

No. 2491

Ex 2491

DEF. DOC. #972

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- versus -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: ISHIKAWA, Jun

In accordance with the formula employed in our country, I, after having taken an oath as set forth in the accompanying paper, hereby depose as follows:

I, ISHIKAWA, Jun, on December 4, 1946, at Tokyo, made the following answers in answer to questionings by Defense Counsel MIYATA and

(Ques.) Please state the period of your residence in North China and your duties while there.

(Ans.) I was in residence in North China between September, 1932 and January, 1937 as head of the MANICHI SHIBUN PEIPING Branch and in addition head of the Tentsing Branch of the same paper.

(Ques.) Please state the political situation in North China at that time.

(Ans.) My period of residence was from the Manchurian Incident to the spring of the year in which the China Incident broke out, so North China was the cynosure of the world, being in an atmosphere delicate as well as most serious, from a military, political, and economic point of view. As a result of the agreement, signed at Tang ku May 31, 1933.

of the suspension of hostilities, the CHITUNG area saw the creation of a demilitarized zone in it. In regard to the preservation of public peace, the Kwantung Army had a voice. CHANG Hsueh-Liang had left FEIPING and the former North-East Army had lost its power in North China; the Executive Council Administration Adjustment Committee stationed in FEIPING whose Chairman was HULING Fu, and in addition the FEIPING subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee had been sent with Ho Yin-chin the Chief of the Military Administration Department as its chairman ^{pro} tempore.

(Ques.) Was North China then in friendly relations with Japan?

(Ans.) Not necessarily so. Because of close geographical and economic relations between North China and Manchoukuo, as a natural course of event, political frictions were likely to arise in the former, and because of a strong desire for restoring the lost territory, somehow or other we felt there was unrest though not yet coming to the surface.

(Ques.) When did Major-General UMEZU arrive as Commander of the Garrison in China?

(Ans.) In April, 1934.

(Ques.) How was the attitude of the common people to Major-General UMEZU'S arrival as such?

(Ans.) Because of the Major-General's reputation as a man of good common sense with moderate and fair thoughts, his coming was generally welcomed. With this general as Commander, they thought that he would not make a mistake in coping with the complicated state of affairs in

North China.

(Ques.) How were you related with Major-General UMEZU?

(Ans.) While there, I had come to be on very intimate terms with him. Not as a newspaper man, but rather as a member of the Japanese nation, I often had interviews and frankly expressed my opinion and occasionally reminded him of the behavior of the Army. The Commander frankly admitted my unreserved opinion and gladly expressed his own thoughts on the matter.

(Ques.) Why did you come to be on intimate terms with Major-General UMEZU?

Was there any motive?

(Ans.) The Commander once expressed his thoughts as follows:

"Since the Manchurian Incident Japan's foreign relations have become tense. So Japan's attitude toward North China has been the cynosure of the world, we should use prudence and caution in our behavior.

I may be here one year or two years. I don't know how long. I would rather prefer being called a fool during my stay than having trouble with China. I want you to understand this and I wish you too will be a fool in the same sense as I am."

I was very deeply impressed with this brief remark of immense significance. Believing there would arise no trouble in North China while this Commander was in office, I positively wished to be good friends with the Commander without reserve, and I did so. Besides, the fairness of his thoughts regarding our attitude toward China also proved a motive of my being attracted to him.

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(Ques.) How did the Commander express to you his thoughts regarding our attitude toward China?

(Ans.) The Commander often told me the following in substance as follows:

- A. It is not proper for Japan to behave toward China with a sense of superiority.
- B. We should take a sound and fair attitude toward China. Threats and coercion should never be resorted to on any account.
- C. The rights and interests of Powers in North China should be fully respected. I strictly prohibit any act tending to infringe on these.
- D. We should never interfere in Chinese internal affairs.

(Ques.) The UMEZU-HO Yin-chin agreement is said to have been proposed by Japan on the assassination of pro-Japanese newspaper men. Please tell us what you know about this matter.

(Ans.) In spring, 1935, the anti-Japanese sentiment in North China was quite serious, giving rise to even sanguinary incidents. Thus the situation had been increasingly threatening. In the meantime, on May 5 Hu En-pu, proprietor of the KOO CHUAN PAO was assassinated in the Japanese concession in Tientsin, and the next day on the 3rd, FAI E yu-huan, proprietor of the CHEN PAO met the same fate in the Japanese concession. These two persons had been regard as pro-Japanese. The observation, on the part of the Japanese garrison, on this matter was that the Kuomintang party was behind the assassins and everything related with these incidents. On May 29 when I heard that the Chief of the Staff Colonel SAKAI,

Takashi and a military officer posted in PEIPING called on General HO Ying-chin and submitted various demands to him. I wished to ask the Commander's opinion, but since he was out in Shinking being wired for by the War Minister HAYASHI, I saw him when he came back from the trip. Then the Commander told me as follows:

"Frequent assassinations are really injurious to the diplomatic relations. If China fail to take some drastic measures toward this matter, unfortunate incidents will repeatedly happen. The agreement regarding the North China incident also provides for the suppression of anti-foreign acts. I sent the chief of the staff with items desired by us to talk with representatives of the Chinese Government as to how can we brighten, in the spirit of the agreement, the situation in North-China. The items suggested by us were briefly this - the military forces and political party local chapters, from which dark politics or terrorism are likely to originate, should just be removed from the districts where Japanese residents are. I learned from him that it was not anything formal like a treaty or an agreement but simply an oral representation, and felt relieved as I thought such a step was just what his character might dictate.

(Ques.) Was this representation accepted by the Chinese?

(Ans.) General HO Ying-chin, as a result of his previous conference with the Nanking Government, accepted the items proposed by the Japanese Army and on June 10 withdrew of his own accord the anti-Japanese military forces. So there is nothing like an agreement.

There is much misunderstanding about this and many people think as if there is an agreement because the newspapers designated it the UMEZU-HO Ying-chin agreement.

(Ques.) Was Commander aware at that time that this representation had provoked the Chinese Government?

(Ans.) It is true that it proved more provocative than expected on account of poor statesmanship on the part of the negotiators themselves. Commander UMEZU tried not to give any further provocation to the Chinese.

I will give one example:

In the middle of June I had a visit from HSU Hsiu-chih, Vice-Minister of the Department of Internal Affairs, from whom I got the following representation: "Kwantung Army airplanes are found flying over the withdrawing central military forces. There is danger of occasioning a war. Will you tell this to Commander UMEZU and ask him to stop it?" Immediately I called on the Commander and told him all about this. The Commander readily wired to the Kwantung Army and had it stopped, which favorably influenced the Chinese Government. This I learned later from HSU Hsin-chih.

(Ques.) Didn't he secretly expect the birth of something like a North China government or a self-government movement as a result of this agreement?

(Ans.) The Farmers' Self-government Movement was organized two months after Mr. UMEZU's departure and the CHICHA Government four months after.

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It is not thinkable that he secretly expected the birth of such organizations behind the agreement. Mr. UMEZU, being of such a character, did not like politics and had a firm conviction that we should never interfere with the internal affairs of China. Though I had often talked with the Commander about China, I could hear from him not a word about such intension. So far as I am concerned, I shall never hesitate to deny it.

(Ques.) Wasn't there any gulf or difference between the Army Commander and the Chief of the Staff in regard to their opinion or character?

(Ans.) There was a considerable difference, it seems to me. I heard the Chief of the Staff publicly say "The Army Commander is weak." I often heard the Chief of the staff criticising the Commander because he was dissatisfied with the Commander who thoroughly rejected military oppression or coercion policies. When the Chief of the Staff SAKAI was going to make a representation to HO Ying-chin, he suggested to the Commander the concentration of our garrison forces in Peking, but the Commander did not permit it, saying it was not proper to make a demand by force of arms. I remember the Chief of the Staff criticized the Commander thus under these circumstances. I learned from the Commander himself at that time regarding the concentration of our military forces.

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WRITTEN OATH

I swear, according to my conscience, to state the whole truth, neither
concealing what I know nor adding what I do not know.

(signed) ISHIKAWA, Jun (seal)

On this 4th day of December, 1946

At Tokyo

Affiant ISHIKAWA, Jun

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, 1946,
at Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) MIYATA, Mitsuo (seal)

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Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch,
hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the
attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning
of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947