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21616

WAR DIARY

German Naval Staff Operations Division

PART A VOLUME 44

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APRIL 1943

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Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
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In reply
refer to
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for April 1943, Part A, Volume 44
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
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Mr. Melland, Chief of Enemy Documentation Section of the Historical
Branch, Cabinet Office, London, c/o British Joint Services Mission,
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Captain Steiger, Canadian Army Historical Section, c/o Canadian
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Editorial Note:

The translation of this German War Diary was made in London, England, under the guidance of Commander S. R. Sanders, USNR. When his London Office was closed and the translation project was discontinued, much unfinished material was sent to Naval History Division, (Op-29). Volumes of these diaries have been periodically distributed as funds and other conditions permitted.

The translations and stencils have not been checked by the Director of Naval History Division for accuracy of interpretation, phraseology, and spelling of officers' names or geographical names. Distribution under these conditions seems justified because of the excellent reputation of the London personnel and because translators are not available in Naval History Division. Research to correct possible inconsistencies did not warrant the time involved.

The War Diaries of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof.



Items of Political Importance

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

- I. The Chief, Naval Communications Division reported on the present position of radar gear in the Sicilian-Tunisian area and along the French coast.

Chief, Naval Staff ordered investigations as to whether destroyers could not actually be prevented from making locations by introducing jammers on submarines.
- II. Report of Quartermaster General on ships' anchorages in Alta Fjord; on the organization of the fire fighting services in the French Atlantic coast naval bases; and on the difficulties encountered in the establishment of the transit route from Auxerre to Chalon-sur-Saone. It was thought, however, that April 18, the date set on the basis of Organization Todt's report, would be adhered to.
- III. Our Naval Attache reported that the survivors of submarine U "77" have been released by the Spanish Navy.
- IV. Chief, Intelligence Division submitted the confirmed results of warfare against merchant shipping for March 1943.

Copy as per l/Skl 10111/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, file: "Enemy Shipping Losses 1943".

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

- V. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:
 - a. The Naval Staff proposed leaving the LUETZOW in the Northern Area until fall 1943. Chief, Naval Staff concurred. Corresponding instructions will be issued to Group North in Teletype l/Skl I op. 965/43 geh. Gkdos. Chfs. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.
 - b. Operations Division's plans for the Iberian Peninsula (copy as per I Skl I op (no reference No. given, Tr.N.) in War Diary, Part C, file: "Gisola") coincide, according to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, with the Fuehrer's ideas which are similar as far as the question of regaining the initiative from the Western Powers is

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concerned, except that they also deal with the possibility of seizing Iceland.

The Naval Staff does not feel that an operation against this island would justify the effort and the very considerable military risks involved. The supply problem would be insoluble, and new supply problems are definitely to be avoided, even if only because of the unsolved problem in the Mediterranean and the strained situation prevailing in the Norwegian and Channel traffic.

Special Items

- I. In accordance with the decision of the Commander in Chief, Navy, Quartermaster Division has issued orders on the cession of six PT boats to Spain. Copy corresponding to 1/Skl 95901/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.
 - II. The Naval Staff has sanctioned the proposals of Group North on the allocation of minelayers (see War Diary 29 March) in the cases of the BRUMMER, OSTMARK and SKUGERRAK.

The KAISER and ROLAND are, for the time being, to remain at the disposal of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic. Further instructions on the allocation of minelayers will be issued to Group North. Copy in accordance with Teletype 1/Skl I op. 9475/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C d.
 - III. With reference to the report from the Naval Attache, Rome on the administration of the Toulon arsenal (see War Diary 28 March), Naval (Ship) Construction Division considered the Italian Navy Department's apprehensions to be groundless in view of the agreement reached in Italy with High Command, Navy's representative for naval ship construction in Southern France on 31 March 1943.
 - IV. Special Radio Monitoring Report 13/43 contained a compilation of enemy intelligence obtained from radio deciphering and radio intelligence between 22 and 28 March. There is no need to call attention to any special items not already dealt with.
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Situation 1 April 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The DOGGER BANK has not answered our request of 28 March for a position report from her position 300 miles south of the Azores. If she has been sailing at a lower speed than assumed, and her position on 28 March was farther north than the above-mentioned line, she should be off Cape Ortegal by 6 April at the latest. According to dead reckoning, the fuel supply can only last up to 4 April, or if a slower speed has been maintained over a long period, ten days longer. The Naval Staff will have to give her up as lost after 7 April, if no clues concerning her fate have been established by then.

Group West has been notified in Teletype 1/Skl I k 985/54 Gkdos. Chefs.

Naval Staff transmitted a weather report to the DOGGER BANK in Radiogram 1403, and a submarine warning for the inner part of the Bay of Biscay in Radiogram 1906, mentioning a torpedo hit against the PIETRO ORSEOLO whilst putting in, about 60 miles off the mouth of the Gironde (see "Situation West Area"). Radiogram 1906 furthermore included the estimated positions of the reported enemy convoys.

The following instructions were dispatched to the IRENE in Radiogram 0052:

1. From 4 April our submarine will be waiting at a position 1° farther north and 1° farther east of Point Isegrimm.
2. The rendezvous is to be approached five hours after dawn, then she is to wait within a ten mile radius until dark. If the meeting does not take place, the same procedure is to be repeated the following day.
3. Special recognition signal for submarine: painter;

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stages are to be hung up on both sides amidships if weather favorable, firehose on after mast if unfavorable, as well as merchant vessel recognition signal.

4. Naval Staff anticipates that the meeting place will be reached on 4 or 5 April.

The IRENE was informed in Radiogram 1424 that on 27 March numerous icebergs and floes were reported to be in 57° 10' N, 42° W, and floes alone in 58° 42' N, 40° 49' W. The ALSTERUFER was ordered in Radiogram 2234, thus canceling order 2306 of 31 March, to steer a southwesterly course from Point Odde for 200 miles, only then altering course to the south.

The PORTLAND and the OSORNO were informed that on 3 April they were to anticipate being passed west of the island group by the IRENE (formerly SILVAPLANA) still a reciprocal course.

All ships in foreign waters were informed of enemy warship movements in the South Atlantic in Radiogram 1514, and of the estimated positions of convoys in the North Atlantic in Radiogram 2105.

The Naval Attache, Tokyo reported that in the interests of subsequent blockade runners all blockade runner movements were without exception to be treated as top secret in Tokyo and requested that reports on incoming vessels be submitted in special officers' cipher.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, two 18,000 - 20,000 ton transports with men and equipment, left Plymouth on the evening of 30 March for Gibraltar, escorted by three heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier and 16 torpedo boats.

At 0943 a British vessel was approximately located about 240 - 390 miles south of Brest.

According to an intelligence report from England via the Ostrow intelligence agency, dated 24 March, no large-scale plans for launching an attack on the

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continent were perceptible in London. Troop concentrations were not extensive. No leave was being canceled in the Army and Navy and only to a limited extent in the R.A.F. Concentrations of heavy transport tonnage were not observed. Single divisions could, however, be embarked from places in the southwest of England and in Fife at very short notice. The warships reported in Milford Haven were still there on 27 March.

According to further intelligence reports, it was said that preparations were in progress for sending a considerable number of troops out from England to North Africa in April.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

On its return to Bordeaux, the 8th Destroyer Flotilla reported on the execution of Operation "Elisabeth", that it had had to take evasive action in the Bay of Biscay because of planes carrying radar gear. Otherwise Operation "Elisabeth" had proceeded according to plan and without incident. The Flotilla was once again sighted by enemy air reconnaissance on the evening of 30 March before picking up the PIETRO ORSEOLO. Enemy reports decoded aboard ship, however, contained no references whatsoever to the PIETRO ORSEOLO. The Flotilla assumes that the enemy operations on 30 and 31 March were diverted from the PIETRO ORSEOLO by the destroyer group and the repeatedly sighted steamer HIMALAYA. Although the Flotilla took evasive action to the south to get away from the HIMALAYA, in order to shake off the enemy air reconnaissance flying round that ship, owing to a difference in fix contact was made with her at the limits of visibility. A recognition signal from destroyer Z "32" was not answered by the HIMALAYA. Following an SOS from the HIMALAYA, containing the positions of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, destroyer Z "32" was detached, but failed to find her, despite a thorough search. The Flotilla thought she might possibly have scuttled herself, although a ruse on her part was not out of the question. The PIETRO ORSEOLO was picked up by the Flotilla according to plan. At 0445 on 1 April the PIETRO ORSEOLO was attacked by the enemy submarine. The Flotilla even suspected two submarines, as two torpedo spreads were

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observed. As visibility was less than 1,000 meters, the Flotilla thought it quite likely that the submarines fired according to location data. A submarine chase was carried out by two destroyers without result. The PIETRO ORSEOLO received a hit level with hatch 2, but it had very little effect, as the cargo consisted of rubber. Destroyer Z "23", too, was hit by a torpedo which did not explode, because the track angle was too acute. She was not damaged. At 1330 PIETRO ORSEOLO dropped anchor off Le Verdon.

The incoming blockade runners were obviously picked up with success owing to synchronization with the escort of vessels outward bound.

The PIETRO ORSEOLO had 4,000 tons of caoutchouc on board, part of which may have been unfortunately lost through the leak caused by the torpedo hit, 1,108 tons of tin, 2,369 tons of fats, 556 tons of tea and 15 tons of quinine as well as various other goods for Germany. The tin and part of the tea are for Italy. The remaining goods are in short supply and of considerable importance to Germany's economic warfare.

On the suggestion of the Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla, the 4th Coast Patrol Force has assigned the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla the task of salvaging drifting bales of rubber southeast of the scene of the disaster.

The HIMALAYA reported at 1630 in answer to our patrol vessels near St. Jean de Luz. The ship is undamaged and is being taken along the coast to La Pallice by escort vessels.

A further report is still outstanding. It is thought that the ship's SOS signal was possibly sent out as a result of contact with our own 8th Destroyer Flotilla.

For further details about Operations "Elisabeth" and "Anke" see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b, file Operation "Elisabeth".

Group West has been instructed by the Naval Staff to continue long-range reconnaissance for the REIHER, at least with a few planes, until 6 April. Group West reported in this connection that it will not be possible to resume the reconnaissance until 3 April, as Air Commander, Atlantic Coast has, at his own

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urgent request, had to be given two days' respite to re-establish the operational readiness of his planes.

Naval Staff has informed Group West, Supply Ship Unit, West, Naval Special Service, Bordeaux, with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Section III and Chief, Naval Communications Division that all blockade runners which have not sailed by 1 April 1943 will then be unable to do so until late fall. The preliminary measures so far taken will have to be rescinded unobtrusively. The sailing orders issued should be canceled but not destroyed.

Order to this effect l/Skl I k 976/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Minesweeping operations and escort duties were canceled owing to the weather. The patrol positions were not taken up.

One mine-exploding vessel was in action merely in order to sweep the channel from Elbe I to Wesermuende.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reported four Russian submarines off the Arctic coast of Norway. One submarine left Polyarnoe for the Barents Sea. Russian PT boats are expected to put out from the bays of the Rybachi Peninsula on 2 April.

According to an intelligence report, a convoy of 40 steamers is said to be leaving Belfast for Murmansk on 5 April.

Own Situation:

There is nothing to report from the area of Naval Command, Norway.

Group North informed the REGENSBURG of weather conditions. As the ship has not been located either by the Air Force or by submarines, she has been ordered by Group North in Radiogram 1735 to report passing longitude of Point "Luzie" by a short signal.

Naval forces have been ordered to wait at Point "Caesar" until 2000 on 2 April.

The same air reconnaissance as for 1 April is planned for 2 April.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

The patrol in the Skagerrak during the night of 31 March had to be canceled as the patrol boats were on escort duty. It was carried out by five patrol boats during the day.

Escort duties were postponed for 24 hours, partly owing to the weather. Vessels were sent out to sweep the channels. One mine was swept off Cape Kullen, one west of Anholt and one off Pillau. The German diving tender HARMSDORF sank off Zingst, presumably having struck a mine.

Both Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States had nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

There was brisk reconnaissance activity in the Bay of Biscay, 30 planes having been observed.

2. Own Situation:

In the North Atlantic a new group, "Loewenherz", consisting of 15 submarines, has been formed which is to take up position in reconnaissance line from AK 2516 to 5919 at midnight on 2 April and lie in wait for the eastbound convoy on course 260°. No reports of successes have been received either from the North or the South Atlantic, or from the Cape area.

For further details see "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare:1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 140 planes out on operation over the west area and 12 over the Mediterranean. A place on the Isle of Wight was bombed and machine-gunned by three FW 190's in the late afternoon.

During the day planes were observed three times over the coast of northwestern France.

Between 1600 and 1800 the air force station and city of Trier were heavily raided. For further details see "Daily Situation Report".

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force has been concentrating on supporting the defensive action of Army Group, Africa.

The enemy repeatedly attacked our Tunisian airfields. Such raids are expected to increase. Five Spitfires and four bombers were shot down.

3. Eastern Front:

On 31 March 20 enemy planes were shot down over our lines, two of our planes were lost.

The 4th Air Force's report on the result of its reconnaissance of the Black Sea ports has furnished us with no fresh information.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The FORMIDABLE entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean on the evening of 31 March.

On the forenoon of 1 April a convoy of 14 steamers, 1 naval landing craft and 6 escort vessels left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

In the afternoon the RODNEY carried out a firing practice east of Gibraltar. Towards noon, the Swedish Red Cross ships BARDALAND and FENRIS entered

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Gibraltar from the Aegean Sea, while the Swedish vessels ANKA and YARRAWONGA left making for the west.

Only slight shipping traffic was observed in the Western Mediterranean.

Submarines were observed near San Vito, south of Palermo, where the coast was under fire, and also west of Cape Bon. According to Italian radio intelligence, one convoy entered Tripoli from the east on 31 March. Nothing to report from the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

A PT boat minelaying operation has been planned for the night of 1 April. The minesweepers M "6021", "6023" and five auxiliary motor minesweepers entered La Spezia on 31 March. The minesweeper M "6024" and the submarine chaser UJ "2210" sailed from Naples to Trapani. The report of moored mines off Cape Spartivento (see War Diary 31 March) has been corrected. It was a drifting mine.

German Naval Command, Italy reported that 602 German soldiers were missing and 340 saved, when the two Italian destroyers struck mines and sank off Cape Bon on 24 March.

German Naval Command, Italy reported that in agreement with the German Staff attached to the Italian Naval High Command, the HERMES will be specially commissioned for minelaying operations, and that the Italian Naval High Command was therefore requested not to attach her to the 7th Coast Patrol Force for operations, but to place her directly under the German Naval Command.

The Naval Attache, Rome reported that according to information from the Italian Navy emanating from a reliable source, the movements of warships and merchant vessels in French south coast ports were being regularly betrayed to the enemy in detail. Who discloses the information has not yet been discovered. The Intelligence Service has been brought into action.

Two steamers were sunk and a third set on fire during an enemy air raid on Cagliari on the afternoon of 31 March.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Of the eight ships which left for Tunisia on 23 March, only the tanker BIVONA has reached Bizerta, and the steamers BELLUNO and PIERRE CLAUDE Tunis. The following were lost: the steamer NUORA (3,075 G.R.T.) by bomb and aerial torpedo hits off Cape Bon at 1345 on 31 March; the steamer CREMA (1,684 G.R.T.) in a PT boat attack 18 miles east of Bizerta at 0145 on 1 April; the steamer BENEVENTO (5,229 G.R.T.) was torpedoed and beached. One PT boat was shot up by a German submarine chaser. The steamer LE BORGNE and the destroyer LUBINIA as well as the steamer AQUILA were beached.

The transports "5", "6", "7", "9" and "13" were expected to enter Tunis on the evening of 1 April. Their arrival has not yet been reported. Of the 46 small craft which left Marsala and Trapani, so far only seven Italian naval landing craft have reported their arrival in Tunis.

The resumption of transport traffic with the improvement in the weather, has occasioned a very regrettable number of losses. According to reports received by Operations Division, the following vessels were sunk by enemy action in the Mediterranean during March:

28 ships, totaling 78,223 G.R.T. as well as 2 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 2 submarine chasers, 5 tugs, 3 motor sailing vessels, 3 harbor defense vessels, 6 Siebel ferries, 1 landing boat, 2 naval landing craft and 1 lighter. In addition, 9 ships totaling 45,769 G.R.T., 4 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 3 German motor minesweepers, 2 German naval landing craft and 2 landing boats were damaged. The balance sheet is appalling.

It has been reported in connection with the progress made in the transfer of ships from south coast French ports to Italy, that so far 99 French and 24 neutral ships have been transferred.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Two Greek fishing vessels were stopped by a submarine

off Kassandras on 31 March. One of them was sunk. According to an Italian report, another enemy submarine was fired on by an Italian netlayer group northeast of Khios on the same day. The report is rather doubted, as air reconnaissance did not spot anything.

A submarine chase has started off Kassandras and Khios. Escort duties in the Aegean Sea are being delayed by the submarine menace. An attempt to dynamite the quarters of the Port Commander, Canea was made on the evening of 31 March, causing only slight material damage.

The Naval Staff pointed out to Group South that the proposals for the defense of the Corinth Canal will have to be dealt with by German Naval Command, Italy as being the competent authority, for Vice Admiral Ruge at the Italian Admiralty is only carrying out the limited task of safeguarding the supplies for Tunisia.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

The tanker torpedoed by submarine U "24" was not sighted again by our air reconnaissance.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla did not put out owing to deteriorating weather conditions.

The Crimea convoys and the Constantza-Sevastopol convoy service have been carried out according to plan, as has the 12th Anapa transport. The westbound ferry service across the Strait of Kerch carried, among other things, approximately 5,000 men, 370 motorized and 560 horse-drawn vehicles, and 2,317 horses; the eastbound, 1,224 soldiers and approximately 2,500 tons of supplies.

Admiral, Black Sea reported that 101,665 soldiers, 17,970 prisoners, 14,961 civilians and 1,910 wounded - 136,500 men in all - more than 38,000 motorized and more than 15,000 horse-drawn vehicles, and nearly 60,000 horses were transferred by sea up to 1 April.

In answer to a request from Group South for further submarines, Naval Staff stated that it had decided not to allocate any more for the time being, in view of concentration of forces and slight prospects of success in the Black Sea. Any reinforcements at a later date would depend on the results achieved by the six submarines now operating there.

Admiral, Black Sea reported that one of the pre-requisites for the proposed use of the naval artillery lighters was that the crews be accommodated on board. This matter will be further dealt with by the Quartermaster Division (see teletype 1240).

VIII. Situation East Asia:

It is reported from Tokyo that the following vessels took part in the action west of Attu: on the Japanese side, 2 heavy and 1 light cruiser and 4 destroyers; on the American side, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser and 4 destroyers. Neither side was supported by its air force. According to Japanese observation, the forward turret of the cruiser PENSACOLA was put out of action and there was a large fire in the stern. There were also fires on a light cruiser of the OMAHA class. Two destroyers were damaged. There were no Japanese losses. The American ships took evasive action to the east. The Japanese were escorting supply transports bound for Attu and Kiska.

Aerial warfare in the area of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands has been further increasing in intensity. Enemy air raids have been mainly directed against the Japanese air base at Munda. Japanese naval anti-aircraft guns brought down 41 planes in the middle of March.

On 19, 22 and 26 March Japanese planes successfully raided the American air base on Canton Island. On 25 March two carriers and ten destroyers were sighted southeast of the Solomon Islands.

On 28 March there were Japanese air raids on Oro Bay (south of Buna). An 8,000 G.R.T. transport, a 5,000 G.R.T. one, a destroyer and a patrol vessel were sunk. In the course of an engagement with 30 enemy fighters, 11 were shot down for certain and probably 8 more. Three Japanese planes were lost.

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On 13 March there was a Japanese raid on Port Darwin; 16 planes were shot down. Only slight damage was caused by enemy raids in the Alfura Sea.

On 19 March the Japanese passenger steamer TAKACHIHO MARU (8,154 G.R.T.) was sunk off Formosa. Only 200 of the 1,000 passengers were saved.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

In the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill once more refused to discuss submarine warfare on 1 April.

In the Canadian Parliament, Mr. Eden declared that the submarine was still the greatest menace. He furthermore stated that Germany, Italy and Japan would have to be completely disarmed, and that there would always be differences of opinion among the Allies but they were not insurmountable.

United States:

Secretary Knox stated in a speech that the main responsibility for the victory at sea rested with the United States, because she had the largest fleet. Naval warfare would as never before in history be the decisive factor in the achievement of victory. This war was a naval war to an infinitely greater extent than ever before, a global war, involving every ocean.

France:

According to Reuter General de Gaulle has announced his great desire to go to North Africa immediately, accompanied by several members of the French National Committee of Liberation.

Turkey:

According to our own News Agency it has been announced in the Turkish press that the State Aviation Department has decided to have seven new airfields built in various parts of the country.

Japan:

According to Domei, Rear Admiral Prince Kuni has been appointed Chief of the Combined Naval Air Forces.

Hungary:

The Hungarian Premier arrived in Rome on a visit on 1 April.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

- I. Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division reported that the ships' anchorages in Alta Fjord are well defended. Admiral, North Sea Station gave an account of Wilhelmshaven's inadequate air defenses. Until the number of anti-aircraft batteries has been increased, supposedly by the end of October, Wilhelmshaven will continue to be unsuitable for berthing important vessels.
- II. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reported that the question of the iron quotas for constructions had not yet been definitely solved. In any case, subordinate authorities were refusing to deliver the quotas promised to the Navy. It was suggested that the Commander in Chief, Navy, after having studied a preparatory report by the Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament, should once more broach the matter to Minister Speer on the occasion of the coming visit to the Berghof.
- III. The Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reported among other things, that strikes and boycotts have been occurring in the heavy industries of Milan.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

- IV. Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section, Operations Division reported on the situation regarding long-range reconnaissance planes.
- V. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:
 - a. German Naval Command, Italy plans to use the HERMES for minelaying operations. Naval Staff felt that an agreement with Commanding General, Armed Forces, South would have to be reached on this question. Chief, Naval Staff concurred.
 - b. No news of the DOGGER BANK has been received. Reconnaissance operations for this ship will be continued until 6 April. A submarine rendezvous with the IRENE has been agreed on with Submarine Division. Neither has a report been received from the REGENSBURG. The destroyers GALSTER and RIEDEL have sustained severe sea damage and have had to break off operations. Naval Staff felt that it had been most unwise to send out the destroyers in such weather.

- VI. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff suggested that the HIMALAYA should, if possible, put out immediately in order to take advantage of this month's remaining new moon period. The Chief, Naval Staff concurred.
- VII. The Chief, Operations Division reported that the Japanese Naval Attache had been informed about the Italian transport submarines.
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Special Items

- I. Vice Admiral Ruge reported on the activity to date of the German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty. It would appear that the German Staff's work is beginning to bear fruit. The general situation is being very greatly influenced by the enemy air force's numerical superiority. Our own escort forces are at present inadequate, both in number and armament. Copy of the report as per l/Skl 1043/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.
- II. A record of the investigation up to 1 April 1943 into the possibilities of a special delivery of 18,000 tons of fuel oil from the stocks of the German Navy to the Italian Navy in view of operations by Italian battleships in defense against enemy landings, will be found in l/Skl 9661/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX. It would only be possible by foregoing the proposed transfer of the NUERNBERG and of a destroyer and two torpedo boats from Norway back to home waters, and of four destroyers from Western France to Norway via home waters, and by abandoning all other plans to exchange light naval forces. The resulting economy might amount to some 4,000 tons which would then be available in the second half of April. (See also War Diary 3 April.)
- III. According to information from the Naval (Ship) Construction Division, the Italian Navy has requested that in order to increase the capacity of the Italian shipyards, repairs to German submarines in the Mediterranean be carried out as soon as possible in Toulon instead of in La Spezia and Pola. The Naval (Ship) Construction Division has come to an agreement whereby this change will be effected by 1 August 1943. It will

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mean increasing the submarine repair capacity in Toulon from five to sixteen submarines by the end of July.

Naval Staff will have to point out to the Italian Navy that the strength of the Toulon air defenses will have to be increased accordingly.

- IV. The Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff replied as follows to Naval Staff's request for submarine protection by attacks on the enemy air force in the Bay of Biscay (see War Diary 5 March):

"The Commander in Chief, Air Force is aware of the situation described by the Naval Staff. But it is for the present impossible to effect a change as there are no better types of planes available. In order at least to improve reconnaissance, an order has already been issued for one of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast's reconnaissance squadrons to be re-equipped with the Ju 88 T 1 as soon as this type comes off the assembly lines. This change will probably begin in April. The advantage of this new type lies in the air-cooled BMW engine which is far less vulnerable to gunfire than a water-cooled engine, as well as in the fact that the entire series is equipped with a cold starting device (GM 1)."

Situation 2 April 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio Daventry gave details of the sinking of a large German blockade running tanker about 600 miles west-southwest of Cape Finisterre at 0945 on 26 Feb. It was spotted by a U.S. plane with R.A.F. Coastal Command. The heavy cruiser SUSSEX reached the reported position six hours later and opened fire at a range of nine miles. The blockade runner caught fire and was abandoned by the crew. It sank at 0610 the next morning. A FW 200 having been reported shortly before the sinking of the ship, and submarines having been sighted nearby, the British cruiser was unable

pick up the survivors. The British learnt from statements made by prisoners that our submarines were being sent out to meet the incoming blockade runners. In conclusion Radio Daventry stated that within eight weeks five German blockade runners had been sunk.

This all referred to the loss of the HOHENFRIEDBERG.

According to an intelligence report, the convoy from Pensacola to Dakar is scheduled to leave round about 7 April. It is said to include eleven troop transports filled to capacity, and seven large tankers.

2. Own Situation:

The following instructions have been issued as a precautionary measure to the DOGGER BANK in Radiogram 1923:

1. Naval Staff has no information on position of DOGGER BANK.
2. According to Naval Staff's calculations, fuel supply must be nearly exhausted. Refueling possible in Cadiz, Vigo and Ferrol. Any one of these ports may be resorted to if need be.
3. Radio communication permitted, if thought necessary and likely to result in assistance from here. Weather report was transmitted to DOGGER BANK in Radiogram 1540.

In Radiogram 1130 the KARIN was instructed to report her position at a suitable opportunity, as no news of the ship's fate was available.

Group West was informed of Radiogram 1923 to the DOGGER BANK with the additional remark that the request for a position report south of the Azores had not yet been answered and that a direct request for a position report might well, in the opinion of the Naval Staff, greatly endanger the ship between the Azores and the Portuguese coast, so that the commander would be only too justified in forbidding the transmission of radio messages except in cases of special emergency. Copy of instructions in accordance with 1/Skl I k 997/43 Gkdos. Chofs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

II. Situation West Area:1. Enemy Situation:

At 1020 air reconnaissance spotted two destroyers 320 miles northwest of Cape Ortegal making for the north.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/J mines were swept off Brest. The town and dockyard area of St. Nazaire were raided by about 15 enemy planes at 2303. The locks were undamaged. One four-engined plane was shot down by two patrol boats on the outer Gironde.

The PIETRO ORSEOLO entered Bordeaux at 1930.

The HIMALAYA dropped anchor in Paillax Roads at 1830 on 1 April and entered La Pallice at 1330 on 2 April.

The Naval Staff informed the Naval Attache, Madrid that the HIMALAYA had broken off her preparations for scuttling and had returned to Western France.

Group West was ordered to investigate and report at the earliest opportunity whether the HIMALAYA would be able to sail again soon (condition of the ship, crew and conduct of the captain). If the results are satisfactory, preparations will have to be undertaken at once - issue of Naval Staff's operational orders translated into Italian, and recognition signal instructions for overseas by "Betasom" (Italian submarine station in Bordeaux, Tr. N.), replacement of the captain, if necessary, etc. The signal equipment has been arranged by the Naval Staff.

Commanding Admiral, Group West submitted a short report on Operation "Elisabeth" (Blockade running operation in Bay of Biscay area - Tr. N.) supplementing reports made during the operation. Copy as per 1/Skl 1003/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b. The report rightly stresses that the credit for the successful execution of this operation was essentially due to the long-range reconnaissance of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast. On the conclusion of Operation

"Elisabeth", ten blockade runners totaling 60,053 G.R.T. had been escorted out, and five totaling 38,080 G.R.T. brought in by Group West since 1 Oct. 1942. Two homeward bound and two outward bound blockade runners totaling 30,687 G.R.T were lost by enemy action in Group West's area within the same period. These losses are to be attributed to the lack of long-range reconnaissance which then prevailed.

Naval Staff fully concurred with the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Group West.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Escort duties were postponed for 24 hours owing to the weather. Minesweeping was canceled, patrol positions were not taken up. In the Dutch area, an enemy plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

The 5th Air Force's reconnaissance of the areas southwest of Jan Mayen and off the east coast of Scotland did not produce any sighting reports. Nine planes were detected by radio intelligence over the central part of the North Sea; there was slight activity by the Iceland air squadrons.

Own Situation:

At 2250 on 30 March two Russian vessels were sighted off Kimoniemi; they withdrew to the north after being fired on by the Battery Petsamo. A mine was cut loose west of Makkauer on 31 March. A Norwegian sea rescue cutter was unsuccessfully attacked by bombs and machine-guns in Varanger Fjord on 29 March. Slight enemy air activity was reported over the Vardoe - North Varanger area and Petsamo; no bombs were dropped. Escort duties were carried out according to plan.

The 6th Destroyer Flotilla with the GALSTER, JACOBI and RIEDEL had to break off the exploratory sweep undertaken to pick up the REGENSBURG owing to sea damage and engine trouble. The flotilla started its return passage to Narvik.

The torpedo boats GREIF and JAGUAR completed their submarine chase off Ands Fjord. The JAGUAR sustained sea damage and developed engine trouble. The boats put in to Harstad. The four submarines of the second wave are being formed into Group "Taifun" with orders to proceed at high speed and occupy grid squares AB 8255, 8267, 8227 and 8261.

Group North informed the REGENSBURG that air reconnaissance had been canceled owing to weather conditions, and that the destroyers were putting in for the same reason, but that our submarines would be stationed in defense positions at Point "Caesar" from 1600 on. The REGENSBURG received instructions in Radiogram 1030 that as soon as Point "Caesar" is reached, according to her own fix and she is not picked up by our own forces there, she is to steer straight for the southern point of the Lofoten Islands and enter West Fjord, where she will be taken under escort by our forces at the entrance. The REGENSBURG is to report her departure from Point "Caesar" in a short radio message. The first submarine will not reach Point "Caesar" until about 2200 owing to delay. The REGENSBURG was furthermore directed to transmit five-letter groups beginning with the letter "J" for a period of two minutes, after having passed Point "Luzic", at 2300/2.4. or 0400/3.4. for bearings to be taken.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

The patrolling of the Skagerrak was carried out by three patrol boats. Eleven vessels were detailed to sweep the channels in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. The Aarhus - Oslo shipping traffic was postponed for two days owing to the lack of escort vessels. One ground mine was swept north of Buelk and one southwest of Anholt. Shipping in the western part of the Baltic Sea was warned of drifting mines.

According to information from the Naval Attache, Stockholm, the Swedish Navy is insisting on channel 90 being used for the time being. Until such time as an identical form of course instructions has been worked out by the Swedish Navy and the Naval Attache, Stockholm, divergences in the

descriptions of the channels by the German and Swedish stations issuing these instructions, will have to be accepted.

Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that the first partial minofield "Nashorn IV" had been laid. The Net Defense Unit is continuing Operation "Walross". The "B" group of the 31st Minesweeper Flotilla put in to Liepaja on account of the weather with 18 ships bound for Tallinn.

Special Items:

The Minister of Transportation requested escort and anti-aircraft protection for ferry boats between Trelleborg and Sassnitz. Naval Staff stated that anti-aircraft protection had already been provided for as part of the proposed defense measures. A request for fighter protection was passed on to the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff as being the competent authority.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity in the Bay of Biscay was normal, 29 planes having been observed.

2. Own Situation:

In the North Atlantic, submarine U "229" sighted a single ship in AK 1576, course 320°, and was ordered to pursue her as far as the western limit of the closed area, but not to attack before checking up on her type very carefully owing to the lack of exact data on the blockade runners.

Submarine U "178" intercepted a convoy in CF 3389 at 1605, course 200°.

Submarine U "129" of the southern group sank the refrigerator ship MELBOURNE STAR (12,806 G.R.T.) in DD 9929. No further successes were reported from the Atlantic. For further details see "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Seventy-seven planes belonging to the 3rd Air Force were over the west area and seven over the Mediterranean. During the day there was slight enemy air activity over the occupied part of the west area. There were no raids. In the evening, 45 planes were over the Lorient - St. Nazaire area. For the raid on St. Nazaire, see "Situation West Area".

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force is supporting the battles of Army Group Africa with all available forces and concentrating on the southern sector in repeated day and night attacks. Reconnaissance, escort and air transport operations were carried out as usual. Nocturnal enemy air operations against Sicily were ineffective. On 1 April three bombers carried out a nuisance raid on Bone. Three enemy planes were shot down in all.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

On the evening of 1 April a convoy of 15 steamers, 1 transport and 1 tanker entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. The transport and two steamers were damaged. On 2 April a convoy of 10 steamers and 2 landing craft accompanied by 5 escort vessels reached Gibraltar from the Atlantic. In the afternoon, the NELSON and five destroyers ostensibly carried out a firing practice east of Gibraltar. One corvette and 20 LCT's have left for the Mediterranean.

According to an intelligence report, a convoy consisting of 28 steamers and one seaplane parent ship was said to have left Cardiff for Algiers on 31 March.

Enemy Situation Branch, Intelligence Division stated that the total shipping space available in the Western Mediterranean was, once again, 300,000 G.R.T. below normal. Reinforcements in the shape of three convoys, reported under way, are anticipated. The concentration of forces now prevailing in the Western Mediterranean is emphasized by the continuous influx of material and landing craft. This unstable state of affairs may well continue, particularly if the enemy wishes to await further developments in the present fighting around Tunis, so as to be, if necessary, in a position to attack the supply lines of the German Army in Tunis with stronger forces. Brisker shipping traffic has been observed in the area off Oran; it included an eastbound convoy of 15 steamers at a point 22 miles northeast of the port at 1722.

In Algiers, 7 tankers, 3 passenger steamers and 54 steamers totaling more than 300,000 G.R.T. were observed on 31 March. Our air reconnaissance sighted five ships 50 miles southwest of Malta on a northeasterly course at 2330 on 1 April, a convoy of ten ships off Tripoli at 1030 on 2 April and, for the first time, 21 LCT's in the harbor. In the afternoon, there were seven steamers, one tanker, and additional small craft in Benghazi.

No important sighting reports have been received from the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Two Italian submarines were in the operational area. Submarine U "755" sank an individually routed 8,000 G.R.T. ammunition steamer in CH 7566 at 0624.

Weather conditions prevented PT boat, motor minesweeper and auxiliary motor minesweeper operations in Tunisia. The minesweepers M "6021" and M "6023" and five auxiliary motor minesweepers entered Piombino. The minesweeper M "6024" and the submarine chaser UJ "2110" were proceeding from Naples to Trapani. The submarine hunt carried out north of Cape Zebib on 1 April was unsuccessful.

Vice Admiral Ruge reported that it was intended to carry out minelaying operations in conjunction with two Italian destroyers after the arrival of the

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HERMES. The German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty reported with reference to the disastrous events of 31 March and 1 April, that shipping losses could only be reduced by increasing the air cover and by using vessels capable of a speed of at least 12 knots, so that most of the danger zone could be crossed by day and the North African ports entered before dark.

Following the survey of the situation by the German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty (see special Items, Paragraph I), Vice Admiral Ruge depicted the position of our own defense forces in the Mediterranean as follows:

Former French torpedo boats are being taken over. Two boats will be ready to sail by about the middle of April; one boat will have had echo-ranging gear installed by the beginning of May. An aviso will be commissioned in Port de Bouc on 15 April. The gun boat YSER is out of commission. Six fast escort vessels (2 - 3,000 G.R.T. anti-aircraft corvettes) and a night fighter control ship will be completed by the end of June. Six submarine chasers are fully operational and one partially; one will not be operational for months as a result of bomb hits. Six additional submarine chasers (1,000 G.R.T. fishing vessels) will be commissioned on 15 April. Three small motor minesweepers belonging to the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla are operational; two are due for dockyard repairs in Naples; one is lying seriously damaged at Bizerta; two vessels on passage Rhine-Rhone will be ready for action in the second half of April, four in Kiel dockyard will be ready to put out on 20 April. Six motor boats will be ready for operations as auxiliary motor minesweepers at the beginning of May. Six auxiliary motor minesweepers (open sea-going lobster boats used as minesweepers) are operating in the North African area, five are under way and will be ready for operations at the beginning of April. An additional ten are under way in the Canal du Midi and will be ready for operations by the middle of April. One minesweeper (small fishing vessel) is operating in the North African area, three are on passage and will be ready for operations at the beginning of April. Forty-six motor fishing vessels for anti-submarine patrols are to be available for commissioning from the beginning of April onwards. Work on the overland route, Seine-Saone, for transporting the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was

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started in the middle of March. The transfer of the 2nd Gun Carrier Flotilla from the west area via the same route is under consideration. Eloyon mine-sweeping picket boats in Antibes will be ready for loading from the middle of April.

The German Staff furthermore reported that the 22nd Submarine Chaser Flotilla confirmed the sinking of one submarine and the probable sinking of another.

For further details see teletype 1445.

According to a situation report from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the hard fighting near Guettar led to the retaking of the desired defense position and to an outstanding success. Strong enemy movements opposite the Faid Pass would suggest that an attack is also being planned here.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The transports KT "5", "6", "7" and "9" entered Tunis in the forenoon. KT "13" was sunk by a mine or submarine 27 miles north of Cape Bon at 1640 on 1 April. Three naval landing craft entered Tunis from Trapani on both 1 and 2 April. According to reports so far received, all the Siebel ferries and infantry landing boats from Marsala, except six, have entered Tunis. Owing to the most praiseworthy efficiency, it was possible to unload all the vessels in Tunis and Bizerta on the same day. The motor ship FOSCARINI entered Naples from Bizerta.

The German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty made the following report on the incidents of 31 March and 1 April:

1. The fast convoy BELLUNO - PIERRE CLAUDE (13 knots) reached its destination according to schedule without being attacked from the air.
2. The slow convoy (9 knots) of the steamers NUORO, BENEVENTO and CREMA, escorted by two Italian torpedo boats and two German submarine chasers was subjected to two daylight air attacks, the steamer NUORO being sunk by a bomb and an aerial torpedo during the second one. Six planes were probably shot down, one by a German submarine chaser. British PT boats launched a night attack immediately

off Bizerta. Sea 4 - 5, The British had a following sea and withdrew, probably towards Malta. A large type boat was evidently involved. The steamer CREMA was sunk, the steamer BENEVENTO damaged and beached. One PT boat was at least damaged by a German submarine chaser.

3. The very slow convoy (7 knots) consisting of the steamers LE BORGNE, AQUILA and BIVONA was escorted by the destroyer LUBIANA, as the convoy leader, a torpedo boat and three submarine chasers, course Pantelleria - Cape Bon. Heavy seas caused great delays, and as a result Cape Bon was passed after dark. The convoy kept close inshore owing to minefields. LUBIANA ran aground west of Cape Bon despite a supposedly accurate fix. LE BORGNE following in her wake, also ran aground and was rammed by AQUILA. LUBIANA broke up. LE BORGNE was beached and AQUILA and BIVONA proceeded on their way. Having sprung a leak, AQUILA was beached just off Bizerta.

German Naval Command, Italy reported that during March 1943 the following ships were operating on the ferry service to Africa:

44 ships totaling 129,339 G.R.T., of which 17 ships totaling 53,110 G.R.T. were sunk and 6 ships totaling 21,328 G.R.T. were seriously damaged. Of the escort vessels, 3 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats were lost, 2 destroyers seriously damaged, and 2 of our submarine chasers sunk. Of the small craft, 6 Siebel ferries, 1 naval landing craft, 1 multi-purpose boat, 1 submarine and 1 landing craft were sunk. Two multi-purpose boats, 2 naval landing craft and 2 landing boats were damaged. For further details see teletype 2015.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Submarine chasing in the northern part of the Aegean Sea was broken off owing to the weather. An enemy submarine opened machine-gun fire on the German DM (microwave, Tr.N.) Station on the southeastern tip of the Peloponnese at 0900 on 1 April. Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan.

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Group South reported that with the shipping space available at present, the storing of supplies on Crete can be carried out in two months if the goods are made ready in good time, and if it proves possible to make extensive use of the ships SINPRA and SANTA FE for the undertaking.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports that there has been lively shipping traffic along the east coast.

Own Situation:

On the night of 2 April operations by German and Italian PT boats proved impossible owing to the weather. Submarine U "24" has been ordered to enter Feodosia for replenishment, and then to return to the operational area for an additional five days.

Sea convoys were canceled owing to the weather. The captured French steamer BRIGITTE entered Burgas from the Bosphorus on 1 April.

The 13th Anapa transport was carried out with two naval landing craft according to plan.

Southeast of Sulina, barrage section "S 54" was laid according to plan. Minesweeping and mine clearing operations in the Sevastopol area and in the Strait of Kerch were unsuccessful.

The ferry service across the Strait of Kerch to Senaya and the fish curing factory was suspended. All the troops and equipment held in readiness at Taman were transported to Kerch. Thus, apart from what is being transported by air, east-west transport traffic has been virtually completed.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

According to a diplomatic report, since the recent German successes on the Eastern Front, Britain and the United States are afraid lest Russia in the face of the recent setbacks in her offensive, should surrender. It is therefore considered imperative that the United States should also give assurances to Stalin as regards Russia's position after the war. In London, however, the value of such assurances is not rated very highly and it is felt that the present waiting policy should be abandoned and the pressure on the Russian Front relieved by way of operations on a large scale in Europe. It is these factors which would point to the imminence of a large-scale offensive being launched from North Africa.

According to a Swedish newspaper report from London, the possibility of a conference between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin is being widely discussed. The British Minister of Food stated that at the beginning of the next phase of extensive military operations Britain would presumably have to live on her reserves during the initial stage of the offensive, as military operations would have priority over all available shipping space. There would therefore probably be alterations in the food ration.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

- I. Report by Naval Ordnance Division on the iron quota for constructions for the second quarter of 1943. Of a total monthly quota of 387,000 tons, only 8,700 tons are allotted to the Navy.

This matter (iron allocation) has been earmarked for the Commander in Chief, Navy's next conference with the Fuehrer.

There will no longer be any exemptions for the age groups 1919 to 1922; they are to be conscripted without exception. The Bureau of Naval Administration will not conscript the skilled workers for the Navy. As a similar decision is not to be expected from the Army and the Air Force, further difficulties are unavoidable.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

- II. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division on the situation as regards the REGENSBURG, KARIN and IRENE. The REGENSBURG is two days overdue. There is as yet no need for anxiety on this score, as ice and weather conditions could easily account for the delay. The fate of the DOGGER BANK is obscure. The maintenance of complete radio silence during her capture or sinking by U.S. patrol forces in the Straits of Natal (narrowest part of Atlantic between Natal in Brazil and Freetown, Tr.N.), for instance, is possible, although it should be remembered that in the case of merchant vessels in the Atlantic, the enemy is generally compelled first to ascertain the enemy character of the ship with great care, which gives our blockade runners time to transmit an SOS or short signal. The submarine which tried in vain to meet the KARIN is now to meet the IRENE.
- III. Chief, Operations Division pointed out that the Commanding Admiral, Group West's summary of Operation "Elisabeth" (see War Diary 2 April) was most carefully phrased in the parts dealing with the Air Force.

The survey of the oil situation (see War Diary 2 April) made by Operations Division reveals an extremely critical state of affairs. Any movement of forces will call for the most careful deliberation. The exploratory sweep by the three destroyers in Northern Waters was scarcely justified in view of the fuel oil supply. An improvement in the situation cannot, from past experience, be expected until June, when there is always a seasonal drop in Rumania's own consumption.

Special Items

- I. Regarding fuel oil deliveries for the Italian Fleet, the Naval Attache, Rome reported (in a personal letter to Chief, Naval Staff based on strictly confidential information from the German Ambassador) that the Duce had been informed that the Italian Navy would be supplied with 2,000 tons of oil. The Duce is then said to have once more expressed his unshakeable determination that the battleships should put out to sea and carry out unrestricted operations in case of danger despite the fact that with present oil supplies they will only be

able to remain at sea for 20 hours. The Military Attache, Rome emphasized the fact that in his opinion - not shared by the Chief of Staff, German Naval Command, Italy in his communication of 17 March to the Chief, Naval Staff - the spirit of the crews of the Italian Fleet, above all that of the officers, would guarantee the ships fighting and being able to put serious difficulties in the way of any enemy attempt at landing. The British Intelligence Service will be equally well aware of this, and is no doubt likewise accurately informed of the oil situation. Each additional 1,000 tons of oil supplied may, therefore, well have a decisive influence on the enemy's decisions. The Military Attache, indicating the significance of Sardinia, said to be the Achilles heel of the Axis, requested that the question of allocating some further consignments of 1,000 tons of oil be once again investigated. The Military Attache, Rome has, ever since the Casablanca Conference, been of the firm conviction that the British, possibly under Russian pressure, are deferring their original plans for an offensive in the Aegean Sea in favor of concentrating all their forces on breaching the position at present held by us in the Western Mediterranean.

On the basis of the views of Naval Staff, Chief, Armed Forces High Command dispatched to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and to the German General attached to Italian Armed Forces Headquarters the following decision on oil deliveries to Italy:

After a thorough investigation into the oil situation at High Command, Navy and into oil production itself, the Chief, Armed Forces High Command, despite recognizing in principle the demands of the Italian High Command, finds himself unable, for the time being, to supply the requested 18,000 tons of oil.

Reasons:

- a. The necessary ample stocks for such a delivery are available neither in the German Navy nor in the German economy.
- b. The total fuel oil production is at present only barely sufficient to cover the current requirements of both navies.

The fuel oil supplies delivered by the German Navy to cover current Italian requirements have already imposed

the maximum restrictions on our own operations and they could not possibly be exceeded.

The German General attached to Italian Armed Forces Headquarters has been requested to pass this on to the Italian High Command adding that everything is being done by the Armed Forces High Command gradually to improve this situation.

Copy of Teletype 1/Skl 9952/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

- II. The order of Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division dated 2 April on the re-organization of the German Navy (Organization of Naval Warfare) has been recorded in War Diary, Part B, Vol V as per 1/Skl 10211/43. By this order Group North/Fleet is to be set up by merging Group North and Fleet Command. The Command's Headquarters are to be Kiel. The Command's tasks will include: naval warfare in the northern area, control of naval operations also in the operational areas of the North Sea and Baltic Sea Station commands if an enemy attack requires the merging of control for combined defense purposes, as well as direction and execution of operational measures which, within naval warfare in the northern area, call for a general overruling directive for the operational areas of the Stations and the northern area, except for the actual distribution of forces which will be arranged by the Naval Staff.

The area boundaries between the Stations themselves, as well as in relation to the northern and western areas are also laid down in the order.

- III. For a summary for March 1943 of losses within the Axis sphere of influence of merchant vessels sailing under flags other than German see War Diary file: "Own Shipping Losses 1943" as per 1/Skl 9898/43 Gkdos.
- IV. Following the discussion between Commander in Chief, Navy and administrative president Dichls, the reproaches leveled by the latter against the Navy in the Black Sea were thoroughly examined at a conference with Commander in Chief, Navy on 3 April. For the minutes of the conference see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI as per 1/Skl 9936/43 Gkdos. The minutes have revealed the charges to be so unfounded that Commander in Chief, Navy has ordered investigations to be made as to whether proceedings against president Dichls would be justified.

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V: On 15 Feb. the Paris Working Committee of the German Armistice Commission submitted a comprehensive report by the naval section of the French delegation on French naval action at the time of the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa and Morocco.

A copy of the report was passed on to the Foreign Office by the Naval Staff. A further copy is in War Diary file: "Enemy Large-Scale Operations in the Mediterranean in November 1942" as per l/Skl 5048/43 geh.

Situation 3 April

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff transmitted a weather forecast to the DOGGER BANK in Radiogram 1421.

Submarine U "229" reported that the steamer sighted (see War Diary 2 April) was definitely the former KOTA NEPAN = KIRIN. Position at 0200 on 3 April was reported to be 58° 40' N, 33° W, course north, speed 7 knots.

The Naval Staff transmitted this report in Radiogram 2005 to the KIRIN adding instructions to continue her passage north. In Radiogram 2026 a further order was given for the rendezvous with the submarine to be canceled, and that the passage along the ice limits was to be continued via Denmark Strait, whereby Points "Hans", "Jot" and "Max", the positions of which were transmitted in Radiogram 2058, were to serve as guides.

The weather report for the KIRIN was transmitted in Radiogram 2228.

IRENE received the following instructions in Radiogram 1543:

1. In addition to operational order and charts, ship

is to take one meteorologist and two specialists with radar interception gear aboard from the submarine.

2. Instructions on radar interception are being sent. Captain must thoroughly acquaint himself with these instructions before using the set.
3. When transfer from submarine has been completed, passage is to be continued north with submarine. Operational order is to be thoroughly studied and reports requested passed on to submarine. Submarine is then to be dispatched.
4. Naval Staff is making every attempt to prevent ship from being delayed provided weather conditions favorable.

Naval Staff informed Group North about the IRENE in Teletype 1/Skl I k 1009/43 Gkdos. Chefs. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

All ships in foreign waters were informed in Radiogram 1303 that PIETRO ORSEOLO entered the Gironde on 1 April and that the HIMALAYA, contrary to her own report, did not scuttle herself but returned to the southwest coast of France on 1 April.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Our Atlantic reconnaissance was without result.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

2,500 bales of rubber, each weighing 100 kg., have been discharged to date from the PIETRO ORSEOLO. The loss through the leak in hatch 2 has been estimated at 11,000 bales, the equivalent of 25% of the rubber cargo. So far several hundred bales have been either picked up or drifted ashore. Salvage operations are still in progress.

Naval Staff shares the opinion held by Group West on planned action by enemy submarines in the southeastern

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part of the Bay of Biscay. This area is particularly vulnerable also on account of enemy submarine attacks on our ore ships. Group West has been informed of Naval Staff's opinion that it would be expedient to direct ships protected against enemy air attack by destroyers or torpedo boats, not via the channel chosen for the PIETRO OLSEOLO, but farther north, preferably via channel "Kustergatte". For non-escorted ships, a route along Spanish territorial waters will have to be chosen. Operations Division is to investigate with Submarine Division to what extent it would be possible for parts of the Bay of Biscay to be declared open to anti-submarine activity while blockade runners are entering or leaving. Copy as per Teletype 1/Skl I k 1007/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

At 1750 about 20 enemy planes raided Brest, causing slight damage. During the night of 2 April one enemy plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns near Donges. Another plane was probably shot down near St. Nazaire.

Channel Coast:

A minelaying operation by the 5th PT Boat Flotilla has been planned for the night of 3 April in the area off Start Point.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern waters:

Escort duties were carried out according to plan. Patrol positions were taken up.

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North reported that ground mines and ATE mines have been laid off the Dutch coast, which will necessitate a barrage escort for merchant vessels. This will mean fresh merchant shipping delays during bad weather when barrage escort will be impossible.

As all measures taken so far to prevent Danish fishermen from breaking through to the west have proved inadequate, the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff was asked by the Naval Staff to order attack without warning on all fishing vessels met both within and west of the West Wall. (Atlantic Wall? - Tr.N.). For copy of this request see Teletype 1718.

1. Norway/Northern Waters:Enemy Situation:

Our reconnaissance of Northern Waters was without result owing to the weather. Radio intelligence intercepted seven planes over the central part of the North Sea. The Iceland squadrons displayed no activity.

Own Situation:

On the evening of 1 April Russian batteries on the Rybachi Peninsula fired on our eastbound convoy without causing damage. They were answered by our guns. A mine was cut loose off Festerneset on 2 April. The area was temporarily closed to traffic. Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

The RIEDEL entered Narvik at 2210 on 2 April, the GALSTER at 0630 on 3 April. The extensive sea damage to the JACOBI and the GALSTER is being repaired by the repair ship NEUMARK. Repairs in Trondheim dockyard will be necessary for the RIEDEL which had three cable leads burnt out in a second fire. The JAGUAR and GREIF will probably be able to have their sea damage repaired at Harstad. The destroyer Z "28" and the BEITZEN are being transferred to Harstad.

Group North did not receive the bearing signals the REGENSBURG was ordered to transmit after passing Point "Luzic", and issued orders for the transmission to be repeated at 1800 and, if necessary at 2300. As nothing was heard even after 2300, another transmission has been ordered for 0400 on 4 April. The Group attributed the delay in the reception of the message by the REGENSBURG to weather conditions and reported that escort measures were being continued.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

The Hirtshals - Arendal patrol line was taken up by four patrol boats, the Hanstholm barrage gap by one. Two ships and four submarines were escorted within the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Sixteen vessels and two minesweeping planes were detailed to sweep the channels. The steamer LUMME ran aground in the Great Belt south of Korsøer. Owing to stray enemy planes having flown in as far as the vicinity of

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Helsingoer, aerial mines are suspected in the northern outlet of Oere Sound, Ise Fjord, and north of Zealand.

Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that work on the "Nashorn" Barrage and the sweeping of the "Corbetta" Barrage had to be suspended owing to the weather. Operation "Walross" is being continued by the Net Defense Unit.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

According to dead reckoning an eastbound convoy is expected in the operational area of Group "Loewenherz".

Submarine U "554" reported that the minelaying operation off Fedala and Casablanca has been completed. No reports of successes have been received. For further details see "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Special Items:

Naval Intelligence Division has made a summary of enemy opinions on the submarine war, adding its own point of view. Copy as per l/Skl 10369/43 gch. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV. It mainly deals with reports already mentioned in the War Diary.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 169 planes out on operations over the west area and 4 over the Mediterranean.

Eastbourne was raided by sixteen fighter bombers at noon. One BV 138 did not return from a defensive reconnaissance in the Bay of Biscay.

A reconnaissance by six planes has been planned for 4 April between 41° and 46° N up to the limits of penetration.

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The convoy reconnaissance, carried out by two FW 190's for Commander, PT Boats in the direction of Start Point, was without result. Fifty-four of our planes mined the Thames during the night of 3 April. During the day several groups of enemy planes penetrated into the west area. Twelve Mosquitoes attacked an airfield near Abbeville without causing any significant damage. For details of the enemy air attack on Brest between 1710 and 1735 see "Situation West Area".

The Rhine - Westphalian industrial area was attacked by 120 - 150 planes on the night of 3 April. The attacks were concentrated on Essen where heavy damage was once again caused to industrial plants and dwellings. Nineteen enemy planes were shot down.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force went into action in Tunisia in support of the Army. Two steamers sailing in an enemy convoy west of Tenes were torpedoed by seven Ju 88's. The Italian Air Force reported the sinking of one tanker sailing in convoy northeast of Tobruk. During the night of 3 April some torpedo planes were detailed to attack an enemy convoy off the Algerian coast.

3. Eastern Front:

No special reports were received from the army fronts or from the 4th Air Force. One Mosquito was shot down by our fighters southwest of Lister.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Three battleships, one aircraft carrier and one minelayer were observed in Gibraltar at 1300. The view of the harbor was greatly obscured by poor visibility.

The infantry landing ship QUEEN EMMA left for the Mediterranean at 1910 with three destroyers.

No further reports were received from the Western Mediterranean.

A submarine was northwest of Naples at 0410.

According to an Italian report, the steamer TERGESTE was sunk by a submarine torpedo in the Gulf of Marathonesi at 1930 on 2 April. According to radio intelligence, at 1410 a Gibraltar based plane dropped depth charges on a German submarine in an unidentified position. Furthermore, a British formation, several times detected in radio communication with Tripoli, was in the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

PT boats were unable to put out on the night of 2 April owing to the weather. Minesweeping operations along the coastal channel were also canceled for the same reason. The minesweepers M "6021", "6023" and five auxiliary motor minesweepers entered Civitavecchia, M "6024" Palermo, and the submarine chaser "2210" Trapani.

The Naval Staff transmitted to German Naval Command, Italy and to the German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty, its agreement to the proposed commitment and subordination of the HERMES.

The Chief, Naval Staff does not agree with Operations Division that the withdrawal of the HERMES from the Aegean Sea was primarily designed to afford direct convoy protection to the supply line to Tunisia and that the resulting disadvantages in the Aegean Sea could only be borne in view of the urgency of this particular task.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty reported at the request of Operations Division that the tactical command of the three convoys which suffered such heavy casualties on 31 March and 1 April, was in the hands of Italian destroyer and torpedo boat commanders and that in future every effort will be made for a German Staff officer to act as Commander, Convoys.

See Teletype 1845 about equipping the escort vessels with more defense weapons.

Of the 14 Siebel ferries and 14 infantry landing craft which put out, 7 of the former and 2 of the latter have not yet entered Tunis. Furthermore, no

reports have been received on the shipping traffic between Italy and Africa, or on the ships which ran aground on 1 April. For the report by German Naval Command, Italy on the activities of German small craft used for carrying supplies to Africa between 1 - 31 March, see Teletype 0630. Thirteen naval landing craft and 45 Siebel ferries and infantry landing craft took part and they carried out 55 and 135 unescorted trips, respectively. This month every naval landing craft had 10.8 days and every Siebel ferry and infantry landing craft 5.7 days at sea. Transport figures up to 21 March were as follows: 2,760.5 tons of supplies, 157 vehicles, 15 tanks, 33 guns and 186 men.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

An enemy submarine was unsuccessfully attacked with six depth charges by our naval landing craft in the northern part of the Aegean Sea. Submarine chase by the Coastal Defense Flotilla, Macedonia and by planes in the northern part of the Aegean Sea on 2 April was also without result.

The HERMES left Salamis at 1300 on 2 April for transfer to Italy. Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance did not sight any shipping along the east coast.

Own Situation:

The German and Italian PT boats were unable to put out for operations on the night of 2 April. The PT boat operation planned for the night of 3 April also had to be canceled.

The sea convoys have been once more resumed. A towed convoy escorted by two naval landing craft en route from Yalta to Feodosia was attacked by two enemy planes with about 20 bombs on 2 April. One vessel was slightly damaged.

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The 13th Anapa convoy was carried out according to plan. The 14th convoy left Kerch with four naval landing craft.

Submarine U "24" entered Feodosia for replenishment at 1600.

Arrival and dispatch was impeded by bad roads on the Taman side of the ferry route across the Strait of Kerch. Only small amounts for the east-west convoy were assembled ready at the fish curing factory and Taman. On 3 April 952 tons of supplies were carried by the Navy from west to east.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

Reuter reported that a discussion took place between Mr. Churchill and General de Gaulle on 2 April.

On the same day there was a meeting at Melilla between General Clark of the United States and General Orgaz, the Commissioner of Spanish Morocco.

No further items of importance have been received.

Special Items

1. The focal point of our submarine warfare continues to be in the Atlantic. Tonnage sunk there has repercussions in all the other theaters. The number of large submarines at Germany's disposal is at the moment insufficient for the submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean to be extended north of the equator as far as the Arabian Sea. Naval Staff therefore asked Vice Admiral Nomura to investigate whether there might not also be chances of success during the monsoon period by using the far larger Japanese submarines. In view of the situation in the Mediterranean, action against enemy shipping is particularly desirable in these waters. For a letter to this effect from the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, l/Skl I opa. 986/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

It was stated in the same letter that as soon as more large German submarines were ready for operations, the Naval Staff would approach the Japanese Admiralty in good time to discuss extending the operational area and using the base at Penang or provisioning from a floating base.

2. In brief news on the enemy situation, Enemy Situation Branch, Intelligence Division reported on anti-submarine operations, increased convoy escort, auxiliary aircraft carriers, warship movements, interesting appointments and also on the losses and damage to warships announced by the enemy. Copy as per l/Skl 9443/43 geh. in War Diary, file: "Data on the Enemy Situation".

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Situation 4 April

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

A weather report was transmitted to the KARIN in Radiogram 1217. The ship was informed in Radiogram 1402 that no patrols or locations had been observed lately in Denmark Strait and that the ice limit ascertained on 21 March ran north of the line joining the points "H", "J", and "M". Under present weather conditions the ice limit is north of these points, but may quite possibly in parts be somewhat further south. The best protection for the ship would be hazy weather. The positions for points "L" and "C" are given in Radiogram 1525.

The KARIN received the following directive in Radiogram 1950:

1. Our air reconnaissance may be expected from Point "Max" onwards. The types encountered will be FW 200's, BV 138's and Ju 88's. Later on there will be a close air escort along the coast by Ju 88's and He 115's or Arado 196's.
2. On being located by enemy air reconnaissance, immediately steer a deceptive course: if west of the island, towards the port; if east of the island, to the northeast as steered by independently routed ships bound for Murmansk.
3. Group North will assume command approximately from Point "Max" onwards. Group North's radiograms will contain the letter "Nanni" written three times after the number.
4. One of our submarines is at Point "Max"; she is not to meet the KARIN but, if possible, to sight and report her later.
5. It is planned that our destroyers, torpedo boats, or submarines will meet the KARIN at Point "Caesar" and that they will bring charts of Norway and

escort the ship to Narvik via Harstad through Ands Fjord. The area off the Norwegian coast is endangered by submarines, planes and mines.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

At 2233 radio intelligence intercepted an enemy sighting report from the commander of a British formation about 20 miles east of Yarmouth. Plymouth transmitted the suspected presence of our PT boats in the Portland area.

Air reconnaissance by units of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast was without result.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Seven hundred and sixty-four bales of rubber from the PIETRO ORSEOLO had been salvaged by 1100 according to a report from the Naval Office, Bordeaux.

On 1 April Naval Staff was ordered by Commander in Chief, Navy to point out to Group West that the responsibility for the preservation and safety of the cargo of the PIETRO ORSEOLO rested with the Navy, and that in view of the vital importance of the cargo of rubber to our war economy and the impossibility of replacing it, it was necessary to ensure all possible precautions, quickest unloading and, if necessary, immediate dispatch, safeguarding against sabotage, in conjunction with Commanding General, France.

On 3 April the attention of Quartermaster Division was drawn to Naval Staff's directive, dated 19 March, on the protection of the blockade runners and their cargoes. All essential measures taken for protection of the ships and the harbor are laid down in this directive.

Channel Coast:

The 5th PT Boat Flotilla's minelaying operation was carried out from Cherbourg according to plan and unobserved during the night of 3 April by seven boats

in the western part of the Channel. The enemy was not sighted. For short report see Teletype 1405.

From 0117 to 0125 the Batteries Lapin and Sangate each fired two salvos on targets located west-northwest of Calais.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

One of our planes was shot down off Zeebrugge by patrol boat "1303" at 2137 on 3 April after having twice approached the patrol boat without giving a recognition signal.

Escort duties within the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North and the sweeping of the channels were carried out according to plan.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Six Russian submarines were detected by radio intelligence off the Arctic Coast of Norway on 3 and 4 April. There was brisk air reconnaissance and also many raids by the enemy air force along the south and southwest coasts of Norway. Five planes belonging to the Iceland squadrons were observed on operations.

Our reconnaissance in Northern Waters and in the Arctic was without result. It is perfectly obvious from material aboard the captured M.T.B. "631" that enemy PT boats spend days in the skerries, lie in the fjords and bays close to the convoy route for considerable periods, and occasionally land scouts at small places.

Own Situation:

On 3 April nine enemy planes were over the Petsamo area, and nine monoplanes over Skudesnes. On the evening of the same day a submerging submarine was sighted at the entrance of Ranen Fjord. Submarine chasing has so far been without result. Shipping has been

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temporarily suspended.

The steamer ALTAIR was sunk by an enemy aerial torpedo attack southwest of Kristiansund North at 1040 on 4 April. The steamer was to bring 2,500 tons of heavy diesel oil for submarines north and was escorted by one patrol boat.

The steamer PATRIA was likewise hit by aerial torpedoes and sunk near Lister at 1658. The steamer was sailing in a convoy of three steamers, also escorted by only one vessel.

These two losses only too clearly emphasize the precarious state of the convoy escort situation. Escort duties were otherwise carried out according to plan.

The BEITZEN and the destroyer Z "28" entered Harstad on the afternoon of 3 April.

Group North ordered the transfer of the RIEDEL to Trondheim, where the dockyard is to check whether it will be possible to repair her. If not, she will have to be transferred to home waters with the NUERNBERG.

Air reconnaissance for the REGENSBURG was canceled owing to the weather.

On 2 April the weather station "Holzauge" reported that the police station Eskimonaes was wiped out on 23 March. Two men were captured, one killed and the others fled. An order by the Governor of Greenland was examined on the subject of killing or capturing the crew of "Holzauge". One of the U.S. warship NORTHLAND's planes searched in vain for "Holzauge" on 26 and 27 Aug. (March? Tr.N.).

Naval Staff informed Group North of the directive to the KARIN. Copy of the Teletype I k 1012/43 Gk. Chofs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II^a.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

The Hirtshals-Arendal patrol line was taken up during the day by two patrol boats, but not at all during the night, as the boats were required for escort duties.

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Five ships and four submarines were escorted in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

The Norwegian steamer RYGJA struck a mine and sank five miles south of Skagen. The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported on the continuation of the assignment "Nashorn IVa".

According to a report from Admiral, Baltic States, the Battery "Bismarck" received five hits as a result of gunfire from the battery at Seiskari. One gun was slightly damaged.

There was lively enemy air activity over the Gulf of Finland. Bombs were dropped on Tallinn causing damage to dwellings.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance over the Bay of Biscay was normal, 20 planes having been observed.

2. Own Situation:

In the North Atlantic, the eastbound convoy expected by Group "Loewenherz" was intercepted by submarine U "530" in AK 4645 at noon.

The group has started operations against this convoy.

Submarine U "229" sank a fast independently routed vessel of the GLEN EARN type (9,784 G.R.T.) in AK 0193 after midnight on 4 April. No further reports of results have been received from the Atlantic.

For individual reports see: "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Three BV 138's of the 3rd Squadron 406th Group were transferred to Air Commander, Atlantic Coast. One plane had already been lost on 3 April. (See War Diary 3 April.)

Forty-eight bombers laid mines in the Thames estuary during the night of 4 April.

There was brisk enemy air activity during the daylight hours of 4 April. An air attack on the industrial districts of Paris was carried out between 1415 and 1424 by 70 four-engined planes under fighter escort. For further details see daily situation report. Other raids were directed against an Air Force station near Caen, the railroad station of St. Bricux, the airfield at Abbeville, and the Wilton shipyard at Rotterdam. Of the planes which went up to intercept them, 17 were shot down in all.

About 145 enemy planes were reported to have flown in on the night of 4 April.

Five courier planes were observed flying at an altitude of 6,400 meters between Sweden and England.

Enemy attacks over Reich territory were concentrated on Kiel. For details of the damage inflicted see the daily situation report.

Considerable damage was caused by incendiary bombs in small villages and farms. Five of the attacking planes were shot down by night fighters and four by naval anti-aircraft guns.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Four torpedo planes attacked an enemy convoy northwest of Bougie, scoring a hit on an 8,000 ton steamer.

There was a heavy air raid on Naples between 1515 and 1535 from an altitude of 6,000 - 7,000 meters causing damage to equipment, planes and harbor installations. A hospital ship was set on fire. Two other steamers were hit. Damage in the town is severe. Fifteen thousand liters of gasoline and 11 Italian fighters were destroyed on the ground in a near-by airfield, 2 of our planes were destroyed, and 10 Ju 55's damaged. The enemy only lost one Fortress through anti-aircraft fire. A further attack was carried out on the island of St. Pietro off the southern point of Sardinia by 21 enemy bombers with fighter escort.

Eight enemy planes were shot down over the Tunisian

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area where our forces were giving active support to the Army.

3. Eastern Front:

Eighteen enemy planes were shot down over the front lines.

The 4th Air Force's reconnaissance over the Black Sea did not produce any fresh information. One BV 138 was shot down by three enemy planes off the southwest coast of Norway at 1237.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

On the afternoon of 3 April a convoy of four loaded U.S. tankers entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic, and towards evening, three French submarines and one U.S. destroyer as well as one submarine chaser.

A cruiser of the DIDO class together with two destroyers left Gibraltar making for the Atlantic on the forenoon of 4 April. The cruiser's bow and stern appeared to be damaged.

The MALAYA docked. At 1430 the NELSON, the RODNEY, the FORMIDABLE and ten destroyers put out for the Mediterranean. From 0612 to 0650 an eastbound convoy consisting of 15 vessels was observed from Bougie to Jijelli.

At 1015 three PT boats heading north were reported about 20 miles west of Cape Serrat.

The following ships were lying in Bone at 0942: 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers, 13 landing craft (2 outward bound), 5 torpedo boats, 3 gun boats, 7 small auxiliary warships, 8 steamers and 1 tanker.

Submarines were observed south-southeast of Toulon, south of Messina and north of Sfax.

The British Admiralty announced the loss of the submarine TIGRIS, which according to radio intelligence had been operating in the Mediterranean since the end of November 1942.

In the Eastern Mediterranean 8 small merchantmen with 3 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats were reported by coastal reconnaissance to be heading west 85 miles northeast of Benghazi.

The reconnaissance was not complete.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four Italian submarines are approaching the operational area. No reports of successes were received from our submarines. No PT boats were out on operations owing to the weather. The minesweepers M "6021" and M "6023" and five auxiliary motor minesweepers entered Gaeta.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The convoy of the tanker BIVONA and steamer MIN left Bizerta in the forenoon and joined seven naval landing craft west of Cape Bon. War transports KT "5", "6", "7" and "9" left Tunis for Reggio at the same time. No sailing report of the BELLUNO - PIERRE CLAUDE convoy from Tunis to Leghorn has been received so far. The beached steamers AQUILA and BENEVENTO were attacked by enemy planes near Cape Zebib at 1609. The BENEVENTO's bow was hit by bombs. Of the seven missing Siebel ferries and two infantry landing craft, three Siebel ferries sank and one ran aground. One infantry landing craft has run aground and two Siebel ferries are lying at anchor. There is no news of one Siebel ferry and one infantry landing craft.

Six Italian naval landing craft left Trapani for Bizerta in the afternoon. The sailing report of four German naval landing craft proceeding from Tunis to Trapani has not yet been received.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Convoy traffic was disrupted owing to the weather.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there was brisk

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shipping traffic off the Caucasian coast during the forenoon. PT boats were sighted in Anapa Bay on the night of 2 April.

Own Situation:

Escort duties were carried out according to plan. No attacks by enemy planes and submarines were reported. The 15th Anapa convoy started out during afternoon.

The ferry service across the Strait of Kerch was carried out without enemy interference. There was no service from west to east.

Group South attaches great importance to the conversion of six naval landing craft from the June output into gun-carriers at Linz. (See Teletype 1410.)

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

Mr. Eden has returned to London from the United States and will give an account of his stay in the House of Commons.

Reuter reported that the Deputy Under Secretary of State of the U.S. State Department declared in a speech that the United States needed a strong and victorious Russia.

According to an Associated Press report from Rio de Janeiro, it was officially announced there that Brazilian troops would be ready to fight the Axis on foreign soil. Brazilian military missions were already in North Africa, where they were said to have been accredited to Eisenhower and Giraud.

In a statement on the Swedish policy of neutrality, the Swedish Premier declared that there would be no change in the Swedish attitude towards German transit traffic.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

- I. The Chief, Naval Staff agreed with the Naval Staff's proposal to express appreciation of the successful annihilation of the enemy weather station, Eskimonaes, by the weather station "Holzauge" in Greenland.
- II. Quartermaster General reported that the negotiations with Rumania have led to a slight increase from 30,000 to 35,000 tons in the fuel oil quota to be delivered to Germany for April.
- III. Foreign Affairs Section, Operations Division reported on the question of action against Brazil as discussed in the War Diary prior to Brazil's entry into the war. For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
- IV. Commander Wegener who has returned from the Transport Operations Staff, Scheurlen in Kerch reported on the progress of the ferry service across the Strait of Kerch. No fresh items of any importance came to light.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

- V. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:
 - a. Group North advised Naval Staff for information of

the directive to Admiral, Northern Waters, on the defense measures to be adopted by Commander, Submarines, Norway when bringing in the blockade runners in Northern Waters. For further details see the Group's teletype as per 1/Skl 1016/43 Gkdos. Chofs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

The Group furthermore requested Naval Staff to allocate three at present outward bound submarines of Commanding Admiral, Submarines temporarily to Commander, Submarines, Norway, as his forces are occupied to the limits of their capacity in escorting incoming shipping: so much so that the routine replacement after 25 days at sea may be impossible and his forces will probably be inadequate should a PQ convoy approach.

The Chief, Naval Staff has decided that not a single submarine beyond the present number is to be allocated to Northern Waters. The Group has been advised that it is not proposed to allocate any Atlantic submarines to Commander, Submarines, Norway owing to the weakening effect this would have on the North Atlantic forces and our lack of information on the sailing dates of the PQ convoys.

- b. Inquiries at Naval Staff about the Pentland Firth revealed that all the shipping there is escorted and the patrols are exhaustive. It is therefore out of the question for our blockade runners to use this route.

Special Items

- I. Quartermaster Division has decided upon and issued orders governing the authority to be exercised by the German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty. Accordingly, the Chief of the German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty is immediately responsible to the Naval Staff. The German staff officers attached to the Italian coastal admirals in Bizerta, Trapani, Palermo, Messina and Naples, and the German Chiefs of Staff are to be placed under German Naval Command, Italy. They will receive orders and directives for the commitment of the German escort groups directly from the German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty.

II. In the course of intelligence evaluation covering the period from 28 March to 5 April Enemy Situation Branch, Intelligence Division noticed that the extraordinarily vivid picture gained, consisting largely of reports planted by the enemy, reached a certain peak during the week 15 - 21 March and has been followed by a noticeable lull since the beginning of the Anglo-American offensive in Tunis. This decrease in reports has persisted during the last few days, but this should not deceive us into thinking that preparations for later concentrations are continuing without change.

Situation 5 April

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff informed the KARIN in Radiograms 1210 and 2127 of weather conditions and prospects between 57° and 70° N.

As the REGENSBURG has so far not been located and sighted in Northern Waters, she may have engine trouble or else be damaged by the ice, or have got stuck.

The KARIN is, therefore, to expect sighting the REGENSBURG in Denmark Strait. The necessary instructions have been issued to the KARIN and the REGENSBURG in Radiogram 2340.

All ships in foreign waters have been informed in Radiogram 1132 of the position of the Gibraltar - U.S. convoy, which was 27° N 42° W at 0800 on 5 April.

The Naval Attache, Tokyo reported the gratifying news that as a result of the use of the special code, the crews of the ships which had returned to Japan had no knowledge of the movements of the blockade runners,

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except that the PIETRO ORSEOLO had put in. The Attache pointed out that in the course of the routine procedure, it is, despite the most exhaustive counter-measures, well nigh impossible to prevent the reports on the blockade runner movements from filtering through to the crews, and thereby ashore, via the radio stations and ship's officers, owing to the tremendous interest they arouse in all quarters in Japan.

The Chief, Naval Communications Division has been informed.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted two eastbound destroyers near the Lizard Head at 1130 and nine merchant vessels of 4 - 8,000 G.R.T. north of Kinnaird Head, course not given.

Radio intelligence picked up the location reports of German forces on the convoy route off Cape Gris Nez. In addition, the British M.T.B. "306" reported four trawlers 40 miles off South Foreland at 0230, and a trawler on fire at 0244. At 0252 M.T.B. "306" made the following report: "Going aboard trawler". At 0348 M.T.B. "306" received orders to sink the trawler and secure the signal books. At 0515 M.T.B. "306" reported that the trawler had sunk. M.T.B. "243" reported to Dover at 0547 that 13 men had been taken prisoner including some wounded, and that all the boats had been slightly damaged.

Shortly after midnight two motor gun boats in the Plymouth area received orders to intercept enemy PT boats.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One mine was swept in the La Pallice area and one in Quiberon Bay.

One ground mine was swept south of La Rochelle, two off the Gironde and two off Brest on 4 April. A mine exploded in a fishing net off Lorient.

Group West requested Air Commander, Atlantic Coast to repeat on 6 April the reconnaissance of 5 April for the DOGGER BANK, to serve also as preliminary reconnaissance for the HIMALAYA which is to put out again.

Channel Coast:

Our motor minesweepers were attacked by enemy fighters off Calais at 1922 on 4 April. The motor minesweepers R "97", R "96" and R "117" were severely damaged and suffered casualties. R "95" ran aground while rendering assistance, and in the case of R "94" both engines were put out of action as a result of explosions under the vessel. All the damaged vessels were towed in to Calais. The minesweeper M "3630" reported an engagement with enemy PT boats in AN 8784 at 0214. Further details have not yet been received.

The minesweeper M "3818" sank in BF 3386 at 0054 as a result of an enemy air attack. One of our convoys off Cape Gris Nez was fired on by a British long-range battery at 0020. The steamer MALAGE (2,150 G.R.T.) was damaged and towed into Calais with her steering gear out of order. Our batteries returned fire from 0022 to 0230.

The harbor defense vessel "06" lying off Ostend was attacked by a British PT boat at 0245. The vessel reported that all secret documents had been destroyed. The subsequent developments of the engagement are to be found in the information gained by radio intelligence. (See "Enemy Situation".) We have merely been able to ascertain that the vessel and 19 NCO's and enlisted men are missing.

The three groups of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla broke off their unsuccessful torpedo operation as not only did radio intelligence show that our forces had definitely been located, but also that the convoy they had been waiting for was not in Lyme Bay but had already passed Portland. Contact with the enemy was not established. For the short report see Teletype 0730.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Six ELM/J mines were swept on the convoy routes

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within the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, three by an escort vessel, and one by a mine-sweeping plane; furthermore, a heavily corroded Dutch mine with horns was swept in AN 8582. The sweeping of the channels was carried out according to plan. Five patrol lines were occupied during the day. At night the positions had to be abandoned owing to the weather. The patrol boat "1252" sank near buoy "L" as a result of a collision. The crew was saved.

For the report from North Sea Station on the enemy air raids on Rotterdam and Kiel on 4 April see Teletype 0728.

A severe enemy air raid on Antwerp was carried out from a high altitude on the afternoon of 5 April. No damage was suffered in the harbor area.

North Sea Station reported the convoy and transport figures for March 1943. For copy see Teletype 1710. 363 merchant vessels totaling 645,946 G.R.T. were escorted; of these 196, totaling 385,604, sailed with Netherlands convoys. In addition, 28 short distance convoys and numerous Zuider Zee convoys were carried out. The following were lost as a result of torpedoes fired from PT boats: 1 Swedish, 1 Belgian and 2 Danish steamers; as a result of drifting mines: 1 Danish fishing vessel and 1 German motor boat. The following were damaged: 3 minesweepers by drifting mines, 1 mine-exploding vessel and 1 patrol boat by bombs, 1 Finnish and 1 Swedish steamer by ground mines.

Altogether 192 mines were swept, 3 planes were shot down, 3 PT boats sunk, and 4 PT boats severely damaged. The laying of ground mines has been intensified throughout the area. ATE mines have been found off the Dutch coast. Enemy PT boat activity against convoys has increased.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, seven Russian submarines were at sea, some of them in Varanger Fjord. Four PT boats were in the same area. There was moderate air activity over the North Sea whilst that of the Iceland Squadrons was lively. Our reconnaissance

between Iceland and Jan Mayen had to be broken off because ice was forming on the planes. No sighting reports have been received from the Faroes area.

Own Situation:

On 3 April a German westbound convoy was fired on without result by Russian batteries on the Rybachi Peninsula. The fire was returned. On 3 and 4 April enemy air raids were carried out on Petsamo, causing only slight damage. The naval battery at Kristiansund North was approached by three Hampdens on 3 April, one of which crashed. Twelve ships were escorted north and twenty-eight south.

Owing to the situation prevailing in February, the Naval Staff abandoned plans for the further expansion of all the berths for large ships in the Norwegian area. But as conditions have once again changed, Quartermaster Division received a new directive, ordering the berths in Alta Fjord to be expanded as originally planned. Not five but ten destroyer berths will now have to be constructed. To avoid further aggravating this year's critical transport situation, work on the inner berths in Bogen Bay will be postponed for the time being. Fresh decisions on this matter will be made in the fall. Further expansion of the berths in the Trondheim area will likewise be abandoned. Copy as per l/Skl I op 9615/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

The Naval Staff informed Group North that the IRENE will receive the operational order of the KARIN.

Group North informed the REGENSBURG that delay is attributed either to damage by weather and ice or else because the ship is ice bound. Air reconnaissance between 14° W and 5° E as far as the ice limits has been planned for 6 April.

The Admiral, Northern Waters reported that the JACOBI and the GALSTER have left Narvik.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

The patrol positions in the Skagerrak were not taken up during the night of 4 April; during the day there were four patrol boats there. Five ships were escorted in

the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic; 13 vessels were engaged in sweeping the channels. Kiel was raided by about 100 enemy planes during the night of 4 April. Barracks in the Wik were slightly damaged; damage was also caused to various industrial and traffic installations. One warehouse in Kolbe shipyard was destroyed, otherwise the shipyards sustained no damage. Naval anti-aircraft guns reported four planes shot down.

The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that minefield "Nashorn II a" has now been completed. "Nashorn IV a" and the sweeping of the "Corbetha" minefield as well as the work on the "Walross" minefield were suspended owing to the weather.

The Admiral, Baltic States reported normal activity without anything special to report.

Group North reported the outcome of a further conference on 30 March between the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and the Finnish Naval Staff. Copy in accordance with 1/Skl 9907/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance in the Bay of Biscay was normal, 21 planes having been observed.

2. Own Situation:

Group "Loewenherz" was able to maintain contact with the convoy southeast of Greenland despite heavy defense forces and an air escort from noon onwards. Six ships were sunk, three of which were tankers totaling about 44,000 G.R.T., some were sailing in convoy, others had scattered and were proceeding singly; one tanker and one steamer were torpedoed; and two further hits were probably scored. Submarines U "635", U "630", U "563", U "632", U "706" and "530" participated in this successful action. The convoy, consisting of about 30 steamers, was in AK 2829 at about midnight.

A new group "Adler" is being formed with nine submarines which is to take up patrol positions in AJ 5693 - AK 7174 at 0700 on 7 April and lie in wait for a convoy bound for the northeast on course 210°. On the outward passage submarine U "487" intercepted a

convoy steering course 80° in AL 22. The submarine was ordered to proceed on her course, as strong British air cover was anticipated and submarine U "487", being a supply boat, was not to be endangered.

Submarine U "438" reported having shot down one plane in the Bay of Biscay.

No reports of successes were received from the southern group of submarines. For further reports see: "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The Naval Staff informed the Naval Attache, Tokyo that during May and June several submarines will be in the operational area which has been extended as far as the equator, and that it is planned to send one of these submarines to Penang on an exploratory cruise probably at the end of June.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

There was brisk enemy air activity during the day. Raids were concentrated on Antwerp, where the aircraft industry was considerably affected. For further details see the daily situation report. Twelve enemy planes were shot down in the course of this raid, five by anti-aircraft guns. Brest was raided by light forces in the late afternoon. The shipyards suffered slight damage. On this occasion our fighters shot down seven enemy planes.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Altogether 442 planes belonging to the 2nd Air Force were out on operations. The focal point lay in the Tunisian area. Two enemy ships were damaged during an attack on shipping targets in the harbor of Gabes. Heavy enemy raids on our airfields in Tunisia and Sicily as well as on one of our air convoys caused serious losses, especially in transport planes. The town and harbor as well as the airfield of Palermo were raided in the afternoon. A large ship was damaged, a small tanker set on fire. Four German planes were entirely destroyed, 20 others damaged. Ten German planes, mostly Ju 52's, were destroyed on

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Trapani airfield, a further 50 damaged. Two of our fighters and two Ju 52's were totally destroyed during the landing in Tunis of a transport group. Altogether 16 enemy planes were shot down in defensive action.

Reconnaissance in the Western Mediterranean produced much fresh information. For further details see: "Enemy Situation Mediterranean".

3. Eastern Front:

On 5 April four enemy planes were shot down over the front lines. The 5th Air Force reported an unsuccessful attack by five fighter bombers on shipping targets in Kola Bay, and during the night of 5 April a raid on the town and harbor of Murmansk by five bombers.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Three French submarines left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean, a cablelayer left for the Atlantic. A small convoy consisting of three steamers and one corvette entered Gibraltar, presumably from the Atlantic. A convoy of 1 transport, 2 tankers and 3 steamers left the harbor accompanied by 5 escort vessels. According to a sighting report from Ceuta, the transport made for the Atlantic, the remaining vessels for the Mediterranean. Air reconnaissance reported that the NELSON, RODNEY and FORMIDABLE entered Oran in the forenoon. A heavy cruiser and destroyer lay outside the harbor; according to photographic evaluation, while a battleship was already inside.

The presence of a third battleship in this area is unlikely.

Convoy activity off the Algerian coast was brisker. A westbound convoy consisting of about 30 vessels was reported 30 miles north of Jijelli at 0945.

Our PT boats sighted three destroyers ten miles off Philippeville at 0135 and two PT boats north of Cape Scrat on a westerly course at 0539.

Submarines were reported southwest of Naples and east-northeast of Pantelleria. According to an Italian

report, three destroyers were heading west 15 miles south-southwest of La Valetta at 1100. According to photographic reconnaissance, 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer, 5 submarines, 2 escort vessels, 3 landing craft, 1 minelayer, 1 steamer of about 7,500 G.R.T. and 1 harbor tanker were all lying in La Valetta. According to a report from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the harbor of Gabes is already being used for enemy supplies.

Air reconnaissance confirmed only slight convoy traffic in the Eastern Mediterranean. According to a German intelligence report from Istanbul, dated 3 April, the Turks have taken over two PT boats bought from Great Britain.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four Italian submarines were in the operational area. No special reports were received from our own submarines.

Five vessels belonging to the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla left Bizerta on the evening of 4 April on a minelaying operation off Philippeville. One of the vessels had to turn back owing to engine trouble. Two vessels of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla also put out to sea to lure the enemy away from the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla, and to operate against a steamer and a patrol boat off Bone. The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla was pursued without being fired on by three destroyers ten miles north of Philippeville. All the vessels returned undamaged. The minelaying operation was not carried out.

One auxiliary motor minesweeper was sunk during an enemy air attack on motor minesweepers and auxiliary motor minesweepers off the Tunisian coast. Some of the other vessels were damaged. There were casualties on two motor minesweepers. The vessels are no longer operational. Other air raids on Bizerta and Tunis as well as on the ships beached near Zebib, caused no damage.

One steamer and one tanker were damaged by bombs during an air raid on Palermo.

The submarine chasers UJ "2203", "2205", "2207" are being used as anti-aircraft defense for the steamers

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which ran aground near Capo Zobib. The echo-ranging gear on two of these chasers is out of action, as also that of submarine chaser UJ "2210" in Trapani. The submarine chaser UJ "2209" together with a tug is on passage from Naples to Genoa. The submarine chaser UJ "2206" is lying in Genoa for repairs to her radio gear. The submarine chasers UJ "2202" and "2208" with the steamer MIN are on passage from Bizerta to Naples. The submarine chaser UJ "2202" has presumably entered Trapani for repairs. This boat brought down four enemy planes during an air raid on the afternoon of 4 April.

At the request of the Chief, Naval Communications Division, German Naval Command, Italy reported on the means of communication between the Italian escort forces and the German - Italian fighter cover. For copy of report see Teletype 2245. An improvement in the situation can only be achieved by establishing radio telephony communication between the leading escort boat and the German - Italian fighters.

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South informed the Naval Staff of the following directive, which, in agreement with the Italian High Command, was issued to German Naval Command, Italy and the 2nd Air Force, with copy to Army Group, Africa:

1. The enemy may possibly undertake a landing operation at Sfax. To prevent such an operation taking us by surprise minefields are to be laid in the waters south of Sfax between the island of Kerkennah and the mainland.
2. The necessary details for the execution of this operation will have to be agreed upon between the Italian Admiralty and German Naval Command, Italy. The German destroyer HERMES and two Italian destroyers, fitted with German mine rails, are to be detailed to this task.
3. The 2nd Air Force, in conjunction with the Italian Air Ministry, will provide air reconnaissance before and during minelaying operations and also fighter escort and bomber formations.
4. All plans are to be reported. - End of directive.

The operation is planned to take place between 6 and 10 April, weather permitting.

Group West reports that seven 20 - 25 ton fishing vessels which had been requisitioned for the Navy and were being transferred from Sete to Marseilles have been overdue since 29 March. Their loss is probably due to bad weather. Searching operations have been broken off without success. One officer, 3 NCO's and 17 men are missing.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The convoy ROVERETO consisting of four steamers left Naples with four torpedo boats on the night of 4 April. One steamer returned because of damage to her rudder; one is assigned to Trapani, two to Bizerta. The convoy of the tanker REGINA and of the motor vessel CARBONELLE was to leave Messina and join the convoy ROVERETO at 1400. The CARBONELLE remained behind in Messina because her engines had been damaged. The tanker REGINA (9,545 G.R.T.) was torpedoed by an enemy submarine south of Point Stilo on the afternoon of 4 April, before reaching Messina, and is returning to Taranto under her own steam.

The convoy PIERRE CLAUDE - BELLUNO is on passage from Tunis to Leghorn. The tanker BEVONA and five Italian naval landing craft entered Trapani in the forenoon coming from Bizerta. The transports KT "5", "6", "7" and "9" entered Naples according to plan. Ten Italian naval landing craft from Trapani and Palermo entered Bizerta at noon. The missing Siebel ferries and infantry landing craft meanwhile entered Tunis. One transport submarine and five Siebel ferries are on passage from Marsala to Tunis.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Submarine chase in the northern part of the Aegean Sea on 4 April was without result. A Spanish steamer sank on 5 April while entering Merica. Further details are not yet available. It is very probably the steamer ISEDORO (335 G.R.T.). A German plane reporting post on Kythnos reported sighting enemy submarines. A plane took off on a submarine chase.

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Convoy traffic in the Aegean Sea was restricted in some areas owing to the weather.

Group South reported that in the event of Operation "Viktoria" it was essential that it should be able to supply all the naval bases in the Aegean area, including the Dodecanese. Furthermore, it was obliged to supply the Italian vessels with fuel oil. Without informing the Italian offices concerned, the Group therefore requested that its fuel oil quota be increased by about 2-3,000 tons, so that delivery can be started forthwith as a precautionary measure.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Escort duties were carried out according to plan. An air raid warning was transmitted to the TISZA convoy southwest of Eupatoria. Further details are not available. The convoy meanwhile entered Sevastopol. Owing to an unfavorable weather forecast, it is not intended to send the German and Italian PT boats out on the night of 5 April.

The 15th Anapa convoy entered Kerch, and the 16th convoy composed of four naval landing craft left Kerch.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch proceeded without enemy interference from the air. The discharging of the cargo was still greatly slowed down by the poor condition of the roads. The Navy transported 600 soldiers, 154 horses, and a few vehicles to the west, and six soldiers and about 500 tons of supplies to the east. The Strait of Kerch is ice free. Mariupol harbor can be reached by steamers with ice protection.

Group South reported the request of the Rumanian Head of State that the passenger steamers TRANSYLVANIA and BESSARABIA be recalled from Istanbul to a Rumanian port as soon as possible. The Head of State has been informed of Group South's opinion which is as follows:

1. As a result of military developments on the Eastern Front, a change in Turkey's attitude is not to be

expected for the present. Therefore no new indications of threat to the ships in the Bosphorus are seen.

2. In view of the present situation, the withdrawal of the ships would create excitement and apprehension in Turkey, neither in the interests of Rumania nor of Germany.
3. With the present shortage of escort vessels urgently needed for the supply traffic, we cannot allow any of them to be assigned to transfer operations. The Head of State has not yet revealed his attitude to our point of view. The Naval Special Duties Detachment has worked out the orders for the transfer which will take place without orders from the Group. Should political considerations call for a different opinion at a higher level, it is requested that instructions be issued accordingly.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

The Allied Supply Conference in Washington scheduled for 27 April has been postponed for an indefinite period.

General Eisenhower has requested General de Gaulle to postpone his journey to Algiers for military reasons.

Reuter reported that the Financial Secretary of the British Admiralty stated that since the outbreak of war, well over 30,000 of the Merchant Navy's vessels had been repaired or overhauled. In 1942, a total of 10 million tons of merchant shipping space had been recommissioned after repairs. According to a British press report, the Admiralty had examined and rejected the proposal to commission armored merchantmen.

According to the United Press, Mr. Sumner Welles announced that South America would produce a total of 60-70,000 tons of rubber in 1943.

A Swiss newspaper reported from Washington that Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles is to go to England shortly, and subsequently to Moscow for political discussions. This is regarded in Washington as a direct result of the talks Mr. Eden had in America.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

- I. In connection with the boarding of the harbor defense vessel "06" off Ostend, Quartermaster Division was instructed to examine the question of armament for vessels of this type.
- II. Chief, Naval Communications Division reported on the results of the experiments on the location of protected and unprotected submarines at various depths. Under favorable circumstances the danger of being located can be reduced to 20 per cent in the case of the protected submarines.

From British publications it is clear that the British are quite familiar with the system of decoy floats.

III. Report by Quartermaster General:

- a. The Commander in Chief, Navy is in agreement with the

suggestion to exclude the YSERE and to recommend Vice Admiral Ruge to obtain two avisos (dispatch boats) from the Italians in exchange.

- b. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping tried to issue direct orders to the Toulon Arsenal. The Arsenal Commander quite rightly refused to carry them out, pointing out that he was under orders from the Navy alone.
- c. Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division reported on the present position as regards the number of torpedo recovery vessels available. The Commander in Chief, Navy ordered the Remote Control Target Unit immediately to release T "151" for duty as a torpedo recovery vessel, regardless of the fact that the BLITZ was not yet ready for use.

IV. Foreign Affairs Section, Operations Division reported on the re-shuffle in the German Foreign Office.

V. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reported that Reichsminister Speer did not consider himself competent to make a decision on the question of fitting submarines with anti-aircraft guns, because he felt it a matter for the Chief, Armed Forces High Command to discuss with the Fuehrer.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

VI. Report by Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section, Operations Division on the suggestion made by General Kessler, Air Commander, Atlantic Coast, to the Chief, Naval Staff on keeping the Bay of Biscay free of enemy planes. There would be three possibilities:

- a. Attacking approaching enemy planes;
- b. Attacking enemy ground installations;
- c. Distracting the enemy air force by launching an offensive against enemy convoy traffic and shipping around the British Isles. (The Air Force would at the same time be contributing towards the warfare against merchant shipping.)

Operations Division could not recommend Air Commander, Atlantic Coast's suggestion that the Air Force, General Staff should be approached with a corresponding proposal;

it was felt that a discussion between the Chief, Naval Staff and the Reichsmarschall would be far more to the point. Chief, Naval Staff agreed, and will report to the Fuehrer, circumstances permitting, after having had a discussion with the Reichsmarschall.

VII. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

- a. The Chief of Staff, German Naval Command, Italy made the following report:

"A few days ago, the Italian Navy, evidently using the German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty as a pattern, established a High Command, Italian Escort Forces under Admiral Somigli. This High Command has been made responsible by decree for the entire organization and training of the Italian escort forces, and in the case of operational tasks, merely for the commitment of submarine chaser flotillas under special circumstances. Although on the face of it, no actual change in the powers of the Italian Admiralty and consequently in Ruge's influence has taken place, it is nevertheless difficult to dismiss the thought that by means of re-organization or even further expansion, the effort to weaken German influence could be tacitly achieved. Somigli, who is stationed in Rome, and not with the Admiralty, is one of the ablest Italian naval officers, senior in years of service to Sansonetti, and from his former activities as Chief of Staff, Italian Admiralty, a known opponent of German claims to leadership."

Chief, Naval Staff reported that Vice Admiral Ruge welcomed the setting-up of this staff, and had passed favorable judgment on it.

- b. Group South reported its plans in support of the army operations against the enemy bridgehead at Novorossisk with its naval forces. On the night of "X" Day + 1 all the naval forces would be put into operation against enemy supplies to, and transportations from the beachhead:
- aa. 3 motor minesweepers fitted with 3.7 cm. guns near Myshakov;
- bb. 4 boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla between Myshakov and Gelendzhik;

- cc. 6 boats of the Italian PT Boat Flotilla between Gelendzhik and Cape Idokopas;
- dd. Submarine U "24" southeast of Cape Chugoropas as far as Tuapse;
- ee. A faked landing with Italian PT boats between Gelendzhik and Idokopas.

Coastal defense measures will be taken over by the Army which has strong artillery forces at its disposal.

Efforts will be made to provide floating batteries, by arming Siebel ferries, for instance, to reinforce the coastal defenses when the operation has been carried out.

The Naval Staff approved the plans reported which exhaust all possible naval resources.

The permanent representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters; Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; and the Naval Liaison Officer attached to the General Staff, High Command, Army, were informed.

The Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

- c. In 1940 the Naval Staff considered the supply problem in connection with the Iceland operation (Ikarus) insoluble and the Chief, Naval Staff reported this to the Fuehrer at the time.

Chief, Naval Staff stated that this was even truer of the position now than then.

- d. In the event of an operation against the Iberian Peninsula it will have to be remembered that the traffic network in the interior of the country is in no way adequate for the maintenance of supplies, which will mostly have to be brought directly in from the ports.

VIII. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reported that Vice Admiral Nomura has expressed the desire to become acquainted with the Command Station of the Operations Staff, Commanding Admiral, Submarines, in view of Japan's

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future warfare against shipping. The Commander in Chief, Navy is prepared to inform Admiral Nomura personally as far as is judged expedient. A longer initiation (extending over a period of days) into the work of the Operations Staff, Commanding Admiral, Submarines, is however, out of the question.

Chief, Naval Staff will visit Fuehrer Headquarters on 7 April to report to the Fuehrer. His stay will coincide with the Duce's presence at the Berghof.

Special Items

I. On 9 March Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff made the following report:

"As a result of the report made by Reichsminister Speer, on 6 March 1943, the Fuehrer ordered a 45,000 ton increase per month in the Navy's steel quota for the second quarter of the year for the following purposes:

- a. Increased construction of auxiliary warships for submarine warfare (motor minesweepers, submarine chasers, patrol boats, minesweepers, destroyers, etc.).
- b. Increased construction (to full capacity) of naval landing craft and transports in all shipyards, including French and Italian ones, equipped for their construction.

The Fuehrer expected the Navy's plans regarding a) and b) to be submitted through Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff."

On 23 March the Commander in Chief, Navy made the following report on this matter to Chief, Armed Forces High Command with copy to the Reichsminister of Armament and Ammunition and Armed Forces High Command, War Economy Staff: "The increase in the Navy's steel quota for the second quarter of 1943, ordered by the Fuehrer on 6 March 1943 as a result of a report submitted by Reichsminister Speer, will not serve, as assumed, to increase the output of auxiliary warships, naval landing craft, etc., but will merely reduce the enormous present shortage of approximately 60,000 tons a month to approximately 15,000 tons a month. This will only enable us to maintain the necessary minimum naval strength for fulfilling submarine

warfare's most urgent tasks and to carry out the present naval construction program, which has already been cut down to the minimum for operational requirements; further delays compared with the planned output will have to be accepted.

The following survey gives further details:

First allocation for second quarter of 1943	119,795 tons per month
Additional allocation in accordance with the Fuehrer's order	45,000 tons per month
Total steel quota	164,795 tons per month
Minimum essential for operational requirements	<u>180,691 tons per month</u>
Remaining shortage	15,896 tons per month

In order to carry out the naval construction program to the fullest possible extent, I utilized the additional steel allocations as follows:

Submarines: Increased allocation to accelerate submarine constructions ordered. (Submarines and transport submarines.)

Destroyers: Z 43 - Z 45 full allocation
Z 46 - Z 47 85 % allocation

Torpedo boats: T 37 - T 42 90 % allocation
T 44 - T 48 60 % allocation

Torpedo recovery vessels: Start of full production (so far only quota had been for the engines).

PT boats and motor minesweepers: Full allocation inclusive of spare engines.

Minesweepers: Full allocation.

Escort vessels: G "1" and G "5" full allocation (G "5" to the extent possible in Dutch shipyards).

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Naval landing craft:

Italy: Allocation for 40 naval landing craft per quarter.

Southern France: Allocation for 30 naval landing craft per quarter.

Others: Allocation for 60 naval landing craft per quarter. _____

Totaling 130 naval landing craft per quarter.

as compared with the total allocation for 80 naval landing craft possible up to now.

Transport vessels: Increased allocation for 20 transports in order to speed up the constructions already in progress in accordance with the new facilities available.

Fishing vessels: Increase in the allocation for 39 fishing vessels from one quarter to one half of schedule.

Submarine Chasers: Full allocation for continuing construction, no fresh orders for new constructions.

Multi-purpose boats: No orders for new constructions.

Mine-exploding vessels: Full allocation.

Auxiliary vessels: 85% allocation.

Maintenance vessels: 65% allocation.

Guns, mines, torpedoes, and other urgent operational tasks of submarine warfare have been taken into consideration accordingly.

II. Commanding Admiral, Submarines reported submarine strength as on 1 April 1943:

1. <u>In commission:</u> on 1 March 1943	411	submarines
commissioned in March	<u>27</u>	"
	438	"
March losses	<u>15</u>	"
in commission on 1 April 1943	423	"
plus foreign submarines	9	"
The 15 losses were accounted for as follows:		
In the Atlantic type VII c	7	"
In the Atlantic type IX	5	"
In the Mediterranean type VII c	2	"
In Home Waters type II	1	"
2. <u>Distribution:</u>		
On operations	235	"
On trials	124	"
For training purposes	<u>64</u>	"
	423	"
3. <u>In March</u>		
New additions in the operational areas	20	"
Increase in the number of submarines in the operational areas	6	"
4. <u>Distribution of submarines in the operational areas as on 1 April 1943</u>		
Atlantic	194	"
Mediterranean	17	"
Northern Waters	21	"
Black Sea	<u>3</u>	"
	235	"
5. Daily average of submarines at sea in the Atlantic in March	116	"
in the operational area	49	"
on passage	67	"

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- III. The authorization for minelaying operations requested by Group North, and the directive for the delivery of the mines was issued by Operations Division in the order I E 9741/43 Gkdos. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.
- IV. The Naval Staff's directive for the control and distribution of mine transport vessels was issued in order l/Skl I op. 9806/43 Gkdos. Copy in War Diary, Part C d.
- V. In the Enemy Situation Report No. 7 for 1 April the Army General Staff, Foreign Armies, West made the following assessment of the general situation for the period 16 - 31 March 1943.
1. The assessment of the general situation does not differ essentially from that of 15 March 1943; subsequent developments serve rather to support the conjectures made then on the intentions of the enemy command.

The situation is characterized by:

- a. the large-scale battles in Tunisia, in which the extraordinary numerical and material enemy superiority built up over a number of months is being brought to bear;
- b. the extensive shipping space being kept available round the British Isles and in the ports of Northwest Africa;
- c. troop movements in England apparently aimed at gradual transfer of units to the embarkation areas;
- d. the reinforcement of the uncommitted Anglo-American force in Morocco and Western Algeria;
- e. the swift and far-reaching assembly of landing craft of various types in the enemy ports of the Western Mediterranean, so that their numbers have been almost doubled within a very few days;
- f. ceaseless activity in the Western Mediterranean where the enemy naval forces there are being reinforced;

- g. the disclosure of comprehensive Turko-British commitments which are decisive for the developments anticipated in the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. Shipping space for men and material:

The amount of transport space available, rather than the more than adequate number of enemy forces, is still the decisive factor in all the enemy plans.

According to a statement by Intelligence Division, transport and freighter tonnage sufficient for 11 to 12 divisions (including the Air Force) is available in the area around the British Isles and in the Western Mediterranean. In addition, two or three divisions can be embarked on landing craft in the ports of Northwest Africa.

Consequently, the enemy command has the following forces at its disposal for its first wave in landing operations:

- a. for any given operational area 11 - 12 units
- b. plus, for the northern area of the French Atlantic coast only, parts of three British airborne divisions
- c. plus, for the Western Mediterranean area only 2 - 3 units.

It will thus be possible for the enemy command to launch as the first wave in its landings in the Western European area a total of

13 - 15 divisional units

Parts of three British airborne divisions.

If sea transportation were used to the fullest extent as above, it would cause a temporary lack of additional shipping space for troop transportations from England and America to other Anglo-American operational areas. It should, however, be remembered that shipping would be speedily released again after landing operations at short distances away. This may influence Anglo-American decisions.

There are numerous reports on the shipping concentration round England which have of late been confirmed by extensive withdrawals of shipping space from the Western Mediterranean to England. According to Intelligence Division, however, there are so far no signs of this shipping being assembled into any single area. In view of British ingenuity at camouflaging such movements, and remembering the vast embarkation possibilities which Britain as a whole can offer, unexpected large-scale operations from the British theater should, however, be anticipated at any time.

3. Signs of forthcoming enemy operations:

a. Scandinavia:

The persistent support given to sabotage in Norway, and the lively naval activity in Norwegian coastal waters, continue to emphasize the enemy command's interest in this theater. Furthermore, reliable reports dating from the middle of March, on troop concentrations near the ports, on the reinforcement of anti-aircraft defenses, and on various other activities pointing to preparations for overseas operations, have been received from the east coast of Scotland (Aberdeen, Firth of Forth). Our extremely scanty air reconnaissance (the last, incomplete results were obtained three weeks ago) adds nothing to the picture.

The all-round impression, based then on incomplete data, continues to give no indication of any plans for a large-scale operation against Norway. The number of troops reported, and the extent of the preparations would at present rather point to operations of limited scope only, serving to deceive and split up German defense forces and to gain a local foothold from which to spread further insurrection in the country. Operations of this kind will probably have to be expected, however.

There are only very isolated indications that the Danish coast may be a landing area. They give the impression of being deliberate foils.

b. Channel and Atlantic Coasts:

Reports and statements on plans for a fairly large-scale operation against the French Atlantic coast

still continue. These include:

- aa. Troop movements in the south of England especially in Devonshire. The transfer of a division from the Midlands has been definitely confirmed. Tank concentrations have also been several times reported from this area. Included in these movements is the probable transfer to the Isle of Wight of a Canadian division alleged to be engaged in intensive commando training (presumably for landing operations) in a closed area.
- bb. Reference has already been made to the concentration of large ships in British home waters. This measure proves nothing but it is the necessary prerequisite for any landing on the Atlantic Channel coast.

In England the assembling of landing craft of all types appears to have made considerable progress. There are numerous indications of intensive construction there and a large consignment of these vessels appears to have arrived from the United States. Reports that a larger type of boat is under construction whose design enables it to be used in coastal sectors where unloading possibilities are small should be noted in this connection (Intelligence Division). The development of this type of boat together with the increase in the number of LSI's would indicate that the enemy is preparing means of landing in more distant coastal sectors (e.g. Brittany, Gironde estuary?), and not just for crossing the Channel.

The exact distribution of landing tonnage has not yet been ascertained owing to incomplete air reconnaissance. The fact remains that at least there has been no reduction in the number of vessels (several thousand craft of all descriptions) lying in British south coast ports, which means that vast quantities of landing tonnage are available there at any time.

- cc. The closed area regulations for the entire

coastal region of southern and southwestern England which were relaxed during the winter of 1942/43 have been enforced again as from 1 April 1943.

- dd. The continuation of organized and insidious underground activity in France, with clearcut objectives as regards armament, organization and training also helps to substantiate the present assessment. The discovery of enemy intelligence instructions to reconnoiter suitable landing fields for airborne troops in Brittany is a further indication, as are the continuous British air attacks on Northern France aiming at a progressive dislocation of the French railroad network.
- cc. The most noteworthy of the numerous utterances reported from military and political quarters appear to be those of an American general which stressed the intensive preparations for an offensive against Northern France which were to be deliberately covered up by giving as much publicity as possible to the plans being drawn up for the one in the Mediterranean.

It can therefore generally speaking be said that the Anglo-American command is continuing preparations for landing operations on the Channel - Atlantic coast and has the necessary means for launching them at any given time. More distant sectors (Brittany, Gironde?), as opposed to the French Channel ports, are gradually coming to the fore as target areas.

c. Western Mediterranean:

- aa. As regards plans for a landing on the Iberian Peninsula, there are merely fresh rumors of doubtful origin; concrete military clues are still lacking. The political development on the Iberian Peninsula is marked, as before, by an attempt on the part of the Anglo-American powers gradually to gain ground there, and appears to be based on long term plans. It is, therefore, still maintained that a landing on the Iberian Peninsula is not actually under preparation.

bb. North Africa and the Western Mediterranean Islands:

Throughout the Mediterranean it is firmly believed that the enemy command is planning a large-scale operation in the Balkans for some future date. With this end in view, the enemy is at present clearing the Western Mediterranean sea route to the Near East of enemy forces; consequently a landing operation on a fairly large scale in the Western Mediterranean is to be expected in the near future. The grounds for this standpoint have meanwhile been further substantiated.

The concentration of Anglo-American forces in the region between Oran and Casablanca is above all an indication of operational plans for the Western Mediterranean area, for it not only exceeds the numbers required for the Tunisian fighting but also for the necessary occupation forces (three or four infantry divisions - these recently appear to include either the whole or part of an American Marine division which has to be counted as a definite landing unit - and 1 or 2 armored divisions). It is reported that these forces are to be reinforced by sending British troops from Great Britain equipped for fighting in Africa and by the imminent departure of an American convoy. The continued and apparently, accelerated transfer of commando and paratroop units to Gibraltar and North Africa is very striking. There are at present four or five British Commando units - i.e. about a third of the total available - and several battalions of British paratroops in North Africa, Gibraltar and Malta which have not yet taken part in large-scale operations.

According to Intelligence Division, the shipping transfers from England at the end of March mean that the numbers of amphibious landing craft in the Western Mediterranean are now sufficient to embark about three divisions, including one armored division. These numbers correspond approximately to

the strength of the Anglo-American forces still available around and west of Oran. The withdrawal from the Western Mediterranean to the Atlantic of about 330,000 tons of shipping in ballast will not jeopardize landing possibilities, as the required tonnage (see above) still remains available for the landing forces presumed there; rather the additional shipping in England will increase the opportunities of transferring fresh forces from there in one operation, by way of the Straits of Gibraltar, for a large-scale landing in the Western Mediterranean. In this connection, the periods during which large Atlantic convoys are approaching Gibraltar (at present approximately between 4 and 10 April 1943), always demand special attention.

The recent increase in British naval forces in the Gibraltar area to a strength corresponding to that reached immediately prior to the first African landings is worth noting.

Information on the conjectured point of landing continues to alternate between Sicily, Sardinia, Tunisia and the French Mediterranean coast; Sicily is the most frequently mentioned and apparently also considered the focal point of reconnaissance by enemy intelligence. This plan would appear the most probable one in view of the decisive effect of an Anglo-American base on Sicily. It should be stressed, however, that the information on which this conclusion is based is not nearly as reliable as that gained on the enemy command's plan for a landing as such. The early detection by air reconnaissance of the direction of approach will be of decisive importance for taking countermeasures against any landings. The importance of this can hardly be sufficiently emphasized.

With reference to the conjectured dates for landing operations, all our sources stress their extreme imminence. They may be planned to take place either during the Tunisian campaign or immediately after it. Should a landing in Sicily have been decided on, the idea of decisively influencing the fighting in

Tunisia would make for an early start of operations. It is plain, however, that a pause of any appreciable length of time, possibly after the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign, is not to be expected.

d. Eastern Mediterranean:

The Anglo-American plans in the Eastern Mediterranean have been considerably clarified and confirmed, corroborating Enemy Situation Report No. 6/43 of 15 March 1943, as a result of the announcement of the outcome of Turko-British negotiations. It is now an established fact that the Anglo-American command is definitely counting on inducing Turkey to enter the war, and that it may well have concrete reasons for doing so, despite all Turkish assurances to the contrary. Only in this way is it possible to explain the considerable assignments of shipping and equipment which the British Government has sanctioned within the framework of the Turko-British negotiations. The value of Turkish neutrality - actually already certain - would be worth far more than the price paid for it by the British. It will, therefore, have to be kept in mind that the entry of Turkey into the war is a factor in probable Anglo-American operational plans, the exact date of which alone is perhaps still unknown to the British command. Thus, all independent Anglo-American action in the Eastern Mediterranean area will presumably be reduced to the level of preliminary partial operations: in other words a merely strategic preparation for Turkey's entry into the war.

Clearing the Aegean Sea of enemy forces, gaining a good operational stronghold on the Greek mainland, and perhaps in addition, establishing an Anglo-American force in the Salonika area, would presumably be preparations towards this end. An operation against the Dodecanese would thus be given priority in the Anglo-American plans. It is presumably in preparation, but there is, however, no reason for believing it to be imminent.

Adequate forces are available in the Eastern Mediterranean for the battle for the Dodecanese.

(3 to 4 fully equipped infantry divisions, about 1 armored division, 1 to 2 armored brigades, and 3 to 4 commando units.) On the other hand, Anglo-American shipping space in the Eastern Mediterranean (Intelligence Division) is fully committed owing to the large quantities of supplies needed by the 8th Army in the Tunisian campaign and the Anglo-American shipments to Turkey. A lull in the fighting in Tunisia would immediately free shipping for operations against the Dodecanese; the possibility of transferring further tonnage quickly and, in the initial stages, unobserved by our own reconnaissance, from the Arabian and East African areas to the Mediterranean therefore also deserves attention. The enemy command is thus capable of launching a surprise attack against the Dodecanese at very short notice. But measures of a more far-reaching nature are not to be expected for the present.

4. Summary:

- a. At present, the Anglo-American command has sufficient shipping space and forces available for the execution of several simultaneous, independent landing operations.
- b. The Sicily-Tunisia area as well as the northwest coast of France continue to emerge as possible focal points for landings.
- c. Parallel operations on a smaller scale and with a limited objective may be expected along the Norwegian coast and in the Dodecanese.
- d. Our own defenses must be made ready for imminent operations. The need for further improvement in the air reconnaissance against the launching areas is urgent.

Intelligence Division's comments:

With reference to paragraph 2.:

- a. No confirmation of extensive shipping space being kept permanently in readiness in the British Isles and vicinity was issued by Intelligence Division. Agents' reports, which cannot be checked here as

our air reconnaissance is inadequate for obtaining a comprehensive survey of the shipping in the harbors, may possibly have been used as evidence.

- b. The statement that according to Intelligence Division, shipping space for 11 - 12 divisions is available in the British Isles and vicinity and in the Western Mediterranean, is misleading. Attention is drawn to the secret report of 24 March 1943 which was also submitted to the Army General Staff, according to which 2.6 million tons of shipping for carrying the weapons and equipment of about 300,000 men would be available in foreign waters, if the existing fresh troop movements from the United States to Great Britain, and from both these countries to North Africa and the Near East were stopped. At present, the greater part of this shipping space is being used for the North African campaign.

With reference to paragraph 3. c.bb.

From captured material it was ascertained that the following craft were used in Algiers and Oran for the North African operation:

13	LCT's
86	LCA's
346	fast LCP's
163	LCM I's
52	LCM III's
<u>660</u>	

It is assumed that these landing craft are still in the North African ports of the Mediterranean.

The following craft were added in February - March 1943:

13	landing craft not specifically described (probably LCT's or LCI's)
53	LCI's
<u>16</u>	LST's
82	

Thus, the 16 LST's were a fresh addition in the Mediterranean. For the rest, the increase, based

on the number of vessels, does not yet amount to 15% of the special landing craft lying in this area since November 1942.

The landing craft stationed in the ports of Northwest Africa should be able to carry two or three divisions.

With reference to paragraph 3. d.:

Intelligence Division knows nothing about the reported and confirmed agreements, nor of the setting-up of a Turko-British plan of campaign and the fixing of an actual date for the entry of British troops into Turkey. It is merely known that the expansion of the harbors of Mersin and Alexandretta is being carried out with the assistance of British engineers.

As far as is known here, five British 10,000 ton vessels will be put at Turkey's disposal and will sail under her flag.

5. The Intelligence Service has transmitted an authentic sounding report from the Ostrow intelligence agency describing the preparations being made in Great Britain for an offensive, which concluded as follows:
Preparations for a fairly large-scale operation are undoubtedly under way though not on the scale necessary for an invasion of the continent. It is impossible to ascertain, to any reliable degree, how the weather and above all the stabilization of the eastern front will affect, or has already affected, the scale of these plans. The preparations were, of course, begun long before the counter thrust at Kharkov. It is therefore impossible to predict how the operation will be adjusted to this or whether, in view of the highly unfavorable moment, it will still be carried out. The preparations have, however, been made.

Copy of the report as per l/Skl 10413/43 geh. in War Diary, file: "Information on Enemy Situation".

6. Foreign Affairs/Intelligence Division submitted statements made by the Spanish General, Munoz Grande, on the occasion of a discussion with the Military Attache on 23 March 1943. The Spanish General is increasingly dubious of the possibility of Germany and Spain ever coming to any real agreement, both sides being to blame. Copy in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Situation 6 AprilI. War in Foreign Waters:1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

In view of the uncertain position of the REGENSBURG on her passage north and the favorable enemy situation in the Bay of Biscay, the Naval Staff has decided that the IRENE is to be escorted back from the Bay of Biscay. The ship, therefore, received the following instructions:

- "a. As the situation in the Bay of Biscay is favorable, do not sail north, you will be taken under escort in that area. Exact orders will follow. Passage from the vicinity of the submarine rendezvous will probably take place on 7 April. (See Teletype 1146.)
- b. 1. Course east on a latitude 2 degrees farther north than "Isogrimm" so that the new point "Ingo" is passed at 1800 G.S.T. on 10 April at the latest. "Ingo" is 2° farther south and 8° farther east than "Inselmeer".
2. Four destroyers will take you under escort at that point about 1800 and their orders to proceed are to be followed. (See Teletype 1924.)
- c. 1. If the rendezvous with the destroyers does not take place, proceed via the new points "Ilse" and "Irma".
2. "Ilse" is 1° 6' farther north and 1° 8' farther west than "Irrenhaus". "Irma" is 18' farther south and 6° 2' farther east than "Irrenhaus". Escort forces will meet you there. Should these forces not be met, patrol up and down on a zig-zag course as far as 25 miles west of point "Irma". Report position by short signal or in a radiogram and await further orders. On no account is the 50 m.

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line to be crossed without escort. The inner part of the Bay of Biscay is endangered by submarines." (See Teletype 2003.)

The Naval Staff informed all in foreign waters in Radiogram 1035 that the PIETRO ORSEOLO sighted nothing throughout her passage and in Radiogram 2001 that the British cruiser UGANDA, the auxiliary cruisers CELICIA and QUEEN OF BERMUDA, and the French cruiser GEORGE LEYGUES were in the Freetown area on 3 April.

The Naval Staff has informed the Naval Attache, Tokyo that the information on the results achieved by using the special code - of vital importance to the Naval Staff - had been received with thanks.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to reconnaissance by the Air Commander, Atlantic Coast, one destroyer and two escort vessels were 400 miles west of Cape Ortegal at 0930; course 30°, speed 8 knots, obviously on escort duties.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

During an enemy air raid on Brest on the evening of 5 April barracks, depots and offices in the docks were destroyed. One plane was shot down.

The CONDOR rammed and sank a French tug sailing in a smoke-screen at the harbor entrance. Two ground mines were swept off the Gironde.

The 6th and 28th Minesweeper Flotillas made the following report:

- a. According to statements by fishermen, most of the bales of rubber were drifting towards Cape Machicahco yesterday and the day before.
- b. The Spanish Government is paying a higher price every day and has categorically forbidden their sale to other buyers. (The English marking is given as the excuse.)

- c. The British Legation is offering at least 200 pesetas per kilo.
- d. Fifty-eight bales were taken over by minesweepers, partly in exchange for oil and partly for cash (RM 30.- per kilo). Food and luxury goods were not accepted.
- e. About 40 Spanish sardine boats have picked up approximately 400 - 600 bales.

The Naval Attache, Madrid has been informed. The Spanish Government is being approached on the subject through the Foreign Office.

For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Channel Coast:

Air reconnaissance did not throw any light on the whereabouts of the boat WIKING which disappeared from St. Brieux between 2200 and 2400 on 5 April.

One patrol boat and four gun carriers of the 2nd Gun Carrier Flotilla were attacked by enemy planes off Le Touquet on the evening of 5 April. Among those killed was the Commander of the 2nd Gun Carrier Flotilla.

One ELM/J mine was swept off Calais.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Convoys had to be postponed for 24 hours owing to the weather.

For the report of Admiral, Netherlands on the results of the enemy air raids on the Rotterdam shipyards on 31 March and 4 April see Teletype 1200.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, two ice breakers left Molotovsk for the Gorlo Straits. Russian planes reported one of our convoys in Kongs Fjord, another in Bass Fjord. No reconnaissance activity was observed over the North Sea. Four planes of the Iceland squadrons were observed.

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Two enemy planes were sighted in the Vardoc area.

Air reconnaissance reported 13 merchant vessels in Kola Bay and 28 medium-sized merchant vessels between Vayenga and Murmansk.

Own Situation:

Eighteen ships were escorted north, twelve south.

In the course of a telephone conversation the Commanding Admiral, Group North suggested to the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff that open water firing (torpedoes) be discontinued. The Naval Staff cannot sanction this. The necessary directive was issued. For copy see Teletype 1717.

The JACOBI and GALSTER were transferred from Narvik to Alta, the RIEDEL to Trondheim.

Group North advised the Admiral, Northern Waters that quite apart from the transfer of the destroyers in the Western Area, the LODY and destroyer Z "25" would be transferred from home waters to the Northern Area any time after 20 April.

The Commander, Submarines, Norway drew the Naval Staff's attention to the instructions issued to the submarines detailed to bring in the KARIN, pointing out, among other things, that the task must be kept absolutely secret from the crew even after putting in. See Teletypes 1029 and 1031/43 Gkdos. Chofs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

For reports from Group North to the REGENSBURG and KARIN on air reconnaissance and weather conditions see Radiograms 1125, 1535 and 1905.

Group North reported the attitude of 5th Air Force Command to the orders for the commitment of naval forces in Northern Waters as far as cooperation with the Air Force was concerned, and remarked in this connection that it could be taken for granted from past experience that the Navy's requests to the Air Force would be fully recognized and understood. Copy of the letter in accordance with 1/Skl 1045/43 Gkdos. Chofs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

Fifteen vessels and three minesweeping planes were on duty sweeping the channels in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. The steamer LUMME was refloated on 5 April and entered Korsöer. Part of the Skagerrak patrol anchored close inshore owing to the weather.

On the suggestion of Baltic Station the Naval Staff asked the Naval Attache, Stockholm to request the Swedish Navy to sweep and keep clear of mines that part of a projected channel - about 1.3 miles of which will lie in Swedish territorial waters - connecting route 32 and Swedish territorial waters. It will also be of advantage to the Swedes. The execution of this measure is expedient to speed up traffic. Copy of the letter as per l/Skl 10019/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

The Foreign Office has transmitted the text of the Swedish note announcing that the DICTO and the LIONEL will definitely not sail for six months. In view of these circumstances, the Swedish Government requested that the Gothenburg traffic be provisionally resumed and following further agreements, permanently re-established. For further reference to the political aspects of the matter see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

On the basis of this communication, the Naval Staff instructed Group North, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Naval Command, Norway, to stop the special patrol measures immediately, and to lift the night traffic restrictions enforced by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Copy of this directive as per l/Skl 10340 and 10365/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that the minelaying operations had to be broken off owing to the weather. The leave transports to and from Finland are also being delayed.

The Air Force attacked Leningrad on the night of 5 April. Otherwise Admiral, Baltic States had nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare:1. Enemy Situation:

There was brisk air reconnaissance over the Bay of

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Biscay. Twenty-seven planes were intercepted.

2. Own Situation:

The convoy operation southeast of Greenland was considerably handicapped by the strong enemy air cover. Only two shadowing reports were received. Submarine U "632" is believed to have torpedoed a destroyer at 1507. Sinking noises were heard. Submarine U "270" heard two explosions at 0142 in AK 2838 after firing two single shots at two steamers. The submarines of Group "Loewenherz" have been requested to display more energy and persistence in taking advantage of an opportunity to attack a convoy. The Commander in Chief, Submarines has declared the results obtained so far in fighting the convoy to be absolutely unsatisfactory, despite favorable weather conditions. Three submarines reported damage from air attacks. No successes were reported by the remaining Atlantic submarines. Nor were sinkings reported from the southern group of submarines. For further individual reports see the "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

261 planes of the 3rd Air Force, 232 of which were fighters, were over the Western Area and 11 over the Mediterranean. Attacks by light enemy forces were made towards evening in the Namur area and in Western France. There was brisk enemy air activity in the area of the Channel Islands and off the Atlantic coast as far as the mouth of the Gironde during the night of 6 April, minelaying operations were presumably in progress. It is now reported that 2,000 persons, 300 of whom were children, were killed during the daylight raid on Antwerp on 5 April.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force had a total of 449 planes out on operations. Their efforts were concentrated on supporting the defensive actions in the 1st Italian Army sector. Enemy air activity increased. Further attacks were made against airfields in Tunisia and

Sicily. It was only with great difficulty that we were able to press home our attack in the Tunisian area in the face of strong enemy fighter defenses. Six enemy planes and five of our own were lost. Supplementing the reports of 5 April was the information that a transport plane formation of 31 Ju 52's was attacked by 40 enemy planes resulting in the loss of 14 planes. Ten additional Ju 52's were completely destroyed and 56 Ju 52's damaged during a raid on the Sicilian airfields.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report, two convoys are due to leave Gibraltar by 10 April, one for the Atlantic and the other presumably for Malta. Shipping movements in the Oran area were lively. Eleven steamers and two tankers were off Arzew steering various courses. Seven steamers were sighted lying at anchor in the Gulf of Oran and 18 merchant vessels and two destroyers in Oran itself.

A surfaced submarine bombarded railroad installations 20 miles east of Palermo at 1530.

According to photographic reconnaissance, which was, however, incomplete, one minelayer of the MANXMAN class and four destroyers were in La Valetta. The reconnaissance of the coastal waters, likewise incomplete, did not produce any sighting reports from the area off the Cyrenaican coast.

According to an unconfirmed intelligence report from Istanbul, an aircraft carrier and six U.S. destroyers are said to have entered Suez at the end of March. An attempt is being made to check the report.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four Italian submarines were reported in the operational area. No reports of successes were received from our submarines. For further details see the "Supplement to the Submarine Situation".

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On the night of 5 April altogether seven boats of the 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas carried out remote escort for a convoy north and south of La Galite. There are at present six operational PT boats in Bizerta. Nine men were killed and 21 seriously wounded in the enemy air attack on our motor minesweepers and auxiliary motor minesweepers off the Tunisian coast on 5 April. One of the attacking planes was shot down. Only one motor minesweeper is still operational at present. The minesweepers M "6021" and "6023" and five auxiliary motor minesweepers entered Naples on 5 April. On the same day, the Italians swept three mines from the Marcttimo minofield in the Trapani area and attached buoys to 14 mines in another minofield.

Reports of heavy damage to the harbor and harbor installations of Naples during the air raid there on the afternoon of 4 April have now been received. The hospital ship SICILIA (9,646 G.R.T.) capsized. The steamer LOMBARDIA is aground with a list. The motorship ROSELLI, the steamers TERNI and SAN LUIGI, as well as four torpedo boats were damaged. Another air raid on the same evening did not cause any further damage.

Group West has requested the immediate release of the passenger steamer CAMBON and the steamer CONDE from the blocked reserve for an urgent task of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South. The representative of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has requested an immediate examination as to whether ships of the 50,000 G.R.T. class could not be made available for a special operation and provided with facilities for unloading heavy equipment and trucks. These ships would also have to be released ahead of time from the blocked reserve. Group West has already sanctioned the release of the CAMBON and CONDE because Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff had agreed in principle. The Naval Staff requested a decision from Armed Forces High Command concerning the 50,000 G.R.T. class ships; the latter ruled that in accordance with the Fuehrer's order, blocked shipping space would be released for the Sardinia operation. The Fuehrer refused to allow it to operate in the Tunisian traffic. For copies of the teletypes exchanged see Teletypes 1200, 1717 and 1910.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The two steamers of the supply convoy ROVERETO and SAN DIEGO were sunk in an enemy air raid shortly before entering Bizerta. Another steamer exploded off the entrance to Bizerta harbor after an enemy air raid at 1730. One escort vessel was sunk. The steamer SAN DIEGO also exploded after having been sunk. Thus, two more large vessels totaling nearly 15,000 G.R.T. and fully loaded with supplies of all kinds have been lost.

The convoy PIERRE CLAUDE - BELLUNO entered Leghorn from Tunis. The small craft traffic between Tunisia and Sicily proceeded without any special incidents.

Four French ships put out from French south coast ports bound for Italy.

German Naval Command, Italy reported the outcome of the conference with the Naval Attache, Rome and the Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy to discuss the competent authority for merchant shipping in the Western Mediterranean from Marseilles to Italian ports and to the Aegean Sea, and also for effecting the transfer of the former French and neutral ships from Marseilles to the Italian area. It was agreed that as from 15 April German Naval Command, Italy should take over the responsibility for this merchant shipping from the Naval Attache, Rome. For copy of the report see Teletype 2020.

The arrangement, considered necessary all along by the Naval Staff, has thus at last been made.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

A submarine hunt from the air in consequence of the sinking of the steamer SAN ISEDO was unsuccessful, as was also similar activity in the Attica and Milos areas and along the east coast of the Peloponnese. Neither were successes achieved in the northern part of the Aegean Sea. Intensified anti-submarine patrols were carried out in the Gulf of Petali and in the Straits of Doro and Keos. Convoy traffic was handicapped by the weather. The auxiliary cruiser BARLETTA returned to Greek waters from Italy.

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Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, two destroyers and one torpedo boat were off the central part of the east coast.

Own Situation:

No PT boats were in operation owing to the weather. The 7th Anapa convoy left Kerch. Although the ferry service across the Strait of Kerch was carried out without interference from enemy planes, it continued to function slowly owing to the poor condition of the roads on the Taman Peninsula. Furthermore, vessels were unable to tie up in Taman in the afternoon owing to the heavy seas. Two mines were swept by minisweeping planes in the Strait of Kerch. About 900 men were transported west, and about 800 tons of supplies east.

Tomriuk harbor and the northern exit of the Strait of Kerch are free of ice. It is planned to resume the Kerch - Tomriuk traffic on 9 April.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

According to a United Press report, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, stated that it was difficult to ascertain whether the pounding of German submarine bases by Allied planes would have any effect on the Battle of the Atlantic.

Commenting on the present situation, "The Times" expressed the view that it was at the moment imperative to render Russia the utmost assistance by dealing Germany the most overwhelming blows.

Allied circles see in the postponement of General de Gaulle's visit to Algiers a sign that British policy is veering towards that of the United States, at the moment said to be opposed to the establishment of a French central government.

The official German news agency reported that meetings have been held in Sweden at which resolutions to stop the German transit traffic through Sweden were made.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff

I. Quartermaster Division brought a directive addressed to our naval offices on the question of responsibility for the merchant shipping in the Mediterranean to the attention of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping raised objections to it, referring to a Fuehrer directive, which had given him full responsibility for all merchant shipping, and requested a discussion on the subject with the Commander in Chief, Navy. The Commander in Chief, Navy had for quite some time felt the need for clarifying several issues in discussions with the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, but it had unfortunately been quite impossible, because the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping had been abroad. At all events, the Naval Staff's apprehensions at the creation of the post of a civilian Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping were entirely justified. Smooth cooperation, which could have only been guaranteed by the Navy surrendering its responsibility for merchant shipping for the duration, was unfortunately inadequately achieved. In the face of a further undoubtedly imminent straining of supply lines in the various theaters of war - a decisive factor in the recent plan to increase escort forces - a thorough settlement of this question cannot be evaded either.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

- II. Report by Mine Warfare Section, Operations Division on the general minefield plans in all theaters of war in accordance with the decree 1/Skl I E 9741/43 Gkdos.

Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff concurred.

Special Items

- I. The Naval Staff has sent the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff and Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff for the attention of the permanent representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters, and the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff (Navy) a short report by Group West on Operation "Elisabeth", i.e. the sailing of four blockade runners from the west coast of France, timed to coincide with the bringing in of a homeward bound blockade runner. Naval Staff felt that the operation could be considered a success. In this connection, it particularly stressed the part played by the Air Force in the common achievement. Copy of the communication 1/Skl 1046/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.
- II. According to the Naval Attache, Rome, Admiral Riccardi intends to raise the question of the establishment of an Italian submarine base in Batavia during Admiral Nomura's stay in Rome on 8 and 9 April, and requested pertinent information on the subject. Riccardi has the impression that the Japanese are placing obstacles in the way of the Italian plan because they apparently do not wish to see the Italian flag flying in East Asia.

The Commander in Chief, Navy has not yet touched on the subject of a base for Italian transport submarines with Admiral Nomura. It is most advisable for the loading and supplying of Italian submarines in Japan and the Dutch East Indies to remain in our hands, because we have the blockade runner organization there. The Italian base ships are considered valuable support in this connection.

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The Commander in Chief, Navy does not intend to discuss the matter with Admiral Nomura until after the latter's return from Rome. The necessary instructions are being issued to the Naval Attache, Rome. Copies of the teletypes exchanged with Rome in accordance with 1/Skl 1041 and 1057/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

- III. Intelligence Division was requested by Operations Division to investigate whether any signs of concentrations for enemy operations in the Eastern Mediterranean could be detected in the intelligence reports on shipping in the area: Capetown - East African coast - India.

Intelligence Division stated in this connection that only sparse data had been received during the past few months from the area in question and no conclusions of the kind referred to could be drawn from it.

- IV. Intelligence Division submitted a report based on available intelligence material on the launching points and bases for any landing operations which might be started from the Great Britain - Iceland area. Copy in accordance with 1/Skl 10587/43 Gch. in War Diary file: "Material on Enemy Situation".

Situation 7 April

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff informed the KARIN in Radiogram 1345 that our submarines have received permission to attack single vessels on the KARIN's route south of 56° N from 7 April on.

ROSSBACH received orders in Radiogram 2139 to report her position should she be unable to reach Batavia by 9 April.

Submarine U "174" reported that she had missed the

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KARIN and had handed over the personnel, equipment and operational orders to the IRENE on 6 April. The PORTLAND was sighted outward bound in BD 8737 on 2 April.

The PORTLAND was informed in Radiogram 2042 that she was encountered outward bound in BD 87 by one of our submarines.

According to a report from submarine U "174", the maximum speed of the IRENE is 11.5 knots. The ship is camouflaged as the HOEGT SILVESTAR or the REINHOLT; fuel supply 500 cubic meters.

The IRENE was informed in Radiogram 2330 of the receipt of the report, and instructed to steer course 86° from the west to Point "Ingo", so as to facilitate the rendezvous with destroyers.

Group West was informed of reports on the IRENE; her arrival in time at Point "Ingo" is just possible.

Some delay must, however, be reckoned with.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, a convoy of 12 steamers and four destroyers was in BE 9792 at noon, course 180°, slow speed.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Three British ELM/J mines were swept on the convoy route, one of them by a magnetic minesweeping plane. Group West received instructions to take over control of the IRENE at 1000 on 8 April. The ship has yet to be informed of this by the Group, as also of our air reconnaissance and of the procedure to be adopted during enemy air attacks on the basis of the HOHENFRIEDBERG's experiences.

Group West reported that the HIMALAYA would be ready to sail at noon on 8 April. The Italians have replaced the captain at the request of the Group. The

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Naval Staff asked to know the reason for this change. The Group suggested that the ship be allowed to sail on the evening of 8 April, escorted by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla approximately as far as BE 8311, and then to proceed alone at approximately 45° 30' N as far as 30° W.

The Naval Staff approved and gave orders that the captain was to be briefed at "Betason" (Italian submarine station in Bordeaux, Tr. N.) on the Naval Staff's sailing orders, the execution of the task and the necessary secrecy.

The Group reported that it had itself issued instructions to the captain and gave the reasons for the replacement of the interpreter and the radio officer, but not, however, of the captain. Further details will follow as soon as reports have been received from German and Italian offices on the investigation of the incidents which occurred aboard the HIMALAYA during and after her encounter with the 8th Destroyer Flotilla.

The time fixed for sailing will make it possible to synchronize operation HIMALAYA with the incoming escort of the IRENE. Group West, therefore, received the following instructions:

The incoming escort of the IRENE is to be synchronized with the outgoing escort of the HIMALAYA. The IRENE was approximately in BD 75 on 6 April. If the HIMALAYA sails on the night of 8 April, the IRENE will have to start passage east on 7 April. Efforts must be concentrated on the IRENE's incoming escort. Naval Staff anticipates that the take-over by the destroyers will be similar to that of the PIETRO ORSEOLO.

Channel Coast:

With reference to the loss of minesweeper M "3818" on 4 April (see Teletype 2235), the short action report from the 38th Minesweeper Flotilla reveals that on a very dark night and from an altitude of 1,000 - 2,000 meters - judging by the noise of the engines - enemy planes at once dropped six bombs on our vessels which were proceeding without leaving much wake, and scored a direct hit. If the estimated altitude is correct, it would appear that a new and very

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effective radar bomb-sight or infra-red searchlight gear was being used.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

With the exception of one convoy, escort and defense duties had to be canceled owing to the weather.

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff informed the Naval Staff of the instructions issued to the 3rd and 5th Air Forces, to the Air Force Commander, Center and to the Commander, Operations, England, concerning operations against Danish fishing vessels in the North Sea as requested by Naval Staff. For copy see Teletype 2230.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence intercepted nine submarines off the Arctic coast of Norway and in the Barents Sea on 6 and 7 April. Seven Russian submarines were operating off the Arctic coast of Norway on 8 April. These submarines were informed of the departure of our steamers from Kirkenes.

Two planes were observed over the North Sea and two over the Iceland area.

According to photographic reconnaissance on 5 April there were:

7 steamers and 1 floating dock in Murmansk, 1 C-class anti-aircraft cruiser, 3 destroyers, 2 submarines, 1 torpedo boat and 16 steamers in Kola Bay.

Own Situation:

Enemy air raids on Petsamo and Kirkenes on 6 April did not cause any damage. Enemy reconnaissance covered the ships' anchorages in Kaa Fjord.

Twenty-two ships were escorted north and thirteen south. The KARIN will be transferred to Group North's command as from 1800 on 7 April.

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No reports had been received, either from the REGENSBURG or from the KARIN. Great anxiety is now felt about the fate of the REGENSBURG.

For the precautionary instructions by Group North for escorting the two ships in, see Radiograms 1128, 1137, 1142, 1245, 1556 and 1858. Three submarines were given instructions to escort the ships, should they encounter them, by the shortest possible route to AB 9856. Weather permitting, it is planned to have the convoy taken over by destroyers from Harstad. A patrol of the approach channels by torpedo boats has been arranged.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

The patrol positions in the Skagerrak were not taken up because the patrol boats were out on escort duties. Five steamers and one submarine were escorted in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Thirteen vessels and two magnetic minesweeping planes were out on operations sweeping the channels. One ground mine was swept off Anholt.

Group North asked that the Swedish Navy be requested to carry out the following minelaying measures:

- "1. Not to lay the Swedish Oeland minefield until specifically requested. The regulations for the dummy minefield and the dummy declared area as well as the barrage gap markings remain in force.
2. To lay Swedish minefields in the Swedish declared area between Haevringe and Krakelund for protecting the ore shipping in case of submarine danger.
3. The Swedish minefield off Understen is to be dispensed with, as it has not justified its existence and, to judge from the experiences of the previous year, is causing great navigational difficulties to merchant shipping."

As regards direction of shipping, Group North sees no need for restrictions in the Baltic, unless the submarine and mine menace were to become acute there. But should submarines become a real danger, the following plans have been made:

- "1. Ore traffic and independently routed merchantmen

are to proceed through Swedish territorial waters without any special Swedish escort.

2. Troop transports and important ships carrying supplies for the armed forces are to sail along the Baltic coast under escort of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic. These measures are also necessary for security reasons."

In the area of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, work on the "Nashorn" minefield and the searching sweep of the "Corbatha" minefield were canceled owing to the weather. Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Merchant Shipping:

The Naval Staff made the following statement to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping on the question of shipping delays in the North Sea (see War Diary 24 March):

"The complaints of the Swedish Shipping Committee that the North Sea passage is taking too long, are not unjustified.

During February it was not only the long spells of bad weather, but also the exigencies of war - essential special convoys, for instance - which forced the temporary closing of the channels to general traffic. Apart from the weather, further delays were caused because, owing to the increased enemy PT boat activity off the West Frisian Islands and in the Dutch area, it is only possible to sail from approximately an hour before dawn until an hour after dusk. The mining of the channels with new types of mines, which has lately increased to a marked extent, has further contributed to convoy traffic delays.

The Naval Staff is fully aware of the North Sea traffic's importance and is doing everything in its power towards more efficient defenses and greater speed. The enemy situation and that of our forces, however, often prevent requests for safety and speed from being met at one and the same time."

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance in the Bay of Biscay was normal.

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Twenty-nine planes were observed.

2. Own Situation:

The operation in the Northern Atlantic was broken off after an unsuccessful search. Position reports from two of the Group "Loewenherz" submarines are outstanding.

Submarine U "185", belonging to the southern group, reported having sunk a 5,550 G.R.T. steamer in Windward Passage on 6 April.

For further details see the "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The instructions to Submarine Division on synchronizing the escort of the IRENE into the Bay of Biscay with the outward bound escort of the HIMALAYA, were issued in a short dispatch l/Skl I K 1049/43 Gkdos. Chfs. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

VII. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Sixty-one planes belonging to the 3rd Air Force were on operations over the Western Area, five were over the Mediterranean. Two enemy planes were shot down. Enemy air activity both by day and night was only slight.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 3rd Air Force reported a total of 483 flights which concentrated on beating off enemy air attacks on Army Group Africa, particularly on the Italian 1st Army. Enemy air activity against airfields in Tunisia as well as against towns in Sicily was lively. Six enemy fighters were shot down for a loss of nine of our planes. For reconnaissance results see: "Enemy Situation Mediterranean".

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Minesweeping operations were observed off Tangier on the afternoon of 6 April. A small convoy consisting of two steamers, one escort vessel and a British submarine left Gibraltar on the evening of 6 April bound for the Mediterranean. The cruiser UGANDA entered Gibraltar on 7 April from the Atlantic. Increased convoy traffic was observed off the Algerian coast on the evening of 6 April, and during the forenoon of 7 April. A convoy consisting of 30 steamers and 15 escort vessels on a westerly course was 60 miles west of Algiers at 1925 on 6 April; it is ostensibly the same convoy reported north of Jijelli on the forenoon of 5 April.

Twenty vessels were located 50 miles north of Cape Tenes at 0342 on 7 April, their course could not be determined. Eight merchantmen were west of Cape Bougaroni at 1045 heading east.

A submarine was reported northeast of Point Stilo in the afternoon.

According to photographic reconnaissance, eight steamers and ostensibly 13 landing craft were in Benghazi. One hospital ship and one tanker, the latter apparently aground, were lying outside the harbor.

Exhaustive reconnaissance of the coastal waters between Mersa Matruh and Derna produced no sighting results.

The number of ships lying in Alexandria harbor was, according to photographic reconnaissance, unchanged as far as the French vessels were concerned. In addition, the following vessels were counted:

2 light cruisers, 10 destroyers or corvettes, 1 submarine and about 40 merchantmen.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four Italian submarines were reported in the operational area.

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Our submarines were assigned new attack areas in the Western Mediterranean. No successes have been reported. For further details see: "Supplement to the Submarine Situation".

PT boats of the 3rd and 7th Flotillas were not out on operations during the night of 6 April because it had been planned to use Italian PT boats.

There were no operations on the night of 7 April owing to the weather.

3,500 tons of sulphur caught fire in Palermo after the enemy air raid on 5 April. The submarine chaser UJ "2202" and the steamer SKOTTFOSS were sunk during an enemy air raid on Trapani on the afternoon of 6 April. The submarine chaser UJ "2210" was damaged. Three of the original ten German submarine chasers have been sunk so far, only two of the remaining seven are fully operational.

Three mines were swept in the Bizerta area by Italian minesweepers on 6 April.

Operations by minesweeping planes were unsuccessful.

According to a situation report from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the Italian 1st Army had to be withdrawn to the Douacu-Skhirra line, where the majority of the German forces are ready for defensive action. The situation of the 1st Italian Army continues to be very serious owing to extremely heavy casualties. The enemy also attacked with strong armored forces on the western front and made a breach about 8 kilometers wide and 2 kilometers deep in our positions. An enemy attack west of Pichon is also believed to be imminent. The Gafsa-Gabes road being in enemy hands, it is quite possible that the enemy forces will shift the focal point of their efforts in the hope of breaking through to Kairouan. According to photographic reconnaissance of 5 April, a section of the landing craft and equipment which had so far been assumed in Oran, was transferred to the Bougie - Bone region. Landing craft spotted in Algiers and off Oran were, for the most part, either loaded or being loaded. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, therefore, anticipates the possibility of a Commando operation being launched against the coast of Northern Tunisia

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as soon as a further transfer of landing craft to the east is noticeable.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The motor vessel TOMMASO left Leghorn for Tunis on the evening of 6 April escorted by a torpedo boat. The convoy was diverted to Trapani owing to the weather. Six Sicbel ferries and two submarines from Marsala entered Tunis on the afternoon of 6 April. The putting-in report of eight Italian naval landing craft on their return passage from Bizerta to Trapani has not yet been received.

The German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty gave details of the convoy consisting of the steamers SAN DIEGO and ROVERETO which were sunk by enemy bombers from an altitude of 4,000 meters just outside Bizerta harbor despite their own strong fighter escort. For copy see Teletype 1200. This report reveals that the steamers had been shadowed and repeatedly attacked by enemy planes during the whole of their passage from Naples. During the last attack our fighters were not strong enough to prevent several bombers from breaking through. Vice Admiral Ruge has therefore come to the conclusion that it is only possible for supplies to reach their destination aboard fast, heavily armed steamers, provided with the strongest possible fighter escort. Even so, hopes of success still remain in doubt, as the armament of our fighters is inadequate against four-engined enemy bombers.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Adgean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, there was a small number of single vessels under escort off the Caucasian coast.

Own Situation:

Operations by four PT boats planned for the night of

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7 April in the Tuapse-Sochi area had to be canceled owing to the weather.

The 17th Anapa convoy was carried out according to plan; the 18th Anapa convoy has sailed. The ferry service across the Strait of Kerch proceeded without interference from enemy planes. The roads on the Taman Peninsula continue to be in poor condition and can only be used by caterpillar vehicles. The rate of discharge is correspondingly low. It is therefore planned to increase supplies for Anapa on 8 and 9 April.

The first Temriuk convoy with a cargo of 2,146 tons put out on the night of 7 April.

Group South reported that Admiral, Black Sea was informed by Army Group A of the Fuehrer's Operational Order No. 5. This order stipulated that everything be done to complete the reinforcement of the Crimean coastal defenses. Army Group A has appointed fortress commanders in Sevastopol, Feodosia and Kerch.

The aim is to turn the provisionally fortified peninsula into a Crimean fortress. The details of the operational order are not known to the Group. In the Group's opinion this means that the Navy will have to effect fundamental changes in the prevailing coastal defense system by confining itself to those positions essential to naval operations. The focal points for the Navy are still the Strait of Kerch, Feodosia including Ivan Baba, and Sevastopol. As a precautionary measure the Group submitted its requirements as follows: nine 8.8 cm., five or six 10 cm., two 12.7 cm., eleven 15 cm. and eight 20.3 cm. guns, one 30.5 cm. battery. This demand represents the ultimate target for the naval artillery defenses of the Crimea and has been calculated on the basis of the fortress artillery in the west. For copy of this report see Teletype 1800.

IX. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

According to Reuter, the Bolivian Government has announced that Bolivia has been at war with the Axis since 7 April. General mobilization was ordered simultaneously. This resolution was passed at a cabinet meeting and still requires the approval of Parliament.

No further items of political importance were received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff

Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

Germany's natural rubber demands now only amount to 250 tons a month and those of her Allies to 100 tons, a total of 350 tons. On this basis the PIETRO ORSEOLO would have brought in supplies sufficient for at least six months.

According to information gained from the Spanish Naval Attache, Berlin, Spanish fishermen stated that German naval forces forced them to surrender the rubber which they had salvaged. A political demarche is anticipated. Spanish naval forces were said to have orders to defend the rights of the Spanish fishermen, if necessary, by force of arms. The Spanish Naval Attache and the German Naval Attache, Madrid were informed by the Naval Staff that the German naval forces had standing orders not to use force, and that therefore the statements made by the fishermen must be untrue. The German Foreign Office has been approached in order to obtain its opinion on the legal aspects of the situation. Group West has been instructed that incidents must be avoided and that the text of an order to our own forces not to apply force, for which the Naval Staff gave instructions by telephone, is to be submitted. The Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters was informed accordingly. For copy of the report see Teletype 1718.

Special Items:

- I. In accordance with the wishes of the Italian Admiralty, the Naval Staff has agreed to an alteration in paragraph V

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of Directive No. 1 of Commanding Admiral, Group South, the paragraph in question to read as follows:

"In the event of an enemy offensive in the Aegean Sea, Commanding Admiral, Naval Group South will assume control of operations and, for that purpose, transfer his headquarters to Athens. During the interval required for this transfer, Admiral Hoggan will issue the operational orders which circumstances dictate, in the name and by order of Commanding Admiral, Naval Group South, signing them: "By order of Commanding Admiral, Naval Group South"."

Copy of the dispatch addressed to the Italian Naval Liaison Staff attached to the Naval Staff (Im 1042/43 Gkdos. Chofs.) in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

It was announced in the same dispatch that Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division will visit Rome in order to report on the attitude of the Naval Staff to the proposals on organization submitted by the Italian Admiralty and to discuss and settle the matter on the spot. Group South was informed accordingly.

- II. A compilation of the enemy intelligence obtained from 29 March to 4 April by radio deciphering and radio intelligence is contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 14/43.

Situation 8 April

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Blockade runner situation:

- a. No news of the REGENSBURG. Air reconnaissance did not extend as far as the approaches to the Denmark Strait owing to ice formation trouble.

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- b. Group North took over command of the KIRIN on the afternoon of 7 April. The ship was estimated by dead reckoning to be located in the eastern approaches to Denmark Strait on 8 April. Visibility was good with a stiff northerly breeze.
- c. Group West took over command of the IRENE as from the forenoon of 8 April.
- d. The HIMALAYA put out on the night of 8 April under destroyer escort which will pick up the IRENE on the afternoon of 10 April. The Chief, Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters has been informed accordingly.

The ORSEOLO has been informed that Point "Echolot" is to be moved 5° east (see Radiogram 2218).

Through a submarine, the IRENE reported camouflage ships of which the Naval Staff had no knowledge. To avoid misunderstandings, the Naval Attache, Tokyo has been requested to report exactly which ships have been selected for camouflage, whenever submitting general information on ships.

All outward bound blockade runners were instructed in Radiogram 1009,

- aa. to keep as far east as possible between $10^{\circ} 00'$ N and $05^{\circ} 00'$ S;
- bb. that the limit of the submarine area between $13^{\circ} 00'$ N and $05^{\circ} 00'$ to port of the advance course had been moved east by 200 miles;
- cc. to keep at least 250 miles away from Ascension Island.

All vessels in foreign waters were informed in Radiogram 2001 that the auxiliary cruiser BULOLO was at $08^{\circ} 30'$ N, $27^{\circ} 30'$ W, on a northwesterly course, speed 14 knots, on 2 April.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1310 our air reconnaissance reported a single funnel cruiser 280 miles west-southwest of Cape

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Ortega heading north, and at 1550 two 5,000 G.R.T. steamers and the passenger steamer SAMRIA escorted by three destroyers 310 miles west of Cape Ortega, course 30°.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The approaches and roads of La Pallice, and the approaches to Royan were closed on 7 April because the presence of ground mines was suspected. At 1522 on 8 April, the mine exploding vessel "16" struck a mine off La Pallice and was seriously damaged.

Group West informed the IRENE in Radiogram 1235 that it had taken over command and gave details of our air reconnaissance operations as well as intelligence on enemy air reconnaissance.

Channel Coast:

A detonation of the explosive cutter aboard minesweeper M "3620", caused by faulty operation, inflicted considerable damage as well as casualties. On the same day a raft was found by the eastern breakwater of Le Troport from which enemy agents are believed to have landed during the night.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Escort duties were postponed for 24 hours and minesweeping activity and patrol boat duties canceled owing to the weather. An enemy plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns in the Dutch area on the night of 8 April, as numerous enemy planes passed over the area making for the industrial area of Western Germany.

It is planned to tow the ADMIRAL HIPPER from Wilhelmshaven to Brunsbuettel some time after 10 April. For further details see Teletype 1553.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence intercepted an urgent tactical

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radio message from a British vessel which was also relayed to Murmansk by a British home radio station. Four patrol boats and three minesweepers were intercepted on their way from Murmansk to Varanger Fjord. Aerial activity was moderate over the North Sea. It was confirmed that six planes of the Iceland squadrons were out on operations. On 27 March an unidentified vessel received instructions to avoid a certain area off Reykjavik.

Our air reconnaissance reported a submerging enemy submarine 240 miles northwest of Trondheim at 1805.

Own Situation:

A mine of an unknown type was cut at the entrance to Brei Sound, west of North Cape. It sank immediately. The area was closed owing to the suspected presence of mines. Raids by small numbers of enemy planes were carried out on Kirkenes on 6 April.

What is believed to have been a gas explosion occurred aboard the SCHARNHORST at 1755 on 8 April in the compartment containing chemicals for boiler maintenance. The cause remains a mystery. The between deck above the compartment was bent upwards, and the gun deck above it was slightly bulged. The ship's fighting qualities are in no way impaired, but 16 men were unfortunately killed and two seriously injured.

The NEUMARK is being transferred to Lang Fjord to be at the disposal of the SCHARNHORST.

The steamer ANTJE FRITZEN (6,582 G.R.T.) sprang a leak from an unknown cause west of Egeroey, but reached Stavanger under her own steam. The cargo consisted of 9,400 tons of coal.

Nineteen ships were escorted north and twenty-two south.

Instructions to the KARIN and REGENSBURG were issued by Group North in Radiograms 1150, 1201, 1503 and 1525.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

The gaps through the minofields off Hanstholm and Kristiansand South were each guarded by one patrol boat.

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Seven steamers and five submarines were escorted in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Thirteen vessels were out sweeping the channels. The marking of route "38" with buoys has been started.

The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that minfield "Nashorn IV" consisting of 172 mines had been completed, and that "Nashorn Va", to contain 324 mines, had been started. The sweeping of minfield "Corbetta III" was continued as well as the work on the net of the "Walross" barrage. The marking of route "Golf" with buoys was started. The 24th Landing Flotilla reported that all the naval landing craft were available. The 25th Minesweeper Flotilla is sweeping the "Wartburg" minfield. The minelayer KUISER is at Tallinn.

The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic has transmitted the report of the Commander, Net Barrage Unit on his inspection of the Finnish net north of Porkalla. The nets are of poor quality and consist of captured supplies from World War I. Contrary to official statements repeatedly made in the preceding year, Finnish officers declared that it was north of Porkalla that Russian submarines frequently broke through in 1942. The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic has therefore suggested closing this 3 - 4 mile long, 25 meter deep section with a German anti-submarine bottom net, foregoing, if necessary, the section south of Nargoen. Group North concurred with the suggestion of the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and requested a decision from the Naval Staff. (See Teletype 1534.)

The Commanding Admiral, Baltic States reported that it was planned to have three 4 cm. guns for anti-aircraft defense, which will be mounted by the beginning of May. A few 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns will most probably be added.

V. Merchant Shipping:

Group South advised the Naval Staff for information of its demand to the Shipping and Transport Branch, Quartermaster Division to make up the deficit of 20,000 tons of shipping space which still exists after allocation of 20,000 tons of captured French vessels. This is necessary if the demands of the Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas for supplies for April and May at a monthly average of 135,000 tons are to be met (see Teletype 1850).

VI. Submarine Warfare:1. Enemy Situation:

Very brisk air reconnaissance was confirmed as far as 15° W in the Bay of Biscay.

2. Own Situation:

Now that the convoy operation in the North Atlantic has been broken off, the submarines will be newly assigned. Group "Adler" will be made up of 16 submarines which are to take up positions in the reconnaissance line from AK 7257 to BD 1959 from 11 April onwards and lie in wait for the convoy making for the northeast, course 225°. The Group "Loewenherz" submarines will be mainly assigned to supply operations. The rest of the submarines are to make for AK 85.

Submarine U "123" of the southern group reported the sinking of a 4,500 G.R.T. steamer in ET 2452. This was possibly a Spanish ship, although neither a flag nor neutrality identification marks were recognizable.

In the West Indies submarine U "155" sank a 3,000 G.R.T. steamer in DM 4288 and a 9,973 G.R.T. tanker in DM 2883. Further reports are contained in the "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare:1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 137 planes on operations over the Western Area and four over the Mediterranean. Two Spitfires were shot down during daylight sorties.

Nine of our planes laid mines in the Thames on the night of 8 April. A total of 244 enemy planes were reported to have penetrated German or German occupied territory on the night of 8 April, 150 - 170 of which broke through to the Muenster - Paderborn - Giessen - Metz area, dropping numerous bombs on cities and towns in the Rhine - Westphalian industrial areas and Dutch border districts. There did not appear to be any definite focal point. Eight enemy planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns, one by naval

anti aircraft guns, and one by fighters.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reported 298 flights which were concentrated on the western part of the Tunisian front during the day, and on the southern front during the night and evening. The transportation of fuel supplies had once more to be assigned to bombers. Two enemy planes were shot down. Enemy attacks against our air and supply bases were less heavy than on the previous days.

3. Eastern Front:

Reconnaissance activity in the Black Sea by the 4th Air Force did not yield any appreciable results.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

A minelayer of the ADVENTURE class which entered Gibraltar from an unknown direction on the evening of 7 April, left again for an unknown destination on the evening of 8 April. According to an Italian report, about 21 large and medium-sized vessels passed Tangier at approximately 2300 on 7 April, coming from the Atlantic and making for the Straits of Gibraltar. Visibility was poor. A confirmation of this report has not yet been received from German sources. A transport escorted by three destroyers entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean on the afternoon of 8 April.

Convoy traffic in the Western Mediterranean was normal. At 0718 our air reconnaissance sighted 12 steamers, 6 destroyers and 6 escort vessels west of Cape Bougaroni, making for the east.

Photographic interpretation of the exhaustive air reconnaissance of the Algerian ports on 5 April showed that the following vessels were in these ports and Gibraltar: 3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 6 cruisers, including a large cruiser, 1 minelayer, 2 large destroyers, 17 destroyers, 16 submarines, 23 patrol boats and smaller naval craft and about 25 PT boats. Reports of an additional battleship

being in Mers el Kebir have been clarified. The large cruiser had obviously been mistaken for a battleship.

Submarines were reported west of Elba, southeast of Catalina and northeast of Point Stilo.

There was nothing to report from the Eastern Mediterranean.

The German Embassy in Ankara reported that the two PT boats purchased from Great Britain were taken over by the Turkish Navy in Alexandretta on 2 April.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four Italian submarines were reported in the operational area. Our submarines submitted no reports of successes. No PT boats were out on operations owing to the weather. Thus, only four boats are at present operational. Another mine was swept east of Cape Zebib on 6 April.

An auxiliary motor minesweeper ran aground off La Goulette. Minesweeping operations in the Trapani area were canceled owing to the weather. The submarine chaser UJ "2207" shot down an enemy plane on the afternoon of 7 April while making for Reggio.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The motor vessel TOMMASEO entered Trapani on the night of 3 April. The steamer FOGGIA is on passage from Sousse to Pantelleria. Twelve Italian naval landing craft dropped anchor off Favignana on account of the bad weather. Four of these are bound for Bizerta, the remaining eight are on their return passage to Trapani.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The anti-submarine patrol by planes and naval craft was without result. Escort duties were carried out according to plan and without incident.

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Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, only slight shipping traffic was observed off the Caucasian coast. Radio intelligence intercepted a destroyer in the area west of Sochi-Adler in the afternoon.

Own Situation:

PT boats were not out on operations. The convoys sailing along the Crimean coast and lumber transports from Yalta to Kerch were detained owing to the weather. The 18th and 19th Anapa convoys were held up at Kamish Burun for the same reason. The motor minesweeper R "30" with four naval landing craft and two freight train ferries is on her return passage to Kerch after having unloaded at Temriuk.

The ferry service across the Strait of Kerch was not handicapped by any enemy air activity. Low flying enemy planes dropped mines on the Senaya ferry route. The quantities landed on the Taman Peninsula have for days been more than the Army could deal with. 1,682 tons of supplies and 217 tons of engineer equipment were shipped east.

According to a report from Group South, it is planned to increase the supplies to the Taman bridgehead, partly by a new method and partly by a change-over from naval landing craft to lighters. On the conclusion of present operation, it has been planned to ship still about two divisions west, and to transfer personnel returning from leave east. The Schourlen Operational Staff cannot be disbanded until the second half of May when it is proposed to draw on it to reinforce the Kerch Naval Shore Command for current ferry operations.

IX. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

On 8 April Mr. Eden gave the House of Commons an account of his journey to the United States. He revealed no facts of any particular interest. His statements gave the impression that it had not so much been a matter of concrete resolutions having been passed but rather of opinions on all current, and also on a number of future questions having been thoroughly discussed. Secretary of State Hull has been invited to visit London. For further details see the daily situation report of Intelligence Division, No. 84, paragraph 2 c and the Foreign Press Report of 9 April No. 1, paragraph 2 a.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval StaffI. Report by Quartermaster Division:

- a. By Armed Forces High Command making a special allocation from Army and Air Force stocks, it will be possible to increase the oil supply to the Italian Navy by 11,400 tons, making a total of 51,000 tons for the current month. To this will be added 7,000 tons available in Italy. The requirements for supplies for Africa, if carried through according to plan, amount to 45,000 tons per month. For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.
- b. The Fuehrer has decreed that the Army be given priority allocations of small arms and machine-guns.
- c. The permanent representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters reported that in the course of the discussions at the Berghof the Italian Navy requested the allocation of a workshop in the Toulon arsenal.
- d. The possibility of using Ship "14" as a night fighter control vessel in the Skagerrak is being investigated.

II. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff stated that the Commander in Chief, Navy has successfully settled the steel allocation question.

No details are yet available.

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Special Items

- I. According to the Underwater Obstacles Branch, Naval Ordnance Division, a new device in the form of a delayed action contact was found in a salvaged ELM/J mine. The mine switches off the firing mechanism for seven seconds after the first impulse, and after that period has elapsed remains ready for firing for a further nine seconds. Consequently such mines cannot be swept by single magnetic minesweeping planes, but all other kinds of minesweeping gear can be used.

Two Ju 52 magnetic minesweeping planes will therefore have to cover the same stretch at an interval of 10 - 12 seconds, if they are to clear British ELM/J mines fitted with delayed action contacts.

Details will be relayed to all operational stations for information, pointing out that as a normal ELM/J mine might possibly endanger the second plane, the advisability of the sweeping procedure is to be investigated once more by the Minelaying Experimental Command, and that the tactical commitment of the minesweeping planes is to be directed by the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Aerial Mine Inspectorate.

- II. Group North advised the Naval Staff of the request made to the 5th Air Force for a reconnaissance of Denmark Strait and the ice areas because of the REGENSBURG and KARIN which are overdue.

The Naval Staff emphatically supported this request in the following teletype to the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff:

"Two blockade runners are in Denmark Strait area; one of these, THUSNELDI, has been overdue for the past eight days. Naval Staff assumes that she has either run into ice or been damaged in it. Reconnaissance of part or of the entire Denmark Strait, if possible, is requested in order to clarify the situation. Results will be of decisive importance for further measures."

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Situation 9 April

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Our Attache in Tokyo reported that the RIO GRANDE and the BURGENDLAND entered Yokohama on 31 March and 2 April respectively, and the ROSSBACH Batavia on 8 April.

Thus, all the blockade runners which were turned round have returned to port.

Situation of the blockade runners in the Atlantic:

1. No reports from the REGENSBURG and KARIN. Air reconnaissance was canceled.
2. The homeward bound IRENE is today between 24° and 20° W according to dead reckoning.
3. The HIMALAYA put out on the night of 8 April escorted by destroyer.

The Chief, Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters will be informed accordingly.

All vessels in foreign waters were informed in Radiogram 1822 of the position of the auxiliary cruiser ALCANTARA on 3 April with a group in $5^{\circ} 23' N$, $52^{\circ} 09' W$, course 117° , speed 12 knots.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance by the Air Commander, Atlantic produced the following information:

- a. 1135: three destroyers about 350 miles west of Lorient, course 200° , high speed.

- b. 1205: Warship group consisting of 4 cruisers, 2 destroyers, and 2 escort vessels, 350 miles off Brest, course 360°, moderate speed. A plane was over the formation. This group had, at the same time and in the same position, been interpreted as a group of four merchant vessels with two escort vessels and one plane.
- c. 1332: one destroyer in BE 8384, course 100°, high speed. A plane was in the vicinity.
- d. 1147: one destroyer and one vessel (a light cruiser, according to subsequent photographic evaluation) in BE 9147, course 100°, medium speed.

The information contained in paragraph d) did not come to the attention of the Naval Staff during 9 April.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The heavily damaged mine exploding vessel "16" was towed in to La Pallice. The mouth of the Gironde is closed as far as Pauillac owing to the suspected presence of aerial mines. A total of 15 British ELM/J mines was swept off La Pallice on 7 and 8 April.

The roadstead and approaches to La Pallice and the approaches to Bayonne are once more open to shipping.

Group West reported that the outgoing escort of the HIMALAYA sailed at midnight according to plan. In place of the destroyer Z "37", which is out of action, two boats of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla were assigned and these were to turn back on the evening of 9 April at the latest.

At 2145 Group West reported that the HIMALAYA assignment has so far been proceeding according to plan.

Channel Coast:

Harbor defense vessels off Le Havre were machine-gunned by nine enemy planes at 1930. Damage and losses were negligible.

Because of the known shortage of urgently needed fast

escort vessels, the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West has requested the assignment of the LOTHRINGEN and fitting up as a fast escort vessel. Further steps will be taken by Quartermaster Division.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Escort duties were carried out according to plan. In the forenoon a battery on the Dutch coast opened fire against enemy planes; hits were observed. There were otherwise no special incidents to report.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, five Russian destroyers were heading towards the Kola Bay exit on what were believed to be maneuvers. There was considerable air reconnaissance over the North Sea in the direction of the west coast of Norway. Five planes belonging to the Iceland squadrons were observed. Our air reconnaissance in the area of the Faeroes and the Shetland Islands was without result. The drifting bow of a ship was sighted 300 miles northwest of Trondheim. A submarine with a black conning-tower was seen submerging 240 miles west of Mosjoen. A patrol boat reported sighting submarines in the area of Naval Shore Command, Molde. Further details have not yet been received.

Own Situation:

Our convoy, eastbound for Petsamo, was fired on from the Rybachi Peninsula. Slight damage was caused by a hit on the steamer TROSTBURG. Our guns returned fire with 139 salvos.

The tanker WEISENBURG was attacked by six enemy torpedo bombers north of Stadlandet at 1741. The tanker sustained a torpedo hit. The fire which it caused was extinguished, and passage resumed. Two of the attacking bombers were shot down.

It is feared that a considerable amount of oil has been lost as a result of the hit - a particularly regrettable fact in view of the critical oil situation.

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Twenty-three ships were escorted north and twenty-five south.

The Naval Staff has informed Group North that the IRENE is not to be expected in Northern Waters as she will be escorted home via the Bay of Biscay, and that further incoming escort operations, apart from those of the REGENSBURG and KARIN, are not to be expected.

Group North continued to transmit instructions to the KARIN and REGENSBURG in Radiograms 1055, 1107, 1110, 1232 and 2023.

No special reports were received from the submarines in Northern Waters.

IV. Skagorrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

Seven steamers and four submarines were escorted in the areas of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Thirteen sea-going vessels and three minesweeping planes were sweeping the channels.

Following a collision with a patrol boat, submarine U "733" sank without any casualties in water 9 meters deep in Gdynia on 8 April. Salvage operations are in progress.

The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that "Mashorn Va" has been laid according to plan. The laying courses for "VIIa" and "VIIIa" have been swept clear. The sweeping operations in the "Corbotha III" and "Wartburg II" minefields are being continued. The 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla was transferred to Memel to assist in the latter task.

The Naval Staff has assigned the net material requested by the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic for strengthening the Finnish barrage near Porkalla (see Teletype 1718).

From Kronstadt Bay, the Commanding Admiral, Baltic States reported the usual activity. Three Hurricanes were shot down by our planes on the afternoon of 8 April. Numerous lines in Glinki were destroyed by the gunfire from Sciskari.

V. Merchant Shipping:

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping stated that

owing to the inadequate harbor facilities it would be impossible to effect the immediate transfer of the Spanish fruit and ore traffic to Port Vendres. The necessary arrangements were being made as quickly as possible.

The Naval Staff notified the offices concerned. The Naval Staff has informed the Naval Attache, Madrid of its apprehensions lest the six Spanish ships should be attacked by the British. But if the Spaniards insist on the ships being independently routed beyond Port Vendres, the Naval Staff will raise no objections apart from pointing out the risks involved, as the traffic is also of importance to us.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Air Reconnaissance over the Bay of Biscay was very brisk; 36 planes were observed.

2. Own Situation:

No reports of successes were received. For further details see "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary Part B, Vol. IV.

Four submarines were detailed to BE 7527 to take over the IRENE. The submarines have been given the task of closing in and taking over anti-aircraft defense or torpedo action against surface forces in close escort.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 117 planes out over the Western Area, four over the Mediterranean. Four FW 190's carried out a nuisance raid on Folkestone in the late afternoon. One plane was shot down by anti-aircraft fire. For the results of the reconnaissance by the Air Commander, Atlantic Coast see: "Situation West Area".

There was great activity by enemy fighter and fighter bomber formations during the day. Railroad stations

and traffic installations in the Dieppe and Amiens areas were attacked. Many engines were lost and casualties were heavy. Two enemy fighters and one four-engined bomber were shot down. The number of planes shot down on the night of 8 April has risen to 16. On the night of 9 April a total of 172 enemy planes flew over German territory. 100 - 150 planes raided the Rhine - Westphalian industrial district, Duisburg being the main target area. For damage see the daily situation report. According to reports so far received, eight of the attacking planes were shot down by fighters.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Operations were mainly concentrated on supporting the severe defensive fighting along the entire Tunisian west front.

3. Eastern Front:

Thirteen enemy planes were shot down over the Army lines.

According to photographic evaluation, a 1,000 G.R.T. steamer was anchored near Novorossisk at 0946.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Portugal, emanating from diplomatic sources, a large formation of British warships is to put out from Milford Haven and Devonport on 14 April for Gibraltar to reinforce the Mediterranean forces.

The transfer of a large number of heavy bombers from Great Britain to North Africa is scheduled for 15 April.

Both reports would suggest the imminence of a large-scale enemy operation.

Three loaded U.S. steamers and one cable layer entered Gibraltar from an unknown direction early on the forenoon of 9 April; a further four steamers put in from the Atlantic in the course of the forenoon. A large convoy consisting of one transport and twenty-eight steamers, two with hoisted torpedo

nets, entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean before noon. Further vessels from the Mediterranean arrived later. Four transport vessels, 99 steamers, 10 tankers and numerous small craft in addition to naval craft, were in Gibraltar at 1400. A total of 154 planes was counted in the harbor and on the airfield.

Only slight shipping activity was observed in the Western Mediterranean.

At 1018 3 landing craft were 12 miles west of Cape Tenes heading west; at 1045 2 destroyers were 30 miles southwest of Cape Tenes heading north; at 1135 7 destroyers were 30 miles south-southwest of Almeria heading east. Twelve steamers were in Oran roads at 1615; and 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier and 2 cruisers were in Mers el Kebir at 1915. What was believed to be an additional cruiser was lying off the harbor entrance.

A submarine was sighted southeast of Cagliari.

An exhaustive reconnaissance of the coastal approaches from Tobruk to Appollonia resulted in the sighting of a steamer lying stopped 24 miles northwest of Derna.

According to a report of the Naval Intelligence Center, Istanbul from a reliable source in Adana, confirmation has been received of a British aircraft carrier already reported as having entered Tripoli (Syria) on 2 April. The Naval Intelligence Center, Istanbul, however, considers this report to be of a doubtful nature or deliberately spread.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four Italian submarines were in the operational area. No reports of successes were received from our submarines. Submarine U "602" entered Toulon.

Weather conditions put a stop to all PT boat operations. Minesweeping activity and shipping traffic also had to be canceled.

The auxiliary minesweeper HR "6612" which ran aground off La Goulette will have to be considered

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a total loss. It proved impossible to unload any of the ships which ran aground off Cape Zebib.

The motor minesweepers R "3" and R "4" arrived in Chalon on 8 April.

The Reich Minister for Air and the Commander in Chief, Air Force, General Staff have ordered, effective immediately, that the nine ferries in operation in the area of the 3rd Air Force and the two ferries attached to the Ferry Anti-Aircraft Training Command be allocated to the 2nd Air Force for use as transport ferries. The ferries will be turned over to the Navy.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The steamer Tommaseo, the only supply ship on passage, lay off Favignana during the northwesterly gale in the Sicilian Channel. The transport operations of war transports and naval landing craft had to be postponed.

The German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty reported that of the only two approach routes to Tunisia, our own and enemy minefields have narrowed the Zembretta route down to three miles. Because of the unpredictable cross current, which has caused the loss of several vessels, including the two troop transport destroyers, any approaching vessels must be piloted by torpedo boats from Zembrètta. This passage can be used only if weather conditions improve. The Pantelleria route cannot be used in heavy seas, as the channel near Cape Bon is only a few hundred meters wide. In addition, the evaluation of the operations of the ABDIEL cruiser on the night of 30 March has led to mines being once more suspected in the area. The Italians, however, intend to take the risk. In view of these navigational difficulties, we will, unfortunately, be unable to exploit the bad weather to the desired extent.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Transport and convoy traffic proceeded according to plan and without incident.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, shipping off the Caucasian coast was negligible.

Own Situation:

Our PT boats were not out on operations. An enemy convoy consisting of one steamer and two patrol boats was attacked by our planes on the evening of 8 April; results were not observed.

The patrol boat duty off Taganrog was carried out with one motor fishing vessel. Convoy traffic in the Black Sea was carried out according to plan. The 18th Anapa convoy sailed from Kamish Burun in the evening.

As for the ferry service across the Strait of Kerch, the passage to Senaya was closed because of the danger of mines. 300 tons of supplies were transported east, none west.

IX. Situation East Asia:

Based on a communication from the Japanese Admiralty, the Naval Attache, Tokyo made the following report:

160 Japanese fighters and 70 dive bombers based at Rabaul and Buka, attacked about 15 escorted U.S. transports between Tulagi and Guadalcanar on the forenoon of 7 April. According to reports so far received, the following vessels were sunk: 1 light cruiser, 1 anti-aircraft destroyer, two 10,000 G.R.T., six 8,000 G.R.T. and two 4,000 G.R.T. transports. Three additional transports were severely damaged. Thirty-six planes were shot down during aerial combat. Japanese losses were as follows: 6 planes shot down, 14 missing.

The claim made by enemy propaganda that a Japanese cruiser was sunk during an air raid on Kavieng (New Ireland) is quite unfounded. The Japanese cruiser was merely hit aft, but did not sink.

Items of Political Importance

Nothing of any value to naval warfare has been received.

A statement by Litvinov to the effect that Spain had been at war with the U.S.S.R. ever since Spanish volunteers left for the east, is worth noting. This act of aggression was said to have made a formal declaration of war by Russia quite superfluous.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff

I. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division reported that:

- a. Lack of escort and defense forces had again made itself very much felt during the past few days.

In Norway, following the loss of the ALTAIR and the PATRIA on 3 and 4 April, the tanker WEISSENBURG was damaged by aerial torpedo hits off Stadlandet on 9 April. The two steamers which made up the WEISSENBURG convoy could only be escorted by one patrol boat. The Naval Staff felt that in view of the special importance of the tanker's cargo, a heavier escort should have been provided at all costs. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered that this view be brought to the attention of the Naval Command, Norway.

It is imperative to control Danish fishing vessels off the west coast of Jutland and in the Kattegat, where they are suspected of contacting the enemy and sometimes, the enemy air force.

- b. Group West transmitted the following summary of the situation in anticipation of the sailing of important Channel convoys:
1. Our flanking minefields are no longer effective.
 2. British long-range batteries are continually improving their firing by radar. These batteries will become increasingly dangerous.
 3. Night operations by British fighter bombers have so increased in efficiency that effective attacks will even have to be anticipated on dark nights.

4. Sweeping is being considerably complicated by the use in mixed minefields of a new type of mine, Mark XIX, fitted with snag lines, especially as it has been again proved by the fighter attack on the 8th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla that mine clearing by day will frequently lead to losses. Of 52 motor minesweepers, only 22 are still operational. Group West, therefore, urgently requested a considerable increase in the day and night fighter strength of the 3rd Air Force for the protection of the minesweepers and convoy operations of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and has promised a detailed report on the situation.

In addition to pointing out the necessity for reinforcing fighter cover, this summary also stresses the general lack of naval forces in no uncertain terms.

The details to a) and b) were transmitted to the Chief, Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters. Copy of this teletype in accordance with l/Skl 1082/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b and l/Skl I a 10422/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

II. Report by Quartermaster Division:

- a. On the basis of the instructions transmitted by the permanent representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters, German Naval Command, Italy was provided with the following information and instructions on 9 April:
 1. In April, the Italian Navy will receive a total of 58,000 tons of oil from Germany and Rumania: i.e. 6,000 tons more than originally proposed.
 2. These 6,000 tons are only to be used for the specific purpose agreed upon between the Fuehrer and the Duce. German Naval Command, Italy will make certain of this by discussing it with the Italian Admiralty.
- b. Fieldmarshal Milch has called a meeting of all the civilian and military offices concerned for 14 April; it is proposed to discuss the necessary steps for the evacuation of public and military offices and authorities from Berlin in view of the growing number of air raids. In the case of the Naval Staff, the

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Commander in Chief, Navy has discussed with the Chief, Army General Staff, who has promised to investigate the matter, the possibility of evacuating to the Zossen Command Post, actually intended for the Army Command.

III. The Naval Attache and Foreign Affairs Section, Operations Division have reported on the Swedish request to permit Swedish shipping to be escorted by Swedish vessels in the northern part of the North Sea because of the mine menace. Germany cannot comply with such a request. For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Special Items

In a report dated 29 March, the Deputy Military Attache, Madrid shares the Spanish and Italian point of view prevailing in Tangier, namely that the Anglo-American military preparations perceptible in Northwest Africa are not being planned for an operation in Tunisia alone. The Attache points to the sudden very obvious reticence of all the Spanish authorities where information on the enemy situation is concerned, information which had until now, been always freely given. It has been definitely noticed that Spanish concern over military events outside the borders of the Protectorate has ceased. Several instances have gone to prove that the Spanish know more about American plans than they care to admit. The Spanish High Command in North Africa has probably concluded that the numbers of men and material landed, which considerably exceed the requirements of the Tunisian front, would be more than sufficient for an operation at another point in the Western Mediterranean. In a situation report submitted to Madrid at the end of March, the Chief, General Staff stated that the area chosen for an operation of this kind would probably lie within the triangle Oran - Sicily - Marseilles. The Attache recalls that during September - October 1942, the Spanish were clearly living in great fear of the British landing in Oran. He is of the opinion that, given these facts, the view repeatedly expressed of late by leading Spanish authorities, that the coming attack will be directed against France, should not be underestimated.

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Situation 10 April

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

The French cruiser PRIMAUGUET was out on patrol at a speed of 19 knots in 09° 30' N, 27° 20' W on 8 April.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache, Tokyo transmitted the ROSSBACH's report from Batavia, according to which three Norwegian members of the crew deserted on 26 March after an unsuccessful attempt at sabotage, but had been re-captured. All twelve Norwegians aboard were consequently locked up. The Naval Attache, Tokyo is trying to have the prisoners transferred to Ship "28" to have them court-martialled.

No reports have been received from the KARIN and the REGENSBURG. Air reconnaissance over Denmark Strait has consequently been requested of Commander in Chief, Air Force.

All ships in foreign waters were informed of the enemy situation in Radiogram 1557.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance by No. 19 Group over the outer part of the Bay of Biscay and over the Eastern Atlantic was extremely lively.

The reconnaissance report of the Air Commander, Atlantic, made at 1147 on 9 April on the sighting of a destroyer and a light cruiser in BE 9147 was not transmitted by Group West until 0125 on 10 April and was received by the Naval Staff at 0313.

Our air reconnaissance reported an enemy minelaying cruiser in 63° 51' N, 24° W heading north at 1250 on 10 April (obviously the ADVENTURE which had left at 2000 on 8 April on an unknown course).

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The cruiser was once more reported at 1440, course 30° to 40°, speed 15 to 20 knots, position not given. Radio intelligence intercepted numerous British air reconnaissance reports by No. 19 Group on our forces, in connection with the HIMALAYA, the IRENE and the 8th Destroyer Flotilla. The HIMALAYA, together with the destroyers, was continually intercepted from 08° 00' W onwards.

Atlantic Coast:

1. Blockade runner operations:

On the basis of any enemy reports, Group West recalled the HIMALAYA group to draw the enemy's attention away from the IRENE. The formation received orders to return to La Pallice. The IRENE has received instructions to make for Vigo immediately as it will be impossible for her to be picked up by destroyers. The Group intends the ship to steer an inconspicuous course and withdraw to the south. Three or four of our torpedo boats of the Brest group have received orders to put out for BF 5857 for a rendezvous with the HIMALAYA group at 2000. The convoy is to be picked up by minesweeping forces at Point 438. The IRENE has been informed that she is being sought by four of our submarines on her approach route to Vigo, which are waiting to close in and take her under close escort. At 1315, the IRENE received a radio message from Group West that our air reconnaissance had reported an enemy minelaying cruiser at 42° 30' N, 16° 00' W at 1250, course 360°, speed about 20 knots. A change in the course of this cruiser to 30° - 40° was notified in Radiogram 1435. The position of the minelaying cruiser was, according to our air reconnaissance, transmitted as being 42° 45' N, 15° 35' W course 40°, speed 20 knots at 1520.

The matter was brought to the attention of the Chief, Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters by teletype at 1055. Teletype in 1/Skl I k 1086/43 W Gkdos. Chofs. in files 1/Skl I k III.

At 1719, the IRENE reported her position by short signal as 43° N 14° W; a battleship was attacking; secret documents had been destroyed. The Chief, Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters was informed of this report at 2140.

At 2330 Group West reported that, in accordance with orders the three torpedo boats from Brest had, in all likelihood, met the HIMALAYA group in BF 5857 and that it had been decided to allow the HIMALAYA to enter by channel "Mustergatte", letting the destroyers sail for Le Verdon roads and the HIMALAYA for Bordeaux. The HIMALAYA group reported bombers at a high altitude and a torpedo bomber attack in BF 5883 at 2100. The first wave of attacking planes was beaten off; three planes were shot down. Further attacks were anticipated. An air sea rescue operation for the IRENE has been put into operation by the Air Commander, Atlantic Coast. In addition, the HIMALAYA group will be provided with a close escort of heavy forces from daybreak on.

Group West has submitted the order for the escort by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla of the outgoing blockade runner HIMALAYA and the incoming blockade runner IRENE (keywords: "Ponte" and "Buch").

Copy in accordance with l/Skl 1080/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

2. Miscellaneous:

One 12 G.R.T. motor fishing vessel has been missing in Douarnenez since the morning of 8 April. Investigations by the German Intelligence Substation are in progress.

A French passenger steamer plying between Ushant and Brest was attacked by four enemy planes at 1520. Four German and three Frenchmen were injured.

Four low flying enemy planes also attacked two patrol boats in BF 5213 at 1525. One commander was seriously injured, the other only slightly. One of the attacking planes is believed to have been shot down. The boats were slightly damaged and consequently non operational.

The Chief, Armed Forces High Command conveyed the Fuehrer's decision on the instructions proposed by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West for the Commander, Defenses Area, La Rochelle. Except for a actual land engagements, the Fuehrer has made the Navy responsible for the training and commitment of all coastal batteries. Naval coastal defenses,

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including all Army coastal batteries, are, therefore, to remain under the Naval Shore Commander, and no other stations shall have the right to issue orders to the battalions and batteries independently of the Naval Shore Commander.

The proposed paragraph 3 of the instructions is to be altered, therefore, as follows:

- a. Naval coastal defense forces, including Army coastal batteries, will remain under the orders of the Naval Shore Commander during preparations for action. The Commander, Defense Area will submit his requests to the Naval Shore Commander who will issue the necessary orders to the stations under his command. The Naval Shore Commander is likewise to allow the Commander, Defense Area to participate in defense preparations affecting land defense in general at an early stage. In cases of doubt, the Divisional Commander will take the necessary decisions within the limits of his power, in accordance with Directive No. 40. Local offices are once again ordered by the High Command, Navy and the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West to work in the closest collaboration, regardless of these assignments of actual authority.
- b. Local naval coastal defense forces have been placed under the Commander, Defense Area for land engagements. But as far as the local situation permits, he is obliged to comply with the Naval Shore Commander's demands as regards all matters concerning naval warfare (e.g. opening the harbor booms for outgoing submarines or PT boats etc.).
- c. Naval forces in any case remain under the Naval Commanders, in accordance with Directive 40, section III, paragraph 5.

Channel Coast:

Enemy targets located of Le Troport were fired on by one of our batteries from 0201 to 0302. At the same time and in the same area, five vessels belonging to the 38th Minesweeper Flotilla were engaged in a skirmish with three PT boats, two of which were severely damaged. We suffered no casualties. For the short report on the engagement see Teletype 1353.

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The harbor defense vessel Fo "16" was attacked by PT boats off Dunkirk at 0415 and chased aground. Salvage operations are thought possible.

The 5th PT Boat Flotilla left Cherbourg on the night of 9 April for a torpedo operation in the area southeast of Falmouth. The convoy channel was unsuccessfully reconnoitered. Cooperation between a shadowing enemy plane and gun boats was observed during the approach. For the short report see Teletype 1440.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

The patrol boat "3406" was attacked by four enemy fighters off Ijmuiden at 1106 and suffered casualties. One of the attacking planes was shot down.

One ELM/J mine was swept by a harbor defense vessel off Heligoland.

Convoy duties were carried out according to plan.

Numerous enemy planes were fired on in the area of Admiral, Netherlands between 1054 and 1226. One Hurricane was shot down, the pilot was taken prisoner.

At 1105 enemy planes machine-gunned the Amsterdam petroleum wharf, a tug in the North Sea Canal and a strong point north of Nordvik.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, five steamers were lying in Yokongo; a convoy of two steamers and one escort vessel was northeast of Yokongo on a north-westerly course; two steamers lay at anchor east of Kildin.

According to radio intelligence, two tankers, the destroyer URITZKI and three minesweepers left Kola Bay for the Gorlo Straits. The following vessels were observed: 6 submarines off the north coast of Norway, 16 small craft in the Murmansk area, 4 ice-breaker and 13 small craft in the Gorlo Straits and the Archangel area.

Own Situation:

In connection with the aerial torpedo attack on the convoy of the tanker WEISSENBURG, the Naval Command, Norway reported that three tanks had been damaged but it was estimated that only 200 tons of oil had been lost.

Convoy traffic on 10 April proceeded according to plan. Twenty ships were escorted north and twenty-two south.

Group North informed the REGENSBURG and the KARIN on air reconnaissance and weather conditions in Radiograms 1125, 1625 and 1855.

Group North transmitted a report from Admiral, Northern Waters which stated that on the basis of a report from an officer of submarine U "212" it was to be presumed that Operation "Thusnelda" was known to most of the vessels in Harstad and also to the shore stations there. While in Harstad the officer learned from the civilian crew of the tug ATLANTIK of the operation of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla and of the assignment to escort in a ship homeward bound from Japan.

A prompt investigation for a court martial is to be carried out by Group North.

The Chief, Naval Staff wished to be informed of the results of the investigation at the earliest opportunity.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

The Finnish steamer KALEVA (381 G.R.T.) sank off Langeland at 0130, and the Danish steamer EMANUEL (1,290 G.R.T.) off Laaland at 1541, both as a result of striking mines.

Escort and channel sweeping operations in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic were carried out without incident. The Swedish steamer VIRIL was left by our patrol boat escort off Kristiansand South.

The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported the execution of minfield operations "Nashorn VII a" by the 24th Landing Flotilla according to plan. Loading for the assignments "Secigol 2" to "5" was in progress. The rest of the minelaying and netlaying operations were carried out according to plan. Given favorable weather

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conditions, it is estimated that the sweeping of the "Wartburg" barrage will take 3 to 4 weeks to complete.

The Commanding Admiral, Baltic States reported the usual activity. (See Teletype 0935.)

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Submarine U "176" made the following report from BE 9495 at 2232: one cruiser or destroyer and one unidentified vessel, northwesterly course, high speed.

There was brisk reconnaissance activity over the Bay of Biscay. For further details see "Enemy Situation West Area".

2. Own Situation:

In the North Atlantic, submarine U "404" intercepted a convoy of at least ten steamers believed to be heading south, in AK 4768 at 1400. Nine of the Group "Adler" submarines were detailed to attack the enemy. The remaining seven submarines of this group have been formed into a new Group "Weise" and are to take up patrol positions from AK 7593 to BD 1617 at 0800 on 11 April.

Six of the Group "Adler" submarines established contact with the enemy. The heavy defenses, however, prevented all attempts at gaining an initial success. Outside the group, in AK 4840, submarine U "615" scored a hit on an independently routed 10,000 G.R.T. vessel heading northeast.

Ten additional submarines, formed into the new Group "Lerche", have taken up patrol positions from AK 5489 to 8916.

The four submarines detached to escort the IRENE are to be informed on the situation, as far as known, and are proceeding to BE 9884 to render assistance.

In the Cape area submarine U "182" sank the South African steamer ALOE (5,047 G.R.T.) carrying a cargo of wheat from Australia for the African Theater.

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No reports of successes have been received from the submarines in the West Indies.

For further details see "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The Naval Attache, Madrid transmitted a report from the commander of submarine U "167" from Las Palmas that some of the confidential and secret matter was washed ashore by the ground swell, two days after the sinking. It was definitely to be assumed that the Spanish Armed Forces had seen a certain amount, but he had subsequently personally destroyed most of it. The following material was either retained by the Spaniards or else lost: operational order and supplements, communication orders, warhead pistol Pi II specifications, War Diary up to 29 March, disks for the recognition signal setting disk, recognition signal table 3rd Air Force, code book "E", crew list, and the special officers' code. The red print of the latter ran, with consequent illegibility.

The Naval Attache, Madrid is taking steps to discover exactly what material is in the hands of the Spanish Navy and will then request its return.

For further details of our negotiations with the Spaniards see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

The Chief, Naval Communications Division has taken up the matter.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Altogether 92 planes of the 3rd Air Force were over the Western Area and 15 over the Mediterranean. About 30 enemy planes made daylight attacks on traffic installations in occupied areas of the west. For further details see "Situation West Area" and "North Sea". During the night of 10 April 220 enemy planes penetrated; 25 of them came from the east. Bombs dropped in the Koenigsberg - Eydtkuhnen district only caused slight damage. The raids in the west were on targets in the Rhine - Main area. For further details of the damage in Mannheim, Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden and Mainz see "Daily Situation Report".

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reported a total of 310 planes on operation, concentrating on the Tunisian battlefield. According to an Italian report, hits were scored on a fuel dump and a cruiser during an enemy air raid on Maddalena (Sardinia) on 9 April.

3. Eastern Front:

Seven enemy planes were reported to have been shot down over the Army lines on 9 April. The 4th Air Force's Black Sea reconnaissance spotted no fresh developments.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

No further reports have been received of the 21 vessels which, according to an Italian report, were said to have passed Tangier, making for the east on the night of 7 April. They may well be the large number of landing craft reported by an agent. Two steamers were towed in to Gibraltar on the afternoon of 9 April and a damaged tanker and freighter also put in. Three empty U.S. tankers left the harbor the same evening, making for the west. The cruiser of the FIJI class which put in on the evening of 9 April coming from the west, put out with a destroyer on the forenoon of 10 April, making for the east. The cruiser UGANDA put out, making for the west.

Very brisk convoy traffic has been confirmed in the Western Mediterranean.

A submarine was lying east-southeast of Cagliari. Despite an exhaustive reconnaissance of the inshore waters between Derna and Sollum, the enemy was not sighted during the forenoon.

According to an intelligence report, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 aircraft parent ship, 10 torpedo boats, 6 mine-sweepers and 8 submarines are said to have entered Aden on 8 April from Great Britain, bound for the Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four Italian submarines were in the operational area.

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No special reports have been received from our submarines. PT boats and minesweeping vessels did not go out owing to the weather.

A supplementary report stated that Italian minesweepers swept five mines from the "Arsinelli" minefield on 6 April, and that a sixth mine exploded.

Ten auxiliary motor minesweepers entered Marseilles on 7 April from the Western Area. The first five boats are to proceed onwards, probably in ten days, after a short overhaul.

An Italian motor sailing vessel was sunk by an enemy submarine 8 miles west of Cape Carbonara at 1328 on 9 April.

The cruiser TRIESTE sank during a severe enemy raid on Maddalena at 1500. The cruiser GORIZIA and the naval arsenal were severely damaged.

In connection with the land fighting in Tunisia, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported that the enemy attacks were continuing and fresh reinforcements were constantly being brought up. Our main line of defense has had to be moved 10 kilometers back in order to straighten out the front in the area northwest of Medjez el Bab. The switch position southwest of Kairouan has so far stood up to enemy pressure. The German Africa Corps and German troops of the 1st Italian Army retreated to a general line 15 kilometers south of Sousse. Battery Madia and the Port Commander, Sousse have received demolition and evacuation orders.

In connection with the loss of the submarine chasers "2201" and "2204" in Palermo the German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty reported that the vessels had been forbidden to remain in harbor owing to the danger of air raids. The Commander, 22nd Submarine Chaser Flotilla, relying on the torpedo hydrophone gear, considered it reasonable, therefore, to drop anchor outside the harbor for a short time. Contact with the local Italian naval command was not established as ordered. Relief of the Flotilla Commander and a court-martial inquiry are requested. (See Teletype 1835.)

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported that despite a heavy fighter escort, a formation of Italian transport planes on its way to Tunis was again attacked and suffered severe losses. The air and sea situation is turning the supplying of Tunis into an increasingly difficult task because adequate means of transport, such as supply submarines, fast dispatch boats and small craft, are lacking. Means of communication between Italy and Sicily are also being seriously threatened by attacks on the Messina ferry. The transfer of the Rhone tankers, barges and tugs must be speeded up. The German Staff attached to the Italian Admiralty reported on the convoy of the steamer TOMMASEO which arrived in Tunis at 1515 with supplies. For copy see Teletype 2125.

The steamer FOGGIA was to have entered Pantelleria from Sousse on the evening of 8 April. Investigations have so far been without result. The transport vessels KT "5", "7" and "9" are due to put out from Reggio for Trapani on the night of 10 April the convoy of the FABRIANO and CASERTA from Naples at 0300 on 11 April, and the steamer CARBONELLO from Messina for Tunis at 0530.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The reconnaissance was uneventful. According to an agent's report, dated 8 April, Group Command, Krasnodar has been informed that the enemy has finished re-grouping his forces in preparation for the opening of the offensive on Novorossisk from the south and the east, and on the Taman Peninsula from the east and the north. The attacks are to be supported by the Fleet as well as by naval landing forces and airborne troops.

A Russian reconnaissance plane was over Constantza on the forenoon of 9 April.

Own Situation:

Submarine U "24" left Feodosia for the operational area in the forenoon. PT boats were not operating on the night of 10 April.

An unsuccessful enemy air attack on the convoy of the tanker DRESDEN southwest of Feodosia was carried out at 0700. During an aerial torpedo and bombing raid on the convoy of the PRODRAMOS off Eupatoria, the ship was slightly damaged by splinters. Another unsuccessful attack took place against a towed convoy sailing from Feodosia to Yalta. It was repulsed by the action of the naval landing craft in the escort forces.

Twenty FMB mines were laid in the harbor entrance and the harbor basin of Novorossisk.

The 18th Anapa convoy was carried out according to plan. The 19th unit is on the return passage to Kerch; four naval landing craft of the 20th unit put in during the afternoon.

The 2nd Temriuk convoy also left Kerch with a 1,550 ton cargo. The steamer TISZA (1,022 G.R.T.) entered Kerch from Feodosia.

The ferry service across the Strait of Kerch was the target of unsuccessful enemy air attacks against the fish-salting factory, Taman and Kossa Chushka on the night of 8 April. The ferry service proceeded without incident on 10 April. Only the channel to Senaya was closed because mines were suspected there. Forty-one men and 15 tons of war material were ferried westwards, 200 tons of supplies and 19 vehicles eastwards.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

The Naval Attache, Tokyo reported that the Japanese Navy has given 316 ships totaling 1,854,000 G.R.T. as the total tonnage sunk in 1942.

In January 1943, one 5,000 G.R.T. ship and in February six ships totaling 54,000 G.R.T. were sunk by submarines and one 7,000 G.R.T. ship by the Air Force. None of the ships sunk have been identified. The grand total amounts to 324 ships totaling 1,920,000 G.R.T.

Items of Political Importance

Mr. Eden's report to the House of Commons on his visit to the United States was the subject of lively Allied and neutral press commentaries. A Swedish newspaper, discussing the main subject of the talks - Anglo-American relations with the Soviet - states that Mr. Eden failed to obtain any binding commitments from the United States Government. All that he achieved was a rapprochement between the British Government and President Roosevelt. In particular, this means that the United States is now willing to recognize the Russian frontiers of 22 June 1941. The Russian Government apparently avoided involving itself in any post-war commitments by announcing that it was at present far more interested in the military issues than the political ones. It felt that the immediate establishment of a second front in Europe was of far greater importance than any post-war problems. The idea of a conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin was discussed on President Roosevelt's suggestion. The Russian attitude to the matter has not yet been ascertained.

The British press expressed concern lest the United States revert to isolationism should Roosevelt fail to be re-elected. Britain was determined, however, not to relinquish her friendship with Russia again as the peace of Europe depended on it.

According to Reuter, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs has announced that Brazil has joined the United Nations.

According to a London report in the Swedish press, the Spanish Ambassador in London has been very busy lately. It also revealed that the Allied food conference in the United States has been postponed until 18 May.

The B.B.C. reported that General Catroux has arrived in London from Algiers to submit General Giraud's proposals for the re-establishment of French unity to the French National Committee. They were said to cover the following four main points: termination of the armistice with the Axis powers; formation of an administrative committee for the French possessions overseas; rejection of any provisional government; abrogation of the oath of allegiance, in cases where it had been made to individual persons. General Giraud has sent a liaison staff to General de Gaulle in London.

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Special Items

According to an intelligence report of 8 April, the British and Americans are planning to land heavy forces in Sicily at the close of the Tunis offensive. The Anglo-American troops are said to have spent almost their entire winter training for landing operations. Considerable reinforcements have been brought up via the Straits of Gibraltar during the past weeks.

According to another intelligence report based on information from diplomatic sources, a large-scale raid against the French Atlantic coast is imminent, in order to wipe out the submarine bases at Lorient, St. Nazaire and Brest following their systematic destruction by air attack. The raids to be carried out with a total disregard for losses in men and material.

Situation 11 April

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

On 8 April the position of the auxiliary cruiser BULOLO was 24° N 31° W, southeasterly course, speed 14 knots.

2. Own Situation:

No news has been received from our vessels. The Naval Staff informed all ships in foreign waters of the position of the BULOLO in Radiogram 1351, and of shipping movements in the South Atlantic, gained from intercepted and decoded radio messages, in Radiogram 1351, laying particular stress on the importance of secrecy where information obtained from decoded radio messages was concerned.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to our air reconnaissance, a cruiser on course 300° , high speed, was in CF 3346, and a destroyer on course 30° , medium speed, in BE 6910 at

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0940. A British destroyer was sighted in CF 3332 making for the north at 1140.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

1. Operation "Ponte":

A short report from the Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla gave information on the return passage of the HIMALAYA escorted by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla. For copy see Teletype 1200. The group was continuously escorted from 0845 until dark on 10 April by two to four Ju 88's which failed, however, to shake off or shoot down the enemy shadowing planes. The combined aerial torpedo and bombing attacks already reported occurred between 2030 and 2128. Four of the attacking planes were shot down. The destroyer Z "24" was machine-gunned and the forward radar gear and the search light, as well as the aft range finder were damaged, and it is announced with regret that five men were killed, five seriously injured and 27 slightly. Defensive action on the part of the Ju 88's was not noticeable during the raids. The destroyers Z "23" and Z "32" are fully ready for action. The destroyer Z "24" is once again ready for action to a limited extent now that her complement has been made up again by the destroyer Z "37".

Our air reconnaissance gave the following clues as to the fate of the IRENE: a big oil patch, boxes, bales and parts of the cargo floating in the water, as well as six cutters, one motor boat and several rubber dinghies were sighted in BE 9739 at 1100. All the boats were empty and gave the impression of having been left in complete order.

It is therefore to be assumed that the crew was picked up by the enemy warship.

Group West requested the Air Commander, Atlantic to continue the search.

Group West intends to transfer the 8th Destroyer Flotilla to Bordeaux.

The Naval Staff has informed Group West that it is not planned to send out any more vessels once the HIMALAYA has put in.

2. Further Items:

One ELM/J mine was swept off Lorient. The entrances to Bayonne and St. Jean de Luz are closed because minelaying operations have been observed. The Gironde is now open to navigation.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has opened the following offices as from today: Commander, Defense Area, Brest; Commander, Defense Area, St. Nazaire, and Commander, Defense Area, Lorient.

The establishment of the offices is to be carried out by Army High Command. As offices of the Armed Forces, they will be responsible to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West who will give them their service instructions and organize other subordinate offices.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea/Norway/Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

One ELM/J mine was swept off Heligoland and one off Borkum, both ahead of a convoy. Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan. The patrol positions were occupied.

On 10 April four enemy planes searched the convoy channels between Terschelling and the mouth of the Ems between 2250 and 2350. Our eastbound convoy was unsuccessfully attacked.

2. Norway/Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, six Russian submarines operating off the Arctic coast of Norway were informed of our convoy in Varanger Fjord. A

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submarine left Polyarnoc for the Barents Sea on the evening of 10 April. Three Russian ice-breakers were observed operating in the Gorlo Straits exit.

Five planes were detected over the North Sea towards the west coast of Norway and two over the Iceland area.

Air reconnaissance spotted the following vessels: one special purpose steam trawler 120 miles south of Jan Mayen one enemy submarine 28 miles northeast of the Shetlands and one submarined submarine 40 miles east of Nordkyn. The latter was bombed.

Own Situation:

260 rounds were fired against our westbound convoy by an enemy battery on the Rybachi Peninsula on 9 April. No damage was inflicted and the fire was answered with 105 rounds. What was believed to be a hit on the enemy battery was observed. Ammunition in the Battery Petsamo was set on fire. In addition, one of our cutters was repeatedly fired on in the entrance to the fjord. This fired was also returned. Group North sanctioned the 5th Air Force attacking the special purpose steam trawler (approximately 1,000 G.R.T.) spotted by air reconnaissance in AE 31, as there was no possibility of mistaken identification.

As the Naval Staff felt that there were serious objections to this, the Group was immediately contacted.

Escort duties were carried out according to plan. Thirteen ships were escorted north and twenty-four south on 10 April.

A gun barrel for the heaviest battery (40.6 cm.) was unloaded at Harstad on 25 March. The second barrel is expected to leave Trendheim on 15 April. The transport situation for battery construction depends on the present tug situation improving.

The Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reported in connection with the damage to the tanker WEISSENBURG, that it was only possible to provide one escort vessel, as no further vessels were available. A minesweeper had to be used for torpedo firing practice owing to the unexpected breakdown of another

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vessel. It did not prove possible to reinforce the escort for the passage round Stadlandet, as the patrol boat stationed there had to be withdrawn owing to boiler damage, and there was no time for the Naval Shore Command, Molde to recall the two patrol boats on duty off Haugsholm. Naval Command, Norway also reported details of the damage to the tanker which had already discharged 500 of its 8,000 cbms of furnace oil in Kristiansand South. Contrary to the report of 11 April, not 200 cbm but 2,174 cbm of the remaining 7,500 cbm of oil were lost; 1,925 cbm were ruined by water, leaving only 4,450 cbm of furnace oil and 996 cbm of gas oil fit for use.

As a precautionary measure, Group North is continuing to provide the REGENSBURG and the KIRIN with air reconnaissance and weather reports. (See Radiograms 1300, 1405, 1545, 1905 and 1913.)

The Admiral, Northern Waters had nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak/Baltic Sea Entrances/Baltic Sea:

The experimental vessel DORPAT of the Minelaying Experimental Command struck a ground mine and sank in Aarhus Bay outside the channels while attempting to sweep a mine thought to be an ELM/A mine.

Eight ships and one submarine were escorted in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Sixteen vessels and three minesweeping planes were out sweeping the channels.

The Danish steamer DUORO (840 G.R.T.) sank north of Warnemuende as a result of a collision with the destroyer of Dutch origin ZH "1". ZH "1" was slightly damaged.

Aerial mines were suspected along the Samland coast following enemy flights over this territory on the night of 10 April.

The Naval Attache, Stockholm was instructed to advise the Swedish Navy of the Naval Staff's wishes as regards escort and patrol duties in the Baltic. Copy of the instructions in l/Skl I Nord 10232/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported that the minesweeping and minelaying operations were discontinued

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owing to the weather. The Net Defense Unit has laid the first net of the "Walross" barrage. The laying of the second net is to be started on 13 April.

The Admiral, Baltic States reported the usual activity in Kronstadt Bay. Line faults and other slight material damage were caused to Battery "Bismarck" by shells falling in the area. Our air attacks were directed against the airfield and harbor of Lavansaari.

Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

There was brisk air reconnaissance in the Bay of Biscay; 36 planes were observed.

2. Own Situation:

In the North Atlantic the submarines of Group "Adler" were able to maintain contact with the southwest bound convoy in AJ all day long despite the appearance of a heavy air escort. The last position was reported from BC 2634. Altogether seven ships totaling 49,500 G.R.T. were sunk, and six hits were scored on other ships. Submarines U "571", "84", "188" and "613" took part in this successful operation. The two first named submarines and submarine U "613" had to withdraw owing to depth charge damage. The operation was still in progress.

Submarine U "516" reported from AK 5417 the sinking of what is believed to have been a 12,000 G.R.T. auxiliary naval vessel.

A convoy, on course 60°, was intercepted by submarines of Group "Lerche" in AK 8213 towards noon. The submarines are to take advantage of the hours of darkness to carry out a surprise attack.

Four submarines are to continue rendering assistance to the blockade runner IRENE until midday on 12 April.

Submarine U "515" of the southern group of submarines reported the sinking of a 3,500 G.R.T. steamer in AK 5633 on 9 April. For eight days the submarine has observed only light traffic off the harbor entrance to Dakar. Submarine U "181" sank the U.S. steamer

MONASSES (5,983 G.R.T.) in ET 8881. One man was killed and two seriously injured by a barrel burst

Sections "A", "B" and "C" of route "Anton" have now been sanctioned until further notice for attacks independently routed vessels. For further reports see "Supplement to the Submarine Situation" in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 105 planes on operation over the Western Area, 19 over the Mediterranean. Altogether four enemy planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and three by fighters. An eighth plane crashed.

During the night of 11 April 61 of our planes laid mines in the Thames.

Numerous enemy planes crossed the coast on daylight raids on occupied western territory. Hengelo in Holland, and traffic installations and trains in the area of Bentheim and Mecheln were attacked. During the night of 11 April three British courier planes bound for Sweden and six bound for England were observed. Ten planes laid mines in the area of the West Frisian Islands. Two large groups of planes were also observed off the west coast of France, presumably on minelaying operations. Anti-aircraft gun emplacements were machine-gunned several times.

The number of planes shot down during enemy raids over Reich territory on the night of 10 April has now been given as 20.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In Tunisia our forces concentrated their operations on the western front. The enemy attacked ports in Sicily and Italy as well as transport planes, and supported the fighting in Tunisia on a large scale. Hits were scored on two ships in Trapani. Slight damage was caused in Marsalla. A heavy raid on Tunis caused no damage to the shipping there, but the harbor will have to be closed for the time being. The steamer ROSELLI was hit forward during an attack

on Naples. A German naval food depot was set on fire. It was further reported in connection with the raid on Maddalena, that in addition to the vessels already enumerated, one submarine was damaged and two PT boats were destroyed. Furthermore, the submarine dockyard, the torpedo repair shop and other port installations were severely damaged. Five Ju 52's and three Me 323's belonging to our transport formation and eleven planes and two fighters belonging to an Italian transport formation were shot down on 10 April. According to reports so far received, 18 of our transport planes were lost on 11 April.

3. Eastern Front:

Apart from air reconnaissance reports nothing of interest has been received.

For information on the strength of the Russian Air Force regiments see Daily Situation Report. The total strength of the Russian Air Force as on 1 April 1943 was estimated at 6,000 planes (including 800 foreign types), comprising 2,600 fighters, 1,300 ground-attack planes, 1,500 bombers and reconnaissance planes and 600 others. Given a 60 per cent operational readiness, 3,600 planes will have to be reckoned with in the battle areas. Additional planes produced at home and imported, amounted to about 2,000 in March.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Five escort vessels left Gibraltar for the Atlantic at 2000 on 10 April. Thirteen vessels were sighted leaving Tangier for the Atlantic at 2200. This is possibly an underestimation as visibility was poor. The LSI of the QUEEN EMMA class which entered Gibraltar with two destroyers from the Mediterranean on the evening of 10 April left the harbor again on the morning of 11 April bound for the Mediterranean. A convoy of twelve U.S. and two British steamers, a British transport with allegedly 1,500 men aboard and two destroyers left Gibraltar for the Atlantic at 0715. The group joined a convoy of 15 steamers coming from the Mediterranean. A small convoy of four steamers with four escort vessels and two tugs left

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Gibraltar for the Mediterranean at 1330. The number of vessels in the harbor showed an increase of 14 tankers, 16 steamers, and 12 escort vessels.

Convoy traffic in the Western Mediterranean was normal. The presence of 15 new LCT's was confirmed in Jijelli.

Submarines were reported 29 miles east of Ferro (northeasterly point of Sardinia), off Capri and Cagliari.

No important sighting reports have been received from the Eastern Mediterranean.

According to radio intelligence, a steamer was torpedoed within the wave range of Algiers at 1442.

The Naval Attache, Madrid reported intelligence from a Norwegian source which may not be absolutely reliable, namely that three Canadian divisions have been transferred from Casablanca into the Oran - Algiers area in the past few days, where they are ready for embarkation, and that an enemy landing in Sardinia and Corsica is planned to take place in about two weeks' time.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four Italian submarines were in the operational area.

At 1400 on 10 April, the submarine U "617" (Lieutenant s.g. Brandi) sank an eastbound cruiser of the FIJI class, speed 24 knots, in CH 7546 after two hits, and torpedoed a destroyer of the TRIBAL class half an hour after submarine U "596" had unsuccessfully fired a spread of three against the cruiser.

For the assignment of operational areas in the Western Mediterranean see "Supplement to the Submarine Situation".

Submarine U "414" passed through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean on the night of 11 April.

The 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas carried out the minelaying operations off Sousse harbor according to plan.

There were no minesweeping operations owing to the weather.

According to the Army situation report from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the enemy broke through the new main defense line in the area northwest of Medjes el Bab on 10 April. It seems probable that the enemy will continue his attack with numerically superior forces in the direction of Tunis. Owing to strong enemy pressure and our own considerable losses, we evacuated Kairouan on the evening of 10 April but succeeded in withdrawing to the north. The fuel supply for these movements is ensured, whereas the ammunition situation is critical.

Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas has requested the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South to accelerate the transfer of Rhone tankers, pinnaces and tugs as the shortage of minesweeping vessels in Tunisia is causing shipping losses.

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has, on the instigation of the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, for days been endeavoring to secure the release of motor launches and small craft suitable for the required purpose, at present in German ports. About 20 harbor launches are on their way by rail from Hamburg.

German Naval Command, Italy reported the commissioning of the following former French torpedo boats in La Spezia on 5 April: BOMBARDE as FR "41", POMONE as FR "42", IPHIGENIE as FR "43".

According to a report from the Naval Attache, Madrid, it has been discovered in connection with the Spanish phosphate traffic from Safi and Casablanca sanctioned by Germany, that the British have promised to sanction this traffic only as from May or June. This British decision deserves special attention by reason of the stipulated date.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The steamer FABRIANO (2,943 G.R.T.) was sunk by a torpedo bomber while sailing in the convoy proceeding from Naples to Tunis. No further details have yet

been received. The steamer CARBONELLO is on route from Messina to Tunis according to schedule. The arrival of the transport vessels KT "5", "7" and "9" bound for Bizerta, which were to have put in to Trapani during the afternoon, has not yet been reported. The sailing reports of four German and twelve Italian naval landing craft which were to leave Trapani and Favignana respectively for Bizerta, are also still outstanding. Two Siebel ferries and one submarine are on passage from Marsala to Tunis, and four Siebel ferries and six infantry landing craft from Tunis to Marsala.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report on the naval situation.

Group South reported that shipping and dockyard activity in Piraeus will have to be suspended in the next few days, as the efforts of the Group and of the Admiral, Aegean to increase the coal supply, have so far continued to be unsuccessful. At the moment, 13,000 tons of coal are stored in Trieste, and about 1,800 tons are in transit to Piraeus.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

The Crimea convoys and the 20th and 21st Anapa convoys were carried out according to plan. The 22nd convoy has put out from Kerch. The 2nd Tomriuk convoy entered Tomriuk. About 700 men were ferried west across the Strait of Kerch and 700 tons of supplies east.

The following were ferried across the Strait of Kerch from 1 to 10 April: A total of 18,000 tons of war material and 9,000 men east, with approximately 8,500 tons aboard naval craft, and about 90,000 men west. The Anapa convoy carried 2,900 tons east and the Tomriuk convoy 3,700 tons. For further details see "Daily Situation Report".

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VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

- I. The Chief, Naval Staff returned to Berlin from Fuehrer Headquarters on the afternoon of 11 April.
- II. Quartermaster Division reported that a preliminary discussion between the Services on evacuating their offices from Berlin is to take place at Armed Forces High Command on 13 April. Armed Forces High Command is also of the opinion that the evacuation of the Service staffs should not be entertained until the very last.

The Chief, Naval Staff announced that the Chief of the Army General Staff will report on the possibilities for billeting the Naval Staff in Zossen. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff is to investigate and report whether, and to what extent, the Naval Staff should be evacuated as a precautionary measure.

Among other things, Quartermaster Division also reported that the visit of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to the Commander in Chief, Navy is scheduled for 21 April.

- III. Report by Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section on the unreasonable request of the United States to evacuate Red Cross personnel and supplies from Bizerta. The note concerned has been returned to the Swiss Government. For further details see: War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.
- IV. The Commander in Chief, Navy stated that the question of the iron quota for constructions has been settled. Minister Speer will immediately grant an allocation of 20,000 tons per month and devise means of supplying the remaining 8,000 tons.

The Fuehrer is absolutely in favor of the suggested submarine program, including the program for auxiliary vessels and PT boats. The experiences in Tunis have not failed to serve as a note of warning. Future

developments are hard to foresee but under no circumstances must they be allowed to lead to reverses similar to those suffered in the Mediterranean. The submarine program has the Fuehrer's unreserved approval. He will discuss the remaining requests with Minister Speer. The Navy has no need to take any further part in the proceedings for the time being. The Fuehrer will discuss the subject of increasing steel production for the current year with the steel industry on 12 April. The Chief, Naval Staff stated that it now at last appeared to be a recognized fact that this was a war against the great sea powers, and that naval expansion had become an obvious necessity which, if neglected, would have the direst consequences.

Report by the Chief, Naval Intelligence Division:

The text of the Adana agreement has been received from reliable official Turkish intelligence sources. The agreement deals primarily with the delivery and shipment of military equipment to Turkey. Furthermore, the immediate dispatch of British General Staff officers to Ankara to investigate with the Turkish General Staff the possibilities of British support in the event of Turkey being drawn into the war, was also agreed on. Plans for sending British forces to Turkey are being prepared should this contingency arise.

The plans for this assistance have been drawn up in great detail and have no restricting conditions or reservations. In this way the British are offered a pretext for bringing about a state of war themselves. It should be borne in mind, however, that the resolutions date back to a time when the situation on the Eastern Front was so unsettled that the Turks probably had Russia rather than Germany in mind in case of war.

Group South was informed accordingly by the Naval Staff. For further details see 1/Skl I c 1124/43 - Gkdos Chofs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

The Chief, Naval Intelligence Division also reported the request of the German envoy in Athens for action by German troops in Thessaly where, as a result of the failure of the Italian occupation forces and authorities, insurrections were proving an ever growing menace, the effects of which had already spread to Athens.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:VI. Report by Auxiliary Cruiser Section, Operations Division on the attempts to bring out the HIMALAYA and bring in the IRENE.

The Chief, Naval Staff was of the opinion that, on the basis of the then existing enemy situation, the HIMALAYA group should not have been made to turn about. It would perhaps have been more expedient to have maintained a northwesterly course in the hope of deceiving the enemy away from the far more valuable incoming blockade runner. The IRENE should have tried to turn about and withdraw to the west the very moment the enemy was reported. This in itself would not have guaranteed a successful break-through, it is true, but the chances would have been greater. The exceptional value to the war economy of a cargo of several thousand tons of rubber gave the escorting of the IRENE the significance of a major action, which was all the more reason for exploiting every conceivable possibility.

In accordance with the policy so far adopted, the Naval Staff had refrained from interfering in the command of Group West. Neither could the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff nor Operations Division see any reason for doing so, as they assumed that the Group was in a far better position for obtaining a quick and accurate survey of the enemy situation. Both from the point of view of personnel and material, the Staff of Operations Division as constituted at present is by no means adequately equipped for taking over direct operational command.

The Chief, Naval Staff admitted that there could be differences of opinion on questions of this kind. He was against taking the direct control of operations out of the hands of the Groups and putting it into those of the Naval Staff; he thought it desirable however, that contrary to the prevailing practice, proper use should in future be made of the prerogative of the Chief, Naval Staff and of the Naval Staff to intervene, if necessary, in the operation of the Groups.

The Chief, Naval Staff agreed that no further blockade running operations should be undertaken for the time being, but that with the lessons of the past in mind, preparations for resuming this important task in the

fall should not be neglected. The Naval Staff suggested in this connection that the best plan would be so to arrange the sailing dates of the blockade runners that they cross the danger zones during the periods of the longest nights, and that, if necessary, the ships should have longer waiting periods in order to complicate enemy plotting.

It is extraordinary that the REGENSBURG and the KARIN seem to have vanished without a sound. The permission given by Group North to attack the special purpose steam trawler reported in Northern Waters by air reconnaissance (see War Diary 11 April) was considered with some misgivings by the Naval Staff who pointed this out to Group North by telephone.

Finally the Chief, Operations Division made a further report on the subject of the blockade runners: this time on the dismissal of the captain of the HIMALAYA and the mutiny of the Norwegian seamen aboard the ROSSBACH.

VII. At the request of the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, the Chief, Naval Staff decided that Submarine Section, Quartermaster Division was to be responsible for the preparation of Italian transport submarines. So that these submarines could be converted as quickly as possible, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines was instructed not to use them for any further operations.

VIII. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

- a. On the request submitted to the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff for reconnaissance in the Denmark Strait in accordance with War Diary, 11 April. In addition to this air reconnaissance, a submarine has now been ordered to sail through Denmark Strait.
- b. On the conclusion of the blockade runner operations, it had been planned to withdraw the 8th Destroyer Flotilla from the Western Area and transfer it to the Northern Area. According to a report from Group West and the Commander, Destroyers, it will no longer be possible to take advantage of the prevailing new moon period because only one vessel would be available for immediate transfer, as the remainder must undergo repairs and have their degaussing equipment checked. The Chief, Naval Staff has agreed to the suggestion

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