

Resume by: Commander C. T. Cole

Date : 6 August 1947

Wenneker, Paul W.

1. Requested as witness by: SHIMADA and OKA

2. Application for production as witness: States that "The witness has been interrogated and will be used to testify concerning Japanese naval collaboration with Germany, together with testimony concerning the alleged fortification of the Mandated Islands". (Paper No. 1071, dated 30 July, 1947)

3. Summary of Personal History:

1890 - Born, Kiel, Germany

1909 - Entered German Navy

1914 - Participated in 1st World War on Light Cruiser Mainz.
Artillery and Staff Officer, German Fleet High Command.

1934 - 1937 - Naval Attache, German Embassy, Tokyo (January 1934
to August 1937)

1937 - In August, he became Captain of German Battleship Deutschland

1940 - 1945 - Naval Attache, German Embassy, Tokyo (27 February, 1940
to end of war)

4. Decorations:

He holds the Iron Cross, First and Second Class, and the Knights Cross of the Order of Merit.

In January, 1944, he was decorated by the Emperor with the Order of the Rising Sun, First Class (Case File 448, serial 11, p. 1).

5. Present Status: Ex-Admiral, German Navy
Present address: Karuisawa, Japan

6. Summary of Wenneker's Interrogation (Case File 448 - ser. 11)

"WENNEKER was not informed of the negotiations for the consummation of the Tripartite Alliance until Ambassador STAMMER arrived in Tokyo as Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP'S special emissary. Although WENNEKER was the senior of the three weapons attaches (air, army and navy) attached to the German Embassy in Japan, he was not consulted in respect to the pact." (p. 1)

"Admiral YONAI, Mitsumasu, former Minister of the Navy was the leader of the group of senior naval officers who opposed the Tripartite Alliance on the ground that the alignment of Japan with Germany would constitute an affront to the United States." (p. 2)

"Following execution of the Tripartite Alliance a reception and banquet for the diplomatic staffs of the Axis nations was held at the residence of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. Admirals SHIMADA, OKA and NAGANO were present. WENNEKER was impressed by the limited number of high ranking Japanese naval officers who attended the function."
(p. 2)

"NAGANO expressed regret that he did not consider the naval and military forces of Japan to be equal to the opportunity made available by the then existing military and political situation. The conversation, which occurred at a cocktail party, according to WENNEKER, was indicative of the attitude of most of the senior naval officers. They possessed the desire to undertake the military measures necessary to extend the Japanese sphere of influence, but they were deterred by the fear of defeat." (p. 3)

"There existed within the officers corps of the Japanese Navy a clique of young officers (GUMBU) which possessed enormous influence over the Navy General Staff. This young and irresponsible group consistently overestimated the strength of the Japanese Navy and underestimated the fighting abilities of the navies of the United States and England. Almost without exception the members of the GUMBU were adherents of the extremist theories of Professor FUJISAWA and Professor MATSUMOTO." (p. 3 and 4)

"As a general rule the senior naval officers supported the diplomatic efforts which were being made through Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU to bring about a settlement of the differences existing between the United States and Japan. However, after the proposed mission of Prince KONOYE to confer with President Roosevelt failed to materialize, WENNEKER was told by both Admiral KONDO and by Captain ICHIKAWA of Admiral OKA's staff that Japan was being encircled and strangled, economically and militarily and that war with the United States was unavoidable. The German Embassy in Japan did not receive instructions from the German Foreign Office in respect to the German position towards the diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States. WENNEKER pointed out to Admiral KONDO that if Japan continued her southern advance and, for example, attacked Singapore, the United States would certainly enter the war. Admiral KONDO agreed with WENNEKER's evaluation of the situation.

"As Naval Attache WENNEKER made the arrangements with the German Admiralty for the naval mission headed by Admiral NOMURA to visit the German naval establishment. The naval mission consisting of about twenty officers left for Berlin about February, 1941. The commission included experts in almost every branch of naval warfare. WENNEKER described the Japanese Navy as it was then constituted as lacking in many technical departments. The Japanese Navy lagged in the development of submarines, naval airforce, radio, radar, diesel engines and other technical branches.

"The naval mission was commissioned to make tactical and technical studies of the entire German naval establishment and to procure blueprints of German submarines, naval aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, radar designs, and other new weapons and equipment. Special emphasis was placed upon securing data of value in the improvement of the naval airforce. Admiral NOMURA remained in Berlin and about March 1943 he received from HITLER on behalf of the Japanese Government a gift of two submarines. About the same date ten German engineers including experts in submarine and ship construction, radar and ordnance were sent to Japan at the specific request of the Japanese Government. Those engineers are still in Japan.

"About March 1941 Staatsrat WOHLTAT, a representative of the German Four Year Industrial Plan and a direct representative of Marshal GOERING arrived in Tokyo with a staff of some five members. WOHLTAT's mission which subsequently became known as the German Economic Mission in Japan was to purchase critical raw materials required in connection with the German war effort, to improve transportation facilities between Manchuria and Germany, and to arrange a commercial treaty between Germany, Japan and Manchuria. The mission of Staatsrat WOHLTAT was eminently successful. The shipments of rubber, wolfram, tin and other critical items arranged by WOHLTAT greatly exceeded the shipping space available. After the war between Russia and Germany began it was necessary to rely entirely on blockade runners to exchange goods and supplies between the two countries. Dairen and Kobe were the main ports used by the blockade runners. After the war between the United States and Japan began WOHLTAT established representatives of the German Economic Mission at Penang, Singapore, Batavia, and other southern ports. WOHLTAT received a credit of 200,000,000 yen from the Japanese Government which was used to acquire critical raw materials needed by Germany. This credit was easily balanced by Japanese payments for new German inventions, weapons and special equipment.

"As the ranking German naval officer in the Far East Admiral WENNEKER was charged with the direction of the blockade runners used by the German Navy. In addition he was charged with tactical, operational and supply duties in connection with the operation of German submarines in the Indian Ocean. WENNEKER received excellent cooperation from the Japanese Navy Ministry in connection with the operations of the German blockade runners. WENNEKER has heretofore submitted to the CIC a statement in respect to the administrative organization of the German naval establishment in the Far East, German light cruiser and submarine operations in the Far East, and other pertinent data." (pp. 4, 5 and 6)

"In March of 1942 the naval attaches of the Axis countries as

guests of the Japanese Government, visited Saigon, Batavia, Singapore and other areas occupied by the Japanese forces. It was WENNEKER's impression that the Japanese Army in each of the areas visited had made little or no effort to erect defensive positions against the counter-attacks which WENNEKER knew would be launched by the United States. It was WENNEKER's observation that the Japanese Army had seized the finest residences, clubs and buildings in the occupied areas, and that officers and men alike were interested solely in drinking, seeking women and other similar pursuits.

"In Batavia WENNEKER was permitted to visit an interment camp for Dutch civilians. His impression on the whole was not too unfavorable. While in Soerabaya WENNEKER observed Dutch internees engaged in the construction of military airfields." (pp. 6 and 7)

"The mixed military commission established in Tokyo composed of representatives of the Axis nations after the conclusion of the military alliance between Japan and Germany, met only twice. The first meeting was held about November, 1942 and the second sometime after the downfall of the Fascist Government in Italy. It is WENNEKER's recollection that Italy was not represented at the second meeting of the mixed commission. WENNEKER stated that the mixed commission was in reality merely an instrument of propaganda intended to demonstrate the solidarity of the Axis powers. Prime Minister TOJO presided at each of the two meetings. The agenda of each meeting was arranged in advance. The addresses read by the representatives of the member nations were prepared in advance and obviously intended for propaganda purposes." (p. 7)

7. Additional Information Concerning WENNEKER in Interrogation of General Kretschmer. (Case File 324, ser. 62)

- (a) Before leaving for Japan in 1940 Kretschmer was instructed by General Jodl that WENNEKER would be the oldest of the three military attaches in Tokyo and hence would be in charge of reports to the High Command of the Wehrmacht. (p. 6)
- (b) Kretschmer states that he was subordinate to WENNECKER in all military-political questions concerning the High Command of the German Armed Forces and regarding the proper coordination of news received from the Japanese Army with that received from the Japanese Navy. (p. 8)
- (c) In December, 1940 and January, 1941 Kretschmer from talks with Ott, Von Gronau and WENNEKER received the impression that Japanese political, military, economic and press circles were urging that Japan take advantage of the European war for the expansion of the Japanese sphere of influence. At the end of January, Kretschmer was commissioned by Ott to make a strategic study of Japanese war capabilities. (p. 9) This is apparently the study set forth in Exhibit 562, a telegram dated 31 January, 1941 from Ott to the German Foreign Minister which states that research was undertaken with the military attaches of the Embassy. This indicates that WENNEKER cooperated in it. (Record p. 6,429)

(Resume by Comdr. Cole re - WENNEKER, Paul W., contd)

- (d) Both Kretschmer and WENNEKER were convinced from their talks with Japanese leaders that the interests of the Japanese Army and Navy lay more in the south than in the north. (p. 16)
- (e) Maj. Gen. OKAMOTO approached Kretschmer about 20 November, 1941 regarding Germany's aid in case of a Japanese-U. S. war. At the same time a Naval Staff official approached WENNECKER with a similar request. (p. 18)
- (f) In March, 1942, the Naval attaches (presumably including WENNEKER) visited part of the Southern regions occupied by the Japanese. Kretschmer went on the same tour and visited Hongkong, Saigon, Bangkok, Singapore, Alor-Star, Juola-Lumpur, Yojore-Bharu, Palembang, Batavia, Bandoeng, Manila, Baguio and the region west of Aparri. (For WENNEKER's observations on this tour see his interrogation, p. 7, quoted above in paragraph 6.)
- (g) In the second half of 1943 and the first half of 1944, the Japanese Navy approached WENNEKER regarding the necessity of a special Russo-German peace. WENNEKER communicated the Japanese request to the German Admiralty. (p. 27)
- (h) Kretschmer and WENNEKER were able to get a fairly good picture of the situation because they pooled the Japanese information they received as well as their own opinions and then compared them with the enemy reports. (p. 29)
- (i) Pursuant to instructions, Kretschmer notified WENNEKER about all telegrams concerning the war situation. (p. 30)

8. Documents in evidence concerning WENNEKER:

- (a) Exhibit 830 (IPS Document No. 4052) is a telegram from Kretschmer and Ott to the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs and concurrently to the High Command and the Army General Staff on 25 July, 1941, in which they describe the Japanese mobilization after the German attack on the U.S.S.R. and give the opinion that the Japanese plan to attack the U.S.S.R. in August after the German units reach the Volga. (Record p. 8,071) WENNEKER is not mentioned in this exhibit, but since he was Kretschmer's superior and since the latter stated in his interrogation that all telegrams were submitted to WENNEKER, this document can be used in cross-examination of WENNEKER.
- (b) Exhibit 533 (Record p. 6,257) is a telegram from Ott in Tokyo to the German General Staff dated 17 July, 1940 which contains a reference to Senior Attache Admiral WENNEKER.

Curriculum Vitae of WENNEKER, Paul (Admiral)

- 1890 - Born, Kiel, Germany
- 1909 - Entered German Navy
- 1914 - Participated in 1st World War on Light Cruiser MAINZ
- Artillery and Staff Officer, German Fleet High Command
- 1934-37 - Naval Attache, Tokyo

Wife - Irma (Age 32)

Children - Jutta (Age 22)

Ulrich (Age 5)

Ilse Maria (Age 3)

In his second term as Naval Attache, WENNEKER acted as advisor to the Japanese Government on submarine warfare, and was nominally in charge of blockade running activities.

Wenneker, Paul W, Admiral
Nationality of witness is German
Witness will be used to testify concerning
Japanese naval collaboration with Germany

IPS file 115 USSBS 258 refer to witness

Witness will testify for Shimada and Oka

31 July 1947

Wenneker, Paul W. Admiral

Nationality of witness is German.
Witness will be used to testify concerning Japanese
Naval collaboration with Germany.

IPS file 115 USSBS 258 refer to witness

Witness will testify for Shimada and Oka.

8/15/47

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al) A F F I D A V I T
 - VS -) of
 ARAKI, Sadao, et al) Paul W. Wenneker

1. My name is Paul W. Wenneker. I reached the rank of Full Admiral in the German Navy. From 1934 until 1937, and later from 1940 until the surrender I was the chief German Naval Attache to Japan, residing in Tokyo. After returning to Germany in 1937 I was given general naval duty including command of the German pocket battleship Deutschland.
2. My duties as German Naval Attache were quite similar to the duties of attaches of other countries at that time. During my first stay in Japan from 1934 to 1937 I had absolutely no instructions of any kind with reference to military collaboration with Japan. In fact my association with the naval men of other countries, namely Great Britain, the United States and Russia was much closer than with the Japanese. We were all treated with like suspicion and distrust by Japanese naval officers. Even when I returned the second time in 1940, after the outbreak of the European war, the situation relative to cooperation between my country and the Japanese naval officials was not greatly improved. I seldom was able to inspect their ships. My request to visit the Mandated Islands had been repeatedly refused. I was never afforded the courtesy of discussing matters with Japanese naval officers of my own rank but was forced to deal with captains and younger officers. Even after the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, cooperation was sadly lacking between German and Japanese naval officials.
3. I was not informed by the Japanese that they were to attack Pearl Harbor. I did not know that hostilities would commence on December 8, 1941. Such information had not been conveyed to my country through my office or through the Embassy, even though both Germany and Japan were then faced with a common

enemy. As to the real strength of the Japanese Navy, the number and size of ships under construction, the construction projects under consideration, the oil supply in stock and operational plans under contemplation, I must state that I possessed not even an approximate knowledge concerning them, even though I was the logical person to receive such information. I had inquired concerning these matters frequently both officially and privately but received either no replies or such vague answers as to be of no value whatsoever.

During the Pacific War, further evidence of lack of cooperation was the fact that the Japanese failed to reveal vital information concerning their losses incurred during important naval battles. I distinctly remember that it was around a year after the battle of Midway that I first learned that Japan had lost four carriers. We had requested information concerning this particular matter on many occasions since we had heard American broadcasts to this effect but the Japanese consistently refused to inform us.

Relative to cooperation between Germany and Japan in regard to submarine warfare, I wish to say that the utter lack of cooperation would be the better topic for discussion. Germany did attempt to school Japanese naval officers in the thought that submarines should be used to attack enemy merchant shipping and thereby to cut off the supply lines. The Japanese Navy contended that they could better use their submarines for direct attack against fighting vessels of the enemy. Hence our proposal was completely rejected. We wished to assist the Japanese toward the construction of modern and efficient submarines. To this end we presented them with two new submarines. The first was delivered by German crew at Kure. The second was lost in the North Atlantic and never reached the Japanese Islands. The first submarine was minutely inspected by the Japanese but I was later informed that they did not feel they could duplicate it and did not intend to do so. Therefore, insofar as German

activity is concerned, the Japanese submarine warfare was not effected in any way.

5. In April of 1942, I was finally allowed to visit some of the Mandated Islands. I went to Palau and Saipan, also stopping at Guam. I have been asked if there were any fortifications on Saipan or Palau. I, like the Italian Attache who was with me, was greatly surprised to note there were absolutely none. We saw air strips, some good billets, houses and store houses, but no guns and no fortifications. I saw a large field on Saipan which was supposed to be an airfield but which was grown over by weeds. The harbors were very poor and they were only commencing the building of oil tanks. As I said before, we were greatly surprised at the lack of precautionary measures taken by Japan on these islands and I felt that the reason for the prior refusals to visit the islands was more to conceal the lack of fortifications than to reveal fortifications.
6. Germany lost two auxiliary cruisers, three submarines and six steamers in Japanese waters during the war. Most of these were lost out of lack of cooperation, that is, insufficient escort or the relaying of vital information concerning the enemy's position by the Japanese.
7. During my stay in Japan and from my many social and business contacts with various military men, I noticed a decided lack of cooperation even between the Japanese Army and Navy. They were constantly suspicious and jealous of each other and I personally tried to smooth matters over as best I could. The Army escorted its own convoys and except for those military movements which necessitated the use of the Navy in transporting Army troops the disunity was quite amazing to me.

Karuizawa)
Nagano Prefecture, Japan) SS

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul W. Wenneker, being duly sworn upon my oath do hereby state that the foregoing writing consisting of three typewritten pages is true and accurate according to my best knowledge and belief.

PAUL W. WENNEKER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of August, 1947.

DAVID W. PARSONS, 0244429
Captain, Infantry
Investigating Officer

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
August 22 1947
Defense Division V Pacific
Naval Preparations

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WENNEKER, Direct

Page

Exhibit 2999, the affidavit of Paul W. Wenneker, stated that the witness was a full Admiral in the German Navy. From 1934 until 1937 and from 1940 to the surrender, he was the chief German Naval Attache to Japan and lived in Tokyo. After returning to Germany in 1937 he was given general naval duty, including command of the German pocket battleship Deutschland.

His duties as Naval Attache were similar to the duties of other countries' attaches. During his first stay in Japan he had had absolutely no instructions with reference to military collaboration with Japan. In fact his association with the naval men of other countries was closer than with the Japanese. They were all treated with like suspicion and distrust by Japanese naval officers. Even after he returned in 1940, after the outbreak of the European war, the situation with regard to cooperation between Germany and Japan naval officials was not greatly improved. He was seldom able to inspect their ships. His request to visit the Mandated Islands had been repeatedly refused.

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*He could never discuss matters with naval officers of his own rank but had to deal with captains and younger officers. Even after the Pacific hostilities broke out cooperation was lacking between German and Japanese naval officers.

He was not informed by the Japanese that they were to attack Pearl Harbor. He did not know hostilities would begin on December 8, 1941. This information had not been conveyed through his office or through the Embassy to Germany even though Germany and Japan were then faced with a common enemy. He did not even have an approximate knowledge of the real strength of the Japanese navy, the number and size of ships under construction, the construction projects under consideration, the oil supply in stock and operational plans under contemplation, although he would be the logical person to receive such information. He had inquired on these matters both officially and privately but received no reply or valueless vague answers.

During the Pacific war the further lack of cooperation

WENNEKER Direct

Page

was shown by the fact that Japan failed to reveal vital information on their losses. It was a year after the Midway battle that he first learned that Japan had lost four carriers. They had requested information on this matter many times since they had heard American broadcasts to this effect but the Japanese consistently refused to inform them.

As to cooperation on submarine warfare he would say that utter lack of cooperation would be the better topic for discussion. Germany did try to school Japanese naval officers in the thought that submarines should be used to attack enemy merchant shipping and thereby cut off the supply lines. The Japanese contended that they could better use their submarines for direct attack against fighting vessels of the Americans. The proposal was rejected. Germany wanted to assist the Japanese in constructing modern and efficient submarines and gave them two new submarines. The first was delivered at Kure. The second never reached Japan. The first one was minutely inspected * by the Japanese but they did not feel they could duplicate it and did not intend to do so. Japanese submarine warfare was not affected in any way.

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In April 1942 the witness was finally allowed to visit some of the Mandated Islands. He went to Palau and Saipan and also stopped at Guam. He and the Italian attache were greatly impressed to note there were absolutely no fortifications at Saipan or Palau. There were air strips, good billets, houses and storehouses but no guns and no fortifications. He saw a large field on Saipan which was supposed to be an airfield but which was grown over by weeds. The harbors were very poor and they were only beginning the building of oil tanks.

Germany lost two auxiliary cruisers, three submarines and six steamers in Japanese waters during the war. Most of these were lost because of lack of cooperation, that is, insufficient escort or the relaying of vital information.

26558

The witness noticed during his stay in Japan * a decided lack of cooperation between the Japanese Army and Navy. They were constantly suspicious and jealous of each other and he personally tried to smooth matters over. The army escorted its own convoys and except for those military movements which required the use of the navy in transporting army troops, the disunity was amazing.

18 August 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM : Lt. K. Steiner
SUBJECT : Affidavit of Paul W. Wenneker, Defense Document No. 1972.

Reference is made to the memoranda by the undersigned to Mr. Sutton, dated 13 June 1947 (in connection with statements about military cooperation including submarine warfare in affidavit of NOMURA, Naokuni), and to Mr. Tavenner, dated 1st and 6th of August 1947.

1. In the following statements made in Wenneker's affidavit (Defense Document 1972) are compared with parts of a summary of an interrogation of Wenneker conducted by Lt. Kennamer on 18 May 1946, and included in Case File 448 as Serial 11, as well as with previous evidence in the case:

a. In his affidavit, Wenneker cites as an example for the lack of cooperation between the German and Japanese Navies the fact that he was "never afforded the courtesy of discussing matters with Japanese Naval officers of my own rank but was forced to deal with captains and younger officers." (par. 2 on p. 1)

In the above mentioned summary of this interrogation, the following phrases may be found: "It was Wenneker's impression based upon numerous conversations with senior naval officers particularly Admiral YONAI and Admiral KONDO that the responsible sections of the Japanese Navy did not underestimate the naval potentialities of the United States and England." (p. 2)

"As Naval Attache WENNEKER was at a disadvantage in Japan as the Japanese Navy took an almost contemptuous view of the German Navy. Accordingly, except for social occasions, his communications with members of the Japanese Navy General Staff were usually confined to captains and commanders. On occasion WENNEKER conferred with Admiral KONDO, Vice Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral ITO, Admiral OKA, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs and on rare occasions he met with Admiral NAGANO, Chief of the Navy General Staff. WENNEKER's closest link with the Japanese Navy was through Captain ICHIKAWA, Aide to Admiral OKA. ICHIKAWA was one of the most energetic and influential officers attached to the Bureau of Naval Affairs. He possessed enormous influence over Admiral OKA, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs. ICHIKAWA was one of the leaders of the GUMBU or young officers' clique." (pp. 2 and 3)

Memo to: Mr. D.N. Sutton
From : Lt. K. Steiner
Subject: Affidavit of Paul W. Wenneker, Def. Doc. No. 1972.

"Admiral KONDO told WENNEKER that Japan could not risk a naval war with the United States citing the difficulties of maintaining her lengthy lines of supply and communications, the scarcity of oil, and the great potential of America's naval forces as insurmountable objections to a successful war against the United States. Some months before the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, WENNEKER had a conversation with Admiral NAGANO, Chief of the Navy General Staff. NAGANO spoke of the favorable political and military situation which had been created by the German victories on the continent of Europe. NAGANO expressed regret that he did not consider the naval and military forces of Japan to be equal to the opportunity made available by the then existing military and political situation. The conversation, which occurred at a cocktail party, according to WENNEKER, was indicative of the attitude of most of the senior naval officers. They possessed the desire to undertake the military measures necessary to extend the Japanese sphere of influence, but they were deterred by the fear of defeat." (p. 3)

"After the proposed mission of Prince KONOYE to confer with President Roosevelt failed to materialize, WENNEKER was told by both Admiral KONDO and by Captain ICHIKAWA of Admiral OKA's staff that Japan was being encircled and strangled, economically and militarily and that war with the United States was unavoidable. WENNEKER pointed out to Admiral KONDO that if Japan continued her southern advance and, for example, attacked Singapore, the United States would certainly enter the war. Admiral KONDO agreed with WENNEKER's evaluation of the situation." (p. 4 and 5)

b. In his affidavit, WENNEKER states "even after the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, cooperation was sadly lacking between German and Japanese naval officials." (end of par. 2 on p. 1)

"Germany lost two auxiliary cruisers, three submarines and six steamers in Japanese waters during the war. Most of these were lost out of lack of cooperation, that is, insufficient escort or the relaying of vital information concerning the enemy's position by the Japanese." (par. 6 on p. 3)

The summary of his interrogation contained the following statement: "As the ranking German naval officer in the Far East Admiral WENNEKER was charged with the direction of the blockade runners used by the German Navy. In addition he was charged with tactical, operational and supply duties in connection with the operation of German submarines in the Indian Ocean. WENNEKER received excellent cooperation from the Japanese Navy Ministry in connection with the operations of the German blockade runners." (p. 6)

Memo to: Mr. D.N. Sutton
From : Lt. K. Steiner
Subject: Affidavit of Paul W. Wenneker, Def. Doc. No. 1972.

c. In his affidavit, Wenneker states: "As to the real strength of the Japanese Navy, the number and size of ships under construction, the construction projects under consideration, the oil supply in stock and operational plans under contemplation, I must state that I possessed not even an approximate knowledge concerning them, even though I was the logical person to receive such information." (par. 3 on p. 2)

In connection with the Japanese naval mission to Germany which Wenneker arranged in February 1941, the following statement can be found in the summary of his interrogation: "WENNEKER described the Japanese Navy as it was then constituted as lacking in many technical departments. The Japanese Navy lagged in the development of submarines, naval airforce, radio, radar, diesel engines and other technical branches. (p. 5)

d. In regard to cooperation in submarine warfare, Wenneker states in his affidavit that a German proposal to use submarines to cut off supply lines rather than against enemy fighting vessels was "completely rejected". (par. 4 on p. 2)

Exhibit 839-A, p. 8175, is an excerpt from notes about conversations between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA, on 18 April 1943. The document contains also notes on a conversation with Admiral NOMURA which were not introduced. The parts of this document which were not introduced contain references to a transfer of submarines. An almost identical telegram about the conversation was sent to the German Embassy in Tokyo and a photostat of a copy of this telegram is in our possession (compare memorandum by the undersigned to Mr. Sutton of 13 June 1947, and to Mr. Tavenner of 7 May 1947, Item 6). In this conversation NOMURA stated that since October 1942, the Japanese Navy has also come to the understanding that the cutting of enemy communications is of prime importance thus changing her views about the use of submarines. Almost simultaneously with the discussions between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA regarding the necessity of cargo warfare conducted by Japan was the offer of Hitler of a grant of submarines for the Japanese Navy. The Japanese Navy would now use all her power for cargo warfare. The document contains also NOMURA's expression of gratitude for German confidential cooperation and for the understanding and continuous assistance which Ribbentrop showed the Japanese Navy in all matters as well as expression of hope for continued good cooperation.

2. Additional information of possible importance:

a. Wenneker's position differed from that of other naval attaches in that he was also weapons attache. As such the military attache, Kretschmer, was subordinate to him and had to inform him about all telegrams concerning the war situation. (Memo to Mr. Tavenner, dated 8 August 1947.)

Memo to: Mr. D.N. Sutton
From : Lt. K. Steiner
Subject: Affidavit of Paul W. Wenneker, Def. Doc. 1972.

b. Kretzhmer's statement prepared for Mr. Keenan mentions that Kretzhmer and Wenneker, by pooling the Japanese information which they received, exchanging opinions and comparing them with enemy reports, were able to obtain a fairly good picture of the situation. (p. 29)

c. The above mentioned summary of the Wenneker interrogation shows that the Japanese naval mission consisted of about 20 officers, including experts in almost every branch of naval warfare, and was commissioned to make tactical and technical studies of the entire German naval establishment to procure blueprints of German submarines, naval aircraft anti-aircraft guns, radar designs and other new weapons and equipment. Special emphasis was placed upon securing data of value in the improvement of the naval airforce. At the time of the transfer of two submarines, 10 German engineers including experts in submarine and ship construction, radar and ordnance, were sent to Japan at the specific request of the Japanese Government. (Case File 448, Serial 11, p. 5)

d. According to Kretzhmer's statement (p. 18), Wenneker was approached by an official of the Naval Staff regarding Germany's aid in case of Japanese-U.S. war at the same time at which Kretzhmer's talk with Major General OKAMOTO on the same subject took place (around November 1941).

e. As the ranking German naval officer in the Far East, Wenneker must have been fully informed of the German-Japanese treaty of January 1942 dividing the zones of operations for the German, Italy and Japanese Army and Naval forces. (Exhibit 49, p. 6681)

f. Exhibit 576, p. 6478; a report from OTT to Ribbentrop, dated 25 March 1941, states that according to Japanese Chief of Navy General Staff, the Navy is preparing for an attack on Singapore and will be finished before the end of May. OTT adds that the air forces are to be enhanced by allocating a few experienced German dive bombers to the Japanese naval air forces. Wenneker, in his position as naval attache, was the logical man to have received and relayed such information.

K. Steiner

K. STEINER
1st Lt., Inf.

copy to "T"
20 August 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. D.N. Sutton
FROM : Lt. K. Steiner
SUBJECT : Agreement ^{of views} Between German and Japanese Navy
Concerning the Use of Submarines.

1. The opening statement of Mr. Brannon contains on p. 7 the following sentences:

"Japan at no time accepted the German policy of submarine warfare. Japan sought to confine the activities of its underseas craft to destruction of Allied war vessels and not commercial shipping and supply lines. This was the great principle in dispute between Germany and Japan."

2. The affidavit of Admiral Paul W. Wenneker (Defense Document 1972) states in this regard on p. 2:

"Relative to cooperation between Germany and Japan in regard to submarine warfare, I wish to say that the utter lack of cooperation would be the better topic for discussion. Germany did attempt to school Japanese naval officers in the thought that submarines should be used to attack enemy merchant shipping and thereby to cut off the supply lines. The Japanese Navy contended that they could better use their submarines for direct attack against fighting vessels of the enemy. Hence our proposal was completely rejected."

3. Admiral NOMURA in his affidavit (Defense Document 1606) limits himself to the German requests for increased Japanese submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean in connection with the North African Campaign (March, April, 1942).


4. Your attention is invited to par. 1d of my memorandum of 18 August 1947, which mentions Exh. 839-A, as showing (in a portion which was not read into the Record) that the Japanese Navy accepted the viewpoint of the German Navy regarding the importance of submarine warfare against merchant shipping after the Guadalcanal Campaign in October 1942, and promised to use all its powers for cargo warfare.

Memo to: Mr. D.N. Sutton
From : Lt. K. Steiner
Subject: Agreement Between German and Japanese Navy
Concerning the Use of Submarines.

5. To show that Japanese submarines were actually used against embargo vessels thereafter in conformity with this changed ~~the~~ viewpoint of the Japanese Navy, the Court's attention may be directed to the following exhibits:

a. Exh. 2092 (p. 15153), which is a protest by the British Government, dated 5 June 1944, against the attacks made upon survivors of six merchant vessels torpedoed by Japanese submarines containing the names of said vessels.

b. Exh. 2076 (p. 15083), which is a protest by the United States Government, dated 20 June 1944, against the attack made upon survivors of United States merchant ship; the U.S.S. RICHARD HOVEY, torpedoed by Japanese submarine.



K. STEINER
1st Lt., Inf.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

15 August 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Lt. Kurt Steiner
FROM : D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT: Affidavit of Paul W. WENNEKER,
Def. Doc. No. 1972

Will you please prepare a report on the witness Wenneker and an analysis of the above affidavit with suggested lines of cross-examination, if considered proper, and references to the Prosecution's evidence on the subjects as to which the witness testifies.

D. N. Sutton,
Assistant Counsel.

cc: Mr. Tavenner

1 Aug 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Cdr. Cole, Brig. Quilliam, and Mr. Wiley**

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

**SHIMADA
OKA**

WITNESS

Wenneker, Paul W.

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

**Curriculum Vitae
Memo for the file**

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN