

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND

140935

GB/RFE/FEC/LG-CGB/WAS/rt

OUTGOING MESSAGE

8048

FROM: CINCPE TOKYO JAPAN

TO: COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN ROUTINE (COURIER)

CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN ROUTINE (COURIER)

CX 68459

CG ARMY EIGHT KOREA . . . (ADVANCE) ROUTINE

Reference CINCPE confidential letter AG 311 (12 Nov 51)GB and FEC/LG, J15-3/01 confidential manual promulgated thereby. Disseminate to such units of your command as may require following effective recognition signals for reference vessels from 0001 item time, 15 Jun 1952 thru 14 Aug 1952 with inclusive dates for each operational period preceding the authorized recognition and emergency signals for particular periods. Read dates first then table prefixes and code numbers of authorized signals for periods indicated: 15 Jun thru 30 Jun recognition A 132 object C 653 emergency D 102. 1 Jul thru 14 Jul recognition A 432 object C 853 emergency D 106. 15 Jul thru 31 Jul recognition B 222 object C 453 emergency D 103. 1 Aug thru 14 Aug recognition A 132 object C 952 emergency D 102. Emergency procedure not authorized except if authorized flare signals for operational periods cannot repeat cannot be made or have expired. No special purpose FLW E or separate object C signals authorized by this plan except for special FLW E recognition signals for operations Han River Estuary as follows: Period from 0001 item time 15 Jun thru 14 Aug with inclusive dates for each operational period preceding the specially authorized FLW E signals for particular periods. Read dates first then table prefixes and code numbers of authorized signals for periods indicated: 15 Jun thru 30 Jun FLW E 403. 1 Jul thru 14 Jul FLW E 401. 15 Jul thru 31 Jul FLW E 404. 1 Aug thru 14 Aug FLW E 402.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

C.C.B.WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

R. S. HATTEN
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

Copies to:
G2 (Return)
G2 FEC/LG (Return)

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CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

THIS IS AN ORIGINAL MESSAGE

311.5

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO DIVISION

INCOMING MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL / RPH/JGW
(SECURITY INFORMATION)

ROUTINE

20 Mar 52

FROM : COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : COM 7TH FLT, CTF 77, CTF 95, CTF 90, CTF 92, CG 1ST
MAR AIR WG, CTG 96.2, CTG 95.7, CTG 96.9, CTG 96.7

INFO : CNO WASH DC, CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR TH, CINCFE TOKYO
JAPAN, CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN

NR : 190816 Z

Subject is recognition signals for friendly small craft operating in Korean waters on special intell missions for period 150001 I Apr 52 thru 142400 I Jun 52. Ref is GHQ FEC Signal Recognition Manual. Effective dates and authorized signals are as follows:

- (A) 15 Apr thru 30 Apr recog A 432 Object C 552 emerg
D 101.
- (B) 1 May thru 14 May recog B 622 Object C 352 emerg
D 104.
- (C) 15 May thru 31 May recog A 232 Object C 253 emerg
D 102.
- (D) 1 Jun thru 14 Jun recog B 422 Object C 752 emerg
D 107.

Emergency procedures not authorized except if authorized flare signals for operational periods cannot be made or have expired. No special purpose FLW E or separate Object C signals currently authorized except those in CINCFE 311035 Z Jan passed as my 311430 Z Jan 52 NOTAL for Han River Estuary only. CTF 95 pass to non-US holders of Signal Recognition Manual who need to know.

82583 (over)
ROUTINE

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING



Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No.

6/K
311.5



CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FROM : COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN NR : 190816 Z 20 MAR 52 CONT'D

NO SIG

INFORMATION : G-2, G-3, TRANS, WAR ROOM

NOTE : This msg recd dir fr COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN via Courier.

NOTE : Ref msg "311035 Z" is CINCFE's rad "CX 62629" (G-2).


82583

ROUTINE

TOO : 190816 Z

MCN : NONE

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

GB/FEC/LG-CCB/MJP/ft

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN 6502

TO: COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN ROUTINE (COURIER) 180108

CG FRAF TOKYO JAPAN ROUTINE (COURIER)

CG ARMY EIGHT KOREA . (ADVANCE) ROUTINE

CX 65437

Reference CINCFE confidential letter AG 311 (12 Nov 51)GB and FEC/LG, J15-3/01 confidential manual promulgated thereby. Disseminate to such units of your command as may require following effective recognition signals for reference vessels from 0001 item time, 15 Apr 1952 thru 14 Jun 1952 with inclusive dates for each operational period preceding the authorized recognition and emergency signals for particular periods. Read dates first then table prefixes and code numbers of authorized signals for periods indicated: 15 Apr thru 30 Apr recognition A 432 object C 552 emergency D 101 X 1 May thru 14 May recognition B 622 object C 352 emergency D 104 X 15 May thru 31 May recognition A 232 object C 253 emergency D 102 X 1 Jun thru 14 Jun recognition B 422 object C 752 emergency D 107 X. Emergency procedures not authorized except if authorized flare signals for operational periods cannot repeat cannot be made or have expired. No special purpose FLW E or separate object C signals currently authorized except those in my CX 62629 for Han Estuary only.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

R. S. Bratton
R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

Copies to:
G2 (Return)
G2 FEC/LB (Return)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
Self-explanatory.

M. J. P. 26-7977

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

THIS IS AN ORIGINAL MESSAGE

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CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

29961

Routine CINCFE Confidential
Dispatch, Promulgating
Recognition Signals

FEC/LG-CCB/MJP/af
13 March 1952

FEC/LG

G-2

26-7977
Cmdr M. J. Perry

1. Enclosed herewith as Inclosure 1, for approval, is dispatch for Recognition Signals for period 15 April 1952 to 14 June 1952, inclusive. 1.
2. Subject dispatch is in format prescribed by CINCFE confidential ltr AG 311 (12 Nov 51)GB, for promulgation of subject signals and procedure for identification of ships and craft supporting covert or clandestine intelligence activities as set forth in GHQ FEC Signal Recognition Manual. 6502
3. Future routine recognition signal plans (dispatches) will be issued in due course.
4. Recommend signature and dispatch of Inclosure 1.

1 Incl:
a/s

-C. C. B.-

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SEKISUI JUSHI

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information
G2 GHQ, FEC

(Do Not Detach)

29961

MAR 15 1952

SUBJECT: Routine Circle Confidential Dispatch, Promulgating

FROM: Admin Recognition signals

TO:

6502

AC of S, G2	()	Intelligence Division	()
Deputy	()	Operations	()
Secretariat	()	PDM	()
Deputy for Adm	()	Fn Mil Ln	()
Deputy for Navy	()	Plans & Estimates	()
Planning Group	()	Special Intell	()
Asst Ex	()	Geog Branch	()
Asst Sec Div	()	Targets Branch	()
Asst SIA	()	Tech Intell Branch	()
Sp Asst 441st CIC	()	SSO	()
Sp Asst Fiscal	()	Japan Section	()
Sp Asst Radio	()	Security Division	()
Sp Asst FEC/LG	()	Admin	()
Sp Asst Comd Rpt	()	Operations	()
Sp Asst Library	()	Plans & Policies	()
Admin Officer	()	441st CIC	()
Pers (Mil) (Civ)	()	PSB	()
Pers Sgt Major	()	MISG/FE	()
Japanese Liaison	()	FEC Intell School	()
-----	-----	Hq FEC/LG	()

Info () Approval () Signature () Draft Reply ()
 Action () Concur () Initials () Info for Reply ()
 File () Comment () Dispatch () Brief ()

DATE ALL COMMENTS

*Routine radio for recognition signals
 used in Korea by CBRAC elements when
 challenged by UN Naval vessels.
 For signature and dispatch*

*Prof read
 18 Mar 52
 JB*

CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By Az NARA Date 2/13/12

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

INCOMING MESSAGE

RHS/odh

SECRET

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

PRIORITY

31 Jan 52

FROM : CTF 95
TO : COM 7TH FLT
INFO : COMNAVFE (ADMIN) TOKYO JAPAN
NR : 300143 Z

Paragraph 4 of Page 4 CINCFE signal recognition manual.

A. Request authority to use special visual directional signal.

AE. In Han River estuary.

B. Due to fact that flares are observable by enemy from North shore and due to their frequent use for 15 day period it is considered that flare system is bound to be compromised in this area.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: G-2, G-3, WAR ROOM

NOTE : This msg readdressed to CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN for action by COMNAVFE (ADMIN) TOKYO under DTG 300904 Z.

46785

PRIORITY

TOO : 300143 Z
MCN : NONE


(SECURITY INFORMATION)

SECRET

CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING


Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No.



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CONFIDENTIAL

5105

SECURITY INFORMATION
OUTGOING MESSAGE

RFE/FEC/LG/CCB/MJP/af

31 January 1952

FROM: GINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO: COMNAVPE TOKYO JAPAN . . OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (COURIER)

CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN . . OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (COURIER)

CG ARMY RIGHT KOREA (ADVANCE) OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

317 0352

CX 62629

Reference CTF 95 300143Z: COM7THFLT 300752Z: GINCFE confidential letter AG 311 (12 Nov 51)GB and confidential Signal Recognition Manual promulgated thereby. Disseminate to such units of your command as may require following effective recognition signals flashing white (directional) light signals for exclusive use by CTF 95 ships and craft or other vessels operated and controlled by CTF 95 while operating in the Han River Estuary only. Responsibility for appropriate planning, coordination and dissemination of pertinent information and arrangements to other commands concerned in ample time for effective measures to be taken by them rests with commander requesting this special authorization. This plan covers the period from 0001 Item time, 1 Feb 1952 thru 14 April 1952 with inclusive dates for each operational period preceding the specially authorized FLW Easy signals for particular periods. Read dates first then table prefixes and code numbers of authorized signals for periods indicated: 1 Feb thru 14 Feb FLW Easy 402 X 15 Feb thru 29 Feb FLW Easy 404 X 1 Mar thru 14 Mar FLW Easy 402 X 15 Mar thru 31 Mar FLW Easy 403 X 1 Apr thru 14 Apr FLW Easy 401 X No other FLW Easy signals are currently authorized. Responsibility for furnishing adequate directional signal equipment rests with commander requesting authorization for signals.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

R. S. Bratton
R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

Copies to:
G2 (return)
G2 FEC/LG (return)

THIS IS AN ORIGINAL MESSAGE

ceb

G2 FILE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

(6)D

311.5



CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

FEC/LG-CCB/WHL/af

File No:

Subject: Recognition Signals

Date: 31 January 1952

FROM: FEC/LG

TO: G-2

PHONE: 26-7977
NAME: CDR Perry

**Comment
Number**
1.

1. Enclosed herewith as inclosure 1, for approval, is dispatch for recognition signals for special tactical use in connection with naval island defense activity in the Han River Estuary for the period 1 February to 14 April 1952, inclusive.

2. Subject dispatch is based on the verbal request of LCDR J. A. MacLellan, USN (NAVFE Intelligence Liaison Officer with this office), supported by copies of CTF 95 to COM7THFLT 300143Z Jan 52, and COM7THFLT 300752 Z Jan 52, setting forth the tactical and security reason justifying the request:

a. Flares are observable by enemy from the north shore of estuary which would compromise current signals.

b. For same reason, indications of friendly activities would be revealed.

3. In general, subject dispatch follows applicable portion of prescribed format for regular periodical recognition signal promulgation as prescribed by CINCFE confidential ltr AG 311 (12 Nov 51)GB. Necessary additions or alterations have been made to cover particular features of the special situation in accordance with appropriate provisions of CINCFE Signal Recognition Manual.

4. Recommend signature and dispatch of inclosure 1.

1 Incl:
a/i

-----C. C. B.-----

G-2 FILE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By AZ NARA Date 2/13/12

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

13475

Lt Olson
26-8121

Request for Call Signs

G-2

Signal Section GHQ

5 Feb 1952

1.

1. Request that the call signs presently assigned to JSOB be withdrawn.

2. Also request that FEC/LG GHQ be assigned fifty (50) call signs but that these not be published in the SOI.

S/RSB
R. F. E.

5 Feb 52

MEMO FOR RECORD

Signal Section, GHQ, recommends an occasional change of call signs. Because of the number of agent sets now in operation fifty (50) call signs are required. Our operations would be compromised if the assignment of call signs were to be published in the SOI. This request for assignment has been coordinated with Maj Getchell, Signal Section, GHQ.

G-2 File

K. W. O.
K. W. O.
26-8121

cy p FEC/LG, info cl [unclear]
file
V 40

SECRET



SECURITY INFORMATION

FEC/LG 1336

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CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SC PO VMG/rh

2507 12 Z

FM: CINCFC TOKYO JAPAN

- TO: CNO (CNC) WASH DC OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- AACS WASH DC OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CHASA WASH DC OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CINCLANTCOM OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CINCPAC AND US PAC FLT OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CG USARPAC HAWAII OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CG AREIGHT ^{ADV} (~~MAIN~~) KOREA OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CG ALASKAN AIR COM OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- COMDR ALASKAN SEA FRONTIER KODIAK ALA OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- COMDR PAC DIV MATS HICKAM AFB HI OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CG SIXTEENCOR SENDAI JAPAN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CG JLCOM YOKOHAMA JAPAN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CG RYCOM OKINAWA RI OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CG HEDSVCCOM TOKYO JAPAN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CG FEAFF TOKYO JAPAN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CG TWOLOGCOM KOREA OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CO GHQ LL SIG GP KOREA OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CO 71ST SIG SVC BN TOKYO JAPAN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CO 441ST CIC DETACH TOKYO JAPAN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
- CHASAFAC TOKYO JAPAN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

Cx 62194

Compromise of Feb edition FEC Auth. System No. 3.

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

Copy to

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FEC Im Cp (G-2)

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CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

FM: CINCPAC, TO: CNO (CNC) WASH DC, AACS, CPASA WASH, CINC ALASKAN COM,
CINCPAC AND US PAC FLT, USARPAC, AFBIGHT (MAIN), ALASKAN AIR COM,
ALASKAN SEA FRONTIER, PAC DIV MATS, SIXTEENCOR, JLCOM, RYCOM, HEDSERVCOM,
COMNAVFE, FEAF, TWOLOGCOM, CHQ LL SIG GP, 71ST SIG SVC BN, 441ST CIC
DETACH, CHASAPAC, SC PO VMG/rh

February Edition FEC Authentication System No. 3
considered compromised. Place Emergency Edition (C) system No. 3 in
use effective 0001Z 1 Feb 52.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

C.C.B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

ELTON F HARMOND
Brigadier General, USA
Signal Officer

Copies furnished:
AG-MR
FEC Ln Gp (G-2)
SigO (ret)CD
SigO (ret)



CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

MEMO FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Compromise of February Edition FEC Authentication System No. 3

1. BASIC: Fifth AF message 240935Z Jan 52.

2. REFERENCE: Same as basic.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. Reference above reported possible compromise of February Edition of FEC Authentication System No. 3 and FEAF Aircraft Voice Authentication System No. 1. Fifth AF is investigating and will forward report of circumstances.

b. FEC System No. 3 Emergency Edition (C) is in reserve and should be placed in effect.

c. FEAF is disseminating instructions to holders of System No. 1 and will place FEAF Reserve Edition "B" in effect.

4. ACTION INDICATED: Prepare a message notifying all holders of System No. 3 of compromise and to place Emergency Edition (C) in effect.

5. RECOMMEND: Approval and dispatch of instant message to accomplish action indicated above.

6. COORDINATED WITH:

FEAF (Lt Smith)
NAVFE (Cmdr Hughes)

7. COPIES FURNISHED:

AG-MR
FEC Liaison Group (C-2)
Comcenter Div
Journal (2)

8. P&O file 311.5 refers.

9. Clears action 7494.

Wmg
Maj Getchell, 2 -3405

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

47949

**CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION**

Routine CINCFE Confidential Dispatch
Promulgating Recognition
Signals

FEC/LG-CCB/WAS/ft

13 May 1952

FEC/LG

G2

26-8975
Lt Col Stricklen

1. Inclosure 1 is dispatch in form and format prescribed by CINCFE confidential letter, AG 311 (12 Nov 51)GB, for promulgation of subject signals and procedure for identification of ships and craft supporting covert or clandestine intelligence activities as set forth in GHQ/FEC Signal Recognition Manual. 1

2. Recommend approval and dispatch of Inclosure 1. 8048

1 Incl
a/i

-----C. C. B.-----

*w/d & dispatched
14 May 52
LSD*

G2 File Copy

311.5

FEC/LG 04811



CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

GB/FEC/LG-CCB/WJP/af

160446 Z
5129

04660

CX61560

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN
TO: COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN ROUTINE (COURIER)
CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN ROUTINE (COURIER)
CG ARMY EIGHT KOREA . (ADVANCE) ROUTINE

Reference CINCFE confidential letter AG 311 (12 Nov 51)GB and
FEC/LG, J15-3/01 confidential manual promulgated thereby. Disseminate
to such units of your command as may require following effective
recognition signals for reference vessels from 0001 item time,
15 FEB 1952 thru 14 Apr 1952 with inclusive dates for each operational
period preceding the authorized recognition and emergency signals for
particular periods. Read dates first then table prefixes and code
numbers of authorized signals for periods indicated: 15 Feb thru
29 Feb recognition B 122 object C 653 emergency D 105 x 1 Mar thru
14 Mar recognition B 422 object C 952 emergency D 103 x 15 Mar thru
31 Mar recognition A 832 object C 453 emergency D 104 x 1 Apr thru
14 Apr recognition B 222 object C 752 emergency D 106 x. Emergency
procedures not authorized except if authorized flare signals for
operational periods cannot repeat cannot be made or have expired.
No special purpose FLW E or separate object C signals authorized by
this plan.

G2 FILE COPY

act

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

R. S. Bratton
R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

Copies to:
G2 (return)
G2 FEC/LG (return)

THIS IS AN ORIGINAL MESSAGE

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Self-explanatory.

L.E.D.
L.E.D. 26-8672

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CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

5129

G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: _____ **Subject:** Routine CINCPAC Confidential Dispatch, Promulgating Recognition Signals **Date:** 15 January 1952
FROM: FEC/LG **TO:** G-2 **PHONE:** 26-7977 **NAME:** Cmr M.J. Perry

Comment
Number

1. Enclosed herewith as Inclosure 1, for approval, is dispatch for Recognition Signals for period 15 February to 14 April 1952, inclusive.

1.

2. Subject dispatch is in format prescribed by CINCPAC confidential ltr AG 311 (12 Nov 51)GB, for promulgation of subject signals and procedure for identification of ships and craft supporting covert or clandestine intelligence activities as set forth in GHQ FEC Signal Recognition Manual.

3. Future routine recognition signal plans (dispatches) will be issued in due course.

4. Recommend signature and dispatch of Inclosure 1.

1 Incls:
a/s

C. C. B.

19 Jan - Radio dispatched

G-2 FILE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

FEC/LG 00516

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By Az NARA Date 2/13/12

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO DIVISION

F

INCOMING MESSAGE
JDT/gms
CONFIDENTIAL
(SECURITY INFORMATION)

ROUTINE

15 Feb 52

FROM : CTG 95.7
TO : COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN
INFO : CTF 95
NR : 141030 Z

Subject Recognition Signals for Covert Craft. Recognition Signal Manual GHQ FEC requires single color 1 phase flares fired in specified order flares made available this command are Signal Aircraft, double star, AN-40 AEWB in 2 colors for simultaneous firing as follows: red red, red yellow, green yellow also single star red color. Impossible to make signal in proper order and proper color combinations. Please advise.

NO SIG

INFORMATION : SIGNAL, TRANS

ADDED DIST : G-2, G-3 (16 Feb 52)

NOTE : This msg readdressed to CINCPAC for info by COMNAVFE under DTG 150158 Z.

58589

ROUTINE

TOG : 141030 Z
MCN : NONE

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

CONFIDENTIAL


CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

INCOMING MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL EHD/wjw
(SECURITY INFORMATION)

DEFERRED

18 Jan 52

FROM : COMNAVFE (ADMIN) TOKYO JAPAN
TO : COM 7TH FLT. CTF 77, CTF 95, CTF 90, CTF 92, CG 1ST
MAW, CTG 96.2, CTG 95.7, CTG 96.9, CTG 96.7
INFO : CNO WASH DC, CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR TH, CINCFE TOKYO
JAPAN, CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN
NR : 170558 Z

Subject is recognition signals for fradly small craft operating in Korean waters on special intelligence missions for period 150001 I Feb 52 thru 142400 I Apr 52. Ref is GHQ - FEC Signal Recognition Manual. Authorized signals and effective dates are as follows:

- A. 15 Feb thru 29 Feb Recog B 122 Object C 653 emerg D 105,
- B. 1 Mar thru 14 Mar Recog B 422 Object C 952 emerg D 103,
- C. 15 Mar thru 31 Mar Recog A 832 Object C 453 emerg D 104,
- D. 1 Apr thru 14 Apr Recog B 222 Object C 752 emerg D 106.

Emergency procedures not authorized except if authorized flare signals for operational period cannot be made or have (Over)


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(SECURITY INFORMATION)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING



Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEFERRED

FROM : COMNAVFE (ADMIN) TOKYO JAPAN NR : 170558 17 JAN 52
----- CONT'D -----

expired. No special purpose flw E or separate Object C signals authorized by this plan. CTF 95 pass to non-US holders of signal recognition manual who need to know.

NO SIG

INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, G-3, AG, SIGNAL, WAR ROOM

NOTE : This msg recd dir fr COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN via Courier.

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DEFERRED

TOO : 170558 Z

MCN : NONE

CONFIDENTIAL



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
 RADIO BRANCH

INCOMING MESSAGE JDT/jm

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 (SECURITY INFORMATION)

ROUTINE

14 Jan 52

FROM : COMNAVFE (ADMIN) TOKYO JAPAN
 TO : COM 7TH FLT
 INFO : CTF 95/CTG 95.7/, CINGFE TOKYO JAPAN
 NR : 140250 Z

Refer CTF 95 120205 Z and your 130508 Z. Recognition signals prescribed by GHQ, FEC are intended for use only by small craft engaged in special intelligence missions to identify themselves upon being challenged. It is not contemplated that UN Naval ships or boats will use such flares except occasional ROK ONI boats on missions authorized by CTG 95.7. GHQ FEC has obtained and delivered to CCRAK a supply of AN-M 8 projectors and authorized flares for distribution to subordinate units of CCRAK engaging in such missions. The responsibility for properly equipping these small craft rests with the command operating same and CCRAK is the source of supply for all such units including CTG 95.7 as needed for ROK ONI boats. Suggest CTF 95 withhold clearance for any small craft scheduled for special mission until he is assured that the vessel carries proper signal equipment. In view of above consider it unnecessary to request change in prescribed signal procedure.

(over)
 ROUTINE

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(SECURITY INFORMATION)

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
NO SIG



CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No.



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By AZ NARA Date 2/13/12

SECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN NR : 140250 Z 14 JAN 52 CONT'D

INFORMATION : G-2, G-3, G-4, SIGNAL, TRANS

NOTE : This msg rec dir fr COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN via Courier.

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ROUTINE

TOO : 140250 Z
MCN : NONE

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

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Mr J F Fesperman
26-7467

Japan Communist Party Utilization
of Codes and Ciphers.

Scty Div/OPNS/JFF/gw
10 Jan 1952

G-2

ASAPAC

1. Attached hereto is Summary of Information dated 28 December 1951, Subject as above, outlining available information on formulation and use of code and cipher communication systems by higher echelons of the Japan Communist Party.

2. This is for your information.

1 Incl:
S/I, Subj as above,
dtd 28 Dec 51

HRSB

R. F. E.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Copies this S/I previously fwded to G2, JLC, G-2, XVI Corps and G-2, GSUSA via Targets Br. Text of S/I to be published in Jan 52 issue G-2 Counterintelligence Review. Copy fwded herewith to ASAPAC as of possible interest to that agency. Credit line on copy to ASAPAC.

Mr J F Fesperman
26-7467

Incl attached ~~to~~ to all file copies of ltr to G-2, JLC, dtd 1 Jan 52, Subj as above.

G-2 File Copy
Scty Div/OPNS/JFF/gw

[Handwritten signature]

*File PP
Copies to Sec Div
and Opus*

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Mr. J. F. Resperman
26-7467

Japan Communist Party Utilization
of Codes and Ciphers.

copy Div/OPNS/177/ew
10 Jan 1952

ASAPAC

G-2

1. Attached hereto is summary of information dated 28 December 1951, subject as above, outlining available information on formation and use of code and cipher communication systems by higher echelons of the Japan Communist Party.

2. This is for your information.

I Incl:
S/I, Subj as above,
dtd 28 Dec 51

Handwritten initials: R 22 B

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Copies this S/I previously fwded to GS, JIC, G-2, XVI Corps and G-2, GSUSA via Targets Br. Text of S/I to be published in Jan 52 issue G-2 Counterintelligence Review. Copy fwded herewith to ASAPAC as of possible interest to that agency. Credit line on copy to ASAPAC.

Mr. J. F. Resperman
26-7467

Incl attached to all file copies of Itr to G-2, JIC, dtd 1 Jan 52.
Subj as above.

copy Div/OPNS/177/ew
G-2 File copy




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Scty Div

APC 500
1 January 1952

SUBJECT: Japan Communist Party Utilization of Codes and Ciphers.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
XVI Corps
APO 14

1. Attached hereto is Summary of Information dated 28 December 1951, Subject as above (Incl 1).

2. Inclosed Summary covers all available information on this Subject obtained as a result of nationwide investigations by Counter Intelligence Corps during 1951. Information was obtained from usually reliable sources and is evaluated probably true.

3. This is for your information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl:
S/I dtd 28 Dec 51,
Subj as above

RS
R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

S/I on Subj fwded herewith as of possible interest to G-2, XVI Corps. Copy fwded to Targets Br for submission to G-2, GSUSA. Same info will be published in Counter Intelligence Review in accordance with agreement with CIC per CIC IOM, 27 Dec 51, Subj as above. No other distribution made outside intelligence channels. Copy of S/I also furnished to G-2, JLCOM.

Mr J F Fesperman
26-7467

Copies of Incl attached to all file copies of ltr to G-2, JLCOM dtd 1 Jan 52, Subj as above.

G-2 File Copy
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Scty Div

APD 500
1 January 1952

SUBJECT: Japan Communist Party Utilization of Codes and Ciphers.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Japan Logistical Command
APO 343

1. Attached hereto is Summary of Information dated 28 December 1951, Subject as above (Incl 1).

2. Inclosed Summary covers all available information on this Subject obtained as a result of nationwide investigations by Counter Intelligence Corps during 1951. Information was obtained from usually reliable sources and is evaluated probably true.

3. This is for your information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl:
S/I dtd 28 Dec 51,
Subj as above

⁵¹ R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with ~~Proops~~
Deputy

G-2 File Copy
Scty Div/OPNS/JFF/gw

MEMO FOR RECORD:

S/I on Subj fwded herewith as of possible interest to G-2, JLCOM. Copy fwded to Targets Br for submission to G-2, GSUSA. Same info will be published in Counter Intelligence Review in accordance with agreement with CIC per CIC IOM, 27 Dec 51, Subj as above. No other distribution made outside intelligence channels. Copy also fwded to G-2, XVI Corps.

Mr J F Fesperman
26-7467

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Setydiv/Opms/JFF

28 December 1951

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Japan Communist Party Utilization of Codes and Ciphers

1. Introduction:

a. During the early postwar years when the activities of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) were largely overt in nature, the Party apparently felt that there was little necessity for concealing the text of its documents and written communications. These documents of a classified nature generally were transmitted by courier, evading the regular mails and the Occupation censorship which prevailed until late 1949. Particularly sensitive messages or directives often were relayed verbally. Some reports of JCP use of codes and/or ciphers were received during these years, but many of these are suspected of having been originated by information brokers or anti-Communist elements in the interests of sensationalism or propaganda.

It was not until the end of 1950 that some reliable evidence began to appear indicating that the JCP was finding a need for more secure means of communication, and accordingly beginning to employ code and cipher systems. Japanese Government suppression of the Party had begun in earnest with the purge of the nine top JCP leaders on 6 June 1950, and the subsequent banning of the leading JCP organ publication Akaba in July 1950. From that time forth, available information clearly indicated that the Party, though in the throes of a serious internal factional schism, was making rapid progress in building up a covert structure in anticipation of eventual outlawing by the Government. Thus with the birth and growth of the JCP's covert organization came the first reliable reports of attempts at utilization of concealed and enciphered communications, largely by covert elements of the Party. By the end of 1950 when the JCP reportedly had a fairly well established national underground organization, reports were obtained indicating the existence of a JCP code and cipher system allegedly for use by the Party's national headquarters in communication with regional and prefectural headquarters of the Party.

b. Investigation throughout 1951 has revealed that the JCP National Headquarters successively issued code and/or cipher systems, replacing those which were compromised by Japanese police seizure. With the exception of brief periods, the Party apparently managed to develop new systems as needed. Each of these is discussed in the following paragraphs, together with certain comments on forms of concealed or secured communication other than codes and ciphers, as reported to have been used by the JCP.

2. The HISE Code:

a. The first code of a relatively complete nature known to have been developed by the JCP was a list of 226 code words for commonly used Communist terminology, which, for the sake of identification, will hereinafter be referred to as the "HISE" code ("HISE" or "store" in English was the first code word in the list, representing "Japan Communist Party"). The HISE code is believed to have been developed in or around December 1950, presumably by personnel of the JCP National Headquarters. This code was somewhat irregular in that the words chosen varied in the number of

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syllables they contained and, while the majority of the code words were listed in Japanese kana or phonetic symbols, a substantial minority were given in kanji or Japanese characters. This clearly suggested that the code was not designed primarily for use in encoding the entire text of messages or documents, but rather for the purpose of substituting code words for key words in the plain text to conceal the basic meaning thereof. The MISE code was arranged in blocks of words roughly related to each other (i.e., general Communist terminology, geographical names, labor union names, etc.), with numerous blank spaces left between blocks apparently to permit the insertion of additional code words as desired. Each code word was numbered, with the numbers running from one to 312 (including the blank spaces which were likewise numbered). Use of the MISE code would necessitate both an encoding and decoding chart, and the existence of both an encode and a decode actually was reported by one source.

b. While copies of the MISE code were reported from two usually reliable sources during January 1951, there was some indication that its use was confined to certain regions of the country only. Such indication was given by the reporting of a similar but not identical code from another region of Japan, in which the nature and arrangement of plain text words was identical to that of the MISE code, but in which the corresponding code words were entirely different. The apparent explanation for this situation was that the JCP headquarters may have seen fit, in the interests of security, to provide various regions with similar codes in which the code words differed, but there is no further substantiation of this theory.

c. As previously noted, no evidence was ever obtained of actual use of the MISE code or other codes of similar type. As of March 1951 information was received to the effect that the MISE code had become compromised through seizure of a copy by the Japanese Police, and this was borne out by subsequent receipt of several copies of the code from various Japanese Police sources. Whether the JCP was immediately aware of the police seizure of the code is unknown, though it is of interest to note that one usually reliable source reported the code still in use as late as mid-April 1951. More plausible is the theory that the MISE code and its counterparts, if any, were never used to any great extent and that compromise of the code caused no particular inconvenience to the JCP.

d. The MISE code, whenever reported, was accompanied by an ingenious and rather complex enciphering system (hereafter termed the "MISE cipher") which, although not stipulated in the instructions accompanying the cipher, presumably was to be used with the code. Like the code, the MISE cipher was never reported in actual use, and it would appear that if the code and cipher actually were supposed to be used in conjunction with each other (i.e., encipherment of the coded text of a message), the combined system probably presented an insurmountable problem in complexity to the persons for whose use it was intended.

3. The MISE Cipher:

a. The MISE enciphering system consisted basically of a "square" ten spaces wide by six spaces deep, containing the 46 symbols of the Japanese phonetic or kana alphabet plus basic punctuation and pronunciation symbols, with the numerals from 1 to 0 on the bottom line. The vertical and horizontal columns of the square were represented by numbers taken from a previously designated basic numerical sequence of 16 digits, such as: 0 4 5 3 1 2 8 4 5 6 3 2 1 9 7 0. Such a square appeared as follows:

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	8	4	5	6	3	2	1	9	7	0
0	a	ka	sa	ta	na	ha	na	ya	ra	wa
4	i	ki	shi	chi	ni	hi	ni	ya	ri	()
5	u	ku	su	tsu	mi	fu	mu	yu	ru	n
3	e	ko	so	to	no	ho	no	o	re	(v)e
1	e	ko	so	to	no	ho	so	yo	ro	wo
2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0

Using the square with the number on the horizontal axis (or "abscissa") first followed by that on the vertical axis (or "ordinate") the syllable "a" was represented by "80," "shi" by "54," "ho" by "23," etc. Thus the message or document plaintext in "kana" phonetic symbols was enciphered to form a series of two-digit numbers, which could be readily deciphered by the use of the same "square." However, the MISE cipher system called for further encipherment by use of an "additive" or random numerical series to scramble the enciphered plaintext. For this purpose, the same basic numerical sequence as that of the square was used, repeating as many times as necessary. The digits of this sequence, in pairs, were to be added to the enciphered text by non-carrying addition (i.e., non-carrying of numbers to the tens column). Thus a sample text scrambled by use of the foregoing basic numerical sequence would appear as follows:

Plaintext:	a	su	a	sa	ko	i	("come tomorrow morning")
Ciphertext:	80	55	80	50	41	84	(using square to encipher)
Additive:	04	53	12	84	56	32	(numerical sequence)
Scrambled	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Ciphertext:	84	08	92	34	97	16	(digits of additive added to digits of ciphertext by non-carrying addition)

To further complicate the system, the instructions called for variation of the point at which to begin using the additive, in accordance with the date which was appended at the end of the message. This resulted in a doubly-enciphered message of which the final ciphertext would vary according to the date.

b. Cryptographically speaking, this system was highly secure and could not be broken without numerous sample messages enciphered thereby on different dates. At the same time it was rendered somewhat simpler by using the same basic numerical sequence for both the square and the additive. However, it may well be understood that persons having no experience with such systems would have little patience in trying to make practical use of them, and further that the possibilities for error were numerous in a system having so many steps. It was perhaps for this reason that the system was never known to have been used. Nevertheless, it is of interest to note at this point that such a system, while by no means the most complicated ever devised, would almost unquestionably have to be devised by a person or persons familiar with cryptography, suggesting that the originators probably may have had wartime training in this field in the Japanese armed forces.

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c. The MISE Code and Cipher had a somewhat amusing aftermath, according to one fairly reliable source who reported that upon receipt of a coded message, the various members of the JCP Kansai Regional Committee would convene to decipher and interpret the contents of the message. If they were not successful in this venture and it is believed that this was often the case, someone invariably had to be dispatched to the JCP headquarters in Tokyo to ascertain the contents of the message. This situation finally resulted in the complete cessation of the use of encoded and/or enciphered communications.

d. Whether this report specifically referred to the use of the MISE Code and/or Cipher is not clear, but inasmuch as no other code or cipher system is known to have been issued by the JCP Headquarters between the MISE period and the subsequent "Savings Passbook Code" period, it appears likely that the MISE systems were those responsible for the confusion.

4. The Savings Passbook Code

a. An entirely new code was issued by JCP Headquarters on 20 May 51, bearing the title of "Savings Passbook #1" (Chokin Tsucho #1). The contents of this code subsequently were reported by several usually reliable sources, one of which obtained photographic copies of the original. From these and accompanying information regarding the use of the code, it has been determined that the code was almost undoubtedly authentic. Savings Passbook #1 contained 116 words covering ordinary JCP terminology in the fields of organization, activities, liaison, publications, etc., as well as for minerals and days of the week. A large majority of the code words contained therein were represented in Japanese kanji characters, clearly indicating that the code was not intended for use with any phonetic enciphering system. Strangely enough, the only code word in the Savings Passbook #1 which was identical to the earlier MISE code was the first word: "Mise" itself, again representing "Japan Communist Party." An interesting feature of this code was that it was the first known to contain code symbols for units of the JCP covert organization. Specifically, it designated the English letter "P" as the symbol or code word for "bureau," JCP terminology for its covert regional or prefectural headquarters. In addition it designated English letter symbols for each of five different regional "bureaus," which are known to be still in use despite the demise of the Savings Passbook Code as a whole many months ago.

b. The exact date on which Savings Passbook #2 was issued is not known, but believed to have been in early June 1951. Prepared as a supplement to Savings Passbook #1, it contained a total of 15 code terms for overt and covert JCP publications. In addition, Savings Passbook #2 contained instructions for several minor changes in Savings Passbook #1 terminology, the most notable of which was the substitution of the English letter "V" for "P" as the symbol for "bureau." It is of interest to note that the "V" for "bureau" was still in use as of November 1951, being, together with the aforementioned English letter symbols for regional "bureaus," the only surviving terminology of the Savings Passbook Code.

c. Savings Passbook #3 comprised another brief supplement and contained only seven additional code words. However, the notes included therein directed a change in the scope of applicability of the Savings Passbook Code. Instructions in Savings Passbook #1 had specified that the codes were to be used only haiwan and nihon the Central and Regional "Bureaus" (i.e., the national and regional headquarters of the JCP covert organization). Instructions appearing on the supplementary Savings Passbook #3 revised this to include prefectural "bureaus" as well, but stipulated that the codes were under no circumstances to be employed at levels lower than prefectural.

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d. Savings Passbook #4 appeared to be a further supplement to the same series of Savings Passbook Codes, but was much more lengthy than the previous two supplements and included a total of 190 new code words, more than Savings Passbook #1 had contained. These new code words covered major Japanese labor organizations, major JCP front organizations, and a large number of additional words and phrases common to the Communist lexicon. No. 4 bore a notation that it was effective from 25 June 1951 on, though usually reliable sources reported that it actually was not distributed until early July 1951.

e. Definite evidence has been obtained indicating that the Savings Passbook Code actually was used in early July 1951, for the purpose of disguising key words in covert JCP notifications. Whether it was used to any extent in other types of communications is unknown, but all available evidence suggests that the total of instances of the code's use was very small. It is known that in July 1951 the Party had reason to believe that a copy of Savings Passbook #1 had been confiscated by the police during the previous month, and for a time was on the point of declaring the code void. However, according to one usually reliable source, such action was not taken at that time, and the code continued in use through July 1951. Copies of the entire code were obtained by Japanese police presumably around the latter part of that month; the exact date is unknown as is the date on which the JCP became aware that the code was compromised. There is no evidence that the code was actually used beyond July 1951.

5. The INHO #1 Code

a. A code of somewhat different type from the MISE and Savings Passbook codes was introduced by the JCP on 17 August 1951, according to several usually reliable sources. This code reportedly was known as the "INHO #1," "INHO" being the code designation for the plaintext word "code." Distribution and use appears to have been confined to higher echelons of the JCP's covert structure, and although specific information is not available, its use is believed to have extended down to prefectural levels.

INHO #1 consisted of a list of 406 code words representing a somewhat larger selection of plaintext words, phrases, symbols, etc., than the previous codes. Its distinguishing feature was the fact that each code word was composed of three Japanese *kana* syllables, of which the first was invariably "in the clear," i.e., the same as the first syllable of the plaintext word represented. For example: "ka-ra-su" was the code word for "kansai;" "shi-ya-no" for "shiraibu" (GHQ); "yu-a-mi" for "yubinkyoku" (post office), and so on, with the first syllables identical in every case. Such a system frequently has been used in Japanese codes, particularly of the commercial variety, having the advantage that when properly indexed according to the Japanese alphabet, the same list serves as both encoding and decoding chart. In the INHO #1 code, numerals and days of the week were included in the regular code list, having three-*kana* code words like all other plaintext groups. These categories, however, coming at the end of the code chart, were indexed individually in another Japanese *kana* alphabetical pattern. The first syllables of their three-*kana* code words thus occurred in the order of 一, 二, 三, 四 for numerals, 日, 月, 火, 水, 木, 金, 土, 日, etc., for days of the week, and 日, 月, 年, 季, etc., for miscellaneous words used in designations of time such as "day," "year," etc. As had become customary by that time in the JCP covert organization, the code was printed on small thin sheets of rice paper which could readily be burnt, swallowed or otherwise destroyed in an emergency.

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c. Some documentary proof has been obtained from usually reliable sources indicating that the INKO #1 code actually was used to some extent, serving chiefly to conceal key words in covert JCP notifications and other secret communications. However, there is no indication that INKO #1 was used to encode the entire text of documents or messages, or any major part thereof. Like its predecessors, this code clearly was designed rather to disguise the meaning of critical or incriminating words or phrases. Such a system apparently suited the needs of the Party adequately and at the same time was sufficiently simple to preclude the confusion that reportedly was caused by earlier codes and cipher systems.

d. Available information indicates that the INKO #1 code was short-lived, inasmuch as it was compromised on 30 August 1951 when copies were seized by the police in a raid upon a Tokyo JCP member's house.

6. The TOKKI #0 Code

a. The comparatively quick compromise of the INKO #1 Code, which was perhaps the most practical code produced by the JCP up until that time, apparently annoyed the Party Headquarters but did not catch them unprepared. On 2 September 1951, two days after the police seizure of the INKO #1, a new code entitled "TOKKI #0" was issued together with a notification warning all lower echelons of the Party to cease the use of INKO #1. Sufficient information regarding this code has been received from usually reliable sources to leave little doubt as to its authenticity. The TOKKI #0 Code included code words for 405 plaintext words, phrases, etc., and thus in size was almost identical to the INKO #1. However, TOKKI #0 differed in two respects from its predecessor. Firstly, the code words, though all were represented in Japanese kanji, contained varying numbers of syllables ranging from two to five. Secondly, the system of the INKO #1 using the first syllable of each code word "in the clear" was reversed in the TOKKI #0, with the last syllable of each code word identical to the first syllable of the plaintext word it represented. Thus, the code word for "Niigata Prefecture" was "ta-ni," that for "peace committee" (heiwa linkai) was "ka-wa-ji," that for "propaganda" (agenden) was "de-ni-ji," etc. Like the INKO #1, this system permitted the use of a single code and plaintext chart both for encoding and decoding purposes. Also like the INKO #1, numerals, days of the week, etc., in the TOKKI #0 Code were individually indexed, with the middle syllables of their three-kanji code words (all code words in this category had three syllables) occurring in ji, ka, ha, etc., order in accordance with the Japanese ji, ka, ha, etc. alphabetical arrangement of kanji symbols.

b. The TOKKI #0 was accompanied by strict instructions from the JCP Headquarters regarding the proper security precautions to be taken to prevent its being compromised. For the first time, it was required that the names of all persons having access to, or custody of copies of the code be registered with the Party Headquarters, and it was specifically ordered that the number of such persons be kept to an absolute minimum.

c. By this time it had become fairly obvious from all available information that the JCP Headquarters codes such as the INKO #1 and TOKKI #0 were used only to conceal key words and phrases in covert Party communications. Used in this manner, the code words were scattered through plaintext documents and generally were clearly marked by being enclosed within the Japanese equivalent of quotation marks or parentheses. In many cases the context left little or no doubt as to the probable meaning of the code words so employed, a fact which suggests that the primary reason for using these was to prevent the use of the documents as evidence against the JCP in the event of their confiscation. Furthermore, such evidence of the use of these codes as has become available indicates a surprising paucity of code words in Party documents, leaving some doubt as to why such elaborate codes were prepared when such shorter and simpler ones would appear to have sufficed.

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Possibly as a result of this increased emphasis on security, the TOKEI #0 Code is known to have remained in use for approximately one and one-half months. Copies of the code finally fell into police hands in mid-October 1951. Whether the JCP was aware of its confiscation at that time is not clear, but on 5 November 1951 an article appeared in the Tokyo newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun giving numerous details of the code and, according to one usually reliable source, the JCP "Central Bureau" (covert organization headquarters) immediately thereafter issued instructions to its subordinate regional and prefectural "bureaus" to cease the use of TOKEI #0.

7. The TOKEI #1 Cipher:

a. In the latter part of October 1951, information was received concerning the existence of an enciphering chart believed to have been used by the JCP since 1 October 1951. This chart, consisting of a simple substitution table of "square," was entitled the "TOKEI #1" and, according to instructions accompanying it, was supposed to be used either alone or in conjunction with the TOKEI #0 Code. The instructions further stipulated that in the event of the compromise of the TOKEI #0 Code, the TOKEI #1 Cipher would continue to be used alone. The TOKEI #1 enciphering system, quite similar to the MISE Cipher of early 1951, was based on an enciphering "square" ten spaces in width and ten in depth. The 100 small spaces thus formed contained all the Japanese kana, numerals, and common punctuation symbols, as well as a few commonly-used Japanese kanji. Each had a corresponding two-digit cipher. As in the case of the MISE Cipher, a plain text in kana or phonetic symbols could be converted into a series of two-digit numbers by use of the square, and reconverted into plaintext by the use of the same square.

b. With the TOKEI #1 Cipher the "additive" (see par. 3a) feature was again introduced. A sheet accompanying the cipher contained instructions for the use of certain "key numbers" (ken suji) as additive to scramble the ciphertext. A "key number" was designated for use within each fifteen-day period beginning with 1 October 1951 and extending through the end of December 1951; i.e., the "key number" or additive was to be changed every fifteen days. Designation of the key numbers was made by means of a rather ingenious device: each fifteen-day period was assigned as its "key number" the date of some well-known event in Communist or proletarian struggle history, such as the signing of the peace treaty with Japan, the beginning of the French revolution, Stalin's birthday, etc. Thus, for the period to which was assigned the date of the peace treaty signing, the numerical sequence 19510908 (1951/9/8 or "1951.09.08" as dates generally are written by the Japanese) was to be used as the additive for all messages enciphered in the TOKEI #1 Cipher. The obvious advantage of this usage of well-known dates was the fact that the appropriate additive for a 15-day period could be mentally retained by the persons using the cipher, eliminating the security risk of carrying the additive in written form. Like the earlier MISE Cipher additive, the additive or "key number" of the TOKEI #1 was to be repeated as many times as necessary to scramble the entire ciphertext of messages or documents enciphered by the TOKEI #1 square.

c. As a final security feature, TOKEI #1 instructions stipulated that the scrambled ciphertext (plain ciphertext with additive added) when transmitted in written form should be arranged to look like innocuous groups of figures such as in financial reports, etc. A sample message enciphered in the TOKEI #1 system would be handled in the following stages:

Plaintext: 2 4 hi ka 1 gi hi ra ku (conference will
begin on the 24th)

Ciphertext: 37 17 29 92 81 32 86 99 72 (using square to
encipher)

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Additive: 19 17 11 07 19 17 11 07 19 (proper "key number" for the period: Russian revolution date: 1917:11.07)

Scrambled Ciphertext: 46 24 30 99 90 49 97 96 81 (additive added to ciphertext by non-carrying addition)

Disguised arrangement of scrambled ciphertext:

4,624 #6 Bolts (arrangement in columns to appear as innocuous business figures)
309 #6 Nuts
9,904 #10 Washers
99 #3 Angle Brackets
79,681 #7 Wood Screws

To identify the "key number" or additive used, messages generally would bear a plaintext date showing when they were written.

d. The instructions accompanying the TOKEI #1 Cipher urged that persons using the system memorize both the enciphering square and the key numbers, to eliminate insofar as possible the necessity for retaining them in written form. However, it would seem highly unlikely that these instructions were followed for the enciphering square. The TOKEI #1 square with 100 plaintext kana, etc., was considerably larger than the MISE square which accommodated only 60 plaintext groups, and in addition, its irregular arrangement of both plaintext and ciphertext digits would make memorizing difficult.

e. This was the first instance since the time of the MISE Cipher in which the JCP headquarters is known to have prepared and distributed an enciphering system for use in its higher echelon communications. The re-appearance of such a system suggests that the JCP, then undergoing steadily increasing suppression from the Japanese police in the form of raids and arrests, felt the need for more security in its communications than that provided by the TOKEI #0 or any similar code. As previously noted, the TOKEI #0 Code fell into the hands of the police in mid-October 1951, and subsequently its compromise was loudly proclaimed by the Japanese press. It is believed that the TOKEI #1 Cipher was not obtained by the police at the time the TOKEI #0 Code was picked up, though the Cipher was discovered shortly thereafter. There is at this time no indication as to whether the JCP is aware of the compromise of the TOKEI #1 Cipher. The instructions accompanying the Cipher indicated that it was intended for use at least through the end of 1951, but since no evidence has been obtained of the actual use of TOKEI #1, its present status is unknown.

8. JCP Code or "Cover" Words in Frequent Use:

a. As noted above, the size and scope of the codes which have been issued by the JCP to date do not appear warranted by available evidence of the extent of their actual use. However, since May 1951 certain words or symbols which can be classified as code terms have been used consistently by the Party's covert organization in its directives, notifications, etc., to lower echelons. Some of these originated as part of codes now out of use (notably the Savings Passbook Code of May-July 1951), but nevertheless continue to be used in Party documents. Others were initiated singly or in small groups, and apparently remain in use despite the successive compromise and rejection of the JCP codes in conjunction with which they were used. The most frequently appearing of such code terms is the "V" for "bureau," which reportedly is still in use at this writing. It was previously noted that Savings Passbook #1, issued on 20 May 1951, designated the English letter "B" as the code term for "bureau"; Savings Passbook #2, issued shortly

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

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thereafter to supplement #1, substituted the letter "V" for "B." The use of "V" to all appearances has become standard throughout the JCP organization since that time. The English letter designations for various regional "bureaus," also originated in the Savings Passbook #1, likewise are believed to be still in use. Thus, "HV" is the symbol or code word for "Hokkaido Bureau," "KV" for "Kanto Bureau," "WV" for "Kansai Bureau," etc. In addition to these, several other English letter designations are known to be in common use although they are not known to have originated with any particular JCP Headquarters code. "G" for "group" or "fraction" has been used for several years by the JCP; "S" for "cell" (saibo) is a term which has been noted with increasing frequency since 1949; another such designation believed to be of more recent origin is the English letter "C" for "cap" (kyappu), a word used by the JCP covert organization for the "chiefs" or, literally, "captain" of a cell, committee, or "bureau." These terms, rather than being code words, are more in the category of such common JCP abbreviations as "tec" (teku) for "secret courier" or "repo" (for "repota" or reporter) for "secret contact man." In other words, they are more in the nature of abbreviations than of code terms.

b. The origin of the Japanese custom of abbreviating words or phrases by using one significant Japanese character from that word or phrase surrounded by a circle (or "maru" in Japanese) is somewhat obscure. The theory that it stems from the Japanese "han" or name seal, or from the "mon" or family crest, would appear as logical as any. In any case, the JCP has during the past year adopted numerous such symbols to indicate publications or certain types of activities. These seem to be used more as abbreviations than as code symbols inasmuch as their true meaning is generally readily perceivable from the context in which they appear. As used by, or in connection with, the Japan Communist Party, the symbol " " or "maru-kyo" has been noted since the earliest days of the Occupation as an abbreviation for "Communist Party" (Kyo-santo). This symbol was, and often still is, used by both the Party itself and by the Japanese police to refer to the JCP. However, during the past year the JCP is known to have used various other such "maru" symbols to designate its covert publications, such as " " or "maru-hei" for its leading covert publication "Heiwa to Dokuritsu" (Peace and Independence) and " " or "maru-nai" for "Naigai Hyoron" (Foreign and Domestic Review). Similar symbols were until recently known to have been used by the Party's covert organization to designate certain categories of people, such as " " or "maru-ke" for "police" (Keisatsu), " " or "maru-shin" for "Occupation Forces" (Shinchugun), and " " or "maru-yo" for "National Police Reserve Japan" (Yobitai). In recent months the latter group of symbols have been replaced by English letter symbols such as "Y 1," "Y 2," etc, and current unconfirmed reports claim that the "Y" symbols in turn have been replaced by new and unknown designations.

9. Systems for Emergency Warnings:

a. In times of emergency, such as when news is obtained of impending raids on JCP property, confiscations of illegal publications, or arrests of Party leaders, the JCP generally is forced to resort to communication by telegraph to forewarn those concerned. In such cases, according to usually reliable sources, prearranged texts of a seemingly innocuous nature are dispatched. If necessary, the warnings are relayed by headquarters' at each level of Party structure down to the next lower echelon headquarters. Recent information has substantiated the belief that the Party has perfected this warning system as an absolute necessity in times of suppressive action by Japanese police or other authorities. For example, it has been definitely established that the JCP headquarters had advance information regarding the mass arrests of JCP leaders on 4 September 1951, and that warning messages were dispatched to leaders in at least some of the Party's regional headquarters prior to the raids which took place on that day. The exact extent

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to which such warnings were disseminated within the JCP organization is not clear, but there is some indication that they were relayed all the way down to district committee level on a nationwide scale.

b. From a technical point of view, these warning messages are of little interest, and can hardly be placed in the category of coded communications. Judging from available information on such systems, a list of from ten to fifteen brief and innocuous message texts are drawn up, each having a particular meaning. For example, "Mother is ill, please come tomorrow" may mean "Arrests expected tomorrow"; or "Will arrive 23rd" may mean "Raids will take place on 23rd." It may be noted that in most instances the dates used in such messages are disguised as noted in a previous paragraph, by adding or subtracting a prearranged number. Though they constitute one of the simplest means of secured communications employed by the JCP, they are at the same time perhaps the most important to the Party. It would appear highly unlikely that the JCP will at any time in the future be without such a prearranged system of emergency warnings at any level of the Party's structure.

10. Selection of Words in JCP Codes:

a. It may logically be assumed that the words and phrases chosen by the JCP for inclusion in its headquarters codes are those commonly used by the Party, and conversely, that terminology not generally used by the Party would not appear in such code lists. On the basis of these assumptions, a close examination of the four codes believed to have been prepared by the JCP National Headquarters to date (namely: the MISE Code, the Savings Passbook Code, the INKO #1 Code and the TOKEI #0 Code) reveals some interesting fragments of information about certain phases of the JCP's internal structure and about some of its activities. Firstly, a comparison of the size of these codes reveals that presumably out of necessity, they increased steadily in length until the TOKEI #0 Code:

MISE Code:	226	plaintext	groups
Savings Passbook Code:	328	"	"
INKO #1 Code:	406	"	"
TOKEI #0 Code:	405	"	"

Secondly, comparison of the choice of terminology included in these codes reveals considerable change in each successive code until the TOKEI #0, which contained plaintext terms very nearly identical to those of the preceding INKO #1. Following are noted some of the major differences in the first three codes:

Labor Union names:	Included in the MISE Code and in the Savings Passbook Code (Savings Passbook #4), but not thereafter.
Geographical names:	Only names for regions (i.e., Tohoku, Kanto, Kansai, etc.) included in the MISE Code and the Savings Passbooks Code. Thereafter, names of all prefectures as well as regions appeared in the INKO #1 and the TOKEI #0.
Names of JCP Leaders:	Names of all top JCP national leaders (including the nine Central Committee members purged in June 1950) appeared only in the MISE Code; no names appeared in subsequent codes with the exception of SHIINO Etsuro, chairman of the JCP Provisional Central Guidance Department until his purging in September 1951.
JCP Covert Organization Terminology:	The MISE Code included no covert organizational terminology, suggesting that at that time the JCP's covert organization was still in an elementary formative stage. All subsequent

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codes, beginning with the Savings Passbook Code, contained code words for all covert regional "bureaus," and for various other units of the JCP covert organization.

b. Another highly revealing feature of the selection of words included in JCP headquarters codes has been the fact that they help to substantiate or disprove allegations of the existence of certain JCP departments, and of other organs in the Communist sphere. Of particular interest is the fact that all such codes to date have included a code word for "Cominform"; but that, despite repeated allegations of the existence of an "Asiatic Cominform" or "Far East Cominform," no mention of such an organ has ever been made in any JCP code. While not conclusive evidence, this nevertheless strongly supports the theory that no "Far East Cominform" exists, at least not under such a name. Terminology used by the JCP's covert organization in several cases has been confirmed by appearing in JCP codes. An example of this is the "gunji linkai" or "Military Affairs Committee" of the covert Party organization, which frequently has been reported as an organ responsible for covert JCP activities against the Occupation forces, the Japanese police and the NPRJ. This term did not appear in a JCP code until the issue of the INKO #1 Code on 17 Aug 51; thereafter, it again appeared in the TOKEI #0 Code, suggesting that such an organ had been established.

11. Prefectural, District and Local Codes and Ciphers:

a. Information from usually reliable sources indicates that the JCP National Headquarters has never made any effort to establish a single code and/or cipher system for use in and/or between all echelons of the Party. Such a system, copies of which necessarily would be in the hands of hundreds of JCP members throughout the country, would be in constant danger of compromise through police raids, spies, etc. The Party headquarters, therefore, apparently has adhered to a policy of providing code and cipher systems only to the higher echelons of the Party, generally down to and including its prefectural headquarters. Below prefectural level the custom reportedly has been to allow district and cell group committees to devise their own codes or other means of securing communications. Available evidence completely bears this out, indicating the existence of a great variety of locally-originated and locally-used code, cipher and coverword systems, each designed to meet the needs of the group it is to serve. Some consist of only a few words, phrases or symbols, while others are elaborate beyond any perceivable necessity. The majority are designed for use within or between prefectural committees and their subordinate district committees. It will be noted that the general practice is for the prefectural committees to be the relaying point for information from higher echelons; i.e., information from the Party's National or Regional Headquarters may go as far down as prefectural level using the JCP's national headquarters code system; however, at prefectural level, if it is to be passed on to still lower echelons, it must be re-encoded in the system used by the prefectural committees for that purpose. In some cases, another re-encoding may take place at the district committee level for communication to cell groups, etc.

b. One simple concealment device which has been widely reported in use by JCP organs of prefectural or lower level is that of changing the dates in a message or document according to a prearranged system. Thus, in a certain prefecture, it may be understood that communications from the prefectural committee to the district committees will have all dates and times changed by adding or subtracting numbers previously agreed upon. If it has been decided that the number two (2) will be added to all dates and five (5) to all times expressed in hours, a message meaning: "Meeting will

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be held on the 19th at 1300 hours" will be transmitted as: "Meeting will be held on the 21st at 1800 hours." Though this is an extremely simple method, it is effective in deceiving any possible interceptors of the message. Such devices are known to have been in use between lower level JCP groups since early 1950, with isolated instances reported even earlier.

c. The multiplicity of lower echelon JCP codes and ciphers reported to date precludes any detailed discussion of such systems in this Summary. Careful study of these reveals that many are crudely and illogically designed, and that few if any display any features of cryptographic interest. In general, as compared to the various systems produced and used by the JCP National Headquarters, they show none of the ingenuity of the headquarters systems.

12. Comment:

a. An analysis of all information available to date on this subject leads strong support to the belief that no major development in the field of JCP code and cipher activity has been completely unreported. That some local, district or even prefectural cryptographic systems may remain unreported is not improbable; however, it is believed that the information on hand, as briefly reviewed in the foregoing paragraphs, presents a fairly comprehensive cross-sectional picture of the JCP's utilization of codes and ciphers at higher echelon levels.

b. The major conclusion derived from a study of the various code systems developed and used by the JCP National Headquarters is that the primary reason for the use of such codes is to avoid legal prosecution, rather than to prevent detection of the actual meaning of classified Party communications. Thus, authentic JCP documents making use of code terminology are by no means unreadable - for, as previously noted, the meanings of almost all code words used are easily discernable from the context. However, the substitution of code words in strategic places has the one effect of preventing a document from being used as legal evidence against the JCP, in the event of the document's confiscation. In particular, the identity of the sender and addressee are encoded; this alone being sufficient to prevent the document's use as legal evidence. For example, using the TOKKI SO Code, a communication originating with "matchi" (Secretariate) and addressed to all "tomato" (Prefectural Committees) may contain a scurrilous and undisguised denunciation of the Occupation and the US-Japan Security Pact, but as legal evidence such a document is virtually worthless. Even though copies of the code used therein are available, the complications of legal proof that the code is an authentic JCP product, and that it is in fact the one used in the document, would be formidable. It is apparently in recognition of this fact that the JCP employs codes as it does. Documents using code terminology seldom fall into the hands of unfriendly forces early enough to permit their use for any practical purpose, and the only remaining danger is the possibility of their use as legal evidence of subversive intent on the part of the JCP. To date, this purpose has been served well by JCP codes, despite their comparatively infrequent use. With the possible exception of the emergency warning telegrams described in an earlier paragraph, no document or communication, known to be of authentic JCP origin, has employed such complete use of code terms as to be entirely unintelligible to the uninitiated reader.

c. With regard to the development and utilization of cipher systems by the JCP headquarters, a somewhat different situation from that of the codes appears to have prevailed. The MIBR Cipher, presumably issued around the end of 1950, was of a fairly complex type, a fact which is believed responsible for its apparent lack of use. Thereafter, although a

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series of JCP codes appeared for use within and between higher echelons of the Party organization, no further enciphering system made an appearance until October 1951. The appearance of the TOKEI #1 Cipher at that time strongly suggested that the JCP Headquarters felt the increasing necessity of using some form of encipherment in its communications, despite any difficulties which might arise from the complexities of using ciphers. However, as previously noted, evidence of the actual use of the TOKEI #1 is lacking to date. As of mid-December 1951 there was likewise no evidence that the JCP considered the TOKEI #1 compromised, and it is therefore possible that the system is still available to the JCP for use at this time.

d. In conclusion, it may be noted that all available evidence of the use of the JCP codes and ciphers described above indicates that they were designed for, and used exclusively by, the Party's covert apparatus as a necessity of the increasing underground activity of the JCP. Development of JCP systems for securing and concealment of communications has followed the development of the covert organization, and it may logically be presumed that Party will continue to utilize such methods in its underground liaison.

SOURCE: Scty Div/Opns Br Case Reports: CIS-2330, Subj: JCP Codes and Ciphers

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
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series of JCP codes appeared for use within and between higher echelons of the Party organization, no further enciphering system made an appearance until October 1951. The appearance of the TORRE JI Cipher at that time strongly suggested that the JCP Headquarters felt the increasing necessity of using some form of encipherment in its communications, despite any difficulties which might arise from the complexities of using ciphers. However, as previously noted, evidence of the actual use of the TORRE JI is lacking to date. As of mid-December 1951 there was likewise no evidence that the JCP considered the TORRE JI compromised, and it is therefore possible that the system is still available to the JCP for use at this time.

d. In conclusion, it may be noted that all available evidence of the use of the JCP codes and ciphers described above indicates that they were designed for, and used exclusively by, the Party's covert apparatus as a necessity of the increasing underground activity of the JCP. However, the development of the TORRE JI cipher and concealment of communications has followed the development of the covert organization, and it may logically be presumed that Party will continue to utilize such methods in the future.

SOURCE: Sety Div/Opns Br Case Reports: CIB-3330, Subj: JCP Codes and Ciphers



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