

Page

He admitted that he had heard much later that the troops sent by China north were stopped at Paoting, where they were held voluntarily by the Chinese authorities. He did not know at the time whether the act was voluntary or for some other reason. He would say that Paoting was a little more than one hundred miles from Peiping.

20,734

The witness stated that General TADA replaced IMAI as Vice Chief of Staff. In view of his statement that the decision to capture Nanking was made on December 1, when he was asked whether it was not a fact that TADA had prepared the plans for Nanking's capture during the battle of Shanghai, the witness stated he was not familiar with the preparations within the General Staff, but the decision to capture Nanking was taken the 1st of December.

When asked whether TADA had not drawn the plans for operations against Hankow in June or July 1938, the witness stated he did not know when the plans were first begun, but he did know that the decision to take Hankow was made the early part of December 1938.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Brooks,
Counsel for MINAMI

20,737

When asked whether once materials had been supplied and agreed upon, was the use of these materials and operations conducted thereunder solely in the hands of the General Staff, the witness stated that materials provided in accordance with operational plans were not supplied to the General Staff. They were in the hands of the War Ministry, which delivers them to the units directly.

20,738

When the General Staff wishes to change operational plans, it would have to consult the War Ministry, * since these materials must be transported from this place or that and produced to the various units, and the function of transportation rests with the War Ministry. * The War Ministry

20,740

had no authority to give orders stopping or changing military operations in the field. The War Ministry could limit the use of materials. There were no regulations or stipulations regarding the extent of such limitations.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
April 24, 1947
DEFENSE - Division III - China
TANAKA, S. - Redirect

Page

20,741

When asked after Imperial sanction for an operation was given whether the War Minister could withhold further supplies, * the witness stated that once an order for operations had been given and the operation begun, the War Ministry must authorize the use of such material to attain the object of the operations. When an operational order is given the Chief of Staff customarily consults the War Ministry and the War Ministry, taking various factors of material into consideration, either gives his approval or not, when consulted.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Banno,
Counsel for ITAGAKI

20,743

The witness stated that in the preparation of operational plans the War Ministry has something to do with it. * Definite decision is made at the time when the Chief of Staff and the War Ministry have agreed and are seeking to obtain Imperial sanction. It is most clear when the Imperial sanction has been granted.

23 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Nelson Sutton

FROM: Mr. J. F. English

An examination of the deposition of TANAKA, Shinichi shows that certain matters therein might refer to decisions of the Cabinet, Liaison Meetings or Five Ministers Conferences. These matters occurred between July 8 and July 27, 1937; the middle of August, 1937; December 1, 1937 and some date, not stated, in September, 1938.

An examination of the record shows that there are in evidence references to two Cabinet meetings as being held in 1937 - 11 July and 22 October.

Exhibit 260 refers to the meeting of 11 July 1937. It is the cross-examination of CHING TEH-CHUN during which he stated that the Japanese Cabinet under KONOYE on 11 July 1937 passed a resolution to send a bigger Army to North China. (2455) This agrees with TANAKA's statement on page 11-B.

Exhibit 239 refers to a Cabinet meeting of 22 October 1937 (2960). At this meeting the Cabinet decided to form a more powerful national political company to establish and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo. The Affidavit of TANAKA makes no reference to such a matter.

No exhibit relating to a Privy Council meeting refers to any matter discussed in TANAKA's Affidavit during 1937 or 1938.

TANAKA's Affidavit is confined to happenings within the years 1937 and 1938. The record shows that there was a Four Ministers Conference held on 16 April 1937 (Ex. 219, Record p. 2748) and a Five Ministers Conference on 20 February 1937 (Ex. 218, Record p. 2745-2747). TANAKA's Affidavit refers to Five Ministers Conference of 20 July 1937.

Conclusion: Consequently, there is in evidence no record of any meeting or conference mentioned by TANAKA in this Affidavit.

23 April 1947

Re: TANAKA, Shinichi
Def. Doc. #925

Objections to the Introduction of the Affidavit

I. In General

- (a) The affidavit is argumentative.
- (b) The witness purports to state the contents of official documents and to give information which he secured from documents, as to which the documents themselves are the best evidence, and he does not account for the absence of the documents or the inability of the defense to produce them.

II. Specific

- (a) In Section III, 1, the witness purports to quote an explanation issued by the General Staff. This is objectionable on two grounds,-
 - (1) It is an attempt to introduce a document without complying with the usual rules, and
 - (2) The official statement should be produced or the inability to produce it accounted for.
- (b) In Section IV, 1, the witness gives as the source of his information, "This I know from documents," without giving the nature of the documents or giving any reasons why the documents should not be produced. The last two sentences of this sub-section purport to be third-hand hearsay concerning the establishment of the policy of non-enlargement by the Imperial Government.
- (c) In Section IV, 2, the witness recites, ". . . which I know from documents." This is objectionable for the reasons recited in item II (a) above. In the last three paragraphs of this sub-section (page 8), the witness purports to quote a "judgment of the situation" adopted by the General Staff Headquarters, as to which he had second-hand information. This is subject to the additional objection set out in item II (a) above.

Re: TANAKA, Shinichi
Def. Doc. #925
Page 2.

- (d) In Section IV, pages 8 and 9, the witness purports to summarize an official statement of the Government issued 11 July. This is objectionable on the two grounds set out in item II (a) above and on the additional ground that it is doubtless the same statement as already in evidence as Exhibit No. 260, R _____ in the Prosecution's case.
- (e) In Section V, page 9, the witness testifies to the decision of a Cabinet conference on second-hand information without complying with the rule on the production of the record or accounting for the inability of the Defense to produce it. The same objection applies to the so-called "Policy for the settlement of the North China Incident" (Pages 9 and 10), adopted by the Governing Board of the General Staff and of the War Ministry. This applies to the last paragraph on page 9 and the first paragraph on page 10.
- (f) Section VI, A, seeks to introduce third-hand evidence of the action taken at a Cabinet meeting.
- (g) In Section VI, E, page 11, the witness purports to give the decision of a Cabinet meeting which is objectionable for the reasons above stated.
- (h) In Section VI, F, the witness recites the information contained in "a report received from a higher official."
- moving to check*

Def. No. 925-

from Bureau

4-22-47

Additional Questions for Cross Examination
of Witness TANAKA, Shinichi

Defense Affidavit No. 925

Questions:

1. Witness, in what department of the War Ministry and in what capacity did you work in 1937?
2. What were your duties?
3. Was it not one of your functions to receive information about the Soviet Union from the Japanese General Staff, or did you happen to hear about it from some one else?
4. What was the General Staff information? Wasn't it assumptions of the Special Service Department of the General Staff?
5. Do you know exactly upon what specific sources was the General Staff information based in 1937?
6. If you are not aware of the original sources of the information about the Soviet Forces in the Far East, how can you then state in your affidavit without any reservations that the information is hypothetical?
7. Don't you have any doubts that the information about the armed forces of the Soviet Union is exaggerated and that there is some doubt as to its credibility?
8. You stated in your affidavit that the Soviet Union had 10 cavalry divisions and some mechanized and airforce units stationed in the Mongolian People's Republic. Is this what you meant to say?
9. If the witness says that those are Mongolian cavalry divisions, he should be asked: Why then do you refer to facts concerning other states and attribute them to the Soviet Union without making any reservations?
10. If the witness says there were 10 cavalry divisions, he should be asked: Do you yourself believe such absurd information which has not the slightest resemblance to the description of the true state of affairs?
11. In your affidavit you refer to the information concerning the Soviet forces in the Far East in 1937, including your conjectures and assumptions as to the forces of the

(Additional Questions for Cross Examination of Witness TANAKA
(contd))

Siberian Military District at a distance of 5000-6000 Klm. from the Primorje. Is it not because Novosibirsk and Western Siberia were objectives of Japan's plans of aggression?

12. In the English version of your affidavit it is stated that the Soviet Union had 45 cavalry divisions in the Far-Eastern direction. Aren't you surprised at such confusing strength? And was it actually like that?

Correction: I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that in the English version of the affidavit of TANAKA, Shinichi, Defense Document No. 925, on top of page 4, line 3, it is stated that the Soviet Union had 45 cavalry divisions in the Far-Eastern direction; whereas in the Japanese version of the affidavit only 4½ cavalry divisions are mentioned. This circumstance has to be clarified and a respective correction made in the affidavit.

13. Is your statement correct that the actions of the Soviet Union having been taken into account, Japan's operations in China would have been jeopardized and considered undesirable?
14. However, didn't the Japanese High Command start waging war in China in 1937 because it held the belief, in spite of what you say, that there was no real threat on the part of the Soviet Union and that it was necessary to secure a reliable war for an eventual attack against the Soviet Union?
15. Don't you think that, if the information you have given, concerning such large forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East in 1937 were true, the Japanese High Command would never have had the war with China started in the same year?

PERTINENT INFORMATION
RE: TANAKA, Shinichi
Def. Doc. 925

IFS DOC 1831

- Not yet introduced
- No official English translation ready

Chart of Mobilized Units during the China Incident, from July 1937 to Dec. 1940, by the 3rd Section, Army General Staff.

The first item in the Chart is substantially as follows,

The order, Army-A-No.6---dated 15 July 1937---, was given to mobilize the China Garrison Force, the Headquarters of Air Corps, and the Headquarters of another Headquarters of ~~Air Corps~~ Air Corps (name not quite clear).

The China Garrison Force would be formed of the following, 1st Infantry, 2nd Infantry, 3rd Infantry, Tank Battalion, Cavalry Battalion, Artillery Battalion, Engineering Battalion, to be formed into the 27th Division.

This checks with the information contained in the CHINESE YEAR BOOK, p. 157, which said according to the report of REUTER, War Office in Tokyo announced the troops would be dispatched from Japan proper.

TANAKA, Shinichi.

1. We should clear up ambiguities as to what department he was serving in, probably due to translation. I think it should be Military Affairs Section of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry.
2. He refers in terms to documents not produced or accounted for. on Page 6, para IV 1 and page 25 - end of paragraph 7.
Further on pages 4, 8, 10, 17, 20 (first para), 23 (last para) there are "instructions reports &c.," mostly at considerable length purporting to be verbatim, which must probably have been documents which alternatively it is difficult to believe he can remember.
3. The Affidavit is full of hearsay about matters which he could not possibly know himself, most of which are in themselves hearsay by his alleged but usually unnamed informants with no probative value as to the truth of the original reports themselves.
4. On pages 8-9 no. IV, he says that the published decision of July 11th to send forces to North China from Japan was cancelled or postponed on the afternoon of the same day, but that part of the Kwantung and Chosen Armies were sent there and on page 12, para f, it was not until 27th July that it was decided to mobilise and despatch divisions from home, but on page 13, para 8 he says that 4 divisions were mobilised and despatched in July, 7 in August and 4 in September and October and on page 16, para IX he speaks of the expenditure of Expeditionary forces sent to Korea and Manchuria on July 11th 1937, apparently indicating that forces sent from those places to North China on that date were replaced by new forces from Japan.

PERTINENT INFORMATION
RE: TANAKA, Shinichi
Def. Doc. 925

THE CHINESE YEAR BOOK, 1938-39, prepared from Official Sources by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking.

If necessary, this book can be introduced into evidence, on the basis of being an official document, the same status as US Government publications.

The following information is obtained from the book, wherein the pertinent parts have been marked in red pencil.

Page 156, right column, near the bottom

On July 12th, the Chinese Foreign Minister proposed to the Japanese mutual cessation of military movements. But no reply was ever received from the Japanese.

Page 155, right column, upper part of the page

On July 15th, Japanese Army at Fengtai publicly announced that it wanted ~~the~~ the expulsion of the 29th Army. Fresh demands were also reported. Chinese National Government began to send troops northward. But on July 17th, at the request of General Sung, the leader of the Hopsi-Chahar, who was negotiating with the Japanese, the troops sent were halted at Paoting.

Page 156, right column, bottom, to Page 156, left column, top

Now the Japanese could no longer ignore the National Government, and on 17th, a "virtual ultimatum" was presented to China, asking for a prompt and adequate reply.

Page 156, right column, middle, to Page 157, left column, middle

The Chinese gave a reply on the 19th, to the effect that the local settlement must receive the sanction from the National Government. It again proposed a simultaneous cessation of troop movements and the troops of both sides should return to the original position. It also made it clear that China would ~~agree~~ agree to all means of settlement, through normal diplomatic channels.

However, there was no further communication from the Japanese. In fact, in the absence of any documental proof at hand, the witness could well be asked whether it was a fact that Japanese nationals residing in various parts of central China were ordered to go home immediately, and Japanese ships were sent to fetch them home.

wishes

~~PERTINENT INFORMATION~~
~~RE: TANAKA, Shinichi~~
~~Def. Doc. 925~~

THE CHINESE YEAR BOOK, 1938-39, prepared from Official Sources by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking.

If necessary, this book can be introduced into evidence, on the basis of being an official document, the same status as US Government publications.

The following information is obtained from the book, wherein the pertinent parts have been marked in red pencil.

Page 156, right column, near the bottom

On July 12th, the Chinese Foreign Minister proposed to the Japanese mutual cessation of military movements. But no reply was ever received from the Japanese.

Page 155, right column, upper part of the page

On July 15th, Japanese Army at Fengtai publicly announced that it wanted ~~to~~ the expulsion of the 29th Army. Fresh demands were also reported. Chinese National Government began to send troops northward. But on July 17th, at the request of General Sung, the leader of the Hopei-Chahar, who was negotiating with the Japanese, the troops sent were halted at Paoting.

Page 156, right column, bottom, to Page 156, left column, top

Now the Japanese could no longer ignore the National Government, and on July 17th, a "virtual ultimatum" was presented to China, asking for a prompt and adequate reply.

Page 156, right column, middle, to Page 157, left column, middle

The Chinese gave a reply on the 19th, to the effect that the local settlement must receive the sanction from the National Government. It again proposed a simultaneous cessation of troop movements and the troops of both sides should return to the original position. It also made it clear that China would ~~accept~~ agree to all means of settlement, through normal diplomatic channels.

However, there was no further communication from the Japanese. In fact, in the absence of any documental proof at hand, the witness could well be asked whether it was a fact that Japanese nationals residing in various parts of central China were ordered to go home immediately, and Japanese ships were sent to fetch them home.

In sub-paragraph 2 he relates munitions problem, that it was difficult to mobilize and dispatch 15 divisions and maintain operations at that time, with only eight months' stock on hand. That continuous supply would be impossible and leave none for self-defense.

Part IV of the affidavit: That the Incident was not planned. Par. 1, that on July 8, 1937 the army adopted policy of non-enlargement and non-exercise of military strength, which policy the government adopted along with measures for self-preservation.

In sub-paragraph 2, he relates that on July 9 General Staff instructed Army to negotiate with Hopei-Chahar; that reports indicated compliance.

(N. B. The compliance is a conclusion).

Information received show Chinese send additional forces to Honan Province, strengthening Northern forces, and repeating illegal firing.

To protect Japanese residents it was desired to dispatch a minimum force to the Peking-Tientsin area.

That the government made a statement July 11 explaining the sending of troops; in effect--that on assurances of negotiations the preparations will be reserved. Orders given sending parts of Kwantung and Chosen armies.

Part V. On information, affiant gives outcome of Cabinet conference.

(N. B. Not the best evidence).

General Staff decided on settlement policy July 15th, namely: to avoid expanding Incident to war, to accept settlement terms of 11th, but if Chinese ignored agreement to attack.

Part VI. (A) Mobilization and dispatch not thought necessary at beginning of Incident.

(B) Later, considering danger to residents, increased Chinese preparations and attacks, brought Government announcement of dispatching of troops July 11th.

(C)(D) Settlement reached July 11th and mobilization discontinued.

(E) Due to further concentration of Chinese Army, delays in withdrawal, Cabinet decided on mobilization by July 19th, but China again gave promise of settlement so it was postponed until the 22nd.

(F) After Langfang and Kwangan Gate Incident of July 25th and 26th, government decided on 27th to mobilize and dispatch the armies at home, the purpose being to protect nationals, communications and maintain defense.

(G) General Headquarters made no plans for further or future mobilization and took passive attitude.

(N. B. Conclusion)

(H) Higher officers adopted policy of further mobilization. After the Shanghai incident, 2 divisions were sent, also one to protect the residents of Tsintao. By October 1937 a total of 37 divisions had been sent.

(I) By the time of the HANKAO and Canton operations, 23 divisions were in China including some organized in that zone.

Part VII. Regarding Nanking, Hsu-Chow, Kwantung and Hankow:

1. Though previously not intended, on December 1, 1937, deciding to terminate the incident, orders were given to capture Nanking.

2. In May 1938 the War Minister and Vice-Chief of General Staff agreed on operations at Hsu-Chow, to secure contact between North and South divisions. Disagreement had existed due to policy of non-expansion.

3. Decision made in September 1938 for operations at Hankow and Kwantung.

4. The Army budget passed by the 38th Diet had not anticipated these operations, which caused inconveniences.

(N. B. Should be stricken as conclusion).

Part VIII. Regarding budget. In October 1937 prospects were entertained in Tokyo of ending positive operations late in 1937. We had 16 divisions in China and had hoped to reduce to 10, starting in Spring of 1938. This was approved both by the department and the outposts. The budget was fixed accordingly, but the expected settlement did not materialize and after 1938 operations we had an enormous deficiency in the budget.

Part IX. Regarding budget preparations. As principal plans of War Minister for troops in Manchuria and Korea in July 37, which were to stay 3 months, negotiations with Finance Minister resulted in budget for only 2 months which Diet approved in July 1937.

In September 1937 an additional 4 months budget was approved, thus budgets made little by little indicated how the '38 budget was underestimated.

Part X. Regarding non-aggravation policy.

1. that the foregoing statements show efforts toward non-aggravation.

2. All commanders in North China were instructed of this policy. No troops were carried on the Peking-Tientsin railway. Every Peking castle gate was guarded by Chinese and 6,000 Japanese were guarded by only 2 of our platoons. Many inconveniences were suffered to prevent aggravation.

3. The commander in Central China reported to affiant (on liaison work) that Central command gave out no information regarding general operation plan, but only the purpose and time of each operation. This was done to follow localization policy.

4. In the Pingtsin Area during July 1937, tried to localize Lefang and Kwangan Gate Incidents. Chinese insincerity in their agreements and war-like actions made it necessary to mobilize the divisions at home.

On July 26th the General Staff gave notice that mobilization should not be delayed. War Minister recognized it on July 27th. On the 29th the government ordered mobilization of 3 home divisions, but to continue localization and settlement policy, also to avoid need of requiring more troops and cautioned to do no damage to third Powers personnel.

That future action in Pingtsin area would be purely defensive according to government information.

Affiant learned from a document that the General Staff approved action against the Chinese 29th Army by limiting the shooting area.

5. Affiant told by Chief Military Affairs Bureau of action taken by the Five Ministers' meeting July 20, announcing policy to improve the situation and satisfy Western Powers of their high principle and peaceful aims. On page 22 affiant "also heard" that an opinion existed among the General Staff that forces could be moved back and that an interview between Konoye and Chiang Kai-shek be arranged for a settlement.

Affiant states this was not realized.

(N. B. Statements such as the last one mentioned giving opinions of other people should be stricken).

6. Circumstances following Oyama Incident at Shanghai:

That affiant received a Navy report regarding possible need of dispatching troops to Shanghai. Government authorities said to have opinion that due to this Incident, measures might be needed to protect residents.

On August 15th 2 divisions were ordered dispatched but "not as a purely military operation".

That Tsingtao residents might need protection. That about August 15th the General Staff concluded that China had decided on an all-out war. That Chiang Kai-shek was appointed Supreme Commander and war zones created and general mobilization ordered.

Affiant received notice about August 16 of a Cabinet decision: That localization is very difficult in China which indicates a long war although efforts should be made to restrict it in time and area.

That less than 2 divisions were dispatched temporarily; 5 battalions later and finally 5 more divisions from North China. That 3 divisions were landed at Hangchow and one at Paimaokiang.

That the delay in occupying Shanghai, plus the numerical shortage of forces and materials, caused the battle to last 3 months, according to the Commanding General's statement to affiant.

On page 25 affiant states that the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was later made headquarters of the Central China Expeditionary Force, with the aim of bringing about a settlement of the Incident.

Affiant comments having seen documents that the forces were instructed to move West beyond Wusih and Fuchow.

8. Affiant states that by Ordinance Imperial Headquarters was established in Tokyo and the munitions mobilization program began in November 1937. That in March 1938 the general mobilization law was promulgated, and applied in May for the China Incident.

COMMENT: As to TANAKA's Testimony:

The first page or two of this affidavit are mostly direct primary evidence, but from then on the bulk of the evidence is an elaboration of needless details, conclusions, opinions of others and constantly repetitious of the whole theory of non-aggression, self-defense and provocation by China.

Although the witness is qualified to give opinions as to military operations, purposes, strength, etc., he is not qualified to state what the Cabinet thought, what the Diet anticipated, what the government intends, etc. The probative evidence of the entire exhibit could have been recited in 3 pages.

* * * * *

~~PA~~

925

TANAKA-

abjectors & affidavit.

X 2 Hs 17-18-19 ~~of~~ Given part of H 20

Wachi's report & notes, was

was Wachi testified to this

23 Apr. D. No. 1003 (Ex)

p. 5.

Quoting his report & Journal, ~~which~~ ^{Shenick}

Check date

Wachi affidavit - Apr 3 -

Zenab

"

Apr. 14 -

objection
in work's affidavit
pp. 1003 / 5
to why p. 17-18
works report is not cut



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Generally an agreement
Quotes & summaries
facts substantially correct
official documents

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: TANAKA, Shinichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

5 min confer 20 July - p. 21
Statement of Gen. Goud 15 Aug - p. 22
Cabinet confer 16-17 Aug - p. 23

Draft for copy of the questions prepared by Russian

1 hour for documents of 4, 7, 21

Receipt of your statement of 11 July 18
action cabinet conference around 13 July 19
meeting around July 19 - 14

21 Jul Wachi's report - 17-18
action Gen staff 20 July } 20
about a notebook
Decision & capture Hankow decided 1 Dec 37 and
for taking of Hankow was issued 1. 14
2. 15

I. I, TANAKA, Shinich, formerly a lieutenant-general, live at No. 2,042, Mizawa-mura Yokoseko, Mie District, Mie Prefecture.

I occupied the post of the chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, from March of 1937 to February of 1939, and had charge of the affairs concerning the organization, equipment, budget, mobilization and reinforcement of our forces, under the command of the director of the bureau.

It was about the middle of March, 1937, that I arrived at my post. When I paid a visit of courtesy to Minister of War SUGIYAMA, he pointed out that the time had come to try strenuously to avoid all foreign troubles and devote ourselves to the completion of national defence; that the Army would try to modernize its armaments and particularly to improve and complete its war materials; and that the Military Affairs Section should make a special effort to improve the organization and equipment of our forces.

II. As to whether or not our Japanese Army had a plan of operations against China before the outbreak of the China Incident, the General Staff Headquarters of the Japanese Army had no plan of operations for the war with China before the outbreak of the China Incident. While I was engaged in the affairs concerning the organization, reinforcement and mobilization of our forces, as the Chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, I never received any report or information concerning the mobilization and operational preparation necessary for any plan of operations

against China, either from the General Staff or from the superior authorities. This means that the General Staff had no preparatory plan of this kind at that time. For the plan of operations as well as that of mobilization and operational preparation were just in its charge, but the realization of such plans was necessarily accompanied by the strength, munitions and expenditure. Therefore they could not be realized without the approval and cooperation of the War Ministry, and the Chief of Military Affairs Section would have had to be informed of the business concerning such plans, all the more so because I arrived at my post in March -- at the end of the fiscal year.

III. As to whether or not the Japanese Army was then so situated as to be able to attempt Chinese operations in China, in view of the strength and munitional materials of the Japanese Army at that time, it would have been almost impossible to attempt operations in China.

1. In 1937, when the China Incident broke out, Japan had only a peace-time strength of 17 divisions and a war-time one of 30 divisions. In the judgment of the General Staff as well as of the War Minister, as later referred to in this affidavit, it was very dangerous for the Army to operate in China with the fighting strength available at the time in view of the fact that China had a force 20,000,000 strong (200 divisions), and a vast ^{land} as well as the social idiosyncracies of the Chinese people.

In addition, we had to be greatly concerned in the Russian military preparations in the Far East. According

to the information received by the General Staff as to the Russian preparations for war with Japan, she had a standing peace-time strength of 28 sniper divisions, 45 cavalry divisions, 6 mechanized brigades and 1,900 aircraft for the Far East, including the Siberian Military District, together with a peace-time force of 10 cavalry divisions and some mechanized units and air units for Outer Mongolia. The minimum war-time strength that she could use against Japan amounted to 31 or 50 divisions, of which mobilization, concentration and reinforcement were to be sufficiently secured. It was concluded, therefore, that it would be dangerous and inadvisable to carry out operations in China under such circumstances, taking into consideration the movements of the Soviet Union. In this connection, after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out in July, 1937, the General Staff gave the following explanation:

"Considering the Chinese situation, the present incident is liable to turn into a head-on, protracted war between Japan and China. If so, we could use only 11 divisions in these Chinese operations, or, adding the reserve corps of the Army, 15 divisions in total. But, if we should use half our war-time strength, totalling 30 divisions on the plan of mobilization, in the Chinese Area for a long time, then we are sure to meet with a serious crisis from the viewpoint of national defence. So it is necessary to take every possible measure for the immediate settlement of the incident."

As I was present when this explanation was made, I know that the War Minister was in entire accord with

the explanation.

2. The production and maintenance of munitions were under as much difficulty and disadvantage as the abovementioned problem of military strength.

According to the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry, having charge of the production and maintenance of munitions it was very difficult to mobilize and dispatch about 15 divisions and even to maintain operations in the incident at the time, in view of our conditions of production and supply of munitions. In 1937, our Army had only an eight months' stock of ammunition for fifteen divisions. As to the ability of munitions mobilization, we could barely hope to meet the operational consumption of 15 reinforced divisions in about eight or nine months after the mobilization was commenced, and a continuous supply of special materials was impossible. As regards the arms, supposing that we were able to use all the arms we had in stock and bring our munition mobilization to a maximum, it would have been difficult to meet the operational consumption of 15 divisions, and this was especially the case with special materials. Therefore, if we should go to a protracted war with China, it would not be sufficient to use all the stocks and maximum munitions mobilization in the operations in China, and if our relations with another country should be strained under such circumstances, we were sure to be at a loss what to do for self-defence. Generally speaking, with our anticipated munitions mobilization for 1937, and guaranteed a supply of 70 per cent of munitions, including arms and

ammunitions, for the estimated war-time strength of 30 divisions for the fiscal year, we planned to be able to mobilize in about ten months after such munitions mobilization was commenced. However, far more materials were expected to be consumed in the China Incident, so we admitted that it was extremely difficult to maintain operations with 15 divisions.

iv. Data indicating that the incident was not planned from the Japanese point of view.

In addition to the data in the above II and III, I wish to refer to the following:

1. Establishment of non-enlargement and non-exercise of military strength. On July 8, when the Army was informed of the clash at the Marco Polo Bridge early in the morning, it immediately determined the general policy of non-enlargement of the incident as well as non-exercise of military strength, and informed the Chief of the Staff of the Army at the front to that effect through the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. This I know from documents. About July 8 or 9, the Imperial Government established the policy of non-enlargement, desiring for the smooth settlement of the incident by reconsideration on the part of China, and simultaneously decided to take proper measures for self-preservation, according to the circumstances, though it was too early to send more forces at that time. This I heard from Lieutenant General USHIROKU, Director of the War Service Bureau who was informed thereof in the Bureau-directors Council by the War Minister.

2. Effort for speedy settlement at the front. On July 9, the General Staff instructed the army at the front to nego-

Summary

tiate with the Hupei-Chahar authorities for the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which I know from documents. The gist was to avoid reference to political issues under such circumstances, and to obtain the approval of the Hupei-Chahar Political Committee and fulfil as soon as possible our demands, such as the suspension of stationing the Chinese forces on the left bank near the Marco Polo Bridge, its necessary guarantee, and the punishment and apology of those persons directly responsible.

According to the reports which I received from the army at the front, our occupation forces in China prohibited promptly any military movement, following the policy of non-enlargement of the incident and its speedy settlement at the front. In order to save the situation, Major-General MATSUI, Daikuro, Chief of the Peiping Special Service Agency, was negotiating with the Chinese military authorities, and it seemed that an agreement would be reached in conformity to the above-mentioned policy of negotiation with Hupei-Chahar.

However, according to the information received by the General Staff, the Chinese authorities ordered four divisions of her central army near Suchow to march for the frontier of the Honan Province and all her air forces to move out. Moreover, there was no indication that the northern Chinese situation might be mitigated; the Chinese forces in North China were strengthening preparations for war, such as construction of their positions or transport of munitions, and also illegal firing was being repeated near the Marco Polo Bridge.

If the state of affairs had been left as it was, the lives and properties of our residents in Peking and Tientsin would surely have been forced to face unavoidable danger. Thus the General Staff HQ's was compelled to adopt the following judgment of the situation:

942
Judgment

"The authorities in Peking and Tientsin as well as the Nanking Government, seem to be exerting themselves to prepare for armed hostilities against Japan. As a result of the aggravation of the situation, caused by the reinforcement of Chinese troops in North China, the lives and properties of our residents are, now, on the verge of utmost danger. It is high time for us now to dispatch a minimum possible number of forces to the Peking-Tientsin area, in order to protect our residents. A grave situation is arising also in areas other than Peking and Tientsin, which comes to call our careful attention with regard to protection of our nationals."

I was informed of the above adoption by the report and explanation of a high class officer of the Military Affairs Section.

21
2260
IV. Our government made the following point clear in an official statement on 11 July, that we were utterly compelled to send forces to North China to cope with anti-Japanese armed actions, planned by the Chinese side. But upon being informed that the Hopei-Chahar Government authorities had accepted our proposal, we took steps, in the afternoon on the same day, as to reserve our preparation for the mobilization and dispatch of our home divisions. Furthermore, orders

were issued by the General Staff HQ's, with the approval of the Government, to dispatch only a part of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and of the Chosen Army respectively.

The latter step was taken in view of the situation as mentioned above, to ensure the achievement of peace-time duty by our garrison in China under aggravated situation in the Peiping-Tientsin area.

V. According to an information I got around 13 July from the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the outcome of the Cabinet Conference was as follows:

is this correct

"It is extremely doubtful whether the Nanking Government has the sincerity to settle the matter in peace. For the Chinese Central Army forces are now advancing hastily to the north and anti-Japanese actions and unlawful firing cases are being repeated everywhere. Thus not only in North China but also in Shanghai and Chingtao the situation is very dangerous in regard to the protection of the Japanese residents there. Therefore, it will be advisable for us in accordance with our firm policy of localization, to pay constant attention to the future course of things; urging on the one hand, the Hopei-Chahar Government to fulfil the stipulated terms, and abstaining on the other hand from provoking the Chinese."

In conformity with this principle, the governing body of the General Staff and of the War Ministry decided upon the so-called 'policy for the settlement of the North China Incident' on the night of 13 July.

The outline of the above 'policy' is as follows:

"All possible measures should be taken to avoid the expansion of the incident to an all-out war, adhering to the principle of localization and settlement at the spot. For this purpose, it is desirable to accept the terms for settlement proposed by the representative of the Chinese 29th Army and signed on 11th instant, and to see to it that these terms are fulfilled by the Chinese. Whether or not our forces now in homeland should be mobilized is a matter to be decided in the light of the future course of things. In case however the Chinese ignore the above terms and show no sincerity to put it into practice, or in case the Nanking Government removes their central army forces to the north to prepare for attack, resolute steps must be taken on our part."

It was that it is necessary for the garrisons stationing in China to receive beforehand the recognition of the central headquarters. This was what Lieutenant-General ATOMIYA who was the Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau participating in setting up the plan (regulation) reported directly to me.

VI. As I was connected with mobilization, I wish to explain the real circumstances under which mobilization and dispatch were carried out with cautious attitude.

A. It was a fact acknowledged by the government on July 9th when the incident broke out that the mobilization and dispatch of divisions at home might be necessary to meet the emergency circumstances, although it was not considered necessary at the beginning of the incident. (I knew this through the Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau as a report from the minister after a cabinet meeting.)

B. Taking consideration of the dangerous state of Japanese residents in the Peking-and Tientsin district, increasing preparation of fighting power and repeated attacks of Chinese forces in the same district, as well as the insincerity of Hopei-Chahar authorities in negotiations of reconciliation and the northward advancement of the Chinese central armies, the Japanese Government announced on 11 July the dispatch of troops to north China. //

C. But in the afternoon of July 11th, as the Hopei-Chahar authorities accepted our proposal, the mobilization, and dispatch of divisional troops at home and other preparations were discontinued.

D. On 13 July it was decided as the policy of dealing with the north China Incident that the mobilization of divisions at home would be considered properly according to circumstances which might occur afterwards.

E. As a new circumstance which appeared up to 15 July I mention an increase and concentration of Chinese armies in the area of the north Lancho-Haichow railway, the activity of the Canton air forces, the delay of actual withdrawal of the Chinese Army forces from the left side along Yungtinho, which withdrawal had been accepted by an agreement. Not only that, further construction was continued and more army forces were concentrated (a report from the General Headquarters). Considering the above report, it was decided at a cabinet meeting that the carrying out of mobilization of divisional armies at home which had been discontinued on 16 or 17 July should be prepared as to be practicable whenever

necessary after 19 July. The officers and officials concerned in the General Headquarters and the War Ministry proceeded with preparations in their respective sections. But the authorities decided to persevere as much as possible considering self-defense, as the Hopei-Chahar authorities accepted once our proposals, in spite of the report that Chang-Kai-shek revealed his firm determination against Japan on 19 July. Besides the acceptance of the Hopei-Chahar authorities, expecting the conclusions of the "anking Conference, the preparation for mobilization of divisional armies at home was postponed and reserved for the future on 22 July.

F. After the Langfang incident on 25 July and the Kwangan Gate Incident on 26 July, the condition in north China became finally serious. A report was received from a higher officer stating that the Japanese Government had decided upon a program on 27 July to mobilize and dispatch divisional armies at home. And the purpose of the mobilization and dispatch was to eliminate the threat of the Chinese forces to the lives and property of Japanese residents and transportation and communication and also accomplishment of self-defense of the already dispatched garrison troops in north China. The mobilization and dispatch at first for the time being were emergency operations with peace-time formation and equipment not suitable or sufficient for actual operations. These operations were only for the purpose of protecting the Japanese residents and to carry out the duty of self-defense.

G. There was no definite expression of intention of the authorities of the General Headquarters whether further mobilization of divisional armies at home would be carried out

or not in the future besides the above stated one. I recognized that the Minister, the Vice-Minister of the War Ministry and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau who were the highest staff authorities, maintained a passive attitude in regard to further mobilization.

H. Since then higher officers adopted the policy of taking proper steps in regard to further mobilization after consideration and investigation of developments which might occur in the future. When the Shanghai Incident broke out, two divisions were sent to cope with the emergency and when it became urgently necessary to protect the residents of Tsintao, a plan to send out one division was set up and when faced with the necessity of carrying out operations in the area of Paotai, Hopei Province in central China, a hasty mobilization at home was begun. As above stated, patching and supplementary mobilization and dispatch were carried out as circumstances required. Eventually after the outbreak of the incident up to October 1937, army forces totaling 15 divisions, were mobilized and dispatched on eight different occasions, to say roughly 4 divisions in July, 7 divisions in August, and 4 divisions in September and October.

I. In 1938, prior to the execution of operations in Hankao and Canton, the number of the divisions in China reached 23 but among them there were several divisions which were organized ^{the} in fighting zone as the circumstances required. Therefore, although the number of army divisions in China increased generally, the number of soldiers decreased in each division and the predisposition of each division and equipment were lowered.

VII. As examples of lack of unity and non-planning of military action, I wish to make mention of the capture of NANKING, operations in HSU-CHOW, capture of KUANGTUNG and operations in HANKOW.

The following is necessary confines of my duties as announced by the General Staff and other quarters.

1. Concerning the capture of NANKING, I was, at first, informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that the General Staff had no intention to realize it and the War Minister had the same opinion as the General Staff. I approved of this. But because of the tendency of the tide of war on the spot and because of the desire to seize the opportunity of terminating this incident, the decision to capture NANKING was firstly decided on December 1, 1937 (the 12th year of SHOWA) and the order for the taking NANKING was issued.

2. Carrying out of the HSU-CHOW operations.

In May 1938 (the 13th year of SHOWA), an agreement of views between the War Minister and Vice-Chief of the General Staff was not reached until immediately before the decision to carry out operations was made. The point at issue was that if it was possible to preserve the contact between north China and central China by securing permanently the important area of HSU-CHOW after the occupation of this area and to supply needed army strength because of the necessity to increase by 2 or 3 divisions the strength necessary for securing the important area of HSU-CHOW, but the fundamental fact was the disagreement of views as to the anticipation of settling this incident in accordance with the policy of non-expansion.

Finally, agreement of views to carry out this military operation was arrived at due to strategic demand in the light of the entire situation. Part of it, I personally heard at the above-mentioned conference and the rest I learned from my superiors.

3. As to the HANKOW and KUANGTUNG operations, decision was not made so quickly. Only in September 1938 it was decided to carry out the HANKOW operation about October 1938 and capture KUANGTUNG about that time to cut the communication and supply route from abroad.

4. Under these circumstances, the army budget passed at the ordinary session of the Diet in 1938 had not anticipated these military operations. Therefore a great deal of inconvenience was felt in the matter of expenses for the year as explained in the following:

VIII. I, as one of the men who were connected with the military budget, wish to state as follows; by way of proposing materials to indicate that the operations in HSUCHOW, HANKOW and KWANTUNG were not planned well before they actually occurred. After about October 1937, in TOKYO, prospects were entertained for putting an end to the positive operations against China and, moreover, plans and preparations were promoted regarding the adjustment of and extraction from the military strength in China, on the premise that the Incident would be concluded in the near future. To explain more in detail, at about the end of 1937, our military strength in China consisted of 16 divisions, forming its main part. As the first step, these were to be reduced to about 10 divisions.

Following this, in the units, which were to remain in China, the reservists were to be relieved from active service. The enforcement of this program was first to be started from the early spring of 1938, and, pursuant to the anticipated establishment of peace, an all-round withdrawal of the armed forces was planned. With respect to this matter, both the department quarters and the out-post army authorities were unanimous in their opinion.

Accordingly, the budget, agreed upon at the ordinary session of the Diet at that time, was also based on the above; namely, it was made on the premise that (1) the military strength in China was to be reduced roughly by half; (2) the repatriation of those troops who had been inducted; (3) the continued stationing of armed forces to such an extent as to presuppose no positive operations.

But, as it was, the situation did not favorably develop as was expected, and after the failure of peace negotiations and the occupation of NANKING, the consequent operations in HSUCHOW, HANKOW and KWANTUNG necessitated the total abandonment of the attempted adjustment of the military strength as aforementioned, not only this but in the 1938-1939 fiscal year an enormous deficiency was found in the budget.

IX. I wish to submit the following materials about how the military budget was actually prepared. About the expenditures of our expeditionary forces which were sent to Korea and Manchuria on July 11, 1937, I was asked by my superiors in the War Ministry to negotiate with the Finance Ministry with a

view to meet current expenses with a reserve fund and to open a three months' budget covering August, September and October for the troops that had already been sent, including their evacuation expenditures and supposing their stay to be about three months. But in fact, after negotiation with the Finance Ministry it was reduced to two months. A budget for two months of August and September was presented at an extraordinary session of the Diet in July and passed. A budget for four months from October till January of the next year for about 11 divisions already mobilized by the end of August, passed at a session convened at the beginning of September.

Thus budgets were prepared little by little according to the number of the expeditionary forces, instead of making a wholesale estimation for a long period in expectation of aggravation and protraction of the incident. This is also clear by the fact that the budget for the fiscal year of 1938 proved greatly deficient as hereinbefore stated.

X. Realization of Japan's policy of non-aggravation.

1. What I have already stated shows efforts to realize a policy of non-aggravation.
2. As a reference to strict execution of non-aggravation policy on the spot, I wish to mention a verbal report made to the Minister of War, in my hearing, by Lt. Col. WACHI, a staff officer of the expeditionary forces in China, who had been called up to the central government to make a report of the situation developing on the spot.

Its gist is as follows:

Wachi's Report

A Dec 10 1903
Wachi
7.5

The policy of non-aggravation and peaceful settlement of the Incident was thoroughly disseminated to the commanders and all the rest of the Japanese forces in North China and utmost care was being taken for it. For instance, the transportation of any Japanese troops was prohibited by the railway between Peking and Tientsin. Any Japanese soldier in uniform was also prohibited to make use of the railway between Fengtai and Peking.

And though all the Japanese who passed through the gate of the Peking Castle were examined and interrogated by the Chinese military police. They submitted to it.

Every castle gate in Peking was closed by the military force of the Chinese 37th Division, Chinese machine guns were turned upon the Japanese houses within Peking Castle, and 6,000 Japanese were guarded by only two Japanese infantry platoons.

In spite of being in a position enabling us to go into action immediately against any Chinese bombardment, we were operating upon the instructions of the Army headquarters in Tientsin as they came to us one by one. Being afraid of aggravating the situation, we refrained from carrying the wounded into Peking Castle to be operated upon; likewise we left the bodies of the dead as they were, etc. This was but an example of our policy of localization to prohibit actions which might provoke magnification of the incident. Thus to carry out this policy, we submitted to any humiliation or inconvenience.

As for the Chinese forces, anti-Japanese sentiment was high among officers and soldiers alike, and especially among those in the grade of second major. The Chinese in the Pientsin Area were convinced that the Chinese 29th Army had won at Marco Polo Bridge, that the Chinese losses were small

Wachi's
after report
A Dec 10 1903

and that the Japanese Army had completely withdrawn.
We endured the rising anti-Japanese sentiment.

*washi
T R*

In addition, it was said that the Central Operations Staff had advanced to Paoting.

3. Concerning the strict observance of the localization policy of the local Army Commander, I will state what General Terauchi, the Army Commander in the North China area, told me when I was there about October 1937 (Showa 12), for liaison work.

That was as follows:

Hitherto the Central Supreme Command has made the technique of leading actual operations difficult by not clearly showing beforehand the general purpose of operations and the points of operation. Instead they have simply given the purpose and time of each local operation (such as the Central Hopei operation and the Taiyuan operation). To facilitate operations the Supreme Command should clearly show the general scope and purpose of the operations as a whole and leave the details of local operations to the Army Commander at the front. However, this case being merely an "incident" and having no bearing on our general national policy, it is necessary to sacrifice perfection in technique to the preservation of our general localization policy. In the future, it will be necessary for both the central and local commands seriously to consider various technical methods which would relieve the disadvantage to actual operation, brought about by strict observation of the localization policy.

4. On the policy of localization in the Pingtsin Area in July 1937 (Showa 12) it was decided that the occurrence of the Langfang and Kwangan Gate Incidents, together with the lack of sincerity on the part of the Hopei-Charhar authorities to fulfill the terms of agreement as well as

the aggressive actions repeated everywhere by the Chinese, made it at last necessary to mobilize our divisions now in the homeland.

On the night of July 26, the General Staff gave me a notice: "Hitherto we have avoided the mobilization of the home divisions but the actual situation in China admits of no further delay." Even the then Chief of the First Department of the General Staff, who was one of the strongest opponents to the mobilization of forces for fear of conflict between Japan and China, at last admitted on the 26th the necessity of mobilization by way of self-defense.

On the 27th the governing body of the War Ministry also recognized the unavailability of mobilization.

Then a draft was prepared for adoption by the Cabinet conference concerning the mobilization of three home divisions, and the War Minister issued orders in the evening of the same day with the approval of the Cabinet conference about the mobilization of three home divisions.

After a meeting of the Bureau Chiefs, I was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that on the 27th of July the government had decided as follows:

To mobilize three home divisions; to maintain the policy of localization and settlement at the spot even in case of the outbreak of a self-protective battle in the Pingtsin Area, such a battle should be purely for the achievement of the peacetime duties of the commander of the Japanese Army in China; to do its best not to bring about a situation which might require despatching soldiers to Tsingtao and Shanghai for the protection of Japanese residents -- though such a situation may eventually come about; and to do no damage to the personnel of third Powers.

Besides I learned that the Minister gave an explanation at the said meeting of the Bureau Chiefs to the following effect:

Exercise of military force in Pingtsin Area which might be required in the future would be purely self-defensive action and as such it would never be contradictory to the policy of localization adhered to by Japan. And even if despatch of forces to Shanghai or Tsingtao should be required for the protection of the Japanese whose security was being seriously menaced at that time; it would never run counter to the policy of localization. And the actions of the Japanese forces had hitherto been in strict conformity with the localization of military movements, and could and should remain so in the future as well.

I also learned from a document that the mobilization of home divisions was ordered in the evening of the 27th, and the Chief of the General Staff approved the application of the Commander of the Japanese Army in China for taking military action against the Chinese 29th Army, and that at the same time he ordered that the actual shooting be limited to the line of the Yungting River.

9 v.
5. I was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that at the Five Ministers' Meeting held about the 20th of July, they debated upon the advisability of the Japanese policy to improve the situation by taking means to clarify our observance of the principle of equal opportunity in North China, in order to satisfy the Western Powers, as well as China herself; and upon the plan to withdraw the forces at that time in the Pingtsin area, which had been despatched there from Manchuria and ^{Korea} after the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and then to take diplomatic means for the solution of questions pending between Japan and China. The Five Ministers' Meeting was a conference

held at the time by the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, and the Finance Minister. I also heard directly that at the end of July, there was an opinion among the governing body of the General Staff that contemplated neutralizing the situation by gathering and moving all the Japanese forces in North China back to the area of Tientsin in order to bring about prompt settlement of the incident, and then to hold a personal interview between Konoye and Chiang Kai-shek, and thus to smooth out the difficulty between Japan and China. However, since the attitude on the part of the Chinese was against this plan, it was not realized after all.

6. Circumstances after the Oyama Incident at Shanghai:

✓ About the Incident Captain Oyama, I received a report on the morning of the 10th of August 1932 in the War Ministry from Hoshina, the Chief of the First Section of the Navy Ministry. It purported that the Japanese authorities in Shanghai would not take further steps until they were assured of the sincerity of the Chinese by negotiating with them, and that the circumstances might require preparations for despatch of troops.

On that day the government authorities seemed to be of the opinion that adequate measures for the protection of our residents in Shanghai should be taken after the real circumstances of the Oyama Incident came to light, but that it would be worth while to study the Navy Minister's proposal demanding preparations for eventual mobilization as a last resort. But I learned later that on the 13th, the Cabinet conference took up a plan to despatch forces, and that on the 14th this plan was being subjected to re-consideration. Then a statement was made by the Imperial Government on August 15. In accordance with this

Statement
Jmf Galt

statement, it was decided to despatch a 'despatched force' to Shanghai of which two divisions from the homeland formed the main body, for the purpose of protecting the Japanese subjects in Shanghai. The word 'despatched force' was used to show that it had nothing to do with pure military operations thoroughly. The mobilization for this purpose was ordered on August 15.

As for Tsingtao, I heard that it was talked about at the Cabinet conference that the situation in Tsingtao being calm, it would be possible to maintain the status quo, provided that nothing happened to disturb it, but some measure would be taken for the protection of residents there in case the worst should happen.

About August 15 or 16, 1937, the General Staff concluded that the Chinese had decided upon the policy of beginning over-all military operations. This conclusion was based on the report that the Chinese had established headquarters on August 15th, made Chiang Kai-shek Supreme Commander of all the land, sea and air forces and divided the whole country into four war zones (the 1st war zone, Hopei-Chahar; the 2nd, Chahar-Shansi; the 3rd, Shanghai, the 4th, South China), and that general mobilization was ordered on the same day.

About the 16th or 17th of August, I was duly notified at the meeting of the Bureau Chiefs as usual that the following has been decided at the Cabinet conference:

Cabinet Conference

"It is becoming difficult to solve the affair in strict conformity with the policy of localization, as the Chinese have determined to carry out a long war. Therefore, the utmost efforts should be made to restrict the war to the minimum in point of time as well as strategically, and territorially.

As the original object of the Shanghai operations lay chiefly in the protection of the Japanese residents, they had to be confined to a minimum. To check the danger of creating a general clash between Japan and China on the one hand, and to avoid trouble with other countries on the other, Japan at first despatched less than two divisions temporarily with the idea of carrying out the operations with minimum forces. Nevertheless the difference of forces between Japan and China was so great that the war situation did not take a favorable turn as it was expected. The central Supreme Command, therefore, despatched first five battalions during the period from the end of September to the beginning of November, and then five more divisions from North China; in addition, the beginning of November three divisions landed at Hangchow and again in the middle of that month one division landed at Paimaokiang. By supplying forces temporarily as stated above, the battle continued for three months, and at last in the middle of November the Chinese Army made a general retreat to the west. Thus the operations which were executed to protect the residents in Shanghai were brought to a conclusion. But the fact that Japan was obliged to use forces in such a way as was considered to be an error from a viewpoint of strategy shows the circumstance under which Japan was curbed by her own policy of localizing the Incident. In fact, General Sugiyama, ex-Minister of War, who was afterwards appointed Commander of the North China Expeditionary Army, pointed out these circumstances, saying that the delay in occupying Shanghai was an important cause that prolonged the Incident, but the fundamental cause lay in the numerical shortage in military forces and amount of materials, so the Japanese policy of solving the Incident in a short time should have been carried out more thoroughly. The

General told me so personally when I made a business trip to North China in the winter of 1938 (Showa 12). He was then the Commander of the North China Expeditionary Army.

The headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was reorganized into the headquarters of the ^{Central} China Expeditionary Force, and at the same time was entrusted with the duty of operating in the vicinity of Shanghai with the aim of creating an opportunity to settle the Incident. This meant that the authorities wanted to find an opportunity of settling the Incident in the operations near Shanghai, and had no intention of capturing Nanking at that time. After the battle near Shanghai the Central Authorities of the Supreme Command instructed our forces not to advance beyond the line of Changshu-Soochow-Kashing so as not to give an unnecessary provocation to Nanking. Later I learned from documents that confidential instructions had been given to the forces not to enlarge the theatre of operations further west than Wusih and Fuchow.

8. In our country the Imperial Headquarters Ordinance was enacted on November 17, 1937, and the Imperial Headquarters was established in Tokyo for the first time on November 20 of the same year.

In the same month the munitions mobilization program was begun. However, the order for the national general mobilization had not yet been put into force (T.N. in that year).

The General Mobilization Law was promulgated in March of the following year, that is, 1938. But it was in May 1938 that a part of the law was applied for the China Incident.

With this I bring my affidavit to an end.

Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch,
hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the
attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning
of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947

23 April 1947

Re: TANAKA, Shinichi
Def. Doc. #925

Objections to the Introduction of the Affidavit

I. In General

- (a) The affidavit is argumentative.
- (b) The witness purports to state the contents of official documents and to give information which he secured from documents, as to which the documents themselves are the best evidence, and he does not account for the absence of the documents or the inability of the defense to produce them.

II. Specific

- (a) In Section III, 1, the witness purports to quote an explanation issued by the General Staff. This is objectionable on two grounds,-
- (1) It is an attempt to introduce a document without complying with the usual rules, and
- (2) The official statement should be produced or the inability to produce it accounted for.
- (b) In Section IV, 1, the witness gives as the source of his information, "This I know from documents," without giving the nature of the documents or giving any reasons why the documents should not be produced. The last two sentences of this sub-section purport to be third-hand hearsay concerning the establishment of the policy of non-enlargement by the Imperial Government.
- (c) In Section IV, 2, the witness recites, ". . . . which I know from documents." This is objectionable for the reasons recited in item II (a) above. In the last three paragraphs of this sub-section (page 8), the witness purports to quote a "judgment of the situation" adopted by the General Staff Headquarters, as to which he had second-hand information. This is subject to the additional objection set out in item II (a) above.

- (d) In Section IV, pages 8 and 9, the witness purports to summarize an official statement of the Government issued 11 July. This is objectionable on the two grounds set out in item II (a) above and on the additional ground that it is doubtless the same statement as already in evidence as Exhibit No. 260, R _____ in the Prosecution's case.
- (e) In Section V, page 9, the witness testifies to the decision of a Cabinet conference on second-hand information without complying with the rule on the production of the record or accounting for the inability of the Defense to produce it. The same objection applies to the so-called "Policy for the settlement of the North China Incident" (Pages 9 and 10), adopted by the Governing Board of the General Staff and of the War Ministry. This applies to the last paragraph on page 9 and the first paragraph on page 10.
- (f) Section VI, A, seeks to introduce third-hand evidence of the action taken at a Cabinet meeting.
- (g) In Section VI, E, page 11, the witness purports to give the decision of a Cabinet meeting which is objectionable for the reasons above stated.
- (h) In Section VI, F, the witness recites the information contained in "a report received from a higher official."

23 April 1947

Re: TANAKA, Shinichi
Def. Doc. #925

Objections to the Introduction of the Affidavit

I. In General

- (a) The affidavit is argumentative.
- (b) The witness purports to state the contents of official documents and to give information which he secured from documents, as to which the documents themselves are the best evidence, and he does not account for the absence of the documents or the inability of the defense to produce them.

II. Specific

- (a) In Section III, 1, the witness purports to quote an explanation issued by the General Staff. This is objectionable on two grounds,-
 - (1) It is an attempt to introduce a document without complying with the usual rules, and
 - (2) The official statement should be produced or the inability to produce it accounted for.
- (b) In Section IV, 1, the witness gives as the source of his information, "This I know from documents," without giving the nature of the documents or giving any reasons why the documents should not be produced. The last two sentences of this sub-section purport to be third-hand hearsay concerning the establishment of the policy of non-enlargement by the Imperial Government.
- (c) In Section IV, 2, the witness recites, ". . . . which I know from documents." This is objectionable for the reasons recited in item II (a) above. In the last three paragraphs of this sub-section (page 8), the witness purports to quote a "judgment of the situation" adopted by the General Staff Headquarters, as to which he had second-hand information. This is subject to the additional objection set out in item II (a) above.

Re: TANAKA, Shinichi
Def. Doc. #925
Page 2.

- (d) In Section IV, pages 8 and 9, the witness purports to summarize an official statement of the Government issued 11 July. This is objectionable on the two grounds set out in item II (a) above and on the additional ground that it is doubtless the same statement as already in evidence as Exhibit No. 260, R_____ in the Prosecution's case.
- (e) In Section V, page 9, the witness testifies to the decision of a Cabinet conference on second-hand information without complying with the rule on the production of the record or accounting for the inability of the Defense to produce it. The same objection applies to the so-called "Policy for the settlement of the North China Incident" (Pages 9 and 10), adopted by the Governing Board of the General Staff and of the War Ministry. This applies to the last paragraph on page 9 and the first paragraph on page 10.
- (f) Section VI, A, seeks to introduce third-hand evidence of the action taken at a Cabinet meeting.
- (g) In Section VI, E, page 11, the witness purports to give the decision of a Cabinet meeting which is objectionable for the reasons above stated.
- (h) In Section VI, F, the witness recites the information contained in "a report received from a higher official."

Exhibit 2235 } identical.
" 270 }

Speech by Sato, Kenryo, Press Service
Chief of the War Ministry on
25 - 26 August 1938.

He quotes the Declaration of the
Japanese Government of 15 August ¹⁹³⁷ ~~1937~~
"..... to uproot all
anti-Japanese activities and to
do away with source of such
disgraceful incidents - - -"
and calls this a declaration of war.

Exhibit 2197

no: 925

TA NAKA

Gen. Tanaka Nagata declares on 26 June
1937 that the army should be
prepared to continue the hostilities
for 10 or more years.

Exhibit 672.

Chief of Staff of Kwangtung Army
in telegram of 9 June 1937
to Vice War Minister and
Vice-Chief of General Staff urges
an attack on China ~~before~~ to
get rid of "menace in the back"
and have hands free for attack
on Russia

secter
officinal

Sanaka Shenichi

on 40

roots Decim +

Ex 260
R.I.

IV B Puzalok, Trops & hort Cheni

1. 11 1.

affidavit Talant

Am 40

VII (1) Decision to capture ^{Ranking}
made 1 Dec. 1937

R 3377
Gen Tada, in chief
in staff 87
Plans drawn during

flight campaign
(Captures 12 Nov 37) 7.3377
to capture Ranking
during

(2) Harbors operations
(Harbors)

Plans + capture
Harbors drawn
June - July 38 R 3378
imperial HQ decided
+ Council of Harbors R
Conferring June - July 38. 3383

(3) Harbors +
mining operations
J. 15

Sept 38 decided
after Harbors
act 38 decided +
capture Ranking -

"

Am 2

I (6)

Opium Incident
at Shanghai on
hostilities at
Shanghai ~~mission~~
Aug 1937 -

Powell R3253

League of Nations
Report 458

~~R3302-6~~

R3302-11 ✓

5

2

VI (I)

no troops in chivai
for Hantam operations.

total of
Hantam, Center 23 Div

Our E-

Hota et 256

R 3445

23 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Nelson Sutton
FROM: Mr. J. F. English

An examination of the deposition of TANAKA, Shinichi shows that certain matters therein might refer to decisions of the Cabinet, Liaison Meetings or Five Ministers Conferences. These matters occurred between July 8 and July 27, 1937; the middle of August, 1937; December 1, 1937 and some date, not stated, in September, 1938.

An examination of the record shows that there are in evidence references to two Cabinet meetings as being held in 1937 - 11 July and 22 October.

Exhibit 260 refers to the meeting of 11 July 1937. It is the cross-examination of CHING TEH-CHUN during which he stated that the Japanese Cabinet under KONOYE on 11 July 1937 passed a resolution to send a bigger Army to North China. (2455) This agrees with TANAKA's statement on page 11-B.

Exhibit 239 refers to a Cabinet meeting of 22 October 1937 (2960). At this meeting the Cabinet decided to form a more powerful national political company to establish and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo. The Affidavit of TANAKA makes no reference to such a matter.

No exhibit relating to a Privy Council meeting refers to any matter discussed in TANAKA's Affidavit during 1937 or 1938.

TANAKA's Affidavit is confined to happenings within the years 1937 and 1938. The record shows that there was a Four Ministers Conference held on 16 April 1937 (Ex. 219, Record p. 2748) and a Five Ministers Conference on 20 February 1937 (Ex. 218, Record p. 2745-2747). TANAKA's Affidavit refers to Five Ministers Conference of 20 July 1937.

Conclusion: Consequently, there is in evidence no record of any meeting or conference mentioned by TANAKA in this Affidavit.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

23 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Maj. General A. N. Vasilyev
FROM : D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT: TANAKA, Shinichi
Def. Doc. #925

Mr. Tavenner is considering not cross examining the witness Tanaka, Shinichi and in view of the statement made by the Court this morning if we determine not to cross examine we will draw the Court's attention to the evidence introduced by the Prosecution which gives our view or our position on the points testified to by the witness, reciting the name of the witness who testified for the Prosecution and the place where his evidence appears in the record or the number of the exhibit in the event we introduced a document on that subject.

Would you kindly ascertain and let me know as promptly as you can whether there was introduced in the Russian Phase of the case any specific evidence which is contradictory to or which bears on the statements made by the witness Tanaka with reference to the USSR, particularly with regard to the statements in Section III of the Affidavit.

D. N. SUTTON,
Assistant Counsel

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

17 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dunigan
FROM : Mr. Lopez
SUBJECT : Defense Document 925, Sworne Deposition
of Shinichi TANAKA

1. You will be interested to know that TANAKA,
Shinichi, was a prosecution witness during the MUTO Phase.
His testimony appears on pp. 16,140-16,174 of the Record.

Pedro Lopez
Associate Prosecutor

cc: Mr. Sutton

DATE 2 April

PROGRESS REPORT OF: Tanaka, Shinichi

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Partially Completed</u>	<u>Fully Completed</u>
1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division.	_____	<u>X</u>
2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony.	_____	<u>X</u>
3. Examination of case file, if any.	_____	<u>X</u>
4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division.	_____	<u>X</u>
5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division.	_____	<u>X</u>
6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony.	_____	<u>X</u>
7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness.	_____	<u>X</u>
8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses.	_____	<u>X</u>
9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you.	_____	_____

Lester C. Durrigan
(4)

Personal History of Senichi TAZAKA

Permanent Domicile: - No. 2001 Daishoin-Mura, Nu-gun, Ehime Prefecture

Present address:- SENICHI TAZAKA--Born in Nov. 8th 1892

Dec. 25th, 1915: Appointed Second-Lieutenant, Transport Corps, attached on same date to No. 2 Commissariat Battalion

Apr. 15th, 1919: Promoted to First-Lieutenant, Transport Corps.

Dec. 27th, 1923: Ordered to enter the Army General Staff College

Aug 7th, 1925: Promoted to Captain, Transport, relieved on the same date of his post and attached to No. 2 Commissariat Battalion.

Dec. 7th 1926: Left the Army General Staff College.

Jan. 13th, 1927: Appointed Company Commander of No. 2 Commissariat Battalion.

Mar. 24th, 1928: Attached to Company of No. 2 Commissariat Battalion and ordered on same date to serve with the Inspectorate General of Military Training.

Aug. 1st, 1929: Appointed Instructor of the Military Academy.

Aug. 1st, 1930: Promoted to Major, Transport Corps.

Aug. 29th, 1931: Appointed concurrently as Instructor of the Army Intendance School.

Feb. 2nd, 1932: Issued emergency mobilization order and appointed staff officer of the 9th Depot Division.

Feb. 10th, 1932: Relieved of his concurrent post as Instructor of the Military Intendance School.

Aug. 8th, 1932: Appointed staff officer of the 9th Division, and engaged himself in Manchuria Incident duties at the 9th Division Headquarters from Feb. 6th to June 10th.

March 5th, 1934: Appointed Instructor of Strategy at the Army General Staff College.

March 15th, 1935: Promoted to Lt-Colonel, Transport Corps.

Aug. 2nd, 1937: Appointed Instructor of the Military Automobile School and concurrently member of the Laboratory of the same school. Issued mobilization order on July 27th.

Aug. 4th, 1937: Appointed staff officer of No. 1 Line of Communications and completed the organization on the same date (despatch for North China).

Aug. 24th, 1937: Issued mobilization order and completed the organization on Sept. 1st. (despatch for North China)
Appointed Staff Officer of No. 2 Army Corps.

Feb. 1st, 1938: Promoted to Colonel, Transport Corps and attached to the Military Automobile School (due to his holding the post of Staff Officer of No. 2 Army Corps)

July 15th, 1938: Appointed Instructor of Strategy at the Army General Staff College.
Left Shanghai port Aug. 12th and landed at Nagasaki Aug. 13th.

May 15th, 1939: Relieved of his main post and completed the organization May 27th. Appointed on the same date as Commander of the 4th Motor Transport Regiment.

Aug. 14th, 1938: Engaged himself in China Incident duties at the Army General Staff College.

Aug. 1st, 1940: Appointed member of the Commissariat Inspection Bureau.

Dec. 9th, 1940: Attached to the Commissariat Inspection Bureau.

Mar. 1st, 1941: Promoted to Major-General, and appointed Chief of Staff of the 5th Army Corps.

Apr. 24th, 1941: Left Shimonoseki and passed the frontier at Antung on the 25th.

Apr. 28th, 1941: Arrived (?) at Mutanchiang Province and completed the organization Aug. 25th.

July 1st, 1942: Appointed Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Defence Corps.

May 16th, 1944: Appointed Inspector of Line of Communications of the 2nd Area Army.

4 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Edward P. Monaghan, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS.
FROM : Lester G. Dunigan.
SUBJECT: TANAKA, Shinichi.

Case #235 relates to the above-named individual although the first name in that file is spelled "SHIZUICHI."

TANAKA was interrogated on 10 June 1946, and a copy of the interrogation is contained in Case #448, Serial #20. Another interrogation of the same individual on 10 June 1946, and a copy thereof, appears in Case #448, and although it bears no serial number is between #38 and #39. A copy of the same interrogation as is contained in Case #448, Serial #20, appears in the file of the defendant NUTO, which is Case #319. None of these interrogations appear in TANAKA's file, Case #235.

It is suggested that copies of these interrogations be placed in the file pertaining to TANAKA or a memorandum setting forth where such interrogations may be found be placed in TANAKA's file, Case #235.

Copy to: Mr. David H. Sutton

LCD/nb

29 May 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David N. Sutton
FROM : Lester G. Dunigan
SUBJECT: TANAKA, Shinichi.

Reference is here made to my memorandum dated 17 April 1947 concerning the above named individual.

This person appeared as a Prosecution witness and his testimony is contained in pages 16,140 - 16,174 of the Record.

He was also called as a witness for the Defense and was cross-examined by Mr. Tavenner starting at page 20,705 of the Record.

He has now submitted a new affidavit dealing with matters pertaining to the Soviet Union. In this connection, there is in File #459, Serial #16, an interrogation of TANAKA by the Russian Division. The subject matter of that interrogation would have bearing upon the contents of his new affidavit.

His prior testimony mentioned above related primarily to the China Incident. I have examined it and compared it with the contents of the present affidavit and find no matters therein which would be of value in cross-examination.

LCE/nob

Def. Doc. #1077-B

Exh. No.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

ERRATA SHEET

T

The following correction should be made on this document:

page 1. - Line 4 from bottom,

"Peace restration"

should read

"Race restrotion"