

Doc. 2251 Evid

Folder 120

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2251

**INTERROGATION OF  
ARAKI, SADAO**

Date and Place: 15 February 1946, Tokyo, Japan

Place: Super Palace, Tokyo, Japan

Date: 15 February 1946

Mr. Elton Hyde, Interpreter  
Commander John C. Thomas, Interpreter  
Inspector S. Hyde, Interpreter

Place of Interpreter: Assigned by Col. Morrow

Q. Do you voluntarily agree, by signing here, that you  
**INTERROGATORS: COL. MORROW**  
**Mr. ELTON HYDER**  
understand the meaning and contents of the questions asked of you, in this proceeding?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you understand the meaning and contents of the questions asked of you, in this proceeding?

Q. The other day you were asked this question, "Did your government and the Japanese Army have with HIRASHI's suggestions? Why did they allow him to resign?" Will you explain this again, please?

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HIRASHI was opposed to the Third Army plan I think. The question was debated for a long time over a period of about eight months and was still undecided. Then Germany, without saying anything to Japan, concluded the armistice with Russia. As it was thought in Japan that Germany had concluded the armistice treaty with the idea of ending war in Europe, hence the HIRASHI cabinet was formed including the Third Army party. The signing of the armistice treaty was taken as evidence that Germany would not ask any loan. Germany's action in concluding this treaty without consulting Japan was thought to be self-reverent. Italy, Germany and Japan had been united in the anti-Britain pact. England, France

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**INTERROGATION OF**

and Japan were similar. Germany in cooperation with these latter countries had not severed good relations with Russia. Germany's action in concluding the ARAKI, SADAO with Russia was thought to be a preparation for waging war against England and France.

Q. Yesterday you stated, "My opinion was always different from that of HIRANUMA and his cabinet as I think they very much direct re-"  
Date and Time: **15 February 1946, 1000-1225**

Place : **Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.**

Present : **ARAKI, Sadao**  
**Col. Thomas Morrow, Interrogator**  
**Mr. Eiton Hyder, Interrogator**  
**Commander Yale C. Maxon, Interpreter**  
**Ingeborg E. Hyden, Stenographer**

Oath of Interpreter; Administered by Col. Morrow;

COL. MORROW : **Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?**

Commander MAXON: **I do.**

Questions by : **Col. MORROW**

- Q. The other day you were asked this question, "Just what connection did the Russia-German treaty have with HIRANUMA's resignation? Why did that cause him to resign?" Will you explain this again, please?
- A. HIRANUMA was opposed to the Three Power pact I think. The question was debated for a long time over a period of about eight months and was still undecided. Then Germany, without saying anything to Japan, concluded the non-aggression treaty with Russia. So it was thought in Japan that Germany had concluded the Russo-German treaty with the idea of waging war in Europe. Hence the HIRANUMA Cabinet was against concluding the Three Power pact. The signing of the non-aggression treaty was taken as evidence that Germany couldn't wait any longer. Germany's action in concluding this treaty without consulting Japan was thought to be self-centered. Italy, Germany and Japan had been united in the anti-Comintern pact. England, France



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and Poland were similarly bound together in sympathies but these latter countries had not enjoyed good relations with Russia. Germany's action in concluding the treaty with Russia was thought to be a preparation for waging war against England and France.

Q. Yesterday you stated, "My opinion was always different from that of Prince KONOYE and his cabinet so I didn't have very much direct relation with those affairs." In what way was your opinion different from that of Prince KONOYE and his cabinet?

A. At first in 1937 I was asked by Prince KONOYE "How shall we dispose of the China Incident?", and I became a Cabinet counselor. I replied "Finish it quickly." However, after about two months, on January 16, 1938 it was, Premier KONOYE made the statement that the Japanese government would no longer deal with the government of CHIANG Kai-Shek. The opinion of all the counselors had been the same as mine but after this statement it no longer mattered whether there were counselors or not. I entered the Cabinet in May on the request of Prince KONOYE who asked me to come in and uphold the same opinion which I had previously expressed. However Prince KONOYE soon began consulting with the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministers separately from the rest of us in relation to problems which particularly concerned them. He consulted separately with the rest of us for two or three times. I was there as Education Minister and SUETSUGU was there as Home Minister. I don't remember whether the Finance Minister was there or not. In any case Admiral SUETSUGU and I disagreed violently and quarreled at each meeting and after two or three meetings I no longer attended and simply carried on my duty as Education Minister without going to Cabinet conferences. For that reason I am not acquainted with much of what was done.

Q. When Prince KONOYE told you that he assumed and expected you to maintain your opinions, did he mean with reference to the China Affair and foreign matters, or what did he mean?

A. The China Affair broke out without Premier KONOYE's knowledge. Soon after it had broken out in August or September Prince KONOYE came to see me since I met no one, and asked me what I thought ought to be done. I replied that it ought to be stopped so at that time I think he may have had the idea of trying to stop the Incident.

Q. You said that Prince KONOYE, when he asked you to enter the Cabinet, in May 1938 asked you to maintain your same opinions. Were those opinions your opinions about the China Incident?



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- A. Yes, they were my opinions in relation to the China Incident.
- Q. In Prince KONOYE's memoirs, KONOYE writes that he stated to the Emperor that a military group within the army had caused the Manchurian Incident, the China Incident, and the war with America. Do you agree?
- A. I think perhaps it was so.
- Q. What individuals were responsible?
- A. I don't know. I have been separated from the army and army affairs for a long time and I am not familiar at all with individuals any more. I know, however, that at the time of the February 26, 1936 Incident there were two rival groups of field grade officers. One group committed these assassinations and we got a good deal of information from members of the other group who had a great deal to say after the quarrel between the two groups. I remember that there were a Lt. Col. SATO and a Lt. Col. MUTO involved.
- Q. Were there any other names that you remember?
- A. No.
- Q. SATO and MUTO belonged not to the group which carried out the assassinations but to the group which quarreled with that group did they not?
- A. Yes.

Questions by: Mr. HYDER

- Q. General, at the Imperial Conference of December 17, 1931 who besides the Privy Council and members of the Cabinet were present?
- A. It was not an Imperial Conference (Gozan Kaigi) though the Emperor was present. It was a plenary conference of the Privy Council (Sumitsuin Honkaigi). All of the Cabinet members were there seated according to court rank on the Emperor's right, and all of the Privy Counselors were there seated according to rank on the Emperor's left hand. In the second row behind the Cabinet ministers sat the various assistants including the Chief of the Military Affairs section of the War Department, the Chief of the Naval Affairs section of the Navy Department, the Chief of the Political Section of the Foreign Ministry, etc. I am not positive that these subordinate officials were there but I believe they were. The subordinate officials came or did not come according to the particular needs of the situation. On some occasions even very young men came in reference



(ARAKI 15 Feb 46 Cont'd)  
(ARAKI 15 Feb 46 Cont'd)

- Q. Did you think of it before you became War Minister, usually to some particular problem, other occasions nobody came. It depended on the situation.
- Q. Were the two Chiefs of Staff and the two vice-chiefs of staff present?
- A. No, because matters of military command were not discussed at this meeting.
- Q. General, have you ever sat in on an Imperial conference?
- A. No. At the time when I was a Cabinet member these things were very rare and I wonder whether there even were any during the time I was minister. I think if there had been I would have remember because they would have been very important matters. I don't remember very clearly but these were for very important things and I don't think there were many during that time. During the time when I was War Minister there were Supreme War Council meetings (Gunji Sangi Kan Kaigi) which were attended by the Emperor. The Emperor's assent was required for all such important matters as structural reorganization within the army, etc. Before one structure could be dissolved or a new structure formed, the Emperor's assent had to be obtained.
- Q. At these Supreme War Council meetings, were matters of policy decided?
- A. Only military matters or related things were decided.
- Q. Was the matter of the pacification of Manchuria under CHANG Hsueh-liang discussed in these council meetings?
- A. Such matters were not decided by the Supreme War Council.
- Q. Were they discussed?
- A. I dare say they were discussed but I don't know for sure. In any case they were not acted upon.
- Q. Did the Supreme War Council make recommendations as to Manchuria?
- A. The Supreme War Council was not a very strong body and considered matters only on request. Such subjects as the pacification of Manchuria were not considered.
- Q. When did you decide in your own mind that the four provinces under CHANG, Hsueh-liang should be pacified and occupied?
- A. Soon after I became War Minister.



(ARAKI 15 Feb 46 Cont'd)

Q. Hadn't you thought of it before you became War Minister, General?

A. Before that time I had been concerned with military education so I hadn't thought about it but when I became War Minister public opinion was very worried about this matter and up to that time there had been no policy. It was my duty to settle the thing as quickly as possible and the first stage was to decide on a policy. So I lost no time in consulting the cabinet, specifically I talked to the following members of the cabinet, to wit: the Premier, the Minister of Finance, the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister. I also talked with the Chief Cabinet secretary and he may or may not have talked to the other members of the Cabinet. In any case the decision was made by those I have mentioned. The decision was made along about the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th or so of December 1931.

Q. How long did it take to prepare the supplementary military budget submitted to the Privy Council on December 15, 1931?

A. Not very long I think. It was a matter of 30 million or 50 million Yen, I believe. However that was a long time ago and I don't remember too clearly.



(ARAKI 15 Feb 46 Cont'd)

I, YALE G. MAXON, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of five pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

YALE G. MAXON, Commander

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of February, 1946.

THOMAS MORROW, Colonel  
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

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We, THOMAS MORROW, Colonel, \_\_\_\_\_ and ELTON HYDER, certify that on the 15th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me ARAKI, Sadao and according to YALE G. MAXON, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

THOMAS MORROW, Colonel

15 February 1946.

ELTON HYDER

*original presented in*  
I, INGEBORG HYDEN, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

INGEBORG HYDEN



CHARGE OUT SLIP

JUL 1 - 1946

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

EVIDENTIARY LOC. NO. 2251

TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT NO. 187-D

BACKGROUND LOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SIGNATURE Lockett

ROOM NO. 378

*Original presented in  
Court*



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2248 to 2257 inclusive

26 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogation of ARAKI, Sadao

Date: See below Original  Copy  Language:  
English

Has it been translated? Yes  No

Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARAKI, Sadao

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>	<u>Exhibit No.</u>
2248	12 March 1946	290
2249	8 February 1946	230
2250	7 February 1946	232
2251	15 February 1946	290
2252	13 February 1946	290
2253	19 February 1946	290
2254	11 February 1946	290
2255	8 March 1946	290
2256	21 February 1946	290
2257	7 March 1946	290

Analyst: C. W. J. Phelps

Doc. Nos. 2248 to 2257  
inclusive



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. *2251*

Date *26 June 1946*

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: *Transcript, Interrogation of*  
*ARAKI, Sadao*

Date: *15 Feb 46* Original () Copy () Language: *Eng*

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

*Doc. Div.*

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *I. P.S. (see our Case File # 58)*

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

*ARAKI, Sadao*

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

*Interrogation of ARAKI by Mr. Hyder.*

Analyst: *CW Phelps*

Doc. No.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

26 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN DARSEY

FROM : Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Asst. Chief,  
Document Division

SUBJECT : Re-numbering of Interrogations of ARAKI,  
Sadao.

1. Due to the necessity of presenting to the Tribunal single copies of each interrogation, in the original, the following system of numbering of such interrogations has been set up and cross-reference should be made to your document numbers (10,001 to 10,008):

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2249	8 Feb 46
2250	7 Feb 46
2251	15 Feb 46
2252	13 Feb 46
2253	19 Feb 46
2254	11 Feb 46
2255	8 Mar 46
2256	21 Feb 46
2257	7 Mar 46

2. It is suggested that subsequent to the initial presentation of these interrogations, you refer to them by the Tribunal exhibit number.

*Calhoun W. J. Phelps*  
CALHOUN W. J. PHELPS

6 CC: 1-Mr. Eugene Williams  
1-Capt. Salmons  
1-Lt. Alexander  
1-Miss Brunner  
1-S/Sgt. Overfelt  
1-Mr. Buckho  
(9)-1 cy. ea. file.