

Permanent residence and status; FUKUI Prefecture - Nobility.

Date of birth; 12 November 1893.

Name; MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa - Bachelor of Laws - Marquis

Former status;

Former Name;

- 29 March 1905; graduated from the ordinary course of the primary School of the Tokyo Higher Normal School.
- 30 March 1907; graduated from the Higher Primary School of the same.
- 31 March 1912; graduated from the Middle School of the same.
- 31 March 1916; graduated from the Peers' School, Senior Department, First Section.
- 1 July 1916; Entered the KYOTO Imperial University, Law Department, administration and economics courses.
- 5 July 1919; Passed the Bachelor of Laws Examination in the same University, the same Department.
- 12 November 1913; Conferred with the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade, by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 12 August 1919; Conferred with the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade, by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 1 December 1920; Enlisted as a one-year volunteer in the 3rd Infantry Regiment, Imperial Guards.
- 30 November 1921; Released upon expiration of his term of service.
- " " " ; Appointed a sergeant, Intendance.
- 1 April 1922; Given non-regular duty as political science instructor at the MEIJI University by MEIJI University.
- 1 April 1923; Given non-regular duty as political science instructor at the NIPPON University by NIPPON University.
- 31 March 1924; Commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant, Intendance.
- 1 July 1924; Appointed an assistant professor at MEIJI University by MEIJI University.
- 20 August 1924; Went abroad to study political science in England and France. Returned to Japan in November, 1928.
- 5 December 1927; Conferred with the 4th Court, Junior Grade, by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 1 December 1928; Appointed a professor at MEIJI University by MEIJI University.
- 15 December 1930; Appointed a peer upon succeeding to the headship of his family. By the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- " " " ; Became a member of the House of Peers.
- 9 November 1932; Appointed a member of the Rice Control Inquiry Commission by the Cabinet.
- 30 September 1933; Appointed a member of the Peers' School Board of Trustees by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 2 July 1934; Conferred with the 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 1934; The post of member of the Rice Control Inquiry Commission abolished in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 256.
- 1 September 1934; Appointed a member of the Inquiry Commission on Rice Policy by the Cabinet. Abolished in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 22 of 1936.
- 8 August 1935; Appointed a member of the Inquiry Commission on Weights and Measures by the Cabinet.
- 29 April 1934; Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 4th Class, for services in the 1931-1934 Incident. *Imperial Household Minister.*
- 13 June 1936; Appointed chief private secretary to the ~~Imperial Household~~ Minister. Given the second rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 13 " " ; Given the second salary grade by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 13 July " ; Released from membership in the Inquiry Commission on Weights and Measures at own request by the Cabinet.
- 17 June 1939; Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 3rd Class.
- 20 July 1939; Promoted to the first rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.

- 15 July 1940: Conferred with the 3rd Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 19 October 1940: Given the first salary grade by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 29 April 1940: Decorated with the Medium Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun for services in the China Incident.
- 10 April 1945: Given the first salary grade by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 24 November 1945: The post of chief private secretary to the Imperial Household Minister abolished in accordance with Imperial Household Directive No. 41.
- " " " : Appointed Chief of the Archives Division /IN: possible Imperial Ordinance Division/, the Imperial Household Ministry.
- 17 January 1946: Given the first rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Imperial Household Ministry.
- 25 January 1946: Appointed Director of the Bureau of Peerage and Heraldry.
- 25 January 1946: Given the first rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 25 January 1946: Appointed a member of the Committee on compilation of Emperor Meiji's Biography For Publication by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- Appointed an investigating officer of the Inquiry Commission on the Imperial Family and Nobility /of Korea/ by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- Appointed a member of the Peers' School Board of Trustees by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- Appointed a member of the budget committee by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 5 October 1946: Appointed acting director of the Peers' School by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- " " " : Appointed a member of the budget committee by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 18 October " : Released from appointment as acting director of the Peers' School by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 7 March 1947: Ordered to serve concurrently in the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 7 March 1947: Given the first salary grade by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 7 March 1947: Specially accorded treatment befitting the SHINNIN rank.
- 7 March 1947: Appointed Chief of the Board of Ceremonies by the Imperial Household Ministry.
- 2 May 1947: Imperial Household Directives and appurtenant directives abolished after 2 May 1947 in accordance with Imperial Household Directive No. 12.
- 3 May 1947: Appointed an administrative official of the Imperial Household Department and, concurrently, a Master of Ceremonies.
- 3 May 1947: Given the first salary grade by the Cabinet.
- 23 April 1947: Appointed chief of the Board of Ceremonies by the cabinet.
- 23 April 1947: Appointed chief of the Main Line Section, Bureau of Peerage and Heraldry, and, concurrently, acting chief of the General Affairs Section, Bureau of Peerage and Heraldry, by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Civil Intelligence Section

General Activities
APO 500
17 September 1947

SUBJECT: MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa, Marquis

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Address: No. 911, Yoyogi Nishihara, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo-to.

Born: 12 November 1893.

- Mar 1914 - Graduated from College of Political Science, Kyoto Imperial University.
- Aug 1924 - Sent abroad to England and France to study Political Science.
- Dec 1930 - Succeeded his father as Marquis. Appointed member of House of Peers.
- Sep 1933 - Appointed Councillor of Peer's School.
- Jun 1936 - Appointed Chief Secretary to the Grand Keeper of the Privy Seal.
- Nov 1945 - Appointed Chief of Inner Court Document Section of Board of Chamberlains.
- Jan 1946 - Appointed President of Peerage Bureau.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Object
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Def. Doc. No. 2750
Tōgō

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

MATSUDAIRA YASUMASA

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I had known Mr. Tōgō Shigenori before I became private secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, in which position I served from June 1936 till November 1945. My acquaintance with Mr. Tōgō became more intimate after he assumed the Foreign Ministership in the Tōjō Cabinet.

2. On 6 April 1945 Admiral Suzuki received an Imperial order to form a cabinet. As I was informed that the Admiral had asked Mr. Tōgō to accept the Foreign portfolio, but that Mr. Tōgō was hesitating to accept the offer, I called on him on 9 April at his residence in Azabu and expressed the desire that he should assume the post that was offered. On that occasion Mr. Tōgō told me that Admiral Suzuki was desirous of terminating the war and that he and the Admiral were in agreement in principle in that respect but that whereas he believed that it was extremely difficult to continue the war and that it must be terminated as soon as possible, the Admiral thought that it could, depending on circumstances, be continued two or three years more; and that so long as he and the Admiral entertained different opinions on this point, they could not agree on the high policy regarding the war; and that he could not accept the Foreign portfolio under such circumstances. I thereupon told him that the opinion of Admiral Suzuki on that point, as I had observed, was not necessarily a fixed one, and that it was desired that Mr. Tōgō should enter the new cabinet and enlighten the Admiral in that respect; that it was known that the Emperor was considering the termination of the war, so that he need not worry about the point too much; and that it was urgently desired that he should contribute his strength to the Emperor. The reason that I desired Mr. Tōgō to assume the ministership was that the war could not be terminated in the domestic circumstances then prevailing without a Foreign Minister who had unusual sincerity and the determination even to risk his life, as well as superior brilliance, and that I could not find any such candidate for the post other than Mr. Tōgō. As I reported the conversation with Mr. Tōgō to Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido, the latter told me that it was his hope that Mr. Tōgō would accept the Foreign portfolio. Thereupon I called Mr. Tōgō on the telephone to convey this message and again to request him to accept the ministership.

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O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Matsudaira Yasumasa (seal)

On this 18th day of February, 1947

At International Military Tribunal
for the Far East

Deponent: Matsudaira Yasumasa (seal)

I, Katō Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: Katō Denjirō (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
14 April 1947

3 October 1947

HIROTA

MATSUDAIRA - Direct

Page

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* DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa
BY MR. HANAI

The witness identified and verified Exhibit 3292 as his affidavit.

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* The affidavit stated that the witness was Chief Secretary under Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO from June 1936 to November 1945, and learned many things ex-officio from the Lord Keeper or others as to the progress of the senior statesmen's meeting and the State Councillors held in the presence of the Emperor. He often had opportunity to call on HIROTA by the orders of the Lord Keeper or to sit with him at various meetings. In most of these cases, he told the witness with regard to the Cabinet that there was a necessity of adjusting the eccentric way of the military and there was no other way but to have military leaders occupy responsible positions and assume * the helm of state with a strict control over the military, and that civil statesmen lacked such capacity. As to the Imperial Headquarters, its constitution should be enlarged by appointing senior statesmen to its staff instead of constituting it exclusively with military and naval officers.

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DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOZUMI
Council for KIDO

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Reference was made to the affidavit where the witness stated there was no other way to adjust the eccentric ways of the military than to have military leaders occupy responsible posts. Asked if HIROTA was one of the senior statesmen when he expressed this opinion, the witness said that he heard from HIROTA as such. * At that time the witness was Chief Secretary to Lord Keeper KIDO and he reported HIROTA's opinion to KIDO. He had met HIROTA prior to the statesmen's conference on 17 October 1941 and knew he entertained this opinion.

The witness did not recall whether KIDO only listened to HIROTA's opinion or spoke of it.

Kido



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

{
{ A F F I D A V I T
{ of
{ MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa

1. I, MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa, make oath and say as follows:

2. The contents of this affidavit are based on facts within my own knowledge and on conversations I have had with various people as hereinafter set forth.

3. I was born in Tokyo in 1893. I graduated from Peers School in 1912 and from the Imperial University of Kyoto Taisho 8. After graduating from college I became a lecturer at Meiji University. On graduating from college I was a lecturer of political science and European political philosophy at Meiji University for approximately 15 years. During this time I traveled in Europe, spending two years in England and two years in France. In 1930 when I succeeded to my father's title I also became a Member of the House of Peers. In June, 1936, when Marquis Kido resigned as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal I was appointed his successor by the Minister of the Imperial Household, Matsudaira, Tsuneo. Upon the recommendation of Prince Saionji, Baron Harada and Marquis Kido, I served as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Yuasa, Kurahei, until June 1, 1940, and continued in this capacity as Chief Secretary to Marquis Kido until November 24, 1945.

4. I first met Marquis Kido at Peers School and became better acquainted with him when we were in the Imperial University of Kyoto. Marquis Kido succeeded to his father's title and became a Member of the House of Peers in 1917 and when I joined the House of Peers in

1930 I became even more intimate with him. We have been extremely friendly all these years and I have had an excellent opportunity to observe his work, ability, character and reputation from my intimate association with him and from working with him. While I was Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal I became well acquainted with the historical background of the office of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the duties and functions of the Lord Keeper. Prior to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal (Nai Daijin) had official duties to perform but with the passage of time his office became a mere sinecure. It remained only in name. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868 Prince Sanjo, Sanetomi, who had rendered meritorious service to the state in connection with the political reform, was appointed Nai Daijin (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) in 1885, the office being resuscitated specially for him. It was a mere honorary post. Following his death, Prince Tokudaiji, Grand Chamberlain, was concurrently appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in 1891.

5. The present Emperor assumed regency while very young. It was deemed necessary therefore to offer proper political guidance to him as the Prince Regent. In deference to the strong advocacy in evidence since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 that the Imperial Court were clearly distinguished from the government, it was deemed improper for the Minister of the Imperial Household to offer such guidance to the Prince Regent. Nor would it be proper for a minister of state to engage in a court job because it would lead to the introduction of politics to the Imperial Court. The law governing the creation of the Office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stipulated that the Lord Keeper should offer Joji Hohitsu to the Emperor which means the offering of advice to the Emperor from time to time by attending on His Majesty constantly. In consequence the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was called upon to take charge of this

job of advising the Prince Regent politically and this continued after he became Emperor.

6. Extra court affairs, that is, political affairs, started to become complicated both nationally and internationally about this time so that something was needed by way of liaison between the Emperor and the cabinet. Thus circumstances both in and out of the Imperial Court called upon the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to offer his Joji Hohitsu to the Emperor from time to time on political matters. This political advice was offered to the Emperor prior to any political action on his part so that the Emperor could make suggestions prior to definite action by responsible government officials but when the government had made a decision pursuant to the provisions of constitutional government, the Emperor abided by those decisions and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was prohibited from interfering with those decisions. It has been strongly and consistently demanded since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 that a clear line of demarcation be drawn between the Imperial Court to which the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal belonged, and the government. The result has been that the official duties of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal as established by the law pertaining to his office, which law is a part of that governing the organization of the Department of the Imperial Household, were performed along those lines. The Lord Keeper is not empowered to take action against or interfere with those government officials whose responsibility was fixed under legal provisions and he had no legal responsibility therefor. The Lord Keeper, being appointed by the Emperor, was a court official pure and simple and was responsible solely to His Majesty, the Emperor.

7. In addition to Joji Hohitsu, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal also had the duty of taking custody of the privy and state seals. When documents were sent to the office of the Lord Keeper he could not refuse to affix the privy or state seals to them if they

were sanctioned by the Emperor with the conditions stipulated in Koshikirei all fulfilled. He was not authorized to make critical comments on the contents of the documents. He was only empowered to examine whether the conditions for affixing the privy or state seals were legally fulfilled by the documents in question.

8. Due to changing conditions during the past twenty years a new duty devolved upon the Lord Keeper, that of recommending a new Prime Minister in the event of a cabinet change. Originally it was not the job of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

9. The following historical development was related to me by Prince Saionji, Count Makino, Mr. Yuasa, Kurahei, Marquis Kido, Baron Harada and others:

10. At every Cabinet change, the Emperor first used to inquire of the Genro about a succeeding Prime Minister. The Genro was defined to be a man who rendered outstanding services to the state by personally taking an active part in the Meiji Restoration and the subsequent political reforms, and who was granted a message by the Emperor, according special treatment due to Genro. At first there were several Genro or Elder Statesmen, but with the passage of time, they died one after another in quick succession. The vacancies, thus caused, could not be filled up, due to the above-mentioned definition of the Genro. Finally, Prince Saionji became the only surviving Genro. When he advanced in age, Prince Saionji was living at Okitsu. As he experienced growing difficulty in coming up to Tokyo every time he received an Imperial inquiry, he declined the honor to be inquired by the Emperor about a succeeding Prime Minister at a Cabinet change. Therefore, His Majesty inquired of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about a succeeding Prime Minister, but in reply, Count Makino, then the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stated that it would be proper for His Majesty to inquire of the Genro about a succeeding Prime Minister, because he believed

that Prince Saionji had intelligence enough to judge the home and foreign situation. In accordance with the reply of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Emperor inquired of Prince SAIONJI, Genro about a succeeding Prime Minister. As Prince SAIONJI, Genro had already declined the honor to be asked by the Emperor about a succeeding Prime Minister, on the ground of growing difficulty experienced by him in coming up to Tokyo, first, the Grand Chamberlain and later, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal made inquiry of the Genro, in pursuance of Imperial request. After seeking the Genro's view, he returned to Tokyo and reported it to the Throne. In case the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was prevented by some unavoidable circumstances from visiting Okitsu, His Chief Secretary visited the Genro for him. This practice was continued from Count Makino's time until the middle part of Mr. YUASA's tenure.

Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. But Prince SAIONJI, Genro, petitioned the Emperor to release him from the responsibility for replying to Imperial inquiries on the ground that he lost his confidence in his replies, as he not only further advanced in age, but his continued residence at Okitsu for a long time kept him out of touch with the actual situation. His Majesty was gracious enough to consider his petition sympathetically, so that when Prince KONOYE tendered his resignation to the Throne together with the resignation of his first Cabinet, His Majesty inquired of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal YUASA, about a succeeding Prime Minister. In order to enable the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to make a mature judgment and also assist him, the Emperor added in inquiring of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about a succeeding Prime Minister that he should submit his reply to the Throne after consulting the Genro. This practice was since kept up until the Genro's passing away. In consequence, Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, in order to make a mature judgment, first separately visited the

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ex-Premier's and the President of the Privy Council and had exchanges of views with them, after which he proceeded to the Genro. After consulting the Genro, he submitted his reply to the Throne on his own responsibility. Both Baron Harada and Marquis Kido told me that the idea of the Lord Keeper seeking advice from Senior Statesmen and then making a recommendation to the Throne originated from Prince SAIONJI. It was generally understood from custom that if his reply to the Imperial inquiry led to bad results, the Lord Keeper was not responsible therefor, because the responsibility of the acts of the Prime Minister were assumed by the Prime Minister when he took office and he was legally responsible for his own conduct of state affairs as provided in the Constitution. The responsibility of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal disappeared the moment he submitted his reply to the Throne and it was accepted by His Majesty. Should the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal forfeit Imperial confidence as the result of his reply to the Imperial inquiry, and which later proved unfortunate, he would not be permitted to stay in his post any longer. Hence the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was responsible to the Emperor alone.

11. Even before Marquis KIDO became Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on June 1, 1940, he and I had discussed on several occasions the best method of procedure to be followed for the recommendation of a Prime Minister at a cabinet change. I recall that in June, 1939 we agreed that it would be better for the Lord Keeper to hold a conference with the Senior Statesmen and obtain their views rather than a procedure whereby the Lord Keeper would interview each of them separately. He told me at that time and I agreed with him that this method of procedure would eliminate speculation, rumors and malicious propaganda which would lead to political unrest as it was a danger that the Lord Keeper might be engaging in politics if he saw each of the ex-Premiers separately. Furthermore, by

obtaining their views in conference it would be possible to discuss all the facts objectively and the Senior Statesmen would be able to benefit from one another's views. We both further thought that no vote should be taken at the conference but that all the views of all the Senior Statesmen should be submitted to the Throne together with the Lord Keeper's recommendation. This was the procedure which Marquis KIDO followed when he became Lord Keeper and in the one instance where there was a Cabinet change while Marquis KIDO was Lord Keeper and while Prince SAIONJI was still alive I obtained Prince SAIONJI's recommendation and views on the succeeding Prime Minister and reported them to Marquis KIDO. This was on the occasion of the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet and the commencement of the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet in July, 1940.

12. In order to understand why it was necessary to adopt a method of procedure for the recommendation of a new Prime Minister which would be above suspicion, a knowledge of the trials and tribulations of the office of the Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal prior to Marquis KIDO is necessary. The political strife of recent years in Japan involved a sharp controversy between the militarists and the liberalists. The militarists aimed at governing Japan as a self-complaisant and self-important Japan--nationalists, whereas the liberalists aimed at administering Japan as an international Japan--internationalists. Within the militaristic nationalist group there were two factions, each seeking to eliminate the other and seize control of the government. Prince SAIONJI, whom I knew very well, was the leader of the liberalists. On many occasions he talked to me about the necessity of maintaining international peace and the necessity of Japan's Government being conducted strictly in accordance with the Constitution. I know Prince SAIONJI submitted his opinions to the Emperor on many occasions strictly in accordance with those ideas and that His Majesty readily followed his advice

and understood the Prince's political principles.

13. The group, which enjoyed Prince SAIONJI's trust and was on good terms with the Prince was headed by Count MAKINO and included Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, who succeeded the Count as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Prince SAIONJI trusted Prince KONOYE and Marquis KIDO of the rising generation and took trouble to extend guidance to them. I know this from my contact and conversations with those people and also from Prince SAIONJI's private secretary, Baron HARADA. All of these men who advocated peaceful relations between nations and internationalism as national policies in general and pursued a pro-Western policy as a definite measure for the realization of those general policies were invariably excluded by the Army which was opposed to such policies. Hence they found themselves exposed to the danger of assassinations at various incidents, including the May fifteenth and February twenty-sixth incidents. Attempts were made on the life of Count MAKINO several times; Viscount SAITO, who succeeded him as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, fell a victim to the dagger of an assassin. Assassination of Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, who succeeded Viscount SAITO as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was attempted several times, though they failed. Plots and attempts to kill Marquis KIDO were made on three occasions, February 26, 1936, July 5, 1940, and August 15, 16, 1945. Cases of malicious propaganda against them as well as plots on their lives, were too many to be enumerated here. It may not be necessary to recapitulate them either, especially since they are widely known. In addition to those who were very close to Prince SAIONJI, just referred to, others who were regarded as Prince SAIONJI's friends, sharing in the Prince's political principles were either assassinated or exposed to the danger of assassination. The salient cases in point were Viscount K. TAKAHASHI, who was killed and Admiral OKADA, who was attacked.

14. The Emperor was like-minded as Prince SAIONJI, the Genro. In view of the fact that the Army and ultra-rightist groups had steadily encroached on the political field, the only surviving Genro Prince SAIONJI intended to make the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to act as bulwark against or deterrent upon dictatorship, espoused by the Army and others. This accounts for meticulous care taken by the Prince in choosing the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. All successive Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal were chosen by him for this specific purpose. When I had an interview with Prince SAIONJI, I heard this from him at first hand. Not only that, it may be also clear from the fact that the successive Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal, including MAKINO, SAITO, YUASA and KIDO, became targets of attack by the so-called young military officers and ultra-rightists since the country was gripped by political unrest. Further judging by talks which I had with Prince SAIONJI, Count MAKINO and others from time to time, it was clear that Marquis KIDO was trusted as most capable Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, which post then was held by Count MAKINO and that the Marquis vigorously assisted his superiors along lines of this policy. At that time, he studied the political situation in close touch with Baron HARADA, Prince SAIONJI's private secretary and Prince KONOYE. I recall that member of the House of Peers as I was, I frequently met and had exchanges of views with Marquis KIDO, Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Baron HARADA, and Prince KONOYE.

15. It was during the March incident of 1931 and the Manchurian incident that activities of part of the Army and ultra-rightist groups first came to the fore in the political field, having far-reaching effects on Japan's trend, later. I recall that Marquis KIDO reminiscently told me about it years later as follows:

"When I became Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Count MAKINO, big affairs such as the March incident and the Manchurian incident cropped up one after another in quick succession within six months of my assumption of office. The March incident failed but we attached extreme importance to it, because it was a forerunner of the Army's attempts at launching on the political field to carry out national reforms. We thought it was a very serious affair. Therefore, I had talks with Prince KONOYE, Baron HARADA, private secretary to Prince SAIONJI, and others about it so as to stop it on the one hand and on the other, place politics on normal 'tracks'. Under guidance of Prince SAIONJI, I worked hard together with Prince KONOYE and others not only to accomplish this by guiding the Army as much as possible so as to prevent it from going to extremes, while taking up positions opposed to the situation, but also to strengthen political power for party politicians, that is, to ensure sound development for constitutional government. Incident after incident which cropped up later in quick succession, however, fast added to the Army's power, with the result that we failed to carry out our original plan to our great regret."

16. During the February 26th incident, Viscount SAITO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal under whom Marquis KIDO served as Chief Secretary, was assassinated, and Admiral OKADA, then Prime Minister was also first thought to have shared the same fate. This called upon Marquis KIDO to make extraordinary efforts to avert further trouble which he did pursuant to Imperial wishes. As an aftermath of the incident, Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, then Minister of the Imperial Household, was appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. This

necessitated the choice of a new Minister of the Imperial Household. Shortly after Mr. LATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo was chosen as Minister of the Imperial Household in 1936 Marquis KIDO told me to the following effect:

"It was I who recommended Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo to the Throne as succeeding Minister of the Imperial Household and urged him to accept the offer. I was actuated by the burning desire to keep the Imperial Court at least free from infiltration of Army influences."

17. Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, had just returned home from England, where he represented Japan as Ambassador. He was also diplomatic envoy to the United States of America, and was branded by the Army as a pro-British and a pro-American leader. Marquis KIDO's moral courage in recommending him to the Throne as Minister of the Imperial Household in the midst of pressure from the Army cannot be too highly estimated. I recall that it frequently became the topic of conversation later when I had chats with Prince KONOYE and Baron HARADA. Both of them paid high tributes to Marquis KIDO for his moral courage of no mean order in recommending Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo to the Throne as Minister of the Imperial Household.

18. After I became Chief Secretary to YUASA, Kurahei, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis KIDO was appointed President of the Bureau of Peerage in the Imperial Household Department. In October, 1937, several months after the first KONOYE Cabinet was formed, the Marquis joined the Cabinet and became Minister of Education as successor to Mr. YASUI, who resigned. Falling back on my past connections with the Marquis, I was in touch with him to gather information about the Cabinet. On many occasions he told me he was paying the most serious thought to termination of hostilities with China at the earliest possible opportunity, greatly worried about the incessant extension of the China Affair. When he was

offered the portfolio of Education, he told me that he did not like to join a war cabinet, but he decided to join the Cabinet in compliance with Prince KONOYE's importunate request to put forth his efforts for restoration of peace with China as member of the Cabinet. Prince KONOYE also told me to the same effect.

19. Marquis KIDO joined the HIRANUMA Cabinet of 1939 as Minister of Home Affairs. This Cabinet was troubled so much with the question of strengthening the Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact, that it was rumored to collapse from time to time. I was in close touch with Marquis KIDO at that time. Inasmuch as he was not a constituent member of the Five-Minister conference, however, to which the question was referred, the Marquis was not much acquainted with the contents of the question, so that I was not able to obtain much information from him. The Five-Minister conference met scores of times, and yet it failed to arrive at any conclusion. Meanwhile, the Army, which got fretfully impatient began to work on the outside, for the purpose of interesting the public in strengthening the Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact. The inevitable result was that an alarming situation was created from the viewpoint of maintenance of peace and order. In consequence, I recall that Marquis KIDO in his capacity of Home Minister was greatly worried. He thought that the question must be handled most tactfully; because in case the Cabinet collapsed due to this question, the antagonism between the Army and Navy would come up to surface, causing unrest to the people; while should the Senior Statesmen and other leaders be wiped out by terroristic actions, the country would be plunged into a state of anarchy and disturbance, when it might be most probably come under the reign of extremists. I recall that he gave this question serious thought. When an anti-British and anti-American agitation broke out about that time, the Marquis in his capacity of Home Minister controlled it through orders and directions to the Chief

of the Metropolitan Police Bureau and Director of Police Affairs in the Home Ministry. The measure, taken by him, however, was criticized by both those opposed to the extremists and the Army as well as by the pro-British and pro-American people, but his real intentions may be clearly seen from what was mentioned above. Both factions denounced him. One faction said he was too lenient, the other said he was too strict. I heard from Marquis INOUE, Saburo, that in 1938 when he visited Germany as cultural envoy, von Ribbentrop, German Minister of Foreign Affairs in an interview with him, cited Marquis KIDO as one of the leading pro-British and pro-American statesmen in Japan.

20. In 1940 when Mr. YUASA resigned as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on account of ill health, Marquis KIDO was appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in succession to him. Prior to Marquis KIDO's appointment, Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, then Minister of the Imperial Household, who was responsible for recommending a succeeding Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to the Throne, invited me to express my opinion to him on the question of the succeeding Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He also told me to seek the view of Prince SAIONJI, the Genro. Accordingly, I spoke with Baron HARADA, private secretary of Prince SAIONJI, several times in Tokyo on this question. After ascertaining that the Prince, who was in Okitsu, recommended Marquis KIDO as succeeding Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, I reported to Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Minister of the Imperial Household to that effect. I understood from Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Minister of the Imperial Household, that the Minister of the Imperial Household, sought the views of Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, outgoing Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, who was confined to bed and Prince KONOYE too, who all recommended Marquis KIDO as succeeding Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I know of no military leaders who endorsed Marquis KIDO for this position. I know of none of the accused who either endorsed him or

took any active part in securing his appointment to this position.

21. When the question of concluding a tripartite alliance pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy under the second KONOYE Cabinet arose, Marquis KIDO feared that it might eventually cause a clash between Japan and America and told me to that effect several times. Marquis KIDO said he had talks with Prime Minister KONOYE and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA about this point and told me once that both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were of the opinion that this alliance was intended for averting war with America, but it was beyond his comprehension. I recall that he told me so in a disappointed manner.

22. True to his official duties to offer joji hohitsu or counsel to the Emperor from time to time, by constantly attending on His Majesty, Marquis KIDO refrained from commenting on the reports, submitted by the Ministers of State to the Emperor. In talks with me, however, he used to express his private views that he feared this alliance might move in a direction opposed to bringing about world peace, judging by actual politics, notwithstanding the phraseology of the alliance to the contrary, or might usher in war with America and Britain. Should things come to such a pass, the Marquis used to tell me that it would be a serious affair for Japan. The Marquis remained true to his official duties, never going beyond their scope; but at the same time, he left nothing desirable undone in seeking a better understanding between the Emperor and the Ministers of State, including the Prime Minister.

23. Advice on the conduct of state affairs is offered to the Emperor by the Ministers of State or Cabinet Ministers; advice on the conduct of Court affairs is offered to the Emperor by the Minister of the Imperial Household and advice on military operations is offered by the High Command. Advice was offered to the Emperor by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on other affairs when he was

asked by the Emperor to offer counsel to the Throne. What could be the affairs, then, on which the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was called upon to offer counsel to the Emperor? He was called upon to offer counsel to His Majesty on his mental attitude. Put in other words, he was expected to offer advice to the Emperor on the question as to how to operate the various responsible organs under him as constitutional monarch. The Emperor of Japan is a constitutional monarch. Setting aside constitutional provisions, the Japanese constitutional monarchy was in fact patterned after that of England. Prince SAIONJI told me that guidance which he offered to the present Emperor was made along those lines. The Emperor, too, was intent upon observing this constitutional tradition intently. His Majesty personally visited England; while the Prince of Connaught, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Gloucester, and others paid visits to the Emperor since the Meiji era. There was a cordial exchange of courtesies between the Japanese Imperial family and the British Royal family. And the Emperor deeply appreciated the warm friendship, shown by the British Royal family and people to the Japanese Imperial family and people.

24. Marquis KIDO told me that at the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Emperor told to Prime Minister TOJO to the following effect:

"I have not yet forgotten hospitality and kindness shown to me by the English Royal family when I visited England and also warm friendship, manifested by the British people to me. It grieves me to go to war with them."

25. Mentally and politically trained as he is, the Emperor attaches importance to fixing of responsibility himself, so that in his talks with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or seeking the latter's views of counsel, His Majesty paid scrupulous care not to go beyond his official duties. I know of no instance where Marquis KIDO on his part ever went beyond the province of his official duties

as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. It may be recapitulated that Marquis KIDO offered his counsel to the Emperor on His Majesty's mental attitude or line of action prior to the commission of political action. I will refrain from referring to the theoretical aspect of the matter, as it is fully discussed by Dr. SASAKI, Soichi, Professor of the Kyoto Imperial University, in his article. For facilitating a practical understanding of the question, however, let me give an explanation with some instances.

26. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal used to have an audience with the Emperor almost every day of recent years. When Count MAKINO became Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal he first did not attend office every day. When some important affair occurred, he used to be summoned to the Imperial Court. Then he proceeded to the Palace to have an audience with the Emperor. Generally speaking, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was more frequently summoned to the Palace since the May 15th incident, so that later Mr. YUASA, Kurahei, nearly every day attended office and had an audience with the Emperor from the very beginning of his assumption of office as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. But those audiences were private interviews, so that the Emperor would never order a Minister of State to execute the contents of those interviews, nor would the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal advise the Emperor to execute his own private views. While I was Chief Secretary to YUASA, Kurahei, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, I know from conversations with him that he sometimes submitted his own private views to the Throne for the purpose of helping the Emperor grasp the political situation both at home and abroad and so that he could understand what was submitted by a Minister of State to the Throne or mentally prepare himself for passing proper judgment. As a matter of fact, therefore, a Minister of State prior to or after his audience with the Emperor often called on YUASA, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, to

explain his report to the Emperor for the purpose of amplifying it or deepening the Lord Keeper's understanding of it. But such an explanation, given by a Minister of State to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was done for his own convenience, and was not called for by any legal provisions.

27. When Marquis KIDO was appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal I continued as Chief Secretary and in accordance with the duties of my office I used to obtain information from various sources and report to him so that he would be advised of what was transpiring. This was necessary so that he would be well informed in the event that the Emperor asked him any questions on current matters. The following is an account of the principle events which took place while Marquis KIDO was Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

28. In June, 1941, I received information that there was a possibility that war would break out soon between Germany and Russia. At that time I had several conversations with Marquis KIDO discussing Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's intention to advocate a military expedition against Russia as well as an advance to southern regions. We were both very much disturbed about this.

29. After word was received on June 22, 1941, that Germany had commenced war against Russia, a certain section of the military commenced advocating an advance on Russia by Japan. We were all fearful that such a course would be pursued. Liaison conferences were held continuously discussing this question. Incidental to this question of a peaceful advance toward the south, I kept Marquis KIDO informed of the progress of the liaison conferences although I never attended any of these conferences. Finally, on July 2, 1941, an Imperial Conference was held. I was informed at that time that Prince KONOYE was successful in dissuading the military from proceeding against Russia and that Japan would endeavor to advance in the southern regions through diplomatic means. I informed Marquis

KIDO of the foregoing decision of the Imperial Conference. I was not informed at that time that there had been a decision in the Imperial Conference that preparations for a war with England and America would be carried forward in the event that the diplomatic relations broke down.

30. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's policy continued to be an enigma to us. I had a telephone conversation with Prince KONOYE at 1:30 o'clock in the morning of July 15. The substance of this conversation was that MATSUOKA was pursuing a policy which would interfere with the success of American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations and that contrary to KONOYE's instructions the Foreign Minister had sent a cable to Ambassador NOMURA rejecting Secretary Hull's oral statement and he did not submit any compromise suggestions to Ambassador NOMURA. At 2 o'clock in the morning of July 15, TERAZAKI, Chief of the American Affairs Bureau, also telephoned me that MATSUOKA had sent the telegram. He too was perturbed that MATSUOKA had taken such a course. The next morning I reported both of these conversations to Marquis KIDO and we discussed what measures could possibly be taken with respect to Foreign Minister so that the negotiations with America could be successfully concluded. We arrived at the opinion that steps should be taken to obtain the Foreign Minister's resignation and if he did not resign the only thing left would be to have the Cabinet resign en bloc and have KONOYE form a new cabinet. Although the latter course may have an unfavorable reaction, we could see no other way out of the situation. The next day, July 16, 1941, the Cabinet resigned en bloc. I have read Marquis KIDO's statement to be presented to the Tribunal with respect to the events that transpired on September 5 and September 6, 1941. I did not know about these conferences at the time they took place but several days thereafter Marquis KIDO told me about them as

related in his aforesaid affidavit. At that time he told me that he was very much disgusted with the weak attitude which Prince KONOYE had adopted.

31. About October 13, 1941, it became apparent that the KONOYE Cabinet would collapse. From that date until formation of the TOJO Cabinet on October 17, 1941, I had a number of conversations with Marquis KIDO, the substance of all of which is as follows: There was a suggestion from various quarters that Prince HIGASHIKUNI should be the next Premier. Marquis KIDO told me and I agreed with him, that a Prince of the blood should not accept the Premiership at this time unless the military first agreed on a peaceful policy and that he should not be appointed to bring about such a situation because if he failed and the country was plunged into war the Royal Family would be blamed for it. Marquis KIDO told me that the main stumbling block in any efforts toward peace was the Imperial decision of December 6, 1941. He explained to me that it was his idea and he explained to me that the next Premier should if possible be free from that decision, and that he intended to ask the Emperor to give such a direction. He further stated that due to the adamant stand of the Army to go to war with America, that it was necessary to have a Premier who could control the Army and prevent an internal revolution when the necessary negotiations with America were finally accomplished. A third point which was bothering him was the utter lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy. The Army was bent on war and the Navy was opposed to it but would not come out and say so openly. He thought that there should be greater unity between the two of them, that is, neither of them should be unbending in their decisions towards one another. He also explained that the next Premier should be one who was thoroughly familiar with the Government's policies in all the events leading up to the decision of September 6 and the subsequent events. After having

analyzed the situation, Marquis KIDO and I then discussed who would be the best Premier under the circumstances. We both thought that it was necessary to have someone from the fighting services as no civilian would be able to control the military. We talked about General UGAKI who had been mentioned by some as a possible successor but we arrived at a conclusion that the situation was too delicate to take a chance in recommending him because of the possibility that he would be unable to form a Cabinet as had happened in the past and furthermore that his ability to control the Army was an unknown quantity as he had been in retirement for some years and his power was therefore insufficient. We also discussed the merits and demerits of Admiral OIKAWA and General TOJO. We considered the fact that OIKAWA represented the Navy which was opposed to war but we felt that if OIKAWA was appointed the chances would be that the Army would not obey him, and that it might lead to a revolution by the Army. On the other hand we thought that if TOJO was saddled with the responsibility of being Prime Minister and was ordered to disregard the decision of September 6th that he would be able to continue the negotiations with America to a successful conclusion and control the Army. On the afternoon of October 16, 1941, before KONOYE appeared at the Palace to tender his resignation, we further discussed the matter and KIDO told me that he had noticed a change in TOJO during the past few days and that he was not advocating war if the Navy was opposed to it. Marquis KIDO told me he was going to discuss the matter further with Prince KONOYE and arrive at a decision. The next morning when I saw Marquis KIDO he told me that Prince KONOYE had called him on the telephone and stated that he was in favor of recommending TOJO. The meeting of the Senior Statesmen was held that afternoon. I recall that a few days after the formation of the TOJO Cabinet, Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, told me very joyfully in his room that "TOJO is reviewing the negotiations

with America with a will." Several days later, he told me to the following effect:

"TOJO is studying the negotiation with America in dead earnest. When I asked him what should be done to control the Army in case the negotiations are successful, he assured me that he would control the Army at the risk of his own life."

32. A few days prior to November 19, 1941, Marquis KIDO told me that he had an idea which might result in making the government and the military more cautious and perhaps avoid a decision for war. His idea was to have the meeting between the Senior Statesmen and the Cabinet members at which the Senior Statesmen could express their opinions and influence the Cabinet members with their conservative opinion. Marquis KIDO made this suggestion to the Emperor on November 19, 1941. He also suggested it to TOJO who at first demurred but some days later consented to such a meeting. On November 29, 1941, members of the Cabinet met with the Senior Statesmen. Marquis KIDO was in his office all that morning and I know he did not attend the meeting. He did, however, have luncheon with the Emperor, members of the Cabinet and Senior Statesmen. After luncheon for about one hour the Senior Statesmen and TOJO met in the presence of the Emperor. Marquis KIDO attended this meeting but I understood after it was over that Marquis KIDO did not say anything at this meeting. The purpose of that meeting was for the Emperor to receive the opinions of the Senior Statesmen. After the hearing in the Imperial Presence the Cabinet members and the Senior Statesmen had a further meeting at which neither KIDO nor the Emperor attended.

33. Following the outbreak of the war, Marquis KIDO had a pessimistic outlook on the war. Once hostilities opened, it is

needless to say that he never hoped that Japan would be defeated, but he never was self-complacent as to dream of straight victories nor was he unaware of the necessity for peace as quickly as possible. It was his realistic outlook on the war that it would be impossible for Japan to win an unbroken series of one-sided victories, and it would be the possible best for Japan to restore peace when those who advocated it had attained their objective. Following the fall of Singapore, I remember him telling me that "now that the ABCD encirclement line is broken, it is time to seize the opportunity to make peace." I was also like-minded. But the least hint of the idea could not have been given at that time. Otherwise it would have been stopped. Both the Marquis and I secretly racked our brains how to attain our object, keeping our idea to ourselves.

34. After Mr. SHIGEMITSU became Foreign Minister in April, 1943, he and Marquis KIDO had many conversations in an endeavor to take the proper steps to obtain an early peace. I knew that Marquis KIDO and he were working toward this end and I too had many conversations with Mr. SHIGEMITSU. From then on, I, under secret instructions from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, kept in touch with various quarters to study the situation, both home and foreign on the one hand and on the other to seize opportunity for restoring peace between Japan and the Allies. I reported to Marquis KIDO the information I obtained and in January, 1944, the Marquis told me, "Let us secretly study a peace formula," as he was anxious to do something concrete. I had many conversations with Mr. SHIGEMITSU and so did Marquis KIDO during 1944. I kept in secret touch with suitable officials in the Foreign Office, War and Navy Ministries and Munition Ministry to make closer studies, the results of which submitted to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

35. I had an interview with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in February, 1945, when I thought that those studies reached a stage in which a conclusion should be arrived at. But no peace talk could be made openly. Otherwise, those who were party to it would be ostracized or outlawed. From the end of 1944, however, there were many politicians who secretly and yet zealously advocated peace, feeling deep concern over the future of the country. The gumbatsu, however, kept a vigilant watch over the new turn of the situation, so that the peace movement had to be conducted with meticulous care and the utmost caution. The great pains, taken by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, in the midst of such an atmosphere were really inspiring. At that time, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal never allowed the syllable of peace talk openly to slip out of his lips, so that there were many people who earnestly advocated peace and who requested me to arrange interviews between them and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal for the avowed purpose of urging upon him the necessity for making peace with the Allies to save Japan. I tried to arrange interviews between some of them and Marquis KIDO, who, however, used to tell me:

"Even if I meet them, I know that they have the same opinions as I do. They are generally regarded by the public as peace advocates or pacifists. Should I, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, meet them at this juncture, I would be associated with a peace movement, with which the Emperor might be also associated by the public. Our cause would be defeated, should the Emperor be won over to the opposite influence. It would do for some time, even if KIDO should be regarded as bigoted or as jingoist. Time will show. If only our country is saved, I shall be entirely satisfied."

I remember him adding to that occasion:

"Japan may now be likened to a ship entering an uncharted, narrow strait, full of sunken rock. Make just a little deviation from the right course, and she would be stranded. I must petition His Majesty to take drastic action at an opportune time."

36. I was strongly impressed that Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was inwardly troubled greatly by the peace movement with which he identified himself, and yet outwardly betrayed nothing. It was also in February, I told Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, in his room to the following effect:

"This is no time for mere thinking any longer. It is time for action. Even if we take action immediately for fulfillment of the peace formula, it will take a pretty long time, situated as we are. Should it be too late, we should be prepared for death, as it would be inexcusable."

Whereupon the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal replied:

"Certainly. I have been long fully prepared for death. Besides, I also think it is already time for taking definite action for fulfillment of the peace formula. So you may be prepared for it."

He added:

"I have faced death twice before. First, I faced it in dealing with the aftermath of the February 26th incident and then in making endeavors for the continuation of the negotiation with America. I may face death for a third time. This time I may be possibly killed."

37. In order to have the Emperor obtain the views of the Senior Statesmen on the necessity of restoration of peace, Marquis KIDO arranged to have them appear before the Emperor individually.

He could not arrange for a meeting with all of them at one time, as the military would become suspicious. This was accomplished in February 1945. On June 9, 1945, I saw Marquis KIDO in his office before noon and he told me about his plan against the pending national crisis which existed at that time. He showed me his manuscript and I read it. It was the tentative plan for peace moves and Marquis KIDO explained it to me very enthusiastically. Marquis KIDO reported his peace move plan to the Throne in the afternoon the same day, and his plan was approved by His Majesty, the Emperor. I knew this from my conversation with Marquis KIDO which took place soon after he had the audience with the Emperor. I also heard from Marquis KIDO that he discussed with the Premier and other ministers about his peace move plan later on.

38. I understand that Prime Minister SUZUKI and Admiral YONAI approved it in general and that War Minister ANAMI was of the opinion that the enemy should be dealt a telling blow before overtures were made for peace. It was about this time that some of the military became suspicious that Marquis KIDO was trying to bring about peace and a movement was started by them to oust Marquis KIDO as Lord Keeper. Marquis KIDO told me that he had had an audience with the Emperor regarding the proposed meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of War and at that time he had advised the Emperor that the previous decision of June 8th, 1945 should not be a deterrent to peace moves. At the meeting of the Council on June 22, 1945, the Emperor communicated to the Council his desire that peace be effectuated. It was shortly after this that efforts were made to enter into peace negotiations through the mediation of the Soviet Union and have Prince KONOYE go to Moscow to make the necessary arrangements. Prince KONOYE agreed to do so but the necessary approval was never obtained from Moscow. Marquis KIDO

told me about that time that he was heartily in favor of this move and did all he could to accomplish it.

39. After the Potsdam Declaration was issued, Marquis KIDO immediately made up his mind that Japan should accept it and terminate the war. On the morning of August 9, 1945, he had an audience with the Emperor about this and after that, in accordance with directions from His Majesty, he advised the Prime Minister that steps should be taken immediately to take advantage of the Potsdam Declaration. The Prime Minister called a meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of War at which time they discussed the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on four conditions.

40. That afternoon the Cabinet held a meeting at which time it was unable to decide whether or not to accept the Potsdam Declaration on the one condition of preservation of the Imperial House. They decided, however, to submit the question to the Emperor for his decision. Accordingly, in the early morning of August 10, after the Imperial Conference was held in the presence of His Majesty, decision was arrived at to accept the Potsdam Declaration with this one condition. After this decision was arrived at, pursuant to his suggestion and Imperial approval, Marquis KIDO worked on the preparation of the Imperial Rescript to be delivered to the nation over the radio. Pending the reply from the Allies the situation in Japan was tense as there was a possibility that there might be a revolution. Marquis KIDO and I discussed on several occasions how we could meet any opposition pending the acceptance of the peace terms. In anticipation of trouble happening we thought up a plan of having the Emperor call not only the War and the Navy Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff but also the divisional commanders in Tokyo and Section Chiefs and order them to maintain order after making them understand fully the Imperial wishes in this respect.

Marquis KIDO so advised the Emperor and His Majesty called Admiral YONAI and General ANAMI and first discussed this with them. They said they would give the matter consideration and later Admiral YONAI reported that he would assume full responsibility for peace and order so His Majesty did nothing further about it.

41. In order to render all assistance possible to effectuate peace, Marquis KIDO, commencing about August 12, remained constantly at his office not even returning home at night. He had many conferences with various officials who were lukewarm about accepting the peace terms and I know from my conversations with him that he was vigorously advocating the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and trying to win people over to that thought. Finally, on August 14, after the Allied reply had been received, Marquis KIDO had an audience with the Emperor and advised him to command the government to accept the Allies' terms without a moment's delay as there was a possibility that the situation might get out of control. Marquis KIDO also had a conference with Prime Minister SUZUKI and they both petitioned the Emperor for an audience at which time the Prime Minister requested the convocation of an Imperial Conference which was held that evening at which time it was decided to terminate the war.

42. It was early on the morning of August 15 that a rebellion occurred in the Guard Division and an attempt was made to assassinate Marquis KIDO who, upon hearing of this, took refuge in the underground vault room in the Ministry of the Imperial Household. They were also seeking the phonograph record containing the Emperor's rescript as they wanted to destroy it. Further attempt was made by the same outfit to assassinate Marquis KIDO when they called at the home of his brother on August 16.

43. From my personal association with Marquis KIDO, both in and out of public office, and from my conversations with him and many others and from my knowledge of Marquis KIDO's acts and thoughts I know that at no time was he ever in favor of war but on the contrary he exerted his best efforts to control the militarists in Japan. In his capacity as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal he was in an extremely difficult position in his constant endeavors to curb the militarists. The constant pressure of the militaristic group in obtaining political power was so great that no one person or small group of persons in Japan could possibly have prevented the war. Marquis KIDO at all times was devoting his energies trying to curb the militarists.

On this 26th day of September
1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: Yasumasa MATSUDAIRA (seal)

I, S. HOZUMI, hereby certify that the above statement
was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal
thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: (signed) S. HOZUMI (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Yasumasa MATSUDAIRA, (seal)

Hirota

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.



S W O R N D E P O S I T I O N

Deponent: MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa.

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

(1) I was in the office of Chief Secretary under Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Marquis KIDO from June, 1936, to November, 1945, when the system of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was abolished. And accordingly, I learned many things ex officio from the Lord Keeper or from other persons with reference to the progress of the meetings of those senior statesmen called "jushin" and the state councils held in the presence of His Majesty.

(2) On November 29, 1941, a meeting was held of the executive officials of the Government and the senior statesmen (jushin) for the exchange of their views. On that occasion, Mr. HIROTA opposed to the opening of hostilities by advocating an amicable settlement through diplomatic negotiations with the United States, saying: "War is not always to be the immediate result of a standstill in diplomatic negotiations. Diplomacy is by no means of such nature. A break will surely be found through the deadlock while negotiations are repeatedly resumed and continued through many turns and twists." Mr. HIROTA was not in the habit of adhering to his point after he expressed his opinions once. In spite of that, I remember that he was considerably persistent in his opposition against the opening of hostilities at that meeting.

(3) I had often chances to call on Mr. HIROTA by the orders of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or to sit with him at various meetings official or unofficial. In most of these cases, he told me, with regard to the Cabinet, that the state of things at that time pointed to the necessity of adjusting the eccentric way of the military, and that, for that purpose, there was no other way but to have military leaders occupy the responsible posts and assume the helm of state with a strict control over the military, and that civil statesmen lacked such capacity. As to the Imperial Headquarters, he told that its constitution should be enlarged by appointing some of the senior statesmen as members of its staff, instead of constituting its staff exclusively with military and naval officers, as it had included civil elements at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. I understand that Mr. HIROTA set forth his opinions to the above effect at the jushin conference held on July 17, 1941, immediately after the resignation of the second KONOYE Cabinet with a view to selecting the head of the succeeding Cabinet.

On this 19th day of September, 1947, at 912, Yoyog-Ueharamachi, Shibuyaku, Tokyo.

(Signed) MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa

(SEAL)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned date and place.

(Signed) HANAI, Tadashi (SEAL)

Witness

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Signed) MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa (SEAL)

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
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MATSUDAIRA - Direct

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DIRECT-EXAMINATION OF MATSUDAIRA, YASUMASA
BY MR. BLAKENEY

26,179 The witness stated that he lived in Tokyo. He identified
Exhibit No. 2963 as his affidavit and verified it. The affidavit
26,180 stated * that the witness was private secretary to the Lord Keeper
of the Privy Seal from June 1936 to November 1945.

 On the morning of December 7, 1941, he received a call from
KASE of the Foreign Ministry. He told the witness that the Foreign
Ministry had a telegram from Washington reporting that a personal
telegram had been sent from Roosevelt to the Emperor and asked if the
telegram had been delivered directly to the Imperial household. The
witness told him that they had not received such a telegram. Again
about 8:30 PM, KASE telephoned and asked about the telegram. The
26,181 witness immediately * inquired of the office of the Chamberlain and
the duty officer in the Imperial household Ministry and told KASE that
they had not received the telegram.

 After midnight KASE called by phone and advised that Grew had
conveyed the President's telegram to TOGO.

 There was no cross-examination of the witness

Def. Doc. No. 1030
(Revised)

Ex 2963

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

MATSUDAIRA YASUMASA

Having first duly sworn on oath on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was the private secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal from June 1936 to November 1945.

2. I received a telephone call from Mr. Kase, an official of the Foreign Ministry, in the morning of 7 December 1941 at the Imperial Household Ministry. He told me that the Foreign Ministry had received a telegram from Washington reporting that a personal telegram had been dispatched from the American President to the Emperor, and asked me if the telegram had been delivered directly to the Imperial Household Ministry. I told him, however, that the Imperial Household Ministry had not received such a telegram.

On the same day about 8:30 P.M., when I was at my private residence, Mr. Kase telephoned and asked me again about the above-mentioned private telegram from American President. Thereupon, I immediately inquired of the office of the Chamberlain (Jijushoku) and of the officer on duty in the Ministry about the matter, and informed him (Mr. Kase) that the Ministry had received no such telegram as yet.

Later on, after 12 o'clock of the same night Mr. Kase called me by phone and informed me that the American Ambassador in Tokyo had conveyed the telegram of the President to the Foreign Minister.

See Kase # 2063



O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Matsudaira Yasumasa

. . . .

On this 13th day of August 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT Matsudaira Yasumasa (seal)

I, Katō Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Katō Denjirō (seal)

. . . .

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko


Tokyo
13 August 1947

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
NETHERLANDS DIVISION

15 August 1947

To : Mr. D. N. Sutton
From : A. T. Laverge
Subject: Witness MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa

1. There are no personnel data available on this witness as apparently no official summons for him was requested.
2. There are references to several Matsudairas both in the cross reference file in the Investigation Division and in Commander Maxon's index of Prosecution evidence. Time has failed to make a thorough investigation as to which of these references pertain to this witness. In view of the insignificant official positions held by the witness it may be assumed that the references will usually pertain to other Matsudairas, one of whom was Imperial Household Minister.
3. The affidavit of the witness is completely innocuous and only bears out the information given in the affidavit of the witness Kase. (Defense Document 2063) It is advised that this witness should not be cross examined.


A. T. Laverge

copy to Frank 8/17/47

17 Sep 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

Witness General

WITNESS

MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Curriculum Vitae

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

EPM
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Personal history of Yasumasa Matsudaira

Permanent residence and status: FUKUI Prefecture - Nobility.

Date of birth: 12 November 1893.

Name: MATSUDAIRA, Yasumasa - Bachelor of Laws - Marquis

Former status:

Former Name:

- 29 March 1905 : Graduated from the ordinary course of the Primary School of the Tokyo Higher Normal School.
- 30 March 1907 : Graduated from the Higher Primary School of the same.
- 31 March 1912 : Graduated from the Middle School of the same.
- 31 March 1916 : Graduated from the Peers' School, Senior Department, First Section.
- 1 July 1916 : Entered the KYOTO Imperial University, Law Department, administration and economics courses.
- 5 July 1919 : Passed the Bachelor of Laws Examination in the same University, the same Department.
- 12 November 1913 : Conferred with the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade, by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 12 August 1919 : Conferred with the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade, by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 1 December 1920 : Enlisted as a one-year volunteer in the 3rd Infantry Regiment, Imperial Guards.
- 30 November 1921 : Released upon expiration of his term of service.
- " " " : Appointed a sergeant, Intendance.
- 1 April 1922 : Given non-regular duty as political science instructor at the MEIJI University by MEIJI University.
- 1 April 1923 : Given non-regular duty as political science instructor at the NIPPON University by NIPPON University.
- 31 March 1924 : Commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant, Intendance.
- 1 July 1924 : Appointed an assistant professor at MEIJI University by MEIJI University.
- 20 August 1924 : Went abroad to study political science in England and France. Returned to Japan in November, 1928.

- 5 December 1927 : Conferred with the 4th Court, Junior Grade, by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 1 December 1928 : Appointed a professor at MEIJI University by MEIJI University.
- 15 December 1930 : Appointed a peer upon succeeding to the headship of his family. By the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- " " " : Became a member of the House of Peers.
- 9 November 1932 : Appointed a member of the Rice Control Inquiry Commission by the Cabinet.
- 30 September 1933 : Appointed a member of the peers' School Board of Trustees. by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 2 July 1934 : Conferred with the 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 1934 : The post of member of the Rice Control Inquiry Commission abolished in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 256.
- 1 September 1934 : Appointed a member of the Inquiry Commission on Rice Policy by the Cabinet. Abolished in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 22 of 1936.
- 8 August 1935 : Appointed a member of the Inquiry Commission on Weights and Measures by the Cabinet.
- 29 April 1934 : Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 4th Class, for services in the 1931-1934 Incident.
- 13 June 1936 : Appointed chief private secretary to the Imperial Household Minister. Given the second rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 13 " " : Given the second salary grade by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 13 July " : Released from membership in the Inquiry Commission on Weights and Measures at own request by the Cabinet.
- 17 June 1939 : Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 3rd Class.
- 20 July 1939 : Promoted to the first rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 15 July 1940 : Conferred with the 3rd Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 19 October 1940 : Given the first salary grade by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 29 April 1940 : Decorated with the Medium Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun for services in the China Incident.

- 10 April 1945 : Given the first salary grade by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 24 November 1945 : The post of chief private secretary to the Imperial Household Minister abolished in accordance with Imperial Household Directive No. 41.
- " " " : Appointed Chief of the Archives Division /TN: possible Imperial ordinance Division/, the Imperial Household Ministry. Given the first rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Imperial Household Ministry.
- 17 January 1946 : Appointed Director of the Bureau of Peerage and Heraldry. Given the first rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 25 January 1946 : Appointed a member of the Committee on Compilation of Emperor Meiji's Biography For Publication by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
Appointed an investigating officer of the Inquiry Commission on the Imperial Family and Nobility /of Korea/ by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
Appointed a member of the Peers' School Board of Trustees by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
Appointed a member of the budget committee by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 5 October 1946 : Appointed acting director of the Peers' School by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- " " " : Appointed a member of the budget committee by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 18 October " : Released from appointment as acting director of the Peers' School by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
- 7 March 1947 : Ordered to serve concurrently in the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
Given the first salary grade by the Ministry of the Imperial Household.
Specially accorded treatment befitting the SHINNIN rank.
Appointed Chief of the Board of Ceremonies by the Imperial Household Ministry.
- 2 May 1947 : Imperial Household Directives and appurtenant directives abolished after 2 May 1947 in accordance with Imperial Household Directive No. 12.
- 3 May 1947 : Appointed an administrative official of the Imperial Household Department and, concurrently, a Master of Ceremonies. Given the first salary grade by the Cabinet.
Appointed Chief of the Board of Ceremonies by the Cabinet.
- 23 April 1947 : Appointed Chief of the Main Line Section, Bureau of Peerage and Heraldry, and concurrently, acting chief of the General

Affairs Section, Bureau of Peerage and Heraldry, by the
Ministry of the Imperial Household.