

EXHIBIT No. 3143

(53)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent ; -- SAITO, Yoshie

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, Yoshie Saito, under oath testify the following facts:

I was born in 1880, and live in Shoto, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo-to. After graduating from the Tokyo Imperial University, I entered the Foreign Office, was stationed as diplomatic and consular attache in Peking and Tientsin, China, became Secretary of Embassy in Washington under Ambassador Shidehara, became Director of the Bureau of Commercial Affairs of the Foreign Office; after resigning in 1926, I became a Director of the South Manchurian Railway Co., Ltd., in July 1940, upon formation of the Koneye cabinet, at the request of Foreign Minister Matsuoka I became adviser to the Foreign Office and held that position until I resigned in July 1941.

1. I was on intimate terms with Mr. Matsuoka for 30 years; at

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the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy, as advisor to the Foreign Office I stayed day and night at the private residence of Foreign Minister Matsuoka where the negotiations were taking place, and throughout the entire period I was responsible for the technical side of the negotiations concerning this pact. Due to this, I am comparatively accurately informed regarding the ideals, and motives on the Japanese side which led to the conclusion of the pact, and the circumstances concerning the conclusion of the pact.

2. Before entering into details I would like to testify as to Mr. Matsuoka's general idea concerning the method to bring about peace throughout the entire world. Mr. Matsuoka was of the opinion that it was impossible to establish world peace through the power of the League of Nations, and he considered a separate formula was necessary; this he often spoke of before he became Foreign Minister. When Mr. Matsuoka was President of the South Manchurian Railway Co., and when I was advisor to the S M R, I once called on him at his villa at Gotemba concerning company business, he spoke as follows after finishing the company business:

"The world is too large. Races, national sentiments and policies are different, and the past ideas of establishing world peace through a centralized and unique organ is a mistake when dealing with such a world. For this, I can think of no better method than that friendly neighbouring countries with mutual interests should form a union, then a larger union should be formed among these unions, and among these larger unions peaceful relations

should be established, and finally this should be spread through the world. Should I become Foreign Minister, I intend to realize this idea. However, this will not be easy, and sufficient study must be made of the problems. I would like you to think about it."

When I met him again at Gotenba, in the spring of 1937, as I recall Mr. Matsuoka said:

"Well, have you studied my idea? A union including Japan, Manchuria and China and their neighbouring countries must be formed. However, unfortunately, this cannot be hoped for considering the present situation of long-standing disputes between Japan and China. So, I, as President of the SMR and as a man with many Chinese friends, am in a good position to take steps to further Sino-Japanese peace as a private individual, and I should like to go to China some day soon and see what can be done. Therefore, I wish to request you to go to China, and make thorough observations on the situation."

I had been studying Chinese affairs for many years, and since I considered this my life-work, I went to China in accordance with Mr. Matsuoka's suggestion with great pleasure.

The reason why Mr. Matsuoka said that Japan should form a union with the East Asiatic countries was according to what he often told me, because he thought that these countries are neighbours with similar races, and both from historic and realistic view-point, are as closely related as cogs in a machine.

therefore these countries could comparatively easily construct a new order on the basis of mutual interests. Then the reason for his urgent desire to solve Sino-Japanese conflicts was not only in order to realize Sino-Japanese economic collaboration, but also because he considered it was absolutely necessary for the construction of an East Asiatic new order as one stage toward world peace.

3. After Mr. Matsuoka resigned his post as President of the S M R, in March 1939, for a time he lived a 'leisure' life, and during this period he spoke to me from time to time of his opinion concerning inter-states unions as a method of establishing world peace. In July 1940 when he became Foreign Minister he made me an advisor to the Foreign Office, and he gave much thought to the method to be taken to establish world peace. Mr. Matsuoka decided to conclude the Tripartite Pact in August 1940 when he received a telegram from Ambassador Kurusu saying that Mr. Stahmer had left Germany for Japan. His motives were:

- (1) to realize his above-mentioned concerning the establishment of world peace,
- (2) to solve the China Incident.
- (3) current Japanese-American relations were in such a bad condition that they could not be improved by ordinary diplomatic methods due to the extremely strong American attitude, and no other method could be found.

These were the 3 circumstances behind his decision, and this I

was told by Mr. Matsuoka two or three days after the negotiations were begun concerning the conclusion of the pact.

4. First, on the content of Mr. Matsuoka's idea for establishing world peace, I have already given a rough idea. Mr. Matsuoka considered, according to what he told me that it was necessary first of all to construct an inter-states union in the East based on the mutual interests of the various countries. The area to be covered by this inter-state union was to be decided in accordance with the attitude taken by the countries concerned, and Mr. Matsuoka's ideal was that Japan, Manchuria and China should form the core, and that it should include the whole of East Asia. Moreover, if interests identical to the mutual interests of East Asia, forming the basis of this inter-state union, should exist in other parts, these countries should of course join the union-- this was Mr. Matsuoka's opinion. The meanings of mutual interests are too broad to be defined in one word; but, for example, one of the ideas was economic co-existence and co-prosperity. Mr. Matsuoka thought that all the treasure lands of the East Asiatic countries were either the colonies of the European and American Powers or else were of a semi-colonial nature, and in cases where the territorial or colonial policies of the European and American Powers did not necessarily coincide with the interests of the East Asiatic countries themselves, then it was to the mutual interest of East Asiatic countries that these policies should be appropriately modified. In other words, Mr. Matsuoka thought

that amendment of the policies of these European and American countries to a certain extent had to be asked if the new order in East Asia should really be established. However, Mr. Matsuoka never told me that it was inevitable that the European and American Powers would have to be excluded in order to construct the East Asiatic new order. Surely, the European and American Powers with territory in Asia would not utterly oppose some changes in their policies if this was to the benefit of the inhabitants of the territory and also to the benefit of world peace, Mr. Matsuoka's thought was that, even if these changes could not take place rapidly, it was not impossible to make gradual changes after due discussions. At the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Matsuoka did not have the intention of using force in order to improve this situation. He was not so vain as to suppose that Japan had so much actual strength.

The first time this idea of an East Asiatic new order was announced to the public was in the preamble to the Tripartite Pact. In it it reads:

"The Government of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and to co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe wherever it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to

promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the people concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Government to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized"

This English text was written and proposed personally by Mr. Matsuoka, and German side did only accept it.

As such was what happened, leaving aside the question of how Germany and Italy regarded the Tripartite Pact. Japan was firmly convinced that it was one way to establish world peace. The so-called "new order in East Asia" referred to in this pact indicated the situation which would be brought about once the peaceful region in East Asia was established.

5. The second Japanese motive for concluding the Tripartite Pact was the Chinese question. To say the truth, Japan was greatly troubled by the Chinese question. At that time, Japan was worried over her extraordinary increase in population, and there was no solution except the encouragement of industry. Therefore, Japan thought that on Sino-Japanese economic collaboration depended the very existence of the nation. However, due to the irresponsible anti-Japanese movement in China, many difficulties were created to prevent its realization, in addition to the Japanese vested interests were violated, and the lives and properties of Japanese residents in China were

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continuously threatened.

Even after the China Incident broke out in July 1937, Japan intended to withdraw her forces as soon as possible. For example, an order was issued to the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces (which later became the China Expeditionary Forces) not to advance beyond the Soo-chow River, which flows through Shanghai, and also that permanent measures should not be taken in the Shanghai area. (this order was issued in or about August 1937). The reason why this order was not strictly obeyed was because Chinese resistance was so strong that Japanese forces could not halt at this line.

In this way, after the Japanese Army occupied Nanking, and after further advances were made, the situation continued to deteriorate. Therefore Japan was in a hurry to end the China Incident, and turned to various measures. The statement that no dealings would be made with Chiang Kai-shek, the pronouncement of the three Konoye principles, the emergence of Wang Chingwei, all these measures were taken for this purpose. On the other hand, Japan earnestly desired to open direct discussions with General Chiang Kai^{shek} on the entire peace question, and military personnel, diplomats and private experts on Chinese affairs who were thought to have formerly been familiar terms with the Chiang Kai^{shek} clique took every available step, unfortunately all of them ended in failure. Although there may have been many reasons for the failure, Japan considered that at the time America, Britain and other countries wholely sympathized with China, and did not hesitate to

offer concrete and abstract assistance. By obtaining Anglo-American assistance, General Chiang Kai^{shek} maintained his position and did not shift one iota his thorough anti-Japanese policy, this was thought to be the main reason on the Japanese side: To be frank, Mr. Matsuoka and others on the Japanese side thought that it was the intention of America and Britain to have General Chiang Kai^{shek} bitterly oppose Japan, and then taking advantage of the weakening of Japanese strength, to overpower Japan by force. Therefore, on one hand, facing Japan, they argued that peace was profitable, and repeated strong protests based on the stipulations of treaties were made, on the other hand, toward General Chiang Kai^{shek}, material and moral support was given, and efforts were made to prolong, as long as possible, the Sino-Japanese armed conflict--this was considered to be the Anglo-American policy vis-a-vis Japan. Setting aside the question of whether this opinion was false or not, Mr. Matsuoka believed in view of this situation that Japan's power would necessarily have to be strengthened by allying herself with other Powers in order to settle the Chinese question. By doing so, America and Britain could be checked and their policy toward Japan would be changed, thus leading to the early solution of Sino-Japanese questions. This was one of the motives leading to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

6. The third reason why Mr. Matsuoka was forced to conclude the Tripartite Pact was the so-called A B C encirclement problem. Among these, Mr. Matsuoka was most concerned over

the American attitude. At that time, America, Britain and China combined and formed the so-called A B C encirclement front, and planned to crush weak Japan--this was the problem which caused endless concern to the Government and the people of Japan. Setting aside the question of whether America and Britain actually had this idea in mind, the pressure put by these 3 Powers on Japan actually increased daily, and unless some means were found to break through the encirclement, Japan would be faced with the danger of extinction--this was the opinion held by Mr. Matsuoka and many other informed Japanese at that time. Mr. Matsuoka was constantly bothered by this problem, and continuously worried about how it could be possible to dissolve this encirclement. Especially, the fact that America concentrated the larger part of her navy--the largest in the world--in the Pacific greatly stimulated Japanese feeling as it was considered to be a threat by force. Again, the rumour that America possessed bases in Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma, etc., and the American naval vessels would in the near future enter Singapore, was becoming stronger from day to day. Therefore, Mr. Matsuoka and many other informed Japanese becoming increasing worried over the danger that Japan would soon be attacked by the combined Anglo-American forces. On the other hand, America abrogated the Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911, and trade with Japan was in reality extremely curtailed, thus causing Japan to suffer under military and commercial pressure. Mr. Matsuoka was constantly concerned

over this, and one day said to me:

"If Japan and America should ever go to war, it would be most unfortunate for Japan, and it would inevitably have the most disastrous results for Japan. Not only that, but the culture of the human race would be completely destroyed, and the world would become darkened. To prevent this is something that I, as Foreign Minister, cannot forget even in my dreams."

Mr. Matsuoka, day and night, studied measures concerning this problem. In fact, Mr. Matsuoka often told me:

"If it were possible to dissolve America's high-pressure policy, the problems of Japan, America and Britain, and the Sino-Japanese problem would be naturally easy to solve. Moreover, if this were realized, it might even be possible for Japan to take a step forward, and could alone, or together with the Soviet Union, act as arbitrator in the Anglo-German war. However, since American policy is so high-handed, Japan cannot oppose America single-handed with her own power, so Japan must shake hands with some other strong Powers."

To express what Mr. Matsuoka told me then in a simple way, the countries he had in mind by saying to shake hands with some Powers were the Soviet Union and Germany. However, to combine with the Soviet Union would probably irritate America, and it was certain that the Soviet Union would immediately refuse Japan's proposal to shake hands with her. So, Mr. Matsuoka

reached the conclusion that there was no other measure for the time being but to associate with Germany.

7. Another motive besides the above-mentioned three which Mr. Matsuoka had in concluding the Tripartite Pact was to attempt to adjust Russo-Japanese relations through the good offices of Germany. At the time, although there did exist a small dark cloud over Soviet-German relations, at any rate they were on friendly terms. So Mr. Matsuoka thought to shake hands with the Soviet Union by utilizing, if possible, Germany after associating with her. Mr. Matsuoka thought of shaking hands with the Soviet Union for a considerably long time. When Mr. Matsuoka was President of the S M R he said to me:

"I was a great favorite of Count Shimpei Goto who was a well-known Russophile and made all sorts of efforts to realize a Japanese Soviet rapprochement. Recently, he has gone himself to Russia and carried on negotiations. I believe that I myself am responsible for making Count Goto a Russophile. In this way, my pro-Sovietism is considerably old, and now that I have become President of the S M R, I am even more impressed by the necessity."

In this manner, he based his opinion on the actual conditions ~~of Japan~~ and went on to discuss world currents, speaking in a logical way of a Soviet-Japanese friendship.

Long after that, when he returned from his trip to Europe in 1941, he spoke to me of the events which occurred on his departure from Moscow where he had stayed and said:

"Mr. Stalin came to the station to see me off. Both Soviet officials and Ambassador Tatekawa assured me that this was without precedent. He appeared to be sincerely reluctant to say goodbye to me, and when I was about to leave he hugged me and kissed me very hard. And he said to me, "The Russian race is not a European race. They are real Asiatics. Since they are both Asiatics, shouldn't Japan and the Soviet Union be good friends?" So I thought utilizing this opportunity to delay my departure, and carry on further negotiations concerning Soviet-Japanese friendly relations beyond the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. However, since arrangements had been made on affairs to follow my return to Japan, I thought that to postpone my return would have a delicate effect on the international situation. So I reconsidered, and thought that I could again come at some appropriate time."

At the time, since it was urgent for Japan to settle the Chinese question, as mentioned above, and the Soviet Union had a important influence on this question, if friendly relations could be established with the Soviet Union, it would naturally minister to the solution of the question. From this view-point also, it was necessary to establish Soviet-Japanese friendly relations. Mr. Matsuoka once said to me:

"The China Incident is less a problem having to do with China than it is a problem concerning America and the Soviet Union."

From this view-point, Mr. Matsuoka attempted to realize his cherished plan to establish Soviet-Japanese friendship by

shaking hands with Germany, and utilizing her good offices. This was also one of the motives behind the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. In addition, Mr. Stahmer told Mr. Matsuoka at the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact that Germany was prepared to act as intermediary.

8. As stated above, the Tripartite Pact was not concluded in preparation for war. However, since an association was formed with Germany and Italy then actually at war with England, Mr. Matsuoka was aware of the danger of Japan being forced against her will into the war by Germany and Italy notwithstanding Japan's desire not to enter the war. So, he thought of making reservations at the very beginning of the negotiations concerning the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, and made two reservations in connection with the negotiations. The first was that Japan would remain outside of the war waged by Germany and Italy against Britain, and the second was that the European War would be prevented from spreading to America and East Asia. Mr. Matsuoka told both Mr. Ott and Mr. Stahmer at the beginning of the negotiations that Japan considered that the most important mission of the Tripartite Pact was to establish peace throughout East Asia, therefore, Japan should not be forced into the Anglo-German war because of the Pact, and a German guarantee on this point was desirable.

He demanded that the following two points be promised:

- (1) Germany would not interfere in the political questions of East Asia, and Japan would not interfere in the political

questions of Europe;

(2) The European war should be carried on by Germany and Italy alone and Japan's aid should not be sought, on the other hand, the military operations against China would be carried out by Japan alone and Germany's aid would not be sought.

The German side immediately agreed to this. Concerning the policy of improving the relations with the United States and of preventing America from entering the war, agreement was

In the summer of 1941, the Soviet-German war broke out, and reached almost in the same procedure. shortly thereafter Mr. Ott brought Ribbentrop's personal message to Mr. Matsuoka, which I also saw and read at that time. This was a fairly short note; one sheet typed in German, but its contents were very important. Its point was that Japan should speedily attack the Soviet Union from the rear. Its wording was impolite, and to the point, moreover its contents were in violation of the promises given at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. When Mr. Matsuoka saw it, he was very angry, and utterly declined to give any consideration to the proposal as it was in contravention to the mutual understandings exchanged at the time of the Tripartite Pact. Another thing, after Mr. Matsuoka had returned from his trip to Germany and the Soviet Union, I asked Mr. Matsuoka about the information I had received that he had been advised by Hitler and Ribbentrop to attack Singapore. To this Mr. Matsuoka replied:

"There was such talk. I was Foreign Minister, and not one of the Service Ministers. So no matter how earnestly this was recommended to me, I was not in a position to assent to the proposal. Moreover, concerning the use of armed force by Japan to further the development of the European war, reservations were made at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Whether Japan should attack Singapore or not was a matter concerning which Germany had no right to say anything. I am absolutely opposed to conquest. As you know, my motto is non-conquest, non-aggression, non-exploitation. I did modify my words. For example, I said that if Japan were to be presented with a chance that came only once in a thousand years, Japan would fight. I also said that if Japan were to fight, the sooner the better. This was only because I wished to prevent further conversation on the same line. However, I did not make any promise with reference to an attack on Singapore, nor did I say anything to commit myself, so you needn't worry."

9. At the time of the conclusion of the pact Mr. Matsuoka said to me:

"The Tripartite Pact may temporarily worsen Japanese-American relations, and may lead to a very dark phenomenon. In half a year, however, its darkness will fade, and world peace will be more firmly established. I must pour all my wits and abilities into it for this object. I do not even dream of fighting with America, and I must not do so."

Again Mr. Matsuoka had often declared in the Diet that

the Tripartite Pact was a means to the establishment of world peace. The following happened at the time of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. The question of Japanese-American negotiations was put before a Cabinet meeting, and I was instinctively to be present at the conference. ~~Then~~ the Home Minister, Baron Kichiro Hiranuma spoke in detail for about 30 minutes opposing war from all angles, and said that Japan must not fight for any reason whatsoever. All of the other Ministers remained silent. Only Mr. Matsuoka spoke and said:

"I agree with Baron Hiranuma. War must be avoided at all costs." That day after Mr. Matsuoka returned to the Foreign Office he said to me in the Minister's office:

"I am in entire agreement with what Baron Hiranuma had to say today. The very fact that Baron Hiranuma, who is usually silent, should have spoken in detail against war must have been because of the importance of the matter, and because he came prepared to deeply impress all the Ministers with a thorough sentiment against war. Coming from his mouth, anti-war opinion carries much more weight than if it were voiced by someone else."

10: Since Mr. Matsuoka was well aware that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact might greatly irritate American nerves, he paid much attention ^{on} to this point. He repeatedly persuaded Admiral Nomura, who was reluctant, to finally accept the post of Ambassador to America, and this was because he considered as I

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heard from him that the post must be given to a man who would be welcomed in America, and that Admiral Nomura was the best person. To this Admiral Nomura he begged that all efforts be made to improve Japanese-American relations. Again, for the same purpose he tried to dispatch Count Kabayama, who had many friends in America, to America. He tried to dispatch Mr. Toyohiko Kagawa, an American-type missionary who was considered to have the best comprehension of America, to the United States. He was very polite in his conversations with Ambassador Grew. One day (the date I have forgotten) after Ambassador Grew had returned, I asked Mr. Matsuoka how the conversations went on. Mr. Matsuoka answered:

"Recently conversation have become somewhat difficult. Although the policy of giving absolute importance to Japanese-American friendship has not changed, at a time like this when the situation is critical, unless a strong attitude is shown, it can have no effect. At the same time, if the other party is angered, it will be disastrous, and to maintain a proper balance is difficult. So I was very careful in choosing my words."

At the end of 1940 Mr. Steinhardt, the American Ambassador to Russia, passed through Japan on his way to his post, and saw Mr. Matsuoka. At this meeting, Mr. Matsuoka spoke at great length of Japan's difficult position, and the necessity of Japanese-American friendship. Later in 1941, when Mr. Matsuoka went to Europe to visit Russia, Germany and Italy, he repeated

similar sentiments to Mr. Steinhardt in Moscow and consulted him on the means to attain Japanese-American friendship. This I learned from Mr. Matsuoka. Before his journey to Europe, he told me:

"My journey to Europe is, on the surface, in order to visit the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy, but hardly anyone knows that my hidden mission is to adjust relations with Soviet and America." At this time, he had already prepared and kept hidden a draft of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty, and was prepared for negotiations with America. On his departure he said:

"I intend to cut as short as possible my sojourn in Europe and then go to America. I intend to indicate Japan's actual situation and a concrete draft of the basis of a Japanese-American understanding, and by negotiating directly with the Secretary of State to endeavour to improve Japanese-American relations."

On another occasion he said:

"It is regrettable that American sentiment towards Japan grown greatly tense owing to the Tripartite Pact. However, this I anticipated at the time of the conclusion of the pact. But this situation must not be neglected. I must go to America at any cost, and after directly bearing from the authorities America's real intentions, I must take appropriate measures."

So I spoke of my opinion and said:

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"Since I believe that the tension of American sentiment toward Japan is due to the Tripartite Pact and the Chinese question, if a Japanese-American understanding is to be made possible, something must be done about the Tripartite Pact. The entire withdrawal of troops from China must also be considered. If these two things are possible, I think the other questions are secondary."

To this Mr. Matsuoka replied:

"I agree entirely. As you well know, the Tripartite Pact is not for the purpose of waging war. If such a situation should be created that Japan might be forced into war, the way of thinking concerning the Tripartite Pact must be fundamentally changed. If a pact aimed at preserving Japan should become a pact leading to the destruction of Japan, drastic measures will have to be taken against the pact. Concerning the whole-scale withdrawal from China, if one were to advocate that at the present moment it would not pass in Japan. In any case, I must first of all directly negotiate with the American authorities."

Then I asked:

"Have you confidence in your ability to influence America if you were to go there?"

Mr. Matsuoka answered:

"I believe so. Americans do not indulge in intrigues nor in plots. They are fair and do not harper themselves with what has passed or with barren logic. The reason why American diplomacy has always been so clear, is because of this. If I were to go and adequately

explain Japan's true intentions, and demonstrate Japan's sincerity, although it may be difficult to alter American opinion at one stroke, I do not think it impossible. For this, Japan must necessarily make great concessions, and I have prepared my own draft."

At that time in America, Mr. Matsuoka was looked on in an extremely unfavorable light, and in my opinion I thought it might be better if someone else were to go, but Mr. Matsuoka was confident that if he were to go himself there was hope that Japanese-American negotiations would be successful, Mr. Matsuoka was cared for by an American missionary and spent his early years in America so he was well acquainted with American circumstances and American sentiments. In fact, when he returned from his European journey in May 1941, he said he would go in spite of the fact that his lungs were already in a bad condition and repeatedly took council with Premier Konoye. Premier Konoye was opposed to it, and Mr. Matsuoka's trip to America was not realized. Soon, the third Konoye Cabinet commonly said to be a reshuffle to eliminate Matsuoka came into existence, attitude of the Japanese Government at the time of the third Konoye Cabinet towards the Tripartite Pact became cool. It was rumoured that Foreign Minister Toyoda said that Japan did not exist for the Tripartite Pact, but that the Tripartite Pact existed for Japan. When Mr. Matsuoka heard of this he said that it was possible that things would go so far as the abrogation of the pact.

Further he said.

"There are many instances of abrogations of newly concluded

treaties of abrogations during the effective period of treaties. I should like to know on what grounds in international law this can be justified. When I visited Mr. Matsuoka, who was confined to bed, as soon as I learned of the outbreak of war between America and Japan on 8 December 1941, he said:

"So it finally ended in war."

Then for a short time he maintained a sorrowful silence, and continued:

"If I had remained, I should have made all efforts to avoid war." In September 1940 when Mr. Matsuoka resolved to conclude the Tripartite Pact he said to me:

"I am neither pro-Anglo-American nor pro-Italo-German. I am pro-Japanese, and believe in world peace. The Tripartite Pact, the policy of Soviet-Japanese rapprochement and the Japanese-American problem, all these were because I wished to bring about world peace, and because I thought about Japan. If Japan combines with Germany and Italy at this time, the public may say that I am pro-German. In foreign countries they may say that I support aggression. No matter what they may say, I do not care. However, I am absolutely against conquest. Not only am I opposed to Japanese conquest, but I am also opposed to conquest by other countries. If the Tripartite Pact should be used as a tool of aggression, such a pact must not be allowed to exist."

11. The Tripartite Pact was entirely separate from the negotiations among the three Powers which took place before Mr. Matsuoka's time, and was not a continuation of the former negotiations, which took place from the summer of 1938 to about August 1939 between Japan, Germany and Italy. As was informed to the American Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington at the end of August 1939, the former negotiations were absolutely dropped and have no connections with the Tripartite Pact of 1940. Mr. Matsuoka was a man with considerable self-confidence. Mr. Matsuoka was a senior member of the Foreign Ministry and the four or five Foreign Ministers preceding him were his juniors or were absolute amateurs. So Mr. Matsuoka did not think much of the men who preceded him. Mr. Matsuoka often told me as well as other people, that the Japanese diplomacy to date was utterly incompetent, and that fundamental reforms would have to be carried out. So when he became Foreign Minister, he immediately dismissed a large number of higher diplomats including Ambassadors and Ministers. Although this move was severely criticized by the public (some foreign papers called this mass dismissal a clean-out of the pro-Anglo-American school, but that was absolutely not so. Many people of pro-German tendencies were also dismissed), this measure was taken as an unavoidable step to reform diplomacy. Since that was his character, he disliked being bothered with events in the past concerning important diplomatic questions. So he never looked at the Foreign Office

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records concerning the former negotiations between the three Powers, nor did he order his subordinates to study them. At times, some persons spoke of the past negotiations, but he did not listen to them, and said that it belonged to the past, and had no bearing on his diplomacy. In this manner, when Mr. Stahmer arrived in Tokyo in the autumn of 1940, at a meeting of the three persons Mr. Stahmer, Mr. Ott and Mr. Matsuoka, Mr. Matsuoka presented them with his own draft and the pact was concluded.

One of the reasons why Mr. Matsuoka conducted diplomacy on his own in the second Konoye Cabinet is due to the following circumstances: In 1940, when Prince Konoye was entrusted with the forming of the cabinet, immediately preceding the formation, a meeting known as the Big Four Conference was held for two or three days, with Konoye, Tojo, Navy Minister Yoshida and Matsuoka taking part at Prince Konoye's private residence. At this conference Mr. Matsuoka stressed that if he were to become Foreign Minister all diplomatic questions would be left to him. If other Ministers were to interfere he would not be able to accept the post. The other three leaders agreed to this. This fact was told to me by Mr. Matsuoka, and ever since, diplomacy was carried on solely by Mr. Matsuoka. These circumstances continued at least until about the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. One day at that time I saw Prince Konoye in the Japanese room at the Premier's official residence on official