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DIPLOMATIC TRANSACTIONS

IN

CENTRAL ASIA,

FROM 1834 TO 1839.

“ The Olynthians could mention many Things now, which,
had they known in Time, their State
had not perished.”

By (Lingard)

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MDCCCXLI.

242845*

TO DAVID URQUHART, ESQ.

&c. &c. &c.

Glasgow, 20th August, 1839.

SIR,

From your intimate acquaintance with the affairs of Turkey and the East, we would feel greatly obliged by your giving us your opinion on our commercial and political relations in that quarter of the world, and particularly on the correspondence laid before Parliament relative to Affghanistan and Persia.

We make this request from the impossibility of attaining elsewhere this knowledge, and from a consideration of the importance to the commercial communities of being possessed of this information, derived from one so eminently qualified for so laborious and intricate an investigation.

We are, Sir, your most obedient humble Servants,

(Signed) JAMES FINLAY and Co.
BUCHANAN, HAMILTON, and Co.
HY. MONTEITH and Co.
and forty-seven other Commercial Houses.

TO JAMES FINLAY AND Co., &c., GLASGOW.

Bittern Manor, October 16, 1839.

GENTLEMEN,

It was my intention to have transmitted to you my reply to the letter you have done me the honour of addressing me, together with an exposition of the diplomatic transactions between Great Britain, Persia, and Russia.

In the execution of this task I have unfortunately been delayed by other occupations, as also by the weak state of my health.

I therefore address to you the present letter, fearful lest this delay might in any way be misunderstood, and anxious to convey to you my sense of the responsibility which you have imposed upon me by the request which you have addressed to me.

As some time must still elapse before I am enabled to transmit to you my opinions upon this matter in an extended shape, you will perhaps allow me to offer you a few considerations upon the subject.

The conclusion to which I have come, after a minute investigation of these documents, is this—that the policy and alliances of the Indian Government previously to the invasion of Affghanistan, have been exactly the reverse of what they ought to have been, and exactly such as Russia would have desired—that the previous policy of the British Government, in regard to Persia, was exactly the reverse of that which should have been adopted, and exactly such as Russia would have desired—that the defence of the Affghans against the injustice of the Seiks was the only policy of the Indian Government—that the defence of Persia against the violence of Russia was the only policy of the Government of Great Britain—that the alliance of the Indian Government with the Seiks—that the alliance of the English Government with the Russians—imposed on us the duty of arresting their encroachments, or of separating ourselves from their alliance; that remaining the ally of the aggressive Seik, and of the aggressive Russian, England became a party to the aggressions of both, and thereby the enemy of Affghanistan and of Persia. That the only object of England in Central Asia was the elevation of barriers against the encroachments of any European power,

and consisted in the strengthening of the power and the maintenance of the independence of the Persians and of the Affghans, and the binding of those people to herself—that her alliance with the Seiks and with the Russians has introduced a *de facto* policy, the very reverse of the nominal policy assumed in England to be pursued—that the *de facto* policy pursued in the East, and not the nominal policy assumed in England, has been that which has produced results—that the results are, hostility of the Affghans and of the Persians to Great Britain—the combination of those two nations against us, and ultimately the placing of the resources of those two nations at the disposal of Russia, for the purpose of dismembering our Indian Empire.

On the consequent defection of Persia and Affghanistan, the Indian Government is alarmed, and proceeds to take measures to avert the danger.

These measures, so adopted, were unjust, and had they been just, they were the most inexpedient that could have been devised. The attack of Affghanistan was warranted by no act of aggression. The setting up of a Pretender would have been unjust had the war been legitimate. The ruler they undertook to overthrow was the best instrument they could have found. Having, by the alliance with the Seiks, brought the influence of Russia to the banks of the Indus, the war which they undertook as a means of arresting that Russian influence had only the effect of uniting the spirit of Affghanistan with that of Persia, and of bringing the power of England so near to the Russian frontiers as to give Russia means of striking it a deadly blow with so much the less trouble and so much the more effect.

The diplomatic correspondence between England and Persia, and the subsequent explanations between England and the Court of St. Petersburg, lead me to the following conclusions :

That England, having admitted from the year 1834 a unity of intentions and a concert of policy with Russia in regard to Persia, had at once transferred her power to Russia, and deprived Persia of every shadow of independence—that the subsequent action of England upon Persia of necessity became conducive to the ends of Russia—that the present King of Persia felt that he owed to Russia the support of England for his establishment on the throne—that the Foreign Minister not merely tacitly sanctioned, but directly encouraged, the prosecution by Persia of Eastern projects of conquest under the impulse of Russia—that he further confirmed Persia in that line by

breaking with her on the grounds of her connection with Russia—that he counteracted the effect of the remonstrances of the British Envoy in Persia, by not acting upon the representations and the proofs sent home by that Envoy respecting the avowed hostility of Russia to Great Britain—that he disguised this collusion from the British Parliament and nation by an ostensible reproduction of the statements of the British Envoy in Persia, as by an apparent demand of satisfaction from the Russian Cabinet, that he neutralized the effect of this step on Russia by accepting, as a reply to it, an anterior communication from the Russian Government—that he admitted, as a satisfactory reply, a document which contained no refutation of the alleged facts, and no reparation for the established injuries—consequently, that the Foreign Minister, throughout this transaction, acted collusively with Russia to establish her supremacy in Persia, and to misrepresent the facts to the British nation.

But the power of Russia to assail India, as of England to defend India against Russia, is to be estimated and found in relative strength of both in Europe.

If the Foreign Minister has criminally sought to destroy the influence of England in Persia for the gain of Russia, he must have sought to attain the same end by the other means equally at his disposal; he must have laboured to destroy the influence of England in Europe, to make states and nations her enemies: this was more important towards the subjugation of India than the placing of Persia at the disposal of Russia.

The Foreign Minister has equally lent his support to Russia in Turkey as in Persia, and thereby Russia approaches to the possession of that empire—he has created grounds of hostility in regard to the boundary question between the United States and Great Britain, opening up the chances of war with the United States, and increasing the internal commotions of our American possessions; thereby weakening England as against the world, and drawing away resources from the defence of India by the dangers in North America. Prussia has been allowed to establish commercial controul over Germany, which gives her a future interest of a commercial character in the exclusion, by Russia, of British commerce from the East. France has been suffered to proceed in a policy of aggression, which prepares her for future hostility with England, and has been supported in this scheme by the Foreign Minister.

Pretexts have been afforded by the Foreign Minister for naval armaments by other powers. FLEETS have been commissioned in profound peace, and have been suffered by

the Foreign Minister without remonstrance, or with remonstrances which, having been made without effect, have only served to confirm what the Minister pretended to oppose.

The result, I anticipate, unless another spirit is awakened in this country, and another policy pursued, *is the loss of India*; and with it the general dismemberment of empire, and the fall of Britain.

I have the honour to be,

GENTLEMEN,

Your obedient humble servant,

DAVID URQUHART.



P R E F A C E.

Paris, October 1840.

THIS analysis, written in October 1839, was partly published in the *Glasgow Herald*, between December 1839, and April 1840. It has been reprinted, during my absence from England, and without my knowledge; and the latter parts, which had not appeared, I have had to furnish nearly as originally sketched—not having the opportunity of reference either to documents or to notes.

The interval of twelve months has now been given to judge of the events, and for the production of other expositions of the subject. In revising my own conclusions with the benefit of these lights, I find that I have nothing to alter and nothing to reply to. The only objection to my knowledge that has been made to any of the statements in this volume has reference to the letter of condolence sent by the Russian Minister in Persia to the Shah, on the death of Abbas Meerza. It has been denied that that letter contained any allusion to Mahmoud Meerza's successor*, on the authority of the English Envoy, who had obtained a sight of the original, and did not find in it any such allusion. My statement with respect to the contents of the letter was made, of course, on hearsay, and it is only given as such; and that hearsay is as important as the fact in its bearing upon the argument. I may add, that my information was from a *Russian source*.

I have hazarded the supposition that the expedition for the establishment of Shah Shooja upon the throne of Cabul, was brought about by the direct influence of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. I was led to that supposition by knowledge of the repugnance of the Indian Government, so late as April 1837, to that expedition, and by the conviction, then entertained and expressed by the Indian Government, that its discouragement of the projects of Shah Shooja would operate in favour of British

* See page 38.

interests : and I therefore felt that Lord Palmerston must have intervened to bring it about in a manner too direct for his influence to have escaped observation. I have since learnt that this is the case, and that the instructions which determined the expedition had been sent at the suggestion of the Foreign Office, direct from the Board of Control to the Governor-General, without communicating them to the Board of Directors, in violation, consequently (if this report is grounded), of the authority under which, by Act of Parliament, the Board of Control is constituted, and the Governor-General holds his post.

In Parliament, nothing has taken place bearing on these transactions. The vote of thanks to the Commander-in-Chief and the Army which crossed the Indus, led to no discussion beyond that of precedents as to the mode of conveying public acknowledgments for military service ! The leader of the Opposition declared, indeed, that he reserved his opinion upon the political merits of the transaction—until he had an opportunity of seeing the accounts !

In France and in Germany some valuable papers have appeared on Indian affairs, and in the latter country even some attempts to analyse the Parliamentary papers. From the Indian press two valuable pamphlets have issued from the pen of Colonel Caulfield. They bear exclusively upon the Seik and Affghan portion of the question, and corroborate the view here given on these matters.

In the periodical literature of our own country two essays alone have appeared, both of them currently reported to be from the pen of Sir John M^cNeill. The first appeared in the *Quarterly Review*, of June 1839 ; the latter has appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* for July 1840. Both articles are formal defences of the conduct of the Government, and justify the assault upon Affghanistan, and the abandonment of and subsequent rupture with Persia on the necessity of resisting the hostile progress of Russia. Persia is stated as being incapable of resistance to Russia ; Central Asia is represented as having fallen under her sway, and the expeditionary movements into Cabul and Kandahar are represented as triumphs, because they had displaced the influence of Russia, and arrested her practical progress in these regions, and the extension of her disorganizing power into the centre of Hindostan. In the first of these articles Russia is represented as a Power whom no foreign Government can trust ; and yet it is stated that Lord Palmerston does trust in Russia. That article, moreover, appeared at

the time that Lord Palmerston *assumed* a French alliance as against Russia, and exhibited strong personal antipathy to Russia. The article of the *Edinburgh Review*, of 1840, allows no shadow of reproach to rest upon Lord Palmerston, and still represents all his acts as dictated by the necessity of opposing Russia, admits no trust in her on his part, and justifies the policy pursued on the grounds of its mistrustfulness of Russia. A fortnight after the article appeared, the Treaty of the 15th July was signed, and the grounds of Lord Palmerston's defence, supposing it had been a defence, became by that act grounds of condemnation.

The readers of that article have been, no doubt, satisfied that the ambition of Russia explained the invasion of Cabul. The same readers, when it has been explained to them that the reason of the Alliance of the 15th July is the absence of ambition in Russia, and the presence of ambition in France, have been equally satisfied; and those same readers, six months ago, approved of the submission of England to the blockades of Mexico and Buenos Ayres, because they were told that the friendship of France was too valuable to be endangered by any minor differences. Thus, by accumulating upon a nation events which are incomprehensible to it, does its mind become unfit for the performance of any public duty, or the comprehension of any fact.

To-day that there is a public alliance of England and Russia against France, the reader, influenced unconsciously by the new position in which things are placed, has lost the consciousness of the intention of deception which must have come home to him on discovering collusion between the British Minister and a power to whom we were publicly opposed. Wherever, therefore, the words "union with Russia" occur, they conveyed, at the time when written, a very different sense from that which they convey subsequently to the Treaty of the 15th July. The growing suspicions with respect to the Foreign Minister rendered it necessary, to bring about an ostensible alliance between England and Russia, because, while a simulated disunion between the two countries existed, the support which Lord Palmerston received from Russia became dangerous. But when the nation is as it were suddenly turned round, and the habit comes of talking of Russia as an ally, and danger imposes upon us the necessity of looking to her as a protector, then vanishes at once the idea of guilt in regard to the secret collusion with her of the Foreign Minister, and then comes the support which she affords to him to be given as it were to England, and received by him, not as against England, but for the public benefit.

I may take this opportunity of replying to some objections which I find constantly reproduced. It is said, “ You seek to prove too much in showing Russia’s hand every where, and you do harm and not good in charging the Foreign Minister with *treason*; if you charged him with incapacity and ignorance, you would get more to believe you, and might sooner bring about a change.” It is not in my power to alter my conclusions; and conclusions such as mine, it is not in my power to withhold. If I saw only that which others see, it would be needless for me to speak. If the hand of Russia were not wherever there is a British interest to frustrate, and a Russian interest to advance—and that is *everywhere*—there would be no danger to England, because there would be no system in Russia. To charge Lord Palmerston with incapacity, where I am convinced that there is crime, would be to screen that crime, and to become a sharer in the guilt.

It is then objected, “ You serve Russia by exhibiting her in a light which is extravagant—you strengthen Lord Palmerston by an accusation which is incredible; by spreading visionary alarms, you render men heedless of real dangers, and by accusing of atrocious crime, they become careless of real offences.”

Such reasoning amounts to this, “ We are unable to say whether you are right or wrong, and we wish to be spared the trouble of inquiring; we care not that charges and statements remain uninvestigated, since they refer to weighty and important matters. If you told us what we already believe, or repeated things by no means alarming, then should we be attentive and pleased.”

It is doubtless true, that amongst the men where such objections can be made—revelation of danger may not bring security—exposure of guilt may only strengthen crime. Is it he who asserts that which is alarming—or those who neglect to ascertain whether the alarm or the crime be visionary or real, that are worthy of reproach? Whoever, being unable to refute, is negligent in investigating such a charge, is a dishonest man and a bad citizen—whoever suppresses his conviction, or shrinks from any labour or any responsibility in rendering those convictions effective, is an accomplice.

IN the "PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS," written in the month of October 1839, I have exhibited France as engaged in schemes of Indian conquest in common with Russia. The recent rupture between Russia and France will appear at first sight to be in contradiction with such an opinion. I have stated that schemes of Indian conquest animated the French Cabinet—not that they were known to the French nation. If such was the case, it will be asked, "How is it that Russia now unites with England against France?" I shall endeavour to answer that question.

Russia seeks, as she can only attain supremacy in Europe and in Asia, by the separation of France and England, by mutual wrong and by common suspicions she seeks to render them both progressively hostile to each other, and prepares for herself the power of uniting with each against the other, so as to be able to coalesce with either, and to be opposed to either; and if now she enters upon an alliance against France with England, from the moment that France is humbled and broken you will see her again join France against England—to come back again and join an English alliance. This process will be continued, first in peace and then in war, till Europe is tamed and exhausted.

In 1823, the policy of the French Cabinet (see "the Congress of Verona," of M. Chateaubriand,) was constituted upon the basis of union with Russia against England, with the ultimate end of destroying the Treaties of 1815, and concurring with Russia in her projects of partition of the Ottoman Empire. In 1828, it was through France that Austria was prevented from gaining the co-operation of England in resisting the aggressions of Russia upon Turkey. In 1830, Russia made the formal proposition to France of a secret alliance for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, by which France was to have a portion of that empire, and also the frontiers of the Rhine, together with Belgium. The Revolution of July alone destroyed that compact after it had been adjusted.

At the very time that the preliminary observations to this work were written, had Russia obtained from a French Minister, devoted to her interests (Count Molé), a proposition to her of a similar nature, which she did not reply to, intending to make use of that proposition to support Lord Palmerston in prosecuting the Treaty of the 15th

of July, by which England should herself be made a party to the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and to the Eastern ambition of Russia. The proposition of France was furnished to Lord Palmerston as secret and authoritative documents, to show to two or three leading men in his own country, enabling him thereby to justify his union to Russia, and that therefore it was a patriotic and not a traitorous proposition on his part to unite with that same power.

Shortly afterwards, however, a Minister favourable to an alliance with England came to the possession of power in France. He took office on the express condition of such an alliance, and committed himself in face of his nation against Russia and to England. That, therefore, was the moment chosen for a rupture between England and France, to make England the instrument for the destruction of her friends and for their conversion into foes*.

Count Molé's propositions to Russia were not, of course, a project standing by itself. It must have arisen out of general considerations of policy, and out of a common tendency and common objects in the two Cabinets. Must not these projects and these designs have borne upon India? and must they not have been of the character which is sketched in the introductory chapter, and which I need not again repeat?

In furtherance of the same projects was a splendid Embassy sent from France to Persia, an Embassy recalling that former Embassy of France to Persia in 1807, which was equally founded on the common design of Russia and France to subjugate India. You now hear of that Embassy's failure, and of its retreat. The French Government, having furnished to Russia the pretext she wanted against England, then had to be beaten back; and England, after being awakened to alarms for France, was now to be warmed into gratitude for Russia. Thus by the same blow turning each against the other, and bringing both round to herself.

* "England, it seems, has the habit of mistaking friends for foes, and the faculty of converting the former into the latter."—*Words of the Minister of another State—a friend to England, and persecuted by her.*

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The “ *Exposition of the Boundary Differences between Great Britain and the United States,*” will be found a useful Introduction to this Analysis.

A copy of the “ *Correspondence relative to Persia and Affghanistan,*” presented by the Foreign Office, is necessary for reference in perusing this volume.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

DISPOSITIONS AND POLICY OF THE POWERS OF EUROPE TOWARDS INDIA.

WE are informed that Peter the First directed his eyes towards India with the view of securing to Russia the transit commerce of Asia ; but while looking to the commerce of the East, he did not neglect higher, and more valuable, and more easy acquisitions. The fact and mode of his assault upon Persia—the alliances which (while Moscow was his capital, and his subjects did not number 20,000,000,) he formed in Central Asia, and more especially with the Affghans, and the means conceived, employed, and perfected at that early period to mislead the Cabinets of Europe, and through them to paralyze the action of Turkey—reveal thoughts as much beyond the grasp of the present age as of that in which he lived. Such men have no interpreters, and the history of Russia will only be written when a greater than Peter becomes its historian. Then only will be given to the admiration of Europe the picture of the early germ of those conceptions by which he made his people great. It will only be when its mighty destinies are accomplished—when Calcutta and Constantinople, when Alexandria and Delhi, and other cities scarcely less famed than these, become the eyries of the Imperial Eagle, that will be understood what bourn the genius of Peter gave to his empire, and what toils he bequeathed to the devotion of his successors.

But a Turkish slave arose in Central Asia, with a mind not unequally matched to his. The spirit of Russia overawed—for once retreated—Persia revived—the Caucasus became the barrier once more to the teeming North—

Turkey was saved from co-operation in an Eastern partition, and the balance of the European and the Asiatic world was restored. But Nadir Shah, while he repelled Russia westward, and saved Delhi from a European spoiler, himself seized that gorgeous plunder ; but unable to retain his conquest, he departed and left behind him an empire broken and prostrate, the government powerless to reign, the people incapable of revolt. Hindostan deplored the “ avenger’s ” retreat rather than his approach.

The maritime nations of the West had already found a footing on its coasts. They now ventured encroachment upon its territories. These European merchants asserted rival dominions, and struggled for divided sovereignty in the patrimony of Baber, Akber, and Arungzebe, and after carrying the animosities and the struggles of Europe to the Coast of Coromandel, and to the plains of Arcot, carried back the animosities of their Indian strife, to agitate not only the Councils of Europe, but to call forth against their brothers the tomahawk of the Indian, and to startle with the sounds of discord the banks of the Mississippi and the St. Lawrence.

In modern Europe, Russia was the first to conceive the project of a conquest of India. One hundred and twenty years ago, mistress of one-half of Persia, and bound in a bond of common injustice with the Affghans and the Ottoman empire, she felt that conquest almost within her grasp. A sudden development of national spirit in Persia, arrested her design. France then succeeded to her ambitious thoughts, and in the cabinet of Versailles, while at peace with England and at peace with the Mogul empire, was planned the project of the expulsion of the English from Hindostan, and an invasion of the Mogul territories. England then, and only then, aroused by the attempt of the French to tax the orchard and the fields of the English merchants, entered upon a competition for the Indian empire. Mistress *then* at sea, she of course triumphed ; and succeeding to the power and the authority of her rivals, she was surprised to find herself an Eastern sovereign. For twenty years she struggled to resist the belief, and to repudiate the designation of the power she had won unconsciously and unwillingly, by accident and by insubordination.

Such and so different in character are the three nations who then stood, and who now stand, in a position to aim at, or to defend the sovereignty of India.

Nations have oft times been unjust—they have at intervals waged aggressive wars, and at others assumed the mask of delusive peace. To Russia, acquisition is an occupation as continuous and familiar as to the labourer the gain of his daily bread. For this end, systematic deception practised on the Powers of Europe and of Asia was the strength on which she could rely; but powerful aggressive means were requisite even for the purposes of that deception. The creation of a maritime force far beyond any necessities arising out of her own state, placed her in a position of rivalry with Great Britain, with whom collision was the inevitable result of extension eastward. Friendly as has been the bearing of England to Russia, every object which the latter has aimed at has been sought and attained in opposition to the interests, and most of them to the intentions, of Great Britain. In the wide circle of affairs controlled by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, in the large sphere of interests of which the centre is the British Crown, there is no point at which the two systems meet where they are not opposed—there is no case of opposition that does not spring from the desire of Russia to gain what is unjust, and from her consciousness that England will not oppose her; thus has England remained ignorant of this position of hostility of Russia to herself; because Russia has advanced cautiously, and step by step, in proportion to the progressing demoralization of the English people, who, ceasing to understand their own rights, or to defend their own property, are necessarily ignorant alike of the fact of trespass, and of the intention of injury.

But these Powers could not stand in this position of permanent and universal hostility, without their relative means of coercion becoming an object of profound consideration to every foreign Government and people;—and it has been generally felt, and universally admitted, that effective means of coercion were possessed by Great Britain over Russia. England, by a single commercial regulation, being able to convulse the whole internal state of Russia. The indication, therefore, of an intention on the part of Great Britain to use this power, necessarily rendered the policy of the Russian Government subservient to that of Great Britain.

It has been supposed by some of those who are best acquainted with the relative positions of the two countries, that the real source of the designs of Russia against India, as of the efforts she has recently made to approach

that country, is her dread of this commercial control possessed over her by Great Britain; and that she, therefore, seeks, and has sought, to place herself in an attitude of menace in India, as a counter-check over the Government of England, so that if England should say to Russia, “your finances and internal existence are in my hands,” Russia might be able to reply, “you hold India on my sufferance.” It is not my belief that such is the object of Russia in her Eastern policy. If she dreaded that England might awake to the sense of her dignity or the consciousness of her power, she would be careful not to provoke her. Russia has formed a more accurate estimate of the British character—she does not apprehend any use that can be made of power by the weak mind against the strong. She aims at India for itself—she aims at India for the European and the Asiatic influence she acquires by the very revelation of such an intention. The attitude of menace against India leads France to hope and beg for a share of the spoils, and this disposition places France (in Europe) in opposition to England, and in subserviency to Russia. The power of pointing to the plunder of Agra and Delhi becomes the means of securing to Russia ascendancy and control over the warlike populations of Central Asia. She does not seek these ends as means of controlling England, since she is only enabled to obtain them through England’s co-operation. She does not require to be able to threaten India to disarm the hostility of England; it is through England that she can alone hope to be Mistress of India. There is no contest of will, skill, strength; no interchange of injury, not even a balancing of chances or of faults. On one hand there is policy, on the other—nothing. When I consider the objects and the actions of Russia, and when I look around on the mighty resources of this dormant empire, I cannot compare their struggle to one of similar things; it is neither that of matter against matter, or of man against man. The faculties of the one act upon the substance of the other as disease upon its victim.

It required, however, no particular penetration to observe in England one remarkable and distinctive character, and one on which a power, aiming at the possession of any British dependency, could not fail to reckon as a certain means of ultimate and tranquil success—that character is the ignorance of every individual throughout this whole people of International Rights.

The strength of such a country, however great, may be gradually undermined through the violation of its rights, and the Government which has conceived and commenced the execution of such a project, can, by the prospect of advantage, lead other Governments to take the same line, and thereby can place the remaining Powers of the world in a position of hostility to it, through the fact of the injury it has led them to inflict.

Hardly had the treaty of Vienna been signed when Russia violated, by an Imperial order, the commercial rights of Great Britain in Poland secured by that treaty—secured as an inalienable right of every British subject—secured also as a portion and as a guarantee of the independence of Poland. There does not appear to have been a single man speaking the English language aware of there being any British right involved in the Regulations of the Polish Kingdom, and not one of them consequently knew that the British nation had been injured by any act of the Emperor of Russia. Russia, thus encouraged, went on imposing restrictions upon the commerce of Great Britain in her own territories—she transferred again, in violation of British rights, her own tariff to the provinces and countries which she had acquired (through the concurrence and support of England), she then cut off the transit trade from England to the regions Eastward, to which a passage had been formerly open through her territories. She thus inflicted upon England loss, injury, and degradation, and England has been all the while every where the ally of Russia, and a co-operator with her in all her projects. Thus has Russia shewn to other nations how to gain by England's friendship, and by what means that friendship was to be secured.

Since the conclusion of the last war, the principal ally of Russia has been Prussia. Russia, in anticipation of the use she could make of that kingdom, insisted, when it was reduced to a third-rate power, on raising it to the station of a first-rate power, and threatened Europe and her allies with a renewal of the war unless this proposition were carried into effect. Prince Talleyrand endeavoured to awaken the other Cabinets to the danger thus prepared for them. "Prussia," he said, "and Russia will henceforth be combined for the purpose of carrying out distinct objects of aggression. In such a concert they will be possessed of means sufficient to baffle the penetration or to overrule the resistance of the other Cabinets. Prussia

“ will seek to extend her influence over the smaller states of Germany. “ Russia to expand towards the East, and they will lend their hands mutually “ to each other to effect these purposes.” And such has been the history of the events of the last twenty-five years, Prussia having made use of a Union, nominally commercial, to take into her own hands a portion of the administrative and financial functions, and consequently of the sovereignty of the small independent states around her, has placed a barrier between the commercial interchange of the German population and England—she has been supported in doing so by Russia in the interest of their common objects of aggression. Prussia is as yet shut out from the North and East by the Custom-house barriers of Russia—which will not be thrown down until the utmost advantages realisable from the concession are ripe. In the meantime, statesmen, politicians, Ministers of State, point out to Germany that these barriers must fall, because, as soon as the influence of Russia is predominant in Asia, she must admit the manufactures of Germany, if only for the purpose of excluding those of England, her enemy. Russia thus acquires a new source of influence over Prussia, and of popularity in central Europe. She augments the existing ill-will and contempt of Germany for England; and she teaches Germany to regard the successes of Russia “ as triumphs of industry, progress, and civilization.”

Thus another link and tie has grown out of the “ German Customs’ “ Union,” giving to Prussia and to the German population an interest and a longing for more intimate union with Russia, an interest in and a desire for the extension of the commercial and political control of Russia through central Asia and India. This alliance of Prussia with Russia, though it continues to receive fresh impulse from these new commercial and Eastern objects, had already been sufficiently strong on other grounds to place the whole diplomatic and moral resources of Prussia, for the last twenty years, at the disposal of Russia, for the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire, and for the establishment of her supremacy in every Cabinet of Europe*.

Let any one picture to himself for a moment the intense interest

* Prussian officers have fortified the Dardanelles against England. Prussian officers were substituted for the English officers requested by the late Sultan from England to discipline the Turkish troops. Through these Russia secured the defeat of Nezig and the triumph of Mehemet Ali.—See *Portfolio*, vol. 11, under the head of “ Prussian Officers.”

associated with the objects presented to the ambition of the two or three individuals who, in each of these Cabinets, direct its movements, and who thereby feel a consciousness of the possession of power over the present relations of states, and over the future destinies of mankind—a power which no man or system ever possessed without the desire of using. To carry back again the mastery of affairs from the ocean to the land—to overthrow the so-termed commercial despotism of Great Britain, and to shiver in the hands of Albion her long-famed trident, are purposes, independently of all the feelings and interests summed up in the word “India,” sufficient to enlist all the sympathies, and to incite all the energies, of the Cabinets of the North—are the purposes to which the power they possess must naturally be turned, and with an effect proportioned to the secrecy of the design. It is not within the limits of Great Britain that these objects can be felt—it is not looking from our shores that these dangers appear menacing or near—it is from the shores of the Bosphorus, and placed as a middle term between Europe and Asia, between the North and the South, where the influences of the land come to meet and to mingle with the influences of the ocean, that the full bearings of these questions are brought within the range of the human eye, and the feelings that actuate, and the interests that sway, the millions in the East and in the West, express themselves in language too simple and too natural to be misunderstood. It was on the shores of the Bosphorus that was expressed, in the following words, the consequences to Europe and to Asia of the concert of Russia and Prussia :—

“ You begin to perceive in England the connivance between Russia and Prussia, do they appreciate all the effects of that connivance, with respect to the plans of Russia here ? the first taking into her hands the supremacy of the East !—the second concentrating in herself the supremacy of Germany. Where is the counterpoise ? especially, when Egypt shall be brought forcibly into this formidable alliance. The three great bodies will have in their possession all the rivers, all the watercourses which maintain the communications of the world. Let a signal from St. Petersburg be answered from Constantinople, Berlin, and Alexandria, and at the same moment, all Northern Europe, Central Europe, European and Asiatic Turkey, all the commercial part of Africa, Arabia, Persia, will be closed against England and France, without its being possible to find the slenderest fissure by which to evade the padlocks, the keys of which will be at St. Petersburg. What is necessary for the realization of this gigantic combination of despotism ? The taking of Constantinople—and in three days, the northerly winds which prevail during nine months of the year, bring thirty thousand Russians to the Dardanelles, and in twenty-eight days they are supported by

a hundred thousand more from Bessarabia, and the right bank of the Danube. And Europe is quietly sleeping in the midst of such danger! Cursed be her blindness. We must not, therefore, cease to tell that powerful, but ignorant and indifferent public of Europe what we know, but what they do not, and to show them still suspended above their heads that frozen avalanche which at once will close every issue of liberty, fortune, and thought, when allowed to roll down on Constantinople*.”

But there is another Power far more important than Prussia as a friend and as a foe—far more capable of influencing the balance of power upon the seas, the opinion of the European world, and the mind of England itself—a Power interested only less than England herself in the past events and in the future destinies of Asia, Africa, and America. It is to France that England has succeeded in the possession of those North American territories which are the chief nurseries of her naval power; it is with France that England had to struggle in endeavouring to avert the independence of the United States; it was from France, and not from the Mogul, that England wrested the supremacy of India; it was from France she first derived her scheme of Indian administration, the first idea of the discipline of the native troops, and the first thought of an Indian sovereignty. The gain of England throughout the world has always been effected by loss to France, and it surely is needless to show that France cannot be unmindful of her loss, or less desirous than heretofore for the extension of colonial possessions at your expense. France is, moreover, your neighbour in India; she has frontiers there opposed to yours; her flag flies in Hindostan; her escutcheon is there chiselled, and her Indian press chronicles the signs of British decay, the progress of assault from without, of insurrection from within; and warns the French people of the obligation imposed upon them by events of considering “what is to be done with India.”

France, with possessions in India, cannot see another nation aim at projects of Indian conquest without feeling herself directly interested in that matter; she cannot see a Power preparing to invade your territories without deciding to resist that Power in self-defence, or to unite with that Power for mutual benefit. France has coalesced with the United States to drive you from your own fisheries; she has coalesced with Russia for the dismember-

* Letter from Mr. Blacque, formerly editor of the *Moniteur Ottoman*, and having reference to an article of mine on the Prussian Customs' Union, which appeared in the Second Number of the *British and Foreign Review*, and to which I would direct the attention of those who are anxious to understand their country's position.

ment of the Ottoman Empire—she may have acted without system, but aggression will not the less in the end become systematic. She has been recently assailing your commerce with the most undisguised violence—and has been suffered to do so—nay, encouraged and invited—and this by calculation and on system; so that the friends of peace are sacrificed in France by England's adoption of that injustice against herself which they have denounced, and would have prevented.

Your ally, the Chief of Lahore, protected by England, and on terms of the closest intimacy—an intimacy extending to the formal expression of a desire for his aggrandizement—employed Frenchmen in disciplining his formidable native force, while he sedulously excluded Englishmen; and a circumstance so remarkable has only served, by the process of reasoning of the times, to increase our confidence in the absence of all Indian ambition in the councils of France*, and of entire devotion to us in the breast of Runjeet Singh.

Thus has Russia secured the co-operation of Prussia, and at least the neutrality of France, in her progress to Indian dominion, and by laying the foundation of future hostility between England and France, she has made a wonderful stride towards the overthrow of the British Sovereignty in the East†.

These results have been obtained through twenty-five years of unheeded and unresisted aggression upon English commerce, that is on the rights of citizens, and by violating which the citizen is destroyed; consequently it

* Some months ago an article in the *Pondicherry Gazette* appeared in the London press, on the downfall of the British power in India—concluding with the opinion, that though Russia might convulse India, and drive out the English, she could only expect to obtain a real footing in that country by co-operation with some maritime state of Europe. *The very next day* the London press gave an article from the French official journal on the British and French navies, declaring the latter to be now superior to the former.

† It is superfluous to remark that the national spirit, intentions, and sympathies of Prussia and France are hostile to Russia. But national opinions, sympathies, interests, or intentions, have nothing to do with events—as the map of Russia will show. In every age of great movement it has been the secret will and thoughts of one or two men, unsuspected either in their tendency or power, that have done and undone; and that by using those “opinions” that men think their own.

is to the neglect, in the first instance, of their own interests by the commercial communities that is to be attributed—the precariousness of our present existence, and the ultimate downfall of Great Britain, if this criminal apathy cannot be removed.

LIST OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT ON THE
RELATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN WITH PERSIA, CABOOL, AND RUSSIA.

TEN PAPERS PRESENTED BY THE INDIA BOARD.

No. 1.—Presented on the 8th February, 1839, contains the treaty with Runjeet Singh, for the re-establishment of Shah Shooja, and for the cession to Runjeet Singh of a large portion of the Affghan territory ; and the “ Declaration” of the Governor-General of the 1st October, 1838. This Declaration (of war) and the treaty for carrying it into effect, constitute the first information, and for more than a month the only information given to Parliament to enable it to judge of the policy of an invasion of Central Asia, and of the justice of a national war.

No. 2.—On the 8th of the following March another set of papers is presented, containing the treaties connected with the navigation of the Indus. It also contains treaties which have specific connection with Persia, Runjeet Singh, or Cabool, but none of these are later than 1828.

No. 3.—On the 20th March were presented a third set of papers, containing seventy-two despatches, extracts and documents, relative to the expedition of Shah Shooja into Affghanistan in 1833-34. The most recent date in these documents is March 1835. They contain nothing which has any natural connection with the present war.

No. 4.—It is after five weeks delay from the first announcement of the war, after the first interest and curiosity excited by these events had subsided—after the leading men had been committed, and that their minds had been led astray by the previous supplied correspondence connected with the expedition of 1833-34, that the correspondence of Lord Auckland with the Secret Committee is published, exposing the grounds of the decision he had taken, namely, his alarm at the progress of Russia eastward.

Nos. 5 and 6* contain sixty-five despatches or extracts, and thirty-five enclosures connected with the mission of Sir Alexander Burnes to Cabool, commencing with a letter of Dost Mahommed to Lord Auckland, on the 31st May, 1836, begging the support of the Indian Government against the Seiks, and offering on his part unconditional obedience to its wishes. The correspondence in No. 5, commencing from May 1836, goes down to April 1838, including the correspondence between Sir Alexander Burnes and Lord Auckland. No. 6 commences in September 1837, and goes down to

* It is impossible to understand how the papers are classed, as there are double numbers which do not coincide.

January 1839, being part of the same correspondence between Sir Alexander Burnes and the Governor-General. No reason is assigned for this separation of the correspondence, and no intelligible motive for the separation appears.

The effect of this separation is, however, to render the subject unintelligible. For instance, a letter of Dost Mahommed's to Lord Auckland, dated 21st May, 1838, is given in papers No. 5, and in the middle of papers No. 6 are given extracts from Sir Alexander Burnes's letter enclosing it, as also from despatches of four days before, detailing circumstances essential to the understanding of the position of Dost Mahommed at the time of writing that letter. The more immediate object of this separation seems to have been to present in the one set the matters connected with the Seiks, and in the other those connected with Russia, so as to prevent the reader from perceiving that the connections of the Affghans with Russia (the subsequent justification of the invasion of their country), was the necessary result of the connection of England with their enemies the Seiks.

No. 7 is entitled "Occupation of Karrack." It appears that it had occurred to the Governor-General "that cruisers with troops in the Persian Gulph might essentially aid the negociations in Persia." Towards the middle of the papers we find that these troops "are being landed (at Karrack) with the consent of the authorities of the place." No other reasons for the operation are assigned—no instructions appear. No. 7 is composed of two-and-thirty extracts.

No. 8.—This part is not numbered. It is a single despatch from the Court of Directors to the Governor-General, which is a reply to eighteen specifically quoted despatches, commencing from July 1832, which thus had remained unanswered five years and two months. The object of this despatch is to convey the approbation of the Court of Directors to the Governor-General, in avoiding all political connection with any State west of the Indus, and in taking no part in their quarrels!

No. 9.—Two months later, on the 28th May, is presented, "Correspondence relating to Aden." The first document in this set, dated 31st July, 1837, calls the Sultan of Aden "a barbarous robber." One hundred and fifty-two extracts, letters, and documents, are given, and it concludes with a Map, *colouring Aden as British territory!*

No. 10 is a repetition of the two treaties with Persia of 1809 and 1814, already given with all the treaties in Number 2—but which were defective.

ONE DOCUMENT FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE, ENTITLED "CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO PERSIA AND AFFGHANISTAN."

Five weeks had been allowed to elapse from the publication of the declaration of war, before any of the correspondence between the Indian Government and the Affghans had been made public.—Before that had been given, the anterior events connected with the expedition of Shah Shooja, in 1833-34, had come to divert attention from the subject matter. When the correspondence connected with Affghanistan is published, it is separated into two parts, so as to be rendered unintelligible. But the war was presumed to be justified by the position of hostility assumed by Russia in Central Asia, and by the connection between Persia and Russia; consequently none of the circumstances of Affghanistan could be understood, without a knowledge of the previous events which had taken place

in Persia; nor could these again be understood, without a knowledge of the anterior intercourse between England and Russia. All these papers had been supplied in an inverse order, and the last documents that are published are the first in order of time—the first in order of proximity—the first in order of inquiry. The anterior relations of England and Russia with regard to Persia were the first points to ascertain, and yet they are published the last.

18th February, firstly appear—The acts of the Indian Government, of the dates of July and October 1838.

8th March, secondly—General treaties not bearing on the subject.

20th March, thirdly—Transactions in 1833–4 not bearing on the subject.

26th March, fourthly—Diplomatic intercourse with Cabool, from May 1837, downwards.

Fifthly—Diplomatic intercourse with Russia and Persia, from January 1834, downwards.

The fifth and last publication (had it been intelligible) was necessary to the understanding of the fourth; and without a perfect knowledge of the subjects which these two publications profess to expose, the nature and objects of the war announced in the first set of papers could not be understood.

The volume presented by the Foreign Office has no date, is not numbered as connected with the Indian papers. It comprises the transactions with Persia and Russia during four years and a half.

COMMUNICATION WITH ST. PETERSBURGH.

1834—During this year there are three despatches from Lord Palmerston to St. Petersburg, amounting to less than one page of the printed documents.

1835—No communication.

1836—No communication.

1837—One despatch, half a page.

1838—One despatch, five pages*.

INTERCOURSE WITH PERSIA.

1834—No communication.

1835—One despatch (four lines).

1836—Two despatches (twenty-one lines).

1837†—Three despatches (sixteen lines).

1838—Nine despatches (two pages and a quarter).

Two of the despatches merely enclose Russian despatches—two of them are merely to state that no instructions were sent. Previously to the rupture with Persia the total despatches from the Foreign Office to Russia and Persia, amounted to two pages and a half.

* The disasters had then taken place, and discussion was too late.

† In July 1837, Persia had declared her bonds with England dissolved, and the treaties abrogated. This is unnoticed by England, consequently no despatches could be of use.

On the event of war, the first duty of the Power proclaiming it is to prove its justice, the second to make its expediency or necessity clear. If a duty so solemn could be rendered more than ordinarily imperative, it would be when the war is proclaimed by a stronger against a weaker Power, and is one of aggression and invasion. If one circumstance more than another could render it obligatory on a people to examine into the justice and the expediency of a war, it would be when that war is proclaimed by a delegated authority. The invasion of Affghanistan is the first British war unannounced to Parliament by a Ministry, and unquestioned by an opposition !

PART I.

NEGOCIATION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, RELATIVE TO THEIR POLICY IN PERSIA—1834.

THE transactions detailed in the papers presented to Parliament by the Foreign Office, commence with a correspondence between Great Britain and Russia respecting the selection of an heir to the Crown of Persia. The importance of such a measure can only be justly estimated by making the case our own ; what would be the dependence of this country on the Power that could settle the succession of the Crown—what would be the relative attitude of two Foreign Powers who could settle or dispute between themselves the succession of the British Crown for the advancement of separate and hostile purposes ?

To select an heir to the Persian throne was to exercise a greater and more solemn influence than has ever been exercised by Great Britain over any independent State. It was the exercise of an influence incompatible with its independence—it was to overthrow, in conjunction with Russia, that independence which England had laboured to maintain—Russia to subvert. It was in opposition to every anterior dogma and practice of the British State to assist in putting down national rights, instead, as heretofore, of interposing to defend them. The step involved, therefore, no less responsibility as to the direction given to the policy of England, than as to the effects produced upon the condition of Persia. The Power with whom

this influence was to be disputed or exerted was one whose hostility to England was the sole ground of British connexion with Persia—whose hostility to Persia was the sole ground of British influence over that State.

The concurrence (if such could exist) of Russia with England, in regard to the Eastern interests of the two Courts, would have averted all danger from India and from Persia—all anxiety and alarm from Europe and from Asia. But concurrence of England with Russia rendered the policy of England subject to that of Russia, and gave to the latter, for the furtherance of her designs, the assistance of the Government against which they were planned, and by which they had hitherto been resisted.

In opening this correspondence we look for a clear and able exposition of the “ policy and views of the Government during the whole of that “ long and important transaction*” — we look for anxious and suspicious watchfulness of every movement, word, or act of Russia; and, above all, for proof that the Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg, as at Teheran, had counteracted the policy and frustrated the intrigues of our adversary. That this correspondence should not present necessary information would indeed be a matter of surprise—that it should not exhibit watchfulness and foresight would be matter of culpability. This correspondence does not present either the one or the other—and the point from which it starts is the assertion that our interests are identical with those of our antagonist!

The first document is an extract from a despatch (Jan. 3, 1834) of the Secretary of the British Embassy at St. Petersburg to Lord Palmerston, re-echoing the report of intelligence received there, “ that expectations were “ entertained that the Shah of Persia would nominate Mahommed Meerza “ successor to his throne;” and he adds, “ I have reason to believe the “ above-mentioned appointment is considered satisfactory by the Russian “ Government.”

On the 28th of January the same functionary states, “ that Count “ Nesselrode considers the interests of Great Britain and Russia so very “ similar in Persia, and expresses his anxiety that His Majesty’s Government “ should have a good understanding with the Russian Government respecting “ that country.”

* Speech of Lord Palmerston when in opposition.

If this doctrine was an old and admitted one, it was useless to present it. If it was a new proposal, it required to be supported by evidence, and could not be admitted without proof; it involved discussion, and it necessitated formal communication between the two Courts. Without proof, without discussion, without formal communication, was this new doctrine put forth.

Lord Palmerston does not reject it, he does not investigate it, he does not admit it, but he remains silent; acquiescence is yielded by the same process to the proposition for the joint selection by the two Courts of Mahommed Meerza to fill the throne of Persia. Supposing the proposition for this union accepted, does it follow that England is from that hour to abstain from inquiring into the motives, or understanding the object of any measure she is to adopt? Yet the Russian Minister gives, and the British Minister accepts, as the ground for the adoption by England of the proposal of Russia—that union did exist between the two Courts.

No shadow of reason is offered to support the proposition that union did exist between the interests of the two Courts—no shadow of a motive is advanced for the selection of Mahommed Meerza as expedient for the two Courts—yet Russia could not have advanced the principle of union unless certain that it should be adopted, nor aimed at the elevation of Mahommed Meerza, unless certain of the co-operation of England—yet this proposition was energetically announced in Persia, by Russia, without awaiting for that co-operation of the British Government which was the object of the proposal, and without any regard as to whether or not *her* act should render Persia that “scene of civil discord,” which she affected to apprehend from any independent action of the British Government.

Before proceeding to examine Lord Palmerston’s reply, I must direct attention to the fact, that these communications were not made by the one Government to the other—and that they appear solely as the opinions of a British functionary respecting the views of Russia. Russia could therefore retire from the proposition, if necessary, without disgrace; and, if successful, she left no clue by which, in subsequent publication of the documents, the British public could trace her motives or follow her action. She imposed on the Foreign Minister of Great Britain the necessity of assuming the defence of her policy as if it had been his—giving to her triumphs over England the appearance of a triumph of England over her, and supporting

the Foreign Minister at one and the same time, by that diplomatic strength which he gained in exchange for his sacrifice of British interests, and by the confidence of his sovereign, his colleagues, his party, the parliament, and the nation at large, derived from the opposition which all this while he publicly avowed to Russia—and from his simulated success in compelling Russia to support the policy of Great Britain.

The first communication from Lord Palmerston (16th June, 1834) is given in extract. Diplomatic papers refer to one exclusive subject. It is to be presumed, therefore, if extracts are given instead of entire documents (unless when insignificance combined with prolixity might account for omission), that there is an intention of concealment.

That this despatch containing the germ of the future events of the East, indicating the line and policy adopted by the British Cabinet with regard to Russia, announcing a total alteration of its policy and objects in Persia, and being the only document in which are to be found any statements whatever of the views and policy of the British Government on any of these subjects—that this should be presented or assumed to be presented as a fragment, is a circumstance which may well furnish food for reflection*.

The first passage is as follows:—

“ I had to-day a conversation with Prince Lieven upon the affairs of Persia, with the substance of which it is right that you should be made acquainted !”

Most strange terms for such a subject ! Lord Palmerston proceeds:—

“ The Prince having called at this office at my request, I said, that I wished to have some conversation with him upon the state of Persia.”

Thus the Russian Government, which had not committed itself by any formal communication in leading England into this monstrous predicament, did not even suffer its Minister in London to invite to discussion the British Minister. The allusions dropped to the British Secretary of Embassy at St. Petersburg, and transmitted in four lines to Downing Street, are apparently the only means employed to effect every purpose of Russia—to obtain the admission of her doctrines, and the adoption of her proposals.

* From the context, it would appear that the document, though given as an extract, is in reality an entire document. It may be given as an extract to prevent readers from thinking that they had the whole case before them, so that they might abstain from forming any opinion.

It is then Lord Palmerston who requests the Russian Ambassador to “call at the office”—then, “he says to him that he wished to have some *conversation* with him upon the state of Persia.” But this assumed conversation, is no conversation at all—it is a statement made by Lord Palmerston, the result of previous concurrence, but he selects a term implying discussion, and consequently casting over the transaction a shade of opposition.

The assertion of the Russian Government, that the interests of Russia and Great Britain in Persia were identical, was what Lord Palmerston had hitherto avoided to notice. He now formally, after four months’ silence, approaches the question. He neither admits nor denies it, but he advances a similar proposition of his own. He says :—

“England and Russia are both too deeply interested in maintaining the *internal tranquillity* of Persia, to allow either Power to be indifferent to complications which might tend to throw that country into a state of confusion and civil war; and that *as each would necessarily be applied to* by the rival parties, it would be a *fortunate circumstance*, if the *wishes* and good offices of both could be united in support of *one and the same* candidate.”

Russia’s proposition had been, “Our interests are identical, take my candidate.” Lord Palmerston replies, “Our interests are not identical, but they are the same; I hope, therefore, we may have one and the same candidate.” Russia says, “Mahommed Meerza is my candidate.” Lord Palmerston replies, “HE is mine.” If both have fixed on the same man, why the discussion?—If there is no practical difference, why the abstract proposition?

Lord Palmerston continues :

“*The latest accounts* from Persia led us to suppose that the Russian Envoy at Teheran had expressed the *inclination* of his Government in favour of the *pretensions* of Mahommed Meerza.”

After the communication from St. Petersburg, reference to news from Persia would have been in a *bona fide* conversation impossible—equally so that Lord Palmerston should tell this to the Russian Ambassador. It was Lord Palmerston’s part to demand from him the intentions of Russia, not to inform him of them. Even then how refer to the views of the Russian Envoy at Teheran, when he was in possession of those of the Minister at St. Petersburg? He continues :—

“That *some time ago* Count Nesselrode had *mentioned* this subject to you, and had expressed the *willingness* of the Russian Government to *come to an understanding* with that of His Majesty as to a *joint* exertion of the influence of the two Powers in Persia in favour of *some one candidate*.”

This passage is placed as if the original communication from Russia was an abstract proposition which had left the English Government fruitlessly to guess who the individual was who should be selected. But Russia had named Mahommed Meerza! had named him twenty-five days before emitting the general proposition regarding the union of the two Courts. He continues :—

“ That at that time His Majesty’s Government were not in possession of the information necessary to enable them to form a clear opinion upon the subject.”

Respecting a contingency of such moment—so long anticipated—in a country where England possessed authoritative control over its political, financial, and military departments—in a country where she employed a far more efficient diplomatic system than she possessed elsewhere, or even than that which was employed by Russia herself—we are told that England was unprepared to have an opinion! The English Minister too volunteers the declaration!—Comment is here superfluous. Had the Minister been conscious of ignorance it would have been carefully concealed. Had Lord Palmerston’s avowal of inability on the 15th of January to decide, been an honest avowal, the information would have been furnished on which he did decide on the 16th of June. Without necessity ignorance is avowed as the grounds for enactment by which England is committed, and information necessary to account for a change from one inexplicable course to another is suppressed. The assumption of ignorance, as the suppression of knowledge, has not been without a necessity—the necessity of masking secret concurrence by an appearance of investigation.

Lord Palmerston then proceeds to state that the English Government would take suitable measures for maintaining the pretensions of Mahommed Meerza, and this so-termed “ conversation ” concludes with the expression to Prince Lieven of a wish that he should “ communicate this intention to his own Government, and express the satisfaction, &c.”

The Prince was sure (and his part of the conversation is limited to this assurance) that Lord Palmerston’s statement would be received at St. Petersburg with satisfaction.

By the next communication from Mr. Bligh, it appears that the foregoing despatch of Lord Palmerston’s—a despatch on which hinged the future

position of England in Asia, and consequently in Europe, was sent by the post! This fact reveals the perfect understanding of the two governments. This despatch must have been a startling revelation to the statesmen of observant Europe, since it even seems to have surpassed the expectations of Count Nesselrode himself. Mr. Bligh observes, “that the *satisfaction of that minister was increased*”—observe the ‘*increase of satisfaction*’—on learning the contents of a despatch that had come by the post! “when I read to his Excellency that part of the despatch which testified in your Lordship’s own words, that Prince Lieven had rightly interpreted the view taken of this matter by His Majesty’s Government.”

The Crown Prince, Abbas Meerza, dies—Russia instantaneously proposes as Crown Prince in his stead, his son, the young Governor of Azerbaijan, the district over which her influence had already extensively been spread, and was wholly predominant—she proposes that successor in opposition to (according to Eastern opinion) the, at least equally legitimate heir, the eldest surviving brother of Abbas Meerza, who was ruler of the district particularly under the influence of Great Britain. England is unprepared in Persia to offer any opinion on the subject, not even to neutralize the influence of Russia, by immediate co-operation. Russia then insinuates in London that the interests of the two countries are one, and that consequently they must co-operate in Persia. England accepts the insinuation, but remains four months, as she herself says, too ignorant to act. She then decides on active co-operation with Russia in the elevation of “*some one candidate* ;” but before the news of her decision could reach the capital of Persia, information is sent from St. Petersburg (England seems only capable of receiving information from St. Petersburg) that the Shah had already yielded to the suggestions of Russia, and appointed Mahommed Meerza his heir.

Lord Palmerston had not been ready in January to understand whether it was desirable or not that Mahommed Meerza should be nominated to the Crown of Persia—it was not till the 16th of June that he had grounds for uniting with Russia; it was only on that date, that “suitable steps” were taken by England for effecting her purpose, consequently, no doubt could be left upon the mind of Mahommed Meerza, that he owed the support of England to the patronage of Russia. Lord Palmerston’s first service was to

adopt Russia's candidate—his second, to leave Russia ample time to secure the credit of the initiative—his third, as we shall presently see, that of imposing upon England the full cost of the execution.

The next document is an entire despatch (5th September) from Lord Palmerston to Mr. Bligh, expressing his satisfaction at the receipt of the intelligence (from St. Petersburg) of the nomination of Mahommed Meerza, reiterating the gratification of the English Government, to find “the two governments equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain not only the internal tranquillity but also the integrity and independence of Persia.”

Hitherto the communications had been limited to “internal tranquillity.” Count Nesselrode had asserted a general identity of interests. Lord Palmerston had admitted that identity, with a limitation of it to the “internal tranquillity of Persia.” He now adds to “internal tranquillity,” the words “independence and integrity*.” What are the motives for these additions? There had been no question whatever mooted regarding the integrity of Persia; and the transaction in which both Courts were immediately engaged shewed that they considered that its independence had ceased to exist. These expressions are not, therefore, to be understood from any thing that had then transpired, and the motive for introducing them is to be so sought in the sequel.

But previously to the date of this despatch (of the 5th September), we have a despatch from Count Nesselrode, communicated by the Russian ambassador in London, on the 22nd August. The Russian Minister says:—

“We expect to see the Representatives of Russia and England in Persia, authorised to act in concert in a *spirit of peace and union*, as the despatch from my office of the 30th of June has already expressed the desire should be the case.

“The importance of providing, with this view, the two Representatives with *corresponding instructions* is no wise diminished by the mere fact of the nomination of the hereditary Prince.”

* The importance of such terms can of course be only understood among nations, whose political existence is not visibly in danger, by special study of diplomacy. The following incident may lead to useful reflection on their value. At the discussion of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, one of the Turkish Ministers endeavoured to introduce the word “integrity,” in lieu of “independence,” in a proposed emendation to the effect, that Russia recognised “the independence (integrity) of the Ottoman Empire.” It was upon this occasion, and as addressed to this Minister, that was used the expression, “*the vengeance of the Emperor.*”

To this communication there is no ostensible reply, but it had been received before Lord Palmerston's despatch of the 5th September, which in these papers stand first—that *displaced* despatch is then the reply to the Russian note and the adoption of the proposal! but the documents are so placed as to render the transactions which they record, and the diplomatic relations they establish, incomprehensible to the reader.

The concert thus established is henceforward to regard ulterior objects, and Count Nesselrode leaves to Lord Palmerston the duty of first asserting that "*independence* of Persia," which four years later Russia was to defend against England, and of first announcing that "*integrity* of Persia," under the sanction of which two years afterwards she was to point the cannon of the Shah against Herat.

In the explanation given to the British Parliament of proceedings so extraordinary, there is *no statement whatever* upon any one of the questions in debate; there are no grounds assigned by Lord Palmerston for any opinion which he had expressed, or any decision which he has taken. If these papers were presented to Parliament in order that Members of Parliament might form their opinions upon the subject, they do not fulfil that intention. The questions to be decided before any step could be taken, were whether or not it was true that the interests of Russia and England coincided in Persia; whether or not England should interfere in the election of a Prince to the throne of Persia; whether or not it should prevent Russia from so interfering. Then came, and only then, the question of the selection of a Prince; the adoption of means by which his rights should be ascertained; his claims recognized, and his nomination secured? Upon each and all of these points there is not a syllable of information in the papers submitted to Parliament; papers scarcely less extraordinary in that which they dare to withhold than in that which they reveal. In the absence of all the information that these documents were required to give—in the absence of every conviction which the English Government had been, or could be, supposed to entertain, these documents present in the very first page the full view of the abyss which had at once been opened before this country's steps and concealed from its view—*co-operation with its enemy*.

This co-operation, constituting the master-key of the policy of this land,

is all along concealed even from the very service to which its representation is confided. It is now made public when interest in the subject is lost—when the individuals capable of understanding its import are sacrificed or committed—when the results of that co-operation have been brought about, and when England, bewildered by complications which she cannot unravel, and stunned by blows self-dealt, which she deems irresistible, is reduced—to use the words of Count Pozzo di Borgo, to the “necessity of submitting to what (she is taught to believe) she can no longer prevent.”

The Foreign Minister avows opposition to Russia—he is commended for nationality; he reveals co-operation with her—he is applauded for prudence; he advances Russia’s protégé to the throne of Persia—England exults in the national triumph; he denounces Persia as Russian, and spurns her away—the persevering applauses of the English nation still pursuing in his tortuous course, now extol his decision and his courage. Can such a nation expect honesty from its servants, or find safety in its strength?

In concluding the first part of this analysis, I am unable to repress the avowal of the inability which I feel of rendering clear and intelligible even such portions of this scheme as I myself am able distinctly to perceive. The difficulty must be evident, of unravelling a web which has taken so many years to weave in secret. There is not a phrase or a term employed by Lord Palmerston which does not appear calculated for the purpose of misleading the person for whose guidance it is transmitted, or the public for whose information it is put in print. Two Governments have united to misrepresent the truth in regard to transactions conducted in secret between themselves, sole depositaries of national power and representation, whose words are events and bonds. The evidence by which the policy of England is to be judged, thus consists of such documents, or fragments of documents, only, as a hostile Government and a faithless Minister think fit to produce, considering them useful to mislead opinion, or necessary to prevent detection.

PART II.

RELATIVE POSITION OF THE DIPLOMACY OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND RUSSIA.

IF Russia in any one state is found to aim at acquisition, her designs are dangerous in all; if England in any one attempts to preserve, she must use those means which will enable her every where to protect the weak and to resist the strong. England and Russia could not be opposed at any one point without being opposed at every point, nor united in one if not in all. But it is the assault of Russia upon each and all of these states which has alone called forth the interest and the interference of England in the East, and the sole object of that interference is to oppose her. It is the assault of Russia, by endangering nations and violating rights, which has given that influence and power to Great Britain by which Russia may be restrained. Unless England is opposed to Russia, she is powerless to protect any ally, or to assert any right, because she herself is allied to violence and a sharer in injustice. Hitherto English Ministers have done that which she desired they should do; but they have always thought that they were acting in opposition to her. But it is impossible that an English Minister could act with and against Russia in regard to the same country, or that he should co-operate with Russia in one country and oppose her in another—by mistake. These contradictions are, however, in evidence. We have seen Lord Palmerston asserting in 1834 union of Great Britain and Russia in regard to Persia. In the course of the following year (1835) we shall see him acting ostensibly against her at Teheran. In the same year, month, and week in which he united England with Russia in regard to Persia, was he, in another country, taking against her steps apparently the most hostile, and holding to other Courts, respecting her, language the most insulting.

In Greece a Regency with Sovereign character and powers had been established. Lord Palmerston instructed the British Agent in Greece to support with all his influence *one* member of that Regency, thus breaking it into two factions. He then declared the *majority* of that Regency to be Russian, *and on that ground took measures to have it ejected from Greece.* The expelled members published a statement declaring the British Resident member to have acted in collusion with the Resident of Russia—to deceive (for they saw not farther) the British Secretary of State ; they substantiated the denunciation by documentary evidence, and their words as their proof stand—the first unrefuted, the second unquestioned. It is on the 16th June, 1834, that the co-operation is concerted with Russia in regard to Persia ; and on the 19th June of the same year, does the Bavarian Minister at London report the declarations of Lord Palmerston, not only that he did not co-operate with Russia in Greece, where that co-operation between England and Russia was established by two treaties and an Act of Parliament, but that he did oppose her—that he had triumphed over her.

The document that follows is a despatch published in the work of M. V. Maurer, Member of the Royal Regency of Greece. The despatch of the Bavarian Minister is dated London, June 19th, three days subsequently to the despatch of Lord Palmerston to St. Petersburg, establishing the union of England and Russia.

“ In deploring the discord which has manifested itself lately in the Councils of the Regency, Lord Palmerston has told Count Jenison (the Bavarian Minister) *that, according to letters* which he had received from Greece, this discord was only due to the preponderating influence of the Russian Cabinet, as also to the proceedings of M. Catachasi (the Russian Envoy), who has managed, by dint of intrigues, to gain an ascendancy over a portion of the Regency. According to him, M. de Maurer and General Heydech had become the dupes of the Russian Envoy, and M. d’Abel had been the instrument which M. Catachasi had made use of in order to accomplish his intrigues ; that the English Cabinet, whilst agreeing that there had been reciprocal wrongs in the Regency, *was decided in supporting Count Armensperg with all the weight of its power, if necessary,* inasmuch as it had always had a high opinion of his qualities and his political views ; and that with a view to *neutralize* or to *equalize* the action *of the two fractions* of the Regency, it had thought to have found the means in the removal from Greece of M. d’Abel, not because it thought him the author of this deplorable dissension ; but because it had, he said, certain knowledge that the Russian agent made use of him, as a docile instrument, to foment a dissension which would end in overthrowing the whole edifice which they had with such difficulty constructed. Lord Palmerston particularly insisted that Count Jenison should make the King of Bavaria understand, that in expressing this

wish relative to the removal of M. d'Abel, he was inclined to consider it the most efficacious remedy, and the one most adapted to prevent much mischief*.”

This document has only to be placed by the side of Lord Palmerston's despatch to Mr. Bligh, of the 16th June, 1834, to establish the existence of two lines of policy, pursued and declared at the same period, and probably on the same day, the one destructive of the other. The one Union with Russia—the other Hostility to her! But in these contradictions a common feature is to be detected in these divergencies—a common end attained. The Union of the two Courts in Persia raises to the Throne the candidate of Russia. The appearance of hostility in Greece enables them to co-operate in overthrowing a sovereign body which had detected collusion between the diplomacy of Russia and England, and which had taken steps to acquaint therewith the British Cabinet. Lord Palmerston instantly denounces these men as Russians, and declares his policy in Greece to be opposed to Russia. He is then enabled to join his influence to that of Russia to drive them from Greece, and he and Russia unite to represent that event as a triumph of England over Russia.

If Lord Palmerston had opposed Russia in Greece, must not Russia have turned round to counteract the policy of England in Persia, if indeed co-operation of the two courts in that country had been advantageous to England? But if the co-operation of the two courts in Persia was not advantageous to England, then could there be nowhere opposition of England to Russia.—It is therefore clear that as co-operation in Persia was assumed, to disguise the conflicting interests of the two states:—so in Greece, was hostility devised to disguise the concert of the two Ministers.

Faction, in Persia as in Greece, sprung solely from the assault of Russia upon their independence. Russia by corruption and by intimidation had created for herself in each, allies and partisans. The remainder of the nation

* Subsequently Lord Palmerston, in violation of the treaty of May 1832, compelled the expulsion of the two members. The bearer of the instructions to that effect alighted at the Russian Mission, and the Russian Admiral was prepared, if necessary, to support the instructions by force. The members so expelled had appealed to Lord Palmerston against the British Resident, whom they accused of acting in collusion with Russia, and they are expelled by Lord Palmerston on the grounds of their being Russian—by the aid of Russian bayonets! The Secretary of the British Legation was also expelled, having asserted his belief of the collusion of the British Resident with Russia.

looked abroad for support. It saw in England the only Power interested in defending their rights, because interested in defeating the designs of their enemy. It was the greatest of triumphs for Russia to designate these men as a party, and by styling it *English* she disguised the fraud of designating traitors as partisans—and mitigated the infamy of the word “*Russian*” by placing it in antithesis with “*English*.”

Lord Palmerston has completed the measure of this confusion by declaring a union of England with her enemy—the enemy of Persia. His knowledge of the character and constitution of the two parties into which that State was divided. His consciousness of the conflicting character of the interests of England and Russia, not merely in Persia and in Greece alone, but universally, are established in the following words:—

“ England and Russia are *both* too deeply interested in maintaining the internal tranquillity of Persia, to allow either Power to be indifferent to complications which might tend to throw that country into a state of confusion and civil war; and that as *each would be applied to by the rival parties*, it would be a fortunate circumstance if the wishes and good offices of *both* (England and Russia) could be united in support of one and the same candidate*.”

He saw, therefore, that the union of England and Russia was to have accomplished the overthrow of one or other of the rival parties—that is, it was to annihilate either the national spirit or the Russian faction.

In Greece there was less disguise in the mode, and bitterer exasperation in the language. She there reviled while she betrayed, and while betraying those who trusted in her, branded them as Russians. Those only who have consciously witnessed such deeds—who have shared in the afflicting scenes to which they have given rise—know what it is to blush for the name of Englishman, and to feel the meaning of “national degradation.”

While sorrowing over the fate of a country that unconsciously adopts such deeds, and makes their guilt as their consequences her own—it is an increase and not a diminution of shame to reflect that the mere assertion by England of her own rights, annihilated at once all internal faction, and consequently all external danger for Persia, for Greece, and for each other country equally exposed—that the commonest intelligence—that the plainest sense of duty would have sufficed to put an end to all hostile acts, on the part of Russia, and to all fear of such, on the part of those whom she assails.

* Despatch to Mr. Bligh, of the 16th June, 1834.

But presented to us, as this question is, in these and similar transactions, there is danger to the national judgment. All previous knowledge is excluded—all means of comparison shut out. The field of inquiry being thus narrowed, the mind of the observer is contracted, and his spirit sinks. While, horror-struck in contemplating this assassination of whole people and nations, he is surprised into a mis-estimate of his country by having to trace, laboriously, a struggle between Russia and England of duplicity and fraud, as if these were the weapons of England's warfare, and Russia her equal; or as if Russia were more than her equal in all save dishonour. He shrinks from such an inquiry, and despairs of such a people, little suspecting the strength that lies in England's breasts, dormant now but not extinct—strength derived from the absence of ambition in the character of her people, and from the power of maintaining the Right in the posture of her Isle. The breath of an honest and able Minister in the House of Commons may even yet, in an instant, break the mighty spell that has fascinated Europe and Asia—may arouse the drooping fortunes of this land and give to them a supremacy—bounded by no ocean tract—limited by no mountain course, but extending through every region, and having a hold upon every soil where men have rights to assert or homesteads to defend. England's interests are those of the World—her rights those of Man. To understand the first—to assert the second, is to render her will Law—because just. Then would the power of England be dear to other people—by the alarms it would avert from the weak, and useful to ourselves by the curb it would place upon the strong. Then, and only then, would be established the peace of the world—*peace* because *right prevails*, not because force has triumphed.

In the very year 1836, in which the British Government pretended to feel these duties—to assert this policy—to enter on this high career—did the British Minister at St. Petersburg declare that *England and Russia were united to maintain the peace of the world*. England required no consort in such an office—from the hour that she did assume it, becoming true to herself, she ceased to have a foe. There was one Power that threatened the independence of nations—that endangered the peace of the world. The union, therefore, of England with that Power was to crush the liberties of nations, and to extinguish the hopes of men.

TABULAR VIEW OF THE UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA.

Since the last war, the following great international events have occurred, in all of which Russia has stood on the one side, acting or prompting, England on the other, complaining or resisting.

The Holy Alliance.

The occupation of Naples by Austria.

Invasion of Spain by France.

Insurrection of Greece.

Treaty of the 6th July, 1827, for the dismemberment of Turkey.

War of Russia against Persia.

War of Russia against Turkey.

War of Russia against Circassia.

War of Russia against Poland.

Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi offensive against England.

England stood alone without, and opposed to the Holy Alliance.

The Austrian occupation of Naples was prompted by Russia, England alone standing aloof.

The invasion of Spain by France was prompted by Russia, who had recourse even to menaces*. Against this invasion, it was a question whether or not England should interfere by arms.

The insurrection of Greece was conducted by Russia as a conspiracy chiefly alarming to England.

The Treaty of the 6th July, 1837, England engaged in avowedly for the purpose of restraining Russia.

The war of Russia against Persia was a direct assault against England, who was bound by treaty to protect Persia.

The war of Russia against Turkey again placed England and Russia in direct opposition.

So the war against Circassia.

So the war with Poland.

Finally, on the revelation of the secret Treaty imposed by Russia on Turkey, that of Unkiar Skelessi, England protested against Russia's act.

England stood as the sole opponent, in Europe as in Asia, at once of the objects which Russia pursued, and of the doctrines which she laboured to propagate.

Hostility, more grave in its character, gigantic in its objects, inveterate in its activity (on one side at least), never was presented before between nation and nation.

* Avowed by the Minister of France.

Such being the reciprocal position of the two Governments, namely, that of constant aggression of Russia, of constant resistance on the part of England, we discover, in the year 1838, by the publication of these diplomatic documents, *that four years before, the two governments had secretly recognised to each other* that the interests of the two countries were the same, and had agreed to concert their policy ! Nevertheless, the opposition between the two countries continues as before to the eyes of England, of Europe, and of the East. This secret concert is established at a time when a public protest is made by England against Russia in regard to Turkey. At the time when England publicly protests against Russia in Turkey, she concurs with Russia in regard to the destinies of Poland. At the time that England concurs with Russia regarding Poland, she sends instructions to counteract Russia's intrigues in Greece. At the very time that England is counteracting her intrigues in Greece, is England paying to her the Russo-Dutch Loan, under a treaty which the legal authorities of the Crown declare to be no longer binding. In this same year a Quadruple Treaty is framed for the assumed purpose of arresting the influence of Russia in the Peninsula. In the same year the Sovereign of England accepts the appeal of the Circassians against Russia; and, in the same year, the Indian Government proceeded to take measures to arrest her designs for dismembering that portion of the British territory. Opposition is shown here, and union is declared there; now the one, now the other, appears secret, now patent, till the whole becomes an inextricable mass of confusion, where no one can see his way, yet, respecting which, every man is perpetually expressing opinions. Thus is reason perverted, and honesty destroyed—a mist is spread, producing a mist over the senses of the nation, and the mechanism created for the conduct of public affairs is converted into an engine for the destruction of the state.

Could Russia have suffered England to announce UNION between them, had England been pursuing objects of her own? If so, this union would have given to England Russia's influence, to be employed against herself. It was for the advancement of Russia's ends, therefore, that this union was proclaimed. The union of England and Russia to maintain that peace which no one but Russia threatened, has, in four years, converted Europe into a vast camp of permanent armaments, and spread war throughout Asia, from the Adriatic to the Yellow Sea.

UNION OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

(DECLARATION OF THE AMBASSADOR OF H. B. M. AT ST. PETERSBURGH—MAY, 1836.)

	PERSIA.	AFFGHAN-ISTAN.	TURKEY.	EGYPT.	GREECE.	CIRCASSIA.	POLAND.	CRACOW.	HOLLAND AND BELGIUM.	SPAIN.	BRITISH EMPIRE.			INDIAN GOVERNMENT (4).	
1833.	<i>Defensive Treaty between Great Britain and Persia AGAINST Russia.</i>	Defensive Treaty between England and the Affghans— Invasion by a Pretender from the British Territory.	Refusal by England of succour to Turkey against Egypt, so as to compel her to accept Russian Succour.	Revolt of Egypt prepared by Russia, suffered by England, brings Russian Intervention.	Union of Russia and England to dismember Turkey of Greece. Transfer to Russia of property mortgaged to British bondholders.	Independence guaranteed against Russia by Treaty of July 1827.						NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES.	THE UNITED KINGDOM.	INDIAN DOMINION.	Alarmed at designs of Russia.
1834.	Secret Union of Great Britain with Russia respecting Persia. (June 16th.)		Protest of England against the Treaty between Russia and Turkey; the Price of that Succour.		Majority of the Royal Regency expelled from Greece by England on the plea that they were Russian.	Appeal of the Circassians against Russia accepted by the King of England.									Takes preventive measures to arrest Russian Influence.
1835.	British Envoy instructed to warn Persia AGAINST Russia. (July 25th.)	The Affghan Princes informed by Russia of the intention of the British Government to set up the same Pretender.	Submission by England to execution of a Treaty, declared by herself to be offensive against her. (*)		Boast that England had overthrown the Influence of Russia in Greece.										Russia fomenting Discontent within, and creating Hostility around, by secret and avowed Emis-saries.
1836.	British Envoy instructed to acquiesce in Persia's assault on Herat. (*)	The Indian Government opens Communications with Cabool for mutual Defence against Persia and Russia.	Measures adopted ostensibly by British Government to defend Turkey against Russia.		Act of Parliament to separate England from Russia, that England might pay the Loan which Russia refused to advance.	Measures adopted by the British Government to maintain the Independence of Circassia.									Negoeiations in Affghanistan to resist Persia and Russia.
1837.	British Envoy instructed from India to counteract the Assault upon Herat.	The Indian Government disavows any Intention of setting up a Pretender.	Sacrifice of those measures. UNION of the two Courts.		Russia predominant.	Sacrifice of those measures.									
1838.	<i>England annuls the Defensive Treaty between herself and Persia BECAUSE Persia is united to Russia.</i>	The Indian Government invades Affghanistan without Declaration of War, and sets up the Pretender.	Alteration of a Treaty, adopted to defend Turkey against Russia, into a means of convulsing and dismembering Turkey (1).	Pacha of Egypt warned so as to be invited to declare his Independence, to afford the opportunity for the Treaty of the 15th July.	Vehement dissensions between England and Greece.	UNION of the two Courts.									CHARTISTS organised by Russian agents.
Local Effects.	Persia invading Affghanistan, and pondering over the Conquest of India.	Hostile Occupation of Central Asia by England.	Prostration of the Ottoman Empire.	Egypt opens Communications with Persia— Fomenting Insurrection in the other Provinces of Turkey.	Annihilation of internal Liberties, and of external Independence.	This people assailed by Russia, cut off from the rest of mankind through—	Incorporated with Russia.								Great Britain an object of contempt to the powerful— of alarm to the weak.
Consequence to England.	Persia, the Defence of India, converted into a Source of Danger to India.	England and Russia changing places in Central Asia.	Decay of Turkey through union of England with her Foe.	Success as elsewhere of England in ruining England's Interests and Power.	Sacrifice of Interests, Rights, and £.3,000,000. Fraudulent accounts presented to Parliament.	England's submission to the piratical seizure of a British vessel on their Coast.	Sacrifice of commercial Rights.	Sacrifice of commercial Rights.	Sacrifice of Money and Rights.	Sacrifice of Blood, of Treasure, of Rights, of Name.					England incomprehensible to Englishmen, therefore— Knowledge of Public Affairs, Sense of Justice, Affections of Patriotism, Rights of Citizenship—destroyed.
General Results.	ENGLAND SUCCESSFUL AGAINST ENGLAND by submission to Injustice—by employment of ships, troops, money, and influence, to inflict injustice. Loss of allies, ruin of character, sacrifice of interests (3).—Gradual darkening of the mind of England, and, thereby, of Europe and the world; gradual development of hatred between nations, and of passions among men.										HOUSE—WHICH AN ENEMY HAS DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF.				

WAR WITH RUSSIA.

THEREFORE THE UNION OF ENGLAND TO RUSSIA HAS PRODUCED :—

<p><i>Union of Persia with Russia AGAINST England.</i></p>	<p>The frontiers of the British power brought ONE THOUSAND MILES NEARER TO RUSSIA. NATURAL FRONTIERS OF INDIA OVERSTEPSSED.</p>	<p>By England's act the PROTECTORATE OF RUSSIA, established OVER THE ONLY ANTAGONIST OF RUSSIAN AMBITION!</p>	<p>Egypt prepared to be the pretext of a COALITION for the DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.</p>	<p>Greece had thrown herself on the protection of England— ENGLAND THROWS GREECE UNDER THE FEET OF RUSSIA.</p>	<p>Participation of England in Russia's AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST CIRCASSIA.</p>	<p>ANNEXATION TO RUSSIA OF A KINGDOM.</p>	<p>Admission of the right of Russia TO DO AS SHE PLEASES.</p>	<p>Years of ALARM to Europe. Its press filled with millions of columns of VAIN DISCUSSION.</p>	<p>Division of Europe into TWO HOSTILE LEAGUES.</p>	<p>Insurrection in Canada—Sedition in the United Kingdom—Insurrection in India —fomented by <i>Russia</i>. India openly —menaced by <i>Russia</i>. Interests and Power of Britain throughout the World —assailed by <i>Russia</i>, ENGLAND AND RUSSIA BEING THE WHILE UNITED, THROUGH THE TREASON OF A BRITISH MINISTER.</p>
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NOTES TO TABLE.

(*) (*) Appointments in these years, as Envoy to Persia, and as Secretary of Embassy in Turkey; of Authors of Works and Essays exposing the errors of the past policy of Great Britain; proving the danger to Persia and to Turkey of the public policy and the secret machinations of Russia; proving the hostility of Russia to Great Britain; and showing that the sole danger for Persia and for Turkey, as for England, rested in the control which Russia possessed over the policy of Great Britain. Both these individuals were appointed out of the ordinary course. They accepted these situations solely in the belief of the change which they conceived they had been themselves the instruments of effecting in the mind of the British Government.

(No. 1.) The British Government had ostensibly adopted the project of a commercial treaty with Turkey. This instrument was framed to shield from Russia the internal prosperity of Turkey; also to counteract the designs of the Pacha of Egypt against his Sovereign. This Treaty, then proposed, was not carried into effect. Two years later it was concluded, *but so altered* as to become, in the hands of Russia, an instrument against England and against Turkey.

(No. 2.) By the Quadruple Treaty (a measure proposed by the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Russia obtained, *First*, another diplomatic web spreading over these four countries; *Second*, Continuation of distraction in the Peninsula; *Third*, Patronage of, and influence with, the opposition in England, which resisted the measures into which she had led the Government; *Fourth*, The occupying of attention—confusion of opinion—the exasperating of faction throughout the whole of Europe. Having secured all these results, she further obtains, *Fifth*, The formation of a counter-league of Austria and Prussia with herself; controlling the Quadruple Alliance through the British Minister; placing France in opposition to England by the violation of its conditions; putting Austria and Prussia in opposition to England, by the fact of its existence. Thus has Europe been divided into two hostile leagues. At the head of the one is *Russia*, at the head of the other is *England—the two Powers declaring themselves united to maintain the peace of the world!*

(No. 3.) The actual loss of money in expenditure, sacrifice of mortgage, pecuniary advances, loss of revenue in India and Canada, &c., amounts to above £.20,000,000; but the diminution of commerce, by the arrestation of its course abroad and the shaking of commercial confidence at home, has imposed a much heavier loss than this. I refer, of course, only to the few countries enumerated in this table.

(No. 4.) I have placed in distinct columns India and the Indian Government. The first a State convulsed by Russia; the second, a Government paralysed in mind and action by the control possessed over it by England. Had the Indian Government been independent, it would have appealed to England against Russia; and had it found England *united* to Russia, it would have looked on it also as its foe, and must have ceased to be influenced by it. But unfortunately for *England*, the Governors of India are Englishmen.

N.B.—In this table I have omitted the relations of England with the other great Powers—France, the United States, and Prussia; and further, those with Denmark, Sweden, Western and Southern Africa, and South America, in each of which our position is endangered by aggressions of the native authorities, or by interference of Foreign States, or by our own injustice. Violation of right, sacrifice of money and of commerce, we have endured in all. National contempt, and political hostility, is preparing to invite the strong and to compel the weak into enmity against this land—once the palladium of liberty, and the holder of the scales of power.

In glancing at this general picture of our condition, it must not be forgotten that a transfer has taken place from England to other nations of that power upon which her existence depends. On entering the last war, England's naval force was equal to that of the united naval force of the world. It now constitutes little more than a third. It must also be borne in mind that England depends on *supremacy at sea* for the maintenance of her colonial dominions—the protection of her coasts and territories, for the materials for naval architecture, and—for food.

PART III.

ELEVATION OF MAHMOUD MEERZA TO THE THRONE OF PERSIA. EVENT UNNOTICED IN THE PAPERS PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT.

THE practical connection of England with Persia dates from the year 1800, and commences with a transaction which shews that the good-will and services of the weaker were recognised by the stronger of these two Powers as of vital importance—and that the friendship of the stronger was felt by the weaker to be so valuable as to make it for Persia the first of objects to merit the favour, and to obtain the protection, of her powerful ally. Threatened in India by the Affghans, England appealed to Persia. Persia immediately assumed such an attitude as to compel the Affghans to relinquish all designs against Hindostan. A few years later, Persia, unable to cope single-handed with Russia, had in turn to appeal to the State whose gratitude she had merited, and to whom she had proved the value of her independence and her friendship, but—England was allied to her foe! She appealed to France, who, being at war with Russia, soon secured an entire ascendancy over Persia. England, now alarmed for India, attempted to regain her ground in Persia. The contest between England and France was thus carried to the Persian capital. France in the meantime was joined by Russia. This union restored the Eastern position of England, by snatching her from the control of Russia, and on the other hand barred against France the gates of India, and deprived her of all influence in the East. The influence of each of these Governments has been successively effaced in the East from the moment that it allied itself with Russia. Persia was now supported by England, but England again allied herself to Russia. The disastrous effects of this alliance on the Eastern interests of Great Britain, and on the integrity and independence of Persia, soon appear. Russia was struggling for existence against Napoleon; she was also at war with Turkey and Persia. England compelled Turkey and Persia to a peace with Russia—without the slightest regard to their rights or interests—and Russia in each, through the use she was enabled to make of the co-operation of England and of the prostituted honour and faith of her representative, gained more

than she might have secured by a successful war. To Persia this co-operation of England with Russia was peculiarly disastrous, for the definitive treaty between her and Russia was postponed till after the defeat of Napoleon, so that she presented to Persia her whole national force undistracted after the greatest of modern successes; and strong at once in the strength of the two Powers who now divided the world—strong in the fall of France—strong in the alliance of England.

The treaty of Gulistan, mediated by England, was thus the Partition of Persia*. Persia by that treaty ceded the whole of the region lying south of the Caucasus, actually possessed by Russia—no less than twelve provinces or districts, equal together in extent to England. England no sooner brings about the Partition of Persia, than she bethinks herself of entering into a defensive alliance with that State—bound herself to defend it—and constituted herself a party to the settlement of its frontiers.

From the moment however of the signature of the treaty of Gulistan, Russia commenced to exhibit a determination to fulfil no engagement, and to spare no means of oppression, degradation, and menace to the Persian Government. The frontiers remained unsettled, and the object of incessant agitation and alarm, and thus at once was the Persian nation exasperated and the English Government degraded; the English Government, always uncertain whether to keep with the hounds or run with the hare, had allied itself to Persia for her protection, after compelling her to desist from hostilities against Russia—had pledged the faith of its Minister in Persia for the sincerity of Russia—had exerted the influence of its Minister at St. Petersburg to mitigate the severity of her injustice. False position—useless efforts—broken pledge—violated faith!

After fourteen years of this continuous action upon Persia, and after the exasperation thus artfully roused had led to the catastrophe which befell the Russian Minister, the war of 1826 broke out, and England lent to Persia neither protection nor troops—withheld from her all political support, and refused to acquit her pecuniary obligations.

The treaty of Turkmanchai, by which this war was ended (1828), enforced a further partition of the kingdom, it imposed an enormous debt upon

* Russia did indeed reject the formal mediation of England, while using the services and prostituting the faith of the English Envoy.

the sovereign, and it pressed with such weight upon the northern provinces of the empire, which were the chief nurseries of its strength and the sources of its riches, as to occasion, with the famine and epidemic diseases which followed, a loss of two millions of souls.

After such disasters, and bound as England was to Persia—looking to her as the defence of India—conceiving the support of her independence, and her integrity against Russia, as the first object of her eastern policy*, it was impossible in taking any decision to be content with less or to contemplate any other save that which sufficed for securing to Persia the possession of her own territories—the observation of her own frontiers—and, above all, for giving to her confidence in the support of England against her implacable foe. Nothing of the kind is dreamt of: energetic measures, however, *are* taken with respect to Persia—treasure expended—blood shed. But this is not done to impose any check on Russian ambition—it is done to put a new monarch on the throne—that monarch the nominee of Russia!

The following passage from the pen of a Russian agent, and written at the period of the accession of Mahmoud Meerza, may prove of interest:—

“ During the last reign the influence of the English was paramount in Persia; they had the entire confidence of the monarch, and were the objects of the affections of the people; they were entrusted with the full command of the military force, and were enabled to form a small but efficient regular army, capable, under the British commanders, to whom they were devoted, of meeting the best troops that Russia could bring against them. The Russians, on the contrary, were detested by the people, and the Shah could not bear their presence. On one occasion a Russian traveller happened to fall ill at Teheran; the Shah sent repeated messages to the English Envoy at Teheran, where the invalid had obtained an asylum, to desire that he might be removed beyond the walls of the city. The inhabitants of the Mohulla, or quarter in which the British resided, having on another occasion learned that the gentlemen of the Russian mission were permanent guests of the British Ambassador, sent a deputation to the Envoy to entreat their removal.”

Persian hatred of Russia constituted our strength—their confidence in us arose from our opposition to Russia. Concert of England with their foe was destruction to them. This position is clear and simple—they could only hope for defence against their enemy in the determination of England to protect herself. To be the friend of England, therefore, was to be the foe of

* “ As long as Britain retains India, and Russia her present military force, so long must the integrity and independence of Persia be of vital importance to the one, and a formidable impediment to the exercise of the power of the other.”—*Progress of Russia in the East*, p. 61.

Russia, and the foe of England was necessarily the ally of Russia—the two camps stood entrenched in the face of each other. The highest authority of the State had proclaimed the cause of England to be the cause of national independence, and the expounders of the law and the faith had denounced the friend of Russia as a traitor and a renegade*.

First-rate States, looking to no human power as greater than themselves—dreading injury from none—calculating on the dispositions or character of no other Government for justice or for independence—cannot form to themselves any idea whatever of the mental state of weaker powers, of the dependence which they feel or the anxiety with which they watch the words, acts, and thoughts of the representatives, the statesmen, or even of individuals, belonging to the leading nations. England, whilst thus observed, has had no design to carry out, and, therefore, has she been indifferent and ignorant; still, confidence in her integrity and in her power, is the sole international source of resistance to the assault of Russia, and her allies, on the liberties of mankind. How essential is it, then, for England, that, supplying her mental deficiencies, she should have a Foreign Minister alive to the human chords which are strung in the hearts of the minor States. But should a Foreign Minister alone in a land comprehend this power to use it against his country!

The following extract is from a speech of Lord Palmerston's, delivered when in opposition in 1829. It will apply to our subject—reading Persia for Portugal, Spain for Russia—with the difference that Spain is not quite Russia—and that if Spain did entertain designs against the possessions of England in India, or on the Ottoman Empire and Europe, the acquisition of Portugal would not materially assist her :—

“ It has been the opinion of the wisest statesmen of Portugal, that the best security for Portuguese independence must be found in the selfish interests of England, and that as it was worth while for England, for her own sake, to make great efforts to prevent Portugal from being annexed to Spain, England, therefore, was sure to be the most sincere and trusty ally to whom in the hour of need Portugal could turn for assistance. These reciprocal interests engendered connexion and alliance, mutual usefulness led to good offices on one side, and to confidence on the other—treaties imposed obligations and conferred corresponding rights, and hence it is that Portugal has always solicited and received the advice of England, as that of a friend whose interests were identified with

*In the appendix will be given a very remarkable state paper, drawn up by the chief men of the law, assigning the reasons of their friendship for England, and their enmity to Russia.

her own, and hence it is also that England has been permitted to exercise an authority and possess an influence in the councils of Portugal which did not naturally belong to her, regarding her as an independent State."

The appreciation here evinced of the feelings engendered in weaker states by the necessities and the affections of protection, the terms in which the thoughts are conveyed, and the order in which they are placed, afford valuable means of estimating the powers of the actual Foreign Minister of this country. The ignorance, or the worse than ignorance, of great and small, of wise and simple—of all that concerns the public faith, honour, interests, and policy, have reduced every question connected with our national affairs—every question connected with the States whose independence and existence depend on the policy of Great Britain—to a knowledge of the ideas, or the will, or the caprice of a single man. A knowledge of this man's character is therefore the first step in every international investigation; and few passages among even the unfrequent sentences which at intervals escape his lips or flow from his pen, have revealed to me so much of his power, for evil or for good, as the passage above quoted.

Upon the death of Abbas Meerza, the Prince Royal, his son, Mahmoud Meerza, succeeded to the command of his army, *then employed in the expedition against Herat*, and to the Governorship of Azerbaijan—a province which had borne the chief penalties of the last war, and was now subdued to the influence of Russia. It was the source of projects of Eastern conquest in which the suggestions of Russia had prevailed, and to which her support was requisite. Mahmoud Meerza did not, however, succeed of right to the pretensions of his father on the Crown of Persia, as, according to the ideas of the East, the son of the Sovereign comes before his grandson—and this very uncertainty it was, in regard to his title, which gave to the pretensions of Mahmoud Meerza their chief merit in the eyes of Russia.

The principal competitor of Mahmoud Meerza was his uncle, the eldest surviving brother of Abbas Meerza. He was almost the independent ruler of a strong and difficult country, inhabited by tribes attached to the British name, who from their southern position stood, in relation to England, in a light analogous to that in which Azerbaijan stood in regard to Russia. He was known to entertain feelings equally strong of hostility to Russia, and of confidence in England. Each of these provinces was moreover influenced

by the dangers which it had to apprehend—the advantages which it might derive from the hostility or the friendship of the power to which it approached. This opposition of local interest was confirmed and augmented by corresponding opposition in the opinions of the Princes by whom they were ruled, and by the conflicting claims of these on the Persian Crown.

In the eyes of Persia, the struggle between these two Princes became a contest between the hostile influence of England and of Russia, that is to say, between Persian nationality, vainly appealing to England, and—Russian aggression.

Thus did the question present itself at the opening of these negotiations, when Russia asserted, and England admitted, that their interests were one, and that they should unite to advise the Shah to adopt “*some* one candidate,” and when they did unite in supporting “*one* and the SAME candidate.”

The papers presented to Parliament furnish no information whatever upon any of these subjects. While occupied with voluminous details upon all the subordinate and posterior transactions, there is not the remotest indication given of the anterior position of England and Persia, or of the opinions of any individual connected with the British Service, and no exposition of the policy pursued or of the objects which the Government of Great Britain had in view ; and while no reason whatever is assigned for the selection of Mahmoud Meerza, the very fact of his elevation to the throne—an event accomplished by British arms—is not so much as even mentioned. Mahmoud Meerza’s name seems only introduced as an unintelligible pretence for putting forward the union between Russia and England ; by involving the enquirer in details to drag him into an admission of the proposition with which they were connected. This union is all that the reader of the Parliamentary Papers is to know. He is to commence with learning that England and Russia *are* united—no doubt is to exist in his mind as to this fact ; and it was to be expected that he should enquire no farther. This expectation has been entirely realised—the nation and Parliament have adopted as their own the policy of Russia. Years have gone by, catastrophes have overtaken them, but not reflexion. In prosecution of that union with Russia, which, had it been a union, must have rendered them all-powerful, they have lost in Persia all that they possessed, and all that they sought to obtain. But has the nation’s illusion thereby been dispelled ? Has one man in this country been brought to draw the plain and simple

inference that this union was a deception practised on his ignorance? Has one man been brought to perceive that national dishonour is individual disgrace;—that national disaster must ultimately entail individual loss? Has one man perceived that it is a solemn duty to himself, to the society to which he belongs, to the family of which he is a member, to understand those matters in which are involved the national weal? If not, experience has no wisdom in store for us. In vain is spread open the page of history before eyes that cannot see; bootless the words of warning and of truth to ears that cannot hear.

Russia waited not for the approval by England of her choice to announce to Persia the election which she had made, nor for the co-operation of England to declare that she had 40,000 men ready to support Mahmoud Meerza. The very moment that the Prince Royal expired, the Secretary to the Russian Mission was sent to the Shah with a letter of condolence, and also of congratulation on the promising character of the heir whom he had left to inherit the throne of Persia. England had no opinion to offer, and no line to take—but by the time of the death of the Shah the English Envoy was prepared instantaneously to stand forth as the advocate of the Russian protégé, against the prince who was considered in Persia the champion of the interests of Great Britain. Mahmoud Meerza was proclaimed by the British Envoy, English money being disbursed to the troops, and English officers placed in command of the force commissioned to place him on the throne.

The Governor of Teheran, an uncle of Mahmoud Meerza, had secured the treasure, and had assumed the royal title—the influence of the British Mission and the money of England were supplied to detach from him his supporters, and succeeded in compelling him to relinquish the diadem.

The combined efforts of the new Shah and the English were then directed against the Prince of Schiraz, and by bold measures and rapid marches the English commander paralyzed his antagonists—entered successively Ispahan and Schiraz—secured the unfortunate Prince—carried him to Teheran—and delivered him up to an untimely fate*! The Russian

* These facts I state merely on the rumours of the time. I know of no account of these transactions available for reference. All notice of this period has been carefully excluded from the documents presented to Parliament.

Minister throughout these transactions remained a passive spectator of events, and had but to applaud the ability of English diplomacy, to extoll the valour of British arms, and to congratulate the Emperor upon entire success. It then became known to Persia that the support of Russia was necessary to obtain the friendship of England, and the Persians had already ascertained upon what condition the support of Russia was to be secured.

England has applied herself with a remarkable intensesness of purpose and sequence of design to cultivate the favourable dispositions of the Persian people, and to bind its Government to herself. She has employed men for this service of distinguished ability—she has expended for this end more money than in peace she has expended upon all the other states of the world during the whole course of her existence. She has laboured successfully to overcome the prejudices of the Persians to military discipline*, and gave to Persia a respectable military force.

The end to which her diplomatic labours tended was the maintenance of the nationality of Persia against Russia, and that end was apparently realised in the establishment of the new monarch securely on the throne, and by the union of the kingdom under a monarch apparently the choice of England, and indebted to her for his elevation:—he is no sooner on the throne than he avows the intention of attacking India.

The end of her military labours was to enable Persia to cope with the armies of Russia, and no sooner is that object realised than these troops are put in motion against her allies and herself. Are these the results of the UNION of England with Russia?

These facts are generally known throughout this country, they yet have led to no public indignation, they have prompted no enquiry—they have neither given rise to individual curiosity as to the process by which they have been effected, nor to Parliamentary investigation of the conduct of those through whose instrumentality they have been brought about. Consequently, England must fail in every enterprise; since, where there is no penalty for guilt, there can be no incentives to honour: where there is no

* In this she only imitated France, whose Ambassador, General Gardanne, during the short space of French influence in Persia, had introduced European discipline as preparing Persia for an assault in India. England continued to improve the discipline of the Persian armies, while she sacrificed the independence of the Persian state, preparing thus a weapon against herself.

interest in public events, there can be neither intelligence nor honesty in public men. Equal calamities await the inaction as the activity of a heedless people, and the sole system of mismanaged affairs, is falsehood of statement, and error of act.

The struggle in Persia, which succeeded to the death of the king, brought into effect the previously established concert of England and Russia, by the employment of the diplomatic influence, of the money, and the military means of England, to overthrow the rivals of Russia's nominee. The English minister assumes this to be a British object—if an object it was a triumph; he was therefore entitled to applause, and he ought to have sought that legitimate support, from the public knowledge of his success, which an upright man, in the difficult station of Foreign Minister, must feel to be absolutely requisite to give him power, and to keep him honest; but, far from this, Lord Palmerston claims no merit—shews no pride—he rejects the laurels of victory—he hushes the trumpet of fame—the triumph of Great Britain in giving a Monarch to an independent kingdom is not thought worth communicating to a British senate, and no suspicion, no disposition to inquire, is awakened in that senate by so extraordinary a suppression.

PART IV.

PERSIAN INVASION OF AFFGHANISTAN.

RUSSIA no sooner effects the elevation of Mahmoud Meerza than she proceeds to inspire that monarch with ambitious projects against the British Possessions in India.

Before applying ourselves to the analysis of the few dissevered lines in which we are to seek the solution of problems so involved, and the object of transactions so obscure, it may not be unprofitable to attempt to place ourselves in the relative positions of Russia and of Persia—the latter look-

ing to Russia and to England, weighing them against each other, balancing the language, capacity, and intentions of each. To the Envoy of Russia—urging a Persian expedition against Herat, the Shah would declare that he was neither able nor willing to adopt a course hostile to England. We may suppose the following reply :—

RUSSIAN ENVOY.—You have already attacked Herat, and England has taken neither alarm nor offence.

SHAH.—Then my grandfather was alive, and his known friendship tranquillized the English Government; but in me a young, and, as she may think, ambitious Prince, she may be seriously indisposed, and take against me decisive and destructive measures.

RUSSIAN ENVOY.—Did not England's alliance with you spring from the necessity of your assistance to protect India against us? England, then, only possesses India by our disunion? You dread England. Look at facts: observe England how she has dwindled—Russia how she has grown. Have we not conquered your hostility, and made you our friend? Have we not conquered Turkey? Have we not conquered Poland? And in doing so have we not acted in opposition to the will of Great Britain, and in defiance of her power? She has protested against our treaty with the Porte, and what has been the benefit of her protest? Have we not captured a vessel of her own without a shadow of a pretext*—has she not submitted? At the treaty of Gulistan (Persia and Russia were then still foes) you relied on her protection and her power. Did she succeed in obtaining for you one point to which she had given her guarantee, or in compelling from us the fulfilment of any stipulation to which we were pledged? When the war broke out in 1826, did England, after encouraging you to resistance by the confidence of protection and the promise of subsidies, afford you support? Did she pay you the money? What advantage then is there in her

* It may seem strange to put in the mouth of the Russian Ambassador the declaration of the injustice of the acts of Russia; at least this must appear strange to an English reader. He has to learn that the value to Russia of the act lay in its injustice—the greater the indignity offered to England, the clearer the proof of Russia's power and of England's weakness. There is also another object besides inspiring the Shah with awe for the power of Russia, and contempt for that of England; it was necessary to familiarize his mind with the idea of injustice, and of evil injustice practised against England.

friendship, or what danger in her enmity? Russia, her foe, detesting her, detested by her, has grown, and triumphed, and prospered under the blasts of her hostility and the frowns of her hate. Persia, Turkey, Poland, Circassia—every population or state which has looked to England with confidence, and has been fostered by her sympathy or upheld by her mighty arm—has been injured, broken, and betrayed. It is true that it is by the efforts and the money of England that you have been made the Monarch of Persia, but it is by the will of the Emperor that these efforts have been made, and this money has been expended—he it is who has chosen you for the throne of Persia—he it is who may also place you on the throne of Delhi.

SHAH.—But is Russia prepared at this moment to protect me against the consequences of the immediate hostility of England—against the consequences of the dissatisfaction of my own people in their attachment to England if this step should lead to an open rupture? Is Russia, in fact, prepared to make common cause with Persia against England, or rather common cause with me against my own people, and against England?

RUSSIAN ENVOY.—The English Minister in London is the friend of the Emperor. Look at the diplomatic service of England. Does not the Emperor choose the men whom England shall employ, and displace those whom he dislikes? The leaders of that factious people are cowardly men, and have regard to private, not to public interests. What do they know of Asiatic affairs? what do they care for them? Like children, they are fighting for straws at home—strong alone in domestic hate, and rejoicing in national disgrace and disaster, if hurtful to their antagonists. But England, if she had men of ability and integrity to direct her councils, has not the power to injure you. She is involved in insurrection in America. You know what is preparing for her within her own dominions in India and—what around. An island constituting a third of her own kingdom is ripe for revolt, and her own people is divided into factions more bitter against each other than if they belonged to nations at war. This nation has no political sagacity or instinct, but it has political power, so that what it calls its liberty suffices to prevent union for any purpose—the state becomes incapable of action, and the Foreign Minister must rely for support from with-

out, against the assaults of faction at home*. The military force of the Government is insignificant; it is perfectly contemptible against a foreign enemy, and is even insufficient to compress the disaffection growing up and spreading throughout the wide limits of this disconnected empire. That naval supremacy which has hitherto constituted its strength, and without which India cannot be held, is gone†. The naval power of Russia and of France have each separately risen to an equality with it, and these two nations are united. Their naval power has grown before the eyes of England, without their comprehending its object, or even being conscious of its existence, and as you see England united to Russia while engaged in working her downfall, you may understand that a nation so stupid must give to every power with which it is in contact an interest in its overthrow. While convulsion is preparing and organizing in her own territories, a general “union of crowns” is concerting against her, and it requires but moderate prudence to render her downfall no less safe than certain.

SHAH.—Since then you assert that England is powerless to oppose us, and since, moreover, you assert that the English Government is in reality your friend, it is easy for you to give me from the mouth of the English Ambassador, the proof of England’s union with you.

RUSSIAN ENVOY.—You cannot expect from the English Ambassador the declaration that his Court will concur with you in the invasion of its territories, but I will draw from the English Ambassador the avowal, that whatever may be the alarms that he may individually entertain regarding your projects upon India, these alarms are not shared by the Foreign Minister, who is the only person of importance in this matter. Moreover, England and Russia being *united*, whatever Russia counsels, Persia must receive as the will of the two States; if England had any complaint to make it would be against Russia, and not against Persia, and the two Courts come to a perfect understanding at St. Petersburg and in London,

* “By an excessive jealousy of its liberty, the nation (Poland) has placed itself out of the power of acting, so that its councils are committed to the caprice or the treachery of a single minister.”—Vattel, B. 1, cap. 3, sec. 24.

† Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone relates in his work on Cabul, that on observing to an Affghan that England had the supremacy at sea, the Eastern remarked, “How then had you to pay 25 per cent. premium on insurance during the war?”

before sending instructions. The Persian monarch cannot forget that his predecessor relied upon the support of England against Russia—that that support has not availed anything to Persia—that Persia has now lost it—and that England and Russia being united, Persia can have no will in this matter save that of the Emperor.

SHAH.—Bring from the English Ambassador confirmation of that which you have said—prove to me that the union of the two Courts extends to your present recommendations, and I am ready to adopt your counsels and to follow your advice.

RUSSIAN ENVOY.—I will bring from the English Ambassador the avowal of the actual knowledge of his chief of our projects against Affghanistan, of the continuance of England's union with Russia notwithstanding that knowledge; and, farther, I will put you in possession of England's concurrence in our common views regarding the rights of Persia over Herat, Cabul, and Candahar; and, moreover, here is a draft of the instructions which will be sent from London for the direction of this new Ambassador, and by which you will feel at once the strength and the delicacy of our position.

SHAH.—So be it.

Now let us examine the Documents.

Mr. Ellis is sent out to congratulate the Shah, as Ambassador Extraordinary, with the following instructions:—

“ You will especially warn the Persian Government against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war against the Affghans. Whether Persia is successful or not, her resources will be wasted in these wars, and her future means of defence must be diminished.”

This Instruction, which may appear to the reader insignificant common place, places the British Ambassador in the necessity of proving the case put to the Shah by the Envoy of Russia.

We have first to enquire whether or not this instruction had been communicated to Russia, and whether a corresponding instruction had been sent to the Russian Envoy at Teheran.

Count Nesselrode had proposed that the two Cabinets, whose interests were so identical, should continue to act in concert in the “ spirit of union and of peace,” and that “ corresponding instructions should be sent to

“ their Envoys in Persia.” Lord Palmerston had admitted this proposal, and further by adding the words “ integrity and independence of Persia,” he had shown the determination of subjecting the whole of the internal affairs, and of the external relations of Persia to this irresistible despotism which by uniting with Russia he had established.

Thus then had England and Russia bound themselves to act in concert—they were bound mutually to communicate the instructions to their representatives in Persia. Their language indicates communication in regard to secret measures of future policy. A perfect understanding, therefore, existed between the Foreign Ministers of the two Cabinets, as to the nature and the effects of this union, and as to the results with a view to which it had been established. Therefore community of objects no less than the terms of the compact imposed on the British Minister, the obligation to communicate to the Russian Cabinet the instructions to the British Ambassador in Persia.

Had Russia objected to this instruction it could not (according to compact) have been sent. In like manner if sent, similar instructions must have been addressed to the Russian Envoy. Consequently this instruction became also an instruction from the Court of St. Petersburg. This is a clear and simple case, it is a plain practical matter of business. The instructions to the two Courts were to correspond—no instructions could be sent by either, unless adopted by both.

In this Anglo-Russian despatch, there is this passage—“ Whether Persia is successful or not her resources will be wasted in these wars, and *her future means of defence must be diminished.*” Defence implies danger, and danger the proximity of an enemy. England had by treaty given to Persia the right of claiming her protection, and had declared her own decision to stand forth in Persia’s defence. She was, therefore, not the enemy that Persia dreaded. Both recognized her helplessness and danger. England then compels Persia to relinquish that right, and abandons her in her helplessness to the enemy whose proximity had *called their alliance into life.* For England to warn her, after so casting her off, against injuring her means of defence, was to offer to her an unintelligible insult.

Whence was the danger to proceed? Who was the enemy? Russia.

England was united to Russia—*united*—identified*! What means then interest in the defence of Persia, after perfidiously betraying her? What means anxiety to protect any one against the ally of your bosom?

If it were possible for England to have warned Persia against her ally
—COULD THAT ALLY HAVE CO-OPERATED IN WARNING PERSIA AGAINST HERSELF.

If not, then this instruction was kept secret from Russia. In that case Lord Palmerston violated his faith to Russia—he practised a fraud upon her, and at the same time upon the English nation, as the representative of whom he had the faculty of making a contract, and in whose name, therefore, that contract was made. But what object could he have had in taking this course — a course which was necessarily fatal to his ministerial existence. Was it to gain something for England at the expense of Russia. But what could be obtained by a secret instruction to act in opposition to the Government to whom he had voluntarily lent the enormous power that resulted from the union and co-operation of Great Britain? But to seek to counteract secretly that policy which England avowedly supported, was to prove, that in the estimation of the Foreign Minister the ostensible policy which he pursued, was injurious to Great Britain. Consequently this supposition falls to the ground. It could not have been the object of Lord Palmerston to oppose Russia, and no motive could exist for secretly opposing that Power which he openly and voluntarily supported. But the clear and evident object of the terms and tone of that dispatch, was to make it be believed that Lord Palmerston was acting in opposition to Russia. Then it must be that this despatch, bearing on its face opposition to Russia, and leading to the inference that it was concealed from her, was not in reality opposed to Russia nor concealed from her. If this despatch assumed to be written in opposition to her, was not in reality opposed to her, nor concealed from her—then was this despatch of simulated opposition concerted with her—then must the British Minister have been placed in the power of

* There is no instance on record of independent states concerting to give to their agents corresponding instructions. Union of two Courts is not a diplomatic expression. When things are united they become one, and diplomatic relations would in the case of united Courts cease between them. The confusion of national as of individual sense of course must introduce confusion of terms, but the peculiar ability of Russia has resided in leading in that confusion by the introduction of false terms.

Russia—then must every act of that Minister have been performed under a similar control—then must every act be opposed to the interests of England—then must every statement be the reverse of the truth.

Having thus dwelt upon the deductions from the pretence of opposition in a despatch concerted with Russia, I think it proper to add a few further considerations, proving that it was impossible that Russia should have been ignorant of this despatch, or that it should have been penned by Lord Palmerston with any other view than that of communication to her.

1st. Had Lord Palmerston intended by secret opposition to the joint policy of the two Courts to counteract Russia, he must have given the British Ambassador decided and practical means for doing so. There is nothing of the kind—nothing but a vague warning and an indistinct insinuation, coupled with a careful destruction of the Ambassador's power, by assigning as the motive of the caution, *not* the interests of England, where he had the right to speak, but the interests of Persia, where he had no right to interfere.

If the British Secretary of State had intended what he pretended to wish, he must have written somewhat in the following strain:—" I have
 " ascertained that Russia is about to urge the Persian Government to revive
 " the ancient pretensions derived from the conquest of Nadir Shah, and
 " that she seeks to inspire the young monarch and the Persian people with
 " the desire of Indian plunder. You are instructed to oppose these pro-
 " jects in the most decided manner. Should the Russian Envoy deviate
 " in his bearing and language from the spirit of the union of the two
 " Courts as stated in the despatch of Count Nesselrode, communicated to
 " me by Count Medem on the 22nd August, 1834, you will immediately
 " report such deviation; and you are instructed to declare to the Persian
 " Government that Russia is bound to act in concert with England—that
 " the basis of their concert is peace and union. Language in an opposite
 " sense, if addressed to them by the Russian Envoy, must not be considered
 " as emanating from the Court of St. Petersburg, but as being an act of
 " disobedience on the part of the Envoy." There were no words that could
 be set down with any purpose of prevention, or with any sense of honesty, less decided than these. But had there existed in the mind of the British Minister the intention to oppose Russia, such words would have been super-

fluous. It was in London, and not at Teheran, that Russia was to be opposed, and Russia could not be opposed without integrity and intelligence in the English Minister.

2nd. This warning, such as it stands, had it been intended to be concealed, would have been transmitted in a private letter or in a secret despatch. Russia had obtained the right of inspection of the instructions of England. This despatch is the only document connected with Persia during thirty months—the whole question lay, therefore, in these four lines. On Russia's requiring to be put in possession of the instructions to the British Ambassador—a demand which she must have made had she been kept in any way in the dark—there was nothing else to show. It is, therefore, clear that Lord Palmerston could have put in this despatch nothing which it was an object for him to conceal from Russia.

3rd. Under what circumstances does this document see the light? When publishing correspondence in which he has called Russia to account for acts hostile to Great Britain, a British Secretary of State makes public a document which reveals that he had secretly violated his pledged faith, and broken the existing compact between the two States;—the British Minister voluntarily publishes the fact—Russia carefully abstains from taking advantage of it. The first could not have been done, if Lord Palmerston had had anything to conceal—the second could not have been neglected, if Russia had any discovery to make.

4th. Supposing that the assumed opposition had been real, and that the British Ambassador in Persia had acted against Russia, must not Russia have at once come to the knowledge that he had received secret instructions in opposition to the established concert of the two Courts?—must she not have instantly denounced the perfidy and duplicity of such a transaction to the British nation?—must not she have obtained that very instant the power of removing the Secretary for Foreign Affairs from his office, or of marking him as her own?

Therefore, in each of these four additional grounds is the position established—that this despatch, assumed to be hostile to Russia, was not hostile to her—assumed to be concealed from her, was not concealed from her; but, on the contrary, that it was written with her knowledge, with her concurrence, and for her ends.

That despatch could not have been withheld from Russia honestly—it is not honestly that it is assumed to be concealed from her; the Secretary of State could not honestly have desisted from requiring from Russia the transmission of a similar despatch. On the non-transmission by Russia of a similar despatch, he could not honestly have sent that despatch to Persia—he could not honestly have warned Persia against Russia; it is not honestly that he assumes to have done so—it is not honestly that he pretends interest in her defence, or apprehension for her being rendered weak; every thought in this despatch is dishonest, every insinuation perfidious, every word false, and every sentence a knot of falsehoods.

Let us now examine the effects it was to produce on Persia, putting aside, for the moment, the question of the union of Great Britain and Russia, which, in fact, was the whole question—let us see what instruction the British Ambassador might expect to receive: “ You will inform the
 “ Persian Government that Great Britain cannot admit of the prosecution
 “ by Persia of schemes of conquest; that Great Britain is under the neces-
 “ sity of opposing such designs on the one hand by the duties attached to
 “ her Eastern Empire—on the other by the obligation to enforce respect
 “ for justice on the Government to whom she has lent, and still lends, mili-
 “ tary, pecuniary, and political support.” For a British Minister to say less than this was to render his views and the subject alike incomprehensible. To direct a diplomatic agent to counteract projects of conquest on other grounds than the national rights and interests of his Court, was to render him incomprehensible or contemptible. To transmit a despatch with instructions to counteract warlike measures, injurious and alarming, but without instructing what language was to be used, and what steps to be taken, would seem but an opportunity created for confusing the ambassador, lest uninstructed he might have acted right, and for ensuring from the Foreign Court that aggression on which, unencouraged, it might not have ventured.

The pivot of Lord Palmerston’s instruction is the word “ WARN.” The experience of public disasters and the practice of ages have necessitated the use in diplomacy of terms having an exact and ascertained value—and, as in legal matters, the introduction of terms which have no ascertained and established value vitiates the document, and is referable to ignorance or

dishonesty. “Warn,” is not a diplomatic term. If the danger was to proceed from the will of the nation speaking, it would *threaten*—if not, it had no grounds to interfere, and no right to speak. But in no way is the term warn here admissible. You warn those only who are exposed to danger, and who are ignorant of their being so exposed. On perceiving a man driven back, or pushed forward, you might deplore his case, but your sympathy could not be expressed by the word “warn.” The sentence, “especially to warn the Persians against being pushed on,” is, moreover, ungrammatical. Warning has reference to danger—you warn *of* the danger, not *against* it.

The word warn is thus improper and inadmissible in regard to the subject-matter—it conveys no intelligible meaning as it stands—it is employed ungrammatically. It is, however, the verb which governs the sentence—the sentence composes the whole instruction. The despatch, therefore, is without meaning, and is a solecism.

Lord Palmerston then proceeds to arrange, under two heads, the contingencies of the future. Persia will be successful, or she will not be successful. Certainly there is a very great difference between victory and discomfiture; but Lord Palmerston seems to have sought to establish the difference, for the purpose of effacing it, and convert into the same thing the opposed alternatives. He says:—

If Persia is defeated—	}	Her means of defence must be
If Persia is successful—	}	diminished.

Defence! Had Persia anything further to defend? Where was Persia's defence? Was it not on the banks of the Araxes—in the fastnesses of Ararat—on the shores of the Caspian—under the walls of Koe and Abasabad? These abandoned, there was no Persia to defend; and these were abandoned because England was united to her foe. While these were held, Persia was strong to defend her hearths—when she turned her back on the north she became dangerous to the hearths of other. But if “*successful*,” “her means of defence will be diminished!” Oh, it must be that the mind of the Foreign Secretary is confused—his vision obscured by the great dread and apprehension of any thing that would render Persia unequal to cope with Russia—of any thing that would render her *weak*. Persia thought differently—she had the vanity to believe that the British power would be endangered by her success.

“ *The British Government has been informed of Persia’s projects of Eastern conquest—it has examined the various contingencies which these projects present—it considers the annexation of Affghanistan to Persia as a matter calling for no decision or opinion on its part, and therefore by no means liable to disturb the amicable relations subsisting between Persia and Great Britain, or the union that exists between Great Britain and Russia.*” Such is the interpretation of the words “ WHETHER SUCCESSFUL OR NOT.” The other fragments of the sentence are merely brought together to afford the occasion for their introduction.

Whence did Lord Palmerston derive his information regarding the designs of Persia against the Affghans? No communication upon the subject had arrived from Persia—no communication appears even from St. Petersburg—the source of all Lord Palmerston’s admitted knowledge. Even when the warning arrives in Persia, there had been no intention avowed of any such design. What means, then, warning Persia, *on her own account*, not to injure England?—what means warning a State not to do that which it had declared no intention to do? Language could not convey a more direct incitement!

The selection of the word “ pushed” displays equal subtilty. It was a word over which, conjointly with “ warn,” the British Ambassador must have pored and pondered till he had lost every clear perception of language, of sense, of diplomatic practice. The influence of the study of this document is manifest in the subsequent communications from Persia to London. Lord Palmerston had anticipated by six months the intention of Persia to invade Affghanistan. No less extraordinary foreknowledge is revealed of the mode in which that assault was to be brought about. He knew that when this should occur it should not be as a voluntary movement, or as a spontaneous impulse of Persia, but as a necessity imposed by some secret and irresistible agency. She was to be “ pushed.” The warning is thus directed against the power that was to impel. So that after all this warning, not implying danger—not called for by ignorance (and therefore which is no warning at all)—now appears, had it been a threat, incapable of having any application to Persia. What could this impelling power be? Who could push Persia on? Was it the Turks, or the Toorkmans, or the Oosbegs? No, of course, none of these; and if it had been, how could Lord

Palmerston have got at their intentions? Lord Palmerston could only have had his foreknowledge from Russia, and she alone could push Persia on. Thus was Persia borne wholly harmless, and was the question brought to issue between the two Courts whose union had already extinguished the independence of the Persian state and the free will of its monarch.

The source of the foreknowledge of Lord Palmerston is revealed in the use to which it is applied. This instruction is so framed as at once to advance the views of Russia, and to maintain that appearance of opposition to her which was necessary to his security as to her success. This instruction, which insulted Russia in its forms, benefited her in its matter. The contradiction between the language and the intention proves the concert of Lord Palmerston and Russia in framing it—concert farther established by the circumstances attending its immediate use and its subsequent publication; and if such concert did exist, there was the Russian Envoy in Persia informed of the steps taken in London, and prepared to take advantage of the position in which the British Ambassador in Persia was placed.

The English Ambassador, on receiving this despatch, must seek to obtain information regarding the intended projects of Persia, but he must feel the impossibility of asserting the opposition of England to them. It is clear, therefore, that the Russian Envoy, knowing the instructions of the English Ambassador, could draw from him the proof of every assertion which we have supposed him to have previously made, and was enabled to exhibit in his restlessness, and his anxiety to know, and his inability to speak, the alarm of Great Britain and the helplessness of India! This instruction, which Lord Palmerston leaves on record as the evidence of his desire, and of his attempt to resist Russia, moreover furnished Russia with the means, in case of Lord Palmerston's removal from office, of assaulting his successor for his (Lord Palmerston's) treachery to her. It placed in her hands the justification, if she required it, for breaking the compact of co-operation between the two Courts. All this is effected by a writing of four lines!

Let us now turn to the reports from Persia to see how far these anticipations are realized; the first is dated November 13th, 1835, that is about a month after the receipt of Lord Palmerston's instruction. Mr. Ellis writes:—

“ It is unsatisfactory to know that the Shah has very extended schemes of conquest in the direction of Affghanistan, and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that the right of sovereignty over Herat and Kandahar is as complete now as in the reign of the Suffavean dynasty. This pretension is much sustained by the success of his father, Abbas Meerza, in the Khorassan campaign, and by the suggestions of Colonel Borowski.”

Here suddenly bursts upon us not merely the schemes of a monarch—the impulse of a people in the same direction. All this unexpectedly bursts upon the British Ambassador; he has not seen the clouds rising or the storms threatening; it comes upon him all at once; and such a decision of a monarch placed by England on the throne, such an impulse of a whole people looking to England for protection and defence, he has to account for by the suggestions of one single being—a foreign adventurer and spy! When he communicates all this, he says that “ it is unsatisfactory to *know*.” If it had been known it would not have been stated; he meant to say to learn; but had he used that word he could not have escaped from the necessity, in some degree, of accounting for the process by which it had been brought about.

Lord Palmerston’s instruction had now realized the end for which it was calculated and intended, and the Russian Minister having been enabled to shew to the Shah that the English Ambassador could not speak in the name of England, could not deny that the English Government was aware of the Shah’s projects, and was unprepared to take umbrage at them, in the event of their entire success, did effectually prove to the Shah that England and Russia were in every case united, thereby making him feel the utter impossibility of his resistance to the will of the Emperor, backed as it was by the power of England.

More than even this,—the formal concurrence of England with Persia, in her pretensions upon Herat and Kandahar, was conveyed to Persia.

Lord Palmerston had anticipated Russia in announcing his disposition to concur with her in regard to the “ integrity of Persia.” He first announces Persia’s projects of conquest, and reveals his foreknowledge of Russia’s share in these projects. Persia then declares that Herat and Kandahar are integral portions of her territory, and in making this declaration she is pushed on by Russia, who consequently entertains the same opinion regarding the integrity of Persia. England (acquainted with the

suggestions of Russia to Persia) concurs with Russia in regard to the “integrity” of Persia. England must likewise concur with Persia, who concurs with Russia. Thus the three Powers equally admitted Herat and Kandahar to be integral portions of the Persian kingdom.

It may be said that Lord Palmerston, by using the word “warn,” implied opposition to the projects of Persia. That word, we have seen, meant nothing, and the instruction in which it was included was an incentive to Persia, and not a threat. Further, the declaration of the union of England and Persia in regard to the “integrity of Persia,” was not withdrawn after the declared knowledge of Lord Palmerston of Russia’s pushing Persia on to assert these pretensions, which it must have been had Lord Palmerston not concurred in them. But all doubt on this head is removed by the fact, that the statement of Persia’s pretensions was formally made by the Persian Government to the English Ambassador, was officially transmitted by him to the British Secretary of State, and received no contradiction. Thus was trebly established the recognition of the pretensions of Persia on Herat and Kandahar; first, between England and Russia, by previous compact respecting the “integrity of Persia;” secondly, between Russia and Persia, by communications known to England; thirdly, between England and Persia, by express communication of the latter to the former.

After nearly two months’ consideration, Mr. Ellis determines on bringing the Persian Minister to an explanation, the result of which is that the Persians, pressing on as they find the British Minister retire, boldly assert their claims as far as Ghizni. Of course Mr. Ellis can only inquire, listen, thank them for their courtesy, and withdraw. To his chief he reports that the attack of Persia on Herat* is justifiable, but “ventures” the opinion that the “attempt to annex Kandahar and Ghizni upon preten-

* The documents published do not afford the means of tracing this matter, or ascertaining whether or not Lord Palmerston had taken any steps, and what steps he had taken to lead Mr. Ellis to justify the Persian attack upon Herat. But Mr. Ellis could not fail to know that Lord Palmerston had fully justified, and most energetically supported, the attack of Russia upon Turkey in 1828—that he had concurred in the justice of the Russian war against Persia in 1826. The bias of his chief’s mind could therefore be no secret to him, whether as to associations with the views of Russia, or in a more abstract form, co-operations with injustice.

“ sions derived from the time of Nadir Shah,” (extending as such pretensions must to Delhi, and all the dependencies of the Mogul empire,) “ could not be looked upon with *indifference* by the British Government.”

After another week, he makes the important discovery that Persia, in all that she has been doing, is the instrument of Russia :—

“ January 8, 1836.—I yesterday ascertained, from authority on which I could rely, that the Russian Minister at this Court had expressed himself in very strong terms respecting the expediency of the Shah losing no time in undertaking the expedition against Herat; and had assigned, as a reason for the immediate urgency of his doing so, the probability of the British Government discouraging the attempt, in pursuance of their known wish to see a restoration of the Affghan monarchy.”

England pretends to desire to support the Affghans against Persia ; in reality she justifies and encourages the assault of the latter. In India she openly joins the Seiks against the Affghans, driving them to look for support to Persia, while Persia is pushed on against them by Russia ; Russia, supported by England, pushes on Persia against the Affghans, and is simultaneously appealed to by the Affghans against England and the Seiks. England exhibits in Persia secret opposition to Russia, but ostensible union with her. Russia proclaims open hostility to England, but proves secret understanding. Finally, England is declared by Russia to be preparing in India to give a new sovereign to Affghanistan ! This project, then unknown to Great Britain, is used by Russia further to urge Persia against the Affghans, and of course also to arouse the Affghans against England. Lord Palmerston shows foreknowledge of the acts of Russia. Russia possesses foreknowledge of the *intentions* of England, and commences to make use of the project of the elevation of Shah Shooja, years before England had been brought to the commission of that crime*.

Mr. Ellis continues (8th January, 1836) :

“ *I had hitherto confined myself to the simple expression of the pacific recommendation of his Majesty’s Government on the subject, but when I found that the Russian Minister was about to hold, or had actually held, very opposite language, I determined to be more explicit with the Persian Ministers, and I ventured to be so from the knowledge which I individually had of the general views*

* A Government print recently declared as exhibiting the perfect harmony that reigned between the various portions of the public administration, that the orders from England directing the expedition to Cabul, and the despatches from India announcing its departure, crossed half way, and corresponded in all the details !

of the Authorities in England, respecting Persia and Affghanistan. I accordingly had an interview yesterday with Hajee Meerza Aghassee and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and having recalled to their recollection their declaration that the sovereign rights of the Shah extended in Affghanistan to Ghizni, I informed them *that the official situation which I had held at the India Board*, enabled me to say to them, with confidence, that the British Government would look with great dissatisfaction on the prosecution of any schemes of *extended* conquest in Affghanistan."

Here the English Ambassador, avowing alarm, flatters the ambition of the Persian monarch revealing the want of instructions ; relieves that ambition from every check by referring to having been a member of another "Board," he showed that the house was divided against itself.

Still Mr. Ellis seems to have misgivings lest in "venturing" even so far he had exceeded his chief's intentions*. He had, in fact, departed entirely from the letter of his instructions. He says that he individually possessed the knowledge of a general opinion, language which a common traveller in the country could not have used without self-disrespect. He says, that the British Government would look with great dissatisfaction upon schemes of *extended* conquest. Now, his chief had told him that if Persia was successful against the whole body of the Affghans, her means of defence would be diminished, and consequently the farther she extended, the less would she be alarming to India ; consequently, Mr. Ellis, in declaring as a general opinion, or as an individual opinion, that any, the slightest umbrage, should be taken by England at the projects of the Shah, however extended or however successful, did act in opposition to the instructions of his chief, and must have called down upon himself the animadversions of his chief for such deviation from his duty, had the instructions been penned with the intention of being executed in their patent sense.

Let us examine the position of the British Ambassador. He had received (see despatch of 5th September, 1834) instructions to communicate confidentially with the Russian Minister, and is directed, July 25th, 1835, to warn the Persians against being pushed on to attack Affghanistan. He conceives, of course, that the Russian Minister had received similar instruc-

* I beg to refer to my "Exposition of the Boundary Differences" for an analogous instance of the process of confusing and paralysing an envoy by ambiguous and by contradictory instructions.

tions, and that they are in common to resist this secret influence. He cannot fail to be startled at the foreknowledge of his chief, who in London had fathomed the intentions of Persia three months and a half before he had come to that knowledge in Persia; he then discovers that, as Lord Palmerston had prognosticated, Persia did not act of her own impulse, but that she actually had been *pushed on*. What then must be the effect on Mr. Ellis of the discovery that it was from the very power with which England acted in concert that these projects emanated, and that Persia was pushed on by the very Envoy with whom he had to co-operate!

Mr. Ellis thus found himself instructed to act in two senses directly opposed to each other. In an ordinary transaction an agent would have addressed his principal and said, "Your instructions are inexecutable or "unintelligible, give me other instructions." But a diplomatic agent, serving under a chief whom he may suspect (independently of foreign connexion) of subserving disguised or unavowed interests at home, stands on very different grounds; his progress and position depend not on the performance of a service, but on the discovery of an intention. If he receives ambiguous instructions, he knows that that ambiguity proceeds neither from accident nor from neglect. By the dubious glimmerings lent to his official instinct, he has to grope his way and to guess his steps, under the additional perplexity of being fully conscious that zeal, integrity, ability, and success, would not suffice, unassisted, to screen him even from disgrace.

What is the result? He fulfils the instruction to communicate confidentially with the Russian Minister, by remonstrating against his suggestions; he fulfils the instruction to warn the Persians against being pushed on to attack the Affghans, by justifying the attack upon Herat*. The justification of the war, and the failure of the remonstrance, combining to encourage Persia in doing that which she never could have attempted had the British Minister remained without instructions, or declined to act on

* Mr. Ellis goes so far as to address Prince Kamran a public letter, asserting the justice of the claims of the Persian King, and urging the Prince of Herat to unconditional surrender; and this letter is transmitted through the Persian authorities, and that after Mr. Ellis had submitted to being told, as he himself communicated to his own Government, that the Persian Government would not otherwise suffer him to communicate with Herat.

instructions which were contradictory. If, in either case, Mr. Ellis had not fulfilled the intentions of his chief, his act would have been reversed. His chief, however, adopts his acts and words, proving that this was what he intended.

Mr. Ellis had next to excuse his failure (and whichever way he turns he must fail), and he naturally does so by representing Persia as hostile to England ; and he lays on that hostility the blame of the defection of Persia from England, which had resulted from the collusion of his chief with Russia, and from his own blind agency in that collusion.

Lord Palmerston had it thus in his power to exhibit as early as January, 1836, the opinion of a British Minister in Persia, that Persia was then lost to England ; that she was “ no longer a barrier for the defence of “ India, but the first parallel from which an assault might be made.” The mind of the reader perfidiously familiarised with Persian hostility is thus carried away from dwelling upon or perceiving *the process by which the control of that country has been transferred from England to Russia* ; and he is prepared to re-echo the subsequent denunciations which Lord Palmerston (when violence would only serve to confirm the hostility that art had engendered), was to launch against a State which, through his will and act, had joined in the enmity of a Government which he represented to England as her friend, and rendered predominant in Persia through England’s power.

Thirteen weeks later, on the 16th of April, 1836, Mr. Ellis writes as follows :

“ I called yesterday separately on Hajee Meerza Aghassee and Meerza Massood, in consequence of having received information that the Russian Minister had had a long audience with the Shah on the preceding day, at which those ministers were present, when the subject of discussion was the expedition against Herat, in which the Russian Minister had recommended perseverance this year, on the ground that what now could be effected with 10,000 men, would not next year be practicable with a much larger force.

“ Hajee Meerza Aghassee said that the Shah would prefer submission on the part of Kamran Meerza, and security against a renewal of predatory incursions, to the necessity of seizing Herat.

“ Meerza Massood held the same language as Hajee Meerza Aghassee.

“ So many difficulties beset the execution of the Herat expedition this year, that it may be said there is no ground for thinking it will take place. I have endeavoured to throw into the scale of difficulties the risk of seriously disquieting the British Government, which the Shah and

his ministers cannot fail to see, must be the result of *introducing the counsels or co-operation of any other European nation into the design.*

“As I had heard that the Russian Minister had earnestly urged the Shah to persist in the Herat expedition, and would be prepared to give him, if necessary, his professional advice on the conduct of it, I called on Count Simonich this day, and I now report to your Lordship the substance of our conference.

“I commenced by stating that Affghanistan must be considered as frontier to our Indian Empire; that no European nation had relations, either commercial or political, with that country; and that accordingly I could not conceive that the British Government would view, otherwise than with jealousy, any interference, direct or indirect, in the affairs of Affghanistan. I trusted that the exposition of this principle would excuse me to the Russian Minister for inquiring from him whether there was any foundation for the statement that had reached me, of the Russian Government having offered a body of troops to assist the Shah in the projected expedition against Herat, or aid of any other description.

“The Count at first said, that our respective ministers at London and St. Petersburg would be best able to answer the question; he, however, afterwards distinctly declared, that the subject had never been mooted between him and the Persian ministers. The Count must have perceived from some further remarks made by me, that I was aware of the discussion in the presence of the Shah respecting Herat, and he therefore said that, on that projected expedition, as upon all other subjects, he gave such advice to the Shah as he deemed most conducive to his Majesty’s advantage.

“My reply was, that in my judgment the settlement of the internal administration of the kingdom was the most pressing subject for the Shah’s attention; but that I did not presume to question the right of Count Simonich to give such counsel to the Shah as he might think fit.”

On the 29th April, 1836, Mr. Ellis says:—

“I took occasion to allude to the declaration publicly made by Uzeez Khan, the Kandahar Envoy, that the Shah, with the assistance of the Barukzye Chiefs, would push his conquests to Delhi; and I observed that if a Mahomedan Sovereign were seated, as formerly, on the throne of Delhi, such language and such preparations would necessarily excite alarm and apprehension. I appealed to Meerza Massood, who was present, and asked whether, among the nations of Europe, armaments were not looked upon with great jealousy, and whether they did not give rise to very serious and pressing inquiry.

“It was impossible for the Persian ministers not to see the drift of my observations, and I feel assured that neither the Shah nor they are without uneasiness as to the possible effect of the British government of the prosecution of the favourite scheme of annexing Herat and Kandahar to Persia. The probability of the expedition taking place is rather augmented; the regiments are arriving from Azerbaijan, having received six months’ pay; and the settlement of the south-western frontier certainly sets the Shah free for operations elsewhere.”

In these extracts the parts are displayed with greater distinctness. The Russian Envoy is seen urging formally the expedition against Herat upon the King of Persia—the English Ambassador applying for information to

the Persian Ministers, who, conscious of the facility and the impunity of deception, make him believe that the expedition would not take place. The English Ambassador is then seen “*endeavouring* to throw into the scale of “difficulties” (in regard to an expedition for which there was “no ground for “thinking it would take place”) “the risk of seriously disquieting the “British Government.” He is then seen attempting an explanation with the Russian Envoy, and *excusing* himself for asking if Russian troops were to assist the Shah. The Russian Envoy, strong in “the *mutual understanding of the two Courts!*” repels Mr. Ellis’s attempt, asserting that, which Mr. Ellis knowing to be false, dares not contradict, and declares that he will act as he thinks proper. Mr. Ellis fitly closes this remonstrance by recognising his right to do just as he thought fit!

In the despatch of the 29th Mr. Ellis is seen representing England as destitute of the instinct of self-preservation, which would have been expected in the Mogul Government: and as ignorant of the commonest habits of political business, as followed by the other Courts of Europe. “It was “impossible for the Persian Ministers,” says he, “not to see the *drift* of my “observations.” Of that there can be little doubt; and no further trouble was taken, nor anxiety evinced by them, in regard to the friendship or the hostility of the British Government.

The last sentence of the above quoted paragraphs supplies matter for reflection on a great variety of important interests. “The probability of the “expedition against Herat is rather augmented.” In the last communication it had been said that there was no ground for thinking that the expedition would take place. “The regiments are arriving from Azerbaijan,” which they could not have quitted without a complete understanding with the Government of Georgia, “having received six months pay” from money furnished on orders from St. Petersburg. Finally, “The settlement of the “south-west frontier sets the Shah free for operations elsewhere,” exhibiting concurrence with Turkey, which Persia had recently avowed the intention of assaulting.

No movement could be effected by Persia eastward, while any doubt existed as to the intentions of Russia. Persia, exposed in her western and south-western frontier to Turkey, was likewise incapable of turning her arms to the East while insecure in regard to Turkey. As a threat of the Per-

sians, obtained by the influence of Great Britain in 1800, had recalled the Affghans from the Indus, so would the slightest movement of the Turks have called back the Persians from Herat. It was therefore evident that the concurrence of Russia and Turkey were requisite to enable Persia to undertake, or even to entertain, the project of conquest "in the direction of Affghanistan." The movement against Herat, the displacement of the troops from the northern frontier of Persia, the advance of money of Russia for the design, the offer of troops for its support, and the British Ambassador's ignorance of the dispositions of the parties, or of the tendency of events, are facts known to the British Minister, accepted by him in silence, and therefore such as he desired.

England had it in her power, according to the opinion of the successive representatives in Persia, to prevent the attack upon Herat, by "declaring opposition to that object." On the contrary, she urges the Prince of Herat to unconditional submission, and declares the war on the side of Persia to be just; England avoids to withdraw her officers from the Persian service while engaged in that expedition (the Ambassador in Persia does so without instructions, and Lord Palmerston reverses that decision). England thus takes no steps to prevent what she admitted and declared to be injurious and hostile, but on the contrary takes steps to censure its being done.

Mr. Ellis, despite the silence of his chief, kept pouring in on the Foreign Office, during ten months, communications showing the hostility of Russia, her control over Persia, and her agitation throughout Central Asia. In the month of June, 1835, Lord Palmerston had been in possession of the schemes of the Shah, of the suggestions of Russia to that effect, and from that period till the hour of Mr. Ellis's departure, being fourteen months, no notice whatever is taken by Lord Palmerston of the fact. Union between the two Courts, and concert in their instructions is established, and yet no single communication appears to have been made by either of the Courts to the other during the period of the establishment of this unheard of compact, and the only instruction now produced is one to counteract our ally. Russia takes no steps against Lord Palmerston's pretended perfidy to her, and Lord Palmerston makes no remonstrance against Russia's hostility to England. Persia is about to throw herself into a career alarming in the deepest degree to the British empire, by directing the warlike spirit and predatory habits

of the whole of Central Asia to the spoils of India ; no step is taken to avert this danger at its source. The Foreign Secretary, on the contrary, sanctions a military movement for the enforcement of claims derived from the time of Nadir Shah, and undertaken with the avowed object of the ultimate conquest of Hindostan.

These objects are effected by the art with which the words are selected and arranged in three or four short, and as the reader would suppose, common-place sentences. These sentences have, moreover, conveyed to the Parliament and the British nation the impression that they were penned for the purpose of thwarting these designs.

When the expedition to Herat is finally resolved upon, and when it is practically undertaken, the British Minister, as has become usual on such occasions, is absent from his post*.

PART V.

MISSION OF MR. M'NEILL, INSTRUCTED, APPARENTLY, TO OPPOSE RUSSIA— IN REALITY TO CO-OPERATE WITH HER.

THE facts reported in Part IV. are received at the Foreign Office, to be buried there as in a tomb. England, whom we have seen so energetically supporting the nominee of Russia, now that she is insulted, endangered, allows no whisper to escape her lips—no sign of consciousness of instinct or

* During the last ten years the most important diplomatic events for England have been :—

The march of the new Sovereign of Persia eastward.

The march of Ibrahim Pacha on Constantinople.

The rejection of the award of the King of Holland by the Senate of the United States.

The assault of France on Mexico.

At the critical moment of all these events, there has been no British Ambassador or Envoy at the various Courts. Lord Palmerston is reported to have said, that “ they re-appeared *afterwards* with more grace and better effect.”

of life to agitate her frame. Putting aside all the diplomatic ties, duties, and interests of Great Britain, what, in the eyes of Persia and of the East, is her position? Concurrence with a foe—disguised opposition to an ally—insidious betrayal of a dependent State—co-operation in injury—submission to insult; her characters to them must appear to be falsehood, faithlessness, cowardice, and cunning. Such, in fact, was the bearing, such the helplessness, such the degradation of an Embassy Extraordinary of the British Crown—an Embassy sent with congratulations to a Monarch whom England had, by her will and act, placed on the throne—after displacing a rival—after subduing resisting provinces—after seizing rebellious relatives and delivering them into his merciless hands! Now assaulted—endangered by this puppet of her own creation, she stands before him trembling and inert, or only uttering such sounds, and assuming such attitudes, as to justify injury and to invite aggression.

But a position of so much falsehood and of so much danger could not have been brought about in one country, if not by causes that must have acted equally on all the relations of Great Britain, and have placed her everywhere in a false and dangerous position. It was then to be expected that from the eyes of some Englishmen the scales should fall—that some indignant feelings of honesty and nationality should be aroused—that so much degradation and so much discomfiture should awaken reflection and recall energy, and that the excess of evil would bring a cure.

Connected with the public service in Persia, there was an individual of distinguished ability, intimately acquainted with that country, and possessed of extraordinary influence over it. This gentleman had for years been the sole advocate of British rights and interests in Persia, and of Persia's rights and claims in regard to Great Britain. He had arrived in England in the end of the year 1834, and had laboured to convey his knowledge, and to impress his convictions upon the men connected with public affairs, whom he found disposed to enter into such investigations. The result was, as I have understood, the entire omission of his name in the first settlement of the Embassy Extraordinary to Persia. After some time, however, Mr. M'Neill was appointed the Representative of Great Britain in that country. Whence so extraordinary a change? The British Government saw, or assumed to

have seen, its own position with different eyes. Our Eastern position had become the subject of minute and anxious enquiry, and the proofs of its past errors had been presented to it, and had been admitted. It was impossible to give up the old opinions without adopting the new, and the new opinions which had been urged were in the following sense :—

That Russia did entertain and pursue projects hostile to Great Britain—that Russia was enabled to injure England solely by the ignorance of the individuals composing the British Government, as the British nation of those things which it behoved them to know ; so that England's course was like that of a man wandering in the dark and led by an enemy's hand—that it was in England's power at once to arrest the projects of Russia by the mere adoption of the decision that that was to be done. That the policy prosecuted by Russia, and which she was enabled to prosecute solely through the concurrence and support of England, aimed at and tended to the subjugation of Turkey and of Persia. That such acquisitions must give to Russia ascendancy over Central Europe and Central Asia, the power of disturbing, if not of possessing, India, the command of the Mediterranean, the command of the commercial interchange of Europe, Asia, and Africa, together with such an augmentation of naval, military, political, commercial, and financial power, as to overawe the policy, if not to lay prostrate the independence, of the remaining States of Europe. That the securing by Russia of supremacy over one or other of the two Mussulman States (Persia and Turkey), must give to her, ultimately, the entire resources of both ; for as the fall of Persia must destroy the power of resistance in Turkey, so the control of Russia over Turkey would lay prostrate the independence of Persia without a blow. That the whole of the interests which Great Britain had ultimately in both, was therefore at stake in either. That the preservation against Russia of the integrity and the independence of each of these kingdoms, was the most important of the external duties, and not less binding than any of the obligations of the British Crown. That in this duty was involved the preservation of our rights in those countries—of the public rights of nations—of our own special dominion in Asia, and that proportion of relative power in Europe which was requisite for the protection of our shores and our hearths—for the transmission unimpaired and unendangered of our dominion and

our race. And finally, that these duties required for their performance, that these dangers required, so that they might be averted—solely a separation of the policy of England from that of Russia*.

These opinions were directly hostile to the personal convictions of the Foreign Secretary; the subject here exposed has exhibited his entire concurrence with Russia in office, and in opposition he had attacked the administration to which he was opposed, for not co-operating sufficiently with Russia; he had given his most energetic support to the policy of Russia, and had concurred in the justice of her assaults on Turkey and on Persia. These opposite opinions were nevertheless now made public by official authority; they obtained the assent of public opinion, at war upon all other subjects, and were known to have received the most decided and energetic support from the Monarch; and that which more especially marks the purpose and resolution of the Government in adopting them is this—that the individuals by whom this policy had been urged were, in deviation from established practice, adopted by the Government, and placed in the situations best calculated to render them efficient instruments for the attainment of the ends they had proposed; they were the worst men the Government could have found, unless it had made their opinions its own.

We are henceforward, then, to find the whole character of British diplomacy altered—cessation of all contest, as of all co-operation, with Russia in third states, but the assumption of that tone with her that would bring back harmony into the relations of Europe and of Asia.

We are to look for the visible signs of this change more immediately in Persia—there was the greater danger—there the more immediate influence upon the British possessions in Asia—and there was Mr. M'Neill to be representative of Great Britain.

The following words were, at the period of Mr. M'Neill's departure, published by him, under the sanction of the Foreign Secretary. They were, therefore, the expression of the convictions which Lord Palmerston had now

* See "Progress of Russia in the East," "England and Russia," "Sultan Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali Pacha." *Quarterly Review*, No. CV. *British and Foreign Review*, Nos. I. II. III. *Portfolio*, first 25 Nos.

admitted, and from the public avowal of which he sought to gain support for his policy, and strength for himself:—

“ Persia values alliance with England as a protection against Russia. When it ceases to be so, it is of no political value to her. * * * * *

“ The whole Mahommedan population of Central Asia dreads the power of Russia, and looks for countenance from England.

“ It is known that our object is to defend, not to attack—to preserve, not to overturn; but if Persia should be lost, then all spirit of resistance to Russia will be subdued, and the means which the resources of Persia would furnish, wielded with the skill and intelligence which would then direct them, would suffice for the final subjugation of Central Asia, from the Caspian to the Oxus and the Indus.

“ While she accuses the more popular Governments of Europe of a desire to subvert existing institutions, Russia is herself undermining every throne within her reach; that of Poland she has pulled down. Since the battle of Narva she has never ceased, by intrigues and by force, to distract and encroach upon Sweden. Since the battle of Pultawa she has continually sought the subversion of Turkey. Since the peace of Neustadt, she has perseveringly pursued her conquests of Persia. Her intrigues in Germany, and her ambitious projects, are sources of continual alarm of Austria. France was threatened with invasion, in order to force upon it a Government it had rejected. Greece is taught to believe that its tranquillity can be secured only when it shall be a Russian province. Prussia purchases forbearance by acquiescence in the views, and even the caprices of the Emperor; hostile restrictions are directed against the commerce of England, and her empire in the East is openly threatened with attack. In the wilds of Tartary, on the east and on the west of the Caspian, on the north and on the south of the Black Sea, in the centre of Europe, on the Baltic,—every where we find her a successful and persevering aggressor. With a larger extent of territory than ever before was subject to one crown, she thirsts insatiably for more, and studiously directs all her energies, not to the means of improvement, but to further acquisition.

“ When the Sovereigns of Europe twice demanded, and twice enforced the abdication of the throne of France by Napoleon, on what ground did they justify the right they exercised to change the dynasty of France? Was it not that they considered it necessary to their own security. * * * Were his views more grasping, his ambition more unbounded, his arts more subtle, his aggressions more unprovoked, or his acquisitions more extensive than those of Russia? Or would the evil have been diminished if it had been perpetuated in a race of monarchs, instead of being dependent on the life of one man? * * * * *

“ The only Power that seeks to put down an existing Government is Russia. Russia alone threatens to overturn thrones, to subvert empires, and subdue nations hitherto independent.

“ If she protests to have no views of aggrandizement in Persia—if she seeks no portion of its territory, no exclusive influence in its councils, let her evince her sincerity by redeeming the pledges of General Pitescheff, and by restoring the districts beyond the Araxes to Persia; let her relinquish the command of the passage of that river at Abbas Abad, which is not necessary, or even useful for her defence, and can be available only for attack;—let her abandon her right to the exclusive navigation of the Caspian, and permit Persia to use the waters of her own coast—to have the means of observation on her own frontier.

“If Russia had never crossed the Caucasus, the intercourse of England with Persia would now have been purely commercial; it is the ambition of Russia that forces upon us the necessity of endeavouring to preserve that which is obviously necessary to our own protection. If she will not give us security for the future, she can have no right to complain if we should take all practicable measures to impede and obstruct the course she has so perseveringly pursued. If she attempts to justify her own aggressions, on what principle can she complain of *measures of defence, however extensive?* The integrity and independence of Persia is necessary to the security of India and of Europe; and any attempt to subvert the one is a blow struck at the other—an unequivocal act of hostility against England.”

Being now in possession of the diplomatic correspondence, let us see what instructions were given to Mr. M'Neill in order to realise the objects here proposed, and to avert the dangers here pointed out. Those instructions are as follows (June 2, 1836):—

“It will be your duty on all occasions to discourage any ambitious schemes of foreign conquest on the part of the Shah, and to impress upon his mind the advantage which must result to *Persia*, from the maintenance of friendly relations with neighbouring States.

“With respect to the relations between the Persian Government and *Affghanistan*, it will be necessary for you to keep in mind the article of the treaty of 1814, which bears upon that subject, *so long as the relations between Great Britain and Persia are regulated by that Treaty*; but as His Majesty's Government would see with regret any attack made by Persia upon *Affghanistan*, you are authorised to tender to *the Shah* the good offices of the British mission for the adjustment of any points on which differences may arise between the *two nations*.”

This instruction is then only a repetition of the former instruction to Mr. Ellis! a mere continuation of that policy recognised by the British Government as false, fatal, and declared to be abandoned. Lord Palmerston had thus, by appearing to change his course, converted the spirit of nationality, which had been aroused in England against Russia, into an element of strength for himself*, and thereby into a further means of securing her triumph.

According even to subsisting engagements, Mr. M'Neill ought to have been instructed to communicate confidentially with the Russian mission, and empowered to demand confidential communication in return. He receives

* I have understood that this apparent change was not effected until his official situation was more than in danger—that he then turned suddenly round and adopted all the measures he had hitherto resisted. The reader desirous of tracing the career of Lord Palmerston, may consult with advantage his speech in the House of Commons, of June 1st, 1829, and the *Portfolio*, vol. i. p. 182, where there is a singular reference to that speech by the Russian Ambassador in London.

no instructions of the kind—he is, on the contrary, instructed to discourage schemes of conquest on the part of Persia, which schemes Mr. M'Neill had proved were schemes of Russia, and which therefore could only be counteracted at St. Petersburg. While instructed to counteract Persia's (so called) schemes, he was not allowed to speak as the representative of England, because the interest of Persia, not of England, are assumed as the grounds of the discouragement. Being told to counteract in Persia projects of Russia, he is then forbidden to use any argument which can influence Persia. Mr. M'Neill's position is therefore the continuation of that of his predecessor—but under circumstances how different! that continuation was now the overthrow of the hopes which had been awakened in Persia as elsewhere, and brought home to those who had the means of perceiving or of understanding the course now pursued—the paralysing suspicion that this sacrifice of British rights and interests was no longer through ignorance.

Let us now examine the instructions in detail, to see if they reveal, as they must, if every previous induction has not been false, the deep dissimulation, the laboured vagueness, and the studied reserve apparent in every sentence we have hitherto analysed, and which must characterise the language of a man involved in so perilous a design.

The first paragraph of the despatch is:—

“It will be your duty on all occasions to discourage any ambitious schemes of foreign conquest on the part of the Shah.”

If it was a duty to discourage, it was an object to prevent; if it was an instruction to the Envoy to oppose, it was an obligation on the Minister to enable him to do so. By the selection of the term “discourage” the intention of opposition is given to be inferred, but the power is not conveyed to the Envoy of opposing. What is it the Envoy is to discourage? “*Any ambitious schemes of foreign conquest?*” The attack upon Herat could not be one of these schemes, because the justice of that attack had been recognised. What was just ought not to be discouraged, and could not be termed ambitious. Lord Palmerston requires that the conditions of “*ambition*” and of “*conquest*” should belong to any scheme which Mr. M'Neill was to discourage. Persia had, therefore, “on all occasions,” only to say that her schemes were *not* ambitious, and that the conquests she sought were not “foreign.” If Mr. M'Neill had disputed this position, the Persian minister

would have “*referred to the perfect union of the two nations**,” the Russian Envoy to the mutual understanding of the “*respective ministers at London and St. Petersburg†*,” and to their common views as to the “*integrity of Persia‡*.”

Lord Palmerston further directs Mr. M'Neill to impress upon the mind of the Shah the “*advantage which must result to Persia from the maintenance of friendly relations with neighbouring States.*” Persia conceived even more advantage to lie in the acquisition of these States. The lesser was included in the greater. The recommendation being superfluous, had therefore no value, and could have no effect. Lord Palmerston knows, and even knows *before-hand*, that she is engaged in a war of aggression against Herat; that she advances pretensions to the sovereignty of the old Affghan kingdom that is as far as the Sutledge: he knows that these designs spring from Russia, and all he has to say is, that Mr. M'Neill must impress on the Shah the love of peace!

This first paragraph of the Instruction is thus a continuation of the incentives held out by England to Persia, as seen in the previous instruction of four lines to Mr. Ellis.

The next paragraph, however, appears to contain references to Governments and to Treaties—specification of measures and proposals for the adjustment of differences. Here then we may expect something that does not elude the grasp or shun the eye. The passage is as follows:—

“With respect to the relations between the Persian Government and Affghanistan, it will be necessary for you to keep in mind the article of the Treaty of 1814.”

Diplomatic relations are the bonds connecting different Governments, where relations exist, Governments on either side must have existence. Is there a nation—is there a Government—of the name of Affghanistan? There is neither.

There is a race termed “Affghan”—supposed to descend from an Israelitish origin, and distinct from the three great families of Hindoos, Persians, and Turks, which, with the Affghans, are spread over central Asia

* Mr. M'Neill's despatch of June 30, 1838.

† Mr. Ellis, April 16, 1836.

‡ Lord Palmerston, 5th Sept. 1835.

from the Himalaya to the Persian Gulph, and from the Caspian Sea to the Indian Ocean. The principalities which the Affghans chiefly inhabit are Herat, Cabul, Kandahar, and Peshaur, which constituted integral portions of the Affghan kingdom, established by Ahmed Shah Duranee, on the death of Nadir Shah. The Affghan kingdom further included the whole of the territories now possessed by the Seik power. That kingdom had been broken up, and these four Principalities were ruled by different chiefs, and had neither community of internal nor external interests. And though of the same race, having recently constituted one kingdom, they stood as distinct in a diplomatic point of view as if each spoke a different language, and had from time immemorial stood as distinct or hostile powers. The Affghans having constituted the strength of the Turkish invaders of India, and having themselves given many sovereigns to Delhi and to Agra, had been the chief stay of the Mogul Empire, and of the dynasties which preceded it, had passed in considerable bodies into India. Under the name of Petans and Rohillas, their power, as their prowess, became renowned ; and though principally attached to the military service, yet they settled a large and important district in Upper India. The province of Rohilcund is as much an Affghan district as Herat, or perhaps more so, as the population is there more exclusively Affghan.

“ Affghanistan” is an oriental and a poetic term—as those with a similar termination ; it is of nomade origin, is derived from the name of a race, and applies to the soil, or to the region which it occupied. Thus “ Toorkistan” applies to the regions of Upper Asia occupied by Turks, not to the Turkish nation or government. “ Frangistan” designates the regions occupied by European races, and includes all their governments : thus terms of this kind cannot apply to a constituted authority, and are capable of comprising any number of governments and tribes. While there did exist an Affghan kingdom it was not termed “ Affghanistan,” but received the title of its capital—Cabul ; and in like manner, in remoter times, the Affghan Government, from the name of its then capital, was termed—Ghizni.

To spread a political fallacy by a name—to designate a nation by a term not correct, has been the discovery of Russia. By taking to herself the improper title of “ Russia,” did she first commence the establishment of her pretensions upon Poland, and did she screen the nature of her objects,

and the character of her acts, from the observation of mankind. But this conception of introducing a term not applicable to any nation—to create, as it were, the phantom of a state, and to weave round that name a web of diplomatic deceit by the hands of the minister of another power, was a flight of a bolder and a loftier kind. I say Russia, because the source of the discovery of this term can be no more doubtful than the object for which it has been introduced—than the purpose to which it has been applied. This term therefore represents neither a nation nor a Government. It is alike inadmissible in the East, and unintelligible in the West. It is not admitted by geography—it is not known in diplomacy, and yet a British Minister, thirty years in office, remarkable for laboriousness, and capable of precision, introduces this term so elaborately false—introduces it as the basis of another creation, false in turn; and both these falsehoods being used to support a third, namely, that of applying a treaty having reference to the ancient Affghan kingdom to other states, and, in a sense, the reverse of its original intention.

But to leave no doubt as to the intention in the introduction of this word, I must represent the facts as they stand. There were, as we have said, four principalities inhabited by Affghans. I have said that they were united neither by internal interest nor by foreign alliance. Let us see how they stood. There was—

Candahar against Herat and Peshaur.

Cabul do. do.

Peshaur against Cabul and Kandahar.

Herat do. do.

There were—

The Seiks and Peshaur against Cabul.

The Persians and Candahar against Herat.

Persia and Russia against Herat.

England and the Seiks against Cabul.

It is for things so dissimilar that Lord Palmerston finds a common term; it is to four hostile principalities, and to four foreign influences warring in and around them, that Lord Palmerston applies a name which he calls a nation—representing them as a Government—speaking of them as *one!*

Mr. M'Neill's predecessor had declared Persia's assault upon Herat to be just, but he had declared her pretensions to the sovereignty of that place to be unjust. Herat resisted Persia's pretensions, but Cabul and Kandahar volunteered to recognise her supremacy, and offered to her assistance against Herat. Within the question, therefore, before the British Minister the Affghan race presented itself in opposed and hostile characters, and Persia presented herself as having opposite relations with various States composed of Affghan people. In reply to these statements, does Lord Palmerston instruct Mr. M'Neill with reference to Herat? No! To Cabul and Kandahar? No! To—"Affghanistan!" If Affghanistan means any thing, it must equally mean Herat and Cabul, and Kandahar and Peshaur; by that word, then, are the whole of these questions connected into one, and the sanction of the British Government given to the assault of Persia upon Herat is made to apply to her pretensions to the sovereignty of that place, and equally to her pretensions on all the others. Thus, while Mr. M'Neill is ordered to discourage schemes of foreign conquest, does the very instruction compel him to admit that the territory coveted by the Shah was his own.

But with regard to these "relations," which, as we have seen, cannot exist, Mr. M'Neill is to be guided by the article of a Treaty.

The Treaty here referred to of 1814 was the defence of Persia and of India; and so serious an obstacle was it in the path of Russia that the British Government, engaged in latter times in advancing the views of that power, violated it in its essential parts, but left its forms as a web further to entangle, and a net to ensnare. It would be beside the present question to expose this transaction, but it is necessary here so far to enter into the subject as to shew what the article was, what the value of the Treaty.

The article is—

"If war should be declared between the *Affghans* and the Persians, the English Government shall not *interfere* with *either* party, unless their mediation to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties."

That is to say, Persia, by declaring war against any portion of the Affghan people, can forbid all communication between the British or Indian Governments and that people. This article surrenders to the caprice of Persia the relations between Great Britain and a nation to whose Government she had bound herself, by a defensive treaty, against Persia.

This article is the surrender of natural rights, which nations are not suffered to abrogate, and which Governments have no authority to set aside. If Persia, after a successful war against England, had imposed upon us this obligation, then would the British Government have been required, by the law of nations, as by its duties to its people, to break this outrageous exercise of authority whenever it was in a state to resist or to defy the power of Persia. But this is an article in a treaty of protection. The party whose natural rights are thus trampled upon being the strong and protecting power!

The terms used in this article have no diplomatic value. "Persians" and "Affghans" neither designate a nation nor a government. In contracts between states, the authority must be specified, which, on the part of the nation, imposes or incurs obligations. "Interfere" is a word with no diplomatic value or international meaning; this word has confused the public sense of Europe since its deplorable introduction into common use—in a treaty it is destructive. Rendering vague and unintelligible the phrase in which it stands, it renders inoperative the article in which it is introduced, and thereby invalidates the Treaty, of which it forms a part.

The article is informal by the reference it contains to a third state. A treaty must be binding as a whole—it must be reciprocal in its engagements—no state can share in the benefits of a treaty without incurring its obligation, nor be a party interested in an article of a treaty which it has not signed.

The Ninth Article of the Treaty of 1814 is thus null and void upon each of these distinct grounds; *1st*, by containing a general proposition contrary to the rights and duties of nations; *2ndly*, by the employment of language not diplomatic; *3rdly*, by the introduction of a stipulation, having reference to a power not a party to the treaty. But as a treaty is an instrument binding as a whole, and not of value unless entirely fulfilled, or capable of fulfilment, then is this Treaty invalidated by each of the three flaws which we have pointed out in the Ninth Article, and rendered void by the informality, the unintelligibility, and the illegality of that article.

The Treaty had, however, on other grounds been rendered void—it had been violated by each of the parties by whom it had been signed—it had been abrogated in no less than three distinct transactions; *1st*, England had refused to pay the subsidy to which it bound her; *2nd*, Persia had annulled two articles by an act not international; *3rd*, Persia had refused to conclude

a treaty of commerce set down in the preamble as a condition of the alliance.

This treaty had already not been considered binding by England in its legal and its valuable stipulations. After the fact of violation, Lord Palmerston goes back to it to select from it a clause which would have been informal and invalid, had the treaty remained intact, and applies it in a sense the reverse of the original intention, to a party which had no existence—in a manner declared to be improper, and for objects declared to be injurious, by two successive representatives of Great Britain in Persia*.

Mr. M'Neill receives this article as an instruction ; the value of it resides in the word "*interfere.*" In the article "mediation" is understood "interference." Therefore he is informed that the public faith of Great Britain prohibited "mediation." Lord Palmerston, in the next sentence, directs him to deviate from the article. The only possible object in deviating from the article was to offer mediation. The instruction is therefore this—

You are directed to	}	offer mediation.
You are forbidden to		

"But the word is" it may be objected "'good offices.' This is not mediation ; and, moreover, he is not to offer these good services to both parties, "but *to one only*—to the Shah." Is not this interference ? Interference on one side, and therefore to promote aggression—not to mediate peace†.

But what was the occasion of this instruction ? Was it not the warlike movements of Persia ? Were these movements not in direct opposition to the spirit, the letter, the object, the conditions of that treaty ? *Subsequently* we have the Governor-General declaring that the possession of Herat by Persia would be considered an act of hostility by Great Britain. We have Lord Palmerston declaring the treaties with Persia broken‡, (strange mode of procedure) on the double ground of her assault on Herat, and of her connection with Russia. Were these facts not known to Lord Palmerston *before* as well as after. How then can he make use of the treaty as an excuse for not preventing the measures by which he declared it to be violated ?

* In memorandum of Mr. Ellis, enclosed in his despatch of 15th Jan. 1836. See despatch of Mr. M'Neill, of April 11, 1838. Enclosure 5 in despatch of May 12, 1838. Despatch 3rd Aug. 1838.

† "The purport of the treaty," says Mr. M'Neill, "is that England should mediate a peace, not that it should promote the subjugation of Affghanistan by Persia." Enclosure 5, in despatch, June 30, 1837.

‡ Despatch, 27th July, 1838.

On this portion of the subject Mr. M'Neill remonstrates, in the following terms, with his chief:—

“ January 18, 1838.—I need not to repeat to your Lordship my opinion as to the effect which such a state of things (the fall of Herat and its consequences) would necessarily have on the internal tranquillity and security of British India; and I cannot conceive that any treaty can bind us to permit the prosecution of schemes which threaten the stability of the British Empire in the East. The evidence of concert between Persia and Russia for purposes injurious to British interests is unequivocal, and the magnitude of the evil with which we are threatened is in my estimation immense, and such as no power in alliance with Great Britain can have a right to aid in producing. Our connection with Persia has for its real and avowed original object to give additional security to India, and it has been maintained for the purpose of protecting us against designs of the only power which threatened to disturb us in that quarter; but if the proceedings of Persia, in concert with that very power, are directed to the destruction of the security and tranquillity which it was the sole object of the alliance with Persia to maintain, and if they obviously tend to promote and facilitate the designs which the alliance was intended to counteract, I confess I cannot believe that we are still bound to act up to the letter of a treaty, the spirit of which has been so flagrantly violated. I do not hesitate to repeat my conviction, that if our only object were to preserve as long as possible the alliance of Persia, that object could best be effected *by preventing her from taking Herat.*” ✓

The reader of the Parliamentary papers forgetting that the article here referred to was given by Lord Palmerston as his instruction by Mr. M'Neill, will not perceive that these observations are directed against Lord Palmerston's instructions. This and similar communications would have left Lord Palmerston informed had he been ignorant, and indignant had he been honest.

Thus it is to an article which in its very informality represents the Persians and the Affghans as equals, that Lord Palmerston applies for a pretext for preventing the British Envoy from resisting the assumption by the first of sovereignty over the latter. It is to a treaty for the protection of India that he refers for an excuse for not opposing a movement by which it was endangered. It is to a treaty that he refers for grounds of non-resistance to that which when done he declared to be destructive of the treaty. It is to a treaty which had already been considered as not binding, and which had been set aside because it interfered with the objects of England that he now refers to account for the policy of England in acting in a sense equally hostile to the treaty—to the assumed object of his concert with Russia, and to every object, interest, or duty, that ought to have guided a minister, or could have animated the breast of an Englishman.

But at the same time that this article is given to him as his instructions, he is instructed to act in a sense opposed to it. The article he is told to bear in mind forbids interposition, yet he is ordered to interpose—the interposition is practicable only in the name of England—he is told to interpose in the name of Persia. The project emanates from Russia—he is ordered to interpose with Persia—he is required to remonstrate with Persia on her own account against the suggestions of Russia—to whom *England is united*.

Lord Palmerston then says, “You are authorized to tender to the Shah the good offices of the British Mission for the adjustment of any points on which differences *may rise* between the two *nations*.”

The differences between Herat and Persia had already arisen, and were perfectly known. It was an assault ostensibly recognised by the British Government as injurious—secretly admitted to be just. Men in doubt do not act. If the contradictions here exhibited by Lord Palmerston had arisen from doubt, he would have said to Mr. M'Neill, don't interfere—wait till I have made up my mind—take care, above all things, not to encourage by inefficient opposition, not to commit England by any unsupported declarations, nor yourself by unsuccessful steps. He says to him, in these doubts and amid this confusion, be bold and resolute; interfere, act, but act in your own name and in the name of Persia; not on my authority nor in the name of England. That is, he placed his “good offices” at the disposal of the Russian Envoy.

As to Cabul and Kandahar, there were no “differences” that had arisen, or that appeared likely to arise. Lord Palmerston was in possession of the fact that the Princes of these States had appealed to Persia for support *against England*. That is against the Seiks, with whose injustice England had allied herself on the banks of the Indus, as she had united herself to the ambition of Russia on the shores of the Caspian. The “good offices” of the British Mission could in this case only be required to facilitate the appeal of those Princes against England, and to encourage Persia in accepting it.

Observe “*two nations*.” To point out the falsehood therein contained, or its object, would be to repeat what I have already said respecting “Affghanistan;” but admitting that there was a “nation” here in question, how

would the Treaty apply to it? Herat was opposed to Persia. Kandahar and Cabul opposed to Herat. These two rejected by England had appealed to Persia and to Russia. Peshaur had been treacherously assaulted and retained by Runjeet Singh, the ally of England. Lord Palmerston says that England is debarred from interference with the Affghan *nation*; he does so as a pretext for not preventing Persia's attack upon one Affghan principality, while England was supporting the assault of Runjeet Singh on another, and was preparing to attack herself the remaining two*.

By the liability of every point to double interpretation, Mr. M'Neill was at every moment exposed to be sacrificed by his chief, nor could a fitter process have been adopted entirely to unfit him for the assumption of that responsibility requisite for doing any thing, and for retaining, not influence, that was gone, but respectability. An envoy of less ability or integrity, might at once have resigned himself, and given no further trouble to himself, to his chief, or to Russia.

Thus, as we proceed, do we find the same systematic deception, and not a word introduced which does not bear the impress of long labour and minute calculation to falsify the question, to conceal the intention, to paralyze and mislead the Envoy, and to render the subject unintelligible to a successor, and to the public when put in possession of the documents.

Lord Palmerston, upon the departure of Mr. M'Neill, adds a second instruction at the interval of eleven days.

No communication appears to have been received in the meantime from Persia—no event had occurred—no intelligence from any quarter—not even from St. Petersburg, had arrived. Considering that the instruction we have just examined was all that had been sent to Persia, with the exception of the four lines to Mr. Ellis from the origin of these transactions; this additional instruction, at so short an interval, and with no visible cause, must have been the result of some new and important resolution in the Minister's mind:—

* Mr. M'Naughten, on the 10th April, 1837, indeed, says, that a "*means of useful influence in our favour*" may be found in "the circumstance of the British Government having resolved "decidedly to discourage" the schemes of Shah Shooja. If this decision was to be useful, it was as counteracting opinions of an opposite tendency. Fifteen months *before*, however, the Russian Envoy had declared that England would invade Cabul and Kandahar, and—England *has done so!*

“ Foreign Office, June 13, 1836.

“ Mr. Ellis, in his despatch of the 4th of February, reports that he has suggested to the Shah, that the desire of his Persian Majesty to put a stop to the expeditions undertaken by the marauding tribes of the northern districts of Central Asia, for the purpose of obtaining slaves*, might be more effectually accomplished by a negotiation at Bokhara, than by an attack directed against Khiva.

“ Mr. Ellis was led to imagine that the Shah was not disinclined to the adoption of this suggestion ; and I have to instruct you to recommend that course strongly to the Shah, in preference to a military expedition.”

The *quoted despatch* of Mr. Ellis, as given in these papers, *contains no mention of Khiva or of Bokhara.*

The earliest notice by the Ambassador in Persia of the invasion of Khiva occurs on the *very day upon which Lord Palmerston dates this instruction from Downing Street.*

We have seen that each object of Russia has been first shadowed forth by Lord Palmerston. His signature to the principle of the union of the two Courts appears before the signature to that proposition of any Russian functionary. He first introduces the words “ integrity and independence “ of Persia.” He first announces Russia’s intention of pushing Persia upon Affghanistan, and if he had now spoken in his own person of an attack that was to be made upon Khiva, we could only infer that England was taking anticipatory measures to give Russia that co-operation which was necessary for the advancement or the success of the object she had in view. But that in a document made public, Lord Palmerston should have put into the mouth of a displaced and unrecompensed Ambassador, words which he never used, is what I cannot comprehend. I can only refer to the documents as they stand. There they are—to be consulted by those who have hearts to feel for their country, or eyes to see for themselves.

The object of Lord Palmerston’s instruction of 13th June is, however, sufficiently clear : it was rendered impossible for Mr. M’Neill now to counteract any schemes of the Shah on Toorkistan, as he was, by the former instruction, prevented from opposing them on Affghanistan, while he was ordered to act, and action was impracticable, except in concurrence with

* Light is thrown on this proposition by the recent announcement of the assault of Russia upon Khiva.

Russia. By this recommendation “strongly to urge” negotiation with Bokhara, he sanctioned negotiation at that place and the assault on the other, since the assault on the one was the alternative to the negotiation with the other. The object in view must have been acceptable to England, since the means are not opposed, and, indeed, desired by England, since one of the means to obtain it was strongly to be urged.

If the British Minister, in taking ostensible steps to avert France from projects of conquest on the Peninsula, had written to the British Ambassador at Paris, “You are strongly to urge* negotiations with Madrid in preference to an attack upon Lisbon,” would not the British Ambassador have understood it to be the real object of his Court to promote, in the largest sense, the designs of France, and to invite her to entertain and to encourage her to prosecute hostile projects against both Portugal and Spain? So in this case was the sanction of the British Government given to the designs of Persia, whilst falsification was resorted to in order not to appear ostensibly to sanction them. These projects were urged on Persia by Russia, and directed against that region lying between the Eastern frontiers of Russia and the Affghans, so that the concurrence of England with Persia presented to them England as their foe†. Thus was opened to Russia a line of advance on India parallel to Persia, so as to interpose between her and the Affghans—to act directly on the latter, and prepare the way to a footing among the warlike horsemen of Transoxiana, who have formed the armies which have conquered India, China, Egypt, Central Asia, Asia Minor, and Russia herself.

Mr. Ellis’s despatch of the 4th February, to which Mr. M’Neill’s attention was thus so particularly directed, must, however, in that which it does contain, be worthy of our attention. The subject of it is—one which Lord Palmerston had hitherto excluded from all notice—Herat! It details most extraordinary steps taken in reference to that matter. Mr. Ellis states that he had *failed to obtain the consent* of the Persian Government

* Mark the difference between the terms when speaking directly in a Russian sense, and when appearing to oppose her. Contrast “discourage” with “urge.”

† “The whole Mussulman population of Central Asia,” says Mr. M’Neill, “dreads the power of Russia, and looks for protection from England.” The Turkomans, as the Persians, seeing England united with Russia, cease to hope for independence, and the barriers to her progress thus every where are converted into means of strength to her, and of assault upon India.

to his sending an officer to Herat—that he had written a letter* to the Prince of Herat, but that the Persian Minister had only “consented” to his sending that letter, “*provided it were despatched through the Persian authorities.*”

The Ministers of Persia, consenting to communications from the representative of England to an independent prince! and making the condition of that consent the placing of such communication in their hands! The time was that for an English representative to have submitted to such degradation—but it avails little to talk of what has been.

This, then, is the statement which Lord Palmerston, by a process so peculiar, places before Mr. M'Neill. Such are the facts from which Mr. M'Neill has to learn how his chief estimated the prostitution of the character of England, and the toleration of personal indignity. This additional instruction, uncalled for by new intelligence, and unexplained by itself, has it been intended to convey to Mr. M'Neill as the latest recommendation of his chief—incompetence as a model, and failure as an end?

In Part IV. we have analyzed Lord Palmerston's instructions of July 25th, 1835. In this part we have analyzed his two instructions of 2nd and 13th June, 1836. The first was to the Embassy Extraordinary to the Shah, which England had placed on the throne. The last was to the British Envoy, selected for the ability with which he had exposed opinions the reverse of those hitherto professed or acted on by Lord Palmerston. These instructions constitute the whole of the policy of Great Britain in Persia. They are penned under the establishment of a concert between Russia and England to act together and to communicate their instructions to each other.

We have found these three instructions to have one common character—to convey no distinct idea on any subject—to present no intelligible objects or policy—to appear to be written in opposition to Russia—and to be in reality conducive to her ends.

We have now to follow the course of events in Persia and Central Asia, which such instructions were calculated to open, and which the concert of a British Minister has enabled Russian ambition triumphantly to pursue—whilst this nation slept on.

* In this despatch is enclosed Mr. Ellis's letter to the Prince of Herat, which exhibits the English united with the Persian Government against Herat. This letter will be found in the Appendix.

PART VI.

SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST HERAT.—CONTRADICTORY INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE ENVOY IN PERSIA.—1836-7-8.

Mr. M'NEILL quits England in June 1836, armed with the instructions which we have just examined. He was by them, if our interpretation has not been incorrect, placed in the necessity—

1st, Of admitting the justice of the assault of Persia on Herat.

2nd, Of recognizing the inability of England to deny the claims of Persia upon Affghanistan.

3rd, Of acknowledging that it was prohibited to England to interfere in any way between the Persians and the Affghans.

4th, He was to discourage schemes of Persia ineffectually, being only to speak in the name of Persia; and to discourage war—only in the name of peace.

5th, He was not to discourage any schemes of Persia against Toorkistan.

6th, He was to discourage to Persia the designs of Russia, while Russia could prove the sanction of England given to those designs.

Thus was he, on grounds distinct from the union with Russia, to advance all the objects which Russia had in view, as if they were distinct objects of England pursued in opposition to Russia.

It has already been made clear that the former instructions to Mr. Ellis, bearing on their face opposition to Russia, could not have been concealed from her, either during their operation, or at the period of their being delivered, and therefore that they were concerted with her; so it is in the present instance. Thus did Mr. M'Neill go out to Persia directed to oppose Russia, upon instructions concerted with Russia, and directed to advance, as objects of England, the measures which Russia was prosecuting against England. Presenting England allied to Russia whenever the Persian Government should attempt to resist the latter; while an air of opposition was worn by England to Russia, whenever that opposition could benefit neither Persia nor England, or rather wherever Persia and England could be best injured by that course.

We must now see if these anticipations, drawn from the analysis of the instructions, are borne out by the subsequent events—we must see whether or not Mr. M'Neill remained inactive under ostensible instructions to act and to oppose—whether or not that at which Russia aimed—that which Lord Palmerston affected the desire of preventing, and had the power to prevent, has been brought about. If we find that Mr. M'Neill did not act, that Russia did succeed and England fail—then here again will be on distinct grounds established—concert of Lord Palmerston with Russia, and fraud practised on the Envoy in Persia, on his colleagues, and the Parliament.

On Mr. M'Neill's arrival in Persia, the Shah had already quitted his kingdom, and commanded in person the army then encamped before Herat. No sooner does Mr. M'Neill arrive than he commences to transmit news of the hostile movements of Russia—of her violent bearing in Persia and her intrigues through Central Asia—he exposes his own alarms, and urges the necessity of arresting the spirit of conquest excited throughout Central Asia by the direct acts of Russia—to whom England is united. These communications remain as all the former ones, without notice or reply.

In the meantime the expedition against Herat fails. The whole matter has to be re-commenced. Russia has again to push Persia on—again to exhibit to her the union of England with herself, notwithstanding the full knowledge of her designs ; she has to re-awaken hopes in a monarch smarting under defeat, and lust of plunder in a people humbled by discomfiture. All this she has to accomplish in the presence of a British representative—bound and fettered it is true, but of talent and integrity.

Mr. M'Neill, on the 1st of June, 1837, is to be found defending himself to his chief against accusations of the Minister of St. Petersburg, so that early in the year, and in time to influence the military movement against Herat, must Lord Palmerston have addressed communications to Mr. M'Neill calculated still further to damp, and so discourage him, and to exhibit to him not merely the union of the two Courts, but the understanding of the two Ministers. Mr. M'Neill in reply shows that the representations made against him by the Minister of St. Petersburg were unjust—he proves the hostility of the acts of the Russian Envoy at Teheran to Great Britain—he proves his acts to be in direct opposition to the declared policy of Russia,

and consequently lays bare the double deception practised (that is, assumed to be practised) upon his chief.

We naturally turn to look in Lord Palmerston's answer for the determination of the British Government no longer to co-operate in deception now laid bare; and what do we find? A despatch in which is folded a Russian despatch—*again* in contradiction to the statements of Mr. M'Neill. Thus is blow after blow levelled at him from the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, and the Foreign Office in London.

Lord Palmerston's despatch is as follows:—

“August 4, 1837.

“I have received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 3rd of June.

“You will perceive by the despatch from Count Simonich to Count Nesselrode, of which a copy is enclosed in Mr. Milbanke's despatch sent to you herewith, that the Russian Minister has reported to his Government that he has already urged the Shah to abandon, for the present at least, his expedition against Herat.”

Were not the Papers on record I might scarcely venture to say that this despatch is in reply to despatches in one of which is contained the formal and official declaration of the Persian Government of its decision to attack Herat. Mr. M'Neill communicates this final step to his chief, and his chief, as heretofore, sends not a word of instruction, commits himself to no syllable of an opinion, but makes a despatch *requested* from the Russian Government the interpreter of his intentions, and through it he contradicts Mr. M'Neill, and asserts that Russia had opposed that which Mr. M'Neill had stated she had brought about, and that she had obtained the abandonment of that which the Persian Government had declared itself to be on the point of undertaking!

The mode in which these documents are introduced is alone sufficient to prove the fraud.

They are printed in the following order:—1. Mr. M'Neill's despatch of the 1st June, in which he establishes the accuracy of his previous statement regarding the conduct of the Russian Minister in Persia. 2. Lord Palmerston's reply to Mr. M'Neill's despatches of the 3rd June, and referring Mr. M'Neill to an enclosed Russian despatch, stating that Count Simonich had used the most pressing solicitations in order to induce the Shah to content himself with the voluntary submission of the Prince of Herat, and that he had reason to believe that his proceeding would produce

a salutary effect. 3. A despatch of Mr. M'Neill's of the 3rd June, stating that he had addressed a note to the Persian Minister to the effect that he had relied upon that Minister's assurance to inform him as soon as any thing should be decided regarding the Shah's movements, and that now finding the day of his departure proclaimed by the public crier, he begs to know what was really intended. Then follows the reply of the Persian Government, in which it affects to treat of warlike operations against Herat as a matter of internal administration, and says no doubt his Majesty will move towards Khiva, Merve, Meimuna, and Herat, and those parts. 4. Another despatch of Mr. M'Neill of 3rd June, enclosing a despatch from the Chief Secretary of the Indian Government, conveying the alarm of the Indian Government with regard to the movements of Persia, and relying upon Mr. M'Neill's not having failed to communicate to the Government at home the conduct pursued by the Russian Envoy in Persia.

The order of insertion is therefore this;—1st June, 4th August, 3rd June, and 3rd June. The first and the two last being despatches to which the second is the reply. What could have been the object for placing the reply before the communication? What could be the object of separating despatches received together, and replied to at the same time, and of placing the reply between them? After perusing the statement of the Persian Government of its determination to attack Herat, had the reader come to Lord Palmerston's observations (from St. Petersburg) that the Shah had been induced to abandon the expedition, he must have been surprised—startled—and the spirit of inquiry might have been awakened. In like manner, after perusing the sentiments of the Indian Government regarding the danger to India of these movements in Asia—regarding the hostile character of the policy of Russia—the “public notice” which it had conceived the British Government would have to take of the conduct of the Russian Envoy in that country, had the reader come immediately to Lord Palmerston's despatch as a reply to this, directing Mr. M'Neill's attention to another Russian statement, he might have been again surprised and startled, and he might have felt interest in inquiry. But, by placing the reply before the despatches, the connexion is entirely broken—the reader cannot see his way, and not merely is he prevented from discovering what it was intended to conceal, but he is unable to follow that which is placed

before him. But these transactions belong to passing events, the legislator, whose duty it is to understand them, is not allowed to choose his time ; and, if unable, or unprepared at the proper moment, to expose error and deception, he adopts the statements, and becomes committed to them, for he would be reprehensible, if, being false or dishonourable, they were allowed to pass unquestioned and unexposed. Thus has this, as other diplomatic volumes, committed a nation, to a policy hostile to itself, and men, to opinions which they do not know ; and when some party violence (worthy of the men and the times,) may hereafter assail, some intrigue endanger the guilty framer of these perversions, then will he appeal for support to the sound judgment and the liberal-minded members of the Senate, and point with confidence to the proofs of his ability, loyalty, laboriousness, and success, contained in this volume, stamped with the sanction of national oblivion.

Mr. M'Neill, I have stated, had been by his instructions prevented from interfering in the Persian attack upon Herat, although his instructions ostensibly required discouragement of that attack.

We shall now see whether he did or did not oppose.

On the 24th of February, 1837, the following words appear from Mr. M'Neill :—

“ I have continued to refrain from making the relations of Persia with Herat a subject of discussion.”

Our inference therefore was correct, and the instructions were given not to be acted upon. But, perhaps, to some peculiar bias of Mr. M'Neill's mind is to be attributed his not acting on the instructions to discourage and to counteract. If so, he must have suffered reproof from his chief, to whom it was a duty to reprove that which he did not adopt. The terms which Mr. M'Neill employs, leave, however, no doubt as to the sense he entertained of his chief's intentions ; the words “ continuing to refrain,” exhibit his anxiety to act, and inability to do so. The show of opposition and discouragement was therefore a mask assumed by the Foreign Secretary to support the character of enmity to Russia, which he wore in the Cabinet*, in society, and in Parliament.

* One of Lord Palmerston's late colleagues said to me, “ How can there be any understanding between Lord Palmerston and Russia? We never could keep him decently civil with the Russian Ambassador.”

Again it may be said that although up to the month of February 1837, the language of Mr. M'Neill bears out this construction of the instructions of Lord Palmerston, still that subsequently to that period the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had seen his error, and come to act in another sense, since Mr. M'Neill a few months later did interfere, and offer his mediation. Of course here again if we find that Lord Palmerston did take steps to avert the consequences of his previous acts, we must discard our previous suspicions or conclusions—but if we find that these acts of Mr. M'Neill were not undertaken through the authority of his chief, were not undertaken on instructions which even left open to his option the taking or the not taking of such a course—then indeed must we revert to our former conclusions with greater confidence — with a confidence increasing at every step, and strengthening under every trial.

Mr. M'Neill did *offer his mediation*. How is it that the instructions upon which he must have acted are not given? What could they have been? From what authority could they have emanated? Mr. M'Neill says (30th June), “*I have been instructed by the Government of India*” “to dissuade the Shah from undertaking another expedition against Herat.”

Mr. M'Neill in taking this step, therefore, acted not upon the instructions from his chief, but upon instructions from India, and by supporting himself in taking this line, upon his having been instructed from India to “dissuade” the Shah, it is clear that he conceived he had received no instructions from Lord Palmerston in the sense of *dissuasion*, and that it was requisite for him in dissuading, to find some authority to support himself with the Shah and against Lord Palmerston. But Mr. M'Neill's attempt is perfectly fruitless, because in offering his mediation, he can only offer it in the name of the Indian Government, and not in the name of England; and when he says in the name of the Governor-General, that the “prosecution of this war might diminish the cordiality which had so long subsisted between England and Persia,” the Persian Minister very naturally turns round, and says, what has the Governor-General of India to do between England and Persia? England and Russia are united, Russia and Persia are agreed, England and Persia must therefore agree. Who then is this Governor-General of India? The Persian Minister, says Mr. M'Neill,

“ refers to the perfect union of the two nations as an answer to this statement ;” and so it was. And the Persian Minister only repeats the words which the Russian Envoy had previously used to Mr. Ellis, so that there could be no question, if we had known nothing of the antecedent steps, that the Persian Minister was fully aware of the character of the union of England and Russia, and of the valuelessness of any resistance on the part of the Governor-General or of Mr. M'Neill, while Lord Palmerston was Minister in London.

But most embarrassing is the position of Mr. M'Neill. Supported by these vague and inconclusive expressions of the Governor-General alone, he attempts to act against Persia, against Russia, and against Lord Palmerston ; and he must act in obedience to instructions framed by Lord Palmerston, in an opposite sense. Let us see how he proceeds—he writes thus, accounting to his chief for the step he had taken (30th June) :—

“ In my despatch of February 24th, I expressed an opinion that the war which the Shah was prosecuting against Herat was a just war, and I *ventured* to question the advantage, under such circumstances, of endeavouring, by implied threats, to dissuade him from renewing it.”

“ But,” continues Mr. M'Neill, “ when the Herat government offered terms so very advantageous that I felt convinced Persia could not, by conquest of the place, have gained so much in strength and security, it appeared to me that the war had from that moment become, on the part of Persia, an unjust war.”

So that Mr. M'Neill considered the war just in February, and unjust in June ; that is to say, he considered the war just before he had instructions from India, and unjust after he had received them.

Now let us see upon what grounds, on the 24th February, he admitted its justice. On that day he said :—

“ *Putting aside the claims of Persia to the sovereignty* of Herat, and regarding the question as one between two independent sovereigns, (!) I am *inclined to believe* that the Government of Herat will be found to have been the aggressor.”

This, certainly, was not an admission of the justice of the war, since the Shah's pretensions were to the sovereignty of the place. Mr. M'Neill, in

that despatch, further states, that arguments furnished him by the Governor-General, were not of any value, and that England ought, “to insure success,” in preventing that war, by convincing the Persian Government that “she was prepared to act as well as to threaten.” The object of the despatch is therefore to urge the British Government to act. Therefore, it does not bear out the statement of Mr. M’Neill either as to his own conviction of the justice of the war at that period, or as to his having dissuaded the English Government from using threats to prevent it. Now, what grounds are assumed by Mr. M’Neill for his change of opinion on the 30th June? Solely this, that Persia would gain more by sparing Herat than by conquering it. The measure of advantage to Persia must therefore be the measure of justice or injustice. Mr. M’Neill’s despatch of the 24th February does not, therefore, seem to bear out his statement that he then considered the war just; nor does that of the 30th June assign any admissible or intelligible ground for his ceasing to consider it just. The occurrence, however, of the distinction prevents the instructions from Downing Street and the instructions from India, from appearing to come into open collision, and enables Mr. M’Neill to lay aside the instructions from Downing Street, and to take up the instructions from India.

What must the instructions from India have been—in what spirit conceived.

The Indian Government, not understanding the existence of a compact of co-operation between England and Russia, could have no grounds to go upon except the international relations of England and Persia—it could only remonstrate on the ground of the injustice of the war and of the interest of England, not knowing that Lord Palmerston had admitted the justice of the war, and had agreed with Russia to consider the interests of Russia and England as one.

The policy of Indian Government was, therefore, directly hostile to that of Downing Street, and the ignorance of the Indian Government of every thing pertaining to the relations of Great Britain and Russia was complete because it did not possess the key. What, then, could avail its instructions to Mr. M’Neill to restrain Persia, and to resist Russia—its voice might have been used for that purpose in Downing Street, had it seen its way.

Mr. M'Neill, however, thus strengthened, offers mediation, but not in the name of England, and consequently, he himself could have anticipated nothing but failure—but he did use every means within his reach—he did exhaust every chance that was open to him; and, though it was put out of his power to render service to the state, he did his duty.

Ten months again elapse, and on the 8th March, 1838, he takes the next step of importance, which is to proceed to the Camp before Herat, and here again he acts on instructions of the Indian Government. These instructions had not indeed reached him—he merely hears of their existence through a circuitous channel, and at once determines upon proceeding to Herat. He says :—

“ Colonel Stoddart had considered it his duty, on receiving the communication from Lieutenant Leech, to acquaint the Persian Minister, confidentially, that the Governor-General of India had instructed me to mediate between the Shah and the Government of Herat; that his Lordship required that the integrity of Herat should be preserved, and proposed to withdraw the Shah from Herat by Treaty or otherwise.”

These facts are most remarkable—they shew how urgent it seemed to every Englishman connected with the public service to grasp at any instructions which would warrant them in taking in this matter steps of any kind. They felt, therefore, at once the danger in which England stood, and the ease with which that danger might have been averted, little dreaming, at least those occupying subordinate stations, that danger was owing solely to an Englishman, and that Englishman the Representative of the Nation's interests, and the holder of the Sovereign's power.

The assault on Herat was *the* question at issue—the event of Central Asia upon which hinged the future supremacy of that region—it was the point through which Russia had established a complete ascendancy over Persia—drove her upon India—alarming the Affghans, or exciting their cupidity, and thus preparing double means of action upon every portion of Central Asia—means which in so short a period have carried forward her influence from the Araxes and the Emba to the Indus.

On this question, Lord Palmerston had, from the origin of these proceedings, avoided giving any instructions whatever—it is a name which he never pronounces until the catastrophe is consummated. In these papers, though selected with so much care, and in communications from successive

Ministers, who each felt that Lord Palmerston's co-operation with Russia was the source of danger, there is an official chain of evidence of the constant conviction in their minds of its being in the power of England, at any moment to have prevented the expedition against Herat.

This question, however difficult to treat or to decide upon, could not have been avoided by a Minister not committed to Russia. But to avoid it when presented as one of such facility, and not to make applicable to it general instructions to oppose, shows that Lord Palmerston was engaged in counteracting the influence, and that he had to dread the power, not of Russia, but of England.

The following passages will substantiate my words :—

Mr. Ellis to Lord Palmerston, April 10th, 1836.

“ The Shah will not abandon the object (the attack of Herat) unless compelled to do so by the declared opposition of the British Government.”

Mr. Macnaghten to Mr. M'Neill, Nov. 26th, 1836 :—

“ The Government of India is also desirous not to incur the loss of character which must ensue if there should be the slightest ground for suspicion that British support had been granted to Persia *against parties (!) with whom we are on terms of friendly intercourse.*”

Mr. M'Neill to Lord Auckland, July 4th, 1837 :—

“ I see no reason *why we should conceal from Persia* that the necessity of providing for our own security compels us to require that she should abstain from injuring our defences and weakening our position.”

Mr. Ellis, at the commencement of these proceedings, said,

“ Persia will not, or *dare not*, place herself in a condition of close alliance with Great Britain.”

Towards their close, in May 1838, Mr. M'Neill declares that the Shah dreaded to give umbrage to the Russian Government if “ he desisted until “ Herat should be taken.”

In these extracts it is seen that it was the conviction of the two representatives of Great Britain, that the expedition would not have taken place had England opposed it ; and further, there is the proof that England had in no manner opposed it. It is seen that the Indian Government dreaded loss of character through the co-operation of England with Persia. It further appears that Russia had adopted a course of systematic menace and of threat against Persia, to place her in a state of hostility with England ;

and that Russia was supported in this course by Lord Palmerston, since, from the origin of these proceedings, he was fully aware of them without taking any steps either to call her to account, or even to put an end to the union of the two Courts under which she acted.

In the former parts we have seen that Lord Palmerston knew beforehand that Russia was to take this course: he had prepared the English Ambassador at Teheran for the projects of Persia before these were revealed by Persia herself. We have seen that from the commencement the concurrence of the three Courts had been established in regard to the pretensions of Persia, upon the sovereignty of Herat, Cabul, Kandahar, &c.; we have seen that, while a complete alteration was assumed in London to be effected in the relations between England and Russia, that the secret understanding between Lord Palmerston and Russia remained unaltered; so that between the two alternatives then presented to him—the defence of British interests against Russia—the sacrifice of British interests to Russia (for there was no middle course between these)—he had chosen the latter.

In the present, as in the former parts, it will be seen that every step was avoided by the British Secretary of State which could embarrass the proceedings of Persia, invalidate the influence of Russia, or sustain that of England.

In this, as in two of the former parts (Parts I. and IV.), will be observed displacement of documents.

The intention of the instructions to Mr. M'Neill, as exposed in Part V., namely, that he should be unable to counteract Russia, is in the present part corroborated and established by the events which followed in Persia, and by the statements of the British Envoy.

The attempt of Mr. M'Neill to interfere between Persia and Herat has been shewn to be in obedience to instructions from the Governor-General of India, and in direct opposition to the instructions of the Foreign Secretary.

These proceedings, examined with scrupulous minuteness, exhibit no redeeming heedlessness or inadvertence—no carelessness, incongruity, or contradiction: order and system pervade the whole. The policy of England is no longer the policy of England, but has become the policy of Russia, and thus have the archives of England, during the last ten years,

been rendered a lie to pollute the sources of history, after perverting the minds of the time, and rendering the public servants of the British Crown its deadliest foes.

Lord Palmerston has thus lent his authority, and employed his official power, to advance the designs of Russia, with the perfect knowledge of the hostility of that power to Great Britain, and her powerlessness to injure England without his concurrence. He has all the while been professing opinions the reverse of his deeds, and betraying to Russia the counsels of England at home, while sacrificing her friends and her interests abroad. This conspiracy has been conducted with ease, security, and success, in the face of a Legislative Assembly, the members of which are commissioned to watch over the public safety. Not one member, therefore, of that body possessed the intelligence required honestly to accept such a trust at the hands of his fellow-citizens. By the policy of a constitutional State are the liberties and the independence of Persia trampled in the dust. The control of Russia over Persia is enforced by the power of Great Britain, while Englishmen there are who believe that England is feeble. Had England been powerless, Persia had still been independent—India in security. Had the British Parliament been powerless, this conspiracy never would have been conceived, and if conceived, never could have succeeded. It has been conceived upon the consciousness that that body had not the capacity requisite to direct its power, and it has been prosecuted through the support yielded by its ignorance. “What England is now,” said Lord Palmerston, in 1829, “Parliament has no means of knowing, except from vague and “uncertain report.” That, indeed, was a fearful position for a nation; but what is that to be compared to the state of a nation whose minister presents falsified documents to Parliament, whose Parliament accepts these as true?

While the proofs of this part have been correcting, a debate of five days has been brought to a conclusion, to determine whether or not the Ministers deserve the confidence of the country. During that debate a Member having referred to insults to our flag, was stopped by cries of “question.” The same Member proceeded to speak of the affairs of Persia (and he was the only one who did so), and the reporters were unable to follow him, from the noise which immediately rose in the House. The leader of the opposition in this debate assumed the responsibility of the Government of the country, by stating that he had the power to support it when it acted well, and

to prevent it when it attempted to act amiss. This legislative assembly, therefore, considers that an insult endured by the British flag, is not included within the "question" of the conduct of the Ministers. The Senate of Great Britain takes no interest, therefore, in the affairs of Persia, or of the East, and the opposition is no longer a safeguard against the errors of the Government. The mass of the nation not having the means of judging of the character, knowledge, and motives of public men, suppose that Ministers attend to the affairs of the nation, that a Parliament watches over the administration, and understands something of the objects for which Government is established. They further suppose that the opposition to the Government will control it in its aberrations, and detect any dangerous betrayal of the public interests of which it might be guilty. But let any practical man of business consider the points I have put forward, drawn from that debate, and it will be impossible for him not to feel that all these expectations are groundless. As the institutions of the land have been rendered valueless by the violence of faction, so now has even faction itself ceased to have any redeeming qualities, or controlling power, by the increasing valuelessness of the men.

PART VII.

RUPTURE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PERSIA.—1838.

IN the advance of Russia to India two great movements had to be made—*1st*, To cross the gigantic physical barriers that stood in her way—the Caucasus, the Caspian, and the deserts spreading to the north-east from the shores of the sea;—*2ndly*, To subdue the national spirit of the kingdoms and people lying behind these barriers, namely, Persia and the populations of Toorkistan and Affghanistan.

Persia constituted of these so large and so powerful a portion that for Russia to associate that State with herself was to obtain the control, and ultimately the dominion, of Central Asia.

Russia has succeeded in overpassing these physical barriers. She has crossed the chain of the Caucasus, which, for the three thousand previous years, had protected Asia against the north; she has converted the Caspian into a lake of her own from which the flag of Persia is excluded; she has spread far eastward through the regions of Northern Tartary, if not

dominion, influence leading to it: she has established her posts on the Indian side of the Caspian Sea.

The first great movement of Russia towards India was thus completed at the opening of this Correspondence—the second remained to be effected.

Persia, menaced by Russia, had looked throughout the world for foes of Russia, and for the antagonists of her power. England, fearing for India, looked to the East to see if there was there any people who dreaded the power of Russia, and were capable of throwing impediments in her way. Persia thus saw in England—England in Persia, the alliance which each sought, and the advantages which they mutually required; and thus did England secure complete ascendancy over the mind, and authority over the councils of the Persian people. This support of England further increased the desire of Persia to maintain her independence, and confirmed her spirit in hostility to the designs, her frame in resistance to the assaults, of the Russian power. This opposition of the dispositions of Persia towards Russia and England could only be changed by a change in the relative positions of England and of Russia. Confidence in England could only cease when Russia ceased to threaten—opposition to Russia could only cease when England ceased to protect. Further progress of Russia towards India became, therefore, practicable only in so far as she could lead England into being false to Persia and to herself. So long as this was not effected, political measures, military efforts, against Persia could only tend to strengthen more and more the hostility of the Persian people to Russia and their affection for England. It was only by exhibiting to them—England united to Russia—that their expectations would be blasted, and that Russia's triumph would be secured. But how was this to be effected—how was such a project even to be contemplated? If Persia could not be subdued by Russia, how could she contemplate the subjugation of England as the means of subduing Persia—for the subjugation of a state is practically effected when its policy is perverted?

If the triumph of Russia or the downfall of Great Britain should appear a mystery in after times, the papers we are at present examining will lay that mystery open to the eyes of men.—From these documents it appears that Russia has found amongst the leading men of Great Britain, one who had consented to make Russia's objects his objects—who had become in the

furtherance of them Minister of England, and who then at once placed Russia in that position without which her further progress to India would have been impracticable. He declared that the interests of Russia and England were *one*, and made this union the basis of British policy, but concealed it from the nation, until through ten years of systematic mismanagement, deception, and falsification, there remained not a man in the land that could see his way.

Little does the appointment of Mr. M'Neill appear to coincide with the general scheme of the Foreign Minister. The necessity, however, was imposed upon him for the employment of that gentleman, as already exposed in a former Part, and the analysis of the Instructions with which he left England, as the examination of his conduct in Persia and his reports from that country, show that he was removed from England, where his voice might have been heard, to be annihilated in Persia, where his opinions could be of no avail—while his appointment gave to Lord Palmerston the credit of British objects and of enlightened policy. Thus the very man who had been the assertor of British rights in that country—who had been the advocate of Persia's connexion with Great Britain—was made the instrument for the overthrow of the one and for the destruction of the other.

Mr. M'Neill arrived in Persia in September 1836, and there appears from that period until the 11th July, 1837, that is, during nine months, fourteen despatches, detailing the circumstances and the opinions above referred to, without these communications or those of his predecessors in the same sense for the ten anterior months, that is to say from November 1835, having called forth from the Foreign Minister any declaration, any decision, or indeed any communication, whatever. It is not, therefore, surprising, that on the 11th July, 1837, after nineteen months of openly avowed intentions of aggression*, by Persia on England, with perfect impunity, that the

* So early as the 16th April, 1836, we find the following sentence in a despatch from Mr. Ellis:
“Tehran, April 10, 1836.

“Uzeez Khan held the same language to me as he had undoubtedly done to the Shah and his Ministers, namely, that the whole of Affghanistan was, with the exception of Herat and its dependencies, ready to come under feudal submission to the Shah, who in fact might, with the aid of the Affghans, like Nadir Shah, push his conquests to Delhi.”

Mr. M'Neill at a subsequent period thus speaks:

“The Persian Government has openly expressed a belief that the possession of Herat would

Minister of the Persian Government should declare that he conceived Persia no longer bound by her engagements to Great Britain, and that existing treaties between them were abrogated. Two days later Mr. M'Neill addresses to the Persian Government a demand for immediate explanation; the Persian Government vouchsafes no reply; Persia takes no notice of the demand of the British Envoy; the English Minister takes no notice of the first declaration, or the subsequent silence of the Persian Government. This transaction is, however, screened from the observation of the reader of the published documents. The declaration of the Persian Minister (11th July, 1837), and the reply of Mr. M'Neill (July 13th) are not given in their order, nor according to their date. Mr. M'Neill, in detailing the rupture with Persia, refers to this transaction, and by this reference alone do we learn, that it occurred. To this subsequent despatch the two documents are appended as a note, and in small type—they are the only documents so introduced, or so printed. Had they appeared in their order, the reader must have said to himself, “now or never is the moment for England to act,” and finding no steps taken he must have perceived the intention of encouraging Persia in her hostile course.

Three months after this event was the insult offered to Mr. M'Neill's messenger—a circumstance so entirely in harmony with the previous proceedings, and with the intentions of the British Minister that it is needless to dwell upon it*.

On the 6th February, 1838, Lord Palmerston was in possession of all the events which had occurred in Persia up to the 27th November, 1837, including the above quoted declaration of the Persian Government, the mission of Captain Vicovitch to Affghanistan, the fall of the fortress of Ghorian, &c., and, after a week's consideration, writes to Mr. M'Neill:—

give such a hold upon England, that she would no longer be able to deny anything they might demand; for that the possession of Herat would give the power to disturb us in India, or to give a passage to our enemies, whenever the Persian Government should think proper to do so.”—26th Nov., 1837.

* The correspondence regarding this outrage occupies a full half of the published documents!

“ February 1838.

“ I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that Her Majesty’s Government entirely approve the course which you have taken, and the conduct which you have pursued in all the matters to which these despatches relate.

“ *I delay sending you* FURTHER *instructions* with respect to the affairs treated of, until I hear from you what has been the answer of the Persian Government to your very proper demand.”

This demand had reference to the insult offered to the English Minister, and had nothing to do with any of the subjects detailed or touched upon in this Exposition! Thus, this despatch rendered the existence of friendly relations between Great Britain and Persia contingent on a minor matter, which must necessarily be decided against England, by the fact of the sacrifice of the major question, merely because no instructions are given upon it. What means assigning a reason for delaying instructions on the question—in which was included, and in which were at stake, all that England had to gain or to lose in Persia and Central Asia? It, moreover, assumes the very delay of the Persian Government in replying on the one point as the grounds for sending no instructions on the other! If a reason, not the reason, is assigned, then were objects to be concealed—and what can be the motive of concealment, save that which has already so often appeared—*viz.*, the working out of the ends of Russia.

After vain efforts to obtain on the one hand reparation for the insult which had been offered, and to induce, on the other, the Shah to relinquish his enterprise against Herat, Mr. M’Neill, on the 10th March, 1838, had proceeded to the camp before Herat on instructions to that effect from the Governor-General of India. Had Mr. M’Neill, on his arrival at the camp, been prepared to threaten Persia with interruption of diplomatic relations, and, consequently, with war, because of her aggressions against the Affghans, then would his words have been of weight, and would his menace have been intelligible, and then would the threat of his withdrawal from the camp have been a proposition to strike with alarm the Persian Government—not to fill it with derision. But the Persian Government had itself made its withdrawal from before Herat contingent on the reception of such a threat. The King went so far as to say to Mr. M’Neill, “ that if he was “ at liberty to announce that England would attack him if he did not

“ retire,” that he would do so* ; and Mr. M’Neill had shown that he could not venture to withdraw, through the dread of Russia, so that to have been threatened on the part of England would have strengthened them against Russia. Mr. M’Neill says—“ I would, therefore, if I could venture to do so, save Herat, which would be saving all Affghanistan.” But Mr. M’Neill could not venture to do so.

He was soon in possession of the despatch of 12th February. It brought him, as above shown, no decision in regard to the affair of Herat, but did support him in his demand of personal reparation. “ Now,” says Mr. M’Neill, “ that I was *fortified (!)* with that decision, I determined to “ bring the matter to an issue.”—*On the wrong point!* He is compelled to make the question of Herat depend on the issue of the question of the Messenger ; what object could there be in so strange and laboured an involution of the parts, save that of sacrificing both ? He is compelled to withdraw, because of the refusal of a demand which was no threat—leaving untouched the question of Herat, in regard to which the same act of withdrawal (implying in that case a threat) would have been decisive. Thus are the instructions of the Governor-General—the journey of Mr. M’Neill to the camp—the favourable disposition of the Shah—all rendered abortive. The mediation is broken off at the very moment of success† by this despatch of 12th February.

The efforts of Mr. M’Neill, and the intentions of the Governor-General, are thwarted with an ease that startles and astounds. The despatch effecting these purposes does not consist of half-a-dozen lines—it appears to approve of all that Mr. M’Neill had done—to be quite on his side, and against Persia and Russia. The words in which its strength resided are, “ *I delay sending further instructions‡.*” It may be said that Lord

* The Shah afterwards said to Colonel Stoddart (August 14, 1838), “ Had we known that our coming here might risk the loss of the friendship of the British Government, we certainly would not have come at all.”

† Mr. M’Neill had succeeded in concluding the preliminary arrangements for peace between Persia and Herat during the night. In the morning the Minister of the Court, *united with Great Britain*, arrives in the camp, the negotiations are at once stopped, and the operations of the siege commence.

‡ Lord Palmerston, four months and ten days after this delaying of instructions, again writes,

Palmerston has erred on the weak and amiable side—he has been averse to the use of harsh terms or of strong measures—his great object is Peace. Let us see.

After the rupture with Persia was secured—after menaces and threats could be of no avail, the following despatch is sent from Downing Street :—

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. M'Neill.

“ Foreign Office, July 27, 1838.

“ Sir,—I have to instruct you to state to the Shah of Persia, that whereas the spirit and purport of the treaty between Persia and Great Britain, is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier for the British possessions in India, and that the Persian Government should co-operate with that of Great Britain in defending British India ; it appears, on the contrary, that the Shah is occupied in subverting those intervening States between Persia and India, which might prove additional barriers of defence for the British possessions ; and in *these operations* he has *openly connected himself with an European power, for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, to British interests* ; that under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter upon a course of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned treaty, Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that treaty, such measures as a due regard for her own interests, and the security of her dominions may suggest.—I am, &c.

“ PALMERSTON.”

“ John M'Neill, Esq., &c. &c. &c.”

Years before Lord Palmerston knew what was coming—and co-operated to bring it about—knew that it could not be effected without his co-operation, and has shown in the selection of every term the consciousness that the British Envoy would avert it unless sufficiently paralyzed by himself. On the 27th of July he was in possession of no more than he was acquainted with on the 12th of the previous February, on which day he had penned the despatch which placed Mr. M'Neill in the necessity of a rupture with Persia, in regard to the affair of the Messenger, but which withheld from him the power of threatening that same rupture on account of the Herat war.

On the other hand, the Indian Government, which, in taking the steps we have seen, had not commissioned Mr. M'Neill to *threaten* upon its part, sends a hostile expedition to the shores of Persia. By the menace every object would have been obtained—the menace is not used—the expedition

June 22, 1838 :—“ I wait for further information from you to see whether it will be necessary to give you any additional instructions besides those already sent to you.”—See “Exposition of the Boundary Differences,” for a remarkable instance of a parallel despatch.

is sent to render England a mockery and to be a failure. This expedition, from the use to which it is subsequently turned by Russia, seems no less a part of the concert between Russia and the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, than—the setting up of Shah Shooja, announced by Russia in 1835, as to be undertaken by England; than—the elevation of Mahmoud Meerza effected by England the year before; than—the concurrence of England in the attack on Herat; than—the overthrow by England of the attempts of the Governor-General to resist that expedition; than—the rupture between England and Persia; or, than any other of the Cabinet which we are accustomed to call—British.

England breaks with Persia because of her being allied with her own ally—she thus presents an array of the joint power of England and of Russia to crush any state that exhibits attachment to England, and a desire to preserve its own independence. England quarrels with Persia because of her union with Russia, and remains united to Russia. Some months afterwards she requests to be informed of the intentions of the Russian Cabinet. Having quarrelled with Persia upon the ground of her union with Russia, she could hold no intercourse with Russia except to render her responsible for doing that which had placed Persia in a state of hostility to England. It is Russia then who proceeds to take advantage of this negotiation—she calls upon England to renew her relations of amity with Persia, on the footing of the happy and beneficial union of 1834! England is driven out of Persia, as out of Central Asia, avowing herself expelled by the influence of Russia, and declaring herself in a state of hostility with those nations, because of their connexion with Russia so as to drive them to seek through Russia protection against England! Russia will then re-appear in Asia, leading back England by the hand—exhibiting herself in the East as already mistress of the strongest power in Europe, presenting herself in Europe as the preserver of the greatest of Asiatic dominions—Great Britain. Presenting herself to the admiring eyes of Great Britain as the stay of her influence in Asia, as the protector of Delhi and of Agra, and as ready to march her Cossacks and her Baskirs to the defence of the Indus.

Thus is accomplished the second movement of Russia towards India, which it was impossible for her to have effected except through the co-operation of Great Britain, namely, that of uniting Central Asia with

her in her projects against that Power on whom those nations relied for the support of their independence against her assault.

The effect of this union on Persia has been the extinction of the national spirit, and the triumph of the Russian faction. Lord Palmerston then had further to involve Persia in projects of hostility against Great Britain, and finally to throw her into the arms of Russia, by denouncing her as Russian—unparalleled temerity—to declare a Government that was *united to Russia*, an enemy to the British Crown!

[The subject of this supplementary part is too important to exclude, and it could not have been introduced into the former parts without breaking the connexion of the transactions.

I omit in this place a chronological view of the information from Persia, received at the Foreign Office, and of the instructions given. Being intended rather for substantiation and reference, it will appear when these papers are printed in a collected form.]

PART VIII.

BRITISH OFFICERS IN PERSIA.

A NATION in ideas, in manners, in habits, in costume, so different to ours—professors of a faith which stands, and has stood for twelve centuries, with hostile front against the West—so forgets its antipathies, subdues its habits, obliterates its fanaticism, as to place in command over themselves foreigners—Europeans—officers—and Christians! These officers henceforth constituted an authority in and over the nation. This foreign military command was connected with political influence, with financial control, and resting on these constituted the key-stone of an arch of diplomatic power, by which England shielded the Persian state. In the fall of this structure—not from external force that scatters it, but by secret mining within that pulls it down—the fragments must crush that which they were raised to protect.

These officers were not like questions of right, of interest, or of policy, which could be explained away by an ambiguous term, an insidious reference, or put aside by “delaying to send instructions”—they were corporeal substances present, and acting, occupying a station too important in the eyes of Persia, too influential in the relative positions of Russia or of England, not to render any measures adopted with regard to them comprehensible to all men. If Lord Palmerston has been throughout the secret agent of Russia, what will his conduct prove to be in regard to these officers? We shall find him through means of these Englishmen exhibiting to Central Asia the co-operation of England with Russia—we shall find him placing them at the disposal of the Shah in attacking Herat, and realizing that co-operation which the Russian Minister had already announced, in which the Shah, in his projects against Khiva, “should receive at once the “ assistance of Russian troops and of British officers.”

In these suppositions of what was likely to occur under the hypothesis of a traitor directing the Foreign policy of Great Britain, I have nearly stated that which has taken place, except that the intention of the Minister to place these officers at the disposal of Russia is brought, by peculiar circumstances, into prominence and into evidence of the most remarkable and conclusive kind. The British Ambassador had, without instructions, withdrawn these officers from the Persian service—the Governor-General of India had instructed the successor of that Ambassador to withdraw them from the expedition against Herat. These unexpected events imposed upon Lord Palmerston the necessity of instructions to replace the officers at the disposal of Russia. This has further given rise to the necessity of the suppression of those instructions, leaving, by that suppression alone, neither indistinct nor doubtful the intention and the object of these proceedings.

The only step taken by Mr. Ellis before leaving Persia, to mark the opposition of Great Britain to the projects of Persia, was the withdrawal of these officers from Herat. Nearly a year afterwards we find the Indian Government similarly alarmed, suggesting the same step to Mr. M'Neill as the only specific measure which it can devise in order to counteract the policy of Russia and the arms of Persia. We see, therefore, that Mr. M'Neill must have received instructions reversing the decision of Mr. Ellis,

because the Indian Government again suggested their withdrawal, although no instructions to that effect from Lord Palmerston appear. We also see afterwards that Mr. M'Neill did act on the suggestions of the Indian Government—if so, he must have detailed to his chiefs the steps he had taken, and his reasons for taking them—but these are not published.

It appears from a passage in a despatch from the Secretary-General of India, that the British officers had been driven by the Shah with ignominy from his camp; and we learn that this was because they had been forbidden to accompany the expedition against Herat, and thus we ascertain that Mr. M'Neill had followed the instructions of the Indian Government.

I have selected, and I subjoin the various passages having reference to this subject. Strange to say there is not a word from Mr. M'Neill respecting the British officers admitted into these *published* papers.

The two first extracts are a peculiar illustration of the system that pervades British Diplomacy. The last extract, the instruction of Lord Palmerston to Mr. M'Neill, will show that a second time had he counteracted the act of the envoy in Persia—that he had insured the employment of British officers against Herat up to the last moment of the positive rupture between England and Persia, and left even then the door open to their continuance in the Persian service!

The following are the passages:—

Mr. Riach to Mr. Ellis.

(Extract.)

“ *Teheran, June 16, 1836.*

“ We all (the Russian mission and the British officers) went to the royal presence together. His Majesty, having inquired after Count Simonich's health, immediately turned to me and said ‘ the officers are to attend me on my journey,’ to which I replied, ‘ of course, whenever his Majesty was pleased to order them.’ He seemed gratified, and replied ‘ certainly,’ and then praised the officers and the British Government for all the acts of friendship he had received from the latter during a long course of years. He did not allude to where he was going; and it was only during a conversation he held with the Russian Ambassador about the rivers running into the Caspian, west of Asterabad, Khorassan, &c., that Herat was mentioned.

Mr. Ellis to Mr. Riach.

“ *Tabray, June 14, 1836.*

“ Should the Shah inquire whether the British officers would accompany an expedition against Herat, your answer should be, that on a former and similar occasion, during the lifetime of the Shah's illustrious father, the detachment had been withdrawn; that the withdrawal had been

approved of by the British Government; and therefore, until orders to a different effect were issued, the officers must consider the orders then given to be in force."

The Governor-General to Mr. M'Neill.

" Nov. 21, 1836.

" In order to prevent any appearance of the expedition being sanctioned by the British Government, it will be matter for consideration with you whether you should not direct them to withdraw."—(Nov. 21, 1836.)

Mr. M'Naghten to Mr. M'Neill.

" April 10, 1837.

" We do not make ground of complaint of the circumstances attending the dismissal of the British officers from the camp of the Shah, because, as those officers could not take part in the attempt upon Herat, the King had a fair right to remove them from the army, which was proceeding in its march upon that city."—(April 16, 1837.)

Lord Palmerston to Mr. M'Neill.

" 10th March, 1838.

" If you should deem it necessary to withdraw from the Persian territory into Turkey, I authorize you *to use your discretion* as to calling upon Sir Henry Bethune, Colonel Stoddart, and all the British officers, and non-commissioned officers, to do so likewise, *or to permit them provisionally to remain*. But as long as you think it expedient to continue within the Persian territory, it would not be *advisable to require any of those persons* to retire from the Persian service*."

I conceive this point so important that I recapitulate.

Mr. Ellis withdraws the British officers, according to an established precedent—Lord Palmerston reverses that decision; the Indian Govern-

* The only other passage in which there is reference to the employment of these officers is in the subjoined extract from Mr. M'Neill, which shows that the dismissal of the British officers from the camp has been intended as an insult from Persia to England, and accepted as such by England.

Mr. M'Neill to Persian Minister.

30th June, 1837.

" From the time that his Majesty, by the succour and assistance of the British Government, became possessor of the crown and throne of Persia, and that your Excellency became Prime Minister, I put it to your Excellency's candour to declare what circumstances have occurred to give satisfaction to the British Government, or give it assurance that nothing contrary to the rules of friendship has proceeded from the Court of Persia. Is it the respect shown to its Ambassador Extraordinary, or the removal of its officers from camp, or the conclusion of a treaty of commerce, or the sanctioning the establishment of its Consuls, that can inspire the British Government with confidence?"

instructs Mr. M'Neill to withdraw the English Officers—Lord Palmerston then reverses that decision. The only specific measure proposed by India—the only step of any kind adopted by the successive missions in Persia, is the withdrawal of these officers—the withdrawal of these officers was the only step taken to exhibit—and it could go no further—the nonconcurrency of England in the projects of Persia, and having been taken, the reversion of it by express authority of the Foreign Office in London, became an additional proof of the concurrence of England in the projects of Russia. The instructions upon which Lord Palmerston reverses the decision of Mr. Ellis is suppressed, and the communication of Mr. M'Neill, as there must have been, respecting the grounds upon which he had acted in opposition to those suppressed instructions, is also suppressed.

Words cannot add weight to such facts.

This betrayal of the national interests is of course not confined to one region—and the process by which injury is inflicted on us in one state is available in others. This will of course at once be admitted to be true, but the value of the truth will depend on knowledge of the variety of the facts, and the extent of the injury. It therefore may not be without interest to glance at the steps taken at the same period regarding military instruction in Turkey.

In the course of the year 1836, the Turkish Government was induced to apply to Great Britain for officers both for its fleet and army. This request was formally made to his late Majesty, and immediately complied with, and officers were sent out to Constantinople. After several months delay their services were rejected.—This was effected by Russia—not however through her direct influence but through means of the individuals employed in the British service. The Turks were however anxious to have at least European officers—it became therefore advisable to furnish them with such officers as Russia could count upon. They were furnished by Prussia.

The diplomatic service of Prussia has, since the treaty of Vienna, been entirely at the disposal of Russia, and far more useful to her than if ostensibly her own. So now these Prussian officers, while they effected her purposes, appeared to the eyes of Europeans to be distinct from her, and they obtained confidence in the Turks because they were *Germans*.

It is by these officers that the Dardanelles have been fortified!—it is through them that the defeat of Nezib has been secured!

These circumstances will illustrate the recorded proposal of the Persian Minister of sending away the British officers, and of employing officers from some other European nation, which occurred so early as 1835. Prussia has been made a party interested in the decomposition of the northern portions of the Ottoman empire,—France in the southern. France has prepared the schism in the empire by disciplining the troops, encouraging the pretensions, and advocating the designs of Mehemet Ali.

The next step was to bring back France to Teheran—reviving at once all our old Indian recollections, and all her European rivalry with Great Britain. French officers, it is said, have recently proceeded to occupy the place of those of Great Britain. The way being prepared, after 30 years of non-intercourse, by a brilliant Embassy to a Government recognised in Europe and Asia as the bulwark of India, and at whose Court there is no representative of Great Britain!

[Having concluded the 1st portion of the Exposition of our relations with Central Asia, it may be here advantageous to lay before the reader an outline of the subjects into which we shall now have to enter. The present and four subsequent Parts will be devoted to the relations of India with the Sikhs, with the Affghans, with China, and with Central Asia; we shall then revert to the Diplomatic explanations which took place between the British Government and the Court of St. Petersburg, in regard to the policy pursued by the latter in Asia.

In the eight parts that have appeared, having had to show that the British Secretary of State had intentionally yielded to Russia the power of Great Britain for the furtherance of her projects against England, it was imperative upon me to enter into a minute examination of the Diplomatic documents through which these objects were effected, and in which, proof of his guilt was to be found. I conceive that the case has been made out and proved. No attempt has been made to refute any one statement,—to controvert the accuracy of any one conclusion: henceforward therefore, it will be superfluous to dwell with the same minuteness upon the documents, or to extract so largely from them.

In the examination of the transactions in Asia, in which the Indian Government is the acting party, the agency of the British Secretary of State does not appear, but having proved in the former part his collusion with Russia, it is evident that the British Government associated, through that Minister, with Russia, must have acted upon the Indian Government so as to lead it into false positions, and to induce or to require it to take that line which it was desirable for Russia that it should take. The line it has taken has been, as we shall see, in every instance precisely such as to justify this supposition, and its policy is intelligible upon no other hypothesis.

The leading event of our Indian policy has been the setting up of Shah Shoojah at Cabul, and the motive assigned for that measure has been, opposition to Russia. We shall see of what immense advantage that step has been to her. It will be in the recollection of the reader of these papers, that so far back as the year 1835 the Russian Minister announced that England would undertake that expedition, and made the announcement for the purpose of advancing thereby the designs of Russia.

By a double process we thus arrive at the conclusion, that the setting up of Shah Shoojah was the project of Russia, and if so the measures leading to that event must equally be considered as emanating from her. The first and most important of these is the unnatural alliance of the Indian Government with Runjeet Singh, which forms the subject of the part which follows.]

PART IX.

RELATIONS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WITH RUNJEET SINGH.

FOR more than ten years after the peace of 1815, Russia had not visibly directed her attention towards India, and neither there nor in England was alarm felt for her progress, and scarcely any suspicions entertained of her designs. During this period of apparent repose for the East, Russia was preparing far more powerful means for assailing it than she had ever possessed before, and that was by establishing her ascendancy over the Governments, policy, and opinions of Europe. The Holy Alliance and the struggle of principles, legitimate and liberal—the convulsions of the Peninsula—and the association of France in her ambitious designs—were the results obtained by her within the first seven years of peace. These led to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire—to the binding of England to her in that object by the protocol of St. Petersburg of 1826. Having committed all parties, and every state in Europe against Turkey, she was prepared to venture on the Persian war, for which she had kept open the occasion and the pretext for the twelve previous years.

During the same interval she was gradually levelling the barriers that practically opposed her passage Eastward, by continuous assaults and murderous expeditions against the independent tribes of the Caucasus; and more particularly those on the borders of the Caspian Sea. In the year 1826 she

was thus prepared by the ascendancy secured in Europe, by the paralyzing of the Ottoman Empire, by the distraction of the Persian state, and by the amount of military means accumulated within her own frontier, where she was enabled to concentrate all her attention and her strength—to attack and to triumph over Persia.

This event first awakened uneasiness in England and alarm in the Indian Government.

In the course of the following year, the Governor-General of India, then resident in the Upper Provinces, sought to open communications, and to establish relations of friendship, with the States intervening between the British and the Persian territory. The *nearest* of these was Lahore. The Indian Government inquired no farther—neither recognised in itself the ignorance which would have led it to gather in extensive information before adopting any plan whatever—nor admitted in its policy a specific object, which would have imposed upon it the necessity of order, system, and of the study of the means by which men have become great, and nations made to prosper and to flourish. The Indian Government, suddenly alarmed, because it had not anticipated events, suddenly rushes into the arms of a foe, because that foe had measured its mind so well as to speak to it of friendship.

From the year 1828, the alliance of the British Government with Runjeet Singh commenced, and this bandit chieftain has stealthily proceeded to render the British power at once his dupe and his instrument, until finally ✓ it came (as the Government at home in respect to Russia) to identify itself with him against justice, right, and honour—against its friends, its allies and itself.

On the year in which the diplomatic correspondence commences (1834), the Secretary of the Indian Government, in a work which issued from the Calcutta press, informs us that the Government in India anticipated, as a consequence of the successes of the war of 1826–7 of Russia against Persia, and as the result of a new succession to the Crown, that Persia should virtually become Russian, and that it was the idea of danger to India flowing from this change that led to the union with the Chief of Lahore, and to the other measures of exploration or of policy adopted by the Indian Government.

Thus while the Government at home admitted a union of interests

between Great Britain and Russia—while it admitted a concert of policy—while it established unreserved communication of its own views to the Russian Government, and commanded confidential communication on the part of the British Envoy at Teheran, to the Envoy of Russia,—was the English Administration in India feeling alarm, and taking measures to avert the consequences of this concerted policy. While Lord Palmerston, in Downing Street, declares that the interests of England and Russia are ONE—the official announcement is made on the borders of the Ganges of the measures taken to avert from India the storm of Russian invasion—the menace of which had already been officially proclaimed on the banks of the Neva!

The Indian Government thus assumed a line of opposition to the policy of the Government at home—that is to say to the designs of Russia, not indeed understanding the concert that existed. We are, consequently, to expect that in the measures it will adopt, it will be misled, and that the steps it will take and the efforts it will make, will be conducive to these designs.

What could the Indian Government do, it may be asked, to serve the interests of Russia more than it had done? It had violated the laws and customs, the financial and administrative habits, and the etiquette of the natives. It had neither preserved, as the Moguls, the native administration—nor introduced *a system* of law or administration of its own—consequently it had, and could have, no hold on the affections of India: and India, as heretofore, was—there, to be accepted by the invader that could touch its soil. In regard to the external defences of India, what, it may be asked, could the Government do more for Russia than it had done? Had it not remained wholly inert, wholly ignorant of every interest, population, or state intervening between the territories of Russia and of British India? There was a further service for the Indian Government to render to Russia. Successful as might be her intrigues with these populations through the neglect of Great Britain—widely different were the results to be attained by unjust acts and ineffectual attempts on the part of Great Britain. Not to be right in acting was far more dangerous than to have been wholly inert; and England passed from inertness which was injurious, to actions which, unless arrested and reversed, will bring the downfall of the British Dominion.

The policy which the Indian Government adopted, under the apprehension of Russia, and of course under the indirect influence of the Foreign Secretary

in London, was strict alliance with the chief of the Sikhs. This, I conceive, to have been the root of all the evil, and the source of all the danger.

The Sikhs, unlike the Rohillas, the Affghans, the Persians and Turkmen, the Rajpoots, are no race of date and name—they boast no ancient splendour, no traditional dignity: as a race or a Government, they are mean and contemptible in the eyes of all Asia. They are of yesterday—they have risen as bandits, nor has a single tombstone yet effaced the freshness of their usurpation. They are detested alike by Mussulman and Hindoo—feared alike (that is, feared as plunderers) by the subject and the neighbour of the British power. Such is the people with which England binds itself—such the race whose ruler the Governor-General of India exhibits to the eyes of the Indian world as the equal of the Representative of the Majesty of England—as the peer of the Depository of the authority of the Mogul!

Had our alliance with Runjeet Singh been just and judicious in its intention, still would it have degraded the British character, and thereby injured the British power. It would have taken from us our character of religious toleration in India, and exhibited us through Central Asia as the enemy of the Mussulman; but when that alliance is unjust in its object as regards others, and injurious as regards the necessary hostility to England of the Sikh power, which we have elevated not only by our strength but by our degradation—then indeed does such an alliance reveal a degree of imbecility, or rather an amount of madness in the system from which it emanated which appears as the prelude to a nation's fall, and such as never could exist without entailing ruin.

We have to consider, therefore, the position of the Sikhs in respect to the Affghans, and their own interest in regard to Great Britain.

The Sikhs, who from a race of bandits and outlaws had for a century and a half been gradually increasing in strength, number, and importance, had been subject to the Mogul empire, and were included in the Affghan kingdom which Shah Ahmed had raised on the death of Nadir Shah. The Affghans thus looked on the Sikhs as their subjects, and between the two races existed mutual hate and religious antipathy.

After making himself master of the Sikh associations of freebooters, Runjeet Singh immediately applied himself to extend by conquest the limits of the Sikh principality, at the expense of the Affghans.

In 1810 the expulsion of Shah Shooja from the throne of Cabool, and the consequent distraction of that state, emboldened him to attack its possessions in the Punjaub. He invested Multaum, and, strange to say, pretended to justify his assault, by declaring that he demanded it in the name of Shah Shooja. Three years after he succeeded, though with great difficulty, in inducing his Sikh followers to break through the old traditional horror of passing the limits of the Hindoo world. He led them across the Indus, and by bribing the Affghan Governor got possession of Atock, which has in all times been considered as the key of India.

The next year he attempted, but in vain, the reduction of Cashmere, but it was not till 1819 that he obtained possession of that celebrated region, driving hence the Affghan commander and troops. In 1818, taking advantage of the troubles of Affghanistan produced again by the ill-starred Shah Shooja, he overran a portion of the Affghan territory, and occupied Pashawur, but was unable to retain it. In 1823 he repeated his visit, and again drove the garrison from Pashawur, but saw next day the élite of his forces cut down by four thousand Mussulman peasants. The possession of Pashawur proved so onerous, and in its pretensions so precarious, that Runjeet Singh, while asserting his claims of sovereignty over it, entrusted it to the keeping of an Affghan chief, and to one of the family of the Barukzyes, thus smoothing the way to eventual possession, and sowing dissensions through the Affghans and their rulers.

Again, on the attempt of Shah Shooja to recover his throne in 1833, did Runjeet Singh overrun a portion of Affghanistan, and occupy Pashawur—he penetrated even to the Kayber Pass, and in 1836 received a memorable check, fifteen thousand of his troops having been defeated by two thousand Affghans*. His aggressions, it is needless to observe, were conducted without any of the formalities of war—without any of the forms that regulate intercourse with states, or without provocation on one side, or the shadow of justification on the other.

Shah Shooja, after his discomfiture, was confined—tortured—plundered—by Runjeet Singh—and was suffered to make his escape, in the night, into the

* It is in reference to this event that the Governor-General, in his proclamation of the first October, says, that Dost Mahomed had made a *sudden and unprovoked attack upon our ancient ally.*

British dominion, only because he had nothing more to give, and having signed a secret contract for the dismemberment of the Affghan territory*; but Runjeet Singh, wisely deeming that the support of such a pretender was not worth the cost, preferred allowing his claims to slumber till more powerful dupes could be used for their defence, and contented himself with the plunder he had extorted from the weak and deluded monarch, and with the possession of another Shah and another Pretender in the person of his brother Eyub.

Thus the two important nations lying between the British possessions and Persia were in a state of mutual hostility, animated with strong national animosity, the one unjustly the aggressor, and aiming at the subjugation of the other.

There was here, however, offered to England the high and beneficial position of arbitrator, by which peace and tranquillity might be established in Central Asia—the Affghan people attached to us, and the Sikhs rendered dependent upon us. For England to ally herself with either was to lose that station—to ally herself with the unjust was to do what an enemy alone could desire or devise; it was to make her the tool of the designing, and to drive the injured party to look throughout the world for patrons and defenders, and for that support which the hostility of England must bring, in that friendship which was to be found wherever there were foes of Great Britain.

The topographic position of Affghanistan rendered it the first and the most important barrier against that danger which the Government of India apprehended. When on a former occasion Persia had joined Russia and France in a combined assault upon the dominions of Great Britain, England turned its eyes to Affghanistan as the barrier which it had to consolidate and elevate, and upon the strength and consistency of which it had to rely for the defence of India. Such was the policy to have been pursued upon the present occasion—such was the simple, the natural course to be adopted. The Indian Government had but to replace its foot in the same foot-print it had left—to revisit Cabool as a friend and as an ally, and that measure would have been the one by which, while securing the Affghans by protection, the Sikhs would have been equally secured by the curb placed on their injustice.

* This is the Treaty which the British Government has subsequently revived, made its own—and taken as the basis of policy and its wars in Central Asia.

Now, let us examine the position of the Sikhs in regard to the British power in India.

If India is to be defended from foreign aggression, it must be so defended in advance of the Indus. The occupation of the Punjaub and the whole Sikh territory, and consequently the downfall of the Sikh power, must precede any contest. The Sikh power is, therefore, the most inveterate and implacable foe of Great Britain. Runjeet Singh's whole mind—the entire policy and power of the Sikh State—must be exerted to prevent you from being able to defend yourselves against an external foe. From this position we may deduce—

First, That he has understood who is the foe whom you have to fear—that he has sought by every means to enlighten himself on that subject.

Second, That Runjeet Singh having formed the estimate of our weakness, which was requisite for the belief that we would be attacked, must have *considered the question of our expulsion from India.*

Third, Our blindness to his motives and to our own interests, and the extreme facility with which he has made us his dupe, must have taken away from him all respect for us, and consequently all belief in the permanence of our power, and thence immediately in his mind are evoked the vastest visions of ambition and the determined purpose of preparing alike to accomplish our downfall, and to profit by the catastrophe.

Let us see if his attitude and his acts justify this representation of his thoughts. Let us see if the attitude and the acts of the Indian Government justify his estimate of its incapacity?

Runjeet Singh is menaced by no one—but his military establishment is on a scale of attack—exceeding twice the amount of that of Tippoo Saib. For what purpose has it been created? Was it a fact worthy of the attention, or calculated to awaken the suspicion, to call forth a decision on the part of the Indian Government? Has it done so?

A former Indian Government had shaken with war the Peninsula, for the purpose of expelling French officers. The present Government saw no cause for apprehension in the placing of the Sikh troops under the direction of French officers.

When Runjeet Singh made it a condition of introduction to his service

that the officers so introduced should *not be British**, was the Indian Government led to conclude that he had objects hostile to Great Britain?

The Indian Government had accidentally discovered, in 1824, the existence of communications between St. Petersburg and Lahore. During the siege of Burtpoor, it became publicly known that Runjeet Singh had declared the moment was come for the expulsion of British power from India. Was the Indian Government led by such facts to consider the interests, the objects, or the character of the Sikh principality? It considered nothing; it perceived nothing. Every consideration which could have influenced a Government was cast aside, and every fact calculated to bring reflection to the unthinking—perception to the blind—passed by them unheeded, or rather seem to have confirmed in their minds convictions the very reverse of those which any reasoning being could have thence derived.

Thus, without any conceivable object, without any intelligible motive, have you broken through every restraint of honour, of policy, of self-respect, and of justice, to strengthen a state in interest diametrically opposed to you—to ally yourselves to a Power directly hostile to you—to unite yourselves to a Government which must fall in the event of your defending yourselves against assault, and which has therefore a vital interest in preventing you from ever having the chance of defence. Thus have you allied yourselves with a people the natural enemies of your necessary bulwark—the Affghans, and the religious foe of the Mussulman defenders from without, and the Hindoo occupiers of India from within; and by this alliance have you driven the Affghans to seek open protection from St. Petersburg, while you afford to the Sikhs the secret opportunity of concerting measures with that Power, rendering them important in its eyes by your alliance. The Sikhs would be rendered Russian by the false policy of the Indian Government—they are rendered Russian by the Russian policy of Great Britain—they are Russian by their essential hostility to British interests, and by the mutual sympathies of races

* “ It was only after many cautionary inquiries that they (Allard and Ventura) were allowed to enter the Punjaub, for Runjeet Singh *had shown suspicion that they were English*, nor was he in any way satisfied until a Vakeel (agent) employed by our Government at Lahore, had been sent to examine and report on the national character of the strangers.”

(the Sikh and the Muscovite) in whom resides a common character of religious and political aggression.

In reviewing such transactions, it is difficult to exclude the hope that some Englishmen may be brought to feel that knowledge is necessary to national prosperity and existence—that it is impossible to understand the position of England in any portion of the globe without understanding its interests every where, and that the action of any separate part of the Government is valueless, even if good, unless the whole acts as one system. This cannot be effected unless you have men instructed in those matters which pertain to public rights and duties; and if this be not so, sooner or later, national downfall must ensue, from a neglect of the means of acquiring this knowledge. For my own part, I am convinced that nothing now which England can do, can prolong her national existence, unless she devotes a few young men to that apprenticeship of diplomacy requisite to unravel the web she has wove around her, and so as to render her public servants a match for those with whom they have to deal. How has Russia risen from what she was—how has England sunk to what she is? The first has studied, the second has neglected to study, men, laws, and nations. Why has the Government of India hurried us into this alarming position in central Asia? Because it had no knowledge of the relations in which Russia and England stood. Had it known that Russia and England were in strict and concerted alliance at the very moment that it was taking these steps to oppose her—if it had known that England was sacrificing her political rights and interests—the property of her subjects, and the independence of foreign states, to further the views of Russia—if it had been aware that the English Minister was doing this knowingly and systematically, and while he was collusively disguising from the British public and Parliament the acts which he was performing—if it had known that the English Minister was lending this collusive, secret, and effective support to Russia in every transaction in which the two Cabinets were involved, and in every interest in which Russia directly or indirectly came into opposition with Great Britain,—if, I say, the Indian Government had known this, it would certainly not have thought of any other means for counteracting the action of Russia than by coming to an explanation with the Foreign Office, and meeting the evil there at its source. Had it understood the power of diplomacy, a knowledge of which was a duty imposed upon its fortunes and its station, it would have comprehended that proximity and distance weigh

relatively little in the secret influences that command the world, and that a state that holds the existence of others in her hand—that a power that can influence the motives of Statesmen and of Governments, can effect without the appearance of action, and can advance without putting herself in motion. It was not, therefore, by an alliance with Lahore, or by conquest of Affghanistan—it was not by any policy in Persia—it was not by explorations of the Indus, or expeditions in Transoxiana, that the power of Russia was to be curbed, or the integrity of the British power and character to be maintained. It was by the direct action of Great Britain upon Russia—it was by the estimate in the Russian Cabinet of the knowledge, integrity, and capacity of that of Great Britain, that Russia could desist from an endeavour which then she would feel to be hopeless. If India therefore required to be protected against Russia by England, how was India to be protected by Lahore or Affghanistan against England and Russia united?

It may appear foreign to the subject with which we are at present occupied thus to refer to the mental character of Great Britain—but the position of all the interests with which we have to deal is comprehensible only through the knowledge of the character of England—a subject less understood in this country even than India.

[“Here I omit an analysis of the documents in which each of the foregoing conclusions is established; it will appear when these papers are printed collectively. The documents examined in this excluded Part refer to the expedition of Shah Shooja in 1833-4, *put forth by the Government as explanatory of the objects of the late expedition to set that pretender on the throne of Cabool*. The summary is as follows:—

“Thus did the result of this struggle prove in every respect the erroneousness of the estimate of Captain Wade (whose bias in favour of Runjeet Singh seems to have been the spring of our Indian policy), of the characters of men and the tendency of events. It showed the absence of any strength in the party supporting Shah Shooja, of any capacity in that Prince—it proved a determined spirit in the Affghans against him—exhibited great ability in Dost Mahommed—and raised the man whom it was the particular object of the expedition to overthrow, as of Captain Wade to vilify, to a position of decided pre-eminence. It exhibited Runjeet Singh as the mover of the enterprise for objects concealed from the British Government—it revealed his unjust designs against the Affghan—it brought to light the treaty of partition arranged between himself and Shah Shooja—it exhibited the strong political and religious animosities subsisting between the two nations, and the madness of any Power that should seek to gain influence in Affghanistan by allying itself with the Sikhs. Yet this experience was without fruits, and these results without value on the Indian Government; and the subsequent conduct of that Government would lead one to suppose that conclusions, the very reverse of the truth, were drawn by it from this experience, and that, despite these lamentable failures, it considered the views of its agent, not injudicious, the capacity of Shah Shooja not contemptible, and the policy of Runjeet Singh not hostile to Great Britain.”]

PART X.

RELATIONS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WITH DOST MAHOMMED.
1836—1838.

IN the last Part I have shown that the Sikh power (occupying the Punjaub of which Lahore is the capital, and whose ruler was Runjeet Singh) was by its character and position essentially hostile to the British dominion in India. I have shown that the British Government was perfectly unconscious of the interests of the Sikhs, and of the objects of Runjeet Singh—that it had become the dupe of that Chief, and had lent to him the means of becoming important in the eyes of India and of Asia, and formidable to others and to us.

I have shown that the Sikhs had risen by usurpation upon the Affghans—that they were religious foes to the Mussulman—that their hostility was lawless robbery, unsanctioned by any form, and unveiled by any pretext. That the Sikhs had been supported by the alliance of the British Government, and that the Affghans consequently had been compelled to consider England their foe, and had turned round and looked to Saint Petersburg for protection. I have further said that this procedure of the Indian Government must be attributed to the influence exercised over it by the Foreign Secretary in London, in pursuance of the secret concert of that Minister with Russia.

We have now to see if the conduct of the Indian Government in its direct relations with the Affghans, justifies the above conclusion. If there, also, it has taken steps which were just, prudent, or politic—if it has even taken steps which were simple, natural, and intelligible, we will have grounds to doubt the justice of the inference we have drawn from those parts of its conduct hitherto examined. But if we find the steps which it takes directly with the Affghans also to be unjust, inexpedient, and injurious; and if, moreover, we find these steps to have been neither simple nor natural, nor in themselves intelligible—then of course, will the previous inference be strengthened and confirmed, and, indeed, the supposition of a secret and hostile influence will be requisite to render its policy comprehensible.

Before proceeding to the question immediately before us, it may be advisable briefly to sketch the general position of the Affghan people.

The Affghans, it has been already observed, are of a race supposed to be Jewish. They have been considered, and they not uncommonly consider themselves the lost tribes of Israel; they are Mahommedans of the Sooni sect (to which the Turks belong), which is hostile to the Shea sect, which is composed of Persians. They inhabit a region extending from East to West about six hundred miles: that is from Herat to the banks of the Indus, and four to five hundred miles from North to South from the Parapamisan range to the deserts that border the Arabian sea. They amount to about six millions of souls; they are warlike, enduring, enterprising, and faithful to their blood and leaders. They appear first of importance in the history of the East, and of the world, in the eleventh century, when the Ghisnvide dynasty arose, and made Hindostan for years the field of its forays, until it became subject to lines of Emperors of Affghan origin. The Moguls or Tartars then appeared upon the scene of Central Asia, the power of the Affghans was broken in their own territory, but their stock, transplanted to India, enabled Hindostan successfully to withstand, during two centuries, the assaults of the northern warriors, and to repel, from the year 1202 to 1305, twelve attempted invasions of India, which constitute the only successful attempts at resistance made by India from the time of Alexander; though five and forty times have hostile banners crossed the Indus. Humayoun, the son of Baber, in the sixteenth century yielded, though but for a short time, the imperial diadem of Hindostan to an Affghan. From the period of the restoration of Humayoun the Affghans in India became the prop of the Mogul dominion, and the Affghans in their own territory fell under the influence, and finally the dominion of Persia. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, encouraged by the aggressions as by the policy of Peter, they revolted against the Shah of Persia, Tamsab, and allied themselves with the Russians, at once for the destruction of Persia and for the invasion of India. Nadir Shah thwarted their projects, restoring the Persian power, reduced the Affghans to submission, and rendered them subservient to his conquest of India. On the death of Nadir Shah the Affghan kingdom was again reconstructed by Ahmed Shah. Ahmed Shah invaded India eight or nine times. In 1752 he added the Punjaub to the Affghan kingdom. In the year 1752 he occupied Delhi, and contracted a

blood alliance with the Mogul Emperor. In 1760 he entered India to defend, in conjunction with his Affghan brethren in India, the Mogul empire against the Sikhs and Marattas.

In the first year of the present century, the Affghan Shah, Zuman, crossed the Indus, advanced to Lahore, and then it was that the English Government allied itself with Persia for the purpose of saving India from Affghan invasion.

When, after the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia and France concerted the invasion of India, and brought Persia into alliance with themselves for that purpose, the Indian Government fell back upon the Affghans as the only defence for India, and Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone was sent in 1809 to form a defensive alliance with Shah Shooja, then on the throne of that state. Immediately afterwards, Shah Shooja was expelled from his dominions by an internal revolution. A period of great disorder followed, during which Runjeet Singh raised himself upon the ruins of the Affghans, and made himself master of the whole of the Punjaub and of Cashmere, and, crossing the Indus, occupied Peshawur, one of the principalities of the Affghan kingdom. The remaining principalities were Cabool, Kandahar, and Herat. Herat remained under the dominion of one of the Suddoyzees, a nephew of Shah Shooja, and son of Shah Mahmoud. Cabool, under Dost Mahommed, brother to the distinguished Futteh Khan, formerly the Vizir of more than one of the Affghan kings, Kandahar was under the dominion of three other brothers of the same minister, and Peshawur was placed by Runjeet Singh under the governorship of one of the same family of the Barukzyes, who had become his dependent.

From this sketch it will be at once perceived what enormous influence has been exercised over the fortunes of India by the Affghan people in ancient as in recent times; it will be seen that from internal and external causes, the conciliation of their good-will is the first duty, and the first object of the policy of the Indian Government. It will be seen by a glance at the map, that in respect to any action of Russia upon India, the dispositions of this people are more immediately important than that of any other; and the facts recorded regarding the former alliance of the Affghans with Peter show the view that Russia takes of this question.

The India Board, as explanatory of its recent transactions with Affghan-istan, and before making public the correspondence which had taken place with the mission in that country, had published (Indian papers, No. 3) extracts rela-

tive to the expedition of Shah Shooja, for the recovery of his throne in 1833 and 1834. The Indian Government professed to take no ostensible part in this expedition; but the pension of Shah Shooja, as on his previous attempt in 1818, was paid in advance to enable him to depart; and the reports made by Captain Wade, the resident of the Bengal Government, are entirely in favour of the projects of Shah Shooja and Runjeet Singh. The expedition was undertaken in consequence of a treaty entered into between Shah Shooja and Runjeet Singh, which we shall have at a subsequent period more particularly to examine, which constituted Shah Shooja, if he recovered his throne, a mere vassal of Runjeet Singh, and cedes to him territory still possessed by the Affghans, or over which the Affghan kingdom still possessed rights equal in extent to Great Britain. Runjeet Singh may therefore be considered as the party chiefly interested in the expedition of Shah Shooja, and the Secretary of the English Government, on the 5th March, 1833, declared that the interests of the British Government and of Runjeet Singh, “are considered as identical.” Although, by a letter of the same date, the same functionary instructs Captain Wade as follows:

“Should an impression exist in any quarter that the British Government feel otherwise than indifferent as to the movements of the Shah, you will do your utmost to remove it.”

And Lord William Bentinck, on the 30th of April of the same year, writes thus to Runjeet Singh:

“Your Highness states that Shah Shooja intends to make another attempt for the recovery of his throne. This is a matter with which the British Government has no concern, and has therefore taken no pains to inquire into it. The Shah’s success, or otherwise, depends upon the will of Providence, and the favourable disposition, or otherwise, of the inhabitants of that quarter.”

The Indian Government on the one hand, identifying itself with Runjeet Singh, and on the other affording a real countenance to Shah Shooja, pretended, it is true, to be no otherwise than indifferent, and asserted with greater truth that it had taken no pains to inquire into that to which it had become a party.

“Captain Wade states, on the 17th of June, 1834, that he had been ‘endeavouring to obtain a copy of the Treaty concluded between Shah Shooja and Runjeet Singh, but without success, neither party being inclined to show it to me. On expressing a wish to see it, I was referred from one to the other, without obtaining a sight of it from either.’”

Yet, on the 21st of November, 1831, he had transmitted the proposition for that Treaty by Runjeet Singh, and the reply on the part of Shah Shooja,

stating the articles which he agreed to, and the articles to which he objected. The projects of Runjeet Singh and of Shah Shooja were, however, discomfitted, and the last communication from Captain Wade contained this expression :

“ Dost Mahommed, in point of fact, may now be considered to have asserted his right to the throne of Cabool, and is acknowledged by the people as their leader.”

This was in the beginning of the year 1835. A despatch of the Court of Directors of 20th of September, 1837, and having reference to communications from the Governor-General, from the date of July 2, 1832, up to the 17th of March, 1836, and having therefore reference to the whole of the proceedings connected with this expedition, says :

“ With respect to the states West of the Indus, you have uniformly observed the proper course, which is to have no political connection with any state or party in those regions—to take no part in their quarrels.”

In the meantime, the aggressions of Runjeet Singh against the Affghans continued, as also the identification of the British power with Runjeet Singh.

The Indian Government, nevertheless, is convinced that the Affghan people is the most important barrier for India, and the only remaining one since Persia has been lost ; it has the proof before it that Dost Mahommed is the only man of action and of value in that region—he has raised himself, in the midst of most difficult circumstances, to a station of pre-eminence, and almost to one of royalty. The ablest servant of the British Crown represents him as the man on whom England has to rely. Mr. McNeill had so emphatically declared it to be his conviction that the Affghan people and government were entirely at your disposal, that in recommending the sending of an expeditionary force to Herat, far from contemplating the opposition of the Affghans to the passage of those troops, he suggests that the assistance and the services of the Affghans should be refused. Every thing, therefore, was within your reach which it could be an object to desire.

But it would appear that the Indian Government, when first it took steps with regard to Affghanistan, had admitted that the grounds of its interference was to give security to Dost Mahommed—knowing that Dost Mahommed would be compelled to appeal to Russia against the violence of the Sikhs, unless England did afford him that support. Yet, strange to say, taking these grounds of judgment, and these motives of action, it ended in conclusions and in results exactly the reverse. It added, by its interference, to the insecurity

of Dost Mahommed, which its own strict alliance with the Sikhs had created, and which it was the object of its interference to avert. That the Indian Government did so enter into this negotiation is proved by the following passage which has appeared in the 127th number of the Quarterly Review, in an able and elaborate article, which constitutes the only defence which has appeared of the policy of the Government in this transaction, and which is generally attributed to Sir John M'Neill :

“ When the Government of India felt itself called upon by the proceedings of Persia, in concert with Russia, to deviate from the rule which it had hitherto prescribed to itself of not interfering in the political affairs of Affghanistan, it appears to have contemplated the adjustment of the differences between Dost Mahommed and the Sikhs, in such a manner *as would afford security to the Affghan chief*, as the first step to be taken for promoting the tranquillity of Affghanistan and the prosperity of commerce, as well as with the view of defeating the intrigues of Persia and Russia in those parts. And as the only object of Dost Mahommed Khan, in seeking alliances with foreign courts, appeared to be protection against the Sikhs, it was not unreasonable to presume, that any arrangement which should ensure to him that protection, would meet the difficulties which had led him to court a foreign alliance, and would therefore remove the only inducement which he appeared to have to form connections which might ultimately prove to be injurious to our interests. The Government of India, therefore, authorised Captain Burnes to tender its good offices, with a view to the adjustment, on equitable terms, of the differences between Dost Mahommed and the Sikhs; but coupled with this proposal was a condition that the chief of Cabool, in consideration of the friendly intervention of the British Government to effect this object, should renounce all connection with the Governments to the westward—that is, with Persia and Russia,—except with the concurrence of England.”

The Government of India then felt that the aggression of the Sikhs was the cause of the dread of the Affghans for England—and it considered alliance with Russia as the consequence of misunderstanding with England. We have on record on the one hand the conviction of the Indian Government that Dost Mahommed was driven into the arms of Russia by the aggressions of the Sikhs, and you see on the other that the means which that Government has taken to counteract that alliance was by making itself a party to the secret compact of partition of Shah Shooja and Runjeet Singh !

We have the Indian Government declaring the hostility of Russia to it, and its hostility to Russia, and you have the Foreign Minister in London, declaring that the interests of Great Britain and Russia are one. The Indian Government shows that it has to afford security to Dost Mahommed against Runjeet Singh, and then declares that its “interests are identified”

with those of Runjeet Singh. Such a Government, even if not placed in this position by previous collusion, must be the mere dupe and instrument of any and every power with which it comes in contact.

Mr. Macnaghten, on April 10th, 1837, says:—

“ The circumstance of the British Government having resolved decidedly to discourage the prosecution by Shah Shooja of further schemes against Cabool and Kandahar, may be found the means of useful influence in our favour.”

Take this single passage alone—look at its terms—compare its statement with subsequent facts:—was ever such an exhibition of weakness, vacillation, and dishonesty made voluntarily public by a Government? And yet there is no public denunciation of such proceedings, no arrestation of transactions so fatal and so anomalous. There is carelessness alike for the mismanagement that precedes, and for the catastrophes that follow. To live from day to day seems the only thought of the state, and disasters and misfortunes seem rather coveted than deplored, because to one party they afford the means of factious triumph—to the general frivolity of the nation the interest of novelty and the excitement of news.

The Government proposes to arrest the dangers of the connection of Russia with Affghanistan by imposing upon Affghanistan the condition of renouncing all intercourse with Russia. If the Indian Government had prevented the cause of the evil, there was no necessity to stipulate that the evil should not exist; and if it did not, the stipulation was worse than useless, because it was a declaration of failure; it was, farther, an exhibition of its fears as a Government, and of its incapacity as men. But it is of more worth than this in the examination of the subject; it shows that the Indian Government did not honestly enter into the line which it assumed; and contaminated and debased by its alliance with Runjeet Singh, how could it have confidence in its policy, or honesty in its professions? The stipulation was, further, in itself monstrous. It was a stipulation which, had it been entered into by the party to whom it was proposed, could, with the utmost impunity, have been violated; it was a stipulation which any state was justified in violating, from its being in contravention to the duties of independent powers, to the rights of sovereignty, and the law of nations*. While

* See in Part IV. the Treaty between Persia and England, respecting the Affghans.

the Indian Government attempts to impose on the Affghans an obligation to hold no intercourse with Persia—Lord Palmerston instructs the British Envoy at Teheran that England was prohibited by her public faith from interfering in any way between the Persians and the Affghans!

The following letter* from Dost Mahommed to the Emperor of Russia, about the beginning of 1836, is the first communication between St. Petersburg and Cabul.

“ There have been great differences and quarrels between myself and the Royal House of the Suddozyes. *The English Government is inclined to support Shooja-ool-Moolk.* The whole of India is governed by them, and they are on *friendly terms with Runjeet Singh*, the Lord of the Punjaub, which lies in their neighbourhood. The British Government exhibit no favourable opinions towards me.

“ I, with all my power, have been always fighting with the Sikhs.

“ Your Imperial Government has made friendship with the Persians; and if your Majesty will graciously be pleased to arrange matters in the Affghan country, and assist this nation (which amounts to twenty lacs of families), you will place me under obligations.

“ I hope your Imperial Majesty will do me the favour by allowing me to be received, like the Persians, under the protection of the Government of Russia, under your Royal protection. I can perform, along with my Affghans, various praiseworthy services.

“ That will be highly proper, whatever your Imperial Majesty may be pleased to do.”

The arrival of a new Governor-General then awakened the expectation of a change of policy, and Dost Mahommed addresses a letter to Lord Auckland, of which the following is an extract (March 31st, 1836):—

“ The late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and misguided Sikhs, and their breach of treaty, are well known to your Lordship. Communicate to me whatever may now suggest itself to your wisdom, for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for my guidance.

“ I hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your own, and favour me often by the receipt of your friendly letters. Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased to issue for the administration of this country, I will act accordingly.”

On the 22nd August, Lord Auckland replies, and writes:—

“ I have learned with deep regret that dissensions exist between yourself and Maharajah Runjeet Singh. My friend, you are aware that it is not the practice of the British Government to interfere

* The documents we are now proceeding to analyse, although they constitute one and the same correspondence, are separated into *two parts*, so that, without much labour, it is impossible to understand even that which is apparently made public.

with the affairs of other independent states ; and indeed it does not immediately occur to me how the interference of my Government could be exercised for your benefit. I shall be happy, however, to learn from you by what means you think that I can be of any assistance ; and, in the meantime, I have only to hope that you will be able to devise some mode of effecting a reconciliation with the Sikhs ; it being not only for your own advantage, but for the advantage of all the countries in the vicinity, that two nations so situated should ever preserve unimpaired the relations of amity and concord.

“ Begging that you will accept my renewed assurance of friendship and regard.”

The Governor-General then determines on sending Captain Burnes to Cabool, for the objects already explained ; namely, that of affording Dost Mahommed that protection against the Sikhs which he had sought from St. Petersburg. He, consequently, writes to him a letter (May 15, 1837), in which he says :—

“ To your enlightened mind it cannot fail to be obvious that it is commerce alone which enables the people of one country to exchange its superfluous commodities with those of another.”

In September 1837, Captain Burnes arrived at Cabool, and on the 24th of that month thus describes his reception by Dost Mahommed :—

“ We were conducted into the city by Sirdar Mahommed Akbar Khan, with great demonstration of respect and joy, and, immediately on our arrival, presented to the Ameer, whose reception was of the most gratifying nature.

“ On the following day I had the honour to deliver my letter of credentials, which the Ameer received in a very flattering manner, with many expressions of his high sense of the great honour which had been conferred on him, in his at last having had the means of communication with an officer of the British Government, for which he felt deeply grateful to the Governor-General.

“ I have good reason to believe Dost Mahommed Khan will set forth no extravagant pretensions, and act in such a manner as will enable the British Government to show its interest in his behalf, and at the same time preserve for us the valued friendship of the Sikh Chief.”

On the 4th of October he writes :

“ That an agent from Persia had been sent with robes and presents in return for the previous application made by Dost Mahommed to the Shah of Persia, and is now at Candahar ; but he has appeared at a time most unfavourable to his master, when the attention of the British Government is directed to Affghanistan, and which goes far to discredit him with all parties, and even to damp the hopes of the Kuzzilbashes. It is even doubtful if he will advance to Cabool ; and it is certain if he does so, that any offers which he may make will never be placed in the balance against those of the British Government.”

Next day (5th October) he reports an interview with Dost Mahommed, of which the following are extracts :—

“ ‘ But,’ said the Ameer, ‘ I am involved in difficulties which are very prejudicial to commerce ; my hostilities with the Sikhs narrow my resources, compel me to take up money from merchants, and

to even increase the duties to support the expenses of war. These are the shifts to which I am driven, for seeking to preserve my honour. While we were engaged in resisting Shooja-ool-Moolk at Candahar, the city of Peshawur was seized from our family, and I had the mortification to discover, among the papers of the ex-king, after his defeat, a treaty that made Peshawur the reward of the Sikhs, and to hurl me and mine from authority. I was yet left; but when Runjeet Singh's officers planted a fort near the Khyber Pass, my existence was endangered; I resisted, and here also with success.' * * * * *

“ I strongly urged him to reflect on the uselessness of seeking to contend with so potent a Prince as Maharajah Runjeet Singh (!) I stated the revenue of that chief, the great abilities which he possessed, the riches at his command, the fine army which he could bring into the field, the hopelessness of warring with him, and the injuries which he inflicted on himself and his people, by allowing himself to be drawn into hostilities, and, though the fortune of war had, of late, granted success to his arms, and his formidable opponent Huree Singh was no more, I could assure him, as a well-wisher, that he was contending with a Power which he could not resist, and that it would be prudent to seek for such an adjustment of differences as would preserve his own reputation, and that of his countrymen. * * * * *

“ Dost Mahommed ran over the history of the Dooraunee kingdom, expatiating on its powers, which extended from Meshid to Cashmere, and pointing to the house in which he sat, said, that this is the whole share of that vast empire that has fallen to me, and I cannot therefore be indifferent to the honour of having communication with an agent of the British Government, nor to seeking, by every means I can, to interest it in my behalf. * * * * *

“ I pointed out that Peshawur was an undoubted conquest of the Sikhs, made by the sword, preserved by it; and to interfere with which would be *a violation of justice, and the integrity* of Runjeet Singh's dominions*. I continued, however, that there was a rumour very current in Peshawur, and which has also reached me, that the Maharajah intended to make some change in the management of Peshawur, but that it sprung from himself, *and not the British Government*.

“ He also asked of me the relations between the British Government and Russia; the influence of Russia over the dominions of Turkey; and spoke of the control which Russia exercised over the trade in Toorkistan.”

Dost Mahommed thus saw that the British were entirely the dupes of Runjeet Singh, that they were unconscious of all that was preparing in Central Asia.

Lord Auckland, on the 21st January, had despatched a letter to Dost Mahommed by which all the hopes of protection against the Sikhs were cut off.

The following are extracts :—

“ In regard to Peshawur, truth compels me to urge strongly on you to relinquish the idea of obtaining the government of that territory. From the generosity of his nature, and his regard for his old alliance with the British Government, Maharajah Runjeet Singh has acceded to my wish for the

* Nevertheless in the subsequent Treaty between the English Government and Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja, the latter is made to cede Peshawur to Runjeet Singh.

cessation of strife and the promotion of tranquillity, if you should behave in a less mistaken manner towards him. It becomes you to think earnestly on the mode in which you may effect a reconciliation with that powerful prince to whom my nation is united by the direct bonds of friendship, and to abandon hopes which cannot be realised.

“ Should you be dissatisfied with the aid I have mentioned from this Government, which is all that I think can in justice be granted, or should you seek connexion with other Powers, without my approbation, Captain Burnes, and the gentlemen accompanying him, will retire from Cabool, where his further stay cannot be advantageous; and I shall have to regret my inability to continue my influence in your favour with the Maharajah.”

On the 13th March, 1838, Captain Burnes reports the result of this communication :—

“ In the forenoon of the 5th I had a visit from the Nawab Jubber Khan, who came over from the Durbar, by the Ameer's request, with a string of propositions, which were to be agreed to by me, as the terms on which the Ameer consented to what was asked of him. These consisted of a promise to protect Cabool and Candahar from Persia; of the surrender of Peshawur by Runjeet Singh; of the interference of our Government to protect, at that city, those who might return to it from Cabool, supposing it to be restored to Sultan Mahommed Khan; with several other proposals.

“ I at once informed the Nawab that I would agree to none of the terms proposed; that I was astonished to hear a race so illustrious as the Dooranees, who had carried their sword to Ispahan and Delhi, imploring protection against Persia;”—(The British Agent is *astonished* that the Affghans should apply to England for support—he is indignant at such a thing, reproaches and denounces them for it) “ that as for Peshawur, it belonged to our ancient ally, the ruler of Lahore, and he alone could surrender it, and that as for protecting those who returned from Cabool, supposing the Maharajah to make a settlement, it was an after concern, which it was now useless to discuss, as well as the other matters stated, since the Ameer seemed so little disposed to attend to the views of the British Government, and, what was of more importance, his own interests.

“ I abridged the interview by stating that, as I saw no hope of adjustment in the present tone held, I should request my dismissal and proceed to Hindostan, where they might solicit, but probably in vain, another listening to their grievances. The Nawab left me in sorrow.”

Captain Burnes then formally asks leave to withdraw, saying, “ to remain longer here fetters the Ameer.”

Another conference takes place, he describes Dost Mahommed as more gracious and more friendly than ever—he states that Dost Mahommed declares to him that he “ could not stand for a month against the British, and “ the thought of their displeasure filled him with terror.”

“ ‘ He knew,’ he says, ‘ that the Maharajah was our friend, and that we would not attack him; but we had it in our power to rescue Peshawur, as we had rescued Shikarpore, not by arms, but by a single hint to the ruler of Lahore; that, on the contrary, we had avowed our being more than ever friendly to him; had preferred him to the Affghans, who were willing to do us service.’”

In the meantime the Emperor of Russia acknowledges the previous communications of Dost Mahommed, and sends not only letters but an agent—not only proffers of sympathy but of money.

Dost Mahommed, however, declined this overture, in the expectation of a change in the policy of England. The chiefs of Kandahar, likewise, were far from grasping at the Russian and Persian proposals; but as to the line which they would ultimately adopt, there could be from the origin no doubt whatever, England having associated on the one hand with the Sikhs, and on the other with Russia; while she gave to Russia's hostility a dangerous effect by every where revealing apprehension of her. The chiefs of Cabool and Candahar saw Persia connected with Russia advancing upon Herat. They saw in that expedition an open defiance of British power. They therefore had only to obtain similar support to be able to meet her with similar defiance. Russia and Persia meanwhile could both threaten and promise. Russia required not to threaten in words, since within a few months they had seen her overleap a thousand miles, and directing the siege operations before Herat. She could also promise all that the weakness or the avarice, that the ambition and the credulity of these rulers or populations might desire or accept. Then, as regards the Sikhs and the Persians, she could offer protection against both. It is under such circumstances that the initiatory step is taken by Russia. A Polish Lieutenant, who had been degraded and sent to Siberia, was released for this service, and with hope held out to him of restoration in case of success. This officer proceeded as the aide-de-camp of the Governor of Orenburg to visit Central Asia, charged at once with letters from the Russian Minister at Teheran, and from the Persian Government; and, moreover, the bearer of letters from the Minister of Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, and from the Emperor himself! "The object of the Russian Envoy," as explained by Dost Mahommed's agent at Teheran, "is to have a road for the Russians to the English, for which they are anxious." This mission came to assert to Dost Mahommed that the great European power of Russia was interested in his welfare—that it was disposed to assist him against the Sikhs. What impression could Dost Mahommed, or any Asiatic, draw from this assertion except this—that Russia had the power of defying the vengeance of England? Lieutenant Vickovitch had, further, to proffer pecuniary assistance to Dost Mahommed, to urge him to renounce all connection with England, and to

induce him to connect himself in alliance with Persia and Russia, whom he represented as one. Captain Burnes thus announces to the Indian Government this extraordinary and startling intelligence :—

(Extract.)

“ Cabool, 20th December, 1837.

“ I have the honour to report, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, a very extraordinary piece of intelligence of the arrival in this city yesterday of an agent direct from Russia.

“ On the 11th instant, I received a notification of his approach. A circumstance of so unusual a nature prevented my sending off an express to you till I could be better informed.”

A few days later, Sir A. Burnes details the offers to Dost Mahommed of the Russian agent, and gives utterance to his alarms at the altered state of affairs, and at such a step as this taken by Russia.

To this communication of Sir Alexander Burnes, the reply of the Government of India is—“ His Lordship” (the Governor-General) “ *attaches little immediate importance to this mission of the Russian agent to the westward!*”

The Governor-General “attaches little immediate importance” to a circumstance which within the same letter is stated to involve the contingency of the expulsion of the British mission from an independent state! The Governor-General then directs that this mission should be assumed to have been a commercial one. There was no necessity for such an assumption if it had been real, and no possibility of its being so assumed if it were not so. The Governor-General proceeds then to threaten in case the Ameer does not dismiss the mission to which he attaches no importance, and his threat is—*cessation of our good offices with the Sikhs*; that is to say, that he threatened to withdraw that which had no existence, and this again was tantamount to a threat of letting loose the Sikhs upon the Affghans, while by the avowal of the Government itself it was the alarm of the Affghans for the Sikhs which had led Dost Mahommed to open intercourse with Russia. It suffices but to take up any single document connected with the British Government in India to perceive in the confusion of its sentences, as in the contradiction of its statements, mental characters which never yet have been associated with success—to feel alarm for the prosperity, or the existence of whatever interests are confided to such men.

Captain Burnes of course cannot excute the orders of the Governor-General—he cannot represent Lieutenant Vickovitch’s Mission as commercial ;

he can only continue to revolve in a vicious circle of fallacies, halting between the desire, and the impossibility of perceiving and acting—now leading Dost Mahommed to hope, now driving him to despair—now soothing his irritation against the Sikhs, and by the excitement and betrayal of delusive hopes, destroying the reverence and awe for British character and power—relics, alas ! of better times.

Three months and twenty days after the former interview, Captain Burnes reports another interview with Dost Mahommed (January 26, 1838), who says, in reference to the former conversation :—

“ I think, therefore, that I see in the contemplated plans for altering the arrangement for governing Peshawur, that his (Runjeet Singh’s) designs are sinister, and his object to draw the British Government unawares into them.

“ In the friendly expression of the feeling entertained towards the Affghans by the British Government, I see clearly that it would not permit itself to be made a party to my destruction. If you are not disposed to strengthen my hands, and raise me above the rank which I at present enjoy, *it cannot be your intention with offers of sympathy to bring about my ruin.* On that point I am at ease ; but in separating us all one from another ; in seeking to keep the chiefs from being dependent on one another ; you are certainly neutralizing the power of the Affghan nation, and sowing the seeds of future dissension.”

Sir A. Burnes’ ultimatum is as follows :—

“ You must never receive agents from other Powers, or have ought to do with them, without our sanction, you must dismiss Lieutenant Vickovitch with courtesy ; you must surrender all claim on Peshawur on your own account, as that chiefship belongs to Maharajah Runjeet Singh ; you must live on friendly terms with that potentate ; you must also respect the independence of Kandahar, and of Peshawur, and co-operate in arrangements to unite your family.”

Dost Mahommed, apparently in a state of despair, says he will submit upon the adjustment of conditions, and on their being reduced to writing.

Captain Burnes declares, in reporting these circumstances to the Governor-General, his opinion, that after nearly a six months’ residence, he considered the reconciliation of the Sikhs and the Affghans as impracticable, and that it was “ only out of regard for his Lordship and our feelings generally, that the “ Affghans have been taught to name Maharajah Runjeet Singh *with becoming* “ *respect.*”

A meeting is arranged for the final adjustment, which is interrupted by the arrival of letters from Kandahar, conveying communications from Mr. Goutte, the Russian agent. It is needless to add that this timely interposition, as that of Count Simonich, at the moment when Mr. M’Neill

had brought to an adjustment the differences between Persia and Herat, led to a similar result—the arrangement was broken off, and Captain Burnes retired from Cabool!

The previous explanations which I have given of the position of the parties, renders comment upon these extracts superfluous. Complete identification of the British Government with Runjeet Singh—the entire dependence of Dost Mahommed upon us—his extreme reluctance to associate himself with Russia or with Persia, are clearly established. It is also clearly established that the Indian Government converted its own motives for interfering to prevent the alliance of Dost Mahommed with Russia into means for bringing that alliance into existence.

We have seen in a former part that the Russian Envoy at Teheran had announced, in 1835, that it would be the intention of the English Government to set up Shah Shooja—we have seen, by a subsequent communication of Mr. M'Naghten, that the Indian Government had decided to discountenance that project. We have, therefore, the secret of the mission of Lieutenant Vickovitch—namely, that of furnishing a pretext for leading the Indian Government into that expedition.

I have, in concluding my observations upon the relations of Dost Mahommed with the Indian Government previous to the rupture, but to direct the reader's attention to this final consideration—that the Governor-General of India had placed before Dost Mahommed certain consequences as flowing from his rejection of such proposals as had been made—that these consequences were the withdrawal of the mission, and the cessation of the employment of his good offices to effect a reconciliation with Runjeet Singh. By the statement of these consequences he excluded all other steps, and, consequently, if there were no rights of nations—if there were no human sympathies in the breasts of men—if he had had, on other grounds, just reason for war with Cabool, he had, by this specification of consequences, excluded himself from taking steps which he had not specified; he had rendered it impossible for him to proceed to physical means of coercion, far less to aim at the destruction of the Prince himself, and to introduce, in the midst of the distractions of the Affghan race, the pretensions of a dethroned monarch as the colouring for invasion by his own troops, and for the assault upon them of their implacable religious and political foe.

But Mr. M'Neill has told you that the whole Mussulman population of Central Asia looked to Russia with dread, and to England with confidence—looked to Russia with dread, because she was known to be desirous to pull down—looked to England with confidence, because she was known to be desirous to maintain that which did exist. What relative position do those two nations now occupy? Is it not England that seeks to pull down?—Russia that appears anxious to maintain? Must not, then, the effects be reversed, and England and Russia have changed places in Central Asia?

If the human mind recoils from violence and injustice, even with an object—if it revolts against fraud, even when gilded by genius, or produced with power, with ingenuity, or plausibility? With what feelings must any one who still preserves some consciousness of honesty, or some love or respect for his country, close these documents put forward by the India Board as the explanation of its views and the justification of its acts?

PART XI.

TREATY BETWEEN RUNJEET SINGH, SHAH SHOOJA, AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

It will be recollected, that when the news first reached this country of the invasion of the Affghan territory by the British force, that all parties concurred in approving of that measure. Those who, the day before the arrival of the intelligence, scoffed at the idea of the march of Russian troops from Asterabad to Kandahar, now conceived that triumph was to crown the attempt of British troops to march from Calcutta to the same place. Those who had resisted every attempt to show them the danger of their position and the valuelessness of that which they call “peace,” instantly concurred in the expediency of war. Those who had termed British subserviency to Russian aggression laudable prudence, now exulted in the “display of commendable “vigour.”

When this war was announced, it was hailed with univereal applause; not one individual, or one public paper, questioned either its expediency or its justice; and no Englishman whom I had at that time the opportunity of seeing, had so much as the idea of associating the merits of this question with the justice of the act. This was not all. To the leading organ of the Opposition was confided the task of advocating the policy of the Government, and the *Quarterly Review* put forth an able, elaborate, argumentative, and documentary article, to prove how energetically the Government had asserted the honour of the Crown, and how ably it had maintained the interests of the empire.

Soon after, news was received of the triumphs of the British arms, and of the conquest of Affghan territories and cities, sounds of exultation arose, and were re-echoed from shore to shore! Unworthy Britons, soul-less men! *Triumphs* where there was no foe? *Conquest* where there was no resistance? Having so exulted, all England pleased itself with believing that its power and dignity were restored in Asia, and that the tranquil possession of India was secured. Your triumph in Cabool is followed by war with China—your rupture with China opens Peking to a Russian embassy. Your conquest over the Affghans throws Herat into the arms of Persia. Your expedition to Kandahar brings thirty thousand Russians to Kiva, and—infatuated nation! your policy has nevertheless been *successful*, for that policy has been to yield your strength to an enemy, and to impose upon yourselves a lie!

Having in the two previous Parts shown that the interests of the Sikhs were hostile to Great Britain, and that the Indian Government had become the dupe of the Sikhs—that the dispositions of Dost Mahommed were most friendly to England, and that the Indian Government, being at once the dupe of the Sikhs and the instrument of Lord Palmerston, had strengthened the hands of its Sikh foe, and driven its Affghan ally to appeal to Russia (to whom England was united) for protection against the Sikhs (to whom the Indian Government was united), I now come to the grounds put forward by the Indian Government for its invasion of Cabool and Kandahar. I must first observe, that that invasion, if the object of it was to subdue the country, was quite superfluous, as Dost Mahommed had declared his readiness to do whatever was required in regard to its administration, and avowed himself equally unable to resist the force of England, and zealous to obtain its protec-

tion. If the expedition was intended to relieve Herat, and to resist the progress of Persian or Russian arms, or influence—again, was it superfluous, as Sir John M'Neill when before Herat had told you, that not only would the Affghans give passage to your troops for that purpose, but that they would furnish auxiliary forces, which Sir John M'Neill considers useless, as detracting from the moral character of a British expedition? Let us see what the reasons are for this expedition. They are a *Treaty*—not signed by, or binding on, the Indian Government, but a Treaty between Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja, while the latter was an exile. This secret compact of partition, which had lain unexecuted for fourteen years, and which *had been concealed* from the Indian Government, is now adopted by the Indian Government. The Indian Government proceeds to execute it, and assigns as a reason for doing so, that that compact (*viz.* between Shah Shooja and Runjeet Singh) did exist! This treaty is put forth in explanation of, and as the motive for, the invasion of the Affghans. No other explanation is given, no other motive assigned. Never before has a Government assumed the existence of a compact, even if made by itself, as the motive for entering into it, or given a measure it has adopted as the explanation of the end it has in view. I may be permitted, in an event so grave, in a case so unprecedented, to dwell with greater minuteness and at more length on this treaty, than otherwise this document might seem to warrant. I do so, conceiving that the character or position of the Government of India can be comprehended only by a thorough appreciation of its past conduct, and dreading great and near disasters, which will be without value for instruction, unless their causes are understood.

The Preamble to this treaty is as follows:—

“ WHEREAS a treaty was formerly concluded between Maharajah Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, consisting of fourteen articles, exclusive of the preamble and the conclusion: and WHEREAS the execution of the provisions of the said treaty was suspended for certain reasons: and WHEREAS at this time Mr. W. H. M'Naghten having been deputed by the Right Hon. George Lord Auckland, G.C.B., Governor-General of India, to the presence of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and vested with full powers to form a treaty in a manner consistent with the friendly engagements subsisting between the two states, the treaty aforesaid is arrived (*sic*) and concluded, with certain modifications; and four new articles have been added thereto, with the approbation and in concert with the British Government, the provisions whereof, as contained in the following eighteen articles, will be duly and faithfully observed.”

A preamble is the statement of the parties to a treaty, and of the object for which it is concluded. The preamble in this case does not designate the

parties between whom the treaty is contracted. The preamble to this British treaty refers to a foreign treaty—a secret compact never executed—one of the parties to which was a private individual, and which contained references to three other states, from each of which it was kept secret.

The preamble contains a specification of four *new* articles, but none of the old were known. It states that these articles had been added with the approbation of, and in concert with the British Government, as if to show that the British Government had nothing to do with the treaty itself. It further adds, “that the provisions whereof, as contained in the following eighteen “articles, will be duly and faithfully observed.” The provisions of the treaty could only be found in the articles—whatever the number of which it is composed; and if the parts of the treaty were not binding, because they were treaty stipulations, the introduction of so strange a declaration could not make them so. Thus this preamble does not consist of those parts which are requisite to constitute a preamble. There is no declaration of the contracting Powers, no statement of proposed objects, no specification of plenipotentiaries, no mutual verification of full powers. Yet in these statements does a preamble alone consist, and without these preliminaries no treaty could be adjusted.

Mr. W. H. M'Naghten “is *vested* with full powers to *form* a treaty *in a* “*manner* consistent with the *friendly engagements* subsisting” between the two states. Powers are vested *in* a man. Alliances are *formed*—but treaties are negotiated. Every thing *not hostile* is consistent with friendly relations, and there is nothing inconsistent with these except that which is hostile. The formation of a treaty, therefore, in a manner which should not be hostile, is the amount of the statement. But this statement neither explains how or why the present treaty comes into existence, or how “the treaty aforesaid is “arrived (revived) and concluded with certain modifications.” The three passages following the thrice repeated word “WHEREAS” appear to stand as grounds assigned for the treaty. As no other reasons are assigned for this treaty, these must be assumed to be the only pretexts which it was possible to put forward.

The first statement is, “WHEREAS*, a treaty was formerly concluded “between Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja!”

* This word alone reveals the absence, in the men by whom these transactions have been conducted, of the commonest acquaintance with the business of diplomacy.

The second, “WHEREAS, the execution of that treaty was suspended “for certain reasons”!!

The third, “WHEREAS, Mr. W. H. M’Naghten had been deputed to “the presence of Runjeet Singh”!!!

What would be said of a treaty signed between Prince Louis Bonaparte, Spain, and England, for the purpose of a dismemberment of France, and that the reason assigned should be that a certain individual was vested with full powers, and deputed to the presence of the chief of Madrid to form a treaty in a manner consistent with the friendly engagements of the two states? If friendship existed between the states, all the objects of a treaty as regarded them were already secured; but if the action of the treaty regarded other parties, what ground is there for referring to the friendly relations of the states themselves? Men do not confuse themselves, and men do not use superfluous expressions, and still less superfluous, confused, and unintelligible phraseology, especially in the solemn wording of a public treaty, except when there is some strange consciousness of disgrace attached to their acts, or of dishonesty to their intentions.

By turning to the original treaty, framed in March 1834, between Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja—between a bandit chief and a de-nationalized and expelled pretender—how different the tone, character, and expression, from those of this diplomatic document which has degraded the very tongue of Great Britain!

The preamble of that treaty is as follows:—

“PREAMBLE.—Relations of friendship having been firmly established between Maharajah Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, so that there neither is, nor ever shall be, any alienation, or difference of interest existing between them, they agree to adopt the following articles, in consideration of the terms of good-will and friendship by which they are reciprocally actuated.”

The document is a good and proper instrument, which establishes, in a decided and straightforward manner, the partition of the Cabool kingdom between a prince who assumes to have a right, and a robber who has none. The support of Runjeet Singh affords to Shah Shooja the only chance of recovering his throne, and Runjeet Singh extorts, as the price of his co-operation, a formal cession of territory, amounting to one half in extent, and to more than one half in importance, of his actually acquired territories—territories acquired by violation of international right, sanctioned

by no compact, and regarded by his own subjects as an insecure possession—by the Affghans as property of their own, held for a while, and to be retaken whenever they are able.

Let us now examine the articles of the Treaty as it originally stood.

The First, Second, and Third articles have reference to the cession of territory to Runjeet Singh—extending seven hundred miles in one direction, and four hundred in another, and to the settlement of the frontier.

The Fourth article is the indication of a scheme upon the Sinde territory, in which the name of England is artfully introduced as being a party to the projects of Runjeet Singh, and in which, more artfully still, is introduced the name of Captain Wade—whom it was advantageous to Runjeet Singh to render authoritative and important in the eyes of the Indian Government. Captain Wade himself, when he comes to a knowledge of the treaty, remonstrates* against this article, which nevertheless appears in all its informality in the subsequent treaty with England.

The Fifth article fixes the tribute in the form of presents which the Shah shall pay to Runjeet Singh.

The Tenth forbids the slaughter of kine when the armies are united—consequently rendering the Mussulman habits subservient to the Sikh religious prejudices.

The Eleventh establishes an equal partition of the booty of the Barukzyes, should the Maharajah lend an auxiliary force to the Shah; but in any case if the Shah should succeed in getting possession of that property without Runjeet Singh's assistance, still a portion of it is to come into the coffers of the Sikh.

Article Thirteenth stipulates that the Shah is, on the requisition of Runjeet Singh, to send him an auxiliary force, and, in like manner, the Maharajah will furnish the Shah, when required, an auxiliary force. Now, as this document was drawn up in consequence of a negociation opened by Shah Shooja with Runjeet Singh, by a request made from the former to the latter that he would “confer a throne,” the non-stipulation of success as the contingency

* The remonstrance, however, is a very mild one. He says, 17th June, 1834, in addressing Mr. M'Naghten—“I know not with what sentiments his Lordship may view the manner in which the name of the English Government has here been introduced”—(phraseology not without analogy with the preamble of the treaty, and the declaration of the Governor-General.)

upon which the advantages secured to Runjeet Singh were to be obtained, and the non-specification of the military and other means to be devoted to that purpose by Runjeet Singh, prove that Runjeet Singh had no intention whatever of carrying the treaty into effect—and that he merely took advantage of the necessities and the baseness of Shah Shooja to encourage an insurrectionary movement in Affghanistan, by which, whatever its issue, he was sure to profit. That this article was incompatible with the general proposed ends of the treaty seems even to have been felt by the English negociators, for they have endeavoured to render it less ambiguous by an addition which has only rendered it more so. To the words, “should the Maharajah require the aid “ of any of the Shah’s troops,” they have added this passage, “ *in furtherance “ of the objects contemplated by this treaty.*” How the Maharajah should require the troops of a private individual then resident at his Court, for any object, it is difficult to conceive, and how Runjeet Singh should require the troops of Shah Shooja for any of the purposes connected with the objects contemplated by this Treaty is still a greater enigma. But to speak of objects contemplated by a treaty—to bring together such ideas—to set down such words—to make such emendations, is worthy of the men who have pursued such a policy. The one as the other defying alike criticism and reproach.

The Fourteenth article says : “ The friends and enemies of the one shall “ be the friends and enemies of the other,” to which the English negociators add, “ *of each of the three high Powers.*”

This is the first time that the number of the parties to the treaty is specified.

These articles, composing the original treaty of 1834, having exclusive reference to the advantages which Runjeet Singh shall obtain when Shah Shooja is sovereign ; but which contain no obligation imposed upon Runjeet Singh to place him on the throne, constitute no treaty at all. There are no counter-stipulations. None of the stipulations were capable of execution. The parties did not possess the power to execute them. No measures were stipulated for their execution. The treaty did remain a dead letter*.

* Yet in reference to this treaty we find Captain Wade writing :

“ By that article of the treaty that relates to Peshawur, it will be seen that Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk *has really transferred the sovereignty* of that territory to the Maharajah, and that his High-

No wonder that so infamous a transaction should have been concealed from the British Government, and even from Captain Wade; and this identical compact is now revived by the British Government! No wonder that the preamble is such as we have seen, and that no better reason could be assigned for adopting this compact than that which the preamble assigns, namely, that it had been already proved incapable of receiving execution,

But the insanity of the Indian Government does not stop even here. It adds four articles, the first as follows:

“Shah Shooja engages to pay the sum of two lacs of rupees to Runjeet Singh, calculated from the date on which the Sikh troops may be dispatched for the purpose of reinstating His Majesty in Cabool, in consideration of the Maharajah stationing a force of not less than five thousand men within the limits of the Peishwa’s territory for the support of the Shah.”

Here is a further contribution of money to Runjeet Singh. Is this a single sum? No; for that would require no calculation of time. The conditions of the calculation are not intelligible—its object is not specified. The term is to be calculated from the period of the march of certain troops, but the march of these troops is not fixed by definite or intelligible stipulations. It is a body of troops that is to be put in motion within the possessions of Runjeet Singh—at least such is the best interpretation which I can give, and only that by venturing to correct errors of grammar and topography. For,

“In consideration of the Maharajah stationing a force of not less than 5000 men within the limits of the Peishwa’s territory for the support of the Shah,”—I propose to read,

“In consideration of the stationing of a force of 5000 men by the Maharajah, within the limits of the territory of Peshawur.”

If I am right in these corrections—the first, that it is in consideration of the specific act of the Maharajah, and not in consideration of the Maharajah; the second, that the act is the stationing of troops in the territory of Peshawur, and not in the territory of Sattarah* ;—then is the event specified from which the

ness has not taken it in opposition to the Shah, as those who are ignorant of the real merits of the transaction infer; a motive for the capture of the place, which, however unjust to its former possessors, accounts for the congratulatory tone of the letter which his Highness has written to the Weffa Begum.”

* The Peishwa was the title of the *Maires du Palais* of the Marattah dynasty—the Rajahs of Sattarah.

calculation for the payment is to commence. The next points to be ascertained are the *rate* of payment and the *terms*. Neither the one nor the other is given! Two lacs of rupees are to be paid to Runjeet Singh—that is at all events clear, and it is to be a continuous payment, since it is to begin from a certain period; but whether this sum is to be paid by the lustre, the year, the month, or the day, in no ways appears. Further, the English Government makes itself responsible for the payment, and this, again, is done in a peculiar manner; it makes itself “annually” responsible. The adverb “annually,” it has probably been the intention of the Government to apply to the two lacs of rupees; but as the treaty stands, it applies not to the payment of the money, but to the responsibility of the Indian Government.

The article continues :

“These troops are to be sent to the aid of His Majesty whenever the British Government, in council and concert with the Maharajah, shall deem their aid necessary; and when any matter of great importance may arise to the westward, such measures will be adopted with regard to it as may seem expedient and proper at the time to the British and Sikh Governments.”

It is sufficient humiliation to have to extract such passages, and I may spare the reader and myself any comment upon them.

The second of the additional articles, is to the effect that Shah Shooja relinquishes all claims of supremacy and arrears of tribute over the country now held by the Ameers of Sindh—and to this annunciation is appended the condition of another payment to Runjeet Singh—an indefinite sum of money is to be so paid, to be determined under the mediation of the British Government; and further, a specific sum of 1,500,000R. This article (the sixteenth) further declares the fourth article of the same treaty to be annulled; or, to use its own words, “will be considered cancelled!”

The third additional article (the seventeenth) stipulates that when Shah Shooja shall succeed in establishing himself in Affghanistan, he shall not attack his nephew, Kamran, in the possession of the territories now subject to his government. He has the liberty of attacking him, therefore, until that period; and so long as he asserts that his authority is not established in Affghanistan, the stipulation could be of no protection. It is curious that this is the only stipulation, clogged with the condition of the elevation of Shah Shooja to the Royal dignity.

This article, however, shows that the English Government *had considered*

the danger to Kamram, arising from the elevation of Shah Shooja to the throne of Cabool.

The fourth additional article (the eighteenth) is, however, the climax of the whole. It stipulates that Shah Shooja “shall refrain from entering into “negociations with any foreign state, without the knowledge and consent of “the British and Sikh Governments.”

To impose upon a state an obligation not to do that which it is not contingent on its will or power to prevent, would be an act of destruction were it not an act of folly. Negotiation is a term applicable to all transactions between independent states, which spring out of the relationships of neighbourhood, and are inseparable from the possession of subjects, property, rights, and frontiers. But the proposed object of the monarchy to be created in Affghanistan, was to give there to England an exclusive influence, and England stipulates that another Government shall be possessed of this power over the Affghan kingdom. But by the same words it constitutes that other Government the arbiter of its own measures and policy in Cabool—and places at its disposal our whole policy in Central Asia, by the mere faculty it has acquired of arresting negociations by withholding its consent.

The treaty, in conclusion, states that “the parties cordially agree to the “foregoing articles.” This is not true, because Shah Shooja, before the introduction of the four additional articles, and before there was any mention of money contribution, had protested against the extortions of Runjeet Singh, even when he had nothing to hope and nothing to lose, and before the British Government had adopted the championship of his pretended rights. If the English Government cordially agreed, it was an avowal which any other Government would blush to make, even had there been a necessity for the avowal, or had such been a customary phrase in the wording of treaties.

It continues, “There shall be no deviation from them.” If they were not prepared to enforce them, the treaty was superfluous: and it continues—“in that case the present treaty shall be considered binding “for ever.” It would be binding for ever if there were no deviations from it—but that is an inference and not a stipulation. It continues again, “this treaty shall come into operation from and after the date “on which the seals and signatures of the three contracting parties “shall have been affixed.” It is the exchange of ratifications which con-

cludes the negotiation of a treaty, and not its signature. The signatures to a treaty are those of the plenipotentiary, not of the parties—its action proceeds according to the conditions laid down, not “after the date” of signature*. All the stipulations of the treaty had their execution contingent on the acquisition of royalty by one of the parties. No portion of it, therefore, could come into operation until a future period. The execution, therefore, of the whole treaty could not take effect from the date on which (the day on which) the seals and signatures of the constructing parties were affixed to it.

The treaty is dated Lahore, 16th day of June, 1838, corresponding to the 15th of the month of Assam, 1895, era of the Sikhs. The Mussulman date is not given. One of the parties being a Mussulman, the treaty was of no value without it. To the signature of Shooja is added the designation “King”—there is no designation attached to the signature of the Governor-General of India, nor to that of the ruler of the Punjaub!

The preamble to the treaty declared that Mr. M'Naghten was deputed to the presence of Runjeet Singh to “form a treaty.” His signature does not appear, and in lieu of it appears the signature of the Chief of the State. The treaty is dated Lahore, June 26, 1838, and signed “Auckland.” If this is not the Governor-General, the treaty is invalid, because not signed by the plenipotentiary specified in the preamble. If this is put for the signature of the Governor-General, the document would, in a civil case, be treated as a forgery.

It is superfluous, perhaps, to say that this monument of unexampled fatuity is wholly worthless as a diplomatic instrument.

It has been already shown that there was no object in invading the Affghans, since they had appealed to you for protection, and offered you troops against the Persians or Russians. But supposing that England determines to use brute force against that people, why ally herself with Runjeet Singh? Allying herself with Runjeet Singh—why revive this infamous compact, and impose it on herself?

Shah Shooja at the outset of the negotiations used these words to

* These elaborately absurd expressions are not in any way terms of office or routine—they are all new.

Runjeet Singh—"What use is there in enumerating concessions which I am " to make, or presents which I am to bestow, since I am wholly identified " with you." The Governor-General of India in like manner proclaims to the world that England is identified with Runjeet Singh, and exults in the joint aggrandizement of the two nations.

The perusal of this treaty will prove what without such testimony would be incredible. That the English Government, in identifying itself with the robberies of Runjeet Singh, was not to be a sharer in his plunder—that the English Government, not even content with enabling Runjeet Singh to plunder, was content to constitute itself his prey.

We shall now proceed to the Declaration of War under this treaty.

PART XII.

DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, AGAINST DOST MAHOMMED.—OCTOBER 1, 1838.

AFTER the treaty which we have examined, we must come to this document, prepared for ignorance, mis-statement, fallacy—injustice in every intention avowed, inexpediency in every measure proposed. These expectations are more than realized:—The Indian Government, already false to its trust, treacherous to its friends, subservient to its foes, ends in this gratuitous "DECLARATION," by being merciless to itself!

"The Governor-General," says the first paragraph, "having determined " upon the assemblage of a British force for service across (beyond) the Indus, "deems it proper" to publish an exposition of his reasons for doing so. The assemblage of a body of troops for service is then that which he undertakes to account for. What was required was a statement of facts—announcement

of the decision, justification of that decision, and finally the DECLARATION OF WAR* :—There is nothing of the kind.

Suppose a case of justifiable war, that is of injury or of aggression perpetrated, what step does the injured and the just party take? Is it not to declare, to prove, to substantiate the ACT of aggression? Here the subject is introduced, not as a matter between two countries, but as a movement of British troops. It is by general orders that are made known, facts or opinions requiring publicity connected with the movement of troops; it is by a declaration of war, by manifesto and by proclamation, that hostilities are declared, and the causes of them made known. But this anomalous “Declaration” assumes to be a justification not of hostilities between two states, but of a movement of troops,—not venturing to declare that these troops were intended for warlike purposes; though their services are to be required in a region not British, and where, therefore, they could only appear as foes.

This document, therefore, in its first paragraph establishes this movement across the Indus as a buccaneer expedition, justified by no necessity—unscreened by forms as unauthorised by law, and worthy alike of the contempt and abhorrence of mankind.

“ It then states, “ that it is a matter of notoriety that commercial “ treaties have been formed for the navigation of the Indus, with a view to “ obtaining that legitimate influence which an exchange of benefits would “ naturally produce ;” and that with a view to invite the aid of the *de facto* rulers of Affghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties, Captain Burnes was sent to Cabool. If measures dependent on the will of the chief of Cabool were necessary for giving their due effect to these treaties, they were objects of negociation, and such negociation ought to have been conducted successfully to a close before the treaties were signed. But here it appears treaties had been signed for the execution of which other measures were necessary—to which the aid of third parties was requisite—with whom other negotiations were to be undertaken, and with a view to which only was this mission deputed. And what has this to do with “ *the assem-*

* As a means of awakening some degree of self-examination, if that be practicable, in Englishmen’s breasts, I may mention, that the Sultan of Turkey has not the right of declaring war,—matters of war and peace, *affecting the honour and the faith of each individual*, are placed under the guidance of law and religion—so it was in ancient Rome.

“ *blage of troops for service across the Indus ?*” If this is meant as justification of the attack upon Affghanistan, the offer of such a reason on the part of the aggressor would be the most triumphant vindication of the assailed against their powerful and ungenerous foe.

It then states “ that the original objects of that officer’s commission were “ *purely* of a commercial nature.” Is that word “ *purely*” introduced to rivet the mind on the dishonesty of the statement? The statement about the treaties for the navigation of the Indus was broken off in the middle, leaving us to inquire why it was not finished, or why it was commenced. Again, the original purely commercial objects of the mission are as suddenly dropped as they had been unaccountably taken up, and the “ Declaration” continues :—“ whilst Captain Burnes however was on his journey to Cabul, “ information was received by the Governor-General that the troops of Dost “ Mahommed Khan *had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of “ our ancient ally Maha Raja Runjeet Singh.*” What relationship has this statement either to the treaties for the navigation of the Indus, or to the original objects of this mission?

The statement respecting the treaties for the navigation of the Indus it may be superfluous to remark is false—is perfidiously false. That of the original objects of the mission of Colonel Burnes being merely commercial is also false.

Let us now consider this new operation. Dost Mahommed (while Captain Burnes was on his journey) does attack some other Prince. Such an attack being a political question, could have nothing to do with the commercial objects of Captain Burnes, and was a matter which could not interest the Indian Government, as it was its avowed policy not to interfere in any such affairs; and it was declared to Dost Mahommed by Lord Auckland, “ that “ it was not the practice of the British Government to interfere in the “ concerns of other independent states.” This statement therefore is as irrelevant as each of the previous sentences of the “ Declaration :”—let us see if it is equally false.

Dost Mahommed makes an attack on Runjeet Singh—of course he must have entered the territory of the Sikh chieftain. He has done so in a “ sudden “ manner,” therefore Runjeet Singh must have been taken unawares in a period of peace; it was “ unprovoked,” therefore Runjeet Sing had never inflicted on

him injury, nor been guilty of aggression. This attack took place, however, not in the Sikh territory, but in the Affghan. It was an action fought near the Kyber Pass, in which Dost Mahommed repulsed an unprovoked and sudden invasion of Runjeet Singh! The concurrent characters of falsehood and irrelevancy are thus so far maintained.

Having converted the unprovoked assault of Runjeet Singh into an assault of Dost Mahommed upon him, the “Declaration” goes on to assert that—

“The Governor-General consequently resolved on authorising Captain Burnes to intimate to Dost Mahommed Khan, that if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maharajah, his Lordship would exert his good offices with his Highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maharajah, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Governor-General, to the effect that, in the meantime, hostilities on his part should be suspended.”

Thus the Governor-General, after asserting that the sole objects of the mission were commercial—after asserting that the sole objects of the mission to Cabool had reference to the navigation of the Indus, which was preposterous—after evincing, by the statement and its untruth, his alarm for fear of his being supposed to have any political objects in view, then asserts that he gave to that mission a political character, because Runjeet Singh had been defeated, and exhibits himself as interfering, while dreading to take any steps for the political interests of Great Britain, for the sole purpose of advancing the interests of Runjeet Singh. Prostituting the tongue of freedom—he calls that which is unjust—just, and he designates as unjust that which is just; he calls heroic defence—unprovoked violence; he considers violent aggression—assaulted innocence. After this monstrous perversion of fact and truth—after this fearful misuse of power and authority, he publishes this statement on the very theatre of these events!

Leaving again this subject, the “Declaration” addresses itself to Herat, and states :—

“It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor-General, that a Persian army was besieging Herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Affghanistan, for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of her Majesty’s mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.”

The statement is worthless for any purpose ; but, however vague, unmeaning and contradictory, it could only have place in a declaration of war against Persia. But is it not here Russia that is meant ? If so, the act is no less cowardly than unjust.

The “ Declaration,” dropping again unconcluded this sixth subject, reverts to Cabool, and states that Dost Mahommed persisted, as respecting his misintelligence with the Sikhs, “ in urging the most unreasonable “ pretensions, such as his Lordship could not be the channel of submitting to “ the consideration of his Highness.” If the Governor-General did not choose to be the channel of the communications he had invited, even supposing that it was true as here stated that they were “ unreasonable,” the offer of mediation rested there. It is then the quarrel of the Sikhs which you espouse—if so, why not avow your partnership ; take your share in the plunder, but take *only* your share in the infamy and the guilt ! The Governor-General the channel of communication to his Highness ! Has the Governor-General then been shut up in Salsette, or reduced to the old fortress of St. David, and even were he so, could he have constituted himself a channel of communication to Runjeet Singh ?—the representative of British majesty in the eastern world—the head of a hundred and thirty millions of our fellow-subjects, the commander of 200,000 men—the successor to the authority of Acbar and Arungzebe, the chief of Maharattas and Moguls, and the individual possessed of the largest share of power and authority throughout the world—regrets that the unreasonableness of the demands of the chief of Cabool, rendered it impossible for him to become the channel of such demands to his Highness—the robber chief of Lahore. This dignitary then alleges the unreasonableness of the demands, which he had invited, as a motive for sending an expedition to dethrone that chief to whom he had offered his mediation !

The “ Declaration” proceeds, “ that he (Dost Mahommed) avowed “ schemes of aggrandizement and ambition injurious to the security and “ peace OF THE FRONTIERS of India.” Indignation overpowered gives way before such baseness. You “ identify” yourself with Runjeet Singh—you rejoice in his aggrandizement—you designate the heroic resistance of the Affghans to his violence an “ unprovoked attack,”—your envoy at Cabool scoffs at his entreaties for support, taunts him with the old glories of the

Douranee dynasty, and marvels how their successors should condescend to ask for British protection. You then denounce him for schemes of aggrandizement—schemes of aggrandizement of Dost Mahommed against Great Britain! Is the Governor-General of India addressing a world of madmen?

He continues,—

“ He (Dost Mahommed) gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Affghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprised, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Government, compelled Captain Burnes to leave Cabul without having effected any of the objects of his mission.”

Dost Mahommed shewed to the Governor-General that the line of policy pursued by Great Britain must compel him to fall under the influence not of Persia but of Russia, from which he entreated to be saved; he did not compel Captain Burnes to withdraw from Cabul—the Governor-General himself ordered him to retire if Dost Mahommed held any political intercourse with the agent of a power with which England was at peace, and to whom he made him an unwilling sacrifice.

“ It was now evident,” says the “ Declaration,” “ that no further interference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh ruler and Dost Mahommed Khan.”

Was it by designating the defence of his country on the part of Dost Mahommed against a robber-like invasion—an “ unjustifiable attack”—was it by designating the appeal of Dost Mahommed to the English Government for protection against the Sikhs, as an “ inadmissible pretension,” that the Governor-General had “ exercised any interference” to bring about a good understanding between the two—was it possible for him to have exercised any interference more calculated to augment the violence and the injustice of the Sikhs, or to increase the exasperation and alarms of the Affghans? Having done this, the Indian Government declares Dost Mahommed hostile, and his views ambitious—and further falsifies truth and fact by declaring that the individual disposition of the Government of Cabool, whatever it was, endangered the power of Great Britain.

After this, the “ Declaration” goes back to Herat, and

“ Deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege and the conduct of the Persian nation. The attack was a most unjustifiable aggression, perpetrated (!) and continued notwithstanding the solemn (!) and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy.”

The besieged, it continues, had behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause—and the Governor-General would indulge a hope that they might defend themselves till succoured. In the meantime the ulterior designs of Persia have been more and more openly manifested—diplomatic intercourse has ceased between the two governments, and the necessity of regarding the acts of Persia as acts of hostility against Great Britain, have been officially communicated to the Shah. The Chiefs of Kandahar have also adhered to Persian policy. After this enumeration of events and assemblage of opinions, the Governor-General declares that he felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the progress of intrigue and aggression.

“ His attention was *naturally drawn*, at this conjuncture, to the position and claims of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, a monarch, who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of *united resistance* to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British Government, and who, *on his empire being usurped by its present rulers*, had found an honourable asylum in the British dominions.”

What Shah Shooja had thought or proposed in 1809 was immaterial, as he never had the power of execution. His empire was not usurped by its present rulers, for it passed into the hands of his brother, and the asylum which he found in the British dominions was after his escape from the bonds of Runjeet Sing.

But these statements, if they had been true, do not render the drawing of the Governor-General's attention to the subject the more “ *natural* ;” and if his attention had been drawn to the subject, the statement of that fact was of no value. It was the conclusions at which he had arrived which were to be considered ; and the statement, that his attention was drawn to the subject, cannot stand in lieu of the grounds of his conclusions, or could not render those conclusions just, if they were unjust. If the conclusions had been just—if they had been felt by the writer of this composition to have been just—if they had been felt by him to have been intelligible, they would have been stated as the easiest mode of explanation.

The next paragraph is a mass of vague generalities, of false antecedents, of disconnected consequences, of anticipations, and congratulations. In the sense of the Treaty which we have analyzed in Part XI., it is asserted that policy and justice warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Shooja,

“ whose popularity throughout Affghanistan had been proved to his Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities” —that “ it was just and proper that Runjeet Singh should have an offer “ of becoming a party to the contemplated operations”—that “ the identity “ of the interests of Runjeet Singh with those of the Indian Government “ had been made apparent.” But what could identity of interest of Runjeet Sing and the Indian Government have to do with the specific measures before us ; how could it sanction an act that was impolitic, or a policy that was unjust ? But identity is not established—it is only said that identity is rendered “ apparent.” You have convinced no one that your interests were identical with those of Runjeet Singh ; but you have, indeed, shewn that you had identified yourselves with his intentions.

The “ Declaration” proceeds to state that :—The general freedom and security of commerce would be promoted, and a lasting barrier would be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment—that Shah Shooja would enter Affghanistan at the head of his own troops—that the British army would only have to act against foreign interference, that the Governor-General confidently hoped that the Shah would be placed upon the throne by his own subjects, and that the British army would be withdrawn. That the object of these measures was “ *the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power, in the Eastern provinces of Affghanistan.*” That the Governor-General was led to these measures by his duty, but that he also rejoiced in being able to assist in restoring unity and prosperity to the Affghans, and concludes with stating—that the chiefs, whose resistance has given offence to the British Government, would receive liberal and honourable treatment on ceasing from opposition to that course of measures which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of the country.

The principal statement of this pseudo-manifesto is, that a mission had been sent to Dost Mahommed to settle the differences between him and Runjeet Singh, and that the pretensions of Dost Mahommed were such as not to be capable of transmission by the Governor-General to his Highness ; and, therefore, the Governor-General naturally thought of Shah Shooja. Now, the fact stated by the Indian Government, of its having sent a mission to Dost Mahommed, was a complete bar to the claims of Shah Shooja. The British Government has recognised by a mission stated originally to be

commercial, and thereby avowed to have been subsequently political, the rights of the *de facto* ruler of Cabul, and has offered (however perfidiously) its mediation between him and another sovereign prince.

However unjust wars may hitherto have been—however groundless the pretexts, or violent the aggression—never has there been recorded on the page of history such an exhibition of weakness, rashness, injustice, cunning and falsehood. I fear that it is not upon an individual, even though Governor-General of India, that can rest the responsibility of such a deed*. I fear that it is not to any peculiar mental perversion in the administrators of India that these measures are to be attributed. The universal approval of them in England on the arrival of the news in this country—the gratification of the public at what they called the “energy of the Indian Government,” shew that such acts are in accordance with the morality of the times, and that such publications are no misrepresentation of its capacity. Each citizen sinks with the dishonour of his country—he is, in his own person, responsible for its acts, as in his person he is involved in the consequences. Each year, therefore—I may almost say each day—lowers the value of each man by the disgrace to which he submits, by the accumulation of facts which it is his duty to understand, and which he neglects.

I have heard this “Declaration” compared to a Russian document—but those who drew such a comparison had recollected only that Russia was perfidious—they forgot that she was able. Russian documents are intelligible and grammatical: observe the forms of diplomatic intercourse: confine themselves to the subject of which they treat, and are effective for the end which they propose—when they falsify facts it is for an object, and when they misrepresent the truth it is with an intention.

Yet in one sense this document is Russian—that is, it is just the document which it suits Russia that England should put forth, and this is the manifesto put forth by the British Government in marching an army into Central Asia,

* Lord Auckland is, personally, I am convinced, a sincere well-wisher to his country. All who know him must recognise and appreciate his simplicity of mind and integrity of character; but he has to be considered here as the chief of a system; and no worse features can any system present than that the possession of power should lead to subserviency, and that good men should be made instruments of evil.

and it marches that army because a Captain of Cossacks had arrived at Cabul !

But is it of the acts of England that we must thus think and speak ? are we content that she should be merely blameless—or would it not be a subject of grief and shame that her conduct should be doubtful—that her motives should be ambiguous—that she should not be recognised by all men as a model to the good and an example to the brave ? Have we not been taught to look upon our Island as Ocean's Queen and freedom's sanctuary ? Is it not upon our fields that have risen the wonders of industry under the guardianship of equal laws ? Is it not upon our purified altars that has blazed forth the renewed lamp of faith and charity ? Have the circling waters of the Northern Ocean not enclosed in Albion a region of refuge consecrated by a people's hostility to the unfortunate of the world ? Have not our freemen arms and sea-born battlements in every zone and land, afforded strength to right—triumph to weakness ? Are not these reflections the endearing associations of our land, race, language, and name ? Are they not a portion of ourselves ? Can these associations belong to her race, or be transmitted to her children, if England—the dupe of craft, the tool of ambition—becomes the violator of right, and the spoiler of all that it was her pride and honour to revere, to love, to protect, and to preserve ? And yet could such acts, as those which it is now our sorrow and our duty to examine, take place, unless we had been shorn of all those characters which have hitherto rendered us noble as a nation and dignified as men ? And while transactions of so black a dye, and so alarming a character, take place,—not a single voice is raised to protest against injustice, to evoke any lingering remnants of the sense of honour, or the instinct of preservation—not a single tone of reproach is mingled with the chorus of public jubilation, to arrest the rapid scorn of present men, or to mitigate the reproach of the sage and the free, who in after times may inquire into the causes of our fall.

Although by these documents alone can the value of my conclusions be tested, still I am desirous of recording here the first impression made upon me by the fact itself, and when no documents were within my reach. I subjoin an extract from the report of a speech, delivered in the town of Hull, on the *very day on which I read the "Declaration" of the Governor-General.*

“ Mr. Urquhart then alluded to the proclamation of the Governor-General of India (brought by the last London papers), enumerating his reasons for attacking Affghanistan ; he pointed out that, by mismanagement, we had allowed those states who were willing to become our allies to fall into the hands of our antagonists, thereby not only weakening that barrier to our Indian possessions, but also depriving the British merchant of the trade with Central Asia. Error in peace, must end in error in war ; in short, whenever we allow our rights to be infringed, although at the time it may appear unimportant, yet, when the moment of action comes, then that power which would have been of service, is turned into an engine of hostility. He then explained the position of Runjeet Singh, the ruler of the Punjab, and his necessary hostility to Great Britain, and the fatal error of our alliance with him. Every act of this country seemed as if dictated by an enemy. By stepping out of our way, gratuitously, to espouse the cause of Runjeet Singh, we ally ourselves to the violence of that ambitious ruler against the generous people of Affghanistan. And whilst the Maharajah makes use of us for the futherance of his projects against the Affghans, we appear allied to the Sikhs against a people who have armed in defence of their religion. England henceforward appears in Central Asia as the foe of the Mussulman and the enemy of Islamism. *She changes places, therefore, with Russia.* The Mussulmans looked to her for support and protection against Russia ; now they will look to Russia for protection against those who publish their intention (Russia is guilty of no such publications) to espouse an unjust, and, as there understood, religious quarrel against Mussulmans, to overthrow constituted authorities, and to violate national independence. This course persevered in, and you may write down India ‘lost.’ Strange to say, those who have been crying out peace, peace, when every insult and wrong that one nation could inflict upon another were perpetrated against us, now applaud and commend this act of madness, and smilingly term this infamous transaction a measure of ‘ commendable energy.’ The Governor-General of India ascribed the movements in Cabul, &c., to the influence of Persia, not daring to name Russia, and thus exhibiting England throughout the East as quaking before that Power, and having recourse to what they must deem falsehood, to avert her wrath. Persia had over and over again stretched her suppliant hands towards England for support ; her statesmen pointed out the danger of India, if Persia was abandoned to Russian ambition ; her priesthood, by a solemn act, anathematised the friends of Russia ; her Minister declared the impossibility of maintaining her independence, if England abandoned them ! England replied, ‘ You Persians are mistaken—you are not threatened ; India is not endangered.—Russia is our ally !—Russia and England take counsel together ; they unite to preserve the peace of Europe and the world !’ Is it then to be wondered at that Persia should ally herself with the ally of England ; cease to hope for national independence, and concur with that ally in the invasion of Hindostan ? * * * * It was a question (India) on which he conceived the very existence of this country to depend, and fortunately it was not a party question ; for the Tory and the Radical press were equally loud with the Government press in commendation of the unhappy policy which the recent proclamation revealed.”

PART XIII.

CHANGE IN THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF RUSSIA AND ENGLAND
IN CENTRAL ASIA, FROM 1834 TO 1839.

CENTRAL ASIA was secured against invasion from Russia by gigantic defences. It was protected from disorganization by Russia by strong national feelings. The Caucasus and the steppes of the Oxus, were the physical obstacles in her path. The love of freedom in the simple breasts of Circassians and Tartars opposed to the stealthy steps of her diplomacy a stronger barrier, and afforded to Southern Asia a surer defence, than the mountains and the wilds that restrained her armies.

Peter the Great did, indeed, establish himself in Persia by crossing the Caspian, and thence he was enabled to form with the Affghans an alliance menacing at once to Persia and to India. But he was only able to reach this advanced position by the internal disorder of the Persian state. When that disorder ceased, Russia was instantly constrained to withdraw behind the same barriers that, in 1834, still limited her power and arrested her progress. Russia, after a century and a quarter of continuous efforts and of enormous sacrifices, had made no sensible impression, either upon the populations that occupy the Caucasus, or upon the populations that inhabit the steppes of Tartary. She has never crossed the Caucasus by open force. She has never been able to execute a campaign, or even to send an army to the south of the Ural.

In 1834, Russia exercised no influence whatever in Central Asia. The highest authorities in India and England, treated as visionary the idea of danger from her designs. They narrowed danger to the march of an army; they considered such a march as impossible, because of the resistance it would arouse throughout all Middle Asia. One or two individuals foresaw danger, but that was because they considered her silent action on the cabinets of Europe, not the physical means to be employed on the plains of Asia. But they could not induce their fellow-countrymen even to think upon the subject,

because Persia, Tartary, and the Affghans were all her enemies. Danger to India could only arise as the dispositions of the intervening regions ceased to be hostile to Russia. That danger commenced only with the transactions we are now examining.

In the middle of the last century, Russia was threatened by a simultaneous invasion of an extent of frontier, of not less than twenty degrees, by a portion of the Tartar or Turkish tribes of Middle Asia. She was unable to collect any force that could afford hope of efficient resistance. China, however, was equally menaced; and it was uncertain whether the storm would burst on her, or on Russia—it was the Chinese Government that averted the storm from both.

The Chinese, after their conquest of the Zungars, and the extension of the frontiers of the Celestial Empire to the West, formed schemes for the conquest of Upper Asia, which filled with alarm the whole of these populations—an alarm which extended to the Governments to the west of the plains watered by the Oxus and the Jaxartes. Russia was then engaged in the seven years' war, in which she had been enabled to appear against England, in consequence of the relief afforded her by the vigorous and successful measures of China against their common foe; now, again, must we look to some other Government's intervention to avert the new danger with which she was threatened. A Mussulman coalition was formed to protect Middle Asia; but it was not till the Affghan monarch had marched a powerful army from Cabul to the confines of China, that tranquillity was restored. The march of this army was suspended by negotiation, near the same spot where death arrested Timour in the invasion of China.

A Calmuck tribe had been transported and planted by Russia in the midst of her Slavonic population. There, it learnt to estimate Russian dominion; it rose up again from the soil, and fought its way back through the Russian armies across the Volga, the Jaik, the Ural, lined by her hordes of Baskirs and Cossacks,—across the desert and the mountains of Tartary, where their native foes of the “three hordes” were assembled to arrest their flight,—finally to seek refuge within the limits of the Chinese empire.

I mention these three facts, as likely to lead the reader to perceive the real importance of regions which we speak of, as of the domain of fiction, having no practical bearing on our past or present existence. I mention

them further as showing the connection of the position of China with the affairs of Europe, and the mutual influence of China, Russia, and India, on the dispositions of that central region, which must give, as it has ever given, the command of the world to whoever controls it.

We have recently seen with what strength the hate of Russia has inspired the inhabitants of the Caucasus. A similar spirit animated the Toorkmans, the Usbecks, the Khivans, and Bockharans. All Central Asia was thus sealed against her, with one exception. Persia. There she had, by conquest, established a footing; but she was detested; and as the British Government considered it of vital importance to support Persia, the power of England, it could not be doubted, would shut this single gap, by which Russian influence could penetrate to the East and South. That England had the power to do so, who could doubt? She declared it to be her intention to use this power—what was there, after such a declaration, to require or to apprehend?

No wonder, then, that, up to 1834, those most familiar with the subject and with the East, treated the idea of Russian invasion of India as the dream of alarmists.—England applied herself energetically to the cultivation of authoritative relations with Persia, and placed its sceptre in the hands of a monarch of her choice. Thus was completed the picture of our security, and rivetted every link of our defence.

And even this is not all. Russia renounced her projects, and joined herself to England. Made perfect abnegation of every design, and conferred on England the right of controlling her policy, and of dictating her despatches.

Such was the apparent position of affairs in the early part of the year 1835. One half of the same year had not rolled by when the British Government was startled to learn that Persia refused to sign a treaty of commerce with England, or to admit the establishment of British consuls in her territory; England then learns that the King she had made, announced the design of invading India. Then the British Government discovers that Russia was lost to it, and that it was owing to her suggestions that the King of Persia had turned against England!

Thus concludes a year, 1835, opening with promise so auspicious, and promised long and beneficial repose.

In the early part of 1836, the British Government receive information that the Shah intends to march an army to attack the Affghan territory,

as preparatory to his Indian invasion. In May of the same year, it learns that overtures have been made by sundry Affghan Princes for the purpose of co-operating in the designs of the Shah. Five months later it learns that the Persian army is assembled, and has received its pay in advance from the Russian treasury. At the close of the year, it, however, receives intelligence that the expedition, notwithstanding all the efforts of Russia, had failed, or at all events had been postponed for that season.

Thus concludes the year 1836, during which the Affghans, on one side, are menaced with Persian invasion, and, on the other, open communications with Persia, the grounds of such negotiations being to open to the Russians the road to attack the English, “for which they are most desirous.”

In the course of the following year, the Persian army marches on Herat—the British envoy is insulted.

In the year that follows (1838) the British envoy, who had followed the Shah to Herat, comes to a rupture with Persia, because of the insult offered him the year before. The expedition is, however, unsuccessful—Herat, unsupported, holds out, and the Shah is forced to retire. Herat is saved, but a positive rupture is established between England and Persia, the British envoy is driven away, and the Indian Government commits fruitless acts of hostility on the Persian coast.

In the mean time, the arrival of a new Governor-General had awakened hopes at Cabul of a change of sentiments and policy in India. The Prince of that state had made overtures to the Indian Government, and it had replied thereto by a mission. That mission was soon driven thence, “because a Captain of Cossacks, without pomp or retinue, had ridden up to Cabul.”

The Indian Government then determined to invade Affghanistan, because it saw Persia lost to England, Affghanistan lost to India, and both ready to join with Russia. Yet these, with Russia, had been unable to cause the fall of the unsupported fortunes of Herat!

Had England been inert all this while?—No! England has been active beyond any previous example during peace; she has placed a monarch upon the throne of Nadir Shah; she had bound to herself by enormous sacrifices of interest and of character, another sovereign, the ruler of Lahore; she had opened the Indus to her navigation; she had formed treaties with all the principalities upon its banks; she had taken these measures as parts of a

grand system for repelling the designs and excluding from Central Asia the influence of Russia.

Let us now examine the position of Russia.

In 1834, having completed an important phase in her relations with Turkey and with Europe by the occupation of the Bosphorus, by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, she was prepared to revert to Persia, and to bring to bear upon it the means which she now possessed in her command over Turkey and over England.

Russia then proceeded to impel Persia forward (simultaneously inviting her through England) into measures hostile to Great Britain. England then breaks with Persia, because she was the friend of Russia. The menaces of England throw Persia under Russia's *protection*. England then abstains from executing her menaces. Thus is Persia convinced that the union of England and Russia had for its object the advancement of the designs of the latter Power.

The same semblances which deceived—the same motives which influenced the minds of the Persian people and government—told on every other population spread between the Indus and the Caucasus. Has not the shock given to the power of England spread with electrical rapidity? Has it not every where, and instantaneously, produced the same effects? And could such effects be produced by any thing which *Russia* could do? *Must they not have arisen from that which England did?* And what is it that Great Britain has done? She has shown to the nations of Central Asia that she has transferred her power to Russia for the accomplishment of Russia's designs against herself.

The Indian Government is now alarmed. Persia, the barrier on which it first relied, is subverted, and becomes, in the language of the British Ambassador, “the first parallel from which an assault is to be made.” Affghanistan, the second barrier, has also fallen, or is about to fall, and thus become the second parallel of the assailing power; next, the Indian Government avows that even the third line, the Indus, has been reached and gained by the hostile influence of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and, in the words of the Governor-General, “Danger is brought to the threshold of “Hindustan.”

By using the word “*barrier*,” we grant :—*First*, Hostility in Russia. *Secondly*, Power in Russia to assail India. *Thirdly*, Restriction of inquiry

to details of measures of defence. Here are three involuntary admissions in one word, each being false. Russia is the ally of India because of England. Russia is unable to endanger India. India could only be assaulted by Russia when she was at war with England; the defences of India are not therefore to be found in Asia. India and England are one, the navy of England is the bulwark of India, and the assailant of India has to be arrested, not on the Caspian or the Indus, but in the Baltic and the Black Sea; assault in peace could not be, as that involved rupture between Great Britain and Russia. England is the ally of the Porte. England is the guardian of the Caucasus. The Porte and the Circassians, supported against Russia, there could be no danger for Asia. England is the ally of France, equally endangered by the designs of Russia. England and France united by these designs, what danger could there exist for India, for Asia, or for Europe? But England and France being united to maintain Turkey, to support the Caucasus, to support Persia, &c., there could be no Russian ambition. England had been negligent; threatened now in India, her supineness must cease; she is compelled to take a decision; she looks around, and gathers together these elements of neglected strength.

The Indian Government, as obeying the directions of the Government at home, can also largely contribute to fortifying the security of British power and possessions against Russia. Supposing, however, the English Government to remain inert, the Indian Government would in vain bestir itself. Supposing the English Government not only to neglect the defence of its interests, but (if the case is supposable) that it should ally itself with its enemy—then all action of India against Russia must be useless, and even dangerous, because either, unsuspecting, it is made a tool of by the secret and hostile influence at home, or it must place itself in a state of direct insubordination to the authority of the mother state, by acting against England's ally.

England does remain inert, and the Indian Government acts. It acts in opposition to the ally of the British Government, and therefore places itself in a state of insubordination without being conscious that it does so. It assumes to itself sovereign attributes—it places itself in opposition to the policy of a European power. The responsibility is therefore imposed upon it of acting as a sovereign power, and of meeting a danger arising in Europe according to the means by which such danger can be met. If the Indian

Government, assuming to interfere in the policy of Europe, neglects to act upon the Government of England, it at once rebels against England, and it betrays the Indian interests which lead it to interfere in Europe, and which impose upon it the obligation of finding alliances in Europe to meet European hostility.

Let us suppose India still subject to the sway of the Mogul dynasty. That Government discovers that the design for its overthrow had been framed in the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and that extensive combinations and dark intrigues are prosecuting by that Cabinet among its neighbours and its subjects. Its first impulse must be to seek to avert the danger in Europe. It would perceive in England a power endangered by such designs, and capable of arresting them; disposed, by its traditional character, to resist anti-social dispositions in governments, and to maintain rights between nations; interested in justice, because largely commercial, and pre-eminently powerful to prevent it by the maritime character of its strength. The Mogul Government would observe that the possession of India, and, perhaps, even more, the possession of Central Asia, must be most alarming to England, as giving to Russia a dominion no less paramount in Europe than in Asia; that the very direction of the policy of the Cabinet of Russia to such projects, and the prosecution of such enterprises, must necessarily divert the whole resources and mind of that powerful state from commercial and peaceable ends to warlike designs; *that to allow Russia to entertain such hopes, would be to bend her whole mind to the creation of military means dangerous to the peace of the world, and to the creation of diplomatic system and power, in order secretly and silently to prepare other states for concurrence in her projects, or for submission to her triumph.* Such a prospect was what no European power could view without alarm, or suffer without criminality.

India would therefore appeal to England for protection; she would be led to that step by the same state necessity, the same popular instinct and impulse that had led Greece, Poland, Turkey, Persia, Circassia, to make the same appeal. She would represent the subjugation of Persia and Central Asia as the consequence of the designs of Russia upon India; she would represent the fall of Constantinople as a consequence of the supremacy secured in Persia; and she would show that the supremacy

secured over Persia was effected solely by the prospect of Indian plunder held out to its ambition. She would say to England, “ Unless you arrest
 “ the designs of Russia upon India, Persia, Central Asia, and Turkey,
 “ will fall under her control; her dominion will then spread over the Medi-
 “ terranean, over Austria, and the independence of Europe will be lost by
 “ the establishment of her power in Asia. But if you ally yourself with
 “ India, if you give support to each of the states that are undermined
 “ and threatened, then will the designs of Russia turn to your glory
 “ and your greatness.”

Supposing that the English Government had replied to the Mogul Ambassadors, “ You are perfectly mistaken in supposing that Russia has
 “ designs upon India; Russia is our ally, our bosom friend; she consults us
 “ in all things, and we direct her in all things; she never desires anything
 “ that is not just, and never aims at anything that is impossible.” The Indian Envoys would reply, “ Here are the proofs of what we assert; here
 “ is evidence upon evidence, fact upon fact, deeds under her own hand,
 “ words from her own mouth, presented in a thousand forms—asserted
 “ by a thousand tongues. You tell us that Russia is your ally—that she
 “ tells you all—that you direct her in all she does! We thought you were
 “ her dupe, but we now find you are her partner.” These men would return to their country, and say “ England and Russia are united—
 “ England is stained by the same vices, engaged in the same projects. To
 “ the danger of Russian enmity let us not add that of English friendship.”

The Mogul Government, repulsed in England, would then apply to France, to Austria, to Turkey, to induce these states to unite in resisting the coalition of England and Russia, now become equally alarming to Europe as to Asia.

If the Mogul Government did not make these efforts to avert the danger with which it was threatened, it would have been unworthy of its station, and dead to every instinct of self preservation.

Is the union of England and Russia less beneficial to Russia, and less dangerous to India, because there is no Mogul Government? Is the neglect of the necessary measures of defence less culpable in an English Governor-General of India than it would have been in a Mogul Emperor?

But it may be said that the Government of India had emancipated itself

from the control of the English Government, and that it has taken a line of opposition to Russia. Vain semblances that increase the peril! The Indian Government has not even dreamt of moving *England* to oppose Russia; it has had no conception of what the means were by which Russia could have been opposed. It has not said so much to the English Government as “use your influence with Russia to prevent her from assaulting Persia, and threatening India.” The Indian Government has not even thought of calling on England to break her union with Russia—her union with the Power against which India was called on to make war! The measures of the Indian Government have thus not been directed to the proper ends—have not been directed to the most simple and necessary ends. The Indian Government had therefore no conception of its position—its movements therefore could only be conducive to the progress of Russia. They have been so.

The dissidence between the British and the Indian Governments (and what dissidence can be greater than hostile alliances?) has further served to exhibit to the world a house divided against itself. Thus is India endangered because it is possessed by England, and is England endangered because of the possession of India.

Had England been simply just, her policy would have been judicious, and her position secure. It sufficed to have abstained from allying herself with the violence of Runjeet Singh, to have prevented the introduction of Russian influence at Cabul. It sufficed to have required from Russia the performance of engagements volunteered by herself, to have prevented Persia from becoming the foe of England. Without England, neither the dishonesty of the one, nor of the other, could have had existence, and their dishonesty has triumphed through her support.

The march unopposed of a British army through Central Asia exhibits the power of the English name. That power, England is actively destroying; first, by the injustice that led to that march, and then by the very position in which she is placed by her success. It will be no longer Russia seeking to obtain influence in Affghanistan, but its spirit of independence that will appeal to Russia for deliverance from foreign domination. Persia and Tartary, hitherto restrained in ambition by the barrier of the Affghans, now see Affghanistan, the enemy of Great Britain, appealing conjointly to them and to Russia. They see the military force of England brought to their own frontiers, so that

while invited to invade India, they are compelled to fall back on Russia for protection. The elements of thought, and therefore of power, are changed, and the alarms of England have made Russia known to the Eastern world, and have heralded her advent. The hordes encamped on the Oxus and the Jaxartes, no less than the Ministers of Persia, will be taught that the collision of Russia with England is not distant, and that the result is not doubtful, and they will be invited to follow across the Indus the retreating remnants of the British troops so lately advancing in triumph, and which we are told will soon retire in peace.

England, unless by a complete revision of the past, and by an entire repudiation of the acts committed falsely in her name, *is fixed in Affghanistan until driven from it by defeat*. We have occupied there a position whence we cannot retreat, beyond which we cannot advance, where we cannot fix ourselves on the soil—where our connexions with India are difficult, dangerous, and exhausting—and where every day of our sojourn will augment dissatisfaction, increase the number and strengthen the hostility of foes. By the pretender whom we have selected to sit upon the throne, we have further charged our fortunes with his incapacity; we unite the interests of the various displaced chiefs of Cabul and Kandahar—we unite these to the chief of Herat, whose pretensions are barred by this selection*, and whose right to Herat itself is thereby also endangered; the power of England henceforward becomes associated in Central Asia with the supremacy of Shah Shooja; revolt against that prince, success of Dost Mahommed, alliance of the Affghans with the Persians, are all blows directly levelled against Great Britain, and all these must come in the natural course of events.

Thus does this invasion unite Affghanistan and Persia against England, does it tend to the union of Dost Mahommed and Kamran Shah? Does it tend to the union of Shah Kamran with Dost Mahommed on one side, and the Shah of Persia on the other? Does it tend to the union of these with the only maritime prince of Asia, the Imaum of Muscat, whom we have taken care to insult and to injure, and who no more than any other Asiatic potentate, can view our expeditionary movements without alarm? The whole spirit of Central Asia is thus raised against us. The local antipathies, the religious

* In Persia, we assert the rights of the nephew against the uncle; in Affghanistan, systematic in our confusion, we assert the rights of the uncle against the nephew.

animosities, the family feuds that draw lines of such strong antipathies across that region, paralysing its own power of action, and rendering it impervious hitherto to all the bootless efforts of our enemy, are softened down by our act, and over all, the fear of Great Britain casts a common shade, and supplies a common motive for alliance with our foe.

Away with the idle and worse than idle dream of honour, strength, glory, or security to be derived from your invasion of Cabul. If the act is unjust it is defeat, not triumph, that is honourable; and if the measure is injudicious, it is success that we have to deplore. The justice of the enterprise there is no Englishman that will assert; its expediency is alone advanced—*expediency of WAR against the influence of Russia, while England and Russia are united—while Russia was able only to influence Asia by England's support**! The “expediency” is Russian, its guilt alone is English. But you say, “Russian influence had reached the Indus—she “was intriguing in Central Asia—we had proof of her secret action all over “India—we were menaced by hostile movements and dispositions in Scinde, in “Nepaul, in Birmah. The Indian Government could not wait to see or to “consider what the relations were between the Foreign Office and St. Peters- “burgh—they had only the choice of difficulties, and the necessity of immediate “action to avert impending danger. The Indian Government did act, and by “striking a blow so sudden, so distant, and with such entire success, it inspired “subjects and neighbours with respect for its councils and terror for its arms.” Such is the reasoning of men called statesmen—such is the apology made by the Opponents of the Administration, for a war which they admit to be unjust.

* “England has come to a rupture with Persia—England has sent an army to overthrow the Government of Cabul, and the justification of the English Minister for the rupture and the war, has been, that these two countries were *subject to the influence of Russia*, and, at the very time that he makes the influence of Russia a case of WAR with a third state, he allies England to Russia for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and stipulates the occupation of Constantinople by Russians! Is it possible to imagine treason rendered more manifest by the contradiction of words and of acts—by the contradiction of avowed intentions and realised results?

“If the alliance with Russia had been the cause of the war with Cabul, would Russia unite herself to England? If the object of the Treaty of the 15th July was to maintain the Ottoman Empire, would Russia be one of the allies? The pretext of hostility against Russia in Central Asia, as of friendship for her in Turkey, is equally false, but equally serves, through opposite means, to assure the domination of Russia in one country as in the other.”—THE CRISIS.

You *make war on the influence of Russia!* Say, then, you make war *to create* the influence of Russia. You dread the fall of Herat. Do you do any thing to support Herat? Do you require Russia not to push Persia on? Does the Indian Government send, as recommended by the envoy in Persia, *a body of troops through friendly Affghanistan* to support Herat? No. But you attack Affghanistan to exclude this “Russian influence.” Was this Russian influence the single Captain of Cossacks that had carried the imperial letters to the Prince of Cabul, who received them only after you had declared yourself his enemy? “But then it was necessary to strike a blow to overawe “the imbecile Prince of Nepaul—the vain-glorious Birmans, the ambitious relic “of the House of Sattara, the turbulent Rohilla and Rajpoot.” What had India to dread from the disordered movements of subdued antagonists, and disunited if unwilling dependents, already broken, actually subdued, and incapable of action as of union? England had to dread not their dispositions, but their concert—there could be no concert till Russia was brought forward to the position where she could unite them. Your blow has retarded their desultory movements, while it extends the field of that combination; and affords her the means of advancing to occupy it. This deed places you in your own minds on a level with Russia, familiarises you with injustice, and lulls you into security.

But the effect of this robber invasion of Affghanistan is not confined even to the wide area of our operations. It traverses the Paropamisus, it crosses the Taurus, it penetrates beyond the Himalaya, and spreads over the wildernesses of Bootan and Tibet. Bokhara, Khyva, Kokan, and Samarcand, resound with indignant denunciation of British aggression, and to England are transferred that hatred and those epithets which hitherto had been reserved for Muscovy.

But if Central and Northern Asia—if Affghanistan and Tartary—if the fishermen of the Gulph of Arabia, and the shepherds of the hills of Cashmere, are led to censure the acts and to dread the objects of the British Government, and to see in them danger and injustice—if the whole population inhabiting the vast territory that stretches from the Indus to the foot of the Caucasus, see that England is no longer the power that protects, but the power that pulls down, what is the effect on the relative power of England and of Russia? If that enormous mass of men is led to consider the strength

of England as only matched by that of Russia, is not Russian power extended by this thought all over Asia?

Must not the same considerations as the effects of these come to tell upon the whole population of India—come to fan into flame each latent discontent—to give energy and power to each ambitious thought—to reawaken old grievances—renew lost expectations?

Must not the accumulated effects of this mighty change equally come to tell separately on each of the nations and powers bordering upon our dominions, and lead them to rate lower and lower, day by day, the dignity of Great Britain—to be alarmed for acts of violence on her part—to become familiarized with the idea of her antagonism with Russia, and *to wait* until Russia can effect her overthrow, by a concert and combination of the hostile elements existing throughout the extent of Asia*?

Not even the Celestial Empire has remained a stranger to the excitement which this assault has created, or indifferent to those convulsions with which the Indian Government has alarmed the East. Threatened by these demonstrations, exposed upon the whole coast to the assault of the British Navy—exposed as she would be by the triumph of England in Central Asia—it was not for China to have injured England, unless she had been taught to conclude that the power of England was about to be broken. The recent acts of the Indian Government would have sufficed to have brought China into concert with Russia, if she had never been so before; and the late acts of the Chinese Government are corroborative evidence of that connexion. But we have seen everywhere, in every portion of the globe, secret preparation, made long before the results appeared for placing England in enmity or hostility with other powers†.

* The first practical advance of Russia will be to *protect* English interests.

† The process for the abrogation of the adjustment of the North American frontier, commenced in February 1831; for the sacrifice of the independence of Circassia, preparation was made in October 1831; for the transfer in Greece of British rights to Russia, preparation was made in 1832; for the treaty of July 1840, preparation has been made by incitement offered to Mehemet Ali to declare his independence from 1830, and by simultaneous encouragement to France to ally herself to that Pasha, and to place herself in opposition to England; for rupture with China, preparation was made February 1834; for the rupture with Persia in July 1838, preparation was made in February 1834.—See “Exposition of Boundary Differences,”—“Affair of the Vixen,”—“Diplomatic History of Greece,”—“Mehemet Ali and Lord Palmerston,”—“Chinese Papers,”—and the present volume.

If so, must not the same system have been brought to bear in China? When Lord Palmerston became Foreign Minister, the relations of Great Britain with China were still under the direction of the Indian Board; but the act of 1833, unhappily brought our relations with China under the control of that Minister, who, from the early part of 1834, commenced the application, to that empire, of the same insidious process of exasperation, and of invitation to aggression, which we have seen so remarkably illustrated in the affairs of Persia.

The relations of Russia with the Celestial Empire, influence materially, at this moment, and have materially influenced of past, the power of Russia, and her faculty of action upon Europe, as well as upon the East. When Russia first emancipated herself from the Tartar yoke, her mind was instantaneously carried to Peking, because there reigned the population that she had expelled from her soil*. India, China, and Russia, equally stand exposed, and have all equally been conquered by the nomade inhabitants of Transoxiana and Upper Tartary. Upon that region, China and Russia have exercised in common a powerful influence; and, during the last century, the relations of each of these empires with that region (wholly excluded from the observation of Europe), have been second in importance to no other interest of either state.

Hitherto the arms, as the diplomacy of China, have been far more successful than those of Russia, in acting upon that important region†, which gives to whoever can discipline or control it, the power of subduing the three great empires which touch its frontier—Russia, China, and India. There has been no conqueror of the world, but he who has gained a supremacy over that people, and whoever does obtain such a supremacy, must be master of the East‡. They have hitherto been paralyzed

* The Tartars were expelled after Russia had, by intermarriage with the heiress of the Eastern Empire, admitted the thought of possessing a right to the ancient dominions of Rome, actually constituting the various kingdoms of Europe!

† Included within the following limits, the Caspian Sea on the West, Chinese frontiers on the East, the Emba on the North, the Paropamisus on the South, inhabited by the “three hordes,” (4,000,000,) the Tartar, Turkish, and Usbeg populations of Khiva, Bockhara, Samarcand, &c.

‡ Alexander subdued and strengthened himself amongst these people before he invaded India, Zengis Khan, Timour Beg, Malek Shah, Alp Arslan, Mahmoud of Ghuzni, Baber, Nadir Shah, drew their whole or their chief strength from this region. These populations have subdued Russia—twice

because divided; but Russia has now fairly entered into a struggle for their supremacy, and if she succeeds in establishing it, she will have China and India at her mercy. The dread of China for England, and the consequent connexion which will be established, and authority that will be given to Russia in that empire, immensely facilitate this result; and on the other side, it is facilitated by the movement of England upon Affghanistan, by which the Tartars are alarmed—by which they are exasperated against England—by which they are led no longer to dread subjugation from Russia, but from England—by which they have the opportunity brought near to them of opening the gates of India through an insurrection of Affghanistan, the temptation to which removes many impediments in the way of their associating themselves with the designs of Russia.

England, in 1834, with the western limit of her Indian territory lying still in the rear of the Indus, to the East touching only the Hindo-Chinese regions, was defended against any state that could threaten, by a neutral space of two thousand miles, was protected by an impenetrable belt of rocks on the North, and by ten thousand miles of ocean to the South. Seeing within her own Indian world, no rival and no enemy—she chose to consider her position insecure because of the designs of a Cabinet seated on the Baltic, and undertook to make great efforts to defend herself against that power, though it had not moved a single soldier, and though it professed the strongest attachment for Great Britain, and was entirely at the mercy of Great Britain. England in India has made gigantic efforts; she has extended herself over half the distance that separates her from Russia; she has involved herself in differences, which, ultimately, will be a struggle with the Empire to the North-East, that numbers nearly half the population of the globe; she has given herself a frontier many fold more extensive than the single line of the Suttlege, which alone she had previously to defend. If there was danger from without and insecurity within before, what is there now? If her means were insufficient for securing her these com-

conquered China—they subdued the Caliphate of Bagdad—four times subdued Asia Minor (one of the waves flowed over to Europe, and constitutes actually the Ottoman Empire). They have thirty times invaded India. The strength of Persia, in its grandeur, before the invasion of Alexander, lay on that region—so also subsequently, under Nushirvan and Nadir Shah. These populations were the strength of the Bactrian dynasty, which also asserted a supremacy over India.

paratively compact and tranquil possessions, what are they now? If an enemy at two thousand miles was dangerous, what is he at half that distance? If she created envy or inspired mistrust while tranquilly occupying the station, and confining herself to the frontiers, which had become hers by practice and by admission, what alarm will she not inspire, and what envy will she not create, when revealing, at once, such consciousness of weakness and such colossal designs of injustice and ambition?

Supposing that the Cabinet of Russia had hitherto entertained no designs, what would be the effect upon it—what the obligations of self preservation imposed by the projects of Great Britain in Asia?

Supposing that France could be the ally of England, who has ceased to be a friend to herself, what must be the effect upon the Cabinet of the Tuilleries, of this exhibition of grasping policy on her part, and of the hostility to her of that Eastern world, where, recently, she has been considered secure and supreme? Upon the rest of Europe, and upon her cognate races across the Atlantic, involved with us in a difference which also tends to war, must not the same facts produce similar impressions; and must not, every where, the insecurity impending over us in Asia, tend to strengthen projects of hostility*?

But is it the United States, or France, Persia, Turkey, Cabul, or China, that is to profit by that decay of England, which each is taught to desire? No! Russia alone is to gather in the inheritance of their hatred and of our crimes. Weak in her frame, and powerful in mind alone, she must act by the strength of others; she must contaminate before she can controul—she must desolate before she can possess. She sows deception to reap ruin.

Russia, within a lustre, has made greater progress than in the preceding

* A United States' paper says, "We now understand the outcry that has been making in England about Russia. England is just quietly preparing the way for the conquest of the whole of Asia, and expecting that we would believe her to be moderate and just, because she had been telling us for the last three or four years that Russia was ambitious." A Canadian paper replies, "Can any man in his senses suppose that England invents, when she speaks about the designs of Russia? It cannot be ignorance, it is sheer malevolence, to represent England, assailed by Russia, as seeking a pretext for an expedition into which she is driven in self defence." There is no alternative in the eyes of mankind between the supposition that England menaces the world by her ambition, or that she is threatened in her very existence by Russia.

century and a half. A British Minister has given to her the power of threatening India: she has thereby made a bloodless conquest of Great Britain.

Paris,
20th October, 1840.

I have this day to revise for the press the foregoing chapter, written on the same day last year. I add, as a commentary upon it, an extract from an article which has this day appeared in this city in the *Journal des Débats*, from the pen of M. Philarète Chasles:—

After exhibiting the vastness of the fields upon which Russia acts, the insignificance of the power which suffices for her to obtain success—after endeavouring to establish that there is a British system of resistance carried on against her by private individuals, he continues:—

“ This struggle of the Slavonic genius, and the Saxon genius,—of Russia and of England, has not turned hitherto in favour of England; she has ever been the dupe; wherever she has obtained any partial success, it has been by accident; she has put in motion great armaments to produce trifling results, and treaties full of art employed in vain; ending, consequently, in weakening her, and endangering her, prove little in favour of her ability. Russia, on the contrary, hiding her game, concealing her losses, swelling her victories, increasing her territory, and profiting by all, even by her own weakness, has conquered in Asia, alongside of the British possessions, a rank and authority all fictitious, but which are as powerful as if they were realities, because she inspires fear. That is all that Russia seeks at present; she will do better at a future day.

“ The relations of the travellers whom I quote, and of many others whom I could name, present the most curious incidents, and display the progress of that Russian fraud which is a power, and the establishment of this Muscovite credit, founded on deceit, which menaces to-day at once the Bosphorus and the Ganges. ‘ As for the Persians,’ says one of these travellers, ‘ the Muscovite has become the arbiter of peace and war. The Shah of Persia swears by the Russians, and regards them as the masters of the world, and constitutes himself their humble instrument. In Central Asia,’ says Captain Conolly, ‘ the Czar is believed to be the King of the European kings, and they so translate the word ‘ autocrat’ (imperator azoûm). I have heard relations made to the inhabitants of Herat of the pretended prowess of the Orouss (Russians), who are for them giants and man-eaters, giving law to all the people of Europe, and being destined to possess the East.’ * * * * * ‘ The generals of the Orouss,’ said one of these Heratees, named Choumsondine Khan, to some of his compatriots that surrounded him, ‘ fill up the ditches of the fortresses they besiege, with the bodies of their living soldiers; when they are in want of provisions, they kill some thousands of men, whose flesh is distributed as rations to their comrades. Thus are the Orouss invincible; nothing can resist them; neither citadels, nor kingdoms.’ Such absurd reports, so useful to the Muscovite power, spread far beyond Affghanistan and Nepaul. The fright of the Russians has penetrated into Bengal, whose timid inhabitants share in the veneration of the Heratees for the Russians, and the word *Russia* lowers already over half Hindostan

“ By means of such manœuvres does Russia cast her shadow over China and Persia, Armenia, Hindo-China, and Asia Minor. Everywhere the extravagant opinion of her grandeur prepares the reality of her power. In China, the only foreign caravan that crosses the gates of Peking is Muscovite. In Persia, the Russians command. We have seen what estimate the populations of Central Asia, and the merchants of Bengal, have formed of Russia. An enormous chimera, impalpable and invincible, surrounds and undermines, on every side its enemy, offering itself no vulnerable point. If a question of military power arises, the advantage is on the side of the British. But if a question arises of dexterity, then Russians reap all the benefits. They have been beaten in Circassia, but that will not prevent the stratagem, by the accomplishment of which, they will one day be in possession of that country. The English have beaten the King of Persia before Herat, and have imposed their laws upon Affghanistan, but that will not help them much. In continuing to darken and to destroy the British preponderance in India, Russia hazards nothing; to preserve and to maintain itself, England expends millions, and moves armies, but cannot make the colossus retire a step, because the colossus is a phantom. It is in such circumstances, and between a war in China, and the difficult defence of her Indian possessions, that England has opened to Russia, in a possible hypothesis, the gates of Constantinople! *an error such, that it is impossible to believe it even with the facts before us.*”

Such is the aspect of danger presented by England to the world; such is the picture of Great Britain, drawn by an able and a friendly hand!

PART XIV.

OPPOSITION AND UNION OF BRITISH AND RUSSIAN POLICY IN REGARD TO PERSIA, CONCURRENTLY AND PERMANENTLY MAINTAINED. INDUCTION THEREFROM OF TREASONABLE CONCERT. CHARACTERS OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR THE PROOF, AND PRESENTED BY THE SUBJECT.

THE diplomatic correspondence between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia has opened with :

A mutual admission (secret at the time) of the similarity of their interests in Persia.

A compact to draw up in concert their instructions to their representatives.

This correspondence details continuous conflict between the representatives of the two governments in Persia!

Has either, or have both governments instructed their agents in this course? No! on the contrary, the conflict is asserted to have arisen out of disobedience of instructions.

Has one, or have both governments, been cognizant of the proceedings of their agents?—They have.

Have no means been adopted to arrest such conduct?—None have been adopted.

Have they admitted such conduct as fitting and proper?—They have not admitted such conduct as fitting and proper.

But such a state of things is incredible. That two governments should agree to act in *concert*, and then act in opposition, that that opposition should be disavowed and still continued, is what can only be believed when it is admitted that the two governments are composed of madmen.

During three years this concert and hostility have, nevertheless, been concurrently maintained. We have the facts, we have the instructions, we have the results; and further, we have language exchanged upon the subject between the two governments themselves.

The governments then have come to an explanation. What has been its character? What its effect?

Twice have these explanations occurred—in the midst of the proceedings and at their close: the first only increasing the intensity of the struggle, and the last concluding with the expression of reciprocal satisfaction at the result!

The facts are as follows:—

On the 5th of September, 1834, a *concert* of corresponding instructions from the two governments to their agents in Persia, and of confidential communication between the two missions in Persia, was established.

On the 7th of April, 1836, the British Foreign Secretary was in possession of a series of communications from the British Ambassador of Persia, detailing acts of the Envoy of Russia in direct violation of the concerted policy of the two governments, and constituting a portion of a project of warlike assault upon the British possessions in India.

On the 16th of January, 1837, that is to say, after an interval of nine months and ten days, the British Foreign Secretary addressed a remonstrance to the Court of St. Petersburg.

On the 27th July, 1838, the British Foreign Secretary came to a rupture with Persia, because of her connexion with Russia—but made no communication on the subject to St. Petersburg.

On the 26th October, 1838, that is, twenty-one months and ten days after the first remonstrance, and thirty-nine months after knowledge of the intentions of Russia, the British Foreign Secretary addresses a second remonstrance to St. Petersburg.

On the 20th December, 1834, the British Foreign Secretary declares Her Majesty's Government to be entirely satisfied.

The rupture with Persia continues—is continued to the present hour.

The grounds for remonstrance that existed in January 1837, were equally in existence in April 1836.

The right of remonstrance that existed in April 1836, had, by acquiescence, ceased to exist in January 1837.

By the delay, the measures remonstrated against, because they were hostile, are suffered to be brought to completion, and the policy, of which they constituted a part, to become consolidated.

The measures of the two governments being *preconcerted*, acts imposing on one government the necessity of remonstrance, implied fraud on the part of the other.

The two governments being bound to mutual communication, to defer remonstrance was *to suppress information*. The delay, therefore, implied fraud on the part of the government making the remonstrance.

The information suppressed by the British Government was, first, disobedience of the Russian Envoy in Persia to the patent orders of his government. Secondly, it was hostility of the Russian Envoy in Persia to the Envoy of Great Britain, and to her avowed policy in that country. In either case, such information could not be suppressed unless through collusion between the British Secretary of State and the Russian Envoy in Persia.

The Russian Envoy must have been acting with the British Secretary of State either to deceive his own Court, or to deceive the English Government.

Either the Russian Envoy, or the English Foreign Secretary, was a traitor to his own Government.

Either the English Government had suborned the Russian Envoy to deceive the Russian Government, or the Russian Government had suborned the British Foreign Secretary to deceive England.

This treasonable conspiracy between London, St. Petersburg, and Teheran, was either directed by the Russian Government against England, or by the English Government against Russia.

But the anterior compact of co-operation being suffered *by both governments* to be broken, the collusion must have been between the governments themselves; that is, between the Foreign Minister of England, and the Government of Russia.

Momentous as is the question—atrocious as is the crime, the proof is here sufficient and complete. On this concurrent attitude of concert and of opposition of the two cabinets, can alone be established the reality of this mighty betrayal for any one who approaches the subject with that previous knowledge, without which, such a subject cannot honestly or usefully be approached.

I add the following considerations to prove, if any doubt can remain, that this double position was impossible without dishonesty, and in such a matter dishonesty is high treason. I further feel it to be incumbent on me to show how it was possible for such fraud to escape detection by the other members of the cabinet, and by the leaders of the other parties in the state.

A single instance of hostility of agents of cabinets acting in concert, involves the instantaneous punishment of the agent that has transgressed, or the demand for his punishment from the other government. But a compact for the mutual communication of instructions renders it impossible for the agents to act in opposition. Each is in possession of the common instructions, any deviation from them by the one would, although the case is insupposable, compel the other immediately to expose to the government to which both are accredited, the insubordination, and, consequently, the valuelessness of the act.

Here the instructions are concerted,—the agents *permanently* opposed! The instructions were then concerted with the view of producing this disunion. But how could concert produce opposition? How, without the concert, can you account for the hostility? There are two distinct concerts, the one of false policy, the other of criminal collusion; the one patent* between the governments, the other between one government and a single member of the other. This is the solution of the problem. Does this solve it? What else can?

To render intelligible this double concert, we must trace it back to its origin. Lord Palmerston had persuaded his colleagues that it was desirable that England should make a selection amongst the many candidates for the Persian throne. He then makes it appear (*having put forward Russia's candidate*) that Russia has come to concur with England in this selection. The cabinet concurs in a Russian object, taking it to be an English object. This was the point where resistance was to be made, and where, if not made, subjugation was entailed. Resistance was not made, and England applied itself to the pursuit of a Russian object as its own. It is proposed that a concert shall be established by the two governments to advance their common policy. To

* Patent to the cabinet only. Concealed from the public and even from the representatives of the British crown. It was a fraud the most cruel practised upon them. I am convinced that if Mr. M^cNeill had been aware of this concert, he would never have gone to Persia, because then there was before him the necessary sacrifice either of his integrity or of his position.

this end, it is necessary to declare that the interests of both are the same. Henceforward a patent concert for objects not understood cloaks the consciously criminal concert. Russia's next step is to compel the monarch she has raised, to attack the Affghans. Here the English Minister cannot persuade his colleagues to concur. He sends out, he tells them, "*secret*" instructions to oppose Russia. This satisfies his colleagues, and prevents them from breaking the compact of co-operation between the two governments, while the existence of that compact frustrates the instructions he had sent to Persia*. Thus the opposition in Persia grows out of the union at home, and is made the means of preserving it.

The colleagues of the acting minister see one portion of the scheme to-day, another to-morrow. As they have been deceived respecting the tendency of measures, so are they deceived with respect to the character of effects. Involved in a continuous circle of fallacy, they can neither stand still nor advance; unable to control measures for which they are responsible, they must pretend to understand them. To escape from the reproach of being led without knowledge, their self-love takes refuge in the defence of what they are conscious they have not understood. They have to shut light out, to silence conscience, and then is brought about that state of the mind which Russia understands so well, and which she has so well described; where men fear knowledge, and repel examination into their own position. Say that some mind active and more conscientious than the rest should still retain doubts or admit difficulties—will that bring him nearer to the solution, when the only solution—the truth—is what he dares not look upon?

But it may be said this act was committed by the Foreign Secretary without the concurrence of his colleagues? If without their concurrence, it is needless

* When Mr. Ellis attempted to remonstrate with Count Simonich, he referred him at once "to their respective Ministers in London and St. Petersburg." When Mr. McNeill attempted to threaten the Persian Government, because it yielded to Russia, it repelled the threat by a simple reference to "the perfect understanding between the two nations." Moreover, the double position is used at pleasure by the Russian Minister. Now displaying the joint power of the allies to commit Persia, then threatening her with England's resistance or vengeance, when already engaged to a plan, or committed by an act. Speaking of the expedition to Herat, Sir J. McNeill says, "Count Simonich adduced the certainty of England's opposition as one of the strongest arguments to accelerate the execution of the scheme." Yet the English Ambassador had not one word to say on the part of the English Government.

to trace the steps by which his ascendancy has been secured, since he must have been their master from the very origin. Then would it be superfluous to speak of “ Cabinet,” of “ Government,” of “ Policy,” or of “ England,”—these would have become vain and empty sounds*. The Foreign Secretary, we must therefore assume, did obtain (sooner or later) the concurrence of his colleagues, and this gives us the measure of their minds morally and intellectually. The cabinet dreaded Russia; desired to oppose Russia; was ignorant of the means by which she could be opposed; and had no repugnance to act with dishonesty and with perfidy. Lord Palmerston had their apprehensions of Russia, and their dishonesty, at once to use; by these he led them to perfidious opposition†, so as at once to render them the instruments of her policy abroad, and of his power at home. If the objects of England are honest objects, she must sacrifice those objects from the moment that she has recourse to fraud, for honesty can only honestly resist. England is powerless, unless opposed as much in *character* as in intention to the government that obtains by fraudulent means, unjust ends. To oppose her, you give her your hand, and you give that hand dishonestly! The cabinet of England has, first, been brought to concert its policy with Russia. The cabinet of England has, secondly, been led to be guilty of perfidy to its ally. The cabinet of England has, lastly, been led to believe itself guilty of perfidy that was not real! What more can be said—what further imagined? Here is illustrated the double power of evil, swaying by its intelligence, while corrupting by its touch.

The man who has concerted such a scheme must be so superior to his

* Lord Palmerston acted, and subsequently compromised his colleagues, by giving them knowledge of his acts—in proportion as they became confused, and the government committed, so as to render it impossible for them to understand, or understanding, to resist. In the debate in the French Chamber on the Treaty of 15th July, the command of Lord Palmerston over his colleagues was completely exposed. M. Guizot, in a despatch of June 24th, represents Lord Palmerston's colleagues and the Ministers of Austria and Prussia as *weighing* upon him at once and in vain.

† In regard to the Treaty of 15th July, when Lord Palmerston was reproached in the House of Commons for having furthered the objects of Russia, he declared that that treaty counteracted the objects of Russia. The treaty was not then ratified. Lord Palmerston had no hesitation in making this declaration, nor Russia in ratifying the treaty after it. Englishmen either did not think of this fact, or, thinking about it, said to themselves,—Oh! Russia uses this man as a dupe. So that the Englishmen who did think, would have done better to let thinking alone.

colleagues*, and to the other parliamentary men of the nation to which he belongs, as to be wholly incomprehensible to them. Constituting for all practical purposes the cabinet, he joins with a Foreign Power, transcendent in ability as in ambition, yields to that power the means of commanding the world through England, and of assuring his position and her domination over England by the results obtained against herself within and without. The road to these ends, is the complication of affairs, that is the confusion of the thoughts and the corruption of the mind of the English nation. To these ends the whole power, at their joint command, must be intently devoted.

But it may be supposed that the very success of the system will bring its fall; that the disasters which will ensue must arouse the nation—that the contradictions which will appear, must break the spell which fascinates the cabinet. But the collusion of the Minister of so great a power as England, with so powerful a government as Russia, establishes an extra-national dominion†, which will dispose events so as to prolong the slumbers of a factious people and the fascination of a heedless cabinet, until there will be nothing to dread from that cabinet's knowledge, or from that nation's power. Here then, as in every case of treason, the blindness of the nation is necessary to its success and to its existence, and it must triumph so long as ignorance of its existence is allowed to stand as proof that it does not exist.

Thus, from the mutual positions of the two cabinets have we arrived at

* It is in reference to knowledge that talents are of use. If talent and success in political affairs were synonymous, we should not see nations sinking in one age and rising in another, unless the natural powers of different ages varied. It is the knowledge of ages, that is their wisdom, that varies, thence progress and decline. The man associated with the system of Russia assumes, in reference to his compatriots, the position of Russia with respect to other powers, powerful over them, because understanding them without being understood.

† This union commands at once all the resources of aggression wielded by Russia, and all the moral power of resistance which the aggressions of Russia have placed at the disposal of Great Britain. They are the two great military and naval powers, the commercial and diplomatic powers, commanding two hundred millions of men, inhabiting Europe, Asia, and America. While this concert remains secret, every government or people that opposes the one falls back upon the assumed opposition of the other; and when they can openly avow their union, all hope disappears for Russia's victim—all chance of effectual resistance on the part of the greatest of remaining powers disappears. Russia will, so long as it is necessary, therefore, render events throughout the world subservient to the maintenance of the British Minister, through whom this position has first been secured.

the conclusion of the traitorous intelligence of one member of the British Government with the Russian Government. We have seen that it is impossible to come to any other conclusion, or to resist this.

We have been brought to the very same point by examining the instructions sent to Persia.

We are now about to examine a third body of evidence—the explanations between the two cabinets.

The conclusions drawn from these separate data stand by themselves. With these data we have to proceed by mental processes, which furnish each its own result, distinctly and separately. Thus each result, derived from one process, becomes a test alike of the other processes, and of their results.

It has been by analysis that we have treated the instructions sent out to Persia. It is by induction that we have just arrived at our conclusions respecting the reciprocal attitudes of the two governments. In turning now to the exposition by the governments themselves of their own acts, we must proceed by synthesis, because their exposition must include the *whole* case. Hitherto we have scarcely had other assistance to guide our steps than the glimmerings which involuntarily escape from the very intricacy of the process of deception. Every sentence addressed by government to government must be clear and steady light, that will expose the falsehood of the pretexts assumed by them to veil intentions, or the errors committed by us in attempting to explain them.

Here then are elements of judgment worthy of our subject—worthy of a subject unparalleled in inherent difficulties—unparalleled in the depth of the crime that is involved, or in the magnitude of the interests that are at stake.

But the power of the proof rises not only in proportion to the extent of evidence, and the variety of the processes which separately are employed, and which mutually concur—it rises also in proportion as the circumstances of the parties enable them to exclude, or the disposition of the inquirer to circumscribe, testimony. These difficulties present themselves here to a degree perhaps without example. No judicial tribunal—no political authority—no public opinion investigates or compels the production of evidence*. The

* “ This inquiry will produce no great information, if those whose conduct is examined are allowed to select the evidence. What will they produce but accounts, obscure, fallacious, imperfect, and confused, from which nothing can be learned ?”—*Chatham on Impeachment of Walpole*.

parties are two Governments, and the evidence that we have, is not produced for the purpose of meeting inquiry, or even doubts, but spontaneously for an advantage ; that is, to mislead opinion, to misrepresent facts, and to commit parties and public men by the mere fact of publication.

Conscious of all these obstacles cast in our path, will a conscientious man the more lightly weigh objections, or the more readily admit proof ? Far from it. To such a man it will not be necessary to bring home the proof of guilt in order to lead him to demand, and to seek by every means to obtain, public investigation. For him it will be enough that failure should have occurred—that doubts respecting the honour of the state should exist—that suspicions regarding the motives of individuals should be abroad—that information respecting the transactions themselves should be withheld ; any one of these would be perfectly sufficient for any upright man, or any good citizen, to require that such investigation should take place as should dispel doubt, as should destroy suspicion, or as should convert suspicion into knowledge, and thereby prevent danger and punish crime. Such a man will, of course, not come to conclusions of guilt, except on positive knowledge of ascertained facts, and therefore it is that he will urge inquiry. But, alas ! there is no reason here for the absence of conclusions respecting guilt ; there is no scantiness of facts, no deficiency of information. Would to God that it were so, for one might then hope. Whatever the incredulity of the nation, I know of no instance in which a man, who has applied himself to investigate this charge, has not come to the admission of its truth—each of course moved, in entering upon the inquiry, by the desire to detect fallacy in the alleged proof. But those who did apply themselves to investigate, had first been changed men. From their minds the idols of faction had been displaced. Without such change how could they take interest in that which belonged to England ? How could they comprehend that which constituted citizenship ?

In former instances of treason you have had a man overreached in some particular transaction—overreached by an antagonist nearly his own match, and brought into subserviency to some foreign power much on a level in intelligence and in objects with his own. You have seen that minister continuing subsequently a series of deceptions, to conceal his weakness or his crime ; but that which we have here, and that which I assert is betrayal premeditated—is betrayal by compact—betrayal complete and entire, every

word a lie, every act a crime—betrayal to a power so superior in mind, and so entire in ambition, that if the betrayal was not complete, it could have no existence.

To substantiate this assertion, it does not suffice that we should have evidence of falsification of language, of misrepresentation of facts—it does not suffice that we should have Russian ends thereby obtained—it does not suffice that no other solution or result can be found save the advancement of the ends of Russia. But we must have the total absence of any fact or any incident which does not present the same characters, and give the same results. The British Minister, who *intentionally* obeyed but once that Government, must be, from that hour, no more than a portion of its system. If, therefore, I saw in the present Foreign Secretary of England any instance of weakness, caprice, indifference, or neglect, in matters of importance to Russia (that is, in all important matters), I should reject my conclusions respecting him, because I know that that system is everywhere and at all times self coherent, presenting the only coeval example by which an idea can be gained of judgment applied to the conduct of human affairs.

PART XV.

REMONSTRANCES ADDRESSED IN 1837, BY THE BRITISH CABINET TO THAT OF RUSSIA, RESPECTING THE CONDUCT OF THE LATTER IN CENTRAL ASIA.

NINE months are allowed to elapse before any remonstrance is made by the British Government, after official communication of the hostile acts of the Russian Government in Persia. During eleven months the Foreign Secretary had been aware of the intentions of Persia, to which the acts of Russia had reference. During eighteen months, had he been aware that it was the intention of Russia to push Persia to the performance of these acts.

After eighteen months of silence, a remonstrance is made against a government whose acts were hostile, and whose intentions were *fore* known. It is needless to go further in search of the motive for such conduct ; here again is it clear, as in every preceding act or sentence. But again, let us set the past aside, and placing our previous conclusions in abeyance, suppose that the Foreign Secretary now, for the first time, learns what Russia has been about ; or suddenly recovering from a state of torpor, determines at last to act. He makes a remonstrance : a remonstrance neither placid in spirit, nor measured in terms. This, in a minister so enduring, so circumspect, so exact, reveals, at least, a decision taken. A remonstrance is made ; St. Petersburg is spoken to. The face of things is now to be changed, and we are about to be relieved from the long and heavy burthen of humiliation and suspicion. But stop :—What is a remonstrance ?—Is it a statement of grievances ? Is it proof of the facts stated ? Is it demand of reparation for injury done, and of cessation of that injury for the future ?—Yes. Supposing that the party asserting that it has suffered injury, avoided to specify it, and possessing the proof of such injury, withheld it ; and that while speaking in an insulting tone, it made no intelligible demand : would that be called a remonstrance ?—No. What, then, would it be called ?—That which has never occurred in the conduct of private or public affairs can have received no designation. A transaction such as this can have the designation only of the characters of the folly or of the guilt to which it belongs.

Such is the incident before us ; the British Foreign Secretary, addressing himself to St. Petersburg, remonstrates, but states no case—asserts various things, proves none—argues, but does not specify ; and insulting much the Russian Government, from that Government demands nothing.

The remonstrance excludes from view the whole of the communications transmitted from Persia during the previous eleven months. A despatch from Mr. McNeill, written shortly after his arrival in Persia, and before he had seen either the Shah or the Russian Minister, narrates incidentally and on rumour, that :—

“ The Russian Minister still continued to urge the Shah to undertake a winter campaign against Herat.”

The despatch containing this passage is immediately enclosed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and constitutes the *whole case* that is

sent to substantiate the remonstrance of England against the policy which (under the cloak of concert with England) had evoked the shade of Nadir Shah, and pointed out Delhi and Calcutta to the ambition of Central Asia.

Even this expression is too explicit and robust for the purposes of the Foreign Secretary, and he restates it, so as to be enabled to alter its grammatical structure. He tells Lord Durham that Mr. M^cNeill “ reports that Count Simonich *had urged* the Shah to undertake *a winter** campaign against Herat.” The Foreign Secretary does not inform the Ambassador of the value of the facts—he does not refer him to the compact of the two Governments—he does not enlighten him as to the opinions or policy of the British Government. Lord Durham is thrown back in bringing this weighty matter before the Russian Government, on the comparison of the expression of Mr. M^cNeill with the version of it by his chief, and must infer that the statement is valueless, and that the proceeding, now reported, is novel—if true. On such grounds is Lord Durham left to proceed with the aid of that judgment, and under the guidance of those predilections, which led to his selection for the post which he occupied.

The Foreign Secretary then proceeds to instruct Lord Durham upon the case thus placed before him :—

“ I have to instruct your Excellency to ask Count Nesselrode whether Count Simonich is acting according to his instructions.”

According to all the knowledge here avowed, what grounds were there to assume that Count Simonich had acted? Mr. M^cNeill’s expression would not have been changed by his chief, except on the conviction of its worthlessness. How then does he assume upon it, in face of a great ally, that its minister had done a thing, which thing he, in the subsequent phrase, characterizes as so monstrous? There was here, then, no patent ground for the assumption that Count Simonich had done any thing? Other grounds existed. Why are they not produced? Why, having them, is the authority of Mr. M^cNeill’s statement invalidated?

Could a *bona fide* remonstrance be, without establishing the facts? Could it proceed on an assumption? Having established the facts, would it proceed by asking a Foreign Power whether its envoy was, or was not, in a state

* As placed in the extract, the value of the passage seems to turn on the word “ winter.”

of insubordination? And supposing such to be diplomatic practice, could that question be put to a Government by the man who was aware of its intention three months before that intention was revealed by the envoy's act?

In this transaction do you perceive weakness, or ignorance, or recklessness? Or do you find evidence of knowledge, of firmness, of system? No, these are simple, common-place expressions, which you construe too harshly. He who digs a pit and places in it a snare, will he not cover it over?

The despatch continues :—

“ If your Excellency should learn that Count Simonich is acting in obedience to his instructions, Your Excellency will represent to the Russian Government that ————”

Now what are we to expect? The British Minister, at length driven beyond the verge of endurance, demands a categorical reply. He has, however, opened to Russia a door of escape by the sacrifice of her agent. If she sacrifices her agent, Lord Durham will, of course, then be instructed further to require such public declaration in Asia as shall completely counteract the consequences of the policy he has urged. If Russia refuses or delays, of course Lord Durham will be instructed to demand his passports.

The reader ought not to proceed till he has weighed whether it was, or was not, possible to adopt any course saving one of these alternatives, after the question which Lord Durham was instructed to put. When he has satisfied his mind on this point, he will be prepared to peruse the following passage :—

“ If your Excellency should learn from Count Nesselrode that Count Simonich is acting in obedience to his instructions, your Excellency will represent to the Russian Government, that these military expeditions of the Shah are, in the highest degree, unwise and injurious; that they lead him, &c.! and that they cause him to waste, &c.!”

In the first paragraph the assumption of the act of Count Simonich as unquestionable, gives an appearance of energy, and casts a shade of menace over the transaction; no sooner is this effect produced, than the assumption is withdrawn; to Count Nesselrode is not left the hazard even of denying it.

“ It would,” Lord Palmerston continues, “ be so contrary to all the *professed* principles and *declared* system of the Russian Government to have instructed Count Simonich to urge the Shah in the manner in which *he is reported* to have done so, that *it must be assumed* that the Count has been acting without instructions; and *if that be the case*, His Majesty's Government *cannot*

doubt that the Russian Cabinet will put a stop to a course of conduct so much at variance with *its own* declared (!) policy, and so adverse to the best interests of an ally, for whom the Russian Government *professes* friendship and good-will."

The British Foreign Secretary has to call on Russia to explain what might be ambiguous (supposing there were any thing ambiguous) in her conduct: instead of that, he applies himself to making assumptions respecting her conduct, and *addresses to herself* explanations of these assumptions. He insinuates suspicions of her good faith, doubts of the subordination of her service; he places these assumptions as alternatives, and alternately admits and rejects both—so that he asserts and denies good faith in her policy and subordination in her service. In the first paragraph the charge against Count Simonich is laid down as positive; in the second paragraph, it is assumed to be untrue. On the assertion of this truth no demand is made, and on the assumption of its falsehood a reply is suggested*. How is the reader not to lose himself in this maze; but these snares are set only for the dishonest mind. Coming from Russia, the idea of Count Simonich disobeying his instructions would have been too preposterous; advanced on the part of England, the dishonest reader admits it, because he knows that no one ever doubted that Count Simonich acted according to instructions. Leaving the subject, he passes on to admire the ingenuity of the insult; his

* The following parallel instance of suggestion of a reply is from a despatch from Lord Palmerston to Mr. Fox, in the United States, dated July 22, 1837:—"With reference to your despatch of the 25th of January last, relative to the outrage that was committed in October 1835, within the Canadian frontier, by certain citizens of the state of New Hampshire, I have to instruct you to point out to the American Secretary of State, the unjustifiable violation of territory, indisputably British, which was committed on the occasion referred to; *to express a conviction that such an act must incur* the disapprobation of the President; and to say that, if it has not been punished, *ITS IMPUNITY MUST HAVE ARISEN FROM SOME INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION.*" On this passage, I have made the following comment in "Exposition of the North-East Boundary Differences."—"It is a novel procedure in diplomacy, to suggest an excuse as the means by which redress is to be obtained! To advance an hypothesis in an irrelevant matter, and to cast an imputation on the constitutional character of an independent state, has, I believe, been hitherto unheard of in international correspondence. So complete a displacement of the question at issue—so entire a departure from the forms of the subject and the style of the office—so artful a leading away of the mind of the reader from the intention of the writer, and from the effect of the communication—could not have fortuitously presented themselves to the writer's mind; nor could ideas so disjointed, and propositions so unnatural, have been brought together in a single phrase, except by an ominous concert of ability and design."

indignation not having been aroused by the dishonesty, his eyes are closed to the treason against England, concealed behind the assumed insult to Russia.

“ England cannot doubt that Russia *will put a stop* to such a course of conduct.”

The British Minister had not ascertained whether “ such a course of “ conduct” had, or *had not**, been according to instructions, yet he argues with her to show that it has not, while he insinuates that it is by instruction that Count Simonich has acted, in every term which he uses in arguing the reverse. If the question was to be argued, why was the question put? Why diminish the chances of this conduct being stopped by the insult insinuated? But no demand is made, as no assertion had been made, because both are put forward only to be destroyed. This despatch, alleging hostility in an Ambassador, and insinuating, as the explanation of his acts, either insubordination in the service, or fraud in the Government, concludes with no more than the hope that this course of conduct should receive a check from the Russian Government, in the case *only* in which the Russian Government had been already unable to check it!

Here, again, is our case complete.

Now let us see how the effects produced on Lord Durham correspond with what we have here anticipated.

Lord Durham writes, on the 24th February :—

“ In conformity with your Lordship’s instructions I *spoke* to Count Nesselrode on *the subject* of the conduct of the Russian Minister in Persia.”

His instructions were :—

“ I have to instruct your Excellency to ask Count Nesselrode whether Count Simonich is acting according to his instructions?”

“ If your Excellency should learn from Count Nesselrode that Count Simonich is acting according to his instructions, your Excellency will represent,” &c.

The instructions then were, first to make and record a formal demand ; and secondly, on an affirmative reply, to make certain statements. Could Lord Durham put such a question? Could an instruction be obeyed which required insult to a Foreign power in the first paragraph, and supplication to

* Lord Palmerston does not instruct Lord Durham to ask “ whether Count Simonich is *or is not* acting according to his instructions;” or “ whether *or not* Count Simonich?” &c. he says, “ *whether* Count Simonich *is* acting according to his instructions?”

it in the last. Lord Durham was, at the time, playing the part of mediator between the Foreign Secretary and Russia. Lord Durham, therefore, disobeys his instructions; that disobedience is submitted to—therefore it was intended*. While the bold demand stands on record in the Foreign† Office in London, the supplication alone drops from the lips of the Ambassador at St. Petersburg—consequently Lord Durham writes:—

“ I *spoke*‡ to Count Nesselrode upon the subject of the conduct of the Russian Minister in Persia.”

* Parallel case from the negotiations through which Lord Palmerston has effected the abrogation of the award of the King of Holland, on the disputed boundary in North America:—

“ Mr. Bankhead (the British Chargé d’Affaires at Washington) in his despatch of June the 13th, as in his previous despatches, has expressed his conviction that the decision of the Senate would be favourable to the adoption of the award. It is upon this ground that he justifies, it is this fact that he assigns as his motive for his communication of what he terms ‘ the ulterior views of His Majesty’s Government.’ As Lord Palmerston, in confiding to him the secret proposal of negotiation, had, by the peculiar construction of the language he had used, thrown upon him the entire responsibility of its employment, and directed him to be particularly cautious in making any communication of this nature, to guard against the possibility of being (mis) understood as inviting negotiation as a substitute for the adoption of the award; and as Mr. Bankhead himself had stated ‘ that the slightest intimation, on his part, as to the possibility of future negotiation, might endanger the favourable decision of the Senate,’ it is clear that he had contravened the positive instructions of his chief, and had acted in opposition to his own emphatically expressed conviction of duty. If, therefore, Lord Palmerston, with the whole facts before him, with the rejection of the award coming after the dangerous intimation of negotiation as a substitute for adoption, did not visit, with his severest censure, the functionary by whom that intimation had been so unfortunately made, it follows, that he had placed him in that position of embarrassment with a purpose, and that the unfortunate step, so taken, was that which Lord Palmerston desired.”—*North East Boundary Differences*, p. 50–51 *quarto edition*.

† Another parallel case:—

“ Looking upon this state of things, no less unwonted than unaccountable, it cannot fail to strike and to startle the inquirer, that there *is recorded* in the Foreign Office, as dated, and, therefore, dispatched on the 14th October (and, therefore, one month and twenty-two days before the opening of the Session), a despatch calling upon the American Government to accept the award; and, at the same time, dealing in a most conclusive and authoritative manner with the objections raised against it by the State of Maine. This despatch arrives at Washington two months and four days after its date—that is AFTER the message is delivered. When it does arrive, it is accompanied with a secret instruction in an opposite sense!”—*Boundary Differences*, p. 45.

‡ How was this not the subject of a formal note? What record is there in the Russian archives of any remonstrance having been made? There is nothing that can enlighten a future minister of Russia—nothing to which England can appeal even of the character represented in Lord Durham’s

Thus do we see gradually softened down the demands and complaints of England as they are transferred from despatch to despatch, and from agent to agent. You commence with a loud and lofty tone—it gradually sinks to a whisper. A large and imposing body is before you—your eyes, and watchfulness are called here and there by some dexterous movements, and when you look again there is a shrunken shadow in its place, growing less and less, till nothing is to be found*.

Lord Durham continues :—

“ His Excellency (Count Nesselrode) said that he was convinced that our minister had been misinformed, and that Count Simonich had never given any such advice to the Shah as that which had been attributed to him.”

Now again, is it not in the power of the British Minister to restore the whole position ? Can he not, in reply, transmit the proofs of his allegation ? These proofs, has he not subsequently given them to the world ? It was *then* if ever that they had to be produced. This, if not his duty, his self-love required. Nevertheless, he remains silent. What common explanation can be found for the silence as to the proof, and the remonstrance as to the facts ? One only, and the same one, and the only one which explains, or can explain, each and all of these enigmas.

After this explanation with Count Nesselrode, Lord Durham tells his chief, in apparently a private letter (a passage from which is introduced as an “ extract” from a despatch), that he had “ had *an opportunity of talking* with “ M. Rodofinikin, on the subject of the conduct of Count Simonich.”

“ In answer to my complaint (?) HE SAID HE WOULD BRING ME THE “ ORIGINAL BOOK, in which were entered all the despatches and instructions “ to the Russian Ambassador, which would prove to me *how little* the Count “ had attended to them *if* he had acted in the manner stated by me.

despatch. Compare this with the proposals to France to force the Dardanelles against Russia. This was a thing not to set down and record till both parties were agreed ; without such concurrence it is set down—it was to be recorded, not performed.

* *First*,—The whole case from Persia dwindles down to the report from Mr. McNeill that Count Simonich “ still continued to urge.”

Secondly,—Lord Palmerston reports this report as “ had urged.” Instructs therefore to make demands.

Thirdly,—Lord Durham *speaks on the subject*.

Fourthly,—Lord Palmerston replies ————— ? ————— !

“ I SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT OF THE FACT; it had been mentioned *so often* and by *so many persons*, that it was, *I feared*, indisputable; and I pointed out to him the inconvenience of the Russian Government being represented by a person, who either *would not* or *could not act according to his instructions.*”

Here is the British Ambassador making complaints regarding Count Simonich, which are not listened to, refusing to see the instructions that are offered him, persisting in asserting, without being permitted to prove the facts that are denied, lamenting over the insubordination of a Russian functionary, without either having instructions or spirit to suggest so much as his removal. After disobeying the instructions that required him to insult, he is compelled now to sit down under the rejection of what he was commissioned to supplicate.

The Book of Instructions is offered to Lord Durham for perusal! Had not the instructions been drawn up in common*? Why then is the offer made? Again, if the instructions have been concealed, why is not the *offer* accepted? Knowledge is therefore rejected, while information is pretended to be sought. It was desirable then to remain ignorant, and inconvenient to accept so patently the position of dupe.

But where are the despatches from Persia? Count Simonich's despatches were the reply to the despatches of the English Envoy.

Either Count Simonich had, or had not, obeyed his instructions; but in both cases his report must have been equally available for the purposes of the Russian Government. If he had obeyed his instructions, he must have narrated that obedience. If he had disobeyed his instructions, he must have specially guarded himself by misrepresentations against the statements of the English Envoy. Simulated instructions had, therefore, been prepared for this occasion, but simulated despatches had not been thought of.

This is the first instance in which I have found Russia unprovided. The neglect, however, was soon repaired.

The explanation takes place in the end of January; it is reported

* See Despatch of Count Nesselrode, 20th October, 1838, par. 41.

in London on the 14th March, and two months and fifteen days from that period we find Mr. McNeill writing from Persia *in reply to a despatch which is not given*, and defending himself against the Russian Minister. On the other hand, within the time barely requisite for communication from St. Petersburg, Count Simonich writes a despatch*, which is immediately submitted to the representative of England at St. Petersburg. It was then desirable to communicate despatches from Persia! But how is this the first occasion in which such communication is made? Were there no despatches from Persia at the time of the explanations? Did none arrive from Persia, until precisely there was time to send for one? Count Simonich states that he had “*used the most pressing representations*,” to stop the expedition against Herat, and that “if His Majesty shall decide to set out this summer he will “not go too far” (*trop loin*)†. Lord Palmerston immediately sends off this despatch to Mr. McNeill, adding a single passage by which (as in reporting to St. Petersburg, Mr. McNeill’s expression,) he vitiates the sense and the structure of the phrase; he says the Russian Minister reports to his Government that “he had *already* urged the Shah to abandon the expedition.” Must not then his former letter (suppressed) have conveyed to Mr. McNeill, as the result of the remonstrance, that henceforth Count Simonich *was to be instructed* to urge the Shah not to proceed with the expedition? Mr. McNeill in the meantime has sent home a despatch, stating that Count Simonich had admitted *that he had disobeyed his instructions*, and justified that disobedience, and further stated his instructions not to be to dissuade the Shah from prosecuting the war, but merely *not to urge* the Shah to undertake it. Thus have Lord Palmerston and the Russian Government concurrently substantiated the deception; Lord Palmerston intimidating Mr. McNeill into the admission

* Mr. McNeill’s despatch is of the 1st June, Count Simonich’s of the 28th May. As the latter must have had communication at least a fortnight before the former, it appears as if he did not immediately write. But the despatch of Count Simonich bears only *one date*; I have never seen any other Russian despatch with a single date. The date given, is it the new or the old style? The difference is twelve days. These contradictions I have collated with a succinctness, which, I fear will only be intelligible to those who trace the facts the volume in hand, and refer from document to document and letter to letter.

† The Parliamentary papers suppress the sarcasm, and translate “very far.”

of the Russian case, and misrepresenting to him the result of the remonstrance; Count Nesselrode instructing Count Simonich to affirm the monstrous charge suggested by the British Foreign Secretary, that he (Count Simonich) has disobeyed instructions. Here is the complement to the explanations at St. Petersburg; the absurdities the most incredible, repeated from side to side, till the reader loses all sense, not of truth only, but of reality.

But passing a sponge over the proofs we have examined, and forgetting the conclusions we have formed, and recommencing the investigation afresh:— Here we have the official admission of disobedience of the Envoy, and of instructions from the Russian Government, at variance with the statements made by that Government; Lord Palmerston receives the communication of these facts, and he neither requires the removal of the Envoy nor the communication of the instructions!

No one can undergo the labour of collating the documents (and without it all attention given to this subject is useless, and worse than useless) without wondering that so much more trouble has been bestowed on every branch and on every detail of these transactions, than appeared necessary for the purposes of deception. It must, however, be borne in mind, that as at any hour a change of men, or the accidents of human life, might have interrupted the proceedings before their termination, it was necessary to have a veil carried on in advance of facts, so as to prevent the light of day from penetrating, whatever contingencies might have occurred*.

The remonstrance appeared to expire with the fruitless expostulations of

* Before I put pen to paper regarding the contents of this volume of diplomatic correspondence, which we are actually examining, it had cost me six weeks of uninterrupted labour, having several copies cut out, so as to put the despatches in their order, and to collate passages naturally illustrating each other. It is now a year since, at intervals, I have been studying the same volume, which I scarcely ever open without detecting some new instance of art—and of the art of concealing art. It is a mine of fraud, requiring time, labour, and perseverance, to work it.

The weaving of this web was, however, an easy matter, compared with the unravelling of it. The work went on from day to day; each transaction led to that which followed, and the difficulty suggested the expedient; and then two governments were at work, not merely disguising from all others what they were doing, but falsifying the documents which they left behind, and then these papers, when published, are only published so far as they have been deemed advantageous for the perversion of opinion, no necessity compelling them to make any thing known, and no eye being open upon that which was published.

Lord Durham; but we find Lord Palmerston, in the final explanation with the Russian Government (20 months later) rehearsing the occurrence we are now examining, in the following words:—

“ On the 1st May, 1837, Count Nesselrode said to Lord Durham that “ Count Simonich ‘ would not long remain in Persia.’ That Ambassador, “ nevertheless, has *continued to remain in Persia, pursuing with increased “ activity, and in the most open manner, the conduct of which his Government “ had expressed such a decided disapprobation.*”

The most material fact connected with the explanations which took place in January 1837, has thus been wholly suppressed in the published documents. Why was this fact suppressed at the time? Was it not to prevent the reader from being struck with the evident solution of the difficulty—the removal of Count Simonich? Why is it subsequently brought forth? The events having occurred, it only affords the opportunity to the Foreign Secretary of appearing to deal with Russia roughly. The conduct of the agent, the object of “ decided disapprobation!” The conduct of that agent was, by the Russian Government, entirely adopted. Had the case been as stated, would the triumph not be the greater for Russia to maintain him—the crime the greater in the British Minister to endure him? The British Minister takes the severest reprobation that could be directed against himself, and by using it against Russia, convinces his countrymen that he is blameless!

Count Simonich is a wonderful creation. He arrives in Persia, sent by Russia as her representative. From that hour we hear of him as her antagonist. On his reaching Persia, England was there all powerful. He prostrates at once her power; he drives Persia, notwithstanding the joint resistance of Russia and England, to assault Herat. He draws to himself the Affghans, causing them to break with the Indian Government. Acting at once against England and against Russia—against the Persians and against the Affghans—he carries out his own ends in despite of them all. Upon such an assumption as this, is every single word of these negotiations based! This fiction* is

* Who, in reading the passage, “ You will ask Count Nesselrode if Count Simonich is acting according to his instructions,” could have dreamt of the crop of fallacies that were to be reaped from such a shoot as this? Since that period, all disquisitions on Russia are suspended between the horns of this dilemma. I extract, as a specimen, the following passage from a Bombay paper, re-echoing an English review.

“ The intrigues in the East, which are certainly in contradiction to the individual views of the

called into account on the one hand, for the inability of England to protect herself, and presents on the other the occasion for exhibiting the energy with which the British Foreign Secretary can denounce the Russian Government!

Our subject having now, for the first time, carried us to St. Petersburg, and having fixed our attention upon the individual, at the time charged with the representation of England at that capital, it may be beneficial, and indeed is necessary, to devote a moment's consideration to the part that has been there played by that ambassador. Lord Durham's predilections for Russia are well known; it is also felt that his opinions have exercised a very material influence upon the policy of this country, and upon the general impressions of the public at large in respect to Russia. To those who have examined these matters, there is no name which probably excites more painful sensation than the name of Lord Durham. His mission excited, and was calculated to excite, expectations respecting Turkey and Poland which were utterly betrayed: the event, which more than any other has hastened the triumph of Russia in the East—the capture of the Vixen, has, by excess of infamy, given lustre to that mission*. An English vessel was captured by a Rus-

Emperor, were then, in any thing like their extent, probably unknown to him, and to him alone, in the whole empire. The powers which would have been requisite to sustain them effectually, could not be obtained without his consent; *this appears to have been withheld*; and the intrigues themselves, though carried on with the full concurrence of the ministers and the nobles, whose course is more hidden, though unchanged from that of former times, failed, and fell away at the first breath of approaching contact.

“ Such is the clue to the recent explicit disavowal made by the Emperor Nicholas of the acts of his ministry, in answer to the spirited requisition of the British Foreign Minister; and this likewise explains the previous declaration of Lord Palmerston in Parliament, that *there were governments that attempted every thing and disavowed every thing*. The Emperor can but work with the means in his power; and from the general bias of the nation, it must be confessed that if aggrandizement is no longer the principle of Russian policy, it is still its tendency.”

* The following passage is from the pen of the Representative of England in Persia during these transactions:—

“ Still the distance which separated her frontier (Russia's) from ours was so considerable; the protestations of the absence of all ambitious views were so solemn, * * * and Lord Durham was so fully satisfied of the perfect sincerity of all her professions, that this country was lulled into a feeling of security, from which the voice of the few who did not participate in these sentiments was unable to rouse it. Russia saw publication after publication, exposing her past and denouncing her present policy, issue from the press of England without awakening the nation; she saw every attempt which

sian cruizer on a foreign coast, and confiscated by the act of the Government, without legal procedure, on the ground of the infraction of quarantine regulations, and of custom laws which had no existence. The act of Russia was admitted, confirmed upon a despatch of three lines from Lord Durham, stating, in his own name, that the bay in which that vessel was captured, was occupied by Russia—a statement which was false.

This occurred when Lord Palmerston was Foreign Minister, and when Lord Durham was Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

At the same period, and during the exercise of the responsible functions of government by the same men, have those transactions taken place respecting Persia, which we are perusing with wonder, shame, and indignation.

Lord Durham was selected by the Emperor of Russia to fill the post of British Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg. The Sovereign of England had the grief and shame to learn, by an accident, that this appointment had been settled between his Minister and that Sovereign before the intention of it was communicated to himself.

The selection of Lord Durham for this service gave to Lord Palmerston daily occasions for exhibiting opposition to Russia, and contempt for the man (the ambassador appointed by himself) who could so easily be made the dupe of the Emperor. He was relieved from the necessity of having to propose measures in the interest of Russia, and appeared to *yield* to the opinion or importunities of Lord Durham, or to the weight of his family connexions. Lord Durham was further strengthened in this course by the appearance of leading the Government at home into a line of policy of his suggesting.

Lord Londonderry, in his “Recollections of a Tour in the North of Europe,” throws valuable light on this position.

was made to direct the attention of the House of Commons to her designs fail. She saw the British nation so exclusively occupied with domestic feuds that no question of foreign policy seemed to be at all thought of. She heard a party in the nation even questioning the value of India; and having, as she imagined, tried the temper and the spirit of England by the seizure and condemnation of the Vixen, and thinking she had discovered that the one was docile and the other dormant—her government and her agents cast aside all apprehension of the only danger which would have deterred them. Yet it was not until civil war in Canada promised to direct the disposable military resources of England to the opposite extremity of her empire, that the intrigues of the Russian agents in the direction of India took such a shape, that it was impossible to doubt either the nature of their plans, or the tendency of their proceedings.”—*Quarterly Review*, No. CXXVII., p. 146.

“ Lord Durham,” he says, “ conversed with frankness upon his own position in the country, and congratulated himself on having kept our cabinet in strict amity with the Emperor, of whose high honour, integrity, ability, and straightforward conduct, he did not entertain a doubt.

“ He had also obtained access to information, superior, he believed, to any that had been gained before.

“ His Lordship’s policy (as to Russia) seemed to me to be to establish trust and confidence in our cabinet, and to discourage suspicion and doubt. The Emperor’s character inspired an unbounded reliance on all he said. Combining the statements and opinions I now heard, with what afterwards came to my knowledge, I am inclined to think that there was much reason and justice in all the Ambassador said. There was, of course, a great deal more stated and communicated, but I feel in no degree justified in reporting private conversations and anecdotes, although the general complexion of the sentiments of a high British functionary may be fairly brought forward as interesting and historical*.”

At this time the ostensible policy of England was resistance to Russian aggression. That it was so, is proved by this, that Lord Durham was avowedly labouring (and was allowed to believe with effect) in opposition to the existing opinions of the British Cabinet, to establish “ confidence and trust.”

The selection of a British Ambassador by a Foreign Power, is, however, not a fact standing alone; it followed the rejection of a British Ambassador by a Foreign Power. Russia, after having refused Sir Stratford Canning, chose Lord Durham†.

An ambassador is named by Great Britain to the court of Russia, he is

* On his return to England Lord Durham said “ My mission would have been successful if only on this account, that I have convinced the Emperor that all his efforts to break the English and French alliance are vain.”

† The process of decomposition applied to England, is illustrated in the relative positions of the two Ambassadors above named, Lords Durham and Londonderry—two leaders of ultra faction, brought to unite on the common grounds of devotion to their country’s foe. Lord Durham was soon “ covered with all the honours of Russia,” and returned to his native land rejoicing in the success of his mission, proclaiming the friendliness of the Emperor for England, extolling the excellence of the institutions of the Russian Empire. Lord Londonderry returns to England equally magnifying the Emperor and the institutions of Russia, bespeaking public favour for his Radical coadjutor, and announcing that the “ impurities of Glasgow Green had been washed out by the Conservative waters of the Neva.”

rejected by the court of Russia; another ambassador is selected by the Emperor of Russia—that ambassador is rewarded with Russian honours.

The practice or regulations of the English service admit of no predilections in a foreign sovereign, as the grounds of the choice of a diplomatic agent, but exactly the reverse. They admit of no foreign orders or decorations for any subject of the British crown, except for *patent service* in the field of battle. As Lord Durham was selected without the knowledge of his sovereign, in the same manner was the rejection of Sir Stratford Canning settled. Months before intimation of such an intention to the sovereign of England, or to the ambassador himself, was that rejection announced by the diplomatic servants of Russia. Ten years before, that ambassador had successfully resisted a design of Russia, and was immediately *threatened* in a public despatch by a Russian envoy. The ambassador rejected had occupied the highest and the most important public trusts. But the Emperor disliked him. Russia's affections are they not her *ends*? And had Lord Palmerston not the means of first ascertaining whether Sir Stratford Canning was, or was not, agreeable to the Emperor? Do the documents before us reveal any practice of preconcert? Sir Stratford Canning was named to afford to Russia the opportunity of dealing the double blow at him and at England*!

The sovereign of a foreign state can make and unmake the ministers and representatives of Great Britain—and you are startled at the sound of the word TREASON! Could Russia succeed without instruments?

PART XVI.

RUPTURE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PERSIA, BECAUSE OF THE PREPONDERANCE OF RUSSIA IN PERSIA†.

IN the last Part we came to the conclusion that the remonstrance of the British Foreign Secretary against the policy of Russia in Persia, was a scheme

* The proposition of the appointment was to the men with whom Lord Palmerston has to deal—another proof of his enmity against Russia.

† This rupture has already been exposed in Part VI. It was there introduced in connexion with transactions in Persia. Here it is introduced in connexion with the negotiations between the Courts of London and St. Petersburg.

concerted with the very Government against which the measure was directed. This judgment we must now submit to the test of facts and of results.

We turn to the official Reports from Persia, and we find that the policy which gave rise to this remonstrance, was not discontinued in consequence of it; but, on the contrary, that it was continued more openly and with greater effect. The whole resources of the Persian State are directed against Herat, which it was the assumed object of England, and therefore of Russia, to protect, since their policy was concerted. The Persian Government exhibits deference and subserviency towards Russia, and assumes towards England a position at once of insult and of menace. It is known throughout Persia, throughout Asia, as throughout Europe, that such are the objects of the policy of Russia, and it is not doubtful that these are the results of the influence which she has exercised. Indeed, she herself seeks no concealment, and makes a public boast of the bribes which she employs to seduce, and the menaces which she uses to overawe, the Persian Government. England, meanwhile, remains silent; takes no measure to arrest in Persia these hostile acts, or to break in Russia this perfidious coalition; she stands by in the attitude and with the demeanour of one who approves, applauds, and assists. But when these measures come to be consolidated, and this policy to be triumphant—when all threats have become superfluous, and the threats, as the words of England, have become contemptible—then does England burst forth into a violence as extravagant as her previous subserviency had been mysterious, and by a sudden rupture confirms the hostility which her long procrastination had admitted, invited, and ensured.

Such is the outline of the facts by which our judgment respecting the remonstrance in 1837 is to be tested—such are the proofs by which it is confirmed.

That remonstrance is assumed to have led to a renewed declaration of a conjoint policy of England and Russia in regard to Persia. During eighteen months the events we have shadowed forth, progress unopposed, unquestioned, and unnoticed; and at the close of that period, and four years after giving a monarch to Persia, England and Persia stand as follows:—

Rupture, because of Persia's refusal to give satisfaction for an insult to a British messenger!

Rupture, because of an attack upon Herat by the Persian Government,

as threatening India, and as violating treaties between Great Britain and Persia!

Rupture, because of the connexion of Russia in Persia's attack upon Herat!

Wonderful and mysterious situation!

The rupture with Persia is the most important of the events that have occurred in Asia; it contains proof the most decisive of the objects which the English Minister pursued, illustration the most valuable of the means he employed. It constitutes the chief link between the practical results obtained in the East, and the secret adjustments prepared in Downing Street. This transaction has been specially shrouded by ambiguity of language and by intricacy of management. Therefore it is essential that it should not be left obscure, and that the reader should not pass it by with a doubting mind. I venture to request from him some little time and consideration to this matter; nor will that be refused by whoever has felt that a whole nation has been negligent of every interest touching its present honour and welfare, and its future existence—that this heedlessness has been continued for long years. To the reader of this volume, I trust that the negligence of others will be a spur to energy and action. Whoever perceives that there has been neglect of the duties of citizens and of men, will enter on the field of inquiry not merely urged by a sense of duty. Where so many are heedless, and where all are ignorant, he will feel that even one citizen's thoughts, and one man's labour, may become of importance to his country, and of benefit to his times.

The following observations on the process through which the rupture with Persia has been effected, is offered only as an assistance to those who examine the official documents in the volume itself. No one can enter upon this question honestly or usefully except with that volume in his hand.

The question at issue between England and Persia was the attack upon Herat. The question at issue between England and Russia was the assault of Persia upon Herat. The grounds of remonstrance of England to St. Petersburg was the share which the Russian Ambassador had had in pushing Persia on Herat. The ostensible result of that remonstrance had been, that henceforward Russia should concur with England in preventing the assault upon Herat. A representative of England had been, after Russia's intentions

had been fully developed and had become alarmingly successful, sent out to Persia. He is above all others the uncompromising and strenuous advocate of the Persian alliance, and the exposé and denouncer of Russian perfidy and ambition. He is on this account selected to occupy this important post. What were his instructions respecting Herat? His instructions were, that *England has nothing to say between Persia and Herat**! He is instructed (constructively) that the faith of treaties debars England from interfering in any way in the matter. And, after the remonstrance with Russia, he is furnished with no instructions even to guard against the repetition by her of the acts with which the English Government had charged her. He is not commissioned even to watch and to report her acts.

The British Representative remains in Persia, acting upon these instructions; that is, doing NOTHING. But at the end of five months he receives instructions to offer his mediation between Persia and Herat. Whence this change, or whence these instructions? These instructions do not come from Downing Street; they come from India! Mr. McNeill decides to act upon them, and on the 24th of February reports the decision which on his own responsibility he had taken. His report of this decided step is received in Downing Street on the 20th of April, 1837, and remains unnoticed in any way by the Foreign Secretary for five weeks. He then acknowledges the receipt of the despatches, and says *no more!*

Nine weeks elapse, and (on the 7th of September) the Foreign Secretary again addresses Mr. McNeill. For the first time he uses the word "Herat." The despatch conveys the naked approval of the step which had been taken. The mediation undertaken by Mr. McNeill must remain without possible effect, since he receives no power to speak in the name of the English

* He was to be guided by the 9th Article of the Treaty of 1814, which article stated, that in case of war between the Affghans and the Persians, the British Government was not to interfere, except their mediation to effect a peace, was requested by both parties. That is, that in case of the assault of Persia upon Herat, the English Minister was to take no part, and was bound, by treaty, to take no part, except on the joint demand of the parties, and on the joint demand of the parties he could only undertake the part of mediator; but as no instructions were given him respecting that mediation, and as he was simply told to be guided by the Article of the Treaty, his instructions amounted simply to inaction. But he is, in addition, told to render his good offices to the Shah, because "the British Government would see with regret any attack made on Affghanistan." This was no instruction to act in any way, but only a cloak to cover the absence of instruction—a cloak proving the intention of giving none. Besides, the former Representative of Great Britain had admitted that the war against Herat WAS A JUST WAR.

Government. The instructions from India had been of course rather the expression of an expectation, than the transmission of an authority. If it was wrong to offer mediation, why was the step approved?—If it was right, why were the requisite instructions not forwarded? If, on the 7th of September, 1837, the offer of mediation was acceptable to the British Secretary, why were instructions not given to that effect on the 2nd of June, 1836, when Mr. McNeill received his first instructions in an opposite sense? What was known on the 7th of September, 1837, that was not known on the 2nd of June, 1836? Thus was the failure of the mediation ensured, even after it had been undertaken, in opposition to the evident intentions of the Foreign Secretary, through circumstances beyond his controul.

It would have been dangerous, if not impracticable, to proceed to a rupture with Persia because of that assault upon Herat, which he had treated of directly with the Court of St. Petersburg, and which he had directly sanctioned in Persia. It was, therefore, necessary first to confuse the question, and to exasperate men's minds. A quarrel on distinct grounds was requisite for this purpose, and that, considering the position of Russia now in Persia, and the position of England, was no difficult matter to obtain.

On the 6th February, 1838, the Foreign Secretary receives information that an outrage had been committed on a servant of Mr. McNeill's, for which he had demanded, but for which he had not received reparation.

Eight months had now elapsed from the period of the sanction given to the mediation without any step having been taken respecting Herat.

What information has now the Foreign Secretary before him—what ends has he to desire—with what influences has he to contend? First, there is the assault upon Herat, undertaken by Persia at the suggestion of Russia—therefore there is complete ascendancy over Persia, secured by Russia. Here, then, is the whole question. *Russia does* command Persia—*Russia is* hostile to England, and *uses Persia AGAINST England*. But Russia is bound to concerted policy with England. Is not then here an abstruse question, but it is one plain and easy? It is not optional to call Russia to account—it is obligatory. In addition to the Herat question, an insult is offered by the Persian Government to England at the direct instigation of a Russian agent. No reparation on the part of Persia is possible, until she is emancipated from the power of Russia, which has been brought about under the system of united policy. The Foreign Secretary has, therefore, to take

steps at St. Petersburg. There he has to commence with the principal question. He has to deal with it, not as a Persian, but as a Russian matter. If any subsidiary and simultaneous steps are taken in Persia, these must *first* be directed to the arresting of the expedition against Herat, which expedition (constituting Russia the protector, England the foe) renders England utterly powerless. What does the British Foreign Secretary do? He addresses not one line to St. Petersburg; he speaks to Persia! In speaking to Persia, he says not a word about Herat or Russia; he confines himself to confirming Mr. McNeill's demand for reparation for the insult! This he does *immediately*. For weeks, months, and years, the affair of Herat had been suffered to drag on unheeded; but on the announcement of the insult, not a single week is allowed to intervene—a decision is at once taken, at once dispatched—Mr. McNeill's demand is confirmed, and these words are added, “ I delay sending you further instructions with respect to *the affairs treated of*, until I hear from you what has been the answer of the Persian Government to your *very proper* demand.” Who would suspect that these “ affairs” were not those to which the “ demand” had reference? Who would suspect that this phrase separated into distinct parts one question, and sacrificed the whole by the separation?

Thus is Mr. McNeill compelled to restrict himself to demand reparation for the insult, and to stand on this alone. Thus were the real matters at issue between Great Britain and Persia rendered contingent on the incident of the insult, to fail in its failure, while, by being separated from the rest, the failure of that question was insured.

One month and four days later (on the 16th March) the British Foreign Secretary addresses another despatch to Mr. McNeill upon the subject of the insult to the messenger, but still not one word upon the affair of Herat, or upon the influence of Russia.

In the meantime the mediation of Mr. McNeill has failed; the army has marched; the Shah is before Herat, pushing the siege. The Indian Government, becoming more and more alarmed, writes to Mr. McNeill, suggesting to him to proceed to Herat, and, by any possible means, to withdraw the Shah from before that place.

On the 8th March, Mr. McNeill writes to his chief, that, finding that *the Indian Government* entertained the opinion that the preservation of its inte-

grity was of vital importance, he had determined on proceeding to Herat, in the hope of being able to effect “ what appeared to be *the Governor-General’s* “ *wishes.*” He had not then received the instructions from the Governor-General; but by an indirect channel he had learnt their nature, and he conceives the necessity so urgent, and the moment so pressing, that he determines forthwith to proceed. He arrives at the camp before Herat, in the beginning of April.

On the 21st May, Lord Palmerston replies to Mr. McNeill’s despatch of the 8th March, approving, as before, of the step that had already been taken, and declaring that the enterprise is considered by the British Government “ *as undertaken in a spirit of hostility, and as wholly incompatible with the* “ *spirit and intention of the alliance between Persia and Great Britain!*”

But the despatch in which this decision is conveyed, does not quit the shores of England until the matter which it regards has already been decided* in the centre of Asia! It says, “ If when you receive this despatch you shall “ have succeeded in inducing the Shah to retire from Herat, you will only “ have to express to the Shah the lively satisfaction,” &c. “ But it is “ possible that you may have failed in the object of your journey,” &c. So that either the end for which the menace was intended had been realized without it, or the evil had been accomplished, according to the judgment of the British Foreign Secretary, before the first step was taken to prevent it.

This despatch could not reach Mr. McNeill till four months after his arrival in camp; and three months after the despatch of the 12th February. On arriving at camp, he would have at once to enter on the question of the mediation, with such powers as he possessed, which were *nothing*. If he had not failed at once, he would soon after receive the despatch of February 12th, which was calculated to ensure rupture with Persia on other grounds. The despatch of 21st May, expressing the first opinion, and at once conveying a final threat on the affairs of Herat, is thus reserved until the Foreign Secretary is certain that the question has already been decided, until he has exhausted every means to ensure its failure, and has the strongest grounds for believing that he has been completely successful.

* In a despatch, dated April 14th, there occurs this passage—“ *If you should be still in Persia when you receive this despatch.*” Thus was the rupture with Persia anticipated—thus was the British representative prepared for it.

Now let us see, if the facts realize this judgment upon the instructions. What does happen on the arrival of Mr. M^cNeill in the camp ?

Mr. M^cNeill's first attempts are crowned with complete success ; he arrests the assault, and both parties empower him to conclude a peace. At the very moment when that adjustment is about to be completed, Count Simonich, who had hastened after him from Teheran, arrives, and breaks up the adjustment. A struggle is for some time maintained, by Mr. M^cNeill's personal influence and the difficulties of the siege, on the one hand ; by the urgency, and the threats of the Russian Minister, on the other. But, during this time, Mr. M^cNEILL *is unable to speak in the name of England*. THE SHAH DECLARES THAT HE CANNOT WITHDRAW FROM BEFORE HERAT, UNLESS HE IS THREATENED BY ENGLAND. Mr. M^cNeill is unable to do so. In this juncture arrives the despatch of the 12th of February, which empowers him to insist upon satisfaction on the affair of the messenger, but in which not a single word is said respecting Herat ; and which tells him that he is not to have instructions respecting Herat until the affair of the messenger is settled ! He can now neither give support to Herat nor impose moderation upon Persia, nor, indeed, maintain for himself a position, not of influence—that was gone—but of common respectability. And whilst he is unable upon this question, touching the most vital interests of England, and, in the eyes of every Persian, involving her character alike for sense and for power, to use a single definite expression, he is compelled to quarrel with Persia about an affront that had happened seven or eight months before. Such is Mr. M^cNeill's helplessness, that he considers himself *strengthened* by this despatch : he says, “ strengthened now, I determined to bring the matter to an “ issue ;” that is to say, that, being unable to bring the matter of Herat to issue, he brings the affair of the messenger to issue, and fails. Involved, however, in the mediation, he still lingers on in the camp, exposed to every species of contumely and insult, until unable further to endure, he withdraws. Mr. M^cNeill retiring, thus reports his failure, while he announces the suspension of official intercourse with the Persian Government.

“ Meshed, June 25, 1838.

“ After having exhausted all the means I could devise to induce the Persian Government to grant me reparation and satisfaction for the violence offered to the messenger ; and finding that I could obtain nothing, I felt compelled * * * to quit the Court. * * * Some public act of reparation which will prove to the people of Persia and of Central Asia that we are not with impunity

to be insulted, is, in my opinion, indispensably necessary—I will not say to restore us to our former position, but to enable us to retain one of any credit or respectability. Both the Persians and the Affghans in the Shah's camp saw, with amazement, the Persian Government treating a British Mission as a proscribed body, and punishing persons who ventured to hold even a casual intercourse with it; while some of the members of the Russian Mission took to task, and threatened to get punished for that offence, persons who occasionally visited at my tent, taking some precautions to prevent their being discovered*.”

Soon after he receives the despatch of 21st May, announcing the determination of the English Government to consider the assault on Herat as an act of hostility against Great Britain. A hostile expedition, sent by the Indian Government, also arrives on the coast of Persia, and takes possession of the Island of Karrack. Upon this, Mr. M^cNeill sends Lieut.-Colonel Stoddart back to the camp with a message to the Shah, threatening him *now at length*, in the name of England†.

“ But before this message had been delivered to the Shah, the Treaty
 “ of Kandahar had been concluded (I use the words of Sir John M^cNeill),
 “ and the Russian Minister had formally guaranteed the performance of the
 “ engagements contracted by both parties. A treaty of nearly similar import
 “ was in progress with Cabul; and Captain Vicovich having visited the Shah's
 “ camp at Herat, had returned to Cabul and Kandahar, provided with funds
 “ to a large amount, to complete the arrangements he had so successfully
 “ commenced for the establishment of Persian dominion and Russian supre-
 “ macy in all the Affghan States * * * The whole of the countries, from
 “ the frontiers of Russia on the Araxis to the banks of the Indus, had been
 “ successfully tampered with, and had been instigated by accredited Russian
 “ agents—some openly, and some secretly sent—to unite in one great league,
 “ for the purpose, not only of opposing the views and the interests of Eng-
 “ land, but of disturbing and threatening her Empire in Asia.” Thus:—

* “ At a time when the Governor of Ghilan is ordered to be sent in chains to the capital, and there placed at the disposal of the Russian Minister, for the purpose of being punished by His Excellency, for having carried into effect the sentence of the law against a Mahommedan subject of Russia in Ghilan, I fear what I have demanded may not, here at least, be thought a sufficiently ample reparation for the affront.”—Mr. M^cNEILL to LORD PALMERSTON, *November 25th, 1837.*

† The language which Mr. M^cNeill had already used to the Persian Government and Monarch, and which had fallen so far short of a threat, was still such as he conceives himself called on to account for, and to justify to his Chief.

Before this message had been delivered, time had been allowed for Russia to triumph—the threats of England, delayed until they were useless, are now uttered with the double intent of further exasperating Persia against England, and of leaving on record such documents as should suffice to prove that the interests of England had been defended, and her honour vindicated.

But the task of the British Foreign Secretary is not yet complete; it is not enough that there should be a rupture: there must be a rupture of such a kind as to compel Persia to seek protection from Russia against England.

On the 21st May, the Foreign Secretary had threatened Persia because she had invaded Herat.

On the 22nd June, he replies to the first despatches from the camp, approves of Mr. McNeill's proceedings, but waits for further information before sending instructions. No further information is received up to the 27th July, and yet upon that day he repeats the rupture with Persia, adding to the previous cause a new one—*Persia's connexion with Russia!*

This despatch, though quoted in another part, is too remarkable not to be again presented to the reader:—

“SIR,—I have to instruct you to state to the Shah of Persia, that whereas the spirit and purport of the Treaty between Persia and Great Britain, is, that Persia should be a *defensive* barrier to the British Possessions in India, and that the Persian Government should co-operate with that of Great Britain in *defending* British India*; it appears, on the contrary, that the Shah is occupied in subverting those intervening States between Persia and India, that might prove additional barriers of *defence* for the British Possessions; AND THAT IN THESE OPERATIONS HE HAS OPENLY CONNECTED HIMSELF WITH AN EUROPEAN POWER, for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, to British interests; that, under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter upon a course of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned Treaty, Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that Treaty, such measures as a due regard to her own interests, and the *security*† of her dominions, may suggest.

“Signed, PALMERSTON.”

This despatch reaches its destination after the siege of Herat has been

* The two articles of the Treaty of 1814, that stipulated defensive measures, *had been expunged by Persia* ON THE DEMAND OF GREAT BRITAIN.—See Part V. of this *Exposition*.

† Those words “defensive,” “defending,” “defence,” and “security,” tend to impress the reader's mind with a vague sense of danger. In the Russian counter statement, the counterpart will be found in a vague shadowing forth of the power to injure, of the position and attitude of assault, so that the Englishman may sink to that state so fixedly the aim of Russia, where men fear to examine their own position.

raised, and (so admirably adjusted is the mechanism of the drama) reconstitutes the quarrel after the grounds of it had ceased to exist*.

The spirit and intent of the Treaty between Persia and Great Britain! Did not that Treaty spring from a sense of mutual danger, and did it not impose upon England the obligation to defend Persia? It was here, therefore, a question of the power of England to protect, not of the will of Persia to be protected. Persia is endangered, because she lies between Russia and India; England is endangered, because Persia is unable to resist Russia; England looks to Persia as a means of defence, Persia to England as a source of protection. Hence has arisen an alliance of protection and a compact of mutual defence, the object of which is, not that Persia should be friendly to England, but that her independence should be supported, so that that friendship may endure. But England allows Persia to cope single-handed with her enemy, suffers her to be beaten, refuses to fulfil the treaty, and then bribes her to expunge the articles that stipulated means and measures for her defence. England then joins with the common foe of both nations†, declares their interests to be one—imposes upon Persia, Russia's will, and then, *after three years* concurrence in this control of Russia and this obedience of Persia—suddenly declares that Persia has been violating the treaty! Was not this to make Persia a sacrifice for England's crime, while converting her into an instrument for England's punishment?

We must now for a moment turn our attention to a remarkable incident in this drama. This period of rupture is selected by Russia for sending an embassy from Persia to England, and for having that embassy rejected by England. I say Russia, because, since the union of England to Russia, the acts of Persia may be regarded as acts of Russia, and since the accession of the present Foreign Secretary, the acts of England are neither more nor less

* See parallel case, in "The Sulphur Question."

† The Persian Government says, "*In consequence of this* (the Defensive Treaty between Great Britain and Persia), other powerful states which had no friendly feelings towards the British Government inflicted on Persia all the injury they could, and reduced the state to such a condition, that it had no longer power to resist, or strength to endure."

Upon this passage Mr. McNeill makes this remark:—*June 25th, 1838.*

"The assertion, that Russia sought quarrel with Persia *because* Persia was in intimate alliance with England, would seem to imply that that intimacy cannot be renewed, without incurring the hazard of similar consequences."

than the acts of Russia. On receiving intimation of the approach of this congratulatory mission, the Foreign Secretary writes a despatch to the British Ambassadors at Paris and Vienna, announcing to them the probable arrival of the Persian Ambassador, and requiring them to declare to him that he could not be received in England. Thus is formally announced to Europe that rupture with Persia, with which the British Parliament was unacquainted. This opportunity is further used to announce that the rupture is owing to the *personally hostile dispositions of the Shah to Great Britain**. If the statement was true, was it in any way called for? Why could such an assertion be made? The reader has seen enough to understand its object. In Persia, the line pursued by Russia was that of exhibiting the Shah as English, while driving him into hostility against England. She urges and seduces that unhappy Prince into acts that injure the interests, or that wound the feelings of his subjects, and gathering thence odium and hatred, she directs these not only against the Government of Persia, but against England, by pointing out the “English Shah” to the disaffection of his subjects; and at the same time, as we have just seen, she loses no opportunity, however remote, to impress upon the mind of the Persian Monarch the hostility of England, and, consequently, his necessary dependence upon herself alike against internal faction and external enmity.

This Persian Ambassador is now paraded throughout the Courts of Europe, rejected by England and the client of Russia, exhibiting thus her newly acquired command of that chief state of Central Asia, where England had hitherto been considered paramount and secure. The mission then returns to Persia to confirm at once the most exaggerated estimate of the power of Russia, and to justify the contempt and the hostility engendered by the conduct of England.

But this ambassador had propositions to make in reference to the rupture. We are not informed of their nature. It is by an accident that we learn their existence; but, whatever they are, they are alike excluded from the docu-

* “Certain Persian authorities acting there is too much reason to suppose under the immediate orders of the Shah.”—*Lord Palmerston to Earl Granville and Sir F. Lamb, March 20, 1838.*

ments voluntarily presented, and they are refused to Parliament when they are asked for*.

Thus the rupture with Persia is complete. But is a rupture an object—an end? Is it a task which, after being performed, allows the performer to sit down in tranquillity and contentment? to repose from his labour and to enjoy its fruits? You proclaim the insult offered you, and parade the disgrace you have incurred all over Asia and Europe, but you take no steps whatever to obtain that reparation which you pretend to require. But you have squared, you say, accounts with Persia, and the rejection of the Ambassador of Persia is equivalent to the expulsion of your Minister. It is, then, an object with you to produce animosity, and you have an especial department for that purpose.

Here, then, was the end; this was the task; and this having been effected, the Foreign Secretary could repose from his labours.

But if the official correspondence is not satisfactory, and not complete, there is at least the House of Commons to refer to and to rely upon: and if there is in the published documents concealment or insufficiency, that alone must insure thorough investigation by that assembly. It must so apply itself to this high international question as to place in evidence the facts. Its wisdom and knowledge directed to this subject must relieve the public mind from uncertainty and doubt, dispel unfounded confidence, or repress unjust suspicion. Such is the duty, such the business of the House of Commons; but unhappily, the Senate of England is not qualified for such a task, and has in no ways realized such an expectation. Sometimes, for the space of five or ten minutes, the business of the State forms the subject of conversation; and even these fleeting moments are occupied by the Foreign Secretary himself to confuse and to bewilder men, whom indeed, it is scarcely worth his trouble further to mislead. On the 21st of June, 1839, such an incident occurred. Persia was spoken of in the House of Commons. A Member, seeing the Noble

* The only document connected with the affairs of Persia which was published at length in the continental journals, was an exposition of the griefs of Persia against England, addressed to Mr. McNeill by the Chief Priest of that country. This document is not given in the official correspondence, and there was not a single English journal that thought it worth while to copy it from the Continental press!

Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in his place, takes that opportunity to state that it appears that Sir John M^cNeill is in England; that the Secretary of Embassy is at Erzeroum; that some substantial differences have taken place between this country and Persia, and that the government of this country has refused to receive the Envoy of Persia. He therefore desires to know whether the mission is terminated, and—how the money allotted for the expenses of the mission is now expended. On this the Foreign Secretary observes, that he might answer the Honourable Gentleman in a very few words, but that he conceived it proper to set him right in some of the facts which he had stated. He continues :—

“ We must all know that when differences arise between two governments, it often happens that the envoy of one of them is withdrawn—”

It is a British Minister announcing a rupture with a Foreign Power—the abrogation of treaties with a protected and dependent State, who, fifteen months after the catastrophe, addresses these words to a British Senate! Would it not seem as if he were speaking of the laws of nature that regulate the times and the seasons?

“ We must all know that when differences arise between two governments, it often happens that the envoy of one of them is withdrawn, without putting an end to any amicable communications which may have been opened. In the present instance, the difference which exists is very far short of an absolute rupture, and a temporary retirement of the mission has taken place. That is the state in which we stand with regard to Persia. Sir John M^cNeill is at home on leave of absence, which was granted to him before the occurrence that gave rise to the retirement of his *successor*; and although he has had an audience of Her Majesty, this must not be supposed to have been granted on the conclusion of this mission, but only on his return from leave of absence. The Chargé d’Affaires has withdrawn from the territories of Persia on account of difficulties which have intervened in our relations with the Shah; but he was ordered to remain at Erzeroum, the nearest point to the Persian frontier, for the express purpose of being at hand to receive any communication which might be made. On the other hand, the Persian Government has sent an ambassador to this country, but he has been told that he cannot be received until the differences between the two countries shall have been arranged. The ambassador is now in London, and I have had some private communications with him.”

Another member of the Senate says:

“ As we are not at war with Persia, I beg to ask whether sufficient reparation has been made by the Shah for the insult offered to the messenger of Sir John M^cNeill? I desire to ask also whether the noble Viscount is satisfied with the explanation which has been given by Count Nesselrode of the conduct of Count Simonich and Lieutenant Vicovitch, in certain proceedings of theirs, in connection with the negotiations with Persia?”

“VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.—Sir,—With regard to the first question of the Honourable Member, I beg to state that no sufficient reparation has yet been made by the Shah for the outrage upon the messenger of Sir J. McNeill. As to the explanation of the Russian Government, in reference to the conduct of Count Simonich, I can only refer the Hon. Gent. to the papers which have been laid upon the table of the House, which contain matter from which he may *infer* an answer to his question. We are certainly not at war with Persia, though there has occurred a serious interruption in our relations with that power.”

“SIR S. CANNING.—Before the discussion terminates, I should be glad to be informed by the Noble Lord whether the confidential communications which he has stated to be going on between him and the Persian Ambassador have ceased?”

“VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.—I have recently seen the Ambassador, and shall most likely see him again before he leaves England. The plan which he has submitted to me, is of a nature to prevent its being received here officially.”

Thus, after a triple rupture with Persia—after a declaration that all treaties ceased to be binding, and after the violation of its territories by warlike operations—war, not of men, but of bandits and outlaws—after alleging against Persia all the motives that ever were alleged by one State against another, namely, violation of treaty, preparation for assault, alliance with an enemy, positive insult and outrage; after combining all these motives, and at once launching them against that State, the Minister of England tells the Parliament, who had known nothing of the event beforehand, who know nothing of it when it occurs, and who hear of it accidentally a long time afterwards, that the differences are “*far short of an absolute rupture;*” that they are not even such as to put an end to “amicable communications.” Can there be a doubt, then, that he is addressing men whom he has to blind and to bewilder, and that he only speaks to them for that purpose? Contradictions the most patent, ideas the most incongruous, and propositions the most wild, can be placed before them with perfect impunity and entire success? Is not, then, this body dangerous to the constitution and to the nation? Amid such reflexions, we may, perhaps, partly comprehend the words of England’s first diplomatist—“Parliaments may ruin, but never save a State.”

Now let us endeavour to reduce the pretexts for the rupture with Persia to their simplest expression.

The affair of the Messenger we have found to be a subordinate question, solvable only through the solution of the major questions. The major questions are the assault of Persia upon Herat, as established by the despatch of 21st May, and the connection of Persia with Russia as established by the despatch of

27th July. The intention of Persia to assault Herat is known, during nearly three years, and is not resisted. The only instruction from the Foreign Secretary to the British Envoy in Persia upon the subject, declared England to be debarred from interfering. At the end of the third year this assault is taken as the grounds of rupture; thus the British Foreign Secretary, after encouraging Persia, during three years in the execution of this design, declares, when it is executed, that treaties are thereby violated!

In regard to the second motive—the alliance with Russia—England had herself united herself to Russia, and she breaks with Persia, upon the ground of union with the state to which she was herself united. The assault upon Herat was Russia's, not Persia's act; the danger of it arose from Russia, not from Persia. England breaks, not with Russia, but with Persia, confirming thereby the act, rendering it in reality dangerous.

England in acting against Persia, does not specify demands and threaten their enforcement, but contents herself with abrogating the treaty by which she was bound to defend Persia against Russia. This is the punishment she inflicts on Persia for submitting to Russia!

There was, therefore, no grounds for a rupture with Persia—the pretexts assumed for it were preposterous and outrageous. Rupture with Persia was not the way to counteract any of the effects which the Foreign Secretary affected to dread, or to realize any of the ends which he pretended to desire.

But between England and Russia existed the concert of mutual communication. No communication takes place upon this subject on the part of England; no demand for communication is made by Russia. What is the character of such silence on the part of England, of such forbearance on the part of Russia? Would Russia have failed to use her right to know, had she had any thing to learn? As, therefore, we have found that the Instructions sent out to Persia to oppose Russia, in 1835, were concerted with herself—as we have found that the remonstrance to St. Petersburg against her, in 1837, was concerted with herself—so also do we find that England's rupture with Persia, because of her union with Russia, was concerted with Russia.

If such a scheme has been formed, it is based upon the calculation made by the parties to it of their power to beguile the confidence, and to overreach the penetration of the nations who are its victims. Such a scheme necessi-

tates the employment of every means of deception, and the adoption of every variety of disguise. And what is it we have before us? Is there not presented to us at one moment an act which, not understanding the intention, we can only attribute to cowardice—at another, one which rashness alone will explain? Here we find indications of negligence, there of industry; we must call in folly to account for what is done to-day, and transcendant ability is revealed in the effort of the morrow. Then are the parts so disconnected, causes so concealed, results so misrepresented, that events present themselves as accidents, the products of long calculation come forth as natural phenomena, which men may wonder at, but which they are not to comprehend. But the intention once suspected, what assistance do we not receive from this incongruity, and from these contradictions? Could cowardice and rashness, could industry and negligence, could ability and folly, be parts of the same mind, and constitute one man? Could accidents in the same transaction coherently present the successive steps which bring it to a conclusion? Could these separate results, and disjointed accidents, without any human will, be the adjusted parts of a great design, and the co-ordinate means for the accomplishment of a mighty purpose?

I entreat the reader here to reflect and to decide, whether or not England has broken faith with a Foreign State. I put aside every question of injury in the transaction, or of motive in the actor. I restrict myself here to the simple question of public faith broken. If he sees that the faith of England has been broken in this transaction with Persia, what will his estimate be of the judgment and integrity of a nation, which has not taken the slightest interest in this matter? What of the value of a Senate that has not inquired into it? Must it not be that that nation is deficient in judgment, and that that Senate is of no value? If so, is not the conclusion inevitable, that there is danger in every step we take—that there is uncertainty in every opinion we entertain, and that there is no prudent course, save that of seeking to obtain the suspension of all foreign relations—(that is of all public business, for that alone touches the *Nation* which you call by the name “*Foreign*,”) until, by a thorough examination, we come to an exact knowledge of our position?

The line has been avowedly effaced which separates Europe from Asia, as every European transaction is now evidently connected on the one hand with the interests of Asiatic countries, and on the other with their practical exist-

ence. Knowledge, therefore, of the East is requisite to the comprehension of every European transaction. Is there any man that will not admit that the public men of Europe, as the nations of Europe, know nothing of the East? What, then, can they know of the diplomatic transactions in which Russia has succeeded in involving them, and which hinge on Eastern affairs? Have we not a recent and deplorable example before us? Has not the alliance between France and England, regarded hitherto by both nations as the safeguard of the peace of the world, been sacrificed, without the intention of either, and in opposition to the interests, the intentions, and the sympathies of both? Has not this been effected, by involving them in transactions connected with the East, which put them both in Russia's power? Thus, then, does every Eastern question become of an importance not to be estimated by its own specific value;—the East is the breach, in our knowledge, through which the enemy enters and possesses us.

Stop then in time! Call for the suspension of negotiations—demand inquiry. There is no other course in reason. There are no other means of safety. Such a conviction I do not entertain alone, nor is it singly that I proclaim it. What expression of alarm more intense—what words of reproach more severe in these pages—than the following?

“ In reflecting on the details of these transactions, and observing their immense results, one is struck with the comparative insignificance of the means by which Russia has been able to effect, in the face of Europe, a series of aggressions and encroachments which the leading cabinets of Europe had at all times professed a desire to oppose. * * * *We have seen her whom we regard as still barbarous, handling the more enlightened cabinets of Europe as if they were the tools with which she worked, and converting, what one of our most distinguished Statesmen considered a master-stroke of policy**—what all his adherents and the whole liberal press of Europe applauded as such—into an instrument for her own aggrandizement, more effectual than all the means that her unaided resources could have supplied. * * * We were never able to appreciate the value of what they (Russia's Eastern neighbours) lost, or what Russia gained. We were incapable of profiting by their strength, or guarding against their weakness. Though we have acknowledged a community of interest, we have made no attempt to establish a concert of design. We have been walking in the dark, and we need not wonder that we have lost our way†.”

* The treaty of 6th July, 1827 (for the dismemberment of Turkey by the separation of Greece). This treaty was designated—“ *The Treaty for the Pacification of the East.*” The treaty of July 15th, 1840 (for the dismemberment of Turkey by the separation of Egypt), is termed—“ *A Treaty for the Maintenance of the Ottoman Empire.*” By these two treaties has the object of Catherine been effected to the letter: the crescent has been shorn of its two horns, Greece and Egypt.

† *Quarterly Review*, No. CV., p. 241.

PART XVII.

EXPOSURE BY THE CABINET OF ST. JAMES'S OF THE PERFIDY OF THAT
OF ST. PETERSBURGH.

THE Persian territory having been invaded by the forces of Great Britain because the Persian Government had suffered itself to be influenced by Russia, the British Government has now to call Russia to account for the measures into which she had led Persia.

To this end A NOTE, the first that appears to have passed between the two governments on Asiatic affairs, since the last war, is addressed by the Cabinet of St. James's to that of St. Petersburg. After having been made the object of aggression so alarming, and of deception so perfidious—it is as follows, that the British Government speaks :—

“ Events which have lately occurred in Persia and Affghanistan, render it necessary for the British Government to request from that of Russia, explanations with respect to certain circumstances which are connected with those events, and which have an important bearing upon the relations between Russia and Great Britain.

“ It is unnecessary for the undersigned to remind Count Nesselrode that the British and Russian Governments have, for a long time past, and from SIMILAR MOTIVES, taken a deep INTEREST in the affairs of Persia.

“ To Russia, Persia is an immediate neighbour ; the frontiers of the two countries touch ; and it is a legitimate object of solicitude to Russia that her neighbour should be friendly and tranquil ; so that the Russian territory should be secure from attack, and the Russian population should be free from the uneasiness which civil commotions in an adjoining country have a tendency to create. Russia, therefore, must naturally desire that the Persian nation should be prosperous and contented, and that the Persian Government should abstain from all external aggression ; should direct its attention exclusively to internal improvement, and should occupy itself in the pursuits of peace.

“ Great Britain has regarded Persia as a barrier for the security of British India against attack from any European power. With this defensive view, Great Britain has contracted alliance with Persia, and the object of that alliance has been, that Persia should be friendly to Great Britain, independent of foreign control, and at peace with all her neighbours.

“ The INTERESTS, therefore, of Great Britain and Russia, with regard to Persia, are not merely compatible, but almost the same ; and hence the two governments have felt, that having COMMON OBJECTS to attain in Persia, they would find it for their mutual advantage to *consult* together upon matters connected with Persian affairs, and to *endeavour to pursue*, with respect to those affairs, a common course.”

The British Government has just punished connexion with Russia as a crime. It has alleged, as the last reproach it can address to Persia, that she had openly connected herself with Russia. It then addresses to Russia a formal note on this subject, and has not one word to say respecting this charge! Let us consider what ought to have been said, and what ought to have been demanded.

“ You have betrayed us,” the British Government would say, “ into
 “ a compact of co-operation, and you have, under the mask of that compact,
 “ aroused Persia against England, and formed a coalition throughout
 “ Central Asia for her dismemberment. England now requires reparation
 “ for the injury inflicted on Persia, and for the hostile acts directed against
 “ Great Britain. She requires the complete revision of the relations between
 “ Russia and Persia. To Persia must be restored the means of independent
 “ existence; from her shoulders must be taken the chains which, with the
 “ hitherto unconscious assistance of England, Russia has laden her. The
 “ British Government is now aware that Russia is able to injure England
 “ and others, solely by the use which she has been allowed to make of
 “ union with England. That union now ceases. In its cessation, England
 “ has ample guarantees for the moderation of Russia. The British Govern-
 “ ment, therefore, contents itself with demanding the disgrace of that
 “ minister of the Imperial Crown, through whose word falsely pledged,
 “ these events have been brought about.”

If such was the spirit, when was the time for such a note? Was it not *before* coming to a rupture with Persia? But after quarrelling with the subordinate, the British Foreign Secretary remains, month after month, on the most friendly terms with the principal, and then pretends to call her to account. It is after he has rendered, by delay alone, every proceeding against Russia impracticable (while his acts are not disavowed),—that he makes the show of remonstrating against her! The assumed remonstrance cannot, therefore, be a denunciation of Russia, but must be a justification of Russia and of himself. He cannot say that she has not done the deeds; therefore, he applies himself to confound the reader, by arguing that she could not, or ought not, to have committed them. He commences by insinuating that the motives of Russia and England are similar.

This insinuation is introduced as a thing of which it is *unnecessary to remind* the Russian Government, yet a large proportion of this solemn note is occupied in establishing it, by proof of a character such as might be employed in demonstrating a theorem. The interests of Russia in Persia, are defined: then those of Great Britain: these are shown to coincide. This proposition was adopted from Russia herself—and it was adopted without any inquiry whatever. Why then these arguments? How are they addressed *to* Russia? Supposing the proposition not to have emanated from Russia, how could Russia's motives be asserted to the Russian Government? and in calling Russia to account, how could the British Minister speak to her of the motives of Britain. Had it been Russia that called England to account for having led her into a compact of co-operation, with the view of first deceiving and then injuring her, England might then have spoken of *her* motives. England calling Russia to account for hostile and perfidious acts, thus presents against herself the defence which it was natural for Russia to attempt. But indeed what defence could be required where the statement of the case commences with an argumentation against the probability of the facts?

Surely this is a dream! You assert that you are assailed by two governments united; you constitute yourself the open enemy of the one, and then declare and undertake to prove that the other is your friend. If you are reasonable in breaking with Persia, your bearing towards Russia is madness; if you are reasonable in your union with Russia, your bearing towards Persia is madness. One or the other must be an act of insanity, or both are worse. What, then, is the position and the character of the nation that entrusts its existence to a minister, who, if not a traitor, must be an idiot? This is now no deed in darkness, it has been laid bare to the winds of heaven; the facts are known, and each man has accounted for them, or submitted to them unaccounted for; he has then either found a reason for madness, or has renounced the rights of freemen. The publication of this document divides England into two classes; the names of which I leave to be applied by those who have courage to utter the epithets they have merited.

I know not which to consider the most daring and most marvellous

in this document, the revelations or the suppressions; I know not which is most bewildering, the thoughts or the language. There can be here required no analysis to detect and no argument to prove the intention of this composition, and but slender experience in Russian diction to recognise its source. This note was drawn up at St. Petersburg!

Diplomatic success, and profit in peace, at the expense of other nations, is merely the over-reaching of an inferior by a superior intellect. Such success is practicable solely through errors. Great or fortunate is the state which can profit by the errors of those around it; but very differently dangerous to its neighbours would be a system that possessed the idea of producing error. Still is there conceivable a higher grade in the hierarchy of spiritual despotism, which is the power of implanting fallacious methods of reasoning, which not only produce error, but which render men and nations incapable of being right. Occupied in the decomposition of states, Russia has penetrated to the sources of their life, and touched the fibres of their strength. She has given to diplomacy a scientific and transcendental character, by constituting it a part of its duty to possess all knowledge, and by proposing to it for an end the attainment of all things possible. All things are possible for her, through the blindness of her opponents, and her victims; they are blinded through error, and she spreads error through fallacy. She does not assault the body; but mentally soaring, she descends, vulture-like, on the head, assailing the senses at their seat: whatever she rises above, that becomes her prey*; to that end and by these means she labours, and with this hope, that when she shall have succeeded in rendering fallacy universal,—universal dominion will be within her reach, or already in her possession.

The future historian, in narrating how the existing governments shall have been subverted, and how the nations of Europe and of Asia shall have been reduced to obedience to a common master, will not have to detail the progress of the invasion of empires: it is the invasion of the human mind that he will have to expose. It will not be the march of armies that he will have to

* “Eruditionem haud quaquam aviculæ, qualis est alauda, similem esse, quæ in sublime ferri et cantilando sese oblectari solet, ut nihil aliud quinimmo ex accipitris potius genere esse; ut qui in alto volare et subinde, cum visum fuerit, descendere et proedam rapere novit.”—BACON, *de Augmentis*.

follow : it is the flight of a pestilence which he will have to trace—a pestilence of the reason and not of the flesh—a contagion spreading not by the touch, but through the brain.

The note which we have before us is a wonderful instance of the power of this mental contamination. In these few sentences which we have quoted, are assembled the means by which the mind of England has been led to *reason* to a false conclusion. It is therefore necessary to dwell upon it, not less for the comprehension of the specific interests which we have before us, than for that of the intellectual character of Britain ; which, as it is the most important knowledge for every Briton, so is it knowledge of most difficult attainment. The thoughts which constitute the common mind of England can be visible to no Englishman, as he has nothing dissimilar with which to compare them, or by which to detect their presence. By the perception of the mode of proceeding of a race differing from his own, and of the objects of a system obtaining results for which he is unprepared, alone can he acquire the power of thinking of the character of a nation, and of turning his mind so as to look upon his own.

The Englishman who takes up this document, knows that a struggle has long existed between England and Russia in regard to Persia ; that that was a point between the two Governments of permanent and intent opposition ; that a formal treaty binds England to defend Persia against Russia, and that England had just come to a rupture with Persia, because she had suffered herself to be influenced by the counsels of Russia, dictated in a spirit of hostility to England.

In this document, he meets at once the declaration, that the interests of the two countries are the same. This is exactly the reverse of all his knowledge. If he accepts the proposition, he must abandon all that he possesses of knowledge or conviction, and he must accept it, or admit suspicion of the motives for presenting it ; that suspicion is too large for him to grasp. He thus passes on, not too anxiously inquiring : carrying with him the thread thus tangled, every subsequent step will ravel it the more. He then comes to the fact, that both Governments have recognised this identity, and that they have acted upon it. This is placed before him in a business-like manner, and as from authority. It is conveyed with so much gentleness of thought,

in such an easy flow of language—there is so perfect an exclusion of the whole of his previous ideas, and he is involved in such a multiplicity of irrelevant thoughts, that he hurries on from point to point, seeking only for explanation. Unless by previous knowledge he at once detects—he is harnessed and laden, he has yielded to the yoke, he has bowed to the burthen. He is carried away to consider the geographical position of Russia and of Persia; he is set to investigate the legitimacy of certain objects, the expediency of certain others; he is made to share in Russia's solicitude to prevent danger, to sympathise in the uneasiness which results from her neighbourhood to Persia. Persia threatening Russia at once by designs of aggression and by projects of convulsion, he will discover to be a very powerful and a very dangerous state: this is startling, but it is an inevitable inference from propositions established between the Cabinets of Great Britain and Russia. But Russia must be inoffensive and weak before the intentions of Persia could be aggressive, or her means alarming. He admits, then, the power of Persia because of the weakness of Russia, and the weakness of Russia because of the power of Persia; thus he revolves in a circle around his errors. The admission that the danger is *to* Russia, and not from Russia—that it is *from* Persia, and not to Persia, once nestled in his breast, all its functions are disordered—truth and falsehood have changed places, things and reasons are reversed; for him, the order of the universe is broken, the ocean is poured out upon the sky, and the clouds are rolled into the deep. And must not nature around, or the spirit within be changed, when a reasoning being could believe, or a freeman not believing could admit—that the interests of Great Britain and Russia were the same?

He has been conscious that India is endangered through Persia, the attack proceeding from Russia; but having admitted that Russia is endangered by Persia, *the danger to India must be from Persia*, not from Russia. The danger to England was from Persia's weakness, now it must be from Persia's strength. Thus has he at once floating in his mind weakness and strength in Persia, and danger to England, alike from her weakness and from her strength. He has also weakness and strength in Russia, since he must mix together the original knowledge of which he was possessed with the

false conclusions which he draws*. The ideas, therefore, of strength, and weakness of danger and ambition, are severally and conjointly applied to each state, until he has lost the power of withholding or of yielding any conviction; he seeks only to escape from suspense and bewilderment, and is ready to admit whatever inference are placed within his reach, accepting it as the explanation of whatever motives is placed beyond it. He admits, then, danger to England from Persia, and by that danger explains the union of England with Russia; and he concludes that there must be danger to Russia from Persia, because Russia is united to England. Thus proceeding in either direction round this circle of fallacy, he returns to the identity of the interests of England and of Russia.

The common object for which their policy has been assumed to be concerted, must, therefore, be to diminish the power and thwart the projects

* The reader is led through a series of equations and conversions labouring to bring out results from the false admissions he has made, and the true impressions he has preserved, thus:—

(*True.*) England alarmed *for* } Persia. Therefore { England } alarmed *by* Persia.
 (*False.*) Russia alarmed *at* }

Persia threatening { England.
 { Russia.

England's interests in Persia have reference to *danger*.

Russia's interests in Persia have reference to *danger*.

England + Danger = Russia + Danger.

England = Russia.

To seek gain is *ambition*, to apprehend loss is to be exposed to *danger*.

(*True.*) Russia's interest in Persia is ambition.

(*False.*) England's and Russia's interests are the same.

The interest of { England } in Persia is ambition.
 { Russia }

The interest of England in Persia is danger.

England's and Russia's interests are the same.

The interest of { England } in Persia is danger.
 { Russia }

Danger + Russia = Ambition + England.

Ambition + Russia = Danger + England.

England = Russia, Ambition = Danger.

of Persia. England and Russia are therefore united, to produce weakness in Persia. The reasoner has started from the knowledge, that the weakness of Persia was dangerous to England, and he is brought to the conclusion, that England is justified in joining with Russia, to augment that weakness. He must now accept the consequences of the proposition he has admitted. Danger to Russia means the invasion of Russia by Persia; danger to India likewise means the invasion of India by Persia. But community between England and Russia being recognised, the invasion of India by Persia would be dangerous to Russia, and the invasion of Russia by Persia would be dangerous to England. Therefore, the attack of India by Persia would increase the necessity of England for alliance with Russia, and justify the policy which has united England to Russia, so as to render Russia predominant in Persia.

This is preposterous!—the reader will exclaim. It is the consequence of a proposition which he has admitted;—a proposition emanating from the chief authority of the State—acted upon internationally,—being the basis of an alliance,—and standing the accepted explanation of a policy that has been disastrous. Such is the character of a proposition which no one can look upon without exclaiming—“It is preposterous.” Such is the practical importance, such the lofty station of that proposition, which when presented before the eye of any individual in the nation will call forth the expression—“It is incredible.” How, then, could it have been admitted or acted upon? There must either have been a mental effort of the British nation, ending in error, or there has been no effort. There has either been a fruitless attempt at being right, or there has been abject submission to another’s will.

The brain of a nation is that portion of it, however minute, which thinks, and the body of a nation is that portion, however vast, which does not comprehend. The brain of this nation must therefore produce error by its labour, or work ruin by its intention. If so, then are the institutions of the State inadequate to the due performance of the functions of independent existence, and for the retention of sovereign power. Institutions! Are not the institutions the thoughts, are not the laws the mind, is not the State the men? Whatever a nation comprehends, that will its government do. Institutions may discipline the character, and, in their continuous action through centuries, may mould the mind; but where judgment is given, or action is requi-

site, it is not the institutions that judge or act. Cast not, then, upon institutions the responsibility, since it will not be upon institutions that will fall the consequences of your ignorance and folly. In the year 1838 England was unable to detect the preposterousness of the proposition of the similarity of the interests of England and of Russia. Therefore, throughout that country, in that year, we have the means of knowing that no one could detect a very simple falsehood, or that none could resist a very dangerous crime—that no one could reason to an evident conclusion, or that no one took interest in the gravest interests of the state. There is, therefore, nothing in this proposition preposterous; but what belongs to each subject of the British Crown, and whatever in the transaction is criminal, rests now on the shoulders of each individual member of the state.

Russia looks to profit by assaulting Persia—England has looked to prevent loss by defending Persia. Russia is led by ambition, England influenced by alarm. Russia's interests are positive, England's interests are negative. This NOTE mixes all these together—it finds similar interests for England and for Russia—it finds a common denomination for ambition and for danger—a common value in profit and in loss! But it stops not here. After giving a common term to dissimilar things, it supplies double images to the same name. There are two Russias, two Persias, two Englands. There is a Russia of ambition, there is a Russia of feebleness. There is a Persia threatening England and Russia by its strength; there is a Persia, by its weakness, affording to Russia the means of assaulting India. There is a shadowy England of sense and justice motioning as if to defend herself and to support her ally; and there is an England, the instrument of Russia's ambition, using to that unhallowed end the other England's shadow and name. Thus, to the perplexities of false equations confounding syllogisms, bewildering expressions, and contradictory propositions, is added the further confusion of these double identities, of false masks placed on every person, of lying names given to every thing.

But no sooner has the reader been brought to admit the expediency of this concert of the two powers, than he discovers that this concert too is a mask. Nor is it even a mask—it is but the shadow of one; for it is not said we *concerted*, we formed a *compact*—but—the two governments would “*find* it for their mutual advantage *to concert*,” it would be for “their benefit

to *endeavour* to pursue a common course." By these words the idea of a concert, but not the fact of its existence is conveyed, and thus the obligations imposed upon Russia by that concert are excluded from view. No sooner has he admitted that concert would be expedient, than the existence of that concert fades upon his sight ; no sooner has he doubted the existence of concert, than he learns the total subjection to Russia of the nation, to maintain which against Russia, was the sole object in establishing that concert. Does this lead him to trace back effects to their causes ? No, he has admitted the expediency of concert, the barbed shaft of fallacy is in his breast, shocks will not extract it. Misfortune may teach to the simple wisdom—the fallacious reasoner drains poison from his own thoughts—for him experience is no teacher—for it disaster is no antidote. First bewildered, he is now alarmed, he seeks to escape from inquiry, and to shut out the sight of danger, by clinging to the cause of his confusion as of these disasters—the alliance of England with Russia against Persia—by which the independence of the Persian State has been laid low, and by which Central Asia is levelled for the car of Russia triumphantly to roll on.

A whole people has passed under this yoke. Britain has admitted that concert with Russia was good—Britain then admits (what is it she will not admit ?) Russia's violation of that compact as valid. Each man, if not in his own person, in the persons of the leaders in whom he trusts, has accepted the consequence of the error—has undergone the contamination of the process. The few leading men who have been the channels through which this bewilderment has been poured out upon the land, have unconsciously yielded themselves up for this purpose. It is not by conviction that they have been gained, it is by fascination that they have been subdued ; the eye is caught, and is fixed by varying images and indistinct forms, and their convictions are taken by surprise, while they are endeavouring to understand the thoughts presented to them, and which are only not rejected because incomprehensible. While too preposterous for conscious admission, they are also too insidious for unconscious rejection ; and so artfully are they linked together, that all find entrance if one is admitted, and no one is safe against them but he who grasps them as a whole, and detects them at a glance.

These statements are made public long after the facts have occurred, and

a few hours at best are given to examine transactions which years have been employed to arrange and to disguise. They are presented to men who only seek to be informed *how* things have happened; who have no knowledge of Persia or of diplomacy—no *interest* in the one, and no conception of the other; who are doubly hopeless by the ignorance that admits falsehood, and the diffidence that excludes judgment; who now, unconscious of ignorance, accept every statement, and now quell suspicion or doubts, attributing these to their own ignorance of policy or of facts; who have no idea of an international crime, and if such is forced upon them—who have so much honesty and courage as to make up their minds to avoid the responsibility of having convictions. The few men, moreover, who control Great Britain, and in whose individual thoughts lie her political destinies as her moral character, occupy stations of responsibility. They are not spectators merely—they are actors. If they do not expose that which is reprehensible, they yield to it their support, and how can they expose what they do not comprehend? When that occurs which they do not comprehend, they array themselves against inquiry, joining from opposite sides in an arch to cavern darkness and to shelter crime. A small transgression which can be explained by a motive within their reach, they will seize and convert into a brand of party warfare; but if there be found in the state a bad man who understands them, he will subdue them, and use them by doing what they cannot conceive. He has but to commit a great crime, to convert the antagonist of his party, and the judges of his acts, into advocates and partisans. Then will faction subside, antagonism disappears, and the traitor, because he is a traitor, and by that alone, stands surrounded by the united power of people, among whom the very traditions of sense and custom have been effaced, though unhappily for mankind and for itself, a tongue is in its brainless head, and arms are in its cruel hands.

The note continues :—

“ The *expediency of such concert* between Great Britain and Russia upon Persian affairs, has *frequently been urged* by the Russian Government, and *acknowledged* by that of Great Britain.

This expediency, as above observed, had not been discussed or explained when that concert was established : now that the question is the fulfilment of the engagement, is mooted the expediency of the proposal !

Observe the epithets used and the thoughts presented—here is *frequency*

and *urgency* superadded to the proposal of concert—here is the acknowledgment of its expediency substituted for *acceptance*. A concert being accepted, every question arising out of it is one of obligation and of right. Here is not a word of acceptance, of obligation, or of right; and while the realities are withheld, shadows are offered. Here, as every where, the reader is conducted through an accomplished scene of semblances so true to deception that the false vision extinguishes consciousness. If deception is not complete, exposure is entire :—but if exposure is not complete, deception is so. In this lies the strength of that fascination of the minds of men against which we have to struggle :—but in this too lies our hope, for without hands may that power be broken, and the meanest and the weakest of the honest may aid in the task of a world's salvation. He surely had had a foretaste of the present days who first pictured palaces and halls of enchantment, created by a *word*, while there was another word which the art of evil dared not use, and by pronouncing which its power was broken and its work destroyed. Fallacy is the magician's spell,—truth is the talisman that sets his victims free.

The note continues :—

“ Upon this principle it was, that in 1833 the two governments came to an understanding (!) with respect to the succession to the Persian throne, and that they agreed together to give their support to the present Shah, whom the then reigning Monarch named as his successor. It is well known to the Russian Government how instrumental British influence was in carrying that decision of *the late Shah* (!) promptly into effect.”

The two governments had concerted to select for the Shah a successor. This falsehood then, could not be of use *for* the Russian Government. It was not requisite to tell Russia how serviceable England had been to her, or how serviceable she could be again. It was not for the Russian Government that the British Foreign Secretary pretended to hesitate to yield those services, nor for it that he furnished arguments himself for overcoming that reluctance.

The note continues :

“ The two Governments continued for some time afterwards to maintain the same *similarity in their respective courses of policy* towards Persia; and the influence of both, as exerted by their missions at Teheran, APPEARED to be directed towards the same end, namely, *to secure to Persia internal tranquillity and external peace.*”

What means similarity? Let the strange term be granted:—are there various kinds of similarities—is similarity a term by which an established concert could be designated—does similarity describe the concealed hostility that did exist? And it is after the expulsion of the British Missions from the whole of Central Asia,—the assault upon Herat, by Persia and Russia united, during three years—of alliance with Cabool and Kandahar—of threats against Bokhara and Khiva, conjointly by Russia and Persia—it is after an invasion undertaken by England to resist Persia and Russia—that the Minister of England speaks of the *apparent* union of these governments, of the joint efforts of the two great powers of Europe and of Asia to bring about a state of tranquillity and peace!

Thus concludes the exordium of the note, which then proceeds to unroll a long and startling detail of the frauds perpetrated by Russia, and of the wrongs endured by England. I find it impossible to dwell upon this document in detail, for the difficulty of the task of exposing, increases with every step we take, from the accumulating load of falsehood which we have to bear along with us. The document must be studied in itself, and I trust that the reader who has followed thus far this analysis, will peruse it for his enlightenment, and not for his deception. Avoiding all allusion to the events which occurred in the course of the year 1835, and all the communications from Persia down to November 1836, it rehearses from that period the conduct of Count Simonich in Persia and before Herat, and the measures adopted by Russia in Central Asia to combine these principalities in a general league against England. This statement of facts is not made upon report; it is not made as of things heard, but as of things known. It rests not upon the testimony of an Envoy; it is asserted, and authoritatively, in the name and on the behalf of the British Government. No door is left open for evasion; no opportunity is given for contradiction. It is absolute in its tone, and final in its manner, so as to render it impossible for Russia to disavow her acts, or for England to retract her assertions.

But every specific indication of acts, of intention, or of opinion on the part of the British Government itself is carefully avoided. The Foreign Secretary speaks of the British *Envoy* being “*known* to disapprove;” he speaks of the objects which the “*British Envoy proposed* to accomplish.”

No where is it said that the British Government had instructed any one to do any thing, or that it proposed itself to accomplish any thing; yet the attempts made by Mr. McNeill on the suggestions of the Governor-General of India, and which we have seen were so effectually counteracted by the Foreign Secretary, are used to exhibit the British Government as if it had proposed and as if it had acted. Thence, the reader must infer that Russia was powerful in herself: powerful to effect her objects alone, and had done so, in opposition to the efforts of Great Britain.

I select a single paragraph, as it bears upon a subject not hitherto dwelt upon in this analysis.

“ *The British Government possesses a copy of a Treaty which has been concluded between Persia and the Affghan ruler of Kandahar, the execution of which has been guaranteed by Count Simonich, and the stipulations of which are INJURIOUS AND OFFENSIVE TO GREAT BRITAIN.*”

* * * “ *In the original draft of this treaty, specific allusion has been made to England as one of the powers against whom assistance was to be given by Russia to the rulers of Kandahar*.*”

This deed, the rupture of every bond and the violation of every right; this deed—which shows that no obligations are sacred and no faith binding for the government by which it is perpetrated, for the men of which that government is composed—is conveyed to the hands of the government against which it is directed, while both are bound together by a bond of reciprocal communication and concerted policy. The case is flagrant beyond all parallel, in the hostility of its intentions, in the perfidy of its means, in the faithlessness of its character, and in the clearness of proof. Here no interval is left between right and wrong; no middle course between the path of Russia and the path of England. Now at last a decision is inevitable. No doubt England has decided; for this deed has been discovered in the remote regions of Asia by the scrutinizing vigilance of the agents of the British Government; it is now produced by that government and publicly declared to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself. Delay, indeed, has occurred in taking this step, but

* It is against the Sikhs, *Shah Shooja* and the British that protection is to be afforded. Russia informed the Princes of Central Asia of the intention of England to restore *Shah Shooja*. This belief is used to induce them to accept her proffered protection against England. Then the evidence of Russia's influence in those regions affords Lord Palmerston the pretext for urging the Indian Government into the expedition against the Affghans, as a means of overthrowing the influence of Russia!

in that delay there must be judgment, seeing that in its past conduct there is evidence of vigilance, and that in its present act there is proof of hardihood.

Let us read on :—this treaty is *censured*. No decision is conveyed—no redress is demanded!

What then, here again, can we conclude, except that we have an additional fact to confirm that conclusion, which—the oftener presented, is but the more appalling.

The winding up of the statement of facts is as follows :

“ Whereas, Russia has of late years invariably professed *a desire* to concert with Great Britain the course of policy which the two governments should pursue with regard to Persia, *so that* the identity of their measures in that quarter *might be a manifest proof of their friendship and union*. Russia’s agents in Persia and Affghanistan have lately been engaged in measures studiously concealed from the British Government, and planned in a spirit unfriendly to Great Britain, and for objects hostile to her interests.”

Can these words have reference to the facts which have been rehearsed? Are these the words of a friend or of a foe? Is this a denunciation that bursts forth, or is it an excuse that is insinuated? And while the grand features of the case are screened from the view, mark the industry with which each crevice is crowded with deceptive images—“ Russia *professed a desire of concert.*” Was there a doubt in her profession. Was there insincerity in her desire? Was the fact of concert not established? Was that concert not established at her suggestion? Was it not violated by her act? “ That “ the identity of their interests in that quarter should be a manifest proof “ of their friendship and union.” As if it were the most desirable of things for England to unite with Russia—as if that union could be spoken of after that which had occurred—as if union could be of use in its exhibition and not in its existence—and as if the friendship of states might continue in its course undisturbed by the acts or the measures of the governments which professed it. “ Russia engaged in measures *STUDIOUSLY concealed* from the “ English Government?” Climax of audacity! As if he had been kept in ignorance of the task which he had to perform—as if those measures were concealed from him which his voice was used as the first to announce. Russia acting against the British Government! What act is there of that Government that she has not dictated?

Supposing that some stranger to passing events had perused this document, and perused it with a free mind, looking merely to that which was before him, and not supposing things different from what they appeared,—would not his mind be roused to anxious anticipation of the conclusions at which the English Government must have arrived? Would he not feel himself upon the very verge of its decision on an occasion the most momentous—a decision between the two great governments of the Asiatic, American, and European Worlds, hitherto allies and co-operators, and suddenly brought into flagrant hostility? A gigantic process of concealed attack, had been concocted against England from the banks of the Emba to those of the Indus—her influence had been uprooted, and her power supplanted by Russia throughout those illustrious regions which have been the arena of the greatest of human events, because they are the sources of the power which has been required to obtain supreme dominion. This vast conspiracy has been conducted by Russia while associated with England, and England is at once startled by the knowledge of its existence, and overwhelmed by the catastrophes to which it has given birth. Further, the stranger would behold before him the Slavonic race and the Anglo-Saxon people, reaching from opposite sides to that point where was to be decided the contest between them for the dominion of the Eastern World—therefore, for the supremacy of the one over the other—therefore, for universal empire! Hanging over the expressions used to convey from Albion to Muscovy her mighty indignation,—watching the steps which were to bring to triumph or to failure this fearful conflict—with what sensations would he read the following passage :—

“ THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT READILY ADMITS THAT RUSSIA IS FREE TO PURSUE, WITH RESPECT TO THE MATTERS IN QUESTION, WHATEVER COURSE MAY APPEAR TO THE CABINET OF ST. PETERSBURGH MOST CONDUCTIVE TO THE INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.”

Indignation, as it bursts, is quelled by sudden bewilderment! *Free?*—what can the word—what can the sentence mean? A person that is free is one who is relieved from an obligation or emancipated from a restraint, and he only can say that another is free who has the faculty of dissolving the obligation, or of releasing from the constraint. But the word has received another sense, that of power or right; but this vulgar and improper sense is only to be found in this term when it is ungrammatically

used,—as “ free, to perform ”—“ free, to pursue.” Has it, in the present instance, crept incidentally into some immaterial passage, through the inadvertence of one unacquainted with the value of terms? No; it is used by a man master of the power of words, and versed in their use. The passage into which it is introduced is the important passage of the most important document which has ever passed between the two Cabinets. The passage hinges on this term, and, therefore, in this little word, must we find the value of the document and the intention of the transaction. This word conveys to Russia the *right* to perform that which is spoken of; he who reads the document will have no more knowledge of this concession than if it were written in an unknown tongue, and therefore it is England that does this.

And what is it that Russia thus obtains the right to do? Any thing—everything! Russia is *free* to maintain concert of policy with England; *free* under its shade to form offensive alliances against her; *free*, at once, to use England’s strength as a terror, and to hold up her possessions as a plunder; *free*, in fine, to do all that this note charges upon her. Can words effect more than this? Could wider bounds be set to power, or ampler licence be conferred on freedom?

What right, has England then to remonstrate—*what object could there be in remonstrating?*

Was this that “ important bearing on the relations between Great Britain and Russia,” that “ rendered it necessary for the British Government “ to request explanations from that of Russia?” The necessity was then one which Russia imposed,—that England should herself detail, and then sanction the injuries she had suffered.

But the reader will exclaim—“ England has not done this!” *Who* is England? Is she not that which she is made by words that are spoken for her? Are you not all bound by these words? And can you escape from their binding until you can unravel them?

For the right thus conceded, a reason is given as follows:

“ — and Great Britain is too conscious of her own strength, and too sensible of the extent and sufficiency of the means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note relates.”

England denounces Russia, her own associate, for acts which arouse the whole mind to uncontrollable detestation, and the Foreign Secretary speaks

of England's *strength*; tells her that England has strength—is conscious of it—is not uneasy, or—not seriously so. Could the weakest of states, in addressing the strongest government by which it could be assailed, speak of strength? The state the most powerful in the pursuit, and of ends the most criminal, unless baser than ever baseness has been exhibited, would seek and find some pretext of right to cover its injustice. And here in the mouth of *England*, as addressing *Russia*, is placed a boast of strength, but—not a word of justice! Yet that thought of justice is introduced to be associated with—Russia! First, Russia receives freedom, to perform that which a moment afterwards it becomes a question for England to use her strength to resist. It is not Russia that assumes this right, it is you that grant it. You detail her acts, and then say, that she is justified in performing them, and the might which you have attributed to England, is the reason you assign for placing this right on the side of Russia. You are confident that Russia cannot harm you, because you are possessed of power; but when did the possession, without the use of power, justify the confidence of men? Here, where your power is to be exerted, it is not used, and the occasion which demands its employment is seized for the purpose of making renunciation of its use. But, at all events, Russia is here threatened; she is told that account is kept with her, and that a day of retribution may come. That threat is for you, not for Russia to believe. If it were for Russia, would it be a threat? It would be to urge the performance of that for which a term of immunity was granted. It would be to say to her, “that which you do, do quickly.”

Observe now the terms selected to produce these effects—“*Uneasiness!*” What connexion is there between the uneasiness of England and the *acts* of Russia, after the right to perform them has been recognised? What connexion between the uneasiness of England and her *power*, since uneasiness could not justify its use? Yet the sequence of fallacy is held together by the mere ambiguity of this term, chaining the mind, because it eludes the grasp. It is in such words that the destinies of England lie—such sentences are the bonds in which she is bound.

Here the matter was concluded and the discussion closed—England had alleged against Russia all that could be alleged, and declared herself satisfied.

But still the note is not yet concluded; it contains other paragraphs. It says :—

“ *But* the British Government considers itself entitled to ask of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, whether the intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia and towards Great Britain, are to be *deduced* from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and M. Rodofinikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Count Simonich and M. Vicovitch ?”

You have granted to Russia the right to do every thing she pleased. No sooner has this proof been given of unbounded devotion—no sooner has this faculty been conferred of illimitable power, than you proceed to insult her; telling her that you don't believe what she says; and that you do not know from what officer of the imperial crown her intentions are to be learnt; and it is to the Foreign Secretary himself that you make the declaration! Your remonstrance in 1837, at St. Petersburg, amounted to nothing more than a suggestion from the British Foreign Secretary to Russia, that her agent in Persia must be in a state of insubordination. Count Nesselrode accepted the suggestion, and Count Simonich, as soon as he could receive instructions to that effect, confirmed the assertion of the British Government that he had been acting in disobedience to his instructions. Upon this, neither are remonstrances addressed to St. Petersburg, nor is the continuance of the same agent in Persia, as the executor of the joint policy of the two Governments objected to. England then believed the contradictory assertions of the Russian Foreign Secretary, and of the Russian Ambassador; and was perfectly satisfied with the discrepancy between them. After admitting both as true, during eighteen months, England declares she believes neither. After eighteen months of distinct avowal by the Russian Government, and by its ambassadors, of habitual opposition between them, England asks Russia which of the two is to be taken as the criterion of her intentions?

At the commencement of this note, the Foreign Secretary declares himself to be fully acquainted with the motives of Russia; at the end of it he declares himself ignorant of her intentions. At the commencement of the note, he explains the interests of Russia from which her motives spring, and concludes an exposition of her *acts*, by demanding how her policy could be comprehended, and where it was to be discerned.

Throughout England, it is believed that Russia had been preparing,

either covertly or openly, to attack India ; but that in consequence of the steps taken by the Foreign Secretary, she had disavowed her acts, and sacrificed her agents. In the communications which have passed between the two Governments upon the subject of Central Asia, we find, as we shall presently see, no retraction on the part of Russia, no sacrifice of an agent, no disavowal of an act. How is it, then, that this belief has been accredited ? It has, principally, if not entirely, to be referred to the passage above quoted—a passage which has been selected and reproduced as containing the very marrow of these transactions, and read by almost every individual in this land. From this passage the reader must infer that Russia is treated with insult and spoken to with sarcasm, and no one could doubt that the position of England was secure, when the British Minister could so treat Russia*, and when she submitted to such treatment.

But, after all, the question spoken of is not put. The British Government only considers itself *entitled* to put it. The British Foreign Secretary, without ascertaining those intentions which he had not discovered, and knew not where to seek, continues :—

“ And the British Government thinks itself *also* justified *in observing*, that *if*, from any cause whatever, the Russian Government has, *subsequently to the months of February and May 1837*, altered the *opinions* which were then *expressed* to the Earl of Durham ; and if that Government has, in consequence, thought fit to give to its Ambassador in Persia instructions diametrically opposite to those which were then *described* by Count Nesselrode and M. Rodofinikin, and which M. Rodofinikin *offered* to exhibit to the Earl of Durham (!) then, and in such case, the SYSTEM OF UNRESERVED RECIPROCAL COMMUNICATION upon Persian affairs, which of late years has been established between the two governments, gave to the British Cabinet a *good* right to *expect*, that so entire a change of policy on the part of Russia, together with the reasons on which it was founded, would have been made known to Her Majesty’s Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, *instead of being left to be inferred* from the acts of Russian agents in Persia and Afghanistan.”

Let us re-state this passage, taking out parenthetical expressions—

“ If the Russian Government has altered the opinions it entertained in 1837, then the system of unreserved reciprocal communication established between the two governments, gave to England the right to be informed of this change.”

* To which must be added, the enigmatical insinuation of the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons, that *there were Governments* that attempted every thing, and *disavowed* every thing.

Governments do not communicate upon abstract questions. A system established between two governments must be based on an intention of both, and must impose reciprocal duties, obligations, and confer equivalent rights. In this expression, therefore, we have clearly a compact to co-operate; why, then, is the simple word not used? We have before seen that that compact was, in fact, established—we have also seen that the British Foreign Secretary never uses a term that simply expresses compact. Here then is another instance of the anxiety to avoid the use of the term, and yet of the necessity of keeping the idea vaguely in presence. Let us, then, restore the proper words to the sentence—

“ If Russia has altered the *opinions* she entertained in 1837, then the “ *compact* to act together, gave to Great Britain the right to be informed of “ this change of *policy*.”

If comment were here required, it would be vain to offer it!

Now let us take the expression so dexterously adjusted to confuse the rest of the sentence.

System of unreserved reciprocal communication.

In this sentence the idea of compact must reside. It can mean nothing else. Yet it may appear to mean something else. It may then mean at once *compact* and *no compact*; that is, it confuses the idea of compact. The phrase is therefore adjusted to furnish grounds for making a complaint while excluding the idea of violation of compact. Had the word compact been used, confusion could not have been introduced, for it was *the thing* itself, and the idea of violation of engagement would have at once presented itself to the reader. Bewildered in this maze, it is himself that he will reproach—he will not suspect the intention to mislead, since he will feel the inability to comprehend; failing to comprehend, he must assume to approve; and to show that he has comprehended, he will labour to justify:—thus, is the character debased, when the intelligence is obscured.

If there was reciprocal communication the acts of Russia were known, and there was no ground for the demand. If the acts of Russia were not known, there was no reciprocal communication, and (according to the phrase) there was no right to make the demand. The occasion for making the demand could only be the violation of the compact, and the existence of that compact gave England the right to require its execution, not the right to be informed

of any change of the policy of Russia. England's right being in the fulfilment of the compact, not in the knowledge of its violation, to reproach Russia for not communicating the intention, was to sanction the acts by which it was violated.

The Foreign Secretary asserts ignorance and communication; asserts reciprocity, and denies existence of communication—he asserts and denies the same thing—making the assertion as the ground of complaint, that it did not exist—taking the complaint that it did not exist, as the occasion for asserting that it had existence; this is not arguing to show the absurdity of the statement, but it is exposing the process laboriously adjusted, successfully employed to confound the reader—that is, the British nation.

The words that must have poured from the lips of a minister, who *unconsciously* had thus bound his government, could only be words of indignation at the perfidy used against himself, of bitterness at the results obtained for his country. But here is not even so much as a declaration that England had been injured; and the height to which his indignation ascends is to insinuate, that Russia had done wrong*.

Let us take a parallel case, and suppose a judge addressing a convicted assassin, and saying to him:—“the social system of reciprocal forbearance, established between the different members of the community, gave to your unhappy victim a good right to expect that so entire a change of sentiment upon your part, together with the reasons upon which it is founded, should have been made known to him in words issuing from your mouth, and not by the act of your arm, levelling a fatal and unexpected thrust at him in the dark.” Would you not say that such language, though spoken on the bench, proceeded from the mouth of an accomplice, and that such a scene could only have occurred in the presence of an assemblage of idiots?

Here a minister of state declares, in a formal note, the acts of a foreign government to be hostile to his own, and complains that that government had not communicated to him such intention of hostility; and there are colleagues of that minister, and there is a senate, and there is a free people, to whom

* When pressed in the House of Commons respecting the interference of Russia in Sweden to prevent Slito from being made a free port, the Foreign Secretary indignantly retorted upon the speakers, that if the case was as they asserted, that if Russia had interfered in the affairs of an independent state, she had done that which was very improper. God forbid that England should do any thing of the kind.

these words are exposed, and who accept them as *bona fide* transactions— Good heaven ! in what times, in what nation, among what men do we live !

Now let us resume. What does this note contain, what propose ? The crimes are charged upon the Russian Government by England in such a strain as to render it impossible for the one to offer an explanation, for the other to retract a single assertion, and upon this there is no proposal made ! No displacement of a functionary nor disgrace of a minister demanded ; no public declaration in Europe or in Asia is proposed or required. The gravamen of the charge, the bathos of the complaint, the climax of the peroration is, that the British Minister is left to discover in Persia the intentions of Russia— intentions which he himself had been the first to announce to Persia, and which he had announced nine and thirty months before !

This note causes England and Russia to change places, and places in the hands of Russia the power against England which England had possessed through the injustice of Russia. It says, we have concerted to act in common. We have been for years pretending to do so, but now, in the fourth year, I tell you, that I have known all the while that you were acting against me ; and what is more, I was the first to act against you, and to take measures in opposition to you before you commenced. I now publish to the world that I have done so, and I give you the documents which prove it. Was not this to place in the hands of the Russian Government the advantage and the right of remonstrance, and the power of denouncing the prior perfidy to her of the British Minister. But this advantage has been superfluous, and this power has been unnecessary, because Russia has been uninterruptedly in possession of the Foreign Office of Great Britain.

Now let the reader examine whether or not every object which Lord Palmerston pretends to seek, is not frustrated, whether every statement which he assumes to make is not destroyed by his own act or word ? If not, every conclusion here drawn is false, and the reader is under the obligation of denouncing that falsehood, and of destroying the doubts and suspicions regarding the conduct of public affairs which a dishonest or a misguided man is casting into the public mind. But if, on the other hand, he finds that Lord Palmerston has himself destroyed each position he has advanced, that by himself is thwarted each object he assumes to seek, then—*Why* this labour ? There is the labour to build up, the labour to pull down, the labour to expose,

the labour to conceal. This labour, for whose profit was it? Who could profit by it? Where was there a man, or a system, with means equal to obtaining, or to extorting such co-operation, or in a position to benefit by its consequences? The monarch of England, the factions of England, the nation itself could have no motive to require, or no interest to obtain, such labour as this. They have shown themselves all equally heedless and equally careless, either to advance or to counteract it. We must, therefore, look abroad for those for whom such labour could be beneficial, or by whom such services could be compelled or repaid. There is a Power to whom such deeds are familiar; there is a Power to whom such labour might be profitable; there is a Power who has profited by it. Russia has here obtained what might be the well-earned conquest of a successful war, carried on under favourable circumstances of position and alliance, and which had cost hundreds of millions of treasure, and hundreds of thousands of lives.

The conclusion of this wonderful document baffles the power of language to analyze, and of indignation to denounce:—

“ The undersigned, in conclusion, is instructed to say, ‘ that Her Majesty’s Government is persuaded that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg will see in this communication, a fresh proof of the anxious desire of the British Government to maintain, unimpaired, the friendly relations which so happily subsist between the two countries; and to which the British Government justly attaches so great a value: because explanations sought for with frankness, and in a friendly spirit, tend to remove misunderstandings, and to preserve harmony between nations.’ ”

Friendly relations! Yes, indeed, friendly; fraud and injury, wrong and insult, are friendly things—for England is the foe of England—for England is the foe of truth, of justice, and of men. These explanations are sought for with a spirit of friendship and of frankness—a spirit, alas! too bitterly frank, and too treacherously friendly! “ Friendship,” “ frankness,” “ peace,” and “ harmony,” now have become sounds that ought to cause the just man’s heart to sink, and the patriot’s spirit to fail. But have these been real things that we have been perusing? Is not this some distempered vision, some delirious dream? These are facts, and no visions; this is truth, and no phantom. In the minutest details, in the mightiest results under the darkest concealments, on the widest fields, we have found and traced, and proved one and the same conspiracy for the murder of an Empire, and that our own. The proof and facts, the will and the results, are there before you: but if

these are results, how are they not seen; if there are proofs, how are they not believed; if there be crime, how is it not punished? The facts teach not, for they appal; the proof fails, for it overwhelms; the crime triumphs, not because proof is wanting, but because not understanding, who can believe? You see, but believe not; posterity seeing the end, will wonder and believe. These are not prophesies, they are conclusions, from evidence which lies around, arrived at by steps within your reach. Proof in one case is sufficient for all—that proof lies even in the volume within your hands.

‘ But you speak against the highest head in the realm, whom all men respect, whose conduct all parties approve, who labours to secure to us peace, and who gives to us the assurance of security. It is impossible that he can do that which is not honest, or say that which is not true.’

Yes, he

——— “ speaks of peace, while covert enmity,
Under the smile of safety, wounds the world.”

He speaks of that which he has destroyed. With the smile of safety he beguiles; the wound is in his words, and he is wounded who believes.

‘ But if we believe, it is not in his words alone that we trust. Do we not see with our eyes? And do we not know with our knowledge? And have we not proof in our whole being, that there is peace within, that there is security around? Know we not the might that resides in the arm of England? See we not the terrors that are scattered by her frown? Does not confusion fall on her foes? Are not honour and strength the portion of her partners? Look around the globe in its wide expanse, and behold the splendid markets that are open for our riches, and the unbounded harvests that are yielded to our industry. Look again within this land which an ocean guards, and see after long years of internal broils, and long years of external heedlessness, now at length intelligence and energy swaying her councils, success attending her arms, concord and unity living in the breasts of men the smile of security brightening into the glow of triumph—as they listen to the sounds of almost bloodless victory, which messengers treading on each other’s heels, encircling the globe in their course, announce to us now from the rising, now from the setting sun These are the deeds of the man of whom you speak such things. These are the glories of the times you deplore, and of the people you reproach!’


It is in this midnight of your intoxication, that I declare to you an awakening of bitterness,—it is at this spring-tide of your joy, that I tell you that an ebb of troubles is at hand. A voice of warning and of sorrow I raise, although it be alone ; and if its sounds cannot disturb your slumber, and if its sense cannot pierce your breasts, its tone will be preserved, and will sink upon your spirits when they are softened by misfortune.

In five short years has the power of Russia spread from the Caspian Gates to the banks of the Hyphasis. Her name has arisen suddenly as the simoon, sweeping all around the confines of Asia. The giant phantom spans the ancient realm of Cosroës and of the Arsases. It broods with sudden joy over the tombs of the Persian, the Macedonian, the Backtrian, the Ghiznevide, the Choaresmian, the Tartar conquerors of Hindostan. Resting now at length on those mighty barriers that hitherto restrained—it leans over India, scanning it with its eye, shaking it with its sound, and withering it with its breath. Who has raised the phantom ? Who has built up this power ? Whence the terrors of the one—or the pillars of the other ? Has she sent forth myriads to conquer ? Has she brought forth a Nadir, a Hannibal, or a Timour ? No—not a legion has been moved, not a weapon has been drawn, not a soldier has stepped across her confines. Without effort, without danger, without blood, without numbers expended, or heroes produced, has she won more than Alexander conquered, and in a shorter space of time. She has won this by the single aid of one man, and he neither born of her race nor numbered amidst her servants. But this man had England to give away ; England, when she was drunk with folly, and knew not what she did. No wonder then, at this simultaneous explosion over Europe and over Asia, because at once the barriers that opposed were cast down, and the weight that compressed, has been added to her impulse. Coolly, deliberately, laboriously has he applied himself to this task. He has accomplished it by the poisoning of sentences, the adjusting of phrases—culling vices, and scattering error. He has had neither competitor nor antagonist ; alone has he done this, taking counsel with evil in the icy caverns of his own dark mind. The highest functionary of his native land—his task has been that people's ruin ; the minister of England—her power has been directed to the destruction of all that is noble, worthy, just in man. Not amid fields of the dying and the dead—not in time of fear and trouble ; it is not within embattled fastnesses,

or amidst partisans, conspirators, or resolved men with passions aroused, and consciousness awake, that is performed this appalling task of diurnal crime. It is in the unconscious metropolis of an Empire, in the calm centre of dominion, among a powerful and confiding people, that this conspiracy against the human race is adjusted, and advanced with long and patient labour, interrupted only by friendly and familiar intercourse with the dupes whom he uses, and the victims he has doomed.

END OF PART XVII.

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