SWNCC 000.73 CENSORSHIP



CAT. NO. 52551-P.4





LIST OF PAPERS

CONFIDENTIAL

'ILE UNDER NO. SWNCC 000.73 CENSORSHIP

Serial	From	Date	To	Synopsis
1	Mr. Grew	4/6/45	Mr. Price	Letter forwarding copy of Dean Acheson's letter re censorship of mails between European neutrals and South America.
2	r. Stimson	7/10/45	Sec of State	Letter re press release on draft on the situation of American nationals in Japanese custody.
3	Col. McCarthy	1/17/45		Memo enc. cpy of JCS 1094/5, per request of Col. Sweeney(Measures to Retain the Censorship of International Mail".
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17 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

At the request of the Acting Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the attached copy of JCS 1094/5, "Measures to Retain the Censorship of International Mail", is forwarded for your information. JCS 1094/5 was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 July 1945.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY, Secretary


Enclosure:


Cpy No. 61 JCS 1094/5

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject:

Measures to retain the censorship of international mail.

Enclosure: J.C.S. 1094/5 (Copy No. 61).

It is requested that the attached copy of J.C.S. 1094/5 be forwarded to the Secretary of State for his information. J.C.S. 1094/5 was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 July 1945.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

F. R. SWEENEY,
Colonel, GSC,
Acting Secretary.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Secretary, SWNCO



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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNEU)

F. R. SWEENEY, Colonel, GSC, Acting Secretary.

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WDGAP 000.7 (28 Jun 45)

JUL 10 1945

The Honorable The Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter dated 25 June 1945, with which you inclosed for my consideration a draft of a press release prepared in your Department on the situation of American nationals in Japanese custody.

The statement in its present form is satisfactory to the War Department, and I concur in its release.

Sincerely yours,

BENRY L STIMSON

Secretary of War

Information copy for the Secretariat SWNCC

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

In reply refer to BC 811.711/10-744

April 6, 1945

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The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and with reference to the letter of October 7 from the Director of the Office of Censorship addressed jointly to the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the policy which should be followed in respect to the censorship of mails between the European neutrals and South America after the defeat of Germany, encloses a copy of a letter which the Department has sent in reply. It is understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will likewise reply to Mr. Price.

A copy of this letter and its enclosure has been sent to the Secretary of War.

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to The Honorable Byron Price, Director, The Office of Censorship.

Copy furnished JCS CONFIDENTIAL

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April 6, 1945

In reply refer to BC 811.711/10-744

Confidential

My dear Mr. Price:

Further reference is made to your letter of October 7, 1944, addressed to the Department and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to conversations which have been held with representatives of your office, the Department of State, and Joint Security Control concerning the policy which should be followed in respect to the censorship of mails between the European neutrals and South America after the defeat of Germany. You state that it has been through the operation of the navicert system by the British that we have been able to censor this mail, and that you understand the British authorities plan to abolish navicerting about three months after the collapse of Germany. You point out that if this is done, positive action on the part of the American Government will be necessary if it is deemed desirable to continue this censorship. You suggest four possible courses of action -- namely,

- "1. Pressure upon the British Government for continuance in some form of the present British navicert arrangement until all hostilitis have ceased both in Europe and in the Pacific.
- "2. Assumption by the American Government of a responsibility similar to that now exercised by the Ministry of Economic Warfare and negotiation of diplomatic agreements under which all trans-Atlantic mail would be channeled through American ports.
- "3. Control of the situation by force, including use of the United States Navy to control thesemails as a part of the naval blockade of Japan.
- "4. Joint action by the United States and Brazil, whose censorship has been most cooperative with U.S. Censorship, to force the trans-Atlantic mails into either a United States or a Brazilian port by either of the methods outlined in 2 and 3."

You request the opinion of the Department and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to whether any of these alternatives is considered desirable of execution.

The Honorable

Byron Price, Director, The Office of Censorship. CONFIDENTIAL

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It is the view of this Department that alternatives 2, 3, and 4 would involve action which it would be difficult for the American Government to take. As the war recedes, relaxation of controls will be expected rather than their intensification or the establishment of new ones. Not only will the American people desire controls to be removed as soon as possible, but also neutral countries may be expected to object strenuously to their continued enforcement. Furthermore, as you state, the joint nature of censorship renders it desirable from the practical point of view that parallel action be taken by the two governments vis á vis tnird parties. It would not be politically expedient for this Government to be placed in the position of putting on controls while the British were removing them. Accordingly, the only alternative which is considered practicable is the first -- namely, that we urge the British not to withdraw controls now in force until such time as it is mutually agreed that they can be removed without detriment to the war effort.

In this connection it should be noted that the intention which the British authorities have expressed of terminating censorship of neutral mails shortly after nostilities with Germany cease, is based on the premise that adequate controls will have been established in Germany and the liberated areas in Europe. It is assumed, therefore, that if such controls are not established within the three months' period contemplated, the existing controls are to be continued or satisfactory substitutes devised. Although it is recognized that the actual operation of the system by which the mails come into our hands is a responsibility of the British, the measures were instituted for the purposes of the joint war effort of both countries, and it is believed they should not be terminated without our agreement.

In connection with the first alternative which you have proposed, it is thought that the American Government might bring pressure to bear upon the British from two sides -- (1) through the desirability of continuing the censorship from the military point of view of fighting the war against Japan, and (2) from the point of view of the SAFEHAVEN project for preventing Axis assets from becoming lodged in foreign countries.

As for (1), representatives of Joint Security Control with whom the matter has been discussed have indicated their intention of recommending to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the British Joint Chiefs be advised of our concern regarding the military aspects of the matter. The action taken in this connection will undoubtedly be reported to us later.

As for (2), this Department, through the American Embassy in London, has already pointed out to the British authorities dealing with economic warfare that the discontinuance of censorship would have an adverse effect on our joint attempt to

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prevent the secretion of enemy assets. The officials of the Ministry of Economic Warfare informally expressed concurrence with this view but are apparently under the impression that an agreement has already been reached between the American and British Governments to the effect that existing censorship arrangements are to be terminated three months after hostilities with Germany cease regardless of whether or not navicerting is discontinued (see paraphrase of telegram no. 2824 of March 19 from London, a copy of which has been furnished you). They cite this inter-governmental "agreement" as the reason for their feeling that there is not much which can be done with the matter now, as desirable as it might be from their point of view. They added that the decision of the British side had been taken by the War Cabinet. It is the understanding of this Department that your office, through an exchange of letters with Sir Edwin Herbert, has merely agreed that when proper controls are set up in Europe and navicerting is discontinued, you will take parallel action with the British in closing censorship stations in the Caribbean area. This is not the same thing, and it is thought that it would be desirable to clarify this misunderstanding.

Generally speaking, the British authorities appear to be as much interested as we are in the successful operation of the SAFEHAVEN project. The Department is instructing the American Embassy in London to renew its representations to the British authorities with the view of impressing upon them the desirability of working together in this regard and requesting them to take no unilateral action which might detract from the effectiveness of our joint effort in the economic warfare field. As soon as further information is received from London, I shall be glad to advise you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Secretaries of War and the Navy for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is understood that they will likewise reply to your letter.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary