

"On election day, peace polls for the Stockholm Appeal were taken in various localities of the country despite interference by authorities, and more than 200 scientists adopted a resolution calling for the conclusion of an over-all peace and the prevention of a military agreement.

"Under such circumstances, our party developed an extensive election campaign for the independence of the Japanese people and the defense of peace. As a result, both our party and the masses realized extensive qualitative development. It was because of this that the reactionary forces at home and abroad came to concentrate their attack on our party. In their recent election strategy they utilized all anti-Soviet and anti-Communist rumors, including the cleverly concocted Shinoyama, Mitaka and Matsukawa incidents, the repatriation issue etc. seen since February of last year.

"Social Democrats and Democratization Leaguers became instruments of the reactionary forces and joined forces with senior employees in a frantic attempt to suppress the Communist-supporting masses and estrange the masses from our party. However, the masses support with firm determination.

"Votes won by Communist and Unity candidates show a slight decrease as compared with the 2,980,000 votes won in the preceding Lower House election. However, the proportionate votes won in the two elections are the same. Especially, the support the masses gave the unity candidates was great. Although only a few of the candidates were elected, this is because the election method of the Upper House is different from that of the Lower House. We should think rather that we garnered 'qualitatively higher votes'.

"However, we must give full study to the fact that a considerable number of votes went to the Socialist Party, although less than originally expected, because it contains the masses' criticisms of the defects of our party.

"It is reported that votes won by our candidates show a marked increase at the Mito Plant of the Hitachi Manufacturing Company and the Kyodo plant of the Toyota Automobile Company where a struggle still continues. However, votes won by our candidates in a number of rural villages show a marked decrease despite the fact that propaganda for independence and peace were actively carried out in these places which deeply impressed the populace.

"Generally speaking, increases were registered where daily struggles are in progress and decreases became more pronounced the farther we moved from the scene of such a struggle. From this manifestation we can comprehend the following:

"(1) Our party has not been training and elevating the masses politically through daily struggles because daily struggles are not linked with political objectives. Although they fully support our party in struggles, the masses cannot understand the political significance of voting for our party. Consequently, many of them vote for professional representatives or are drawn in by the persuasion of Socialist candidates without understanding the true nature of the Socialist Party.

"(2) Daily struggles are underestimated. Our propaganda for racial independence and defense of peace was not linked with the daily demands of the masses regarding low wages, increased work, low rice prices and heavy taxes, and, as a result, it did not provide the masses with guidance as to what concrete action they should immediately take.

"(3) The demands of the masses were ignored. As a result, our propaganda became vague and this prompted the masses to escape from reality instead of politically advancing their activities. Many of the masses abstained from voting. This is because our party only pointed out the present situation to the masses and did not inspire them with the confidence to take concrete action.

"(4) Our attention is concentrated solely on the propaganda of our strategical objectives, and the tactics in daily struggle are being

neglected. Therefore, our election campaign ended as a propaganda battle similar to that of the Socialist Party.

"(5) Struggles against Social Democrats and the members of the Democratization League were under-evaluated. Many Social Democrats joined hands with senior company employees and concluded agreements with the Liberals and their constituencies to pay the role of 'Social Fascists'. Because our struggle against them was inadequate, many votes went to them.

"As a result of the aforementioned facts, 3,000,000 votes which the Liberal Party lost and which rightfully should have come to our party, went to the Socialist Party. The aforementioned defects are seen in all our present party activities, and are connected with the thoughts and moves of the separatists. In order to overcome these defects, we must fully utilize the results of our party's long struggles.

"V. ANTI-FASCIST DEMOCRATIC RACIAL FRONT

The mission before us is to further develop the mounting mass struggle and the results of our election campaign and wage an all-out fight against Fascism. The fight against the Fascists is the very basis of our struggle and with it, the independence of the race and the defense of peace become an impossibility.

"The design of the Fascists is to suppress our party which is the vanguard of the working class, to enslave the people, and to provoke a new war. In order to adorn and sanctify this plot, the Fascists have mobilized all organs of expression including the papers and the radio and are conducting anti-Communist propaganda. However, they cannot conceal their sinister designs.

"It is now evident that the 'Great Charter of Free Asia' has already been violated by them, and that they are destroyers of law and order. Their efforts are now directed towards the question of how to cover up facts and realize their sinister designs by deceiving the people. For this reason, they are planning to split and destroy the front of our party and the masses from within. Right-wing Social Democrats, Democratization Leaguers and other separatists are necessary instruments for this

purpose. We must uncompromisingly fight the Fascists and their agents and advance along the road to victory.

"The most important thing in fighting Fascism is to connect our party with the masses and strengthen the united front. For this purpose, the following missions should be fulfilled at all costs:

"(1) The first is to develop the non-enhancing mass struggles more politically and fight for the formation of the democratic racial front. Especially, it is necessary to train the masses politically in the course of these struggles, and not only explain political slogans as abstract slogans but tie them up with the daily demands of the masses and develop them into action slogans of the masses. Otherwise, we will fall into opportunism. The defect of our leadership up^{to} the present lay in the insufficient connection of political issues to mass activities. As a result, our struggles ended merely in political propaganda or economism.

"Voting for the Stockholm peace appeal and fighting for participation in the Democracy Protection League, the National Labor Union Liaison Council and the Youth Fatherland Front by tying them up with daily struggles will give the masses confidence in peace and independence, realize the unified front, and strengthen the class struggle.

"(2) The second is to develop and concentrate upon struggles for racial independence and the defense of peace, which have been extended in the course of the election campaign, upon anti-Fascist struggles from working shops. For this purpose, it is imperative to organize daily struggles. The election campaign has contributed to showing political slogans to the public. However, this alone is insufficient. The importance of connecting this with the daily struggles has been indicated.

"In fighting against the suppression of our party, efforts have been made merely to disclose this political conspiracy without connecting it with struggles at workshops to rouse struggles from there against Fascist suppression. For fighting against the suppression of our party, we have to fight against the purge and dismissal of party members at

workshops. At the same time, it is necessary to fight against the dismissal of the masses. Without organizing the anti-Fascist struggles as the struggles of the masses, political slogans will end as mere powerless exaggerations.

"(3) The third is to organize large scale anti-Fascist, democratic racial front and, especially, strengthen our activities for organizing the united front at each workshop, upon which the anti-Fascist front is based. For the purpose of extending the present struggles and realizing the united front against Fascism, it is urgently required to form unification committees at every workshop. Without organizing this committee, it is very difficult to organize daily struggles. Moreover, the voting for the Stockholm appeal, and the resolutions of the National Labor Union Liaison Council and the Democracy Protection League will not become mass movements. At the present stage, the unification committee can organize all demands and slogans into living class struggles. However, the unification committees are not the lower organizations of the National Labor Union Council, nor the revolutionary opposition factions in the Democratization League dominated labor unions. If we should organize those workers who are affiliated with the unification committees in the National Labor Union Liaison Council or various industry-wide unions affiliated with the NLULC, this will split labor unions and weaken the unification of the labor front. This can be termed as red trade unionism, which has something in common with the separatists who prevent the party from exerting party influence on wide masses.

"The struggle for bringing all workers under the banner of the National Labor Union Liaison Council must not be carried out in such a formal and sectional method. It should be carried out as a large scale unification movement of the working class, by mobilizing all workers throughout the nation. It is our party that will propel this class unification movement. Otherwise, it is impossible to train the working class politically and give it class-consciousness in the course of the movement for unification.

"Under the guidance of our party, the unification committee should connect all struggles with the struggles for participating in the National Labor Unions Liaison Council. For this purpose, it is imperative to adopt flexible strategies which can meet the time and place.

"Sectionalism, which can be perceived in the movement for uniting the labor front, lies in the tendency of changing this movement into an organizational issue without considering the objective conditions, and of strengthening merely militant unions mechanically without taking the over-all situation into account. Even Comrade KASUGA Shojiro, former chief of the Labor Union Department, committed this mistake. Therefore, this influence is deeply rooted. By surmounting this aberration, we should make the unification committee the foundation for unifying the labor front and organizing the democratic racial front.

"(4) The fourth is to strengthen party organization in key industries and key plants. It is important to lay the foundation of our party in these key industries and plants in order to develop our party as a strong organization for fighting Fascism. For the purpose of strengthening these organizations, the urgent mission of every party organ is to give systematic guidance and to publish cell newspapers. It is the regional people's struggle for all the people including farmers to be organized into the democratic racial front upon this basis.

"(5) The fifth is to surmount the sluggishness of the farmers' movement. At this juncture, opportunism of any kind on the land issue should be eliminated completely. The more we secure the leadership of the laboring class, the more we should strengthen the collaboration with farmers. Without collaborating with farmers, the democratic racial front will not be established and the revolution will not be realized.

"(6) The sixth is to work on policemen and other agents of Fascistic suppressive organizations.

"(7) The seventh is on strengthening the AKAHATA. The AKAHATA is the most powerful weapon of our party, upon which the reactionary suppression has been focused. Under the new circumstances, specific efforts

should be made to strengthen this paper. For this purpose, every member of the party should put into practice the decision of the editing bureau, which was published in the AKAHATA of 16 June under the title of 'Realization of the Three-Edition System, and the Renewal and Strengthening of the Editing of AKAHATA.'

"(8) The eighth is to struggle against all separationists. They are engaged in planting seeds of non-confidence in the party leaders inside and outside our party and obstructing the enforcement of party decisions. Moreover, they are planning to organize provocations everywhere in the hope of throwing the party in turmoil.

"The ideologies and activities of the separationists have isolated the party from the masses. This has been clarified in the course of the election and other campaigns. For the purpose of smashing the party from the inside, the Fascists have employed the separationists as their agents. They have gradually resorted to organizational and well-planned activities. There can be no middle-of-the-road policy toward them. There can be no compromise in fighting against them. It can be said that the neutrals who are hampering the struggle against them are more dangerous to us than the separationists. We should strengthen the struggle against the compromisers and eradicate the compromising attitude toward the separationists from our party. In this sense, Comrade SHIGA's statement, which was published in the AKAHATA, under the title of 'Stop the Separationist Struggle for the Sake of the Bolshevik Unity of our Party', is the most dangerous one, since he has assumed a compromising attitude toward the separationists.

"VI. GLORIOUS MISSION OF OUR PARTY

"Now we are in the most glorious period. Despite the Fascist storm, popular masses support and respect our party. There is only one way left for us. There is no alternative except organizing the democratic racial front and smashing Fascism. Hoist our banner in the face of the storm!

"The important slogans at present are as follows:

"(1) Down with Fascism! Opposition to the trampling of the Constitution, of the Potsdam Declaration, and of the 16 principles of the Far Eastern Commission!

"(2) Down with colonialization! Complete independence of the nation! Down with separate peace! Over-all peace in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration! Immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces after the peace treaty is signed!

"(3) Security by the peace-loving forces of the world upon the basis of the agreement of the big four nations! Defense of peace!

"(4) No more war! No militarizing Japan! War munitions must not be produced and transported!

"(5) Stabilize the livelihood of the people! No discharging workers!

"(6) Overthrow the comprador-like Yoshida Cabinet, the colleague of the Fascists!"

The headquarters of the Communist Party on 5 June distributed to all its party organs a draft of Secretary-General Kyuichi Tokuda's fundamental strategy and tactics entitled, "The Japan Communist Party's Basic Role in the Coming Revolution." Tokuda's strategy had been the object of heated discussions during the party's 19th Enlarged Central Committee meeting (28-30 April) and had subsequently been modified to an extent by the Central Committee. Attached to Tokuda's strategy were the written opinions of Hirasu Matsumoto and Shigeo Kamiyama, two Central Committee members who had differed with the views of Tokuda. (For further information on the "Japan Communist Party's Basic Role in the Coming Revolution," see Review of Government and Politics in Japan, May 1950, under POLITICAL PARTIES, "Communist Party".)

The Communist Party's Central Directors Board on 18 June established a special committee to draft a new party policy program. In line with this program, the Akahata on 26 June issued instructions to all party agencies to submit their opinions on party policy to party headquarters. The eight members appointed to the special policy committee were: Etsuro Shino, Ichizo Wada, Kenji Kawata, Ichizo Suzuki, Yoshinichi Watanabe,

Yoshitaro Fujikawa, Katsujiro Yasuda and Yuichi Hori.

LABOR AND GOVERNMENT

Labor and the Upper House Election

The general election for members of the House of Councillors, toward which the attention of Japanese labor had been directed during May, resulted in the election of 36 of the pro-labor Social Democratic Party's 75 candidates - a greater gain over the number of seats held during the Seventh Diet than registered by any other party. Of those 36 elected, 13 were ranking officials from key labor organizations; 6 were members of the powerful Japan Teachers Union; 3 were officials of the National Federation of Japanese Trade Unions (Sodomei); 2 were members of the National Chemical Workers Union; 1 a National Railway Workers Union member; and 1 was an official of the National Electric Industry Workers Union. Though the Administration's new total of 76 seats in the Upper House constituted a plurality, the 61 seats held by the Social Democrats gave rise to a belief in many quarters that the future of organized labor in Japan would be secured. Only 2 of the Communist Party's 50 candidates gained seats - reducing their strength in the Upper Chamber from 5 to 4 and indicating the electorate's antagonism toward Communist excesses in recent months in the field of labor as well as in the political arena.

That the success of the Social Democrats in seating 36 of their candidates was largely attributable to support of organized labor was generally accepted. Membership in organized labor unions in Japan approximates 6,250,000. Of this number a maximum of 400,000 could be labeled Communist or pro-Communist. Therefore, disregarding any defection of leftist elements, the Social Democratic Party was in position to acquire the bulk of the remaining 5,850,000 labor votes. That this vote was actually accorded them is, with a reasonable degree of certainty, common knowledge. The Liberal Administration's stiff attitude toward labor, its adamant stand on the wage base revision issue, as well as its "White Papers" on wages and labor antagonized any support the party may have had in the labor camp; the

Social Democratic Party on the other hand had earlier announced its intention of fostering the labor vote through its support of the Democratization League-sponsored "March Offensive".

Whether or not the drop in the total votes acquired by the Communist Party from the number accorded them in the January 1949 House of Representatives election - from 2,984,583 to 1,333,872 - was due in part to defections within leftist labor was not immediately discernible, but observers agreed that leftist-sponsored strikes preceding the election and the Party's responsibility for the "Imperial Plaza Incident" had antagonized the electorate as a whole.

That the election was conducted undisturbed by leftist demonstrations came as a surprise to observers in all quarters. The arrest and conviction of the 8 leftist demonstrators for assaulting members of the Occupation Forces on Memorial Day (NOTE: See "Imperial Palace Plaza Incident," Defendants Sentenced, National Affairs Section) and subsequent bitter protests by leftists had given rise to a belief that the 4 June election would be marked by violence. That such might be the case was indicated on 2 June when Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, arriving in Mito on a stumping tour, was met by some 600 union members and housewives waving red flags and shouting "Down with the Yoshida Government". The demonstration ended only after the arrival of armed police.

In Tokyo, meanwhile, leftist labor elements were vehemently protesting the arrest and conviction of the "Plaza" demonstrators and attempting to turn the issue into political capital. Following a decision to organize a protest strike on 7 and 8 June, the Tokyo Preparatory Committee for the Democratic National Front (Zenroren sponsored), at a rally on 3 June read a draft of questions to be submitted to SCAP in regard to the arrest of the "patriots". The questions, signed by representatives of 30 leftist labor organizations, were read at a "crack industrial crisis" rally held at the Japan Red Cross auditorium in Minato Ward, Tokyo. (Later printed and widely posted throughout Tokyo, these "questions to General MacArthur" were the cause for arrest and conviction of four unionists

charged with their distribution. (NOTE: See National Affairs Section, this report, under heading, "Four Japanese Sentenced for Distribution of "Open Letter to General MacArthur".)

Simultaneous with the drafting of the "Open Letter to General MacArthur" the Zenroren (All-Japan Labor Unions Liaison Council) decided to appeal to its international parent organization, the World Federation of Trade Unions, for aid in gaining the acquittal of the eight demonstrators found guilty by a SCAP provost court, and asked all member unions to make similar appeals to all international "democratic" organizations.

Fuel was added to the already seething grievances of leftist labor when, on 2 June, all rallies, meetings, demonstrations and parades were banned in the Tokyo Metropolitan area between 2 June and 5 June in accordance with Ordinance No. 111 of Tokyo's Public Safety Regulations. The ban was ordered by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police to prevent the occurrence of possible violence immediately prior to and during the Upper House election. Hardest hit by the ban was the All-Japan Automobile Industry Workers Union whose plans for a rally in Nishiya Park, Tokyo, on the following day were aborted by the police order.

Despite negotiations intermingled with "sit-down" tactics in the office of the Metropolitan Police Board, auto workers accompanied by Communist Diet member Yasoji Kazahaya, failed in an attempt to have the ban lifted.

As voters went to the polls on 4 June, the rallies, demonstrations, and industrial and student strikes called for by the Japan Communist Party on the eve of the election failed to materialize. Despite appeals by the party's organ, Akahata, the day produced no disturbances of note. Although three rain-dampened rallies were held in Osaka and some 10,000 unionists demonstrated in Nagoya, police, alerted for possible violence, were not called.

(NOTE: The ban on demonstrations, etc. in Tokyo was extended for an indefinite period on 5 June and widened in scope to cover the entire nation until 25 June. On that date it was partially lifted.)

That the Social Democrats were willing to attribute their success in the election to support of labor and were desirous of maintaining that support was evidenced on 26 June. On that day the Diet policy worked out by the Social Democrats was taken under discussion and confirmed at a conference of party leaders and representatives of the powerful General Council of Japanese Labor Unions (Sohyogikai) and the National Federation of Industrial Unions (Shin Sanbetsu). The confirmed policy called for: 1) An upward revision of wage scales for both public servants and workers in private enterprises; 2) Opposition to the projected reorganization of the electric power industry; 3) Opposition to the local tax reform bills; and, 4) The conclusion of an overall peace and the maintenance of strict neutrality.

Administration Promises Wage Boost for Government Employees

Action on the part of the Social Democrats in incorporating demands for an upward revision in the wage base of public servants in their Diet policy was in no way an innovation - the Liberal Administration had announced through Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda two weeks earlier that the wage base of government employees would be up for revision by next January. Ikeda, however, denied he had stated the wage base should be raised as early as next month as reported by the press on 13 June. In view of the adamant stand taken by the Administration on the wage base issue during the "March Offensive" there was little doubt in labor circles but that the press was in error.

The Nihon Keizai editorialized on the proposed wage base revision on the following day thus:

"The Government is reported to be planning a raise of the present public service wage standard within the year as promised by Prime Minister Yoshida in a pre-election statement. The public service pay standard should be raised to some extent since it is undeniably lower than the wage standards of private enterprises.

"Public service wages can be raised or lowered only within shorter ranges than those possible for private enterprise wages. Although the

development of trade unionism tends to make even private enterprise wages less elastic, public service wages are always difficult to be raised or lowered.

"Under the circumstances it is hoped that the National Personnel Authority will give more than political consideration in determining new public service wage levels."

Following a Cabinet session on 16 June during which the problem of revision of the public service wage scale was discussed, Ikeda told the press that a decision had been reached to raise the current wage base during January 1951. Ikeda's statement was elaborated upon by Takayoshi Aoki, Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board, the same day. Aoki asserted that the revision would take place during January 1951 simultaneously with an upward revision in the price of rice. He pointed out that it would be impossible to effect a raise during the current year since commodity prices were following a downward trend.

Prior to the Cabinet session, President Kiyoshi Asai of the National Personnel Authority urged the Administration to effect speedily the wage base revision. His recommendation was made during a conference with Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsuo Okazaki. This act on the part of the NPA head clearly indicated that the NPA was adhering to its December 1949 recommendation that the wage base of public service personnel be raised from the present ¥6,307 to ¥7,877.

Reaction to Asai's reiteration of the NPA's stand was seen on 15 June when leaders of the All-Japan Government Communications Workers Union confronted Postal Services Minister Saeki Ozawa with a demand that the pay scale of the union's workers be raised as soon as possible in accordance with the NPA president's recommendations.

Private Rail Workers Win Demands

The concerted efforts of private railway workers to win wage increases from the management of the five private rail companies - Keio Teito, Tokyo Kyuko, Keihin, Tobu, and Tokyo Rapid Transit Corporation

(subway) - resulted in agreements being reached with management during June by each of the five rail unions concerned. (Despite efforts of the Central Labor Relations Board to draft a mediation plan acceptable to both labor and management of the rail corporations concerned, no sign of an accord had been noted as May ended.)

The sporadic strikes of private rail workers during May had resulted in immeasurable inconvenience to the large numbers of urban workers in the Kansai and Kanto regions commuting daily from their places of employment as well as huge losses in revenue by the corporations. Attention had, therefore, been strongly focused on activities of the unionists who had banded together to force their demands upon management. This attention had soon brought to light the direct connection of those unions with the Japan Communist Party and the public had earlier been made aware of this fact by the press which pointed out the incongruity of a labor union fighting for increased wages under the slogan of "overall peace, non-fortification of Japan, and national independence". On 26 May Mainichi had commented thus:

"Private rail workers now on strike give us the impression that they are demanding overall peace and non-fortification of Japan rather than wage hikes. They are absurd indeed if they are truly insisting on political demands which the management is in no position to meet...and yet are counting on the support of the public in their walkouts.

"Labor unions are free to demand overall peace and non-fortification, but they are unwise if they strike aiming to achieve such demands. Walkouts backed by such obviously political slogans can mean only that the unions are working for a political purpose. We can well imagine the Communist Party, which has kowtowed to the Cominform, pulling wires behind some current strikes...."

It was evidenced early in June that the private railway workers unions which had spearheaded the "Summer Offensive" of leftist-dominated unions had no intention of relaxing the pressure exerted on management

during May. On 2 June it was apparent that the second round of strikes by the Keio-Toito unionists was in the offing as a compromise mediation plan offered both labor and management by the Metropolitan Labor Relations Board was rejected by the union after its acceptance by the rail corporation. A clause of the plan which called for an increase in working hours along with the wage increase proved a stumbling block for the unionists, and, though management requested continued negotiation, labor refused. The following day Keio-Toito rail workers walked off their jobs and stranded some 300,000 urban commuters. Management's loss was estimated at ¥1,400,000. (The first strike of the unionists, on 22 May, had cost management over ¥1,200,000.)

The Transportation Ministry, however, was optimistic even while the strike was progressing. A definite trend toward opposition to strikes was appearing among the unionists, the Ministry pointed out, and noted that increasing emphasis was being placed on collective bargaining by all private rail unions whereas, during May, unionists had in most cases refused to negotiate with management.

Adding validity to the appraisal of the situation by the Ministry of Transportation, the 24-hour strike scheduled for 17 June by the Tokyo Rapid Transit Corporation (subway) was called off as the union tentatively accepted terms offered by the corporation on 14 June. The terms, accepted by the unionists with a vote of 116 to 73 were: (1) An increase of the wage base to ¥10,500 (as against the union's demand of ¥11,350) plus a special allowance of ¥1,000; and (2) a 42-hour work week. In addition, it was agreed that the unionists would not be paid for time lost during their earlier strike. Within labor circles, the expected settlement of the subway workers' dispute was seen as bearing directly on the disputes of those other private railway workers currently engaged in struggle tactics.

Evidence that both labor and management were increasingly desirous of the settlement of their disputes without resort to costly strikes as witnessed during May became apparent when, on 14 June, the workers'

union of the Keio-Toito Electric Railway Company agreed to begin collective bargaining with management along lines suggested by the Metropolitan Labor Relations Board. This decision indicated a willingness on the part of the unionists to call off their second-round strike scheduled for three days beginning on the following day. Meanwhile, left and right-wingers of the subway workers' union were deadlocked on the formal acceptance of the compromise plan offered them on 14 June.

The Metropolitan Labor Relations Board lost no time in setting its mediation machinery to work on the Keio-Toito dispute but, despite an all-night effort on the same day, an agreement was not reached. Both management and labor refused to give ground on their respective stands on the enterprise rationalization plan proposed by management and observers feared that the projected strike would be effected on 17 June as scheduled. Spurring the MLRB on to greater efforts was the knowledge that the Keihin Express Company Workers Union and the Tobu Electric Railway Company Workers Union were going ahead with their second-wave strike plans scheduled for 17 and 18 June respectively - despite the fact that negotiations with their managements were being continued. Finally, one hour before the time set for its walkout, the Keio-Toito called off its strike and accepted a mediation plan offered by the Metropolitan Labor Relations Board. The agreement provided: (1) a wage base of ¥8,550 as demanded by the unionists; (2) a stop-gap allowance of ¥1,000 per worker; and, (3) an increase of from one-half to one hour in the length of the work week.

The success of the MLRB in averting the Keio-Toito strike and satisfying the demands of its unionists was not duplicated, however, in the case of the Keihin Express Company Workers Union. Keihin workers went on strike simultaneously with the announcement of the Keio-Toito settlement. Action upon a final mediation proposal offered by the MLRB and accepted by management was delayed by the union until its Central Committee could study it. As a result, an estimated 500,000 commuters

lost their means of transportation as the four branch lines and 32 bus routes of the company came to a halt early in the morning of 17 June. Surprisingly, the strike, which had been called for an "indefinite" period, ended 24 hours later as the union's headquarters issued "back to work" orders to its members. This action was taken as a result of a decision reached by the Central Committee of the union suspending the "indefinite" strike and scheduling, instead, an additional 24-hour walk-out for 21 June. At the same time, collective bargaining with the company was resumed, clearly indicating the union's desire to terminate its wage struggle at the first opportunity.

A similar desire to see an amicable end of their dispute was evidenced on the same day as the 24-hour scheduled strike of the Tobu Railway Workers Union was called off following the union's acceptance of a compromise plan offered by management. The plan, showing mutual concessions by both parties, offered: (1) A promise by management to refrain from further personnel cuts during the remainder of the year; (2) deletion of a controversial article in the new labor contract which gave management the authority to make a decision on personnel affairs when union approval was not forthcoming; (3) an average of ¥1,000 in wage base increases plus the payment of ¥1,500 in special allowances per worker; (4) the expenditure of ¥1,500,000 in recreational activities during the remainder of the year; and, (5) the granting of two days sick leave a month to female workers and a minimum of 10 days yearly vacation to employees in general.

Meanwhile, collective talks between labor and the management of the Keihin Electric Railway Company continued. With management insisting on increased working hours as a prerequisite to a wage base raise and offering a fixed table of personnel organization, observers saw no settlement of the dispute in sight. Instead, the 24-hour strike scheduled for 21 June seemed certain to be carried out. Bargaining was continued, however, and on the eve of the strike it was learned that the unionists had

finally accepted a last-ditch proposal of management and revoked its strike orders. Accepted by the union's Central Committee by a vote of 32 to 29, the company's proposal included the following points: (1) the withdrawal of the company's table of personnel organization; (2) an increase in the work week of one-half to one hour; (3) a ¥900 increase in the monthly wage base; (4) a special allowance of ¥500 per worker every other month; and, (5) the immediate payment of a special bonus of ¥2,000 per worker.

With the settlement of the Keihin dispute, the wage controversy of the Tokyo-Kyuko Electric Railway Workers Union with its management was alone left to be solved among private railways. Within the Tokyo-Kyuko union there did not exist, however, the same closely-knit organization as boasted by the other private railway workers and, as a result, its wage struggles during May and June were not marked by the concerted actions as witnessed in the strikes of other unions. This lack of unity was noted on 20 June following a decision of the union's Central Committee to call a 24-hour strike on 22 June. This decision was taken on receipt of a management reply to the union's demands for a ¥3,000 raise in the wage base. Though management offered to discuss the labor contract, the wage demand was turned down and other matters were relegated to a management-labor council. By 21 June a final decision on the strike scheduled for the following day had not been reached due to opposition to the strike by the Head Office Chapter and the Oimachi Branch Line Chapter. These chapters at the same time adopted non-confidence resolutions in the Central Committee.

With talks between labor and management deadlocked on the eve of the strike, observers believed that the intervention of the Metropolitan Labor Relations Board in the dispute was inevitable. (The MLRB had laid the groundwork for such action through numerous talks with representatives of both parties earlier.)

The Oimachi chapter of the union had meanwhile posted no-strike

notices following its decision to stay out of the impending strike. Angered by the chapter's action, the Central Committee nullified the decision and sent loyal unionists to destroy the notices. At this point, and through the good offices of the MLRB, a mediation proposal offered by the management was accepted by the unionists and the scheduled strike called off. Though concessions were made by both parties, wage demands of the unionists were generally accepted.

NRWU Joins Anti-Red Council

The eighth national convention of the National Railway Workers Union (Kokutetsu), held in Noboribetsu, Hokkaido, for three days from 28 June, was marked by a formal decision to affiliate itself with the anti-Communist General Council of Japanese Labor Unions (Sohyogikai). This decision, made over the vehement objections of left-wing elements, was noteworthy in that it strengthened further the anti-Communist movement and added the prestige of one of the largest (470,000 members) unions in Japan to the new organization scheduled for inauguration on 11 July.

That the question of affiliation with the Sohyogikai would come to a vote at the convention was known in advance, but labor circles were inclined to believe that, due to increased leftist representation in the union, the measure would be defeated. On 15 June a national election for membership in the union's Central Committee had resulted in the election of 75 moderate Democratization League (Mindo) members, 36 leftist Renovationists (Kakudo) members, 1 Communist, 2 anti-Mindo Social Democrats, and 5 neutrals. On 20 June an election was held for delegates to the national convention. Tabulation of the results gave the Mindo faction 228 seats, the Kakudo group 102 seats, Neutrals 93, Communists 16 and unaffiliated members 5 seats. (In the NRWU convention during the fall of 1949 nearly all the delegates had been from the anti-Communist Democratization League.) This shift in representation was caused by the disfavor into which the Mindo faction had fallen following the Government's

refusal to honor the wage awards of the Public Corporation Arbitration Commission early this year despite the union's recourse to all possible legal measures. Under Hindo leadership the union had confined its tactics to force compliance with the awards to legal action alone whereas leftist factions had continually insisted on the use of force.

As a result of the increased leftist representation, heated discussions on the union's future struggle policies arose and resulted in the rejection of the policy drafted by the Democratization Leaguers until a modification calling for an expansion of the struggle was inserted.

"Permanent neutrality for Japan through an overall peace" - a typical Communist slogan - was also insisted upon by the left-wingers. Finally, a non-confidence motion against the Central Struggle Committee introduced by the leftists was voted down by a vote of 242 to 194.

Despite the leftist showing, the anti-Communist faction succeeded in maintaining leadership of the union following the election of officers on the third and final day of the convention. The post of union chairman was filled by Tetsuro Saito of the Democratization League following the resignation of Etsuo Kato, union chairman for several consecutive terms and member of the executive board of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Kaname Hoshika and Fumie Kataoka, both Democratization Leaguers, were elected vice-Chairman and Secretary-General respectively. Only after heated discussions on the advisability of the Kokutetsu's affiliation with the General Council of Japanese Labor Unions (Sohyogikai), between Democratization League delegates and Renovationists with the Communists, was the proposed affiliation put to a vote. The measure was approved by a vote of 262 to 156.

Jobless Figures Given to Cabinet

Labor Minister Masabumi Suzuki reported to the Cabinet on 20 June that unemployment in Japan had increased during April to 500,000 - a rise of approximately 120,000 over the average monthly figure for 1949.

Placing emphasis on the state of the nation's day laborers, Suzuki proposed the following three measures as a means of combating the problem: 1) a higher relief expenditure; 2) the creation of jobs by investments from the Counterpart Fund in public enterprises; and, 3) increased pay for employees of the employment security staff offices.

The Labor Ministry's report pointed out specifically that, according to the monthly Labor Power Survey of the Bureau of Statistics of the Prime Minister's Office, unemployment had shown a monthly increase from 190,000 during 1948 to 380,000 during 1949. Unemployment reached 500,000 for the first time during April 1950. Some 1,210,000 applications for work were received at public employment security offices during April; of that number, 727,000 were new applications.

April Labor Disputes Numbered 284

A total of 284 labor disputes involving 1,270,000 workers were staged during April, the Labor Ministry announced on 17 June. Disputes marked by strikes numbered 108 with 110,000 workers participating. The total represented an increase of 27 cases over the preceding month, but the number of strikers showed a sharp decline of 380,000.

The number of working days lost through strikes totalled 190,000 or a 95 percent decline from the March figure of 3,840,000 days lost.

Labor Ministry Reports Wage Statistics

The Labor Ministry revealed on 24 June that during the month of April Japanese workers received an average monthly wage of ¥9,130, an increase of ¥544 over the previous month. The Ministry stated that workers in the gas, electric, and water works industries received the highest average cash payments with ¥15,756 followed by employees of financial institutions whose average wage was ¥13,286.

Among other industries, employees of various commercial firms were paid an average of ¥10,725, workers of the transportation and communication industries ¥9,002, and manufacturing employees ¥8,362.

Compared with the month of March, average wages for workers in the mining, manufacturing, transportation and utilities industries showed an increase, but employees of financial institutions received an average of 15 percent less in monthly wages.

Japanese Labor Education Program

A labor education program, designed to solidify and enlighten members of labor unions and labor organizations, is currently being carried out in Japan at both national and prefectural levels, according to officials of SCAP's Labor Division, Economic and Scientific Section, who emphasize that the program is presented as a service by the Ministry of Labor's Education Section with SCAP sponsorship.

The National Labor Education Council, comprised of representatives of labor, management, and the public, acts as an advisory group to the Ministry on a national level in carrying out the program. Trade unions are offered facilities, instructors, visual aids, publications, and guidance when desired. A prefectural Labor Education Council, comprised of union and management representatives, acts as an advisory group at the local level.

Themes emphasized during 1949 included: provisions of union constitutions, the handling of union accounts, the relationship between national and local unions, provisions of labor agreements, unfair labor practices, the election of officials, and grievance procedures. An annual training institute was conducted in each region to train the labor officials in the local offices. In 1949, six regional five-day schools were conducted with about 500 officials in attendance. In 1950, due to budgetary limitations, schools are being held in five regions with more than 100 officials invited to attend each school.

Upon completion of the courses, prefectural officials with the cooperation of the unions in their prefectures are sponsoring summer labor

schools for union officials and ordinary members.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Local Autonomy Commissioners Return From U. S.

Recommendations for increased efficiency in local administrative affairs were being prepared in June by three members of the Local Administration Investigation Commission, who returned on 27 May from a two month tour of the United States. During their tour, the three members studied functions of democratic government at national, state, county and municipal levels. Among other things, they examined the duties of mayors and municipal officials, operation of city auditoriums, bus and trolley systems, power distribution systems, sewage disposal and port and airport facilities. They visited New York, Chicago, Albany, Rochester, Knoxville, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.

The Commission announced its intentions of strengthening the financial capacities of local governments and granting priorities to lower levels of government in the redistribution of governmental powers. The group was expected to act with considerable independence in framing annual programs for grants to local entities from the national government's equalization grant fund.

Commission members who made the trip to the United States were Masao Kambe, university professor and taxation authority; Sosei Uzawa, President of Meiji University; and Shozaburo Sugimura, law professor at Tokyo University.

Japanese Local Elections, June 1950

During the month of June 1950, a total of 119 local elections were held in Japan to fill 323 vacant elective seats in local public bodies. Of these elections, 57 were "no poll" contests in which 117 candidates secured seats unopposed. In the remaining 62 elections, 435,314 voters cast their votes for an average participation rate of 75.92 percent.

The percentage of the total vote accorded each party was:

| | |
|-------------------|------|
| Social Democrat | 6.9 |
| People's Democrat | 1.5 |
| Liberal | 11.2 |
| Communist | 4.7 |
| Minor Parties | 0.8 |
| Independent | 74.9 |

The number and percentage of seats won by each party follows:

| <u>Party</u> | <u>No. of Seats</u> | <u>% of Total</u> |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Social Democrat | 8 | 3.7 |
| People's Democrat | 2 | 2.5 |
| Liberal | 15 | 12.8 |
| Communist | 3 | 0.8 |
| Minor Parties | 1 | 0.2 |
| Independents | 294 | 80.0 |

Attached tables, for which the National Election Administration Commission furnished statistics, summarize results of the election and are given as the source of the above information.

TABLE I

SCHEDULE OF LOCAL ELECTIONS, JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>Number of Seats Contested</u> | <u>Number of Voting Elections</u> | <u>Number of No Poll Elections</u> | <u>Total Number of Elections</u> |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Prefectural Assembly | 6 | 5 | | 5 |
| Mayor | 3 | 3 | | 3 |
| City Assembly | 37 | 2 | | 2 |
| Town Headman | 11 | 9 | 2 | 11 |
| Town Assembly | 76 | 10 | 4 | 14 |
| Village Headman | 33 | 17 | 16 | 33 |
| Village Assembly | 157 | 16 | 35 | 51 |
| Total | 323 | 62 | 57 | 119 |

TABLE II**PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION, LOCAL ELECTIONS, JUNE 1950**

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>Percentage of Participation</u> |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Prefectural Assembly | 52.67 |
| Mayor | 76.56 |
| City Assembly | 76.13 |
| Town Headman | 79.05 |
| Town Assembly | 80.51 |
| Village Headman | 85.08 |
| Village Assembly | 81.47 |
| Average | 75.92 |

TABLE III**NUMBER OF CANDIDATES ACCORDING TO POLITICAL PARTY, JUNE 1950**

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>O</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Prefectural Assembly | 4 | 2 | 6 | 3 | | 4 | 19 |
| Mayor | 2 | | | 2 | | 7 | 11 |
| City Assembly | 4 | | 5 | 2 | | 43 | 54 |
| Town Headman | | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 18 | 24 |
| Town Assembly | 3 | | 2 | 2 | 1 | 90 | 98 |
| Village Headman | 1 | | 2 | | | 53 | 56 |
| Village Assembly | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | | 178 | 187 |
| Total | 18 | 4 | 19 | 13 | 2 | 393 | 449 |

TABLE IV

SEATS WON BY PARTIES IN ALL ELECTIONS, JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>Q</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Prefectural Assembly | 1 | 1 | 4 | | | | 6 |
| Mayer | | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| City Assembly | 2 | | 5 | 2 | | 28 | 37 |
| Town Headman | | | | | | 11 | 11 |
| Town Assembly | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 73 | 76 |
| Village Headman | | | 2 | | | 31 | 33 |
| Village Assembly | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | | 148 | 157 |
| Total | 8 | 2 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 294 | 323 |

TABLE V

SEATS WON BY PARTIES IN 62 VOTING ELECTIONS, JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>Q</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Prefectural Assembly | 1 | 1 | 4 | | | | 6 |
| Mayer | | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| City Assembly | 2 | | 5 | 2 | | 28 | 37 |
| Town Headman | | | | | | 9 | 9 |
| Town Assembly | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 65 | 68 |
| Village Headman | | | 1 | | | 16 | 17 |
| Village Assembly | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 60 | 66 |
| Total | 7 | 2 | 12 | 3 | 1 | 181 | 206 |

TABLE VI

SEATS WON BY PARTIES IN 57 NO POLL ELECTIONS, JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Town Headman | | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| Town Assembly | | | | | | 8 | 8 |
| Village Headman | | | 1 | | | 15 | 16 |
| Village Assembly | 1 | | 2 | | | 88 | 91 |
| Total | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 113 | 117 |

TABLE VII

PERCENTAGE OF SEATS WON BY PARTIES, JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|
| Prefectural Assembly | 16.6 | 16.6 | 66.6 | | | |
| Mayor | | | | | | 100.0 |
| City Assembly | 5.4 | | 13.5 | 5.4 | | 75.7 |
| Town Headman | | | | | | 100.0 |
| Town Assembly | 1.3 | | 1.3 | | 1.3 | 96.1 |
| Village Headman | | | 6.1 | | | 93.9 |
| Village Assembly | 2.5 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 0.6 | | 94.4 |
| Average | 3.7 | 2.5 | 12.8 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 80.0 |

TABLE VIII

VOTES OBTAINED BY PARTIES IN 65 VOTING ELECTIONS, JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>FD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>G</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Prefectural Assembly | 31,338 | 14,675 | 80,882 | 8,006 | | 27,415 | 162,316 |
| Mayor | 9,842 | | | 6,373 | | 74,306 | 90,520 |
| City Assembly | 2,224 | | 6,357 | 2,900 | | 27,185 | 38,666 |
| Town Headman | 1,078 | | 1,498 | 1,423 | 1,568 | 31,766 | 37,333 |
| Village Headman | 454 | | 699 | | | 34,208 | 35,361 |
| Village Assembly | 295 | 657 | 129 | 337 | | 31,859 | 33,277 |
| Total | 48,079 | 15,332 | 91,672 | 22,054 | 1,984 | 256,193 | 435,314 |

TABLE IX

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES OBTAINED BY PARTIES, JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>FD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>G</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|
| Prefectural Assembly | 19.3 | 9.0 | 49.8 | 4.9 | | 16.8 |
| Mayor | 10.9 | | | 7.0 | | 82.1 |
| City Assembly | 5.8 | | 16.4 | 7.5 | | 70.3 |
| Town Headman | 2.9 | | 4.0 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 85.0 |
| Town Assembly | 7.5 | | 5.6 | 8.0 | 1.1 | 77.8 |
| Village Headman | 1.3 | | 2.0 | | | 96.7 |
| Village Assembly | 0.8 | 2.0 | 0.4 | 1.3 | | 95.7 |
| Average | 6.9 | 1.5 | 11.2 | 4.7 | 0.8 | 74.9 |

Summary of Local Elections, 1 January - 30 June 1950

During the period 1 January - 30 June, 697 local elections were held in Japan. Of this number, 292 were "no poll" elections. In the remaining 405 contests, 2,578,289 votes were cast for an average participation rate of 74.90 percent.

The percentage of the total vote accredited to each party was:

| | | | |
|-------------------|------|---------------|------|
| Social Democrat | 21.3 | Communist | 3.6 |
| People's Democrat | 3.2 | Minor Parties | 0.6 |
| Liberal | 12.4 | Independents | 58.8 |

The number and percentage of available seats won by each party during this six-month period was:

| <u>Party</u> | <u>Seats Won</u> | <u>Percentage</u> |
|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Social Democrat | 39 | 1.5 |
| People's Democrat | 38 | 1.5 |
| Liberal | 94 | 3.5 |
| Communist | 40 | 1.5 |
| Minor Parties | 17 | 0.5 |
| Independents | 2,450 | 91.5 |

Of the 2,678 vacant seats, 798 were filled in "no poll" elections. The remaining 2,080 were contested by 3,076 candidates.

Attached tables, for which the National Election Administration Commission furnished statistics, summarize results of the elections and are given as the source of the above information.

TABLE A

| | <u>SUMMARY OF LOCAL ELECTIONS, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950</u> | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
| | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
| Number of Candidates | 85 | 55 | 137 | 140 | 33 | 3,229 | 3,679 |
| Seats Won (Total) | 39 | 38 | 94 | 40 | 17 | 2,450 | 2,678 |
| Seats Won (Voting Elections) | 30 | 35 | 66 | 32 | 15 | 1,702 | 1,880 |
| Seats Won (No Poll Elections) | 9 | 3 | 28 | 8 | 2 | 748 | 798 |
| Percentage of Seats Won | 1.5 | 1.5 | 3.5 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 91.5 | |
| Votes Obtained | 613,544 | 93,669 | 355,707 | 106,507 | 17,309 | 1,691,553 | 2,578,289 |
| Percentage of Total Vote | 21.3 | 3.2 | 12.4 | 3.7 | 0.6 | 58.8 | |

TABLE I

SCHEDULE OF LOCAL ELECTIONS, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>Number of Seats Contested</u> | <u>Number of Voting Elections</u> | <u>Number of No Poll Elections</u> | <u>Total Number of Elections</u> |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Governor | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| Prefectural Assembly | 19 | 18 | | 18 |
| Mayor | 12 | 12 | | 12 |
| City Assembly | 205 | 10 | | 10 |
| Town Headman | 61 | 49 | 12 | 61 |
| Town Assembly | 579 | 52 | 15 | 67 |
| Village Headman | 253 | 140 | 113 | 253 |
| Village Assembly | 1,548 | 123 | 152 | 275 |
| Total | 2,678 | 405 | 292 | 697 |

TABLE II

PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION, LOCAL ELECTIONS, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>Percentage of Participation</u> |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Governor | 61.47 |
| Prefectural Assembly | 71.12 |
| Mayor | 64.96 |
| City Assembly | 75.91 |
| Town Headman | 78.32 |
| Town Assembly | 83.38 |
| Village Headman | 81.55 |
| Village Assembly | 82.49 |
| Average | 74.90 |

TABLE III

NUMBER OF CANDIDATES ACCORDING TO POLITICAL PARTIES, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------|
| Governor | 1 | | | | | 1 | 2 |
| Prefectural Assembly | 14 | 7 | 17 | 14 | 3 | 19 | 74 |
| Mayor | 4 | 1 | 2 | 5 | | 25 | 37 |
| City Assembly | 17 | 16 | 11 | 16 | 2 | 313 | 375 |
| Town Headman | 2 | 1 | 11 | 13 | 1 | 103 | 131 |
| Town Assembly | 18 | 6 | 29 | 34 | 7 | 682 | 776 |
| Village Headman | 4 | 7 | 18 | 18 | 1 | 392 | 440 |
| Village Assembly | 25 | 17 | 49 | 40 | 19 | 1,694 | 1,844 |
| Total | 85 | 55 | 137 | 140 | 33 | 3,229 | 3,679 |

TABLE IV

SEATS WON BY PARTIES IN ALL ELECTIONS, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|--------------|--------------|
| Governor | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| Prefectural Assembly | 2 | 4 | 10 | | | 3 | 19 |
| Mayor | 2 | | 1 | | | 9 | 12 |
| City Assembly | 7 | 9 | 9 | 5 | | 175 | 205 |
| Town Headman | 1 | | 5 | | | 55 | 61 |
| Town Assembly | 9 | 3 | 21 | 17 | 4 | 525 | 579 |
| Village Headman | | 5 | 9 | 1 | | 238 | 253 |
| Village Assembly | 17 | 17 | 39 | 17 | 13 | 1,445 | 1,548 |
| Total | 39 | 38 | 94 | 40 | 17 | 2,450 | 2,678 |

TABLE V

SEATS WON BY PARTIES IN 405 VOTING ELECTIONS, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Governor | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| Prefectural Assembly | 2 | 4 | 10 | | | 3 | 19 |
| Mayor | 2 | | 1 | | | 9 | 12 |
| City Assembly | 7 | 9 | 9 | 5 | | 175 | 205 |
| Town Headman | 1 | | 3 | | | 45 | 49 |
| Town Assembly | 7 | 2 | 21 | 13 | 3 | 457 | 503 |
| Village Headman | | 4 | 3 | 1 | | 132 | 140 |
| Village Assembly | 10 | 16 | 19 | 13 | 12 | 881 | 951 |
| Total | 30 | 35 | 66 | 32 | 15 | 1,702 | 1,880 |

TABLE VI

SEATS WON BY PARTIES IN 292 NO POLL ELECTIONS, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Town Headman | | | 2 | | | 10 | 12 |
| Town Assembly | 2 | 1 | | 4 | 1 | 68 | 76 |
| Village Headman | | 1 | 6 | | | 106 | 113 |
| Village Assembly | 7 | 1 | 20 | 4 | 1 | 564 | 597 |
| Total | 9 | 3 | 28 | 8 | 2 | 748 | 798 |

TABLE VII

PERCENTAGE OF SEATS WON BY PARTIES, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|
| Governor | 100.0 | | | | | |
| Prefectural Assembly | 10.5 | 21.1 | 52.6 | | | 15.8 |
| Mayor | 16.7 | | 8.3 | | | 75.0 |
| City Assembly | 3.5 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 2.4 | | 85.3 |
| Town Headman | 1.6 | | 8.2 | | | 90.2 |
| Town Assembly | 1.3 | 0.5 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 0.6 | 90.8 |
| Village Headman | | 2.0 | 3.6 | 0.4 | | 94.0 |
| Village Assembly | 1.1 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 93.3 |
| Average | 1.5 | 1.5 | 3.5 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 91.5 |

TABLE VIII

VOTES OBTAINED BY PARTIES IN 405 VOTING ELECTIONS, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Governor | 325,955 | | | | | 292,752 | 618,707 |
| Prefectural Assembly | 93,405 | 60,788 | 279,575 | 52,711 | 11,542 | 125,918 | 623,939 |
| Mayor | 170,511 | 5,025 | 21,840 | 12,251 | | 382,655 | 592,282 |
| City Assembly | 8,728 | 18,737 | 22,137 | 7,128 | 126 | 123,737 | 180,693 |
| Town Headman | 4,191 | | 11,838 | 9,348 | 1,568 | 147,615 | 174,560 |
| Town Assembly | 6,294 | 1,370 | 7,162 | 10,087 | 1,232 | 162,416 | 188,561 |
| Village Headman | 1,917 | 5,367 | 7,417 | 9,593 | 617 | 254,966 | 279,787 |
| Village Assembly | 2,443 | 2,383 | 5,738 | 5,479 | 2,224 | 201,494 | 219,760 |
| Total | 613,544 | 93,669 | 355,707 | 106,507 | 17,309 | 1,691,553 | 2,878,289 |

TABLE IX

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES OBTAINED BY PARTIES, 1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1950

| <u>Type of Election</u> | <u>SD</u> | <u>PD</u> | <u>L</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>MIN</u> | <u>IND</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|------------|------------|
| Governor | 52.7 | | | | | 47.3 |
| Prefectural Assembly | 15.0 | 9.7 | 44.9 | 8.4 | 1.8 | 20.2 |
| Mayor | 28.8 | 0.8 | 3.7 | 2.1 | | 64.6 |
| City Assembly | 4.8 | 10.4 | 12.3 | 3.9 | 0.1 | 68.5 |
| Town Headman | 2.4 | | 6.8 | 5.4 | 0.9 | 84.5 |
| Town Assembly | 3.3 | 0.7 | 3.8 | 5.3 | 0.7 | 86.2 |
| Village Headman | 0.6 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 3.8 | 0.1 | 91.1 |
| Village Assembly | 1.1 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 1.0 | 91.7 |
| Average | 21.3 | 3.2 | 12.4 | 3.7 | 0.6 | 58.8 |

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS

Four Supreme Court Justices Fined For "Misjudgment Case"

The Supreme Court on 24 June announced that it had fined ¥10,000 each four of its associate justices involved in the court's so-called "misjudgment case." The case originated with the four justices concerned, Seiichi Shimoyama, Shigeru Kuriyama, Katsushige Kotani, and Hachiro Fujita, rendering a "faulty decision" on 16 July 1949 when the case of Mitsuhiro Katagiri (of Suma, Nagano Prefecture), indicted on charges of murder and armed robbery, was appealed to the Supreme Court. Earlier, the Tokyo Higher Court had passed a life sentence upon the defendant, while the defense counsel claimed that the Higher Court had violated Article 353 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure by failing to renew the trial procedures following a 60-day suspension period. The four Supreme Court justices, ignoring the provisions of Article 3 of the regulations concerning the enforcement of the new Code of Criminal Procedure which had went into effect on 1 January 1949, returned the case to the Tokyo Higher Court after nullifying the original sentence.

Subsequently, the four justices, standing on their constitutional prerogatives as outlined in Article 78 of the Constitution, refused to concede to a majority decision of the remaining members of the Court requesting that they resign voluntarily. After having failed to receive a reply to a similar request in May 1950, Chief Justice Kotaro Tanaka requested and received majority support from the Court for disciplinary action.

(For further details regarding this case, see Review of Government and Politics in Japan, October, November, December, 1949; and May 1950).

Death Sentence Demanded for Three Defendants in "Mitaka Case"

Public procurator Seiji Katsuta on 12 June demanded the death sentence for three of the ten defendants on trial by the Tokyo District Court on charges of carrying out the Mitaka "runaway train sabotage case."

of 1949. For the remainder, he asked the court to condemn two to life imprisonment, two to 15 years in prison, one to 12 years and the last two to eight years. Those for whom the prosecution had asked the death sentence were Shichizo Iida, Yoshiho Kiyama and Keisuke Takeuchi. Life imprisonment was asked for Takeo Yokoya and Katsunasa Sotoyama. All of the defendants in the case were members of the Communist Party with the sole exception of Takeuchi.

A dozen Communist attorneys were present at the hearing which was the 50th session of the trial. Reflecting the public interest in the case, the gallery was packed to overflowing capacity. Judge Chugo Suzuki in calling the court to order announced that he had decided following consultation with the prosecution to overrule previous objections raised by the defense with regards to evidence submitted to the court. Thereupon, defendant Shichizo Iida arose and requested permission to state an opinion regarding the court action in overruling objections of the defense, a request which was denied by Judge Suzuki.

Procurator Katsuda in presenting the prosecution's case, outlined the arguments for the state in five sections, evidence to establish the facts of the case, the social background of the case, reasons for discrepancies in testimony presented, the voluntary nature of the testimonies and the existence or non-existence of extenuating circumstances. His arguments, representing the results of 11 months of investigations by police and procurator officials and court examinations, stated that the facts of the case were fully established by the evidence offered. He charged that the accused were involved in a conspiracy which killed on the night of 15 July 1949 six persons and injured an additional ten. He accused two of the defendants, Takeo Yokoya and Takeuchi, of actually setting the train in motion for its murderous run. Procurator Katsuda argued that the motive of the defendants was to stir up the inactive union struggle against the Government's summer retrenchment program.

In conclusion, he called for the full degree of justice in view of the tremendous social repercussions caused by the defendant's "ruthless action."

During the 51st hearing of the case on 19 June, Tatsuji Fuse, chief counsel for the defense, challenged the prosecution's evidence regarding the runaway electric train incident and declared that the whole case was a "frameup," an "infamous conspiracy in disregard of all law." He stated that the case to begin with had been a "conspiracy between railroad officials and procurators." The prosecution, he continued, had not been able to prove in court that the train in question had been deliberately set in motion and that furthermore, there were indications that the prosecution had resorted to torture to extract false confessions from the accused. The "conspiracy," he said, was the last resort of the National Railway bureaucracy and the Yoshida Cabinet who had "blundered in their attempt to make propaganda use of the mysterious death of President Sadamori Shimoyama for the suppression of the anti-discharge struggle of the union and communism." The prosecution wished, Attorney Fuse declared, to turn public animosity against the accused in order to avoid responsibility for the incident at Mitaka. They arrested the accused without any evidence whatsoever, stating, "unless they are found guilty, the victims will not find peace of soul," in an attempt to defraud the public which is not very conversant with legal matters, Fuse charged.

The only evidence the prosecution could put forward, Fuse continued, was that conditions were non-existent in which the train could possibly have had an "automatic start." The prosecution had no evidence to show that the train was deliberately set in motion, Fuse went on. Moreover, he continued, both the records of interrogation by the prosecution and those of questioning by the presiding judge indicated utter disregard of the fundamental human rights stipulated in the Constitution and the rights to withhold testimony and alibi guaranteed by the new Code of Criminal Procedure.

In an editorial entitled, "The Mitaka Trial," the Nippon Times commented on 16 June:

"With the prosecution having rounded up its case, the final verdict on the Mitaka runaway train trial is expected sometime in August following the summation of the defense testimony. In view of the seriousness of the incident - in which six persons were killed and 14 injured - the court should not hesitate to act with decisiveness in meting out justice.

"But the case holds even greater significance than the unfortunate murder of innocent victims. It has political and social significance which will not be cleared up with the finding of the court on the 10 accused.

"Aside from the technical details of the case itself, the extraneous - but nonetheless pertinent - evidences point to a major design. It is known that radical leaders of the railway union had been heatedly berating the 6-3 type of railway coach as unfit for use; and it was just that type of train which was wrecked. It is also known that the Communist-led unionist were doing all they could to create social unrest and confusion.

"As the trial progressed, several incidents occurred which might have been planned to confuse the people completely but which actually pointed the finger of suspicion at the Communist Party.

"First, there was the key suspect who repeatedly changed his testimony: At one time, he pleaded innocent; at another, he said he committed the deed by himself; still later, he admitted that a group of union members plotted the whole affair; and then, he changed his tune again.

"Second, the Communist Party's official organ inferred that the train in question started by itself; then, it blamed the key witness who wrote out a confession while widely publicizing the fact that he was not a member of the Red party; still later, it charged the moderate Democratization League members of plotting the incident; and now, it is apparently preparing to use the term "patriots" for the suspects.

"The actions of the suspects - all Red members except one - and of the Communist Party have been marked with evasiveness from the very beginning of the trial. If the charges of the procurator in his summation are true that

the Mitaka incident was the result of a conspiracy, the court decision on the accused will still leave at large a serious threat to the well-being of honest citizens.

"It is to be hoped that the court will, when the time comes, deal with this case with justice, courage, and a keen social perspective."

Osaka Higher Court Rejects Appeal From "Wall Newspaper" Defendants

The Osaka Higher Court on 19 June rejected an appeal filed by the 19 defendants of the so-called "Osaka wall newspaper case." The defendants had previously been sentenced to prison terms by the Osaka Higher Court for having posted anti-Occupation publications during July 1943.

ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS

Results of Investigation Into Two Government Corporations Released

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry on 15 June released an interim report on the results of its auditing of the records of the Foreign Trade Corporation for Mining and Manufacturing Products (Kokohin Bōeki Kodan) and the Textile Trade Corporation. The investigation was conducted by a special six-member committee which had been appointed for the purpose by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in April. The auditing was conducted with the objective of preventing the recurrence of such scandals similar to this embezzlement case which had involved nearly ¥100,000,000.

The interim report pointed out defects in management of corporation business, delayed adjustment of accounts and negligent custody over commodities stored by the corporations. The special committee found that the corporation's accounting division had been unable to maintain necessary control over various business divisions and sections in the corporation, that regulations concerning custody of commodities in stock had often been ignored, that the accounting division had been slow in making entries in its records, and that corporation officials had failed to make positive efforts towards collecting bills and deferred accounts. The reason for delays in submitting business reports to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was found to have been caused by deferred adjustments in the corporation's accounts.

The special committee found that the Textile Trade Corporation had been unable to keep an accurate record of items handled by the corporation due to the system under which the corporation's business was actually conducted by private quarters in behalf of the government. The resulting confusion led to a lack of enthusiasm on the part of those corporation officials responsible for custody over stock on hand and made it difficult for the corporation to control the activities of private dealers who were entrusted as custodians.

The interim report advised the two corporations to accelerate adjustment of accounts, maintain more accurate records, enforce stricter control over commodities in stock and speed the collection of bills and deferred accounts.

Newshills, it was reported that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry had established two audit sections within its Trade Promotion Bureau to continue strict auditing of government corporations.

PURGE

The Attorney General's Office on 20 June ordered the dissolution of seven terroristic organizations under the provisions of Cabinet Order 64, 1949, "The Organizations Control Order." The dissolution of the organizations was ordered, the Attorney General's Office explained, because of increasing acts of violence being committed by their members. Among the seven terroristic organizations, the New Japan Youth "Party" (Shin Nippon Seinen To) had professed to "spread" democracy and "fight" communism, but in reality had developed into a mere gang of thugs who were concealing dynamite and weapons allegedly against an "expected Communist revolution." The other six organizations were bands of gangsters, gamblers and stalkkeepers, operating under the feudalistic boss-henchman system. Three of the so-called bosses were members of various local assemblies. In announcing the dissolution, the Attorney General's Office pointed out that "if extreme rightists are allowed to increase their influence or to engage in lawless activities, taking advantage of the current purge measures against some extreme leftists, the efforts to democratize Japan would be seriously jeopardized."

The action by the Attorney General's Office brought to 205 the number of terroristic and ultra-nationalistic organizations dissolved under the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 101, 1946, and Cabinet Order 64, 1949. Included in this total were 167 militaristic and ultra-nationalistic organizations, 36 terroristic groups and 2 terroristic and anti-democratic bodies.

Following are the seven terroristic organizations dissolved on 20 June:

Kumagaya Masuya Ikka (Including General Headquarters, Arai Gumi and Branch House Uchida Gumi) - stall keepers operating in Kumagaya City, Saitama Prefecture. - (membership, 45)

Kushida Gumi (Kushida Group) - stallkeepers operating in Kumagaya City, Saitama Prefecture - leader of the group, Hachiro Kushida, a member of Kumagaya City Assembly. - (membership, 40)

Shikano Gumi (Shikano Group) - stallkeepers having as their "territory" the 11 counties of Miyagi Prefecture - leader of the group, Hisao Shikano, a member of Asanuma Town Assembly. Miyagi Prefecture. - (membership, 100)

Utatsu Ika (Utatsu Group) - stallkeepers operating in Kanazawa City, Ishikawa Prefecture - leader of the group, Masakoshi Utatsu - (membership, 60)

Wada Gumi (Wada Group) - an organization of stallkeepers which terrorized Koriyama City and neighboring areas in Fukushima Prefecture - leader of the group, Takeo Wada - (membership, 40)

Yasamura Gumi (Yasamura Group) - gamblers operating in Kure and its neighboring environs in Hiroshima Prefecture - leader of the group, Tatsuo Yasamura - (membership, 10)

Shin Nippon Seinen To (New Japan Youth Party) - ostensibly a political party, but in reality a gang of thugs and rowdies operating in Kaneda Town, Tagawa County, Fukuoka Prefecture - president of the "party", Zentaro Utaka - (membership, 22)

The Japanese Government screened 17,670 persons during the period from 1 to 30 June. Of these, 16,953 were screened for appointment to public office; 415 were seeking eligibility for elective offices; and 272 were screened for other purposes. Of the total, 69 were disqualified for public service, including:

| | |
|--|----|
| Career Army and Navy Officers. | 9 |
| <u>Keisei Tai</u> | 19 |
| Branch Chiefs of Ex-Servicemen's Assns | - |
| Branch Chiefs of IJRA and affiliates | - |
| War Criminals and others | 41 |