


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INTRODUCTION;
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
IN JAPAN

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN

Japanese representative government results from opposition originating without Japan to the system of society and government existing within when General MacArthur set foot on Japanese soil on August 30, 1945.

Under that system Japan was governed by an emperor claiming absolute power by divine right as a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess. His power was derived nominally from a formal Constitution which was protected from liberal reform by so-called secret and patriotic societies (which were neither secret nor patriotic) and the established state church of Shinto.¹

The emperor was the state. The slightest criticism of this theory of the emperor system, such as proposing the mild thesis that the emperor was the organ of the state, was regarded as sacrilege and lese majeste.

The mass of the people, chiefly workers, peasant farmers and small merchants, were exploited and suppressed. Fundamental civil and political rights, including freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and academic freedom did not exist. Even "dangerous thoughts" were relentlessly sought out and ruthlessly suppressed.

The individual had no safeguard against arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, no right to speedy trial or arraignment, no practicable protection against search of his home or workshop, or the summary seizure of his possessions by police or procurators, and no dignity of being.

The Japanese existed as an extremely regimented and exploited people governed by an hereditary dictatorship. The authority of the dictatorship was exercised through a triple oligarchy of military, economic and bureaucratic cliques, respectively called in the vernacular gunbatsu, zaibatsu and kambatsu.^{*} This oligarchy had emerged along with the myths and legends of the emperor system in the era which began shortly after Commodore Perry sailed into Shimoda Harbor in 1854 and ended in the initial phase of the Occupation under the aegis of General MacArthur.

1. Appendix C: 21, The Meiji Constitution.

* Zaibatsu is a term used to designate representatives of financial, business or industrial cliques. Gunbatsu is a term used to designate career military officers clique. Kambatsu is a term used to designate official clique of bureaucrats.

The Revolution of 1868

Unlike the English Revolution of 1688 and the American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century, the Japanese "Restoration of 1868" had not been a revolution directed against despotism, family privilege, and a stratified society. On the contrary, it entrenched more firmly the forces of tyranny and caste.

Politically, the Restoration of 1868 had strengthened the ruling classes. It had substituted for the pre-existing decentralized government of feudal lords and provincial clans, loosely linked by a central military administrative authority, a new and highly centralized government. The central government, with prefectural, municipal and neighborhood branches, included in its tightly-spun web a pyramidal police bureaucracy.

Economically, the Restoration of 1868 had also strengthened the ruling classes. It had substituted for their feudal economy, based upon rice levies and other feudal dues and lordly prerogatives, a modern money economy. Through industrial combinations, financial monopolies, and the ownership of eighty percent of the national resources, a dozen ruling houses gained control of the new system of mercantilism.

Socially, also, the Restoration of 1868 had substituted for the sword-wielding samurai, who had previously protected the privileged position of the ruling classes, the more subtle but not less powerful weapon of the emperor-god. Thereafter, intensive indoctrination of the masses of the people with old wives' tales of gods and demi-gods culminated in 1889 in the promulgation of a constitution which proclaimed that "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable", "combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty", and in the imperial rescript on education of 1890 which pronounced him "coeval with Heaven and Earth."²

When the fifteen-year^{old} Emperor Meiji was thus deified, property in Japan consisted mainly in the ownership of land. Like medieval European feudalism, the

2. Appendix B: 9a, Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890.

Japanese concept of ownership was akin to sovereignty and the tenant akin to serf or subject. At the same time as this modern myth of the emperor-god was being injected into the ignorant minds of poverty-stricken peasants and workers, other forms of wealth were becoming possible through banking and commercial activities, artistic and professional skills, and the genesis of public services reinforced by the power of taxation.

Notwithstanding this development in the political economy of Japan, economic control and political power remained as two sides of the same coin, to the extent that of the two principal political factions one represented the Mitsui economic interests and the other the Mitsubishi domain. The militarists and their allies of the 1930s solved the problem of converting this tightly-welded oligarchy into a modern totalitarian police state by the simple expedient of investing the controlling influences in whom this property ownership was concentrated with political as well as economic power over the unpropertied, reserving to themselves the conduct of international relations.

Since sovereignty was also vested in the emperor who embodied the state itself, feudalism had technically ceased to exist. However, except for this centralization of the source of political authority and the concentration in the hands of the dozen family groups of monarchical capitalism, the feudal forces in Japan continued to exert strong influence on the morals and manners of the people.

The redesigning of the governmental structure into the Meiji Constitution could not itself bring about the collapse of feudalism in the ensuing half century. Governmental policies were not reconciled with political or ethical principles, nor did they flow from principles. Power simply sprang from the force of the emperor and his court, the nobility, the financial barons, and the civil and military successors to the ruling overlords and their retainers. Power was absolute.

The Revolution of 1945

Three years ago the Japanese still had this infallible emperor-god with an aristocratic court, ecclesiastical as well as temporal authority, granting from invisible sources visible power to a few. The Japanese commonwealth consisted of a catenary pegged at one point by thirty-five million peasants and their families who procured little share of the crop they planted and harvested and owned none of the land which they tilled, and at the other by twenty million workers who were paid substandard wages and had forlorn hope of improving their abject living conditions.

Today these same peasants are in the main freeholders or eligible to become freeholders.

Today these same workers bargain and act collectively through their own representatives for their mutual self-interest toward a standard of living in decency and comfort.

Today the same emperor-god has become merely a symbol of the unity of the people. He is forbidden forever to have powers of governing. His court is freely criticized in the public press. His dynasty exists by the sufferance of the National Diet and a majority of the people.

The people through their elected representatives frame the laws which they obey. Sovereignty is vested in the people. And it is within the sovereign power of the people to amend their new Constitution for the purpose of eliminating the hereditary symbol from their otherwise republican and parliamentary form of representative government.³

If visible power today responds to invisible influence, it is the influence of behind-the-scenes political maneuvering but not imperial, ecclesiastical or economic tyranny.

The position of women has been elevated throughout the body of jurisprudence to equality with men. Both men and women are steadily shedding the complacent servility of mind instilled into them from childhood by the Shinto priests as sponsors of the imperial mythology, by the state police as protectors of the imperial authority, and by the school teachers as propagandists for the imperial way of life.

There is, of course, a difference in the attitude of the people in the city and people of the country. The people in the country are more conservative and less anxious for change than those in the cities. They retain old habits of mind and conduct more sedately, adhere to old habits of speech, and are more fearful of foreign influences than city dwellers. This contrast between dwellers in urban and rural areas is not uncommon elsewhere in the world.

Wherever they lived, however, and whatever pursuit they followed, the common people of Japan found their rights trampled and their lives despoiled in the name of the imperial way. That way of life was the antithesis of the democratic way. Its reduction was required in order to make it possible for the people of Japan to follow the democratic way. In general the people sought a new way of life after suffering the hardships of a disastrous war and being wakened to the complete failure of those spiritual supports on which they had traditionally depended. The temper of times demanded a reduction of the power of the responsible rulers.

With enthusiasm tempered by the doubt of an age-old insulation, but spurred forward by the confidence reflected from the spirituality of General MacArthur's leadership, the people drifted into the ways of democracy. Though the establishment of representative government under the new Constitution was neither violent nor entirely voluntary, it was suited to the exigency of the times and the aspirations of the people; and no other form of government was equally suited to the emergency and the national character.

Fortunately for posterity, General MacArthur always refused to be thwarted in his great offensive for democracy by the pleas of the faint-hearted who feared to assume the risks inherent in a democracy and who portrayed the imperial way of Japanese life with its suppression of personal liberty and individual dignity, as a quasi-religious sanctuary affording ideal refuge from the agitating forces of communism.

It was crystal clear that only by a sharp swing away from the imperial way could representative government and individual dignity emerge as realities in Japan. But every step toward the democratic way was met by the walls of imperial beneficiaries that the consequences would be "chaos, anarchy, and communism." Such was the frank tenor of their argument against the elimination of thought control and the granting of basic civil liberties, against the removal and exclusion of active exponents of militaristic nationalists from public service, against the popular election of prefectural governors and assemblies and municipal mayors and councils, against the disqualification for re-election of long-entrenched city, town and village headmen, against the dissolution of compulsory neighborhood imperial cells, against the breaking of the chains of centralized police control by making local communities responsible for the exercise of their police power, against otherwise destroying rule by centralized political power that the several communities might become the foci of political expression, against the repeal of the archaic *lese majeste* provisions of the penal laws, against the puncturing of the myths and mysticism of the Imperial Household rituals, against the installation of a modern civil service system based on merit, against the revelation of corruption in high political and industrial circles, against all measures founded upon General MacArthur's faith in the truth of Lincoln's words that "the people are wiser than their rulers."

Because of such fully expected and well-publicized opposition movement, the question is often asked and has been much discussed--has the Occupation been successful in establishing representative government in Japan? There are various answers to this question, depending in large part upon the concept of the objectives of the Occupation underlying the replies.

Thoughtful Japanese agree it was necessary for the United States to wage war against Japan after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and, having won that war, to make as sure as humanly possible that it could never happen again. To accomplish this an occupation by Allied force of strategic points in Japan was determined upon as the only possible method. The specific course to be taken by the Allied Powers was to many none too clear. But the ultimate objective being to secure a "peacefully inclined and responsible government," the elimination of the existing system based upon the imperial way was unquestioned.

In the achievement of this objective the Japanese people are acquiring not merely an abstract theory of democracy but a way of life attuned to its principles.

Hence there is now developing a peculiar form of democracy adapted to a specific set of political and social institutions, a Japanese democracy which differs as much from American democracy as American democracy differs from British democracy or French democracy or the democracy of any other free nations. It gives evidence in its present embryonic state of being a dynamic democracy, the catalytic agent for which consisted of the reforms generating in General MacArthur's mind when he assumed the reins of military control.

To extinguish the imperial way without undue violence to the Japanese traditional culture has necessitated preserving some superficial defects of Japanese society which find expression in fanatical imperial devotees. This is a calculated potential threat to the development of democracy until such time as its roots become resistant to the pressure of these forces. The constitutionally

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guaranteed freedoms of speech, of the press, of teaching, of movement and of religion will meanwhile be hampered in their exercise by understandable fear of a recrudescence of those forces after the Occupation is withdrawn.

The fact that General MacArthur's reforms have been catalytic rather than cataclysmic will unquestionably help rather than hinder their permanence. Like other peoples the Japanese attach deep sentiment and hold in respect many of the customs, traditions, and institutions of the past. This characteristic inevitably creates a lag between the stated revolutionary objective and its actual achievement.

Even the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution did not result directly in the Reign of Virtue dreamed of by the Jacobins. And the disarmament and demilitarization of the Japanese military machine and war potential, the deconcentration and decentralization of Japanese political and economic power, and the defeudalization of the Japanese system of family organization, of land tenure, and of labor servitude, have not automatically resulted in the immediate establishment of a democratic society. For there is no magic whereby liberty, equality and fraternity can spring full grown even from a violent indigenous revolution, still less from the peaceful reforms of a benevolent conqueror.

Strength of Japanese Representative Government

The strength and the weakness of Japanese democracy, like the strength and the weakness of American or French or British democracy are reflections of the national character of the people. Without conceding the ultranationalistic dogma of the so-called secret, patriotic societies, one can readily admit the existence of a distinctive Japanese national character which is the product of the history, the heritage and the environment of the Japanese people.

Whether political democracy artificially engendered by the external pressures emanating from a conqueror, however benevolent, will endure after the withdrawal of those pressures will depend, in final analysis, on whether changes are taking place in the national character comparable in scope to the shift from a feudal oligarchy to representative government and, most important, the momentum of such changes. For if the momentum is great enough, the change will continue subsequent to the release of the forces of compulsion. And the momentum will determine whether the political equality guaranteed by the new Constitution of Japan carries through to an economic equality and ultimately to a social equality.

Japan is a country of industrious, energetic, homogeneous people, unimpeded by great wealth in natural resource. It is a land in which the position of women has been close to serfdom, in which individual dignity and the preservation of life has counted for little, and in which individual obligation to society has had no opportunity to mature. It is a nation with a passion for equality with other nations, ambitious for universal respect, struggling to observe the proprieties of democracy in a society of great extremes between wealth and poverty without the balance wheel of a middle class.

In some respects the new political constitution and its implementing laws may not provide a true ~~facsimile~~ ^{facsimile} of the national character which will determine democracy's durability. But the Japanese people know they have a stake in its success. They instinctively understand and cherish its immutable principles and they seek with obvious fervence to adapt those principles to Japanese society.

It is perhaps this feeling of spiritual consecration which measures the true strength of representative government in Japan.

From the realization that the rest of the world is deeply interested in the ultimate outcome of this historical reformation, those democratic forces on the march in Japan draw quiet strength. It bespeaks the failure of any counter-revolution to reestablish the oligarchy, at least in the imperial tradition. Although

the possibility of reaction is, of course, ever-present, the national pride in representative government gives assurance of permanence.

In addition, the Japanese realize that their material well-being is best served by a form of representative government, if for no other reason because it is a condition of their re-entry into the family of nations; and such motive is in turn re-enforced by the collateral feeling of achievement in their ability peacefully to overthrow oligarchic rule while tasting the bitterness of defeat and to reconstruct their national institutions on a democratic base while a betterment of individual life from the dregs of economic distress is yet but a remote possibility.

Skeptics speculate upon the re-establishment of the imperial way following withdrawal of the Occupation force upon the theory that the revolution is of external origin and therefore transient. The fallacy of this theory lies in its failure to recognize that the application of wise and far-sighted statesmanship by General MacArthur has left the people wide discretion in the reformation of their institutions. He has so timed and tempered changes as to avoid violent conflict with their legitimate longings. This methodology of General MacArthur is the true measure of the strength of his administration. For it has brought into direct alignment both these objectives and the well-being and aspirations of the Japanese people. History will thus record him as a super-salesman of the democratic concept.

Weakness of Japanese Representative Government

In the political transition from the despotism of the past to representative government the weaknesses which have become apparent are not necessarily characteristic of Japan but may be found in greater or less degree in any western democracy.

There is, however, one weakness, perhaps more aptly termed a threat, which is indigenous to Japan. And that is the peculiar political activity of the so-

called secret patriotic societies which traditionally have wielded a profound influence upon Japanese foreign as well as domestic policy. These societies originated in February 1881 at Fukuoka, with the organization of the Genyosha, or Dark Ocean Society, named after the dark waters separating Kyushu from the eastern coast of Asia. With the Genyosha as a nucleus, the better-known Black Dragon Society was formed at the turn of the century, named after the great natural border, the Amur River, to which in East Asia, the ultranationalists hoped to extend Great Japan.

Both societies sponsored intensely nationalistic doctrines and collaborated with all those who militantly aimed to secure a position of dominance for Japan on the Asiatic mainland. They aggressively supported the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and in this respect their policy paralleled that of the zaibatsu who had furnished the capital for the China Industrial Company after earlier providing the weapons of civil war.

It has, indeed, obscured and distorted political realities to assume that the zaibatsu were nothing more than gigantic industrial combinations uninvolved in political manipulation and intrigue. The grim and inescapable fact is that the zaibatsu engaged in the nefarious business of aiding these ultranationalistic societies in gearing the nation for aggressive war.

That the societies have been destroyed and their leaders purged is certain; that the power of their economic co-belligerents must be broken in the future is equally certain. For the high hopes of maintaining a durable democracy in Japan spring from the clear and unequivocal determination to curb at the threshold any tendency toward the resurrection of any terroristic societies or the abdication to any private pressure groups of the right of the people's elected representatives to decide political, economic and social policies.

In the recently enacted law to create the office of Attorney General, the Japanese Diet provided for a special examining bureau to guard against the revival

of such ultranationalistic groups, recognizing that any such revival would seriously threaten the survival of representative government. By its very nature the assigned task is exceedingly difficult for any governmental agency to perform, but the fact of its assignment reveals a vigilance to safeguard democratic liberties which is their best protection.

Within the framework of the new Constitution the basic issues in Japan today will be resolved through conflict of political parties. In this conflict as revealed during the course of the Occupation, the limiting factors slowing down the spread of the democratic ways of life have arisen more quickly and dangerously from the firmly entrenched Right than from the newly organized Left.

The political parties of the Right (the Progressive and the Liberal in the early phase of the Occupation; the Democratic-Liberal in the later phase) have frankly espoused the cause of the ruling and industrial groups and favored the concept of laissez faire and generally the status quo ante.

On the other hand, the only substantial political party of the Left (the Social Democratic Party whose members vary from slightly left to well left of center) has stood for the rights of the workers, tenant farmers, small merchants and in general, the underprivileged.

The other major political parties, the Democratic Party and the Peoples' Cooperative Party, were in 1948 amalgamations of various factions, mainly based on personal loyalties, but in general following a course of moderate democracy with an opportunistic pattern, bending like the bamboo in the breeze of domestic public opinion. The minor Communist Party has merely endeavored to shape its policy in harmony with the party line abroad.

The threat to democratic institutions from undermining efforts of the extreme Right is ever present. It is somewhat of a phenomenon that in this it finds common cause with the Communists who, masquerading under the name of democracy, also

seek a totalitarian result. Hence, it has been clear from the beginning that if democratic institutions are to survive in Japan, the forces supporting such institutions must repel those deeply entrenched in domestic tradition on the extreme Right and those spearheading foreign pressure on the extreme Left.

These forces of the extremes find a willing and powerful ally in a traditional Japanese bureaucratic clique which holds to the belief that the people are unable to judge for themselves that which is best for them. It holds to the view that it alone is capable of directing the course of political action and concludes the people's representatives, however freely elected to constitute the National Diet, are intellectually incompetent to manage the complex and delicate business of government.

This philosophy of the folly of individual freedom and the infallibility of the bureaucratic inner circle was reduced even in pre-Meiji days to a phrase, kansen mimpi, denoting "government-over-people," or "government predominant, people subservient."

This traditional bureaucratic viewpoint, shared with characteristic self-effacement by some of the people's representatives themselves when supported by forces of either or both of the two political extremes, presents, of course, the greatest danger to representative government. It has led to apathy in the legislative process, lack of understanding of the essentials of public hearings and parliamentary debates, a tendency to shift the legislative responsibility to bureaucratic "experts" and above all, to a breakdown in dynamic and vigorous leadership in all branches of government.

It is perhaps natural that in a country of insular isolation, governed by a feudalistic oligarchy, a concept such as kansen mimpi should continue to retard the development of representative government.

Like other governments the Japanese government contains conscientious career officials devoted to service in the interests of the people. These officials of permanent tenure frequently develop efficient administrative techniques, demonstrate initiative, originality and resourcefulness, and recommend progressive policies the credit for which is often snatched by politically-minded superiors. Many times such officials are invidiously termed "bureaucrats" by political leaders who would arrogate to themselves power which seeks to overawe the career administrator.

The Japanese higher bureaucracy, however, views with distrust and disdain public-spirited career officials of this type who seek to serve the people. It constitutes a clique in which personal loyalties are based on past associations, the "old school tie," and a definite belief in the superiority of the elite. In fact, eighty-five percent of the executive officials in the bureaucracy were in 1948 graduates of the Law Department of Tokyo Imperial University which maintained a monopoly on all higher positions in the public service. Apart from this exclusive alumni prerequisite, seniority instead of merit has been the test of advancement; and the maintenance of the institutional pattern of bureaucratic control, instead of accommodation to the principle that the public official is the servant of the people, has been the end to be achieved. These higher bureaucrats, because of their entrenched political position, generally favor the reactionary Right and are inclined to reject republican ideals as inconsistent with the national character.

There have, however, already been indications of a growing legislative resistance against this bureaucratic assumption of power and the National Diet increasingly is asserting its own constitutional prerogatives and responsibility in the affairs of government. Healthy signs appear in the Diet's refusal to permit

legislation by Cabinet order in lieu of its own enactments.

Just as the Japanese people will not be well served as long as the National Diet permits rule by the higher bureaucracy, so they will not be well led as long as political corruption is condoned. That Japan has no monopoly on corruption among the nations of the world is self-evident. That corruption can exist in a democracy as in a dictatorship cannot be gainsaid. The evil in, but not peculiar to, Japan has been the acceptance of political corruption without any active endeavor to extinguish it or even to punish the perpetrators.

The low standard of political morality may be ascribed to various causes. Superficially it may seem to spring from lack of interest by the people in public affairs, a low level of public salary schedules, or the complacent acceptance by otherwise ethical elements of the community of official corruption because of its traditional place in public life.

Public office as a public trust is a novel notion not yet fully accepted as an essential element in democracy; politicians and industrialists alike treat government as a means of private gain. The axiom of the Tokugawa Shoguns that "punishment shall not be administered to the gentleman, nor courtesy to the commoner," has not been wholly repudiated.

There perhaps lies the key to corruption of contemporary Japan. It is not so much that political corruption exists as that it has a feudal genesis. It is not so much a seamy side of Japanese democracy as the persistence of a feudal influence hampering the growth of representative government. It is another hang-over of the Meiji era, rooted like the bureaucracy in the rule of men rather than the rule of law.

There was no rule of law to be invoked against misfeasance or malfeasance in office. There were no criminal penalties and no political considerations to induce compliance with any code of ethics, except a moral compulsion to share the load

with those in the pyramid of power to whom loyalty was owed or from whom it was demanded.

This primary obligation of loyalty to one's leader and to one's followers superseded considerations of the public interest and persists, particularly in local areas of Japanese politics, today.

Punitive measures recently taken by procurators and the pitiless exposures recently made by National Diet committees appear to be making the elimination of this feudalistic corruption a matter of time and a problem of ethics. It is in itself no more a threat to Japanese representative government than any other residual feudal custom.

In form feudalistic corruption may differ little from political corruption, but its essence requires inculcating an indignation in the minds of the people which will be aroused by the spotlight of publicity on political brigandage.

Once the people come to the view that the moral precepts of honest government are an attribute of democracy and afford an important guarantee of individual protection, that view will become an integral part of the national character.

The ultimate form of the national character will, of course, depend upon the character of the people but more immediately upon the character of the leaders of the people. Just as in the past the bureaucracy failed to serve the people well, so their leaders failed to govern well.

The most hopeful sign of developing strength in future leadership is the unmeasured criticism of prevailing political conditions and the organized, methodical action to unmask and punish corrupt political and business leaders. This movement originating with exposures in the Japanese press and nurtured characteristically by General MacArthur has already educated many in the workings of the democratic process. More than all else it is giving emphasis

to the constitutional mandate establishing the equality of all men under the law.

On Balance

Perhaps it may soon be said of Japanese democracy, as Bryce said of American democracy, that the reason it is not better is because it is so good. It remains to be seen, however, whether leaders will arise who will succeed in fostering the sense of social conscience and public responsibility without which a democratic republic cannot be realized. Perhaps the new dignity of the individual, notwithstanding the searing social inequalities of caste and class and the challenge of his present poverty will produce in response such a new and better leadership.

In any event, it is safe to predict that Japanese institutions have changed irrevocably from the past. The toughness of new laws, new customs, new institutions has yet to be demonstrated; but that by and large the Japanese people are behaving differently, that their habits and attitudes have undergone remarkable transformation, and that their eagerness to experiment with new institutions is evident, will not be disputed even by the most hostile critics. The past has not been too powerful to be pruned from the present.

Whether the inevitable counter-revolution, signals of which have already appeared, in the so-called "flux of political parties", will gain ground depends, internally, upon the depth of faith in the freedom which the Japanese people have tasted for the first time and their willingness to fight the forces of reaction for the preservation of that freedom and, externally, upon the good faith of the nations whose statesmen promised in the Atlantic Charter, to "afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries", to secure to all states "access, on equal terms, to the trade and

raw materials of the world", to "bring about the fullest collaboration of all nations in the economic field", and to "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want".

Representative government in Japan is confronted with the same problems which for eighty years baffled its imperial government. The problems are no less difficult to solve than before and not much different in nature.

Inside Japan the old problems of maximum production, of more equitable distribution of wealth, and of density of population, require stupendous effort to solve. Outside Japan the old problems of promoting international trade, of providing procedures for the orderly settlement of international disputes, and of preventing war, challenge the genius of statesmen everywhere.

Japan's right to live under a government of its own choosing will continue to be exercised in favor of representative government only if the peace settlement does not create a sense of oppression, inferiority, and hopelessness within the collective Japanese mind.

The problems inside Japan and outside Japan are, therefore, intimately related and no appraisal can be made of the permanence of representative government within Japan without taking both sets of problems into account.

Japan has not been freed from political conflict, from economic desolation, or from social unrest solely by promulgating the new Constitution, by creating representative government, or by pursuing the ways of democracy.

The chaos and confusion which might well have followed Japan's collapse have been cushioned, principally by a benevolent occupation and American material assistance.

But when the period of military occupation has ended the new and better political and social structure in Japan can be maintained only if some adjust-

ment, if not solution, is devised for its pressing internal and external problems.

Political democracy in Japan depends very much upon whether the zaibatsu and other entrenched economic and financial power is dispersed or unwisely permitted to survive. For without economic democracy, political democracy cannot exist.

Post-war democracy in Japan in which the industrial, financial and political groups thought Katayama's innocuous departures from complete laissez faire doctrine a greater danger than private monopoly, would surely have been a feeble, if not corrupt, movement without General MacArthur's inspiration, encouragement and constant leadership.

If there is to be a democratic Japan, less feeble than now and more inclined to cherish the new institutions which emerged from its bloodless revolution, it is certain that the national economic order must be integrated with an international economic order affording its eighty million inhabitants an adequate standard of living, despite its inevitable food deficit. Such an economic order must also provide the access to the raw materials Japan needs and both the Atlantic Charter and the Potsdam Declaration pledge. Otherwise free private enterprise and political democracy cannot survive.

For want of raw materials and markets, business would stagnate. The new owner-cultivators would find their two and a half acre freeholds facing poverty or perhaps foreclosure with no available remedy. Industrial workers would face a future with long periods of unemployment and no hope of social security. Free trade unionism, discredited by communist leadership, would be easy prey for revived suppression.

And accompanying such an economic collapse would be a loss of faith in the ways of democracy in general and in the slow, cumbersome, parliamentary procedures of representative government in particular.

In such an hour of disillusionment a demagogic leadership would arise with eloquence and force to strike the chord of tradition, by appealing to the national sentiment for the restoration of the old despotic order.

This is the problem of the future of representative government in Japan. The obviousness of the challenge calls for (1) a cooperative international attitude with a view to an equitable economic and social, as well as political settlement, (2) an avoidance of sweeping scepticism of Japanese sincerity and reformation, rooted in emotional hostility engendered by war, and (3) a recognition that the present imperfect democratic system rendered workable by adherence to certain cherished traditions and ceremonies is preferable to a perfect democratic symmetry which would fail to work because not synchronized with such national habits of political utility.

Thus, three years after the surrender Japan has erected a system of government with the consent of the governed and in which the governed are fully represented; and a system of society in which personal freedom, individual dignity and equality of opportunity are acknowledged. Once ownership of the means of production has been widely distributed, once the responsibilities of power and property have been thoroughly enforced, once the principles of the rights and the obligations of citizenship are taken for granted, representative democracy will have become deeply imbedded in Japanese life.