

Doc. 3138 - 3141

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(42)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3138 - 3141 inclusive

Date 10 October 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Various Documents Relative to Japanese-American Negotiations.

Date: 1941 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated: Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: NOMURA, Kichisaburo; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; KURUSU, Saburo;
TOYODA, Teijiro; SAITO, Yoshio.

PHASES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Japanese-American Negotiations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Doc. 3138 - Collection of Proposals in Japanese-American Negotiations. (15 April to 15 July 1941) Among the proposals is an opinion expressed by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on 10 July 1941 in which he not only agrees with the opinion of diplomatic adviser SAITO, Yoshio of the same date but elaborates further on the intolerability of the American proposals.

Doc. 3139 - Development of Negotiations during the 2nd and 3rd KONOYE Cabinet. (16 April - 30 October 1941) The document states that America has taken a remarkably conciliatory attitude before and after the Cabinet change of October 17 and that the only controversy to be observed between Japan and America lies in the fact that Japan has been calling for peace on one hand and employing armed might on the other.

Doc. 3140 - Development of Negotiations during the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet. (Draft) (Identical with the latter half of Doc. 3139)

Doc. 3141 - Imperial Government's Note to America under date of ___ December (1941). (English Translation) (Identical with "Foreign Relations of U. S. " Japan. 1931-41. Vol. II, pp. 787-792 inclusive)

Analyst: 1st Lt. Fred F. Susukawa

Doc. No. 3138-3141
(Inclusive)

File No. 40

Progress of Japan-American negotiations during

the Third KONOE Cabinet (Foreign Minister TOYODA)

July 18 - October 16, 1941

Foreign Office (pen draft)

A little after the setting up of the Third KONOE Cabinet (July 18), Japan-American relations got suddenly worse by the advanced station of our army into French-Indo-China.

This tense atmosphere is moderated by the KONOE message and thus the negotiations are again begun. But the opinion of two countries does not coincide in the fundamental points and at last the KONOE Cabinet obliged to resign on the 16th of October, not reaching to the final settlement of the negotiations.

1. NOMURA-ROOSEVELT Talk (July 24)

NOMURA explained to the President the circumstances of our advanced station into French-Indo-China, but the President showed his discontent for the movement of the Empire,

2. Proposal from the Japanese side (August 5)

This draft was handed to HULL on the 6th by the Ambassador NOMURA, and HULL received it not showing his interest for that at all.

3. America's reply (August 8)

America made a refusal reply for our proposal because she could not agree with Japan on the point of our advanced station into French-Indo-China.

4. NOMURA-ROOSEVELT Talk (August 17)

President interviewed with Ambassador NOMURA and handed to him a note and made him notify the following two points:

- 1) Being thought that the station in French-Indo-China is a Japan's conquest on the southern area, America will take all the necessary measures for protecting her rights in the area if Japan makes a more military advance.
- 2) Japan must clearly declare her policy ahead of the interview of two countries' leaders which she proposed.

5. KONOE Message (August 26)

Prime Minister KONOE sent a message to Roosevelt and wanted to make a leaders' interview and explained the station in French-Indo-China and Japan's opinion on the Pacific area. Roosevelt praised it and showed his consent.

6. NOMURA-Roosevelt Talk (September 3)

Roosevelt handed the reply for KONOE Message to NOMURA on Sep. 3. In it, President accepted the proposal of interview, but he stressed preliminary discussion of fundamental and essential questions is necessary ahead of that interview. For our opinion, he wanted us to accept the four principles first.

In short, he required the confirmation of our cabinet for the problems of self-defense rights, withdrawal from China and commercial non-discrimination.

7. Proposal from Japan's side (September 6)

As the reply for the above, Foreign Minister TOYODA handed our proposal to Ambassador GREW on Sep. 4. He accepted the American proposal about the interview and proposed the draft of contract of each country.

This draft is proposed to American government on September 6 through the Ambassador NOMURA, but HULL showed the careful attitude and seemed to have a fear about the stability of KONOE Cabinet, and showed his discontent for our proposal in the interview of Sep. 6 and 10.

Ambassador GREW visited TOYODA on Sep. 12 and made some questioning proposals.

We handed a note to GREW and cleared the points which U.S. asked. (Sep. 13)

The proposal of Sep. 6 which we made had some obscure points in connection with the former proposals. So American side seemed to have some suspicion for that.

8. Proposal of NOMURA Draft (September 4)

Ambassador NOMURA proposed a draft to American state by his own judgement. This was a one which gave some amendments to June 21st American Proposal. Hearing that, our cabinet sent inquiries to NOMURA in astonishment, NOMURA clarified that this was not ^{an} official one to the State Department on Sep. 10.

9. Decision of Liaison Conference

Understanding Draft regarding Readjustment of Relations between Japan and America was decided and it was handed to American side on the 27th with the reason of our station into China. America was adhering to the June 21st draft and did not agree with our proposal made on Sep. 6. We gathered our former proposals, made a book and offered it to U.S. for America's

convenience on the 25th of September. This draft became to our final draft with the progress of negotiation.

11. TOYODA-GREW Talk (September 27)

We can not neglect our internal affairs any more because of the revelation of KONOE message, so we were anxious about the realization of the conference of the leaders of two countries, and urged America's reply every day, but America did not agree to us insisting the prior decision of the important problems. On the anniversary of the conclusion of the tripartite pact, 27th September, TOYODA called in GREW and again proposed the leaders' interview appointing the date at 10~15 of October.

12. Memorandum of U.S. State (October 2)

NOMURA sent his opinion by the telegram that the negotiation should be done on the base of American proposal made on June 21, and it is very difficult to negotiate with U.S. by our Sep. 25th proposal. Meanwhile HULL handed a long oral statement to NOMURA on October 2, and told him that

making understanding between two countries ahead of the interview is a necessary item and that a clear-cut agreement is needed for the peace maintenance of the whole Pacific area. This statement is far from our proposal. Negotiation seems to be deadlocked by the problems of withdrawal of Japanese troops, self-defense rights and commercial non-discrimination, especially by the problem of the withdrawal.

13. Opinion of CRAIGIE (October 3)

The opinion which CRAIGIE sent to the British government is very interesting. Its contents is as follows:-

KONOE Cabinet is taking a moderate policy earnestly but Japan needs to settle things down in haste, and America is only planning the make-things-delay policy, ^{the difficulty of} so the negotiation of two countries lies in it. This American attitude seems to come from her lack of understanding for the acute home affairs of Japan and the mental state of the Japanese. I and Ambassador GREW is thinking that only taking the careful attitude and missing the present good opportunity is a very silly policy.

But unless we confirm the realization of the KONOE Principle, we can not pacify our economic revenge measures on Japan.

14. Negotiations after That

We asked to America through NOMURA whether the problems which America can not agree with are only three problems or not, and proposed that we consent to the four principles only in principle and the difference of opinion in practicing that is to be discussed in the leaders' interview. HUMMILTON replied for this on the 9th of October that America wants to set up an ever-lasting peace in Pacific on the basis of the four principles, so if the opinion of two countries on this point consents, the other problems will be all settled down.

TOYODA talked with GREW on 7th and 10th and stressed the negotiation can not be postponed any more in view of the internal and international affairs.

15. WAKASUGI-WELLS Talk (October 13)

WELLS told to the Minister WAKASUGI that the fundamental problem checking the leaders' interview is nothing but the three problems, and Japanese drafts of 6th and 25th of September that he can not approve the because the American proposal is cut down not a little in it.

The Minister asked him that whether or not

the problem of South Area and commercial non-discrimination can be solved leaving the China problem to the other day's discussion. The Vice-Minister said that it is impossible.

Thus, the negotiation came to a deadlock and the Third KONOE Cabinet resigned en bloc on the 16th of October.

Doc 3139

(1)

Translator, T. HOZUMI
19/1947

Excerpts from Vol. 18, "Progress of Affairs during the Secondary KONOE Cabinet."

3. Outline of Latest Progress of the Japanese-American Negotiation (pp. 40-45)

Since before and after the cabinet change (Oct 17) the general aspect of the Japanese-American negotiation has been characterized in the remarkably conciliating attitude on the American side in the talks and a fair eagerness has been displayed in arriving at a conclusion of this negotiation. Nevertheless, no appreciable concession was made up to present in respect of its substantial points. The following is the outlined progress of the talks on the three occasions since Oct 16.

1. Talks on Oct 16 (Among WAKASUGI, Hull and Wells)

Owing to the occurrence of our political change, Secretary of State Hull specially sit among the company of the talks of this day.

To the WAKASUGI's remarks pointing out the vital necessity of achieving an agreement on this opportunity and proposing a discussion with a view to finding out the harmonizing points of the American plan of June 21 and

that of Japan of Sept 25, the American side revealed its enthusiastic intention to bring about restoration of amicable relation between Japan and America, far apart from plotting any retardation and emphasized that the American purposes are at present concentrated to the overthrowing of Hitlerism and are completely opposed to the armed policy, therefore, it is to be observed that the controversies between Japan and America lie in the fact of Japan calling for peace on the one hand and employing the armed power on the other.

As for the three points of outstanding negotiation, (It was said there was no new question to be further brought in) it insisted upon,

(a) Rejection of armed policy (b) Necessity of indiscriminate treatment in the trade over the whole area of the Pacific. Regarding our position in the "Tripartite Pact", it spoke in a tone of apparent recognition but showed an attitude reluctant to step into the Japanese-Chinese peace problem and evading to touch the matters of withdrawal of Japanese forces which impressed upon our side an idea of

it being inclined to consider the above as matters ⁽³⁾ to be settled solely between Japan and China. Furthermore, it was reported that Hull expressed his sincere desire of Japan remaining as a stabilizing power of the Far East as had been spoken to Ambassador SAITO some time ago, and that his desire underwent by no means any change.

2. Talks on Oct 17 (Among WAKASUGI, Hull and Wells)

Discussions were made on the three points in continuance to those of the previous day.

Hull stated, "As for the question of right of self-defense, Japan repeatedly emphasized the major object of the Tripartite Pact resting upon the prevention of participation of America in the war. However, in view of possibility of America entering into hostilities in behalf of its own defense, it became skeptical as to the true intent of Japan and the character of this pact which is apt to be influenced by the then existing government of Japan adopting either the peaceful policy or the armed policy."

No satisfactory understanding having been attained on this point, it was arranged that

further deliberations be made by the American side ⁽⁴⁾ in order to form a decisive opinion, comparing the Japanese and American plans. (b) Regarding the principle of indiscriminate treatment, Hull placed the greatest importance upon it and pointed out that this was the course persistently followed by him several years since his taking the post and because of the foundation of peace depends more upon the economical affairs rather than the political, this principle should be applied to the whole Pacific area (including China) for the purpose of ensuring peace in the Far East and it may prove of ultimate advantage to Japan itself. (3) Regarding the question of withdrawal of Japanese forces, America's assistance to China being merely a representation of one phase of its policy, there seems no alternative at all so far as Japan does not completely abandon its armed policy.

(3) Talks on Oct 24 (Between WAKASUGI and Welles)
During the foregoing period, our Government sent instructions to Ambassador NOMURA to the effect

that although the new Cabinet maintains the same enthusiasm of adjusting the diplomatic relation on the equitable basis, it holds a stern attitude in awaiting for America to reflect so that the talks should be continued with a major object of securing an early presentation of American counter-plans and WAKASUGI talked with Wells acting in this line. On this occasion, Wells said that inasmuch as it appears hopeless to expect any progress so far as we adhere to the previous formulas, continuing the endless discussions, it is most advisable to adopt a new formulas to start with the point comparatively easier for solution and endeavor to arrive at the reconciliation one by one, namely, the indiscriminate treatment the first, the Tripartite Pact the second and the China problem the last. While presenting the above proposal, Wells showed a remarkably conciliatory attitude, it was reported.

— END —

3138

Foreign Office Doc.

July 1951

(38)

Secret

Collection of counter-proposals
re. the Japan-America negotiations

(1)

Telegram from Ambassador NOMURA
to Foreign Minister KONOYE

on April 17, 1940

No. 233

NOMURA is asking for the permission
to start negotiations with the U.S. government.
It will not be contrary to the Imperial Rescript
on the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, will
afford the first step toward the maintenance
of peace in Pacific and will pave the
way to Japan-American collaboration in
restoring peace in Europe.

(2)

Telegram from NOMURA
to KONOYE

on April 17, 1941

No. 234

The Original draft of April 16.

(3)

a copy of Telegram to Ambassador NOMURA
on May 12, 1941

The Japanese counter proposal

- 7.1
- ④ Japanese proposal of May 12
and American proposal of
June 21. compared.
 - ⑤ American proposal of June 21.
 - ⑥ Draft revision of Item 5 of the American
proposal of June 21. (Handed by
Hamilton to NOMURA on September 10.
[in Japanese and in English])
 - ⑦ Main revisions made by the U.S. government
on Japanese proposal. (Reasons for drafting
the American revision of June 21.)
 - ⑧ Oral statement of the U.S. government
21 June.
 - ⑨ American proposal of June 21.
compared with the Japanese proposal
of July 15.
 - ⑩ attached note of the Japanese government
and that of the U.S. government.
 - ⑪ Outline of the explanation given at
the Government-Supreme Command
Liaison Conference on July 10 regarding
the Japan-U.S. negotiations.

~~The same with Doc. No. 20~~
175

By Diplomatic Advisor
to the Foreign Ministry,
SAITO Yoshie

(12)

Matter regarding the Japan-U.S.
negotiations

By MATSUOKA Yosuke
on July 10, 1941

His views on June 21 American
proposal and oral statement.

- 1) Their demand to reorganize our cabinet is extraordinary. Such an attitude is only seen between strong and weak nations.
- 2) Even if we were to accept half of the proposal, it would lead us to the severance from the Tripartite Alliance.
- 3) We shall have to give up our main policies as the establishment of new order, ~~recognize~~ cultivation of the Nanjing government etc.
- 4) We shall have to change our great policy of securing leadership in East Asia which is built upon invaluable sacrifices.
- 5) We shall have to admit status quo in the whole Pacific area and the trade between Japan and the U.S. will be glued to the extent of the pre-war days, leaving no hopeful prospect for us.

- 6) we shall have to rebel against the Axis camp.
- 7) We shall have to withdraw from the Tripartite alliance completely.
- 8) The American ^{government} intends to utilize this in favor of her participation in the European War.
- 9) The American government intends to ~~make~~ lay foundations for their future intervention in Japan's actions.
- 10) In short, they are aiming at the maintenance of status quo, overthrowing Japan's ~~position~~ ^{plan} of establishing Greater East Asia Sphere.

If we consider the austerity and independence of the Empire, we should reject the oral statement

(13) Telegram from MATSUOKA
to NOMURA

on 15 July 41

No. 365

444
Explanation of new July 15 proposal.

(14) Telegram from MATSUOKA
TO NOMURA on 15 July 4)

NO. 366

continued from the above

(15) Off the record conversation between
NOMURA and the President Roosevelt on
24 July (in English)

(16) Paraphrase of a portion of Mr. Welles' report
of his conversation with NOMURA on
23 July (in English)

(17) The Japanese government's statement
on 6 Aug. (in English)

(18) Tentative translation of the U. S. government's
proposal 8 Aug.

(19) The U. S. government's statement
(in English)

20

The U.S. president's message handed
to NOMURA on 17 Aug.

21

The America's answer to the proposal
re the meeting of the heads of both
governments. (translation into
Japanese of (19))

22

Draft telegram from KONOYE to the
U.S. president 26 Aug

23

Our reply to the American answer (21)

24

President Roosevelt's message to
KONOYE on 3 Sept.

25

The U.S. oral statement handed
to NOMURA on 3 Sept.

26

Decisions made at the Liaison Conference
on 3 Sept re the Japan - U.S.
negotiations. Our draft proposal.

27

Basic conditions of peace
between Japan and China
(9 Sept)

28

Japanese translation of the
memorandum handed to the
Foreign Minister by the American
Ambassador on 10 Sept.

29

Telegram from NOMURA
to TOYODA on 16 Sept.

NOMURA's comments on the explanation
given to Ambassador Grew by

TOYODA.

Hull and Roosevelt are "two
in one"

Two heads' conference is impossible
unless preliminary agreement is reached
etc

30

Telegram from NOMURA
to TOYODA on 7 Sept. 41

Report on his interview with Hull
on 6 Sept.

444
③① Draft agreement between Japan
and the U.S.

19 Sept. 41

③② Japanese translation of
the U.S. government memorandum
on 2 October