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(16)

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Room 384-B

公爵近衛ト日召

丙若ノ關係ハ、昭和十六年二月頃ノ某日突然近衛公爵邸ヨリ井上日召ニ対シ電話ヲ以テ会见申込ミ下リ、應諾、即チ翌日午後五時ヨリ十一時迄談交セルニ始マル。

一、才一回会谈。内容ハ、

- イ、日本国家並ニ日本民族ノ本質ニ関スル件。
- ロ、大政翼賛會ハ独逸式強權統制組織ニシテ純日本のナルモノニ非ザルニシテ直チニ改革ヲヘキ事。
- ハ、日本政治経済其他ノ般、組織制度ハ日本本来ノ理念、即チ大乗佛敎ノ所謂「天地同根、萬物一体」ノ精神ヲ指道スル原理トシテ根本的改革ヲ发スベキ事。
- ニ、日本ヲ革新スルハ其時機ニ非ズ公亦其人ニ非ズトノ近衛ノ言ニ対シ、革新担当者ハ他ニ其人アルベキニ依リハ公ハ宗

辛直ニ日召ノ理想心、意圖ヲ天皇ニ傳スル度キ事、

以上四ノ条悉ク公ノ承諾ヲ得タルニ依リ爾後兩者ハ同志

的結合ヲナシ、兩者ノ間ニ他ノ何人ヲモ入セシメサル約束ヲセリ。

第三回日會見ノ際近衛ヨリ日召ニ對シ、公ノ私邸ニ同居生活スル

様申込ミアリ、依テ昭和十六年三月初、頭公ノ私邸(荻窪)

ニ移ル。第二次近衛内閣時ナリ。

日召在獄中、近衛ト將々石岡ニ托テ、日本カ中国ヨリ

撤兵スルコトヲ條件トシテ和平条約將ニ成立セシメタルヲ陸軍

ノ善ノニ破壊セラレタリト聞ク。

第一次近衛内閣以來、和平主義ノ近衛ト侵略主義ノ軍閥ト

ハ常ニ對立、近衛政治ノ失敗ハ悉ク軍ノ陰謀ニ依ルモノナリト云ク。

日支事變打切りニ就イテ屢々懇心談ニタルモ陸軍ノ陰謀ニヨ

リ公モ拙スニ術ナキニ至リ日召ヨリ頭山滿符ニ懇請シ公判ヲ

中心トモ親支日本人國体ヲ造リ天皇ヨリ御内帑金ノ下賜ヲ得テ次身金トナシ和平交渉ヲ開始スル公ト快議セルモ其現スルニ出至ラスシテ止ム。昭和十六年、オ三次近衛内閣時。

一日本ハ先ヅ陸軍ノ肅整ヲ為スニ忙サレハ正ニキ政治ヲ行ヒ得カトノ公ノ意見ト。日本ノ革新ニ當リ最も大ナル障礙ヲナスモノハ軍隊ナリトナス日公ノ意見トハ如セズシテ一致スル所ナリ俱ニ軍肅ヲ計畫セリト雖時既ニ遷リ、軍威ノ執カ力日ニ増大シ國民亦其蔭謀ニ駆ラレ遂ニ如何トスル能ハサリナリ。

一英米ヲ信ジ独伊ヲ信ジ得ルハナラズ、日本ノ英米依存ハ物心^西尚^西ル人全的ナルモノナレバ之ト対立抗爭シ得カトナス公ノ主張ト日公ノ意見一致セリ。

一昭和十六年五月頃、オ三次近衛内閣時、時ノ企画院總裁鈴木不^西眞^西一^西レテ日米国力調査書ヲ作制セシメ其比格上ノ理

由ツ以テ日米(開戦)不可ク天皇ニ表上セル旨公ヨリ傳ク。

一、日米交渉中「ルースベルト」近衛会谈ニ賛成シ俱ニ計リテ洋上会谈ノ地ト夫マテ要ハ決定セルモ内外ノ反対ニ遭ヒテ実現セズ、殊ニ日官ガ公ニ隨行スベキ近衛日官同ノ密約ガ破レルヲ以テ、軍務局長武蔵陸立章ヨリ強硬抗議ヲ申込マレタル由。

一、第三次近衛内閣時、昭和十六年独逸カソ聯、及戦ヲ开始トシテ同時段、駐独大使カ「ヒットラー」ノ意ノ快クニ即時「開戦要請」電報ヲ送ラセ陸軍亦之ニ賛成セルヲ憤リ孤立無援ノ公ハ辱日臣ニ心中一憂甚クシテ減ラセタリ。

一、外務大臣松岡洋右カ政ヲヨリ帰朝ト同時ニ最強硬主義論ヲ主張シ近衛國賊呼ハリシ爲シ、頭山翁ニ米國ヨリ電報内容ヲ傳リ告ゲ以テ國民同反米感情ヲ煽ラントセン止アルヲ小川平吉(近衛ノ友人ニシテ頭山翁トモ親シカリシ故人)ニ依リテ知リ

直ヤニ此名ノ私邸ニ頭山洞ヲ訪ヒ公洞ノ自重ヲ懇請セリトアリ。

一、昭和十六年八月頭山洞^頭ヲシテ近衛ノ対米和親ノ立意志ヲ了解セシメンガ爲メニ西者ヲシテ首相官邸ニ於テ会見セシメタリ。

一、昭和十六年七月頃時ノ海軍聯合艦隊司令長官山本五十六が假ニ日米不戦スルニテ渾戦一ヶ年半ハ勝負アリトモソレ以後ハ全ク自信ナシニシテ語レリト云フヲ傳聞ス。

一、内府木戸幸一が東条ヲ支持スニ到リ（昭和十六年秋頃）官中ハ全ク主我派ノ執カ力ノ圧倒的トナリ近衛ヲ支持セシタル某々宮殿下四名モ亦近衛ト共ニ昭和十九年二月頃迄遠ヤケラレタルヤニ聞ク。

一、近衛親近者及ビ外部ノ日官ニ對スル反對カ治ヲニ強硬ニナルニ從ヒ健康モ亦勝カズ昭和十八年一初頭頃ヨリ漸次遠ヤカル。

5.

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昭和二十年三月九日第一回東京大空襲被害対策委員会
会談あり。

昭和二十年八月東京大空襲被害対策委員会成立直後内閣ニ公テ討じ、皇室財産ノ下附、公ノ学業等一切ノ辞退、新日本建設ノ時、榊到来等ニ関シ懇談三四ニ及じ、其方面ノ反対アリテ無効。

以上、引記臆不取ナレハ思ヒス。

昭和二十一年六月十六日

日 記 事

井 上

井上

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Document No. _____

June 20 1946

CERTIFICATE

I, Lee M. Kennan, hereby certify
that I am associated with the International Prosecution
Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Command Allied Powers,
and that the attached document, consisting of 6 pages
and described as follows: Letter addressed to
Lee M. Kennan from Iwano Akira,
alias Nishio
and dated 6 June 1946, was obtained by me on the
date above set forth in my above capacity and in the conduct
of my official business and in the following manner, to wit:
(place and from whom obtained, including specific Japanese
archives, records and files involved, if any) Delivered to
me by hand at War Ministry Bldg.
by Iwano, Akira, alias Nishio

Lee M. Kennan
NAME

Ofc., Inv. Div., I.P.S.
RANK OR CAPACITY

35782034
ASN

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2174

Date: 21 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Letter to Lee M. KENNA from INOUE,
Akira, alias NISSHO

Date: 6 June 1946 Original Copy Language: Jap.

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Lee M KENNA

PERSONS IMPLICATED: NISSHO, INOUE, Akira; KONOYE; M UTO; MATSUOKA;
OSHIMA; TOYAMA; KIDO, Koichi.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive war-
U.S. - Japanese Relations.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references);

Letter reveals relationships between Prince KONOYE and INOUE or NISSHO from about February 41 when they first met to discuss Japan's problems. At that time, it was agreed that there should be a reformation of I.R.A.A., and of political and economical organizations. KONOYE said that he was not the man to do this, but would report NISSHO's ideals and intentions to the Emperor.

In subsequent conferences they often discussed China Incident but realized that it being due to Army conspiracy, nothing could be done. Both had planned for a purge of the Army, but too late.

Both supported plans for ROOSEVELT-KONOYE meeting and NISSHO was to go along secretly. MUTO, Akira strongly protested against such a meeting.

NISSHO reveals KONOYE as being strongly indignant at Army's ready approval to telegram from Ambassador OSHIMA in January at outbreak of German-Russian hostilities urging Japan to immediately join war. MATSUOKA called KONOYE a traitor and falsely reported to TOYAMA, Mitsuru about contents of telegrams from America, hoping to instill anti-American feelings through TOYAMA's influence.

NISSHO further states that when KIDO, Koichi, came to support TOJO, influences of war advocates became overwhelming in Imperial Court.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Blumhagen

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2/ was not the right man ^{for it,} INOUE said that (91) there are some others who will carry out the actual plan and that all what Prince KONOYE was expected to do was to report ^{frankly} the ideals and intentions of NISSHO to the Emperor.

The above mentioned four items being fully approved by the Prince, the two became bosom friends thereafter and pledged to let no one intervene between them.

1. At his third meeting, KONOYE asked NISSHO ~~that he~~ to come and live with KONOYE at his private residence. Accordingly, NISSHO moved to the prince's private residence (at Ogikubo) in the beginning of March 1941. It was at the time of the second KONOYE cabinet.

1. During the imprisonment of NISSHO, it was reported that the army intervened and destroyed a peace agreement between KONOYE and Chiang Kai-shek which was just about to be concluded on the condition of Japan's military withdrawal from China.

1. We learn that ever since the first KONOYE cabinet, KONOYE with his pacifism and the military with their imperialism always stood in opposition, and that the failure of all the policies of KONOYE

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A Letter from NISSHO to Mr. Lee M. Kenan
6 June 1946

Prince KONOYE and NISSHO [ZINOYE]

The connection between these two started about February 1941 when ^{one day} NISSHO received an unexpected telephone call from Prince KONOYE requesting an interview with him. I consented and we met on the following day at five o'clock in the evening and our meeting lasted till eleven o'clock.

1. The first interview. The content of the conversation:
 - A. The intrinsic nature of the Japanese state and the Japanese race.
 - B. The Imperial Rule Assistance Organization should be immediately reformed since it is an organization for controlling by force after the German fashion and is not after Japan's own fashion.
 - C. All the organizations and systems in Japan regarding politics and economics should be fundamentally reformed ^{in accordance} with the spirit of so-called "Heaven and Earth being of the same origin and all the beings in the world being one" of the Mahayanist Buddhism which is the innate idea of the Japanese.
 - D. When KONOYE said that it was not the time for the reformation of Japan, and that he

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1. The prince told NISSHO that approximately in May 1941 (the Third KONOYE cabinet) he ordered SUZUKI Teiichi, then President of the Planning Board to make a report on the comparative ^{investigation of the} national power of Japan and America, and presented it to the Emperor as a proof why a Japanese-American war is inadvisable. (P.3)

1. During the Japan-American negotiations, both of us ^{warily} supported the idea of a KONOYE-Roosevelt conference and had already decided upon the place of meeting, when the plan was finally met with oppositions from inside and outside of Japan. Especially, ^{the} secret understanding between KONOYE and NISSHO that NISSHO was to accompany KONOYE to the conference leaked out, ~~and~~ MUTO Akira, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was reported to have made a strong protest against KONOYE.

1. At the time of the Third KONOYE cabinet, 1941, immediately after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, Ambassador OSHIMA to Germany sent home a telegram in ready compliance with Hitler's wish, asking Japan to join the war without delay. KONOYE was indignant at the ready approval shown by the army, and being solitary with

3/21/41 was due to the conspiracy of the military clique.
1. How to end the China incident was repeatedly discussed, but due to the army's conspiracy, the Prince could do nothing about it. NISSHO suggested to entreat old TOYAMA Mitsuru to organize a (72) group of pro-China Japanese with TOYAMA as their centre, and with the grant from the Privy Purse as their fund, start peace-negotiation with China. Although the Prince approved, this was not realized. It was during the period of the Third KONOYE cabinet, in 1941.

1. The Prince's opinion that Japan will never have good government unless the army is cleaned was in perfect accordance with NISSHO's opinion that the army makes the greatest obstacle in reforming Japan. Together we planned for the purge of the army. However, the time was too late. The influence of the military increased day by day pushing the people forward by their conspiracy till there was nothing that could stop it.
1. The Prince believed in England and America, but could not trust Germany and Italy, and insisted that as Japan was spiritually and materially depending on England and America, she could not possibly oppose and fight against them. NISSHO agreed with the Prince.

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When KIDO Koichi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal came to support TOJO (about autumn, 1941), the influences of the war advocates became overwhelming in the Imperial court. Four Princes of Imperial blood who supported KONOYAMA were kept at a distance together with KONOYAMA until about February 1944.

- 1. ^{The Prince's associates} ~~People at the Prince's side~~ and outsiders also began to express their abjection to my staying with the Prince, and as my health was failing, I began to keep myself away from the Prince at the beginning of 1943.
- 1. We talked about peace now and then ⁽⁷⁵⁾ during the period between the beginning of 1943 to 9 March 1945, when the city of Tokyo was heavily damaged by the first great air-raid.
- 1. Immediately after the establishment of the Prince HIROASHIKUNI cabinet, I called upon Prince KONOYAMA and talked with him about the granting of the Imperial assets, the resignation of KONOYAMA of all his honours, and the construction of new Japan. We had three conferences but due to the opposition from certain quarters, it brought ^{about} no fruit.

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The above is all what I clearly remember
I omitted others because my memory ^{about them} is
inaccurate.

June 6, 1946
MINOUE Akira alias Niitko