

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VC-93 (b) Based on or at USS SARGENT BAY (CVE-93) (c) Report No. 94
 (d) Take off: Date 19 April 1945 Time (LZT) 0715 (T) (Zone); Lat. 25°-21' N. Long. 129°-02' E.
 (e) Mission Direct aircraft support of ground troops on Okinawa. (f) Time of Return 1044 (T) (Zone)

II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

| TYPE (a) | SQUADRON (b) | NUMBER | | | BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f) | FUZE, SETTING (g) |
|-------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--|---|
| | | TAKING OFF (c) | ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d) | ATTACKING TARGET (e) | | |
| TBM-3 | VC-93 | 12 | 0 | 12 | 10 - 100 lb. G.P. 8 - 5" (HE) AR | Inst. - nose & tail Inst. - .02 base |
| FM-2 | VC-93 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 4 - 5" (HE) HVAR | Inst. - .02 base |
| FM-2 | VC-93 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 6 - 5" (HE) AR | Inst. - .02 base |

III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

| TYPE | SQUADRON | NUMBER | BASE | TYPE | SQUADRON | NUMBER | BASE |
|------|----------|--------|---------------------|------|----------|--------|---------------------|
| FM-2 | VC-93 | 4 | USS SAGINAW BAY | TBM | VC-93 | 6 | USS SAGINAW BAY |
| FM-2 | VC-93 | 4 | USS PETROF BAY | TBM | VC-93 | 12 | USS PETROF BAY |
| FM-2 | VOC-1 | 10 | USS MARCUS ISLAND | TBM | VC-97 | 6 | USS MAKASSAR STRAIT |
| FM-2 | VC-97 | 4 | USS MAKASSAR STRAIT | | | | |

IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

| (a) TYPE | (b) NO. OBSERVED | (c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C | (d) TIME ENCOUNTERED | (e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER | (f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED | (g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING |
|----------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| | | NONE | (ZONE) | | | |
| | | | (ZONE) | | | |
| | | | (ZONE) | | | |

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) _____
 Did Any Part of
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? _____ If so, Describe Clouds _____ (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
 (YES OR NO)
 Time of Day and Brilliance _____ (k) Visibility _____ (MILES)
 (j) of Sun or Moon _____ (NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.)

V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

| (a) TYPE ENEMY A/C | (b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY: | | | GUNS USED | (c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE | (d) DAMAGE CLAIMED |
|--------------------|------------------------------|----------|-----------------|-----------|----------------------|--------------------|
| | TYPE A/C | SQUADRON | PILOT OR GUNNER | | | |
| | | | NONE | | | |
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VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

| (a) TYPE OWN A/C | (b) SQUADRON | (c) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE | (d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit) | (e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed) |
|---------------------|-----------------|---|--|---|
| 1 | | NONE | | |
| 2 | | | | |
| 3 | | | | |
| 4 | | | | |
| 5 | | | | |
| 6 | | | | |
| 7 | | | | |
| 8 | | | | |
| 9 | | | | |
| 10 | | | | |
| 11 | | | | |
| 12 | | | | |
| 13 | | | | |
| 14 | | | | |

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

| (a) NO | (b) SQUADRON | (c) NAME, RANK OR RATING | (d) CAUSE | (e) CONDITION OR STATUS |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------------------------|--------------|----------------------------|
| | | NONE | | |
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VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

| (a) TYPE A/C | (b) MILES OUT | (c) MILES RETURN | (d) AV HOURS IN AIR | (e) AV FUEL LOADED | (f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED | (g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED | | | | (h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING |
|--------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|------|------|----|-----------------------------------|
| | | | | | | .30 | .50 | 20MM | MM | |
| TH-1 | 70 | 67 | 3.3 | 325 | 180 | 570 | 300 | | | 12 |
| YL-2 | 70 | 67 | 3.2 | 245 | 140 | | 2020 | | | 6 |

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

| CALIBER | NONE | MEAGER | MODERATE | INTENSE |
|---|-------------------------------------|--------|----------|---------|
| HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | |

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB,
at various altitudes

- URNS
- DIVES
- CEILINGS
- RANGE
- PROTECTION
- ARMAMENT

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) Ridge southwest of Naha Airfield
near town of Tomigusuku (b) Time Over Target(s) 0940 (I) (Zone)
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)

(c) Clouds Over Target None
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Hazy (e) Visibility 10
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide Bomb Sight Used Mk. 8 gunsight
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)

Bombs Dropped per Run All Spacing 30-180 ft. Altitude of Bomb Release Slant range 1000-2000 yds.
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed None Probably Destroyed None Damaged None

| (h) AIMING POINT | (i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE | (j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON | (l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION* EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT | (m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point | (n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk) |
|---|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|---|
| 1 Target areas 7368 & 7468 | 400 X 1200 yds. | 12 F4U, 8 FM VC-83 | 100 - 5" (HE) AR 20 - 5" (HE) HVAR 119 - 100 lb. G.P. Strafe | All | Not observed |
| 2 | | | | | |
| 3 | | | | | |
| 4 | | | | | |
| 5 | | | | | |
| 6 | | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | |
| 8 | | | | | |

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

1. No definite enemy installations were observed but there were many caves in area and many of them undoubtedly concealed enemy positions and were destroyed or heavily damaged by the attack. A number of fires were started in the area but it is believed that these were largely brush fires.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? No Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" " , Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" " , Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships
Concealment
Searchlights
Night Fighter Tactics
Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

This report marks the return of the U.S.S. SARGENT BAY and VC-33 to the Okinawa area after an absence of 11 days spent on oiler escort duty. This report also marks the first time our squadron furnished direct support to the Army on Okinawa and our first direct support missions on Okinawa south of the III Phib. Corps line after Love-Day.

Upon our return we found that the Marines had secured virtually all of Okinawa Shima north of the III Phib. Corps line but that the Army's front lines had moved practically not at all during the previous 11 days. The Army's big push was scheduled for this day and our first mission was to furnish 12 VT and 8 VF as part of a group of 36 VT and 30 VF in direct support of the Army's advance. The aircraft support was controlled by the XXIV Corps LanFor CASCU.

The only target assigned on this mission was the ridge about 1200 yards from and running due east of the southern end of Haha Airfield. This covered an area about 400 x 1200 yards in which enemy artillery, revetments and gun emplacements had been reported. The sky directly over the target was clear but the clouds at 3000 feet and east of the target furnished excellent cover for the attack. LanFor CASCU directed the planes to split into groups with each squadron's VF and VT forming a group.

It was nearly impossible to observe the concealed gun positions and other installations from the air but each squadron group was directed to make one run only and expend all armament on the designated area. This was done and the area was saturated with bomb, rocket and strafing hits. It was not possible to observe the extent of the damage after the attack but it is doubtful that many of the enemy installations escaped damage, if not total destruction, in the attack.

No enemy AA was encountered and no enemy personnel or activity were observed in the area under attack but one of the VF pilots and one of the aircrewmembers reported possible 120 MM guns about 1000 yds. south.

The use of an Air Coordinator is always helpful but in a mission like this one it is virtually a necessity. The LanFor CASCU cannot act as Coordinator nor can the Flight Leader, no matter how competent, double as Flight Leader and Air Coordinator. An efficient, well-trained, and well briefed Air Coordinator would, in all probability, have been able to select specific targets and not had to rely on area bombing, which at best, is very inefficient for rocketing and bombing with small bombs.

VF Pilots: Lts. H. S. WORLEY, W. C. SAUER; Lieuts.(jg) C. A. EBERT, W. R. ANDREWS, W. ZUMDT, M. BOTZAN, D. O. HANCOCK; Ensigns W. O. GUNDLACH, G. M. ROBERTS, J. T. PARADY, J. D. PROVOST, R. L. BLAKE.

VF Pilots: Lieuts. L. F. ZABEL, R. S. BOOZER; Lieuts.(jg) W. E. FLANKEY, F. M. KREBS, R. W. SCHARPER, P. C. NOTE; Ensigns L. A. KAHN, F. P. McELROY.

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability; following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

The 8" X 8" target folders furnished for the Okinawa operation were virtually useless and it is doubtful whether any pilot used these charts after the first few days of operation. The 8"X8" charts covered such a small area that it was impossible for pilots to pick out a target on the 8"X8" chart and then orient themselves and pick out the same target on the ground. The most distinctive reference points which could be used on Okinawa were the roads and all too often the road pattern was duplicated in place after place.

The 15" X 24" maps were much better but were very inaccurate. Nevertheless they were used almost exclusively after the first few days. The most annoying defect in these maps was that the grid lines did not coincide with those on the maps used by the CASCU's and by the ground troops. This caused error in the identification of targets on many occasions.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

H. VERNON BNEY, Lt., USNR, A.C.I. Officer.

M. S. WORLEY, Lieut., USNR.

4/27/45

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

DATE

Squadron Commander.