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chiefly by the extension of economic and cultural assistance to Afghanistan. This aid program, which contributed to the maintenance of Afghanistan's internal security and governmental stability during the war, will be continued because of impelling political considerations. The intensification of the Anglo-Soviet conflict for supremacy in neighboring Iran has made this Government increasingly aware of the parallels between the international position of Iran and that of Afghanistan and of their potentialities as threats to international security. We will therefore endeavor to assist the Afghan Government on a more comprehensive scale in undertaking its educational and economic development program, in order to contribute to the economic and political stabilization of Afghanistan and thereby to assist in the maintenance of its sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis its two great neighbors. At the same time, we will encourage the Afghans to resist the influence of totalitarian governmental methods, and will endeavor to guide them in the development of the democratic principles and institutions of Western civilization.

This Government will use its good offices in an endeavor to obtain Afghan participation in the United Nations Organization.

BURMA. Our policy toward Burma is:

1. To emphasize to the British at every appropriate opportunity the danger to peace and stability in Asia of a continuance of acute political discontent in Burma and the urgency of an early and amicable settlement, both in the interest of renewing faith in the Anglo-American powers among the peoples of Asia and in accordance with the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories in the United Nations Charter; recent British actions with reference to Burma, including the promise of full Dominion status, appear to fall within the scope of this declaration, and our future policy toward Burma will depend upon the extent to which concrete steps are taken to implement these British undertakings.
2. To disassociate ourselves in the minds of the Burmese people from any action which might be interpreted

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as intended to assure the maintenance or extension of an imperial order in Asia.

3. To use every feasible means to assist the Burmese people to attain a higher standard of living and economic and social progress and development, including the encouragement of cultural cooperation and trade between the United States and Burma.

4. To pursue the foregoing objectives in a manner that will not be harmful to firm Anglo-American solidarity or to the broader aims of international peace and prosperity envisaged in the United Nations Charter.

EGYPT. The relations between the United States and Egypt have been for many years on a friendly basis and very few problems have arisen to mar the traditional cordial feeling existing between the two countries. Among these problems may be mentioned the restrictions imposed by the United States affecting imports of Egyptian long staple cotton, and in the strictly political field, the question of Palestine. Our short-term policy toward Egypt does not differ from our long-term policy and centers chiefly about securing nondiscriminatory treatment for American interests and furnishing to Egypt all proper economic assistance with a view to maintaining order and stability in this strategic part of the Near East. In our relations with Egypt we have never sought to undermine the special position which Great Britain enjoys by treaty in that country, but our friendly influence has been and is on the side of Egypt's progress toward full political and economic independence.

ETHIOPIA. Our present policy is to give appropriate assistance to the Government of Ethiopia in the rehabilitation of the economy of the country, dislocated by five years of Italian occupation, and to aid in the restoration and preservation of internal security. Our interest in this respect is largely humanitarian and is motivated by our desire to encourage the progress of one of the few independent peoples of Africa.

We do not now have any large financial or commercial interests which give us a major economic stake in

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Ethiopia. The Sinclair Oil concession and the Freeport Sulphur Company negotiations do, however, indicate potential commercial and industrial interests of considerable importance should oil and minerals be found. We aim to preserve reasonable opportunities for American trade with that country and we would view with concern any attempt by a third power to secure rights or privileges which would discriminate against legitimate American interests in Ethiopia.

Our long-range policy toward Ethiopia, as in other parts of the Middle East, is to use the influence of the United States to secure and maintain political stability and to encourage political and economic freedom and development.

GREECE. In accordance with responsibilities assumed at Yalta, we have recently agreed to assist in observing Greek elections on an equal basis with the British and French Governments, regretting that the Soviet Government feels unable to participate. Our interest in peaceful conditions in the Balkans will be served by active assistance to Greece in its attempts to restore economic equilibrium. Already the United States is contributing heavily and giving full support to the large-scale Greek UNRRA program. We will support Greek requests for substantial credits from Export-Import Bank funds. In the final peace settlement we would strongly disapprove of any territorial changes that would decrease the 1939 area of Greece, favoring instead Greek sovereignty for the Dodecanese and careful consideration of Greek claims to Northern Epirus.

INDIA. Our policy toward India is:

1. To emphasize to the British, whenever the opportunity arises, the importance that we place upon early and amicable settlement of the Indian political situation both in the interest of renewing faith in the Anglo-American powers among the peoples of Asia and in accordance with the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories in the United Nations Charter; recent British proposals looking toward a change in the constitutional position of India, to be based on the outcome of current elections, appear to fall within

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the scope of this declaration, and our future policy toward India will depend upon the concrete steps taken by the British and Indians to implement the results of these elections.

2. To disassociate ourselves in the minds of the Indian people from any action that might be interpreted as intended to assure the maintenance of the extension of an imperial order in Asia.

3. To use every feasible means to assist the Indians to attain a higher standard of living and economic and social progress and development, including the encouragement of cultural cooperation between the United States and India and the relaxation of existing trade barriers between the two countries.

4. To pursue the foregoing objectives in a manner that will not be harmful to firm Anglo-American solidarity or to the broader aims of international peace and prosperity envisaged in the United Nations Charter.

IRAN. Our policy of extending economic and advisory assistance to Iran has for its immediate objective and desire to respond sympathetically to the appeals of a friendly nation which has suffered considerably through the war and occupation. Its long-range objectives, however, are to contribute to the reconstruction of Iran as a sound member of the international body politic, and thereby to remove a future threat to United Nations solidarity and international security. These considerations governed our participation in the Declaration on Iran, signed at Tehran December 1, 1943 by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill.

The recent intensification of the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran and the increase of Soviet interference in Iran's internal affairs, however, have rendered increasingly difficult the maintenance of Iran's governmental stability and the solution of its critical economic problems. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Iranian situation will continue to threaten international security and United Nations solidarity as long as foreign interference in the country continues and as long as instability within the

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country remains. Our policy toward Iran will continue to be governed by the requirements of international security. Every effort will be made to bring the British and Soviet Governments into multilateral cooperation with the United States in a program of aid to Iran. Although there are obstacles to the achievement of such a solution, this Government is taking the initiative in seeking to impress upon the British and Soviet Governments the multilateral character of the political and economic pledges to Iran, and to effect their active assistance in the stabilization of Iran and its reconstitution as a strong nation. As a corollary, this Government will also attempt to encourage the Iranian Government to assume the responsibilities and functions of a sovereign state, and to establish a legitimate and strong government which will be representative of the population and effectively responsive to its needs.

In the event that foreign interference, either prior to or following the evacuation of foreign troops from Iran, continues to threaten the sovereignty of Iran, we will assist the Iranian Government through all means at our disposal to obtain a full and open hearing of its case before the United Nations Organization, while endeavoring to emphasize to the British and Soviet Governments the necessity for fulfilling their commitments guaranteeing Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity as expressed in the Declaration on Iran.

In implementation of our policy toward Iran, and as a direct result of the recent disturbances in northwestern Iran, on November 24 this Government delivered notes to the Soviet and British Governments. These notes proposed the complete withdrawal, by January 1, 1946, of all foreign troops from Iranian territory, in order to dispel any doubt regarding the intentions of the British, Soviet, and United States Governments to carry out their assurances to Iran, and in order to make clear that Iran's trust in the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council has not been misplaced.

IRAQ. Our present policy toward Iraq is to contribute in every suitable way to the economic and cultural development of that country, while giving appropriate encouragement to its growing desire to achieve

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complete control of its own affairs and to play a more important role in world affairs. Nondiscriminatory treatment for American interests is, of course, a fundamental part of our policy in Iraq as in other countries of the Near East. It is also our policy to encourage the development of trade and direct communications between Iraq and the United States.

LEBANON AND SYRIA. Our policy has consistently been to give moral and political support and encouragement to the efforts of these two Levant States to progress from the status of Class A Mandates to complete political independence. The present policy of the United States is in continuation of that line; it extends friendly political, cultural, and economic support to the Levant States for the purpose of assisting them in consolidating their newly-won independent status.

Whereas our policy toward Lebanon and Syria has been reflected in mutual friendship and good will between the United States and those two countries and has thus redounded to our credit in some degree throughout the Near East, it has on the other hand pointed up sharply the conflicting policy of France, which seeks to retain or reimpose its authority in the Levant States in an effort to achieve a position similar to that held by the British in Iraq. Although we have supported Lebanon and Syria morally and politically against recent French encroachment, our traditional policy of friendship with France has led the United States to temper its approaches and protests to the French Government vis-à-vis the Levant, and to leave entirely to the British the burden of actively intervening when the French by force of arms endeavored to restore their position of pre-eminence in that area. As a consequence, our policy has more recently been regarded in Near Eastern countries as lacking forcefulness and decisiveness as compared with that of the British.

The war has emphasized the strategic importance not only of Lebanon and Syria, but of the Near and Middle East as a whole, where the component countries are in a state of intense political, social and economic readjustment. Looking to the future, there is need for a stronger role for the United States in the political and economic affairs of this region, especially in view

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of the strategic importance of oil reserves and the emergent role of the Soviet Union. The United States has closer cultural relations with the Levant States than with other Near Eastern countries; our policy should be to welcome and wherever practicable to meet without delay the requests for technical, cultural, and economic assistance which Syria and Lebanon are urgently and increasingly making in order that these countries may become viable and truly independent.

LIBERIA. With the outbreak of the European war the strategic importance of Liberia to the United States was recognized, and a defense agreement was entered into, giving the United States the right to construct military installations and maintain troops on Liberian soil for the duration of the emergency. On December 31, 1943 the United States signed an agreement with Liberia for the construction of a seaport which carries with it the right to develop air bases, naval and military installations in the vicinity of the port. Construction of the port is now well under way but the Armed Forces have not indicated when they expect to exercise their rights to develop military installations.

Our current policy is directed toward raising the standard of living of the whole people. Education, public health and sanitation should be made available to Liberia. An economic mission is now engaged in a study of the economic potential of Liberia and hopes to ascertain what native products might be developed for domestic and world markets. Educational grants have been made to the Booker Washington Institute in Liberia. A Public Health Mission is well advanced upon a five-year program for improvements in public health and sanitation.

Our long-range policy is designed to assist Liberia to achieve orderly progress in political, social, and economic development. On July 4, 1945, while the Vice President, Mr. Clarence L. Simpson, was in Washington, we reviewed with him the history of our interest in Liberia and called his attention to the need for Liberia to undertake far-reaching political and legislative reforms in order to obtain desired economic, social, and educational progress.

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The parlous state of the native inhabitants, still living as they did a hundred years ago and without an effective voice in the government, was stressed. We expressed this Government's grave concern over present conditions and our view that Liberia must put its own house in order if the United States is to continue to give Liberia the kind of support which may appropriately be extended and which Liberia requires if it is to take its place among responsible democratic nations. An elaboration of these views was given to the Vice President in a memorandum which was favorably received by President Tubman in Monrovia.

If we are to be consistent and influential advocates of improvement in colonial administration in the interests of dependent peoples, we must insure as Liberia's "next friend" that that country shall not compare unfavorably with neighboring colonies.

PALESTINE. Our policy toward Palestine has been based upon recognition of the responsibility of Great Britain for the administration of the country under the terms of the mandate from the League of Nations, to which administration the United States consented in the American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924. We have held that no basic changes in those terms should be made except after prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Palestine, because of its geographic situation and historical background and of the reverence in which it is held by communities of three great monotheistic religions, has always possessed a peculiarly international character and the solution of the problem it presents today cannot be the exclusive responsibility of any one nation. Its international character has become more apparent during the period of the mandate and the need for sharing responsibility for it among all interested nations has not diminished.

The adherence of the United States to the United Nations Charter, Article 77 of which provides that territories held under mandate may be placed under the trusteeship system by means of trusteeship agreements, has created a new situation.

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The provisions of the League of Nations relating to the supervision of mandates are no longer operative, and Palestine has not been granted self-government. In view of the international character of the territory and its inhabitants, it is our present policy (1) that Palestine should at the earliest practicable date be placed under the trusteeship system established in the United Nations Charter; (2) that the terms of the trusteeship agreement should be determined only after consultation with both Arabs and Jews; (3) that the two peoples directly involved should be encouraged to contribute to the solution of the problem through their own collaboration; and (4) that, in keeping with the provisions of the Charter, the inhabitants of the country should take an increasingly active part in its government with a view to the elimination of Palestine as an element of discord among the Christian, Jewish, and Moslem communities of the world.

On November 13, 1945 the President announced that this Government had acceded to a British request for the establishment of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to examine the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe and to make a further review of the Palestine problem. This proposal was agreed to because of our intense interest in the distressing situation of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution in Europe as well as our desire to find a solution which will be both humane and just.

SAUDI ARABIA. Our policy toward Saudi Arabia is:

1. To develop and protect American economic interests in a manner mutually satisfactory to the Saudi Arabian and United States Governments but not on a basis prejudicial to the interests of any other friendly power.
2. To endeavor to provide, whenever feasible, in cooperation with other friendly powers, such assistance, financial and otherwise, as may be necessary to assure the economic and political stability of Saudi Arabia and to make possible the elevation of the standards of living, agriculture, and health of its people.
3. Not to seek a preferred position in Saudi Arabia, but to consult with the British Government in

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connection with important moves which this Government may make in that country, in the belief that the United States and Great Britain have a common interest in securing prosperity and political stability in Saudi Arabia, and in working in harmony to that end.

TANGIER. The United States has manifested an interest in Morocco extending as far back as 1787. We did not become a party to the Tangier Statute of 1923, which had as its object the creation of an international regime in Tangier, but have vigorously endeavored to retain all of our treaty rights in the International Zone, as well as rights derived from custom and usage, and have considered Tangier of sufficient importance to maintain an office there without interruption from the year 1795.

With the illegal Spanish occupation of the International Zone in 1940, and the reestablishment of the German Consulate General at Tangier, the entire Zone became during the war an advance Axis espionage outpost against United States military traffic through the Straits of Gibraltar. As a great sea power we are bound to take an interest in and to play an active part in matters relating to territories bordering on the Straits of Gibraltar.

During the summer of 1945 we took part in a conference with representatives of the British, French and Soviet Governments concerning the action to be taken with a view to putting an early end to the illegal Spanish occupation and reestablishing the international administration of the Zone. As a result of the work of this Conference, the Spanish authorities withdrew from Tangier and turned over the administration of the Zone on October 11, 1945 to the new provisional regime. The United States is participating in the new administration under reservation of its existing treaty and other rights, pending the holding of another meeting next spring to decide on the permanent status of the International Zone.

It is our policy to obtain for the United States in the forthcoming conference a position in Tangier which will assure that we shall have rights and powers, as well as responsibilities, equal to those of any other participating nation--although in actual practice we may

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not exercise these rights and powers to the same extent as nations with closer geographic interests. The fundamental underlying purpose is to insure the internationalization of the Tangier Zone in a manner to afford the greatest possible security of this strategic area, and, at the same time, to promote the welfare of the local inhabitants.

TURKEY. It is our policy, as in the past, to foster and maintain the sizeable and profitable two-way trade of long standing between the United States and Turkey and to continue as a source of good-will the work of the American educational institutions in Turkey.

As a final step in Turkey's pro-Allied policy, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945. Turkish representatives attended the United Nations Conference at San Francisco and there demonstrated their sincere desire for an international framework ensuring the integrity of small nations. Turkey has no territorial demands and gives every evidence of being eager to continue the peaceful republican course of its economic and social development.

The fact that Turkey did not enter the conflict until the end and retained a dexterous balance of neutrality was not viewed with regret by the United States, since Turkish belligerency would have required supplies from limited Allied resources, and no military plan in which Turkey could have usefully participated was ever agreed upon.

Turkish-Russian relations are a serious cause for concern, Russia having sought two provinces in the East of Turkey, bases in the Straits, and a pro-Russian revision of the Montreux Convention which would recognize the Soviet Union's special security interest in this warm-water outlet of the Black Sea. While willing to see the Montreux Convention revised, the Turks, fearing a Russian effort to make Turkey a Soviet satellite, have categorically refused the other Russian demands as contrary to Turkish sovereignty and have turned to Great Britain and the United States for support under the principles of the United Nations Charter.

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In accordance with the Potsdam agreement that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union would severally make their views regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention known to the Turkish Government, on November 2 our views on this question were conveyed to the Turks as a basis for discussion if and when an international convention is held to revise the Montreux Convention. In so doing the United States announced that, if invited, it would be pleased to participate in such a conference. Our proposals have been made within the framework of the United Nations Charter, and were based on these principles: (1) Recognition of the special interest of the Black Sea Powers, including the Soviet Union, in the régime of the Straits by giving these Powers full freedom of movement through the Straits at all times for all types of vessels, such freedom to be denied generally to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers unless operating under a United Nations directive; and (2) the maintenance of Turkey's sovereignty and integrity.

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LIST OF PAPERS

FILE NO. 992 FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND RELATIONS MISCELLANEOUS

Serial No.	From	Date	To	Synopsis
1	Sec. of War	12/10/45	Sec. of State	Letter re: requests of agencies within the Government asking the War Department to continue or to undertake activities abroad which are not strictly military in nature
2	Mr. Dunn Sec. SWNCC	12/17/45 12/29/45	SWNCC State Dept	Re: Foreign Policy of the United States as of December 1, 1945. Memorandums for the Acting Navy, War, J.C.S.
m 3	Gen. McFarland <i>Reid</i>	1/25/46 <i>1/26/46</i>	SWNCC <i>State Mr. Sullivan</i>	Re: Foreign Policy of the United States. JCS considered first 25 pages etc. (SWN 4827 <i>Ref.</i> <i>SWN 3782</i>)
4	Col. Carter	2/13/46	Secretariat, SWNCC	War member SWNCC views on Foreign Policy of the U.S.
5	Gen. McFarland	2/21/46	SWNCC	Re: Foreign Policy of the U.S.
6	Col. Reid	2/23/46	Members SWNCC	Memo re: enclosure comment of JCS on Foreign Policy circulated for consideration by the Committee <i>JCS 1496/3</i>
7	Mr. Howard C. Petersen	2/21/46	SWNCC	Re: U.S. Military Policy delaying action now requesting be republished as a SWNCC paper.
8	Mr. McCloy	2/26/45	"	Re: Memo from the JCS - Basis for the formulation of a military policy
7	Mr. Sullivan	3/26/46	SWNCC, Sec.	Re: Foreign Policy of the U.S. (SWN-3919) BE.
8	Sec. Reid	1/26/46	SWNCC WAR	Re: Foreign Policy of the U.S.
9	"	2/23/46	NAVY STATE "	"
10	Mr. Matthews	3/29/46	Sec. of State	JCS comments, Navy comments on JCS enclosure. Army concurred.
11	Col. Elmore	12/23/46		SUMMARY: FOREIGN SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS.

092 Foreign Affairs Relations - Mrs. -

1 C/S
2 S/W

1 C/S
2 S/W

CR&R Section, P&O

Lt Col Richards/73748

P&O 040 (14 Dec 46)

Foreign Service Establishments

23 December 1946

SUMMARY

1. By letter State Department requests that the War Department continue to provide logistical support to Foreign Service establishments overseas. Latter have been directed to avoid placing any burden of delivery or distribution upon military personnel and to make themselves as near self-sufficient as possible.

2. War Department Circular 262, 29 August 1946, established the policy of logistical support to United States Government agencies overseas. The State Department is sending this circular to all Foreign Service establishments. This circular states that, at the overseas commanders' discretion, he will be limited to furnishing supplies or services to such extent which will not interfere with his military mission nor will require additional personnel.

3. All overseas commanders have been requested to give the State Department the maximum logistical support within the provisions of Circular 262.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be dispatched to the Secretary of State.

COORDINATION:

Concur - SS&P - Lt Colonel Rising, Ext 4413.


FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PLANS & OPERATIONS:

3437

J. A. ELMORE
Colonel, GSC
Actg Chief, Operations Group, P&O
SWNCC SECRETARIAT

2 Incls:

- 1 - Ltr to S/S fr S/W
- 2 - R/S fr OC/S dtd 12/19/46 w/incls.



APPROVED
WIGHT D. RICHMOND
actg. Chief of Staff, W.S. Army

PK for 27 Dec 46
By J. W. BOWEN
Col.G.S.C., Secretary, General Staff

- State Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

copy for SWNCC 11

27 DEC 1946

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary:


The problem raised in your letter of 14 December 1946 relative to the logistical support of Foreign Service establishments is appreciated.

All overseas commanders have been requested to give the maximum logistical support to State Department Foreign Service establishments overseas within the provisions of WD Circular 262, dated 29 August 1946. They have also been informed that you have requested all Foreign Service establishments to make themselves as nearly self-sufficient as possible and not to require delivery of United States Army supplies.

It is the desire of the War Department to assist the State Department in every possible way; however, our manpower and budgetary situation permit us to maintain only the most essential bases and to carry out only the most essential functions thereat.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Secretary of War


The Honorable
James F. Byrnes
Secretary of State

DEC 31 1946

Copy for SWNCC

SECRET

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VFF: bz

SWR-4096
29 March 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

As requested by the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. James Clement Dunn, in a memorandum to the Committee on 17 December 1945, attached as Enclosure 1 are the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on pages 26 - 106 on a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States", together with the views of the Navy Member, SWNCC, on the JCS comments (Enclosure 2).

The Army Member, SWNCC, concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff without comment.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on pages 1 - 26 and the Army Member's comments thereon were forwarded informally to the State Department about 15 February 1946.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS,
Acting Chairman.

Encls.

1. Comments of JCS.
2. Views of Navy Mbr, SWNCC.

SECRET

COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

(10)

SECRETENCLOSURE 1THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

COPY

SM-5062
21 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

On 25 January (SM-4827) the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted separately and as a matter of priority their comments and recommendations on the first twenty-five pages of a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States," in order to facilitate the decision of the Department of State as to the advisability of releasing that part of the paper to the public.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have now completed their study of the remainder of the document, dealing with American policies toward the individual nations of the world, and submit the following comments. These comments will follow the principal divisions of the basic paper.

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The ultimate security of the United States has become far more dependent than heretofore upon the maintenance of the strategic unity of the Western Hemisphere. This condition arises from the great change that has occurred in the world's politico-military structure, in which a single Power is now in a dominant position on the Eurasian continent, and from the marked developments brought about in the technical military field--the progress of aviation, the appearance of the atomic bomb, and the greatly increased magnitude and complexity of munitioning needs.

In consequence our need for maintaining the military integrity of the Western Hemisphere toward a non-American Power, while similar in kind to that which inspired the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine and led to its reiteration throughout the past century and a quarter as our most fundamental foreign policy, is a need which is now far more compelling. In brief, under present conditions and those now foreseeable, the Western Hemisphere is a distinct military entity, the integrity of which is a fundamental postulate of our own security in the event of another World War.

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With respect to Canada, existing joint arrangements for defense considerations seem ample. With respect to the Latin American Republics, the early accomplishment of a regional security pact, based on the Act of Chapultepec, is essential. A draft treaty is understood to be now at hand for presentation at the Rio de Janeiro Conference tentatively scheduled for March of this year. It is believed that, in addition to this treaty, resolutions should if practicable be adopted for the establishment of an Inter-American Military Agency, the availability of military and particularly air bases for mutual use, and the development of sources of critical strategic materials. The early consideration of the first of these resolutions appears consistent with Resolution IV of the Final Act of Mexico City, and the consideration at Rio de Janeiro of the remaining two subjects would appear appropriate as complementary to the Security Pact, rather than at Bogota as items on a broader agenda such as will presumably be prepared for that Conference.

Bilateral staff conversations have in a number of cases resulted in arrangements for joint action between the United States and Latin American States. These arrangements should be reviewed by the Inter-American Military Agency when established, with a view to incorporation in broader military agreements for continental defense.

The draft policy emphasizes the orientation of the program of military cooperation with the other American Republics toward the decrease of armaments "while necessarily meeting the reality of present conditions". Though agreeing in the ultimate objective of a general decrease of armaments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that for the present it will be desirable for the Latin American Republics to maintain such armed forces as may be determined upon as a result of inter-American staff studies and to increase their efficiency by training and by the supply of most modern equipment, in order that they may form a substantial complement to the forces of the United States in the common defense of the American Continents.

With regard to the policies cited for the individual countries:

Argentina. The maintenance of the strategic unity of the American Continents requires cooperation on the part of all nations. This is particularly true with regard to the stronger nations. The cooperation of the Argentine people should be sought as an essential to hemispheric solidarity, accomplishment of which must in the end over-ride other, more transitory, political considerations.

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Enclosure 1

SECRET

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The adherence of the United States (expressed on page 9 of the draft policy) to the Uruguayan position that violation of the elementary rights of man by a government of force and the non-fulfillment of obligations by such a government warrant a modification of the principle of non-intervention, is apparently directed against Argentina. Should the Argentine people, apart from their present fascist-type government, be deeply antagonized by our efforts to press this policy, the attainment of true hemispheric solidarity might be dangerously jeopardized.

Further, since many Latin-American countries have signified their disagreement with the Uruguayan position, untimely pressure for modification of the non-intervention principle may jeopardize the early and successful negotiation of the treaty proposed by the Act of Chapultepec for the settlement of disputes arising in the Western Hemisphere. As stated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, "It is of cardinal importance to the security of the United States (including the preservation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine) that the Act of Chapultepec be fully implemented by treaty in order that we shall have established procedures and means for the Pan-American regional organization to carry out under the United Nations Charter all enforcement measures found necessary for the settlement of disputes arising in the Western Hemisphere."

The full and free participation of Argentina in the Latin American Security organization, and the preservation of peace among the nations of South America, are believed to be of sufficient importance to warrant the suggestion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our policy toward Argentina be directed in such a manner that the willing partnership of the Argentine people is both established and made capable of early and complete realization.

Ecuador. Not only should the strategic value of the Galapagos Islands be noted in the discussion of the policy toward Ecuador, but mention should be made that the continued use on an exclusive or joint basis of those islands by the United States' forces should be sought.

Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama. The military importance of the cooperation of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Panama because of their geographical location is well recognized in the draft.

SECRET

SECRETEUROPEAN NATIONS AND BRITISH DOMINIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are thoroughly in accord with the statement on page 47 that "peace in Europe can be maintained only by the closest understanding....between all peace loving nations and particularly between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States." In view of the military impotency of Germany and Japan for years to come, the only danger of another world war lies in a major conflict of vital interests between the USSR and the United States, in the first instance, or between the USSR and Great Britain, in which the United States subsequently becomes joined with the British. Avoidance of such a war as well as success and expansion of the influence of the United Nations Organization, will, therefore, depend upon solidarity among the great powers and concert of action by the USSR and the United States.

The avoidance of an Eastern European bloc or sphere of influence is highly desirable, although it is apparent that nations immediately to the westward of Russia are, by reason of their location, necessarily largely influenced by their great neighbor. If it should appear that an Eastern European bloc has actually come into existence, from a military point of view the cohesion of the Western European countries into a bloc would be not only desirable but advantageous.

With regard to the policies cited for individual nations:

Canada. The close military cooperation with Canada stated in the draft of policy is strongly indorsed.

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Indo-China. The extent of our influences as indicated upon the French policy in Indo-China should be so restricted as to preclude any possibility of our military involvement other than through United Nations action in the affairs of that country.

Iceland. The negotiation of an agreement for exclusive or joint military base rights in Iceland is highly desirable; the complete withdrawal of forces at this time from Iceland should not be proffered in such negotiations.

Norway. Although valid objection to the settlement under the United Nations Charter of territorial cessions leading to a mutual Soviet-Norwegian defense of the Spitzbergen Archipelago and Bear Island may be difficult to establish, it is believed that this northward extension of Soviet influence on the Polar air-routes is disadvantageous to the defense interests of the United States and should be blocked insofar as is practicable.

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Portugal. Permanent military rights in the Azores, on a joint or participating basis, are highly desirable.

Roumania. Although the United States may not "regard Roumania as falling within an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence," the present situation in that country demonstrates that Russia may be expected to have a large and potent influence on the activities of that state.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. From a military point of view, the consolidation and development of the power of Russia is the greatest threat to the United States in the foreseeable future. While clashes of vital interest are unlikely to occur immediately, the expansion of Russia in the Far East may ultimately bring about serious conflict with United States policies directly, and its expansion to the west and south may involve clashes with Great Britain into which we might well be drawn. The "adoption of a firm and friendly attitude in our dealings with the Soviet Government" is strongly indorsed with, however, the emphasis upon "firmness". Collaboration with the Soviet Union should stop short not only of compromise of principle but also of expansion of Russian influence in Europe and in the Far East. Support of nations threatened by such expansion should be extended, not only through the United Nations but through direct economic means if necessary. (Military support at present would be difficult if not impracticable.) In considering such support, however, the realities of nations already definitely penetrated by Soviet influence should be recognized in order that a position of antagonism may not be unfruitfully assumed.

FAR EAST

China. In the interest of the development of a strong and independent China it is believed that the establishment of a trained and effective military force capable of controlling internal disorder, of national defense, and of contributing China's quota to the Security Council forces, is highly advantageous. To assist China in this respect the establishment of a United States' military and naval mission of adequate size is believed desirable.

Japan. The reduction of occupation forces after a relatively short period appears probable, but the complete withdrawal of allied troops may not be possible for a long time.

The disposition of mandates and territories stripped from Japan has been discussed in other papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Korea. The early establishment of a stable government in Korea and the withdrawal of both Russian and American troops is highly desirable in order to minimize friction between Russia and the United States arising from the present occupation of the two sections of that country.

Philippines. The continued maintenance of such bases in the Philippines as may be desired by this Government and the garrisoning of those bases by United States forces is now contemplated. The development of the Philippine military forces for the defense of the country and for mutual defense arrangements with the United States of common policies in the Far East should be included in such treaty relations as are established with the new Philippine Republic.

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, AND AFRICA

Preservation of American interests and of equality of opportunity in this region is highly desirable, but any military commitments other than through support of the United Nations should be avoided because of geographic distance and impracticability of assured lines of communication.

In harmony with the above, direct interest, as indicated, in territorial changes in Greece, in Iranian affairs, and in assuming "a stronger role" in the Levant, appears undesirable except through United Nations procedures.

Turkey. Consistent with the views expressed above with respect to Russia, every feasible support, short of military commitments, to Turkey in resisting Soviet demands should be afforded. The use of the Straits in accordance with the proposals advanced by the United States as cited seems just, however, and though furthering Russia's development as a naval power is not believed susceptible to sound objection.

In conclusion the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer the following observations on U.S. foreign policy in general:

Reliance can not be placed upon the efficiency of the United Nations Organization to prevent all war. Many incipient disputes can no doubt be quenched, but power is lacking for, and procedure precludes, the arbitrary settlement of a major conflict of policy among major nations. In such case war may follow. So long as the United Nations Organization functions under its present charter, the security of the United States will by necessity require safeguards beyond those of that Organization.

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Appreciating this fact, one of the fundamentals of national power and prestige must be borne in mind, namely the ability to back with force the policies and commitments undertaken by our government. Two world wars in which we have fought have brought about our participation in the conflict at a time when we were militarily incapable for many months thereafter of keeping pace with our political action, though a fortunate geographical position and the fact of our allies holding the enemy at bay have given us the time in which to gather our strength for the offensive.

In the future neither geography nor allies will render a nation immune from sudden and paralyzing attack should an aggressor arise to plague the peace of the world. Because of this, determination of United States foreign policy should continually give consideration to our immediate capabilities for supporting our policy by arms if the occasion should demand, rather than to our long term potential, which, owing to the length of time required for mobilization of the nation's resources, might not be sufficient to avert disaster in another war.

In the final analysis the greatest single military factor in the security of the world is the absolute military security of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

SECRET - 7 -

Enclosure 1

SECRETENCLOSURE 2THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR AIR
WASHINGTON

1 COPY

26 March 1946

Memorandum for: The Secretariat
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States (SWN-3919)

I concur in the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on pages 26-106 of the document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States" which were circulated to the Committee in SWN-3919 of 23 February 1946.

It is my opinion, and that of Mr. Forrestal and others in the Navy Department, that the State Department is to be commended for its work in preparing this document which, for the first time to my knowledge, endeavors to set forth in one place all phases of our foreign policy. It is my hope that the following remarks may be of assistance in preparing subsequent revisions.

To my mind, the principal value of such a comprehensive statement of policy is that it is available for constant reference and use and that it is susceptible of frequent revision to keep it constantly up-to-date. It is a most constructive and worth-while step and, although it is susceptible of certain changes in its present form, use of the document will undoubtedly demonstrate the need for revisions and amendments which will enhance its usefulness.

One difficulty with the document in its present form, which I feel sure is appreciated by the State Department, is that the separate treatment of our policy toward each nation tends to a compartmentalized view. Our policy toward Russia, for example, is not fully set forth in the section on Russia and must be distilled from the separate statements of policy toward other countries with respect to which issues between us and the Russians have arisen or may arise. The State Department may wish to consider the desirability of giving greater consideration to such regional problems in subsequent revisions, either by expanding the treatment of major countries or possibly, in some instances, by use of cross references.

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I assume that the statement of policy is intended primarily for use within the Department of State. However, it will be of great value as a guide and as a basis for correlating military and naval policies with foreign policy. Consequently, I hope it will be possible in the future to have copies of the document in its most up-to-date form in the Navy Department available for use of selected key officers.

The statement of policy will, of course, be particularly valuable if, as I understand, it is intended to keep it under continuing revision so that it may always reflect recent developments. It might be worth-while to consider whether it should not be made available in loose-leaf form so that changes in particular portions may be made as required without necessitating republication of the whole document. This would facilitate making amendments as required rather than waiting for a quarterly or other periodic revision and would increase the constant usefulness of the document. If the State Department so desired, I am sure the Navy Department would be pleased to comment on such future revisions with a view to the continued improvement of the document. It can be a real tool to increased coordination in the politico-military field.

/s/ John L. Sullivan

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**THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

SWN-3919
23 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
ARMY MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC *(Information only)*

1. The enclosure, the comment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States", is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. A copy of this document was furnished in SWN-3655 to the War Member and SWN-3656 to the Navy Member on 21 December 1945.

3. It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence on the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a view to referring these comments to the Department of State, and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

A. D. Reid.

A. D. REID
Secretary

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

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SWN-3919

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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SWN-3919
23 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
ARMY MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

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A. D. Reid.
A. D. REID
Secretary

APPROVED: *[Signature]*

DATE: 18 March 1946

MAR 1 1946



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STATE WAR

SECRET**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.****SM-5062
21 February 1946****MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:****Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.**

On 25 January (SM-4827) the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted separately and as a matter of priority their comments and recommendations on the first twenty-five pages of a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States," in order to facilitate the decision of the Department of State as to the advisability of releasing that part of the paper to the public.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have now completed their study of the remainder of the document, dealing with American policies toward the individual nations of the world, and submit the following comments. These comments will follow the principal divisions of the basic paper.

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The ultimate security of the United States has become far more dependent than heretofore upon the maintenance of the strategic unity of the Western Hemisphere. This condition arises from the great change that has occurred in the world's politico-military structure, in which a single Power is now in a dominant position on the Eurasian continent, and from the marked developments brought about in the technical military field--the progress of aviation, the appearance of the atomic bomb, and the greatly increased magnitude and complexity of munitioning needs.

In consequence our need for maintaining the military integrity of the Western Hemisphere toward a non-American Power, while similar in kind to that which inspired the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine and led to its reiteration throughout the past century and a quarter as our most fundamental foreign policy, is a need which is now far more impelling. In brief, under present conditions and those now foreseeable, the Western Hemisphere is a distinct military entity, the integrity of which is a fundamental postulate of our own security in the event of another World War.

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With respect to Canada, existing joint arrangements for defense considerations seem ample. With respect to the Latin American Republics, the early accomplishment of a regional security pact, based on the Act of Chapultepec, is essential. A draft treaty is understood to be now at hand for presentation at the Rio de Janeiro Conference tentatively scheduled for March of this year. It is believed that, in addition to this treaty, resolutions should if practicable be adopted for the establishment of an Inter-American Military Agency, the availability of military and particularly air bases for mutual use, and the development of sources of critical strategic materials. The early consideration of the first of these resolutions appears consistent with Resolution IV of the Final Act of Mexico City, and the consideration at Rio de Janeiro of the remaining two subjects would appear appropriate as complementary to the Security Pact, rather than at Bogota as items on a broader agenda such as will presumably be prepared for that Conference.

Bilateral staff conversations have in a number of cases resulted in arrangements for joint action between the United States and Latin American States. These arrangements should be reviewed by the Inter-American Military Agency when established, with a view to incorporation in broader military agreements for continental defense.

The draft policy emphasizes the orientation of the program of military cooperation with the other American Republics toward the decrease of armaments "while necessarily meeting the reality of present conditions." Though agreeing in the ultimate objective of a general decrease of armaments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that for the present it will be desirable for the Latin American Republics to maintain such armed forces as may be determined upon as a result of inter-American staff studies and to increase their efficiency by training and by the supply of most modern equipment, in order that they may form a substantial complement to the forces of the United States in the common defense of the American Continents.

With regard to the policies cited for the individual countries:

Argentina. The maintenance of the strategic unity of the American Continents requires cooperation on the part of all nations. This is particularly true with regard to the stronger nations. The cooperation of the Argentine people should be sought as an essential to hemispheric solidarity, accomplishment of which must in the end over-ride other, more transitory, political considerations.

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The adherence of the United States (expressed on page 9 of the draft policy) to the Uruguayan position that violation of the elementary rights of man by a government of force and the non-fulfillment of obligations by such a government warrant a modification of the principle of non-intervention, is apparently directed against Argentina. Should the Argentine people, apart from their present fascist-type government, be deeply antagonized by our efforts to press this policy, the attainment of true hemispheric solidarity might be dangerously jeopardized.

Further, since many Latin-American countries have signified their disagreement with the Uruguayan position, untimely pressure for modification of the non-intervention principle may jeopardize the early and successful negotiation of the treaty proposed by the Act of Chapultepec for the settlement of disputes arising in the Western Hemisphere. As stated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, "It is of cardinal importance to the security of the United States (including the preservation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine) that the Act of Chapultepec be fully implemented by treaty in order that we shall have established procedures and means for the Pan-American regional organization to carry out under the United Nations Charter all enforcement measures found necessary for the settlement of disputes arising in the Western Hemisphere."

The full and free participation of Argentina in the Latin American Security organization, and the preservation of peace among the nations of South America, are believed to be of sufficient importance to warrant the suggestion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our policy toward Argentina be directed in such a manner that the willing partnership of the Argentine people is both established and made capable of early and complete realization.

Ecuador. Not only should the strategic value of the Galapagos Islands be noted in the discussion of the policy toward Ecuador, but mention should be made that the continued use on an exclusive or joint basis of those islands by the United States' forces should be sought.

Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama. The military importance of the cooperation of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Panama because of their geographical location is well recognized in the draft.

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EUROPEAN NATIONS AND BRITISH DOMINIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are thoroughly in accord with the statement on page 47 that "peace in Europe can be maintained only by the closest understanding....between all peace loving nations and particularly between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States." In view of the military impotency of Germany and Japan for years to come, the only danger of another world war lies in a major conflict of vital interests between the USSR and the United States, in the first instance, or between the USSR and Great Britain, in which the United States subsequently becomes joined with the British. Avoidance of such a war as well as success and expansion of the influence of the United Nations Organization, will, therefore, depend upon solidarity among the great powers and concert of action by the USSR and the United States.

The avoidance of an Eastern European bloc or sphere of influence is highly desirable, although it is apparent that nations immediately to the westward of Russia are, by reason of their location, necessarily largely influenced by their great neighbor. If it should appear that an Eastern European bloc has actually come into existence, from a military point of view the cohesion of the Western European countries into a bloc would be not only desirable but advantageous.

With regard to the policies cited for individual nations:

Canada. The close military cooperation with Canada stated in the draft of policy is strongly indorsed.

Denmark. The indicated prosecution of a treaty granting the United States either joint or exclusive defense bases in Greenland is highly desirable.

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FAR EAST

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Philippines. The continued maintenance of such bases in the Philippines as may be desired by this Government and the garrisoning of those bases by United States forces is now contemplated. The development of the Philippine military forces for the defense of the country and for mutual defense arrangements with the United States of common policies in the Far East should be included in such treaty relations as are established with the new Philippine Republic.

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Turkey. Consistent with the views expressed above with respect to Russia, every feasible support, short of military commitments, to Turkey in resisting Soviet demands should be afforded. The use of the Straits in accordance with the proposals advanced by the United States as cited seems just, however, and though furthering Russia's development as a naval power is not believed susceptible to sound objection.

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Appreciating this fact, one of the fundamentals of national power and prestige must be borne in mind, namely the ability to back with force the policies and commitments undertaken by our government. Two world wars in which we have fought have brought about our participation in the conflict at a time when we were militarily incapable for many months thereafter of keeping pace with our political action, though a fortunate geographical position and the fact of our allies holding the enemy at bay have given us the time in which to gather our strength for the offensive.

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In the final analysis the greatest single military factor in the security of the world is the absolute military security of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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SWN-3781
28 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR MEMBER, SWNCC:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

Reference: A. SWN-3655

1. Reference is made to paragraph 3 of the above reference forwarded to your office on 21 December 1945.

2. Enclosed is a copy of SM-4827 dated 25 January 1946, which are the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this policy, which is circulated in connection with your consideration of the document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States", with a view of forwarding the proposed amendments to the Secretary of State.

3. It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,
Secretary

Enclosure:
Cy memo from Secy, JCS,
(SM-4827) dated 25 Jan 46.

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

SWNCC FILE

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SWN-3781

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SWN-3782
26 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States

Reference: a. SWN-3686

1. Reference is made to paragraph 3 of the above reference forwarded to your office on 21 December 1945.

2. Enclosed is a copy of SN-4827 dated 25 January 1946, which are the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this policy, which is circulated in connection with your consideration of the document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States", and with a view of forwarding the proposed amendments to the Secretary of State.

3. It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,
Secretary

Enclosure:
By memo from Secy, JCS,
(SN-4827) dated 25 Jan 46.

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

SWNCC FILE

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SWN-3782

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SECRET**SWN-3783
25 January 1946****MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING STATE MEMBER, SWNCC:****Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.****References: a. SWN-3655
b. SWN-3656**

1. Reference is made to the above referenced memoranda forwarded to the War and Navy members on 21 December 1945, copy of which was previously furnished your office.

2. Enclosed is a copy of SM-4827 dated 25 January 1946, which are the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this policy, which is circulated in connection with your consideration of the document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States", and with a view of forwarding the proposed amendments to the Secretary of State.

3. It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

**A. D. REID,
Secretary**

**Enclosure:
Cy memo from Secy, JCS,
(SM-4827) dated 25 Jan 46.**

APPROVED _____

DATE: _____

SWNCC FILE

SECRET**SWN-3783**

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SECRET**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.****SN-4827
25 January 1946****MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:****Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the first twenty-five pages of a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States" which was forwarded to them by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no military objections to public issuance of the proposed statement provided additional paragraphs from the speech of the President quoted in the document are included, in order to inform both other nations and our own people that the United States proposes to maintain military forces to support its foreign policy.

To this effect, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that additions and amendments be appropriately introduced in the first twenty-five pages of the document by direct quotation from, or paraphrase of, those passages from the President's speech of October 27 reproduced below:

"The foreign policy of the United States is based firmly on fundamental principles of righteousness and justice. In carrying out these principles we shall firmly adhere to what we believe to be right; and we shall not give our approval to any compromise with evil."

* * * * *

"We have assured the world time and again - and I repeat it now - that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power.

"We do need . . . armed might, however, and for four principal tasks:

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"First, our Army, Navy and Air Force, in collaboration with our Allies, must enforce the terms of peace imposed upon our defeated enemies.

"Second, we must fulfill the military obligations which we are undertaking as a member of the United Nations Organization - to support a lasting peace, by force if necessary.

"Third, we must cooperate with other American nations to preserve the territorial integrity and the political independence of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

"Fourth, in this troubled and uncertain world, our military forces must be adequate to discharge the fundamental mission laid upon them by the Constitution of the United States - to "provide for the common defense" of the United States.

"These four military tasks are directed not toward war - not toward conquest but toward peace.

"We seek to use our military strength solely to preserve the peace of the world. For we now know that that is the only sure way to make our own freedom secure.

"That is the basis of the foreign policy of the people of the United States."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

**A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Secretary.**

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092
Foreign Affairs
Relations

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR AIR
WASHINGTON

SECRET

26 MAR 1946

Memorandum for: The Secretariat
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States (SWN-3919).

I concur in the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on pages 26-106 of the document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States" which were circulated to the Committee in SWN-3919 of 23 February 1946.

It is my opinion, and that of Mr. Forrestal and others in the Navy Department, that the State Department is to be commended for its work in preparing this document which, for the first time to my knowledge, endeavors to set forth in one place all phases of our foreign policy. It is my hope that the following remarks may be of assistance in preparing subsequent revisions.

To my mind, the principal value of such a comprehensive statement of policy is that it is available for constant reference and use and that it is susceptible of frequent revision to keep it constantly up-to-date. It is a most constructive and worth-while step and, although it is susceptible of certain changes in its present form, use of the document will undoubtedly demonstrate the need for revisions and amendments which will enhance its usefulness.

One difficulty with the document in its present form, which I feel sure is appreciated by the State Department, is that the separate treatment of our policy toward each nation tends to a compartmentalized view. Our policy toward Russia, for example, is not fully set forth in the section on Russia and must be distilled from the separate statements of policy toward other countries with respect to which issues between us and the Russians have arisen or may arise. The State Department may wish to consider the desirability of giving greater consideration to such regional problems in subsequent revisions, either by expanding the treatment of major countries or possibly, in some instances, by use of cross references.

I assume that the statement of policy is intended primarily for use within the Department of State. However, it will be of great value as a guide and as a basis for correlating military and naval policies with foreign policy. Consequently, I hope it will be possible in the future to have copies of the document in its most up-to-date form in the Navy Department available for use of selected key officers.



The statement of policy will, of course, be particularly valuable if, as I understand, it is intended to keep it under continuing revision

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
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STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

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A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Paul L. Sullivan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the main text block.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE

___ Mr. Cox
___ Mr. Moseley
___ Mr. Gardiner

WAR

___ Colonel Reid
___ Colonel Schulgen
* Lt. Col. Field
___ Major Karbel
___ Lt. Weiner

NAVY

___ Captain Austin
___ Commander Richardson
___ Ensign Whiteside

___ Note
___ Circulate
___ File

REMARKS:

*Copy of this should be
furnished to Dept of State
(Mr. Savage), also (if not
already done) WD approval
of JCS comments w/o addition
of remarks should be furn-
ished in writing. 3919
should be removed from list
A.P.A.*



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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



SWN-3919
23 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC
ARMY MEMBER, SWNCC
NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC

092
Foreign
Affairs +
Relations

1. The enclosure, the comment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States", is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. A copy of this document was furnished in SWN-3655 to the War Member and SWN-3656 to the Navy Member on 21 December 1945.

3. It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence on the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a view to referring these comments to the Department of State, and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

A. D. KNID
Secretary

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

SWNCC FILE

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SECRET**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.****SM-5062
21 February 1946****MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:****Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.**

On 25 January (SM-4327) the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted separately and as a matter of priority their comments and recommendations on the first twenty-five pages of a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States," in order to facilitate the decision of the Department of State as to the advisability of releasing that part of the paper to the public.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have now completed their study of the remainder of the document, dealing with American policies toward the individual nations of the world, and submit the following comments. These comments will follow the principal divisions of the basic paper.

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The ultimate security of the United States has become far more dependent than heretofore upon the maintenance of the strategic unity of the Western Hemisphere. This condition arises from the great change that has occurred in the world's politico-military structure, in which a single Power is now in a dominant position on the Eurasian continent, and from the marked developments brought about in the technical military field--the progress of aviation, the appearance of the atomic bomb, and the greatly increased magnitude and complexity of munitioning needs.

In consequence our need for maintaining the military integrity of the Western Hemisphere toward a non-American Power, while similar in kind to that which inspired the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine and led to its reiteration throughout the past century and a quarter as our most fundamental foreign policy, is a need which is now far more impelling. In brief, under present conditions and those now foreseeable, the Western Hemisphere is a distinct military entity, the integrity of which is a fundamental postulate of our own security in the event of another World War.

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With respect to Canada, existing joint arrangements for defense considerations seem ample. With respect to the Latin American Republics, the early accomplishment of a regional security pact, based on the Act of Chapultepec, is essential. A draft treaty is understood to be now at hand for presentation at the Rio de Janeiro Conference tentatively scheduled for March of this year. It is believed that, in addition to this treaty, resolutions should if practicable be adopted for the establishment of an Inter-American Military Agency, the availability of military and particularly air bases for mutual use, and the development of sources of critical strategic materials. The early consideration of the first of these resolutions appears consistent with Resolution IV of the Final Act of Mexico City, and the consideration at Rio de Janeiro of the remaining two subjects would appear appropriate as complementary to the Security Pact, rather than at Bogota as items on a broader agenda such as will presumably be prepared for that Conference.

Bilateral staff conversations have in a number of cases resulted in arrangements for joint action between the United States and Latin American States. These arrangements should be reviewed by the Inter-American Military Agency when established, with a view to incorporation in broader military agreements for continental defense.

The draft policy emphasizes the orientation of the program of military cooperation with the other American Republics toward the decrease of armaments "while necessarily meeting the reality of present conditions." Though agreeing in the ultimate objective of a general decrease of armaments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that for the present it will be desirable for the Latin American Republics to maintain such armed forces as may be determined upon as a result of inter-American staff studies and to increase their efficiency by training and by the supply of most modern equipment, in order that they may form a substantial complement to the forces of the United States in the common defense of the American Continents.

With regard to the policies cited for the individual countries:

Argentina. The maintenance of the strategic unity of the American Continents requires cooperation on the part of all nations. This is particularly true with regard to the stronger nations. The cooperation of the Argentine people should be sought as an essential to hemispheric solidarity, accomplishment of which must in the end over-ride other, more transitory, political considerations.

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The adherence of the United States (expressed on page 9 of the draft policy) to the Uruguayan position that violation of the elementary rights of man by a government of force and the non-fulfillment of obligations by such a government warrant a modification of the principle of non-intervention, is apparently directed against Argentina. Should the Argentine people, apart from their present fascist-type government, be deeply antagonized by our efforts to press this policy, the attainment of true hemispheric solidarity might be dangerously jeopardized.

Further, since many Latin-American countries have signified their disagreement with the Uruguayan position, untimely pressure for modification of the non-intervention principle may jeopardize the early and successful negotiation of the treaty proposed by the Act of Chapultepec for the settlement of disputes arising in the Western Hemisphere. As stated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, "It is of cardinal importance to the security of the United States (including the preservation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine) that the Act of Chapultepec be fully implemented by treaty in order that we shall have established procedures and means for the Pan-American regional organization to carry out under the United Nations Charter all enforcement measures found necessary for the settlement of disputes arising in the Western Hemisphere."

The full and free participation of Argentina in the Latin American Security organization, and the preservation of peace among the nations of South America, are believed to be of sufficient importance to warrant the suggestion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our policy toward Argentina be directed in such a manner that the willing partnership of the Argentine people is both established and made capable of early and complete realization.

Ecuador. Not only should the strategic value of the Galapagos Islands be noted in the discussion of the policy toward Ecuador, but mention should be made that the continued use on an exclusive or joint basis of those islands by the United States' forces should be sought.

Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama. The military importance of the cooperation of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Panama because of their geographical location is well recognized in the draft.

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EUROPEAN NATIONS AND BRITISH DOMINIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are thoroughly in accord with the statement on page 47 that "peace in Europe can be maintained only by the closest understanding....between all peace loving nations and particularly between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States." In view of the military impotency of Germany and Japan for years to come, the only danger of another world war lies in a major conflict of vital interests between the USSR and the United States, in the first instance, or between the USSR and Great Britain, in which the United States subsequently becomes joined with the British. Avoidance of such a war as well as success and expansion of the influence of the United Nations Organization, will, therefore, depend upon solidarity among the great powers and concert of action by the USSR and the United States.

The avoidance of an Eastern European bloc or sphere of influence is highly desirable, although it is apparent that nations immediately to the westward of Russia are, by reason of their location, necessarily largely influenced by their great neighbor. If it should appear that an Eastern European bloc has actually come into existence, from a military point of view the cohesion of the Western European countries into a bloc would be not only desirable but advantageous.

With regard to the policies cited for individual nations:

Canada. The close military cooperation with Canada stated in the draft of policy is strongly endorsed.

Denmark. The indicated prosecution of a treaty granting the United States either joint or exclusive defense bases in Greenland is highly desirable.

Indo-China. The extent of our influences as indicated upon the French policy in Indo-China should be so restricted as to preclude any possibility of our military involvement other than through United Nations action in the affairs of that country.

Iceland. The negotiation of an agreement for exclusive or joint military base rights in Iceland is highly desirable; the complete withdrawal of forces at this time from Iceland should not be proffered in such negotiations.

Norway. Although valid objection to the settlement under the United Nations Charter of ~~the~~ territorial cessions leading to a mutual Soviet-Norwegian defense of the Spitzbergen Archipelago and Bear Island may be difficult to establish, it is believed that this northward extension of Soviet influence on the Polar air-routes is disadvantageous to the defense interests of the United States and should be blocked insofar as is practicable.

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Portugal. Permanent military rights in the Azores, on a joint or participating basis, are highly desirable.

Roumania. Although the United States may not "regard Roumania as falling within an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence," the present situation in that country demonstrates that Russia may be expected to have a large and potent influence on the activities of that state.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. From a military point of view, the consolidation and development of the power of Russia is the greatest threat to the United States in the foreseeable future. While clashes of vital interest are unlikely to occur immediately, the expansion of Russia in the Far East may ultimately bring about serious conflict with United States policies directly, and its expansion to the west and south may involve clashes with Great Britain into which we might well be drawn. The "adoption of a firm and friendly attitude in our dealings with the Soviet Government" is strongly endorsed with, however, the emphasis upon "firmness". Collaboration with the Soviet Union should stop short not only of compromise of principle but also of expansion of Russian influence in Europe and in the Far East. Support of nations threatened by such expansion should be extended, not only through the United Nations but through direct economic means if necessary. (Military support at present would be difficult if not impracticable.) In considering such support, however, the realities of nations already definitely penetrated by Soviet influence should be recognized in order that a position of antagonism may not be unfruitfully assumed.

FAR EAST

China. In the interest of the development of a strong and independent China it is believed that the establishment of a trained and effective military force capable of controlling internal disorder, of national defense, and of contributing China's quota to the Security Council forces, is highly advantageous. To assist China in this respect the establishment of a United States' military and naval mission of adequate size is believed desirable.

Japan. The reduction of occupation forces after a relatively short period appears probable, but the complete withdrawal of allied troops may not be possible for a long time.

The disposition of mandates and territories stripped from Japan has been discussed in other papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, AND AFRICA

Preservation of American interests and of equality of opportunity in this region is highly desirable, but any military commitments other than through support of the United Nations should be avoided because of geographic distance and impracticability of assured lines of communication.

In harmony with the above, direct interest, as indicated, in territorial changes in Greece, in Iranian affairs, and in assuring "a stronger role" in the Levant, appears undesirable except through United Nations procedures.

Turkey. Consistent with the views expressed above with respect to Russia, every feasible support, short of military commitments, to Turkey in resisting Soviet demands should be afforded. The use of the Straits in accordance with the proposals advanced by the United States as cited seems just, however, and though furthering Russia's development as a naval power is not believed susceptible to sound objection.

In conclusion the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer the following observations on U.S. foreign policy in general:

Reliance can not be placed upon efficacy of the United Nations Organization to prevent all war. Many incipient disputes can no doubt be quashed, but power is lacking for, and procedure precludes, the arbitrary settlement of a major conflict of policy among

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major nations. In such case war may follow. So long as the United Nations Organization functions under its present charter, the security of the United States will by necessity require safeguards beyond those of that organization.

Appreciating this fact, one of the fundamentals of national power and prestige must be borne in mind, namely the ability to back with force the policies and commitments undertaken by our government. Two world wars in which we have fought have brought about our participation in the conflict at a time when we were militarily incapable for many months thereafter of keeping pace with our political action, though a fortunate geographical position and the fact of our allies holding the enemy at bay have given us the time in which to gather our strength for the offensive.

In the future neither geography nor allies will render a nation immune from sudden and paralyzing attack should an aggressor arise to plague the peace of the world. Because of this, determination of United States foreign policy should continually give consideration to our immediate capabilities for supporting our policy by arms if the occasion should demand, rather than to our long term potential, which, owing to the length of time required for mobilization of the nation's resources, might not be sufficient to avert disaster in another war.

In the final analysis the greatest single military factor in the security of the world is the absolute military security of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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FEB 22 1946

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



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SM-5062
21 February 1946

STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

On 25 January (SM-4827) the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted separately and as a matter of priority their comments and recommendations on the first twenty-five pages of a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States," in order to facilitate the decision of the Department of State as to the advisability of releasing that part of the paper to the public.

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In consequence our need for maintaining the military integrity of the Western Hemisphere toward a non-American Power, while similar in kind to that which inspired the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine and led to its reiteration throughout the past century and a quarter as our most fundamental foreign policy, is a need which is now far more impelling. In brief, under present conditions and those now foreseeable, the Western Hemisphere is a distinct military entity, the integrity of which is a fundamental postulate of our own security in the event of another World War.

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In harmony with the above, direct interest, as indicated, in territorial changes in Greece, in Iranian affairs, and in assuming "a stronger role" in the Levant, appears undesirable except through United Nations procedures.

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
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Appreciating this fact, one of the fundamentals of national power and prestige must be borne in mind, namely the ability to back with force the policies and commitments undertaken by our government. Two world wars in which we have fought have brought about our participation in the conflict at a time when we were militarily incapable for many months thereafter of keeping pace with our political action, though a fortunate geographical position and the fact of our allies holding the enemy at bay have given us the time in which to gather our strength for the offensive.

In the future neither geography nor allies will render a nation immune from sudden and paralyzing attack should an aggressor arise to plague the peace of the world. Because of this, determination of United States foreign policy should continually give consideration to our immediate capabilities for supporting our policy by arms if the occasion should demand, rather than to our long term potential, which, owing to the length of time required for mobilization of the nation's resources, might not be sufficient to avert disaster in another war.


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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
WASHINGTON

13 February 1946

MEMORANDUM TO THE NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC
STATE MEMBER, SWNCC ←
SECRETARIAT, SWNCC

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States
(SWN 3781).

Attached herewith is a memorandum
expressing the views of the War member SWNCC
on the subject paper.

For The Assistant Secretary of War:

Marshall S. Carter
MARSHALL S. CARTER
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Assistant Executive

Encl.

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13 February 1946

MEMORANDUM TO THE NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC
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
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STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

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SECRET**WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.**MEMORANDUM BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT MEMBER, SWNCC

Inclusion in the State Department paper of additional passages from the President's speech of 27 October 1945, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seems sound. It is evident that we face at present a great paradox in international relationships. Each nation, including our own, desires with apparent sincerity to achieve an international organization which can and will prevent future wars, maintain international morality and increase economic well-being. At the same time, each nation is beset by fears, suspicions and anxieties impelling dependence on national strength and power. A period must exist during which a disastrous breakdown in major power relations may be averted only by a morally strong United States with military strength to give stature to her acts. If this paradoxical situation is to be resolved finally in the realization of effective security arrangements within the framework of the United Nations, the United States must possess the prestige, the will, and the military power enabling it to discourage a breakdown in the relations between major powers, and to press for a genuinely effective organization of the United Nations. The United States will require adequate armed forces so that its strength may provide as real a deterrent to future conflict as its weakness and lack of armed forces provided an encouragement of Japanese aggression. In view of the none too strong security consciousness of the United States, it is considered altogether

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desirable that the continuing need for adequate armed forces be emphasized in an exposition of United States foreign policy. The recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is in the right direction. I doubt, however, whether it makes the point with sufficient emphasis.

I feel that there are several other aspects of the State Department paper which deserve comment from a politico-military standpoint.

While recognizing that the Uruguayan "multilateral intervention" proposal has received U.S. support, an altogether uncompromising adherence to it may present undesirable complications. It is quite possible that the Uruguayan proposal, if implemented, would set an extremely dangerous precedent for international relations in Europe and Asia. As an example, it might give an aspect of legality to Soviet intervention in Iran or to possible future action with regard to Turkey.

It is noted that the Monroe Doctrine is reaffirmed in the highly secret portions of the State Department paper, but that no mention is made of it in that part of the paper proposed for possible publication. Even at the cost of an unfavorable Latin American reaction, it might be desirable to reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine in any published statement of foreign policy in order to make clear to the people of the United States that their political and military commitments in this respect have not been abrogated. At the least, it should be specifically mentioned in its historical relationship to the Act of Chapultepec.

"Freedom of the seas" is mentioned without definition or explanation in that part of the State Department paper proposed for possible publication. A brief interpretation might be desirable. Certain other phrases in frequent and common use, such as "good neighbor policy" and "fifth

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freedom", could profitably be mentioned and interpreted.

Despite China's present ostensible place as one of the great powers, the occasion may recur in the future, as it has frequently in the past, of a predatory interest in China's territories on the part of other major powers. The United States has a historical and continuing interest in the maintenance of full Chinese sovereignty. A statement of foreign policy would appear to be incomplete should it fail to reaffirm the U.S. interest in China which has such deep roots in our past policies and which would inspire our reaction against any serious threats to China's integrity.

If the State Department member considers it appropriate, I suggest that an ad hoc SWNCC Working Committee might well examine the first twenty-five pages of the State Department paper with a view to incorporating therein the various suggestions and comments in this connection emanating from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army and Navy members of SWNCC.

Howard C. Petersen
Howard C. Petersen *MSC*
Assistant Secretary of War

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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



SWN-3782
26 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States

Reference: a. SWN-3656

1. Reference is made to paragraph 3 of the above reference forwarded to your office on 21 December 1945.

2. Enclosed is a copy of SM-4827 dated 25 January 1946, which are the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this policy, which is circulated in connection with your consideration of the document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States", and with a view of forwarding the proposed amendments to the Secretary of State.

3. It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. Reid
A. D. REID,
Secretary

Enclosure:
Cy memo from Secy, JCS,
(SM-4827) dated 25 Jan 46.

APPROVED: *John C. Seeger* for *Mr John L. Sullivan*

DATE: 2/5/46

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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



SWN-3783
26 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING STATE MEMBER, SWNCC:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

References: a. SWN-3655
b. SWN-3656

092
Foreign
affairs and
Relations

1. Reference is made to the above referenced memoranda forwarded to the War and Navy members on 21 December 1945, copy of which was previously furnished your office.

2. Enclosed is a copy of SM-4827 dated 25 January 1946, which are the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this policy, which is circulated in connection with your consideration of the document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States", and with a view of forwarding the proposed amendments to the Secretary of State.

3. It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

Field for
A. D. REID
Secretary

Enclosure:
Cy memo from Secy, JCS,
(SM-4827) dated 25 Jan 46.

APPROVED _____

DATE: _____

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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



SWN-3783
26 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING STATE MEMBER, SWNCG:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

References: a. SWN-3655
b. SWN-3656

1. Reference is made to the above referenced memoranda forwarded to the War and Navy members on 21 December 1945, copy of which was previously furnished your office.

2. Enclosed is a copy of SM-4827 dated 25 January 1946, which are the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this policy, which is circulated in connection with your consideration of the document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States" ~~SM~~ with a view of forwarding the proposed amendments to the Secretary of State.

3. It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCG.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,
Secretary

Enclosure:
Cy memo from Secy, JCS,
(SM-4827) dated 25 Jan 46.

APPROVED _____

DATE: _____

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**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.**

**SN-4827
25 January 1946**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the first twenty-five pages of a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States" which was forwarded to them by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no military objections to public issuance of the proposed statement provided additional paragraphs from the speech of the President quoted in the document are included, in order to inform both other nations and our own people that the United States proposes to maintain military forces to support its foreign policy.

To this effect, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that additions and amendments be appropriately introduced in the first twenty-five pages of the document by direct quotation from, or paraphrase of, those passages from the President's speech of October 27 reproduced below:

"The foreign policy of the United States is based firmly on fundamental principles of righteousness and justice. In carrying out these principles we shall firmly adhere to what we believe to be right; and we shall not give our approval to any compromise with evil."

* * * * *

"We have assured the world time and again - and I repeat it now - that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power.

"We do need . . . armed might, however, and for four principal tasks:

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"First, our Army, Navy and Air Force, in collaboration with our Allies, must enforce the terms of peace imposed upon our defeated enemies.

"Second, we must fulfill the military obligations which we are undertaking as a member of the United Nations Organization - to support a lasting peace, by force if necessary.

"Third, we must cooperate with other American nations to preserve the territorial integrity and the political independence of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

"Fourth, in this troubled and uncertain world, our military forces must be adequate to discharge the fundamental mission laid upon them by the Constitution of the United States - to "provide for the common defense" of the United States.

"These four military tasks are directed not toward war - not toward conquest but toward peace.

"We seek to use our military strength solely to preserve the peace of the world. For we now know that that is the only sure way to make our own freedom secure.

"That is the basis of the foreign policy of the people of the United States."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Secretary.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



File

092

Foreign Affairs Bldg.

SM-4827
25 January 1946

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

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* * * * *

"We have assured the world time and again - and I repeat it now - that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power."

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"We do need . . . armed might, however, and for four principal tasks:

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"Second, we must fulfill the military obligations which we are undertaking as a member of the United Nations Organization - to support a lasting peace, by force if necessary.

"Third, we must cooperate with other American nations to preserve the territorial integrity and the political independence of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.


"Fourth, in this troubled and uncertain world, our military forces must be adequate to discharge the fundamental mission laid upon them by the Constitution of the United States - to "provide for the common defense" of the United States.

"These four military tasks are directed not toward war - not toward conquest but toward peace.

"We seek to use our military strength solely to preserve the peace of the world. For we now know that that is the only sure way to make our own freedom secure.

"That is the basis of the foreign policy of the people of the United States."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

JAN 26 1946



STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
1829 COMMITTEE

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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



29 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF STATE DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION
ENTITLED "FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AS OF
DECEMBER 1, 1945"

Enclosed is an addendum to the above pamphlet which was
previously furnished your office, to be inserted at the
bottom of page 6 thereof.

SECRETARIAT,
SWNCC.

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This section proposed to be added at the bottom of page 6 of memorandum containing a tentative statement of the foreign policy of the United States as of December 1, 1945:

REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the United States and other signatories of the United Nations Charter are responsible, under the terms of the Charter, for the formulation of a plan for the regulation of armaments.

We advocate the immediate establishment of a United Nations Commission for the control of atomic energy, this Commission to make specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

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092 Foreign Affairs
+ Relations

SWN-3656 VF/n
21 December 1945

(Misc)
(new file)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING NAVY MEMBER, SWNCC:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from the State Member, SWNCC, enclosing a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States".

Five (5) copies of this document have been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view. The comments on the first 25 pages of this document were requested to be submitted separately as a matter of priority to enable the Department of State to determine in the near future the advisability of releasing it to the public.

The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be circulated upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In view of the highly secret nature of pages 26 to 106, inclusive, it is requested that it be given the minimum practicable circulation.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID
Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Cy memo fm Mr. Dunn, above subj, dtd 17 Dec 45.
2. Cy. No. 53 of document, above subj.

SWNCC FILE

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SWN-3655 VF/n
21 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING WAR MEMBER, SWNCC:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from the State Member, SWNCC, enclosing a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States".

Five (5) copies of this document have been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view. The comments on the first 25 pages of this document were requested to be submitted separately as a matter of priority to enable the Department of State to determine in the near future the advisability of releasing it to the public.

The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be circulated upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In view of the highly secret nature of pages 26 to 106, inclusive, it is requested that it be given the minimum practicable circulation.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID
Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Cy memo fm Mr. Dunn,
above subj, dtd 17 Dec 45.
2. Cy. No. 52 document,
above subj.

SWNCC FILE

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SWN-3654
21 December 1945 VF/n

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Foreign Policy of the United States.

1. Enclosed is a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and five (5) copies of a document entitled "Foreign Policy of the United States".

2. It is requested that this tentative statement of the foreign policy of the United States be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for any comment they may desire to make thereon. The comments on the first 25 pages should be considered separately as a matter of priority to enable the State Department to determine in the near future the advisability of releasing it to the public.

3. In view of the highly secret nature of the remainder of this document, it is requested that it be given the minimum practicable circulation.

4. One copy of this document has been furnished to the War Department and one to the Navy Department.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,
Secretary.

Enclosures:

1. Cy memo fm Mr. Dunn,
above subj, dtd 17 Dec 45.
2. 5 cys. document, above
subj: 54-58, incl.

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December 17, 1945

*092 Foreign Affairs -
Relation*

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

The accompanying memorandum of 106 pages contains a tentative statement of the foreign policy of the United States as of December 1, 1945. It is transmitted for the information of the War and Navy Departments and for any comment they may desire to make thereon. The second part of the memorandum, pages 26 to 106, is definitely "Secret" and should be treated accordingly.

The Department of State has under consideration the question whether the first 25 pages of this memorandum might be made public. Therefore any comment on that section should be transmitted promptly.

Because of the nature of this document the Department of State requests that no copies be made of its contents...~~However,~~ the Department of State can furnish a limited number of additional copies.

*James Ernest Drum**ADR*

CONFIDENTIAL

0.92 - Foreign affairs and relations

SWNCC	
COL. MCCARTHY
COMDR. RICHARDSON
MR. R. E. COX
LT. COL. PENNOYER
LT. COMDR. SEILFUSS
MR. H. W. MOBELEY
MR. J. P. GARDINER
LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD
MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL
ENS. F. WHITESIDE
FILE

10 DEC 1945

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary:

The War Department is now being called upon by agencies within the Government, including the State Department, to continue or to undertake activities abroad which are not strictly military in nature. During the war the Army properly assumed a wide range of responsibilities including many which, though not military in character, were designed to enlist the cooperation of foreign governments and people toward winning the war.

The War Department desires, of course, to support to the best of its ability the foreign policy of the United States since it recognizes the present need for the Government to utilize all the means at its disposal to achieve its international objectives. It is apparent, however, that the end of the war has brought both the military and non-military activities of the Army under closer scrutiny than ever before, both by Congress and by the public. The War Department will not be able to continue non-military activities in support of foreign policy, which are "in the national interest", unless such activities are understood and supported by the Congress and the American people. To obtain the necessary appropriations and public understanding, the assistance of the State Department and, at times, of the President will be required.

Examples of activities which are causing considerable concern are the use of large military forces to guard surplus property abroad pending disposal by the State Department, occupation and operation of air fields for which there is no further military use, training of French Air Force pilots, and assistance by military agencies to U.S. business men abroad.


I believe we should scrutinize most carefully any proposed use of military personnel, facilities or funds for activities abroad for reasons of convenience or because other U.S. agencies are not present in the areas involved. It might be well for the State and War Departments (I presume the Navy, too, has a similar problem) to promulgate internally a word of caution that requests for non-military activities on the part of the Army should be carefully reviewed as to policy.

I recognize that demands upon the military for services "in the national interest" will continue, particularly as an immediate aftermath



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Copy for Secretariat
State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee



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of the war. The present pressure for demobilization of manpower, coupled with the developing pressure for economy, make it essential that all agencies concerned assist in explaining requirements, both to the Congress and to the public, in order that the necessary resources in manpower and funds may be made available. This assistance will be needed, not only for those "national interest" items which the military services undertake for other government departments, but also in order to maintain the bare minimum of military strength essential to carry out military commitments such as occupation forces.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Secretary of War

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