

SECRET

320.2

STRENGTH OF U.S. ARMY

Binder # 2

1. FEB. 50 . . . . . Thru . . . . . 31 OCT 50 . . . . .

G-4 Adm File

SECRET



4 ROUTING

DA C/S G4	
EXECUTIVE	
TO	
C+RE	
SUPPLY	
PETROLEUM	
KEA	
ADMIN	
Signal	1

SECRET

Brig Gen George I. Back  
26-6138

*370.2*

Technical Service Troop Strengths

DC/S, ROK  
Attn: Gen Allen  
28 Oct 50

(Cont'd)

to a proportionately smaller ceiling of 12,082 spaces based on a 3.5% factor. Experience gained in the execution of both the occupation and combat Signal missions proves conclusively that Signal should not be limited to an arbitrary 3.5% slice factor, but must be authorized the necessary troops to perform the mission. The foregoing is submitted in support of the contention of the Signal Officer, GHQ that 15,084 spaces are required. However, as indicated in paragraph 1, this information is being submitted as a matter of record.

1 Incl  
Tabs A - H

G. I. B. *copy*  
--- GP P&O NLM/HDT/EAHW/bc ---

FROM: G-4 TO: CofS, ROK Date: Lt Col Woodman 26-8545

31 OCT 1950

1. G-4 agrees with the Signal officer in his statement that the Korean situation has changed to such an extent as to make any further discussion of Signal strengths required to support the operation academic.
2. The point still unresolved is the number of Signal troops on hand and on requisition from the DA. As of 31 Oct 50 Signal has on hand and requisitioned from DA a strength of 14,808. It is recommended that the Signal officer submit a list of units to be deleted from requisition on DA to bring Signal strength within the Signal slice of 12,082, originally set up to support the Korean operation.
3. Further, it is G-4's considered opinion that as rapidly as the Korean situation permits, the Signal officer and for that matter all Technical Services should take appropriate action to reduce their strength, to within their post hostilities deployment slice.

Incls  
n/c


*Approved by CofS 17 Nov 50 initialed "H"*

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G-4 File Copy

*16015*





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to a proportionately smaller ceiling of 2,000 spaces based on a 10% factor. In the event of a change in the ceiling of the occupation of the ceiling of the signal office, the ceiling of the signal office should not be limited to an arbitrary 2.5% since the ceiling of the signal office is not necessarily based on the number of signal offices. The ceiling of the signal office is based on the number of signal offices, but it is not necessarily based on the number of signal offices. The ceiling of the signal office is based on the number of signal offices, but it is not necessarily based on the number of signal offices. The ceiling of the signal office is based on the number of signal offices, but it is not necessarily based on the number of signal offices.

1. ... ..

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1. ... ..

2. ... ..

3. ... ..



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**SECRET**Brig Gen George I. Back  
26-6138

## Technical Service Troop Strengths

Signal

Deputy Chief of Staff,  
ROK

28 Oct 50

Attn: Gen Allen

1

1. In accordance with our conversation, I have reviewed the pertinent comments presented by G-4 in connection with my reclama dated 8 Oct 1950, for an increase to the Signal personnel ceiling in support of operations in Korea. Since the tactical situation has changed so materially since 8 Oct 50 any further discussion of the reclama would now appear to be academic. Nevertheless the following arguments supported by factual data are submitted for the record as per your verbal directive.

2. It is my contention that application of the 3.5% factor would result in an insufficient Signal ceiling (12,082) and that it was only due to the rapid deterioration of the North Korean military forces that this inadequacy was not damaging to the United Nations effort. Based on this experience, I am unable to concur in the principle of such a limitation and recommend that consideration be given to increasing this factor, or providing some arrangement whereby Signal will be authorized personnel spaces commensurate with the mission in the Far East Command.

3. In support of this recommendation, the following information is submitted:

a. Although the operating front of a division is considered to be from 5 to 10 miles wide, the divisions in Korea were deployed over areas necessitating extended fronts of 25 to 40 miles (Tab A) even under the most favorable situations. Following the breakout from the Pusan perimeter, army, corps and division operating areas were greatly extended, resulting in communications requirements exceeding capabilities of available Signal units. To augment the present capabilities of army and corps Signal units necessitates the request for a Signal service battalion (VHF) to provide a rapid and reliable means of radio relay communications. This type of communications is imperative in order to maintain contact with combat elements operating over extended areas and in fast moving situations.

b. The land line wire and cable system in Korea is inadequate, both in quantity and quality, for support of the UN military operations. Accordingly, studies and surveys of this system were made, resulting in the conclusion that approximately 1,500 miles of the system would have to be constructed or rehabilitated, in order to provide the essential communications facilities. In order to accomplish this, it was determined that a minimum of two (2) Signal construction battalions would be required and were so requested. A construction battalion under the very best of conditions is capable of constructing approximately 30 miles of pole line per week. At this rate, it would take the two (2) battalions approximately 25 weeks to complete the

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Brig Gen George I. Back  
26-6138

## Technical Service Troop Strengths

Signal

DC/S, ROK Attn: Gen Allen

28 Oct 50

1  
(Cont'd)

mission. Conditions of terrain, climate, soil type and enemy activity in Korea plus the fact that none of the Signal construction units can be considered as approaching maximum efficiency, necessitates a reduction in the 30 mile per week construction rate to a maximum of 20 miles per week. It is therefore, expected that the two (2) battalions can perform the mission in approximately 40 weeks.

c. Signal supply activities in support of Korean operations resulted in a tonnage increase of Signal supplies processed through the Yokohama Signal Depot from 6,253 measurement tons per month in June 1950 to 25,978 measurement tons in September 1950 (Tab B). Processing of these supplies and provision of maintenance services justifies my request for an additional Signal depot company and a Signal repair company.

d. The communications mission of this headquarters has greatly increased since the beginning of the Korean operation. This increase is evidenced by charts (Tab C) showing comparative increases in average word groups and average enciphered groups handled per day in the GHQ Communications Center. It was necessary to add 34 additional channels consisting of single side band, single channel radio teletype, continuous wave transmission and multiplex radio and land line circuits in order to provide the essential radio and telegraph communications between this headquarters and other stations of the Army Command and Administrative Network throughout the world. The 71st Signal Service Battalion, responsible for operating the communications facilities of this headquarters, is organized in accordance with the mission existing prior to the beginning of hostilities in Korea. In order to provide operating personnel necessitated by these greatly increased commitments, it is necessary to augment this unit, as per my request.

e. In order to insure adequate service within that portion of the communications system for which the Signal Officer, GHQ is responsible and at the same time to relieve 8th Army of as much of the administrative communications responsibilities as possible, it was necessary to establish GHQ communications facilities in Korea. This function encompassed the establishment of a major radio relay station of the Army Command and Administrative Network and a long lines terminal switchboard at Pusan, plus the activation of mobile carrier repeater teams necessary for the assured operation of the wire carrier system from Pusan north. All of the land line and considerable radio message traffic between GHQ in Tokyo and 8th Army Headquarters in Korea is processed through the facility at Pusan. This traffic consists of 27,000 code groups and 500,000 word groups processed per day.

f. On 12 July 1950, there were 7 major headquarters in Japan

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Brig Gen George I. Back  
26-6138

## Technical Service Troop Strengths

Signal

DC/S, ROK

28 Oct 50

Attn: Gen Allen

1  
(Cont'd)

and Korea, above the division level, between which communications were provided by non-divisional Signal units. As of 8 Oct 50, the command and administrative organization in Japan and Korea had been increased to 16 major headquarters (Tab D). All of these additional headquarters created increased communication requirements on the part of non-divisional Signal units. Circuit diagrams in effect on 12 July and 8 Oct 50, (Tabs E & F) show the increase in terminal and relay facilities required to support the tactical and logistical headquarters which were active at those times.

g. On 12 July 50, 75 land line channels, 10 VHF radio relay channels and 14 radio channels between various headquarters in Japan and Korea were in operation. As of 8 Oct 50, these channels had been increased to 198 land line channels, 28 VHF radio relay channels and 36 radio channels. On 12 July 50, the land line channels totaled 85,200 miles and increased to 159,600 miles by 8 Oct 50.

h. The 3.5% factor does not include Signal personnel required for support provided the Air Force. Paragraph 52 a, FM 101-10 states in effect that the Army communications zone troops required to support the Air Force are not included in the division slice, but are included in the theatre wing slice which provides, that of 1,000 Army troops normally supporting 5,000 Air Force troops, 8% are Signal. Since the Air Force strength in Japan and Korea approximates 43,000, it is concluded that Signal should be authorized an additional 667 troop spaces for this support.

i. Another important feature which definitely should not be overlooked in any operations in which US military forces are to play the principal role is the support that must be furnished allied forces. Signal contribution to the direct support of the ROK Army has been extensive, in both communications and supply activities. Approximately 8,400 tons of equipment has been shipped from Signal depots in Japan and Korea to the ROK Army. Approximately 20% of message traffic handled over US Army communications facilities in Korea has been ROK traffic. Based on the number of personnel employed in communications and depot operations, it is estimated that approximately 715 US military personnel are supporting the ROK Army.

4. As of 1 January 1950 the authorized troop strength for Japan was 96,500 (Tab H). Of this total Signal was allotted 5,340 troop spaces or a slice factor of approximately 5.6%. This was considered the minimum requirement to provide the necessary communications for the occupation mission. However, with the advent of hostilities in Korea and the planned employment of 345,200 US Army and other UN forces, exclusive of ROKA, Signal is limited

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GD P&amp;O NMW/HDT/EAHW/bc

## G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

31 October 1950

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Technical Service Troop Strengths

1. C/N 1 from Sig to DCofS, ROK, subject as above dtd 28 Oct 50 serves as a statement for the record by the Signal officer concerning the inadequacy of the Signal slice of 3.5%.
2. In the C/N to the CofS the Signal officer makes the statement that the situation in Korea makes any further discussion on the subject academic. The Signal officer then goes on to discuss a number of reasons why he feels the slice figure of 3.5% is not adequate.
3. At the present time Signal has on hand and requisitioned from DA a strength of 14,808.
4. C/N 2 to CofS, ROK, recommends that the Signal officer submit a list of units to be cancelled from requisition on DA in order to bring Signal strength within Signal slice of 12,082, and states that it is G-4's considered opinion that as rapidly as the Korean situation permits all Technical Services should take appropriate action to reduce their strengths to within their post hostilities deployment slice.
5. Within established G-4 policy.
6. Completes action on G-4 JN 16015.

E.A.H.W. EW 26-8545H.D.T. HDT 26-6413N.M.W. NMW 26-6444

JN 16015

SECRET

G-4 FILE



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NN D 75029

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

30 Oct 50  
(Date)

To Col Munn

*Red*

See Gen Bucks  
statement for the  
record attached  
suprets. —

Gen Allen hand  
carried in —

Please  
see me.

*G. L. Eberle*  
G. L. EBERLE  
Major General, GSC  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4



*Secret*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
APO 500

6-4  
99  
~~320.2~~

AG 320.2 (27 Oct 50)GC-TC

27 October 1950

SUBJECT: Table of Distribution for Public Health and Welfare United Nations Command, Field Organization, Korea

TO: Commanding General  
Eighth Army  
APO 301

*320.2*  
~~*320.3*~~

ASST. DIR.	
ADJ. GEN.	
EXECUTIVE	
P+O	
C+RE	
SUPPLY	
PETROLEUM	
K.E.A.	

*320.2*  
*320.3*  
*320.2*

1. Reference General Orders Number 15, United Nations Command, subject: Provision of Civilian Type Supplies and Equipment for the Prevention of Disease and Unrest and for the Furtherance of the Military Objectives of the United Nations Command in Korea.

2. a. In order to provide an organization to accomplish direct civilian emergency relief and welfare assistance in Korea, desire you organize Public Health and Welfare, United Nations Command, Field Organization, Korea. The proposed organization chart, Inclosure 1, establishes an overall personnel authorization of 132 and lists job titles, including appropriate military occupation specialty and civilian ratings, which could be utilized to fill these authorized spaces. United Nations personnel will be utilized to the maximum extent possible in the organization of this unit. Personnel will be furnished without requisition.

b. For administrative and accounting purposes, United States Army personnel assigned this unit will be organized as the United Nations Public Health and Welfare Detachment, 8201st Army Unit. The authorized strength of the Army Unit will be the United States Army personnel actually assigned to Public Health and Welfare United Nations Command, Field Organization, Korea. All other personnel will be shown as augmentations to the Table of Distribution. When the strength of Public Health and Welfare, United Nations Command, Field Organization, Korea, approaches its personnel authorization of 132, a Table of Distribution for the 8201st Army Unit, numbered 301-1201, will be prepared and submitted. It is contemplated that the Public Health and Welfare, United Nations Command, Field Organization, Korea, will be discontinued at such time as the responsibility for direct relief of the civilian population of Korea is relinquished by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, or transferred to some other agency.

3. a. Items of Quartermaster expendable supplies required for the unit may be requisitioned in accordance with the provisions of Table of

*Secret*



*Secret*


AG 320.2 (27 Oct 50) GC-TC,

Subj: Table of Distribution for Public Health and Welfare United Nations-  
Command, Field Organization, Korea, 27 Oct 50

Allowances Number 10-100, Allowances of Quartermaster Expendable Supplies,  
26 July 1948.

b. Special issue of equipment listed in Inclosure 2 is hereby  
authorized.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:



*[Handwritten signature]*

K. B. BUSH

M/R:

Brigadier General, USA  
Adjutant General

WEM/sm  
26 Oct 50

2 Incls

1. Proposed Organiza-  
tion Chart
2. Special Issue of  
Equipment

Distribution: (less incl)

- ROK
- AG
- AG PP
- AG SAB
- AAO
- Ch
- Cml
- Compt.
- Engr
- IG
- JA
- Med
- Ord
- PM
- QM
- Sig
- Trans (2)
- G-4 KEAD
- PH&W

Ltr dirs CG 8A to org Pub Health and Welfare,  
UN Comd, Field Orgn, Korea, to furn civ emerg  
rel and welfare assistance to ROK. Maximum  
number of United Nations pers will be assigned  
to this unit. US Army pers assigned this unit  
will be organized as UN Public Health and  
Welfare Det, 8201st Army Unit. When a firm  
orgn for this unit is established, the then  
assigned US Army str will be the auth str  
and all other pers will be shown as augmenta-  
tions to the T/D to be submitted. Ltr further  
includes instrs for supply of authorized  
expendable and non-expendable items. Action  
rqstd by G-1, C/N #6, 23 Oct 50. Concurrences:  
G-4, C/N #3, 10 Oct 50, PH&W, C/N #5, 16 Oct 50.  
Approved by CofS 17 Oct, initial H. Coord: PH&W.

McBride  
26-5963



*Secret*



**SECRET**

Col Myers 28-7489

*320.2*  
*RE*

Augmentation of the 51st Cal Tech  
Intelligence Detachment

G-2

G-3

G-1

G-4 ✓ in turn

26 Oct 50


2

1. G-2 concurs with the action recommended by the Chemical Section in para 6, Note 1.
2. The Department of Army repeatedly emphasizes the need for an expanded, accelerated technical intelligence effort by FECOM and every effort should be made to provide sufficient technical intelligence personnel so that the Chemical Officer can implement in full the duties charged him under FM 101-5.

C.A.W.

G-4


ROUTING	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	G-1
<input type="checkbox"/>	DA O/S G-1
<input type="checkbox"/>	EXECUTIVE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	P + O
<input type="checkbox"/>	C + RE
<input type="checkbox"/>	SUPPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	PETROLEUM
<input type="checkbox"/>	KEA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ADMIN



*mmw*

*P10*  
*16035*  
*h*

**SECRET**





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1. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the results of the investigation conducted by the Special Agent in Charge, [Name], on [Date].

2. The investigation was conducted in accordance with the instructions of the [Agency/Department] and the [Case File Number].

3. The results of the investigation are as follows:

4. [Detailed description of findings and actions taken]


5. [Additional findings and conclusions]

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SERIALIZED  
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Lt Col LaPiana 57-8386

Augmentation of the 51st Cml Tech  
Intelligence Detachment

Cml

G2

25 October 1950

G3

G1

G4 in turn

1. Shortly after the commencement of the Korean conflict, requests were initiated for three chemical technical intelligence teams to be shipped from the ZI.
2. The first of the three teams requested, the 51st Cml Tech Intel Detachment, was shipped 15 Sep 50; arrived in the theater on 3 Oct 50; has been attached to Eighth Army; and is now ready to commence operations.
3. Department of the Army has reported that a second team will be ready for shipment during November 1950. It is known that considerable difficulty is being encountered in securing qualified personnel for this team and it is believed that shipment will be late in November or even December. Based on time required to place the 51st in operation, the new team will not be ready for field operation until sometime after 15 Dec 50.
4. The need for additional chemical technical intelligence personnel is urgent and immediate. Current military operations in Korea are progressing at such a rapid rate that unless additional chemical technical intelligence personnel are made available soon, much of the materiel of intelligence value may be lost. The 51st Cml Tech Intel Detachment consists of 3 officers and 5 enlisted men. This small strength is insufficient to accomplish the desired area coverage in what is considered a suitable time span.
5. In view of the urgent need for additional chemical technical intelligence personnel at this time, augmentation of the 51st Cml Tech Intel Detachment with the best available qualified chemical personnel currently in the theater appears to be the most practical solution to the problem.
6. It is recommended that:
  - a. The 51st Cml Tech Intel Detachment be authorized an overstrength of 3 officers and 5 enlisted men.
  - b. The requirement for this duty be considered of first priority and that commands be directed to release chemical personnel designated by GHQ for such duty.
  - c. That the 51st Cml Tech Intel Detachment be authorized additional equipment under T/O&E 3-500, 10 Apr 50, Part 5 - Operations (Technical Service Intelligence) Column 3, in proportion to the overstrength authorization.

D. R. K.

G4 Cy



SECRET

GD P&O NMW/HDT/JET/dr

G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

31 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Augmentation of the 51st Cml Tech Intelligence Detachment

1. Chemical's C/N to G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4, 25 October 1950, requested authorization for an augmentation of the 51st Chemical Tech Intelligence Detachment. The requested augmentation consists of three officers and five enlisted men.
2. Three Chemical Intelligence Detachments have been requested from the DA. One, the 51st Detachment has arrived. The second detachment will be ready for field operations o/a 15 December 1950, while the third detachment is not expected until after February 1951. The detachments are urgently required in Korea because of the vast areas taken during the rapid advance of the United Nations Forces. Chemical (Major Grimes) in conversation with G-4 (Major Tilton) 31 October 1950, stated that when the second detachment arrives from the ZI the augmentation for the 51st Detachment would no longer be required. The personnel used to augment the 51st Detachment will either be returned to their parent unit or utilized to form another intelligence detachment. This, however, will have to be determined at a later date. G-1 and G-2 have indicated their concurrence in the proposed recommendation in C/N 2, 26 October 1950.
3. Recommend G-4 indicate concurrence by initialing C/N 2.
4. If this request is approved, it will increase Chemical's strength on hand and requested from the DA from 3,541 to 3,549 as compared to a Chemical slice of 3,797.
5. Within established policy.
6. Action completed on G-4 Journal Number 16035.


Concurrence:

G-4 Supply (Major Kreutzer)

J.E.T.	<u>[Signature]</u>	26-6052
H.D.T.	<u>[Signature]</u>	26-6413
N.M.W.	<u>[Signature]</u>	26-6444

G-4 FILE

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CD P-0 MM/HT/ML/AR

G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

31 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD


Subject: Augmentation of the First 3rd Intelligence Detachment

1. Chemical's G-4 to G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4, 28 October 1950, requested authorization for an augmentation of the First Chemical Intelligence Detachment. The requested augmentation consists of three officers and five enlisted men.
2. Three Chemical Intelligence Detachments have been requested from the DA. One, the First Detachment, has arrived. The second detachment will be ready for field operations on 15 December 1950, while the third detachment is not expected until after February 1951. The detachments are urgently required in Korea because of the vast areas taken during the rapid advance of the United Nations Forces. Chemical (Major Grimes) in conversation with G-4 (Major Linton) 31 October 1950, stated that when the second detachment arrives from the DA the augmentation for the First Detachment would no longer be required. The personnel used to augment the First Detachment will either be returned to their parent unit or utilized to form another intelligence detachment. This, however, will have to be determined at a later date. G-1 and G-2 have indicated their concurrence in the proposed recommendation in G-4's 28 October 1950.
3. Recommend G-4 indicate concurrence by initialing G-4's.
4. If this request is approved, it will increase Chemical's strength on hand and requested from the DA from 8,541 to 8,549 as compared to a Chemical force of 8,507.
5. Within established policy.
6. Action completed on G-4 Journal Number 18035.

Concurrence:  
G-4 Supply (Major Krester) \_\_\_\_\_  
R.E.L. \_\_\_\_\_  
J.E.T. \_\_\_\_\_  
M.M.W. \_\_\_\_\_  
28-6018  
28-6013  
28-6012



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G-4 ROUTING	
ASST G-4	
ASST G-4	
EXTENSIVE	
① <i>LA</i>	<i>A</i>
C-PRG	
ASST	
PSYCHO-SUM	
N. S. S.	
② ADMIN	<i>gm</i>
G-4	

SECRET

GD P&O NMW/HDT/EAHW/bsc  
Lt Col Woodman 26-8545

370.2  
~~X370.2~~

Ord Military Personnel Ceiling  
G-3

25 OCT 1950

1. G-4 concurs in recommendation contained in para 1 C/N 5.
2. It is pointed out that strength shown under column Auth Str, Incl 1 C/N 5, is the T/O&E strength and does not agree necessarily with strengths requested from DA.

1 Incl  
n/c

-----G. L. E.-----  
M/R 25 Oct 50

1. For background information see G-4 Journal No. 13306 and G-4 Journal No. 15322 C/N 5 from Ord to G-4 subject as above, 23 Oct 50, recommends a list of units to be cancelled from outstanding CINCPAC requests on the DA.
2. The list of Ord units was submitted by Ord in order to come within Ord slice of 16,570. Total strength of units on the list is 4661. This figure represents the TO&E authorized strength and does not agree with the strengths of Ord units requested from DA. In several instances Ord units were requested at a strength less than T/O&E auth strength.
3. Recommend C/N 6 be approved and sent to G-3.
4. If this request is approved it will effect a reduction of Ord auth strength on hand and requisitioned from DA from 20,165 to 15,504 as compared with Ord slice of 16,570.
5. Within established policy.
6. Completes action on G-4 Journal No. 15648.

EAHW *APSW* 26-8545  
HDT \_\_\_\_\_ 26-6413  
NMW *nmw* 26-6444




SECRET

*nmw*  
RHO  
*gm* 15648

G-4 FILE

JN 15648





GD P&O LHM/HDT/WHM/sec  
24 Oct 50

TO: MILITARY PERSONNEL OFFICE

2-2

1. A copy of the memorandum is being furnished to you for information.

2. It is noted that the memorandum is dated 24 Oct 50. The memorandum is being furnished to you for information.

25 Oct 50

1. For background information see G-4 Journal No. 13306 and G-4 Journal No. 13322. The subject is above, 23 Oct 50, regarding a list of units to be cancelled from outstanding G-4 requests on the DA.

2. The list of G-4 units was submitted by G-4 in order to come within G-4 slice of 18,370. Total strength of units on the list is 4881. This figure represents the total authorized strength and does not agree with the strength of G-4 units requested from DA. In several instances G-4 units were requested at a strength less than T/O&M unit strength.

3. Recommended G-4 to be approved and sent to G-4.

4. If this request is approved it will effect a reduction of G-4 unit strength on hand and reallocated from DA from 30,165 to 18,304 as compared with G-4 slice of 18,370.

5. Within established policy.

6. Complete action on G-4 Journal No. 13348.

WHM 28-8245

HDT 28-6413

LHM 28-8244





SECRET

Major Tilton 26-6052

Ord Military Personnel Ceiling

G-4

Ord

29 OCT 1950

4

Request your recommendations in view of G-3's comments.

----- G. L. E. -----

From: Ord 0

To: G-4

Lt Col Wilson 57-8197  
Date: 23 Oct 1950

5

1. In order to bring the authorized strength of Ordnance units on hand and on request below the ceiling limitation of 16,570 which represents the Ordnance slice of the troop basis currently planned for 31 March 1951 (Fourth Edition "Basis for Planning Supply Requirements" issued 27 August 1950), it is recommended the units on the attached list be cancelled from outstanding CINCFE requests on the DA.

2. These cancellations represent units no longer required for Ordnance support of operations in the FEC. When planning has become firm enough to project accurately the Ord units required to support the post-hostilities force in the FEC, cancellation of additional outstanding requests will be recommended.

3. None of the cancellations contained on the attached list affect the units designated by the DA for shipment to the FEC, for which priorities were given in CINCFE msg CX 66687, 17 Oct 1950.

1 Incl  
List of Cancellations

U. N.

SECRET



SECRET

COPY

UNITS ON REQUEST BUT NO LONGER REQUIRED

<u>Radio</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Item No.</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>T/O&amp;E</u>	<u>Auth Str</u>	<u>No.</u>
CX 57693	12 Jul 50	3	Base Depot HHD*	9-312	41	1
CX 58824	27 Jul 50	4	✓ HM Co	9-9	212	1
		5	✓ Base Depot Co**	9-367T	207	1
		7	✓ Collecting Pt Co	9-358	215	1
		10	✓ HM Co	9-9	212	2
		12	✓ HAM Co	9-197	188	2
		14	✓ Supply Det (CO)	9-500	10	1
CX 59296	3 Aug 50	16	✓ MM Co	9-7	195	1
		17	✓ Recovery Co	9-187	167	1
		18	✓ Depot Co (A)	9-57	166	1
		1a	✓ Ammo Bn HHD	9-76	46	1
		3a	✓ Ammo Gp HHC	9-12	99	2
		15	✓ Ammo Co	9-17	256	3
		19	" "	"	256	3
CX 61015	24 Aug 50		✓ Supply Depot Co	9-367	278	1
CX 61015	24 Aug 50		✓ Base Depot HHC	9-620-1T	133	1
CX 61836	2 Sep 50		Fld Maint Co	9-357	256	1
CX 61836	2 Sep 50		Veh Distr Tm	9-500	72	1
*Request changed to Gp HHC 9-12 per CX 59543					99	✓
**	"	"	" Supply Depot Co 9-367 per CX 59543		278	
Authorized Strength of Units Cancelled herein					4661	

SECRET



SECRET

G-4 ROUTING

- AC/S G-4
- DA C/S G-4
- EXECUTIVE
- P+O *mm*
- C+RE
- SUPPLY
- PETROLEUM
- KEA
- ADMIN *mm*

Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths

320.2

From: G-4

To: Engr

*mm*  
GD P&O NMW/HDT/EAHW/bc

Lt Col Woodman 26-8545

Date: 25 OCT 1950

- 6
1. See attached note from CofS (TAB C).
  2. Attention is invited to C/N4 and C/N5.
  3. To comply with CofS directive contained in his memo to CofS, ROK, it is requested that the Engr submit to G-4, as soon as possible, a list of all non-divisional T/O&R and bulk authorization units to be retained in FECOM and cancelled from requisition on the DA.

3 Incls  
n/c


*mm*  
G. L. S.




G-4 File Copy

SECRET

*mm*  
P+O  
15641







System Technical Service Report

5-4 ROUTING  
A. G. K.  
B. G. K.  
C. G. K.  
D. G. K.  
E. G. K.  
F. G. K.  
G. G. K.  
H. G. K.  
I. G. K.  
J. G. K.

1951 OCT 18





SECRET

Lt Col Owen  
26-5963

## Technical Service Troop Strengths

G-3

G-4

5

1. G-3 concurs with recommendations made in paragraphs 3 and 5 of G-4 C/N, 19 Oct 50.

2. G-3 recommends that the Engineer Special Brigade strength be charged to the Engineer slice because of the following reasons:

a. The frequently demonstrated use of amphibious forces makes it apparent that amphibious operations may be considered a normal tactical procedure in this theater rather than a special operation. A continued need for units designed to execute amphibious landings indicates the need for an Engineer Special Brigade as part of the troop list for this theater.

b. The method used by G-4 in determining appropriate technical service slices is based on world-wide deployment experience in World War II. This table is based on the total of all troops of a particular arm or service being grouped, regardless of mission, to determine percentages of each present in the large balanced force that was deployed in all theaters. The table has been modified to conform to post-war changes.

c. Not to charge the Engineer Special Brigade strength to the Engineer slice might establish a policy which would encourage other technical services to claim that certain units are designed for special operations, therefore should not be charged against the respective technical service slice. The end result of such actions could lead to a misrepresentation of the true combat troop strength of the theater.

d. It is significant to note that up to the present date, the Korean campaign has progressed successfully with the technical services units actually present in the theater being far below the strength authorized by G-4 slice figures.

e. It is believed that any future conflict which may find US occupation forces engaged in their primary mission of defending the Japanese Islands would find almost unlimited indigenous personnel willing to assist and very able to perform many of the service support functions.

3. C/N from G-4 to G-3, 12 Oct 50 requested that Engineer Dredge Crew (Hydraulic Suction 21" cutter type), T/O&E 5-637S nominated for deletion.

SECRET



SECRET

Lt Col Owen  
26-5963

Technical Service Troop Strengths

G-3

G-4

5  
(cont'd)

in C/N from G-4 to G-3, 11 Oct 50 be deferred until 20 Oct. Subsequently, based on Engr C/N, 14 Oct 50 to G-3 thru G-4, CINCFE Msg CX 66567, 16 Oct 50 informed DA to cancel request for above mentioned unit.

3 Incls  
n/c

-----E. K. W.-----

SECRET



SECRET

GD P&amp;O NMW/HDT/EAHW/bc

## G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

25 October 1950

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Technical Service Troop Strengths

1. For background see G-4 JN 14249 and G-4 JN 15095. C/N5 from G-3 to G-4, subject as above, dated 24 Oct 50, concurs in G-4 recommendations that:

a. The Engr slice include all Engr non-divisional T/O&E and bulk authorization units.

b. The Engr submit a list of units to be retained, including all non-divisional T/O&E and bulk authorization units.

2. C/N6 to Engr requests the Engr to submit to G-4, as soon as possible, a list of all non-divisional T/O&E and bulk authorization units to be retained and cancelled from requisition from the DA.

3. Recommend C/N6 be approved and sent to Engr.

4. Within established G-4 policy.

5. Complete action on G-4 JN 15641.

E.A.H.W. GDW 26-8545

H.D.T. \_\_\_\_\_ 26-6413

N.M.W. MMW 26-6444

SECRET

G-4 FILE



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 975029

320.2

CROSS REFERENCE OTHER THAN RADIO

FROM: G-3

DATE: 25 Oct 50

TO: JLCOM

SUBJECT: (MSGFRM AG 320.2) REORGANIZATION OF 5 STATION HOSPS IN JAPAN

With M/R

DOCUMENT IN: 322

JO. NO. XXXX XX DIV. P&O



G-4 ROUTING
A C/S G-4
DAC/S G-4
EXECUTIVE <i>B</i>
P+O
C+RE
SUPPLY
PETROLEUM
KEA
ADMIN <i>W</i>

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

GD P.O. NMW/bc

October 1950

*Secret*  
*32012*

24 OCT 1950

240521

FROM: *W* CINCFC TOKYO JAPAN

TO: DA WASHINGTON DC . . . . . PRIORITY

**C-67296**

FOR GEORGE FOUR PD SUBJECT IS STRENGTH OF POST  
 HOSTILITIES KOREAN ARMY PD PRESENT VIEWS ARE THAT GROUND FORCES SHOULD  
 CONSIST OF TEN INFANTRY DIVISIONS WITH NECESSARY NON DIVISIONAL COMBAT  
 AND TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE SUPPORT TO A TOTAL STRENGTH  
 OF APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PD RECOMMENDED TO&ES NOT  
 FINALIZED PD WILL BE FORWARDED SOON

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

K. B. BUSH  
 Brigadier General, USA  
 Adjutant General

G. L. EBERLE  
 Major General, General Staff Corps  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Copies to: ROK, G-4 (Return), G-4 P&O (Return)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

24 October 1950

SUBJECT: Proposed Strength of Post Hostilities Korean Army

1. In accordance with oral instructions of the CofS, a proposed message to DA on the above subject was prepared by G-4 and submitted to the CofS for approval 21 October 50.
2. CofS approved 22 October 50.
3. Within established G-4 policy.
4. Action completed on G-4 JN 15543.

N. M. W. *NMW* 26-6444


JN 15543

*Secret*

G-4 File

G-4 Return






*[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]*

DISPATCHED  
24 OCT 1950  
G-4  
GHQ

24 OCT 1950  
G-4  
GHQ





SECRET

Colonel Winn 26-6444

Proposed Strength of Post Hostilities  
Korean Army

G-4

CofS

21 OCT 1950


1. In accordance with your oral instructions a proposed message to DA G-4 is submitted for approval.
2. With reference to Part I of proposed message KMAG and Eighth Army's recommended TO&E's are being forwarded to CINCFE in the next few days. After review here, it is suggested they be forwarded to DA for final approval.
3. With reference to Part II of proposed message, a study is being currently conducted by G-4 and Ordnance to determine availability and savings that could be effected by procurement of motor equipment for the Korean army in Japan. In addition to initial savings there is also the lessened cost of maintenance to Korea.
4. Recommend approval and return to G-4 for finalization and dispatch.

1 Incl:  
Proposed Msg

----- G. L. E. -----

SECRET





Colonel William S. Smith

Proposed Summary of Post Hostilities  
Korean Army

1. In accordance with your oral instructions a proposed message to  
LA-24 is submitted for approval.

2. With reference to Part I of proposed message KMAS and RUSKIN  
have forwarded TO-21's are being forwarded to CINCUS in the next few  
days. After review here, it is suggested they be forwarded to IM for  
final approval.

3. With reference to Part II of proposed message, a study is being  
currently completed by G-4 and G-5 in order to determine feasibility and  
having that could be effected by expenditure of major equipment for the  
Korean Army in Japan. In addition to initial savings there is also the  
estimated cost of maintenance to Korea.

4. Forward approval and return to G-4 for finalization and  
dispatch.

RECEIVED  
24 OCT 1950  
G-4  
GH O



SECRET

*W*

GD P&O NMW/HDT/EAHW/dr

G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

23 October 1950

*320.2*

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Subject: Technical Service Unit Requirements for Post-Hostilities Period

1. The Technical Services submitted these actions in response to a request made at a conference held by Plans Branch at 0930 hours 18 October 1950. The subject of the conference was Technical Service Troop Strengths for Post-Hostilities period. Information contained in these actions was used by Plans Branch in showing housing requirements for troops to be stationed in Japan and Okinawa.
2. The Technical Service Troop Strength for the post-hostilities period is 37% of 215,000. The Technical Sections have submitted their proposed list of units to be stationed in Japan and Okinawa.
3. No further action required.
4. Within established policy.
5. Action completed on G-4 Journal Number 15242 and G-4 Journal Number 15246.

E.A.H.W. *Guarano* 26-8545

H.D.T. *Hoy* 26-6413

N.M.W. *MM* 26-6444


*MMW*

*D.O  
15246  
15242  
RT*

SECRET

15242 and 15246

G-4 FILE





G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION  
23 October 1950  
CD P-0 MIM/ADT/EAHW/47

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Technical Service Unit Requirements for Post-Hostilities Period

1. The Technical Services submitted these actions in response to a request made at a conference held by Plans Branch at 0930 hours 18 October 1950. The subject of the conference was Technical Service Troop Strengths for Post-Hostilities Period. Information contained in these actions was used by Plans Branch in showing housing requirements for troops to be stationed in Japan and Okinawa.
2. The Technical Service Troop Strength for the post-hostilities period is 27,000. The Technical Services have submitted their proposed list of units to be stationed in Japan and Okinawa.
3. No further action required.
4. Within established policy.
5. Action completed on G-4 Journal Number 15242 and G-4 Journal Number 15243.

W.A.L. \_\_\_\_\_ 28-0444  
 T.D.T. \_\_\_\_\_ 28-8418  
 S.A.P. \_\_\_\_\_ 28-8248





**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND**

**CHECK SHEET**

**SECRET**

(Do not remove from attached sheets) Major Hatchell 26-7722

File No :

Subject: Post-hostilities FEC (Army) Troop Basis

Note  
No.

1

From: Trans O

To: G-4

Date: 10 OCT 1950

1. Reference is made to C/N 1 from G-3 to G-1, G-2, G-4, subject: Post hostilities FEC (Army) Troop Basis, 14 October 1950.

2. Attached herewith as inclosures 1 through 4, inclusive, are lists of Transportation troops required to support Eighth Army, JLCOM, RYCOM and GHQ activities, respectively.

3. The total number of Transportation Corps troops required for the support missions referred to above is 12,404.

4 Incls  
a/s

*H.M.*

-----  
H.T.M.  
-----

**SECRET**







SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col Dixon 57-8629

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Estimate of T/D Units - JLCOM

Note  
No.

From: QM


To: G4

Date: 23 Oct 50


In accordance with verbal request, there is attached a list showing the breakdown of QM personnel required for JLCOM.

*for* *Risel*  
K.L.H.

SECRET








GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
IAR EAST COMMAND  
CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)  
Lt Col Dixon 27-8629

File No. Subject Estimate of T/D Units - TIGM

Note No. From To Date  
23 Oct 50

In accordance with verbal request, there is attached a list showing the breakdown of GM personnel required for TIGM.





SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

A  
280

CHECK SHEET Lt Col Dixon 57-8269

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: QM Troop Requirements Post Hostilities

Note No.

From: QM

To: G-4

Date: 19 Oct 1950

1

1. There is inclosed herewith a list of QM T/O&E units and the over-all requirements for QM T/D units to support the planned post-hostilities troop basis of 215,000 Army plus 65,000 Air Force spaces in Japan and Okinawa. This list does not include the units required to support the planned occupation force in Korea and to complete Graves Registration and Repatriation of Dead programs there.

2. The list of units is predicated upon providing essential QM service support for one field army in being plus continuing QM service support for a communications zone, represented by Japan Logistical Command, and providing QM service support for the Okinawa Garrison.

1 Incl  
Troop List

15H

----- K. L. H. -----



SECRET  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET  
Lt Col Dixon 27-3269

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: \_\_\_\_\_ Subject: All Troop Regiments Post Hostilities



From: \_\_\_\_\_ To: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: 19 Oct 1950

1. There is attached herewith a list of OLT units and the over-  
all requirements for OLT units to support the planned post-hostilities  
troop basis of 215,000 Army plus 65,000 Air Force bases in Japan and  
Okinawa. This list does not include the units required to support the  
planned occupation force in Korea and to complete Graves Registration and  
repatriation of dead programs there.


2. The list of units is predicated upon providing essential OLT services  
support for one field army in being plus continuing OLT service support for  
a communications zone, represented by Japan Logistical Command, and providing  
OLT service support for the Okinawa Garrison.

1 Incl  
Troop List

-----







CROSS REFERENCE OTHER THAN RADIO

320.2

~~560~~

FROM: Trans 0

DATE: 23 Oct 50

TO: G-4, 1, 3 In Turn

SUBJECT: (C/N 1,2) REVISION OF HARBORCRAFT UNIT REQUIREMENTS

With M/R

DOCUMENT IN: 322

JO. NO. ~~15439~~ DIV. ~~P&O~~



SECRET

Colonel Winns 26-6444

320, 2

Proposed Strength of Post Hostilities  
Korean Army

G-4

CofS

GD P&O NMW/bc

21 OCT 1950

1. In accordance with your oral instructions a proposed message to DA G-4 is submitted for approval.
2. With reference to Part I of proposed message KMAG and Eighth Army, recommended TO&E's are being forwarded to CINCPAC in the next few days. After review here, it is suggested they be forwarded to DA for final approval.
3. With reference to Part II of proposed message, a study is being currently conducted by G-4 and Ordnance to determine availability and savings that could be effected by procurement of motor equipment for the Korean army in Japan. In addition to initial savings there is also the lessened cost of maintenance to Korea.
4. Recommend approval and return to G-4 for finalization and dispatch.

1 Incl:  
Proposed Msg

(E)

-G. L. E.-

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

1. No M/R considered necessary as C/N is self-explanatory.
2. Within established G-4 policy.
3. Initiated action complete.

G-4 ROUTING

AC/S G-4

AC/S G-4

EXECUTIVE

P+O

C+RE

SUPPLY

PETROLEUM

KEA

ADMIN

N.M.W. NMW 26-6444

FILE

*[Signature]*

SECRET



15441

G-4 FILE

*[Signature]*

15





11/11/11

Report of the...

OF THE...

1. The report...

2. The report...

3. The report...

4. The report...

11/11/11

11/11/11

5. The report...

6. The report...

7. The report...

11/11/11

11/11/11



G-4 ROUTING	
AC/SG-1	
DAC/SG-1	
EXECUTIVE	
P+O	<i>[initials]</i>
C+RE	<i>[initials]</i>
SUPPLY	
PETROLEUM	
KEA	
ADMIN	<i>[initials]</i>

SECRET

G-4 FILE

GD P&O NMW/HDT/JET/mg

Major Tilton 26-6052

320,2  
~~320,3~~

Ord Military Personnel Ceiling  
Ord

20 OCT 1950

Request your recommendations in view of G-3's comments.

NMW

G. L. E.

M/R

20 October 1950

1. For additional background see G-4 JN 13306.

2. In brief, the above action concerned the proposed reduction of Ord strength to bring Ord within their 16,570 slice. Ord O in C/N 1 on 23 Sep 50 proposed to meet the Ord strength ceiling by reducing the authorized strength of units on hand and requested from the DA. G-4 in C/N 2 to G-3 on 29 Sep 50 requested G-3 concurrence in the Ord O proposal prior to submitting detailed information.

3. G-3 in C/N 3 to G-4 on 19 Oct 50 did not concur in the proposed method for reducing strength and outlined objections. G-3 recommended that the reductions be effected by deletion of entire units requested from the DA and through the utilization of R/T reduction tables where possible.

4. Recommend approval of C/N 4 which returns G-3 comments to Ordnance for their recommendations.

5. Within established policy.

6. Completes action on G-4 JN 15322.

J.E.T. [initials] 26-6052

H.D.T. [initials] 26-6413

N.M.W. [initials] 26-6444

SECRET

JN 15322

G-4 FILE





GD P&O MMW/HMT/JHT/mg

Report Title: 2-4-52

Ord Military Personnel Center

G-4 ROUTING  
DATE  
BY  
FOR  
BY  
BY  
BY  
BY  
BY  
BY

Request your recommendations in view of G-3's comments.

THAW

20 October 1950

M/R

1. For additional background see G-4 JN 13306.
2. In brief, the above action concerned the proposed reduction of Ord strength to bring Ord within their 16,570 slice. Ord O in C/N 1 on 23 Sep 50 proposed to meet the Ord strength ceiling by reducing the authorized strength of units on hand and requested from the DA. G-4 in C/N 2 to G-3 on 29 Sep 50 requested G-3 concurrence in the Ord O proposal prior to submitting detailed information.
3. G-3 in C/N 3 to G-4 on 19 Oct 50 did not concur in the proposed method for reducing strength and outlined objections. G-3 recommended that the reductions be effected by deletion of entire units requested from the DA and through the utilization of R/T reduction tables where possible.
4. Recommend approval of C/N 4 which returns G-3 comments to Ordnance for their recommendations.
5. Within established policy.
6. Complete action on G-4 JN 13322.

J.E.T. 26-6025

H.D.T. 26-0413

N.M.W. 26-0414



JN 13322

G-4 FILE



SECRET

Lt Col Stahl  
26-5956

## Ordnance Military Personnel Ceiling

G-3

G-4

19 OCT 1950

3.

1. G-3 does not concur in the method proposed for reducing the strengths of Ordnance units requested for the FEC:

a. Units already present in the FEC are assigned to field commanders for the performance of missions assigned to field commanders and any changes in such units should be recommended by the field commanders.

b. The policy of the DA requires that deviations from Tables of Organization in the actual organization of a unit be held to absolute minimum. When an organization is required which for any reason results in extensive deviation from the T/O&E, a Table of Distribution is employed.

c. The proposed action, if followed as a general rule, would result in severely unbalanced grade structure not only in the affected units, but in the command and the Army as a whole.

d. The slice factor should be construed in general terms as including total manpower exclusive of such indigenous personnel which would normally be expected to be available under wartime conditions. Replacement of military personnel with indigenous personnel and/or civilian personnel as contemplated in the proposed action would not correct the excessive obligation of manpower for Ordnance functions.

2. Recommend that reduction in the Ordnance slice be effected by the deletion of entire units requested from the ZI and/or utilization of reduction tables or reduced strength tables where available.

3. In connection with the subject problem, G-3 has just received from the DA a troop ceiling for Army Forces of the FEC which includes a sub-ceiling on Ordnance Corps officers (860). Such sub-ceiling will undoubtedly affect the strength, number and type of Ordnance units which can be absorbed in the FEC troop basis. For your information, the tentative total troop ceiling for the FEC for Fiscal Year 1951 to be reached by 30 Jun 51 is as follows:

<u>Off</u>	<u>ANC/WMSC</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>(Negro)</u>	<u>Aggregate</u>
19808	2115	3960	273330	(30066)	299213

E. K. W.

SECRET



G-4 ROUTING

AC/S G-4

DA C/S G-4

EXECUTIVE

INFO

C+RE

SUPPLY

PROLOG

KEA

ADMIN

*[Handwritten signatures and initials over the routing slip]*

SECRET

G-4 FILE

Maj Tilton 26-6052

*320.2*

G-4 FILE

Technical Service Troop Strengths

CofS

19 OCT 1950

1. G-4 feels that the increase in the Signal slice is not necessary at this phase of the Korean emergency because:

- a. The strength of Signal units supporting the Korean operation to date has been only 10,532 spaces. Additional units with a strength of 1,491 spaces are enroute to the theatre. This gives a total of 11,843 spaces as against an approved slice of 12,082 spaces.
- b. Personnel shortages in existing Signal units have not been filled.
- c. The additional units, 2,942 spaces above the slice, which have been requested from the ZI cannot be made available in the ZI before Feb 51.
- d. If Signal personnel are diverted from the replacement stream to form these new units in the ZI, existing Signal units in the FEC cannot be brought up to authorized strength without difficulty.
- e. All of the Signal units now in or enroute to the FEC have not been utilized as yet.
- f. It appears to be only a matter of time until ROK units will be able to furnish the bulk of their own Signal support.
- g. The gradual assumption for the responsibility of commercial radio and telephone communications by the Korean government will decrease the need for US Sig units.

2. For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph and in G-4's C/N 2 on 14 Oct, G-4 cannot concur in the Signal Officer's request for an increase in the Signal slice.

3. G-4 recommends disapproval of the request for any increase in Signal strength above 12,082.

1 Incl  
Memo fr SGS, 14 Oct 50, w/Incls

*[Handwritten signature: G. L. E.]*

G-4 FILE

SECRET

*910  
15172*



SECRET

Lt Col E. E. Sullio  
26-5874

## Technical Service Troop Strengths

Signal

Chief of Staff

17 Oct 50

Thru: G-4

1. Reference is made to Memo to Signal Officer thru G-4, 14 Oct 50, directing that information be furnished regarding Signal personnel utilized in support of the ROK Army and the use being made of ROK personnel in support of the Signal Corps mission in Korea.

2. An analysis of Signal communications and supply support for ROKA reveals that US military personnel provide communications down to ROKA division level. In addition, approximately 20% of the equipment processed thru Signal depot facilities and message traffic handled over Signal communications facilities represents the minimum support provided ROKA.

3. At the present time, approximately 1,000 ROK troops are attached to Signal units in Korea. They are being utilized primarily in construction and supply operations and have proven to be about 50% effective. The remainder, due to limited mental and physical capabilities and their inability to absorb the necessary training, actually are not of sufficient value to help relieve the personnel problem prevalent in all Signal Corps units. However, ROKA troops will continue to be utilized wherever possible.

4. The effective use of civilian indigenous personnel in communications activities is limited, primarily due to the lack of technical aptitude required of communications personnel. Also to be considered are the security aspects which prohibit the utilization of indigenous personnel in many positions. However, indigenous personnel are presently utilized in Signal construction and depot activities and will continue to be utilized to the maximum extent possible. With the return of commercial radio and telephone communications facilities to the Korean Government, operations and maintenance functions will be relinquished as rapidly as possible in consonance with the military requirements.

5. It is again reiterated that a ceiling of 15,037 requested in my check note, dated 8 Oct 50, is imperative to the satisfactory performance of the Signal Corps mission in support of the Korean operation.

G. I. B.

## NOTE FOR RECORD:

1. Memo referred to in paragraph 1 of context, from the Chief of Staff, requested the above information.

2. Clears action 3284.

SECRET

E. E. S.

15172





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NOTE FOR RECORD:

1. Memo referred to in paragraph 1 of context, Staff, requested the above information.

2. Clears section 3384.



SECRET

## G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

GD P&amp;O NMW/HDT/JET/nm

19 October 1950

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths.

1. For additional background see G-4 JN 14452.
2. In brief, the above action was Signal Officer's request, with reasons, to increase the Signal slice from 12,082 to 15,037. G-4 in C/N 2 to the CofS on 13 Oct recommended that the Signal slice remain at 12,082.
3. The CofS on 14 Oct requested additional information concerning the utilization of indigenous personnel by Signal and the Signal support furnished the ROK troops. Signal Section in C/N 1 to the CofS through G-4 on 17 Oct outlined the use of indigenous personnel with Signal units in Korea. The main points the Signal Officer emphasized was that the capabilities of the Korean personnel were limited.
4. Recommend approval of C/N 2 which reiterates G-4's non-concurrence in the Signal Officer's request for an increase in the Signal slice.
5. Within established G-4 policy.
6. Completes action on G-4 JN 15172.

J.E.T. [Signature] 26-6052

H.D.T. \_\_\_\_\_ 26-6413


N.M.W. [Signature] 26-6444

G-4 FILE

SECRET

JN 15172





MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR  
SUBJECT: Technical Service Troop Strengths

1. For additional background see G-1 18 1112.
2. In order, the above action was taken in response to the request of the Signal Officer to increase the strength of the Signal Troop from 12 to 15. The Signal Officer recommended that the Signal Troop be increased to 15.
3. The Signal Officer requested additional information concerning the utilization of indigenous personnel by Signal and the Signal support furnished the Signal Troop. Signal Section in G-1 18 1112 on 17 Oct outlined the use of indigenous personnel with Signal units in Korea. The main points the Signal Officer emphasized was that the capabilities of the Signal Troop were limited.
4. Recombinant approval of G-1 18 1112 was received in the Signal Officer's request for an increase in the Signal Troop.
5. Signal Section in G-1 18 1112.
6. Complete action on G-1 18 1112.

18-1082  
18-1081  
18-1080





Paraphrase not required. Consult cryptocenter before  
decias. Handle as corr of clas carried herein per pars  
17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and (4) AR 370-510-101-10

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

320.2

OUTGOING MESSAGE GC-TNG RVP/jbh

*Secret*

October 1950

G-4 ROUTING	
A C/S G-4	<i>ML</i>
DA C/S G-4	
EXECUTIVE	<i>Dy</i>
P+O	
C+RE	
SUPPLY	
PETROLEUM	
KEA	
ADM	<i>W/WAP</i>

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : CG ARMY EIGHT. . . . . PRIORITY

CG X CORPS . . . . . PRIORITY

INFO: CG JLCOM . . . . . PRIORITY (COURIER)

191 023

**Cx 66881**

CINCFE MSG CX 66403, 14 Oct 50. X Corps msg

X 10936, 16 Oct 50. Desire strength of ROK personnel in US units X Corps be reduced to 25 per company or similar unit by transfer to ROK units in accordance with desires of CG Army Eight. This reduction to be accomplished as rapidly as practicable in view current operations and commensurate with ability of ROK Forces to accept subject personnel. Direct communication authorized between X Corps and Army Eight for purpose of implementing transfer.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

K. B. BUSH  
Brigadier General, USA  
Adjutant General

*Carl H Gark*  
for B. K. WRIGHT  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Asst Chief of Staff, G-3


Copies to: ROK Distr G-3 (return)

I/R: 1. CINCFE msg CX 66403 post X Corps comments relative reduction authorized str ROK pers in US troop units from 100 to 25 per company. CG X Corps by msg X 10936 concurs in contemplated reduction.

2. Instant msg self explanatory. Approved by CofS 19 Oct 50, initial H.

*Porter*  
Porter  
26-5959


*Secret*





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Authority NN 0975029



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SECRET

GD P&O NMW/HDT/EAHW/dr

Lt Col Woodman 26-8545

320.2

19 OCT 1950

Technical Service Troop Strengths

G-4

G-3

4

1. See attached note from Chief of Staff ROK. (Tab G)
2. The total aggregate strength shown in last column on the fifth page of the Engineer list is in error. The total is 33,451 instead of 33,364 as shown. See correction sheet Tab A. 377
3. G-4 feels that the Engineer slice should include all the Engineer strength of non-divisional T/O&E and bulk authorization units. See Tab B for list of units having Engineer strength but not included on Engineer list of units to be retained.
4. G-4 has no objection to excluding the Engineer special brigade strength from being charged to the Engineer slice as long as it is not charged against Technical Service Troop Strengths.
5. It is recommended that the Engineer be requested to submit a list of units to be retained, including all non-divisional T/O&E and bulk authorization units.

3 Incls  
Tabs A, B, C a/s

(E)  
G.L.E.

G-4 FILE

G-4 ROUTING	
A C/S G-4	_____
DA C/S G-4	_____
EXECUTIVE	_____
TO	_____
C + RE	_____
SUB	_____
PETROLEUM	_____
SEA	_____
ADMIN	_____

G-4 FILE

B20  
150  
95  
88

G-4 FILE

SECRET



SECRET

Correction on Page Number	Type of Unit	No. in Japan and Korea	Agg Str	Total No. Units Rqd	Agg Str	No. of Units Rqd to be deleted by G-4 Directive	Agg Str	Total No. of Units Rqd - Not Received	Agg Str	Ultimate Engr Strength	Agg Str
2	Engr Depot Co	2	438	2	438	0	0	2	438	2	438
4	Wall Drilling Em	0	0	2	28	0	0	2	28	2	28
5	Regional Post Engr Svc Unit	1	527	1	527	0	0	0	0	1	527
5	Total		14,921		47,705		14,328		18,960		33,377
	Engr Spec Brigade	1	1,450	1	1,450	0	0	0	0	1	1,450
5	Total w/Spec Brigade		16,371		49,155		14,328		18,960		34,827

Tab A

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Authority NND 975074

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33



SECRET

UNITS WITH ENGINEER STRENGTH NOT INCLUDED IN  
ENGINEER LIST

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ENGR SECTION STRENGTH</u>
GHQ	73
Hq & Svc Comd	259
JLCOM (Log Comd C)	37
2D Log Comd (G)	37
3D Log Comd (B)	28
Northern Command TD	9
Southwestern Command TD	9
Eighth Army T/O&E	72
I Corps T/O&E	12
IX Corps T/O&E	12
X Corps T/O&E	12
X Corps (Augmentation)	2
ETA JIMA School Command TD	118
Tokyo General Hospital	21
Composite Service Companies TD	
8011	20
8012	33
8013	76
8014	49
8015	45
8016	62
8017	39
8018	24
8019	21
8020	40
8021	41
8022	40
8023	39
8024	43
8025	110
8027	38
8028	37
8030	63
8091	40
8092	40
TOTAL	1,601

SECRET



**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

16 October 1950

SUBJECT: Technical Service Troop Strength

The attached summary, which shows the minimum number of Engineer units considered necessary to give proper Engineer support to the Korean effort, totals approximately 34,800 against an allowed total (G-4 directive) of 33,484. This total is submitted since it includes the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, a unit designated for special operations, and, therefore, not considered as a normal supporting Engineer unit. Exclusion of this unit from the Engineer totals will bring the Engineer total below the 33,484 directed.

J. G. CHRISTIANSEN  
Major General, USA  
Engineer

**SECRET**




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Type of Unit	No. in Japan and Korea	Agg Str	Total No. Units Rqd	Agg Str	No. of Units Rqd to be deleted by G-4 Directive	Agg Str	Total No. of Units Rqd - Not Received	Agg Str	Ultimate Engr Strength	Agg Str
Hq & Hq Co, Engr Const Brig	0	0	1	212	0	0	1	212	1	212
Hq & Hq Co Engr Combat Gp	2	224	7	764	4	448	1	112	3	336
Hq & Hq Co Engr Const Gp	2	240	6	720	2	240	2	240	4	480
Engr Combat Bn (Army)	5	3,620	22	15,928	10	7,240	7	5,068	12	8,688
Engr Const Bn	5	4,565	15	13,695	4	3,652	6	5,478	11	10,043
Engr Searchlight Bn	0	0	1	420	1	420	0	0	0	0
Engr Dump Tk Co	4	520	20	2,600	5	650	11	1,430	15	1,950
Engr Water Sup Co	2	272	4	544	0	0	2	272	4	544
Engr Panel Br Co	1	134	7	938	4	536	2	268	3	402
Engr Ponton Br Co	1	180	5	900	0	0	4	720	5	900
Engr Treadway Br Co	2	278	8	1,112	0	0	6	834	8	1,112
Engr Firefighting Co	1	66	1	66	0	0	1	66	1	66

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


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Type of Unit	No. in Japan and Korea	Agg Str	Total No. Units Rqd	Agg Str	No. of Units Rqd to be deleted by G-4 Directive	Agg Str	Total No. of Units Rqd - not Received	Agg Str	Ultimate Engineer Strength	Agg Str
Engr Port Cons Co	1	261	2	522	0	0	1	261	2	522
Engr Light Equip Co	2	370	7	1,295	2	370	3	555	5	925
Engr Heavy Equip Co	1	221	4	884	1	221	2	442	3	663
Engr Heavy Shop Co	0	0	1	171	0	0	1	171	1	171
Engr Depot Co	2	429	2	429	0	0	2	429	2	429
Engr Base Dep Co	0	0	1	168	0	0	1	168	1	168
Engr Parts Sup Co	0	0	1	175	0	0	1	175	1	175
Engr Equip Sup Co	0	0	1	201	0	0	1	201	1	201
Engr Camouflage Co	0	0	1	76	1	76	0	0	0	0
Engr Topo Co, Corps	0	0	3	405	0	0	3	405	3	405
Engr Pet Dist Co	2	434	4	868	1	217	1	217	3	651
Engr Maint Co	5	955	7	1,337	1	191	1	191	6	1,146

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Authority NND 75024






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Type of Unit	No. in Japan and Korea	Agg Str	Total No. Units Rqd	Agg Str	No. of Units Rqd to be deleted by G-4 Directive	Agg Str	Total No. of Units Rqd - Not Received	Agg Str	Ultimate Engineer Strength	Agg Str
Engr Tech Intell Tm (Combat)	0	0	2	8	0	0	2	8	2	8
Engr Tech Intell Tm (Research)	0	0	1	9	0	0	1	9	1	9
Hq, Engr Sv Bn	1	52	2	104	0	0	1	52	2	104
Pro Cetylene Tm	1	22	2	44	0	0	1	22	2	44
CO <sub>2</sub> Sup Tm	0	0	2	6	0	0	2	6	2	6
Mobile Searchlight Maint Tm	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	3	1	3
Refr Maint Tm #1	0	0	10	30	0	0	10	30	10	30
Refr Maint Tm #2	1	18	1	18	0	0	0	0	1	18
Rock Crusher Tm	0	0	2	14	0	0	2	14	2	14
Welding Team	0	0	4	40	0	0	4	40	4	40
Engr Util Tm (EC)	0	0	3	102	0	0	3	102	3	102
Engr Util Tm (ED)	0	0	1	41	0	0	1	41	1	41
Engr Util Tm (EE)	0	0	1	58	0	0	1	58	1	58

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Authority NND 75024





SECRET

Type of Unit	No. in Jap- an & Korea	Agg Str	Total No. Units Rqd	Agg Str	No. of Units Rqd to be deleted by G-4 Directive		Total No. of Units Rqd - Not Received		Ultim. Engineer. Strength	
						Agg Str		Agg Str		
Engr Util Tn (EF)	0	0	4	352	0	0	4	352	4	352
Engr Fire- fighting Tn	0	0	2	54	0	0	2	54	2	54
Well Drilling Tn	0	0	2	14	0	0	2	14	2	14
Map Depot Det (Corps)	1	22	1	22	0	0	0	0	1	22
Floating Power Plant	0	0	1	59	0	0	1	59	1	59
Power Plant Maint Det	0	0	2	46	0	0	2	46	2	46
Power Plant Oper Det	0	0	5	40	0	0	5	40	5	40
Power Line Maint Det	0	0	4	16	0	0	4	16	4	16
Dredge Crew, Hopper Dredge	0	0	1	56	0	0	1	56	1	56
Dredge Crew, Gutterhead	0	0	1	67	1	67	0	0	0	0
Map Depot Det (Comm Z)	1	7	1	7	0	0	0	0	1	7
Engr Topo Det	2	48	2	48	0	0	0	0	2	48

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Authority NND 75024

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33



SECRET

Type of Unit	No. in Japan and Korea	Agg Str	Total No. Units Rqd.	Agg Str	No. of Units Rqd to be deleted by G-4 Directive	Agg Str	Total No. of Units Rqd - Not Received	Agg Str	Ultimate Engineer Strength	Agg Str
Engr Topo Bn	1	455	1	455	0	0	0	0	1	455
Survey Liaison Det	2	31	2	31	0	0	0	0	2	31
Yokohama Engr Dep	1	961	1	961	0	0	0	0	1	961
Regional Post Engr Sv Unit	1	537	1	537	0	0	0	0	1	537
<b>Total</b>		<b>14,922</b>		<b>47,692</b>		<b>14,328</b>		<b>18,937</b>		<b>33,364</b>
Engr Spec Brig	1	1,450	1	1,450	0	0	0	0	1	1,450
<b>Total w/Spec Brig</b>		<b>16,372</b>		<b>49,142</b>		<b>14,328</b>		<b>18,937</b>		<b>34,814</b>

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 975024





SECRET

GD P&amp;O NMW/HDT/EAHW/dr

## G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

19 October 1950

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths

1. For background information see G-4 Journal Numbers 14249 and 14847. C/N 2 from Engr to G-4, subject as above, 6 October 1950, submitted a list of units that could be deleted from requisition from DA. The C/N stated the Engr felt the Engr troops of the Special Brigade should not be charged against the Engr service support strength. G-4 C/N to G-3 recommended that certain Engr units be deleted from requisition from DA and stated G-4 did not agree that the Engr elements of the Special Brigade should not be charged to the Engr total of service support strength. G-3, on an AG routing slip, sent both C/Ns to the Chief of Staff with a proposed message to DA recommending deletion of Engr units from requisition from DA.
2. The Chief of Staff on a memo 14 October 1950, sent the action to CofS ROK with a directive that the G-3, G-4 and Engr be required to arrive at a single list for deletion and retention of Engr units. The CofS ROK on a memo 17 October 1950 to G-4 and G-3 in turn, asked for comment on any differences in the Engr's proposed list of units to be retained.
3. The Engr list includes both T/O&E and TD units that total in strength to 33,431 instead of 33,364. (See Tab A). The strength figure does not include the Engr Special Brigade, nor does it include Engr strength in Hqs and bulk authorization units, i.e. GHQ, JLCOM, 8TH ARMY, Corps, Log Comds, and composite companies (See Tab B).
4. In order to arrive at an Engr slice, the strength of the units in the attached Engr list, the Engr elements of the Special Brigade and the Engr sections of Hqs and bulk authorization units mentioned above must be combined into a total strength.
5. At the present time the authorized strength of Engr units on hand and designated by DA is about 21,000 including the Engr Special Brigade and the units shown on Tab B. The actual strength is considerably below 21,000. In view of this strength figure G-4 cannot agree with the Engr's contention that Engr Special Brigade strength should not be included in the total of Engr service troop strength.
6. Recommend approval of action C/N to G-3 which:
  - a. States G-4 position on method of computation of Engr strength.

G-4 FILE

SECRET



SECRET

GD P&O NMW/HDT/EAHW/dr

G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

19 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD (CONTD)

Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths

b. Recommends that Engr be requested to submit a list of units to be retained including all non-divisional T/O&E and bulk authorization units.

c. Points out the error in aggregate strength on Engr list of units to be retained and indicates that G-4 has no objection to excluding the Engr Special Brigade Strength from being charged to Engr slice as long as it is not charged against Technical Service troop strengths.

7. Within established policy.

8. Action completed on G-4 Journal Number 15095.


E.A.H.W.	<u>EAHW</u>	26-8545
H.D.T.	_____	26-6413
N.M.W.	<u>NMW</u>	26-6444

G-4 FILE

G-4 FILE

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GP 880 MM/107/12/11/81

G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

19 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD (CONT'D)


Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths

1. It is recommended that there be requested to submit a list of units to be retained including all non-divisional T-4's and bulk authorization units.

2. Points out the error in the report strength on the list of units to be retained and indicates that G-4 has no objection to excluding the T-4's from the strength from being charged to pay since as long as it is not charged against technical service troop strengths.

3. Within established policy.

4. Action completed on G-4 Journal



G-4 FILE



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NN 975029

320.2

CROSS REFERENCE OTHER THAN RADIO

FROM: G-4

DATE: 18 Oct 50

TO: G-3

SUBJECT: (M/R & C/N 1) POST-HOSTILITIES FEC (ARMY) TROOP BASIS.

DOCUMENT IN: 400 Korea

JO. NO. 14988 DIV. P&O



G-4 ROUTING

A C/S G-4

D A C/S G-4

EXECUTIVE

P.O.

G-4 FILE

PETROLEUM

K E A

ADMIN

SECRET

G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

GD P&amp;O NMW/HDT/nm

15 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths. 370,2

1. C/N 2 G-4 to CofS, subject as above, dated 13 Oct 50, recommended disapproval of a Sig Section request for an increase in Signal strength above 12,082.

2. CofS memorandum to Signal Officer through G-4, 14 Oct 50 reads as follows:

"1. The Chief of Staff desires the following information:

- a. How many American Signal personnel are supporting the ROK Army at the present time?
- b. What sort of work and in what capacity are these Signal personnel being used.
- c. To what extent are ROK personnel being used by Signal Corps to implement communications' missions?

2. The Chief of Staff further desires suggested solutions on how the employment of indigenous personnel may be expanded in support of Signal Corps activities in Korea.

s/HDM  
for JOHN M. HIGHTOWER  
Lt Colonel, GSC  
Secretary of the General Staff"

3. Recommend G-4 initial CofS Memo and send it on to Sig.
4. Within established policy.
5. Action completed on Journal No. 14939.

H.D.T. [Signature] 26-6413N.M.W. [Signature] 26-6444

G-4 FILE

SECRET

JN 14939  
P.O.  
RT



SECRET

CD R/O MMW/DT/am

G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

15 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Technical Service Troop Structures.

1. On 2 G-4 to G-2, subject as above, dated 13 Oct 50, recommended disapproval of a Sig Section request for an increase in signal strength above IS, 082.

2. G-2 memorandum to Signal Officer through G-4, 11 Oct 50 reads as follows:

"1. The Chief of Staff desires the following

information:

- a. How many American signal personnel are supporting the ROK Army at the present time?
- b. What sort of work and in what capacity are these signal personnel being used?
- c. To what extent are ROK personnel being used by Signal Corps to implement communications missions?

2. The Chief of Staff further desires suggested solutions on how the employment of indigenous personnel may be expanded in support of Signal Corps activities in Korea.

WDM  
for JOHN M. WIGHTOWER  
Lt Colonel, GSO  
Secretary of the General Staff


3. Recommend G-4 Initial G-2 Memo and send it on to G-2.

4. Within established policy.

5. Action completed on Journal No. 1132.

H.D.T. 56-6113

W.M.V. 56-6114





G-4 ROUTING

AC/S G-1	<i>[initials]</i>
DA C/S G-1	<i>[initials]</i>
EXECUTIVE	<i>[initials]</i>
+ O	<i>[initials]</i>
C + RE	
SUPPLY	
PETROLEUM	
KEA	
ADMIN	<i>[initials]</i>

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

*Secret*

October 1950

140935

*320.2*

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : CG ARMY EIGHT KOREA.....OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C-66426 Ref (a) Urmsg G 25576 KGC, (b) CINCFEmsg CX 66403.

Request made in ref a approved.

OFFICIAL:

K. B. BUSH  
Brigadier General, USA  
Adjutant General

APPROVED:

*Carl H Jark*  
for E. K. WRIGHT  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Distribution:

- C-in-C
- C/S (3)
- G-1
- G-2
- G-3 (return)
- G-4
- JSPOG

M/R:

14 Oct 50

8Amsg G 25576 KGC request auth to return to ROK Army those Koreans now assigned in excess of 25% of those authorized. 100 had been auth each Co. or Battery. CINCFE CX 66403 queries X Corps & 3d Div re their desires re reduction of Koreans in US units.

Inst msg, appd verbally by C/S, gives 8A auth to reduce Koreans to 25 per Co and Battery.

JARK  
26-8103


*Paraphrase not required. Consult crytocenter before decies. Handle ascort of clas carried bereon per pars 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5.15 Nov 48.*

*Secret*



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NN 0975029



RECEIVED  
1 / OCT 1950



140515

G-4 ROUTING

AC/SG-4	
DAC/SG-4	
EXECUTIVE	
TO	
C+RE	
SUPPLY	
PETROLEUM	
FROM: KEA	
TO: DM:IN	

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

GC-TNG RVP/mis

SECRET

October 1950

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

- TO: DM:IN CG ARMY EIGHT . . . . . PRIORITY
- CG X CORPS . . . . . PRIORITY
- CG THIRD INF DIV . . . . . PRIORITY
- INFO: CG JLCOM . . . . . PRIORITY (COURIER)

C X 66403

This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1. For CG X Corps and CG 3d Inf Div. Consideration is being given to a reduction in the authorized strength of Korean personnel in US troop units from 100 to 25 per company or similar unit. This action contemplated due to DA commitments regarding replacement personnel to fill currently existing shortages, which in turn may lead to logistical and other complications due to overall overstrength. Subject reduction would be implemented in each major command as rapidly as arrival of US replacements and current operations permit. Korean personnel released by this action to be returned to Republic of Korea Army. Desire your comments and recommendations concerning ROK personnel asgd your US units.

Part 2. For CG Army Eight. Umsg G-25576 KGC, 7 Oct 50. Request info whether your recommendations also apply to Korean personnel assigned to Logistical Comds in Army Eight.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

K. B. BUSH  
Brigadier General, USA  
Adjutant General

*Carl A. Park*  
for E. K. WRIGHT  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Asst Chief of Staff, G-3

SECRET

*Paraphrase not required. Consult cryptocenter before  
decides. Handle as corr of clas carried bereon per par  
17a(1)(2) and 4b(2)(G) and (1), AR 380-5.15 Nov 48*

*64*



**SECRET**

FROM: CINGFE, TO: ARMY EIGHT, X CORPS, THIRD INF DIV, INFO: JLCOM  
 GC-TNG RVP/ms Oct 1950

## Copies to:

ROK Distr  
 G-3 (return)

M/R:

RVP/ms  
 14 Oct 50

1. Eighth Army msg G-25576 KGC, 7 Oct 50, requests authority to return to ROK Army those Koreans now assigned in excess of 25% of the 100 originally authorized each company and battery.
2. Chief of Staff, ROK, has directed that comments and recommendations of other interested major commands be obtained and, if such action appears warranted, the recommended reduction to 25 per company be applied to all US units.
3. Instant msg requests comments and recommendations of those major commands utilizing ROK personnel in US units.

*Porter*  
 Porter  
 26-5959

**SECRET**



G-4 ROUTINE

A C/S G-4

DAC/SG-4

EXECUTIVE

① P+O

C+RE

SUPPLY

PETROLEUM

G-4

② ADMIN

SECRET

320.2

Major Tilton 26-6052

## Technical Service Troop Strengths

CofS

13 OCT 1950

2

1. By C/N 1 above, the Signal Officer contends his authorized strength should be increased from 12,082 to 15,037. He bases his contention on; the increase in strength of some T/O&E Signal Units, the necessary support given to ROK Army forces, and the lack of available communication facilities in Korea.

2. On 26 September 1950, CofS approved G-4's recommendations on Tech Service strength for all Tech Services of FEC in support of Japan and the Korean operation. G-4's recommendations were based on the following considerations:

a. The slice percentage as set forth in FM 101-10 which is based on world-wide experience at the end of World War II was used as a guide. One consideration in determining the various slices in FM 101-10 was the many instances when armies exceeded normal frontages and depths. The slices afforded each Tech Service was computed so as to allow flexibility enough to accomplish the mission regardless of the size of the Army area. The percentage factors were further modified to conform to post-war studies on the composition of the field army as effected by post-war increases in T/O&E strengths.

b. An abundance of indigenous labor is readily available in Japan and Korea. This indigenous labor can be used to augment units employing a great deal of labor such as construction units. This should compensate in part the construction effort required because of the lack of existing communication facilities in Korea.

c. According to the best sources available to G-4, those Tech Service units requested from the ZI which have not so far been designated by DA will not be available in the ZI until February 1951. G-4 considers that by the time these units could arrive in the FEC the requirement to support ROK Army forces will have been met from Korean sources. The present support provided ROK forces appears to be adequate. Signal support given the Korean Army is not considered sufficient to justify augmentation of the present Signal slice.

d. Japan, corresponding to a COMM Z, has suffered no destruction as a result of the Korean conflict. Consequently, the civil communications are much better than those normally found in a COMM Z. For this reason, an increase in Sig requirements in Japan was not considered necessary.

G-4 FILE

SECRET

144-5-8



SECRET

Major Tilton 26-6052

Technical Service Troop Strengths

G-4

CofS

13 OCT 1950

2  
(cont'd)

3. Since the CofS's approval of the recommendation for Tech Service strengths, the Signal Officer has effected a reduction of 4,148 spaces. This still leaves the Signal Corps with 2,703 spaces in excess of his normal slice of 12,082.

4. For the reasons stated in paragraph 1a, b, c, and d above, G-4 cannot concur in the request of the Signal Officer.

5. G-4 recommends disapproval of the request for any increase in Signal strength above 12,082.

----- G.L.E. -----

GD P&O NMW/HDT/JET/r  
12 October 1950


MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

1. Reference: G-4 C/N 1 to all Tech Services, 26 Sep 50, subject: Technical Services Troop Strengths.
2. Signal C/N 1 to G-4, 8 Oct 50 requests that the Signal slice allocated in reference 1 above be increased from the authorized 12,082 to 15,037. Signal Officer considered the additional strength necessary for support of the ROK forces, the lack of available communication facilities in Korea and to compensate for increases in Signal T/O&E's.
3. The Signal slice of 12,082 is in accord with the percentage factors set forth in FM 101-10. G-4 used FM 101-10 as a guide in making the recommendations for Tech Service slices to the CofS on 25 Sep 50 under G-4 Journal Number 13349. The CofS approved G-4's recommendations on 26 Sep 50 (G-4 Journal Number 13403) and the Tech Services were so informed.
4. Recommend approval of C/N 2 which informs CofS that G-4 does not consider the Signal Officer's request justifiable. C/N 2 also recommends disapproval of the request for any increase in Signal strength above 12,082.
5. Within established policy.
6. Action completed on G-4 Journal Number 14452.

J.E.T. [Signature] 26-6052  
H.D.T. [Signature] 26-6413  
N.M.W. [Signature] 26-6444

G-4 FILE

SECRET





*Secret*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col E E Sullo  
26-5874

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths

Note  
No. 1

From: Signal

To: G-4

Date: 8 Oct 50

1. Reference is made to G-4 check note subject as above, dated 26 Sep 50, which establishes a Signal Troop Ceiling of 12,082.

2. As a result of a complete study of Signal troop requirements to support military operations in Korea, it is my considered opinion that the established ceiling will seriously handicap the successful execution of the Signal mission. This conclusion is based on the following contributing factors:

a. Data supporting the compilation of the division slice, determined as a result of World War II experience, was based on the T/O&E for Signal units employed during that period. Since the conclusion of World War II many Signal T/O&Es have been revised, resulting in extensive personnel increases. The principal new T/O&Es and number of increased personnel spaces are stated below:

T/O&E	Increase			No. Units	Total Increases
	From	To	Net		
11-15, Corps Signal Bn	876	1200	324	3	972
11-95, Army Signal Bn	575	1035	460	1	460
11-25, Signal Construction Bn	455	972	517	2	1034
					<u>2466</u>

It immediately becomes apparent that any Signal slice arrived at thru application of a World War II percentage factor fails to take into account the revised T/O&E strengths of the Signal units listed above.

b. Determination of a division (technical service) slice should definitely take into consideration services that must be provided for ROK Forces. At present six (6) ROK divisions demand considerable logistical, as well as direct communications support. This support will be further increased with the expansion of the ROK Forces to 10 divisions during the next four months. Units to adequately provide this support cannot be made available if the reduced strength ceiling is retained.

c. Deserving of consideration are the extended distances over which 8th Army units have been and probably will be deployed. A normal Army operating zone extends from 36 to 85 miles in depth and from 15 to

G-4 FILE

*Secret*



*Secret*  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col E E Sullo  
26-5874

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths

Note  
No. 1  
(Cont'd)

From: Signal

To: G-4

Date: 8 Oct 50

to 75 miles in width. Eighth Army has been required to operate in an area exceeding these normally established zones. Consequently, providing communications support over these extended distances requires the Signal units requested.

d. Although considerable communications rehabilitation was accomplished in Europe during World War II, it cannot be compared, proportionately, with the effort presently confronting the Signal Corps in Korea. The pre-war inadequacy of commercial communication facilities, along with the heavy battle destruction makes the augmentation of the skeleton force of signal construction troops presently in Korea imperative. No previously established slice factor can be expected to adequately provide for such construction units.

e. Although the majority of US military strength has been withdrawn from Japan and moved to Korea, essential communications throughout Japan for command and logistical traffic has in fact increased considerably. For example, the communications mission of General Headquarters, Far East Command has increased approximately 100% and is being accomplished only through limited overstrength assignment of personnel and excessively long working hours, averaging 12 hours per day, 7 days per week. An authorization increase in the strength of the 71st Signal Service Battalion is essential, but cannot be realized if this ceiling is imposed.

3. The current authorized strength of Signal units in Japan and Korea plus those alerted for movement to FEC total 11,768. The following additional units are urgently required and have been requested to accomplish the Signal Corps mission in Korea, particularly as it pertains to Signal construction, rehabilitation and supply operations:

	<u>Strength</u>
Two - Signal Construction Bns	1944
One - Signal Depot Company	143
One - Signal Battalion (VIF)	664
One - Signal Repair Company	159



*Secret*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col E E Sullo  
26-5874

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths

Note  
No. 1  
(Cont'd)

From: Signal

To: G-4

Date: 8 Oct 50

Strength

Augmentation of 71st Signal  
Service Battalion

359


Total 3269

4. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the Signal Corps not be committed to an arbitrary slice of 12,082, but be permitted to maintain a ceiling of 15,037.

G. I. B.

*Secret*





DISPATCHED  
13 OCT 1950  
G-4  
GHQ

RECEIVED  
13 OCT 1950



SECRET

G-4 ROUTING

AC/S G-1	
PAC/S G-4	
EXECUTIVE	
P+O	<i>A</i>
C+RE	
SUPPLY	
PETROLEUM	
KEA	
ADMIN	<i>Jm</i>

G-4 FILE

*320.2*  
*13 Oct 50*

GD P&O <sup>*EAHW*</sup> NMW/HDT/EAHW/r

Lt Col Woodman 26-8545

Technical Service Troop Strengths

Engr

1. Reference C/N 2 from Engr to G-4, Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths dated 6 October 1950.
2. G-4 cannot agree with the Engr contention that Engr Special Brigades should not be included in the total of Engr Service Units. The Engr Special Brigade is not part of a division and therefore must be included in the Engr portion of the theatre slice. *Engineer elements thereof*
3. Accordingly, G-4 has forwarded the list of units contained in paragraph 3, reference checknote to G-3, with the recommendation that they be deleted from the list of Engr units requested from DA. This reduces the engineer strength on hand and requested from DA from 49,152 to 34,792 as compared with Engr slice of 33,484.
4. Request nomination of additional Engr units for deletion from lists of units on request from DA to bring the theatre Engr strength requested and on hand within the Engr slice approved by the Chief of Staff.

*E*

----- G.L.E. -----

*P&O*

G-4 FILE

SECRET

14847









**SECRET**GD P&O NMW/HDT/EAHW/r  
G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

13 October 1950

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Subject: Technical Service Troop Strengths

1. For background see G-4 Journal Number 14249. C/N 2 from Engr to G-4, subject as above, dated 6 October 1950, stated that the Engr felt the 2nd Engr Special Brigade should not be included in the total of Engr Service troop strength.
2. The Engr Special Brigade is not part of a division and therefore must be included in the Engr portion of the theatre slice. There is no other portion of the slice into which it can be placed.
3. The Engr, in his C/N to G-4, has included the strength of the 2nd Engr Special Brigade in making their proposal for reductions to come within the Engr slice. In view of our stand that the Engr Special Brigade should be included in Engr service support strength, it will be necessary for the Engr to submit another list of units for deletion from requisition from DA.
4. Our C/N to Engr states G-4 position on Engr Special Brigade being included in total Engr service troop strength and requests that the Engr submit a list of units to be deleted from requisition from DA to bring the Engr strength on hand and requested within the Engr slice approved by the Chief of Staff.
5. Recommend C/N to Engr be approved.
6. Within established policy.
7. Completes initiated action.

E.A.H.W. GPW 26-8545H.D.T. HDT 26-6413N.M.W. NMW 26-6444**SECRET**

G-4 FILE



SECRET

G-4 ROUTING

A C / S G-4

DAC / S G-4

EXECUTIVE

CTRE

SUPPLY

PETROLEUM

KEA

ADMIN

*[Handwritten signatures and initials over routing form]*

Lt Col Woodman 26-8545

*320.2*  
~~*322*~~

Technical Service Troop Strengths

G-3

11 OCT 1950

3 1. Based upon list of units contained in par 3 C/N 2 it is recommended that the DA be requested to delete from CINCPAC requisitions the following list of Engr units.

<u>T/O&amp;E</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>No. of Units to be deleted</u>
5-35	Engr C Bn (Army)	10
5-97	Engr Cam Co	1
5-137	Engr Panel Bridge Co	4
5-157	Engr Maint Co	1
5-192	Hq & Hq Co, Engr C Gp	4
5-312	Hq & Hq Co, Engr Const Gp	2
5-315	Engr Const Bn	4
5-324	Engr Dp Trk Co	5
5-327	Engr Petri Distr Co	1
5-328	Engr Hvy Equip Co	1
5-367	Engr Lt Equip Co	2
5-6378	Engr Dredge Crew (Hydraulic Suction 21" cutter type)	1
	Proposed Engr SL Bn	1


2. Recommend that authority be requested from DA to organize the 8224th Army Unit Engineer Construction Gp, Hq & Hq Co as a T/O&E unit. When permission is granted it is recommended that T/O&E 5-312 Hq & Hq Co, Engr Const Gp, number of units to be deleted be raised to three.

3. G-4 does not agree that the Engr Special Brigade should be accounted for in the Division portion of the theater division slice. The proper place for the engineer strength in this unit is in the Engineer portion of the theater slice.

4. If these requests are approved it will effect a reduction in Engineer strength of units on hand and requested of DA from 49,152 to 34,792 as compared to Engineer slice of 33,484.

*[Handwritten 'E' in a circle]*

G. L. E.




G-4 FILE

SECRET

*RHO*  
*14249*  
*[Handwritten initials]*





*[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]*



SECRET

G-4 FILE



**SECRET**

Maj Frank 26-5802

Technical Service Troop Strengths

Engr G-4

2 1. The Engineer strength figures for the total on hand and requested from the DA as shown in paragraph 4, note #1, includes 1450 men assigned to the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. This unit is a combat type organization similar to a Division. The organization's total strength includes Signal, QM, Ordnance and other non-Engineer personnel. It is felt that this unit should not be included in the total for Engineer Service Units in the theater.

2. The Engineer's request for troops was based on the G-4 planning data which indicated the type organization and commands that were to be organized in the theater. These assumptions included a type Field Army (reduced strength), three major logistical commands, and the normal Engineer responsibilities in Japan which included dependent housing, repairs and utilities and the Post Hostilities Mapping Program. The recommended Engineer Troop Support for a type Field Army as shown on pages 78 and 79 FM 101-10 totals 38,292. This is more than the strength allowed by G-4.

3. In compliance with the Chief of Staff's desire to effect reductions in the technical services' request for units to fall within the figures shown in Column 3 para 4, note #1 following is a priority list to serve as a guide for reducing the Engineer required strength:

<u>Delete</u>	<u>TO&amp;E</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Total</u>
1	Proposed	Engineer Searchlight Battalion	420	420
1	<del>5-327</del>	Engr Petroleum Distribution Co	217	217
1	<del>5-157</del>	Engr Maintenance Company	191	191
1	<del>5-97</del>	Engr Camouflage Company	76	76
1	<del>5-328</del>	Engr Heavy Equip Company	221	221
2	<del>5-367</del>	Engr Light Equip Company	185	370
4	<del>5-137</del>	Engr Panel Bridge Company	134	536
5	<del>5-324</del>	Engr Dump Truck Company	130	650
4	<del>5-192</del>	Engr Combat Gp, Hq & Hq Co	112	448
10	<del>5-35</del>	Engr Combat Battalion	724	7240
2	<del>5-312</del>	Engr Const Gp, Hq & Hq Co	120	240
4	<del>5-315</del>	Engr Const Battalion	921	3684
1	<del>5-6375</del>	Engr Dredge Crew (21" cutter Type)	67	67
			TOTAL - - - - -	14,360

4. It is recommended that the 8224th Army Unit Engineer Construction Group, Hq & Hq Company be organized as a TO&E unit. If approval is obtained authorizing the 8224th as a TO&E unit, delete 1 additional Engineer Construction Group, Hq & Hq Company from the units requested.

J. G. C.

**SECRET**



SECRET

The first of these is the fact that the...  
The second is the fact that the...  
The third is the fact that the...


The fourth is the fact that the...  
The fifth is the fact that the...  
The sixth is the fact that the...

The seventh is the fact that the...  
The eighth is the fact that the...  
The ninth is the fact that the...

Serial	Date	Description	Initials
1	1-1-50	...	...
2	1-15-50	...	...
3	2-1-50	...	...
4	2-15-50	...	...
5	3-1-50	...	...
6	3-15-50	...	...
7	4-1-50	...	...
8	4-15-50	...	...
9	5-1-50	...	...
10	5-15-50	...	...
11	6-1-50	...	...
12	6-15-50	...	...
13	7-1-50	...	...
14	7-15-50	...	...
15	8-1-50	...	...
16	8-15-50	...	...
17	9-1-50	...	...
18	9-15-50	...	...
19	10-1-50	...	...
20	10-15-50	...	...
21	11-1-50	...	...
22	11-15-50	...	...
23	12-1-50	...	...
24	12-15-50	...	...
25	1-1-51	...	...
26	1-15-51	...	...
27	2-1-51	...	...
28	2-15-51	...	...
29	3-1-51	...	...
30	3-15-51	...	...

The tenth is the fact that the...  
The eleventh is the fact that the...  
The twelfth is the fact that the...

SECRET





SECRET

## G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS

GD P&amp;O NMW/HDT/EAHW/bsc

11 Oct 50

MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Technical Service Troop Strengths

1. C/N 2 from Engr to G-4, subject as above, dated 6 Oct 50 states:
  - a. They feel the 2d Engr Spec Brigade should not be included in the total of Engr Svc units.
  - b. The recommended Engr troop support for a type field army in FM-101-10 is 38,292. This is more than the strength established by G-4.
  - c. A list of Engr units by priority to serve as a guide for reducing the Engr strength.
  - d. If the 8224th Army Unit Engineer Construction Gp, Hq & Hq Co is organized as a T/O&E unit and additional Engr Const Gp, Hq & Hq Co can be deleted from requisition of DA.
2.
  - a. The Engineer strength in the Engr Special Brigade is not part of a Division and therefore must be included in the Engr portion of the theater slice. There is no other portion of the slice into which it can be placed.
  - b. The total of 38,292 recommended for Engr troop support in FM 101-10 is based on a type field army composed of 12 Divisions. The planning data G-4 has been using is based on 7 2/3 American divisions. The type field army does not justify increasing the Engr slice.
  - c. If all units as listed in Engr C/N were deleted it would effect a reduction in strength of units on requisition from DA not yet designated by DA for FEC.
  - d. The recommendation of Engr for organizing the 8224th Army Unit Engr Const Gp, Hq & Hq Co as a T/O&E unit should be approved. The FEC is over obligated in bulk spaces. Activation of a T/O&E unit would increase the theater authorized strength and deobligate equivalent number of bulk spaces.
3. Recommendation:
  - a. That Engr Spec Brigades not be considered equivalent of a Division and that the Engr spaces in the Brigade be charged against the Engr slice for the theater.
  - b. That all units as listed in Engr C/N be deleted from requisition on the DA.

SECRET

G-4 FILE



SECRET

M/R cont'd

c. That G-4 concur in Engr recommendation to reorganize the 8224th Army Unit Engr Const Co, Hq & Hq Co as a T/O&E unit.

4. C/N 3 gives G-3 these recommendations. Engr will be informed of G-4 non-concurrence in para 1 C/N 2 by initiated action.

5. Recommend C/N 3 be approved and sent to G-3.

6. If this request is approved it will effect a reduction of Engr strength on hand and requested of DA from 49,152 to 34,792 as compared with Engr slice of 33,484.

7. Within established policy.

8. Completes action on G-4 Journal No. 14249.

EAHW WPAW 26-8545

HDT \_\_\_\_\_ 26-6413

NMW MMW 26-6444

SECRET

G-4 FILE

JN 14249





CROSS REFERENCE OTHER THAN RADIO

320.2

~~322~~

FROM: **GD PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIV**

DATE: **10 Oct 50**

TO: **MEMO FOR RECORD**

SUBJECT: **ADJUSTMENT IN TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS FOR FECOM**

**memo for record with related material**

14446  
14465  
14475  
14484  
14486

DOCUMENT IN: **370.5 Korea**

JO. NO. 14510 DIV. P&O



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NNDP 75029

CROSS REFERENCE OTHER THAN RADIO

320.2

FROM: GHQ FEC GC TC

DATE: 9 Oct 50

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY

SUBJECT: letter : ACTIVATION OF 1st LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY

letter with memo for record

DOCUMENT IN: 322

JO. NO. - ----DIV. P&O, SP



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

~~TOP SECRET~~

**INCOMING MESSAGE** *wo/jbl*

~~Top Secret~~  
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

*DRBHI*

*320.2*

6 Oct 50

FROM : CG X CORPS

TO : CINCFE

INFO : COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, CG JLCOM, CG ARMY EIGHT, CG 3D LOG COMD,

NR : X 10613

REURMSG CX 65529 dtd 6 Oct which deletes 421st Med Coll Co. X Corps desires 2 platoons only this unit to accompany it to objective area. Remainder 421st Med Coll Co (Sep) remains with 3d Log Comd. Request service troop list be amended to show 2 platoons this unit asgd X Corps. Request immediate reply.

NO SIG

ACTION : G-4

INFORMATION : COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-2, G-3, JSPOG, SURGEON, COMNAVFE

58028

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOO : 061111 I  
MCN : 84255

~~Top Secret~~


CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

~~TOP SECRET~~

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

*3777*

COPY No.





GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

WG/jb1

*DRB 41*

~~Top Secret~~  
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

5 Oct 50

FROM : CG X CORPS  
TO : CINCFE  
NR : X 10574

*320.2* *WFB*

Letter X Corps File AG 320.2 (4 Oct 50) GD, subj: Modified Svc Troop List X Corps dtd 4 Oct 50 and which was hand carried by Col Billingsley is subj. In order for X Corps to firm its movement and embarkation plans now being executed to meet time schedule imperative radio advice as to CINCFE action as requested in Para 3 reference letter be expedited as a matter of urgency.

ALMOND

ACTION : G-4

INFORMATION : COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, JSPOG

57222

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOO : 051357 I  
MCN : 83970

~~Top Secret~~

CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

*3762*

COPY No.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

051945

051013

OUTGOING MESSAGE GD P&O MMW/AJC/r

~~Top Secret~~

Paraphrase not required. Consult cryptocenter before  
decias. Handle as corr of clas carried hereon per pars  
17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5.15 Nov 49.

320.2

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN  
TO: CG ARMY EIGHT KOREA ..... OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE  
CG X CORPS KOREA ..... OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE  
CG JLCOM YOKOHAMA JAPAN ..... OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE  
INFO: CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN ..... OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (COURIER)  
COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN ..... OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (COURIER)

Cx65529

Ref X Corps ltr to CINCFE, 4 Oct 50, file AG 320.2  
(4 Oct 50) GD, subj: Modified Service Troop List, X Corps. NOTAL. The  
following changes to X Corps Troop List as contained in Appendix 1 to Annex  
B, Operations Order No. 2, GHQ, UNC, dated 2 October 1950 are approved.

- a. Engineer Units. Add the 185th Engr (C) Bn.
- b. Ordnance Units. Delete the following: Hq & Hq Co, 60th Ord Gp; 570th Ord MAM Co; 512th Ord HAM Co; Hq & Hq Det, 79th Ord Bn. Substitute the following: Hq & Hq Det, 328th Ord Bn for Hq & Hq Det, 74th Ord Bn; 1st Ord MM Co for 7th Ord MM Co; 69th Ord Ammo Co for 65th Ord Ammo Co; and Det only of 330th Ord Depot Co, strength 60, for 330th Ord Depot Co, strength 166.
- c. Medical Units: Delete the following: 4th Field Hospital (-1 Plat); 421st Medical Coll Co (Sep); 150th Veterinary Food Det.
- d. Quartermaster units: Delete the following: 130th QM Bakery Co (M) (-1 Plat); 537th QM Laundry Co (SM). Substitute the following: 1 Plat, 20th QM Subst Sup Co for 1 Plat; 19th QM Subst Sup Co.
- e. Transportation Corps Units: Delete the following: Trans Railway Detachment.

OFFICIAL: *Downing*  
*DRB 40*  
*22 Dec 50*

APPROVED: **RETURN COPY**

K. B. BUSH  
Brigadier General, USA  
Adjutant General

G. L. EBERLE  
Major General, General Staff Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Copies to: ROK, AG, Cml, Engr, Med, Ord, QM, Sig, Trans, G-4 P&O (Return)  
G-4 (Return) ~~Top Secret~~ Approved by CofS, 5 Oct 50.

G-4 FILE 3762

Cy 33

G-4 FILE



~~Top Secret~~

GD P&amp;O NMW/AJC/mg

G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

5 October 1950

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Subject: Modified Service Troop List, X Corps

1. CG X Corps, by letter, 4 Oct 50, has requested certain revisions in the X Corps service troop list as contained in Appendix 1 to Annex B, Op Order No. 2, GHQ, UNC, 2 Oct 50. While the net effect of the proposed revision will only increase the X Corps service strength by 339, the critical element in the proposed revision is an increase in Engineer strength of 1407. The letter was hand carried to GHQ by Colonel Billingsley, X Corps Ord Officer, who stated that General Stewart, Inchon Base Commander, concurred in the proposed changes. Colonel Billingsley stated that it was considered that most of the units proposed for deletion from the X Corps Troop List were most urgently needed to continue the operation of the Inchon Base.

2. This msg modifies X Corps Service Troop basis in accordance with recommendations in cited letter as modified by GHQ. Principle differences between X Corps request and GHQ approval are that requests for the 76th Engr Dump Trk Co, the 526th Engr Panel Bridge Co, the 811th Engr Avn Bn (-1 Co) and the 505th Trans Trk Co were disapproved by GHQ.

3. Separate action will be required with G-3 to modify the UNC Order No. 2 Service Troop basis. Addressees of proposed msg include those whom immediate notification of Troop List is considered essential. Other addressees of UNC Order No. 2 will obtain the changes through G-3 channels.

4. Action msg approved by CofS, 5 Oct 50.

5. Within established policy.

6. Action completed on G-4 T.S. JN 3760/14103 and 3762/14124.

A. J. C. \_\_\_\_\_ 26-6040

N. M. W. \_\_\_\_\_ 26-6444

~~Top Secret~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

GD P&O NMW/AJC/jo  
Lt Col Cooper 26-6040

Modified Service Troop List, X Corps

G-4 CofS

1. CG X Corps, by letter dated 4 October (Tab B) has requested certain revisions in the X Corps service troop list as contained in Appendix 1 to Annex B, Op Order No. 2, GHQ UNC, 2 October. While the net effect of the proposed revision will only increase the X Corps service strength by 339, the critical element in the proposed revision is an increase in Engineer strength of 1407. The letter was hand carried to GHQ by Colonel Billingsley, X Corps Ordnance Officer, who offered certain verbal explanations of the proposed changes and stated that General Stewart, Inchon Base Commander, concurred. Colonel Billingsley stated that it was considered that most of the units proposed for deletion from the X Corps Troop List were most urgently needed to continue the operation of the Inchon Base. He, further, stated with regard to the Avn. Engr Bn that the X Corps Commander considered the support of operations in the objective area was impracticable from Kimpo and that the Avn Bn would be required to develop a field at Wonsan for close air support in the objective area.

2. Engineer Units: Additional Engineer units requested are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
185th Engr (C) Bn	541	Korea
76th Engr Dump Trk Co	85	Korea
526th Engr Panel Bridge Co	134	Japan
811th Engr Avn Bn (-1 Co)	647	Korea
Total	1407	

Engineer considers that the 185th Engr (C) Bn and the 811th Engr Avn Bn (-1 Co) should be added to the X Corps Troop List, but that the Dump Truck Company and Panel Bridge Company should not. FEAF considers it essential that the Engr Avn Bn should remain at Kimpo. G-4 recommendation is to increase the X Corps Troop List by the 185th Engr (C) Bn only.

3. Ordnance Units: X Corps proposes the deletion of four units, the substitution of four units for similar units and the provision of detachment of a Depot Co to X Corps in lieu of a full Company. Ordnance Section recommends concurrence in all of these changes. G-4 recommends concurrence in all except the substitution of the 15th Ord ED Sqd now in Inchon for the 14th Ord ED Sqd from RYCOM.

4. Medical Units: X Corps recommends the deletion of the 4th Field Hospital (-1 Plat), the 421st Med Coll Co (Sep) and the 150th Veterinary Food Detachment. Medical Section and G-4 concur.

G-4 File Copy 3762

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

Lt Col Cooper 28-6040

## Modified Service Troop List, X Corps

G-4

CofS

1  
(cont'd) 5. QM Units: X Corps recommends the deletion of a Bakery Co and a Laundry Co, the addition of a Clothing and General Supply Platoon and the substitution of a Petroleum Supply Platoon and Subst Supply Plat. Quartermaster concurs in all proposed changes. G-4 concurs in the proposed deletions; does not concur in the addition of a Clothing and Supply Platoon, non-concurs in the substitution of the Petroleum Supply Platoon and concurs in the substitution of the Subst Sup Plat.

6. Transportation Corps Units: X Corps proposes the deletion of the Transportation Railway Detachment and the addition of the 505th Trans Truck Company. Transportation Section and G-4 concur in the deletion and non-concur in the addition of the Transportation Truck Co.

7. It is recommended that attached draft message approving changes in the X Corps Service Troop list in accordance with G-4 recommendations in this check note be approved and returned to G-4 for dispatch.

## 2 Incls

1. Proposed Msg (Tab A)
2. Hq X Corps Ltr AG 320.2  
(4 Oct 50) to CinC,  
4 Oct 50 (Tab B)

Concurrence: G-3 \_\_\_\_\_

-----G. L. E.-----

*DRB 40  
22 Dec 50*

G-4 File Copy

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS X CORPS  
APO 909 US ARMY

*See attached  
memo*

AG 320.2 (4 Oct 50)GD  
SUBJECT: Modified Service Troop List, X Corps

4 October 1950

TO: Commander-in-Chief  
Far East Command  
APO 500

*Downgrade  
DRB 40  
2 Dec 50*

1. Reference is Appendix 1 to Annex B, Operations Order No. 2, GHQ, UNC, dated 2 October 1950.

2. In order to permit X Corps to perform its mission in the objective area, it is strongly recommended that the X Corps Service Troop List, reference 1 above, be modified as follows:

a. Add the following Engineer Units.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
(1) 185th Engr (C) Bn	541	Korea	<i>Engn yes ✓</i>
(2) 76th Engr Dump Trk Co	85	Korea	<i>no</i>
(3) 526th Engr Panel Bridge Co	134	Japan	<i>no</i>
(4) 811th Engr Avn Bn (-1 Co)	647	Korea	<i>yes AF no</i>

b. Ordnance Units.

(1) Delete the following:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
(a) Hq & Hq Co, 60th Ord Gp	99	Korea	<i>✓</i>
(b) 570th Ord MAM Co	134	Pusan	<i>✓</i>
(c) 512d Ord HAM Co	212	Enroute from ZI	<i>✓</i>
(d) Hq & Hq Det, 79th Ord Bn	46	Enroute from ZI	<i>✓</i>

(2) Substitute the following:

- (a) Hq & Hq Det, 328th Ord Bn, now at Inchon for Hq & Hq Det, 74th Ord Bn, now at Inchon. *✓*
- (b) 1st Ord MM Co, now at Inchon for 7th Ord MM Co now in Korea. *✓*

*Strength Bn Avn 1000  
replaced by 1st Bn  
spec*

*Cy #2*

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*3762*





~~TOP SECRET~~

AG 320.2 (4 Oct 50)GD, Subject: Modified Service Troop List, X Corps,  
4 Oct 50

*Adem. etc.*

- (c) Det only of 330th Ord Depot Co, strength 60, in lieu of 330th Ord Depot Co, strength 166. ✓
- (d) 69th Ord Ammo Co, now in Inchon for 65th Ord Ammo Co now in Inchon. ✓
- (e) 15th Ord ED Sqd now in Inchon for 14th Ord ED Sqd now in RYCOM: *? no assault no*

c. Medical Units.

(1) Delete the following:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
(a) 4th Field Hosp (-1 Plat)	138	Korea ✓
(b) 421st Med Coll Co (Sep)	207	Korea ✓
(c) 150th Veterinary Food Det	5	Korea ✓

d. Quartermaster Units.

(1) Delete the following:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
(a) 130th QM Bakery Co (M) (-1 Plat)	103	Yokohama ✓
(b) 537th QM Ldy Co (SM)	187	Yokohama ✓

(2) Add the following:

(a) 1 Plat, QM Clo & Gen Sup Co	45	Japan <i>? no</i>
---------------------------------	----	-------------------

(3) Substitute the following:

- (a) 1st Plat, 506th QM Pet Sup Co (M), now in Inchon for 1st Plat, 529th QM Pet Sup Co (M), now enroute from ZI. *no*
- (b) 1 Plat, 20th QM Subst Sup Co, now in Korea for 1 Plat 19th QM Subst Sup Co, now enroute from ZI. ✓

e. Transportation Corps Units.

(1) Delete the following:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
(a) Trans Railway Det	8	Asgd X Corps ✓

~~TOP SECRET~~

3762





~~TOP SECRET~~

AG 320.2 (4 Oct 50)GD, Subject: Modified Service Troop List, X Corps,  
4 Oct 50

(2) Add the following:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
(a) 505th Trans Trk Co	132	Inchon <i>wo</i>

3. Request advice by radio as to the action taken on this request.


FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

FRANK W. ROBERTS  
Lt Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Cy #*

*3762*





~~TOP SECRET~~

GD P&amp;O NMW/AJC/mg

## G-4 PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

5 October 1950

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Subject: Modified Service Troop List, X Corps

1. Basic X Corps letter in general, with the exception of Engineer units, is considered a quite reasonable request for additional units for X Corps considering the fact that the X Corps Service Troop List contained in Operations Order No. 2 reflects a net reduction in Service Troops assigned to X Corps in excess of 6000. Discussion of the list with Colonel Billingsley and examination of the list indicates that it was prepared by X Corps, G-4 and reflects the desire by X Corps to satisfy the requirements for the continued operation of the Inchon Base as well as the support of X Corps in the Amphibious Operation.

2. As the 811th Engr Avn Bn is the only Avn Bn in the FEC and as major development work is required at Kimpo, FEAF feels strongly that the Battalion should remain there. There are sufficient engineers in the X Corps Troop List to develop the Wonsan air field to the extent required. Lt Col Godman is of the opinion that the land-based support of the operation by the 33rd Wing should be from Kimpo, which is only twenty minutes from the objective area, and as X Corps moves inland continues to be only twenty minutes from the front lines. The move of the 811th Engr Avn Bn to the objective area would result in the loss of its services for a period of approximately three weeks and is not acceptable. The X Corps Service Troop List contains one Dump Truck Company and one Bridge Company. These units are adequate to support the operation. Therefore, the 76th Engr Dump Trk Co and the 526th Engr Panel Bridge Co should remain with the Eighth Army.

3. Colonel Billingsley indicated that there is a heavy requirement for Ordnance units to remain in Inchon in connection with Base Operations at Inchon and Ascom City. His proposed change in Ordnance units reflects this. He desires replacement of the 74th Ord Bn by the 328th Ord Bn as the 328th is a stronger Bn and is trained on both ammunition and maintenance and supply. It is believed that he should be given this Battalion in view of his other reductions. He desires to substitute the 1st Ord MM Co for the 7th Ord MM Co as the 7th is currently stretched out behind the 7th Division enroute to Pusan to support the move of the 7th Division. It would then be brought back to Inchon. This change is reasonable and is accepted. His proposal to take a detachment only of the 330th Ord Depot Co leaving the Co with a strength of 166 at Ascom City for Depot operations there is accepted, as is his proposal to substitute the 69th Ord Ammo Co for the 65th Ord Ammo Co which is currently engaged in the recovery of ammunition in the Ascom City Depot. His proposal to substitute the 15th Ord ED Sqd (Bomb Disposal) for the 14th Ord ED Sqd in RYCOM so that he may have an ED Squad with the assault elements is not

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## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD (Cont'd)

accepted in view of the heavy requirement for the continued use of this unit in Inchon and the evident feasibility of arranging for the 14th ED Sqd to arrive with assault elements. The 14th can be airlifted from RYCOM to Inchon if necessary.

4. Medical Units. Colonel Billingsley stated that the X Corps feels that the units deleted in their letter are much more urgently needed by the Inchon Base Command.

5. Quartermaster Units. As the port in the objective areas is not expected to be used as a base for long term support, the deletion of the Bakery and Laundry Company is concurred in. For this same reason the addition of a Quartermaster Clothing and General Supply Platoon is not concurred in. G-4 Petroleum Division feels strongly that the withdrawal of the 1st Plat, 506th QM Pet. Supply Co from Inchon is unacceptable as the entire company has a severe load and continuous responsibility for landing POL through Inchon. No particular justification of this proposed change was obtained from Colonel Billingsley. Colonel Billingsley states that the reason the X Corps QM desires to substitute the 1st Plat of the 20th QM Subst Co currently in Inchon for 1 Plat of the 19th QM Subst Sup Co now enroute from ZI is so that he can place this unit with the Marine assault elements and obtain control of rations early in the operation. Colonel Billingsley states that on the operation into Inchon the Marines landed and assumed control of rations and that control thereof has yet to be completely regained by X Corps and that Colonel Ranck, X Corps QM has obtained permission to land this platoon with assault elements so that he may immediately establish control of the supply and issue of rations. It is considered that this latter change is acceptable.

6. Transportation Corps Units. The deletion of the Transportation Railway Detachment is acceptable and the unit can be used in Inchon. Depending on recovery of rail in the objective area, the request for this unit may be reinstated by X Corps. Considering the critical requirement for transportation Truck Companies by 8th Army over the period of the next few weeks the addition of the 505th Trans Trk Co to the three assigned to X Corps is not concurred in. If a requirement for an additional truck company should develop in the X Corps operation it can be moved from Pohang-Dong up the East Coast road. Discussion with Colonel Billingsley did not indicate that failure to provide the fourth Truck Company to X Corps would, in any way, be critical to the operation.

7. Separate action will be required with G-3 to modify the UNC Order No. 2 Service Troop basis after approval of this action by the Chief of Staff. Addressees of proposed message include those whom immediate notification of Troop List is considered essential. Other addressees of UNC Order No. 2 will obtain the changes through G-3 Channels.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD (Cont'd)

5 October 1950

- 8. Within established policy.
- 9. Completes action on G-4 Journal Number 3760/14103.

A.J.C. \_\_\_\_\_ 26-6040

N.M.W. \_\_\_\_\_ 26-6444

3762

~~TOP SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 975029

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND  
G-4 STAFF SECTION  
INFORMATION ROUTING SLIP

File No. \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Technical Service Troop Strength

	Routing Date, Time & Order	Initials
Gen. Eberle	<u>[Handwritten Signature]</u>	_____
Col. Forsyth	_____	_____
Executive	_____	_____
Plans & Opns	_____	<u>(2)</u> <u>[Handwritten Signature]</u>
Constr & R E	_____	_____
Supply	_____	_____
Petroleum	_____	_____
Administration	<u>(3)</u> <u>[Handwritten Signature]</u>	_____

\_\_\_\_\_ Incls CHECKED IN: \_\_\_\_\_

OUT: \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINATOR: \_\_\_\_\_ P&O

Approval \_\_\_\_\_  
 Concurrence \_\_\_\_\_  
 Information / \_\_\_\_\_  
 Note & Return \_\_\_\_\_  
 Signature \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dispatch \_\_\_\_\_  
 File (3) \_\_\_\_\_

JOURNAL NO: \_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS:

[Handwritten Signature]

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
Authority NND 975029

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

3 Oct 50  
(Date)

To Col Meier

Have regts, Bnd,  
etc - recommended  
cancellation of units  
to bring within  
authorized percentage.



G. L. EBERLE  
Major General, GSC  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4