

Doc. 4019 Evid

Folder 13

(38)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1827-PS
OFFICE OF US. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Letter from St. v. Weissaecker, dated 20 June 1939
and addressed to me; my reply of 26 June 1939 con-
cerning instructions by the Reich Foreign Minister
to ambassador in Tokyo.

(Signature illegible)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1827-PS
OFFICE OF US. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The State Secretary
of the Foreign Office.

Berlin, 20 June 1939

Concept:

Strictly confidential:

Berlin, 26 June 1939.

Dear Friend,

For your strictly personal ^{knowledge}/I am sending you enclosed a copy of instructions wired to Tokyo a few days ago. May I add at the same time for your information the Attoloco has been advised of the event. It has been agreed, however, to continue the conversations on the matter under consideration in Berlin exclusively since Count Ciano has expressly designated Berlin as meeting place.

With sincere regards and

Heil Hitler!

As ever Yours

sgd. Weissaecker

(Sgd.) v. Weiskenzen

1) By Courier

2) Air.

State Secretary

Freiherr von Weissaecker

Foreign Office

Berlin.

(Double envelope)

64535

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1827 - PS
OFFICE OF US. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Concept:

Btsch./kr.

Rome, 26 June 1939.

Letter from St. v. Weissacker, dated 20 June 1939

Dear Friends: my reply of 26 June 1939 con-

taining instructions by the Reich Foreign Minister

Sincere thanks for your strictly confidential letter
of the 20th which has just reached me by Courier. It is an
extremely valuable supplement to the intimations by Ciano
and by Shiratori which I have heard concerning the develop-
ment since the latter's return from Berlin. Shiratori
expressed himself in a rather sceptical vein without going
into any details.

Sincere regards and

Heil Hitler!

Always yours,

(sgd.) v. Mackensen

1) By Courier

2) Mir.

State Secretary

Freiherr von Weissacker

Foreign Office

Berlin.

(Double Envelope)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1827-PS
OFFICE OF US. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Letter from St. v. Weissaecker, dated 20 June 1939
and addressed to me; my reply of 26 June 1939 con-
cerning instructions by the Reich Foreign Minister
to ambassador in Tokyo.

Mackensen Papers

(Signature illegible)

7 documents

QUESTIONS

SECTION 7 - COLLABORATION BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY & ITALY

1. Please discuss the relation of the successive Japanese Governments from early 1936 onwards towards German-Italy emphasizing whether or not they

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Mackensen Papers

7 documents

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Japan will not begin with the offensive against RUSSIA, but will occupy INDO-CHINA and that will lead to the break with WASHINGTON" [p. 5. frame 65288].

2). Letter from WEIZSÄCKER in BERLIN, 5 November 1938
to Embassy in Rome.

The Italian Ambassador had spoken with WEIZSÄCKER on that day, saying that Prince PHILIPP VON HESSEN had proposed a Four Pact Agreement or one of his recent trips to ROME. It would seem that the information of the Prince was not altogether valid. ^{WEIZSÄCKER} I answered that the discussion of agreements and pacts with personalities, who are not proficient can naturally lead to misunderstanding. That seems to have been the case with Prince PHILIPP. [from 64402]

3) Letter from MACKENSEN in ROME, 3 January 1939.

"Count CIANO informed me most cordially, during the course of our conversation to-day, that the DUKE had come to a decision on the question of the Tripartite Alliance agreement, and that his signature could be undertaken at once. He — CIANO — had written a private letter to the REICH Foreign Minister on this matter (after the short telephone agreement of yesterday evening) which ATTOLICO would take with him when he returned to BERLIN this evening...."

409 3.

Considering his already planned arrangements for January (Visit of CHAMBERLAIN, Journey to BELGRADE, and the need to spend 2-3 days at work here in Rome) A day towards the end of the month would be suitable for the signature. The REICH Foreign Minister considered that to be practicable, since the technical preparations of the Japanese for the act of signature would take about three weeks. OSHIMA would sign for JAPAN. He - CIANO - would like to conform to the wishes of RIBBENTROP and agreed with the ^{Ribbentrop's} idea that the site of the signature should be BERLIN. Count CIANO then looked at the calendar, and said that the 30th or better still the 28th would suit him. He knew from ATTOLICO that a big speech of the FÜHRER had been planned for the 31st.

Rome 3. January 1939

Hackensen "

[frame 64408]

4) Letter from WEIZSÄCKER, 20 June 1939 to HACKENSEN referring to the fact that he had sent an enclosed copy of a telegraphic order draft sent to Tokyo a few days previously. (see entry 6) ATTOLICO was cognizant of the concertations. As Count CIANO had suggested BERLIN as the centre of negotiation, all

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[frame 64535]

conversations on the topic should take place there

5). Letter from MACKENSEN, 26 June 1939, to WEIZSÄCKER
acknowledging receipt of letter of the 20th. The letter
confirmed the impressions he had received from
CIANO and from SMIRATORI on his return from BERLIN.
The letter was sceptical, but did not mention
any facts. [frame 64536].

6). Telegram from RIBBENTROP, BERLIN 17 JUNE 1939
to the German Ambassador Tokyo. (No 194 of 17.6.) giving
OSHIMA's views on his government's decision on the question
of alliance. JAPAN declared herself ready to stand by
GERMANY and ITALY, ^{even in a war in which the USSR does not participate} and not to side with U.S.S.R. ^{even},
~~in a war, ready to make known the intention of~~
~~support and to do every thing in her power to give~~
military assistance. ^{In exceptional circumstances} It was possible that no use would
be made of Japan's readiness, if it suited the common
interests of the three powers. In such a case the
three powers would agree on Japan's attitude. It was
not Japan's intention to limit in any way by reservations
the ^{obligation} ~~liability~~ accepted under the agreement. The
Japanese Government had the firm intention to ^{conclude} ~~complete~~
the pact. OSHIMA declared that, according to his instructions from ^{Tokyo},
the Japanese Government will accept the agreement and

Q U E S T I O N S

SECTION 7 - COLLABORATION BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY & ITALY

1. Please discuss the relation of the successive Japanese Governments from early 1936 onwards towards German-Italy emphasizing whether or not there was an agreement among the nations during those years and pointing out the differences which arose between 1936 and 1941.

2. Please give your analysis of the sum total effect of the collaboration between the nations created by the Anti-Comintern Pact.

3. Please explain to what extent the Anti-Comintern Pact effected Manchuria and the Nanking Government.

4. Please describe whether or not greater effort was expended in Germany towards establishment of economic, political and military alliances with other countries than with Japan.

5. Please describe the effect in Germany upon Japanese-German relations after the German-Russian non-aggression pact.

6. Please detail the manner in which conversation and later negotiations between Germany and Japan were resumed in July 1940.

7. Please explain the political and other significance of the renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

8. Please describe to what extent Germany used its position to cooperate with Japan in solution of the French Indo-China problem which was climaxed on 22 September 1940.

9. Please state if the No Separate Peace Treaty was contemplated when the Tri-Partite Pact was signed.

10. Please describe the major purposes of the tri-partite pact.

11. Please state whether or not the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise in German circles and to you in particular.

12. Please relate briefly the extent to which Japan and Germany agreed upon joint military action after February 1941.

13. Please state whether or not Japan assisted or hindered, in your opinion, the efforts of Germany to her war in Europe. Please explain this fully.

10. Please explain the events leading up to the recognition of the national government of the Republic of China.

11. Please explain the effect upon German-Japanese relations to the freezing of assets of Japan and China on the 26th July 1941.

12. Please explain the political and other significance of the renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

13. Please state whether or not the Tri-Partite Pact was invoked when Germany declared war on the United States and Great Britain after the beginning of hostilities.

14. Please state if the No Separate Peace Treaty was contemplated when the Tri-Partite Pact was signed.

15. Please state ~~whether~~ whether or not the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise in German circles and to you in particular.

16. Please state if between 1936 and 1945 there existed between Japan, Germany and Italy close military, naval, economic and diplomatic cooperation and exchange of information.

17. Please state whether or not Japan assisted or hindered, in your opinion, the efforts of Germany in her war in Europe. Please explain this fully.

Q U E S T I O N S

#. BASED UPON COUNT 5 OF THE INDICTMENT

1. At any time during your negotiations, conversations or conferences with Ambassador OSHIMA did he initiate discussions on any questions officially or unofficially dealing with Japan-German relations without first obtaining instructions from his Government?
2. Did he take a lead or role as organizer of any movement, policy or program which was sponsored by any group in the Japanese Government, as distinguished from the organized machinery and governmental process of Japan?
3. Did he instigate any program or governmental policy of Japan which later became the foreign policy of his government?
4. It is charged that the object of the German-Japanese-Italian agreements were to secure the military, naval, political and economical domination of the whole world, each having specific domination in its own sphere. Would you please give your explanation of the underlying purpose of the international relations between the three nations?
5. Did he assist or in any way further the program of any faction, group or organization as distinguished from the ordinary channels of diplomatic intercourse during the period of your relations with him?
6. Did he formulate in any manner any policy or plank of any program which was proposed by the Japanese government or were all of his negotiations based upon matters which originated in Tokyo, or through the governmental machinery in Berlin?

6. Did he take any part in the execution of any program, policy or agreement which was not sponsored, promoted and urged by his own government through diplomatic channels?

7. Was there any definite continuity in the foreign policy of Japan towards Germany over the period of years of your association with this problem?

8. Did you ever have any conversations or negotiation with Ambassador OSHIMA which would indicate to you that he bore any closer relationship to one of the nine foreign ministers of Japan than to the other eight, who were in charge of foreign affairs during his tour of duty as Ambassador?

9. It is charged that the object of the German-Japanese-Italian agreements were to secure the military, naval, political and economical domination of the whole world, each having specific domination in its own sphere. Would you please give your explanation of the underlying purpose of the international relations between the three nations

10. Would you please explain the purpose of the agreements as they related to the United States of America.

(b) British Commonwealth of Nations.

(c) Republic of France.

(d) Kingdom of Netherlands.

(e) Republic of China.

(f) Republic of Portugal.

(g) Kingdom of Thailand.

(h) Commonwealth of Philippines.

(i) Union of Soviet Socialistic Republic.

Q U E S T I O N S

COLLABORATION - JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY BASED UPON OPENING STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION ON THIS PHASE.

- of the items set out in the Ciano diary
1. To what extent did any Japanese Statesmen, other than Matsuoka, participate in the negotiations with you and Ambassador Ott prior to the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact in September 1940?

Please state your other experiences upon which you base your observations.

2. During your negotiations with Matsuoka did he at any time interrupt conferences or conversations to confer and consult with other Japanese statesmen concerning the content, wording or intent of the Tri-Partite Pact?

It is charged that Matsuoka intended that they would resign in the event the pact of alliance was not concluded without reservation.
Were you aware of any such conversation?

3. The Prosecution has stated on Page 7, sub-division 2: "Shortly after the reorientation of German policy with respect to Sino-Japanese conflict and German-Japanese relations, Von Ribbentrop, then German Foreign Minister, proposed German-Japanese military alliance aimed at the entire world".
Is this statement true, if not, explain.

Please state if true, or not, please explain the attitude of the German leaders towards appeasement of the United States.

4. It is stated that the accused OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were sent to Rome for the purpose of inducing Mussolini enter in the proposed Tri-Partite Pact?
Is this statement true? If not, explain to what extent Ribbentrop and Hitler had previously negotiated and conferred with Mussolini concerning this matter.

10. It is charged that on 8 July 1940 Ambassador Sato and Kurusu in conference with you and Ribbentrop conferred

5. Were you advised as to the mission of the Ito Commission which was sent to Berlin and Rome relating to the Tri-Partite agreement?

6. In Count Ciano's diary it is related that SHIRATORI and OSHIMA refused to follow the instructions delivered by the Ito Commission. What has been your experience concerning the accuracy of of the items set out in the Ciano diary?
12. Please state your other experiences upon which you base your observations.
7. It is charged that the ambassador asserted that they would resign in the event the pact of alliance was not concluded without reservation. Were you aware of any such condition?
8. It is charged that Germany endeavored to excite Japan's feeling against America by influencing the press and leading personalities. Please state if this is true, if not, please explain the attitude of the German leaders towards appeasement of the United States.
9. It is charged that negotiations for Japanese-German alliance were renewed by Kurusu on the 19 June 1940. Please explain this statement in the light of the actual circumstances.
10. It is charged that on 8 July 1940 Ambassador Sato and Kurusu in conference with you and Ribbentrop conferred concerning the relations between Japan and Germany. Please explain the nature and extent of this discussion.

11. To what extent the French and Dutch East Asia colonies came in for discussion during this conversation? or after its completion in Tokyo?

12. To what extent had the Japanese statesmen manifested their fears concerning the interest of Germany in the Pacific Isles?

13. To what extent did the appointment of Matsuoka effect the Japanese Foreign policy towards Germany?

19. Please explain Matsuoka's idea concerning this matter.

14. In Germany what was the impression as to what officials of the Japanese Government determined upon the foreign policy of Japan during all of the time while you were liaison between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA?

20. Was it all ambiguous at this point and did it require an explanation?

15. At the time when you arrived in Tokyo for the negotiations of the Tri-Partite Pact did you consider that Japan and the United States would become engaged in war in the Pacific (p 19).

21. Was the Soviet Union considered a potential participant in the Tri-Partite Pact? Explain.

16. The Prosecution has stated that the 20 million of German descent Americans were considered to hold an influential position in the United States. Would you please state what you told Matsuoka concerning this?

22. Day research with the attaches of the armed forces in which it was concluded that the chances of success of an attack by Japan against Singapore were favorable. Was this action authorized in Berlin or taken upon the initiative of Ambassador OTTY?

17. Did you discuss the terms of the Tri-Partite Pact with Prince Kenoye or any other cabinet member before or after its completion in Tokyo?

18. Please explain the circumstances which brought about the signing of the Pact in Berlin rather than in Tokyo.

19. As far as you know was Ambassador GSHINA advised before and during the visit of the object of his tour?

19. Please explain Matsuoka's idea concerning this matter.

20. Were you ever aware of any conversations between Ambassador GSHINA and Von Ribbentrop concerning the advisability of an Japanese attack on Singapore?

20. It is charged that letters were secretly exchanged providing for consultation among the signatories for the purpose of determining whether action or a chain of actions would constitute an attack within the meaning of the pact. Was it all ambiguous at this point and did it require an explanation?

21. Is it likely that such a conversation took place? Explain.

21. Was the Soviet Union considered a potential participant in the Tri-Partite Pact? Explain.

22. Was it understood in Berlin that Matsuoka's opinions and expressions were purely unofficial and personal views, rather than backed by his government, when he discussed Singapore and Japan?

22. It is stated that "The German Ambassador to Japan made a report on the 31 January 1941 to his Government of a two day research with the attaches of the armed forces in which it was concluded that the chances of success of an attack by Japan against Singapore were favorable". Was this action authorized in Berlin or taken upon the initiative of Ambassador Ott?

22.

23. Upon the arrival of Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Germany in 1941 did he advise you of the principle international question which he desired to discuss with Ribbentrop?

German Foreign Intelligence Office that Japan acknowledged her treaty obligations in the event United States entered the war. Is this statement based on facts?

24. Did you at any time learn of the purpose of his mission?

30. It is charged that "When the Tri-Partite Pact was concluded 27 September 1940, Matsuoka in reply to a question stated that an agreement would be negotiated between the three powers for a new separate peace pact in the event of hostilities".
25. As far as you know was Ambassador OSHIMA advised beforehand or during the visit of the object of his tour?

26. Were you ever aware of any conversations between Ambassador OSHIMA and Von Ribbentrop concerning the advisability of a Japanese attack on Singapore? Explain this situation.

27. Is it likely that such a conversation took place? Explain.

32. It is stated that on the 18 January 1942 the armed forces of Japan, Germany and Italy concluded military agreement "in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact 27 September 1940", and provided for operational coordination among them. Was any such situation contemplated at the completion of the Tri-Partite Pact?

28. Was it understood in Berlin that Matsuoka's opinions and expressions were purely unofficial and personal views, rather than backed by his Government, when he discussed Singapore and joint economic and military cooperation?

29. It is stated (p 30) that "On the 24 May 1941 a report was made by German Military Attache in Tokyo to German Foreign Intelligence Office that Japan acknowledged her treaty obligations in the event United States entered the war." Is this statement based on facts?
30. It is charged that "When the Tri-Partite Pact was concluded 27 September 1940, Matsuoka in reply to a question stated that an agreement would be negotiated between the three powers for a new separate peace pact in the event of hostilities". Are you aware of any such statement being uttered at that time?
31. Up until the time you left Germany were the officials of the government informed of the state of negotiations between Japan and the United States? Please explain this situation.
32. It is stated that on the 18 January 1942 the armed forces of Japan, Germany and Italy concluded military agreement "In the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact 27 September 1940", and provided for operational coordination among them. Was any such situation contemplated at the completion of the Tri-Partite Pact?

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4019

30 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Photostats: Mackensen Papers

Date: 1938-41 Original () Copy (x) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: NURENBERG

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparation for Tripartite Pact

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. Translation of letter from DUCE to FUHRER of 24 Jul 1941. Political review of current situation in FRANCE, SPAIN, TURKEY, JAPAN (frames 65284-9). With reference to Japan Mussolini says: "The recent government crisis in TOKYO has, apart from the official causes, others which we do not know. It is my conviction that Japan will stay with us, because she is compelled to by reason of the increasingly important assistance which the United States are giving to CHIANG KAI S. Japan will not begin with the offensive against RUSSIA, but will occupy INDO-CHINA and that will lead to the break with Washington." /p. 5 frame 65288/.

2) Letter from WEIZSACKER in BERLIN, 5 Nov 38 to Embassy in Rome.

The Italian Ambassador had spoken with WEIZSACKER on the day saying that Prince Philipp VON HESSEN had proposed a Four Pact Agreement on one of his recent trips to ROME. It would seem that the information of the Prince was not altogether valid. /Frame 64402/.

3) Letters from MACKENSEN in ROME, 3 Jan 39.

"Count CIANO informed me most cordially, during the course of our conversation today, that the DUCE had come to a decision on the question of the Tripartite Alliance agree-

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Page 1

ment, and that his signature could be undertaken at once. He--CAINO--had written a private letter to the REICH Foreign Minister on this matter (after the short telephone agreement of yesterday evening) which ATTOLICO would take with him when he returned to BERLIN this evening.....A day towards the end of the month would be suitable for the signature. The REICH Foreign Minister considered that to be practicable since the technical preparations of the Japanese for the act of signature would take about three weeks. OSHIMA would sign for JAPAN." He agreed with Ribbentrop's idea that the site of the signature should be Berlin.

4) Letter from WEIZSACKER, 20 June 1939, to /F 644C MACKENSEN referring to a telegraphic order sent to TOKYO a few days previously (see item 6). /Frame 64535/

5) Letter from MACKENSEN, 26 June 1939, to WEIZSACKER acknowledging receipt of letter of the 20th. The letter confirmed the impressions he had received from CIANO and from SHIRATORI on his return from BERLIN. The latter was sceptical, but did not mention any facts. /Frame 64536/

6) Telegram from RIBBENTROP, BERLIN, 17 June 1939, to the German Ambassador, TOKYO (No. 194 of 176) giving OSHIMA's views on his government's accession on the question of alliance. JAPAN declared herself ready to stand by GERMANY and ITALY, even in a war in which the USSR does not participate, to make known this intention and to do everything in her power to give military assistance. In exceptional circumstances it was possible that no use would be made of Japan's readiness, if it suited the common interests of the three powers. In such a case the three powers would agree on Japan's attitude. It was not Japan's intention to limit in any way by reservations the obligations accepted under the agreement. The Japanese Government had the firm intention to conclude the pact. OSHIMA declared that, according to his instructions from TOKYO, the Japanese Government will accept the agreement and the two protocols without any limitations. There would be one opinion between the three powers as to Japan's attitude in the case of an outbreak of hostilities. The Japanese Government would not claim an exception to the automatic entry into the obligations of support. The mention of the possibility of exceptional circumstances should signify nothing further than what was laid down in Article III, paragraph 2 of the agreement or in Point A of Secret Protocol thereto. The Japanese government had the intention of accepting the text of the agreement unconditionally and without limitations.

Ribbentrop further asked OSHIMA for:

(a) the attitude of the Japanese Government

toward diplomatic questions, and

(b) an explanation of the limited military ability of Japan.

And remarked further that the Japanese government should give up its proposal to explain the pact as directed solely against the USSR, ^{further} that with regard to point (b) the most that Germany and Italy could accept was our plan of an oral explanation.

OSHIMA agreed on Point (a), and said that the Japanese government could not content itself with an oral statement, but would insist upon an exchange of notes.

RIBBENTROP declared this to be unacceptable. The present military situation of Japan was well known to military Germany and Italy, and that the Pact did not specify actions to be taken by Japan. It would be impossible from Japan's point of view to make an admission of her weakness in this manner.

OSHIMA agreed with this, saying he had sent a telegram to Tokyo, giving the German opinion.

RIBBENTROP said at the occasion of a conference with OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and the Italian Ambassador to Berlin that SHIRATORI, said that it seems as if the Japanese Government still had certain "mental reservations" regarding the alliance. He expressed his complete agreement with the German viewpoint but was rather doubtful whether his government would share it. He, therefore, suggested a secret protocol, stating that the duties of assistance of Japan would only take place automatically, if either USA or USSR took part in the war; otherwise Japan's attitude would be decided by mutual consultation.

RIBBENTROP thought this to be impossible. If Japan were to make such a reservation, then Germany and Italy would have to make a similar reservation, that they would only enter the war if England or France did. This Pact would then lose its political effect. Only a firm and unconditional alliance would keep USA or USSR out of the war
/Frames 64537-42/

7) Letter from WEIZSACKER to Ambassador MACKENSEN, dated 10 March 1939, which mentions that the time has come for military discussions between the General Staff of Germany and Italy as MUSSOLINI desired. KEITEL supported the view that the question of operations should be discussed after clarification of the present negotiations. Between

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ROME-BERLIN-TOKYO and after the German and Italian staff had exchanged their "inventory." WEISZAECKER states that it was not the intention of the REICH to make known fully their operational intentions. /Frame 65613/

Analyst: S.Lt. N.K. St. Clare
Tregalga, R.N.V.R.

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The two protocols ~~admitted~~ without any limitations. There would be one opinion between the three powers as to Japan's attitude in the case of an outbreak of hostilities. The Japanese Government would not claim an exception to the automatic entry into the ^{obligation} ~~status~~ of support. The mention of the possibility of exceptional circumstances should signify nothing further than what was laid down in Article III, para 2 of the agreement or in Point A of the Secret Protocol thereto. The Japanese government had the intention of accepting the text of the agreement unconditionally and without limitations.

Ribbentrop further asked OSHIMA for:-

- (a) the attitude of the Japanese Government towards diplomatic questions, and
- (b) an explanation of the limited military ability ~~possibility~~ of Japan.

and remarked further that the Japanese government should ^{give up its proposal to explain the pact as directed solely against the} ~~clarify its situation with regard to a war with U.S.A.~~

Further that with regard to point (b) the most that Germany and Italy could accept was our plan of an oral explanation.

OSHIMA agreed on Point (a), and said that

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The Japanese Government could not content itself with an oral ^{statement} explanation, but would ^{insist upon an} exchange of notes.

RIBBENTROP declared this to be unacceptable. The present military situation of Japan was well known to Germany and Italy, and that ^{the pact did not} ~~exclusive~~ military action ^{to be taken by} ~~was to be expected~~ from Japan. It would be impossible from Japan's point of view to ^{make} ~~give~~ ^{admission of her weakness} ~~make~~ statement in this manner.

OSHIMA agreed with this, saying he had sent a telegram to Tokyo, giving the German opinion ~~and requesting the views of the Japanese Government~~ ^{at the occasion of conference with OSHIMA, SHIRATORI} and the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that RIBBENTROP said that the Japanese Ambassador ~~to Berlin, SHIRATORI, then a~~ ^{still had} ~~SECRET~~ said that if the Japanese Government would make certain "mental reservations" regarding the alliance, ~~and~~

suggested a secret protocol, stating that the duties of assistance of Japan would only take place, ^{automatically} if ~~either~~ ^{either} USA or USSR took part in the war. ^{otherwise Japan's alliance would be decided by mutual consultation} ~~and Russia would gain by this, as it would prevent USA or USSR entering the war.~~

RIBBENTROP thought this to be impossible. If Japan were to make such a reservation, then

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He expressed his complete agreement with the German
viewpoint but ~~was~~ rather ^{doubtful whether} sceptical about the viewpoint
of his government would share it. He, therefore, ~~asserted~~

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Germany and Italy would have to make a similar reservation, - that they would only enter the war if England or France did. This ^{fact} would ~~lose its~~ ^{lose its} political ~~effect~~. Only a firm and unconditional alliance would keep USA or USSR out of the war.

~~RIBBENTROP requested the Ambassador to conduct discussion on these points, but only to mention the last point made by SHIMAZU if it seemed that it might produce something from the Japanese.~~

[frames 64537-42]

7) Letter from WEIZSÄCKER to Ambassador MACKENZON, dated 10 March 1939, which mentions that the time has come for military discussions between the General Staffs of Germany and Italy as MUSSOLINI desired. WEITZ supported the view that the question of operations should be discussed ~~after clarification of the present negotiations~~ ^{after clarification of the present negotiations} ~~and the secret should when the ROME-BERLIN-TOKYO~~ ^{and after the German and Italian staff had exchanged their 'inventory' of the} ~~question of operations~~ ^{with exchange of inventories}, whilst the secret would be a discussion of questions of operations. ^{WEIZSÄCKER states that} it was not the intention of the RUTH to make known fully their operational intentions.

[frame 65613]

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No.

4019

Date

28/5/46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: ^{Photostats} MACKENZIE PAPERS
(SEVEN DOCUMENTS)

Date: 1938-1941

Original () Copy (x)

Language:

GERMAN

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc. Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

NUREMBERG

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

OSHIMA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Preparation for Tripartite Pact

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

- 1). Translation of letter from DUCE to FÜHRER of 24 July 1941
Political review of current situation in FRANCE, SPAIN,
TURKEY, JAPAN. [frames 65284-9].
With reference to JAPAN, MUSSOLINI says -

"The recent government crisis in TOKYO has, apart from the official causes, others which we do not know. It is my conviction that Japan will stay with us, because she is compelled to by reason of the increasingly important assistance which the UNITED STATES are giving to CHIANG KAI SHEK."

Analyst: S/Lt. N.K. Stillare-Tregilgas R.N.V.R.

Doc. No.

S/Lt. N.K. STILLARE-TREGILGAS R.N.V.R.

See over

Rom, den 25. Juli 1941.

T e l . i . Z . (G)

Auswärtig

B e r l i n

Nr. 1668 vom 25. Juli 1941.

CITISSIME !

Edmundo Reichardt

Für den Herrn Reichsminister des Auswärtigen
p e r s ö n l i c h .

Übersetzung des Duce-Briefes an den Führer
vom 24. Juli :

" Führer ,

Ich beantworte ohne Verzug Ihren letzten
Brief und mache auch - Ihren Spuren folgend -
eine Rundschau .

Frankreich . Sie kennen Führer meine Ideen.
Niccolò Macchiavelli hat die Franzosen schon gekenn-
zeichnet : Je mehr sie versprechen, umso weniger
geben sie Dir. Es ist von ihnen nichts Substan-
tielles zu erwarten. Wochen und Monate sind ver-
gangen und die Unterhaltung über die Häfen in Tunis

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haben keinen Schritt vorwärts getan. In der Zwischenzeit haben Sie weiteren Gefangenen die Freiheit gegeben, und Italien hat seine Luft- und Seebasen in der Heimat und die griechischen Frankreich für den syrischen Feldzug zur Verfügung gestellt, der in den letzten Stunden eine französisch-englische Komödie mit einem amerikanischen Regisseur : dem Konsul der Vereinigten Staaten in Beyrut, geworden ist. Im Innern Frankreichs ist ein sehr starkes Wiederaufleben der Kommunisten und Englandfreunde zu bemerken. De Gaulle gibt den Gedanken von 90% Franzosen wieder, einbegriffen vielleicht den Marschall selbst.

Bei diesem Sachverhalt ist es, soweit es sich um den Mittelmeersektor handelt, notwendig, ausschließlich auf unsere Kräfte zu zählen und vor allem deren ständige Koordinierung herbeizuführen. Auf Grundwegen dieser nicht vollkommenen Koordinierung sind schmerzliche Verluste eingetreten. Der "von Tirpitz" zum Beispiel hat Schiffbruch gelitten (die ganze Besatzung ist gerettet !) zwei Meilen von San Remo entfernt, weil er von Marseille zwei Tage zu früh ausgelaufen ist und ohne sich über die Lage unserer Minenfelder längs der Ligurischen Küste informiert zu haben.

Es handelt sich also darum diese Zusammenarbeit

zu vervollständigen, die schon im Gange ist, und ich bin glücklich, dieser Zusammenarbeit die Form zu geben, die Sie, Führer, wünschen.

Ich beabsichtige anzuordnen, dass die gegenwärtigen deutschen Verbindungsorgane bei uns sich in Dienststellen des ~~Admirals~~ dem Admiralsstab der Kgl. Marine beigegebenen Admirals oder des der Kgl. Luftfahrt beigegebene Generals verwandeln. Diese Dienststellen würden auch materiell bei den respektiven Generalstäben eingerichtet, denen sie beigegeben sind und ~~würden~~ wären dafür bestimmt, in der Person ihres Chefs an den verschiedenen Studien, die unternommen werden, sowie an den Entscheidungen teilzunehmen, die in Bezug auf die Fragen getroffen werden, die Sie so klar in Ihren Briefe definiert haben. So würde neben dem General von Rintelen beim Hauptquartier der italienischen Wehrmacht der Admiral Reichold den Posten beim Generalstabe der Italienischen Kriegsmarine und der General von Fohl beim Generalstab der Italienischen Luftfahrt übernehmen.

Es handelt sich darum, in Gemeinsamkeit daran zu arbeiten, auf bestmögliche Weise das wichtigste Problem zu lösen, das im Mittelmeer vor uns steht: jenes der Transporte von Menschen und Material.

Ich glaube, dass dann in Rom das geschehen wird, was in Lybien geschieht, wo die italienisch-deutsche Kameradschaft einfach vollendet ist. Um bereit zu sein, etwa entstehenden besonderen Situationen auf

der Westfront entgegenzutreten, habe ich die zehn Divisionen der vierten Armee wieder in Ordnung gebracht und beabsichtige vier Divisionen aufzustellen, ^{die} die Front bei Tunisien bewachen sollen.

Spanien. Ich glaube nicht, dass Spanien über die Entsendung der freiwilligen Division hinaus noch mehr tun will oder kann. In seiner Rede hat der Generalissimus die Schiffe hinter sich verbrannt, aber er ist nicht aus dem Bereich der Worte herausgekommen. Ich werde fortfahren daran zu arbeiten, dass die Lage entsprechend unseren Plänen reift, aber alles das muss mit viel Zurückhaltung gemacht werden im Hinblick auf den überempfindlichen Charakter der Spanier, der ihrer Rasse eigentümlich ist. Die Haltung Spaniens ist nützlich, auch um eventuelle ~~Unbesonnenheiten~~ plötzliche Unbesonnenheiten Frankreichs zu bremsen.

Türkei. Auch in diesem Sektor muss man mit viel Mass vorgehen. Ich war vor einem Monat optimistischer. Nach den letzten Nachrichten, die ich aus Ankara erhalten habe, sind die Aktien Grossbritanniens im Steigen, und das versteht sich als Folge des Fehlschlagens des Irakunternehmens und des syrischen Feldzuges. Die Türken werden mit uns gehen, nur wenn sie die mathematische Sicherheit haben, dass Grossbritannien den Krieg verloren hat. Dennoch muss gearbeitet und versucht werden. Wenn die Türkei

eines Tages täte, was Schweden getan hat - das heisst ~~d~~urchmarschieren liesse - so wäre das Schicksal Ägyptens entschieden, und ich bin mehr als je tief davon überzeugt, dass, wenn England in Ägypten liquidiert wird, das Britische Imperium liquidiert sein wird. Grossbritannien ist sich dessen bewusst und verstärkt ununterbrochen seine Positionen und lässt einen grossen Teil der ~~am~~erikanischen Hilfe in Ägypten konzentrieren.

Japan. Die kürzliche Regierungskrise von Tokyo hat ausser den amtlichen Gründen solche, die wir nicht kennen. Es ist meine Überzeugung, dass Japan in unserem ^{Lager} ~~Felde~~ bleiben wird, auch weil es hierzu durch die Tatsache der immer bedeutender werdenden Hilfe, die die Vereinigten Staaten Chang kai Shek leisten, gezwungen sein wird. Es wird nicht mit dem Marsch gegen Russland beginnen, es wird Indochina besetzen, und das wird zum Bruch mit Washington führen.

Russland. Ich habe mit lebhaftestem Interesse gelesen, was Sie, Führer, mir über den Feldzug in Russland erzählen und über die Rassen, aus denen das bolschewistische Heer sich zusammensetzt. Gerade wegen seiner heterogenen Zusammensetzung, wegen der Desorganisation der Befehlsverhältnisse und wegen der viehischen Dummheit der Menschen habe ich ~~mit~~ die mathematische Überzeugung, dass Ihre

Heere rasch die russischen vernichten werden, die übrigens schon schwer mitgenommen sind. Wie mir meine Generale sagen, wird das italienische Armeekorps zwischen dem 10. und 15. August in Aktion treten können. Aber inzwischen bereite ich ein zweites Armeekorps vor, und ich könnte, wenn es notwendig sein sollte, auch noch ein drittes vorbereiten. ~~Die-Männer~~ An Menschen fehlt es nicht. Was ihre Stimmung anbelangt, so ist sie sehr gut, und ihre Bravour ist unbestreitbar, sofern sie nur gut bewaffnet und gut geführt sind. General Rommel wird Sie, glaube ich, informiert haben darüber, was unsere Divisionen um Tobruk herum machen, und dabei muss man bemerken, dass viele dieser Männer seit fünfzehn bis zwanzig Monaten ununterbrochen in der Wüste leben.

Auch ich, Führer, wünsche lebhaft, Sie wiederzusehen. Das kann nach dem 10. August sein, und ich bin bereit, zu Ihrem Hauptquartier auf/^{ehemals}russischem Gebiete zu kommen. Ich kann mich von Italien unbedenklich entfernen, denn das italienische Volk arbeitet ruhig und glaubt mehr als je an den Sieg.

Ich bitte Sie, Führer, meine herzlichen und kameradschaftlichen Grüsse und den Ausdruck meiner unveränderlichen Freundschaft entgegenzunehmen.

Mussolini.

65239

Original Duce-Briefes in versiegeltem Kuvert
folgt mit morgen 26. früh abgehendem planmässigem
Kurier unter der persönlichen Anschrift des Herrn
Reichsaussenministers.

M a c k e n s e n .

J. H. 25/7

65290

Berlin, den 5. November 1938

Der I t a l i e n i s c h e Botschafter sprach mich heute darauf an, daß Prinz Philipp von Hessen bei einer seiner letzten Reisen in Rom als deutschen Plan eine Viererpakt-Abrede vorgebracht habe. Bei näherem Zusehen, d.h. bei dem Besuch des Herrn Reichsaußenministers in Rom, habe ich die Mitteilung des Prinzen von Hessen als nicht recht stichhaltig erwiesen.

Ich habe darauf lediglich erwidert, daß die Erörterung von Verträgen und Pakten mit Persönlichkeiten, welche nicht ganz in dieser Materie lebten, natürlich zu Mißverständnissen führen könne. Das sei vielleicht bei dem Gespräch mit dem Prinzen Philipp auch der Fall gewesen.

(gez.) Weizsäcker

Dt. Botschaft Rom
Eing. 14. NOV. 1938
Egb. Nr.
..... 211.

Berlin, den 9. November 1938

Pol.IV 8107/38

Abschriftlich

der

Deutschen Botschaft

in R o m (Quir.)

zur vertraulichen Kenntnis.

Im Auftrag

Heinrich

11/9 12/4

61402

Konzept.

DER STAATSEKRETAR
DES AUSWÄRTIGEN AMTS

Berlin, den 20. Juni 1939.

Handwritten notes:
K... in ...
Rem. ...
Streng vertraulich!

Handwritten: 26. by

Lieber Freund!

Zu Ihrer ausschließlich persönlichen Kenntnisnahme lasse ich Ihnen anliegend Abschrift einer vor wenigen Tagen nach Tokyo ergangenen Drahtweisung zu-gehen. Zu Ihrer Unterrichtung darf ich gleichzeitig bemerken, daß Attolico über den Vorgang unterrichtet worden ist. Es besteht jedoch Einverständnis darüber, daß Gespräche über den behandelten Gegenstand weiterhin nur in Berlin geführt werden sollen, nachdem Graf Ciano als Verhandlungsort ausdrücklich Berlin bestimmt hat.

Mit herzlichem Gruß und

Heil Hitler!

Handwritten signature:
von Ribb. Hr
Weizsäcker

34535

Konzept

Btsch./Kr.

Rom, den 26. Juni 1939.

Lieber Freund,

Aufrichtigen Dank für Ihren mir soeben mit Kurier zugehenden, streng vertraulichen Brief vom 20ten. Er ergänzt mir in wertvollster Weise das, was ich an Andeutungen von Ciano und von Shiratori nach seiner Rückkehr aus Berlin über die Entwicklung gehört habe. Letzterer sprach sich, ohne auf irgendwelche Einzelheiten einzugehen, recht skeptisch aus.

Mit herzlichem Gruß

und Heil Hitler!

stets Ihr

1) ab m.Kur.

(gez.) v. Mackensen

2) M. r.



Herrn Staatssekretär
Freiherrn von Weizsäcker

Auswärtiges Amt

Berlin.

(doppelter Umschlag)

34506

AUSWÄRTIGES AMT

Berlin, den 10. März 1939.

Ganz geheim!

Persönlich!

Bekanntlich spielt die Frage der Einleitung von Besprechungen zwischen den Generalstäben der einzelnen Wehrmachtsteile Deutschlands und Italiens seit längerer Zeit eine Rolle. Nachdem uns vor kurzem nicht mehr nur auf dem militärischen sondern auf dem diplomatischen Wege und zwar im Auftrage des Duce der baldige Beginn solcher Besprechungen als dringend erwünscht bezeichnet worden ist, hat der Herr Reichsaußenminister nach eingeholter Weisung des Führers dem Generalobersten Keitel mitgeteilt, solche Besprechungen könnten nunmehr in die Wege geleitet werden. Generaloberst Keitel vertritt den auch vom Herrn Reichsaußenminister geteilten Standpunkt, daß die Besprechungen in zwei Abschnitte zu teilen wären, von welchen der erste einen längeren Zeitraum, d. h. wohl einige Monate in Anspruch nehmen könnte, während der zweite zweckmäßig erst nach völliger Klärung der in Gang befindlichen Verhandlungen im Dreieck Berlin-Rom-Tokio einzusetzen hätte. Der erste Teil würde sozusagen eine wechselseitige Inventar-Aufnahme umfassen, der zweite die Besprechung operativer Fragen. Der dortige Militär-Attaché wird Sie über die Einzelheiten, für die ihm vom Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Weisung zugeht, auf dem Laufenden halten. Hier soll nur soviel vorausgeschickt werden, daß in dem zweiten Abschnitt der Erörterungen nicht die Absicht besteht, der Gegenseite vollen Einblick in unsere operativen Absichten zu gewähren.

Herrn

Botschafter von Mackensen

R o m .

K. Fischer

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