



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331107

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

7 November 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-001104DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mohamed Rahim
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Mohamed Rahim, Abdul Rahim, Mohammed Iasac
- Place of Birth: Saparikhel, Jaghatu District, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan (AF)
- Date of Birth: 1958
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-001104DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is on a list of high-risk detainees from a health perspective but is in overall good health. He has no current significant medical problems.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for CD on 20 July 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been mostly compliant with guard force personnel and has shown no outward signs of recidivist inclinations. Detainee*

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20331107

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has, however, employed known counter-interrogation techniques, provided conflicting information and withheld information of intelligence value throughout his detention, indicating his continuing support for extremism. Detainee was Deputy Director of Logistics in the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence, and was closely connected to other senior intelligence officials and senior leaders from the Defense and Interior ministries.¹ After the fall of the Taliban government, detainee commanded a Taliban militia unit, controlled large weapons caches, and facilitated the exchange of large sums of money. Detainee was an associate of senior Taliban and al-Qaida commanders and was involved in anti-coalition militia (ACM) activities aimed at destabilizing the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and defeating US and Coalition forces. Detainee is a veteran fighter with experience spanning two decades. Despite his high placement within the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence and significant connections to Taliban militia commanders still active in Afghanistan, detainee remains largely unexploited. Detainee has employed counter-interrogation techniques throughout his detention. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Documentary evidence showing detainee's role in the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee claimed he traveled outside of Afghanistan once, when he left for Pakistan (PK) during the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation. Detainee traveled to Pakistan at this time to have surgery on his eyes and spent eight days in a hospital. Detainee denied he ever trained to be a soldier, claiming instead to have the background of a farmer who was conscripted into a mujahideen militia.²

¹ Analyst Note: The Taliban Ministry of Intelligence is also known as Estekhbarat. Variants include Estakhbarat and Istakhbarat.

² 001104 HANDNOTE 12-AUG-2003, IIR 4 201 0009 05

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b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee claimed the mujahideen conscripted him into their forces and he served under Gul Mohammad from 1985 through 1989.³ Detainee also stated the Taliban similarly conscripted him in 1998 or 1999.⁴

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee worked in the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence office in Kabul, AF, as the Chief of Logistics for over two years.⁵ Detainee supervised approximately seven men and reported directly to Mohammed Ibrahim, who in turn, reported to Abdul Haq Waziq, ISN US9AF-000004DP (AF-004), First Deputy Chief in the Ministry of Intelligence, and Modir Ghulam Hasan, Chief of Staff.⁶ Detainee described his employer as a “cooperative company” owned by the Taliban government and closely associated with the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence. However, detainee denied that he ever worked for any aspect of Taliban intelligence.⁷ Detainee claimed he only kept financial records of expenditures made by the “cooperative.”⁸ Detainee claimed never to have carried a weapon during the course of his normal duties and stated that the only time he fired a weapon was during ceremonial events, never in combat.⁹

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) On 18 July 2003, US forces and members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) captured detainee in a raid on his house in Saporikhel, Ghazni Province.¹⁰ The raid was prompted by reports that identified detainee as a Taliban member who controlled several arms caches.¹¹ Numerous Taliban documents were recovered from detainee’s house, along

³ IIR 6 034 0464 04, Analyst Note: Gul Muhammad is assessed to be ISN US9AF-001443DP (AF-1443), a member of the Anti-Coalition Militia and an Afghan *mujahideen* leader during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (see IIR 4 201 0010 05 and IIR 6 034 0468 04). AF-1443 is detained in US custody in the Bagram Detention Facility.

⁴ 001104 HANDNOTE 12-AUG-2003, IIR 6 034 0464 04

⁵ 001104 FM40 25-NOV-2003, IIR 4 201 0010 05, Analyst Note: Detainee commented that his salary ranged was between 100,000 and 110,000 Afghani (AFG) (approximately \$2,300-\$2,500 US). He also received another 700,000 AFG (\$16,359 US) for his expenses. Detainee separately claimed to have received between 100,000 and 200,000 AFG (\$2,300-\$4,700 US) per month (see 001104 FM40 25-NOV-2003).

⁶ Analyst Note: A variant of Ibrahim is Abraham. Ghulam Hasan is reportedly from Khogyani village, was the director of Intelligence Logistics, and then became a member of the Taliban Council in Ghazni (see IIR 7 399 0116 04).

⁷ 001104 HANDNOTE 12-AUG-2003, IIR 6 034 0256 04, IIR 6 034 0339 04

⁸ 001104 HANDNOTE 06-SEP-2003, Analyst Note: The “cooperative” is detainee’s description of the section of the Taliban Intelligence organization in which he worked.

⁹ 0001104 FM40 25-NOV-2003

¹⁰ Analyst Note: Variants of Saporikhel include Saporikhil, Sapakheil, Safari Khil, and Zafar Kheil.

¹¹ 001104 PUC Determination 21-JUL-2003, 001104 HANDNOTE 25-JUL-2003, IIR 4 201 0009 05, IIR 6 044 2421 03

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with an AK-47 assault rifle. Detainee was held at the Gardez Fire Base for two days and then was transferred to Bagram Airfield.¹²

b. (S) Property Held:

- Money
 - 15 Afghani (AFG)¹³
 - 10 Pakistani rupees (PKR)¹⁴
- 1 wrist watch

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 21 November 2003

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Mullah Omar
- Usama Bin Laden (UBL)
- Hawalas and their operation

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has been generally deceptive, and his account omits important relationships, activities, and events. Detainee has downplayed his role in the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence, his association with other senior Taliban and al-Qaida figures, and his ACM activities. Detainee is evasive and has actively sought to limit his intelligence disclosures through the use of known counter-interrogation techniques. These techniques include varying his statements regarding his activities and associates, and complaining about medical issues such as headaches and memory problems. He also states that he will not answer questions previously discussed, a technique used to prevent the discovery of previous false statements for which the individual cannot recall the details and does not believe he can repeat.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

¹² 001104 PUC Determination 21-JUL-2003, 001104 HANDNOTE 25-JUL-2003, IIR 6 044 2421 03, Analyst Note: The referenced Taliban documents are not held at JTF-GTMO.

¹³ Analyst Note: Equivalent to less than \$1 US.

¹⁴ Analyst Note: Equivalent to less than \$1 US.

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b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been mostly compliant with guard force personnel and has shown no outward signs of recidivist inclinations. Detainee has, however, employed known counter-interrogation techniques, provided conflicting information and withheld information of intelligence value throughout his detention, indicating his continuing support for extremism. Detainee was Deputy Director of Logistics in the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence. Detainee is assessed to have managed Taliban financial accounts and authorized large transfers of money to fund Taliban operations and to buy communications equipment, and possibly to fund intelligence operatives both in Afghanistan and abroad. After the fall of the Taliban government, detainee commanded a Taliban militia unit, controlled large weapons caches, and facilitated the exchange of large sums of money. Detainee was an associate of senior Taliban and al-Qaida commanders and was involved in militia activities aimed at destabilizing the ATA and defeating US and Coalition forces. Detainee is a veteran fighter with experience spanning two decades, was a close associate of senior Taliban intelligence officers, and would likely rejoin the Taliban as a militia commander if released.*

- (S//NF) Detainee was the former Deputy Director of Logistics in the Ministry of Intelligence before the fall of the Taliban regime. Detainee is assessed to have been responsible for distributing funds to buy communications equipment, and possibly to fund intelligence operatives both in Afghanistan and abroad.
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he was Chief of Logistics in the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence. He reported directly to Mohammed Ibrahim, who in turn reported to the Chief of Intelligence, Abdul Haq Wasiq, ISN US9AF-000004DP (AF-004), and Taliban Intelligence official Ghulam Hasan.¹⁵
 - (S//NF) AF-004 corroborated detainee's placement within the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence. AF-004 identified detainee as Abdul Rahim, who worked in an office in his building and was responsible for deducting a percentage of money from each person's paycheck to pay for groceries.¹⁶
 - (S//NF) Mohammed Zahir, ISN US9AF-001103DP (AF-1103), reported that detainee was the Deputy Director of Logistics in the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence. AF-1103 also reported seeing detainee meet with AF-004 at the Ministry of Intelligence headquarters in Kabul. AF-1103 was a senior-level investigator in the

¹⁵ 001104 HANDNOTE 12-AUG-2003, IIR 6 034 0256 04, IIR 6 034 0339 04, IIR 6 034 0468 04

¹⁶ 000004 SIR 21-SEP-2003

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- Ministry of Intelligence who claims he worked closely with detainee and knew him from childhood.¹⁷
- (S//NF) Abdul Zahir, ISN US9AF-000753DP (AF-753), who attended at least one ACM planning meeting with detainee after the fall of the Taliban, corroborated detainee's former occupation as a logistics specialist. AF-753 noted that detainee had been assigned to the Taliban Logistics Administration.¹⁸
 - (S//NF) A reliable Afghan official reported that detainee was a former Taliban intelligence officer from Sapparikhel Village, Ghazni Province.¹⁹
 - (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have managed Taliban financial accounts and authorized large transfers of money to buy communications equipment, and possibly to fund intelligence operatives both in Afghanistan and abroad.
 - (S//NF) US forces discovered documents at detainee's compound including Taliban financial records dated 1998 to 2001. The records indicated large payments made from the Taliban Intelligence Ministry to members of a group called the Afghan Islamic Movement (AIM).²⁰ (Analyst Note: AIM and the Taliban are synonymous.) Detainee claimed he retained the documents to prove to the Afghan government, if necessary, that he worked for the Taliban.²¹
 - (S//NF) Detainee signed for a payment of 5,000,000 AFG from a Ministry of Intelligence account to a petitioner. Gholam Jalani signed a note saying he received the money from Abdul Rahim.²² (Analyst Note: AF-004, detainee's superior in the Intelligence Ministry, identified detainee by the name Abdul Rahim. The fact that detainee himself acknowledged having the receipts to prove his Taliban employment suggests that detainee is the disbursing officer of the funds.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee signed for a payment of 30,000,000 AFG to a petitioner. Mohammad Fazel signed a note saying he received the money from Abdul Rahim.²³ (Analyst Note: This is possibly a reference to Mullah Mohammad Fazl, ISN US9AF-000007 (AF-007), who was formerly the Chief of Staff of the Taliban Army and Taliban Deputy Defense Minister.)

¹⁷ 001103 HANDNOTE 11-SEP-2003, 001103 SIR 11-NOV-05, 001103 HANDNOTE 09-AUG-2003, 001103 SIR 04-NOV-05

¹⁸ IIR 6 034 0274 03, Analyst Note: In this report, source referred to detainee as Mullah Mohammed Abraham, a variant of detainee's name.

¹⁹ IIR 6 044 1360 03

²⁰ IIR 6 044 2421 03, 001104 PUC Determination 21-JUL-2003, 001104 HANDNOTE 06-SEP-2003

²¹ 001104 HANDNOTE 25-JUL-2003

²² AFGP-2005-0001071, Analyst Note: The receipt was not dated. Although the US dollar equivalent for this amount would depend on the date of the transaction, 5,000,000 AFG was approximately equivalent to \$1,070 US.

²³ AFGP-2005-0001069, Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to US \$6,400 US.

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- (S//NF) Detainee signed for a payment of 40,000,000 AFG to a petitioner. An unidentified individual signed the back of the note saying he received 20,000,000 AFG from Abdul Rahim.²⁴
- (S//NF) Taliban documents seized also revealed detainee was responsible for distributing funds to buy communications equipment and to fund intelligence operatives and operations both in Afghanistan and abroad. There are a number of entries showing detainee in charge of distribution of funds for “operations” or “special operative work” or “operative missions”. One entry was a request for funds to pay an unidentified radio control branch in Peshawar, PK to “intercept enemy communications”. The issuing of these funds was fulfilled by detainee by the direction of AF-004.²⁵ (Analyst Note: It is assessed detainee had a greater level of responsibility within the Intelligence Ministry than merely collecting money for meals. It is assessed both detainee and AF-004 are attempting to downplay detainee’s level of responsibility within the Intelligence Ministry.)
- (S//NF) After the fall of the Taliban government, detainee became the commander of a Taliban militia unit that was preparing to conduct attacks against US and Coalition forces and the ATA. Detainee was a close associate of senior Taliban and al-Qaida commanders.
 - (S//NF) As of May 2002, detainee was reported to be a sub-commander in a newly formed Taliban militia unit operating in eastern Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) AF-753 reported that detainee attended a meeting in late May 2002 with Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), a senior al-Qaida military commander; and Qari Abdul Raouf, aka (Hajji Jamshid), commander of the new unit and former Taliban Governor of Paktia Province. The purpose of the meeting was to obtain funding from al-Qaida (through IZ-10026) for the new unit to finance attacks against US and Coalition forces.²⁶
 - (S//NF) Other attendees included Mohammed Agha, aka (Saif al-Rahman Mansour), aka (Engineer Mansour); Abdul Malik, aka (Sargul); Abdul Kahar; and Mohammed Daoud. These attendees are all former Taliban intelligence officers and military commanders described by AF-753 as the leaders of the new militia unit. These individuals were reportedly close associates of detainee. (Analyst Note: AF-753 was an aide to IZ-10026, who attended the meeting.)²⁷

²⁴ AFGP-2005-0001051, Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to US \$8,500 US.

²⁵ > 001104 PERSDOC GUAN-2006-P01895 21-JUL-2003, 001104 PERSDOC GUAN-2006-P01891 21-JUL-2003

²⁶ IIR 6 034 0120 04, IIR 6 034 0032 03, IIR 7 399 0116 04; IIR 6 044 1713 03, Analyst Note: Variants of Raouf include Rahoof and Rauf. IZ-10026 had primary operational command of the Usama Bin Laden’s (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade, serving as UBL’s military commander in the field.

²⁷ IIR 6 034 0120 04, IIR 6 034 0032 03, IIR 7 399 0116 04, IIR 6 034 0232 03, TD-314/27594-03, Analyst Note: A variant of Daoud is Dawood.

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- (S//NF) According to sensitive reporting, detainee was one of 29 individuals who attempted to organize an opposition group against the ATA in early September 2002. These individuals were former Taliban leaders in and around the city of Ghazni, AF. This group stored weapons, put up flyers at night, and spoke in Ghazni mosques to turn the local populace against US and Coalition forces and the ATA.²⁸
- (S//NF) Near the end of February 2003, detainee was appointed commander of one of three new Taliban militia groups formed at a meeting of Taliban commanders held at a temporary camp site in Zabul Province, AF. The meeting was part of a larger effort to establish a clear command and control structure, as well as to re-establish unity of command among the scattered remnants of the Taliban army to continue the campaign against US and Coalition forces and the ATA. During this meeting, Taliban leaders based in Quetta, PK, gave detainee several satellite phones. Detainee's group had an unknown number of rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47 assault rifles. Detainee was assigned command of 13 Taliban militia fighters.²⁹ (Analyst Note: Satellite phones were the preferred means of communication by Taliban and other ACM leaders due to the security and signal range they provided over standard cell phones.)
- (S//NF) Another meeting of the Taliban militia leaders was planned to take place on or about 16 March 2003. They planned to form more groups, assign commanders, and issue each group their objectives.³⁰ (Analyst Note: No reporting about this meeting is available, but if it was held as planned, detainee likely attended. It is possible the 16 March 2003 meeting was disrupted by a March 2003 US and ANA offensive in central Afghanistan.)
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have controlled multiple large weapons caches used to support attacks against US and Coalition forces.
 - (S//NF) As of November 2002, detainee was responsible for a large, active weapons cache in Shela Habib, Spin Boldak District, Kandahar Province, AF.³¹
 - (S//NF) On 18 July 2003, detainee was identified as controlling another large cache of weapons in a school near Saparikhel Village, Ghazni Province. The cache contained 68x 122mm rockets, 1218x 76mm AT and HE rounds, 54x 122mm artillery rounds, 82x 76mm MNTN gun rounds, 44x 100mm tank rounds, 9x SPG-9 73mm artillery rounds, 17x 60mm mortar rounds, and 35x 140mm rockets.³²
 - (S//NF) The Saparikhel cache was probably used to support specific attacks carried out by Taliban militia forces in Zabul Province in mid-2003, and was

²⁸ TD-314/36964-02 (detainee is identified in item C)

²⁹ IIR 6 044 1360 03

³⁰ IIR 6 044 1360 03

³¹ IIR 6 044 1360 03

³² 001104 PUC Determination 21-JUL-2003

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possibly the same cache that was identified by an Afghan source as one of AF-1443's caches in the Ghazni area of Afghanistan.³³

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have been issued a weapon and ammunition by a Taliban or al-Qaida supplier. On 15 June 2004, US forces obtained a weapon inventory list in Ghazni. The list contained the names of suspected ACM fighters, their fathers' names, residences, types of weapons, and serial numbers. Detainee's name appeared on the list twice.³⁴
 - (S//NF) Detainee was listed as Mullah Muhammad Rahim, number 74, father's name Raz Muhammad, from Safari Khayl. He was issued one AK-47 assault rifle, serial number 975678.³⁵ (Analyst Note: Safari Khayl is a variant of detainee's home town of Saporikhel. Detainee reported that he was given the title of Mullah while in the Taliban.³⁶)
 - (S//NF) Detainee is also listed as number 75 on the list. He was issued a small 2-way radio, serial number 54989.³⁷
- (S//NF) As of June 2007, Mullah Karim, identified as detainee's brother, was reported to be part of a Taliban intelligence cell operating in the city of Ghazni, Ghazni Province. Karim and the other members of the cell report to Hajji Ghafar on convoy movements, on individuals cooperating with Coalition forces, and other information of interest.³⁸
- (S//NF) Detainee is referred to as "Mullah," "Mawlawi," and "Akhund" in reporting and captured documents. These are religious titles or honorifics, and indicate detainee may have a higher level of education than to which he has admitted.³⁹

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 17 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 14 May 2008, when he resisted a search. He has one report of disciplinary infraction for assault occurring on 3 October 2007, when he threw his water bottle at guard. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of five reports of disciplinary infraction and four so far in 2008.

³³ IIR 6 044 2651 03

³⁴ IIR 7 901 9913 05

³⁵ IIR 7 901 9913 05

³⁶ 001104 HANDNOTE 17-SEP-2003

³⁷ IIR 7 901 9913 05

³⁸ >IIR 6 044 4385 07

³⁹ >AFGP-2005-0001051, 001104 PERSDOC GUAN-2006-P01891 21-JUL-2003

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8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 5 November 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was highly placed within the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence and was well connected within the Taliban Ministry of Interior and Taliban Ministry of Defense senior leadership circles. Detainee had first-hand access to Ministry of Intelligence financial records and possibly also access to the financial matters of Taliban militia organizations after the fall of the regime. Detainee met with IZ-10026 on at least one occasion to obtain al-Qaida support for his Taliban militia unit. Detainee had regular access to Taliban militia members and commanders after the fall of the Taliban, including numerous ACM figures still at large.⁴⁰ Detainee was responsible for multiple large weapons caches used to support ACM operations in eastern Afghanistan. Detainee had numerous close associates in the Taliban leadership of Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, and Zabul Provinces. Detainee's former associates include other detainees held in custody at JTF-GTMO and in Afghanistan.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is assessed to have significant intelligence value. He remains largely unexploited due in part to his successful and persistent use of counter-interrogation techniques. Detainee should be able to provide non-perishable information about Taliban and al-Qaida personnel, specifically key ACM commanders and operatives since the fall of the Taliban government. Detainee can provide information about former senior leaders of the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defense, including those in US custody at JTF-GTMO and those still at large in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Detainee can provide information about the transfer of funds within the Taliban, possibly to include sources, distribution, and use. Considering detainee's access to Ministry of Intelligence financial information, he is in a unique position to report about former Taliban personnel. Detainee can probably provide information regarding insurgent groups in Ghazni, AF, and the surrounding provinces, and their associations with similar groups elsewhere, to include command and control. He should also be able to provide information about weapons procurement, planned use, and possibly undiscovered caches.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Insurgent groups in Afghanistan
 - Planning and operations

⁴⁰ TD-314/27594-03, IIR 6 034 0120 04, IIR 6 034 0032 03, IIR 7 399 0116 04, IIR 6 034 0232 03, IIR 6 044 1713 03

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- Personnel and leadership
- Command and control
- Financing
- Weapons procurement, transfer, and storage
- Taliban Intelligence
 - Financing
 - Operations
 - Personnel, including other detainees
 - Associations with al-Qaida and other extremist elements
- Ethno-linguistic groups in Afghanistan
- Terrorist biographical and psychological information
- Terrorist operations in CENTCOM AOR
- Means of communication used by extremists in Afghanistan

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 3 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.

JTF-GTMO Assessment Afghanistan/Pakistan Detainee's

29 March 2004

ISN: US9AF-001104DP

Health Assessment: ISN 1104 has a history of latent tuberculosis, low back pain, and reflux. Otherwise, he is currently in good health.

Background and Capture Data: The detainee worked for the Ministry of Intelligence in Kabul, AF, during the Taliban regime. Detainee and ISN US9AF001103DP have been reported as major facilitators for Al-Qaida and the Taliban in the area Ghazni, AF. During the arrest of detainee, a search of -47, Taliban related documents and what has been reported as financial records dated 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 indicating large money that were found contained detailed account of all outgoing payments. The loose documents were statements of workers that needed to be paid, and receipts for purchases of items for the cooperative. Detainees stated that the Taliban was very particular of their accounts and that once a month someone would come from either the department of logistics or finance and check the ledgers and compare them to the receipts paid out. Detainee still maintains that he only kept these documents to show the Karzai government what his position was and where all the money went within the Taliban. The detainee was also controlling a large cache located in a nearby school which contained 68x 122mm rockets, 1218x 76mm AT and HE rounds, 54x 122mm artillery rounds, 82x 76mm MNTN gun rounds, 44x 100mm tank rounds, 9x SPG9 rounds, 17x 60mm mortar rounds, 35x 140mm rockets. Detainee claims that he had worked for the Taliban, by force, for 2 yrs in the Ministry of Intelligence under the Cooperative as the Chief of that Department. The company was owned by the Taliban government and was closely associated with Taliban intelligence. The company provided logistical support directly to the Taliban government. Detainee had approximately 7 men working under him. Detainee reported directly to Mohammed Ibrahim, who is reported to be Abdul Haq Wasiq (Deputy Chief of Intelligence, Ministry of Intelligence) and Ghulam Hasan (Director of Intelligence). Detainee was the primary target on a recent mission to Ghazi, AF; US9AF-001103DP being the secondary target. US and coalition forces captured detainee at his home early in the morning. 25

Detainee stated that his name was Mohammed Ashaq and that his brother was the one that the US was looking for. Detainee later confessed that he was in fact Mohammed Rahim.

Date of Capture: 21 July 2003

Risk Level: High

Risk Assessment: It is assessed that the detainee is a key member of the Taliban and has directly supported terrorist related activities, may have links to senior level Taliban, Al-Qaida and extremist personalities and maintains the capabilities to continue to support terrorism.

Intelligence Value: High

Exploitation Requirements: Detainee is assessed to be of high intelligence value due to his position in the Taliban government, his contacts with high-level Taliban

CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources

REASON: E.O. 12958 Section 1.5(C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 20290403