by ESS to assist them in considering what marine facilities and equipment, if any, might justifiably be recommended to be withheld from reparations. Economic and Scientific Section was informed by Check Sheet on 6 September 1946 that 122 ships with a total ~~bing~~ of approximately 36,000 tons would be required for coast guard, lighthouse service, sea rescue, ship's inspection, harbor and channel marking and sounding, and other aids to coastwise navigation.(13) This list of required vessels was made the subject of a staff study dated 13 September 1946 in which it was recommended that they be withheld from reparations allotment and assigned to the Ministry of Transportation.(14) It was recognized, however, that decisions regarding reparations lay beyond the scope of authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Up to the time of this writing, no subsequent action was taken, or is being contemplated, by any Occupation Forces agency with regard to ~~the ultimate disposition~~ recommending assignment of these vessels to Japanese authorities.

5) Pilots, Harbor Regulations, and Harbor

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aids to coastwise navigation.(13) This list of required vessels was made the subject of a staff study dated 13 September 1946 in which it was recommended that they be withheld from reparations allotment and assigned to the Ministry of Transportation.(14) It was recognized, however, that decisions regarding reparations lay beyond the scope of authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Up to the time of this writing, no subsequent action was taken, or is being contemplated, by any Occupation Forces agency with regard to ~~the ultimate disposition~~ recommending assignment to Japanese authorities of these vessels.

5) Pilots, Harbor Regulations, and Harbor Pollution

(a) Tentative Revision of Pilots' Law

Maritime Branch has been assisting Japanese authorities in framing or revising legislation on these three subjects. As of June 1948 legislative action was still pending on all three. Japanese pilots operate under the Pilot Regulations of 1899, many provisions of which are not applicable to current conditions. A committee comprised of members of various

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(13) Memo, Chief PSD to G-2, dtd 9 Sept 1946; Sub: "Retention of Japanese Vessels."

(14) Memo, Chief PSD to Col. W. S. Wood, CIS, dtd 13 Sep 46; Sub: "Vessels for the Establishment of Japanese Coast Guard Service."

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pilots associations and the General Maritime Bureau drafted a revised Pilots' Law embodying a number of improvements, among them abrogation of the 60-year age limit for pilots, revision of the pilots' examination to emphasize practical rather than theoretical questions, extension of the legal rights and privileges of the Pilots' Associations, and the adjustment and extension of pilot districts. Although this draft, dated ~~29~~ 30 March 1948, was an improvement over the old Pilots' Regulations, further revision was necessary and the bill was not submitted to the current session of the Diet. However, at the suggestion of the PSD Maritime Branch, the ~~General Maritime Bureau~~ Maritime Safety Board requested legislative action to rescind the provision of the old law which required compulsory retirement for pilots attaining the age of 60.(15)(16)

(b) Uniform ~~Harbor~~ Port Regulations Bill

One of the principal deficiencies in Japanese maritime safety and law enforcement activity was the wide diversity of harbor rules and regulations prevailing in the numerous open ports. In his "Special

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Regulations, further revision was necessary and the bill was not submitted to the current session of the Diet. However, at the suggestion of the PSD Maritime Branch, the ~~General Maritime Bureau~~ Maritime Safety Board requested legislative action to rescind the provision of the old law which required compulsory retirement for pilots attaining the age of 60.(15)(16)

(b) Uniform ~~Harbor~~ Port Regulations Bill

One of the principal deficiencies in Japanese maritime safety and law enforcement activity was the wide diversity of harbor rules and regulations prevailing in the numerous open ports. In his "Special Report on the Study of Japanese Coast Guard and Harbor Police Facilities," Captain Meals pointed out that:

> Of the 44 open ports in Japan practically all are owned and operated by city or prefectural governments. Each of these ports has its own port regulations and special navigation rules. Control and upkeep of the navigable channels and aids to navigation is

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(15) Weekly Activity Report, Maritime Branch, 23-29 May 1948; dtd 8 June 1948.
(16) Memo for Record; Chief, Maritime Branch to Chief, PSD, dtd 26 May 1948; Sub: "Pilot Legislation."

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vested in the city or prefecture owning the port. Naturally this condition brings about a diversity of harbor regulations and a lack of uniformity in the maintenance of channel buoys and other navigational aids, all of which constitutes a hindrance to the efficient use of the ports and a danger to the vessels using them.(17)

To remedy this condition, the ~~General~~ Maritime Safety Board ~~Bureau~~, with the assistance of the PSD Maritime Branch, drafted a Uniform Harbor Regulations Bill, covering entrance and departure, anchorage, repairing and mooring, rules of the road, sailing routes, handling of explosives and other dangerous objects, lights and signals, designation of fishing areas within harbors, and other relevant subjects. This bill was approved by Government Section on 22 June 1948 for transmission to the Japanese Diet.(18)

(c) Proposed ~~Harbor~~ HARBOR Pollution Bill

Although the ~~Harbor~~ PORT Regulations Bill provides that measures be taken to

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drafted a Uniform Regulations Bill, covering entrance and departure, anchorage, repairing and mooring, rules of the road, sailing routes, handling of explosives and other dangerous objects, lights and signals, designation of fishing areas within harbors, and other relevant subjects. This bill was approved by Government Section on 22 June 1948 for transmission to the Japanese Diet.(18)

(e) Proposed HARBOR Pollution Bill

Although the ~~Harbor~~ PORT Regulations Bill provides that measures be taken to prevent harbor pollution, a special harbor pollution bill was proposed which would cover this subject in greater detail. This bill, originally drafted to be presented in conjunction with the Harbor Regulations Bill, was not completed at the time the latter was presented to the Diet. It was expected that this Bill would be taken up at a later session.(19)

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(17) Meals, Frank M., Capt (USCG) (Chief, Maritime Branch, PSD), "Special Report of Study of Japanese Coast Guard and Harbor Police Facilities," pp. 8-9.
(18) Text of Revised Harbor Regulations Bill is shown in Appendix _____.
(19) Verbal Statement by 1st Lt. Martin H. Reinfeld (Maritime Administrator) to the writer, 10 June 1948.

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b. Inspection of Japanese Ports and Harbors

1) Field Surveys

As previously indicated, field surveys and inspections of Japanese ports and harbor facilities continued after the filing of the report on "Japanese Coast Guard and Harbor Police Facilities" on 10 October 1946.(20) Although these visits were conducted for the purpose of obtaining information relative to Japanese maritime activities, Captain Meals and Lt. Reinfeld endeavored to effect local improvements wherever possible through the medium of informal suggestions. As Captain Meals stated, in his report on the surveys of the ports of Niigata, Nanao, Kanazawa, and Tsuruga, made in November 1946; "Aside from the routine collection of maritime data for Public Safety use this trip was made exceedingly interesting by the questioning by the Japanese with regard to American procedure and organization. Consequently, the conferences were devoted to answering questions asked and outlining democratic methods."(21)(22)

During the survey of Osaka, Beppu, Moji and the

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During the survey of Osaka, Beppu, Moji and the Inland Sea of Japan in December 1946, the passenger ship Nishiki Maru carrying Captain Meals and 1,100 passengers from Osaka to Beppu struck a submerged object, presumably a sunken wreck. Fortunately the damage was not severe and the ship proceeded to its destination. According

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(20) See Map Plate opposite.

(21) See paragraph 14 e, p. _____ for representative list of officials contacted on field surveys.

(22) Memo, Meals, Frank M. (Chief Maritime Administrator) to Chief, PSD dtd 18 Nov 1946; Sub: "Report of Maritime Survey, Ports of Niigata, Nanao, Kanazawa, and Tsuruga, Japan."

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to Captain Meals:

This trip was of great interest in that it gave me an opportunity to observe at first hand the conditions under which passenger vessels of the Japanese Merchant Marine presently operate. The "Nishiki Maru" on which I travelled is a vessel of about 2,400 tons, originally a first class vessel, well found, but now in a rather run down condition due to wartime operation. The vessel, licensed to carry 750 passengers, had actually on board 1,100. Had our collision with the submerged wreck resulted in the vessel's sinking it is certain that considerable loss of life would have occurred...On the route from Osaka to Beppu seven navigational lights were not functioning, this condition adding to the hazards of safe navigation. In the instance of the "Nishiki Maru" there are shown ample reasons why Japan should have a Maritime

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(23) Memo, Meals, Frank M. (Chief Maritime Administrator) to Chief, PSD dtd 18 Dec 1946; Sub: "Report of Maritime Survey, Osaka, Beppu, Moji and Inland Sea of Japan."

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2) Inspection of Korean Coast Guard

In January 1947 Captain Meals visited Korea to inspect and report on the progress of the Korean Coast Guard, which was established with surplus U. S. Army vessels and trained by U. S. Coast Guard personnel. The first Korean Coast Guard vessel ever to operate under the Korean flag was put into full commission on 29 October 1946. At the time of Captain Meals' inspection fifteen seagoing vessels had been placed in commission and seven bases established. Classes in seamanship, piloting, rules of the road, safety precautions, ship handling, emergency drills and other nautical matters were being taught by American personnel as rapidly as practicable. In the opinion of Captain Meals, the Korean Coast Guard had shown creditable progress in the short time it had been engaged in actual operations.(24)

3) Local Inspections by the Q-229

From the date of its assignment to PSD on 9 May 1946 ~~until the departure of Captain Meals on 8 December 1947~~, the FS 18-B, later redesignated as the

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3) Local Inspections by the Q-229

From the date of its assignment to PSD ~~on~~ 9 May 1946 ~~until the departure of Captain Meals on 8 December 1947~~, the ~~FS 18-B~~, later redesignated as the Q-229, was engaged almost continuously in the inspection of the numerous ports and harbors along the east coast of Japan, covering Mie, Aichi, Shizuoka, Kanagawa, Tokyo, Chiba, and Ibaraki Prefectures.(25) Under the command of Boatmaster 1st Lt. Martin H. Reinfeld and with a ~~five~~ four-man Japanese crew, the Q-229 inspected dozens of harbors, bays, and inlets (many of which were inacessible by rail) securing information on

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(24) Memo, Meals, Frank M. (Chief Maritime Administrator) to Chief, PSD dtd 29 Jan 1947; Sub: "Report on Korean Coast Guard."

(25) See Map Plate p. _____.

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maritime industries and activities, volume of sea-going traffic, maritime law enforcement, navigation aids, aids to distressed mariners, and related subjects.(26)

~~After the departure of Captain Meals, local inspections were less frequent because Lt. Reinfeld, who replaced Captain Meals as Chief Maritime Administrator, could rarely spare time from his administrative duties.~~

c. Maritime Safety Staff Study, 7 March 47

1) Purpose of Staff Study

The final PSD plan for the establishment of a Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service was completed by 7 March 1947 and submitted to the Deputy Chief, CIS, for transmission to the Chief of Staff. The purpose of this Staff Study was:

> To present to the Supreme Commander the necessity for the Imperial Japanese Government to become self-sustaining, within the aims of the Occupation, in (1) the enforcement of maritime law on the high seas and navigable waters of Japan, (2) the protection of the

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The final PSD plan for the establishment of a Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service was completed by 7 March 1947 and submitted to the Deputy Chief, CIS, for transmission to the Chief of Staff. The purpose of this Staff Study was:

> To present to the Supreme Commander the necessity for the Imperial Japanese Government to become self-sustaining, within the aims of the Occupation, in (1) the enforcement of maritime law on the high seas and navigable waters of Japan, (2) the protection of the customs revenue (prevention of smuggling and illegal entry), (3) the establishment of standards of maritime safety, (4) the maintenance of aids to navigation, (5) the provision of sea rescue facilities and assistance to distressed mariners, and (6) other related government maritime safety functions.(27)

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(26) Memo, 1st Lt. Martin H. Reinfeld to Chief, Maritime Branch, dtd 3 Nov 47; Sub: "Inspection of Ports of Misaki, Shimoda, Toba, and Nagoya."

(27) Staff Study, Chief PSD to AC/S G-2 (thru Dep. Chief, CIS), dtd 7 Mar 1947; Sub: "Establishment of a Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service for Japan,"

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It was pointed out that under the then-existing Japanese administration of maritime activities, there was:

> Divided, overlapping, and dual responsibility among the various ministries in some instances, inadequate or non-converage in other instances, a decided diversity in maritime law, port regulations and methods of enforcement in the various ports, and a generally inefficient maritime law enforcement policy for these services. Furthermore, extensive smuggling and illegal entry prevail, ship safety regulations are not enforced, a large proportion of Japanese navigational aids are not functioning, harbors and channels are obstructed with unmarked wreckage, no dependable means of saving life at sea is presently available, and during 1946 crimes involving ships increased threefold over

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generally inefficient maritime law enforcement policy for these services. Furthermore, extensive smuggling and illegal entry prevail, ship safety regulations are not enforced, a large proportion of Japanese navigational aids are not functioning, harbors and channels are obstructed with unmarked wreckage, no dependable means of saving life at sea is presently available, and during 1946 crimes involving ships increased threefold over 1945.(28)

To remedy these conditions, and "to combine all related activities in one specialized organization", the PSD plan proposed that the Japanese Government be authorized to establish a Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service within the Ministry of Transportation.(29)

2. Japanese Request for Maritime Safety Organization

Meanwhile, the Japanese, desiring to make effective use of the patrol boats authorized by SCAPIN 1622, requested approval of the Supreme Commander to establish a maritime safety organization within the Ministry of Transport-

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(28) Ibid.

(29) Ibid.

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ation which would be an executive organ for enforcement of laws concerning public safety at sea. The Lighthouse Bureau, the Hydrographic Department, and other organs concerned with maritime safety under the Ministry of Transportation would be consolidated under the proposed organization, the personnel of which would be invested with authority for inspection and supervision at sea.Arrangements would be made for a division of functions between this proposed organization and the existing water police, customs, and other agencies concerned with maritime affairs. (30)

The organization proposed in this request was similar in broad outline to that recommended in the PSD Staff Study.

3) Concurrences and Reconciliation of Non-Concurrences.

After some minor revisions, this study was

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3) Concurrences and Reconciliation of Non-Concurrences.

After some minor revisions, this study was approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in June 1947 and submitted to other interested Staff Sections of SCAP for concurrence and comment.(31) Initialled concurrences (no comment) were received from G-3 and the Civil Communications, Public Health and Welfare, and Economic and Scientific Sections during July 1947. Concurrences were also received during July 1947 from G-1, G-4, and Diplomatic Section, all of whom suggested minor revisions.(32) ComNavFe objected

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(30) Ibid; ~~Op. Cit.,~~ Tab "IX"; "Implementation Plans."

(31) The Staff Study and related documents are shown in Appendix _____.

(32) Civil Intelligence Section Special Report: "Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service," undated (November 1947); Tab "L": "Concurrences" (Confidential).

to the inclusion in the Staff Study of a proposed General Order (Tab XI) delineating the responsibilities of interested Occupation Forces agencies with regard to the Japanese Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service. They also recommended, relative to the proposed request for assignment of six additional U. S. Coast Guard officers and six U. S. Coast Guard Chief Petty Officers (Tab XII), that these personnel be assigned to duty under Commander, Naval Activities, Japan to exercise operational control over the proposed Japanese Maritime Bureau.(33) Both of these documents, that is, the proposed General Order and the proposed request for additional personnel were withdrawn from the Staff Study and ComNavFe gave unqualified concurrence to the revised study in August 1947.

The principal objections to the Staff Study emanated from Government Section, who, in a Check Sheet dated 19 July 1947, expressed concern because:

> There is no prohibition of military training, no provision for reviewing plans,

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under Commander, Naval Activities, Japan to exercise operational control over the proposed Japanese Maritime Bureau.(33) Both of these documents, that is, the proposed General Order and the proposed request for additional personnel were withdrawn from the Staff Study and ComNavFe gave unqualified concurrence to the revised study in August 1947.

The principal objections to the Staff Study emanated from Government Section, who, in a Check Sheet dated 19 July 1947, expressed concern because:

> There is no prohibition of military training, no provision for reviewing plans, no limitations on size of force. Such an authorization would clearly permit the establishment of the nucleus of a navy. As written, the proposals contain none of the safeguards which would seem to be required by Basic Post Surrender Policy.(34)

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(33) Memo, ComNavFe to G-2, SCAP, dtd 8 Apr 1947; Sub: "Establishment of Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service."

(34) Check Sheet, Government Section to G-2, dtd 19 July 1947; Sub: "Establishment of a Japanese Coast Guard Agency," Check Note No. 1.

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In a Check Sheet on 29 July 47 to Government Section, G-2 pointed out that military training was already prohibited by the Terms of Surrender, SCAPIN 543, and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Furthermore, the implementation plans clearly stated the limitations of the size of the force; i.e., 37 vessels and 2,054 officers and men for immediate needs and 121 vessels and 9,255 officers and men as a maximum force to be established in the indefinite future.(35)

Similar misunderstandings regarding the proposed plan were clarified in this and subsequent correspondence between the two sections.(36) A series of conferences held during August among representatives of Public Safety Division and Government Section in an effort to reconcile divergent viewpoints resulted in tentative agreements on minor issues. In a conference held on 22 September 1947 attended by Col. Pulliam of PSD, and General Whitney and Mr. A. R. Hussey, Jr. of Government Section, complete accord was reached regarding administration of the proposed service, possible armament of the vessels, implementation of the Maritime

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(35) ~~Op. cit.~~, Ibid., G-2 to Government Section, dtd 29 July 1947, Check Note No. 2,

(36) Civil Intelligence Section Special Report: "Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service," undtd (November 1947); Tab "M": "Reconciliation of Non-concurrences." (Confidential)

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shot cannon (in conformance with international law), (3) That no formal directive be issued to implement the service, (4) That Public Safety Division assist the Ministry of Transportation in drafting the basic legislation, (5) That the PSD Maritime Safety Study be submitted to the Chief of Staff when the draft of basic legislation is approved by Government Section.(37)

4) Draft of Basic Legislation and Budget

The draft of basic legislation was prepared during October and November 1947 and approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 for transmittal to the Chief of Staff. The final draft of the Staff Study, with the draft of legislation was submitted to the Chief of Staff early in January 1948. It was returned with a Check Sheet from the Chief of Staff to G-2 on 14 January requesting "full information as to initial and annual costs involved in implementing the proposed law."(38) This information was furnished on 29 January 1948. It was pointed out that the cost of performing maritime functions by the various responsible

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(37) Pulliam, H. E. (Chief, PSD), Memo for Record, dtd 23 Sept 1947; Sub: "Conference ref: Establishment of Maritime Safety & Revenue Marine Service."

(38) Check Sheet, Chief of Staff to G-2, dtd 14 Jan 1948; Sub: "Maritime Service Safety Legislation," Check Note No. 1.

(39) ~~Op. Cit.~~ Ibid., G-2 to Chief of Staff, dtd 29 Jan 1948; Check Note No. 2.

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replacing the 28 vessels currently being used by the Ministry of Transportation, if and when they are recalled for reparations, would be 2,115,000,000 yen, distributed over a three-year period.(40)

These estimates were accepted by the Chief of Staff, who informed G-2 in a Check Sheet dated 1 February 1948 that the Maritime Safety Authorities Bill was approved for transmission to the Japanese Government on condition that certain provisions be deleted. These were:

Article 4, last sub-paragraph, which read:
"Vessels actively engaged in coastal law enforcement work may be armed with a mounted, single shot cannon not in excess of 3-inch caliber."

Article 13, The words shown in parentheses:
"The Director of the Hydrographic Bureau of the Maritime Safety Board may issue a hydrographic notification with his name (and make direct communications with foreign hydrogra-

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Article 13, The words shown in parentheses: "The Director of the Hydrographic Bureau of the Maritime Safety Board may issue a hydrographic notification with his name (and make direct communications with foreign hydrographic offices)."

Article 21. "When a Maritime Safety official in charge of a patrol vessel has, in accordance with the provisions of Article 18, Item 1 (To make a vessel stop proceeding, or to suspend her departure), ordered a vessel to stop and such vessel does not stop he may enforce compliance by firing two blank warning shots; if the vessel disregards the

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(40) Ibid.

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warning and does not stop he may then fire a solid shot across her bow. Should the vessel still refuse to obey the order to stop he may then fire into the vessel."(41)

These provisions were deleted and the Maritime Safety Authorities Bill was transmitted by Government Section to the Japanese Government on 12 February 1948.(42)

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(41) ~~Op. cit.~~ Ibid., Chief of Staff to Government Section (thru G-2), dtd 1 Feb 1948, Check Note No. 3.

(42) ~~Op. Cit.~~ Ibid., Government Section to G-2, dtd 13 Feb 1948, Check Note No. 5.

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2) Proposed Implementation of PSD Maritime Safety Plan

The prepared implementation of this plan was based for the most part on the recommendations of Captain Neals in his "Special Report on the Study of Japanese Coast Guard and Harbor Police Facilities." As recapitulated in the Staff Study, the implementation program comprised the following measures:

(1) Enact enabling legislation establishing a Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service Bureau for Japan in the Ministry of Transportation. This Bureau would become the law enforcing, property protecting, lifesaving agency of the Japanese Government on the territorial waters of Japan; (2) Enact legislation to incorporate into the above-mentioned Bureau: (a) functions being performed by other agencies in the Ministry of Transportation, such as the Seamen's Bureau, the Lighthouse Bureau and others, (b) functions being performed by the Water Police relating to harbor traffic, designations of anchorages, and other essentially maritime matters, (c) functions being performed by

agency of the Japanese Government on the territorial waters of Japan; (2) Enact legislation to incorporate into the above-mentioned Bureau: (a) functions being performed by other agencies in the Ministry of Transportation, such as the Seamen's Bureau, the Lighthouse Bureau and others, (b) functions being performed by the Water Police relating to harbor traffic, designations of anchorages, and other essentially maritime matters, (c) functions being performed by prefectural or municipal agencies relative to enforcement of navigation laws, removal and obstruction of derelicts, navigational aids, and others; (3) Enact appropriate legislation to insure separation of maritime law enforcement from the administration of government owned docks, warehouses, shipping and other government enterprises; (4) Enact legislation to provide that personnel of the Bureau be civil service employees, and that certain designated personnel of the Bureau be delegated the powers of peace and customs

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officers; (5) Establish a training school for pre-service and in-service training in all maritime activities; (6) Retrain or recruit sufficient ships's officers and seamen to operate the vessels required for the immediate duties of the service and acquire usable vessels up to a total of 37 for immediate duty. Augment the strength of the Bureau up to 9,255 personnel and 121 vessels as future operational requirements dictate. (7) Establish bases at 13 ports for immediate use, the number and location of these ports to be adjusted in the future in accordance with changing conditions; (8) Retain and revitalize the Imperial Lifesaving Institute as an independent auxiliary of the Bureau.(~~30~~ 43)

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(7) Establish bases at 13 ports for immediate use, the number and location of these ports to be adjusted in the future in accordance with changing conditions; (8) Retain and revitalize the Imperial Lifesaving Institute as an independent auxiliary of the Bureau.(~~30~~ 43)

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(43) Staff Study, Chief PSD to AC/S G-2 (thru Dep. Chief, CIS) dtd 7 Mar 1947; Sub: "Establishment of Maritime Safety and Revenue Marine Service for Japan;" Tab IX; "Implementation Plans."

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16. Operations, Maritime Branch: Phase III:

a. The Maritime Safety Authorities Bill

The Maritime Safety Authorities Bill, drafted to conform to the principles and recommendations outlined in the paragraph 15, was passed by the Japanese Diet on 15 April 1948 and became effective on 1 May 1948. This law, passed "for the purpose of insuring maritime safety and preventing, detecting, and suppressing violations of laws of the Japanese Government in harbors, bays, sounds, and coastal waters on the high seas adjacent to Japan," provided for the establishment under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Transportation of a separate agency, the Maritime Safety Board, to consist of Secretariat and three Bureaus.(1) The general functions of the Maritime Safety Board were stated to be "the enforcement of laws and orders pertaining to safety of vessels the qualifications and minimum number as to manning of ship's officers, assistance to vessels in distress, investigation of marine disasters, pilots, prevention and suppression of crime at sea, and services concerning waterways and navigational aids."(2) The specific functions of the

harbors, bays, sounds, and coastal waters on the high seas adjacent to Japan," provided for the establishment under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Transportation of a separate agency, the Maritime Safety Board, to consist of Secretariat and three Bureaus.(1) The general functions of the Maritime Safety Board were stated to be "the enforcement of laws and orders pertaining to safety of vessels the qualifications and minimum number as to manning of ship's officers, assistance to vessels in distress, investigation of marine disasters, pilots, prevention and suppression of crime at sea, and services concerning waterways and navigational aids."(2) The specific functions of the Secretariat, the Safety Bureau, the Hydrographic Bureau, and the Lighthouse Bureau are enumerated in detail in Articles 6 through 9 of the law. The law also provided that the number of personnel of the Board is not to exceed 10,000 and the number of vessels is not to exceed 125, excluding harbor craft. These 125 vessels are to be limited to 50,000 gross tons, with the further

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(1) Maritime Safety Authorities Law, Article 1.

(2) Ibid., Article 2.

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stipulation that no individual vessel shall exceed 1,500 gross tons nor be capable of exceeding 15 knots in speed.(3)(4)(5)

b. Discussion of Maritime Safety Bill be Allied Council for Japan

The Maritime Safety Authorities Bill was placed on the agenda of the 58th meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on 28 April 1948 at the request of Mr. Patrick Shaw, representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India. Mr. Shaw

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(3) Ibid., Article 4.

(4) Exceptions to the limitation of 1,500 gross tons were made for the lighthouse supply ship No. 18, Nissho Maru (2,005 gross tons) and the hydrographic survey ship Soya (2,207 gross tons), which under provisions of Article 38 of the Maritime Safety Authorities Law, "may exceed 1,500 gross tons displacement for the life of these two vessels only."

(5) For entire text of Maritime Safety Authorities

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(5) For entire text of Maritime Safety Authorities Law, see Appendix _____.

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pointed out that "Japanese press reports repeated by foreign correspondents gave to the world an exaggerated account of the Japanese forces contemplated under the Bill."(6) Although stating that the "more sensational

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(6) The dispatch by Mr. Lindesay Parrott in the New York Times of 6 April 1948 is typical. Datelined Tokyo, April 5, the headline of this article reads: "JAPAN SEEKS FLEET TO PATROL COASTS." "The Japanese Government (it continues) is now hoping to build up its fleet of 125 ships including former minelayers and special duty submarines....The new agency would have a staff not exceeding 10,000 men who would be permitted to 'carry arms for execution of their duty'....The total tonnage of the vessels would be 50,000, with no ship having a speed of more than 15 knots, or be larger than 1,500 tons in size. This is approximately equivalent to the modern destroyer." Words like "fleet", "minelayer", "submarine", "10,000 armed men", "destroyer" are misleading in the context of this article. Apart from the patent falsehood that the use of submarines of any type

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details of the earlier press reports were inaccurate," Mr. Shaw expressed his opinion that the principles involved in the legislation were important enough to warrant some prior advice at least, either to the Members of this Council or to the Far Eastern Commission.(7)

In reply, Mr. Sebald, Member for the United States, asserted that:

> The Supreme Commander was acting within his authority as the sole executive for the Allied Powers in Japan when he allowed this legislation to be considered by the Japanese Diet and duly adopted as law in accordance with legislative process....No orders have been issued by the Supreme Commander or his General Headquarters to provide for the establishment of a Maritime Safety Authority; the Japanese Government has not been directed to enact legislation to that effect.... Any discussions which may have taken place on this subject between the relevant Jap-

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(7) Secretariat, Allied Council for Japan; "Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the 58th Meeting (Special) of the Allied Council for Japan, 28 April 1948," dated 30 April 1948. Full text included in Appendix _____.

(8) Ibid.

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General Shang Chen, Member for China, contributed the thought that:

> While admitting the necessity of safeguarding the Japanese coastal waters...to prevent Japan from becoming a menace to the peace and security of the world...the Japanese Government and the Maritime Safety Board must be instructed to understand that the Maritime Safety Authority Law has granted them authority no more than the limited policing power in Japan's coastal waters.... Attention should be focussed on precautionary measures to guard against any possible abuse of power on the part of the Japanese Government which might lead to a resurgence of Japan's naval strength.(9)

Mr. Sebald assured General Shang that the Supreme Commander and his General Headquarters are "fully alive to the connotations which you have mentioned."

The Acting Member for the Soviet Union, Major

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The Acting Member for the Soviet Union, Major General Kislevko, objecting to the "unilateral decision" by the Supreme Commander with regard to the establishment of "Japanese maritime police forces," purported to regard the Maritime Safety Authorities Act as a step in the revival of the Japanese armed forces." He recommended that enforcement of the Maritime Safety Authorities Bill be suspended until the Far Eastern Commission could reach a decision.(10)

Mr. Sebald described the patrol vessels assigned to the Maritime Safety Board and distributed photographs of them, demonstrating clearly that they were wholly unsuitable for military use. The meeting adjourned after

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(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid.

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(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid.

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Mr. Shaw reiterated his contention that "some prior advice would have been appropriate" and General Shang repeated his adjuration that "SCAP should take every precautionary measure to prevent the Maritime Safety Board from being organized as a military establishment." General Kislenko's suggestion was given no further consideration.

c. Decision of the Far Eastern Commission

The discussions of the Maritime Safety Authorities Bill in the Far Eastern Commission followed approximately the same pattern as those at the Allied Council. A motion was introduced at the 103rd Meeting on 22 April 1948 by the New Zealand representative, Mr. G. R. Powles, that the Maritime Safety Authorities Law should not be implemented until the Far Eastern Commission had had an opportunity of considering how far its provisions were consistant with Allied security requirements. In a formal vote on resolution FEC-305/11 (to suspend implementation of the Maritime Safety Authorities Law) during the 104th Meeting on 29 April 1948,

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The view of the United Kingdom, as presented by Mr. H. A. Graves was that "although a fleet of 125 ships is acceptable, no one vessel should exceed 300 tons and the maximum speed should be 12 knots except for a limited number of vessels required for full time preventive work." In view of this position, Mr. Graves voted to

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suport the resolution in order to "press for the amend-
ment of the law on the above lines."(11)

The French representative, Mr. Maggiar, raised questions concerning both the procedure and the substance of the Maritime Safety Authorities Law. He held that, if the matter of a coastal patrol were urgent, the Supreme Commander could have issued an interim directive; if the matter were not urgent, the policy could have been decided upon by the Far Eastern Commission and transmitted to the Supreme Commander in the normal manner.

Regarding the substance of the Law, "two questions were involved: First, armament and other characteristics of vessels, and second, contact between this Japanese patrol organization and foreign nationals. In the matter of armament, Mr. Maggiar stated that while the bill did not provide for armament of the vessels, it appeared impossible for a coastal patrol to discharge its functions without some king of armament. Concerning contact between the coastal patrol

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Dr. Wellington Koo, representing the Chinese government, stated that his Government recognized the practical need of setting up some kind of coastal patrol

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(11) Far Eastern Commission; "Provisonal Minutes of the 104th Meeting, 29 April 1948." Full text included in Appendix _____.

(12) Ibid.

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in Japan. He preferred to approach the question from a practical rather than a legal standpoint. He considered it desirable, however, to postpone the effective date of the law until the decision of the Commission could be reached, particularly regarding armament and contact between the coastal patrol and Allied nationals.(13)

Mr. Makin, representing the Australian Government, "questioned the feasibility of allowing the Japanese Diet, no matter how democratic it might be, to exercise authority to set up a patrol which would come into contact with Allied ships and nationals...." He was forced to ask who was governing Japan. Was it the Japanese Diet or was it the Far Eastern Commission.... Unitl there should be an agreement on the peace treaty, he felt that the Far Eastern Commission had the right to exercise its authority to supervise closely the laws which the Japanese Diet might seek to pass, therefore, he favored the adoption of FEC-305/11.(14)

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Mr. Jovellanos, representing the Republic of the Phillipines, stated that "unless substantial amendments to the text now available have been made, certain provisions appear to be inappropriate at this time or are otherwise in conflict with the Commission's disarmament policy for Japan....For this reason, my Government supports FEC-305/11."(15)

The representative of the Soviet Union, Admiral Ramishvili, offered a resolution that FEC-305/11 be amended to read as follows: "The Japanese should not set up or operate any coastal patrol or coast guard

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(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Ibid.

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service until the Far Eastern Commission had adopted a policy decision on this question." This motion was voted upon and lost for the lack of majority of the representatives.(16)

Mr. Reuchlin representing the Netherlands Government held that "the desire of the Commission to suspend enforcement of the law was considered by his delegation to be legitimate and reasonable and within the competence of the Commission....Until further information were forthcoming, the Netherlands representative would support the adoption of FEC-305/11.(17)

The Canadian representative, Mr. Collins, said that the Canadian Government was sympathetic with the various points that had been raised, and considered that the commission should fully discuss all problems connected with the adoption of a coastal patrol with a view toward insuring that its establishment would not contravene Commission policies. However, it was the view of his Government that the specific proposal in FEC-305/11 was inappropriate, and he was therefore under

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The Indian representative, Mr. Nehru, stated that "since the Commission could pass a policy later if it so desired, and since it was advisable not to interfere with the exercise of the Supreme Commander's authority until it was clear that there was some discrepancy between the law and the commission's policy, he would abstain from voting on this resolution.(19)

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(16) Ibid.

(17) Ibid.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid.

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General McCoy, representing the United States Government, held that the Maritime Safety Authorities Bill had been passed in a normal, routine manner by the Japanese Diet. With regard to the size of the ships, although the Maritime Safety Authorities Bill allowed ships of greater speed and tonnage than those specified by the British representative, it was pointed out that such ships are not now available and only small vessels of low speed are operating at present. General McCoy further stated that the United States Government saw no reason why, if the Far Eastern Commission deemed a policy decision to be necessary, it should not pass one after the act had gone into effect.

The Japanese Government could hardly continue to function if the promulgation of laws must be delayed awaiting the agreement among the 11 member nations of the Far Eastern Commission. If, however, some law should be passed which the Commission considered in contravention of its policy decision, the Commission would still have the authority to adopt an appropriate policy decision, which would be controlling, regardless of the provisions of the law in question. For this

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(20) Ibid.

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c. Current Status of Maritime Safety Board

1) Personnel and Vessels

At the time of this writing, two months after the formal establishment of the Maritime Safety Board, the actual operations have not yet been firmly fixed. The current personnel strength is 5,000 of which about 1,000 are seagoing, the remainder being technical, maintenance, training, administrative, and clerical personnel formerly assigned to various bureaus and installations which were consolidated under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Safety Board. Further increases in personnal up to the authorized strength of 10,000 are contingent upon the possible expansion of actual maritime activities. This seems unlikely within the forseable future because of the lack of suitable vessels and equipment.(21) On 1 June 1948, a total of 462 vessels were under the general jurisdiction of the Maritime Safety Board. The table below shows the classification of these vessels by type and tonnage.(22)

MARITIME SAFETY BOARD VESSELS

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MARITIME SAFETY BOARD VESSELS

	Over 500 Tons	Over 100 Tons	20-100 Tons	Under 20 Tons	Total
Patrol Boats		3	35		38
Harbor Boats	1 (500 ton tug)	10	37	76	124
Mine Sweepers	2 (6,869 tons) (2,860 tons)	40	6	3	51
Lighthouse Tenders	1 (2,005 tons)	2	4	66	73
Hydrographic Boats	*	2			2
Vessels Under Custody	4 (2,330 tons) (1,040 tons) (6,886 tons) (2,860 tons)	103	8	47	162
Miscellaneous			4 (3 disinfection) (1 dredge)	8	12
TOTAL	8	160	94	200	462

* Sova Maru (2207 tons), the hydrographic survey ship [illegible]

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TOTAL	8	160	94	200	462

* Soya Maru (2207 tons), the hydrographic survey ship mentioned in Art. 38, Maritime Safety Authorities Bill, is still (Jul 48) engaged in repatriation work and is not yet available to the Maritime Safety Board.

(21) Statement of Lt. Reinfeld, PSD Maritime Safety Administrator, to the writer on 1 July 1948.

(22) A complete list of vessels by name, function, tonnage, and activity is included in Appendix _____.

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Of these 462 vessels only the harbor boats, lighthouse tenders, hydrographic boats and the miscellaneous vessels are definitely owned by the Maritime Safety Board, the balance being subject to distribution among the Allied Powers for reparations. Although the former vessels total 211, or nearly one-half of all the vessels, it will be observed that almost all of these are under 100 tons and most under 20 tons. These are classified as harbor boats and as such are not included in the 125 vessels authorized by the Maritime Safety Authorities Law. The vessels subject to reparations include 51 minesweepers which are now actively engaged in mine-sweeping and will continue to be so engaged for an indefinite period, possibly 20 to 50 years.(23) The task of sweeping the Inland Sea alone is a formidable one. At present only narrow lanes have been cleared into which mines occasionally drift. The ferry disaster of 28 January 1948 in which the JOO MARU struck a mine and sank with a loss of 289 lives emphasizes the need for continuous activity in this field.(24)

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Some of the 162 vessels under the custody of the Maritime Safety Board are being used for miscellaneous Maritime purposes, but generally the main function of Maritime Safety Board with regard to these vessels is to prevent them from falling into acute disrepair and to guard against theft or vandalism. It is not expected that any of these vessels will be permanently assigned to the Maritime Safety Board. The status of the 38 patrol vessels is not yet certain; it is possible that these will be retained permanently by the Japanese

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(23) Statement of Mr. E. Hara of the Maritime Safety Board to the writer on 1 July 1948.

(24) Pacific Stars & Stripes, 29 Jan 1948.

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Government, but at the present time they are still subject to recall under the provisions of SCAPIN 1622.

d. Relations with other Maritime Agencies.

Although the Maritime Safety Authorities Law consolidated most maritime functions under the authority of the Maritime Safety Board, the Customs Bureau was retained under the Ministry of Finance. Under the provisions of the agreement between the Customs Bureau and the Maritime Safety Bureau the latter will exercise authority in matters relating to customs inspection or customs violations in the absence of properly designated customs officials. Violators of customs laws may be apprehended by law enforcement officials of the Maritime Safety Board but must be turned over to customs officials for disposition.(25). With the powers of each of these agencies clearly defined by law it is believed that close cooperation may be expected between them.

In order to avoid involving the Maritime Safety Board in matters of a financial or commercial nature, certain functions of the Ships Bureau were to be re-

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In order to avoid involving the Maritime Safety Board in matters of a financial or commercial nature, certain functions of the Ships Bureau were to be retained under the General Maritime Bureau. The function of the Ships Bureau generally is to make decisions regarding allocation of materials, size of vessels, shipbuilding techniques, subsidies, and costs, with a view toward planning the overall requirements of the Japanese merchant fleet.(26) The Japanese Government often has a direct financial interest in ship construction and repair. The General Maritime Bureau represents the

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(25) Articles 101-3 and 101-4 of the Customs Law of Japan, as amended by the Session of the National Diet, July 1948.
(26) Doc. GMB #239 (G), Gen. Maritime Bureau, Min. of Transportation, 30 Apr 48, Sub: "Ship Bureau."

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Japanese Government and conducts investigations to insure that fair value is being accorded

Another Agency interested in maritime safety is the Classification Society of Japan, a government agency, under the Ministry of Transportation, whose function is to inspect materials and shipbuilding procedures to guarantee compliance with safety standards. Marine insurance companies accept the findings of the Classification Society as a basis for setting insurance rates.

The allocation of safety inspection functions among these three agencies, the Maritime Safety Board, the General Maritime Bureau, and the Classification Society is still under discussion. The Maritime Branch of PSD is studying the opinions of the U.S. Maritime Commission, the Far East representative of the U.S. National Bureau of Standards, and the Civil Transportation Section of SCAP and will advise the Japanese in this matter.(27)

a. PSD Assistance to Maritime Safety Board

The creation of new agencies with the scope and

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a. PSD Assistance to Maritime Safety Board

The creation of new agencies with the scope and magnitude of the Maritime Safety Board engendered many complex administrative and technical problems. The officials of the Maritime Safety Board although highly qualified in their special fields usually did not have the necessary experience in dealing with these subjects on a national scale. Having no precedents or traditions to guide them, they tended during this formative period to lean heavily on the PSD Maritime Branch for assistance in all phases of organization and operations. The departure of Captain Meals and subsequent unsuccessful efforts of the Public Safety Division to obtain a replacement for him left this difficult task in the

(27) Statement of Lt. Reinfeld, PSD Maritime Branch Administrator, to the writer on 16 July 1948.

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hands of Lt. Reinfeld, who with the assistance of Mr. Moeller, the Public Safety Division Legal Advisor and other interested SCAP agencies, guided the Maritime Safety Board officials through their administrative, operational, and technical difficulties. In addition to normal office routine, Lieutenant Reinfeld held an average of three conferences daily with Maritime Safety Board officials during this period, assisting and advising them in the matters listed below:

1) Procurement of Materials

The consolidation of all operational maritime agencies in Japan required a nationwide inventory of facilities and equipment. On the basis of this inventory, Lieutenant Reinfeld assisted the Japanese in preparing estimates of their equipment needs for the first year of operations, writing requisitions, and facilitating the procurement of necessary equipment by arrangement with the interested Japanese and Occupation Forces agencies.

2) Review of All Existing Laws and Regulations in Possible Conflict with the Maritime Safety Authorities

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2) Review of All Existing Laws and Regulations in Possible Conflict with the Maritime Safety Authorities Law

As previously indicated, a wide variety of laws, regulations, and ordinances were inforced on local, prefectural, and national levels concerning all aspects of maritime activities.(28) The Maritime Safety Authorities Law which dealt only with the broad aspects of maritime safety and law enforcement did not automatically rescind local or prefectural regulations which dealt with minutiae of maritime operations peculiar to any the [illegible]

(28) Meals, Frank M., Capt. (USCG) (Former Chief, Maritime Branch, PSD), "Special Report on Study of Japanese Coast Guard and Harbor Police Facilities," p. 57.

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given port. According to Article 39 of the Maritime Safety Authorities Law, "The provisions of any law or ordinance existing at the time of enactment of this act shall be null and void for the future, in so far as they are in conflict with the provisions of this Act." One of the main administrative tasks of the Maritime Safety Board during its first few months of operation was to study existing laws and regulations to discover and eliminate such conflicts.

3) Establishment of Radio Communications Network

Certain functions of the Maritime Safety Board, such as the enforcement of laws and orders pertaining to the safety of vessels, investigation of marine casualties, the prevention and suppression of crimes at sea, and the detection and apprehension of criminals, require communications facilities with a high degree of efficiency and some degree of secrecy, the latter particularly with regard to marine crimes. It was considered advisable that the Maritime Safety Board have exclusive communication facilities wherever

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criminals, require communications facilities with a high degree of efficiency and some degree of secrecy, the latter particularly with regard to marine crimes. It was considered advisable that the Maritime Safety Board have exclusive communication facilities wherever possible, both to insure secrecy in anti-smuggling operations and to prevent interruptions in the service which may be caused by breakdowns in public communication channels, or strikes. At the request of the PSD Maritime Branch, the General Maritime Bureau on 20 April 1948 submitted a plan for a communications network to be used by the Maritime Safety Board.(29) ~~This plan called for~~ This plan, while not entirely satisfactory, was used as a basis for discussion among representatives of Maritime Safety Board, other Ministry of Transportation agencies, Ministry of Communications, and the Public Safety Division and Civil Communications Section of SCAP. As a result of conferences during April and May 1948, a satisfactory plan, including most of the ~~above~~ plan submitted by the General Maritime Bureau, ~~plan,~~ was formulated, and implementation was begun during June 1948.(30) It is expected that the communications network will be in full operation by September 1949.(31)

(29) General Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Transportation, dtd 20 Apr 48; subj "Plan for Maritime Safety Communications.

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(29) General Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Transportation, dtd 20 Apr 48; subj "Plan for Maritime Safety Communications."

(30) General Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Transportation, dtd 27 Apr 48; sub: "Plan for Maritime Safety Communications."

(31) Statement of Lt. Neinfeld, PSD Maritime Branch Administrator, to the writer on 16 July 1948.

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4) Establishment of Maritime Safety Training Schools

In March 1948 the General Maritime Bureau, with the advice and assistance of the PSD Maritime Administrator, drafted a tentative plan for in-service training of officials of the proposed Maritime Safety Board.(32) This plan was revised several times during the following three months with a view toward eliminating the "cultural" subjects and placing more emphasis on technical and practical matters. Completed in final form on 18 June 1948, the curriculum calls for 14 school weeks of 44 hours each devoted to classroom training, and an additional 56 hours of practical training aboard a vessel.(33) The first class, which began on 7 July 1948, was composed of 90 land-based officials of the Maritime Safety Board. In the second class, scheduled for 15 November 1948, and in subsequent classed, a proportionate representation of seagoing officials will be included.

The curriculum stresses maritime law enforcement, the prevention and detection of maritime crimes, and

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The curriculum stresses maritime law enforcement, the prevention and detection of maritime crimes, and general maritime security. These duties for the most part were new to Maritime Safety Board officials, having been performed in the past by the Japanese water police, who, as previously noted, did not receive specialized training or possess special aptitudes or qualifications for this type of work. In this course, designed to

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(32) Doc. GMB #2382 (I), General Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Transportation, dtd 25 Mar 48; sub: "Plan for the Enforcement of Education in the Safety Department, Government Officials' Training Establishment, Maritime Safety Board.
(33) Doc. MSB #80 (MT), Maritime Safety Board, Min. of Transportation, dtd 18 Jun 48; sub: "Plan of Training for 1948, Maritime Safety Training School.

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prepare Maritime Safety Board officials for thorough and efficient discharge of their official functions, 200 hours of training are devoted to general jurisprudence, including knowledge of SCAP directives, the Japanese Constitution, the Maritime Safety Authorities Law, the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, and other laws. "Security duties" (162 hours), includes a_ong other subjects, control over illegal entry and exit, control of smuggling and maritime crimes, control of dangerous objects, life-saving, and salvage. "Criminal Police" (78 hours), includes an outline of the judicial system and procedures, classification and handling of evidence, criminal identification, and other relevant matters.(34) Lectures by the PSD Maritime Administrator and other qualified Occupation Forces personnel to Japanese students of the Maritime Safety Training School were scheduled for a minimum of two hours per week. It is expected that the school will continue indefinitely for the training of incumbent officials and the normal complement of replacements.

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f. Uniforms, Flags, and Insignia of Maritime Safety Board

The flag of the Maritime Safety Board, a central figure showing the cardinal and inter-cardinal points of the compass with emergent sun-streaks on a field of navy blue, was designed by Maritime Safety Board officials with the assistance and advice of Lieutenant Reinfeld, PSD Maritime Administrator. On 3 May 1948, Lt. Reinfeld personally submitted this design to

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(34) The full curriculum of the Maritime Safety Training School is shown in Appendix _____.

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representatives of the Civil Information and Education Section, the Civil Transportation Section, and the Diplomatic Section of SCAP, and to the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, all of whom concurred without comment.(35) SCAPIN 1895, dated 16 May 1948, authorized the Maritime Safety Board to fly the Board's flag on its vessels and buildings. This SCAPIN also authorized the display of the Japanese national flag on Maritime Safety Board vessels on those dates when display of the national flag has been authorized by SCAPIN 1867 of 1 March 1948.

Uniforms and insignia designed by MSB officials with the assistance of the PSD Maritime Branch were approved on 9 July 1948 by representatives of the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, who scrutinized them for possible points of similarity to naval uniforms of the United States and other Allied Powers.

The PSD Maritime Branch also assisted Japanese officials in preparing a list of, and budget requirements for, minimum uniform requirements for the fiscal year 1948-49.

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g. Evaluation of Maritime Safety Board

The Maritime Safety Board having been in operation only two months at the time of this writing (July 1948), it is impossible yet to appraise its work in the primary fields maritime safety and law enforcement. Various recurring reports, principally reports of patrol activity, have been requested from the Maritime Safety Board by the PSD Maritime Branch. Also, the Maritime

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(35) Memo for Record, Maritime Branch Administrator to Chief, PSD, dtd 3 May 48; sub: "Maritime Safety Board Flag.

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Safety Administrator is planning regular staff visits to the district headquarters of all nine maritime districts, in addition to spot inspections of ports in the Kanto District with the C-229. On the basis of the Japanese reports and his own observations, Lieutenant Reinfeld will continue to advise the Japanese regarding possible improvements in the service.

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19. Statistics and Analysis Branch

a. Reason for Establishment

1) Mission of PSD

The mission of the Public Safety Division has been stated in Paragraph 3. (1) In terms as general and comprehensive as such a statement was, the Chief was free to outline a program and organization that he felt would be adequate for functions involved. In a division that dealt with matters touching every citizen, the staff might well be thrown in more contact with the Japanese people than would be the case with many other groups within the Occupation. "Made in Occupied Japan" would therefore be a stronger test of the PSD set-up than of many other units.

Establishment of the operating branches of PSD was slowed by the small number of civilian personnel available as experts and administrators in the various fields of public safety work, usually considered to be police, prisons, fire, and at times maritime safety. Even before a nucleus of experienced people was at hand, the necessity for reference data on police, prison, fire, and maritime organization and operations was clear. The Statistics and

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The mission of the Branch, hereafter referred to as S&A, was stated as follows:

> To obtain, tabulate, evaluate, analyze, and publish in appropriate form such statistical information in the public safety field as is necessary to accomplish the overall mission set forth in Public Safety Memorandum No. 7, 9 March 1946, and keep

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(1) pp. 54-5.

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the Public Safety Division apprised of current trends.

To translate evaluated data into graphs and charts, where practicable, with a view to quick visual appreciation of the current situation in the public safety fields as compared to a selected n normal.

To establish and maintain such filing systems as will serve to organize and preserve the survey data developed by Police, Prison, Fire, Coast Guard, Signal Communication and special groups.

To prepare a Monthly Report of Activities for submission to Civil Intelligence Section. (2) True, a number of possible actions are permissable. But the statements say to do these four things: (1) Secure, treat, and publish needed statistical data, and point out trends to the Division; (2) Use charts and graphs for comparison; (3) Set up filing system for data, and (4) Prepare monthly report on activities. Much leeway was given for individual judgment and good planning. An underlying assumption in regard to the Japanese people was

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Their tools are inadequate to use our methods without special training and guidance in making the most of their tools. But this is something that could not be

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(2) PSD Office Memorandum No. 27, 28 March 1946

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known beforehand; it is probably one of the great lessons that the Occupation, in all sections, has had to learn. As this is but a preview a detailed development will be found in the Second Evaluation of S&A.

(a) Immediate Objectives

The two immediate objectives of S&A came into sharp focus as soon as the general mission was stated. The first one would be to determine the value of such data as had been secured up to that time. The second would be to contact statistical sources in the Japanese Government to arrange for a constant flow of statistical data regarding crime, prisons, fires, and maritime safety.

2) First Personnel

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Benton reported for duty with PSD on 3 April 1946. His previous military experience has been outlined in the appropriate pages. His qualifications for statistical work, however, are of more interest here. For a number of years he had been statistician for the Alabama Power Company.

b. First Operations

1) General Plan Proposed by Benton

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b. First Operations

1) General Plan Proposed by Benton

One of Lt. Col. Benton's first acts, after becoming Chief of S&A, was to outline the statistical studies that should be made. He wrote:

> The statistical studies to be prepared by this section generally may be divided into three categories, namely, background studies, current trends, and special reports. Background studies will consist of information considered desirable by the various sections which may aid in the study of present conditions

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such as year by year crime charts and the like, although this will be limited to accuracy of source material. Current trends will be recorded for pertinent valuable information so as to reflect changes by short-time interval. Special reports will be compiled from a combination of this or other information as may be considered of benefit to the various sections. (3)

This statement constitutes a general plan of S&A operations, and is the first statement of proposed activity by a member of S&A. The plan has two implications for the time. First, the necessity for developing a knowledge of current conditions is tacitly acknowledged. That Japanese customs are different makes an understanding of them advisable. Secondly, current trends may and may not show signs of development.

Captain Frederick W. Lynch was assigned to S&A on 8 April 1946 to assist Lieutenant Colonel Benton.

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Captain Frederick W. Lynch was assigned to S&A on 8 April 1946 to assist Lieutenant Colonel Benton.

The array of maps was indexed and a master set compiled, extra copies being available for those who needed them. Coincidental with this work is the first mention of a drafting unit within S&A. (4) It was rightly deemed an urgent necessity for the work at hand.

A number of books, brochures, pamphlets, and various printed materials dealing with phases of public safety had been acquired. The staff quickly collected these materials, organized and indexed them, and placed the whole in operation as the PSD Reference Library. For a time a librarian was in charge, but the amount of use of these references did not long warrant such.

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(3) Weekly Report of Activities, 6-13 April 1946
(4) Ibid

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(a) Basic Data Needed

Immediate contacts with statistical agencies of the Japanese Government were established to secure reports of past and current time. Already, also, charts were being made, and preparation of many of these had to be "farmed out" because of lack of facilities within S&A. A drafting unit was developed, first with enlisted men and later with Japanese nationals. As this is written, two of the latter have been with PSD for considerable time and have proven themselves excellent workmen.

2) Requirements

The Valentine Group was the first to make a comprehensive report. Certainly, coming so closely on the heels of the establishing of the section (now called branch), it gave an early foretaste of many others yet to come.

Benton writes of the "huge job of completing charts" for the Special Metropolitan Police Group. (5) To depict every phase of the police administration of Japan and also a proposed set-up modelled after the platoon system of New York City required a series of thirty odd graphs and charts. Even with giving part of the work to other

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At this time, also came the first of a number of rearrangements of tables prepared by Japanese statistical bureaus for PSD. The reports from the Bureau of Penal Administration of the Ministry of Justice was analyzed for rearrangement of the subject material.

To meet the third part of the S&A mission, the filing system was completely revised. Two separate files were established; one for administrative matters and one for research and operations. As an integral part of the

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(5) Ibid, 12-18 May 1946

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system in operation, all information (originals) was required to be kept in the files, though work copies might be charged out and kept in desks. This order insured that all information, of whatever nature, would be available for any person at any time.

Very shortly after the work for the Valentine group was completed, the Olander study was nearing completion and S&A found itself again required to handle a comprehensive report. This one required very nearly the same amount of work.

The first batch of crime data on the new standard forms was received from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The errors were so numerous that it was returned to the Ministry for correction.

3) Difficulties Encountered

A monthly report had been assigned as one of the points of the S&A mission. In July "a new format" is mentioned for the report that had appeared each month. The following month delays ensued "... pending further revision by General Willoughby under whose personal aegis the new publication is being formulated. General post-

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Still further delay was yet to be, for in early September another comment appears. "At this writing the 31 August issue of the new CIS Report had still not been

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(6) Ibid, 18-24 August 1946

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released to its 187 recipients ... release had been ordered withheld pending certain revisions, through evidently PSD's section of the report will not require rewriting at this time." (7)

The name CIS Periodical Summary appears for the first time in the Weekly Report for 15-21 September. And to the present that title has been retained.

In the meantime, efforts had been made to secure needed data from Japanese bureaus. Japanese laws are on a different basis than American laws, their offenses are often different, and the combinations of offenses likewise are at variance. By this time, the problem of comparative data was becoming a genuine one. This part of the story is told elsewhere, together with a statement of the language difficulties involved. But yet another matter rose to plague S&A. In commenting on a report from the Japanese, the Chief of S&A wrote: "Material was typical of that which usually has been received thus far. It is obviously incomplete, and accurate. Figures do not check with themselves even on the same page. Some of the results arrived at are beyond comprehension inasmuch

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The reports concerning which the foregoing was written were returned for corrections, but with meagre results. A few weeks later comment is made on the "drastic inaccuracies" of a report, and that it was being returned. (9) The report for the following week states

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(7) Ibid, 18-24 August 1946
(8) Ibid, 11-17 August 1946
(9) Ibid, 4-10 August 1946

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that the report came back neatly re-typed with "with no apparent corrections." (10) All of the foregoing are comments on crime statistics. There were others, as further comment of the same date will show. Certain fire statistics exhibit the "same careless handling and lack of even simple arithmetical knowledge that seemingly characterizes all Japanese statistics. (11)

The trials of all statisticians are reflected in the comment of the following week. The writer terms it "unfortunate but apparently unavoidable that incomplete and inaccurate data must be used in PSD reports; it is a question of either waiting an inordinate length of time for complete information, or using immediately what is received." (12)

Several conferences were held with Japanese statisticians looking toward agreement on the meaning of terms, as well as correcting data received. After a detailed description of one conference had been given, the following despairing note appears in another weekly report. "It was evident upon processing the July crime statistics submitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs that difficulties in interpretation and misunderstandings in meaning had rendered much of the data either incomplete or insignifi-

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In spite of these difficulties, the staff was producing work. So, early in October S&A was directed to prepare the Daily Report of Activity for submission to

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(10) Ibid,11-17 August 1946
(11) Ibid,11-17 August 1946
(12) Ibid,18-24 August 1946
(13) Ibid,22-28 September 1946

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CIS. This made the third report that the branch prepared, the others being the Monthly Report of PSD Activities and the Public Safety Section of the CIS Periodical Summary.

c. Expansion of Staff

1) Dr. Vold and Mr. Stout

Dr. George B. Vold arrived in Tokyo on 4 October 1946. His appointment as Chief Statistician of S&A greatly strengthened the staff. A professor of Sociology at the University of Minnesota, Dr. Vold had had wide experience in penal and crime statistics, together with the added advantage of extensive travel in South America. He was, therefore, especially prepared to do an intensive, as well as extensive research job in S&A.

Within a month Mr. Donald E. Stout arrived to serve as research analyst. A Navy language officer, he was fluent in Japanese, as well as being a mathematical statistician. The combination of Vold and Stout was a fortunate one for the branch, as will be seen from the work produced.

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d. Development of Co-ordinated Program

The development of a co-ordinated program became possible with a larger and more experienced staff at hand. In the first place, it was by now recognized that Japanese techniques of gathering, evaluating, and using statistical data were unreliable. Therefore, a continuing study of their processes was highly advisable. Secondly, the graphic and tabular analysis of police, prison, and fire data offered the best means of presenting them to those for whom tables alone are seldom understandable. In the

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third place, the weekly reports of other PSD branches could be reviewed to suggest articles for the various reports. And fourthly, the work on the various comprehensive studies was laying a solid basis of public safety statistics with some hope of a full program being set up.

1) Basic Statements of Crime Statistics

Within a few months each issue of the CIS Periodical Summary carried at least one article dealing more with interpretation or basic aspects of crime than with the specific figures for a certain month. Especially noteworthy are three articles in the Periodical Summary for 15 May 1947: "Crime Trends," "The Meaning of Crime Statistics," and the "Effect of the New Constitution on the Japanese Police," together with an article on "The Japanese Parole System" in the 15 June 1947 issue.

A large number of special reports had been prepared in 1946, two of which, the Valentine and Olander investigations, have already been mentioned. Others included the Reynolds study on Police Training, the Meals investigation on Maritime Safety, the Nealon report on police in

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Furthermore, while S&A was classified as a "Service" Branch, established solely for the purpose of providing statistical assistance to the "operating" branches, the

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staff at this time was not only able, but also willing to go beyond this into the field of systematic investigation and thus provice a stronger service than would otherwise have been possible. In other words, while engaged in the preparation of charts and graphs for the larger studies, and in preparing statements and summaries and month by month statistical service to other branches, all of this was done at the expense of their own ably proposed and well-co-ordinated program of research that would in the long run have yielded vastly more in the way of sound data.

In December, 1946, Dr. Vold and Mr. Stout participated in a conference of Japanese prefectural employees who were responsible for police statistics and reporting them to the Home Ministry. (14) Other conferences of similar nature have been held since. It would have been impossible for members of S&A who were neither well acquainted with the field of crime statistics or with the Japanese language to have shared effectively in these discussions.

Of course other phases of Japanese life were occasionally responsible for difficulties. The Ja-

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