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Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
S. Con. Res. 27

December 10, 1945

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 3250 to 3435

WARD & PAUL

NATIONAL 4266 4267

(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)

OFFICIAL REPORTERS

1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.

WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

S. Con. Res. 27

Monday, December 10, 1945

Joint Committee on the Investigation

of Pearl Harbor Attack,

Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson, you were examining General Marshall.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

(Resumed)

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a correction in the record.

On page 3178 I read from the Roberts Report. It is in the record on page 3178, the last paragraph. The record reads:

"8:30 American Honolulu time,"

The record I read from, being the Roberts report, says: "6.30 A. M. Honolulu time."

The word "American" is not in there. So there will be two changes. The figure "8:30" is changed to "6:30" and strike out "American."

The Chairman: The correction will be made.

Senator Ferguson: General Marshall, about the 12th or 13th of August, 1941, you attended the Atlantic Conference meeting, did you not?

General Marshall: What sort of meeting, sir?

Senator Forguson: The Atlantic Conference.

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I was present, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How long before you went to that meeting had you known there was to be a meeting? Ģ

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General Marshall: I do not recall, Senator, but purely as a guess, I would say maybe a week; I don't recall at all. Maybe some circumstances will come up that will jar my memory, but I don't recall now atall.

Senator Ferguson: Did you see any agenda before you went to the meeting?

General Marshall: I know specifically there was no agenda for the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any conferences with the British Chiefs of Staff or military authorities, in relation to the Far East?

General Marshall: I don't recall a specific conference with the three British Chiefs of Staff regarding the Far East.

Might I explain my recollection of what occurred? Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: Admiral Stark, General Arnold and myself met with the British Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the Acting Head of the Air Corps -- Air Marshal Portal was not present -- and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Our discussions were quite general, somewhat in the nature of getting acquainted and of our learning from them of the course of the war from their point of view, and of.

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson their informing us in general statements, of their urgent necessities.

We proceeded thereafter most of the time on the basis of personal conversations between the respective opposite Chiefs of Staff. In my case, that would be Field Marshall Sir John Dill.

My recollection of my conversations with the Field Marshal were that he explained on his own initiative or on my
questioning, whattheir situation was all over the world,
their approaches to the various phases of the campaigns
that had then taken place, and particularly the situation
in the Middle East.

My recollection is that he and I had not a great deal to say about materiel, because in the category of materiel for the ground forces we had already done for them about as much as it was possible for us to do for some time.

My understanding of the conversations between General Arnold and the First Sea Lord; on which General Arnold is the best witness -- I should say with the air representative -- he had a great deal of discussion regarding aircraft that the British needed. And I believe somewhat the same was the nature of the conversations between Admiral Stark and the First Sea Lord in regard to havel requirements.

However, I did not sit in on those details.

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At another meeting with the three Chiefs of Staff -Senator Ferguson: General, I was only interested in
the Far East situation. I didn't care to cover the other.

saying, Senator, that we only had a general discussion of the situation all over the world, and I do not remember specifically the Far Eastern part. So far as our discussions with them, I took the lead in pressing them all the time to unify their procedure and to save us from the confusion that was then existent here in Washington regarding their necessities as to material.

Senator Ferguson: Prior to going there or at the meeting, did you know what this country's, America's, attitude, our attitude was in relation to Japan going any further on her aggressive steps, aggression steps in the Fr East?

General Marshall: My recollection of my understanding of that phase of the matter at that time was that our policy was in every way that seemed possible and suitable to discourage any outbreak in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson: On page 14 of Exhibit 1, I wonder whether this was ever called to your attention. It was on the 7th of August, 1941, translated the 8th of August -- No. Translated the 15 of August. So you would be at the meeting

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

at that time, would you not?

Witness Mrshall

General Marshall: I believe so, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What I wanted to call to your attention was the second paragraph on that page. It is a message from Washington Japan, intercepted:

"When Japan occupied French Indochina" --

General Marshall: Senator, may I interrupt. What page are you on, please?

Senator Ferguson: I am on page 14.

General Marshall: I have it now.

Senator Ferguson: The second paragraph:

"When Japan occupied French Indochina, the United' States retaliated with the 'freezing' order and the export embargo; a joint warning by Hull and Eden was issued with regard to any ambitions in the direction of Thailand."

Did you know that?

General Marshall: I presume that I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that there was a conversation between the President and Mr. Churchill in relation to parallel action by the United States as far as Japan was concerned in case of aggression?

General Marshall: I presume that I did.

Senator Ferguson: Did you return at the same time as the President?

General Marshall: Only part of the way, sir. the AUGUSTA, which was the cruiser on which we were travelling

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at sea, somewhere southeast, I believe, of Nova Scotia, took a seaplane and flew in to the Naval Base near Newport, and there transferred to a plane to Washington.

Senator Ferguson: You came back to the United States? General Marshall: I came back directly to the United States.

Senator Ferguson: Had you learned before you came back to the United States that there had been a conversation between the President and Mr. Churchill in relation to parallel action, was that discussed with you at the conference?

General Marshall: That was not discussed with me at the conference.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know when you returned to the United States? The President -- I relate the day he returned from the record -- the 17th. That was on a Sunday morning.

Do you know when you returned?

General Marshall: Do I know when the President returned? Senator Ferguson: No, when you returned to the United States?

General Marshall: I returned quite a few days ahead of him so I must have been here then.

Senator Ferguson: Did you learn that on the 17th of August the President -- that is on a Sunday morning -- the President called the Japanese Ambassador to the White House

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson and delivered to him a statement, an oral statement. In the oral statement this language was used:

"Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States."

That is the end of the paragraph and the end of the statement.

General Marshall: Your question is --

Senator Ferguson: Whether you knew that, when you learned of it.

General Marshall: My recollection is, and I believe the records of liaison meetings show, that at least the sense of that message, if not the actual message, was read in my presence in the office of the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, about two days later, which I believe was the 19th.

Senator Ferguson: That is the first knowledge you had that such action was taken or was to be taken? .

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

General Marshall: Yes, sir, as far as I can recall.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever know that England -- did

you ever learn that England had taken a similar step?

General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall that on August 24, four days prior to the Jap answer to that message, which was the 28th, that the Prime Minister made a statement to the effect that in case America went to war with Japan that they, the British, would be in in a short time, two or three hours?

General Marshall: I don't recall that, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: What was the discussion you had with the Under Secretary in relation to the paragraph that I just read, the one that was read at the --

General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir. I have not seen the minutes or the record of the meeting. I had a vague recollection of knowing something about that message at some time and I was told that it was in the record of the minutes of the liaison meeting. I believe it is a naval record of a Captain Schuirmann that Mr. Welles either told us of the message or actually read the message to us, so that I am not a very good witness on that.

Senator Ferguson: How did you interpret what was said at that meeting by Mr. Welles? What obligation didit place on you as the head of the Army, if any? How did you interpret it as Chief of Staff?

General Marshall: My interpretation now -- I would have to guess at what it was then -- was that the situation was growing more difficult and the implications here were largely, I believe, economic, but I do not recall exactly what my reactions were at the time. I knew this throughout the procedure then, as far as I understood the matter of the diplomatic interchanges, that were endeavoring to find some way to avoid a rupture in the Pacific without the complete sacrifice of American policies.

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Senator Ferguson: Did you take that as being from that time on the American policy so that you would have to, if necessary, implement it?

General Marshall: I would assume that I would, sir.

Sens tor Ferguson: Did that in any way change the American policy as far as you were concerned, that is, as far as your knowledge?

General Marshall: I would assume that it did not. I have no recollection of any state of change in my mind at the time. Our procedure was more or less uniform throughout.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did that Andicate that the tension was at least growing and that we had certain commitments and that it may be necessary for you to prepare for those commitments?

General Marshall: I presume so, sir. Certainly the tension was growing all the time, and particularly in the months of September, October and November.

Senator Lucas: Will the Senator yield? Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Senator Lucas: What is the Senator talking about when he talks about commitments? I would like to know that.

Sénator Ferguson: Does the General understand my question?

General Marshall: I could not hear, Senator.

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Senator Lucas: I would like to know to what the Senator is referring, what the Senator is inquiring about when he talks about our commitments. I would like to know myself what the Senator is talking about.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I will ask the General, does he understand my question?

General Marshall: Well, I was not making any fine interpretation of the word "commitment", Senator. I was talking
about our military obligations.

Senator Ferguson: We were talking about this particular paragraph, were we not, General?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you understood my questions to re-

General Marshall: I thought I did.

Senator Ferguson: And the fact that the Japanese had received it from the President on Sunday morning?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know, General, whether or not that information of the delivery of this message was sent to General Short or General MacArthur?

General Marshall: I have no -- there was a message sent to General Short and to General MacArthur some time, as I recall, during August that referred to the Japanese attitude.

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson Witness Marshall

I do not know offhand whether or not this message was sent. My recollection would be that it was not.

Senator Ferguson: Your recollection would be that it was not sent?

But the record will show that, of General Marshall: course, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Well, I have no record that it was and I wondered if you have any knowledge that it had been sent.

Had you any information of a proposed meeting between Konoye and the President of the United States?

General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir, now. On that you will have to refresh my memory.

Senator Ferguson: You never prepared any data or had prepared any data anticipating such a meeting?

General Marshall: I do not recall it, sir. It may be but I do not recall it at the moment.

Senator Ferguson: Had you any information that any meeting like that may be held in Junean, Alaska? Would that refresh your memory? I am only asking you that to refresh your memory.

General Marshall: Well, I am sorry but it does not right now. May Isay, Senator, this mass of papers andall I haven't seen for four years, whatever part I did see.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: I approciate that.

General Marshall: And it is very hard for me to recall what I actually had known.

Senetor Ferguson: And that is why at times I ask a question thinking it may refresh your memory on it.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: In the intercepts there is considerable information about such a meeting and in the memos from Ambassador Grew to the State Department and to the Georetary of State there is considerable in the early part of October prior to the fall of the cabinet, - I think the indication is at least that the Ambassador thought the cabinet would fall, and advised them that it would fall unless such a meeting had taken place. Did you have any information?

General Marshall: If it was in "Magic" I presume I did, sir, but just what Mr. Grew's messages were I do not recall whether I knew anything about them or not.

Senator Ferguson: You don't know whether you had any information --

General Marshall: Everything of that kind I got through oral statements from Mr. Stimson who was attending these meetings frequently, more frequently than I was in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson: Well, there is considerable "Magic"

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on that question of the Konoye meeting.

General Marshall: . Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall it now?

General Marshall: I have a hazy recollection now of the fact that there was quite a bit.

Senator Ferguson: But you do not know of any particular data that you may have obtained for that meeting?

General Marshall: I do not recall it now, sir. They may be able to show me a memor andum signed by me but I do not recall it now.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I haven't got any memorandum or I would have given it to you first. I just was seeking information as to what you may have.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: We have a memorandum in the record, Senator, if I may be helpful.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, certainly.

Mr. Gesell: Exhibit 33, item 17, dated October 2, 1941, has the memorandum to the Chief of Staff from General Miles deputy, Colonel Kroner, which discussed that problem. The memorandum was also distributed to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Under Secretary and other officials.

Senstor Ferguson: What part of that memorandum, Mr.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Gesell?

Mr. Gesell: Well, I think toward the middle there there is a discussion of a meeting of leaders and the Army position is stated by G-2.

Mr. Gesell: No, that they were discussing the meeting.

Item 8 at the bottom there starts and discusses the meeting and goed over onto the next page.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, I am familiar with that but I wondered whether any data had been prepared.

Mr. Gesell: Oh, I don't know about that.

Senator Ferguson: That is what I had in mind.

General, do you know whether you advised such a meeting or advised against such a meeting? Were you consulted, in other words?

General Marshall: I have no recollection of that.

Senator Ferguson: General, had you designated anyone to negotiate or at least confer in liaison about it between the State Department and your headquarters of the Chief of Staff?

General Marshall: I think we had two mediums of that sort. One through the G-2 section of the General Staff and one probably through the War Plans Division of the General Staff. However, General Miles and General Gerow can give you an authoritative statement regarding that.

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Senator Ferguson: But you had not designated any particular individual?

General Marshall: No, sir, I don't think I ever have.

I know that during the greater course of the war I had officers that would see Mr. Hull sometimes almost every day but
I do not recall that I ever designated any particular individual unless it was General Hull on one occasion.

Senator Ferguson: During all of this time of all this negotiation did you understand that the Fleet was at Pearl Harbor, the main part of the Fleet?

General Marshall: I knew all the time where the Fleet was based. Its sailings in and cut, though, I was not familiar with.

Sen tor Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: But I would know absolutely when the Fleet left the West Coast, when it arrived out in Hawaii and so long as it was based in Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson: Were you consulted any in the year 1940 or conferred with in relation to the Fleet going and basing at Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall: I am quite certain that I was in-

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what your opinion was on sending it there?

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General Marshall: I am sorry, Senator, I do not recall just exactly what my point of view was. I have a clears? recollection, still dublous, as to what my own thoughts were regarding quite a discussion as to the reinforcement of the Atlantic Fleet from a portion of the Pacific Fleet and at that time the U. S. Fleet was in the Los Angeles-Sen Diego region. There was a very considerable discussion on it for quite a while over that phase of the matter and it was the problem of the maintenance of our convoys across the Atlantic to Great Britain, which Great Britain was vitally dependent upon and the security in the Pacific and the numbers and questions of the disposition of the vessels of the Fleet was a very important matter,

Senator Ferguson: General, you would be vitally interested in the moving of the Fleet to Pearl Harbor because that being in Pearl Harbor, based in Pearl Harbor, it became one of your tasks to protect it while it was at anchorage in Pearl Harbor, isn't that true?

General Marshall: That is correct, Senator. I had a very vital interest, the Army had a very vital interest in the Fleet at Pearl Marbor because the obligation to protect Pearl Harbor was an Army obligation.

Senator Ferguson: And did you have any idea as to its effect on the diplomatic negotiations? Were you consulted on

that?

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General Marshall: "Vell, my recollection is that was one of the considerations involved. Now, just whether they asked me personally or not I do not know, but I assume that I was personally involved in the discussions and, therefore, must have expressed an opinion.

Senator Ferguson: Well, do you know what that opinion Was?

General Marshall: I cannot recall right now, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I see in a memorandum dated the Zoth of February ,1941, a conference in the office of the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff being present, - it is exhibit 55, I will not have to read who was present there. This language is useds (Reading)

"They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability but they must guard against everything."

That is down about a third of the way down.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Does that refresh your memory as to what was going on at the time?

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General Marshall: Only to the extent that we were having these discussions regarding the Fleet and this is a direct statement by me at that time, which is quite evidently what I thought at that time.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know when, - or did you give any opinion as to when the Fleet was actually prepared for war?

General Marshall: No, sir, I could not say I had any date on that. I know I have quite a clear recollection that I was very much concerning regarding their obtaining the additional vessels that I believe at that time were characterized as the Fleet train. In other words, the Fleet itself was very much limited in action unless it had a large supply force to keep it going, not only in oil, gas, but in munitions and in food and in all the other requirements of ships traveling at sea in long voyages.

We greatly lacked, - the Fleet, I believe, greatly lacked such an equipment and I became personally interested in that and I recall discussing it at the liaison meeting and I believe the record will show, though I have not checked it, that a recommendation was made by the liaison group through the medium of Mr. Sumner Welles regarding the immediate establishment of an adequate fleet train. Now, the record will show that. That is my dim recollection at the time.

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Senator Ferguson: General Marshall, when you sent the war warning that would necessitate the Fleet preparing for war, would it not?

General Marshall: The war warning would put the Fleet on the alerted action. It was presumed at that time, at least I should say it was presumed at that time that the Fleet, so far as was possible, was in a state of preparation for war but its actual alert for battle conditions was the purpose of the alert message,

Senator Ferguson: Now, wouldn't it be necessary for the Fleet to go into Harbor --

General Marshall: Senator, you are asking me --Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- to prepare for war? I am just bringing that out, to see what your information was as to the --

General Marshall: I am going to ask you to please ask a Naval authority on that because I am just guessing. I don't expect the Nevy men to tell you much about tanks, but I do not want to commit myself.

Senator Ferguson: General, the reason I asked that question was, as I understand it you had charge of the prete ction of the Fleet.

General Marshall: The Army was responsable for the defenses of Hawaii, or the Island of Oahu in particular,

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

which included Pearl Harbor, and the coordination of all the air and defensible fires in that particular vicinity in the event of aggressive Japanese action.

Senator Ferguson: Well, that would include the actual protection of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, specifically that.

Senator Ferguson: And, therefore, if it was necessary to take the Fleet into anchorage to have it prepared for war on the war warning you would have to protect it while it was in there, that is, your Army?

General Marshall: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: Had you been consulted by anyone, well, by the Secretary of War or the President, about whether
or not we were prepared for a war with Japan? That is, whether
your Army was prepared?

General Marshall: I had had a number of discussions with the Secretary of War regarding that consideration and I believe I testified earlier that along with the Secretary of War I had notified the Secretary of State at some time in September that I thought that by December 5th that we would be in such a situation as to deter Japanese action. I was referring, of course, specifically to the Philippine Islands because we thought we had done all we could at that time to make additional provisions for the defense of Oahu.

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Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether you prepared any memorandums outside of the one exhibit 16 and exhibit 17, - they are joint memorandums of November the 5th and November the 27th, - as to our preparedness?

General Marshall: I will have to go to the record, sir.
I do not recall offhand.

Senator Ferguson: Well, would you have the records checked on this?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The only two that I have seem to bear those dates.

New, I wish you would take exhibit 16 and on the second page I ask you whether you were consulted in relation to the second paragraph on that page?

"The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war."

Was that question put to you?

General Marshall: I don't know whether that specific

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

I myself were called on either by oral direction or otherwise to express ourselves regarding the acceal of the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for protection against what he thought were the inevitable offensive intentions of the Jacanese north towards Kunming, which would cut the Burma Road and this expression, as I recall and as I think itself will show, stated our views in that matter.

Senator Ferguson: Then the next sentence:

"At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the West-ern Pacific."

General Marshall: Yes, siro

Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

"In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces."

Do you remember discussing that with Admiral Stark?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. I don't remember the exact discussion but I knew that must be almost what we discussed.

I couldn't help but have discussed it. And, incidentally, I referred to that a little while ago in stating that our problem was the respective strengths of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

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Senator Ferguson: On top of page 3, at the top of the page it says, "The only existing", and then they say at the bottom of the page, after the word "existing", they say in the footnote "two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word 'current' substituted."

So it would read, "The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies."

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What did you mean by the "current plans for war"? Were you at that time anticipating war was inevitable?

General Marshall: The date of this memorandum is November 5, 1941, and the threat of war was very evident.

Senator Ferguson: You were being consulted at that time as the highest ranking military authority on that question?

General Marshall: Undoubtedly, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And at that time you anticipated, on the same page, - that "The U.S. Army Air Forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March, 1942"?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And then it states down further,

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"By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived."

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Were you of the opinion at that time that if there was a war it would involve not only Britain with Singapore but the United States with the Philippines?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: There was not any question in your mind about that, that if war came to one of the countries, was was coming to both countries?

General Marshall: That was my impression at that time.

Senator Ferguson: And isn't it true that one of the things, at least, that Japan was claiming, their claim was they were trying to get oil and various things, which naturally would come from the south, isn't that true?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, and I think she was also getting oil from California.

Senator Ferguson: As late as --

General Marshall: I do not remember the date, but she had been receiving things from California.

Senator Ferguson: Do you think they were getting it as late as --

General Marshall: I do not think that, sir, but that is easily determined.

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Witness Marshall

Mr. Keefe: As late as what?

General Marshall: November 5.

Senator Ferguson: November 5, I am referring to, 1941.

General Marshall: Let me interpolate again. I am not saying they were getting it on November 5, but there were discussions at the time regarding it.

Senator Ferguson: As I understand it now, we start out on the premise here, at least as on the 5th day of November 1941, that if there was a war coming as far as Britain was concerned in the Far East in relation to Singapore or anything else, that America would be involved in that war?

General Marshall: That was my estimate at the time, because of the situation in the Philippines, our obligations there.

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Hook follows

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Questions by: Senator Perguson

Senator Ferguson: That was your opinion at the time.

I did want to take up with you page 4, if you will just turn to page 4:

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

"(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound."

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then, as of that time there would not be any doubt in your mind that if the Japs intended to move across the line that had been desginated, that would mean a war with Great Britain, and therefore we would be involved in it?

General Marshall: I cannot answer that categorically, Senator, because of this: Admiral Stark and I had recommended that if the Japanese did move east of 100 east longitude, or south of 10 degrees north, that that be regarded as an offensive act, or something of that nature.

Whether or not the Government would accept that is another matter.

Senator Ferguson: I am just getting what your reaction Was.

General Marshall: I would answer that question, I think

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

this way:

In my own opinion, the moment the Japanese moved into the Gulf of Siam, that was a definite offensive act which would result in a catastrophe for us in the Philippines, and for the British in Singapore, unless we definitely resisted it.

Senator Ferguson: And you were of the opinion at that time that military strategy was that if they went in there it would affect Singapore, it would affect the Philippines, and it would naturally affect our interests.

General Morshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And therefore crossing the so-called line would mean war, not only with the United States, but with Britain?

General Marshall: I think that is the statement that I was endeavoring to give.

Senator Ferguson: Therefore, when the message came in from Ambassador Winant on the 6th, that they were across this line --

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: -- that meant war, did it not? General Marshall: That meant war, if the two govern-

ments decided to make it war.

Senator Ferguson: But as far as you were concerned,

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson as the military man, the Chief of Staff, in your opinion that meant war?

General Marshall: In my opinion that meant unless we definitely resisted that, we would be in a catastrophic situation soon thereafter.

Senator Ferguson: And you were of the opinion that at that time it meant war?

General Marshall: I was of the opinion at that time that the Governments would be forced to accept a condition of hostilities, but whether the Governments would do it or not, is another matter.

Senator Ferguson: I understand that.

General Marshall: For example, I recall that somewhere near that time I believe the British Commander in Singapore wished to move troops north into the Kra Peninsula, which is the narrow neck of the Malay Peninsula, leading down to Singapore, to a place called Singara, and that was not, as I recall, accepted by the British Government. That was a defensive measure that he proposed. Why it was not accepted, I do not know.

It may have been because they thought he did not have sufficient men, or it may have been because they thought that would be seized by the Japanese as a definite war act by the British. I recall something of that kind happen-

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson ing at that time, and I also recall my own thoughts in regard to it at that time.

Admiral Stark can speak for himself, but I think he concurred with me, that the definition of the latitude and longitude that has been referred to covering a movement that would turn the southern point there of Thailand, or Siam, and bring the Japanese into the Gulf of Siam, that meant they were on the back door of Singapore, and could have, in our opinion, only a direct hostile motive. It was still possible for them, of course, to have turned north and then east, and establish themselves by shipping on the West Coast of Thailand. That was still a possibility.

However, that threat by air would have been a very complete one over the whole Malay Peninsula.

Those were my thoughts at that time; that is my understanding of the records. My own recollection is that our Governments, - meaning the United States Government, and the Government of Great Britain, - neither one notified the Japanese that a movement south and east of the point determined would be considered in effect a hostile act.

Senator Ferguson; General, what I am trying to get is the thinking of the Chief of Staff, and his staff, the military authorities here, as to what they had in mind, and their knowledge and their information.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Now, on the 5th of November, when you wrote this message you had certain things in mind, and that line was one of the things that you had in mind, was it not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Because at (b) you say, down on page 4:

"War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks, or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

"(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States" --

Now, there would not be any doubt as to that, that in case of any direct act of Japanese forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, it would mean war with the United States, isn't that true?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then it goes further and it says,
"The British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;"
in other words, at that time, you had in mind that in case
there was an attack, a direct act of war against the British

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies, that, as far as you were concerned, it would mean war with the United States, that is, as far as you preparing for war was concerned, and alerting?

General Marshall: You use the expression, Senator Ferguson, that it would mean war with the United States.

Senator Ferguson: I am talking about literally.

General Marshall: Our statement was that military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one of the following contingencies, and you just read one of the contingencies.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Then, on the next page:

"The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand, to the west of 100 degrees east, or south of ten degrees north, or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands."

That is the line indicated on the map.

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I am familiar with that.

Senator Ferguson: You are familiar with that?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, I refer you to Exhibit 37, page

39, and I will ask you to read that.

General Marshall: This is headed "Top Secret."

"2 December, 1941.

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"From: OPNAV

"Action: CINCAF

"Info:

"ø12356

"PRESIDENT DIRECTS THAT THE FOLLOWING BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WITHIN TWO DAYS IF POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIPT THIS DESPATCH. CHARTER THREE SMALL VESSELS TO FORM A DE-FENSIVE INFORMATION PATROL . MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TO ESTAB-LISH IDENTITY AS U.S. MEN-OF-WAR ARE COMMAND BY A NAVAL OFFICER AND TO MOUNT A SMALL GUN AND ONE MACHINE GUN WOULD SUFFICE. FILIPINO CREWS MAY BE EMPLOYED WITH MINIMUM NAVAL RATINGS TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE WHICH IS TO OBSERVE AND REPORT BY RADIO JAPANESE MOVEMENTS IN WEST CHINA SEA AND GULF OF SIAM. VESSEL TO BE STATIONED BETWEEN HAINAN AND HUE ONE VESSELL OFF THE INDOCHINA COAST BETWEEN CAMRANH BAY AND CAPE ST. JACQUES AND ONE VESSEL OFF POINTE DE CAMAU. USE OF ISABEL AUTHORIZED BY PRESIDENT AS ONE OF THE THREE BUT NOT OTHER NAVAL VESSELS. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN TO CARRY OUT PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. AT SAME TIME INFORM ME AS TO WHAT RE-CONNAISSANCE MEASURES ARE BEING REGULARLY PERFORMED AT SEA BY BOTH ARMY AND NAVY WHETHER BY AIR SURFACE VESSELS OR SUBMARINES AND YOUR OPINION AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE LATTER MEASURES."

That is the end of the message.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, General, I will ask you whether or not you ever knew that message existed?

General Marshall: I have no recollection of it, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You have no recollection of any such message, is that right?

General Marshall: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: And the reading of it does not refresh your memory in any way?

General Marshall: It does not.

Senator Ferguson: Now you have the map before you. Would you locate where those three vessels would be, and tell us how far they would be from the Philippines?

General Marshall: The first vessel between Hainan and Hue?

Senator Ferguson: Between Hainan and Hue. Hue is on the China Coast across the Island of Hainan. Do you see that Hainan?

General Marshall: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Do you see Hue just across?

General Marshall: Hue is what I am hunting for.

A little south. Senator Ferguson:

General Marshall: Oh, yes, I see it now. That covers the Strait between Hainan and Northcentral French Indochina, which would be the Japanese course for vessels sailing out of

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Haiphong, coming down the coast all the way from Hongkong.

As to the distance from the Philippines, I would have to guess at that. I should say it was about three or four hundred miles.

Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

General Marshall: Three or four hundred miles.

Senator Ferguson: Three or four hundred miles?

General Marshall: Yes. Now the next point --

Senator Ferguson: I would just like to ask you a few questions about that. That would be for information?

General Marshall: Presumably so.

Senator Ferguson: Were you attempting to get information of ships going south to Singapore? Would not that be the purpose of such a vessel being placed there?

General Marshall: Ships going south anywhere in the China Sea.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, ships going anywhere south in the China Sea. They may go around the point, they may go around to the Kra Peninsula?

General Marshall: They may be going around the point, they may be going to New Guinea.

Senator Ferguson: You would not say we were looking for ships going to the Philippines at that point, would you?

General Marshall: No, sir, unless an expedition against the Philippines, by some strange quirk, would be based on

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

the coast of Indochina, or near Haiphong. Of course an expedition against the southern Philippines might be quite far south. Presumably an expedition against the Philippines would be based more north, in Formosa.

Senator Ferguson: That is right. Now take the next ships.

General Marshall: Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques.

I am familiar with those two places.

Senator Ferguson: You are?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is down around --

General Marshall: Well, that is on the southeastern coast of French Indochina and I should imagine the distance from Manila, rather, is probably some 600 miles. I am merely guessing.

Senator Ferguson: Where would the ships be going there? Where would the lookout look for ships there?

General Marshall: The normal assumption is they would be headed for the southern tip of Indochina or the Gulf of Siam, or Borneo.

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Now, the next one is right at the Pointe, Pointe de Camau, and that is right at the most southerly point of the Peninsula. Do you see it there? General Marshall: Yes, I see it.

Senator Ferguson: Where would that be a lookout for? General Marshall: That would be a lookout specifically for the Gulf of Siam, I should say, and Malay Peninsula.

Senator Ferguson: That would cover ships going to the Kra Peninsula, would it not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: General, would you be of the opinion that this was a lookout to see whether or not there was going to be a movement across the line that had been designated?

General Marshall: I would not say it was necessarily that, specifically.

Senator Ferguson: What would be the purpose of this information to be obtained?

General Marshall: A general knowledge of what the Japanese were doing in the China Ses.

Senator Ferguson: And also the Gulf of Siam? General Marshall: Yes, sir, the China Sea and south into Malaysia. In the light of the various documents and discussions at that time, the most critical move was that

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson Witness Marshall which might go into the Gulf of Siam, and the southern one of these posts would very definitely relate to that. That was somewhat beyond our normal air capability of reconnaissance, although we did send some, I believe, in the general direction toward Camranh Bay at one period for three days.

Senator Ferguson: Now, General, do you know why that action was not reported to you? Would not that be very material to your thinking?

General Marshall: Well, that would be material to my thinking, yes, sir, but on the other hand, I did not have brought to my attention every detail of Navy reconnaissance.

The next states: Senator Ferguson:

"Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures."

General Marshall: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: This was for information of CINCAF, which would be Admiral Hart, would it not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you, prior to the 7th, get any information on his report as to what reconnaissance was

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10 11 13 disapproved." 13 14 General Marshall: Yes, sir. 15 voluntary air corps. 16 17 pay, and control. 10 Senator Ferguson: 19 our movement, as you interpreted the other day. 20 21

Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson being carried out, as far as the Army was concerned? General Marshall: I do not recall, sir. Senator Ferguson: You do not have any recollection on that? General Marshall: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, you have given, at the end of your memorandum -- it is on page 5 of Exhibit 16 -- you specifically make certain recommendations there.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: "That the dispatch of United States Armed Forces for intervention against Japan in China be

Senator Ferguson: Of course, that does not concern the

General Mershall: No, sir, because that was under China's

That was under the Chinese and not

"That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our own forces."

That was your recommendation, was it not?

General Marshell: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: 'Do you know whather we were furnishing

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

any supplies to Borneo or any of the other islands? Did not your first report indicate that we were?

General Marshall: In that report I gave a specific example of furnishing ammunition to the Chinese Government which had been reserved for Iceland. I think it involved 7,000 rounds, and we gave them 4,000 of those, or maybe it was 3,000, one or the other. That was to be sent by General MacArthur from Manila, and we would replace them by shipment at the same time from San Francisco.

Senator Ferguson: Was that under lend-lease? General Marshall: I assume it was, sir. I was getting it out, and the details were being taken care of by someone else.

Senator Ferguson: You do not know what it was under? General Marshall: I think it was under lend-lease, but my action was to get them started.

Senator Ferguson: Your report of 1941, your first report indicates bombs were also furnished.

General Marshall: I do not believe that is quite what 1t was, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Will you explain 1t?

General Marshall: It was necessary, we felt, to have the ability to land, and gas, and arm the B-17°s to the south of the Philippines, for two reason: One was in case

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson

we had to fly them in from Havaii by that front, and the other one was that when you are operating strategical bombing planes of that type, their capacity is greatly increased for carrying bombs, and in range if they have some place they can shuttle to, and shuttle back from.

Therefore, we directed General MacArthur to take up with the governments concerned the proposition of preparing strips that would accommodate the B-17's and that he, General MacArthur, stock those strips with gesoline and bombs.

Senator Ferguson: That was just anticipating, wasn't it, that if we got into any war, we would be using these other bases, and we would be using the ABCD plan, the Singapore plan?

General Marshall: To that extent, yes, sir. The same thing is really covered in the ABC 1 and 2 plans.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: The point here was that the B-17's would be greatly restricted in what they did from the Philippines if they had no lauding points other than in the Philippine Islands, and therefore, it was essential, in my opinion -- and I think I personally directed this myself -- that is my recollection -- that these grangements be made at Rabaul, Fort Morseby, Port Darwin, Balikpapan,

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Borneo and Singapore.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know when that material was furnished to those places?

General Marshall: The records show, and I know this, the deliveries were made and efforts to develop the strips were under way at Rabaul, at Port Morseby and Port Darwin before the outbreak of the war. My recollection is, and the records will undoubtedly show that the ship with the gasoline and bombs for Balikpapan, for Borneo and for Singapore, was just about to sail at the outbreak of the war.

Senator Ferguson: Going back just a moment to page 39 of Exhibit 37, if those lookout ships, those men-of-war, saw convoys of Jap troops moving, for instance, in the Gulf of Siam across to Kra --

General Marshall: What page, please?

Senator Ferguson: On page 39 of Exhibit 37.

General Marshall: I have it, sir.

Senator Ferguson: If you would have known that Saturday morning, the 6th, that ships were moving across the Gulf of Siam, to the Kra Peninsula, would that change your thinking, as far as the alert of the army was concerned, that is, as to what the /rmy should be doing?

General Marshall: No, sir, I do not think it would.

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Witness Mershall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: You had done then everything up to that point, and that would not have changed your mind at all?

General Morshall: I do not think it would have, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You do not think it would have?

General Marshall: It is more a confirmation than anything else.

Senator Ferguson: A confirmation. Your next is, of course, the aid to the voluntary corps, and you explained that.

The next sentence is "that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

Had there been any ultimatum, or why did you and Admiral Stark put that terse sentence there, that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan?

General Marshall: I would assume that there had been some such discussion. I do not recall now.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whom the discussion was with?

General Marshall: My assumption would be that a discussion would be with Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and probably Admiral Stark and myself present.

Senator Ferguson: Did the President confer with you on that point of whether an ultimatum was to be delivered?

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson

General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir. I might say here that Admiral Stark and myself were always on the side of trying to gain as much time as we possibly could, while I assume, and I am certain that Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and presumably the President only had the consideration of the great policies for which this Government stood, that were involved, as well as the military status in the way of potential power.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether you had any further discussions with Mr. Knox, Mr. Stimson or anyone else after that in relation to an ultimatum? That is very strong lenguage, "that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

General Marshall: I do not recall that specifically.

The only recollection I can go on now is these continued discussions as to what measures might be taken while upholding the dignity of the United States and at the same time fend off hostile action in the Pacific. Now as to the question of ultimatum or not, I do not recall that, although we made specific statements in regard to it, and it must have been a discussion of that specific nature.

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Winess Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: That would indicate that at least you had been consulted as to whether or not an ultimatum should be given?

I think that is correct, sir. General Marshall:

Senator Ferguson: And you had given a direct recommendation that no ultimatum should be given?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The next is the Joint Board Washington meeting.

"Secret minutes of meeting, November 3, 1941."

Major General William Bryden was there, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and Major General Arnold was there. Do you recall getting information at that meeting? It was immediately prior to your memo of the 5th.

General Marshall: Allow me to look at it.

Senator Ferguson: I think you were there.

General Marshall: Yes, I was present at the meeting, as it shows there. I am looking at the minutes to see whether I can get any reminder.

On the bottom of page 2 I find this heading: "Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China."

Senator Ferguson: I would like to have you read that and get what your reaction was as of the time that it was given in your presence on the 3rd.

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General Marshall: "At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schulrmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States trge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be Becessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan 1f we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia."

Senator Ferguson: I would like to ask you some questions about that. Does that refresh your memory about that being

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brought up, about the note of the 17th?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was there any discussion as to whether or not that was an ultimatum or not an ultimatum?

General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What is your opinion as to it?

General Marshall: I would say, in reading this and thinking while I was reading aloud, that the desire for the ultimatum was coming from China particularly, by General Magruder.

Senator Ferguson: Going up and reading the sentence, "He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese eggression."

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Apparently that was Schuirmann's opinion, and he said he was speaking at the request of Admiral Stark.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now was that your opinion?

General Marshall: All I can think of at this particular moment, sir, in regard to that is we were probably discussing

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

largely economic exactions or restrictions in order to influence Japan.

Senator Ferguson: What I am asking now, General, is was it your opinion that we had issued an ultimatum on the 17th to Japan? That is just what Schuirmann says, and I will read it again.

General Marshall: I am familiar with that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: What I am not familiar with is the terms of the President's message. I do not know what I knew about it at that time.

Senator Ferguson: I cannot hear you.

General Marshall: What I am not familiar with was the terms of the President's message to the Japanese Government.

Senator Ferguson: I will read it to you.

General Marshall: What I do not know that I knew at the time was the exact expressions in that message. Your question is, did I think that was an ultimatum?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: I cannot answer that. I do not recall whether I knew exactly what he had said or not. I presume probably I had heard the message, but I have no accurate memory of what I thought at that minute. I received this information, and I think the record will have to speak for

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

itself.

Senator Ferguson: In your recollection on what was being aid by Schuirmann, Captain Schuirmann, did you or did you not consider that the message of the 17th was an ultimatum?

General Marshall: I have no recollection of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now the minutes further state:

"He further stated, 'that is Schuirmann', that Mr.

Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any

idditional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and

he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared

to support further warnings by the State Department."

What was your answer to that?

General Marshall: I do not recall what my answer to that was, other than the joint memorandum of Admiral Stark and myself.

Senator Ferguson: And that ended by saying --

General Marshall: That no ultimatum be issued.

Senator Ferguson: -- that no ultimatum be issued, be delivered to Japan. Would you say then that you had advised against further warnings by the State Department?

General Marshall: I would say that at that particular time our advice was that no ultimatum be issued. Now what you mean by "further warnings" is open to considerable interpretation.

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Senator Ferguson: I just have the language of the Joint Board.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I am trying to find out what happened at that meeting. Here is what Mr. Hull wanted to know:

"Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up". Were we in a position at that time, in your opinion, to back up additional warnings?

General Marshall: That meeting was on what date? Senator Ferguson: On the 3rd day of November, 1941. General Marshall: We were not.

Senator Ferguson: Did you express yourself at that ime, when this question was brought up, along that same line? General Marshall: I do not recall, sir. The expressions

of my views must be those of the memorandum, which followed Shortly thereafter.

Senator Ferguson: That would indicate at least that you did not want an ultimatum to go to Japan.

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I next refer to paragraph a, if you want to read the next sentence. You better look at it, so if there is anything you want to bring out you may do so.

General Marshall: You mean the preceding paragraph?

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Senator Ferguson: I mean the following paragraph.

General Marshall: What I was going to read was this in relation to the question of what was generating the ultimatum idea in our minds.

"Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder" - our War Department Joint Staff representative in Chungking -"urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan."

That, to my mind, was what had precipitated this discussion.

Senator Ferguson: That is correct.

General Marshall: That is the urging of our representative there as well as the Generalissimo that we take more positive measures in our communications with Japan. Do you want me to read that?

Senator Ferguson: I do not want to pass over anything that you want to use as an explanation. You did, General, did you not, go further than the mere Chiang Kai-Shek matter? Because warnings to Japan were a different matter from what he was asking. He was asking for military aid, was he not? He wanted military intervention, did he not?

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

General Marshall: He was asking for military aid and he was asking us to take a stronger stand in our warnings to Japan. He uses the words "to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan."

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson Witness Marshall

Senator Ferguson: Then the additional warnings were general warnings; is that correct, and you discussed those? General Marshall: Just what do you mean by that? Senator Ferguson: I am referring to the statement, "Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up."

General Marshall: Well, my conception of this matter, that I have at this time, is that Mr. Hull's discussion was based on this urging of the Generalissimo and of General Magruder and he felt for us to say anything further, unless we were fully prepared to back it up, got us nowhere.

Senator Ferguson: And you were of the opinion at that time, that we were in no position to back up any other warnings?

General Marshall: That was my assumption at the time, because of the slow movement of equipment and materiel and personnel to General MacArthur.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Now, under "a" it states:

"The decision on the Far Eastern situation made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U.S.-British Staff conversations report ABC-1."

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Would you say that was a fair statement? General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Of the conditions there at that time? General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Down at the bottom of page 3;

"f. Assuming that the Fleet could be moved to the Far Erst, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless, the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present."

Was the moving of the Fleet from Pearl Harbor considered at that time?

General Marshall: My recollection is, and Admiral Stark undoubtedly can give you much more direct testimony, that the British were very desirous of the United States Government basing a considerable number of naval vessels on Singapore, and we were very much opposed to any such procedure.

Their point of view, if I may estimate, was that they had very little to build up their Far Eastern forces, because they were completely employed in trying to protect the Western approaches of the North Atlantic, and the movement of the vessels down around the southern end of Africa to get to the Middle East.

They, therefore, were in dire circumstances as to the

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Witness Mershall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
availability of shipping, naval shipping specifically.
Therefore, if we would station part of our Fleet in the
Singapore region, necessitating the base at Singapore,
that would greatly strengthen the naval situation in the
Far East, without a critical reduction in the British power
of controlling the western approaches of the North Atlantic,
and guarding the numerous convoys taking the long route
around the southern tip of Africa to get to the Middle East
and Far East.

That was the discussion that I have a fairly clear recollection of at that time; our opposition to such a move, or the British desire of such a move.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Was it your duty to defend the Fleet in Manila Bay?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, within the means at our disposal, which were almost non-existent.

Senator Ferguson: Whatever we had, but that was your province, as Chief of Staff?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The next paragraph, will you read it? General Marshall: (Reading)

"g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet iue to the lack of adequate anti-aircraft protection for the anchorage."

Senator Ferguson: Before you read the next paragraph, that was considered and you would be the man responsible for the anti-aircraft there?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: It was because you couldn't get it that it wasn't there?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you considered that at the time?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, read the next paragraph.

(Reading) General Marshall:

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of

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launching an attack in five directions; vis., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In the case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and Army forces becomes available.

"Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the Fleet strength at the present time is seriously handloapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the

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impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks."

Senator Ferguson: Now, I want to ask you some questions about the two paragraphs.

There were two parts as far as we were concerned. In the first paragraph it states:

"In the case of Japanes attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack."

That is what you gave us before, that war with one meant war with the other. An attack on one meant an attack on the other.

But not in this case:

"In case of a Japanese attack against Siberia."

In that case a different set of facts existed; isn't that correct?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: There you said we should not declare war. Then, we should not declare war if they went into Thailand.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you consider all parts of Thailand or just east of 100° East?

General Marshall: I couldn't tell you at this time, ar.

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Senator Ferguson: " *** or China through Yunnan." That is exactly what the Generalissimo was asking you about. You said in those three cases we should not declare war.

General Marshall: Might I interrupt, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: You are saying "you". This isn't my ostimate. This is a Naval estimate.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I will withdraw the "you".

Was it discussed there that the United States in the one case would declare war or would consider it as an act of war and in the other should not declare war and did you agree with that discussion?

General Marshall: I don't recall the terms of discussion, sir. I have stated before that my own feeling was that if the Japanese appeared in the Gulf of Siam that war was inevitable and we would be in a very critical situation if we didn't immediately take some action to try to control it.

Senator Ferguson: This memorandum went to the President, did it not, General?

General Marshall: This I thought we were reading was the minutes of a meeting.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, but it is attached, and was delivered to us, attached as a memo for the President.

General Marshall: My understanding of this we were

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

reading from were the minutes of a Joint Board meeting of discussions which occurred in the office of the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not the minutes were attached to the memo that went to the President? They were attached when handed to us.

General Marshall: That is the memorandum of Admiral Stark and myself to the President?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir.

General Marshall: Attached to those minutes? I will have to check up.

Senator Ferguson: Will you check up and let us have that information?

General Marshall: This should show it, the actual memorandum.

Senator Ferguson: Would you not desire to give to the President the information upon which your opinion was based, and part of it is stated in this memorandum, is it not, the Joint Board minutes?

General Marshall: I have got the wrong paper here.

This record copy does not show that that was communicated to the President.

I might say that the purpose of the memorandum such as Admiral Stark and I signed jointly here was to give the

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President, in readily readable form, our views. There are many factors that go into our reaching those views. If we recited all those in each instance, and this particular item you refer to may have gone to the President, I do not know that it did, we would merely lengthen the document he would have to read.

All I can say now is that the record handed me of the joint communication from Admiral Stark and myself shows no indication that the minutes of the meeting of the Joint Board of that date were sent to the President.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any discussion with Admiral Ingersoll or anyone at that meeting on the 3rd in relation to the State Department's impression "that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks"?

General Marshall: It states on page 4, at the bottom of the page, the last paragraph, preceding a discussion of the situation by Admiral Ingersoll:

"General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations."

I would say that that generally is probably the sense of what I said at the meeting.

Senator Ferguson: Now:

"The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5."

What information had you and what did you anticipate would happen?

I would have General Marshall: I don't recall, sir. to go back through all the information given me from G-2 to I am not conscious now of the specific find out what that was. thing.

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know that on that date or whortly after they gave a deadline date of the 25th of November?

General Marshall: I recall most distinctly that they gave a deadline date of the 25th, which they later changed to the 29th.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Did you have intelligence information on the 5th that action was to be taken in relation to this deadline date of the 25th?

General Marshall: I would have to check up. I don't recall, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Would you check on that and let us have your best information. That would be material to this questioning.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, you also spoke again, and I wish you would read what you said. "General Marshall emphasized". I want to get your opinion there.

Just a moment, before you read that I will ask you a question in relation to the other paragraph.

Did we move along as fast as you had anticipated so that by the middle of December the Army Force in the Philippines would have impressive strength or did we fail to get the men there?

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General Marshall: We were delayed materially in getting them in, but part of that delay was known at that particular time, I think, in November. The length of the delay on the West Coast in flying the planes out we were not aware of at that time.

I think I was probably aware of the delay of the delivery of planes, referring to the flying fortresses, from the factory. I was aware of delay in obtaining certain shipping. I was not aware until sometime later, as a matter of fact, I think after December 7, of the delay in arranging convoys from Hawaii to the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson: Did you advise the State Department on those items of delay?

General Marshall: I assume that I mentioned these facts in the presence of Mr. Hull because they were very pertinent to our situation.

Senator Ferguson: The next may refresh your memory.

You spoke, apparently. "General Marshall emphasized the
point." Do you want to read that?

General Marshall: What page?

Senator Ferguson: Page 5.

General Marshall: Does it begin with the words "emphasized the point"?

Senator Ferguson: Yes. I though you might want to look

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Witness Marshall at what you had said.

3316 Questions by: Senator Ferguson

General Marshall: I thought I just read what I had said.

Senator Ferguson: But down in the next paragraph you had something to say.

General Marshall: (Reading)

"General Marshall emphazied the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful are and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiencly developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the pasis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions Eight be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions."

Senator Ferguson: Whose language, General, is this:

"Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation"?

General Marshall: That is not a direct quotation of my language. That is the officer's notes of the meeting, the sense of my expression.

Senator Ferguson: That was the sense of your expression? General Marshall: Yes, sir.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: You were of the opinion at that time that that was true?

Yes, sir. General Marshall:

And so expressed yourself. Senator Ferguson:

Yes, sir. General Marshall:

I notice that it doesn't say whether --Senator Ferguson: was the State Department present at that meeting?

General Marshall:

They would not be present? Senator Ferguson:

They would not ordinarily be present. General Marshall:

Senator Ferguson: Would they get this information?

General Marshall: Not necessarily.

Senator Ferguson: Then I notice: (Reading)

"War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines: ***

Now, did that only cover the Yunnan situation, the China lituation, or the whole Far East?

General Marshall: I will have to glance through this to May I read what the items were? Bee.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

(Reading) General Marshall:

"The memorandum would take the following lines:

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"Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.

"Oppose U.S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.

"Oppose the movement and employment of U.S. military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.

"Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

"Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.

"Point out the effect and cost a U.S .- Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U.S.

"Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U.S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

"On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines! Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying all United States and British requirements."

Do you wish me to go ahead?

Senatur Ferguson: No.

So it was to be a general memorandum covering the Far East? General Marshall: Yes, sir.

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senstor Ferguson

Senstor Ferguson: Rather than just the particular movements in China?

General Marshall: Yes, sir; evidently brought to a head by the Generalissimo and General Magruder's appeals.

Senator Ferguson: Now, notwithstanding what happened at this meeting, do I understand that things did grow more tense and you, as Chief of Staff, knew it from that date on?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Can you account for why it grew more tense?

General Marshall: My recollection on that would be that the continued Japanese movements south in the direction of Malaysia, Indonesia, the general tone of their communications, the tone of the reports that appeared in magic, a large number of details of that nature, which taken all together, gave a very serious and forbidding aspect to the situation.

Senator Ferguson: General, I want to take you to the November 27, 1941, memorandum for the President, subject "Far Eastern Situation," because it relates to the same question. It starts out by saying:

"If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack."

That would indicate that, going from the 5th to the 27th,

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that you saw a different situation, would it not; that it was more tense?

General Marshall: Well, as I just said, I thoughtit continued to grow tense.

Senator Ferguson: That would indicate that you had expressed it there in writing -- had you not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, in the first memo, I notice that the Hawalian Command, or the Hawalian Islands are not mentioned.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson; How do you account for that?

General Marshall: We were discussing here offensive operations.

Senator Ferguson: You stated "in five directions" and you didn't state any direct moving on Pearl Harbor or the Hawaiian Islands.

General Marshall: We were discussing general operations, a combination of naval and land aggressive moves, which wouldmaintain themselves in the business of penetrating still further. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a slash, but not a proposed invasion at all. Simisrly, we anticipated as I told you, Guam would be in trouble, and probably Wake What we foresaw and what actually happened was Island.

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson a general offensive move south of the China Sea into Malaysia, Indonesia, and the New Guinea region, and possibly Australia.

The scope at Pearl Harbor was to lessen the possibility of our action against such a general movement. The direction of the campaign was as discussed by G-2 to the effect that the Japanese would not attack in Manchuria, but would strike south.

That is what they actually did.

Senator Ferguson: General, there you mentioned one thing, that this attack on Pearl Herbor was an attack to avoid our Fleet. In effect, that is what I took from what you said.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Avoid our Fleet being used against their movement?

General Marshall: To the south.

Senator Ferguson: To the south, which you were anticipating there?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When did the General Staff first anticipate that such a move may be made?

General Marshall: That is the move to the south?

Senator Ferguson: No, to take our fleet off, so as to allow them to go to the south?

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General Marshall: I don't know that the General Staff

Specifically at any moment, figured out a time when they

would strike at the Fleet. We did feel that if we put any

of our vessels out at Singapore, aside from the difficulties

of maintenance, that they would be under the hazard of

Japanese air in that vicinity.

We had assumed that in Pearl Harbor we had a reasonably secure base for the fleet.

Senator Ferguson: What was the occasion for writing the memorandum on the 27th?

General Marshall: I believe the record will probably .
show that there was a meeting on it with the President just
preceding that. Does the record show that?

Mr. Gesell: On the 24th, I think.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether this memorandum was written after the message to General Short dated the 27th or before?

General Marshall: I would assume the record from War Plans Division will show, regarding which General Gerow will testify. It probably was written before because it takes a great deal of care in preparing such a memorandum.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not this

November 27 memorandum for the President was a confirmation

of an oral statement that you had given the President?

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

General Marshall: There is another memorandum from General Gerow to me dated November 27 which may answer the question, if you will give a minute.

In a memorandum to me on November 27, with the stamped notation November 28, when it was noted by the Chief of Staff and noted by the Deputy Chief of Staff, regarding the Far Eastern situation, this appears in the second paragraph, following a number of items relating to the alert messages -- possibly I had better read the whole memorandum.

Senator Ferguson: I want to ask you some questions in relation to that,

You believe then that the one of November 27 was brought about by the memorandum signed by General Gerow? General Marshall: No. He is stating what happened here, and I am getting my hint from what he states.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

General Marshall (reading):

November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

"I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me had telephoned

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both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

"2. Later in the morning I attended a conference with
the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark.
The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and
to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General
MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved; (copy attached).
The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum
you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President."

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I am not reading from the memo now. That was the memorandum you questioned me with regard to, Senator. (Reading)

"The Secretary of W ar wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

"Both the message and the memorandum were shown to
the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor chauses
in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached)."
That is the memorandum of November 27th signed by Admiral
Stark and myself. Just when I signed it I do not recall because I was not here on the 27th.

Senator Ferguson: General, do I understand that this refreshes your memory so that exhibit 17, which is the memorandum for the President, dated November the 27th, is the same memorandum that is mentioned in the second paragraph of the letter that you have just read?

General Marshall: I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, I want to ask you some questions on that particular letter. On November the 27th, apparently, this memorandum was prepared, Number 17, was it not, because

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen.Ferguson

it is dated that day?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. The presumption is it was probably prepared on the 26th.

Senator Ferguson: On the 26th?

General Marshall: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Apparently you had not seen that, your letter that you read from, until the 28th. It says, "November 28th: Noted: Chief of Staff."

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is when you would see it?

General Marshalls Presumably that is when I signed it.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not that was prepared by someone else for you?

General Marshall: It was drafted, I am quite certain, in the War Plans Division following the discussions at the meeting of the Joint Army and Navy Board on the morning of November 26th. As I left at about one o'clock, left Washington and did not return until the late evening of the 27th, so the assumption would be and General Gerow can give you direct testimony, that following our discussions, meaning wine and Admiral Stark's and the other officers, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the Air Cor ps, General Gerow and other officers and their opposites on the Navy side, - following those discussions General Garow undertook the preparation of

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

this memorandum and also at the same time he was preparing the drafts of the alert messages, all of those, presumably that afternoon and night of November 26th and maybe on the early morning of the 27th. As I was not in Washington on the 27th my assumption would be that I signed this message, - this memorandum on the morning of the 28th.

Senator Ferguson: So certain things were taken up when you returned and on the morning of the 28th these matters were taken up with you:

First, the Secretary of War at 9:30 on the 27th -- that is the previous day -- had called General Gerow. "He sent for me" -- meaning he sent for Gerow.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, why would he sent for General Gerow and not send for General Bryden? Had you left word as to who would have authority to act while you were away?

General Marshall: No, sir. That would be a matter of routine. When I am absent the Deputy Chief of Staff acts.

Senator Ferguson: Well, had you known there was to be a memorandum prepared before you left?

General Marshall: My assumption would be that I knew that such a memorandum was to be prepared just as I had discussed the preparation of the alert messages before my departure.

Senator Ferguson: Well, it says here that "The Secretary" -- that is the Secretary of War -- "wanted to know what warning messages had been sent to General MacArthur."

Gener al Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: "And what were proposed."

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, there is no mention there about sending any to General Short?

General Marshall: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: But the Secretary of "ar was questioning General Gerow, and your Deputy Chief of Smaff, General Bryden, as to what messages were sent to MacArthur.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That would indicate that at that particular moment he did not know what had been sent to General MacArthur?

General Marshall: That would be correct, sir. Nothing had been sent I do not think.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. (Reading)

"I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24."

Now, let us get that message. It is in exhibit 37, page 32. Now, wouldn't that indicate, General, that the message

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

General Marshall: Just a moment, please, Senator.

Mr. Gesell: It is the same one.

General Marshall: It is the same one?

Mr. Gesell: It is the same message.

Senator Ferguson: Wouldn't that indicate that at that particular time when they were conferring that the message of the 27th had not been sent yet, because he said, "I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November the 24th."

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Wouldn't that indicate that?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Or he would have also presented the other message.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, let us read this message. "e find first that the action -- and "action" there indicates who is to act on it; "information" means that it is at least for their information but not necessarily action by them, so it is the Chief of Naval Operations. (Reading)

"ACTION CINCAF"; that is Admiral Stark?.

Mr. Gesell: Hart.

Senator Ferguson: That is Admiral Hart, is it not? That is Admiral Hart, yes.

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Sen. Ferguson I think so. General Marshall: Senator Ferguson: That is Admiral Hart for action? I think so. General Marshall: "CINCPAC"; that is Admiral Kimmel Senator Ferguson: for action? General Marshall: Yes, sir. Senator Ferguson: "COM11", Where is 11? 8 General Marshall: I don't know, sir. Those are the various naval districts, 11, 12, 13, 15. I presume the 10 Naval District in the Philippines, the one in Hawaii, the one 11 12 on the West Coast and the one in Alaska. Senator Ferguson: General, Hawail is not in there. 13 General Marshall: Well, I --1-1 Senator Ferguson: Hawaii 1s 14. How do you account 15 16 for --The Chairman: Let the General answer. He did not fin-17 ish his answer. 18 General Marshall: I was endeavoring to say what 11, 10 12, 13 and 15 meant. 20 31 Senator Ferguson: All right. General Marshall: I mentioned Hawaii and you say 14 23 23 is Hawaii?

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from the record.

Senator Ferguson: I am so informed. I find that out

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

General Marshall: Probably you are right, sir. I have not got it memorized.

Senator Ferguson: Counsel, would you help us on 14? Is that Hawail?

Mr. Mitchell: The 14th Naval District is on Oahu, the Hawaiian Islands.

Senator Ferguson: Not the Navy. I am talking about the "rmy .

Mr. Mitchell: These are all Navy.

Senator Ferguson: Oh, these are all Navy?

General Marshall: These are all Navy, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: 14 1s on Hawa11?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: The "action" is Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Senator Fergusons Later we get a notice from the Army to the Navy. Now, will you read the message?

General Marshall: (Rading)

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to compliarea. cate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately."

Senator Ferguson: Now, general, this "CINCPAC", that would be "dmiral Kimmel?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Sen tor Ferguson: That would indicate there that the Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch?

General Marshall: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: That would be you?

That is correct. General Marshall:

Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

"Concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior army officers their areas."

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, that would indicate that Admiral Kimmel should have notified General Short of this message?

Yes, sir. General Marshall:

And Admiral Hart should have notified Senator Ferguson: General MacArthur of the message?

Yes, sir. General Marshall:

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: That means that it is action for all parties?

General Marshall: Within their spheres.

Senator Ferguson: Within the limitation of action as outlined?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, would you know why information was sent to "SPENAVO", meaning the British?

General Marshall: Does "Spenavo" mean the British or mean our representatives over there?

Mr. Mitchell: The Naval attache, isn't it, in London?
Mr. Gesell: That is right.

Mr. Mitchell: Our Naval attache in London.

Senator Ferguson: Is that what it means?

Mr. M1tchell: I so understand.

Senator Ferguson: All right. What does "CINCLANT" mean, do you know?

General Marshall: I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson: General Mitchell, have you information on that?

Mr. Mitchell: I guess it was the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, but I am not sure. Is that right?

General Marshall: That is probably right.

Senator Ferguson: It sounds like that now when you get

the words and the letters lined up with it.

a joint message had been sent to the Asiatic Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, to notify the Army tops of those two places, which would mean the Philippines and Hawaii and that would indicate this was written before the 27th note, would it not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, how do you account for the fact that they are talking about General MacArthur and what was proposed and no mention is made about General Short?

General Marshall: My reaction to that woold be this, that they felt an attack on the Philippines was a very certain proposition and an attack on Guam was probably a certainty. They do not mention Wake, they do not mention Hawaii, they do not mention the Aleutians and they do not mention the West Coast of the United States.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, going back to the message that we read on page 32, exhibit 37, the one that you had seen. Why was that message sent on the 24th?

General Marshall: Will you identify that for me again, please?

Senator Ferguson: It is on page 32.

Mr. Mitchell: The messare appears in two books, General. You have the Army book; and the same message ap-

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

pears in the Navy. The Senator is giving you the Navy page. It is the same one you were looking at.

General Marshall: That is the same mess age you were referring to?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: What was the question, please, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: I want to know what was the occasion for sending the message on the 24th? What happened? Wy was there a message sent: (Reading)

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including" -then he specifies two particular places, Philippines or Guam -- "is a possibility, Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas."

Now, what was there that caused you to alert the Army and Navy in the Philippines and not Hawaii, if we consider that an alert?

General Marshall: I will have to go back and refresh my memory from the records. I do not recall the meetings that

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

had occurred on that day or the preceding day. I haven't the data right here.

Senator Ferguson: "ell, now, General, up to this particular time, on November 24th, do you know of any alerts given to either the Philippines or Hawaii?

General Marshall: Not since the preceding summer.

Senator Ferguson: Not since 1940 when the alert was given to General Herron?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So is this an alert?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I would consider it such.

Senator Ferguson: This is considered an alert?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, will you tell us what happened immediately preceding, or any time preceding that caused you to alert the Far East, including Hawaii?

General Marshall: Well, I assume, Senator, that some information came in about that time and there may have been some meetings about that time and I do not recall that at this time. I will have to check it.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator to yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: This is not done for the purpose of inter-

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1s a message on page 99.

Witness Marshall

rupting but I want to help.

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: I want all the help I can get. Mr. Murphy: The deadline on page 100 was the 25th, that was the last day the Japanese would wait, and there

Senator Ferguson: I am going to out those in later. Mr. Murphy: There is a message on page 90. That might be the answer.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I will try to refresh the General's memory.

Was it because there had been a deadline set that you alerted these two places?

General Marshall: I could not say, sir. I will have to check that up.

Senator Ferguson: Could you check it over the noon hour, General?

General Marshall: I will try to do that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, we will develop (Reading) next:

"I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram."

"The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram."

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Was there ever an appropriate cablegram prepared to send a message as wanted by the President to the Philippines? If so, what is the message?

General Marshall: If the reference is to the message to the High Commissioner of the Philippines, there was one sent on the 26th of November 1941 by the Navy, Admiral Stark's initials and name and presumably the signature is on it, for the High Commissioner of the Philippines reading as follows --

Senator Ferguson: Before you read it: Were you familiar with the instrument sent on the 26th of November, being exhibit 45, from the President to the High Commissioner? Did you know about that?

General Marshall: I do not recall, sir, because I think that was sent -- it may have been discussed at the meeting of the Joint Board that morning but it was sent after my departure.

Senator Ferguson: I am just wondering about that sentence, how that sentence could refer to the High Commissioner's message which was sent on the 26th and this meeting has not taken place until the 27ths

"I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram."

Would you say that Admiral Stark had anything to do with the -- yes, he did. It says: "From OPNAV, H. R.

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Now, to go ahead a little further with this? "I told him I would consult "dmiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram." We know that on the 26th the message had gone from the

same paper?

Witness Marshall

Mr. Gesell: Do you have 1t?

General Marshall: I have 1t.

Stark, November 26, 1941." That appears at the top.

Senator Ferguson: Have you anyone in your office that could aid you to make it clear, to sithere with you and to ald you on some of these things you are being asked?

President to the High Commissioner. How could that be the

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I will get somebody.

Mr. Mitchell: We can handle it, Senator, if we know specifically. We can give the General the right documents if we know the particular message you are referring to specifically.

Senator Ferguson: I am trying to find out.

Mr. Mitchell: Are you referring to the warning sent to MacArthur on the 27th?

Senator Ferguson: No. I am trying to find this mes-Bage .

What message? Mr. Mitchell:

This memorandum dated November the Senator Ferguson:

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

27th from Gerow to the Chief of Staff, at the end of the first paragraph, two sentences:

"The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I" -- meaning I take it Gerow -- "told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate oablegram."

Mr. Gesell: That must be the 27th.

Mr. Mitchell: That is the warning message of the 27th.

Mr. Gesell: That is the warning message of the 27th.

Senator Ferguson: "11 right. I am trying to get it from the General, what he knows about it.

General Marshall: This message --

Senator Ferguson: Will you give me where it is?

General Marshall: It is on page 9 of exhibit 32.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

. General Marshall: A telegraphic message between the War Department and Hawaii. It reads as follows:

> "PRIORITY NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

"COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

MANILA, PoI.

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only barest possibilities that Japanese Government might come back and offer to

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in revised Rainbow Five which was delivered to you by General Brereton. Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request you notify Harto

(Signed) MARSHALL."

Now, do I understand then, General, Senator Ferguson: that you never saw that message before it wentout?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir. I was engaged in the discussions regarding the preparation of it, I think, on the morning of the 26th before my departure.

The Chairman: It is now 12 o'clock and the committee "111 recess until 2.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order. The Chairman was detained for a moment or two.

Does counsel have anything at this time before General Marshall resumes his testimony?

Mr. Mitchell: No.

The Vice Chairman: Do you have anything before you resume your testimony, General?

General Marshall: No, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson will continue his inquiry.

Whereupon,

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL was resumed, as follows:

Senator Ferguson: General, if you will take the letter now before you, of November 27, from General Gerow to you, I want to ask you some questions about that letter.

I notice in the letter, as I asked this morning, Gerow speaking:

"I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24."

The next sentence:

"I then showed him a copy of the draft message you disoussed at the Joint Board meeting."

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

I will ask counsel do we have a copy of that draft message?

Mr. Mitchell: We have never been able to locate it.

Senator Ferguson: The answer is, General, they say
they have never been able to locate it.

General Marshall: It would, presumably, be in the files of the War Plans Division or the present Operations Division. General Gerow will have to testify in regard to that.

Senator Ferguson: I will ask counsel, Have we ever had the Joint Board meeting, and that may tell us what was in the message.

Mr. Gesell: Yes. We have the minutes right here, Senator, Senator Ferguson: Do we have those?

Mr. Gesell: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: They have been distributed?

Mr. Gesell: They don't make any reference to this so they weren't distributed.

(The paper referred to was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Senator Ferguson: General, do you have the paper before you?

Mr. Mitchell: No, that is the only copy.

Senator Ferguson: I mean the letter I am speaking of.
Would you show him the letter dated November 27 from General

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson Gerow.

General Marshall: I had it here this morning, Senator, but it seems to have disappeared.

Now, I have 1t.

Senator Ferguson: "I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting."

Do you know when that meeting was held?

General Marshall: My recollection is that that meeting was held on the night of November 26, just prior to my departure from Washington.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what time you left here on the 26th?

General Marshall: I do not remember now, sir. I can obtain that data.

Senator Ferguson: Now, what message was he speaking about there "a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting." What kind of a message was that?

General Marshall: My recollection of the matter is that at that Joint Board meeting, we discussed the question of an alert message and that that is to what General Gerow is referring.

He should be able to state positively what it is he is . talking about, because he committed himself in writing on the subject.

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Witness Marshall

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Normally, in peacetime, General Gerow would not have charge of this, would he?

General Marshall: What do you mean by "have charge"?

Senator Ferguson: Charge of such a message of action.

General Marshall: He would have charge of the preparation of such a message.

Senator Ferguson: In peacetime?

General Marshall: In peacetime.

Senator Ferguson: What was the Operations Division?

General Marshall: The Operations Division of the General Staff, which I tried to explain the other day, labors in peacetime under a misnomer, and it does today also, I think. It is the division charged with the organizational factors in the Army and with matters that pertain to maneuvers, training operations in this country. But it had no direct connection whatsoever with matters of war and the overseas theatres.

Senator Ferguson: Did you assign any of this work to your Deputy?

General Marshall: Not specifically, sir. My Deputy,
General Bryden, attended the meetings of the Joint Board.

He was a member of that by virtue of the fact that he was
a deputy. He was kept conversant with the various sessions.

Senator Ferguson: Did he have access to magic?

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Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson

General Marshall: I don't know whether he received delivery of magic or not. That will have to be answered by General Bryden himself. I know magic was discussed in the Joint Board meetings.

Senator Ferguson: How could General Bryden operate in your absence, if he didn't have access to magic?

General Marshall: General Bryden sat in the discussions of what should be done, or why it should be done, or what should not be done in the meetings of the Joint Board. He was, therefore, aware of those sessions.

Senator Ferguson: Nov, going on in this message:
"Mr. Hull stated" --

I don't want to leave out the next word --

Do you know why, if we have the minutes here of this meeting here that no mention is made of this message?

General Marshall: I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson: It was an important matter?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. A very important matter.