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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA SECURITY
COOPERATION: DRIVERS AND OBSTACLES**

by

Jayson M. Davidson

June 2019

Thesis Advisor:
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Robert J. Weiner
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE June 2019	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA SECURITY COOPERATION: DRIVERS AND OBSTACLES		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Jayson M. Davidson			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>Japan and South Korea's bilateral security relationship has experienced periods of both cooperation and friction. Despite several contemporary similarities, expanded security cooperation between these two countries remains elusive. Clarifying why Japan and South Korea pursue cooperation at some times but avoid it at others provides a deeper understanding of the relationship between these two East Asian nations. This thesis analyzes the influence of international factors (China, North Korea, and the United States) and evaluates the impact of public opinion and domestic leaders, especially with regard to animosity over historical issues. The research reviews how and when each of the above factors encourages or discourages cooperation, utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods. In an attempt to capture variation and identify trends in security cooperation levels, the thesis examines Japanese and South Korean defense white papers that catalog security-related meetings, exchanges, and agreements. The thesis confirms that security cooperation levels fluctuate significantly between cooperation and friction, and contends that domestic factors mostly discourage cooperation while international factors have more of an encouraging effect. In fact, domestic factors appear to play a role at least equal to—but potentially more important than—international factors in explaining this fluctuation.</p>			
14. SUBJECT TERMS South Korea, Japan, security cooperation, North Korea, China, United States		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 147	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

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**JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA SECURITY COOPERATION:
DRIVERS AND OBSTACLES**

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ABSTRACT

Japan and South Korea's bilateral security relationship has experienced periods of both cooperation and friction. Despite several contemporary similarities, expanded security cooperation between these two countries remains elusive. Clarifying why Japan and South Korea pursue cooperation at some times but avoid it at others provides a deeper understanding of the relationship between these two East Asian nations. This thesis analyzes the influence of international factors (China, North Korea, and the United States) and evaluates the impact of public opinion and domestic leaders, especially with regard to animosity over historical issues. The research reviews how and when each of the above factors encourages or discourages cooperation, utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods. In an attempt to capture variation and identify trends in security cooperation levels, the thesis examines Japanese and South Korean defense white papers that catalog security-related meetings, exchanges, and agreements. The thesis confirms that security cooperation levels fluctuate significantly between cooperation and friction, and contends that domestic factors mostly discourage cooperation while international factors have more of an encouraging effect. In fact, domestic factors appear to play a role at least equal to—but potentially more important than—international factors in explaining this fluctuation.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	anti-access/area denial
ADIZ	air defense identification zone
AWF	Asian Women's Fund
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COS	chief of staff
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DTT	Defense Trilateral Talks
ECS	East China Sea
EEZ	exclusive economic zone
GSOMIA	General Security of Military Information Agreement
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MND	Ministry of National Defense (South Korea)
MOD	Ministry of Defense (Japan)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLL	Northern Limit Line
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
PM	prime minister
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAREX	search and rescue exercise
SCS	South China Sea
TCOG	Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group
THAAD	terminal high altitude area defense
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WWII	World War II

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I. INTRODUCTION

Japan and South Korea have had a long and complex bilateral relationship rife with periods marked by both cooperation and friction. However, despite several contemporary similarities between the two countries, more widespread security cooperation remains elusive. T.J. Pempel describes how similarities in their political systems, developmental levels, and relationship with the United States would suggest that Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) security cooperation could be better.¹ In fact, explaining why there is not more security cooperation in light of shared interests is the subject of much scholarly debate. An analysis of the positive and negative influences on Japan-ROK security cooperation is required to better understand this apparent puzzle. Therefore, the research question that this thesis examines is: What are the factors that are encouraging and discouraging security cooperation between Japan and South Korea?

This thesis analyzes the influence of the international factors—China, North Korea, the United States—while also evaluating the domestic impact of both the public and leadership on historical animosity. The research reviews the encouraging and discouraging influences of each of the above factors. Overall, the three international factors all generally contribute to security cooperation, while the domestic factors inhibit cooperation. Some examples that run counter to this main conclusion exist, but are mostly minor. Additionally, the research determines that the domestic influences play at least an equal and likely a more important role than international factors in determining if Japan-ROK security cooperation occurs. When the public or leadership inflames historical issues, security cooperation is strongly discouraged; but, when these issues are not being exacerbated, instances of security cooperation increase. While shared threat perceptions of both China and North Korea do provide encouraging benefits, the latter (often referred to in this thesis also as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK]) threat generates more security

¹ T.J. Pempel, “Japan and the Two Koreas: The Foreign-Policy Power of Domestic Politics,” in *Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Relations between Japan and South Korea*, ed. Marie Söderberg, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 55.

cooperation. Finally, the role of the United States has encouraged Japan-ROK security cooperation, but, again, not as strongly as the DPRK threat influence.

To better understand security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, there is a need for a rigorous and systematic analysis of the state of security cooperation over the last several decades. While much of the current literature takes the level of cooperation, or lack thereof, for granted, this research works to establish the level of security cooperation. This assessment is not only a critical component of this research, but it is also an important contribution to the literature in general. This thesis determines levels of security cooperation by evaluating direct, observable measures of security cooperation, like bilateral and trilateral military exercises and high-level meetings; the research design section of this chapter provides more detail on the methods of evaluation and measurement. In addition, the intent is to capture both bilateral and trilateral Japan-ROK security cooperation. This more all-encompassing approach facilitates a better understanding of the United States' influence on and importance to Japan-ROK relations.

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

A more comprehensive understanding of the factors that encourage and discourage security cooperation between Japan and South Korea is significant for four main reasons. First, Japan and South Korea both represent key Asian actors that will continue to play an important role in the regional order. Potential challengers to the current system include China, which is asserting itself in the Senkaku Islands and expanding its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.² The North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile program also represents another potential flashpoint for conflict in the region. The Japanese and South Korean security cooperation can help mitigate both current regional threats like the North Korean regime and potential future threats like a more assertive China. Second, the regional security order typified by the bilateral U.S. alliances is also dealing with a new challenge. Ikenberry claims that the region is now represented by two

² M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Assertiveness in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute," MIT: May, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2788165. 1; Ja Ian Chong and Todd H. Hall, "The Lessons of 1914 for East Asia Today: Missing the Trees for the Forest," *International Security* 39, no. 1 (Summer 2014): 39-40.

different hierarchies, wherein the United States is responsible for the security aspect and a growing China is beginning to dominate the economic one.³ As Japan and South Korea become more integrated with China economically, it will be important to understand how this affects their security cooperation. This research can investigate how this dual dynamic influences cooperation between Japan and South Korea to forecast the possibility of continued stability in the region.

Third, from a U.S. policy perspective, it is important to understand the various factors that influence security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Historically, the United States has advocated for closer ties between the two nations and has worked toward trilateral cooperation.⁴ This research helps determine the factors that facilitate this closer cooperation and those that tend to impede it. The United States could then apply policy that enhances the positive factors and mitigates some of the negative factors. Fourth, this research can help explain how domestic factors influence foreign policy. A realist perspective focused on externally balancing a nuclear North Korea and growing Chinese power would predict much closer cooperation. On the other hand, there are well-known historical animosities and other domestic factors that seem to inhibit cooperation. Realists emphasize that Japanese and South Korean security cooperation is explained through external factors, but constructivists focus on domestic factors instead.⁵ These two countries represent valuable examples that will contribute to the debate about how domestic factors can have a large impact on state behavior. The coexistence of some shared national interests and a high level of historical animosity between Japan and South Korea makes this a particularly compelling study.

³ G. John Ikenberry, "Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia," *Political Science Quarterly* 131, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 10.

⁴ Kim, 480.

⁵ Ji Young Kim, "Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 15, no. 3 (September 2015): 480, 483.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

After World War II, the United States pursued alliances in Asia in a much different manner than in Europe. In the latter, the multilateral model, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the center, created alliances that best suited the United States. In the former, however, bilateral alliances, known as the “hub and spoke” system, allowed flexibility in the level and type of commitment.⁶ Two of the most important elements of this system were the bilateral security alliances with Japan and South Korea. These two nations continue to each have close security relationships with the United States that have helped define the regional security order in Asia for much of the last seventy years. However, despite their close bilateral ties with the United States, Japan, and South Korea do not share the same degree of security cooperation between them. In an effort to help explain why there is not closer security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, a multitude of potential explanations across the spectrum of international relations theories and levels of analyses might apply.

Prior to understanding the encouraging and discouraging factors that influence security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, it is first appropriate to review the existing literature on the subject. An initial step for this process is to establish what the pattern of cooperation is between Japan and South Korea regarding defense. A review of the various scholarly viewpoints on the current level of cooperation between the two countries assists in identifying which factors are impacting this cooperation. To that end, the literature review explores the various perspectives regarding the current level of defense cooperation between Japan and South Korea, and then proceeds to a survey that outlines the major international and domestic factors that influence their security relationship.

⁶ Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific During the Second Nuclear Age,” in *Asia in the Second Nuclear Age*, ed. Ashely J. Tellis, Abraham Denmark, and Travis Tanner (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), 272-274.

1. Trends in Security Cooperation

One perspective on Japanese-South Korean security relations highlights the improving and positive nature of the relationship. This school of thought categorizes the security relationship as developing over time in a somewhat methodical manner. According to Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, “security relations between Japan and the ROK have developed incrementally” and encompass high-level exchanges, personnel exchanges, and joint operations.⁷ This argument highlights the positive growth in the relationship that started with normalization and gradually improved throughout the Cold War. A subcomponent of this argument is the notion that the negative aspects of the relationship simply receive more attention than do the positive aspects. Park suggests that cooperation is “underestimated while conflicts between them have often been exaggerated” and cites as examples of cooperation the increased economic transactions, human exchanges, and improved perceptions of one another.⁸ Overall, this approach seems to treat the cooperation that is occurring more optimistically, rather than focusing on the negative instances of friction.

Glosserman and Snyder note that the relationship between the two improved throughout the Cold War and that democratization and economic development provided great consensus for security cooperation.⁹ The apparent resolution in 2015 of the comfort women issue and the signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) are further evidence of recent positive trends in security cooperation. Advocates for this school of thought also point to efforts during the nuclear crisis of the 1990s as evidence of Japan-ROK security cooperation. Cooperation and coordination through organizations like the Agreed Framework and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) that developed after the DPRK’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March of 1993 demonstrated positive security

⁷ Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, “Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 28, no. 3 (September 2016): 384-385.

⁸ Cheol Hee Park, “A Whirlpool of Historical Controversies in Widening Waters of Cooperation,” in *Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Relations between Japan and South Korea*, ed. Marie Söderberg (New York: Routledge, 2011), 41-43.

⁹ Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 98.

cooperation.¹⁰ In addition to TCOG, GSOMIA, joint operations, and personnel exchanges, specific cooperation in ballistic missile defense is cited as evidence of security cooperation. Hinata-Yamaguchi highlights the trilateral ballistic missile defense exercise, Pacific Dragon, as an indication of security cooperation.¹¹ Finally, the South Korean disaster response and search and rescue assets provided assistance to Japan during the 2011 earthquake.¹² All of these events signified the real beginning of actual security cooperation between the two nations, which had been absent prior to the 1990s, and in fact demonstrate a positive pattern in Japan-ROK security cooperation.

While the Japanese-South Korean relationship prior to normalization to the present day obviously has improved greatly, there are several instances of decreasing or stagnating cooperation during this period. The second school of thought focuses on the multitude of negative trends in Japan-ROK security cooperation in recent history. While the intelligence-sharing GSOMIA was signed in 2016, it was not a smooth process. Singh highlights that South Korea leadership called off the agreement in 2012 in response to South Korean domestic protest.¹³ The delay of this important military agreement was indicative of a recent degradation of cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Michishita also focuses on the 2012–2014 timeframe as a period of deteriorating relations. He cites the lack of bilateral summits and the subordination of the importance of the bilateral relationship from a Korean perspective as evidence of this deterioration.¹⁴ Others interpret the existing level of security cooperation as insignificant as it has stalled in recent years. Ji Young Kim claims that security cooperation is low and emphasizes that the relationship demonstrates “a certain degree of quantitative development but very little

¹⁰ Yasuyo Sakata, “The Evolution of U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Security Cooperation: Dealing with North Korea and Diplomatic Policy Coordination-the View from Tokyo,” in *Trilateralism and Beyond*, ed. Robert A. Wampler, (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2011), 92.

¹¹ Hinata-Yamaguchi, “Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation,” 385.

¹² Bhubhinder Singh, “Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 27, no. 1 (March 2015): 31.

¹³ Singh, 23.

¹⁴ Narushige Michishita, “Changing Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 21, no. 2 (November 2014): 23-25.

qualitative progress during the post-Cold War period.”¹⁵ Overall, minimal summits, a lack of depth, and limited South Korean interest in an improved relationship stand out as the evidence for this school of thought.

The preponderance of scholarly research on Japanese and South Korean cooperation describes the relationship as varying between greater cooperation and friction. Instead of focusing on the specific negative or positive trends in the relationship, this school of thought recognizes that the relationship is volatile and has experienced periods of both positive and negative trends. Glosserman and Snyder’s views typify this school of thought, and they describe the Japanese-South Korean relationship as one of “rapprochement and rupture,” describing conditions where mistrust often outweighs national security interests to create this fluctuation in the relationship.¹⁶ The authors use the example of the 2013 Japanese offer of ammunition to a South Korean contingent of U.N. peacekeepers in South Sudan. While the soldiers on the ground likely appreciated the Japanese offer, politicians in Seoul reacted quite negatively to the overture of support.¹⁷ This highlights a security area where cooperation occurred likely due to similar interests but ultimately created friction due in part to historical animosities.

Direct security interaction often varies greatly based on the current status of the relationship between the two nations. Ji Young Kim demonstrates how progress toward greater security cooperation has often been interrupted by tensions related to historical disputes.¹⁸ Specifically, Kim cites the cancellation of a combined Search-and-Rescue exercise and military personnel exchanges in 2001 due to a controversy over Japanese history textbooks’ depiction of Japanese actions during WWII.¹⁹ Kim also mentions how

¹⁵ Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 479.

¹⁶ Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*, 161.

¹⁷ Glosserman and Snyder, 162.

¹⁸ Ji Young Kim, “Toward Building a Security Community in East Asia: Impediments to and Possibilities for South Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Security Cooperation.” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 25, no. 4 (December 2015): 512.

¹⁹ Kim, 512.

security dialogues from 2004 to 2006 and defense summits in 2006 were canceled for similar issues and territorial disputes.²⁰ These events afford evidence that efforts to increase cooperation are often disrupted for various reasons, representing volatility in the overall level of security cooperation. Sheryn Lee also identifies this oscillation of the relationship between conflict and cooperation.²¹ North Korean provocations in 2010 appeared to initially strengthen the security relationship between Japan and South Korea, only to see marked decreases in security cooperation by failing to sign defense arrangements like the GSOMIA.²² All of these authors provide ample justification to demonstrate the variation in security cooperation between Japan and South Korea; the proceeding section outlines the various factors that influence this back-and-forth behavior.

2. International Factors

First exploring the various international factors that affect the Japanese-South Korean relationship, three primary factors arise: China, North Korea, and the United States. It is also important to note that for each of these three countries, there are two directly opposite but equally plausible schools of thought. Some scholars view China and the DPRK as encouraging Japanese-South Korean cooperation by instigating a shared threat perception, while others see them as discouraging cooperation due to differing threat perception. In terms of the United States, some see the alliance as binding Japan and South Korea, while others see it as driving them apart due to entrapment fears and/or absolving them of the need to form bonds. China is often cited as a justification for closer security cooperation between Japan and South Korea.²³ This realist-based premise predicts that if Japan and South Korea both see a rising China as a threat, they will be more incentivized to increase defense cooperation as a method of balancing that threat. Areas of mutual concern about China include China's increased defense spending, assertiveness related to

²⁰ Kim, 512-513.

²¹ Sheryn Lee, "Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation," *Asian Security* 9, no. 2 (2013): 94.

²² Lee, 95-96.

²³ Michishita, "Changing Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes," 26, 30; Singh, "Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations," 26.

territorial claims, and support for North Korea.²⁴ This perspective also emphasizes that while relations between China and South Korea are currently good, the potential for this relationship to sour would be a decisive factor in improved Japanese and South Korean security cooperation.²⁵ Overall, a shared interest in preventing the regional dominance of China is one potential factor that encourages security cooperation between Japan and the ROK.

However, numerous scholars also cite differences between South Korean and Japanese views of the so-called China threat. This argument asserts that while Japan clearly views China as a regional threat, South Korea takes a more pragmatic approach, which prevents closer Japanese-ROK security cooperation.²⁶ Hinata-Yamaguchi elaborates on this difference of perceptions by comparing confrontational Japanese responses to Chinese activities in the South China Sea to the more muted South Korean response.²⁷ Further, he states that while Japan is overtly balancing against China, South Korea is pursuing a hedging strategy aimed at ensuring Chinese support for ROK policies in North Korea and maintaining the key economic ties between China and the ROK.²⁸ More evidence to support this school of thought comes from opinion polls that compare how Japan and South Korea see China compared with how they view each other. A survey in 2015 demonstrated that most Japanese recognize China as their greatest threat, while a majority of Koreans ranked Japan as their secondary threat behind North Korea.²⁹ While this obviously indicates some issues with how Japan and Korea perceive each other, it also reveals how differently each nation interprets China. This school of thought focuses on this difference as a factor that limits cooperation. Additionally, while South Korean approval of China

²⁴ Singh, "Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations," 26-27.

²⁵ Michishita, "Changing Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes," 30-31.

²⁶ Tae Hyo Kim, "Japan and Korea: Why Can't They Reconcile?" *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 29, no. 2 (June 2017): 279; Lee, "Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation," 103; Hinata-Yamaguchi, "Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation," 388-389.

²⁷ Hinata-Yamaguchi, 388-389.

²⁸ Hinata-Yamaguchi, 389.

²⁹ Kim, "Japan and Korea: Why Can't They Reconcile?" 279.

decreased from 2015 to 2016, “the South Koreans’ change in perceptions of China, however, has not yielded stronger support for Korea-Japan security cooperation.”³⁰ Overall, this perspective highlights how a closer Sino-Korean relationship impedes more robust security cooperation between Japan and South Korea.

Much like China, scholars present varying perspectives concerning the impact of North Korea on Japan-ROK cooperation. On one hand, the North Korean threat has at times provided a justification to encourage closer cooperation.³¹ The North Korean threat, in particular, creates more unified national interests between Japan and South Korea. Cha specifically focuses on the role that the development of the North Korean nuclear program played in closer security cooperation in the 1990s.³² This perspective notes that further coordination on solving the North Korean nuclear issue, like the Six-Party Talks, has continued to play an important role in encouraging security cooperation. However, some scholars note that North Korea generates friction between Japan and South Korea. While they observed a shared a threat in North Korea, both Japan and South Korea take different approaches to solve the problem.³³ This difference is often referred to as the temperature difference and represents how South Korea, when compared to Japan, has often been less sensitive to threats from North Korea.³⁴ The result is that South Korea sometimes is more willing to cooperate with North Korea, while Japan is unlikely to cooperate with the DPRK. Different opinions on the positive ramifications of reunification also discourage closer security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. South Korea’s policy often employs a positive engagement strategy that is aimed at eventual unification, where Japan sees

³⁰ Kim, 279.

³¹ Victor D. Cha, “What Drives Korea-Japan Security Relations.” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 10, no. 2 (Winter 1998): 82; Singh, “Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations,” 25-26.

³² Victor D. Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 210-211.

³³ Kongdan Oh, “The United States between Japan and Korea: Keeping Alliances Strong in East Asia,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 22, no. 2 (June 2010): 132; Hinata-Yamaguchi, “Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation,” 388; Lee, “Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation,” 105.

³⁴ Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 481.

unification as a possible threat.³⁵ The combination of different viewpoints about the nature of the North Korean threat and prospects for reunification make cooperation more difficult.

Another important factor that affects Japan-ROK security cooperation is the United States. On the encouraging side, the relationship that the United States has in the form of bilateral defense treaties with both Japan and South Korea provides an opportunity for closer cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Under the Obama administration, the United States pushed for closer cooperation between Japan and South Korea through the trilateral summit mechanism.³⁶ This recent effort was indicative of a consistent policy of the U.S. to encourage closer ties between Japan and South Korea. Sneider notes that the U.S. founding of TCOG in 1999, to address the North Korean threat, and subsequent creation of other lower-level trilateral defense, military, and logistics discussions demonstrate U.S. active influence on Japanese and South Korean security cooperation.³⁷ Noting the challenges present in the bilateral Japan-ROK relationship, Hinata-Yamaguchi proposes that U.S. encouragement is the only effective means to improve cooperation.³⁸ However, several scholars note that when the United States has a strong relationship with Japan and South Korea each separately, it diminishes the motivation for those two nations to cooperate in security matters.³⁹ The security guarantee generated by the United States with its large troop presence and nuclear umbrella creates a situation where Japan and South Korea do not need to seek additional security elsewhere. A more nuanced explanation of this phenomenon is described by Victor Cha. His quasi-alliance theory

³⁵ Lee, "Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation," 105.

³⁶ Scott A. Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 184.

³⁷ Daniel C. Sneider, "Advancing Trilateral Cooperation: A U.S. Perspective." in *U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateralism: Building Bridges and Strengthening Cooperation*, ed. Daniel C. Sneider, Yul Sohn, and Yoshihide Soeya (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #59, 2016), http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/sr59_trilateralism_july2016.pdf. 5-6.

³⁸ Hinata-Yamaguchi, "Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation," 390.

³⁹ Kim, "Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," 480; Michishita, "Changing Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes," 30.

predicts that in addition to a strong U.S. presence precluding the need for close Japan-ROK security cooperation, a diminished U.S. role in the region actually encourages closer Japanese and South Korean cooperation because of their fear of abandonment.⁴⁰ Singh also highlights the strengthening of Japan-ROK security cooperation that would result from altering U.S. force posturing in the region.⁴¹ Regardless of the positive or negative judgements regarding its impact on cooperation, the role of the United States is nevertheless a critical influence on Japan-ROK security cooperation.

More specifically concerning the role of the United States, the fear of entrapment prevents closer security cooperation. Glenn Snyder defined entrapment as “being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially.”⁴² Cha cites the impact of entrapment and abandonment as major factors that influence levels of cooperation between Japan and South Korea.⁴³ This concept is particularly salient given the separate and strong bilateral alliances that Japan and South Korea have with the United States. This could create a situation where both Japan and South Korea respectively worry about the potential of entanglement in a conflict that is counter to their interests. Because of their respective alliances with the United States, Japan could be drawn into a major war with North Korea, or South Korea might fear involvement in a territorial dispute between Japan and China. Unlike how fearing U.S. abandonment would likely push closer cooperation, fear of entanglement is likely to negatively influence closer security cooperation between Japan and South Korea.

3. Domestic Factors

From the domestic standpoint, two factors stand out from the literature: historical legacies and the domestic political environment. The first and most-discussed factor that impacts Japanese-South Korean relations is the historical legacy of the Japanese annexation

⁴⁰ Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*.

⁴¹ Singh, “Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations,” 30.

⁴² Glenn H. Snyder “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.” *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 467.

⁴³ Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*, 199-200.

and rule of Korea in the first half of the twentieth century. This period represents a historic grievance from the South Korean perspective, and the resulting bitterness has harmed the relationship.⁴⁴ This issue is not just one-sided, as the Japanese are often frustrated by “the ROK’s confrontational posture toward Japan.”⁴⁵ In addition to the animosity that has carried through from the actual colonial period, some modern-day events reflecting history are influencing security cooperation. Numerous scholars emphasize comfort women, Japanese leadership visiting war shrines, and Japanese textbooks downplaying the negative aspects of Japanese imperialism in the 20th century as factors that prevent closer cooperation.⁴⁶ Each of these issues exacerbates the relationship between the two nations as they consistently remind the South Koreans of the harsh Japanese rule and how the Japanese continue to either intentionally or obliviously aggravate the situation.

Identity differences generated from historical issues also prevent closer security cooperation. Glosserman and Snyder argue that public opinion in democratic societies directly influences foreign policy and that the diverging identities of that define Japan and South Korea are responsible for constraining cooperation.⁴⁷ Their argument highlights that despite the fact that there are many areas where identities and values align, the Japanese and South Korean relationship represents “high levels of mistrust” due to the identity clash.⁴⁸ Glosserman and Snyder contend that this clash is represented by “psychological and emotional gaps.”⁴⁹ Other scholars also attribute public opinion as a key inhibitor to

⁴⁴ Lee, “Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation,” 98.

⁴⁵ Hinata-Yamaguchi, “Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation,” 386.

⁴⁶ Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 484; Oh, “The United States between Japan and Korea: Keeping Alliances Strong in East Asia,” 134-136.

⁴⁷ Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*, 17-21.

⁴⁸ Glosserman and Snyder, 161.

⁴⁹ Glosserman and Snyder, 95.

closer cooperation.⁵⁰ Ji Young Kim asserts that while the Japanese are largely responsible for creating identity conflict, it is South Korea that “brings the conflict into the arena of security policy.”⁵¹ Finally, Singh contends that growing nationalism in both Japan and South Korea coupled with historical legacies constitute identity politics that weaken Japan-ROK cooperation.⁵² While the possibility of shared interests is mentioned in several sources, the negative aspects of identity conflicts are much more prevalent in the literature.

Another factor affecting Japanese and South Korean cooperation is the territorial dispute between the two nations. While this is not technically a solely domestic issue, the dispute represents a direct bilateral issue that fits more appropriately in the domestic arena due to its ties to the history issue. The research therefore treats the territorial dispute alongside the other domestic issues throughout the thesis. The disagreement about the rightful owner of the Dokdo/Takeshima islands is a clear barrier to closer Japan-ROK security relations.⁵³ The islands were historically part of Korea, but they became part of Japan after it Korea was annexed. Currently, both countries claim ownership of the islands, and the South Koreans have stationed a small number of military forces there.⁵⁴ Additionally, Oh indicates that both the Japanese and South Koreans see each other’s naval modernization efforts as concerning developments considering the disputed islands.⁵⁵ Ji Young Kim claims “the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute still remains the thorniest issue which is apparently blocking the development of the current security relationship between Japan

⁵⁰ Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 485; Oh, “The United States between Japan and Korea: Keeping Alliances Strong in East Asia,” 139.

⁵¹ Kim, 485.

⁵² Singh, “Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations,” 23-24.

⁵³ Lee, “Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation,” 99; Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 496.

⁵⁴ Oh, “The United States between Japan and Korea: Keeping Alliances Strong in East Asia,” 136.

⁵⁵ Lee, “Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation,” 104.

and South Korea.”⁵⁶ For obvious reasons, there is widespread agreement that this territorial dispute is discouraging Japan-ROK security cooperation.

More generally, the domestic political environment in both countries influences the strength of the bilateral relationship. Reinforcing the concepts of historical legacy and public opinion as drivers of foreign policy, scholars theorize that the domestic political systems in both Japan and South Korea push the nations apart when their national interests often overlap.⁵⁷ Tae Hyo Kim suggests that politicians are more concerned with appearing strong domestically with respect to historical issues at the expense of the closer Japan-ROK cooperation.⁵⁸ These leaders are aligning their interests with that of the public, regardless of the overarching security implications. Nationalism plays a role in this phenomenon as well, and specific leaders like Shinzo Abe contribute to this impediment to cooperation. Some argue that Abe came back into power in Japan largely due to nationalist support, and he is well known for nationalist ideology.⁵⁹ Mochizuki and Parkinson Porter suggest that his efforts to revise the constitution to give the Japanese military greater flexibility and the right of collective defense, and “his revisionist views on Japan’s wartime history,” are examples of nationalist ideology.⁶⁰ With this in mind, individual leaders, such as Abe, can directly impact the discouragement of security cooperation between South Korea and Japan.

However, there is one aspect of domestic politics where elites and the public diverge. Oh proposes that while the average citizens’ opinions tend to be more extreme, political leaders recognize the importance of economic ties and will “often accommodate,

⁵⁶ Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 499.

⁵⁷ Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*, 161; Tae Hyo Kim, “Japan and Korea: Why Can’t They Reconcile?” 272, 279.

⁵⁸ Tae Hyo Kim, 282.

⁵⁹ Kenneth B. Pyle, “Japan’s Return to Great Power Politics: Abe’s Restoration,” *Asia Policy* 13, no. 2 (April 2018): 78; Mike M. Mochizuki and Samuel Parkinson Porter, “Japan under Abe: toward Moderation or Nationalism?” *The Washington Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 25-27.

⁶⁰ Mochizuki and Parkinson Porter, 30, 35.

for economic reasons, another country of whose politics they disapprove.”⁶¹ This does not suggest that the public is not in support of economic growth, but negative public opinion is less likely to influence economic policies. This allows leaders more flexibility in maintaining economic linkages while potentially sacrificing security cooperation. The close economic relationship is, therefore, a source of cooperation that could lead to an increased security relationship. Cooney and Scarbrough highlight how economic factors serve as a mechanism to transcend impediments between the two nations.⁶² Alternatively, there is an argument that domestically driven negative sentiment that prevents closer security cooperation does not always originate from the populace but sometimes from elites. Kim asserts that confrontational relations are based on mass-led South Korean perspectives, but in Japan, they are driven by elite nationalistic policies.⁶³ Additionally, he claims that the elite-led Japanese actions, representing the view of the dominant conservative forces in Japan, “have had a disproportionate and largely unrepresentative effect on South Korea-Japan relations” and are responsible for the start of the cycle of adversarial relations.⁶⁴

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

As the literature review detailed, the factors that affect security cooperation between Japan and South Korea fall into two broad categories: international and domestic. This research explores each of the major factors in these two categories, determining whether they encourage, discourage, or have both effects on security cooperation. In the international realm, China, North Korea, and the United States are the factors of interest. Instead of taking a one-sided approach that only evaluates at how the international factors encourage security cooperation, the research equally evaluates evidence that China, North Korea, and the United States also may discourage cooperation. The research tests the

⁶¹ Oh, “The United States between Japan and Korea: Keeping Alliances Strong in East Asia,” 130.

⁶² Kevin J. Cooney, and Alex Scarbrough, “Japan and South Korea: Can These Two Nations Work Together?” *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 35, no. 3 (September 2008): 178.

⁶³ Ji Young Kim, “Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan,” *Asian Perspectives* 38, no. 1 (January-March 2014): 39.

⁶⁴ Kim, 39, 54.

hypotheses from the literature review without predicting whether the encouraging or discouraging forces are stronger. From the domestic perspective, historical animosities are the most important consideration to determine the influence on security cooperation. However, since these issues are always present, the research will focus on the leaders' and public's efforts to exacerbate or moderate the history issue and evaluate that impact on Japan-ROK security cooperation.

The first two international factors, China and North Korea, both have similar explanations for how they impact security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. On the encouraging side, as Japan and South Korea see China as more of a threat as a result of its recent assertive behavior, this hypothesis would predict security cooperation as more likely. Similarly, a growing North Korean threat would also encourage security cooperation. However, in both cases, these two factors can also discourage security cooperation. China has a much different relationship with South Korea than it does with Japan. The closer economic relationship and shared animosity toward Japan creates a different view of the Chinese threat from a South Korean perception. This, coupled with Japan's more hawkish view of China, provides an explanation for China negatively impacting security cooperation. Examining North Korea also generates divergent perspectives between Japan and South Korea. An alternative explanation would predict that North Korea diminishes Japan-ROK security cooperation because South Korea has pursued more of an engagement and cooperative strategy with North Korea compared to Japan. Both factors, therefore, could predict encouraging and discouraging impacts on defense cooperation based on how aligned Japan-ROK interests are in regard to China and North Korea.

The United States is the third factor that generates a possible explanation for security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. On the one hand, a hypothesis predicts that the United States positively influences security cooperation between the two nations because it is in Washington's best interest. This hypothesis also evaluates U.S. initiatives encouraging trilateral security cooperation against the bilateral Japan-ROK relationship. Alternatively, the separate bilateral alliances between the United States and each country could create fears of entanglement and discourage security cooperation.

Domestically, the primary hypothesis is that historical legacies discourage security cooperation. This explanation predicts that domestic politics exacerbate frictions and discourage cooperation, because there are incentives to scapegoat but far fewer political incentives to pursue international reconciliation. However, this hypothesis tests the changes in policy that leaders and the public within Japan and South Korea pursue regarding history. While the history issue itself remains largely static, policy approaches that seek to deal with this issue have varied over time and could have a significant effect on security cooperation. Further, a related explanation suggests that negative public opinion prevents security cooperation as well. Therefore, this research focuses first on how public responses in South Korea and Japan impact security cooperation, then evaluate whether leaders in the two countries have the same impact. Assessing the positive or negative outcomes of testing all of these discrete but interrelated hypotheses reveals which factors encourage and which factors discourage Japan-ROK security cooperation.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

A substantial amount of the literature indicates that cooperation is overall much lower than some would predict and that the level of cooperation alternates between collaboration and friction. This is the primary premise the research develops before addressing the international and domestic factors that influence security cooperation. This research analyzes direct, observable measures of security cooperation, including bilateral and trilateral military exercises, high-level summits and meetings, military-to-military exchanges and interactions, and formal security and military agreements. Events such as the Pacific Dragon exercise, the 2014 trilateral summit, port calls, and GSOMIA are examples of the type of instances with which the research is concerned, although this is not an exhaustive list. The scope of the research sets the boundaries of evaluation at 1994 through 2016. Chapter II explains the scope and methodology in greater detail.

The thesis employs a mixed-method approach. First, the research qualitatively analyzes the independent variables—the international and domestic factors—to attribute to them either positive or negative influence. However, the research also analyzes quantitative data to prove correlation between changes in the independent variables and in security

cooperation, which is the dependent variable. The goal is to evaluate specific incidents or flare-ups of certain factors and attempt to directly correlate them with variations in security cooperation. Establishing this higher standard of correlative (not causative) proof is often difficult and can produce mixed results. However, the research still utilizes this quantitative data because it provides additional insights and valuable conclusions regarding Japan-ROK security cooperation. Specifically, concerning the quantitative aspect of the thesis, the research will analyze when cooperation increased or decreased and seek to determine what factors influenced that movement. Chapter II presents several different graphs that inform the evaluation of international and domestic factors.

E. THESIS ORGANIZATION

The thesis consists of five chapters. The introductory chapter explained the primary research question and the significance of determining why more Japan-ROK security is not occurring. The first chapter also highlighted some of the key schools of thought concerning Japan-ROK security cooperation and outlined the research's hypotheses and methodology for testing them. Chapter II develops the research's approach for measuring security cooperation between Japan and South Korea as well as summarizing the resultant data with various graphical representations that facilitate the remainder of the research. Chapter III outlines the three international factors—China, North Korea, and the United States—and assesses their encouraging and discouraging influences on Japan-ROK security cooperation. Chapter IV considers the role of the public and leaders regarding the history issue and how that impacts security cooperation. Chapter V concludes the thesis by comparing the overall impact of all the factors on Japan-ROK security cooperation, outlining several areas for future research, and briefly considering some implications for future improvements.

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II. MEASURING SECURITY COOPERATION

The first step in understanding how international and domestic factors influence security cooperation between Japan and South Korea is to define security cooperation. Security cooperation is just one aspect of the complex relationship between Japan and South Korea. According to Glosserman and Snyder, the relationship between these two nations goes through periods of cooperation and friction, and domestic issues often prevent closer ties.⁶⁵ This variation, where relations progress through periods of improvement and decline, also impacts the specific security relationship. This chapter defines what security cooperation between Japan and South Korea entails, enabling the subsequent measurement of that level of cooperation. Overall, the data demonstrates that there is significant and measurable fluctuation in security cooperation. Additionally, these changes are easily parsed into five distinct periods of either high or low security cooperation. First, the chapter details the methodology for defining and measuring security cooperation. This methodology identifies the measurements, primary sources, time period, and finally any issues or gaps that handicap either the measurement framework or the data itself. After the methodology, the next section will present data accompanied by graphical representations to indicate possible trends. This section also includes some phases of cooperation based on these trends that might provide insights into the encouraging and discouraging impacts of both international and domestic factors on security cooperation.

A. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

One of the most difficult aspects of attempting to measure and analyze the level of security cooperation between the two countries is determining both what security cooperation means and how to measure it. The intent of this research is to focus exclusively on the security aspect of cooperation, excluding other types of diplomatic, economic, and cultural cooperation. To accomplish this, the definition of security cooperation must be very narrowly focused on defense-related cooperation. Therefore, this thesis defines

⁶⁵ Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*, 161.

security cooperation as a combination of direct, observable military and defense bilateral cooperation between South Korea and Japan. This includes several categories of high-level meetings, regular consultations, unit exchanges, bilateral exercises, and security-related agreements. Additionally, due to their respective alliances with the United States, trilateral cooperation is also included to better help determine the U.S. influences on security cooperation. Several scholars highlight the important role the United States plays in the security relationship between Japan and South Korea.⁶⁶ Trilateral cooperation considers various senior defense meetings, trilateral exercises, agreements, and exchanges. While trilateral cooperation is included in the overall measure of total security cooperation, it never represents a primary source of security cooperation. Additionally, the research will, in several examples, break out the bilateral and trilateral cooperation values separately to avoid attributing both cause and effect to trilateral cooperation.

The methodology for determining which types of meetings, exchanges, and exercises to be used is directly tied to the sources that form the primary basis for the analysis. The most comprehensive sources for cataloging bilateral and trilateral security cooperation instances are the white papers published by both the Japan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND). Japan publishes its white paper, *Defense of Japan*, annually.⁶⁷ Though the specific chapter and section headings for the Japanese white paper have changed throughout the years, the Japanese MOD has consistently included details on bilateral security dialogue and exchanges with several countries, including South Korea.⁶⁸ Additionally, these white papers include a

⁶⁶ For more detail on the U.S. role in this relationship see Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*; Hinata-Yamaguchi, "Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation;" Oh, "The United States between Japan and Korea: Keeping Alliances Strong in East Asia;" Bruce Klingner, "Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation," *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, no. 2734 (September 24, 2016): 1-10.

⁶⁷ The annual Japanese defense white papers are available at: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html.

⁶⁸ In the most recent edition used in this research, the information is located in Part III "Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace:" Chapter Two, "Active Promotion of Security Cooperation," Section One, "Towards Strategic International Defense Cooperation," and Sub-section Four, "Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges." See Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2017* (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2017), 363-378.

reference section with a detailed list of all defense cooperation over the previous several years. This research reviewed the annual white paper from 1994 to 2017.

The South Korean version is called the *Defense White Paper* and versions were published annually throughout the 1990s until 2004 and then biennially from 2006 to the present day.⁶⁹ Similar to the Japanese version, the ROK MND paper has consistently included a narrative about defense cooperation with Japan and a detailed reference list of security cooperation by year.⁷⁰ This research reviewed all ROK *Defense White Papers* from 1994 to 2016, with the exception of the 2002 version, which was unavailable in English. The research utilized the editions starting in 1994 through 2016.⁷¹ Additionally, surveys of scholarly articles and books confirm the examples of security cooperation. However, a common authorial trend across research for specific security cooperation is to cite these Japanese and ROK white papers as sources with which to catalog cooperation. The only source this thesis specifically used to generate the measurement data outside of the Japanese and South Korean white papers was Schoff's "First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool."⁷² That source includes all figures that relate

⁶⁹ The annual South Korean defense white papers are available at http://www.mnd.go.kr/cop/pblictn/selectPublicationsUser.do?siteId=mndEN&componentId=51&id=mndEN_031300000000.

⁷⁰ In the most recent *Defense White Paper*, this cooperation information is located in Chapter 5 "Development of ROK-U.S. Alliance and Reinforcement of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation," Section Two, "Expansion of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation," and Sub-section One, "Enhancing Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with Neighboring Countries." See Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. *Defense White Paper 2016* (Seoul, South Korea: Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2016), 155-157.

⁷¹ Of note, the 2001 and 2003 versions had slightly different names, but contained information on security cooperation and will be referred to as white papers for uniformity. In 2001, the ROK government published a *2001 Defense Data and Statistics* report in lieu of a white paper in order to transition to a different publishing timeline for the standard white paper. While the ROK *2001 Defense Data and Statistics* is much less detailed than the typical white paper, it contains a specific section on external military exchanges and cooperation that includes the required information for this research. In 2003, the ROK published a *Participatory Government Defense Policy* document that contains very similar information as the ROK *2004 Defense White Paper*. See Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, *2001 Defense Data and Statistics* (Seoul, South Korea: Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2001), 1; and Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, *Participatory Government Defense Policy 2003* (Seoul, South Korea: Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2003).

⁷² James L. Schoff, "First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool," Cambridge, MA: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2004. <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/updateTCOG.pdf>.

trilateral data. Overall, the respective white papers represent the most comprehensive and consistent repository of all security-related cooperation between the two nations.

Both nations' white papers consistently discuss examples in the categories of high-level meetings, regular consultations, unit exchanges, bilateral exercises, and security-related agreements, and the Japanese version specifically categorizes security cooperation along similar lines. Additionally, the Japanese white paper also highlights trilateral ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation starting in 2009.⁷³ Each of the aforementioned categories have subcomponents that are important to consider for detailed trend analysis. Within the high-level meetings category, three subcategories exist: defense minister meetings, vice-minister and director-level meetings, and senior military leadership meetings. The highest-level military meetings include both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) equivalent as well as the Chief of Staff (COS) of the air, ground, and naval forces for each country. Regular consultations between defense officials incorporate three types of working-level meetings. Although each nation often calls these meetings by different names, the ROK *2008 Defense White Paper* describes the working-level meetings as defense policy talks, security policy talks, and defense exchange cooperation meetings.⁷⁴ Each of these regular consultation-working-level meetings between defense officials is consistently tracked by both defense white papers.

Unit exchanges are a broad category that includes high-level exchanges, mid/low-level exchanges, and naval vessel and aircraft visits. High-level unit exchanges encompass visits by senior commanders of various units, while lower-level exchanges include students, military band visits, and other mid-level staff officer visits. Visits by naval vessels to each other's ports and military aircraft visitations between the ROK and Japan are also included. Finally, the bilateral category includes exclusively bilateral exercises and defense agreements. One of the most persistent and regular bilateral exercises is a naval Search and

⁷³ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2009* (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2009), 305.

⁷⁴ Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. *Defense White Paper 2008* (Seoul, South Korea: Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2008), 121.

Rescue Exercise (SAREX) that was first conducted in 1999.⁷⁵ The military information-sharing agreement, GSOMIA, signed in 2016, is an example of a defense agreement. Finally, from the trilateral perspective, senior meetings consist of the defense ministers of all three countries or meetings between the respective Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One important trilateral meeting that occurred from 1999–2004 is the TCOG, which focused on the unity of effort to address the North Korean issue.⁷⁶ Also considered are trilateral exercises that include both full participation as well as occasions when one nation is merely present in an observer status. Examples of trilateral exercises focus on issues like ballistic missile defense, search and rescue, and maritime interdiction.⁷⁷ Trilateral joint statements and information sharing agreements are also factored into the analysis.

B. TIME PERIOD

This research evaluates the period from 1994 to 2016. While data prior to 1994 does exist and was considered, there was very minimal security cooperation between Japan and South Korea before 1994. According to Pajon and Héméz, there was an “absence of meaningful security interaction” between the two nations throughout the Cold War and only began to change in 1993 with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono’s apology for Japanese actions regarding comfort women and North Korean provocations.⁷⁸ This marked the beginning of actual security interactions, and 1994 saw the first defense minister meeting, first ROK naval vessel visiting Japan, and the first defense policy working-level meeting.⁷⁹ Therefore, 1994 was best suited as the start date for this analysis as it marks the beginning of a measurable level of security cooperation. The year 2016 serves as the ending year for

⁷⁵ Céline Pajon and Rémy Héméz, “Japan-Korea Security Cooperation: Sisyphus Getting Muscles?” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 30, no. 2 (June 2018): 270.

⁷⁶ For a list of all the TCOG meetings see Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.

⁷⁷ For examples of these types of trilateral exercises, see *Defense of Japan 2012*, 283; *Defense of Japan 2013*, 236; and *Defense of Japan 2014*, 443.

⁷⁸ Pajon and Héméz, “Japan-Korea Security Cooperation: Sisyphus Getting Muscles?” 267.

⁷⁹ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 1995* (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Ministry of Defense, 1995), 150; Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 1999* (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Ministry of Defense, 1999), 276.

this analysis due to insufficient data from the latest versions of both nations' white papers. The last ROK version available was in 2016, and while the 2017 Japanese white paper is available, it only covers part of the 2017 calendar year. The 1994–2016 inclusive period contains ample data points to qualify and quantify variation in security cooperation.

C. DATA COLLECTION ISSUES AND CONCERNS

While this research aims to be as inclusive as possible regarding security cooperation, it omits several types of possible cooperation. First, all multilateral meetings and exercises were excluded from the total security cooperation measurement. This decision does not discount the value that these multilateral meetings could have. In fact, one of the important triads of liberal international relations theory argues that international organizations, along with democracy and economic interdependence, reduce conflict.⁸⁰ This reduction in friction could then facilitate closer bilateral cooperation. However, including multilateral events would have injected far too many variables, thus obscuring the goal of assessing direct influences on the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan. So while the influence of international and multilateral organizations is beyond the scope of this thesis, the research does recognize that these interactions can facilitate closer bilateral cooperation. However, the research was sensitive to any distinct bilateral or trilateral meetings that occur on the sidelines of multilateral ones. A prime example of such a sidebar is the ROK-U.S.-Japan Defense Ministers meeting that often occurs on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.⁸¹

As previously noted, the 2002 Korean white paper is missing from this analysis. However, the 2002 Japanese white paper and the 2003 ROK edition covered all the instances of cooperation for 2002. All of the defense white papers detail cooperation from previous years and it is typical for the Japanese documents to cover the previous five years. Given this, there is a low probability of any substantial missing information. Finally, there

⁸⁰ John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992," *World Politics* 52, no. 1 (Oct 1999): 1-37.

⁸¹ This trilateral defense ministerial meeting started in 2014 at the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue and continued annually through 2017. See Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2017*, 500.

was also a change in the level of detail that the South Korean reports provided throughout this time period. From the start of the period through 2003, the South Korean defense report was quite detailed. However, in the 2004, 2006, and 2010–2016 editions, the detailed tables were absent from the appendices. Fortunately, the Japanese reports have consistently contained the same detailed reference tables to mitigate this shift in South Korean reporting. Overall, while there are some potential issues and gaps, there is enough overlap between the Japanese and South Korean white papers to provide a robust sample of security cooperation.

D. DATA SUMMARY

Utilizing the methodology and sources that the preceding sections describe, Figure 1 displays the measurements of overall security cooperation. In the figure, the x-axis depicts the year (1994-2016) while the y-axis shows the number of security cooperation events. Figure 1 displays all of the high-level meetings, regular consultations, unit exchanges, bilateral exercises, security-related agreements, and all trilateral activity. Additionally, each of the above instances count as one act of cooperation. No specific category is weighted more than any other. Although this section does not analyze the data in detail, Figure 1 indicates several trends of note. Security cooperation begins to slowly improve from 1994–1997, with accelerated growth in 1998 and 1999. After this growth over the first six years of the study, there is a slight drop in 2000 followed by another decrease in 2001. 2002 represents the highest value for the total time period, but is followed by a steady decline spanning several years, wherein 2004–2006 experiences the lowest security cooperation. 2007–2010 indicates mostly growing security cooperation before several years of decreasing or stagnant cooperation from 2011 through 2014. The graph depicts an uptick in cooperation for the last two years of the research. Overall, these results seem to confirm two themes present in much of the literature. First, security cooperation between Japan and South Korea does in fact fluctuate between periods of high and low cooperation. Second, the data generally also echoes the literature’s indications of periods of increased tension or improved relations. The increases in the late 1990s, plunges in the middle of the 2000s, and decreases for several years after 2010 parallel periods of emphasis in the literature.




Figure 1. Total Security Cooperation between South Korea and Japan.⁸²

In addition to analyzing the total security cooperation level, it is also important to consider some of the other more focused categories to help indicate trends. Figure 2 depicts all bilateral events, isolating bilateral from trilateral cooperation. This graph indicates a slower initial build-up toward cooperation and other more recent fluctuations in comparison to Figure 1. Figure 3 portrays only the high-level bilateral meetings, including defense minister meetings, vice-minister and director-level meetings, and senior military leadership meetings. While this high-level focused graph demonstrates many of the same aforementioned trends, there is also much more volatility that could determine how encouraging and discouraging factors impact security cooperation. Finally, Figure 4 shows the trilateral cooperation between the ROK, United States, and Japan. For trilateral cooperation, the large spike from 1999–2004 represents the TCOG meetings, the subsequent decline coincides with the termination of those TCOG meetings, and the rest of the graph depicts a steady increase with the exception of somewhat significant dips in

⁸² Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.

2011 and 2015. Emphasizing these more defined categories determines whether and how international and domestic factors influence varying types of security cooperation. This clarifies the relationship between specific incidents and security cooperation. For example, the research determined that periods of extreme exacerbation of historical issues drastically impacted high-level security cooperation.




Figure 2. Bilateral Security Cooperation between South Korea and Japan.⁸³

⁸³ Adapted from *Defense of Japan and ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*.



Figure 3. High-Level Bilateral Security Cooperation between South Korea and Japan.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Adapted from *Defense of Japan and ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*.



Figure 4. Trilateral Security Cooperation between South Korea and Japan.⁸⁵

Additionally, to account for potential delays in various international and domestic factors influencing Japan-ROK security cooperation, the research utilizes a three-year moving average of total security cooperation. This method also reduces some of the volatility and better establishes trends. The moving average of three years best suits the brief scope of the research. Overall, the data indicates that there are in fact distinct periods when security cooperation improves and similar periods of declining cooperation. Figure 5 represents key focus areas of either increasing or decreasing security cooperation divided into phases based on the total security cooperation using a three-year moving average. Each phase is numbered, from I to V, and represents either a positive or a negative trend. Phases of increasing cooperation are outlined in green, while phases of decreasing cooperation are outlined in red. These focus areas and phases are the initial starting point when evaluating how international and domestic factors encourage or discourage security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Finally, Figure 6 compares the total security cooperation

⁸⁵ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.

from Figure 1 and the three-year moving average from Figure 5. This demonstrates that the three-year moving average does not alter the general trends but represents less volatility than the numbers alone suggest.




Figure 5. Total Security Cooperation Using Three-Year Moving Average with Trends.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, "First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool," 26-27.




Figure 6. Figure 1 and Figure 5 Combined.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Adapted from *Defense of Japan and ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, "First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool," 26-27.

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III. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

This chapter analyzes the individual roles of China, North Korea, and the United States to determine whether and when their actions have encouraged or discouraged Japan-ROK security cooperation. While these three external factors are by no means the only external factors that impact Japan-ROK security cooperation, they constitute the most influential external actors relative to the Japan-ROK dyad. The chapter quantifies the level and impact of these actors' influences, providing compelling examples that illustrate the correlation between changing international factors and fluctuating cooperation. Overall, this chapter determines that, despite some instances of discouragement, China, North Korea, and the United States all have more of an encouraging influence on Japan-ROK security relations. The influence of the DPRK was found to have a greater effect in the early period of the study and overall had the most influence on Japan-ROK security cooperation. Both the American and Chinese factors have a stronger encouraging effect, but that influence is more moderate than the DPRK influence.

A quantitative assessment using the measures of security cooperation data from Chapter II further analyzes each of the three international factors' encouraging and discouraging impacts. Although it is often difficult to correlate specific actions by the People's Republic of China (PRC), DPRK, and the United States to fluctuations in Japan-ROK security cooperation, the quantitative assessment sections provide compelling examples where this correlation occurs. Finally, a section with an analysis of the overall impact concludes each of the China, DPRK, and United States sections and assesses their individual influence on Japan-ROK security cooperation. Overall, this chapter determines that China, North Korea, and the United States all have more of an encouraging influence on Japan-ROK security relations.

A. FIRST INTERNATIONAL FACTOR: CHINA

The first international factor that influences Japan-ROK security cooperation that the research considers is China. China's massive economic and military growth has fundamentally changed the Pacific theater. As arguably the region's most powerful local

actor, China's actions and policies have widespread impacts on the behaviors of nearby states, including Japan and South Korea, warranting careful analysis. This research proposes that, overall, the encouraging factors weigh more heavily on Japan and South Korea than the discouraging ones. On the whole, China, by appearing more assertive, encourages more security cooperation between South Korea and Japan. This section details two encouraging factors—Chinese assertiveness and policy toward the DPRK—and two discouraging factors—Sino-ROK animosity toward Japan and differing views of China's DPRK policy.

1. Chinese Encouraging Factors: Threat Perception

A prominent argument regarding China's influence on Japanese and South Korean security cooperation is that the PRC encourages closer cooperation. Glosserman and Snyder refer to this school of thought as the "China threat," and this perspective predicts that Japan and South Korea will work more closely together in order to mitigate the rise of China.⁸⁸ If Japan and South Korea perceive China as a threatening or revisionist power in the region, then they would be encouraged to increase their security relationship to counter that threat. This section is divided into two main subcomponents that will address factors that reinforce Japan-ROK security cooperation: Chinese assertive behavior in territorial disputes and maritime activities and Chinese policy toward North Korea and the associated threat it creates.

a. Encouraging Factor 1: Chinese Assertive Behavior

Chinese assertive actions are one of the most direct ways that Chinese behavior is responsible for closer Japan-ROK relations. According to the 2018 Department of Defense annual report to Congress on the PRC's military, "China's increasingly assertive efforts to advance its sovereignty and territorial claims, and its forceful rhetoric, continue to cause concern among countries in the region."⁸⁹ The focus of the assertiveness that most directly

⁸⁸ Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*, 94.

⁸⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018," (May 2018), 51.

impacts Japanese-ROK relations is the sovereignty claims and associated actions mostly in the maritime domain. Chinese actions in the South China Sea (SCS), the East China Sea (ECS), and the Yellow Sea provide examples of assertive behavior. Although Chinese actions in the SCS supplement proof of assertiveness, actions in the Yellow and East China Seas have a more direct bearing on Japan-South Korean relations. In the ECS, Fravel describes how Chinese actions related to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands represented assertive and escalatory actions taken to improve a relatively weak Chinese position.⁹⁰ Additionally, China has also laid claim to the airspace above the ECS. According to Beckley, the Chinese air defense identification zone (ADIZ) suggests that the PRC views the airspace, land, and sea below the zone as its sovereign territory.⁹¹ These instances of assertiveness have generated strong responses from both Japan and South Korea.

Considering the direct confrontation with China over the Senkakus, Japan is more disturbed by China's assertive behavior regarding territorial sovereignty. During the crisis in the first part of the decade that included the 2010 arrest of the Chinese fishing boat captain and the 2012 private purchase of the islands by the Japanese government, China facilitated national anti-Japanese protests, greatly increased maritime patrols, suspended all high-level exchanges, and used harsh rhetoric when condemning Japan.⁹² Japan has consistently taken a strong stance regarding increased Chinese activity, including patrols inside 12 nautical miles of the Senkakus. Morris details Japanese responses to increased Chinese aggression, including the establishment of a Japanese Coast Guard unit of 600 personnel specifically tasked to patrol the Senkakus, deployment of ground troops to nearby islands, construction of a radar station on a remote island, and the creation of an E-2C air surveillance squadron in Okinawa.⁹³ All of these measures described by Morris

⁹⁰ Fravel, "China's Assertiveness in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute," 1, 14.

⁹¹ Michael Beckley, "The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion," *International Security* 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 96.

⁹² Fravel, "China's Assertiveness in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute," 7, 11.

⁹³ Lyle J. Morris, "The New 'Normal' in the East China Sea," *Diplomat*, February 27, 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-new-normal-in-the-east-china-sea/>.

demonstrate that the Japanese are taking concrete actions to balance Chinese aggression in the ECS. While not as well known as the Senkakus, China and South Korea also have a maritime/territorial sovereignty dispute. The Ieodo, or Socotra Rock, is a feature in the Yellow Sea that is an example of this dispute, and a key component of this issue is this feature's impact on each nation's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).⁹⁴ Wirth highlights South Korea's installation of a research station on the rock as evidence of its resolve and intent to maintain its claim despite several fatal incidents resulting from the dispute with China.⁹⁵

Another important subcomponent of Chinese aggression involves Chinese military modernization, which South Korea and Japan view as threatening. Modernization focused on the maritime arena and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) technologies are at the center of these threat perceptions. Lim notes that the developments of diesel submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles, among other things, demonstrate China's desire to "impose itself as the dominant power of the region."⁹⁶ Specifically, in the undersea domain, Young-June Park highlights the large increase of Chinese submarines since the early 2000s and the introduction of the Jin-class nuclear attack submarine, Shang-class nuclear submarine, and Yuan-class diesel submarine. He also highlights a planned increase from 62 submarines in 2015 to "69 or 78 by 2020."⁹⁷ According to a more recent 2019 analysis by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Chinese Navy will likely have 70 submarines by 2020.⁹⁸ These A2/AD modernization efforts threaten the ability of the United States to project power in the Western Pacific and, therefore, are concerning to their

⁹⁴ Christian Wirth, "Power and Stability in the China-Japan-South Korea Regional Security Complex," *The Pacific Review* 28, no. 4 (2015): 562.

⁹⁵ Wirth, 562-563.

⁹⁶ Yves Heng Lim, "How (Dis) Satisfied is China? A Power Transition Theory Perspective," *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 92 (2015): 287-288.

⁹⁷ Young-June Park, "Living among the Elephants: South Korea and Japan's Response to the U.S.—China Maritime Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 29, no. 3 (September 2017): 392.

⁹⁸ Defense Intelligence Agency, "China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win," January 2019, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf. 72.

alliance partners, Japan and South Korea. Other offense modernization efforts that focus more on strike capabilities and power projection also play an important role in regional threat perception. Specifically, long-range precision capabilities include medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles like the recently fielded DF-26, which has a “4,000 km range and is capable of conducting precision strikes against ground and ship targets.”⁹⁹ The offensive power projection capabilities illustrate the offensive nature of Chinese military modernization efforts.¹⁰⁰ Overall, they justify perceiving China as more assertive, which encourages Japan-ROK security cooperation.

Japan and South Korea have overlapping interests in preventing Chinese assertive actions and this commonality could lead to more security cooperation. Japanese-ROK responses to the Chinese ADIZ in the ECS demonstrate this overlap. In response to the Chinese ADIZ, both Japan and South Korea voiced strong opposition, deployed military aircraft in the ADIZ, and held a joint naval exercise near Socotra Rock.¹⁰¹ Singh argues that despite it being planned before the establishment of the ADIZ, this exercise “displayed the convergence of strategic interests in addressing instability in the sub-region caused by China’s assertiveness.”¹⁰² The actions clearly indicate shared security goals and similar responses to Chinese assertiveness. Additionally, as Japan feels more threatened by perceived Chinese aggression in regard to the Senkaku Island, it could seek to use security cooperation with South Korea to externally balance this threat. Finally, Hughes asserts in his assessment of regional responses to Chinese military modernization that this has led to Japan pursuing more direct cooperation with Korea, and that the ROK “has appeared more willing than before to pursue trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan.”¹⁰³ One example of this cooperation in the maritime area, which Hughes categorizes as

⁹⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018,” 71.

¹⁰⁰ Park, “Living among the Elephants: South Korea and Japan’s Response to the U.S.–China Maritime Rivalry in the Asia–Pacific,” 400.

¹⁰¹ Singh, “Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations,” 28.

¹⁰² Singh, 28.

¹⁰³ Thomas Hughes, “China’s Military Modernization: U.S. Allies and Partners in Northeast Asia,” in *Strategic Asia 2012-13: China’s Military Challenge*, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 222, 230-231.

external balancing toward China's military capability, is when Japanese forces observed U.S.-ROK exercises for the first time in response to the Cheonan incident.¹⁰⁴

b. Encouraging Factor 2: Chinese Policy toward North Korea

The second factor that encourages Japanese and South Korean security cooperation is China's support of the North Korean regime. While China's support for the DPRK could lead to Japan-ROK cooperation through distrust of China, this factor is more focused on how China's support for the North Korean regime is keeping the critical DPRK threat viable. The PRC has a long relationship of support for the DPRK. Although Shambaugh notes that China would prefer regime reform, he claims that DPRK regime survival is the PRC's most central goal, and this is reflected in Chinese food and fuel aid, which represents a large portion of DPRK imports in those areas.¹⁰⁵ In addition to the long-standing relationship between these two communist regimes, China has also more recently demonstrated tolerance for North Korean provocations. Chung describes how despite China's claims to investigate the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling, it refused to analyze the evidence of the ship's destruction and also did not hold North Korea responsible for the artillery attack on South Korea's territory.¹⁰⁶ These actions seem to run counter to China's desire for regional stability and soil its image as a responsible power. Despite some evidence of Chinese efforts to contain the DPRK, like China's support for United Nations sanctions, Singh claims that "China's long-term interest is to maintain an upper hand over other states in relation to North Korea and a strong China-North Korea relationship."¹⁰⁷

The reactions of both Japan and South Korea to some aspects of China's North Korean policy indicate disagreement with Beijing's position. First, from South Korea's perspective, both China's support of the Kim regime and China's views on reunification

¹⁰⁴ Hughes, 222.

¹⁰⁵ David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term," *Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 45.

¹⁰⁶ Jae Ho Chung, "Korean Views of Korea-China Relations: Evolving Perceptions and Upcoming Challenges," *Asian Perspective* 42 (2012): 229.

¹⁰⁷ Singh, "Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations," 28.

create strife. South Korea prefers unifying the peninsula under democracy and a free-market economy, while China wants to prevent a unified Korea from being a threat to the PRC, especially regarding the future of the U.S. alliance.¹⁰⁸ While there are some similarities, these positions diverge on priorities. Chung contends that South Korea could focus on reunification “even at the expense of stability on the peninsula” and that China’s goal is more focused on stability and the status quo.¹⁰⁹ Chinese actions regarding North Korea have created negative views in both public and government circles in South Korea. Cha notes that in the aftermath of the North Korea attacks in 2010, over 90% of South Koreans were dissatisfied with Chinese responses; and, Beijing’s push to show respect for Kim Jong-il and recognize Kim Jong-un as his successor offended senior South Korean officials.¹¹⁰ Japan shares a similar view with the United States and the ROK of what a unified Korean Peninsula should look like and more actively supports unification compared to China. According to Singh, Japan would “support reunification of the peninsula on South Korean terms.”¹¹¹ This pro-US-ROK-Japan alliance approach runs counter to the reduced alliance role that Beijing favors.

China’s approach to the DPRK, compared with Japanese and South Korean policies, generates areas of cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. One of the primary foreign policy areas where Japan and South Korea agree is the view that North Korea is a threat. In fact, Glosserman and Snyder describe a poll where the Japanese and South Koreans see China and North Korea as their top two threats, although with different selections as the number one threat.¹¹² Considering that China is often seen as supporting a dangerous North Korean regime, Japanese and South Korean interests are closer to each other than they are to China regarding North Korea. North Korea has long been a focal

¹⁰⁸ Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers*, 257.

¹⁰⁹ Chung, “Korean Views of Korea-China Relations: Evolving Perceptions and Upcoming Challenges,” 231-232.

¹¹⁰ Victor Cha, *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future*. Paperback edition (Ecco, 2018), 335, 344-345.

¹¹¹ Singh, “Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations,” 28.


¹¹² Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*, 117.

point of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea.¹¹³ In a situation where Japan and South Korea have some historical precedent for cooperation, continued Chinese efforts to stabilize the Kim regime provide a clear motivation for enhancing Japanese-ROK cooperation. Overall, the more Beijing supports the DPRK and undercuts Seoul's vision for unification, the more Seoul's comprehensive view of China as a threat could align with Japan's.

c. Quantitative Assessment of the Chinese Encouraging Factors

While Chinese assertiveness and the PRC's policy toward the DPRK may have contributed at some level to overall Japanese-ROK security cooperation, analysis of several specific instances does not indicate a measurable increase. First, Chinese responses to both the fishing-boat captain incident and the two North Korean provocations in 2010 provide key data points for analysis. Figure 7, reflecting the three-year moving average, 2010 represents a high point for cooperation at the end of the positive trend depicted in Phase III. While both of these events could have contributed in some way to the slight increase seen in 2010, cooperation remained relatively constant from 2009–2011. Further, cooperation decreased in Phase IV from 2011–2014. This indicates that the events of 2010 did not have enough of a long-term encouraging impact to offset other factors that inhibited cooperation. While the Chinese military modernization efforts play an important contributing factor to perceptions of PRC aggressiveness, they are too broad to relate to the quantitative measures of security cooperation.

¹¹³ Singh, "Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations," 25.



This figure displays total security cooperation using the moving average while also highlighting the 2010 fishing boat incident and DPRK provocations, the 2012 nationalization of the Senkakus and PRC-ROK tensions over Socotra Rock, and the 2013 Chinese establishment of an ADIZ in the ECS.

Figure 7. Moving Average Security Cooperation with Key Chinese Aggression¹¹⁴

Second, the so-called nationalization of the Senkaku Islands and tensions between South Korea and China over the Socotra Rock highlight 2012 as another important year to for evaluation. Data in 2012 is right in the middle of the Phase IV decline noted earlier. Much like 2010, it is difficult to link Chinese actions in 2012 with increased security cooperation. Third, the Chinese establishing an ADIZ in the ECS in late 2013 provides an opportunity to analyze an event that influenced both Japan and South Korea. As noted previously, both nations condemned the act and even conducted a joint exercise in part as a response to the perceived aggressive nature of the Chinese ADIZ declaration. Figure 7 depicts 2013 and 2014 as the low points of Phase IV. Outside of the argument that this Chinese action arrested the decline in security cooperation, it is difficult to see any immediate influence from the establishment of the ADIZ. Finally, a comparison of 2010,

¹¹⁴ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.

2012, and 2013/2014 to the more specific Figure 1 shows that during each of these periods there is either declining or stagnating security cooperation. Overall, despite increased Chinese threatening and assertive actions from 2010–2014, Japanese-ROK security cooperation not only did not increase, but it was mostly declining throughout the period.

2. Chinese Discouraging Factors: Shared Animosity and DPRK Policy

In contrast to Chinese capabilities, actions, and policies that encourage security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, there are also several factors that inhibit cooperation. The overall picture that these factors paint is of closer Chinese – South Korean relations because of a shared hatred for Japan and the belief that China is necessary as a partner with respect to North Korea. This closer Sino-ROK relationship in these areas diminishes the need and desire for closer South Korean cooperation with Japan. This section examines the shared perspective between China and South Korea as victims of Japanese historic aggression and considers the counterpoint that China’s DPRK policy hampers Japan-ROK cooperation.

a. Discouraging Factor 1: Shared Historical Animosity toward Japan

China and South Korea share a collective dislike for the Japanese based on Japan’s actions during its imperialist phase and modern failures to make amends for past transgressions. While South Korea and China also share an identity based on historical and cultural factors, this analysis just focuses on the animosity toward Japan because of its direct relation to Japan-ROK cooperation. According to Wirth, the history problem is the biggest hindrance to both Sino-Japanese and Japanese-ROK relations.¹¹⁵ The well-documented transgressions of the Japanese in the first half of the twentieth century not only pushed China and South Korea closer but also obstructed closer Japan-ROK relations. Beyond past grievances, contemporary issues, including visits to Yasukuni shrine, comfort women, forced labor during wartime, political leaders refuting atrocities, and revisionist textbooks, continue to inflame tensions.¹¹⁶ Both South Korea and China have responded

¹¹⁵ Wirth, “Power and Stability in the China-Japan-South Korea Regional Security Complex,” 559.

¹¹⁶ Wirth, 560.

strongly to all the modern examples of perceived Japanese revisionism or lack of remorse. South Korea suspended several summits from 2004 to 2006 due to revisionist Japanese textbooks, and China also canceled high-level meetings during this period.¹¹⁷ Overall, this shared perspective leads South Korea and China to jointly view Japan in a more threatening manner based on both previous and current Japanese actions related to imperialism.

This mutual perspective prevents closer Japan-ROK cooperation because it ideologically aligns South Korea closer to China. Oros proposes that “South Korea has found common cause with China over history issues, which has pushed Japan further away.”¹¹⁸ Moreover, China is able to capitalize on this animosity to thwart Japan-ROK cooperation, which is likely against China’s security interests in the region. Yul Sohn holds that China has used the history issue to “drive a wedge into the trilateral alignment in a way that has brought Seoul closer to Beijing while distancing it from Tokyo.”¹¹⁹ Additionally, he notes that President Xi Jinping made efforts to convince South Korea to go along with China’s stance to condemn Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s views on historical issues.¹²⁰ Not only has China actively sought to limit Japanese cooperation with South Korea through bilateral action, but it has also aligned interests with South Korea internationally. When Japan was seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, both South Korea and China objected to the proposal.¹²¹ Shared Sino-Korean views on the history issue and the associated collaboration prevent further Japan-ROK security cooperation.

¹¹⁷ Kim, “Toward Building a Security Community in East Asia: Impediments to and Possibilities for South Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Security Cooperation,” 512-513.

¹¹⁸ Andrew L. Oros, *Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 142.

¹¹⁹ Yul Sohn, “Relocating Trilateralism in a Broader Regional Architecture: A South Korean Perspective.” in *U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateralism: Building Bridges and Strengthening Cooperation*, eds. Daniel C. Sneider, Yul Sohn, and Yoshihide Soeya (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #59, 2016), http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/sr59_trilateralism_july2016.pdf. 17.

¹²⁰ Sohn, 17.

¹²¹ Kim, “Toward Building a Security Community in East Asia: Impediments to and Possibilities for South Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Security Cooperation,” 513.

b. Discouraging Factor 2: China's DPRK Policy, an Alternative Perspective

While some evidence suggests that China's North Korean policy would encourage Japan-ROK security cooperation, China's current and future role in North Korea can also prevent that cooperation. This explanation stems from China's significance to North Korea. Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi claims that South Korea understands how important China is to the future of the Korean Peninsula in regard to both the DPRK and unification.¹²² From this perspective, South Korea recognizes China's value in engaging with the Kim regime and that Chinese support will likely be requisite to the success of any long-term solution. In addition to the recognition of China's importance, South Korea and China do share some policy interests regarding North Korea. Shambaugh describes a consultation relationship between China and South Korea regarding North Korea policy and says that both nations prefer engagement strategies.¹²³ While Shambaugh's assessment is dated, South Korea and China still share an approach toward North Korea that now includes a mix of engagement and pressure. South Korea still favors engagement with deterrence and China has pursued a mix of "dialogue and pressure" by agreeing to more sanctions.¹²⁴ The end result is somewhat-aligned priorities combined with South Korean recognition of the necessity of working with China. Michishita describes this by claiming "South Korea has no choice but to proceed with closer cooperation with China because of the latter's influence on North Korea."¹²⁵

The closer cooperation between China and South Korean, which South Korea feels compelled to work toward because of North Korea, comes at the expense of additional Japanese-ROK security cooperation. Since South Korea recognizes the importance of

¹²² Hinata-Yamaguchi, "Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation," 389.

¹²³ Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term," 49.

¹²⁴ Hinata-Yamaguchi, "Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation," 388; Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018," 113.

¹²⁵ Michishita, "Changing Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes," 26

China, that diminishes the need to seek other less influential nations' assistance. Doo Seung Kim argues that Japan has not played a primary role in the Six-Party Talks when compared with the importance of the United States and China.¹²⁶ Another reason China is more likely to lessen Japanese-ROK cooperation is that Chinese policy on North Korea is closer to South Korean goals in some areas compared with Japan's policy. The difference in DPRK threat perception, sometimes called temperature difference, is "the phenomenon in which Japan is highly sensitive to North Korean military threats, while South Korea is relatively impervious."¹²⁷ In reference to South Korean cooperation options regarding North Korea, Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi contends that South Korea would be very sensitive to Chinese concerns, which would "dampen the incentives for a Japanese-ROK partnership."¹²⁸ Ultimately, South Korea sees China as more important to its future success with respect to North Korea and recognizes that closer cooperation with the Japanese might actually jeopardize that.

c. Quantitative Assessment of the Chinese Discouraging Factors

Evaluating direct examples of Chinese discouraging efforts that directly influence the quantitative measures of security cooperation is difficult. As Chapter I noted, the aim of this research is to present a general argument that explains how various international and domestic factors influence security cooperation and attempt to apply that to the quantitative security cooperation data. In this case, the shared animosity toward Japan and value of the PRC to deal with North Korea contribute to the overall closer relationship between South Korea and China, but these factors are hard to pinpoint as measurements of Japan-ROK security cooperation. The Chinese factors themselves seem fairly constant and exhibit minimal variation, making it difficult to correlate with changes in Japan-ROK security cooperation. China is not a primary driver of discouraging Japan-ROK security


¹²⁶ Doo Seung Kim, "A Hurdle beyond History: Japan's Changing Perception of the DPRK Nuclear Threat and Its Impact on Korea-Japan Relations," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 27, no. 4 (December 2015): 480.

¹²⁷ Kim, "Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," 481.

¹²⁸ Hinata-Yamaguchi, "Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation," 389.

cooperation but does contribute to limiting cooperation. The desire of China to prevent closer cooperation likely has a greater potential impact during periods of Japanese and South Korean diminished cooperation.

Concerning the shared animosity toward Japan, Chapter IV goes into great detail about how the various historical issues between South Korea and Japan negatively influence security cooperation. As this section indicated, China does play a role in discouraging Japan-ROK security cooperation by attempting to use the history issue to pull South Korea further from Japan and closer to Beijing. However, China's role in this dynamic is secondary and minor compared to the direct bilateral responses to the history issues. Although, it seems China might time its efforts during already low periods of security cooperation to emphasize a shared animosity of Japan with South Korea. This could demonstrate that China is attempting to take advantage when domestic issues inflame Japan-ROK relations. The examples discussed early in the 2005 blocking of Japan's bid to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and Xi's push for South Korea to condemn Prime Minister Abe occurred during low periods of Japan-ROK security cooperation. Figure 8 demonstrates how 2005 and 2013 are both at the low points of Phase II and IV, respectively. The important role that China plays regarding the DPRK demonstrates another area where South Korean and Chinese interests are at times more similar than South Korean and Japanese perspectives. While this can contribute to discouraging security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, China's overall role is both secondary and minor.



This figure displays total security cooperation using the moving average while also highlighting the PRC's blocking Japan's bid to gain a permanent seat on the UNSC and China's effort to encourage South Korea to condemn Japanese PM Abe for his stance on historical issues.

Figure 8. Moving Average Security Cooperation with Chinese Discouraging Efforts¹²⁹

3. Overall Chinese Impact

While there is evidence to support both the impact of encouraging and discouraging factors, encouraging factors generate more influence on Japanese-ROK security cooperation. From the quantitative perspective, it is difficult to draw any direct conclusions regarding Chinese influence on Japan-ROK security cooperation. The periods of Chinese maritime aggression and tacit support for DPRK assertive action that could encourage closer Japan-ROK security cooperation did not cause an increase in the measurement data. These periods actually demonstrated a reduction or stagnation in security cooperation, indicating that other factors were likely more important than Chinese aggressive actions during this period. Conversely, China can discourage closer Japan-ROK cooperation, but it is merely a second-order effect of greater Japan-ROK issues regarding history and DPRK

¹²⁹ Adapted from *Defense of Japan and ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, "First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool," 26-27.

policies. Overall, the most important question to consider when judging the balance between positive and negative impacts on that cooperation is how South Korea perceives China. While South Korea certainly views China in a more favorable light compared with how Japan sees China, the PRC's recent military modernization and assertiveness in the military domain might be changing South Korea's threat perception. If this occurs, China will likely continue to have a more encouraging role in Japan-ROK security cooperation.

B. SECOND INTERNATIONAL FACTOR: NORTH KOREA

North Korea is the second international factor that influences Japan-ROK security. North Korea plays both an encouraging and discouraging role in Japan-ROK security cooperation but this research concludes that the DPRK's encouraging role is more influential. The shared threat perception of the North Korean regime is one of the most evident international encouraging factors in Japan-ROK security cooperation. Much of the motivation for Japan and South Korea to cooperate stems from the threat that North Korea represents. This section first focuses on the shared threat perception between Japan and South Korea with an emphasis on the overall threat and the nuclear capabilities of the DPRK. While North Korea is a net encouraging factor, elements of varying policies and approaches to deal with them can create friction in the Japan-ROK relationship. The discouraging portion of this section focuses on these differences by exploring how South Korea often employs more engagement with the DPRK compared to Japan and how each nation has different priorities regarding on which part of the North Korean threat to focus their efforts.

1. North Korean Encouraging Factors: Shared Threat Perception

North Korea has long represented a threat to South Korea, but the DPRK also represents a regional security threat that concerns the Japanese. In fact, the North Korean threat has often been identified as an issue that has directly resulted in increased security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Cha claims that "Japan-ROK cooperation was especially evident with regard to North Korea."¹³⁰ As both of these nations perceive

¹³⁰ Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism*, 210.

North Korea as threatening, they are encouraged to institute more security cooperation measures in an attempt to mitigate the threat. This section first analyzes the overall threat of the DPRK with a focus on conventional and ballistic missile capabilities, then assesses the North Korean nuclear program and its influence on Japan-ROK security cooperation.

a. Encouraging Factor 1: North Korean Overall Threat

The overall threatening nature of the North Korean regime contributes to more Japanese-ROK cooperation. Throughout this research's time period North Korea has often committed aggressive and belligerent acts that have challenged both South Korea and Japan. Michishita highlights some of the events from 1993–2002 as “assaults on the Korean Armistice” and includes details of border incidents, maritime incursions across the Northern Limit Line (NLL), and even an incident in the West Sea that resulted in a small naval battle with ROK forces.¹³¹ Within the overall conventional threat that North Korea poses, both Japan and South Korea focus on specific capabilities that they find most threatening. Due to the proximity of North Korean forces to the border, the South Koreans are often more concerned with the traditional military power of the DPRK. Specifically, North Korea started enhancing their long-range artillery forces near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) so that Seoul would truly be at risk of widespread destruction in the mid-1990s.¹³² This period of enhanced conventional capabilities also coincided with a massive increase in exercises, and estimates claim that this increase from 1993 to 1994 was “80 percent for the ground forces and 50 percent for the air force.”¹³³ Given their different geographic realities, Japanese leaders were most concerned about a different aspect of North Korean military power. The 1998 North Korean launch of a Taepodong 1 over Japan generated grave concern throughout Japan about the DPRK's ballistic missile program.¹³⁴ Doo Seung Kim notes that this 1998 test pushed Japan toward a more hardline policy on North

¹³¹ Narushige Michishita, *North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns 1966-2008* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 138-150.

¹³² Michishita, 106.

¹³³ Michishita, 100.

¹³⁴ Michishita, 121.

Korea.¹³⁵ Recent advancements in North Korean missile capabilities only exacerbate Japan's concern. Basu notes that the Japanese deployment of two Aegis Ashore batteries in 2017 reconfirmed Japan's fears that North Korea poses a critical ballistic missile threat.¹³⁶

The shared threat perception of North Korean conventional capabilities has directly contributed to bilateral security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Singh claims that North Korea is a "long-term strategic challenge to both South Korea and Japan" and that these two nations have used the North Korean threat since the mid-1990s as a justification for "strengthened security cooperation."¹³⁷ While the conventional capabilities and general North Korean belligerence do generate the conditions for increased security cooperation, it is somewhat difficult to pinpoint these direct results. Much of the time, leaders reference the threat from North Korea as a reason to cooperate more. This was the case in 2010. Lee explains how the sinking of a South Korean ship and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island increased cooperation between the two nations as their strategic interests vis-à-vis North Korea became more similar.¹³⁸ She goes on to note that the Japanese support for South Korea during both incidents demonstrated a move toward a closer security partnership between the two nations.¹³⁹ That said, these intentions do not always translate into discernable action. However, actual increased cooperation is occurring in response to the ballistic missile threat. Hinata-Yamaguchi contends that the 2016 "satellite" launch by the DPRK played a role in the trilateral missile defense exercise Pacific Dragon and better aligned the Japanese-ROK perspectives of the North Korea threat.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Kim, "A Hurdle beyond History: Japan's Changing Perception of the DPRK Nuclear Threat and Its Impact on Korea-Japan Relations," 471.

¹³⁶ Titli Basu, "Debating Security in Japan," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 30, no. 4 (December 2018): 545.

¹³⁷ Singh, "Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations," 25-26.

¹³⁸ Lee, "Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation," 94-95.

¹³⁹ Lee, 94-95.

¹⁴⁰ Hinata-Yamaguchi, "Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation," 393.

Another focus area of security cooperation that resulted from a shared perception of the North Korean threat is the GSOMIA. This military intelligence-sharing agreement is direct evidence of cooperation between the two nations that is based on the threat from North Korea. Kang and Bang's detailed analysis of the entire process shows that Japan's motivation for pursuing this agreement in the first place was firmly based on the North Korean threat and even specifically highlights the North Korean ballistic missile program.¹⁴¹ While a subsequent chapter of this research highlights some of the domestic issues that delayed this agreement, the completion of the GSOMIA does demonstrate a direct link between the North Korean threat and Japanese-ROK security cooperation. However, the postponement of the GSOMIA for several years also indicates that the DPRK threat does not always encourage security cooperation as consistently as expected. Japan has sought and achieved this agreement as a way to enhance its intelligence to help mitigate the North Korean threat.

b. Encouraging Factor 2: North Korean Nuclear Program

An important specific aspect of the North Korean threat that encourages Japanese-ROK security cooperation is the DPRK's nuclear program. North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has long been seen as a threatening and destabilizing force in the region. Prior to even testing nuclear weapons, North Korea often used its program and the resulting "nuclear crises" as a means to achieve diplomatic and economic goals while negotiating with the United States and others.¹⁴² Lankov specifically notes these efforts by the North Koreans and how agreements like the Agreed Framework in 1994 facilitated the delivery of food and oil to North Korea.¹⁴³ However, with the first nuclear test in October of 2006, the threat became much more real for South Korea and Japan. Throughout the various stages of the North Korean nuclear program, Japan and South Korea have often focused on cooperation in the midst of North Korean nuclear provocations. Doo Seung Kim

¹⁴¹ Kang, David, and Jiun Bang, "Japan-Korea Relations: What Goes Up, Must Come Down," *Comparative Connections* 18, no. 3 (January 2017): 93.

¹⁴² Andrei Lankov, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia*, Paperback edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 184-191.

¹⁴³ Lankov, 184-186.

emphasizes the Japanese perspective on this issue by describing various Japanese efforts to coordinate its DPRK policy with South Korea during the process of completing the Agreed Framework.¹⁴⁴ Even prior to the first nuclear test, South Korea and Japan demonstrated the same policy perspective on the DPRK nuclear program by agreeing that North Korea could not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁵ The shared threat perception of the North Korean nuclear program is one of the most identifiable external factors that provided common ground for Japanese-ROK security cooperation.

There are several specific instances when security cooperation intensified in the aftermath of North Korean nuclear provocations. Statements regarding security cooperation have consistently referenced the nuclear issue. During a Japanese-ROK head-of-state meeting in 2003, both leaders noted “the importance of bilateral security cooperation.”¹⁴⁶ This trend continued during the first and second North Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, respectively. Doo Seung Kim contends that Japan specifically utilized the first two North Korean nuclear tests to “build close security relations” with the ROK.¹⁴⁷ He notes the concerted effort Japan made to improve security cooperation and cites numerous meetings between the leaders of both Japan and South Korea to determine similar responses to the nuclear threat and emphasize increased security cooperation.¹⁴⁸ This cooperation is persistent: Kang and Bang point out that the first utilization of the recently approved GSOMIA was to exchange information between South Korea and Japan concerning the North Korean nuclear test in 2016.¹⁴⁹ The GSOMIA example demonstrates that it is often difficult to differentiate between security cooperation based on the general North Korean threat and that based specifically on its nuclear program. Pajon and Héméz

¹⁴⁴ Kim, “A Hurdle beyond History: Japan’s Changing Perception of the DPRK Nuclear Threat and Its Impact on Korea-Japan Relations,” 471.

¹⁴⁵ Kim, 473.

¹⁴⁶ Kim, 473.

¹⁴⁷ Kim, 477.

¹⁴⁸ Kim, 477.

¹⁴⁹ Kang and Bang, “Japan-Korea Relations: What Goes Up, Must Come Down,” 97.

assert that both ballistic missile and nuclear testing in recent years has created more motivation for bilateral security cooperation, including the signing of the GSOMIA.¹⁵⁰

c. Quantitative Assessment of the North Korean Encouraging Factors


In order to assess the impact of the North Korean threat on Japanese-ROK security cooperation, the research first focuses on periods of North Korean conventional belligerence. Since the North Korean threat is persistent, this is an attempt to narrow down the impact of North Korea to determine its influence. First, as noted previously, the years 1993–2002 represent a large number of conventional belligerent activities by North Korea and Michishita dedicates an entire chapter of his book, *North Korea's Military Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2008*, to this time period.¹⁵¹ Figure 9, reflecting the moving average from the first measurement through 2002, shows a steady increase in Japanese-ROK security cooperation. This period is consistent with Phase I. While the total security cooperation values in Figure 10 do indicate a slight decrease in cooperation from 2000–2001, they spiked to their highest point in 2002. The most important North Korean issue in 2002 was the West Sea incident. Klingner highlights a second period of conventional belligerence and provocation as 2009–2012.¹⁵² Data from this period indicates much different results. Figure 9 shows a relatively flat level of cooperation during this period with a slight decrease going into 2012. Figure 10, on the other hand, shows a consistent decline in security cooperation from a high level in 2009. Both these results seem to indicate North Korean influence may have been stronger during the 1990s and early 2000s, but the impact of conventional factors has somewhat diminished recently. The 1998 DPRK missile test and the two 2010 provocations in this period also support this conclusion. The year 1998 is followed by an increase in both figures, whereas cooperation after 2010 is either flat or actually decreases. This indicates that the 1998 missile test served as a

¹⁵⁰ Pajon and Hémez, “Japan-Korea Security Cooperation: Sisyphus Getting Muscles?” 266.

¹⁵¹ Michishita, *North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns 1966-2008*, Chapter 8: Assaults on the Korean Armistice, 1993-2002, 138-162.

¹⁵² Klingner, “Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation,” 2.


quantum leap in threat perception, whereas later conventional provocations did not have the same galvanizing impact on security cooperation.



This figure displays total security cooperation using the moving average while also highlighting two periods of increased North Korean conventional belligerence from 1993–2002 and 2009–2012.

Figure 9. Moving Average Security Cooperation with North Korean Conventional Belligerence¹⁵³

¹⁵³ Adapted from *Defense of Japan and ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.




This figure displays total security cooperation using absolute values while also highlighting two periods of increased North Korean conventional belligerence from 1993–2002 and 2009–2012.

Figure 10. Total Security Cooperation with North Korean Conventional Belligerence¹⁵⁴

North Korea’s nuclear activities provide more concrete dates for assessing cooperation. As noted earlier, the first two nuclear tests took place in 2006 and 2009. In Figure 11, cooperation increased dramatically from 2006 to 2007 and somewhat in 2009. Considering the 2006 test was late in the year and the first of its kind, this seems to indicate a correlation with increased security cooperation. The entire period of these two tests shows consistent improvement in the moving average of security cooperation, as depicted in Phase III of Figure 9. The third nuclear test in 2013 seems to indicate a change in the impact of the North Korean nuclear program. Both figures indicate no change in the levels of security cooperation after the third test. In fact, this supports some of the research on responses to the North Korean nuclear program. Doo Seung Kim theorizes that the two earlier tests produced increased cooperation, but the third test resulted in “no progress in

¹⁵⁴ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.

security relations between Japan and South Korea” due in part to Japan’s reassessment of how much impact its policy decisions can have on the program.¹⁵⁵ Finally, while there were two tests in 2016 and one in 2017, it is difficult to assess their impact on security cooperation. Although 2016 does represent a high point in both measurements, overall, the nuclear issue seemed to have more impact after the first few instances of nuclear testing. It should also be noted that the beginning of security cooperation for the purposes of this research, 1994, coincides with the Agreed Framework and early efforts to address the North Korean nuclear program.



This figure displays total security cooperation using absolute values while also highlighting the first three DPRK nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013.

Figure 11. Total Security Cooperation with North Korean Nuclear Tests¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ Kim, “A Hurdle beyond History: Japan’s Changing Perception of the DPRK Nuclear Threat and Its Impact on Korea-Japan Relations,” 479-480.

¹⁵⁶ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.

2. North Korean Discouraging Factors: Differences Matter

While both Japan and South Korea see the DPRK as a threat, they often pursue different approaches to deal with this threat. These different policy aims can actually frustrate Japanese-ROK security cooperation. When goals are not aligned and one state chooses to pursue more cooperative strategies instead of a more aggressive approach, this misalignment can make cooperation more difficult. In addition to varying perspectives regarding the amount of cooperation to undertake with North Korea, Japan, and South Korea also often focus on different aspects of the North Korean threat. This varying areas of focus can also inhibit security cooperation as each country has a different threat priority to address. This section is divided into two subcomponents that highlight how the differences in both approaches and focus can discourage security cooperation.

a. *Discouraging Factor 1: Different Approaches*

During periods where South Korea favors more cooperation to deal with the North Korean threat, security cooperation with Japan is more difficult because the Japanese often pursue more hardline policies. Nishino describes this as a “divergence over diplomatic approaches and policies toward North Korea” and notes that South Korea has often pursued dialogue in contrast to Japan’s more pressure-based approach.¹⁵⁷ One period that typified this more cooperative approach by South Korea coincides with the Sunshine Policy. Lankov notes that the two consecutive terms by liberal ROK leadership followed a policy based more on engagement with North Korea from 1998–2008.¹⁵⁸ He describes the Sunshine Policy as an effort “to encourage the gradual evolution of North Korea through unilateral aid and political concessions.”¹⁵⁹ A key component of the Sunshine Policy was an emphasis on economic engagement that would eventually lead to improvements in the security situation. This meant South Korea was less concerned about provocations from North Korea and was willing to subordinate security concerns in the near-term. Overall,

¹⁵⁷ Junya Nishino, “Japan’s Security Relationship with the Republic of Korea: Opportunities and Challenges” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017), <https://www.csis.org/programs/japan-chair/strategic-japan-working-papers>, 9.

¹⁵⁸ Lankov, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia*, 197.

¹⁵⁹ Lankov, 197.

this period represented the largest difference in Japan-ROK threat perceptions regarding North Korea. In contrast to this more conciliatory approach, Japan has mostly maintained a more aggressive policy toward North Korea. Söderberg observes that Japan did not agree with this approach and focused more on containment instead of engagement.¹⁶⁰ Reunification is another important factor to consider when comparing Japanese and South Korean approaches to North Korea. While neither Japan nor South Korea likely sees security cooperation as a means to achieve reunification, the importance of that eventuality to South Korea compared with different Japanese priorities can frustrate security cooperation. South Korean engagement approaches like the Sunshine Policy consider the implications for possible reunification and the burdens it would entail.¹⁶¹ The Japanese have different interests and are less concerned with some of the long-term impacts. Cooney and Scarbrough even argue that the Japanese do not want a unified Korea as a divided state provides less of a threat to Japanese power.¹⁶² All of these differences in the political realm make conditions for security cooperation more difficult to achieve.

These different approaches to North Korean issues are partially based on different threat perceptions that directly influence levels of security cooperation. While the encouraging section noted that shared threat perception can create motivations for increased security cooperation, evidence also exists that different threat perceptions can have the opposite effect. This is not challenging the basic threat perception that the DPRK represents, but highlights some second-level differences in threat perception that can retard security cooperation. The 1998 ballistic missile launch over Japan provides an example of this issue. Michishita asserts that the different threat perceptions between the South Korean and Japanese perspective allowed the South Koreans to continue with the Sunshine Policy despite the test.¹⁶³ The ROK perspective did not find the development of this technology

¹⁶⁰ Marie Söderberg, "A Multilayered Analysis of Japan – South Korea Relations." in *Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Relations between Japan and South Korea*, ed. Marie Söderberg (New York: Routledge, 2011), 172.

¹⁶¹ Oh, "The United States between Japan and Korea: Keeping Alliances Strong in East Asia," 131.

¹⁶² Cooney and Scarbrough, "Japan and South Korea: Can These Two Nations Work Together?" 179.

¹⁶³ Michishita, *North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns 1966-2008*, 135.

as threatening considering the massive forces the DPRK could already bring to bear. Japan, on the other hand, responded to the test in a more aggressive manner with additional security measures and sanctions.¹⁶⁴ The Sunshine Policy represented a different perspective where South Korea did not see DPRK actions in the same threatening manner as Japan, and therefore did not pursue the same type of security measures as Japan. Because Japanese and ROK security perspectives were not aligned, this missile test likely did not drive increased security cooperation. Kim describes how the phenomenon of temperature difference, as noted above, leads to low ROK-Japanese security cooperation.¹⁶⁵ Other scholars like Hughes also note that Japan tends to exaggerate the North Korean threat for a variety of reasons but that it results in a consistently tough approach toward North Korea.¹⁶⁶ The utility of security cooperation from the South Korean perspective is also questionable due to this threat perception difference. Michishita relates the shift in the balance of military power on the Korean Peninsula in South Korea's favor after the Cold War to a diminishing need for Japan-ROK security cooperation to counter the DPRK threat.¹⁶⁷ Overall, different threat perceptions and the resulting contrasting approaches to the North Korean threat can inhibit security cooperation.

b. Discouraging Factor 2: Different Focus

Another area of divergence between Japan and South Korea regarding the North Korean threat that affects security cooperation is what aspect of the threat receives focus. While this factor does not seem to influence the Japan-ROK relationship as much as the different approaches dynamic, it does provide another potential contradiction between Japanese and South Korean policies toward the DPRK that can inhibit security cooperation. Lee highlights that the different perspectives on the most important threat might range from

¹⁶⁴ Kim, "Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," 481.

¹⁶⁵ Kim 481.

¹⁶⁶ Christopher Hughes, "'Super-Sizing' the DPRK Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 2 (March/April 2009): 291-294.

¹⁶⁷ Michishita, "Changing Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes," 29-30.

the nuclear and missile program to other threats like conventional forces, criminal actions, human rights, and even refugee issues.¹⁶⁸ As noted above, South Korea is generally more concerned with conventional aspects of the North Korean threat, and Japan is focused on the ballistic missile and nuclear threat.¹⁶⁹ While the argument was also made in the encouraging section that these different threat perceptions created a common enemy in North Korea, when Japan and South Korea focus on different aspects of the DPRK threat, this can prevent cooperation in areas that otherwise might warrant closer security cooperation. While it might appear that small differences regarding what characteristic of the North Korean threat warrants attention should not have much of an impact, these variations do seem to decrease security cooperation. The Japanese also focus on an aspect of the North Korean threat that often disrupts ROK-Japanese cooperation. Doo Seung Kim demonstrates the priority the Japanese government places on the abduction of its citizens by the North Koreans by noting how the Japanese used the Six-Party Talks as a vehicle to find a solution to the abduction issue and how that hindered efforts to solve the nuclear issue.¹⁷⁰ Japan's express focus on the abduction issue in the Six-Party Talks showed a clearly different focus than the South Koreans.

While the different focuses of Japan and South Korea is a nuanced point, it can generate friction that impacts security cooperation. Pajon and Hómez emphasize the massive artillery forces that can strike Seoul and note how this threat complicates security cooperation with Japan because Seoul is trying to avoid conflict that would devastate the country.¹⁷¹ The linking of the abduction issue with the seemingly more important effort to address the DPRK's nuclear program generates friction between Japan and South Korea. Singh describes how the South Koreans do not want to link the abduction issue with denuclearization.¹⁷² Another example where Japan and South Korea have a different focus

¹⁶⁸ Lee, "Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation," 103.

¹⁶⁹ Pajon and Hómez, "Japan-Korea Security Cooperation: Sisyphus Getting Muscles?" 273.

¹⁷⁰ Kim, "A Hurdle beyond History: Japan's Changing Perception of the DPRK Nuclear Threat and Its Impact on Korea-Japan Relations," 472.

¹⁷¹ Pajon and Hómez, "Japan-Korea Security Cooperation: Sisyphus Getting Muscles?" 273.


¹⁷² Singh, "Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations," 35.

has been on missile defense. Klingner describes how both Presidents Kim and Roh “downplayed the North Korean missile threat” and how President Roh did not want to join an integrated missile defense organization with the United States and Japan.¹⁷³ The massive conventional threats that South Korea faced during this period meant that the ROK government did not interpret the missile threat as the Japanese did. Instead of countering a focused threat, South Korea and Japan bifurcated their focuses, to the detriment of increased security cooperation.

c. Quantitative Assessment of the North Korean Discouraging Factors

This research reveals a key time period to analyze how the DPRK can discourage security cooperation. The 1998–2008 Sunshine Policy period presents a clear dichotomy between the Japanese hardline and South Korean engagement approaches. According to Figure 12, which utilizes the three-year moving average, the ten years from 1998 to 2008 represent a wide array of results. The period starts off with a steady increase in security cooperation but then is followed by a steady decline from 2004–2006. This trend then reverses again during the last two years of the Sunshine Policy back toward a steady increase. Additionally, the early years of the Sunshine Policy exhibited even more engagement with North Korea and those years represented increasing security cooperation. Based on this data, it does not seem like the different approaches of the Japanese and South Korean governments during this decade had a consistent impact on security cooperation. Nor do the specific dates mentioned in the approaches and focus factors provide a strong correlation for decreasing security cooperation. First, in 1998, when the Japanese responded much more harshly to the DPRK’s missile test, cooperation continued to increase for several years. The similar Japanese response to the 2006 missile tests provides another different approach example. Again, several years after this event resulted in increasing security cooperation.

¹⁷³ Klingner, “Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation,” 7-8.



This figure displays total security cooperation using the moving average while also highlighting the Sunshine Policy from 1998–2008.

Figure 12. Moving Average Security Cooperation with the Sunshine Policy¹⁷⁴

3. Overall DPRK Impact

In sum, the DPRK has a more positive impact on Japanese-ROK security cooperation as the threat seems to drive closer cooperation, especially when the DPRK commits belligerent acts. However, the data also pointed to North Korean aggression in the earlier phases having a greater impact on cooperation. As South Korea and Japan have become more used to aggressive acts and nuclear tests, the power of the DPRK threat to encourage security may be diminished. It is more difficult to analyze the discouraging factors of the DPRK on Japanese and South Korean security cooperation. The impact of the differences in threat perception that drives varying approaches and focuses does not produce any measurable quantitative conclusions. However, because this is a harder standard to achieve, the results from the general explanation for how the DPRK can diminish Japan-ROK security cooperation is still important. There is certainly reason to

¹⁷⁴ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.

believe that these differences can discourage security cooperation, but they are likely not powerful enough to cause immediate dips in security cooperation in the aftermath of threatening DPRK actions like missile tests. It is also possible that these differences merely prevent or inhibit the potential for more security cooperation rather than directly decrease it. Some evidence points to the fact that when these approaches shift to be more aligned, security cooperation to address the DPRK emerges. While the priority of missile defense was cited as an example of the discouraging factor, it also demonstrates the impact of an aligned focus. South Korea's decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in 2016 shows how the ROK takes the North Korean missile threat more seriously.¹⁷⁵ While South Korea is still not integrated with regional partners into an integrated missile defense system, this deployment shows the potential for greater security cooperation as the DPRK threat is seen similarly by South Korea and Japan. This is a sign of possible future increases in Japan-ROK security cooperation, despite not counting as such just yet.

C. THIRD INTERNATIONAL FACTOR: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The final international factor the research analyzes is the United States. Just as China and the DPRK both encourage and discourage Japan-ROK security cooperation, the United States influence increases and decreases security cooperation. However, the encouraging role that the United States plays has a greater impact than the discouraging aspects. The combination of direct U.S. efforts to encourage Japan-ROK security cooperation and associated trilateral cooperation provides much of the foundation for Japan-ROK security cooperation overall. This section explores the encouraging factors of the U.S. trilateral efforts as well as the increased cooperation that can arise from Japanese and South Korean fears of abandonment in their respective alliances by the United States. The discouraging portion focuses solely on entrapment and examines the decrease in security cooperation related to concerns Japan and South Korea have with becoming involved in unwelcome conflicts due to the alliance structure.

¹⁷⁵ Edward Kwon, "South Korea's Deterrence Strategy against North Korea's WMD," *East Asia* 35, no. 1 (March 2018): 11.

1. American Encouraging Factors: Trilateral Efforts and Abandonment

American interests in the Pacific theater have long been served by dual alliances with South Korea and Japan respectively. South Korea and Japan form two of the key elements of the so-called “hub and spoke” alliance system that differs from the multilateral alliance system in Europe.¹⁷⁶ This unique relationship generates close bilateral ties within the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK dyads, but also provides an opportunity for the United States to encourage closer security cooperation between its two principle Asian allies. Additionally, because there is not a multilateral alliance structure like NATO, Japan and South Korea are both heavily dependent on the United States for security. Therefore, the fear of abandonment by the United States also motivates both Japan and South Korea to seek closer security cooperation. This section first analyzes the direct efforts of the United States to encourage Japan-ROK cooperation through trilateral means, then details the fear of U.S. abandonment and its impact on security cooperation.

a. Encouraging Factor 1: U.S. Trilateral Efforts

American encouragement is the strongest influence on the Japanese and South Korean security relationship. Kim asserts that the United States has “officially promoted cooperation between the two countries ever since the height of the Cold War” as a means of creating a more stable regional order.¹⁷⁷ Closer cooperation between two key allies of the United States in Asia facilitated American interests. Sneider highlights the importance of the U.S. role in mediating the 1965 normalization of Japan-ROK relations as an example of early U.S. trilateral efforts.¹⁷⁸ While much of the motivation for improved trilateral relations was driven by the growing North Korean threat in the 1990s, the United States played a key role in facilitating this cooperation. Wampler specifically describes how the first DPRK nuclear crisis in the early 1990s pushed Japan to take a more active role in

¹⁷⁶ Brooks and Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific during the Second Nuclear Age,” 272-274.

¹⁷⁷ Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 480-481.

¹⁷⁸ Sneider, “Advancing Trilateral Cooperation: A U.S. Perspective,” 4.

North Korea and highlights U.S. efforts to encourage cooperation among their allies.¹⁷⁹ The U.S. actions to increase trilateral cooperation oriented toward North Korea eventually led to the creation of the TCOG. This trilateral group of senior officials held meetings, starting in 1999, on a regular basis to coordinate policy concerning the DPRK.¹⁸⁰ Meetings like the TCOG and other U.S. trilateral efforts have facilitated direct security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Pajon and Héméz contend that the combination of converging threat perceptions and “constant U.S. persuasion” have encouraged Japan-ROK security cooperation in recent years.¹⁸¹

The most measurable impact on early Japan-ROK security cooperation was the U.S. efforts to create TCOG. From 1999–2004, TCOG formal and informal meetings were held 35 times, and Schoff called the TCOG “the first regular, successful trilateral process” and highlighted the importance of this connection to build closer Japan-ROK cooperation.¹⁸² This additional security cooperation between Japan and South Korea was highly dependent on the U.S. role. Wampler maintains that this trilateral cooperation would not have occurred without direct U.S. efforts to bring its two allies together.¹⁸³ The recurring theme that establishes the United States’ pivotal role in encouraging Japan-ROK security cooperation is also apparent in more recent times. Nishino observes that trilateral defense ministerial meetings held since 2010 and the Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) that started in 2008 both provide venues for increased trilateral cooperation.¹⁸⁴ The United States has used these and other high-level meetings to facilitate cooperation. When the intelligence-sharing agreement between Japan and South Korea was delayed due to domestic issues, the United States pushed a trilateral agreement instead.¹⁸⁵ Sohn emphasizes that progress

¹⁷⁹ Sakata, “The Evolution of U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Security Cooperation: Dealing with North Korea and Diplomatic Policy Coordination-the View from Tokyo,” 92-93.

¹⁸⁰ Sakata, 106-07.

¹⁸¹ Pajon and Héméz, “Japan-Korea Security Cooperation: Sisyphus Getting Muscles?” 266.

¹⁸² Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool.” 1, 26-27.

¹⁸³ Sakata, 118.

¹⁸⁴ Nishino, “Japan’s Security Relationship with the Republic of Korea: Opportunities and Challenges,” 5, 6.

¹⁸⁵ Sneider, “Advancing Trilateral Cooperation: A U.S. Perspective,” 6.

occurred as a result of U.S. persuasion of “a reluctant ROK to join talks on a trilateral arrangement for sharing military information.”¹⁸⁶ This agreement was important because it is an example of a clear case where Japan-ROK security cooperation was frustrated and cooperation only occurred through the American-led trilateral process. However, this is not to suggest that U.S. efforts to encourage trilateral cooperation are always successful. Klingner insists that the United States has attempted to develop missile defense along trilateral lines but has not been wholly successful due to South Korean hesitations.¹⁸⁷ Nonetheless, these examples do suggest that the United States plays a vital role in encouraging security cooperation through trilateral efforts. Hinata-Yamaguchi even goes so far as to conclude that Japan-ROK security cooperation will only improve through American efforts to push trilateral activities.¹⁸⁸

b. Encouraging Factor 2: Abandonment

Japanese and South Korean concerns of U.S. abandonment from their respective bilateral alliances can also encourage security cooperation between them. Glenn Snyder refers to abandonment as “prospective bad” of alliances where the prospect of defection by an ally can create a dilemma and a security concern for the allied partner.¹⁸⁹ In *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, Cha contends that Japan and South Korea are in a “quasi-alliance,” because both states have a bilateral alliance with the United States but not each other and that both exhibit a fear of abandonment or disengagement of their U.S. partner.¹⁹⁰ Further, he claims that when both parties demonstrate “a symmetrical structure of abandonment fears with regard to a third party” one result is a “stronger commitment to one another.”¹⁹¹ This hypothesis would predict closer Japan-ROK security cooperation when both countries

¹⁸⁶ Sohn, “Relocating Trilateralism in a Broader Regional Architecture: A South Korean Perspective,” 17-18.

¹⁸⁷ Klingner, “Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation.” 7-8.

¹⁸⁸ Hinata-Yamaguchi, “Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation,” 390.

¹⁸⁹ Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” 466.

¹⁹⁰ Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, 36, 50.

¹⁹¹ Cha, 200.

share a fear of U.S. abandonment. This presents a completely opposite perspective from U.S. trilateral efforts encouraging cooperation because it predicts that American disengagement actually increases Japan-ROK security cooperation.

While both of these hypotheses can logically be true simultaneously, this makes understanding the influence of American actions difficult to determine. The aim here is to evaluate whether or not the abandonment fears also create security cooperation. The general expectation is that the U.S. trilateral efforts will have a stronger influence on encouraging security cooperation than the abandonment fears. From the Japanese perspective, there are several sources of this abandonment fear. Brooks and Rapp-Hopper illustrate how the United States is Japan's lone strong ally, and concerns over Sino-U.S. relations improving or Japan's value as an alliance partner diminishing contributes to Japanese abandonment fear.¹⁹² South Korean fears of abandonment are also complex. Some fears are generated based on questioning the U.S. commitment to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the DPRK used nuclear weapons on South Korea, while others are centered more on decreasing U.S. conventional capabilities in Asia due to long-term counterinsurgency operations.¹⁹³ Overall, both Japan and South Korea fear diminished U.S. presence and capability in Northeast Asia. Singh notes that greater capabilities in North Korea and China, coupled with new economic realities, cause Japan and South Korea to question U.S. alliance commitments.¹⁹⁴

While it is difficult to pinpoint direct examples of shared abandonment fears creating bilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea, the assessment section analyzes periods of decreased trilateral efforts as a possible indicator of potential U.S. disengagement and determines if that impacted purely bilateral Japan-ROK security

¹⁹² Brooks and Rapp-Hooper, "Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific during the Second Nuclear Age," 285.

¹⁹³ Brooks and Rapp-Hooper, 287-289.

¹⁹⁴ Singh, "Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations," 29-30.

cooperation.¹⁹⁵ However, some circumstances indicate the proper conditions were present for this type of cooperation to occur. Recent examples of U.S. foreign policy also support the notion of a sense of shared fear of abandonment by Japan and South Korea. Suzuki, while not supporting the positive impact of abandonment on increased cooperation, notes that the Obama administration's weak response to Assad's use of chemical weapons in Syria and the Russian invasion of Crimea calls into question U.S. power.¹⁹⁶ While these events did not occur in Asia, weak U.S. responses to global crises can contribute to Japanese and South Korean fears of abandonment. The next logical step utilizing Cha's quasi-alliance theory would be for South Korea and Japan to address these shared fears by cooperating more with each other to fill the perceived gap left by diminished U.S. support. While Cha's seminal alliance study did identify two periods of shared Japan-ROK abandonment fear that increased bilateral security cooperation, these periods occurred prior to the start of this research's time frame.¹⁹⁷ Glosserman and Snyder note that the 2011 rebalance to the Pacific was a move to reassure allies in the area of U.S. commitment and notes a diminished level of trilateral cooperation after the TCOG.¹⁹⁸ Additionally, recent actions by President Trump could indicate a new period of shared abandonment fears. A recent New York Times article highlights how President Trump "is often scornful of America's decades-old network of multilateral alliances, seeing them as a costly burden," and states that efforts to pull troops out of Afghanistan and Syria reduce American credibility amongst its allies.¹⁹⁹ Baru notes how the Trump Administration's actions

¹⁹⁵ This statement assumes that trilateral efforts by the United States are a proxy for overall American engagement. More trilateral efforts indicate U.S. alliance engagement and decreases in these efforts indicate disengagement. Still, this is not a perfect indicator of U.S. engagement with Japan and South Korea. A scenario could exist where the United States is disengaging from the region but increases specific trilateral efforts. However, this research did not find this to be the case and since measuring engagement/disengagement is very difficult, trilateral efforts were used as proxy.

¹⁹⁶ Suzuki, "Can the History Issue Make or Break the Japan-ROK Quasi-Alliance," 204-205.

¹⁹⁷ Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, 201; Cha concluded that symmetrical abandonment fears that created increased cooperation between Japan and South Korea occurred between 1969-1971 and again from 1975 to 1979.

¹⁹⁸ Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*. 133, 143.

¹⁹⁹ Steven Erlanger, and Jane Perlez, "America's Allies Fear that Traditional Ties No Longer Matter under Trump," *New York Times*, last modified December 21, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/world/europe/trump-jim-mattis-syria.html>.


regarding North Korea are causing the Japanese to question U.S. commitments.²⁰⁰ President Trump's unorthodox style might also impact South Korean perceptions in a similar manner.

c. Quantitative Assessment of the American Encouraging Factors

As noted in Chapter II, the trilateral values are included in the overall security cooperation instances, but, while significant, never serve as the main driver of security cooperation. Additionally, when looking specifically at how changes in trilateral efforts by the United States influence Japan-ROK security cooperation, two separate graphs present bilateral and trilateral data respectively. This allows an assessment of the effect of trilateral efforts on bilateral cooperation without worrying that trilateral cooperation is part of what constitutes bilateral cooperation in the first place. The first measurable direct U.S. influence on Japan-ROK security cooperation is the series of TCOG meetings that began in the 1990s as a result of the need to address the North Korean threat. Looking specifically at the 1999–2004 timeframe, Figure 13 demonstrates how these meetings represented a large growth in the instances of security cooperation. However, comparing the trilateral values with the purely bilateral numbers depicted in Figure 14, security cooperation increases mostly coincided with the trilateral efforts. The bilateral data shows some growth from 1999 to 2001, a large spike in 2002, and finally a decline through 2004. Referencing Figure 15, the 1999–2004 period represents a general increasing trend. All three figures display a broad increasing trend of security cooperation during this period. Based on this data, the growth in trilateral efforts spearheaded by the United States could have helped increase Japan-ROK security cooperation from 1999–2004. The U.S. trilateral efforts were also noted above as increasing with more regular meetings starting in 2008 and 2010, DTT and defense ministerial meetings, respectively. Comparing Figures 13 and 14, there does not seem to be a significant correlation with increased trilateral cooperation leading to distinct increases in purely bilateral Japan-ROK security cooperation. In fact, as trilateral instances mostly increase from 2009–2014, bilateral cooperation steadily declines. Overall, U.S. trilateral cooperation may have contributed to security cooperation previously, but recent

²⁰⁰ Basu, “Debating Security in Japan,” 546-547.


efforts do not seem to directly produce corresponding increases in bilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea.



This figure displays only trilateral security cooperation using absolute values while also highlighting the TCOG meetings from 1999–2004, the U.S. pivot to Asia in late 2011, and the crises in Crimea and Syria in 2014.

Figure 13. Trilateral Security Cooperation with TCOG and Abandonment Concerns²⁰¹


²⁰¹ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.



This figure displays only bilateral security cooperation using absolute values while also highlighting the TCOG meetings from 1999–2004, the U.S. pivot to Asia in late 2011, and the crises in Crimea and Syria in 2014.

Figure 14. Bilateral Security Cooperation with TCOG and Abandonment Concerns²⁰²

²⁰² Adapted from *Defense of Japan and ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*.



This figure displays total security cooperation using the moving average while also highlighting the TCOG meetings from 1999–2004, the U.S. pivot to Asia in late 2011, and the crises in Crimea and Syria in 2014.

Figure 15. Moving Average Security Cooperation with TCOG and Abandonment Concerns²⁰³

Focusing specifically on abandonment, two periods require analysis. First, the Obama administration’s rebalance to the Pacific could provide an endpoint from which to work backward to determine if prior abandonment fears generated any closer cooperation. If this policy was a reaction to attempts to reaffirm U.S. commitments in the region, it might indicate that there were abandonment fears in Japan and South Korea. According to Figure 13, the trilateral cooperation levels post-TCOG and prior to the rebalance were quite low to moderate. From 2005–2011, trilateral examples varied from zero to four, much more moderate than the higher averages during the TCOG years and the post-2012 period. Interestingly, Figure 14 shows that after two low cooperation years of 2005 to 2006, bilateral cooperation achieved some of its highest values from 2007–2011. This indicates that during periods of relatively low trilateral cooperation, bilateral security cooperation

²⁰³ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.

actually increased. Second, the Obama Administration's responses to Syria and Crimea in 2014 could generate abandonment fears related to declining American power or willingness to intervene. In both Figure 14 and Figure 15, security cooperation increases from 2014 to 2016. Again, this could indicate a correlation with abandonment fears producing Japan-ROK increased security cooperation. Whether or not either of the above increases in security cooperation was a result of abandonment fears, however, is difficult to determine. More comparison against the other factors could determine if that increase correlates with abandonment fears. The conclusion chapter addresses that question.

2. American Discouraging Factor: Entrapment

Despite American intentions to encourage security cooperation between South Korea and Japan, the separate alliances with both nations can create friction that decreases security cooperation. For the most part, this type of friction is based on potentially divergent interests across the three countries and the associated fears of entrapment that can create. Much like how the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances create conditions where fears of abandonment might generate closer Japan-ROK cooperation, that same alliance structure might prevent closer cooperation. While entrapment fears are not the only manner in which the United States could potentially discourage Japan-ROK security cooperation, entrapment best exemplifies that relationship. Tae Hyo Kim suggests that the strong bilateral alliance relationship each country enjoys with the United States suppresses the need for more direct Japan-ROK security cooperation.²⁰⁴ However, determining the impact of the relationship between strong alliance ties is beyond the scope of this research. The focus of the research is not specifically aimed at understanding alliance dynamics but more on the Japan-ROK relationship. Therefore, this section only outlines the concept of entrapment and how it influences Japan-ROK security cooperation.

a. Discouraging Factor: Entrapment

The fear of entrapment in their respective U.S. alliances can discourage Japan-ROK security cooperation. Glenn Snyder defines entrapment as another negative aspect of

²⁰⁴ Tae Hyo Kim, "Japan and Korea: Why Can't They Reconcile?" 281.

alliances where a nation is “dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or only shares partially.”²⁰⁵ The nature of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances can create conditions where both Japan and South Korea believe they could be drawn into an unwanted situation. Because of this fear, neither country would likely choose to cooperate more directly with their non-alliance partner. This research has already noted how Japanese and South Korean interests often diverge with respect to North Korea and China, but adding in the United States alliance variable can create an even more complex situation. Cha holds that, for the most part, ROK fears of entrapment are relatively low but Japan’s fears are higher due to potential actions against North Korea that could entangle Japan.²⁰⁶ However, since Cha’s book has been published, more scenarios involving South Korea’s fear of entrapment have emerged as China’s power has grown in the region. Increasing tensions with both the United States and Japan could force South Korea into an unwanted confrontation or conflict. Sohn emphasizes, for example, how South Korean President Roh was concerned that the United States was using the alliance with the ROK to balance China.²⁰⁷ Therefore, these entrapment fears are based in part on divergent security interests between Japan and South Korea and how the United States and its alliances amplify the issue.

Much like abandonment fears, it is difficult to find a pattern between entrapment fears and security cooperation. Entrapment is a general fear that makes associating it with specific incidents challenging. It does serve as a plausible reason for inhibiting security cooperation, but likely not a factor that is a primary driver decreasing security cooperation. The logic of inhibiting further Japan-ROK security cooperation in the fear that the other country’s alliance with the United States could lead to an unwanted conflict is sound. An example where the ROK is drawn into a regional conflict with China due to U.S.-Japan alliance actions or Japan is targeted by the DPRK because of U.S.-ROK alliance intervention in North Korea are both plausible scenarios involving alliance entrapment

²⁰⁵ Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.” 466-467.

²⁰⁶ Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism*, 52-53.

²⁰⁷ Sohn, “Relocating Trilateralism in a Broader Regional Architecture: A South Korean Perspective,” 16.

fears. This research has noted in several sections how divergent Japan-ROK threat perceptions can frustrate security cooperation. However, measuring directly how entrapment fears influence Japan-ROK security cooperation is extremely complex. In this case, the abandonment and U.S. alliance factor likely serves as a contributing factor to decreased security when Japan-ROK interests are not aligned. Yet, some examples do exist that could indicate some correlation in the above relationship between entanglement and decreased cooperation.

One of the most apparent recent drivers of entrapment is based on U.S.-Japanese threat perceptions of China and their misalignment with ROK perspectives. Sohn indicates that South Korea faces a challenge with engaging China while simultaneously engaging in trilateral cooperation and that the ROK risks policy options if it becomes involved in a U.S.-China rivalry.²⁰⁸ The more unified response the U.S.-Japan alliance has put forward against China links this to Japan-ROK security cooperation. Chinworth, Michishita, and Yoon offer that U.S.-Japanese threat perceptions are becoming more aligned when compared to South Korean views.²⁰⁹ An example where this difference manifests involves ROK response to Chinese maritime aggression. Young-June Park demonstrates that ROK responses to U.S.-PRC maritime rivalry have been neutral where Japan and the United States share similar more confrontational outlooks.²¹⁰ If South Korea was worried about the U.S.-Japan alliance's response to Chinese maritime aggressiveness that was noted in the Chinese section, South Korea could fear being drawn into a larger conflict due to the U.S.-ROK alliance. South Korea's entrapment fears were also substantial during earlier periods regarding North Korea. Oh shows how during the Kim and Roh presidencies, these South Korean leaders were "overtly critical of U.S. hardline policies toward North Korea, fearing the United States might trigger another Korean War."²¹¹ Both of these periods

²⁰⁸ Sohn, 19-20.

²⁰⁹ Michael W Chinworth, Narushige Michishita, and Taeyoung Yoon, "Future Challenges and Opportunities for Trilateral Security Cooperation," in *Trilateralism and Beyond*, ed. Robert A. Wampler (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2011), 148.

²¹⁰ Park, "Living among the Elephants: South Korea and Japan's Response to the U.S.-China Maritime Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific," 401-404.

²¹¹ Oh, "The United States between Japan and Korea: Keeping Alliances Strong in East Asia," 133.

were already assessed in earlier portions of the research, but the entrapment dynamic might reveal different conclusions. Finally, while recent entrapment fears do exist in Japan, these come mainly from the Japanese public and not their more conservative leadership, which is closely tied with America.²¹² Coupled with later conclusions about the more limited role Japanese public play in determining Japan-ROK security cooperation, the current value of Japanese entrapment fears is limited. A stronger potential relationship exists with ROK entanglement fears and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

b. Quantitative Assessment of the American Discouraging Factor

The entrapment explanation can potentially help clarify some earlier conclusions in both the China and North Korea sections. First, concerning China, the research concluded that increased Chinese aggression in the ECS from 2010–2014 involving the Senkakus, Socotra Rock, and the Chinese ADIZ did not increase Japan-ROK security cooperation. In fact, as the Chinese section noted, these years represented a decline in cooperation. South Korean fear of entanglement in U.S. or Japanese responses to Chinese actions could be part of the explanation. The ROK might have feared closer cooperation with Japan in the midst of a more hardline approach by the ROK’s close alliance partner, the United States. Both the greater U.S. interests in combatting Chinese maritime aggression throughout the entire region and Japanese ECS concerns create these entrapment worries. The 1998–2008 Sunshine Policy represents another area where South Korean leaders may have feared entrapment by U.S. actions and not increased security cooperation with Japan. The DPRK portion of the research concluded that this period contained varying degrees of improving and declining security cooperation. If South Korean leaders were worried about the more hardline U.S. approach, increasing security cooperation with Japan might also enflame their relationship with the DPRK. However, there does not seem to be enough evidence to support the claim that entrapment fears play a large role in the Japan-ROK security cooperation during the 1998–2008 period.

²¹² Oros, *Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century*, 160-162.

3. Overall American Impact

In sum, the entirety of the evidence indicates that the United States' influence is more encouraging than discouraging on Japan-ROK security cooperation. However, the encouraging quantitative assessment found that it was difficult to point to discrete bilateral security cooperation increases as trilateral activities increased. The research did seem to indicate that abandonment fears and less U.S. engagement could encourage security cooperation. While it is difficult to quantify the American influence on Japan-ROK security cooperation, it still serves as an overall encouraging factor that facilitates some level of Japan-ROK security cooperation. Although it is difficult to test, the complete absence of the United States and their bilateral alliances with both Japan and South Korea could result in any number of differences. This counterfactual example might indicate that security cooperation between Japan and South Korea might not exist at all without the United States. The research noted that the United States serves a pivotal role in creating the environment for Japanese and South Korean cooperation to occur. Additionally, Klingner indicates that the U.S. alliance with each prevents Japan and South Korea from being as worried about each other.²¹³ In a region without the United States at all, security cooperation between Japan and South Korea would likely give way to security competition. The entrapment aspects of the ROK-U.S. alliance could have served as partial motivation for South Korea to limit security cooperation with Japan in the aftermath of Chinese aggression. Japanese and South Korean differing threat perceptions likely better explain the lack of increased security cooperation from 2010 through 2014, but entrapment dynamics could have facilitated this to some degree.

D. OVERALL IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

Looking at all the international factors together, their influence is clearly of a more encouraging nature for Japan-ROK security cooperation. The DRPK's conventional and nuclear threats have often been at the foundation of Japan-ROK security cooperation. Despite the fact that the quantitative assessment did not find a strong correlation between

²¹³ Klingner, "Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation," 2.

U.S. trilateral efforts and increased Japan-ROK security cooperation, the United States' role is still vital in Japan's and South Korea's relationship. Much like the DPRK can represent a confluence of security interests, the U.S. role of security guarantor to both Japan and South Korea forms a common link that facilitates closer cooperation. It is important to emphasize the central role the United States plays in encouraging its two primary Asian allies to work together. The research also noted how abandonment fears might encourage security cooperation. Finally, China's aggressive actions in the maritime domain and the associated military modernization efforts provide another shared threat perception for both Japan and South Korea. Examples like the joint response condemning the Chinese ADIZ in the ECS and associated joint Japan-ROK exercise demonstrate that when threat perceptions align, security cooperation can increase. However, it is important to note that while Japan views the PRC as a threat, South Korea normally takes a more pragmatic approach with respect to China. The ROK's current perspective regarding the Chinese threat is, therefore, an important evolving perspective that is vital to understanding if the PRC encourages Japan-ROK security cooperation.

Each of the three international factors also demonstrated a discouraging influence of Japan-ROK security, although in a less impactful manner than the encouraging effect. China's role was assessed more as a contributing factor when Japanese and ROK interests diverge on how to deal with the DPRK and when China joins with South Korea to condemn Japanese actions involving the history issue. The key conclusion here is that China seems to pile on during periods of increased Japan-ROK tensions related to domestic issues and thus serves as a contributing but not causal factor in decreasing security cooperation. The main manner in which the DPRK discourages Japan-ROK security cooperation is when Japanese and South Korean interests and policy approaches to North Korea differ. When South Korea takes a more cooperative focused strategy toward the DPRK, this decreases one of the primary drivers of encouraging security cooperation with Japan. If the ROK does not perceive a large threat from North Korea, they are less likely to pursue security cooperation with Japan. Tokyo is also less motivated to work with Seoul when the ROK is engaging with a state the Japanese view as threatening. However, while the different Japanese and South Korean approaches and priorities could dampen security cooperation,

there are no examples of these differences directly inhibiting specific cooperation instances. This is in contrast to the direct measures taken by Japan and South Korea to cooperate in response to the North Korean threat. Overall, these discouraging influences are important but have a less direct impact on security cooperation than the corresponding encouraging results mentioned above.

Several important conclusions can also be drawn from the quantitative analysis of international factors. The data points to a strong correlation between early Japan-ROK security cooperation and DPRK belligerence, which was an expected outcome based on the shared threat perception of North Korea. While confirming North Korea's importance in encouraging Japan-ROK security cooperation is important, the data also revealed that later North Korean conventional and nuclear provocations after 2010 did not have the same impact. This indicates that the large growth in the DPRK threat in the 1990s had a measurable encouraging impact on cooperation, but soon North Korean aggressive actions became the status quo and produced less motivation for Japan and South Korea to cooperate. A similar result manifested after North Korean nuclear tests. After the first test in 2006, security cooperation increased dramatically through the second test in 2009. However, the third test in 2013 did not result in a leap in cooperation. This research did not find any significant quantitative results from the impact of China on Japan-ROK security cooperation. The role of the United States and its efforts to encourage greater cooperation through trilateral efforts also offers an interesting perspective based on the quantitative data. The data suggest that during periods of increased trilateral cooperation through the TCOG, specific bilateral cooperation also increased. However, more recent periods of increased trilateral cooperation from 2009–2014 actually corresponds with decreased bilateral Japan-ROK security cooperation. This result indicates that during certain periods of increased trilateral cooperation, there is not a corresponding increase in bilateral cooperation. The alliance dynamics of abandonment also provide some relevant results. During some of the lower levels of trilateral cooperation from 2005–2011, large increases in bilateral cooperation occurred from after 2006 to 2011. This indicates that less U.S. driven trilateral influence may have provided motivation for greater Japan-ROK security cooperation.

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IV. DOMESTIC FACTORS

This chapter focuses solely on the domestic influences on Japan-ROK security cooperation. The category of domestic politics itself represents a variety of methods to explain security cooperation or its absence. Democratic peace theory would predict a more encouraging perspective on cooperation, but that does not seem to be working in this relationship. In order to narrow down the wide range of possibilities regarding the impact of domestic politics on security cooperation, this research focuses on just two aspects: the role of the public and the impact of leadership. These two factors form the evaluative basis for determining the encouraging or discouraging impact that domestic politics have on security cooperation. At the center of how domestic politics impact security cooperation between the two nations is the history issue. Rooted in Japanese imperialism and actions during World War II, these issues consistently frustrate Japan-ROK security cooperation. However, according to Kimura, the facts of what occurred during this period do not tell the whole story; he claims it is the “gaps between the historical perceptions of Japan and its neighbors” that creates friction.²¹⁴ These perceptions are particularly important when looking at how the public and leaders impact security cooperation. Many of these historical issues are relatively static in and of themselves, but how the public and leaders perceive and then act on them provides insight into how they impact security cooperation. The main findings of this chapter reveal that the influence of the public and leaders on various historical issues has a discouraging effect on Japan-ROK security cooperation. Another important result is that the public plays a larger discouraging role in South Korea, while the negative effects related to history issues are more elite-driven in Japan.

In order to understand how the elements of domestic politics matter, this chapter answers the question: in what ways do domestic politics either encourage or discourage security cooperation between Japan and South Korea? The research investigates both the

²¹⁴ Kan Kimura, “How Can We Cope with Historical Disputes? The Japanese and South Korean Experience,” in *Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Relations between Japan and South Korea*, ed. Marie Söderberg, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 20.

positive and negative influences of domestic politics but concludes that domestic politics have an overwhelmingly discouraging impact on security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. This is largely due to the animosity created by the history issue and how the public and leaders create discord that prevents deeper cooperation. While some encouraging influence is noted, it is outweighed by the discouraging forces. Additionally, the overall pattern that emerges is that history-related domestic issues are mainly generated by the Japanese elite, but are stoked mostly by the populace in South Korea. That is not to suggest that the public does not matter in Japan and that leaders are not important in South Korea. However, most evidence in Japan suggests that leaders have much more influence. In South Korea, both leaders and the public contribute to impacts on security cooperation, but the public has a more visible and active role. Also, this research does not attempt to address whether the public or leaders have more of an impact on any given issue or year. The aim is solely focused on determining whether the domestic factors influence security cooperation in a positive or negative manner.

Assessing the role of the public and leadership entails three issues directly driven by history: visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese leaders, comfort women, and the textbook controversy. Additionally, the chapter considers the postponement and eventual signing of the GSOMIA and the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial disputes. The remainder of the chapter analyzes the influence of the public and the leadership individually, first focusing on qualitative analysis, then on quantitative data. The public section focuses first on the general interest that the public displays regarding the history issue and how active they are. Next, this section covers the public's influence on the comfort women issue, textbook controversy, and GSOMIA. The other major section focuses on leadership's role and is organized similarly but with slightly different issues to evaluate. That section looks at visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the comfort women issue again, and the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute. The comfort women issue is covered in both sections because there are significant public and leadership elements that influence security cooperation. Finally, both sections end with an assessment of their respective issues compared with the quantitative data for security cooperation between Japan and South Korea.

A. ROLE OF THE PUBLIC

Before considering how the public influences specific issues that could ultimately impact Japan-ROK security cooperation, it is important to examine the general levels of public opinion and concern in the Japanese and South Korean relationship. Public views and opinions in a democracy help shape foreign policy and are an important component of the relationship between Japan and South Korea.²¹⁵ By establishing a baseline or default level of public perception between Japan and South Korea, it is easier to determine how changes in public views or actions can drive policy. In general, there is a difference between how the Japanese view South Koreans and how South Koreans view the Japanese. One measurement that highlights this difference are polls that reflect trust levels between the two countries. Glosserman and Snyder cite a poll showing a distinctive difference in trust levels between Japan and South Korea. While Japanese trust of South Koreans fluctuated between roughly 45 to 60 percent over multiple years, South Korean trust was only between ten and twenty percent during the same period.²¹⁶ This poll supports the general trend of South Koreans exhibiting a much more negative opinion of the Japanese than vice versa.

This variation in perspective is also apparent regarding the overall history issues. Ji Young Kim asserts that South Korean views on history issues are more united and strongly negative, while in Japan, “the majority of the general public displayed apathy toward history issues.”²¹⁷ South Koreans demonstrating more negative sentiment makes perfect sense considering their perceived historical victimization by the Japanese. However, the apathy of the general Japanese population does not mean there are not some negative feelings generated on their side by history issues. This is often centered on the concept known as apology fatigue. Tae Hyo Kim reveals a 2015 poll where 63 percent of Japanese

²¹⁵ Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*, 6.

²¹⁶ Glosserman and Snyder, 113.

²¹⁷ Ji Young Kim, “Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan,” *Asian Perspectives* 38, no. 1 (January-March 2014): 39.

believe “their government has done enough to atone for its wartime past.”²¹⁸ This translates into negative views on South Korea when the history issues continue to be brought up despite previous and repeated apologies. Ultimately, public opinion on the history issues is much stronger in South Korea, but the Japanese public also contributes to the negative sentiment that can frustrate cooperation.

In addition to the general positions the public takes on the relationship and with history issues, the active role of the public is also important. While public opinion polls indicate in a general sense how Japanese and South Koreans feel about each other, that does not reveal all aspects of the public’s role. Consideration for the public’s more active involvement in mobilization and protest deserves noting. Much like how the public in South Korea feels more strongly about history issues, the populace is also much more active in voicing their concerns. Ji Young Kim emphasizes how, nationwide, South Korean protests that are organized in response to Japanese actions regarding history issues often complicate the Japan-ROK relationship.²¹⁹ Also, South Korea has a history of mass mobilization and protests aimed at impacting the government and its policies. Yoonkyung Lee illustrates the importance of popular uprisings in South Korea’s democracy movement as well as the recent ousting of President Park.²²⁰ While the specifics of the protests against Japanese actions and their ultimate effect on security cooperation is subsequently evaluated, it is important to note the active role the South Korean public takes regarding Japan. While public opinion polls show frustration with “apology fatigue” with South Korea, Japanese citizens do not typically protest or demonstrate as an expression of their displeasure with foreign policy. *Japan Times* echoed the fact that public protest is not as prevalent in Japan, compared to other Asian nations like South Korea, and only mentions

²¹⁸ Tae Hyo Kim, “Japan and Korea: Why Can’t They Reconcile?” 278.

²¹⁹ Ji Young Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 485.

²²⁰ Yoonkyung Lee, “Popular Reset: South Korean Democracy in the Post-Park Era,” *Global Asia* 12, no.2 (Summer 2017): 9.

the 1960 anti-America protests and more recent ones focused on American military basing in Okinawa as examples of security policy-related protests.²²¹

The overall impact from the general trends in public opinion in the Japan-ROK relationship is that the South Korean populace discourages cooperation, while the Japanese public plays a minor and more neutral role. This section evaluates the public's impact on the comfort women issue, textbook controversy, and the GSOMIA agreement. The section concludes with an overall assessment of how the public influences security cooperation. The preponderance of the evidence from the measures of security cooperation supports the conclusion that the public has an overall negative impact on security cooperation.

1. Comfort Women: Public's Influence

One continuously problematic historical dispute that is influenced by the public is the comfort women issue. Rooted in Japan's sexual enslavement of South Korean women during the war, the comfort women issue has flared up repeatedly over the years with an added intensity in post-democratic South Korea. At the center of the public's role in advocating for a harsher stance toward Japan due to its crimes is the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan. According to Ji Young Kim, this civic organization, founded in 1990, has consistently utilized public demonstrations to push for Japanese recognition and compensation and even leads weekly protests at the Japanese embassy in Seoul.²²² The mass-led movement not only protests Japanese actions or lack thereof, but also pressures the South Korean government to take a harsher position toward Japan. The South Korean government originally supported a Japanese government-developed hybrid public/private program known as the Asian Women's Fund (AWF), but due to public pressure from groups like the Korean Council, changed its position.²²³ When

²²¹ Eric Johnston, "Public Protest in Japan: Power to the People?" *Japan Times*, December 20, 2014. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2014/12/20/general/public-protest-japan-power-people/#.XAH03-hKhPY>.

²²² Ji Young Kim, "Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan," 42-44.

²²³ Thomas J., Ward and William D. Lay, "The Comfort Women Controversy: Not Over Yet," *East Asia* 33, no. 4 (December 2016): 258-59.

the comfort women issue generates public protest in South Korea, the resulting fervor inhibits South Korean politicians from encouraging security cooperation with Japan.

The Japanese public has a lesser role with respect to the comfort women issue's impact on security cooperation. As noted earlier, the Japanese public does not influence the history issue to the degree the South Korean populace does. The Japanese public's actions that do take place are not able to change policy like their South Korean counterparts. Kim notes that despite there being some progressive organizations that push back against Japanese conservative views on comfort women, the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) dominance in government ensures that they have little impact.²²⁴ Conservatives in Japan also do not seem to inhibit Japan-ROK security cooperation based on South Korean complaints of historical issues. In addition, some of the Japanese public is not even aware of the comfort women issue. In 1993, a poll indicated that almost one-third knew nothing of the issue.²²⁵ While the issue is better known today, Kim highlights the "relative lack of awareness of the issue among the Japanese public" and that "public sentiment regarding the issue remains at a similar level even today."²²⁶ The 2015 comfort women agreement certainly brought the issue back into view in Japan, but the public did not respond strongly either way. Either the Japanese public does not place much importance on the comfort women issue or their efforts to impact policy in that arena is limited. Regardless, the public's influence in Japan is relatively neutral.

In 2015, the comfort women agreement between Prime Minister Abe of Japan and President Park of South Korea enflamed public response, which provides an excellent example of how the public does frustrate closer ties between Japan and South Korea. First, from the South Korean position, the public's view of the agreement was quite negative. In a survey conducted shortly after the accord was signed, 56 percent opposed the treaty, almost 60 percent expressed the desire to renegotiate it, and only 26 percent supported

²²⁴ Ji Young Kim, "Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan," 42.

²²⁵ Kim, 42.

²²⁶ Kim, 42.

it.²²⁷ A poll conducted in July 2017 of South Koreans revealed that 70 percent thought the issue was not resolved.²²⁸ Additionally, Moon and Hur note that a large number of civil society organizations, led by the Korean Council, boycotted the agreement while other groups erected an additional statue commemorating comfort women near the Japanese consulate in Busan.²²⁹ These actions by the South Korean public directly affected the bilateral relationship. Prime Minister Abe recalled Japan's ambassador and financial negotiations were suspended.²³⁰ Due to their widespread opposition to the deal, the South Korean public also seemed to have an influence on future President Moon. He claimed during his campaign that the deal was not valid.²³¹ The Japanese public again felt "apology fatigue" as they interpreted the South Koreans as questioning what was supposed to be the final word on comfort women. Nishino indicates that the backlash from the South Korean public and civil society about the comfort women agreement has caused Japanese perceptions of South Koreans to decline.²³² Although this likely only has a weak or indirect discouraging impact on security cooperation, the negative sentiment expressed by both populaces has exacerbated a situation that seemed to be heading toward a resolution based on the actions of leaders.

2. Textbook Controversy

A second history problem that often discourages Japan-ROK security cooperation deals with Japanese textbooks. At the center of this controversy was the Japanese Ministry of Education's decision to approve a revisionist textbook for secondary school students that South Koreans claim did not accurately depict Japanese imperial and wartime

²²⁷ Chung-in Moon and Won-young Hur, "A South Korean Perspective: Trilateral Cooperation: The Devil's in Domestic Politics," *Global Asia* 12, no.1 (2017): 49.

²²⁸ Pajon and H mez, "Japan-Korea Security Cooperation: Sisyphus Getting Muscles?" 275.

²²⁹ Moon and Hur, 50.

²³⁰ Moon and Hur, 50.

²³¹ Moon and Hur, 50.

²³² Nishino, "Japan's Security Relationship with the Republic of Korea: Opportunities and Challenges," 8.

actions.²³³ The South Korean public quickly mobilized to voice their displeasure with the Japanese government's approval of this textbook for use in schools. A South Korean organization called The Headquarter to Make Japanese Textbooks Right organized "large-scale nationwide public protests and boycotts of Japanese products."²³⁴ The results of this public outcry and associated pressure on the South Korean government directly impacted security cooperation with Japan. Ji Young Kim shows that as result of the pressure from the public and media on the textbook controversy, the South Korean government canceled the bilateral SAREX, suspended several high-level defense visits, and did not allow a Japanese naval vessel to make a port call in Incheon.²³⁵ It is also important to note that the public could have pushed the South Korean government in a more negative direction than politicians wanted. Glosserman and Snyder claim that the ROK government took a more moderate approach initially, but that public outcry compelled it to take more drastic measures, including the temporary recall of its ambassador to Japan.²³⁶ Clearly, the South Korean public directly decreased security cooperation between Japan and South Korea in this example. This issue flared up in 2000, with the canceled security cooperation events occurring in 2001.

Much like the role of the Japanese public regarding the comfort women issue, their impact is again mixed concerning the textbook issue. On the one hand, conservative groups were largely responsible for the publication of the controversial textbook in the first place. Ji Young Kim contends that conservative grassroots movements and other organizations, along with backing from similarly minded politicians, supported the passing of the textbook and expressed that the call to alter the textbooks interfered with Japanese domestic affairs.²³⁷ These groups likely reinforced South Korean perceptions that many Japanese

²³³ Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*, 101.

²³⁴ Ji Young Kim, "Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," 494.

²³⁵ Kim, 494-495.

²³⁶ Glosserman and Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States*, 101.

²³⁷ Ji Young Kim, "Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan," 45-46.

are revisionist and have not fully accepted their role during the colonization of Korea and the Pacific War. While the actions of the public in these organizations did not prevent the Japanese government from cooperating with South Korea, the groups negatively impact security cooperation in an indirect manner by advocating for the revisionist textbooks in the first place. The groups did not actively protest against security cooperation like the public in South Korea. Additionally, these revisionist groups are often both anti-Korean and pro-military, but they do not transfer their dislike of Koreans into direct measures to inhibit security cooperation. On the other hand, these groups only represented one side of Japanese public opinion and action. Progressive organizations in Japan launched an alternate campaign that opposed the revisionist textbooks and garnered support from parents, teachers, and intellectuals.²³⁸ In addition to the public's mobilization into groups that opposed the textbook, the actual adoption of the textbook by schools provides some limited encouraging effect. Ji Young Kim proposes that these groups' opposition campaign resulted in less than a one percent adoption rate by schools and that this "shows that Japanese society as a whole did not readily accept the conservative historical narrative."²³⁹ However, while the Japanese public's impact is mixed, the more negative influence of developing and supporting the controversial textbooks is stronger because that is what the South Korean public notices.

3. GSOMIA

A third area where the public influenced Japan-ROK security cooperation focused on the delay of a bilateral agreement. The GSOMIA is an intelligence-sharing agreement that was supposed to be completed in 2012 but was postponed at the last minute by the ROK government. This agreement would have facilitated more military information exchange in areas like ballistic missile defense, which both Japan and South Korea recognized as beneficial given North Korean capabilities.²⁴⁰ However, despite the security

²³⁸ Ji Young Kim, "Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan," 46.

²³⁹ Kim, 46.

²⁴⁰ Moon and Hur, "A South Korean Perspective: Trilateral Cooperation: The Devil's in Domestic Politics," 50.

benefits to the agreement, the South Korean public's response prior to the planned signing of the agreement forced the government to pull away from completing the accord. Tae Hyo Kim argues that "the South Korean government could not withstand the exceptional public furor against the pact with Japan during fractious election-year politics."²⁴¹ Another important fact to note is that the GSOMIA is an agreement that South Korea has with numerous other countries. Ji Young Kim points out that the GSOMIA is not even high-level cooperation as the ROK has two dozen of these agreements with a variety of countries.²⁴² However, Klingner notes that the agreement would serve as an early step that would help facilitate more robust and integrated security cooperation.²⁴³ All this just reinforces the importance of the public in discouraging security cooperation based on historical issues. While the GSOMIA is not a direct history issue, the legacies of the Japanese military's behavior is at the root of why the South Korean population responded so negatively to the agreement. In sum, the postponement of the GSOMIA is one of the clearest examples of how domestic politics can discourage security cooperation.

However, the suspension of the accord is only part of the GSOMIA saga. While public backlash was directly responsible for preventing the agreement from being completed in 2012, the GSOMIA between Japan and South Korea was eventually signed in 2016.²⁴⁴ So, it would appear that the domestic influence of the South Korean public only had a temporary impact on the GSOMIA. That does not negate the discouraging influence the populace exerted on the South Korean government, but it does potentially limit the long-term impact of the public. Singh highlights a 2013 poll where the number of South Koreans who thought the GSOMIA was necessary increased 15 percent, from 44 to 60.²⁴⁵ This might indicate that shifting public opinion in favor of the accord led to the

²⁴¹ Tae Hyo Kim, "Japan and Korea: Why Can't They Reconcile?" 275.

²⁴² Ji Young Kim, "Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," 499.

²⁴³ Klingner, "Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation," 4.

²⁴⁴ For a detailed timeline of the key events regarding the development, postponement, and eventual signing of the GSOMIA between Japan and South Korea, see Kang and Bang, "Japan-Korea Relations: What Goes Up, Must Come Down," 92.

²⁴⁵ Singh, "Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations," 34.

GSOMIA's eventual approval. However, the response after the agreement was finally signed in 2016 demonstrates that the public is still not satisfied with the agreement. Moon and Hur detail the extensive public opposition after President Park pushed to get the agreement completed and claims the GSOMIA might not be renewed in the face of such opposition.²⁴⁶ However, this turned out not to be true. President Moon renewed the agreement in 2017 amid extremely high tension in the region due to North Korea.²⁴⁷ Finally, this factor is only detailed from the South Korean public's perspective because of the support for the agreement in Japan. Kang and Bang indicate that the Japanese government and media have consistently supported the agreement due to the North Korean threat.²⁴⁸

4. Assessment: Role of the Public

The overall assessment of the role of the public is that it discourages security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Also, it is clear that South Korean citizens are much more concerned with the various history issues, take a more active role in voicing their displeasure, and, in turn, have more influence on government policy. Ji Young Kim characterizes this as an example of mass-led politics, where the public forces "the government to take a hawkish stance toward Japan."²⁴⁹ From the Japanese perspective, there are both discouraging and encouraging impacts from the public. On the positive side, there are elements of the public that do not support the conservative narrative involving both textbooks and the legacy of comfort women. Again this fact indicates more of a lack of discouragement rather than actual encouragement. As evidenced in the protests against the adoption of revisionist textbooks and their subsequent low usage rate, some elements of the Japanese populace could encourage closer security cooperation. However, their

²⁴⁶ Moon and Hur, "A South Korean Perspective: Trilateral Cooperation: The Devil's in Domestic Politics," 50.

²⁴⁷ Nikkei Asian Review, "South Korea, Japan Extend Military Intelligence Pact: Skeptical Moon Sticks with Deal amid Increasing Threat from North Korea," August 26, 2017, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/South-Korea-Japan-extend-military-intelligence-pact2>.

²⁴⁸ Kang and Bang, "Japan-Korea Relations: What Goes Up, Must Come Down," 93.


²⁴⁹ Ji Young Kim, "Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan," 40.

ultimate influence on the LDP seems somewhat limited.²⁵⁰ On the discouraging side, the Japanese population's opinion about South Koreans is damaged by apology fatigue. Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi refers to South Korea constantly changing what is required to settle history issues as "moving the goalposts" and notes that it adds to Japanese frustration.²⁵¹ Although this frustration is plausible as a discouraging factor, there is not a direct link between apology fatigue and decreased Japanese efforts for possible security cooperation initiatives. Coupling the high degree of animosity the South Koreans feel to any, albeit likely minor, public mistrust on the Japanese side results in a strong discouraging influence on security cooperation.

While evaluating the impact of the public on security cooperation is often more diffuse than the impact of leaders, some closer analysis of the impact with respect to the measured levels of security cooperation is appropriate. In the comfort women example, the discouraging public influence noted above occurred in 1994/95 and again after the comfort women agreement was signed in late 2015. It is also important to note that other various protests occurred in South Korea following statements by Japanese leaders that questioned the Japanese military's involvement in forcing women into prostitution. However, the subsequent section, focused on the impact of leaders, addresses the political wavering on these issues. Figure 16 shows that cooperation after the 1994/95 period precedes increases depicted in Phase I and the period following the 2015 agreement is located firmly in the positive trend Phases V. 1994/95 was early in the growing security cooperation phase and the public influence did not seem to directly impact security cooperation despite evidence that it damaged relations. There is a slight decrease in the lower-level bilateral security cooperation, from 11 in 2015 to 7 in 2016, based on the data, but the high-level instances show similar growth as the overall security cooperation levels in Phase V. While the public responses to comfort women issues impacted the bilateral relationship overall, it is not apparent if that translated directly to reduced security cooperation trends in the quantitative results.

²⁵⁰ Kim, 42.

²⁵¹ Hinata-Yamaguchi, "Completing the U.S.-Japan-Korea Alliance Triangle: Prospects and Issues in Japan-Korea Security Cooperation," 386.




This figure displays total security cooperation using the moving average while also highlighting the comfort women protests in 1994–1995 and 2015, the textbook issue in 2000, and the public’s outcry concerning the GSOMIA in 2012.

Figure 16. Moving Average Security Cooperation with Key South Korean Public Protests²⁵²

In terms of the textbook controversy, the evidence of public influence on security cooperation starts in 2000 and increases in 2001. As noted previously, actual security cooperation events were canceled due to this dispute so it should be expected that the measurement reflects this. According to Figure 17, after consistently improving since the start of the time period from 1994, 2000 is the first decrease followed by another drop in 2001. This evidence supports the idea that the public’s influence on security cooperation was discouraging. However, the decreases are only minor in nature, and Figure 16 does not show a decrease during this period due to the moving average results. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that the high-level security cooperation instances drop more dramatically than the overall numbers suggest. Figure 18 depicts a decline from 8 to 3, a

²⁵² Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.


nearly 63% drop. This suggests that the issue was serious enough and the public pressure high enough to warrant cancellation of more important defense and military meetings.



This figure displays total security cooperation using absolute values while also highlighting the comfort women protests in 1994–1995 and 2015, the textbook issue in 2000, and the public’s outcry concerning the GSOMIA in 2012.

Figure 17. Total Security Cooperation with Key South Korean Public Protests²⁵³

²⁵³ Adapted from *Defense of Japan and ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.



This figure displays only high-level bilateral security cooperation using absolute values while also highlighting the comfort women protests in 1994–1995 and 2015, the textbook issue in 2000, and the public’s outcry concerning the GSOMIA in 2012.

Figure 18. High-Level Bilateral Security Cooperation with Key South Korean Public Protests ²⁵⁴

Finally, regarding the GSOMIA, 2012 was the focus of the public outcry and postponement of the agreement. In Figure 16, 2012 is near the low point for the negative trend in Phase IV, where the graph depicts decreasing cooperation starting in 2011 and continuing into through 2014. According to this data, the public’s response to GSOMIA certainly impacted that agreement specifically, but there are likely other reasons for the general decrease at the beginning of the 2010s. Figure 18 shows a slightly different result when analyzing just high-level security cooperation. It also shows a precipitous drop from four meetings in 2011 to zero in 2012. This result provides more support for the conclusion that the public is a discouraging factor for security cooperation. Finally, the public displeasure with the eventual approval of the GSOMIA was at the end of 2016. This came too late to affect 2016 security cooperation, and 2017 is beyond the scope of this research. As more data becomes available, levels of security cooperation in the last several years

²⁵⁴ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*.

might provide more insight into the influence of the public regarding the signing of the GSOMIA.

B. IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP

The role of leaders regarding the history problem is another significant influence on Japan-ROK security cooperation. The history issues themselves are relatively constant; what is important is in what way leaders in both countries either exacerbate or dial back these issues and how that impacts security cooperation. Analyzing specific leaders' actions and reactions regarding history issues provides fixed points in time that can be compared to the instances of security cooperation data. This section contains an analysis of leaders' roles in three history-related issues: Yasukuni shrine visits, comfort women, and the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute. After outlining how leadership has influenced these various issues, the section concludes with an analysis of these impacts using security cooperation measurements. The research and data demonstrates that leaders play an absolutely vital role in either encouraging or discouraging security cooperation, reinforcing the concept that negative issues generated by Japanese actions are more elite-driven. Overall, there is more evidence that supports the argument that leaders play a more discouraging role regarding history issues.

Before proceeding to the three specific history issues, it is significant to recognize two key encouraging leadership moves, related to the history issue in general, that were critical in the early development of security cooperation in the modern bilateral relationship. While not directly tied to the selected three history issues, these two events are critical to understanding the importance of leadership in developing or inhibiting security cooperation. During a 1993 summit with his South Korean counterpart, Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa became the first sitting prime minister to officially apologize for Japanese actions during the war.²⁵⁵ Ji Young Kim attributes this meeting as the catalyst of increased bilateral security relations that began in 1994.²⁵⁶ Additionally, another president

²⁵⁵ Ji Young Kim, "Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," 489.

²⁵⁶ Kim, 490.

and prime minister summit in 1998 advanced cooperation even further. President Kim Dae Jung's visit to Japan and the ensuing completion of the ROK-Japan Joint Declaration specifically aimed to increase security meetings and exchanges to foster cooperation.²⁵⁷ These are direct examples of leaders encouraging security cooperation, and much of the subsequent cooperation is linked with these two executive summit meetings.

1. Yasukuni Shrine

Visiting Yasukuni Shrine is the first example of how Japanese leaders impact security cooperation with South Korea. The shrine is the spiritual resting place for Japanese who have lost their lives during various wars, but it also honors many convicted war criminals, including 13 Class A war criminals from World War II.²⁵⁸ When Japanese leaders visit the shrine, it consistently enflames tensions with South Korea and frustrates security cooperation. While the visitation of other important Japanese political figures also elicits a response from South Korea, this research focuses purely on the visitation of Japanese prime ministers. Because the prime minister is the head of the government, analyzing these visits is better suited to determine the most extreme impact on cooperation, and the availability of data allows more accurate tracking of variation. In order to evaluate the impact leaders have on security cooperation through visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, this section examines instances both when prime ministers visited as well as abstained from visiting the shrine, then assesses the South Korean response.

The first important series of visitations to the shrine during the evaluated time period were made by Prime Minister Koizumi. Oh shows that Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine every year he was in office from 2001–2006 and this often resulted in the cancellation of diplomatic meetings by South Korea.²⁵⁹ Looking more specifically at South Korean responses during this period, it is evident that these visits discouraged cooperation. According to Koga, the ROK government canceled two heads-of-state

²⁵⁷ Akira Ogawa, "The Miracle of 1998 and Beyond: ROK-Japan Security Cooperation," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 10, no. 2 (December 1998): 37.

²⁵⁸ Oh, "The United States between Japan and Korea: Keeping Alliances Strong in East Asia," 135.

²⁵⁹ Oh, 135.

meetings as a result of Koizumi's visits to the shrine, one in 2003 and another in 2005.²⁶⁰ After Koizumi's six straight visits, no other Japanese prime minister visited again until Abe Shinzo did in 2013. Despite not visiting the shrine during his first term as prime minister in 2006–2007, Abe visited the shrine in late 2013. According to Koga, the South Korean government responded to this “by declaring the visit made it difficult for South Korea to hold a bilateral summit.”²⁶¹ In fact, Singh suggests that this visit had a measurable negative impact on the relationship between Abe and President Park of South Korea and did, in fact, prevent a bilateral summit from occurring through 2015.²⁶² While it is evident that there is some impact when Japanese prime ministers visit the shrine, it remains to be seen how great this influence actually is or what other historical issues could also explain negative trends in the bilateral relationship.

It is also key to consider that no Japanese prime minister visited Yasukuni Shrine in the interim between Koizumi's last visit and Abe's first visit. Of particular interest during this time period is when the main opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led the government. Tae Hyo Kim shows that the DPJ was known for having more progressive views related to historical issues, and events like Prime Minister Kan's 2010 apology helped improve security cooperation from 2010–2012.²⁶³ The DPJ prime ministers were not alone in not visiting the shrine between the Koizumi and Abe visits. Koga reports that three LDP prime ministers, including Abe in his first term, did not visit the shrine from 2006 to 2012.²⁶⁴ This provides another focus area to determine if this had an encouraging impact on security cooperation. While it is difficult to link the lack of Yasukuni visits directly to improved security cooperation, it appears that it could contribute to encouraging ties.

²⁶⁰ Kei Koga, “The Yasukuni Question: Histories, Logics, and Japan-South Korea Relations,” *The Pacific Review* 29, no. 3 (2016): 333.

²⁶¹ Koga, 332.

²⁶² Singh, “Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations,” 21-22.

²⁶³ Tae Hyo Kim, “Japan and Korea: Why Can't They Reconcile?” 275.

²⁶⁴ Koga, “The Yasukuni Question: Histories, Logics, and Japan-South Korea Relations,” 337.

2. Comfort Women: Leaders' Influence

The second history-related case where leaders influence security cooperation deals with their actions regarding the comfort women issue. In the prior section on this topic, the focus was on how the public's response to the issue influenced foreign and security policies. This section of the research focuses entirely on what actions leaders on both sides took to either minimize or inflame the comfort women issue. The comfort women saga provides examples of both clearly encouraging as well as obviously discouraging influences on security cooperation. From this leadership perspective, the research first looks at ways leaders exacerbated the comfort women issue and then when leaders attempted to solve the problem. In both of these cases, leaders' actions related to the comfort women issue help determine whether security cooperation increased or decreased.

Both Japanese and South Korean leaders have at times ratcheted up the comfort women issue in a manner that negatively influenced their bilateral relationship. The main method by which Japanese leaders intensify the debate is when they question the validity of parts of the comfort women narrative. Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly called into question comfort women details by challenging previous Japanese apologies, saying that no evidence supports the claim of military involvement, and has reiterated this view to the Japanese Diet.²⁶⁵ These events occurred during both his first short stint as prime minister as well as his current tenure. The message this sends to South Korean leadership is that the Japanese are not truly remorseful for their actions during WWII, which could have a negative impact on security cooperation. South Korean leaders have also aggravated the comfort women issue. President Roh brought up the idea of reparations in a general sense during a speech in 2005. Ji Young Kim claims that "this was the first time that a South Korean president officially raised the issue of reparation since the Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was concluded in 1965."²⁶⁶ While this was not

²⁶⁵ Shogo Suzuki, "Can the History Issue Make or Break the Japan-ROK Quasi-Alliance," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 27, no. 2 (June 2015): 205-206; Tae Hyo Kim, "Japan and Korea: Why Can't They Reconcile?" 277.

²⁶⁶ Ji Young Kim, "Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," 497.

specifically focused on comfort women, the idea of reparations or compensation is often linked to solving the issue. In any event, this type of leadership action by the South Koreans reinforces the “apology fatigue” in Japan and discourages security cooperation.

Leaders have also taken positive actions regarding the comfort women issue that have either directly improved security cooperation or have the potential to do so in the future. Two events, in particular, demonstrate encouraging leaders’ actions: the 1993 Kono Statement and the 2015 comfort women agreement. First, the 1993 Kono Statement was an official declaration from the Japanese government both admitting the Japanese army was responsible for comfort women and apologizing for that fact.²⁶⁷ This admission and apology opened up security cooperation between the two countries and served as the catalyst for future cooperation. A leader had made an unambiguous acknowledgement of the Japanese military’s role in forcing South Korean women into sexual slavery, and this leadership action absolutely encouraged security cooperation. Second, the agreement between President Park and Prime Minister Abe in 2015 is another example of leaders forging closer cooperation by moving toward resolution of the comfort women issue. While the public factor section focused on the negative elements of this agreement, these leaders’ efforts did encourage closer security cooperation. Nishino highlights that during a phone conversation after the agreement was reached, the two leaders vowed to push for closer cooperation in areas like security.²⁶⁸ Leaders of these two nations recognized how the comfort women issue was inhibiting closer cooperation and, through their direct actions, sought to mitigate it.

3. Dokdo/Takeshima Territorial Dispute

The territorial dispute concerning the Dokdo/Takeshima islands is the third and final case that demonstrates the impact leaders have on security cooperation. While not directly a history issue like the Yasukuni Shrine visits or comfort women, this territorial dispute is fueled by history and the different narratives each country affirms. The territory

²⁶⁷ Pajon and H mez, “Japan-Korea Security Cooperation: Sisyphus Getting Muscles?” 267.

²⁶⁸ Nishino, “Japan’s Security Relationship with the Republic of Korea: Opportunities and Challenges,” 4.

in dispute is currently controlled by the South Koreans, but the Japanese say their claim is based on the islands not being part of what the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty returned to the ROK.²⁶⁹ Closer analysis of each nation's defense white papers reveals when these issues gained importance. Ji Young Kim emphasizes how the Japanese document started discussing sovereignty of the islands for the first time in almost twenty years in 1997.²⁷⁰ A review of ROK white papers reveals that starting in 2006 and through 2016, the section detailing ROK-Japanese security cooperation specifically mentions the islands as a stumbling block for future cooperation.²⁷¹ Clearly, both countries feel the issue is important, and when leaders manipulate the dispute, it affects security cooperation. Unlike the previous two leadership-focused factors, there is really no encouraging leadership input to consider. Therefore, this section analyzes two main focal points of this argument: the celebration of Takeshima Day by the Shimane Prefecture in Japan and South Korean President Lee's visit to Dokdo/Takeshima.

Before addressing the Takeshima Day, there are also two other caveats worth mentioning. First, there is some overlap between the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute and the textbook controversy. Ji Young Kim describes the publication of textbooks outlining the islands as a possession of Japan in 2009 negatively impacting the security relationship, and Sheryn Lee reports a similar incident in 2011.²⁷² In order to ensure all Dokdo/Takeshima related incidents are evaluated based on the security cooperation measurements, 2009 and 2011 are included in the assessment section. Second, although not discussed in the public-response section, there are elements of public influence possibly driving leaders to make decisions. However, this research focuses on the leaders' actions as the more important factor, since it is less apparent how much role the public plays when compared to the textbooks and GSOMIA issues. Both of these caveats just reinforce the

²⁶⁹ Pajon and Hómez, "Japan-Korea Security Cooperation: Sisyphus Getting Muscles?" 275.

²⁷⁰ Ji Young Kim, "Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan," 49.

²⁷¹ ROK Defense White Paper 2006-2016.

²⁷² Ji Young Kim, "Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," 498; Lee, "Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation," 100.

point that all these history items overlap and it is often difficult to separate them from themselves or determine if the public or leaders are the predominant driving force. In this case, the Dokdo/Takeshima category was chosen due it seemingly having a greater and more direct impact on security cooperation.

The earliest major flare-up over Dokdo/Takeshima dispute was when the Shimane Prefecture held a Takeshima Day in early 2005. Rozman and Lee describe the motivation for this local government action as similar to a previous annual celebration of islands in the north of Japan that were held by Russia.²⁷³ Further, they point out that after the Japanese ambassador to South Korea confirmed Japan did, in fact, claim the island, the controversy began.²⁷⁴ Both the local leaders of the prefecture and the ambassador were antagonizing the issue. On the South Korean side, President Roh also inflamed relations, impacting security cooperation. Shortly after Takeshima Day, Roh “lambasted Japan for its handling of a wide range of history issue.”²⁷⁵ There is also evidence to suggest that Roh took this hardline stance toward Japan despite his desire to develop closer bilateral ties. Cheol Hee Park describes how President Roh’s original forward-looking Japanese agenda did not aim at bringing up history issues, but that the Takeshima Day controversy forced him to take a more confrontational approach.²⁷⁶ Additionally, scholars such as Suzuki and Klingner suggest that Roh may have also been motivated by wanting to appear strong against Japan to increase domestic support.²⁷⁷ In either case, Roh clearly inflamed tensions during this period. The immediate results included the cancelation of the annual security dialogues between the two countries and the defense minister meetings through 2006.²⁷⁸

²⁷³ Gilbert Rozman and Shin-wha Lee, “Unravelling the Japan-South Korea Virtual Alliance,” *Asian Survey* 46, no. 5 (2006): 776.

²⁷⁴ Rozman and Lee, 776.

²⁷⁵ Rozman and Lee, 776.

²⁷⁶ Cheol Hee Park, “The Pattern of Cooperation and Conflict between Korea and Japan: Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Realities,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 10, no. 3 (December 2009): 256.

²⁷⁷ Suzuki, “Can the History Issue Make or Break the Japan-ROK Quasi-Alliance,” 209; Klingner, “Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation,” 8.

²⁷⁸ Ji Young Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 498.

Clearly, the combination of Japanese instigation with Takeshima Day and the response of South Korean leadership directly reduced security cooperation.

South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak's visit to the disputed territory is the next Dokdo/Takeshima related issue that impacted security cooperation. In this example, the instigator came not from Japanese leadership but from South Korea. President Lee made the first trip by a South Korean president in part to demonstrate South Korea's claims over the islands.²⁷⁹ Much like President Roh before him, Lee had domestic motivation to pursue a more hawkish approach toward Japan. Singh suggests that Lee could have used the visit as an attempt to shore up support for his party prior to leaving office or to distract the domestic audience from his issues with the GSOMIA and bribery scandals.²⁸⁰ Regardless of his actual motivation, his visit discouraged security cooperation by intensifying the conflict over Dokdo/Takeshima. Similar to the direct efforts South Korean leaders took in response to Takeshima Day, Japanese leadership promptly decreased cooperation in response to Lee's visit. Klingner reports that the Japanese filed official protests, postponed a high-level economic meeting, and recalled their ambassador.²⁸¹ While these are not security cooperation instances, they signify the impact it had on cooperation in general and likely also impacted security cooperation directly.

4. Assessment: Impact of Leadership

Just as is the case for the role of the public, the leadership's actions in response to history issues have more of a discouraging impact on security cooperation. From the Japanese perspective, evidence supports the notion that leaders are largely responsible for creating and inflaming many of the history issues. This too fits with Ji Young Kim's description of elite-led politics driving the comfort women and territorial dispute.²⁸² In

²⁷⁹ Klingner, "Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation," 4.


²⁸⁰ Singh, "Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations," 23.

²⁸¹ Klingner, "Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation," 5.

²⁸² Ji Young Kim, "Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes Between South Korea and Japan," 40-42 and 48-50.

each of the three examples, Japanese leaders either directly contributed to negative relations by provoking South Korean responses or responding to hawkish South Korean actions. There are also examples of Japanese leaders encouraging greater security cooperation by electing to not visit the Yasukuni Shrine and efforts to address the comfort women issue by both Kono and Abe. However, Japanese leaders' influence is much more negative than positive. South Korean leaders have a similarly negative overall tilt to their actions regarding the history issue. In both the shrine and comfort women issues, South Korean leaders mainly responded to Japanese actions but seem to exacerbate the situation. The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute provides a different example where South Korean leaders have demonstrated they too can instigate friction, when President Lee visited the islands in 2012.

Evaluating the impact of both Japanese prime ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine reveals inconclusive results. Koizumi visited the shrine for six straight years from 2001–2006. According to Figure 19, this time period encompassed both negative and positive trends in total security cooperation. The observations are as follows: 2001 represents the near end of the positive trend in Phase I, and 2004–2006 saw a drastic drop-off in Phase II; but, there was a slight increase in 2002 and steady cooperation in 2003. During the years Koizumi visited the shrine, security cooperation fluctuated in both directions. Next, the period from 2007–2012, when no visits occurred, represents large growth in security cooperation in Phase III from 2007–2010, followed by another drop in Phase IV from 2010–2012. Finally, 2013 does not provide any clearer conclusions about if ceasing the visits improved cooperation since the value in 2013 and 2014 remain the same. Based on these values, it seems the shrine visits are more background irritants to the South Koreans. These visits are certainly an issue that can affect security cooperation, but the frequency seems to prevent determining variation. While shrine visits have caused meetings to be canceled, the South Korean response to these visits could also be related to the aggravation of other simultaneous history issues.




This figure displays total security cooperation using the moving average while also highlighting Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine from 2001–2006 and Abe's visit in 2013.

Figure 19. Moving Average Security Cooperation with Key South Korean Public Protests²⁸³

For the comfort women issue, some new conclusions can be made about the specific role of leaders. The previous assessment of the public influence on the comfort women already confirmed the increases in cooperation after the 1993 Kono statement and 2015 comfort women accord. Obviously, leaders played a vital role in issuing that statement and coming to the 2015 agreement. From the leader-specific negative actions, two key years stand out: 2005, when President Roh talked about reparations, and the multiple instances Prime Minister Abe has questioned the facts behind Japanese involvement with comfort women. First, while Abe's statements certainly do not encourage additional security cooperation, they are spread out and numerous. Therefore, the statements are not as useful in comparing to the cooperation measurement, and indicate that the statements do not have a strong enough effect on security cooperation. However, President Roh's comment was

²⁸³ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and *ROK Defense White Paper 1994-2017*. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, "First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool," 26-27.

indicative of a period of several years where his speeches took on a more hawkish tone from 2005–2007.²⁸⁴ According to Figure 20, 2005 and 2006 both represent very low totals. It seems fairly evident that leaders’ responses to the comfort women issue has had some encouraging effect but also contributes to an overall drastic decrease that hits bottom in 2006. Additionally, Figure 21 shows that there were no high-level security meetings in 2006. This provides solid evidence that this issue discouraged security cooperation.




This figure displays total security cooperation using the moving average while also highlighting ROK President Roh’s reparations talk in 2005, the 2005–2006 Dokdo/Takeshima dispute flare-up, ROK President Lee’s visit to Dokdo in 2012, and the 2015 comfort women agreement.

Figure 20. Moving Average Security Cooperation with Comfort Women and Territorial Issues²⁸⁵

²⁸⁴ See the Pacific Forum’s timeline highlighting a speech in March 2005 about compensation, April 2006 focused on Japanese territorial ambitions, and one in March 2007 aimed at Japan’s glorification of their colonial history. Pacific Forum, “Comparative Connections: Japan-Korea Chronology,” Accessed November 15, 2018, <http://cc.pacforum.org/relations/japan-korea/?frommo=1&fromyr=1987&tomo=10&toyr=2018&pt=date>.

²⁸⁵ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and ROK *Defense White Paper* 1994-2017. Additional trilateral data derived from Schoff, “First Interim Report: The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool,” 26-27.



This figure displays only high-level bilateral security cooperation using absolute values while also highlighting ROK President Roh’s reparations talk, the 2005–2006 Dokdo/Takeshima dispute flare-up, ROK President Lee’s visit to Dokdo in 2012, and the 2015 comfort women agreement.

Figure 21. High-Level Bilateral Security Cooperation with Comfort Women and Territorial Issues ²⁸⁶

Finally, regarding the Dokdo/Takeshima issue, more evidence supports the linkage between leaders’ actions and decreasing security cooperation. First, the 2005–2006 timeframe again jumps out as significant based on Takeshima Day and the resulting South Korean response. As previously noted in both the shrine factor and comfort women issue, this period of time represents one of the lowest total levels of security cooperation and the lowest high-level cooperation. Based on all the research dealing with leadership’s response to history issues it seems that the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute was the primary driving force behind the 2005–2006 dramatic decrease in security cooperation. While the comfort women and shrine visitation were ongoing issues with their own specific influences, the Dokdo/Takeshima seemed to galvanize the South Korean leadership. This could have led them to push back on other historical issues. Second, the research revealed a linkage to textbook controversies where they depicted Dokdo/Takeshima as Japanese in both 2009

²⁸⁶ Adapted from *Defense of Japan* and ROK *Defense White Paper* 1994-2017.

and 2011. Figure 20 depicts inconclusive results, with 2009 coming near the peak of a positive trend in Phase III and 2011 in a decline during Phase IV. It is likely that these only resulted in small impacts on security cooperation. Third and lastly, President Lee's 2012 visit to Dokdo/Takeshima reveals a significant result. Figure 20 shows 2012 in a negative trend, and Figure 21 depicts another zero value for the high-level security meetings. During both of the major Dokdo/Takeshima crises in 2005/2006 and 2012, all high-level bilateral security cooperation meetings were canceled. This is a fairly significant result that proves actions taken by leaders on this history-related issue decrease security cooperation.

C. OVERALL IMPACT OF DOMESTIC FACTORS

In sum, the influence of both the public and leaders on various historical issues has a net discouraging impact on security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. The history issues evaluated in this research provide a constant source of tension, and when the public and leaders tap into that source, the result is a more strained relationship. At times, the damage to the bilateral relationship is difficult to narrow down, while during others the ramping up of history issues directly reduces security cooperation. South Korean public protest and mobilization during the textbook controversy around the year 2000 that resulted in canceled high-level meetings, bilateral exercises, and port visits is a prime example of how domestic influences can decrease security cooperation. The postponement of the GSOMIA in 2012 also supports the conclusion that the South Korean public discourages security cooperation. This research also provides ample evidence that leaders have often been responsible for discouraging security cooperation through inflaming history-related issues. Japanese leaders' actions visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and consistently questioning parts of the comfort women narrative demonstrate this influence. Nevertheless, it appears that the shrine visitation could be too frequent to be wholly responsible for reduced cooperation. South Korean leaders also contribute to these discouraging interactions by responding with their own rhetoric or more hawkish actions. Additionally, leadership in both countries contributed to several instances of tense relations over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands dispute. These leaders' actions provide strong support for greater discouraging influence.

On the encouraging side, the positive impact of the public is minor, but there is evidence that leaders can and do make a difference with respect to security cooperation. Examples like the 1993 Kono statement and the 2015 comfort women agreement prove that when utilizing a more conciliatory approach for history issues, increased security cooperation can occur. The 1993 Kono statement led to the start of meaningful security cooperation between the two countries, and the 2015 comfort women accord paved the way for the completion of the GSOMIA after a postponement of several years. However, the overall contribution towards security cooperation that the public and leadership makes regarding history issues is discouraging. In the public sphere, the Japanese have a more neutral role rather than a direct encouraging role and there are virtually no examples of the South Korean public encouraging cooperation. Leadership examples also contain many more instances of discouraging than encouraging behavior.

Additionally, the idea that history issues are more elite-driven in Japan is also confirmed. The public does play a role in allowing LDP leadership to exacerbate tensions over history issues with South Korea, but it is not an active one. In contrast, South Korea exhibits many indicators of a much more active and influential populace. Evidence supports the public's ability to influence politicians to take more hardline stances toward the Japanese, often despite what South Korean leaders may prefer. Another common theme the research uncovered is the difficulty in separating the influence of certain historical issues from one another. Regardless of whether the history issue was highlighted by actions of the leadership or public, discouraging security cooperation phases often included multiple separate history-related issues. The 2005–2006 is an important example of this phenomenon where several simultaneous history issues were inflamed and the result produced some of the lowest bilateral security cooperation across the entire timeframe. Ultimately, the net influence of the public and leadership domestic factors is discouraging for security cooperation.

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V. CONCLUSION

This research principally analyzed the impact of domestic and international factors on Japan-ROK security cooperation and found that domestic issues mostly discouraged cooperation while international factors had more of an encouraging role. The approach focused on each specific issue in turn and established the relationship between the associated factor and security cooperation. Since each of the factors were examined in isolation, this chapter analyzes and concludes the overall impact of the various factors to determine their combined influence. To this end, the chapter first begins by reviewing the findings that support the main conclusion and as well as the few examples that counter it. These instances do go against the trend that international factors generally encourage security cooperation while domestic ones discourage cooperation. Second, the chapter will focus specifically on the quantitative results to generate some overall conclusions that encompass both international and domestic factors. Third, the chapter denotes areas where future research could further explore other aspects of Japan-ROK security cooperation specifically and of security cooperation in the region generally. Finally, the chapter briefly addresses some implications for Japan, South Korea, and their joint ally, the United States.

A. REVIEW OF FINDINGS

The research utilized mainly defense white papers from both South Korea and Japan to identify and measure instances of security cooperation. These instances include multiple categories such as bilateral high-level meetings, regular consultations, unit exchanges, bilateral exercises, security-related agreements, and trilateral examples with the United States. Focusing on 1994 to 2016, the research revealed a pattern of changes in levels of security cooperation, as well as distinct periods of higher and lower security cooperation. Per Figure 5, the phases are as follows: Phase I 1994–2002, Phase II 2003–2006, Phase III 2007–2010, Phase IV 2011–2014, and Phase V 2015–2016.

Utilizing the general argument level of analysis, all three international factors considered—China, DPRK, and the United States—had clear evidence that supported their encouraging role in Japan-ROK security cooperation, despite theoretical expectations that

could have gone either way. From the onset of meaningful Japan-ROK security cooperation, the DPRK served as a shared threat perception that has encouraged security cooperation. Chinese aggression was also found to create incentives that increased security cooperation in examples like the establishment of the ECS ADIZ and indirectly via their support for the DPRK. Finally, the United States has long pursued trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea to improve regional security and to facilitate closer cooperation between its two main allies in Asia. However, it is assessed that the DPRK factor has a stronger encouraging role than Chinese or American influence. On the domestic front, the history issue and the associated roles that the public and leaders of Japan and South Korea play in exacerbating tensions exhibits several linkages to decreased security cooperation. The South Korean public has influenced security cooperation with their protests and demonstration in response to both the textbook controversy and the postponement of the GSOMIA. From a leadership perspective, executives on both sides have demonstrated that exacerbating issues like the territorial dispute in the Dokdo/Takeshima islands and the questioning the validity of the comfort women narrative by Japanese leaders can inflame tensions and decrease security cooperation. Both the role of the public and the impact of leadership displayed strong evidence to discourage security cooperation. The research also provides insight into the question concerning the relative importance of international versus domestic factors in influencing security cooperation. In a broad sense, the data indicates that the strong international cooperative pressures do seem to lead to increasing security cooperation over the long-term, but that when domestic issues flare-up they have a more powerful negative influence on security cooperation for shorter periods.

While there were examples that ran counter to the main conclusion of domestic factors discouraging security cooperation and international factors encouraging it, these results were mostly minor in nature with the exception of a few cases. One of the most apparent examples of a domestic issue that actually encouraged security cooperation lies in the role leaders can play when they attempt to resolve history issues. The research found that the 1993 Kono statement and 2015 comfort women accord created the conditions necessary to pursue increased Japan-ROK security cooperation. Looking at the

international factors, the main explanation for these to exhibit discouraging influences is when Japanese and South Korean interests are not aligned. This seemed most evident with respect to DPRK policies and approaches but also can be found in perspectives regarding China. The ROK’s Sunshine Policy and other cooperative behavior toward the DPRK created a mismatch with Japanese interests that inhibited security cooperation. Chinese efforts to stoke shared animosity toward Japan and the importance of China’s role in dealing with the DPRK can discourage South Korea from seeking more security cooperation with Japan. However, in both the DPRK and PRC cases, the resulting discouraging influence on security cooperation varies, so the strength of evidence for those explanations is moderate. Finally, the research explored the United States’ role and the possibility of abandonment fears discouraging security cooperation, but found this to have a limited impact. Table 1 displays the overall strength of evidence to support each factor’s encouraging or discouraging impact on Japan-ROK security cooperation.

Table 1. Strength of Evidence and Overall Impact on Security Cooperation

	Encouraging	Discouraging	Net Impact
International Factor 1: China	Moderate	Weak	Encouraging
International Factor 2: North Korea	Strong	Moderate	Encouraging
International Factor 3: United States	Moderate	Weak	Encouraging
Domestic Factor 1: Public	Weak	Strong	Discouraging
Domestic Factor 2: Leaders	Moderate	Strong	Discouraging

B. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT AND KEY FINDINGS

While qualitative evidence supports the main conclusion of international factors having a more encouraging influence and domestic issues generating more discouraging impacts, the quantitative analysis provides more nuanced insights that reveal additional conclusions. One of the most interesting results from the quantitative measurements of security cooperation is the variation the data displays. As Figure 5 indicates, the level of

cooperation oscillates between fairly distinct periods of increasing or decreasing security cooperation. Analysis of the distinctive time periods and their corresponding key trends provides a better understanding of the holistic influences all these factors have on Japan-ROK security cooperation. While this is a simplistic summary of all the various international and domestic factors at play during these distinct time periods, it helps conceptualize how some of the broad trends in each of the factors influence security cooperation. Table 2 evaluates each of these phases against several measurements that encapsulate the impact of the international and domestic factors. Since the quantitative analysis did not indicate a strong relationship between the U.S. trilateral data and Japan-ROK security relationship, this factor is not included in this portion of the data analysis.

Table 2. Phase Evaluation

	Shared High Threat Perception	US Trilateral Efforts	Domestic Disputes	Trend
Phase I: 1994-2002	Yes, DPRK	Variable	Low	Positive
Phase II: 2003-2006	No	Variable	High	Negative
Phase III: 2007-2010	Yes, DPRK	Low to Moderate	Low	Positive
Phase IV: 2011-2014	Mixed	Variable	High	Negative
Phase V: 2015-2016	Yes, DPRK	Moderate to High	Low	Positive

The most important conclusion from this analysis is that domestic factors are the most important cause of increasing or decreasing Japan-ROK security cooperation. During each of the periods of low domestic disputes, security cooperation improved; the corresponding negative security trends align with periods of high domestic disputes. However, shared, high threat perception also mostly aligns with periods of increased security cooperation. While this is a significant finding, the research also determined that the influence of high threat perception was not as impactful or consistent. Additionally, the influence of the DPRK threat was much more pronounced only in Phases I and III, whereas the domestic issues consistently resulted in decreased security cooperation. For example, North Korean provocations after 2010 had a limited effect on Japan-ROK security cooperation. The research also found examples where threat perceptions were not aligned, especially when South Korea attempted to cooperate with North Korea. Therefore, the

conclusion attributes more explanatory significance to the domestic factors than shared threat perception.

Phase I immediately followed the Kono statement and the only domestic issues manifested at the end of the period. From 2000–2001, these included the textbook issue and Prime Minister Koizumi visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. Phase II, on the other hand, had several issues involving Dokdo/Takeshima, shrine visits, and leaders exacerbating the comfort women issue. Phase III was relatively free from history concerns, but Phase IV again had territorial disputes and the postponement of the GSOMIA. Next, in Phase V, the comfort women accord signify another attempt to deal with the history issue. The shared, high threat perception during these periods is assessed as a contributing factor to increased cooperation. Most of the shared threat perception is generated by the DPRK with examples in Phase I, III, and V. Phase II represents a period without major provocations by either North Korea or China until the DPRK’s first nuclear test in the fall of 2006. Since this test was relatively late in the year, the impacts on security cooperation did not begin to manifest until the next year. Finally, in Phase IV, there was some shared, high threat perception toward a more aggressive China, but it represented more of a concern for the Japanese. These periods of shared, high threat perception provide an important additional input that, along with stability in domestic issues, increases security cooperation. The influence of the American trilateral efforts are not uniform across the time periods and therefore their impact is inconclusive. Each of the phases represents a transition in U.S. trilateral efforts as opposed to the more distinguishable other factors. However, it is the domestic disputes centered on the history issue that really determine whether security cooperation occurs or not. Ji Young Kim comes to a similar conclusion in sometimes attributing internal history issues a bigger impact on security cooperation than strategic factors.²⁸⁷

The quantitative data reveals several other key findings related to Japan-ROK security cooperation. The strong encouraging DPRK factor seems to apply mostly to earlier periods of belligerence and the first two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. After these initial

²⁸⁷ Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 479.

periods of increased threat perception, the impact of the DPRK threat on security cooperation seems more diminished. This could indicate the DRPK threat played an important role in the 1990s, getting security cooperation moving during periods of domestic cooperation, but, absent the early nuclear tests, did not have as much continuing influence. Japan and South Korea could have become somewhat numb to the continuous threats from North Korea. The role of the United States also generates some interesting questions based on the quantitative data. The data analysis indicated that increased trilateral activities did not seem to have a measurable impact on Japan-ROK security cooperation, which is counter to what is expected. While trilateral cooperation values might not be the best measure of U.S. influence, it still created an interesting result. As was noted in Chapter III, it might be difficult to accurately determine the tangible U.S. impacts on Japan-ROK security cooperation. However, without their respective alliances with America, it is difficult to imagine much security cooperation occurring between Japan and South Korea at all. It is even possible that actual strategic competition would occur in the Japan-ROK dyad without the U.S. presence.

C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Further examination in several areas could reveal supportive or even alternative conclusions regarding the most important influences on Japan-ROK security cooperation. First, it is important to question where or not Japan-ROK security cooperation is meaningful in the first place. This research merely set out to measure security cooperation and focused on the fluctuation in these values and how various factors may have caused that change. However, it is also possible that the security cooperation between the two nations is relatively minor and small changes in this cooperation are not significant. Manosevitz classifies the security cooperation between the two countries as “limited in operation and narrowly focused.”²⁸⁸ In the same vein, Ji Young Kim highlights the lack of quality in Japan-ROK security cooperation.²⁸⁹ Additional research might seek to

²⁸⁸ Jason U. Manosevitz, “Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence,” *Asian Survey* 43, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 801.

²⁸⁹ Kim, “Rethinking the Role of Identity Factors: the History Problem and the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” 479.

determine if the lower-level security cooperation examples actually signify important macro trends in the strategic relationship between Japan and South Korea.

Second, future research could also investigate security cooperation instances using the same research design for other dyads in the region. Japanese and Australian security cooperation provides another example of two U.S. allies who are seeking to cooperate more. The 2017 Japanese white paper calls Australia a “special strategic partner for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region.”²⁹⁰ Additionally, the 2010 Japanese white paper, and all subsequent versions through 2017, placed Australia ahead of South Korea in the section detailing defense cooperation.²⁹¹ Whether this signified a change in priority for Japan could be an interesting area for further research. ROK security cooperation with China might also reveal some additional insights regarding South Korean priorities and threat perceptions. If South Korea has similar bilateral security cooperation numbers with China, it might indicate that it too might have different regional security cooperation priorities. This research might further reinforce that the history-related issues are severely limiting what should be diverse and extensive Japan-ROK security cooperation.

Third, the impact of multilateral security cooperation might have an important influence on Japan-ROK security cooperation. This research did not consider multilateral meetings, exercises, and dialogues due to the difficulty in determining how these events impact Japan-ROK security cooperation. However, future research might explore the multilateral dynamic to reveal if it encourages or discourages security cooperation.

D. IMPLICATIONS

Given the negative influence of the domestic issues outlined in this research, what can anyone reasonably do to help encourage Japan-ROK security cooperation? Increasing security cooperation can be approached in one of two ways. First, efforts by Japan, South Korea, and the United States to find areas of common interest that address shared threat perceptions could continue to improve security cooperation. Klingner highlights missile

²⁹⁰ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2017*, 363.

²⁹¹ Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2010*, 351.

defense and anti-submarine warfare as two areas were both bilateral and trilateral shared DPRK threat perception creates an opportunity for increased cooperation.²⁹² These areas continue to represent realistic focus areas for increased security cooperation in the short-term. However, these recommendations and others focused on shared interests and threat perception fail to address the history issue as the underlying cause of the difficulty in the Japan-ROK dyad. Of course, the history problem is a multi-faceted issue that is unlikely to be solved in the near-term. Understanding that these domestic factors are at the center of the friction between Japan-ROK security cooperation provides important areas on which to focus efforts.

It is not just the acrimonious history between the two countries that is causing problems, but also how politicians and the public respond to these issues. The research concurred with Ji Young Kim's conclusions that many of the history issues are driven by elites in Japan and by the public in South Korea.²⁹³ This is an important conclusion to consider in addressing what can be done about actors who exacerbate the history issue. Kim concludes that the cycle of history issues being inflamed normally begins with Japanese political leaders' actions.²⁹⁴ Accordingly, a strategy that seeks to minimize the impact of the history issue on Japan-ROK security cooperation should address Japanese leaders' behavior in questioning the comfort women narratives, backpedaling on apologies, and visiting the Yasukuni shrine. While this research is not attempting to determine domestic motivations for nationalist behavior, some efforts from the United States directed at leaders has shown some success. Moon and Hur note that one of the key contributing factors to the completion of the 2015 comfort women accord was how "the Obama administration placed heavy pressure on both leaders."²⁹⁵ Since the research found it difficult to determine if U.S. trilateral efforts actually increased Japan-ROK security

²⁹² Klingner, "Washington Should Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation," 7-8.

²⁹³ Kim "Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan," 31.

²⁹⁴ Kim, 53.

²⁹⁵ Moon and Hur, "A South Korean Perspective: Trilateral Cooperation: The Devil's in Domestic Politics," 48.

cooperation, focusing diplomatic efforts on encouraging Japanese and South Korean leaders to work more diligently on resolving history issues might pay more dividends toward increased cooperation. Also, this seems to be a more direct and achievable goal than aiming at changing South Korean public opinion in the near-term. If Japanese and South Korean leaders continue down the path to resolving or at least mitigating history concerns, the South Korean populace will recognize these efforts and decrease their negative influence.

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