corps appears to react according to traditional leadership which tends to place it in a reactive posture when the demands of the time is one of proaction. However, this thesis maintains, that to assume that traditional leadership will be successful without any changes is tantamount to thinking that today's young male and female marines are the products of yesterday's society.

The Marine Corps has reacted to its internal conflicts by instituting a variety of human resource management programs. The most visible and costly of these programs is the current leadership training program. However, this thesis explains, the leadership training program has been

handicapped by its structure and conduct in achieving full effectiveness. This thesis explores the philosophies of Organization Development as a possible means to upgrade the program's effectiveness. A review of the literature and the theories of major practitioners are examined in a manner that would tend to validate this assumption.

This thesis continues to discuss the internal Marine Corps organizational structure, reward systems, and cultural atmosphere which either support or inhibit the concepts of OD. The thesis examines a variety of forces (both formal and informal) which can possibly promote or possibly deter the successful introduction of OD efforts.

In conclusion, the author recommends that the OD goal of improving organizational channels of communication (both horizontally and vertically) holds great potential benefit for the Marine Corps. The thesis presents a framework whereby OD techniques can be incorporated into the current leadership training program in order to improve inter-unit communication and manage disruptive conflicts. Yet, the thesis recognizes such OD techniques must be initially limited in scope and specifically tailored to the unique needs of the Marine Corps in order for them to be structurally feasible and culturally acceptable. This caution is based on the knowledge that an organization's symbolic fabric is a fragile component whose warp and woof gives the organization its unique character. After careful investigation, the author believes

that the incorporation of specific OD techniques into the leadership training program would present little risk of damage to the Corps as a system. Rather, the author believes that the Corps and its personnel would be better able to interact positively thus upgrading esprit d'corps and combat effectiveness.

II. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

The United States Marine Corps is a component subsystem of the larger United States defense establishment and national security system. The national security system, in turn, is an integral part of the general socio-politico-economic structure prevailing in the United States at any given time. Consequently, the United States Marine Corps as related to its external environment does not exist in "splendid isolation" and probably fits with a degree of firmness Johnson, Kast, and Rosenzweig's (1963) definition of a system: "An organized and complex whole; an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole." [Ref. 40, pp. 4-6] The term system also implies an interdependence whereby what happens to one component affects all others composing the whole in varying degrees of impact. In this respect the relationship existing between the Marine Corps, the defense establishment, and the greater American society follows Bertalanffy's (1956) concise definition of a system: "Elements standing in interaction". [Ref. 32, p. 6]

Given this subsystem relationship of the Marine Corps and the constellation of defense institutions (Army, Navy, Air Force, et al) to general society, the system theory research of Leavitt (1965) and Seiler (1967) notes that such associations must involve interdependence and exchange.

[Refs. 46, pp. 1145-1146; 71, pp. 23-29] The more effectively these exchanges and interfaces are managed in terms of utilizing inputs, the less the subsystem is subject to atrophy, becoming marginal or obsolete, or going out of existence. To remain in dynamic interface with its external environment, a subsystem must react positively to the new demands and changing conditions of its environment. To ignore public pressure and societal expectations is to court organizational disaster.

Since the Marine Corps is an instrument of the federal government (a democratic, popularly-elected assembly), it cannot exist in "Olympian detachment" from the remainder of American society. Having received its *raison d'etre* from the National Security Act of 1947, the United States Marine Corps is responsible to the national public for the effective utilization of its assets. According to the concepts of system theory, to remain a viable subsystem of national defense the Marine Corps must be sensitive to developing social and political pressures and adaptive to changing conditions. Since it is an agent of a democratic, free society which places a premium on human rights, the United States Marine Corps does not enjoy the dubious luxury of insulation from popular demands as do the military forces of more totalitarian national states. Consequently, in receiving its mandate and resources from a free society, it follows that the Marine Corps cannot ignore the "cues" of society. As noted by French and Bell (1973), external interface with society is an increasingly conspicuous and

impactive aspect of organizational life. [Ref. 26; pp. 82-83] How the numerous interface problems with society are managed can have vital consequences for the success, health, or viability of an organization. This concern is especially immediate in today's era of sophisticated news media technology where negative incidents such as racial disturbances or sex discrimination (regardless of how minor or isolated) can be readily escalated and become so newsworthy as to bring severe external pressure upon the Marine Corps.

Essentially, the United States Marine Corps is a governmental subsystem which utilizes society-provided inputs (men and capital) to generate an output (accomplishment of prescribed military mission). Since its resources are procured from the public, the quality and quantity of these inputs are functions of national priorities and values. Further, the United States (unlike most totalitarian states) is a pluralistic society which in recent years has undergone complex and profound changes in its complexion. To varying degrees these increasingly rapid changes have manifested themselves in many institutions of society. Whereas any organism is what it eats, similarly public organizations (e.g., the United States Marine Corps) are affected and altered by the quality and quantity of their resource diets. Just as an organism must manage and adjust its diet to remain viable, so must the Marine Corps address the changing menu (i.e., resources) which is presented by society.

Probably the most rapid changes in American social values and priorities (which control and color the resources available to the Marine Corps) occurred in the two decades between "Brown versus the Board of Education" (1954) and the political scandals attending the Watergate investigations (1974). The former ushered in the "Negro Revolt" while the latter underwrote the increasing skepticism of U.S. citizens (and young people, in particular) for political institutions. Events of this period fostered and validated the cynicism of large numbers of American youth who increasingly engaged in disturbing life styles and behavior bordering on revolt when compared with the traditional social values then current [Ref. 78, Ch. 1] During this era events transpired which when sensationalized by the mass media lent discredit to many of the country's most revered institutions associated with security, e.g., the unpopular war in Viet Nam, police suppression of Civil Rights demonstrations, unconstitutional FBI and CIA activities, etc.

The catalytic agent which generated national cynicism, distrust of governmental institutions, and rejection of many traditional values was, perhaps, the "Negro Revolt". During the mid and late 1960s, blacks who had suffered the stigma of second class citizenship reacted both physically and psychologically. The racial violence of Watts, Newark, and Detroit was attended by the insistence of Black militants on defining themselves on their own terms instead of allowing the White majority to continue to define them. Such slogans

as "Black is Beautiful" underlined the separation of Black identity from the cultural norms of White America. The writings of Eldridge Cleaver (1968) and James Baldwin (1963) are indicative of the rising tide of Black awareness and ethnic pride. [Ref. 17, Ch. 1-4; 5, Ch. 1-3] Blacks demanded increased personal respect and better employment opportunities based on ability instead of color.

The impetus of the Black protest movements was keenly felt in the Armed Forces. Reports by correspondents during the late 1960s stressed the change in attitude among perceptible numbers of Black servicemen. Foner (1974) states that Time magazine reported: "These men are a new generation of Black soldiers. Unlike the veterans of a year or two ago, they are immersed in Black awareness and racial pride."

[Ref. 24, p. 20] Although Blacks had traditionally demanded complete equality of treatment within the armed forces, they now demanded official recognition of their distinctive lifestyle and culture. In this, Black servicemen were reflecting the changes in the larger Black community and its consciousness. Blacks engaged in self-imposed separation, especially off the job, and in displays of racial pride and solidarity along with quick reactions to what they felt were racial slights, acts of discrimination, or racist behavior whether conscious or imagined. [Ref. 24, p. 207]

The continuing war in Viet Nam alienated the moderate, non-violent wing of the Civil Rights movement. Up until his assassination in April 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King spoke

out against the war with increasing sharpness. Black critics of the war charged that it drained resources needed to improve the conditions of Blacks at home. Thomas A. Johnson, a black reporter, wrote in the New York Times: "This is the first time in the history of American wars that national Negro leaders are not urging Black youth to take up arms in support of American policy to improve the lot of the Black man in the United States." [Ref. 24, p. 206]

The rising tide of Black militance increasingly dismissed Black career personnel in the Armed Services as "Uncle Toms" and "Oreos". Young Blacks complained that discrimination pervaded the entire military system as evidenced by: racial and cultural biased tests that relegated Blacks to assignments in the infantry, artillery, or low-skilled jobs; the lack of sensitivity among white military superiors to Black cultural identity; the military justice system which subjugated Blacks to a seemingly disproportionate number of pre-trial confinements and "Article 15s"; and the perceived "railroading" of activist personnel before the expiration of enlistment via administrative discharges. Blacks in uniform directed their society-born dissatisfaction against the military. In 1970, re-enlistment rates among Black personnel fell to a new low of 12.8 per cent. Moreover, serious racial incidents erupted at many stateside and overseas installations. The United States Marine Corps witnessed one of the most serious incidents at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina where a White

corporal died of injuries sustained in a clash between White and Black Marines. Foner reports that in a February 1970 survey of racial attitudes, sixty-eight per cent of the Blacks questioned felt the Marine Corps "had failed to practice its preachments on racial equality." [Ref. 24, p. 215] The survey also revealed that the longer a man remained in the Marine Corps the more biased he became. [Ref. 24, p. 215] In response to these pressing problems the Marine Corps initiated a research project in April 1970 that resulted in the formal training of Human Relations Instructors and the mandatory attendance of all Marines at Human Relations classes.

The "Negro Revolt" with its resulting rise in Black consciousness and political awareness has made new demands upon American society. The Civil Rights demonstrations and ethnic militancy of past years have sensitized American Blacks to the political clout they possess. Blacks are no longer content with basic integration but demand an active role in the administration of national institutions. In composing the largest bloc of this country's minority groups, Blacks have traditionally spearheaded the drive for equal rights. The power sharing enjoyed by other minority groups is determined to a large degree by the events transpiring in Black-White relations. As a subsystem of the federal government, the Marine Corps is subject to these political and social pressures. Increasingly effective human resource management programs are a means whereby the Marine Corps can strive to

deal positively with new minority expectations, continue to tap this vast personnel pool, yet maintain its own internal standards, traditions, and values.

The evolution of the "Negro Revolt" was accompanied by changes in the social values of White American society. Although these changing priorities were initially confined to members of the upper middle class, their influences were felt to varying degrees in most segments of American society. The wake of this social unrest was attended on the part of U.S. citizens by increased skepticism of societal and governmental institutions, questioning of traditional American values, and a frequently severe distrust of authority figures. Leon Friedman (1968) ascribes this conflict as initially born of the Civil Rights movement:

"When Southern racists reacted as they did in Birmingham, St. Augustine, or Selma, the conscience of America was thoroughly aroused. Few were not affected in some way by the pictures of snarling dogs and firehoses at Birmingham, the beatings on the beach at St. Augustine, and the murders in Neshoba County and Selma." [Ref. 27, p. 70]

Perceived police brutality, indifference of politicians, and the seeming reluctance of society to institute immediate changes inflamed the conscience of middle class youth and heightened their frustrations. David Loye (1971) clearly details the bitterness and dissolution of this period. [Ref. 51, Ch. 2]

The continuing escalation of the war in Viet Nam was perceived by White youth as further evidence of the reluctance

of the established order to respond to popular sentiment. Dutton (1972) describes the rejection by youth to "work within the system" and the contagious effect of the "up against the wall, baby!" syndrome. [Ref. 21, Ch. 4] Moreover, he notes how material affluence and rising expectations permitted middle class youth the luxury of denouncing the existing system in favor of rearranged economic and social values. [Ref. 21, Ch. 10] These same liberating tendencies were also clearly discernible in the youth from working class and poorer families, even if less dramatically."

'This is not just a new generation', Time noted in naming the group a collective "Man of the Year" before it was even twenty-one years old, 'but a new kind of generation'."

[Ref. 22, p. 27] The social upheaval generated by American youth was manifested by seven years of teach-ins and demonstrations, five years of large scale draft resistance and emigration, four years of universal disillusionment, the creation of a mood among voters that unseated an incumbent President, defeated his designated successor, and provided a Presidential mandate to "end the war". [Ref. 22, Ch. 1] At Washington, D.C. in May 1971, the largest occurrence of civil disobedience in U.S. history produced nearly 13,000 arrests.

Heren (1970) addresses the cultural revolution of American youth and the accompanying technological revolution of the mass media whereby large segments of the public were directly exposed to the violence of racial clashes, the slaughter in

Viet Nam, the apparent unending confrontation on the streets and campuses, the copouts, dropouts, acid heads, and assassinations of national figures. [Ref. 34, pp. 180-230] Rationalism seemed to be disregarded as affluent, expectant, and angry youth challenged the old disciplines. Social strife was complex because so many forces were involved, and was often triggered by events that had little apparent connection with the acts of violence. O'Neill (1971) comments on the erosion of personal identity and social responsibility that accompanied the inflammatory rhetoric and violence of the New Left, Students for a Democratic Society, and the radical Weatherman factions. [Ref. 64, pp. 275-305]

As a repository of traditional values of discipline and authority and as the most visible institution embroiled in Viet Nam, the U.S. military came under bitter, sustained attack. This anti-war sentiment given birth during the unpopular war in Viet Nam has produced another offspring, anti-military sentiment in the U.S., which may in the long run prove to be a more formidable enemy to the services than its antecedent. Additionally, the aftermath of the "Negro Revolt" and the shifts in societal values (e.g., rising consciousness of women, concern for "people programs" vice technological hardware, orientation towards "pluralism" vice "melting pot", skepticism of government institutions, etc.) have created a mid-1970s climate which poses increased challenges for those concerned with military effectiveness.

The potential enlistee comes to the Armed Forces with a "mind set" conditioned by the social turbulence of the 1960s and early 70s. While these enlistees may lack the tightly ordered mental discipline gained from the printed page – as indicated by alarmingly high illiteracy rates [Ref. 81, p. 8] – they do possess a precocity and complex perception of events developed from radio and television. They appear extremely aware of social issues and seem to demand opportunities for self-esteem and personal growth. This places new demands on any military leadership strictly anchored on authoritarian dictates. The "why" generation is not content with command by fiat but needs open communications to be fully integrated into military organizations. Moreover, population trends reveal that this personnel pool is rapidly shrinking. In a speech given at Arizona State University, R.J. Murray, Under Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, stated that "by 1980, 43% of the eligible male population will have to be recruited to meet required manning levels." [Ref. 60]

Demographic studies also indicate that the military must increasingly rely on minority group members to fill its ranks. [Ref. 76, pp. 50-51] Furthermore, positions traditionally occupied by White males will probably be filled by females. [Ref. 67, pp. 55-61] In addressing the need for fuller utilization of women in meeting manpower requirements, former Secretary of Defense, Elliot P. Richardson, commented:

"We need to make more and better use of women. We say this not just because we're for, in principle, the idea of assuring the equality of opportunity for women. We're not talking about the Department of Defense or the Services as instruments for putting an end to the vestiges of discrimination toward women. We're talking about the very direct interests of the Services, for their own purposes, in doing a better job for the United States in the era of the All-Volunteer Force. We're not thinking in terms of what we can do for women, we're thinking in terms of what women can do for us and the national security. And I'm not sure we're asking them to do enough." [Ref. 83, pp. 8-9]

Skillful, innovative human resource management programs can provide a means of integrating women and minorities into the cultural climate of the Armed Forces, improving the skills of current military personnel, strengthening retention rates, and presenting potential enlistees with a climate conducive to personal growth and self-esteem. Such multi-dimensional efforts are needed to procure and retain military resources in this era of the All Volunteer Force.

As a highly visible component of the broader spectrum of American social institutions, the Marine Corps can utilize effective human resource management programs to:

A. Assimilate the values of a new generation of enlistees into esprit d'corps thereby enhancing organizational effectiveness and commitment.

B. Assume a proactive stance towards negative situations (racial disturbances, sex discrimination, etc.) that could be exploited by the mass media and result in weakened Congressional support and undermined public respect, confidence, and approval.

Human Resource Management is not a luxury to be indulged in according to the whim of the individual commander. The climate of the supporting U.S. society and the keen competition for defense resources demand skillfully tailored HRM programs to maintain a continuing mandate for the Marine Corps. The price of HRM failures is too costly to be left to chance. Indeed, vigorous HRM programs carefully designed to match the Marine Corps' uniqueness may possibly be the only way to simultaneously preserve the Marine Corps' traditional values while maintaining its viability of mission. Yet, probably the greatest obstacle retarding the acceptance of updated HRM programs necessary to insure the Marine Corps' continuing effectiveness is the reluctance of many Marine Corps leaders (at all levels) to fully subscribe to the non-traditional concept that human growth and organizational goals are not mutually exclusive properties.

III. THE LEADERSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM

The United States Marine Corps is probably America's most honored fighting force, justifiably proud of its past. "It is one of this nation's most venerable institutions." [Ref. 11, p. vii] The Marine Corps has developed a history of combat excellence that is equalled by few of the world's fighting organizations. Yet, the Marine Corps is now experiencing an embarrassing growth in disciplinary problems and negative incidents that jeopardize the elite reputation of which it, and the nation, are so rightly proud.

Department of Defense data from fiscal years 1971 to 1975 indicate that the Marine Corps is experiencing not only a significantly higher rate of disciplinary problems than any other service but also a rate that, with few exceptions, has been growing over the past several years. [Ref. 11, p. 62] Indeed, the Marine Corps' 1975 rates of courts-martial, desertion incidents, and absences without official leave (AWOL) far exceed the combined rates of the Air Force, Navy, and Army. [Ref. 11, p. 63] The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Louis H. Wilson, has publicly expressed his strong dissatisfaction with the "deplorable" disciplinary statistics. [Ref. 11, p. 64] Although comparisons of service disciplinary rates are difficult because of differing standards and punishment policies, the Marine Corps is experiencing serious problems which have brought public

embarrassment to its elite reputation. Moreover, the Marine Corps has been forced to expend considerable amounts of valuable time, critically needed elsewhere, to counteract "bad press" and to answer inquiries by Congressional committees. Indeed, one indication of the disturbing degree of internal Marine Corps problems exists in the fact that in one three month period alone (July to September 1975) more than two thousand Marines were discharged for inability to conform to the Corps' standard of discipline. [Ref. 1, p. 16]

Marine Corps leaders are acutely aware of the grave threats presented by such erosions of the Corps' personnel assets. In an era of increasingly scarce defense resources, commanders fully realize that maximization of existing assets and accomplishment of organization mission are seriously jeopardized by disciplinary problems, racial unrest, substance abuse, and similar dysfunctional phenomena. Concern for such problems has been expressed by several Marine officers writing in unofficial publications. One suggested that: "The three Divisions would be hard-pressed to field one full-strength division prepared for combat." [Ref. 43, p. 18] Another officer stated: "My recent experience in Okinawa convinced me without a doubt that the Battalion Landing Teams that go afloat are not adequately prepared for combat or amphibious assault." [Ref. 79, p. 41] While the dismay of such observers is partly based on logistical concerns, disciplinary trends are a seriously corrosive influence on organizational effectiveness (i.e., combat success).

Consequently, to countervene disruptive forces either generated internally or transplanted into the Corps' from the external civilian society, a variety of human resource management programs have been initiated. These programs have been specifically tailored to the organizational climate of the Marine Corps and are directed at improving organizational health (i.e., more effective accomplishment of mission) through a more positive utilization of existing human resources.

The most visible of current Marine Corps efforts to maximize the potential of its human resources and combat organizational conflicts is the leadership training program. As compared to other human resource management programs (Equal Opportunity, Alcohol Abuse, Drug Rehabilitation, etc.), the leadership training program occupies the time, attention, and involvement of the greatest number of marines. It has the full endorsement of the Commandant as a method to improve unit effectiveness: "This program has my full support ... I expect nothing less from all Marines." [Ref. 82, para.3]

The heritage of the leadership training program is described by official directive:

"During the late 1960s, the Marine Corps underwent a period of accelerated change characterized by rapid expansion, the accession of an increasing number of minority members, exposure to new ideas, and rising expectations among its members, placing heavy demands on leadership. To assist in contending with this change, the Marine Corps initiated a human relations

training program. The program's basic objective was, through education and action, to ensure more constructive relationships among Marines and between Marines and individuals outside the Marine Corps. Initial emphasis was placed on resolving racial problems. Subsequently, the Marine Corps moved to provide a more comprehensive leadership approach that would eliminate the need for a separate human relations training program." [Ref. 55, p.2]

The core concept of this initial program remains in the current leadership training program: The Dual-Life Theory. Developed by American Institutes for Research, this philosophy stressed the Janus-like complexion of human nature: All persons have two strong internal drives, the drive for self-preservation (including family and close friends), and the desire for society in general to survive. [Ref. 39, Vol. III] Discussions oriented on this dual-life value emphasize respect for self and respect for others as the locus from which prejudice and discrimination can be eradicated. The commonality and mutual inter-dependence of people are used as means to offset forces of divergence. From this beginning and retaining this essential philosophy the leadership training program has been expanded and developed to incorporate cross-cultural relationships, sexism vis-a-vis the role of women in the Marine Corps, and race relations with special emphasis on institutional discrimination.

As officially defined, the object of the Marine Corps' leadership training program is to "... develop the leadership quality of all Marines to enable them to assume progressively greater responsibilities to the Marine Corps and society..."

[Ref. 55, p. 1] Moreover, as the Commandant has stated:
"The fundamental objective of this program, insofar as the Marine Corps is concerned, is based on the basic need for unity of effort in both war and peace." [Ref. 82, para. 1]
This comprehensive program designed to improve organizational health is clearly anchored on leadership which the Marine Corps holds to be a primary determinant of unit effectiveness. Leadership is defined as "... the sum of those qualities of intellect, human understanding, and moral character that enable a person to inspire and control a group successfully ..."
[Ref. 54, para. 5390] It is through the effective leader that an organization realizes its maximum potential. The Marine Corps has long stressed the vital necessity of military superiors (both officer and enlisted) to combine leadership with their titular authority. As expressed by the Commandant:
"The vast majority of Marines will respond to the most exacting standards, provided concerned leadership sets the example."
[Ref. 82, para. 3]

Official directives express the thrust of the leadership training program and the techniques to be utilized (and avoided) in its employment:

"Leadership training will emphasize the dignity of each individual Marine and the quality of human understanding, and will be conducted in accordance with recognized and proven traditional military techniques and principles. Commanders must guard against the employment of leadership training techniques inconsistent with Marine Corps policies and a mission-oriented approach. Techniques that unduly impinge on personal privacy or which foster a perception of



lowered standards of personal discipline will not be used. Specialist techniques derived from psychotherapy, laboratory games used in group therapy, encounter groups, sensitivity training sessions, emotional confrontations, use of first names, unstructured rap sessions, touch-feel games, transactional analysis, transcendental meditation and structural analysis are prohibited." [Ref. 55, p. 2]

Within these parameters, the program is designed to enhance personnel welfare and mission accomplishment. It is emphasized that the Marine Corps is mission-oriented and is not a psychological counseling service. Moreover, lack of training expertise and material resources prohibit the widespread introduction of intensive, sophisticated counseling techniques.

The Head, Equal Opportunity Branch (Code MPE) is responsible to the Director, Manpower Plans and Policy Division (Code MP) for the development, implementation, and monitoring of the leadership training program. Through the Leadership Instruction Department (LID) located at Quantico, Virginia, unit discussion leaders are trained from personnel at The Basic School and Staff NCO Academies; graduates of intermediate level schools are trained as leadership instructors. Additionally, LID's duties also include the utilization of mobile training teams to provide leadership discussion training to selective field commands. When directed by CMC these mobile teams also conduct research, test materials, collect data, and provide staff assistance to field commanders.

Organizational commanders are responsible for the local implementation of the leadership training program by the

employment of LID-trained personnel. Within this framework all marines - regardless of position of authority - undergo sixteen to twenty-four hours of classroom training annually. The size of these discussion groups range from approximately seven to twenty personnel who are representatives of a common unit. The training discussion emphasizes human understanding and individual dignity as the foundation upon which disciplined, spirited combat units are built. The discussion attempts to open lines of communication between marines across barriers of rank, age, race, and sex. Commanders are encouraged to require some officers and Staff NCOs to attend each discussion group and fully participate in the training in order to bring experience and proven leadership to the group.

The format of the discussion group includes three components:

A. Orientation - This first component provides the discussion members with an overview of the program, provokes thoughts for the discussions to follow, and motivated members to engage in full and meaningful participation. [Ref. 63, p. I-5] The orientation phase addresses worldwide human relations problems that challenge modern leadership.

B. Discussion - The discussion component is the educational phase. Through a set of printed discussion material, this phase utilizes the dual-life value to improve awareness of human relations problems both domestically and foreign. The discussion leader must be prepared to supplement the

prepared material by interjecting current events and local issues. The discussion phase is considered successful to the degree that it stimulates discussion members to implement the classroom material in their daily lives. [Ref. 61, ch. 2-5]

C. Individual Action - This third phase is the desired result of the orientation and education components. The scope of this phase is broad but essentially consists of a voluntary effort by marines to apply their leadership training outside the classroom. It stresses that unit improvement is greatly facilitated by "... self-improvement and constructive interpersonal relations with marines of all racial, ethnic, social, and economic backgrounds, between marines and members of the other Armed Services, and between marines and civilians at home and overseas ..." [Ref. 62, part 5]

In endorsing the leadership training program, the Commandant has stated: "... All officers, staff noncommissioned officers and noncommissioned officers are expected to become fully involved in the current leadership training program ..." [Ref. 26, para. 3] Moreover, he added: "It is a matter of military necessity that this education/action training program continue to be pursued with dedication." [Ref. 26, para. 1] The role of the Commanding Officer is especially vital to the success of the program. The Leadership Symposium hosted by the Commandant in Arlington, Virginia from 7-11 March 1977 reaffirmed that the Commanding Officer's support is necessary to enhance the validity of the program. The Symposium stated in part:

"While it is understood that Commanding Officers cannot personally lead all discussion groups, they can: (a) Introduce training sessions giving the scope and objectives of the program; (b) Actively participate as often as possible; (c) Participate as guest speakers, lending their experience and knowledge to stimulate discussion; and (d) Encourage active participation in the leadership program through seminars for officers and staff noncommissioned officers under their command." [Ref. 53, p. 5]

The leadership training program is an on-going effort designed to permeate all levels of the Marine Corps. Internal Marine Corps correspondance held by the author provides observations and data indicating some of the program's successes: (1) A one-third decrease in significant racial incidents throughout the Marine Corps in 1976 as compared to 1975; (2) A significant decrease in equal opportunity/race relations complaints by individuals; (3) A continuous improvement in the racial and equal opportunity climate reported by the Commandant's Equal Opportunity Consultants after their field trips to Marine Corps commands world-wide; (4) A marked decrease in Congressional interest letters alleging racial, ethnic, and sex discrimination; (5) Reports from field commanders citing leadership training as the reason for fewer equal opportunity complaints, reduced racial/ethnic discord, and an increase in comradeship among all Marines; (6) The observable increase in social interaction among all Marines during off-duty hours, on and off base; and (7), The enthusiastic endorsement of the marine program as a better solution to eliminate racial discord



and promote better understanding by other service officers attending Marine Corps' schools.

Yet, notwithstanding these optimistic observations, the Marine Corps continues to experience significant problems that threaten its mission effectiveness. Alcohol abuse among Marines continues to result in many lost manhours.

[Ref. 19, p. 54] Unacceptably high rates of desertion, unauthorized absence, and disciplinary infractions continue to plague the Marine Corps. As one Marine officer noted in the Marine Corps Gazette:

"The Marine Corps' rate of unauthorized absence per 1000 men has been at least three times higher than the other uniformed services; in addition, we have almost four times the number of desertions and more than three times as many courtmartials than do the other services." [Ref. 37, p. 30]

Disappointing re-enlistment rates erode experienced manpower and result in increased retraining costs. Serious (although isolated) racial confrontations like the Klu Klux Klan incident at Camp Pendleton and negative incidents like the death of Private McClure at San Diego have been fanned to inflammatory degrees by a sensationalism-seeking press. [Ref. 66, pp. 23-32] These realities erode the image of the Marine Corps and increase its vulnerability in the ultra-complex socio-political arena of Washington, D.C. As Wright (1975) notes:

"It is a fact of military life that in eras of scarce dollars any excuse or rationale for not giving a service money suffices. Whether that excuse consists of a race riot, an unwitting training accident or a hassle over female participation is irrelevant. The reality persists." [Ref. 86, p. 11]



Although the current leadership training program contributed to the reduction of highly visible personnel disturbances, image-embarrassing problems still exist. Perhaps this is because the enthusiasm for the leadership training program manifested at Headquarters is not equally shared at many field commands. Regardless of what is done at the macro-level (staff), if failure of execution occurs at the micro-level (unit), the leadership training program will be severely retarded as to its effectiveness. If the officers and NCOs charged with the field implementation of the program look upon it as "another routine training commitment imposed from the top" or unenthusiastically engage in it because "orders are orders", the dynamic thrust of the program will in a great degree of probability be dissipated.

In what may be indicative of a sizeable number of opinions, Marine Corps officers have expressed dissatisfaction and hesitation in unofficial commentaries to professional publications:

"The program falls short of its motivating ideal and stated purpose...once again an expensive, time consuming program has been foisted upon us which fails to provide any basis for dealing with those real leadership problems casually cast aside as 'surface issues'...the lack of relativity to the so-called 'surface issues' is a major problem to anyone participating in leadership training...the manuals guide discussions away from specific, real-life issues...discussion leaders are not assigned their leadership training duties on a primary basis. Nor are they entirely, if in the least, qualified to conduct reliable or meaningful 'pulse-taxing studies' - even if their primary duties



permitted the time to attempt such studies... what is needed, though, is a substantive program which focuses on the realities of local, immediate problems..." [Ref. 59, pp. 22-23]

"...we've been sold a bill of goods. From somewhere a gaggle of social scientists have come out of the woodwork to tell us they've discovered something new called leadership. It has to do with such things as cultural shock, dual life value, ethnic heritage and the mating habits of the lesser apes. Its practice is cloaked in quasi-religious mysticism requiring group therapy sessions that verge on self-flagellation and proper SRB/OQR entries to ensure that the great paper shuffler in the sky will look down on us and smile...I don't care a rodent's rump for the whole wishy-washy, civilian, human relations approach you're selling...seems like there's a lot of change just for the sake of change these days..." [Ref. 10, pp. 21-22]

Professor C.A. Wright in critiquing a consultation trip to the Leadership Training School at Quantico expresses both optimism and concern for the present program. He writes that a major strength lies in the professional commitment of senior Marine Corps leaders and their staffs:

"The General Officers and Senior Colonels with whom I talked at Headquarters left me pleasantly surprised. I found no dated 'Apostles of Yesteryear' that would tend to retard the updating of the Corps' Human Resource Management effort and the subsequent removal of the Marine Corps' vulnerability in the critical areas tending to damage the Corps' image... I found (them) very cognizant of the Marine Corps' current problems and was especially impressed by their insights into the problems of the minorities and young people who form today's personnel pool... I found genuine healthy curiosity at the top whose energy was aimed at ways to tap personnel commitment, loyalty, and ways to motivate the problematic group..." [Ref. 43, p. 1]

Yet, Professor Wright also expresses concern for possible weaknesses that might handicap the program:

"If any one observation during the trip to Marine Corps Headquarters disturbed me it was the trip to Quantico. It drove home to me how extremely difficult the job involved in translating to various levels of subordinate commands what the positive attitudes toward HRM held by top echelon staff might be."
[Ref. 85, p. 16]

Moreover, Professor Wright notes that HRM instructors: tend to incorrectly perceive a lack of support and appreciation by higher headquarters; maintain a subtle but tenacious tendency to continue old methods of instruction due to caution and possibly real fear; and possibly lack knowledge as to the importance of small group dynamics as a tool for experiential learning. [Ref. 85, p. 16]

Since the leadership training program centers on the process of guided discussion, it is critical that the discussion leaders be of top quality and confident of support by superiors. The discussion leaders must operate in an arena where the most painful and emotion laden issues of American life are discussed, debated, and often stripped to their bare bones. If doubts exist as to the quality and continuing commitment of instructors at Quantico (geographically contiguous and in close communication with Headquarters) these doubts may be compounded regarding discussion leaders at more isolated and removed field units.

Given the probable validity of Professor Wright's critique and in view of possible wide-spread dissatisfaction as



suggested by unofficial commentaries, how can the present leadership training program be altered to increase its effectiveness in combatting the problems that continue to threaten the Marine Corps' image? It is suggested by this author that the behavioral science techniques of Organization Development - if specifically tailored to the uniqueness of the Marine Corps - can be incorporated into the leadership training program to improve its problem resolving abilities. Moreover, this author proposes that if Organization Development is judiciously employed in the leadership training program, senior commanders may enjoy a proactive stance towards impending incidents inimical to the Marine Corps and thereby engage in incident prevention vice incident reaction. Minus more trust between juniors and seniors, minority and majority group personnel, the Marine Corps will probably remain in a vulnerable reactive posture. Although Commanding Officers and their senior staffs possess the requisite power and authority to issue appropriate orders for preventing negative incidents, these personnel will probably remain the last to be informed of impending trouble. Without proper lead time to issue orders necessary to set in motion countervailing mechanisms aimed at preventing dysfunctional incidents, senior commanders can only react after the fact and thus remain sources of Corps' vulnerability. However, Organization Development techniques may prove to be an effective "sounding board" whereby unit leaders can feel the



true "pulse" of their organizations which beats immediately below the official surface. Such awareness can facilitate commanders in tapping the sources of organizational "vitality" while simultaneously remedying impending "disease".

IV. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS, GOALS, AND TECHNIQUES

To analyze the possible utilization of Organization Development (OD) techniques in the Marine Corps' leadership training program it is first necessary to discuss the major concepts and principles of OD as espoused by leading practitioners and theorists. What is meant by OD? What does it attempt to do?

French and Bell, who have written what is perhaps "the primer" for this emergent field, concisely define OD as:

"...(an) applied behavioral science discipline that seeks to improve organizations through planned, systematic, long-range efforts focused on the organization's culture and its human and social processes. The goals of organization development are to make the organization more effective, more viable, and better able to achieve the goals of the organization as an entity and the goals of the individuals within the organization..."
[Ref. 26, p. xiv]

Although their semantics differ, the spirit of this definition is commonly shared by noted authorities such as Argyris (1971), Beckhard (1969), Bennis (1969), Golembiewski (1970), and Burke (1972). While various scholars advocate different models and technologies in the employment of OD, it is basically agreed upon by all that the OD process is long-range, system-wide, and on-going. It is a survey data-based approach to planned change and focuses on the work group. OD practitioners emphasize the collaborative management of the organization's culture and eschew the

fallacy that either the organization or the individual must be deprived of its objectives for the service of the other. Moreover, OD scholars typically advocate the use of an external consultant who intervenes into the informal structure given the mandate of the formal organization. Since each of these concepts is central to the OD philosophy, the following discussions are in order.

Although it is deeply rooted in the behavioral sciences, OD has not directly evolved out of behavioral science theory but has developed primarily as a response to the growing requirements for change in our times. [Ref. 36, Ch. 1] The focus of OD is usually on change and is directed towards improving organizational effectiveness. In addition to learning new ways of dealing with complex organizational relationships, OD assists an organization to view change as a natural process instead of a special or disturbing phenomenon. OD emphasizes that the process of planned change can be incorporated into the many other processes of organizational life for the mutual benefit of the organization and its personnel. OD practitioners believe that organization development offers today's best answer to the interdependent problems of improving organization efficiency and enhancing individual worth.

The credos and philosophies of OD are significantly different from the traditionalist school of organizational design. The traditionalists equated organizational health to technical competence. Through the principles of scientific

management, the traditionalists sought to integrate personnel with their respective assignments by careful job design often based on time and motion studies and objective measurements. [Ref. 75, vol. 3] The emphasis was on making a man the extension of his machine through careful hiring practices, job-related instruction, and judicious dismissals for incompetence. Personal emotions were discounted. The preferred organizational structure was generally the Weberian hierarchy. [Ref. 80, Ch. 1-3] Organization conflict was viewed as an anathema and indicative of a "sick" organization. In their abhorrence of organizational conflict, rejection of collaborative management, and dismissal of the personal aspirations of subordinate personnel, the traditionalists stand in direct opposition to the tenets of modern OD.

The behavioralist school of organization theory comes closer to the beliefs of OD by recognizing that conflict is part of the reality of modern, complex organizations. Indeed, the behavioralists felt, conflict is perhaps good for an organization as reflective of organizational vitality. [Ref. 41, Ch. 9] Gardner (1969) suggests that the absence of conflict leads to organizational entropy in which an organization deteriorates and develops what he calls "dry rot". [Ref. 29, Ch. 3] Eventually this malignancy spreads throughout the entire system. Workers begin to produce poorly and this, in turn, places them in a turbulent environment.



The behavioralists built upon the pioneer works of Follett (1940) who stressed the importance of recognizing the personal aspirations of subordinates. [Ref. 23, Ch. 1-6] The behavioralists increasingly sought to develop responsiveness to the social and egotistical needs of workers in order to enhance member cooperativeness with technical requirements. They subscribed to the theories of Maslow (1954) who stated that motivation was a function of satisfying an ascending hierarchy of needs [Ref. 57, Ch. 2-5]. Consequently, the behavioralists argued, worker productivity would not be maximized by relegating workers to mere extensions of their assignments. Leaders had to be cognizant of personal, internal needs which were not associated with the physical mechanics of a job. However, as Wright (1975) notes, the behavioralist approach to organizational improvement was frequently unproductive since it often stopped abruptly with the mere recognition of conflict and the importance of the individual. [Ref. 86, p. 42] Constructive conflict resolutions were infrequently offered.

The human relations approach to organizational improvement shares many of the concepts found in earlier OD efforts. Indeed, this author believes that early OD practices can be criticized as being little more than "advanced human relations." Ganesh (1971) describes the characteristics of a human relations orientation:

"The consultant considers organizational development as a change effort involving small system-like groups and accordingly focuses more on the implications of the

work for the group and less on implications for the rest of the organization.

The consultant works as an involved helper, as if he were another member of the organization.

The consultant relates as a person to individuals and to small groups as client systems.

Involvement is short term and of a specific type as, for instance, in T-groups and sensitivity training.

The consultant is people oriented rather than task oriented, and, accordingly, there is a tendency to work on changes involving interpersonal relationships." [Ref. 28, p. 50]

Current OD practices go well beyond the human relations approach in scope (focusing on the entire socio-technical system rather than on limited aspects of one or the other), sophistication (rejecting simplistic notions of the "one best way" and "happiness leads to performance"), and in its prime change mechanism (development occurs as members learn experientially rather than by following the dictums of staff consultants or personnel specialists). Moreover, unlike advocates of other schools of organizational improvement, the OD practitioner: does not study an organization's life at one particular point and base future policies upon conclusions derived from this one point in time (rather, OD is on-going and interactive); does not restrict intervention to the top strata of management (instead, OD intervenes at all levels of the organization's strata in both the formal and informal spheres); does not make recommendations and render expert advice (rather, OD makes the organization define its own problems and render solutions); and does not produce elaborate reports as end products, in themselves (rather, OD facilitates action plans based on survey data).



OD approaches effectiveness from a systems point of view. It imagines an organization as a system composed of and dependent upon three major elements or subsystems: (1) the task system, or technical system, which includes the flow of work, the required task roles, and the technology involved; (2) the administrative, or managerial system, which includes the organization's structure, policies, personnel selection and evaluation, rules, rewards and punishments, and the ways in which decisions get made; and (3) the human, or personal-cultural system, which involves organization culture, norms, values, and beliefs. The human system also includes the informal organization, the motivational level of members, and individual attitudes. Since it is the interaction of these three systems that produces the behavior and role relationships that affect organizational output, planned organizational change must consider the potential impact on all elements of the system when one of its subsystems is changed. [Ref. 46, pp. 1144-1170]

The initial vehicles for OD intervention tend to be the human and administrative subsystems, that is, the communications and feedback systems plus the attitude and sentiment components of the informal system. [Ref. 26, p. 83] However, these in turn, become vehicles for confronting any problems in the technological subsystem due to the interdependent nature of the three components. For example, the moment that subordinate military personnel start understanding



and internalizing the norms under which they have been operating, their communications and probably their decision making will be affected. When a military superior begins to listen to and understand feelings, the authority structure begins to subtly change. Reciprocally, the outcome of a leader altering his communication style to a more inquiring and understanding-seeking stance is likely to be a positive shift in subordinate feelings. The subordinates are probably more likely to be tied to their leader through bonds of loyalty, trust, and interdependence than through strict, impersonal role requirements.

By intervening in the subsystems of an organization, OD attempts to improve the organization's problem-solving processes. French and Bell (1973) define problem-solving as "the way in which an organization goes about diagnosing and making decisions about the opportunities and challenges of its environment." [Ref. 26, p. 15] For instance, does an organization (e.g., the Marine Corps) solve problems in such a way that it utilizes the creativity and commitment of a select few, or does it tap deeply into the resources, vitality, and common purposes of all organizational members? Does it see its environment and mission in terms of ten years ago, or is it continually redefining its purposes and methods in terms of the present and the future? OD aims at developing the entirety of an organization's internal resources to resolve problems more effectively.



While OD attempts to improve problem-solving processes, it also focuses on the closely associated concept of improving organization renewal. Lippitt (1958) defines organization renewal as "the process of initiating, creating, and confronting needed changes so as to make it possible for organizations to become or remain viable, to adapt to new conditions, to solve problems, and to learn from experiences." [Ref. 49, p. 1] Argyris (1971) stresses organization renewal in his description of OD: "At the heart of organization development is the concern for the vitalization, energizing, actualizing, activating, and renewing of organizations through technical and human resources." [Ref. 3, p. ix] Similarly, Gardner (1965) in writing about organizational self-renewal refers to: the regaining of vitality, creativity, and innovation; the furtherance of flexibility and adaptability; and "the process of bringing results of change into line with purposes." [Ref. 30, pp. 1-7] These concerns with improving the problem-solving and renewal processes of organizations are central to the theories of many OD practitioners.

For an OD effort to be effective it must be "bought into" by organization leaders and receive its mandate from the formal system. [Refs. 73, p. 281; 13, pp. 29-42] However, it is necessary that an OD intervention be simultaneously accepted by the informal organization. Traditionally, this "hidden" domain was either not examined at all or only partially examined. OD not only recognizes the informal



system but also stresses that OD success depends upon the degree to which the prevailing culture of the informal organization can be positively managed to support the aims of the formal organization. Although Krueber and Kluckhohn (1952) cite 164 definitions of culture, it essentially means the prevailing patterns of beliefs, values, attitudes, norms, and interactions found within an organization.

[Ref. 44, p. 291-357] Culture includes Argyris' definition of a "living system": "The way people actually behave, the way they actually think and feel, the way they actually deal with each other." [Ref. 4, p. 2] The culture of the informal organization is a powerful determinant of the formal organization's effectiveness. Its stated mission and desired direction of movement can be severely jeopardized if the culture of the informal organization is not supportive. In recognition of this reality, once an OD program is legitimated by the formal organization, the initial intervention strategy is usually through the informal system since attitudes and feelings are usually the first data to be confronted.

OD stresses that organizational effectiveness is maximized when the officially-stated goals of the formal organization are supported by the culture of the informal organization. OD practitioners advocate that the culture and beliefs of the general organization should be "owned" as much by the subordinates as by the formal leader. OD efforts attempt to foster collaborative management of the culture - not a hierarchically imposed kind. OD theorists hold that an



organization based on shared management of its culture and goals will tend to be a dynamic, vital organization.

[Ref. 7, pp. 3-25]

Implicit in this belief about the desirability of shared management, are the basic assumptions about people. One has to do with personal growth and the other concerns constructive contributions. These philosophies of many prominent OD practitioners are, in general, congruent with the theories of McGregor (1967), Likert (1967), Argyris (1964), Schein (1965), and Herzberg (1966). [Refs. 58, Ch. 1-5; 48, Ch. 1-3; 2, Ch. 2; 69, Ch. 1-6; 35, Ch. 1-3] The first assumption about people is that most individuals have drives toward personal growth and development if provided with an environment that is both supportive and challenging. Most people want to become more of what they are capable of becoming. The second assumption, related to the first, is that most people desire to make, and are capable of making, a higher level of contribution to the attainment of organizational goals than most organizational environments will permit. A tremendous amount of constructive energy can probably be tapped if organizations recognize this. Lewin (1951) and his students produced research to show that active participation may lead to more productivity, greater commitment, and greater personal satisfaction. Moreover, Lewin and his students went further to show that participation by subordinates is worthwhile because people may have important contributions to make. [Ref. 47, Ch. 3] Indeed, they



questioned the genuineness of participation if subordinates were not making significant contributions. Frequently, however, organizational members learn that what they perceive to be constructive efforts may be self-defeating in the sense that these efforts are not rewarded and may be penalized. For example, attempts at lateral communications between two battalions to solve some problems may be met with resistance because of differing interpretations about the chain of command.

These assumptions about people and about contributions differ markedly from more traditional views about people. As Tannenbaum and Davis (1969) state it:

"The traditional view of individuals is that they can be defined in terms of given interests, knowledge, skills and Personality characteristics: they can gain new knowledge, acquire additional skills, and even at times change their interests, but it is rare that people really change. This view, when buttressed by related organizational attitudes and modes, insures a relative fixity of individuals, with crippling effects."
[Ref. 74, pp. 68-70]

Therefore, one can view people as either fixed entities or as "in process" of becoming. The latter assumption underlies many OD interventions - many of which are aimed at unleashing personal growth and contribution or are designed to modify organizational constraints that are having a dampening or throttling effect. The desired result of these OD efforts is to foster organization growth through the growth of its constituent personnel.

Since OD is a process for improving organizational effectiveness, this implies doing things differently and better, which in turn means changing some features of the organization (usually its processes and culture). OD rests on a particular strategy of change that has implications for practitioners and organization members alike. Chin and Benne (1969) describe three types of strategies for change: 1) The empirical-rational strategies based on the assumptions that men are rational, will follow their rational self-interests, and will change if and when they come to realize that change is advantageous to them; 2) The power-coercive strategies based on the idea that change is compliance of those with less power to those with more power; and 3), The normative-re-educative strategies based on the assumptions that norms form the basis for behavior and change comes through a re-educative process in which old norms are discarded and supplanted by new ones. [Ref. 16, pp. 32-59]

Of these various strategies for organizational change, French and Bell (1973) state that most OD efforts are primarily based on a normative-re-educative approach and secondly on a rational-empirical one. [Ref. 26, pp. 50-54] Burke and Nornstein (1971) and Bennis (1969) support this contention. [Refs. 26, p. 53; 9, p. 15] Focusing on this normative-re-educative strategy for change, as practiced in an OD program, the following implications exist: The client organization defines what changes and improvements it wants to



make, rather than the change agent; the change agent attempts to intervene in a mutual collaborative way with the client as together they define problems and seek solutions; doubts, anxieties, and negative feelings that hinder effective problem-solving are surfaced and publically examined; the methods and knowledge of the behavioral sciences are used as resources by both the change agent and the client; and the solutions to the problems are not assigned to factors external to the organization but are assumed to probably reside in values, relationships, and customary ways of doing things. [Ref. 26, p. 53]

The concept of the utilization of a change agent or catalyst is another distinguishing feature of OD. In the early phases, at least, the services of a third party who is not an integral part of the prevailing organization is essential. Although this third party may be a member of the larger organization, he could be external to the particular subsystem that is initiating an OD effort. As French and Bell (1973) clearly state: "We are somewhat pessimistic about the optimal effectiveness of OD efforts that are do-it-yourself programs." [Ref. 26, pp. 17-18] Additionally, Steiner and Miner (1977) discuss the merits of external change agents vice internal change agents from economic grounds by noting that external agents are preferable due to the expenses and resources necessary to maintain a permanent internal staff. An opposite position is held by Margolies and Wallace (1972) and Scurrah, Shani and Zipfel

(1971) who suggest the use of internal change agents because of the advantages of detailed knowledge of the organization and the people in it. [Refs. 52, Ch. 3; 70, Ch. 5] However, the totality of OD practitioners do agree that the operating base of the change agent must free him from the obligation to support particular power groups in the organization.

The change agent frequently concentrates on the ongoing work group as the key element in an OD effort. The work group includes both subordinates and superiors. [Ref. 26, p. 17] OD attempts to encourage team building within the work group to decrease dysfunctional competition and increase collaboration within the work group and between interacting groups. OD strives to perfect teamwork in an organization through analysis of team culture and by developing team skills in planning, setting objectives, and problem solving. The goal of these activities is to increase communications and interactions between work-related groups and to replace an "us and them" point of view with an awareness of the necessity for interdependence of action calling on the best efforts of all groups. Fordyce and Weil (1971) and Blake et al (1965) note that a significant amount of dysfunctional energy is often spent in competition, misunderstanding, miscommunication, and misperception between related groups. Organizational reward structures frequently encourage such behavior through emphasis on unit goal attainment as contrasted with total-organization goal attainment. [Refs. 25,

pp. 124-130; 12, Ch. 1] For example, it is probable that many Battalion Commanders may tend to measure their success on the degree that their individual battalions are combat ready - instead of on the overall effectiveness of the regiment of which they are integral parts. Organization development methods attempt to overcome such parochial syndromes by providing ways of increasing intergroup cooperation and communication.

OD attempts to improve organizational effectiveness through the positive management of group culture which will hopefully result in increased cooperation and communication. In this pursuit, OD practitioners generally employ contingency theories. Although the phrase "contingency theory of organizations" was first utilized by Lawrence and Lorsh (1967), the ideas underlying the concept have been supported by many other researchers and observers such as Chandler (1962), Woodward (1965), Thompson (1967), Cannon (1972), Clifford (1973), Perrow (1973), and Lorsh and Morse (1974). This concept basically asserts that there is no one "right" or "best" way to organize for effective results. The particular method employed to increase organizational effectiveness depends upon the structure, maturity, goals, and culture of the individual organization. [Refs. 45, Ch. 1; 15, Ch. 1-3; 84, Ch. 1-6; 77, Ch. 3; 14, Ch. 1; 18, Ch. 4; 65, pp. 380-441; 50, Ch. 1-2] In recognition of this contingency theory, OD practitioners may utilize a wide range of major types or "families" of OD interventions depending

upon the nature of the client organization and the skills of the involved practitioner. French and Bell (1973) list twelve major types of OD interventions and the activities associated with them. [Ref. 26, pp. 102-104] Utilization of a particular type depends upon whether the OD intervention is problem-specific, process-specific, or program-specific. [Ref. 26, pp. 105-106]

Although OD interventions vary due to the contingencies associated with individual organizations, there is a basic intervention model which runs through the majority of OD efforts. This is the action research model. Basically, the action research model consists of (1) a preliminary diagnosis, (2) data gathering from the client organization, (3) data feedback to the client organization, (4) data exploration by the client organization, (5) action planning based on the data explored and, (6) action. This sequence tends to be cyclical and focuses on new or advanced problems as the client group learns to work more effectively together. [Ref. 26, p. 84] Shepard (1960), Beckhard (1960), and Havelock (1969) emphasize the importance of action research in any attempts to improve organization effectiveness. They conclude that its validity lies in the application of the scientific method of fact-finding and experimentation to practical problems requiring action solutions. [Refs. 72, pp. 33-34; 8, p. 28; 33, pp. 5-33] The scientific method of data base collection is an orderly process of inquiry and hypotheses testing. It is systematic and methodical. Hence,

OD interventions based on action research are not erratic, random, and capricious. The scientific method inherent in action research lends great strength to OD interventions. Indeed, French and Bell (1973) emphasize the importance of action research by stating: "...Because of the extensive applicability of this model to organization development, another definition of organization development could be organization improvement through action research." [Ref. 26, p. 18]

Successful organization development tends to be a total system effort, a process of planned improvement through constructive management of change. It is aimed at developing the organization's internal resources for effective change in the future. Its real thrusts are for organizational members to draw out and help develop the resources of each other. Furthermore, it is a collaborative process of managing the culture of the organization - not something that is done to somebody, but a transactional process of people working together to improve their mutual effectiveness in attaining their mutual objectives. In this sense, OD is much supportive of the Marine Corps slogan "gung ho" (i.e., working together).

Although OD asserts that to develop or improve an organization is to change it, it does recognize that stability and relative permanence have worth in organizations too. Organization development means examining organizational culture and keeping the good things, modifying some, and

eliminating others. If OD were incorporated into the Marine Corps' leadership training program, it would not represent a cutting loose from tested values and assumptions. However, it would involve a searching look to see which practices and norms are functional and which are not. OD would retain the many features of the Marine Corps which have contributed to its growth, relevance, adaptiveness, and responsiveness. Yet, through investigation and management of Marine Corps' culture, it would eliminate those dysfunctional features which are associated with its present problems and represent sources of vulnerability.

Although other branches of the Armed Forces have utilized various tenets of OD to manage their large, complex structures (particularly the U.S. Navy which funded pioneer OD research in 1947 and currently employs OD techniques in its HRM programs), the Marine Corps has yet to tap the benefits of OD technology. As will be later investigated, many internal factors exist which may perhaps inhibit an active participation in OD programs. However, it is the opinion of this author that if these forces were to be overcome or modified, a carefully tailored OD program developed by people who thoroughly understand the unique needs of the Marine Corps could foster increased esprit d'corps and renewed vitality.

V. INTERNAL MARINE CORPS FACTORS INFLUENCING
THE INTRODUCTION OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT

The germination of any seed into fruition is dependent upon the chemical and biological conditions of the surrounding soil into which it is implanted. Unless provisions exist for adjusting unfavorable balances in acidity or alkalinity, the maturity and growth of the seed will be handicapped. Similarly, the salient features of the institutional climate existing in the Marine Corps must likewise be considered in discussing the feasibility of incorporating organization development techniques into Marine Corps HRM programs. Is the structure and internal culture of the Marine Corps supportive to the introduction of OD? Can OD be grafted onto the existing leadership training program to produce a hybrid program yielding increased fruits in the maximization of manpower potential? What are the forces and attitudes whose presence deters the successful introduction of OD into the Marine Corps? Likewise, in what areas does the Marine Corps represent "fertile ground" for the implanting of OD concepts?

In addressing the primary features of the Marine Corps climate which both foster and deter the introduction of OD efforts, this author is forced to adopt a stance primarily based on personal observation and insight, discussions with serving Marine Corps officers and parties interested in Marine affairs, and informal commentaries. Analysis must

rely on such a non-quantitative, subjective base since existing literature and previous analyses reveal a dearth of documented information regarding the "goodness of fit" between OD and the Marine Corps. Essentially, no previous studies appear to exist which specifically examine the compatibility of OD concepts vis-a-vis internal Marine Corps forces. With this restriction in mind, this author proposes the following:

A. Forces which may facilitate the introduction of OD:

1) Senior Marine Corps leadership - Successful OD efforts necessitate a formal mandate by top leadership. Senior members of an organization's hierarchy must "buy in". Wright (1975) reports experiences which indicate that senior Marine Corps leaders charged with developing effective HRM programs possess "healthy curiosity" for innovative ways to tap personnel commitment. Although they are realist and pragmatically interested in combat effectiveness they appear not to be encumbered by a "longing for the good old days" but realize a need to update the leadership techniques of unit level officers and NCOs. [Ref. 85, p. 1] The successful introduction of OD efforts greatly depend upon the professional support of such senior officers. The incorporation of OD into existing Marine Corps HRM programs would be greatly facilitated if such senior leaders - on the basis of much study and professional reflection - become convinced that OD represents a means of maximizing Marine Corps'

manpower potential while concomitantly reducing sources of Marine Corps vulnerability. Indeed, without the support of innovative leaders who are concerned with the organization's renewed vitality, successful OD programs are not feasible.

2) The Size of the Marine Corps - The Marine Corps is the smallest military component of the Department of Defense. [Ref. 20, p. 4] It consumes fewer material resources and utilizes less manpower than its sister services. In contrast to the other services, the Marine Corps requires fewer supporting elements to facilitate its primary mission. While the other services often appear to possess commands whose existence have only the remotest connection to the fundamental missions of sea control, air superiority, or prosecution of land warfare, the supporting elements in the Marine Corps are usually more directly related to its primary mission. Hence, the Marine Corps has been less forced to erect the complicated chains of command and complex communication channels necessary to integrate and coordinate widely diversified and dissimilar elements. Essentially, a sense of teamwork and common mission seems more prevalent in the Marine Corps than perhaps in the other services. Moreover, because of the small size and flexibility of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps personnel of any one occupational specialty (correspondence clerks, for example) are more likely to find themselves involved in direct combat than their counterparts in associated services. The size of the

Corps and the generally-recognized commonality of purpose among Marines (i.e., riflemen) assist the introduction of OD efforts by providing an arena of shared identity. Since Marines, regardless of particular job assignment, are perhaps more prone to share similar expectations about their fundamental military mission (i.e., combat), OD interventions may generate more immediate results than among military personnel possessing more diverse and alienated senses of identity and expectation.

3) Emphasis on Leadership - The Marine Corps has continually stressed that all personnel in positions of responsibility (both officer and NCO) command through sound leadership techniques in addition to the titular authority invested in their rank. A primary characteristic of effective leadership is the ability to "know your men". By understanding the needs, professional potential, and sources of friction existing among subordinate personnel, a military leader is able to engage in appropriate actions which can greatly enhance performance of mission. Moreover, whenever subordinates realize that their leader is truly interested in their aspirations and personal potentials, it is reasonable to assume that they will be tied to the leader by strengthened bonds of loyalty, trust, and respect. In the climate of the mid-70s, motivation of subordinates is perhaps increasingly dependent on a leader's ability to "know his men" in order to overcome and dissuade the apparent scepticism and distrust that many young enlistees may possess towards figures of



authority. As compared to other managerial techniques, OD is especially supportive of a leader's need to "know his men". Indeed, OD may possibly be the best management tool for enabling a superior to know and understand his subordinates. In its insistence on effective leadership (vice strict reliance on authoritarian dictates as a function of rank) the Marine Corps represents "fertile ground" for the introduction of OD efforts especially tailored and structured for the particular needs of the Corps.

4) The Need to Reduce Dysfunctional Phenomena - The Marine Corps is currently experiencing personnel unrest that increases its vulnerability by eroding its existing assets and marring its image in the complex socio-political arena of Congress. Top leaders must divert critical time and energy in reacting to problematic events and in explaining the Marine Corps' position. As was discussed earlier, the symptoms of this personnel unrest are manifested in low retention rates, high degrees of disciplinary infractions, and negative (although isolated) racial and training incidents that are made "newsworthy" by a sensationalism-hungry press. The current leadership training program required of all marines is a main attempt to stem and alleviate dysfunctional occurrences. However, it appears that the conduct and focus of the leadership training program may not be sufficient to overcome the several sources of Marine Corps vulnerability. Although the present program is a sincere effort to address the causes of personnel unrest, it may

not be sufficient - especially in the vital area of providing the local commander with "inside" information concerning potential or impending conflict situations. Without this advanced insight, the commander is forced to react ex post facto and is handicapped in instituting pertinent proactive measures to "defuse" the situation. OD, however, attempts to open the channels of communication. It allows information to flow both "upwards" and "down". Hence, if certain aspects of OD were carefully incorporated into the existing leadership training program, the commander would possess a vehicle by which he could positively manage, direct, and preempt festering sources of strife. The leadership training program could possibly be strengthened and made more effective by the dovetailing of selective OD techniques.

B. Forces Which May Deter The Introduction of OD:

1) Tendency to adhere to traditional leadership - The Marine Corps is, above all, a combat organization. Combat success is usually dependent upon strict obedience and firm compliance to the orders of field commanders. Furthermore, the increasing complexity of modern combat demands tight coordination between associated fighting elements. The documented history of Marine Corps campaigns reveals that combat success has been facilitated by strict obedience to the dictates of superiors. In the "heat of combat", a fighting man must be willing to lay down his life if the success of his unit's mission so demands. Under these conditions, traditional leadership has usually proven



effective. Consequently, Marine Corps leaders are reluctant to depart from such time-tested leadership styles. Moreover, combat success is enhanced by stressful, realistic training which also incorporates traditional leadership.

This belief in the "bottom-line" effectiveness of traditional leadership appears to not only determine the actual conduct of combat but also colors the planning of combat operations. Because a leader must live with his decisions, combat planning is frequently restricted to his own professional expertise and the input of his staff officers. This is quite often the case regardless of obvious dysfunctions associated with it: Superiors plan while subordinates execute. Although Marine Corps history reveals organizations like Carlson's Raiders who actively sought wide-spread input from subordinates in collaborative pre-combat planning, such fighting units were unique: they were not specifically fixed in organization structure and material assets; they tailored their resources to each individual operation; and they disbanded their men/material mix upon completion of the operation. The organizational flexibility of Carlson's Raiders allowed them to practice project management with a high degree of success. Yet, there were attendant complaints that Carlson's Raiders stripped associated units of their best leaders. The majority of today's Marine units are so constructed as to disallow such free and random interchange of personnel talents and material assets. Although supporting and augmenting resources are exchanged between units according



to particular missions, the high degree to which Carlson's Raiders interchanged specific assets is lacking.

The preference for traditional leadership which seems to exist in the Marine Corps is perhaps based on a desire to maintain tightness of control. Unit leaders appear to feel anxiety that more collaborative methods will somehow undermine their position and loosen their grip on unit operations. Since leaders are held accountable for the success of their organizations, they frequently tend to consider their units "my" battalion, "my" company, etc. and consequently fear leadership methods which they perceive as threatening to their personal control. Moreover, the syndrome appears to exist (especially among less experienced officers) that a military officer is a "leader" and not a "manager"; a "leader" makes decisions while a "manager" places his imprimatur on group decisions made for him. Although this perception is erroneous, the syndrome that a leader personally controls and solely directs does appear to exist. Consequently, leaders are often hesitant to solicit unit-wide input for fear of arousing suspicions of "uncertainty", "weakness", and lack of "professional knowledge".

There appears to be a tendency for traditional leadership to deteriorate into authoritarian leadership. The Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps has commented:



"There is a contagious disease evident within our ranks that has infected some of our leaders, both officer and enlisted. It needs curing. I call it, "DI Syndrome." Some of the symptoms are:

The exclusive use of authoritarian leadership techniques by an officer, staff NCO or NCO to accomplish tasks assigned. If questioned by a subordinate why a task has to be accomplished, they answer, 'Because I say so,' and point to their rank insignia.

Giving subordinates the impression that the superior is a mean person, not to be bothered with petty problems.

The use of ridicule to correct subordinates for their mistakes.

The use of mass punishment for the mistakes of a few." [Ref. 38, p. 14]

The Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps goes on to point out that while some effective leaders can use authoritarian methods, they are rare. Rather, authoritarian leadership generally leads to "a loss of respect and alienation of subordinates." [Ref. 38, p. 14] Espirit d'corps is undermined. He continues by stating:

"Authoritarian leaders are not certain of the degree of control they will be able to retain over subordinates, if they release any control in the decision making process to subordinates. Their security is threatened. They must retain control for themselves. Persuasive leaders, on the other hand, involve their Marines in the decision making process, asking their advice, but retaining the final decision for themselves." [Ref. 38, p. 15]

Traditional and authoritarian leadership is not supportive of successful OD efforts. While they tend to view people in terms of McGregor's Theory X (i.e., people need direction and coercion to insure organizational



efficiency), OD views people in terms of Theory Y (i.e., people have valuable contributions to make and do desire to improve themselves and their work). [Ref. 58, Ch. 1-4] The philosophical premises of traditional and authoritarian leadership would tend to resist (and possibly prohibit) effective OD interventions.

2) Organizational Structure - Although it is the smallest of the major Armed Forces, the Marine Corps must still coordinate the efforts and assure communications between numerous, complex elements in order to accomplish its primary mission. To interface its component units, the Marine Corps is organized as a hierarchical bureaucracy. The chain of command is firmly delineated and its employment is emphasized to insure coordination of effort. The management of the Marine bureaucratic structure appears to be heavily influenced by the methods and philosophies of scientific management which Basil and Cook (1974) define to be: central emphasis on efficiency; task specialization and task interrelationships; the motivational devices of extrinsic rewards such as income and status; and the structured and systematic form of rationality for organization control. [Ref. 6, p. 61]

Promotions within this hierarchy are a function of merit, past accomplishments, and seniority. Formal authority is a function of rank. Command positions are sought and coveted as career-enhancing. Command success

is based upon the formal criterion of accomplishment of mission. However, it appears to be simultaneously influenced by the informal criterion of favorable interactions with reporting seniors. These favorable interactions with reporting seniors may sometimes take the form of easing the anxieties of seniors by assuring them that events are "on track" and "under control". Consequently, commanders may tend to tell their superiors what they want to hear instead of revealing harsh reality. Although this is contrary to official policy and professional integrity, human nature is predictable to the extent that men will tend to act in what they perceive to be their best interests. Therefore, it appears reasonable to conclude that commanders may be tempted to emphasize the positive aspects of their organizations while omitting unfavorable information. Due to the competition for advancement, commanders may be reluctant to "upset" their reporting seniors by disclosing negative events that they themselves can later reconcile "in house" or which may somehow disappear on their own accord. OD interventions would be handicapped due to such pressures which tend to promote the absence of valid, candid feedback.

Marine officers are rewarded on the basis of relatively short term assignments. Consequently, there may be a reluctance to "rock the boat" and a tendency to continue with the existing status quo provided it is not too dysfunctional. Leaders often seem more willing to react to



crises than to undertake proactive measures that are often difficult, time consuming, and uncertain in outcome. Perhaps this is because leaders view organizational conflict as unhealthy, a personal embarrassment, and reflective of leadership failure. OD efforts are not receptive to an atmosphere which seeks to avoid conflict and views it as an organization "ill". Successful OD programs depend upon an open recognition of conflict as unavoidable in organizational life and a desire to positively manage conflict situations.

The rank structure of the Marine Corps hierarchy can also deter the successful introduction of OD. Rank generally determines position of authority. In particular, a commander's interest in OD may be frustrated by lower level leaders who are resistant to the philosophies of OD. Due to personnel shortages, administrative/legal restrictions, and the relative inflexibility of the rank structure, a commander may be forced to "make do" with subordinate leaders who are opposed to OD. It is usually impossible to immediately "fire" such leaders, demote them in rank, and promote OD-supporting personnel to replace them.

3) Resource Constraints - As opposed to the other Armed Services, the Marine Corps incorporates fewer supporting, administrative, and logistical organizations. There is a relatively short "body" between its "teeth" and its "tail". The Marine Corps is perhaps more restricted than the other services by resource constraints. The Corps has always emphasized the frugality of its operations. Hence, the



introduction of wide-spread OD efforts would be severely limited by resource constraints. Moreover, the Marine Corps probably lacks personnel expertise in OD methods; there are few serving officers and NCOs who could organize, implement, and monitor an OD program. Simultaneously, current budgetary constraints would hinder the employment of external OD consultants.

4) The Concept of the Marine Corps as a "Being" - OD practitioners advocate that an organization's strength and vitality is increased by tapping the commitment of personnel through a process of conflict management. Individual goals are not seen as subservient to organization goals. In this sense, the organization is seen as a creature of the individuals within it. Yet, there appears to be a tendency in the Marine Corps to view the Corps as separate and discrete from the individuals within it. The Marine Corps is possibly seen as an "organizational being" which is "alive" in itself. The Corps is an image which every Marine must strive to meet. Marine Corps traditions and heritage may tend to further anthropomorphize the organization. There is a popular conception that this "organizational being" is composed of the spirit and values of such former Marines as "Chesty" Puller, Archibald Henderson, H.M. Smith, etc. The individual Marine of today - whether he be from the ghetto or the farm - is expected to live up to the tradition of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps was "alive" before



this current generation of Marines and will continue to "life" after their departure. Although it is realized that the Corps' combat effectiveness fully depends upon the prowess and skill of the individual marine, the Corps is looked on as "more" than the sum of its components. This syndrome holds the Corps up as an ideal to which every Marine should try to ascribe. It represents a binding force and has facilitated esprit d'corps.

There appears to be a deep belief in the Marine Corps that Marines are the repository of traditional military values. The Corps cherishes that it symbolizes all that's best in soldierly virtues: loyalty, strict obedience, discipline, and the necessity to subjugate oneself to the "greater whole". It may be speculated that many career Marines look upon the Corps as a "calling" or a vocation instead of merely a profession. This philosophy of "true believing" demands external symbols as proof of inner commitment: short hair acting as a surrogate tonsure; precise tailoring and wearing of the uniform; strict standards of weight control and physical fitness; and subjugation of many personal mannerisms while in uniform. These external symbols are generally enforced under threat of personal censure.

OD intervention would be frustrated by the existence of such a culture that would view the organization and its members as separate "individuals" and elevate the organization as a "greater being". Moreover, OD efforts



would be handicapped to the degree that leaders emphasized the separation of individual goals and organizational goals. However, this author wonders if today's young Marine (the product of his external society) is fully willing to "buy into" this possible internal culture? Are Junior Marines willing to replace their individual expectations for the goals of the organization? Are they content to be passive followers amenable to traditional or authoritarian leadership? Perhaps today's personnel turmoil and disciplinary problems indicate a "no" response. If this is indeed the case, and if the current leadership training program proves unable to resolve the Corps' personnel problems, then carefully-tailored OD efforts (despite the forces mitigating against it) may prove to be the "only horse in the barn".

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION AND RESEARCH

It is the conclusion of this author that OD as presently practiced in industrial settings and academic laboratory environments would not be feasible in the Marine Corps. Indeed, this author believes, the transposition of such methods onto the existing leadership training program could result in dysfunctional and counterproductive effects. Aside from the cultural and structural forces currently mitigating against "textbook" OD in the Marine Corps, this author proposes that civilian-oriented OD programs would primarily fail due to the fundamental mission of the Marine Corps: The Marine Corps is a combat-oriented organization which (unlike other services which allow cadres of virtually non-combatant personnel) requires that every man possess the capacity to fight. While OD efforts as generally practiced in civilian settings encourage open discussion of conflict and actively strive towards collaborative management, the combat mission of the Marine Corps necessitates that strict traditional leadership methods be ever present. While the Marine Corps could possibly cultivate a thin, temporary veneer of collaborative leadership, the pressures, uncertainties, and frequent chaos of combat situations seem to require that traditional leadership remain closely beneath such a surface. Moreover, combat success demands strict obedience to orders and allows neither time

nor resources to manage inter-unit conflict. Civilian-oriented OD methods would not meet these realities of the Marine Corps. However, this author believes, while "textbook" OD could not be employed carte blanche, OD theory does contain an important concept which would be beneficial to the Marine Corps: opening and expanding increased channels of effective communication. Although this is but one of many OD concepts, this author believes that it is the most feasible and beneficial one given the realities of the Corps' mission, culture, and resource constraints.

In order to upgrade and improve channels of communication both vertically and horizontally within the Marine Corps, the author recommends that the existing leadership training program be modified in the following ways:

A. Group discussion leaders should be assigned their responsibilities as a full-time duty. At the present, group discussion leaders engage in this important work as a secondary duty. Since their military advancement chiefly depends upon their quality performance in their primary duties, there may be a high probability that group discussion leaders devote the majority of their time, attention, and effort to their primary duties. Consequently, their tasks as discussion leaders may only be addressed as "time permits" or as an "afterthought" to their primary duty. Under these circumstances the quality of the leadership training program will probably suffer since its success is greatly dependent upon the skill and interest of the discussion leaders.

B. The leadership training program should be amended to allow fuller discussion of local problematic issues. As presently conducted, the leadership training program tends to skirt personnel conflicts and avoid local problems. As one Marine Corps officer commented:

"... leadership taught to Marines today is concerned with traits and principles. What is not being taught are human behavior skills essential for successful interpersonal relationships ... in order to better understand people and to supervise effectively, we must know the needs and goals of men ... a leader must understand the various needs and goals of men ... a leader must understand the various needs that people have in order to predict their behavior in various situations ..." [Ref. 56, p. 36]

This author believes that subordinate personnel would be increasingly receptive to the leadership training program if they saw it as a vehicle for expressing and addressing local needs and problems. Indeed, perhaps many Marines are "turned off" by the seemingly deliberate avoidance of local issues and conditions. They may possibly see the current program as "hypocritical" and "less than honest" by its ostensive refusal to deal directly with immediate leadership concerns. For example, the nineteen year old Lance Corporal may be more interested in his perceived grievances and misunderstandings relating to his platoon sergeant than in the phenomenon of Communism. Consequently, this author believes that when local problems are displaced with subjects not immediately relevant to local leadership conflicts, many Marines receive little benefit from the program and merely "go through the motions".

This author believes that if the leadership training program did reserve at least one day of discussion to address local problems, inter-organizational channels of communications would be improved. Both superiors and subordinates would gain increased awareness of potentially crippling problems. Through frank communication and open feedback, many embarrassing or dysfunctional events could be avoided. Although many problems surfaced during the discussion could be beyond the ability of the local command to resolve, a significant number could be locally remedied. Moreover, the fact that Marines perceive that the Command is truly interested in sources of local conflict (and does not merely wish that they disappear) could in itself be a source of positive motivation.

C. To open channels of communication via frank discussion of local unit problems would require skillful management by carefully trained discussion leaders. Since the majority of discussion leaders are trained at LID, Quantico, this author recommends that members of LID's faculty receive training in the normaltive-re-educative model of OD with particular concentration on conflict resolution and team-building activities. This author suggests that the proper source of this training should be in the human resources management curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Unlike civilian institutions, NPS is able to provide more practical and functional guidance in the application of these techniques to a strictly military environment. LID

faculty so trained could subsequently instruct and assist discussion leaders in the effective management of local problem resolution.

This author realizes that direct discussion of local unit conflicts through the employment of full-time discussion leaders carefully trained in specific aspects of OD is but a modest introduction of OD efforts. However, this author believes, a limited and specifically tailored introduction of OD which seeks to explore the sources of local conflict is the only feasible way of gaining the potential benefits of OD. Yet, even this small introduction of OD will be doomed to failure unless commanders fully support and actively assist their discussion leaders.

Clearly, much more study and research is needed to develop and implement this framework proposed by this author. However, this author firmly believes that the team-building and conflict-resolving techniques of OD can result in great potential benefit to the Marine Corps not only on the micro-level but also on the macro-level (as, for example, in enhancing communications and mutual support between dissimilar tenant activities sharing a common installation.) The esprit d'corps and personnel commitment that promote combat effectiveness can be strengthened by such limited OD efforts specifically tailored to the unique needs of the Marine Corps. Probably the most positive by-product that could emerge would be upgraded self-esteem for both officers and enlisted men and a greater degree of trust and comradeship

between superiors and the men they command. This, after all, is what esprit d'corps means lest it be reduced to a meaningless cliché.



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