

THE
ELEMENTS OF MORALITY,

INCLUDING

POLITY.

BY

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IN TWO VOLUMES.



Λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις.

A NEW EDITION, REVISED AND CORRECTED.

VOLUME I.

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TO
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, ESQUIRE,
POET LAUREAT.

MY DEAR MR. WORDSWORTH,

I AM desirous that, if the present book finds its way to the next generation, it should make known to them that I had the great privilege of your friendship. And there is no one to whom I could with more propriety dedicate such a work: since in your Poems, at the season of life when the mind and the heart are most wrought on by poetry, I, along with many others, found a spirit of pure and comprehensive morality, operating to raise your readers above the moral temper of those times. I shall rejoice if it appear from the following pages, that such influences have not been wasted upon me.

That you may long enjoy the reverence and affection with which England, on such grounds, regards you, is the wish and prayer of,

MY DEAR MR. WORDSWORTH,

Your cordial friend and admirer,

W. WHEWELL.

Trinity College, Cambridge,

April 5, 1841.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THOUGH the following work has been received in some quarters far more favourably than I had ventured to anticipate, other persons have urged against it objections which show that they have much misapprehended its object and plan. I will therefore make a few remarks which I hope may bring the scheme and purpose of the work clearly into view.

Morality has its root in the Common Nature of man; and no Scheme of Morality can be true, except a scheme which agrees with the *Common Sense* of mankind, so far as that Common Sense is consistent with itself: including in the term *Common Sense*, both men's *convictions* as to what is right, and their *sentiments* as to what is morally good.

Now the Common Sense of mankind has in every age led them to two seemingly opposite Schemes of Morality:—that which makes *Virtue*, and that which makes *Pleasure*, the rule and guide of human action;—the system of the *Stoic* and of the *Epicurean*, with their successors down to our own times. On the one side, men urge the claims of *Rectitude* or *Rightness*, of *Duty*, of *Conscience*, of the *Moral Faculty*; on the other side they declare *Utility*, *Expediency*, *Interest*, *Enjoyment*, and the like, to be the proper guides of men's actions.

Moreover the Common Sense of mankind suggests, against each of those opposite systems, a sweeping argument, which is, in controversy, repeated more and more vehemently on each side; each side having a triumphant persuasion that its own argument is irresistible; and the Common Sense of mankind alternately assents to each argument as convincing.

Against the latter system, that Pleasure is the proper guide of human action, it is urged that such a system does not express the nature and feelings of man;—that we admire and approve virtue when proposed as our guide, and condemn and reject pleasure as something degrading and brutish, when put in opposition to virtue:—that with regard to great transgressions of what is right, odious vices, atrocious crimes, we do not convey what men mean, if we only say that such actions are opposed to utility:—that there is a feeling of remorse for crime, altogether different from the feeling of regret for miscalculated consequences. This argument, presented in various forms, is so constantly and cordially assented to, that the rule of mere pleasure or utility has never been generally accepted as a measure of real *Morality*.

And against the opposite scheme, that virtue is our proper guide, it has been urged that the mere name or notion of Virtue cannot be a sure guide, since Virtue is a matter of opinion:—that Conscience cannot be a real means of determining what is right, because Conscience determines different things to be right, in different countries, ages, persons:—that actions which the Conscience of man in one century or nation determines to be odious vices or atrocious crimes, Conscience at another time and place has regarded as innocent or even

laudable:—that to refer us to an internal Moral Faculty, is to refer us to mere caprice or prejudice. And this argument has been of efficacy enough to prevent the morality of conscience from being generally adopted as a *System*.

These two arguments are so convincing in their effect upon men's minds, that I do not conceive that any system can stand, against which either of them can be justly urged. In order to frame a scheme of morality which shall fall in with the Common Sense of mankind, we must, I conceive, conform it to both the considerations thus urged. On the one hand, the distinction of right and wrong, of moral good and evil, of virtue and vice, must be a *peculiar distinction*, different from the mere distinction of pleasure and pain, gain and loss;—on the other hand, this distinction must be one *not* immediately apprehended by any *peculiar sense* or faculty, which belongs to each individual, and which may vary in its results in each; but must be a distinction discerned by some use of the faculty of Reason which is common to all mankind, so that men may have the means of coming to an agreement on such subjects. The sentiment of approbation with which we regard what is right and good may be different from any result of *reasoning*; but the must be *reasons* why actions are right and good.

When I attempt to proceed further in the direction thus pointed out by the Common Sense of mankind; I am led to ask whether there are any actions or qualities of actions which are universally regarded by mankind with approbation, as right and good; and again, whether there are any moral rules or moral truths which are accepted by the Common Sense of mankind as

universally valid and true, and from which we can reason concerning right and wrong.

To this we may reply, that there *are* such universally approved qualities of actions, namely, those which are commonly called *virtues*; for instance, Veracity, Justice, Benevolence;—that there are also such rules universally accepted as valid; for instance, *Speak the truth: Give to each his own: Be kind to friends*:—I may add that these latter precepts may be expressed as propositions; for we can say, *It is right to be truthful, honest, kind*; and thus there *are* moral truths which are generally assented to.

I remark also that, at this point, the sentiment of approval, and the conviction of truth, which are, both, contained (as I have said) in the Common Sense of mankind on moral subjects, point to one common result. We admire and approve Veracity, Justice, Benevolence; we also assent to the truths that it is right to be truthful, just, kind. Here, therefore, we appear to have certain principles of Reason, which may be also accepted as the dictates of a Moral Faculty; and thus, we have a basis for a Moral System on grounds undisturbed by either of the opposing arguments which have been mentioned. Here are moral principles on which the agreement among men is universal, and from which we can reason to other moral truths.

To this it may be objected, *first*, that there is not such an agreement: and *next*, that the principles cannot be made the ground of reasoning. These two objections I have to explain, and then, to remove.

It may be said, in urging the former objection, that the excellence of such virtues as Veracity, Justice, and

Benevolence is by no means universally assented to:—men treat other men, when they regard them as their enemies, with the extreme of unkindness and violence, rob them, and deceive them by falsehood and fraud; and admire and applaud themselves and each other for such acts. Thus the general authority of the precepts which require men to be truthful, just, and kind, is practically rejected; and with regard to enemies, is not even speculatively admitted. And even without going to cases in which men are thus under the influence of hostile feelings, there are exhibited in the laws and manners of different nations, the widest differences of opinion as to what conduct Truth, Justice, and Humanity require: and the same might be said of the other virtues. So that there is not among men that agreement respecting fundamental moral principles which we have asserted.

To this I reply, that the difficulty of determining what actions Truth, or Justice, or Humanity requires in a given case, does not make an exception to the principle, that we are to do what Truth, Justice, and Humanity require. The principle may be universally assented to, however difficult be its interpretation or application in a given case. And this is in fact so: all mankind agree that we must be truthful, just, humane, even when they differ about what we ought to do. The excellence of these virtues, the authority of these precepts, is universally acknowledged, though the results of them may be different in the minds of different persons. And as to that part of the objection, which states that we do not apply these precepts to our enemies, and do not treat *them* with Truthfulness, Justice, and Humanity; I reply, that, when the moral faculties of mankind are fully unfolded, they

do universally allow that enemies are to be treated with Truthfulness, Justice, and Humanity, no less than friends; though the rules of action in detail may be very different towards enemies, (if we must necessarily have enemies,) and towards friends. And if, at an earlier period of men's moral progress, they look upon enemies as having no claims to be treated with Truth, Justice, and Humanity, this is because they have only turned their thoughts to the virtues which affect their friends. They approve, it may be, of Fraud or Violence used towards enemies; but this is because they look upon such a course as showing Fidelity and Kindness to friends: and thus, the qualities which they admire, are still the virtues of Fidelity and Kindness, though they limit the sphere of their virtues. The Romans at first had *stranger* and *enemy* as synonymous; but afterwards, they learnt to admire the poet when he said *Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*. And it is evident that the latter was truly the voice of man's moral nature. For that which we look for, as principles universally assented to by men, must be principles which we assent to when we think and speak in the name of the human species, not of any fraction or segment of it, separated by hostility from the other parts. And thus, the authority of such virtues as Truth, Justice, Humanity, and the like, over the human species, is assented to by all men, when they are in a condition to judge on such matters. *Truthful, just, humane*, are words which are universally used and accepted as terms of praise. Even if in certain cases, men think that there are allowable exceptions to the rules which enjoin Truth, Justice, Humanity, still they do not deny that it is universally right to be truthful, just, and humane. And thus we *have* an

agreement among men with regard to certain fundamental principles of morality.

But, in reply to this, may be urged that which we noticed in the second objection to our proposed basis of Morality:—namely, that such principles as these are too vague and loose to reason from. It may be said that a verbal agreement in employing the terms *truthful, just, humane*, and the like, as terms of praise, does not prove that men really agree in approving any definite qualities in human actions: that Veracity, Justice, Humanity, are indefinite and variable notions, changing with each changing mood and condition of man, and having only a mere nominal permanency and coherence:—that to say that Veracity, Justice, Humanity, are Virtues, cannot help us to any rules of action, except we know what it is that constitutes a Virtue:—that though men may agree that it is *right* to be truthful, just, and humane, this helps us not in determining what is right in any special case; because we can find no measure of the particular kinds of *Rightness* which we call Veracity, Justice, Humanity, except by finding a Measure of Rightness in general; and that such a general Standard is necessary as the basis of any Moral System.

Now, these last objections I hold to be erroneous: and it is in denying their force, and in establishing a System of Morality in the way which those objections declare to be impossible, that the peculiar character of the present work consists. And I must briefly notice the course which I take, in rejecting the arguments thus urged.

I agree with the objectors, that we must, in the first place, fix, not indeed any Measure or Standard of *Rightness* or *Virtue*, by reference to any other thing, but that, as clearly as we can, we must fix what is meant and

implied in the adjective *right*. When that is determined, there is no great additional difficulty with regard to other fundamental terms of Morality: for actions which are *right*, are also *virtuous*; and *Virtue* is the habitual disposition which produces such actions: and in like manner we say of actions which are *right* in us, that they are our *Duty*; they are what we *ought* to do.

Now what is the character which we designate in an action, by saying that it is *right*? In so describing it, there is *this* Idea conveyed:—we render a *reason* for it, which reason is *paramount* to all other considerations. If the action be *right*, it is no valid reason against doing it, that it is unpleasant or dangerous. We are not to do what is pleasant and wrong. We are to do what is unpleasant if it be *right*. All mankind acknowledge this, as the Rule of their Common Moral Nature:—that is, of their Common Nature by which they know that there is a meaning in *right* and *wrong*. And thus *right*, absolutely used, implies the *Supreme* Rule:—it implies an ultimate and final reason of man's actions: a universal and absolute rule of man's being.

The supreme and universal rule of man's being is the rule which is supreme in its authority over all his faculties, powers, and impulses:—and this supreme rule will separate itself into partial rules according to the faculties, powers, and impulses which it has to govern. And by the very condition that it is a supreme and absolute rule, joined with the conditions which man's constitution supplies, we see, with irresistible evidence, the authority of certain fundamental moral truths; we thus discern the necessary existence of certain virtues as parts of this supreme rule of human action.

For instance: man lives in society with man; *his* actions and *theirs* have a mutual reference: his actions derive their effect, derive their meaning, from his own actions and those of his fellow men; and not present actions only, but past and future. He has the faculty of Speech, which is the means by which a man's past actions mainly, his future actions entirely, are connected with the actions (internal actions, hopes and fears, as well external actions) of other men. His whole being cannot be under a Supreme Rule, a rule of right and wrong, except the use of this faculty, the faculty of Speech,—as declaring his purposed future actions, for instance—be under such a rule. There must be, for the use of Speech, a rule of right and wrong:—a universal and supreme rule. But the ultimate and supreme distinction of the use of Speech is that of truth and falsehood. And it is plain that there can be no ultimate and supreme rule on this subject, except that rule which makes truth to be right and falsehood to be wrong. And thus, one part of the supreme rule is, that Truth is right: that it is right to speak the Truth: that Veracity is a Virtue.

And in like manner, when we consider man as a social being, constantly and universally desiring, using, and appropriating the things which exist in the world—having them as Possessions and Property—it is plain that there can be no universal rule of his actions, except there be a universal rule respecting Property:—and that the universal rule, being the rule of his being as well as of his external actions, must affect his desires of property, and his regards towards it on all occasions. And as the universal rule of Property must be that each man must have his own, (for this is involved in the meaning of *Property*,) the rule of man's internal being must be

in harmony with this rule: and the man must desire that each have his own. And this disposition is Justice, which thus is seen to be a Virtue.

And in like manner, other virtues are seen to be necessary parts of the Supreme Rule, by taking into account other parts of the constitution of man:—Humanity, by considering his Affections:—Purity, by considering his Bodily Desires:—Order and Rule in general, by considering his Reason.

And thus the answer to the objection urged against the recognition of certain Virtues,—Veracity, Justice, Humanity, and the like—as the basis of Morality, on the grounds of their vague character, would be this:—that Veracity, Justice, Humanity, are not merely vague, indefinite and insecure notions;—that we have certain definite Ideas of such Virtues which necessarily arise in our minds, when we consider the constitution of human nature, with its various elements and faculties, as subject to a supreme and universal Rule;—that the praise of being truthful, or just, or humane, is a praise which has always the same meaning as to the general Idea, though there may be different views as to how far the Idea is exemplified in any special case;—that the measure of each virtue is to be found in a due regulation of that part of the constitution of man to which that virtue specially relates;—and that the ground of this regulation is, that without such partial regulation of portions of the constitution of man, there could be no general and universal rule of man's being,—no absolute right and wrong,—and thus, no moral nature at all. There must be such Virtues as Veracity, Justice, Humanity, and others, in order that there may be such a thing as Virtue;—in order that man may be a moral creature.

This view of the nature and foundation of Morality agrees, I think, with the common notions of mankind; who, in pronouncing Veracity, Justice, Humanity, to be Virtues, are guided and determined by a conviction that these virtues are due and right regulations of the Faculty of Speech, the Desire of external things, and the Affections: and not by an apprehension of any extraneous purposes which these virtues are to answer. And when we attempt to carry this view further into detail, and to determine how far special acts are right or wrong, we still follow the course which men follow in their ordinary judgments of one another's actions, or their own. An action is right, if it be, or at least so far as it is, truthful, just, humane. This is the ordinary sense of mankind. But again: *Is a certain act truthful?* To know that, we must consider what we mean by *Truth*; and how far it is found in the case which we have before us: and the like of Justice, of Humanity, of Purity, and of other Virtues.

This is the course followed in the ensuing pages:— and that it is not a mere vague and indefinite mode of treating the subject, which can lead to no positive results, appears further in the course of the Treatise itself: for I have there, following entirely, as I conceive, the course pointed out by the system, been conducted to determinations on special points of Morality, as definite, and I think as well supported by reasons, as those of any previous moralists.

In my first edition, I said a few words implying an analogy between the relations of Truths to each other in Morality, and in that subject in which the nature and foundation of Truth is supposed to be best studied, Geometry. The suggestion of any such analogy appears to be received by many readers with great impatience;

and as none of my conclusions depend upon the analogy, I willingly withdraw all discussion of it. Neither do I consider that it is of any consequence to claim for fundamental principles of Morality, such as I have stated (that it is right to be truthful, just, humane, and the like) the name of *Axioms*. But I must say, at the same time, that a very baseless objection has been urged against this application of the word. It has been said that the Moral Precepts *Be truthful, Be just, Be kind*, cannot be called *Axioms*, and have no analogy with *Axioms*, inasmuch as they are not propositions at all, but commands. Now this objection overlooks altogether the peculiar and distinctive character of Morality. It is the very essence of moral truth, that it implies Command. To say that *It is right* to be kind, is to say to man's moral ear, *Be kind*. When the Ideas of Rightness, of Duty, of Virtue, of a Law of our nature, are once apprehended, it is seen that they involve an obligation to act*. Moral Principles are preceptive in their nature. They are necessarily imperative, even when they are merely assertions. Their *categorical* form involves an *epitactic* meaning.

If it be asked, to which of our English Moralists the Scheme of Morality here presented most nearly approaches, I reply, that it follows Butler in his doctrine, that by the mere contemplation of our human faculties and springs of action, we can discern certain relations which must exist among them, by the necessity of man's moral being. He maintains that, by merely comparing appetite and reflection or conscience, as springs of action, we see that

* So Butler, Sermon III. "Your obligation to obey this law is its being the Law of your nature. That your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of action, is itself alone an obligation."

the latter is superior in its nature, and ought to rule*. This truth, I, with him, conceive to be self-evident; and I endeavour to express it by stating, as a fundamental Moral Principle, that *the Lower Parts of our Nature are to be governed by the Higher*. And I conceive that there are several other Moral Principles which are, in like manner, self-evident. For instance, considering men as social beings, capable of mutual understanding expressed in speech, and also as moral beings, subject to a rule of right and wrong, I conceive it to be self-evident that the rule of their being must include veracity: the question whether it shall or shall not be man's duty to speak the truth, appears to me to be capable of being answered, like the other, "from the economy and constitution of human nature." If we compare the Idea of Truth with the Idea of Moral Rules for man, we see that the former is necessarily included in the latter†. And in the same manner, if we consider men as creatures desiring and appropriating the things of the external world, and also as beings living under a moral rule, we see that it must be a part of the moral rule that *each should not*

* Butler, Sermon III. "Which is to be obeyed, appetite or reflection? Cannot this question be answered from the economy and constitution of human nature, merely, without saying which is strongest? or need this at all come into consideration? Would not the question be *intelligibly* and fully answered by saying that the principle of reflection or conscience being compared with the various appetites, passions, and affections in men, the power is manifestly superior and chief without regard to strength? and how often soever the latter happens to prevail, it is mere *usurpation*."

† Butler, in his *Dissertation on Virtue* (at the end) puts Justice and Veracity, as I conceive, on this footing; and he there also notices that this view is not disturbed by the difficulties which may exist as to what veracity requires in a special case.

desire what is the property of another. And in like manner, it is self-evident, that each man should abstain from violence and anger towards others;—that man *must love his fellow-men*:—it is evident, I say, on a thoughtful consideration of man's moral and social condition, that this must be a part of the general rule of his being, however much there may be, under particular circumstances, cases in which anger on moral grounds is permitted by the rule. As I have already said, this obligation of universal love was assented to as a truth, however striking, yet self-evident, by the shout of the Roman theatre, uttered at a period when the Romans had outgrown the original narrowness and ferocity of their character.

If the evident truth of such moral principles be fully assented to, it is of little consequence whether or not we term them *Axioms*. But we may observe that there is nothing inconsistent with their being *Axioms*, in their requiring calm reflection, steady thought, and a development of the moral ideas, in order to a full apprehension of their evidence and generality; for such reflection, thought, and development of the (geometrical) ideas, are requisite to the full apprehension even of geometrical *Axioms*; and the like is true in other portions of human knowledge. We may very reasonably call it an *Axiom* that *Veracity is a Duty*, if it be a truth which becomes more and more evident exactly as the Ideas of *Duty* and of *Veracity* become more and more clear in our minds.

And the *Maxims* which we have stated:—that *the Lower Parts of Human Nature must be governed by the Higher*;—that *truth must be spoken*;—that *we must not desire what is another's*;—that *man is to be loved of*

man;—and it may be, some others, have also this further character of Axioms,—that we do not and cannot deduce them, in their full evidence and extent, from any more fundamental principles of which they are the consequences and applications. They are primary principles, and are established in our minds simply by a contemplation of our moral nature and condition; or, what expresses the same thing, by *intuition*.

It may be objected to this, that these principles, or at least some of them, are supported by reasoning; for instance, the principle that *truth must be spoken*, may be shown to be necessary to the comfort and well-being of men in society; since men must needs be constantly dependent upon one another, and if they could not reckon upon this dependence, in virtue of the general acceptation of the Rule of Veracity, they must be put to the greatest inconvenience, and suffer much misery. But upon this we may observe, that such a consideration of the intolerable consequences which would follow if the maxim were not true, does not necessarily prevent its being a primary principle, intuitively apprehended. For with regard to other axioms also, one mode of bringing before our minds their necessary truth is, to try to picture to ourselves what would be the consequence of supposing them not true. Thus, in some books of geometry, there are attempts to explain what the consequences would be if two straight lines *could* enclose a space: and it is easily shown that if we imagine the opposite principle to be untrue, the grossest and most intolerable incongruities in the relations of lines to one another must necessarily be admitted.

Moreover, no consideration of the evil consequences which would ensue if such cardinal and moral maxims

as the above were false, can be the ground of our belief in them; for no such consideration can prove these maxims true, in that full and pervading application which men spontaneously give them. For men not only assent to the maxim that *truth must be spoken*, in promises and the like; but when they are led to consider what is a fit maxim for man as a moral being, whose will, purpose, thought, as well as his acts, must be governed by a rule of right and wrong, they do not hesitate to decide that in will, purpose, and thought, as well as in act, falsehood is forbidden him; that he must be truthful in his heart, and a lover of truth, in order to be such as he ought to be. And the like universality and fulness of application men give to all other fundamental moral maxims. It is indeed this application to man's will, purposes, thoughts, desires, affections, which especially makes them to be *moral* principles, and not merely rules of external action.

Certain moral principles being, as I have said, thus seen to be true by intuition, under due conditions of reflection and thought, are unfolded into their application by further reflection and thought. When we have come to the conviction that Truth, Justice, and the like, are the rule of our being, we have to consider, *What is Truth*, and *What is Justice*, in special cases. In pursuing this inquiry, we have to attend both to the external conditions and to the internal essence of moral action; and we are thus led to perceive that between the external conditions and the internal essence, there is a kind of necessary and universal antithesis;—the antithesis which occurs in so many forms and in so many places, of *Idea* and *Fact*. Man is to do what the Supreme Rule of his being requires, under the circum-

stances. The Supreme Rule of his being, an *internal* principle, governs his thoughts, habits, purposes; but yet, his thoughts, habits, purposes, depend upon *external* circumstances also; his very being is what it has been made by his education and his history; by the history of his family and his nation; and thus, by the history of the world, of which that of his nation is a branch. There is thus a *factual* or historical side of every moral question, as well as a purely *moral* side; there are in it external elements, given by man's history, as well as internal rules, given by man's moral constitution. Thus every moral question is, on one side, historical. *What a man ought to do*, at every step, depends in some way upon what he already *has done*, and *has*, and *is*. And hence our absolute solutions of moral questions, and our applications of moral rules, must all be, in some measure, imperfect, partial, and hypothetical.

For instance, Morality must, in some measure at least, depend upon Law. It is wrong to steal, to covet, to desire what is another's. But the law alone can determine what *is* another's. *That* is a historical question; and that *datum*, as given by law and history, must enter into our moral discussions. But yet the legal and historical *datum* is not an absolute and final point:—for the law may be an unjust law; the history may be a series of wrong-doing; and thus, law and history may be judged, and may be modified, by morality. But again, however much modified, there will still remain a law and a history as Facts, as external elements, as the conditions by which the Idea of Justice is to be limited and exemplified. And thus, the anti-thesis of Idea and Fact in moral questions can never be

got rid of, however the boundary line between the two opposite regions may change.

I may once more remark, that this method of deciding questions of Morality which I have thus described, and which I have followed in the present work, is that which men ordinarily follow, when they examine such questions by the spontaneous exercise of their common faculties. I think it must be obvious to any one, on consideration, that men, when they have to determine whether any course of action is to be approved and admired, do not (except when biassed by special adopted systems) inquire whether such a course tends either to general or to particular interest and gratification; but whether it exhibits Justice, Veracity, Kindness, Purity, and Wisdom. If they are satisfied that an action is just, faithful, benevolent, pure, wise, they willingly believe indeed, that it tends to promote human happiness and the happiness of the actor in the long run (as we also teach); but even if they are not able to see this, and if there appear to be, so far as human eyes can discern, an overbalance of pain and inconvenience in the act, still, if it be thus an example of virtue, they approve and admire it. Butler expresses the Common Judgment of mankind, when he says, that we are not competent judges of what is, taking all its remotest consequences into account, for the good of the world; and that God has given us other ways of discerning our duty*.

I have treated some questions of Morality under the Title of *Cases of Conscience*; such questions being all

* Sermon XII. *Upon the Love of our Neighbour*. See the Preface to my Edition of his Three Sermons.

included in this question: *What is our Duty under given circumstances?* a question which no moralist can avoid discussing. I have given, as the general solution of such questions, that we must, in all cases, do that which most tends to promote our moral culture. But I have not given this as a sufficient and satisfactory solution, easily applicable in every case. On the contrary, I have stated that the application of such a rule is difficult, and sometimes dangerous; and requires to be directed and applied by means of narrower rules. And this is so, in virtue of that element of external circumstances, facts and conditions, which, as I have just said, enters so largely into all moral questions: besides the difficulty of judging of our own moral character and its probable future modification. There is a great difficulty in many cases of conscience, precisely because the external historical element must be regarded; but there is no morality possible, if this element be either disregarded, or regarded as supreme and uncontrollable.

In order further to exemplify the external element of Fact and History which is the condition of man's moral action, I have given a sketch of the actual Law of Ancient Rome and of Modern England in Book IV. This sketch was, in the former edition, placed as Book II., and thus preceded the exposition of Morality which forms Book II. in the present Edition. I have made this transposition for this among other reasons, that the parts of the work in their former order might possibly suggest an erroneous view of the grounds of Morality; as if *Jus*, or Positive Law, were the foundation of moral truths, instead of being merely a condition of the application of moral results to actual cases.

The former edition was, indeed, subjected to a

curious kind of criticism on this head. It was asserted, in spite of all that the Author could say to the contrary, that in the system then published, Morality was entirely deduced from positive Law; and then, the Author was blamed because his Law did not fairly lead to his Morality. It might have been hoped and expected that those who complained of the want of a logical sequence from the Law to the Morality which the work contained, might have been willing to attend to the Author's repeated declarations that such a sequence was no part of his plan.

In national as well as in individual conduct, all moral questions have an historical as well as a moral side: and with the increased complexity and extent of the historical element, increases also the difficulty of solving the question in any other than an historical shape. Many questions of national polity cannot be stated in a general and hypothetical form without both disfiguring the question, and leaving out, in each case, conditions essential for the answer. This remark applies especially to questions relative to the relation of *Church and State*, which must be, in each country, questions peculiarly historical. On this ground I have in the present edition omitted the general statements formerly given respecting the Relation of Church and State, and have given to the few remarks on this subject which I have now introduced, an historical turn. I am well aware how imperfectly the subject is here treated; but I have perhaps said enough to point out its place in a system of *Morality and Polity*.

Paley has introduced into his Morality discussions on Forms of Prayer and on the Christian Sabbath. Following him in this respect, I had, in the former

edition, introduced the arguments which bear upon these ordinances, and also upon others which have the same right as these to appear in a system of Morality. In the present edition I have excluded all that relates to Christian Ordinances; perceiving that the discussion of such matters is not a part of the Moralist's proper province, and involves him in various unnecessary difficulties. I trust that none of my readers will regret the absence of these discussions.

I have corrected a few other passages in the First Edition, to which objections were made with some reason. For instance, I had said in Article 271 of the First Edition, that *Things are to be sought only as means to Moral Ends*; meaning, that *Things are to be sought UNIVERSALLY as means to Moral Ends*, as I have now stated it (Art. 164). But though I have thus removed the appearance of enjoining the suppression of all our natural desires of things for their own sake,—an impossible and unmeaning injunction—I conceive that *that* would be a very lax and low Morality which should leave our natural desires and affections, in all ordinary cases, to themselves, as being something out of its province. I conceive, on the contrary, that all gratifications or restraints of the desires, all acts of affection and thought, have their share in the formation of the habits and character; and may have, and therefore ought to have, a moral value given to them. I conceive, as I have here said (Art. 340) that the more our Morality becomes pervasive and efficacious, the more does the circle of things morally indifferent narrow and dwindle. I conceive that, as Religion teaches us, whatever we do, to do it to the glory of God, so the Morality of mere reason teaches us, whatever we

do, to do it so as to help onwards that elevation and purification of our moral nature which is the best mode that reason can discern of promoting the glory of our Creator.

I have been led, by such considerations as those above stated, to lay down, as the Fundamental Points of Morality, these Virtues or Principles;—(162) Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose. These appear to me, as I have said, to possess an axiomatic authority as Moral Principles:—to be virtues of which the excellency and obligation are clearly seen, in proportion as the Idea of Virtue is clearly apprehended and applied to the various faculties and impulses which enter into the constitution of man. These Principles appear to me also to occupy the whole sphere of man's Duty, so far as it offers itself to the eye of human reason; and therefore to afford a proper framework for a system of rational Morality.

I conceive (as I stated also in the First Edition,) that there is a great convenience in the Division of the general trunk of Morality into five branches: the Morality of Reason; the Morality of Religion; Jurisprudence; Polity; International Law. These five provinces, though intimately connected, appear to be distinct, and their boundaries tolerably well defined. The questions belonging to each, and even the general style of treating the questions in each, are different. I hope in particular that the separation of the Morality of Religion from that of mere Reason will be approved of. This separation enables us to trace the results of the moral guidance of human Reason consistently and continuously, while we still retain a due sense of the superior authority of Religion; and it lead us to see that in many places this

guidance of human Reason is insufficient without religion, and that Religion is the higher guide which we need;—the necessary supplement to a mere rational Morality.

By introducing such a subject as Jurisprudence, I have necessarily been led to questions and expressions of a professional kind, and in which therefore an unprofessional person is in great danger of error. I hope it will be recollected, as an excuse for this proceeding, not only that this branch of the subject has a necessary place in my system, but also that almost all preceding writers of Moral Systems have discussed jural as well as moral questions; commonly mingling the two kinds of discussion together. This portion of my work had, in the First Edition, the great advantage of being read and remarked on by Mr. William Empson: and I have taken the liberty of using some of his remarks, especially in the Notes on the Fourth Book. The same Book has, in this Second Edition, had the further advantage of the revision of Mr. Robert Leslie Ellis, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, especially with reference to the Roman Law. The only drawback to the pleasure which I feel in mentioning the friendly services which I have received from these gentlemen, arises from the fear that this part of the work may be still too imperfect to be worthy of having their names put in connection with it.

Besides some of the common English law-books, I have referred to some American ones, especially Chancellor Kent's *Commentaries on American Law*, Judge Story's *Commentaries on Equity*, and his *Conflict of Laws*. In the Fifth Book on Polity, I have made free use of many excellent works of my contemporaries; especially Mr. Hallam's *Middle Ages*, and *English Con-*

stitution; Mr. Allen's Inquiry into the Royal Prerogative; Sir Francis Palgrave's History of the English Commonwealth; Mr. Jones's work on Rent; and (particularly in the Chapter on the Representative System) Lord Brougham's Political Philosophy.

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BOOK I.



INTRODUCTION.

ELEMENTARY NOTIONS AND DEFINITIONS.

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ELEMENTARY NOTIONS AND DEFINITIONS.

CHAPTER I.

THE REASON.

1. IN the present work I have to speak of the Actions of man, and of those Faculties by which he acts as man. These faculties belong to man in virtue of the Human Nature which is common to all men. They are Human Faculties, and give rise to Human Actions.

I and my readers share in this common Human Nature, and hence, instead of saying that *man* acts thus and thus, or has such and such faculties, I shall often say that *we* act thus, or that *we* have such faculties.

2. Man has faculties of Sensation, by which he perceives and observes *Things*, or objects without him; and faculties of Reflection, by which he is aware of *Thoughts*, or actions within him.

These faculties of Sensation and Reflection are inseparably combined in their operation. We cannot observe external Things without some degree of Thought; nor can we reflect upon our Thoughts, without being influenced in the course of our reflection by the Things which we have observed.

3. Man, thus combining Observation and Reflection, is led to regard external things as grouped and classed, in his thoughts. He contemplates objects under *general* and *abstract* forms; and thus has Conceptions or Notions of them, and applies to them Names. Thus bread, fruit, flesh, are classed together and indicated by

the general name of *food*; food, clothing, tools, arms, are all included in the general name *property*. Such terms are abstract, as well as general: in calling many different things *food*, we designate one certain use of the things, abstracting it from the things themselves, and neglecting their other qualities. In like manner, when we call many different things *property*, we abstract one special view of the things so described, from all various circumstances which may belong to them.

4. When we consider things under these general and abstract aspects, they can be denoted by Names, as we have said. Names indicate a class of things, or relations of things, which have all a single general and abstract aspect. The Conception is *that*, in our thoughts, which we express or signify by the Name.

Man not only contemplates things, or objects, and their relations; but he contemplates also Changes of things and of their relations, or Facts. Thus he observes that the stars move round the pole, or that Brutus stabs Cæsar. Or the absence of change may be a Fact; as, that the pole-står does not move.

Facts, as well as things, are described by general and abstract words. Things are described by Substantives; Facts, by Verbs, or words which assert.

5. When the relations or changes so asserted really exist or occur, the assertions are *true*. We can, by various processes, of observation and reflection, satisfy ourselves that some assertions are true and some false. We can be certain and sure of such truth and such falsehood. We may convince ourselves and convince others of it; but we may also mistake in such conviction. Man has means of knowing Truth, but is also liable to Error.

Truth and Error are concerned about many General Relations of objects, which belong to them in the view in which we apprehend them. For example, we apprehend objects as existing in Space and Time; as being One or Many; Like or Unlike; as moving, and affecting each other's motions; and many other relations.

We can, in thought, separate these General Relations from the objects and facts. Such general relations are

Space, Time, Number, Resemblance, Cause and Effect, and the like. These general relations thus separated may be termed *Ideas*; but the term *Idea* is often used more loosely, to designate all abstract objects of thought.

6. Objects and facts being regulated by these Ideas, we can, by the nature of our Ideas themselves, as for example the Ideas of Space, Time, Number, and the like, connect one fact with another by necessary consequence. Thus, we observe the fact that the stars move uniformly about the pole; we observe also their distances from each other. We can connect, with these facts, the times and places of their rising and setting, by a necessary process of thought. Such a process of thought is *reasoning*. We can reason, so that from the north polar distance of the star, and the latitude of the place of observation, we can deduce the interval of time between the star's rising and setting.

7. When we thus reason concerning things existing under these general relations of Space, Time, Number, and the like, we proceed upon, and necessarily assume, certain grounds, or Fundamental Principles, respecting these relations. And these Principles, the origin and basis of our reasoning, may be separately asserted, as *Axioms*. Such Principles are the Axioms of Geometry.

8. By observation of the external world according to the general relations of Space, Time, Number, Resemblance, Cause and Effect, and the like, we become acquainted with this external world, so as to trace its course, at least in some degree. We apprehend several facts, or objects, as conforming to a general Rule or *Law*. Thus, the Stars in general conform to the Law, that they revolve uniformly about the pole. The Planets conform to certain other Laws, which were discovered by the Chaldean and Greek astronomers. Such Laws are *Laws of Nature*.

When we discover such a constancy and sequence in events, we believe some of the events to be the consequences of the others. We are then led forwards to future, as well as backwards to past events. We believe that some events will *certainly* happen, that

others are *probable*. We believe it certain that the Sun will rise to-morrow, and probable that he will shine.

9. We can, in our thoughts, separate Laws of Nature from the Facts which conform to them. When we do this, the Law is represented by the Ideas and Conceptions which it involves. Thus the Law of a Planet's motion round the Sun, as to space, is represented by the conception of an Ellipse, the Sun being in its Focus. Laws so abstracted from Facts are *Theories*.

10. The operations by which we frame and deal with Ideas and Conceptions, and all other acts of thought, are ascribed to the *Mind*; they are *mental* operations and acts.

The mental operations which have been noticed; namely, to conceive objects in a general and abstract manner (3); to apply names to them (4); to reason (6); to apprehend first principles of reasoning (7); to conceive general rules (9); to apprehend facts as conformable to general rules (8); are functions belonging to man, exclusively of all other animals. They are ascribed to a faculty specially human, the *Reason*.

The substantive *Reason*, thus used, has a wider sense than the verb *to reason*. The Reason is not only the faculty by which we reason from fundamental principles, when we have anyhow attained or assumed these; it is also the faculty by which we apprehend fundamental principles. By our Reason, we not only reason from the axioms of Geometry, but also see the truth of the axioms.

The special substantive, *a reason*, denotes a step in reasoning.

11. Of the processes which have been mentioned as belonging to the Reason, some are also ascribed to the *Understanding*, but not all. The Reason and the Understanding have not been steadily distinguished by English writers. The most simple way to use the substantive *Understanding* in a definite sense, is to make it correspond, in its extent, with the verb *understand*. To understand anything, is to apprehend it

according to certain *assumed* ideas and rules; we do not include, in the meaning of the word, an examination of the ground of the ideas and rules, by reference to which we understand the thing. We understand a Language, when we apprehend what is said, according to the established vocabulary and grammar of the language; without inquiring how the words came to have their meaning, or what is the ground of the grammatical rules. We *understand* the sense, without *reasoning* about the etymology and syntax. Again, we understand a Machine when we perceive how its parts will work upon one another according to the known laws of mechanics, without inquiring what is the ground of these laws.

Reasoning may be requisite to understanding. We may have to reason about the syntax, in order to understand the sense: we may have to reason upon mechanical principles, in order to understand the machine. But understanding leaves still room for reasoning: we may understand the elliptical theory of Mars's motions, and may still require a reason for the theory. Also we may understand what is not conformable to Reason; as when we understand a man's arguments, and think them unfounded in Reason.

We understand a thing, as we have said, when we apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules. We reason, in order to deduce rules from first principles, or from one another. But the rules and principles, which must be expressed when we reason, may be only implied when we understand. We may understand the sense of a speech, without thinking of rules of grammar. We may understand the working of a machine, without thinking of propositions in the sciences of geometry and mechanics.

The Reason is employed both in understanding and in reasoning; but the Principles which are explicitly asserted in reasoning, are only implicitly applied in understanding. The Reason includes, as we have said, both the Faculty of seeing First Principles, and the Reasoning Faculty by which we obtain other Principles

which are derivative. The Understanding is the Faculty of applying Principles however obtained.

The Reason, of which we here speak, is the *Speculative Reason*. We shall hereafter have to speak of the Practical Reason also.

12. The term *Intellect* is derived from a verb (*intelligo*) which signifies *to understand*: but the term itself is usually so applied as to imply a Faculty which recognizes Principles explicitly as well as implicitly; and abstract as well as applied; and therefore agrees with the Reason rather than the Understanding; and the same extent of signification belongs to the adjective *intellectual*.

13. Man not only can contemplate external things; he can also *act* upon them and with them. He can gather the fruits of the earth, and make bread. He can take such things to himself, as his property, or give them to another man, as a reward.

The word *Action* may be applied, in the most general manner, to all exercise of the external or internal faculties of man. But we do not always so use the word. We often distinguish external *action* from internal *thought*, though thought also is a kind of activity. We also often distinguish *actions* from *words*, as when we say A man's actions contradict his words. Yet in a more general sense, we include a man's words in his actions. We say that a man's actions correspond with his words, when he performs what he has promised; though the performance itself should be words; as when he has promised to plead a cause.

14. We direct our thoughts to an action which we are about to perform: we *intend* to do it: we make it our *aim*: we place it before us, and act with *purpose* (*propositum*): we *design* it, or mark it out beforehand (*designo*).

15. Will, or Volition, is the last step of intention, the first step of action. It is the internal act which leads to external acts.

An action that proceeds from my will or volition is *my act*. But if it do not proceed from my will, it is

not my act, though my limbs may be employed in it; as for instance, if my hand, moved by another man whose strength overmasters mine, strikes a blow. In such a case, I am not a Free Agent. Human Actions suppose the Freedom of the Agent. In order to act, a man must be so circumstanced that his volitions take effect on his limbs and organs, according to the usual constitution of man.

The Will is stimulated to action by certain Springs of Action, of which we shall afterwards speak.

16. Among the Springs of Action, are Rules or Laws. There are Laws of Human Action, as well as Laws of Nature (8). But while the Laws of Nature are assertions only, as; Mars *revolves* in an ellipse; a solar eclipse *will* take place at the new moon; the Laws of human action are *commands*: as, *Steal* not; or, *Thou shalt* not steal: We *must* be temperate. These imperative Laws of Human Action, we shall call *Rules*. Such Rules, when adjusted with due regard to the Springs of Action, direct the Will.

17. Actions may lead to events, as causes to effects: they may have consequences, immediate or remote. To steal, is an action which may have the gain of a shilling for its immediate, and a whipping for its remote consequence.

An *End* is a consequence intended, aimed at, purposed, designed (14). When we act with purpose, we have an end, to which the action is a *Means*. To possess the fruit being my end, I purposely cultivate the plant as the means.

18. The Rules of Action (16) may command actions as means to an end: thus: *Steal* not, *that thou be not whipt*. Be temperate, *in order to be healthy*.

19. We have often a *Series* of Actions each of which is a means, towards the next, as an end. We dig the ground, that we may make the plant to grow; we make a spade, that we may dig the ground; we take a branch of a tree, to make a handle for the spade.

20. To discern the consequences of actions; to act with purpose; and to consider our actions as means to

an end ; are processes which are ascribed to the Reason, as well as the mental operations which have already been spoken of (10).

As possessing Reason, man is called *rational* or *reasonable*. But the latter term is often used in a more special sense ; meaning, agreeable to such rules and measures as man, by the use of his reason, may discover.

21. The Reason, when employed in such processes as have been noticed already (10), is the *Speculative* Reason : we oppose to this the *Practical* Reason, which guides us in applying Rules to our actions, and discerning the consequences of actions (20). The Speculative Reason tends to speculative Truth ; in which ideas, conceptions, and abstract propositions are contemplated : the Practical Reason guides us to truth, so far as it concerns our actions. By the Practical Reason, we apprehend objects and facts in a manner conformable to their true relations ; and hence, we discern the true consequences of our actions, though the relations and the actions are not explicitly contemplated. This true apprehension of the relations of things may be only implied, not explicitly contemplated, in the Act of the Will, by which we take such means as lead to our ends.

22. The ideas, relations, rules, conceptions of ends and means, and the like, which are implicitly involved in the exercise of the Practical Reason, may be *unfolded*, so as to be matter of contemplation. In this manner, the Practical Reason is developed into the Speculative Reason. Such a developement of the human mind is produced by the exercise of Thought.

23. Animals, as well as man, conform their actions to the true relations of objects (21), and perform actions which look like means to ends (17). Thus, bees build cells in hexagonal forms, so as to fill space ; and birds build nests, so as to shelter themselves and their young. But in the case of animals, the tendency to action cannot be unfolded into ideas, and conceptions of ends. Bees have no conceptions of hexagons, separate from

their cells. Birds do not contemplate an end, when they build a nest: for they build nests in a state of captivity, where there is no end to be answered. The tendencies to such actions are implanted in the constitution of the animal, but are not capable of being unfolded into ideas, as in a rational nature they are (22). Hence such tendencies are called *Instincts*, and are distinguished from Practical Reason.

24. Instinct, as well as Reason, operates through the Will, to direct the actions. In both cases, the Will is stimulated into action by certain Appetites and Desires, which we shall term *Springs of Action*.

We use the term *Springs* of action, rather than *Principles* of action, because the term *Principles* is used equivocally, not only for Operative Principles, which produce action, but for Express Principles, which assert Propositions.

The Springs of Action of which we have to speak, are the Motive Powers of man's conscious nature, and might hence be called *Motives*. They first put man in motion; that is, in the state of internal motion which leads to intention and will. But in common language, the term *Motive* is rather used to designate the special object of the intention, than the general desire which impels us to intend. When a man labours hard for gain, his spring of action being the desire of having, his Motive is to get money. But he may do the same thing, his Motive being to support his family, and then his spring of action is his family affections.

CHAPTER II.

THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION.

25. THE Springs of Action in man may be enumerated as follows: The Appetites or Bodily Desires; the Affections; the Mental Desires; the Moral Sentiments; and the Reflex Sentiments. We shall consider them in order.

1. *The Appetites.*

26. The Appetites or Bodily Desires are common to man and brutes. The strongest and most obvious of them are the Appetites for Food (Hunger and Thirst), by which the individual is sustained; and that by which the species is continued. These appetites are tendencies towards certain bodily things, and cravings for these things when they are withheld.

But besides these, there are many other bodily Desires which may be classed with the Appetites, and which are powerful springs of action. Such are the desire of rest after labour, the desire of sleep after long waking, the desire of warmth and shelter, the desire of air and exercise.

These Desires are *Natural Wants*; they are Needs of man's nature. Man cannot exist at all, except they are satisfied in some degree; and cannot exist in a healthy and stable condition, except they are satisfied in an adequate degree.

27. Moreover, by the constitution of man, certain Pleasures are conjoined with the satisfying of these wants; and the Springs of Action, of which we now speak, include the Desire of these Pleasures. Thus, man has not only an appetite for food, but a desire of delicious food, and a Sense of Taste, by which he relishes such food. He has, in like manner, a pleasure in sweet odours, and a desire of this pleasure; and similarly for the other senses.

Man uses various Arts, to satisfy his natural wants, and to gratify his desires for the pleasures of sense, of which we have spoken. As such gratifications, through means of art, become habitual, they also become Wants, and are termed *Artificial Wants*. These Artificial Wants, no less than Natural Wants, are powerful Springs of Action among men.

2. *The Affections.*

28. The Affections are tendencies or cravings directed towards conscious individuals; not, like the Desires, tendencies and cravings for bodily objects. The Bodily Desires tend to things, Affections to Persons.

But the Affections are not mere tendencies or cravings, they are internal Emotions or Feelings: being directed to persons, not to things, they mould the thoughts in a way quite different from what the Appetites do.

29. The two principal affections are Love, and Anger. The term Love, is sometimes used to describe the Bodily Desires, as when we talk of a Love of wine, or a Love of the pleasures of the table. But the more direct and proper sense of the word, is that in which it denotes an affection towards a person. A man's love of his wife and children is more properly Love, than his love of wine or of music.

30. The most important of the Affections which thus come under the name of Love are;—the Love of the mother and of the father towards the children, Maternal and Paternal Love;—the Love of children towards their parents, Filial Love;—the Love of brothers and sisters towards each other, Fraternal Love; the special and distinguishing affection of man towards woman, and woman towards man, which tends to the conjugal union; this is often expressed by the word *Love*, without any epithet; its natural sequel is Conjugal Love. Also, among the kinds of Love we must enumerate Friendship, and our Love of our Companions; likewise the Affection, so far as it partakes of the nature

of Love, with which we regard our fellow-citizens, our fellow-countrymen, our fellow-men.

31. The Affection of Anger also appears in various forms. Anger comes into play against any one who assaults or threatens us, in man as in other animals; and this Affection, giving vehemence and rapidity to our actions, aids us in self-defence. Anger in this form, is the natural repulsion and return to any harm which falls upon us or approaches us, and is called *Resentment*, as being the sentiment which is a natural re-action to the hostile sentiment to another person.

32. The Affections conspire with the Desires. We are angry with those who take from us, or prevent our obtaining, what we desire. We love those who aid us in gratifying our desires. These affections are modified according to the circumstances under which they thus arise, and receive special names. Men feel *Gratitude* towards those who have conferred benefits upon them. As they feel sudden *Resentment* against a sudden attack, they feel *Permanent Anger* against those who have inflicted or endeavour to inflict pain or harm upon them, or whose desires come in conflict with theirs. When this feeling is no longer a burst of emotion, but a settled and steady feeling, it is *Hatred*, *Malice*, or *Ill-will*. When malice prompts men to return pain and harm to those from whom they have received pain or harm, it is *Revenge*.

All these Affections belong to the *irascible* part of man's nature.

33. The Affections, as has been said, are directed towards persons. In speaking of them, we suppose him who feels them to live as a man among men. He is *in Society*; and his desires and affections are excited, determined, and modified by the circumstances of his social condition. These circumstances may be various, both for the individual, and for the general body of the society. There are various Forms and Stages of Society. We may conceive, as the original form, a society in which there are no Affections except the Family Affection, and no Appetites except the Natural Wants.

But as the society becomes more numerous, and Artificial Wants increase, many other kinds of relation and dependence grow up among the individuals who compose the society, and the Affections are modified by these new conditions.

34. In speaking of other Desires and Affections which we still have to notice, we continue to suppose man existing in society: and we shall have to consider mainly, at first, those Desires and Affections which have reference to the intercourse of a man with other men.

3. *The Mental Desires.*

35. The Appetites are of the nature of Instincts, in that they tend to their objects, without their objects being present to the mind as abstract notions. But yet when we bring into view abstract notions, the bodily desires may be described as tendencies to such abstractions. Thus Hunger and Thirst may be described as the Desire of *Food*: which is, as we have seen (3), an abstract notion. All the Bodily Desires may be included in the Desire of *Pleasure*, which is a still more abstract notion.

As the development of the human mind goes on by the exercise of thought (22), the objects of desire are all presented to the mind as abstract notions, more or less general. In this way, the Bodily Desires may be presented in a general and abstract form. But besides these general and abstract forms of Bodily Desires, there are other Desires which cannot be conceived in any other way than with reference to abstractions; as the Desire of *Fame*, the Desire of *Knowledge*. These we shall call *Mental Desires*.

36. We now speak of those Springs of Action which result from the operations of the mind. Among such operations, besides those which have been referred to, we must place *Memory*, by which past facts and objects are recalled to the mind, and subjected to its view, in the same manner as if they were present; and *Imagination*, by which the distant, the absent, and the

future are represented to the mind, under combinations and aspects imposed by the mind itself. These faculties fill up the abstract outline of the objects of desire, with particulars and images, by means of which they obtain a far stronger hold upon the purpose and will, than the mere abstraction of itself could have. By their means, the desire of a general and abstract object impels us, not merely with the force residing in the ultimate generality, but with a power belonging to the whole of the successive steps of generalization, from objects of sense upwards.

37. Every object of desire as contemplated by the mind may be described by a general term as a *Good*. *Quicquid petitur petitur sub specie boni*. This is the most general aspect of the objects of desire. Opposed to the objects of desire, are objects which we shun, as Pain, Constraint, and the Want or Privation of objects of desire. These are *Evils*. The mind, furnished with the stores of Memory, and exercising the powers of Imagination, can contemplate remotely future, as well as immediate gratifications, arising from the attainment of objects of desire. Such objects, contemplated as future, are *wished for*; if the attainment of our wishes, is deemed probable, they are *hoped*. The infliction of future evils, if probable, is *feared*. Evil so contemplated is *Danger*. *Hope* and *Fear* are springs of action no less powerful than present Desire.

38. We must now consider the particular Mental Desires separately.

In order that we may distinguish and enumerate the more important and more elementary of the Mental Desires, we may remark, that Desires, operating merely as tendencies to action, and not unfolded by the exercise of thought, so as to become tendencies to mental objects, (abstractions,) are like Instincts (23). Hence we may consider those Desires as distinct, which look like the developements of different Instincts. The Instincts of animals are a kind of image of the Desires of man; and we may consider those as so many distinct Elementary Desires, of which we find so many images in

the Instincts of animals. And the Desires of which we shall speak, being also the most universal and most powerful of those by which man's actions are determined, are those which we have especially to notice among the Springs of Action.

The Mental Desires of which we shall first speak, are the Desire of Safety, the Desire of Having, the Desire of Society, the Desire of Superiority, the Desire of Knowledge.

39. *The Desire of Safety.* All the bodily desires may be included under one general expression, as *the Desire of Personal Wellbeing*, or the like. But in order to frame rules of action, we must refer to something more limited and definite than this. Moreover, in our view of the springs of human action, we are to suppose man to be in Society, and to have his desires determined by the circumstances of his social condition (34).

Now if the desires alone be taken into our account, a man living among men is liable to have his desires frustrated, and to suffer harm, pain, wounds, and even death, through the operation of the conflicting desires of other men. We can conceive a condition in which men are in a perpetual state of war and violence, like hostile beasts of prey. But the desires of man, when his irascible affections are not inflamed by conflict, tend towards a state of things the opposite of this. He desires peace and tranquillity. He hopes for these; he fears their opposites. These desires, hopes, and fears are so strong, that man's life is scarcely tolerable if they are not in some degree gratified. Man requires, as indispensable to his human condition, a removal of his fears of violence and harm to his body, arising from the conflicting desires of other men. This feeling we may call *the Desire of Safety*. It is one of the strongest, most universal and most constant of all the desires of men.

40. We find Instincts of animals which correspond to this Spring of action in man. Such an Instinct is variously described, as the *Instinct of Self-defence*, or of *Self-preservation*, the *instinctive Love*

of *Life*, and the like. This Instinct stimulates all the faculties of animals in the most energetic manner; is able to master their strongest appetites and affections; and often calls into play an almost incredible sagacity and strength.

41. In man, the instinctive love of life, the instinctive desire to avoid privation, pain, and constraint, are expanded and unfolded by memory, reflection and foresight. Life, ease, comfort, peace, tranquillity, become objects to which man tends with conscious thought, as well as from blind impulse. Nor can he be at all satisfied, except he can look forwards to the future, as well as the present enjoyment, of these advantages. He must not only have present Safety, but *Security* for the future. When, however, we speak of *the Desire of Safety*, as one of the principal elementary Mental Desires, we may understand Security to be included in the expression.

42. We have mentioned Constraint as one of the things which men desire to avoid. Even when unaccompanied with pain or danger, extraneous force, compelling or restraining our motions, is felt as a grievous infliction. We cannot act so as to make our actions our own, without acting freely; and the Desire of Free Agency, which we naturally feel, is confirmed and made more urgent, by our perceiving that such freedom is necessary to all properly human action. Hence the Love of personal Liberty is one of the powerful Springs of human action; but so far as it is of an elementary nature, it is included in the Desire of Safety and Security from bodily harm of which we now speak.

43. The Safety, Security and Liberty of the body, which man thus requires, as conditions without which he cannot exist satisfactorily, are easily endangered by the angry affections of other men, stimulated by their desires, conflicting with his. By such conflicts Malice is produced (32); and malicious intention shews itself in deeds of force and violence, or in other kinds of attempts upon the safety and liberty of the man. Others become his Enemies, and he becomes theirs.

And the natural Enmity, as well as the Society of mankind, modifies their other desires.

44. *The Desire of Having.* The Desire of Having, so far as it refers to the means of subsistence, is a developement of the instinct of self-preservation, which impels animals to seek food and other necessaries of life. But even in animals, we see a desire of having which goes beyond this; for some animals have an instinct of hoarding and storing; and this instinct is very different from mere desire of food. It often controls present appetite, and leads the animal to hide what it cannot use as food, as well as what it can. In man the Desire of Having is apparent in all stages of Society (33). Food, clothing, weapons, tools, ornaments, houses, carriages, ships, are universally objects of his desire. In the first place, indeed, man desires these things as a means of gratifying his natural appetites, or his affections; of supporting and sheltering his family; of repelling and mastering his enemies. But the desire to possess such objects, as it exists in man, goes beyond the measure of their obvious use. He delights to consider them as connected with himself in a permanent and exclusive manner, and to look upon them as *his*, as his *own*. The things which he thus looks upon as his own, he is disturbed at the prospect of losing, and is angry at any one who attempts to take them from him. Nor can he be at ease in his thoughts, or act steadily and tranquilly, except he be allowed to possess in quiet and security what he thus has as his. He needs to hold it as his *Property*.

45. The objects to which the desire of possessing applies are called *Things*, as contrasted with *Persons*. In considering the rules of human action, Things are contemplated as morally passive, the objects of possession and use; capable only of being given, received, acted with or on: Persons are active, or capable of action; and are considered as conscious, intelligent, intentional agents.

Things, as objects of possession, are contemplated under various aspects of generality and abstraction.

In a general way, they are termed *Possessions, Wealth, Riches*. There is one particular kind of Possession which is used in transferring all other kinds, and which hence measures and represents all other kinds. This is *Money*, which most commonly has the form of copper, silver, or gold, and which is especially called Riches.

46. Wealth or Property includes all objects which are subservient to the satisfaction of our wants; and thus the desire which regards property is strengthened by the progress of Artificial Wants (32). Again, most of the relations of society imply some intercourse with regard to property, some giving and receiving. The progress of society, with the extension and multiplication of these social relations, give additional operation to property, and increase its hold on men's minds. And thus, in a society in which artificial wants and social relations are extended and multiplied, still more than in more simple states of society, there can be no tranquillity, peace, or comfort, except man can possess in security and quiet that which he regards as his Property.

Without Property, and the recognition of Property in Society, even man's free agency cannot exist. If another may at any moment take from me my food, my clothing, my tools, I can no longer, with any confidence or steadiness labour, or travel, or reckon upon being able to live from day to day. In order to act, I must act on, or with things; and I must for that purpose have secure property in things.

47. The Desire of Society appears in man in two very conspicuous forms;—the *Desire of Family Society* and the Desire of Civil Society. These may be treated of as elementary desires; we have images of them in the instincts of animals;—of the former, in pairing animals, of the latter, in gregarious animals.

That man has a Desire of Family Society, in addition to his mere bodily desires, is plain. In the rudest tribes, the man and his wife are bound together by this desire. They wish for and seek habitual companionship and help, not merely occasional pleasure. The woman can hardly subsist through the time of child-bearing,

or the child be supported, without the existence of the ties of family. When the family circle is completed by the addition of children, this desire of companionship is awakened and gratified in a wider sphere. The desires which first lead to the existence of the Family are refined, as well as extended, by the existence of the Family. A desire of a general sympathy among the members of the Family, purifies and elevates the operation of the mere bodily desires. There are added to the gratification of the desires, innumerable new pleasures growing out of the offices of mutual love to which the family gives occasion.

These gratifications are so congenial to the nature of man, so universally and constantly sought, so uneasily and impatiently dispensed with, that no form of man's existence can be tolerable or stable in which men in general are not able to enjoy or to hope for them. There can be no peace, comfort, tranquillity, or order in a state of society in which there are not permanent conjugal unions.

The existence of permanent marriages is requisite, as has been said, for the sustentation of the mother and the child during its earliest age. It is requisite no less for the instruction of the child in the use of language, in the direction of its actions by rules, and in the other manifestations of a social and rational human nature. And thus the existence of marriage is requisite not only to continue the race of mankind, but also to transmit from generation to generation the social and rational character of man. And this necessity is perceived by man, when his reflection is called into play; and thus the Regard for Marriage which men feel is confirmed, and the Desire of Family Society strengthened in its general influence upon man.

48. *The Desire of Civil Society* also is an important spring of action in the nature of man. The other desires which we have mentioned, the desire of safety, and the desire of property, may be supposed to give rise to a desire of civil society, as of a means by which such objects may be secured. But there appears to

exist in man a Desire of Society of a more unconscious and elementary kind; of which, as has been said, we have an image in the instincts of gregarious animals. Man also is a gregarious, or more properly, a social animal. He is nowhere found, nor can he exist, in any other state than in Society, of some form or other. Indeed, the same conditions of his being which make him necessarily exist as a member of a family, make him also, after a few generations, necessarily exist as a member of a family in a larger sense; of a tribe, a clan, a nation. And though, in cases in which the free agency of the individual comes into play, these ties of family may be loosened or broken; man still only passes from one form of society to another, and his state is ever social. The existence of a language is, of itself, undeniable evidence of a recognized society among those who have this bond of union: for those who use the same language have common classifications of things and action, common generalizations and abstractions; which imply, in a great degree, common judgments and common rules of action. Society, bound together by such ties, is a Community.

Men, connected by this bond, have a pleasure in their mutual society. They are pleased with the companionship and intercourse which take place at the social board, in the street, the market, the council-room. Men desire to act, and are fitted to act, in common; declaring and enforcing rules by which the conduct of all shall be governed: they thus act as governors, legislators, judges, subjects, citizens. Without such community of action, and such common rules really enforced, there can be no tolerable comfort, peace, or order. Without civil society, man cannot act as man.

49. The Mental Desires which we have mentioned, include the Appetites and Affections, and may take the place of them in some of our future reasonings. The Desire of Personal Safety, and the Desire of Having, include the Desires of all bodily objects requisite for the support, ease and comfort of the individual. The Desire of Family Society includes the Love of Wife,

Parents, Children, Brothers, Sisters, and the like. The affection of Anger is an attendant upon all our Desires; for we are angry with those who interfere with our Desires; angry with those who threaten our Safety, our Property, or our Family enjoyments.

50. There is another Spring of Action intimately connected with the existence of society, and in some measure implied in what has been said; but which we must also speak of separately: I mean, *the Need of a Mutual Understanding* among men. I speak of this as a *Need*, rather than a Desire; for Mutual Understanding is rather a necessity of man's condition, than an object of his conscious desire. We see this necessity even in animals, especially in those which are gregarious. In their associated condition, they derive help and advantage from one another: and many of them, especially those that live, travel, or hunt in companies, are seen to reckon upon each other's actions with great precision and confidence. In societies of men, this mutual aid and mutual reliance are no less necessary than among beavers or bees. But in man, this aid and reliance are not the work of mere Instinct. There must be a Mutual Understanding by which men learn to anticipate and to depend upon the actions of each other. This mutual understanding presupposes that man has the power of determining his future actions; and that he has the power of making other men aware of his determination. It presupposes Purpose as its matter (14), and Language as its instrument (4). The verb *to understand*, as has been said (11), has especial reference to the use of language.

When we have determined a future action by intention or settled purpose, we communicate the intention to another person who is concerned in the result, by a *Promise*. The person to whom my promise is made, (*the Promisee*,) understands my purpose, and is led to reckon in his actions upon my purposed action; and I understand him to regulate his actions by this reckoning.

51. A large part of the actions which take place among men, are regulated by their mutual understand-

ing, established by promises, or in some other way. In most forms of society, each person depends for food, for clothing, for shelter, for safety, for comfort, for enjoyment, or for the greater part of these, upon a mutual understanding with other men. There is a mutual dependence, the result of a mutual understanding.

One of the ways in which this result is carried into effect is, by the establishment of different employments and occupations, businesses and offices, among different classes of men. One man employs himself solely in preparing food for men; others, in preparing clothing; and again; one, in preparing clothing for the feet; another, clothing for the body. Again, one man's business is to protect the other from foreign foes; he is a soldier: another's occupation is to decide disputes which occur within the society; he is a judge. Persons are placed in such situations by general understanding, express or implied; and each man, in his actions, reckons upon the others discharging their offices according to their respective trades and professions. This mutual understanding is a universal bond, which could not be removed without the community falling to pieces; it is force of cohesion, permeating the structure of society, so that if this force were to cease to act, the whole mass would crumble into dust. We therefore place this Need of a Mutual Understanding among the principal springs of human action.

52. *The Desire of Superiority* may be placed among the elementary Desires, since it is seen to exist as an instinct in many of the bolder animals, manifesting itself in the exertions which they make in their conflicts with one another. In such cases, this desire is often mixt up with the instinct of self-defence and the impulses of anger, as in the combats of pugnacious animals; but in racing and hunting, we see, in dogs and horses, a desire of superiority, showing itself as a distinct spring of action; and the like may be observed in other similar cases.

In man, this desire of superiority appears on a wider scale, the subjects of comparison being vastly more

numerous and complicated. A man desires to know himself more swift, more strong, more skilful than another; hence the contests of the palestra, and even wanton combats for life or death. A man desires to be more wealthy than his neighbours; and hence accumulates riches by labour, agriculture, trade or traffic. But man not only wishes to surpass, but to guide and control other men. He wishes that they should *obey* when he *commands*. He has a Desire of Power. To this object, strength and skill and riches may all be as means to ends. The desire of being superior as regards those circumstances, may be the desire of being more powerful than others, with whom we compare ourselves.

53. This desire of being superior to others in the advantages which we possess, and especially in power, is very general among men. Most men would wish to be strong, skilful, rich; but especially to be powerful, so that other men should conform to their will and do their bidding. But all cannot be superior to others. If each desire to be the strongest, there can be no repose or order, except these conflicting desires balance each other. All cannot be superior; but none need be inferior, for all may be equal. The universal Desire of Superiority cannot be gratified; but if it be transformed into a universal Impatience of Inferiority, it may become the regulating force of society.

When we say that none need be inferior, for all may be equal; it is not meant that all may have *equal shares* of the objects of human desires; but that each may equally have what is *his*, not holding it at the will or command of another man. The equality of which we speak, is the establishment of equal rules, not the establishment of a rule of equal division. Such a rule as the latter, would be inconsistent with the nature of property: for that which is a man's property, is his with its increase, and passes from him if he give or destroy it; so that the shares of different individuals, even if equal at first, cannot continue equal. But *Equal Rules* may be established; and the impatience of in-

feriority, which is natural to man, will not be satisfied with any rules which have not the aspect of equality. It is true, that this equality of rules may be modified by external circumstances; as we have just seen, that the equality of shares must be disturbed by passing changes: but still, the desires of men constantly point to equal rules, as those which alone are tolerable; and there can be no permanent tranquillity in a community, except under the sway of rules, which are equal for all; so far as the nature of man, and the previous condition of the society, allow of rules at the same time steady and equal. And thus, the Desire of Superiority, transformed into the Desire of Equal Rules, is one of the powerful springs of human action.

54. *The Desire of Knowledge* may also be enumerated among the elementary desires. Of this Desire, also, we see a sort of image, in the curiosity and prying propensities of many animals: but in them, these propensities are generally subservient to the actions by which sustenance is obtained or danger avoided.

In man, the Desire of Knowledge is identical with the desire or propensity of the mind to unfold itself (22); and with the desire which we have to contemplate our own conceptions, as distinctly and connectedly as is possible for us. Man, by his rational nature, is constantly impelled to think, to reason, to classify, to trace causes and consequences; to do this, is to know; and to continue to do it, is to go on from knowledge to knowledge.

55. Knowledge influences human actions, not so much by the exertions which it impels men to make for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, as by the different aspects which it gives to the other objects of desire. An ugly pebble may be a most desirable possession, if we know how to extract from it a cure for disease. The desire to possess a particular piece of ground, may become very vehement, by our knowing that it is the heritage left us by our ancestors. Our impatience of the constraint which a body of men impose upon us, may be much inflamed, by our knowing

that such constraint is inconsistent with ancient maxims of law, or with rules of reason, or with the true destination of man. In such cases, our desires and actions are influenced by our knowledge, that is, by our *Reason*. Our knowledge, thus considered as a Spring of Action, is identical with the Reason, by which we contemplate abstract and general conceptions, and thus determine for ourselves rules and ends of action. This is a task which it is our object to perform in the present work.

4. *The Moral Sentiments.*

56. That which is conformable to Rules of Action is *right*. What we mean by *right*, will be considered more particularly afterwards: but before we proceed to that question, we may observe, that our judgment of actions as right, or as *wrong*, the opposite of right, is accompanied with certain Affections, or Sentiments. That which is right we *approve*; that which is wrong we *disapprove*. What is wrong, naturally excites a modification of Anger, which we term *Indignation*. Wrong done to ourselves excites instant Resentment (31); but our Anger against wrong as wrong, when we do not consider it as affecting ourselves, is Indignation. And in like manner, what is right is the natural object of a kind of love, namely, of *Esteem*. These Affections, Approbation and Disapprobation, Indignation and Esteem, are the *Moral Sentiments*.

Though the Moral Sentiments thus partake of the nature of the Affections, they differ in this respect, that they have for their objects in the first instance, not Persons, but Actions. We love a friend; we approve his acts of benevolence. We are angry with a man who picks our pocket, and disapprove of his act.

But the Sentiment is transferred from the action to the agent; and thus the Moral Sentiments combine with and modify our other affections, and are powerful Springs of Action. We befriend a man, or we choose him for our friend, and do him good offices, not because

he is our brother, but because we approve his actions, and therefore love him, and would treat him as our brother. We help to inflict pain or even death upon a man, not because he has done us especially any harm, but because he has committed an act of which we strongly disapprove, and which excites a strong indignation against him.

There are Sentiments which partake of the nature of Esteem or Approval, but imply no settled Moral Rule, and include feelings of surprise and conscious inferiority in ourselves. Such are *Admiration*, and *Awe*.

5. *Reflex Sentiments.*

57. Besides the Moral Sentiments which impel us to act in one way or another to other men, accordingly as we approve or disapprove their actions, there are also certain Sentiments which have a reference to their judgment of us and their affections towards us; and these Sentiments are also Springs of Action. These we shall term *Reflex Sentiments*, for they imply Reflex Thought. In order to regard another man's Sentiments concerning me, I must form a conception of his Sentiments as the image of my own; and of myself as the object of those sentiments.

58. *The Desire of being loved* is one of these Reflex Sentiments. In minds so far unfolded by thought as to be capable of reflex processes, this Sentiment commonly accompanies love; but it belongs to a stage of mental development higher than mere elementary love. Yet we see traces of it in the behaviour of those animals which seek to be fondled and caressed.

59. *The Desire of Esteem* is a powerful and extensive Spring of Action. We desire that other men should think that what we do is right. Hence, this desire assumes some generally established Rule of what is right. Without ourselves esteeming what is right, we cannot conceive Esteem, and thus cannot truly feel the Desire of Esteem. But in this case, we may still feel the *Desire of Admiration*, the *Desire of Honour*,

the *Love of Fame*, the *Love of Glory*, and the like Reflex Sentiments; which do not imply our own approval of the Rule by which others judge. Yet these are very powerful Springs of action in many men.

60. Finally, there is a reflex Sentiment which we may term the *Desire of our own Approval*. This implies that we have adopted a Rule according to which we judge Actions to be right, and that we desire to conform our own actions to this Rule. Such a Desire is a Spring of Action, which must balance all others, in order that the Rule may be really valid. What the nature of such a Rule must be, we shall have to consider: in the mean time, we may remark, that the Desire of our own Approval, of which we now speak, is included in the meaning of the term *Conscience*.

Among the Reflex Sentiments, we may place all those Springs of Action which are designated by some compound of the word *Self*; as *Self-Love*, *Self-Admiration*. These, for the most part, are elementary Springs of Action, combined and modified by reflex habits of thought. Thus *Self-Love* may be understood to include the Desire of Property, of Bodily comfort, and the like, along with a distinct consideration of One's Self. In this view, *Self-Love* is rather a habit of regarding and providing for the elementary Desires, than a distinct Desire. It is sometimes spoken of as a General Regard for our own Good; because, as we have said (37), the term *Good* is so used as to include the objects of all the elementary Desires.

6. *General Remarks.*

61. It appears by what has been said, that the different kinds of Springs of Action are distinguished by the nature of their objects. The Appetites have for their objects, Things; the Affections, Persons; the Mental Desires have Abstractions: the Moral Sentiments, Actions; and the Reflex Sentiments have for their objects the thoughts of other persons, or our own, about ourselves.

The Springs of Action which we have enumerated do not operate upon man as Forces operate upon inert Matter. They all operate through the Will. A man is moved by these Springs, when he *will* do that to which they impel him. Different springs of action may operate at the same time, and with opposite tendencies. The Desire of Safety would keep the sailor or soldier at home, but the Desire of Gain, or the Love of Glory, sends him to the sea or to the war. In either case, it is through his Will that the Desires act. He stays at home because he wills to do so; or he goes forth because he wills it. Acts of Will are *Volitions*.

62. In determining his actions, man is seldom impelled merely by the most elementary Springs of Action, bodily desire and affection. By the progress of thought in every man, bodily desires are combined with mental desires, and elementary affections with moral sentiments.

The men who most seek the pleasures of eating, seek at the same time the pleasures of society. The most blind maternal love generally takes the form of approving, as well as loving, its darling. And thus, in man, the Desires and Affections are unfolded by thought, so as to involve abstract conceptions and the notion of a Rule. The Reason, to which such steps belong (10), is at work, in all the actions which the Springs of Action produce.

63. Reason is conceived as being in all persons the same in its nature. Different men desire different things, love different persons; but that which is seen to be true in virtue of the Reason, is true for all men alike. The influence of desire or affection may be mistaken for the result of Reason, for man is liable to error (5); and so far, the decisions of Reason may be different in different men. But such decisions are not all really reasonable. So far as men decide conformably to Reason, they decide alike. His Appetites, and Desires, and Affections are peculiar to each man; but his Reason is a common attribute of all mankind: and each man has

his Reason in virtue of his participation of this common faculty of discerning truth and falsehood.

But though each man's Desires and Affections belong specially to himself, while Reason is a common faculty in all men; we consider our Reason as being *ourselves*, rather than our Desires and Affections. We speak of Desire, Love, Anger, as mastering *us*, or of *ourselves* as controlling them. If we decide to prefer some remote and abstract good to immediate pleasures, or to conform to a rule which brings us present pain, (which decision implies the exercise of Reason,) we more particularly consider such acts as our *own* acts. Such acts are deemed especially the result, not of the impulse of our desires, but of our own volition.

If we ask why we thus identify ourselves with our rational part, rather than with our desires and affections; we reply, that it is because the Reason alone is capable of that reflex act by which we become conscious of ourselves. To have so much thought as to distinguish between ourselves and our springs of action, is to be rational; and the Reason which can make this distinction, necessarily places herself on one side, and the Desires, which make no such distinction, on the other. It is by the Reason that we are conscious; and hence we place the seat of our consciousness in the Reason.

64. The habit of identifying ourselves with our Reason, and not with our Desires, is further indicated by the term *Passion*, which is applied to Desire and Affection when uncontrolled by Reason; as if man in such cases were passive, and merely acted on; and as if he were really active, only when he acts in conformity with his Reason. Thus, we speak, of a man being *in a Passion*, meaning an uncontrolled fit of anger; and *having a Passion* for an object, meaning an uncontrolled desire.

Still, it is to be recollected that man, under the influence of such Passions, is not really passive. When he acts under such influences, he adopts the suggestions of Desire or Affection, and rejects the control of Reason;

but this is what he does in all violations of reasonable Rules. Passion does not prevent a man's knowing that there is a Rule, and that he is violating it. To say that Passion is irresistible, is to annihilate Reason, and to exclude the most essential condition of Human Action.

65. We have spoken of various elements of man's being, separately: of the Reason and the Understanding (ch. I.) ; of the Appetites, Affections, Desires, Moral Sentiments, and Reflex Sentiments; (ch. II.) of the Will (61), and of the modifications which the Affections, Desires, &c. undergo by the operation of thought (62). We might further speak of the mode in which repeated acts of thought, repeated emotions of Affection or Desire, form internal *Habits*; and of the manner in which the general *Disposition*, composed of all these elements, whether it be an occasional or habitual, a natural or acquired Disposition, affects the Will, and, through that, the Actions.

But while we attend to all these separate Springs of Action, their mutual operation and endless modifications, we are not to regard them as separate Forces, or as independent and distinct Things. They are all *in us* as in a peculiar complex unity. The Appetites are manifestly attributes of the *Body*; but the remaining elements, the Affections, Desires, Moral Sentiments, Reason, Will, are considered as existing and operating in our *Soul*: and it is in the Soul that the formation of Habits and Dispositions takes place. The Soul is the central and fundamental unity in which all the internal elements of human action inhere, reside, act upon each other, and are moulded and modified by all which happens to the man.

CHAPTER III.

MORAL RULES EXIST NECESSARILY.

66. IN enumerating and describing, as we have done, certain Desires, as among the most powerful Springs of human action, we have stated (39) that man's life is scarcely tolerable if these Desires are not in some degree gratified: that man cannot be at all satisfied without some security in such gratification (41); that without property, which gratifies one of these Desires, man's free agency cannot exist (45); that without marriage, which gratifies another, there can be no peace, comfort, tranquillity, or order (47). And the same may be said of all those Springs of Action which we enumerated as Mental Desires. Without some provision for the tranquil gratification of these Desires, Society is disturbed, unbalanced, painful; we may even say, intolerable. We cannot conceive a condition of such privation to be the genuine condition of social man. The habitual gratification of the principal Desires above mentioned must be a part of the Order of the Society. There must be Rules which direct the course and limits of such gratification. Such Rules are necessary for the Peace, and even for the Existence, of Society.

67. Man acts as man, when he acts under the influence of Reason, and Reason directs us to Rules. Rules of action are necessary, therefore, for the action of man as man. We cannot conceive man as man, without conceiving him as subject to Rules, and making part of an Order in which Rules prevail. He must act freely, therefore he must have Security. He must act by means of external things, therefore he must have Property. He must act with reference to other men's intentions, therefore there must be Contracts. He must act with reference to Parents, Wife and Children, therefore there must be Families. We cannot conceive man divested of free agency, of relation to external things, of communication with other men, of the ties of blood

and affection. We must therefore conceive him as existing in Security, with Property, Contracts and Family, subsisting about him; existing, therefore, under Rules by which these things are established; and thus, such Rules are necessary for the action of man as man.

Such Rules being established, that which is conformable to them is *right*, and the Rules are *moral* Rules. We must afterwards endeavour to establish such Rules in detail; but in the mean time, we have shewn in general that the establishment of Moral Rules is necessary for the peace of society and for the action of man as man.

68. That Rules, determined by the Reason to be reasonable, are the necessary guides of Desire and Affection, is also apparent from a consideration of the nature of Reason. We cannot help recognizing, in the Reason, an authority to repress and resist Appetite and Desire, when the two come in conflict. The Reason is the light of man's constitution, which reveals to him himself, and enables him to choose between different objects. And this light, by being light, is fit to guide us. As in the world without, so in the world within us, the light, by guiding us, proves that it is its office to guide us.

69. It has been said by some that the Rules of human action, by which men in Society are governed, are the results of mutual Fear, by which the conflicting Desires of different persons are balanced. But this is not a true view of the subject. Mutual fear and conflicting desires prevail among wild animals; but yet animals have not among them Moral Rules of action. Brute beasts cannot properly be said to steal from one another, to wrong one another, to be morally guilty. They cannot transgress a Moral Rule; because they have not Reason, by which they may conceive a Moral Rule. Mutual fear and conflicting desire cannot give rise to a Rule, when there does not exist the Reason; which, presenting the objects of desire and fear under the general and abstract forms of conceptions, must supply the materials for a Rule. It is therefore not

Fear and Desire, but Reason, which is the source of Moral Rules.

70. Moral Rules balance the repulsive tendencies of the Desires. The Desires, so far as they are desires of external objects in each person, tend to disunite men; for they make each person the sole center of his own springs of action. Further, they tend to bring men into conflict and opposition; for two men desire the same field, the same house, the same wife. But there are also human endowments which draw men together, as the Affections of Family and of Civil Society. The mutual understanding of men, expressed in Language, enables them and leads them to act in union, and to help each other. The objects of desire being assigned by general Rules, the repulsive influences are controlled, the attractive are confirmed in their effect. General Rules being established, the Desires are sources, not of opposition, but of agreement. All men, when they think and feel calmly, sympathise with my Desire to keep my own; all men approve of General Rules, and of those who conform to them. The Reflex Sentiments strengthen this mutual attraction. The Desire to be approved, and the Desire to be esteemed, draw men together. These Sentiments, resulting from settled Moral Rules, remove discord, and establish concord. They tend to make men unanimous.

And, reasoning in the opposite order, we may say that such Rules as tend to produce this effect, agree with that character of Moral Rules, which we have shown to belong to them. Such Rules, with regard to the Affections and Desires, as tend to control the repulsive, and confirm the attractive forces which operate in human Society; such as tend to unite men, to establish concord, unanimity, sympathy; agree with that which is the general character of Moral Rules, and have a claim to be regarded as Moral Rules. And as there is a Universal Human Reason, common to all men, so far as it is unfolded in each man, and to which each man's reason must conform; so is there a Universal Moral Sympathy, common to all men, so far as it is

unfolded in each man; a Conscience of mankind, to which each man's Conscience must conform.

But in order to arrive at such Moral Rules as we have spoken of, we must proceed by a series of several steps, and upon this course we now enter.

CHAPTER IV.

RIGHT, ADJECTIVE, AND *RIGHT*, SUBSTANTIVE.

71. IN order to establish Rules of human action we must consider more exactly the import of the terms *right* and *wrong*, which we have already used (56).

It has been said (18) that Rules of Action may direct actions to be performed as means to an end. Examples of such Rules are these: Be temperate, in order to be healthy: Labour, that you may gain money.

The adjective *right* signifies *conformable to Rule*; and is used with reference to the object of the Rule. To be temperate, is the *right* way to be healthy. To labour, is the *right* way to gain money.

In these cases the adjective *right* is used *relatively*; that is, relatively to the object of the Rule.

72. It has been said also (19) that we may have a Series of actions, each of which is a means to the next as an end. A man labours, that he may gain money: he wishes to gain money, that he may educate his children: he would educate his children, in order that they may prosper in the world.

In these cases, the inferior ends lead to higher ones, and derive their value from these. Each subordinate action aims at the end next above it, as a good (37). In the series of actions just mentioned, a man's gain is regarded as a good, because it tends to the education of his children. Education is considered as valuable, because it tends to prosperity.

And the Rules which prescribe such actions, derive

their imperative force and validity, each from the Rule above it. The Superior Rule supplies a reason for the inferior. The Rule, *to labour*, derives its force from the Rule, *to seek gain*: this Rule receives its force (in the case we are considering) from the Rule, *to educate our children*: this again has for its reason, *to forward the prosperity of our children*.

73. But besides such Subordinate Rules, there must be a *Supreme Rule of Human Action*: For the succession of Means and Ends, with the corresponding series of subordinate and superior Rules, must somewhere terminate. And the inferior ends would have no value, as leading to the highest, except the highest end had a value of its own. The superior Rules could give no validity to the subordinate ones, except there were a Supreme Rule from which the validity of all of these were ultimately derived. Therefore there is a Supreme Rule of Human Action.

That which is conformable to the Supreme Rule, is *absolutely right*; and is called *right*, simply, without relation to a special end.

The opposite to right is *wrong*.

74. The Supreme Rule of Human Action may also be described by its Object.

The Object of the Supreme Rule of human action is spoken of as the *True End of human action*, the *Ultimate or Supreme Good*, the *Summum Bonum*.

75. There are various other ways of expressing the opposition of right and wrong, and the Supreme Rule of Human Action; namely, the Rule to do what is right and to abstain from doing what is wrong. We say, we *ought* to do what is right; we *ought not* to do what is wrong. To do what is right is our *Duty*; to do what is wrong is a transgression, an offense, a violation of our Duty.

76. The question *Why?* respecting human actions, demands a reason, which may be given by a reference from a lower Rule to a higher. *Why* ought I to be frugal or industrious? In order that I may not want a maintenance. *Why* must I avoid want? Because

I must seek to act independently. *Why* should I act independently? that I may act rightly.

Hence, with regard to the Supreme Rule, the question *Why?* admits of no further answer. Why must I do what is right? Because it *is* right. Why should I do what I ought? Because I ought. The Supreme Rule supplies a reason for that which it commands, by *being* the Supreme Rule.

77. Rightness and Wrongness are, as we have already said, the *Moral* qualities of actions. The Rules which, in subordination to the Supreme Rule, determine what is right and what is wrong, are *Moral Rules*. The doctrine which treats of actions as right and wrong, is *Morality*.

Since, as we have seen (58), Moral Rules are necessary, according to the constitution of human nature; Man is necessarily a Moral Being.

78. We have now to establish Moral Rules; and for that purpose, we must consider in what kind of Terms they must be expressed. Among those Terms, must be *Rights*; and Rights must exist, as we proceed to show.

Rules of human action must be expressed by means of words denoting those abstract and general Conceptions which include the principal objects of human desire and affection. And, in order that these Conceptions may regulate men's actions, they must be Conceptions of something which really exists among men. If they are not this, they cannot, by their operation, balance, moderate, check and direct the desires and affections which tend to really existing objects. For instance, my desire to possess what another has, may be checked and controlled by the Conception of *Property*; by my looking upon it as his Property. But this could not happen, if there were no such thing as Property. If Property had not been a reality among men, the Conception of it could never have had the power, which in human Society it constantly has had, to suppress or moderate the greater part of the acts to which the bodily desires, and the desire of having,

would naturally impel men. In like manner, the Conceptions of Promises, of Contract, of Marriage, and the like, restrain or limit most of the acts to which the uncontrolled desires and affections would give rise. This must necessarily be, in order that Rules of action may operate upon men; but this could not be, if the things thus conceived did not really exist among men.

Further: the conceptions on which Rules of action depend must not only be realized among men, but their results must also be assigned and appropriated to particular men. The realities which are conceived as Property, as Personal Security, as Contract, as Marriage, must be attached to persons, and vested in them, as attributes or possessions. We must be able to conceive such things, as being one man's or another man's: as *my* property, *your* debt, *his* wife. Without this condition, the Rules of which we speak could not produce their effect of counteracting and balancing the Desires and Affections. For the Desires and Affections are tendencies to action residing in Persons. Each Person's Desires have a tendency to himself: the Affections have Persons for their objects; the Desires of things also give rise to Affections towards Persons. Since all these tendencies to action are thus directed to and from Persons, the Rules of action, which balance these tendencies, must also point to Persons. My desire to take away what another man has, and my anger against him for withholding it from me, must be balanced by the thought that it is *his* Property. *To use a mathematical image, the centers of the forces, attractive and repulsive, which we have termed *Springs of Action*, are in Persons; and therefore the Conceptions by which these forces are kept in equilibrium must also point to Persons.

The Rules of Action, being Moral Rules, must necessarily be subordinate to the Supreme Rule of human action; and combining this condition with the two others of which we have spoken, we are led to this conclusion: That in order that Moral Rules may exist, there must be abstract Conceptions, including the principal objects of human desire and affection; which

abstract Conceptions must be Realities, vested in particular Persons as attributes or possessions, according to Rules subordinate to the Supreme Rule of Human Action.

But Abstractions vested in particular Persons, as possessions, by Rules subordinate to the Supreme Rule, are *Rights*; and our conclusion may be expressed by saying, *That in order that Moral Rules may exist, Men must have Rights.*

We have already given examples of Rights; such as a man's Right to his Personal Safety, to his Property, to his Debts, to his Wife. Without supposing the existence of such Rights, no Moral Rules can be given.

79. What has been said in general (66 and 78), to prove the necessary existence of Moral Rules, and therefore, of Rights, among men; may be further illustrated by considering, separately, the principal Springs of Action of which we have spoken; and especially the Mental Desires; for these include the Appetites and the Affections (49). It is evident that the Desire of Personal Safety (39) requires that there should exist a Right of Personal Safety. Without such a Right, the Desire would give rise to a constant tempest of Anger and Fear, arising from the assaults, actual or apprehended, of other men. But a Right of Personal Safety, when actually established, holds in check the impulses which give rise to such assaults, and reduces the tempest to a calm. In this calm, man, free from extreme agitations of Fear and Anger, can act with a reference to Rules founded on other men's Rights; and can thus, and no otherwise, exercise his rational and moral nature. And in like manner, the Desire of Having requires that there should exist a Right of Property: for without the establishment of such a Right, the possession of any objects of desire would, in like manner, give rise to Fear and Anger; and to an agitation of men's minds, in which rational and moral action could not take place. But a Right of Property once established, there may be a state of repose, in which the Reason and the Moral Sentiments can act. Again, the

Need of Mutual Understanding requires that a Right of Contract should exist. If no man could depend upon the actions of other men, every man's actions must be performed in a tumult of vague conjectures, hopes and fears, like the actions of a man when surrounding objects are whirled about him by shifting winds. Each man having no certainty as to what another man would do, Society must be dissolved by the repulsion of conflicting Desires and mutual Fears. But if the Right of Contract be established, so that one man can depend upon what another has contracted to do, as something certain; the mutual Fears are removed; the objects included in the Contracts, and the intentions of the Contractors, become stable things; and man can act with reference to fixed moral Rules, as his moral nature requires. Again, the Desire of Family Society requires the establishment of Family Rights; that is, of those peculiar Rights, respecting the Members of the Family, to which the Desires point. The Husband must have an exclusive Right to the Society of the Wife, as a Wife. The Father must have Rights over his Children, which other men have not. Without these ties, which bind Families together in a manner in some respects exclusive, ungoverned bodily Desire and irregular Affection would tend to transient and capricious unions of man and woman; and these would lead to storms of angry rivalry, and the pains of deserted affection. Moreover, on this supposition, the suffering mother and the starving child have no one to depend on: the child has no one to educate him; to introduce him into Human Society; to bring him acquainted with the Rules of Action of mankind; and thus to evoke his rational and moral nature. In the bosom of the Family, when its inclosure is protected by Family Rights, the woman and the child are sustained through seasons of helplessness, the desires of Family Society are gratified, and the moral nature of man is unfolded; and thus Family Rights necessarily exist.

In the same manner, the Desire of Civil Society requires a peculiar Class of Rights, which we shall call

the Rights of Government. For the actual establishment of Rights is the actual enforcement of Rules; and this requires that the office of enforcing Rules should be committed to some special body of men, as the guardians of the Rules. In order that Rights may really exist in a society, the Governors of the Society must have the Right of enforcing the Rules by which such Rights are defined. If such a Right be not vested in the Governors, other Rights, however they may be nominally acknowledged, do not really exist in the Society. If Personal Security and Property, and Contract, and Marriage be spoken of as actual realities; but if, notwithstanding this, the Right of Government to enforce the consequences of these realities be not upheld; there are, in fact, no real Rights in such a Society; and in proportion as the unreality of the Rights of Government becomes manifest, the Society loses its social character; and the moral character of man cannot find its sphere of action in such a condition.

80. There are other Rights, required by other Desires: but none of so primary and universal a character as those which I have now mentioned. The Desire of Knowledge requires Rights which, under the names of the Right of Self-Culture, the Right of Education, the Right of Freedom of Opinion, and the like, may come to be of importance, in the Stages of Society in which men's habits of thought are much developed; but which may be omitted in our primary system of Rights. The Desire of Superiority, as we have said (53), requires that men, in a Society, shall have their Rights assigned by equal Rules; and thus strengthens such Rights when they exist. The Reflex Sentiments have also, in some Stages of Society, their corresponding Rights. Thus, men have a Right to their Reputation allowed them in the Laws of many Societies.

But the primary and universal Rights of men are those *five* which we first enumerated: *the Right of Personal Security; the Right of Property; the Right of Contract; Family Rights; and the Rights of Government.*

81. The opposite of Rights are *Wrongs*. A man's Rights may be infringed, transgressed, violated, by the actions of other men. Thus, a man infringes my Right to Personal Safety by striking me; my Right to my Property, by stealing it; my Right to a Contracted Debt, by not paying me. He who thus violates a man's Rights, does him a *Wrong*.

The word *Injury* is also especially used to designate the infraction of a Right. This is sometimes used merely to express harm; but in correct language *harm* is distinguished from *wrong*, *damnum* from *injuria*.

82. It has been said that Rights must be Realities in human Society. Rights are made Realities in human Society by its conduct as a Society. The conceptions of Personal Security, Property, Contract, Marriage, and the like, are realized among men by their actions. Men, existing in the condition of a Society, regulate their conduct by these conceptions: they appropriate to each his Rights: for the most part they respect each other's Rights; and they constrain, expel, or otherwise punish, those who by their actions contradict these realities, or disturb the appropriation of them. The appropriation of Rights is established and declared by *the Law*; or by Custom, which is Law expressed in actions instead of words; and the Law also gives Rights validity or reality, by assigning *Punishment* to those who violate them.

83. Punishment is itself a Reality, and thus gives reality to the Rights which Laws establish. The various forms of Punishment; constraint, bodily pain, loss of possessions, exile, death; are among the most common and palpable of the real things from which the human affections and desires recoil. And by the existence of Law, supported, when necessary, by Punishment, Personal Safety, Property, Contracts, Marriage, become things no less real than the most palpable objects of bodily desire. Through the reality of such things, human Society, instead of being a mere struggle of appetites, desires, and affections, tending to and from different quarters, is a balanced system, governed by a

coherent body of Rules. And all these Rules spring, not from Desire or Affection, which know nothing of Rules, or of the terms in which Rules are expressed; but from Reason, which, apprehending Rules, directs us to right actions, as those which are conformable to the Supreme Rule; and to Rights, as the Terms in which Subordinate Rules must be expressed.

84. From what has been said, it will be seen that the adjective *right* has a much wider signification than the substantive *Right*. Every thing is *right* which is conformable to the Supreme Rule of human action; but that only is a *Right* which, being conformable to the Supreme Rule, is realized in Society, and vested in a particular person. Hence the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a poor man has no *Right* to relief, but it is *right* he should have it. A rich man has a *Right* to destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be *right*.

85 To a *Right*, on one side, corresponds an *Obligation* on the other. If a man has a *Right* to my horse, I have an *Obligation* to let him have it. If a man has a *Right* to the fruit of a certain tree, all other persons are under an *Obligation* to abstain from appropriating it. Men are obliged to respect each other's *Rights*.

86. My *Obligation* is to give another man his *Right*; my *Duty* is to do what is *right* (75). Hence *Duty* is a wider term than *Obligation*; just as *right*, the adjective, is wider than *Right*, the substantive.

We have here fixed the term *Obligation** to a narrower sense than is sometimes given to it; but it will be found most convenient to use the word in the way

* The term *Obligation* is so commonly used as coextensive with *Duty*, that I shall in general, when I use it in the narrower sense here defined, join with it some epithet (as *positive Obligation*, *legal Obligation*, *perfect Obligation*). I hope this phraseology will satisfy those who still wish to have the term used with its habitual latitude. They will allow that though we are under an *Obligation* (that is, a moral *Obligation*) to practise Charity, we are under no positive, legal, or perfect *Obligation* to relieve any special needy person.

just defined, according to which it is a correlative to *Right*. We shall also use the participle *obliged*, with the same limitation.

87. Hence there is a difference between *obliged* and *ought*. I *ought* to do my Duty; I am *obliged* to give a man his Right. I am not *obliged* to relieve a distressed man, but I *ought* to do so.

There are other phrases which are employed on such subjects. We speak of a man being *bound* in conscience to tell the truth, and *bound* in law to pay his debts. But when the word *bound* is used simply, it more generally refers to Duty, than to (positive) Obligation.

88. *Duty* has no correlative, as *Obligation* has the correlative *Right*. What it is our Duty to do, we must do because it is right, not because any one can demand it of us. We may, however, speak of those who are particularly benefited by our discharge of our Duties, as having a *Moral Claim* upon us. A distressed man has a Moral Claim to be relieved, in cases in which it is our Duty to relieve him.

89. The distinctions just explained are sometimes expressed by using the terms *Perfect Obligation* and *Imperfect Obligation* for *Obligation* and *Duty* respectively; and the terms *Perfect Right* and *Imperfect Right*, for *Right* and *Moral Claim* respectively. These phrases have the inconvenience of making it appear as if our Duties were something more imperfect than our legal Obligations; and as if they were of the nature of Obligations to particular persons, instead of being Rules of Action for ourselves. We may, however, say that we have a *moral* Obligation wherever we have a Duty.

We must suppose Rights to exist before we can treat of Duties; for as we have said (78), the terms which express Rights are necessarily employed in laying down Moral Rules. We must suppose the Rights, and the Laws of Property, before we can lay down the Moral Rules, Do not steal, or Do not covet another man's Property.

90. Hence the Doctrine of Duties, which is *Morality*, presupposes a Doctrine of Rights and Obligations.

There is no term in the English language which denotes *the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations*. In Latin, French, and German, the same term which denotes a Right denotes also the Doctrine of Rights. Thus we say *Jus meum*, and *Studium Juris*: *mon Droit* and *l'étude du Droit*: *mein Recht*, and *die Kenntniss des Rechts*. In English, we say *my Right*, *their Rights*, but we do not use the term in the other sense. Instead of this, we employ various phrases: thus *Jus Naturæ* has sometimes been translated, *The Law of Nature*; sometimes, *The Rights of Nature*, *Natural Rights*, *Natural Justice*. But no one of these phrases fully expresses the Doctrine of Rights: for Rights are not Law only, nor Justice only; (meaning by Law the Law as it exists in Society, and by Justice, that which is right) they are both Law and Justice; Law because Justice; Justice expressed in Law.

Hence, when we have occasion to speak of *the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations* in a single word, we shall borrow the Latin term *Jus*: and by the adjective *jural*, we shall denote *that which has reference to the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations*; as by the adjective *moral* we denote *that which has reference to the Doctrine of Duties*. We have already in the English language several derivatives from the term *Jus*, in the technical sense which we adopt: as *Jurist*, *Jurisprudence*, *Jurisdiction*; so that the word need not sound strange in our ears. *Jus* is the study of the *Jurist*. The term *Jurisprudence* has sometimes been applied by English writers to describe the Doctrine of Rights and Obligations in general: but the corresponding Latin Term is often written in separate words *Juris Prudentia*, a knowledge of *Jus*. It seems unreasonable and inconvenient to make the English name of this Doctrine so much more complex than its names in other languages. The word *Jus* is also implied in the word *Injury*. The words *just* and *Justice* are connected with the same root; but by these, we express moral, not merely jural, notions.

91. *Rights*, and the difference of *right* and *wrong*,

being once brought into view, there are many terms both moral and jural, which can be explained by reference to those fundamental notions. *Duties* are Actions, or Courses of Action, considered as being right. *Virtues* are the Habits of the Soul by which we perform Duties. And *Virtue*, used generally, includes all special Virtues; as *Duty* includes all special Duties. Virtue and Duty are the objects of our Moral Sentiments (56). We *approve* Duty, but we esteem and admire and *love* Virtue. Virtue is the natural object of Love, and is in this view called *Goodness*.

Actions which are opposite to right are *Violations* of Duties, *Transgressions*, *Offenses*. As transgressions of Law, they are *Crimes*. They are of various degrees of *Guilt*. Some are *atrocious* or *heinous* Crimes: others are slighter Offenses, more *excusable* and *pardonable*.

The transgression of a Duty, considered as a Habit, is a *Vice*: and *Vice* in general includes all special Vices.

The sentiment of disapproval of Offenses or Vices admits of various modifications. Some vices are *hateful*, some, *despicable*: some render the perpetrator *odious*, some make him *contemptible*. Some things we more lightly *blame*, others we more strongly *condemn*, or look upon with *detestation* and *horror*.

92. The sentiments with which we regard Virtue and Vice, Virtues and Vices, Acts of Duty and Violations of Duty, are applied to the internal acts which determine the external action. Thus we speak of a *good intention*, a *laudable purpose*, a *vicious thought*.

These Sentiments are extended also to the persons who perform the acts, external or internal. Men, as well as actions, are called on the one hand *good*, *virtuous*, *praiseworthy*, *admirable*, *excellent*; on the other hand, *bad*, *vicious*, *blameable*, *abominable*, *wicked*. When men's actions are right, both they and their actions are *moral*; if the contrary, *immoral*.

Virtues and Vices have been spoken of as Habits: but they may also be considered as the results of the *Dispositions* and *Characters* of men. Considered as a Disposition, Vice is *Depravity*, or *Wickedness*.

93. The consideration of Virtue and Vice, with reference to Religion, will come before us in a succeeding part of this work. But we may here remark, that Virtue, which is conformable to the Supreme Law of our Nature, is the *Will of God*, the Author of our Nature. Hence, the Law of Duty is the Command of God.

Transgressions of Duty, considered as Offenses against God, are *Sins*. God upholds the Law of Duty by Rewards and Punishments, which are assigned to the Souls of men (65).

94. Rights, as we have said (82), are established in Society by the Law; that is, in each Society by the Law of that Society. When this Law is not merely a Rule, tacitly understood and naturally growing into being, but expressly declared and really enforced, it is termed *Positive Law*, in distinction from *Natural Law*, or *the Law of Nature**. Society when it thus declares and enforces Laws, acts as a *State*; not merely as an assemblage of individuals, but as a Collective Agent. A State has an organization by which it acts. It has a Government, Tribunals, stated modes of action. It has Governors, Magistrates, Judges, Executive Officers, and all requisite provisions for the Administration of the Law. When need arises, in consequence of men's actions, and transactions one with another, a man charged with a crime is *apprehended*; or of two persons who allege conflicting Rights, one institutes a *Suit* against the other. The case is brought before a *Court* or *Tribunal*, in which the Judge takes cognizance of such matters; and is tried. *Evidence* is adduced: *Witnesses* are heard. The accused man is found *guilty*; or is *acquitted*, if it do not appear that he is guilty. Between the two contending parties *Judgment* is given. The *Sentence* of the Court is carried into effect. And thus, Rights are realized, and Remedies are provided for Wrongs.

* I do not mean here to imply that there is any special body of Law which deserves to be called *the Law of Nature*.

CHAPTER V.

IMMUTABLE MORALITY AND MUTABLE
LAW.

95. It has been stated (78) that Moral Rules must be expressed by reference to Men's Rights; and thus they necessarily depend upon Rights actually existing. Further, it has been stated (94) that Men's Actual Rights are determined by Positive Law; Men's Rights in each Community are determined by the Positive Law of that Community. But the Laws of different Communities are different; and the determination of Men's Rights by various States are various. Personal Security, Property, Contract, Marriage, are regulated by very different Rules in one State and in another. Private War, Slavery, Polygamy, Concubinage, have been permitted by the Laws of some States; and many other practices which are forbidden by our Laws. And it seems to follow from this, that Morality which depends on the Laws, must prescribe different Rules, in the States in which such practices are permitted, and in those in which they are forbidden.

But on the other hand, we have shown (66—68) that Moral Rules exist necessarily; that they are necessary to the action of man as man; and that they result necessarily from the possession of Reason. From this it seems to follow, that moral Rules must be necessary truths, flowing from the moral nature of man; and that therefore, like other necessary truths, they must be universal and unchangeable. And accordingly, Moralists have constantly spoken of Morality as a body of fixed, immutable, universal Truths.

How are these two opposite doctrines to be reconciled?

96. They are thus reconciled. The *Conceptions* of the fundamental Rights of Men are universal, and flow necessarily from the Moral Nature of Man: the

Definitions of these Rights are diverse, and are determined by the Laws of each State. The Conceptions of Personal Security, Security, Property, Contract, Family, exist everywhere; and man cannot be conceived to exist as a moral being, in a social condition, without them. The Rules by which Personal Safety, Property, Contract, Families, are maintained and protected, are different in different Communities, and will differ according to the needs and purposes of each Community. The Rules of Morality are universal and immutable, so far as they are expressed in terms of these Conceptions in their general form: it is always our Duty to respect the Personal Safety, the Property, the Contracts, the Family Ties, of others. But if we go into those details of Law by which these conceptions are in different Communities differently defined, the Rules of Morality may differ. In one country the wayfarer may morally pluck the fruits of the earth as he passes, and in another he may not; because when so plucked, in one place they are, and in another they are not, the Property of him on whose field they grew. The Precept, *Do not steal*, is universal; the Law, *To pluck is to steal*, is partial.

97. All Truths include an Idea and a Fact. The Idea is derived from the mind within, the Fact from the world without. In the instance of Rights, of which we are now speaking, the Idea, or Conception of the Right, is supplied by our consciousness of our Moral Nature and its Conditions; the Fact, or Definition of the Right, is supplied by the Law of the Society in which we live, and the train of events which have made that Law what it is. The Moral Nature of Man is moulded into shape by the History of each Nation; and thus, though we have, in different places, different Laws, we have everywhere the same Morality.

98. The existence of Rights gives rise to a *Sentiment of Rights* and a *Sentiment of Wrongs*, which may be arranged with the Moral Sentiments among our Springs of Action. Rights, as we have seen, procure and secure to us the gratification of certain Desires and

Affections. These gratifications become more important in our eyes, by being permanent and stable possessions ; which we hold, not only without fear of interruption, but with the consent and sympathy of all mankind. And with this affection for our own Right, grows up an affection for Rights in general. We see with complacency and sympathy the manifestations of this regard for Rights in others. We recognize it as a sentiment which binds us to all men, and all men to us.

99. Also, Rights being established, Wrongs, the violations of these Rights, excite a stronger feeling than the mere privation or interruption of our gratifications. Rights, being assigned to each person by Rules to which the common Reason of mankind assents, we resent the violation of these Rights, not only as an assault upon an individual, but as an aggression upon all mankind. When we receive a Wrong, we know that we have with us the resentment of all our fellow-men, at the infraction of a Rule which all acknowledge. We entertain our resentful emotions with complacency : they become strengthened and rooted, by this conviction of general sympathy. The anger which we feel, is no longer the impulse of our own individual feelings : it is an affection of the common heart of mankind. We not only entertain our wrath, we cling to it as something good, and admire it as something laudable. We deem our indignation to be virtuous.

100. This Sentiment of Wrongs, along with the Sentiment of Rights, operate powerfully in supporting Rights when they are once established, and in maintaining that peace and order of Society, which are the proper atmosphere of man's moral nature. For these Sentiments give force and energy to the exertions with which men resist any violation of established Rules ; and they fill with fear and shame those who know themselves to be violators of such Rules. The man who has Rights on his side, is bold and vigorous ; he who is a conscious wrong-doer is, by that very circumstance, deprived of courage and energy. Men will not willingly expose themselves to the indignation, as well

tend to produce in the Soul a conformity, actual and habitual, to the Supreme Rule of Human Action: they tend to make men do and feel on each occasion, what is right, and to possess an internal Rightness. But what it is on each occasion right to do and to feel:—what is the description of habitual and internal Rightness, are points which require to be further explained: and this is the object of the following Books.

NOTE. We have already seen (79) that the expression of the Supreme Rule of Human Action must involve, among other terms, *Rights*. We have also seen (80) that there are five primary kinds of Rights:—the Rights of the Person, of Property, of Contract, of Marriage, and of Government. Further, we have seen (96) that though these Rights, as general Conceptions, are necessary and universal conditions of Human Action; the Definitions of each Right in each particular Community is given by the Law of that Community; which Law is determined by historical events as well as by moral considerations. In the first edition of this work, examples of such Definitions of Rights were given, by collecting from the Roman and from the English Law, the Rules which have been established by Legislators, by Custom, and by Jurists, concerning each of the five kinds of Rights,—those of the Person, of Property, of Contract, of Marriage, and of Government. This summary of positive Law is however not necessary for the moral discussions to which we have now to proceed: and may be reserved till, having established our moral doctrines, we are ready to examine what Laws *ought* to be.

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MORALITY.

OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES.

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BOOK II.

MORALITY.

OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES.

CHAPTER I.

OF MORAL PRECEPTS.

106. By the constitution of our human nature, we are necessarily led to assume and refer to a Supreme Rule of human action; and to conceive human actions, our own and those of other men, to be absolutely right, when they are conformable to this Rule. In order that such a Rule may have a definite form, in human Society, men must have Rights; and must also have their Obligations, corresponding, in each man, to the Rights of others. The real existence of Rights and Obligations is a condition requisite for the definite application of the Supreme Rule of Human Action: for, by the existence of Rights and Obligations, the objects of human desire and affection assume such a general and abstract form, that they may be made the subjects of Rules of Action. These points have been discussed and established in the First Book.

The Rights and Obligations which really exist among men are regulated by Laws, or Customs equivalent to Laws. Such Laws, the definitions of Rights and Obligations in each community, are determined in each community by its history (97); and may be, and are different in different communities. But in every community such Laws or Customs must subsist, and must define men's Rights and Obligations. Especially they

must define the five primary kinds of Rights of which we have spoken (80); Personal Security, Property, Contract, Marriage, and Government. These Rights, defined and realized by Law and Custom, are primary and necessary elements and conditions of human action. It is in his doings with regard to these things that a large part of a man's external actions consist. And Morality, which treats of actions (76), must have a reference to these, the conditions and elements of action.

But Morality regards other elements as well as those to which Law refers. Laws regard external actions only. But external actions are the result of internal actions, namely, of Will and Intention, of Mental Desires and of Affections. These internal actions are essential parts of external actions, considered as human actions; or rather, these internal actions, Desire, Affection, Intention, Will, are the only really human part of actions.

External actions, as the motions in our own limbs, and the motions and changes thereby produced in material things, and in the state of other persons, are not *our* actions, except so far as they are the consequences of *our* intention and will (61). When we have willed, what follows is a consequence of Laws of Nature, extraneous to us; and derives its character of right or wrong, so far as we are concerned in it, from the Will, and that which preceded the Will. Thus, if I fire off a pistol and kill a man, his pain and death, the grief of his friends, the loss to his family and his country, all follow as the consequence of the act of Will by which I pull the trigger. They are all morally included in that act of the Will. All those consequences are produced by the working of the Springs of Action within me. They may all be prevented by the operation of other Faculties, withholding me from this act of Will. Hence the Will, the Springs of Action which impel it, and the Faculties which control and direct it, must be the main subjects of our consideration, in treating of actions as right and wrong.

Will, Intention, Desire, Affection, are governed, not

merely by external objects and by transient impulses, but by Habits and Dispositions, which give a permanent character to the operation of the Springs of Action and of the controlling Faculties.

107. The Reason is the Faculty by which we conceive General Rules, and Special Cases as conformable to General Rules (14). It is therefore the Faculty by which we conceive Actions as right or wrong. The Moral Sentiments, Approval of what is right, Condemnation of what is wrong, are powerful Springs of action (82), and thus impel us to carry into effect the judgments formed by the Reason. When we intentionally conform to the Supreme Rule, we speak of our actions as rightly directed by our Reason.

Actions to which we are rightly directed by our Reason are *Duties*. The Habits and Dispositions by which we perform our Duties are *Virtues*. Morality is the Doctrine of Duties and Virtues.

108. The internal actions, Desire, Affection, Intention, Will, point to external Acts; they have external acts for their Objects, and derive their character and significance, as right or wrong, from the external Acts to which they thus point. Thus the Desire of Having leads to Acts of appropriation, and derives its character, as right or wrong, from the Acts of appropriation to which it points. Hence, if this, or any other internal Act, point to external Acts of which the character, as right or wrong, is already determined; these internal Acts have, generally, their characters as right or wrong determined. If the Desire of Having point to the Act of Stealing, which Act is wrong; the Desire itself is wrong. For, as we have already said, it is the internal Springs of Action from which the Act derives its character of wrong. If it be wrong, it is so because the Desire and Intention which produce it are wrong.

The character of actions as right or wrong, considered with reference to the internal Springs of Action from which they proceed, is their *Moral* character. See (76).

Morality, as we have seen, (78), presupposes a state

of human society in which positive Rights exist; and moral Rules must be expressed, at least in their first and general form, in terms which have reference to positive Rights. As a primary and general Rule, the violation of positive Rights is morally wrong. And thus the Moral character of actions, as expressed in general rules, is governed by their jural character. To steal is jurally wrong; it is contrary to universal natural Law. Hence the Volition which aims at theft is morally wrong. The Intention which points to theft is also morally wrong. The Desire of that which belongs to another is morally wrong. These internal acts are wrong, even if the external act do not take place. It is wrong to put my hand in a man's pocket in order to pick it, even if I find nothing there. It is wrong to intend to do so, even if I am prevented making the attempt by the presence of a looker-on. It is wrong to desire another man's money, even if I do not proceed to take it.

109. As there are Laws, which express Rules of external action, there are also *Moral Precepts*, which express Rules of internal action; that is, of Will and Intention, of the Desires and Affections. Thus the Law is, *Do not steal*; the Moral Precept is, *Do not covet*, or *desire what is another's*.

Such Moral Precepts express our Duties. They may be put in various forms. Thus the Precept, *Do not covet*, may be expressed by saying, *It is wrong to covet*; *We ought not to covet*; *We must not covet*; *We should not covet*; *We are not to covet*; *It is our Duty not to covet*; *We are morally bound not to covet*; *We must not be guilty of covetousness*.

110. I have said (108) that Moral Rules must be expressed, *in their first and general form at least*, in terms of positive Rights. The limitation is introduced because Laws, the positive definitions of Rights for the moment, may be themselves immoral. Rights, as we have described them (78), are arrangements not only historically established, but also established in conformity with the supreme Rule; that is, they are such

as are right. The actual definitions of Rights at any moment, that is, the state of the Law, may need improvement and reform: but in general, the Law gives, for the moment, the definitions of Rights upon which Morality must proceed.

The distribution of Rights into the five kinds which we have mentioned, was founded mainly upon the enumeration of the principal Desires and Affections of our nature. The Moral precepts must also have reference to these our principal Springs of Action: and therefore we shall have Moral Precepts corresponding to each of the Classes of legal Obligation. Hence we shall have Precepts of Duty corresponding to each of the Classes of Rights of which we have spoken (80).

Thus there are Rights of the Person, and a corresponding Class of Obligations. We are bound by Law to abstain from inflicting any personal harm on any one through anger, malice, or negligence. We are therefore bound morally to abstain from the affections which aim at any such harm, and the habits of mind which lead to it. It is our Duty to avoid Anger, Malice, and the Carelessness which may lead to another's hurt. The Moral Precepts are; Be not angry with any man: Bear no Malice: Neglect no one's safety.

There are the Rights of Property, and a corresponding Class of Obligations. We are bound by Law not to meddle with the Property of another; nor to take or appropriate what is not our own. We are morally bound to abstain from the Intentions and Desires which point to such appropriation. It is our Duty to avoid the Wish to possess what is another's. The Moral Precept is, Do not covet.

There is a Class of Obligations which regards Contracts and Promises. We are bound by Law to perform our Contracts; not to break our Engagements. We are morally bound not to wish to break our Engagements. And as the moral obligation is not confined by mere legal limits, we are morally bound to perform our engagements, whether or not they are legally valid as Contracts. It is our Duty to perform our Promises: not to deceive or

mislead any man by our words. The Moral Precepts are, Do not break your word; Do not deceive.

There is a Class of Obligations which regards the Marriage Union. We are bound by Law not to meddle with the person, or seduce the conjugal affection, of her who belongs to another. There is a Class of Duties which regard the Desires and Affections on which this Union is founded. We are morally bound not to allow these Desires and Affections to point to unlawful objects. The Moral Precept is, Do not lust after her.

There is a Class of Obligations which regard the Governors and the Government of the State to which we belong. We are jurally bound to obey the Governors, and to conform our actions to the Law. We are morally bound to conform our Desires and Intentions to the Law. It is our Duty to submit to positive Laws, as the realization and definition of the Supreme Law. The Moral Precepts are, Do not desire what the Law forbids. Do not desire to violate general Laws.

The Moral Precepts just stated : Be not angry : Bear no malice : Do not covet : Do not lie : Do not deceive : Do not lust : Do not desire to break Law : are to be applied to the whole train of our affections, desires, thoughts, and purposes, and to the whole course of actions, internal and external, which make up our lives. By their application to the various circumstances of human character and condition, the Classes of Duties, thus pointed out, are further particularized and defined.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE *IDEA* OF MORAL GOODNESS.

111. As we have just seen, the Precepts of Morality, so far as they have a proximate bearing upon external actions, admit of a distribution corresponding to the classification of Rights, because both Moral Precepts and Rights have a reference to the primary Springs

of Action, the Desires and Affections. So suggested and arranged, the Moral Precepts point out certain Conceptions which we are to avoid; Anger, Malice, Covetousness, Lying, Lust, Law-breaking.

But this reference of actions and dispositions to external things is not the most essential element of Morality. Morality implies a reference to the Supreme Rule of Human Action, as well as to the social and material circumstances of man's being. External Rights are the conditions and boundaries, Rightness in the Soul is the source, of Morality (105).

And this Rightness in the Soul includes a Rightness in all the Dispositions and Habits therewith connected; not in those only which have a proximate bearing upon external actions; but in internal actions, thoughts and emotions, as such; and in all that discloses or affects the condition of the soul. Men have an Idea of Rightness in the Soul and the Dispositions therewith connected, as *Goodness*, or *Virtue*.

The Idea of Goodness or Virtue grows up in men's minds, and grows more and more distinct, as they consider their relation to the Supreme Rule of Human Action. By such consideration, they are led to see that all their actions ought to be regulated by Virtue and Duty; that their Intentions, Dispositions, Affections, Habits of Thought and of Feeling, ought also to be regulated and formed by Virtue and Duty, inasmuch as these also are actions; and that the complete Idea of Virtue or Goodness implies such a regulation and formation of the whole internal being of man.

112. Moreover men, as they consider the relation of the Supreme Rule of Action to the various Affections and Desires which belong to man's nature, and to the material and social conditions of his existence, are led to see that the Idea of Virtue or Goodness in general involves several separate Virtues, as Benevolence, Justice, Veracity, and the like.

113. Also, any special Virtue implies a Class of Duties; and a Class of Duties may be enjoined by a Precept or Principle, having reference to the internal

Springs of Action which are to be guided, or the external conditions which are to be regarded. And thus, the separate Virtues, which are implied in the full Idea of Virtue, may be represented by certain comprehensive Maxims or Principles of Duty, all of which must necessarily form portions of the Supreme Rule of Human Action.

In order that we may be led to discern the principal Virtues, and the corresponding Principles by which they are represented, let the following considerations be attended to.

114. Goodness or Virtue, considered as a Law of Action and Dispositions therewith connected, must be a Law which belongs to man as man; a Disposition in which all men can sympathize, and which binds man to man by the tie of their common humanity (70). We must exclude all that operates merely to separate men; for example, all Desires that tend to a center in each individual, without any regard to the common sympathy of mankind; all Affections which operate directly to introduce discord and conflict; all dispositions which disunite men and prevent their acting with mutual understanding and confidence.

115. Goodness or Virtue cannot consist in the mere gratification of Bodily Appetite, without any regard to Affection or the Mental Desires: for the gratification of the Bodily Desires, as eating or drinking, being a mere bodily act, can have no relation to the Supreme Rule, except so far as there is a chain which connects them through the Affections, Mental Desires, Rights of other men, and the like.

116. Nor can goodness or Virtue consist in the mere gratification of the Affections, without regard to the Moral Sentiments and the Reason, which recognise Legal or Moral Rules. For the Affections, in so far as they have no regard to the moral Sentiments and the Reason, are attributes which we have in common with brute animals, and cannot have any relation to the Supreme Law of Human Nature. It is only when Love and Anger recognize the difference of right and wrong, that they can form any part of Virtue.

117. Goodness or Virtue implies not only an actual conformity to a Rule consistent with the Supreme Rule, but also a Love of Virtue, as good, and a Love of such Rules, existing in the mind; so far at least as, in each mind, such abstract affections have been developed. Goodness implies the development of such affections,—the Love of Good as Good, and the desire to advance towards it as the ultimate and only real object of action.

From these general modes of conceiving Goodness or Virtue, joined with what has already been said, we may fix upon the principal separate Virtues included in the general Idea of Virtue or Goodness, and may state the corresponding Moral Principles.

118. Since Virtue or Goodness must be (114) a Law and a Disposition which binds man to man by the tie of a common humanity, and excludes all that operates merely to separate men, all affections which tend to introduce discord and conflict: it excludes malice and anger, as we have said (110), and directs us to Mildness and Kindness. The absence of all the Affections which place man in opposition to man, and the aggregate of all the Affections by which man clings to man, may be expressed by the term *Benevolence*, understood in the largest sense. Men feel, in the first place, the kinds of this Affection which operate within certain limited spheres. We feel and conceive the Affection of Love at first, as binding together the members of the same Family, or the same Community: but man is capable of extending his Love to all mankind; in proportion as there is unfolded in his mind, the conception of the community of the nature of all men with his own nature;—the conception of the common affection, reason, and moral sentiments in which all men participate. With the development of this conception, he is led to a love of man as man, and a desire for the good of all men;—an affection which conforms to our Idea of a Virtue (114); for it is an affection in which all mankind are ready to sympathize, and which binds together man as man.

This Affection, then, of Love to man as man, is one*

of the Virtues the Idea of which is included in the complete Idea of Virtue, or Goodness.

And the part of the Supreme Rule which belongs to this Virtue (113) may be expressed by saying that *man is to be loved as man*.

119. Again, in the Idea of complete Goodness or Virtue, we must exclude, as we have said (114), all Desires that merely tend to their center in the individual, without regard to the common sympathy of mankind: and we must have a habit of mind which suppresses and contradicts all such Desires. The Desire of Property is, in its original form, of this selfish kind. Each man desires Property for himself alone. But the nature of Morality, as we have seen (110), rejects this selfish covetousness, and points out the contrary dispositions, for instance, Liberality and Fairness, as the proper guides of Action. Liberality partakes of Benevolence, and thus is partly included in the last Article; but Fairness involves the notion of another Virtue, which may be described as the Desire that each person should have his own. This Desire, in a complete and comprehensive form, is the Virtue of *Justice*: and this Virtue, Justice, is a second part of the complete Idea of Virtue and Goodness.

And the part of the Supreme Rule which belongs to this Virtue (113) may be expressed by saying that *each man is to have his own*.

120. Again: among the necessary conditions of a Rule of Human Action, is the existence of a Common Understanding among men, such that they can depend upon each other's premeditated and predetermined actions. Lying and Deceit tend to separate men; and to make all actions implying mutual dependence, that is, all social action and social life, impossible. Such acts and habits are accordingly excluded by Moral Rules, as we have seen (110), and Veracity and Honesty are pointed out as the proper guides of Human Action. And if we conceive these qualities in their most complete form, as extending from the acts to the words, and from the words to the intentions, and from the intentions to

the dispositions, we are led to a conception of a Virtue of Character which we may term *Integrity*, as implying an entire correspondence of external and internal acts; or we may term it *Truthfulness*, as implying an agreement of the words with the thoughts. We may also speak of this Virtue as *Truth*; and such a Virtue we necessarily consider as a part of the complete Idea of Virtue.

The part of the Supreme Rule which expresses the claim of this Virtue, is this: *We must speak the truth*: which may be farther unfolded, by reference to the origin of the principle, in this manner: *We must conform our language to the universal understanding among men which the use of language implies.*

121. Again; the Appetites and Desires, so far as they are not controlled by the Affections and Mental Desires, and the Affections, so far as they are not directed by the Moral Sentiments and the Reason, cannot belong to Virtue. We have already noticed Moral Precepts directed against one of the bodily desires, when not thus controlled: but in looking at this class of the Springs of Action in reference to the Idea of complete Virtue and Goodness, we are led to a more comprehensive aspect of the Virtue which has reference to them. Since the bodily Desires are, in the order of Morality, subordinate to the Affections, (115), and the Affections subordinate to the Moral Sentiments and the Reason, (116), we may, speaking comparatively, call the bodily Desires the *Lower Parts*, the Moral Sentiments and the Reason, the *Higher Parts* of our Nature. And the Idea of Virtue requires that, in general, the Lower Parts of our Nature should be subject to the Higher. The control of the Appetites by the Moral Sentiments is recommended to us under the form of the Virtues of Chastity and Temperance: but the Virtue which carries the control of the Higher over the Lower Parts of our Nature deeper into the heart and soul, is more properly termed *Purity*. And hence, we place Purity as one element of the complete Idea of Virtue or Goodness.

And the part of the Supreme Rule which expresses

the claim of this Virtue is this: *the Lower Parts of our Nature are to be governed by the Higher.*

122. Again; the Supreme Law of Human Action, in order to operate effectively upon men's minds, must be distinctly and definitely conceived, at least in some of its parts and applications. But all distinct and definite conceptions of Laws of Human Action must involve a reference to the relations which positive Laws establish. Hence Moral Rules, in order to be distinct and definite, must depend upon Laws; and must suppose Laws to be fixed and permanent. It is our Duty to promote, by our acts, this fixity and permanence: and the Duty, of course, extends to our internal actions, to Will, Intention, Desire and Affection, as well as to external act. We must conform our Dispositions to the Laws; obey the Laws cordially, or administer them carefully, according to the position we may happen to hold in the community. This disposition may be denoted by the term *Order*, understood in a large and comprehensive sense. But further: not only positive human Laws, but subordinate moral Rules, are necessary conditions of morality. We cannot conform our actions, intentions, desires, to the Supreme Rule, without having in our thoughts subordinate Rules, which are partial expressions of the Supreme Rule; and to such subordinate Rules, it is our Duty to conform our Intentions and Desires. The disposition to do this may also be included in the term *Order*, taken in its largest sense. We thus denote, by this term, a disposition to conform, both to positive human Laws as the necessary conditions of this, and to special Moral Rules, as the expression of the Supreme Rule.

The Virtue of *Order* in this comprehensive sense, is part of the general Idea of Virtue or Goodness.

And the corresponding part of the Supreme Rule is: *We must accept positive Laws as the necessary conditions of Morality.*

123. Thus we have five Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, which may be considered as the elements or aspects of the complete Idea

of Virtue or Goodness, or as the Cardinal Points of the Supreme Rule of Human Action.

If we look for the origin of this fivefold division of Virtue, we shall find that, we may say, in a general manner, without pretending to any great precision, that it depends on five elements of our nature: Love, Mental Desires, Speech, Bodily Appetites, and Reason. *Benevolence* gives the utmost expansion to our *Love*; *Justice* prescribes the measure of our *Mental Desires*; *Truth* gives the Law to *Speech* in its connection with purpose; *Purity* controls the part of our nature connected with the *Bodily Appetites*; and *Order*, engages the *Reason* in the consideration of Rules and Laws by which Virtue and its opposite are defined.

124. There is also a relation of approximate parallelism between the five classes of Rights which we have established (80). *Benevolence* is the opposite of those dispositions which tend to Violence and wrongs against the *Personal Safety* of our neighbours: *Justice* enjoins the most exact regard to the Rights of *Property*: *Truth* extends to all uses of language, the rules which the Law lays down for *Contracts*: *Purity* carries to the highest point the Moral View of *Marriage*: and the Virtue of *Order*, as we contemplate it, consists mainly in a regard for the Rights of *Government*.

125. But the exactitude of this fivefold division is not an essential point if it be allowed, as I think it cannot be denied, that Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, are, in the abstract, and when the contemplation of them is not perplexed and obscured by the circumstances of special cases, admired, esteemed, and loved by all men who distinguish between right and wrong; and allowed by all to be main elements in that notion of *Goodness* by which all mankind admire, esteem, and love.

126. Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, have been considered as Dispositions in man. But these Dispositions may be conceived as Desires or Affections, tending to certain abstract mental Objects or Ideas. Thus, Benevolence is a Desire or Affection which has

for its Object the Good of all Mankind. This object may be expressed by the term *Humanity*. *Humanity*, which is thus the ideal object of Benevolence, is also a term used to describe the disposition itself, as it exists in man, who is the subject of this affection. We have thus an *objective* and a *subjective* *Humanity*. In like manner, *Justice* is a Desire which has for its Object the Rule, To each his own. This Rule is itself described as *Justice*, ("I ask for Justice"); and thus we have *subjective Justice*, the Disposition, and *objective Justice*, the Rule. In like manner, *Truth*, the Disposition as it exists in man, its *Subject*, assumes and tends to an *Objective Truth*, the agreement between the reality of things and our expressed conceptions of them. *Purity*, the Disposition, has for its *Object* an *Ideal Purity*, free from all blemish and taint of mere desire. Willing conformity to Law, which is *subjective Order*, has, for its Object, *Law* itself, which may be described as *Objective Order*. Thus, some of the most common and familiar abstract terms, *Humanity*, *Justice*, *Truth*, *Purity*, *Order*, are used to describe both subjectively, the Disposition, and objectively, the Idea to which it tends.

127. There are, however, other terms by which the two significations of each of these words is separately expressed. Thus, as we have seen, subjective *Humanity* is *Benevolence*; objective *Humanity* is the Good of all Mankind, the Welfare of Man, and the like. Perhaps one of the most usual modes of describing the object of Benevolence, in its largest sense, is to say, that it is the increase of *Human Happiness*. *Justice* is used with equal familiarity for Subjective *Justice*, the Disposition, and Objective *Justice*, the Rule. Subjective *Truth* is called *Truthfulness*, *Veracity*; and under certain conditions, *Faithfulness*, *Fidelity*. Special portions of objective *Truth* are *Truths*: and are also termed *Verities*. *Purity* in its subjective sense may be distinguished, as *Purity of Heart*, from *Purity* used objectively, as when we speak of the *Love of Purity*. Subjective *Order* is *Orderliness*, *Obedience*, or, as we have said, willing *Conformity to Law*: Objective *Order*

is *Law, Rule*, which includes Special Laws and Rules, as Truth includes special Verities.

128. These five terms, in their Subjective Sense, *Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order*, are Dispositions conformable to the Supreme Law of Human Action: they are Virtues (107). And inasmuch as they are the leading points to which we have been led, by our analysis of human springs of action, and human obligations, we may term them *Cardinal Virtues*; although they are different from the list of Cardinal Virtues as usually given, *Temperance, Fortitude, Justice, and Wisdom*. This latter list is too unphilosophical a division to be employed with any advantage in Morality. But the Virtues which have names in common language, are all conceived as Virtues, in consequence of partaking of one or more of our five Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order; and we may arrange the Virtues in general according to their affinity with these five.

129. We are not to conceive these Virtues as distinct and separable, but rather as connected and combined in a fundamental and intimate manner. Thus, we have already mentioned moral qualities which partake of more than one, as Liberality partakes of Benevolence and Justice: Honesty, of Justice and Truth. And all these dispositions, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, may be conceived to be included in a *Love of Goodness*. The Disposition enjoined by the Supreme Law of Human Action is the Love of Moral Good as Good, and the desire to advance towards it as the ultimate and only real object of action (117). To this object, all special affections, all external objects, and the desires of such objects, all intercourse of men, all institutions of society, are considered as subordinate and instrumental. And thus, this Love of Good includes, excites, nourishes, and directs to their proper ends, those more special Affections and Dispositions of which we have spoken.

In order to describe the character and conduct conformable to the Supreme Rule, we may speak of it as the character and conduct of a *good man*. That is right

which a good man would do. Those are right affections which a good man would feel.

130. The opposite of Virtue, or the want of it, is *Vice*: and the language of all nations supplies us with a long list of Virtues, arising from the combination of the Cardinal Virtues with the various springs and conditions of human action, and of the antagonist Vices. These names of Virtues and Vices are Abstract Terms, and have Adjectives connected with them, by which the varieties of human character and disposition are familiarly designated. The limits of Virtue and Vice, however, are far from being manifest and obvious. It is often very difficult to say where Virtue ends, and where Vice begins. To define such limits, when it is possible, must be our business, when we come to treat of Questions of Duty. But it is necessary for us to employ the names of Virtues and Vices in a general and usual sense, before we thus attempt to define their limits. The names of Virtues and Vices are the Vocabulary of Morality; and of this Vocabulary, we shall give a brief account; arranging the Terms, as we have said, according to their affinity with the Five Cardinal Virtues.

CHAPTER III.

VIRTUES AND VICES.

1. *Virtues of the Affections.*

131. BENEVOLENCE is the Virtue of the Affection of Love. This Affection is variously modified, according to the persons to whom it is directed, and the accompanying circumstances. Thus there is Conjugal Love, the Love of Husband and Wife; Parental (Paternal and Maternal) Love; Filial Love; Fraternal Love, and other kinds of Family Affection; Friendship, the Love by which Friends are especially drawn to each other; our Love of our Fellow-Citizens; of our Fellow-Countrymen; finally, the Love which we bear to the whole Human Race and to every member of it. All these Kinds of Love are Springs of Action, and Sources of Emotion, which it is the business of Morality, not to resist and destroy, but to govern and direct. When these natural Affections are directed to their proper objects, and regulated by Reason, they are *virtuous Affections*. Those in whom they are wanting are blamed as *without natural affection*. They are all included in the general term, *Benevolent Affections*. They are spoken of figuratively as the *Heart*. A man's *heart is hard*, or *cold*, when these affections are feeble and dull in him; he is *warmhearted*, when they are strong; and *openhearted*, when they are readily bestowed on those around him.

132. Benevolent Affections are called *kindly affections*, for they knit us to our Kind, the Human Race. Hence *kind*, the adjective, describes the disposition of a person full of such affections. A man is *estranged* from his friends, when those affections cease; he is *unkind*, when the opposite prevail; he is *unsocial*, when he shuns the occasions of kindly intercourse with companions.

When a benevolent affection turns our attention upon

its object in a tranquil manner, it is *Regard*. *Love*, is the affection in a more marked form. It is *Tenderness*, when it implies a sensitive and vigilant solicitude for the good of its object; *Fondness*, when it absorbs the thought, so that Reason is disregarded. When this is the case, the affection is no longer a Virtue: still less is it so, when Love becomes *doting*, *overweening*, *passionate*.

* Love towards a person, growing out of good received from him, is *Gratitude*. A grateful person expresses his emotions in Words, which are *Thanks*; but he is also desirous of doing Acts of gratitude; of returning Good for Good. Gratitude is a natural and virtuous Affection; but the Acts which it prompts must be limited by Rules of Duty. A man who does what is wrong in return for benefits received, makes his Benefactor the director of his actions, instead of directing them himself, as Morality requires. Hence he is said to *sell himself*; and to be *venal*.

133. The manifestations of the benevolent affections, in their influence upon the habitual external Behaviour, have various names. Such affections, regarding a particular person, and not necessarily leading to action, are *Good-will*. When they produce a current of cheerful thoughts, they are *Good-humour*. When benevolent feelings lead a man to comply readily with the wishes of others, or to seek to give them pleasure, we have *Good-nature*. When this Disposition is shown on the part of a superior, we term him *gracious* and *benign*. When a person's Good-nature makes it easy to address him, he is *affable*. If, in his behaviour, he avoid all that may give offense to others, he is *courteous*. This Disposition is conceived to have generated in the inhabitants of cities, Habits of behaviour which are termed *Urbanity* and *Civility*. The opposite of these is *Rudeness*.

134. Good-humour may often be disturbed by the Provocations which offenses and outrages occasion; but there are virtuous Dispositions which support our benevolence under such provocations. Such dispositions

are *Gentleness, Mildness, Meekness*. Under the influence of these, we repress or avoid the resentment and anger, which offenses against us, and insults offered to us, tend to produce; we preserve benevolence, tranquillity, and good-humour in our minds; and manifest such a disposition in our behaviour. With these dispositions, if men act wrongly or foolishly, we are *tolerant* and *indulgent*; if they offend us, we *par-don* and *forgive* them. We are ready to do this; we are *placable*. To be *intolerant, unforgiving, implacable*, is a vicious Disposition.

135. The Benevolent Affections are also modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object. We naturally share in the emotions which we witness in man: we have a *Fellow-feeling, a Sympathy* with them. When this Disposition leads us to feel pain at the sight of pain, it is *Compassion*; we *commiserate* the object. This feeling, being strongly confirmed by Piety, came to be called *Pity*. Such a Disposition, as it prompts us to abstain from adding to the pain felt, is *Mercy, or Clemency*; as it prompts us to remove the pain or want which we see, it is *Charity*. But this word has also a wider sense, in which it describes Benevolence, as it makes us abstain from judging unfavourably of other men. All these are virtuous Affections, and lead to the performance of Duties of Benevolence.

136. *Admiration* can hardly be called a benevolent affection towards its object; for we admire what does not draw our Love; as when we admire a great geometer. But if we admire a man as a good man, we also love him (91). *Esteem* is the benevolent affection which we entertain towards that of which we approve. Persons whom we esteem, but to whom we are not drawn by love, we *respect*. When, with such a Disposition, we look at them as our Superiors, we *revere* them; in a higher degree, this Affection is *Veneration*; when combined with Fear, it is *Awe*. Reverence assumes, in its object, Authority and Power, combined with Justice and Goodness.

137. The irascible Affections are, for the most part, opposed to the virtue of Benevolence; and therefore are to be repressed and controlled. Yet these Affections also have their moral office, and give rise to Virtues. They act as a Defense against harm and wrong; and hence, in their various modifications, they may be termed *Defensive Affections*. As opposed to harm, inflicted or threatened, they are Resentment; as directed against wrong, they are Indignation (56). And these Emotions may be blameless or praiseworthy; as 'when we feel *natural* and *proper Resentment*, or *just Indignation*. Such Sentiments are an important and necessary part of Virtue; not of Benevolence, strictly speaking, but of Justice. Without Indignation against cruelty, fraud, falsehood, foulness, disorder, the Virtues have not their full force in the mind.

But Anger, in order to be virtuous, must be directed solely against moral Wrong. *Malevolent Affections* directed towards Persons are Vices; *Antipathy*, *Dislike*, *Aversion* to any person, independently of his bad character and conduct, are vicious. It is vicious to be *displeased*, *irritated*, *incensed*, *exasperated* at any person, merely because his actions interfere with our pleasures and desires. The proneness to such Anger is *Irascibility*. Still more vicious are our Emotions, when they swell into *Rage* and *Fury*, or settle into *Malice* and *Hatred*. The term *Rancour* denotes a fixed Hate, which, by its inward working, has, as it were, diseased the Soul in which it exists. *Spite* implies a vigilant desire to depress and mortify its object. All these malevolent Feelings are vicious.

138. Moderate Anger, arising from pain inflicted on us is *Offense*; which term is also used for the offensive Act. A person *commits an offense*, or *offends*, in the latter sense; and *takes offense*, or *is offended*, in the former. If the Act be one which violently transgress common rules, it is an *Outrage*. Anger at pain received, impelling a man to inflict pain in return, is *Revenge*. This term also implies the object or aim of the feeling, as well as the feeling itself. A man is

stimulated by Revenge, and seeks his Revenge. The same may be said of the word *Vengeance*, another form of the word, but of the same origin. The man who admits into his heart this Affection, and retains it, is *revengeful, vengeful, vindictive.*

139. The Malevolent Feelings, as manifested in the external behaviour, have various names. As they affect our disposition to a person, without necessarily leading to action, they are *Ill-will*. When they disturb the usual current of cheerful thoughts, they are *Ill-humour*. When malevolent feelings lead us to speak or act with a view of giving pain to others, they are *Ill-nature*. When they make us rejoice in another person's pain, they are *Malignity*. If the pleasure, which a malignant man takes in another man's pain, be uncheckt by compassion, when the pain is evident, he is *cruel*; and as such a disposition shows a deficiency in the common feelings which bind men together, he is *inhuman*. If this character be strongly marked, the man is *savage*; he approaches to the character and temper of wild beasts; he is *brutal*.

The Malevolent Affections are also modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object of them, as compared with our own circumstances. Malevolent Pain at the Good which happens to another, and at our own Want of this Good, is *Envy*.

140. *Contempt* can hardly be called a malevolent feeling; for we may despise persons without hating them. Contempt consists rather in an estimate of a man as below a certain Standard of Character, to which our Esteem is given. We despise a man for Cowardice, because we admire Courage. The verb *despise*, (*despicio*, to look down upon,) shows that such a view is implied. The word *Scorn* implies a condemnation of this kind, so strong that it approaches to Indignation. The expression of contempt, in a marked manner, is an *Insult*. If the discrepance of the contemplated character with the assumed standard be extravagant, so as to excite a sudden and poignant feeling of Incongruity, our Con-

tempt expresses itself in *Laughter*. The character is regarded as *ridiculous*.

141. There are various modifications of character and conduct which arise from the greater or less Energy of the affections, and appear as Virtues or as Vices. The feelings of Love of Right, and Anger at Wrong, in a permanent and energetic form, are virtuous *Zeal*. Courage, the habit of mind which rejects Fear, is allied to this virtue; as is *Fortitude*, the habit of not yielding to Pain. From such dispositions of mind, arise *Energy* and *Activity* in action; which are important virtues when the action is virtuous.

142. Though Hope and Fear are not simple Affections, (37), they operate in increasing or diminishing our energy and activity, as the Affections do. The Disposition in which the emotion of Hope predominates is also termed *Hope*, or *Hopefulness*. *Joy* and *Joyfulness* describe rather Delight produced by some special event, than any permanent Disposition; but *Cheerfulness*, like Hopefulness, is rather an habitual Disposition; and when governed by Rules of Duty, is an auxiliary Virtue. A tranquil yet cheerful flow of the spirits keeps the thoughts and feelings in a condition suitable to virtuous action. The want of activity and energy is *Sluggishness*, *Sloth*, *Idleness*, *Laziness*, *Indolence*; which are habits alien to virtue, and connected with the Vice of Apathy, the absence of lively affections and desires. As the influence of Fear predominates, the character becomes *timid*, and tends to *Cowardice*, the opposite of Courage. Such habits are at variance with the Rules of Duty; for these Rules often direct us in a course which leads through Danger, either to the Person or Fortune of the Actor, or to the Good-will which others feel for him. In order that a man may act rightly, he must act *freely*, *independently*. Men wanting in Independence of Character, and seeking the favour of others, without regard to moral Rules, are *slavish*, *servile*, *obsequious*, *cringing*, *fawning*; they are *Flatterers* and *Sycophants*. Such dispositions make men *abject* and *base*. The want of

cheerfulness and hopefulness is *Despondency, Dejection, Sullenness, Melancholy, Gloom*; which are habits of mind adverse to active virtue. The theological moralists have made *Acedia* (*ἀκηδία*), Apathy with regard to Good, one of their seven deadly sins.

143. We have placed here the Virtues and Vices which are connected with Energy or Zeal, because these qualities depend very much upon the strength of the Affections. They depend also, however, upon the Habits of Mind by which the intention is directed. The energetic man decides soon and conclusively what course to take. This is *Decision*. Energy also manifests itself in *Fixity of Purpose*. When the purpose is once formed, the energetic man's course is *determined*; his doubts are *resolved*; and he goes on in spite of difficulty and danger. This is *Determination, Resolution*. A man who adheres to his purpose, in spite of strong motives to draw him away, is *firm*; but if the motives which he resists are reasonable, he is *obstinate*. Firmness implies a good cause; Obstinacy a bad one. Energy and Zeal may also become extreme, so as to trespass upon Benevolence. In this case they are *Overzeal, Vehemence, Harshness, Impatience*.

Zeal, operating through the Reason, is *Earnestness*, which leads to *Seriousness*. With this quality, Cheerfulness is not inconsistent, but *Levity* is. *Care* sometimes implies only so much attention as Earnestness requires; at other times, it implies more than is consistent with Cheerfulness. It is right to *take Care*, but it is not necessary to be *full of Care*. It is wrong to be *careless, reckless*. A disposition to attend to Trifles only is *Frivolity*.

144. Connected with the pleasures of Cheerfulness, there are pleasures which show themselves externally in good-humoured Laughter; as the pleasures of Jesting and the like. These arise from intellectual acts, and may be spoken of hereafter; but we may here remark, that under the influence of Levity, they lead to mere *Merriment, Buffoonery, Folly*.

2. *Virtues of the Mental Desires.*

145. Property is the Conception about which the Cardinal virtue of Justice is especially concerned; and hence the dispositions and habits of mind which regard Property, have Justice for their leading virtue. Yet Wealth, and Property of all kinds, may be used as a means of Benevolence; and from this use, arise Virtues; as *Charity*, already mentioned, *Liberality* (a willingness to give), and the like. Wealth may be desired as a means either to such ends, or to different ones. Hence the Disposition which aims at acquisition, may be virtuous or vicious, according to the ulterior object. A man may desire Wealth as a means of Luxury and Sensuality; and in such a case, the Desire of Wealth is opposed to Temperance, rather than to Justice.

The Desire of the means of Subsistence is an universal and necessary Desire. A Wish for a Competence,—for so much property as may free a man from solicitude respecting common needs and common enjoyments,—is not opposed either to Justice or to Temperance. The prospect of *Poverty* and *Penury*; the pressure of *Privation* and *Want*; the sense of *Dependence* upon others;—greatly tend to disturb the influence of virtue in the mind. The Fear of these evils is not a vice. Also wealth may be desired as a means of benevolent action, or of right action, in many other ways. A person's power of doing good, of many kinds, depends much upon the Station and Influence which wealth bestows.

146. But though wealth may be desired for ends which make the Desire virtuous; the progress of men's habits is such that, when sought at first as a means, it is afterwards desired as an end. The Desire to acquire money is then unlimited; and is *Covetousness*, *Avarice*. The man's greediness in desiring, is *Cupidity*: his eagerness in taking, is *Rapacity*. He scrapes and hoards. He spares carefully and spends unwillingly: he is *parsimonious*, *niggardly*, *penurious*. His solicitude and privations make him miserable. He is a *Miser*.

On the other hand, such habits of care, with regard to sparing and spending, as may tend to avoid Poverty and Privation, are reckoned as Virtues; such virtues are *Economy, Frugality*. By these, a man *thrives* or grows in his possessions: he is *thrifty*. A person who is destitute of these qualities is an *Unthrift*. A willingness to give is *Liberality, Generosity, Bountifulness*; which are reckoned Virtues. But this disposition may be excessive: the man is then *lavish, extravagant*.

147. Property conveys Power to the Possessor: but there are also many other Sources of Power. Whoever aims at a larger share of Power than his neighbours possess, is, so far, regardless of Justice. The Desire of Power is *Ambition*. But the Desire of Power for good ends, and the Desire of the Power which moral excellence gives, may be termed *laudable Ambition*.

The Disposition which represses our own desires, whether of money, power, victory, or any other object, and contemplates the desires and claims of other persons with equal favour, is *Fairness*. This is a kind of personal application of Justice, to questions between ourselves and others. *Impartiality* is more commonly used for the Fairness which decides justly between two other persons.

3. *Virtues connected with Truth.**

148. We have mentioned (127) some of the names of the Virtues connected with Truth; as *Truthfulness, Veracity*. These express a conformity of our words to the reality. The conformity of our actions to our Engagements, whether express or implied, is *Fidelity, Good Faith*. Thus a subject is faithful to the engagement which binds him to the Sovereign of the State. If, in such a case, Love is added to Fidelity, it becomes *Loyalty*.

A man who says what he knows to be untrue, is a *Liar*. He is guilty of *Falsehood*. A man who says what he thinks, is *sincere*. Such a man shows himself what he is. A man who conceals some important part of his feelings or thoughts, *dissembles*. When he assumes

the appearance of virtues which he really does not possess, he is a *Hypocrite*. By such means men *impose* upon others, and *deceive* them.

Lies and Deceit are often used as means of *Fraud*; which is an offense against Property, and therefore contrary to Justice as well as Truth. A person who *defrauds, circumvents, cheats* any one, must be destitute both of Justice and of Truth. Property and Language may both be considered as Universal Contracts, to which the whole human race are parties; Fraud by means of Falsehood violates both these Contracts.

A man free from all fraudulent dispositions is *honest*; he is a man of *Probity*. He is not drawn aside, by the desire of gain, to act *obliquely, tortuously, in a crooked* manner. He is *straightforward, and upright*. His intentions, words, and actions, form a whole in which there is no inconsistent part. This is *Integrity*. A deceitful man may have two purposes; one, apparent, simulated, declared; the other secretly held, but dissembled, till it can be acted on. To have two purposes in this way is *Duplicity*. The truthful person, on the contrary, has *Simplicity* for a part of his character: he has *Singleness of Purpose, Singleness of Heart*. He is *frank and open*, showing himself as he really is.

4. *Virtues relating to the Bodily Desires.*

149. The gratification of the Appetites or Bodily Desires, to a certain extent, and under certain conditions, is requisite for the continuance of the individual and of the species, and therefore is not vicious. These Desires being mere attributes of the Body, cannot have, of themselves, a moral character (115). They are to be controlled by moral Rules, and made subservient to moral Affections, and thus, are the materials of Virtues. The Habits of thus controlling the bodily Desires, constitute the Virtues of *Temperance and Chastity*. The Demeanour produced by a chaste mind, especially in women, is *Modesty*.

By the establishment of Family and Social Relations,

the gratification of the bodily wants is connected with the impulses of Affection and the Love of Society. The shelter of the common family roof, and the social meal, as well as the marriage-bed, are the objects of far other feelings than mere bodily desires. The Appetites are thus made subservient to the Affections. They are absorbed by the Affections, and are thus *purified*. All gratifications of the Appetites, sought as gratifications merely, are impure and vicious. Among such vices is the *Love of the Pleasures of the Table*. When the Desire of Food is gratified to excess, there is *Gluttony*, *Gulosity*. When there is an excessive solicitude about the gratification of the Taste, the man is an *Epicure*. The Love of Drink involves, not only a bodily Appetite, but a complacency in the mental condition to which certain liquors lead; namely, the condition of *Intoxication* or *Ebriety*; a condition in which the Reason loses the power of directing our actions. The Vice of falling into such a condition is *Intemperance*, *Drunkenness*.

The other leading bodily Desire, when not morally controlled, is *Lust*. The control of this within moral limits, is *Continence*. The vicious indulgence is *Lewdness*, *Lechery*. Persons whose guiding springs of action are these bodily desires, are *sensual*, *carnal*. A chaste and modest person does not allow his eyes or his imagination to dwell on things which may excite Lust. Such images are obscene, indecent. To suggest such images in speech is *Obscenity*. All such filthy conversation *pollutes the mind*. A man who makes pleasure the object of his actions is a *Voluptuary*. Such men generally cast off moral restraint, and are hence *dissolute*, *profligate*. A woman who thinks lightly of chastity is a *Wanton*.

When the arts of life are employed to gratify artificial wants and desires, those who give their attention and solicitude to obtain such gratifications are *luxurious*. Luxury is often employed to describe the aggregate of such gratifications; but the Solicitude employed on the means of gratification, rather than any special Class of

such means, appears to be essential to our conception of Luxury. Things which are luxuries in one stage of society, become universal wants, and consequently necessities, in another stage. Linen garments, glass windows, tea, were luxuries a few centuries ago in this country. They are now necessities of life.

5. *Intellectual Virtues.*

150. The Disposition by which we accept Law and Rule as the necessary guides of human action, is that which we have termed Order. This Virtue is also, as we have said (127), termed *Orderliness*, *Obedience*, and the like.

But it is a Virtue to govern carefully, as well as to obey cordially, according to the position we hold in the community. A virtuous governor must be guided by Justice; but Justice itself must be defined by Specific Rules. Laws and Rules must be apprehended by the Intellect, and must be expressed in terms of general conceptions constructed by the Reason. Hence, the Virtues connected with Order especially include operations of the Intellect, and may be termed Intellectual Virtues.

151. The abstract Conceptions of the objects of our mental Desires, as Property, Power, Society, require operations of the Reason for their formation in the mind. By the further operation of the like Faculties, we form still more abstract and general Conceptions of objects of action, as Good, Wellbeing, Happiness, Expediency, Interest, and the like. We may construct and express Rules of Action, dependent upon such Conceptions. Various moralists have stated various Rules, thus expressed. Different individuals govern their conduct by one or other of such Rules, more or less clearly apprehended. One man looks to Interest as his object, another to Happiness, another Wellbeing, another to the Happiness of Mankind, and so on.

One or other of such objects being assumed as the end of human action, *Prudence* is the Intellectual Virtue by which we select the right means to this end. A man

is prudent, who acts so as to promote his own Interest, if his Interest be assumed to be the proper Object of action: but if we conceive Happiness to be a higher object than Interest, he is prudent, if he disregard mere Interest, and attend only to his Happiness. Prudence supposes the value of the end to be assumed, and refers only to the adaptation of the means. It is the selection of right means for given ends.

152. In the notion of *Wisdom*, we include, not only, as in Prudence, a right selection of means for an assumed end, but also a right selection of the end. However prudent a man may be in seeking his Interest, he is not wise, if, in doing this, he neglect a truer end of human action. Wisdom is the habit by which we select right means for right ends. We approve and admire Prudence relatively to its end: we approve and admire Wisdom absolutely. We commend the prudent man, as taking the best course for his purpose; but we do not necessarily agree with him in his estimate of his object. We venerate the wise man, as one knowing, better than we do, the true object of action, as well as the means of approaching it. Wisdom is a Cardinal Virtue, like Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity; and with reference to the first, as well as the other four, human Dispositions are good, as they partake of the Cardinal Virtue. Wisdom is the complete Idea of Intellectual Excellence; as Benevolence, Justice, Truth, and Purity, are of Moral Excellence.

153. Prudence is, etymologically speaking, the same word as *Providence*, that is *Foresight*. But we do not call a man *prudent*, except he not only see the bearing of actions on a distant end, but act upon his foresight. A man who gambles, with a clear foresight that gambling will ruin him, is not prudent. Prudence is a Virtue, not of the Speculative Reason, which contemplates Conceptions, but of the Practical Reason, which guides our Actions.

The guidance of our Actions by Reason, requires us to attend both to the present and to probable future circumstances; it requires *Attention*, and *Forethought*,

or *Forecast*. It requires, too, the employment of Thought upon the Circumstances of the case. A virtuous man must be *thoughtful, considerate*. The want of thoughtfulness is a part of that Levity which we have already noticed as involving a Vice of the Affections (144).

In order to act prudently, we must not only have Prudent thought, but have it at the right time for action; this is *Presence of Mind*. *Cunning* is a lower kind of Prudence, that seeks its ends by means, of which the end is not intended to be seen by others, when they are used.

By our Intellectual Faculties we are able to apprehend and know Truth, that is, Objective Truth (126); and especially, Truths which bear upon our actions, and which must be taken into account in framing Rules of Action. Truth is the proper object of Reason; that is, of the universal Reason of mankind: and the Supreme Rule of human action which belongs to mankind, in virtue of their universal Faculties, must depend upon the Truths which Reason makes known to us. The Love of Knowledge impels men to aim at the Knowledge of such Truths: and the *Love of Truth*, which thus contributes to a Knowledge of the Supreme Law, is a Virtue.

The progress which each man makes in the Knowledge of Truth, depends in a great measure upon himself; upon his Observation; his Diligence, Attention, Patience, in seeking the Truth. His progress depends also upon external circumstances; upon the Intellectual and Moral Developement of the Society in which he lives; and upon his own Education, in the largest sense of the term. But there are also differences of the Mental Faculties, between one person and another. One man excels another in Acuteness and Clearness of the mind, when employed in observation or in reasoning; one man has a quicker or a more tenacious Memory than another. There are various degrees of Sagacity; various kinds of Imagination. Some men have Genius. These Faculties are not properly termed Virtues, but *Gifts*,

Endowments, Ability. They may be used as means to right ends, and hence they are termed *Talents*; by a metaphor taken from the Parable in the New Testament, which teaches us that a man is blameable, when he does not use the means of right action assigned to him.

6. *Reflex Virtues and Vices.*

154. We may place, among the Intellectual Virtues and Vices, those which depend upon our apprehension of other men's sentiments concerning us. For such Virtues and Vices imply reflex thought. We have already enumerated (57) among the springs of human action, the Reflex Sentiments, in which we form a conception of other men's sentiments, by the image of our own; and of ourselves, as the object of those sentiments. Such are the Desire of Esteem, the Desire of Admiration, the Love of Fame, and the like.

There is a difference to be made between the Desire of Esteem and the Desire of Admiration. Esteem is given to what is deemed right and good. Admiration and Applause are often bestowed upon qualities which have no moral character; as strength, skill, beauty, wit, and the like. The want of such qualities is a ground, among many men, of Contempt; and if the deficiency appear suddenly and glaringly, of Ridicule. Ridicule implies that the object which excites it is so palpably below the standard which we apply to it, that the comparison is extravagant and absurd. The Desire of Admiration produces a Fear and Dread of this Contempt and Ridicule. But the Desire of being admired, for other than moral excellences, has in it nothing of Virtue. He who desires the Esteem, others, desires them to regard him as good; and for the most part, be disposed to sympathize with them in their admiration for what is good. The *Desire of Esteem* therefore is easily consistent with Virtue.

The *Desire of Admiration* produces a ready belief that we are admired, and a Joy and Elation of Mind accompanying such belief. This Disposition is *Vanity*.

One who is treated with marks of general esteem among men, is brought to *Honour*. One who is pointed at as an object of general disesteem, is brought to *Disgrace*; and, if he feel the Disgrace, is put to *Shame*. But Honour and Shame likewise indicate, subjectively, the Sensibility of the man to those indications of general Esteem and Disesteem. We speak also of *False Honour*, and *False Shame*; meaning Dispositions to be influenced by Applause on the one side, and Blame or Ridicule on the other, even when they are not rightly bestowed. *True Honour* is a Regard for what is right and good, considered especially as the object of sympathy and esteem among men. A *man of Honour*, an *honourable man*, has an especial abhorrence of the Vices of Fraud and Falseness. The Desire of Admiration in another form is the *Love of Glory*. In Civil Society are established marks of Public Honour, as Rank, Titles, Decorations, and the like. Dispositions, for the most part, allied to Vanity, fasten upon these objects; and thus we have the *Love of Rank*, or the like. But such marks of honour are often accompanied with Political Power; as when, in England, a man is made a Peer. In this case, the Desire of Rank may be Ambition, rather than Vanity.

155. When I have formed a conception of *myself*, I am led to regard myself as the object of my own moral sentiments. If I approve my own character, I feel *Self-esteem*. If I am the object of my own Admiration, without requiring the sympathy of others, this feeling is *Pride*; a Vice which estranges me from other men. The Satisfaction which is felt in my own Admiration, is *Self-complacency*; a feeling which blinds men to their true character.

I ought to render my Character such as to deserve esteem, and therefore, such as to deserve my own esteem, if I contemplate my own character. If I do this, I may reject wrong acts and emotions, as unsuited to the character which I thus ascribe to myself. The Disposition to do this, appears to be what is meant by a *Proper Pride*: but this way of regarding one's own

character appears to involve a share of *Self-complacency*. Men reckon among virtues, the *Magnanimity* which disregards small dangers and small injuries or offenses. The opposite term, *Pusillanimity*, denotes cowardice; a quick sensibility to offenses is *Captiousness*.

Pride is, in its tendency, at variance with the Benevolent Virtues, Meekness, Reverence, Courtesy. But the virtue which is especially opposed to Pride, is *Humility*. He who is humble in his estimate of himself, is also *modest* in comparing himself with others; but, as we have said (149), Female Modesty has a more especial meaning. When Pride is manifested so as to imply Contempt of others, it is *Haughtiness*, *Disdain*; if Unkindness be added, it is *Insolence*. The insolent man is *overbearing*, *domineering*, *arrogant*. Self-esteem, so far as it regards the Operation of the Intellect, is *Self-opinion*. When this excludes all mistrust of one's self, it is *Self-sufficiency*: and, as taking much for granted, it is *Presumption*. When Pride fastens upon special points, it is *Conceit*.

156. The Habits of mind by which we resist the impulses of desire and affection, so as to conform to rules of virtue or prudence, are *Self-control*, *Self-command*, *Self-watchfulness*; *Self-mistrust*; when the desires which we control are so lively that we cannot suppress them, though we resist them, it is *Self-denial*. When we seek our own gratification, in disregard of more virtuous objects, it is *Self-seeking*. When we let our Will take its course, in spite of manifest warnings of prudence, it is *Self-will*.

The Habit of making ourselves the principal object of our attention and solicitude, is the Vice of *Selfishness*. A man is selfish, if the Desires which tend to himself (the Desires of the Body, the Desire of Property, and the like), rather than the Affections, are his leading Springs of Action. These may be termed *Selfish Desires*. The term implies an Excess in the attention which we give to ourselves, a Defect in that which we give to others; and is always used in an unfavourable sense. Hence the term is not applied to the predomi-

nance of those Desires which do not interfere with the claims of others. We call a man *selfish*, in whom the Love of Money or of Bodily Ease prevails, because such Dispositions make him disregard the claims of others; but we do not call a man *selfish*, in whom the Love of Knowledge or of Society is strong; for my pursuit of knowledge takes nothing from other persons; and my love of society implies an acknowledgment of some kind of merit or value in other men. Pride and Vanity are selfish dispositions; for the proud man is too much occupied with his own admiration of himself, and the vain man with admiration of himself proceeding from other men, to regard, with due attention, the claims of his neighbours.

The Selfish Man thinks only of himself: hence he has no *Consideration for others*: no due care for their feelings, condition, and claims. This Virtue is required in all; there is a higher degree of it, *Unselfishness*; the disposition of a person who pays no regard to his own gratification when that of another person comes in competition with it. A still higher degree of such virtue is *Self-devotion*; the virtue of him who willingly incurs pain, danger, or death, to procure benefits for another.

157. There are some dispositions regarded as Virtues, which are conceived to go beyond the standard of common characters. Such virtues are called *noble*; and when elevated still higher in our thoughts, they are *heroic*, or *heroical*. *Heroism* generally implies great Fortitude or Courage, combined with Self-devotion. History is full of heroic acts; as that of Regulus, who refused to counsel his countrymen to peace, and returned to Carthage to die in tortures; that of Virginius, who stabbed his daughter to preserve her from dishonour; that of the elder Brutus, who, as judge, condemned his own sons to death; that of Lucilius, who saved the younger Brutus by offering himself to the pursuers as Brutus; that of Socrates, who preferred to receive death in obedience to the Laws of his country, though escape was offered him by his friends. The acts of *Martyrs*,

who died for the Truth, when they might have saved their lives by denying it, are heroic.

158. The Moral Vocabulary of which we have taken a survey, the Collection of Terms describing Virtues and Vices, is used to express the judgments of mankind in general, respecting the Dispositions and Characters of men. The approval or disapproval implied in each Term is, for the most part, so well-understood, that the mere use of the term pronounces a moral sentence on the subject to which it is applied. And the moral judgment of mankind, thus expressed in a recognized form, is very efficacious in forming the moral sentiments of each person; and hence, in modifying the characters and affections of men. The Vocabulary of Virtues and Vices is a constant moral Lesson; perpetually operating to bring each man's moral sentiments into agreement with the general judgment of men. Every man is taught, by the use of moral language, to admire Gratitude and Filial Love, to condemn Revenge and Cruelty; and the like.

For the most part, this Lesson agrees with the Lesson of true Morality, and points rightly to the Supreme Law of Human Action. This may be readily understood. For the Supreme Law of Human Action must be a Law in which all men, as men, sympathize (98). Hence the common moral judgment, of which we have been speaking, which is expressed and communicated by the moral language commonly in use among men, will, in general at least, conform to the Supreme Law. What are universally held as Virtues, must be dispositions in conformity with this Law. What are universally reckoned Vices, must be wrong.

And a man, in so far as he is taught and formed by the general judgment of men, thus conveyed in the language of the Morality universally recognized, will be rightly taught. A man whose character contains what all men reckon Virtues, and is free from what are universally reckoned Vices, will be a good man. His affections and desires being thus regulated, he will tend to the possession of the Operative Moral Principles of

Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order; which we have stated as the Elements of the Supreme Law.

159. To the doctrine, that the common judgment of mankind respecting Virtues and Vices agrees, generally, with true Morality; it may be objected, that there are dispositions which we reckon vicious; and which yet, in many ages and countries, have been esteemed laudable, as Revenge. To this we reply, that men do not conceive themselves pronouncing the moral judgment of mankind when, under the influence of strong emotion, they speak of the satisfaction arising from Revenge, or appeal to the sympathy of other men alike moved. No Moralist, speaking calmly, and in the Name of Mankind, would say that boundless Revenge is good and virtuous. So far as he could praise or defend the Disposition, it would be by identifying it with the Punishment of Wrong, that is, with Justice. Men speak of Revenge as "a kind of wild Justice;" and approve it only so far as it partakes of the nature of Justice. And in like manner, all other dispositions are reckoned Virtues, even in the common judgment of mankind, only so far as they agree with, and partake of, the Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order.

CHAPTER IV.

MORAL PRINCIPLES.

160. By the help of our Reason, we frame Rules of Moral Action which are more or less partial expressions of the Supreme Rule (151). These Rules may be variously connected, so as to give, by comparison and reasoning, rise to other Rules, according to the varieties of the occasions and relations to which the Supreme Rule is to be applied. But such connexion and such reasoning must rest ultimately upon certain fundamental general Maxims or Rules which we may term *Princi-*

ples: just as in Geometry, the reasoning rests ultimately upon the Axioms and Definitions. In order, therefore, to establish and apply Moral Rules, we must state the Moral Principles which are the foundation of such Rules.

These Moral Principles, being the expression, or parts of the expression, of the Supreme Rule of Human Action, must coincide in effect with the Idea of Virtue or Goodness; and therefore with the Elements of this Idea, which, as we have seen (125), are the Five Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. Our Moral Principles must express these Cardinal Points of the Supreme Rule.

161. The term *Principles* is variously used. Springs of Action, as Affections, Desires, Dispositions, are often termed *Principles of Action*; especially when they operate in a steady and consistent manner. We put such steady *Principles* in opposition to transient and casual *Feelings*, which may be inconsistent with themselves. Our Feelings may prompt us to be kind to one person, and harsh to another; but Benevolence, operating as a Principle, would make us kind to all. We have hitherto avoided speaking of "*Principles of Action* in this sense;" and have called the Affections and Desires *Springs of Action* (24). Custom allows us to term Benevolence, and the other Cardinal Virtues, *Moral Principles*, when they operate in any man steadily and consistently, even though they be not expressed in words. But we must distinguish the term *Principles*, used in this sense, from the fundamental Maxims or Rules, the basis of other Rules, which we have also more especially called *Moral Principles*. We may call the former *Operative Principles*, the latter, *Express Principles*. The former are *Principles of Action*, the latter are *Principles of Reason*.

In order that a man's Character should conform to the Supreme Rule, it is requisite that Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, should be in him Operative Principles. In order that he should express his Rules of Action so that they may be contemplated by the Reason, and communicated from one person to

another, it is requisite that he should arrive at Express Principles.

162. Express Moral Principles must, as we have already said, be the expression of those Ideas which are the elements of the Supreme Rule. We have already been led to attempt to obtain such expressions, in speaking of these Moral Ideas.

We have seen (118) that the Idea of Benevolence is, that of an Affection, which makes man, as man, an object of love to us: and that we may state it as a Moral Principle, that *Man is to be loved as Man*. We may term this the *Principle of Humanity*.

We have seen (119) that the Idea of Justice is, that of a Desire that, of external things, each person should have his own, without any preference of ourselves to others, or of one person to another. We may state this also as a Moral Principle, that *Each Man is to have his own*; and this we may term the *Principle of Justice*.

We have seen (120) that the Idea of Truth (as a Cardinal Virtue) is, the Idea of a Conformity to a Universal Understanding among men, which is involved in the use of language, and according to which Understanding, each may depend upon the representations of the others. Hence we may state it as a Moral Principle, that *We must conform to the Universal Understanding among men which the use of Language implies*: and this we may call the *Principle of Truth*.

Again, we have seen (121) that the Idea of Purity implies the contemplation of mere Appetite and Desire, as the Lower Parts of our nature, which are to be governed by, and made subservient to, the Moral Sentiments and Reason, the Higher Parts. We may state this as a moral Principle, that *The Lower Parts of our Nature are to be governed by, and subservient to, the Higher*. This is the *Principle of Purity*.

Again, we have seen (122) that the Idea of Order implies a conformity, both to Positive Human Laws, as the necessary conditions of morality, and to special Moral Rules, as the expression of the Supreme Rule. We may therefore state it as a Moral Principle, that *We must*

obey positive Laws as the necessary Conditions of Morality; and this is the Principle of Order.

163. These five Express Moral Principles may be further unfolded; and the Conceptions by which we designate them, Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, may be further defined hereafter. But we do not fully express the import of the Cardinal Virtues of Benevolence, Justice, and the like, without adding some further Principles to those which we have mentioned. Benevolence must be strong, as well as general: vivid in its degree, as well as universal in its application. And the same is true of the other Affections rightly directed. The Supreme Law must not only direct the Affections and Intentions to their proper objects, but must require steadiness and energy in them thus directed. The recognition of this condition of the Supreme Rule is shown in the place which Zeal, Energy, Earnestness, hold among the Virtues (143). In order to express this, we may therefore state, as a Moral Principle, that *The Affections and Intentions must not only be rightly directed, but energetic; and this we may call the Principle of Earnestness.*

164. Again, it is not enough to give the character of virtue to our desires, that they are directed only to those objects which Justice assigns to us. Our desires are not virtuous (though they are not necessarily vicious,) if they terminate in the objects themselves. The Supreme Law of Human Action requires us (117) to consider Moral Good as the objects to which all other objects are subordinate, and from which they derive their only moral value. We naturally desire external things, as wealth, power, honour, pleasures of the sense and of the imagination, the society of those we love, and the like, and we originally desire these things for their own sake. But a more advanced Morality directs us to desire these things also as means to moral ends: for all these things, as means of moral action, moral restraint, and moral culture, may be made means to moral ends. And we may state this as a Moral Principle, that *Things are to be sought universally, not only in subservience to moral rules, but as means to moral*

ends; and this we may term the *Principle of Moral Purpose*.

165. To the *Express Principles* which we have thus stated, correspond *Operative Principles* of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose: these exist in each man's character, in so far as the Express Principles above stated become his habitual guides and springs of action,—in so far as these express the usual tendencies of his affections and purposes. In this sense, as Operative Principles, a man is also said to have a *Spirit* of Benevolence, of Justice, and the like.

It may be proper hereafter to state other Moral Principles, in addition to these seven: but these seven will enable us to lay down many Rules of Duty, which is the purpose for which we put them forwards. We must now speak of Duty; and in the first place, of the distinction between Duty and Virtue.

CHAPTER V.

DUTIES.

166. WE have already stated (91), that Virtue and Duty differ, as the Habit and the Act; as the internal Disposition, and the outward Manifestation. Acts do not necessarily prove the existence of the Dispositions to which they generally correspond. A man may frequently give relief to a person in distress, without being really compassionate; he may habitually perform what he has promised, without real integrity. Such is the case, for instance, when a man gives alms to avoid importunity; or pays his debts to escape disgrace. Acts do not even prove Habits; for an act may be solitary; like that of her

Who paid a tradesman once to make him stare.

But notwithstanding this, Acts of Duty are both the most natural operation of virtuous Dispositions, and the most effectual mode of forming virtuous Habits. Hence, Acts of Duty are requisite, both as the manifestations

of Virtue, and as the means of becoming virtuous. The Virtues belong to a deeper part of our nature than the Duties, being the sources out of which our acts of Duty spring. But Duties are more capable of definite description and determination than Virtue not exhibited in act; and hence Duties are the more especial subject of the Moralists's discussions. The Virtues are what we are; the Duties are what we do. It is more important what we are, than what we do; but it is more easy to speak of what we do, than of what we are; and moreover, what we are, gives rise to what we do; and what we do, shows what we are.

167. Duties, in their general form, coincide with Virtues. Justice is a Virtue; Justice is also a Duty. But they are generally conceived with this difference; that Virtue is more of an unconscious Disposition; Duty implies more of conscious Thought. Our Virtues exist and operate without our thinking about them; we perform an act of Duty, *thinking* that we ought to do it. To think an act a Duty, is to think we ought to do it; it is to think it right; to think it conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human Action.

To think an act *right*, is to think that there is a Reason for it, by which it is shown to be conformable to the Supreme Rule. Such Reasons are given, when we show that Acts are conformable to the Moral Principles which have just been laid down (162); for these Principles express parts of the Supreme Rule. Hence, Rules of Duty are to be established by a reference to those Principles, as their Reasons.

168. Virtue is a Habit of the Desires, Affections, and Will; Duty involves an operation of the Reason, by which the Desires, Affections, and Will, are directed and governed. By the frequent performance of such acts of direction and government, they become habitual, easy, familiar, and finally cease to be objects of consciousness; and thus Duty becomes Virtue.

169. We may make a further distinction between Duty and Virtue; indicating that we carry the notion

of Virtue further than that of Duty. We speak of *Heroic Virtues*, as we have seen (157), but never of *Heroic Duties*. Heroic Virtues are Virtues beyond the range of Duty. Duty implies Rules of Duty, but Heroic Virtue soars above Rules.

170. The act of conscious thought by which we recognize our Duties, turns our attention upon ourselves as the objects, of the Moral Sentiments of Approbation and Condemnation (155). The habit of regarding ourselves as worthy of Condemnation when we do wrong, and as consequently liable to Punishment, the consequence of deserved Condemnation, in a world in which the Supreme Law is really administered, is the *Sense of Responsibility*. This Habit of Thought is not explicitly recognized in our notion of Virtue, but it forms part of our conception of Duty; and is often termed the *Sense of Duty*.

171. A further feature in our Conception of Duty is, that it includes the notion of Actions determined by external Relations and Circumstances, as well as by internal Dispositions. Duties depend upon the social position of men, and other like conditions. There are Duties of Parents and Children, of Husbands and Wives, of Friends, of Neighbours, of Magistrates, of Members of various Bodies and Professions. Men's Virtues manifest themselves in various Acts of Duty, according to these conditions. The descriptions of Duties must include a reference to those varieties of circumstance and condition. There belong to each man the *Duties of his Station*. Our Duties, so far as they regard our special Relations to particular persons, may be termed *Relative Duties*.

172. Men have legal Obligations, as well as Duties, belonging to their Station. Some of these Obligations, though defined by different Rules and Limits in different ages and countries, are acknowledged and established in some form in all communities. Thus Children are everywhere under an Obligation to obey their Parents; Parents to support and educate their

Children ; Husband and Wife are under mutual Obligations to community of life and fortune ; Master and Servant have Obligations of support and service ; and the like. And positive Obligations of this kind, in some form, are necessary conditions of man's domestic and social life : and the actions proceeding from such Obligations and from the correlative Rights, make up a large portion of the series of actions of which human activity consists. These actions, and the relations from which they proceed, like all parts of human life and being, belong to the sphere of Morality, and are subject to Moral Rule. The several relations of domestic and social life, the Obligations and Rights of station, must have a moral character, as well as a mere legal existence. Hence these actions and relations must proceed from those internal springs of action by which alone they can have a moral significance. They must be the result of Affections and habitual Dispositions ; of Affections and Dispositions belonging to the special relations, domestic and social. And thus the Relative Duties recognise a moral significance in the established Obligations of each Station ; and Relative Duties are necessary parts of the Moral Laws, because established Obligations relative to domestic and social connexions are necessary conditions of man's existence.

This Maxim, that there is a Moral Significance in our Social Relations, will often serve to point out our Duties. All acts relative to other men, in order to be moral, must proceed from an internal Spring of Affection ; our Obligations, being what we ought to do, if the law be a reasonable law, are also Duties. But in order that they may be Duties, there must exist an Affection which is the natural Source of such acts ; and this Affection is itself a Duty.

173. The Affections from which Duties thus proceed, will be, for the most part, those Affections which naturally grow up in the bosoms of men, so far as they are influenced by the common moral judgments of mankind ; they will be Virtuous Affections, the Affections which belong to a good man (158).

Our Duties are determined by the General Notions of the Virtues on the one hand, and on the other, by the Social Relations, special Circumstances, Conditions, Rights and Obligations of men.

So far as Duties depend on the Notions of the Virtues, they will admit of a Classification corresponding to that of the Virtues, already given. We shall have Duties of the Affections; Duties respecting Property and other Objects of Desire; Duties connected with Truth; Duties connected with the Bodily Desires; Duties connected with Order. Each of these Classes contains Duties which may be distinguished according to the Social Relations with which they are concerned.

CHAPTER VI.

DUTIES OF THE AFFECTIONS.

174. The Supreme Law of Human Action adopts and authorizes the Benevolent Affections, as a part of human nature which binds men together, and depends upon their common humanity. This we have expressed, by laying down the Principle of Benevolence as one of our fundamental Moral Principles (162). But further; the Supreme Law requires that the Affections thus authorized be vivid, strong, and permanent. This we have expressed, by stating the Principle of Earnestness as one of our fundamental Moral Principles (163). Now the more general Benevolent Affections which bind men together cannot be vivid and strong, except the special Benevolent Affections, determined by family relations, and other external circumstances, be also vivid and strong. For the Affection of Universal Benevolence is only the expansion of the Love belonging to narrower circles of relation. The Affection of the most General Benevolence is expressed by saying that we love all men

as our *Brothers*. The heart learns to love, by its contact with its nearest objects of love, and by the occasions arising out of its intercourse with neighbouring men. If it do not begin its lesson of Duty in that school, it will never be able to apply it in a more comprehensive sphere. The Natural Affections are the proper moral School of the Heart. The lessons of the benevolent affections are further inculcated by the general moral judgment of mankind; for the universal voice of man commends Gratitude, Family Affection, Compassion, and the like, as Virtues. Hence a good man, in his progress towards the sympathy with man as man, which is implied in the Supreme Rule, will be led to possess the Affections thus universally regarded as Virtues (158). Moreover, such Affections are requisite to give to the obligations of Family, and the like, their moral significance. They are therefore Duties (172).

Hence the special kinds of benevolent Affection, Gratitude, Compassion, Reverence for Superiors, Filial Affection, Parental Affection, Conjugal Affection, Fraternal Affection, are all Duties. They are Affections in which all men sympathize. They are Natural Affections. Those who have them not, are universally condemned as without natural affection. Such men have not found admission into the Moral School of the Heart. They have not made the first steps towards that Universal Benevolence, which is a Fundamental Moral Principle. Such men must be destitute of that warmth of right affections which the Principle of Earnestness requires. Such men cannot give to the Obligations of their Station that Moral significance which Morality requires.

We will consider this further, with regard to the above kinds of Affection in particular.

175. *Gratitude to Benefactors* is a Duty of the Affections. To render advantage for advantage, is often a matter of mutual contract; to render good-will for good-will, is the Duty which gives a Moral Significance to the Obligations of such contracts (172). Gratitude, that is, Good-will in return for benefits conferred with

good-will, is a natural feeling, and is universally acknowledged as a Virtue. He, therefore, who does not feel this, has made little advance in the natural progress of the benevolent affections; he is little influenced by the sympathy of men in favour of Virtue. The ungrateful man disregards one of the most manifest lessons of morality; that in which the common understanding of mankind apprehends mutual good-will, as the proper signification of good offices, given and received. He violates this understanding; and is necessarily looked upon with repugnance and alarm, as one on whom the common ties of Humanity have no hold. He transgresses a Rule which all men can and must sympathize in approving; and which draws men together by the common recognition of the significance of external relations. Thus he is a violator of a Duty.

Hence, Gratitude is a Duty of the Affections. A man who is devoid of gratitude cannot be a good man. And the Affection of gratitude, which is thus a Duty, will tend to express itself in acts. But no special acts are directed by this Rule of Duty. Gratitude is one Rule for the Affections, but the Rules of Action must be governed by the consideration of all the Rules of the Affections, and all the Moral Principles. The actions which gratitude prompts may be prohibited by other Rules of Duty, derived from the Principle of Benevolence in other bearings, or from the principles of Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, and their combinations.

176. *Reverence for Superiors* is a Duty. Reverence is a Benevolent Affection, which assumes in its object Superiority of Condition to ourselves, combined with Justice and Goodness. Obedience to Law and Authority are Obligations; and these Obligations, like all others, have a Moral Significance (172), when the Law is just and the Authority rightful. They require in the Inferior Party, a Spirit of Obedience (165); an Obedience of the Heart. When the person, thus invested with Authority, is also invested with Goodness, the heart joins, and ought to join, with its Obedience, the

Love which belongs to Virtue (91). And thus, this union of the Spirit of Obedience and Love, Reverence for Superiors, is a Duty.

This Sentiment is fostered by a sympathy with the natural feelings, and with the common moral judgments of mankind, expressed by means of terms implying Virtue and Vice. That Reverence for Superiors is a natural feeling, we see in the willing submission with which, in all ages and countries, Superiors have been treated by their inferiors; and in the cordial submission rendered to Laws. Man has, among his natural feelings, a Reverence for Something better, wiser, more stable, more permanent than himself. He readily believes in the existence of something of this nature; and has, in his mind, a ready Sentiment of deferential Regard for it. And this feeling is fostered by the general sympathy of men. The common moral judgment of mankind appears in the commendation bestowed upon such dispositions. Disloyalty to the Sovereign, Disobedience to Authority, Sedition, Treason, Rebellion, are, in themselves, looked upon with feelings of Dislike and Indignation. If a person does not participate in these feelings, he is not likely to possess Benevolent Affections at all. If he have no sympathy with these emotions, his Affections cannot be conformable to that Supreme Law, in which all men, as men, sympathize. If Goodness and Justice, joined with Superiority of condition, are not regarded by a man with Reverence, he has not that feeling towards Goodness and Justice by which virtuous men are bound together. A participation in this feeling belongs to a good man. And this feeling is requisite to invest with a moral significance the obligation of Obedience to the governing authorities of the State. For such Obedience must be a Duty, as well as an Obligation, in order that it may have a moral character. But if Obedience be a Duty, Reverence, the Obedience of the heart, which is the internal spring of external obedience, must also be a Duty. And this Reverence, being a part of the natural feelings of a good man, and a necessary condition of the Duties of Obedience, is itself a Duty.

If it be said, that in the actual constitution of the world, it may happen that Superiority of social condition is not joined with goodness and justice, and that thus this affection has no proper place; we reply, that however this may be the case in particular instances, human government is requisite as a general condition of morality, and especially as a condition of justice and order. The Governors of Society are therefore, so far as this condition requires, the representatives of Justice and Order; and reverence to them, under this aspect, is still a general Duty. A Reverence for Superiors and Governors, as the representatives and cardinal points of justice and order, is requisite, to give a moral significance to the structure of human society. Reverence in inferiors, and Benevolence in superiors, are ties of affection which alone can bind together a community in which there are superiors and inferiors, so as to give them moral relations. And in every community, those who are, by its constitution and nature, the depositaries and sources of law and government, must be looked upon as superiors, and are, in that capacity, proper objects of reverence.

177. *Filial Affection*, the Affection of the Child towards the Parent, is a Duty of the Affections. The Supreme Law of our nature requires us to possess the Operative Principle of Benevolence; but it is unlikely that we shall possess this Principle, if we do not possess those benevolent affections which are the most natural and universal; which are commended to us and urged upon us by the sympathy and common judgment of mankind; and for which there are strong and manifest reasons. Filial Affection is pressed upon us in all these ways. It is a natural and universal affection among men, failing to show itself only under very peculiar circumstances. It is everywhere regarded as a Virtue. A child wanting in love toward his parent, is looked upon with abhorrence, as an unnatural child. And this affection is supported by the strong and evident reasons, of its being agreeable to the Duties of Gratitude and Reverence. For, in the common course of

events, children receive from their parents 'far more kindness, and far greater benefits, than from any other persons. And the sentiment of deferential regard and conscious dependence, which is natural to man, and for which he naturally assumes in his thoughts, as an object, a person wiser and better than himself; is, by the natural condition of man, directed, in the first place, towards the Parents. The child, who learns from them his lessons of what is good and wise; who sees and feels himself to be dependent upon them, and weak and ignorant in comparison of them; sees in them the necessary and proper objects of Reverence. This Sentiment gives a Moral Significance to the Family Relation. Such an affection in the child towards the Parent, combined with Parental Affection on the other part, are ties of affection which must exist, in order that the Members of the Family may have moral relations to each other, such as correspond to the obligation of obedience in the child, and support and care in the parent. If this Affection be not a Duty, there is no Duty on the part of the child; for Duty extends to the Springs of Action, and therefore to the Affections. Hence Filial Affection is a necessary portion of the Benevolent Affections which a good man must possess; and being conformable to the Duties of Gratitude and Reverence for Superiors, and essential to the existence of Filial Duty, it is itself a Duty.

This Affection tends to govern the Actions. Under the influence of Filial Affection, Obedience to Parents tends to become an Obedience of Love. Such an obedience is not merely a submission of our wishes and desires to those of others; but an identification of our wishes and desires with those of the persons whom we love and obey. We wish what they wish. Our intentions anticipate their commands. The pleasure of giving them pleasure, is a more powerful Spring of Action, than any pleasures obtained in opposition to their wishes.

173. The Duty of *Parental Affection* is shown on the like grounds. This Affection is a necessary

portion of our benevolent affections. It is natural and universal; and commended by the common judgment of mankind, who loudly condemn an unnatural Parent. If a person do not feel an affection thus urged upon him, the Operative Principle of Benevolence must be entirely wanting in him, or greatly defective. Such an affection is requisite to give a moral significance to the Family relation. The Obligation of Support and Care on the part of the Parents, is necessary for the preservation and wellbeing of the Child. These good offices are generally secured by the impulse of a strong and almost universal affection, supported by the general sympathy of mankind. This Affection contains the moral significance of the Obligations of the parent; and constitutes the tie by which the parent and child have a moral relation to each other. If this Affection be not a Duty, there is no Duty on the part of the Parent; for Duty regards the Affections. Thus the Parental Affection is a part of the Benevolent Affections which a good man must necessarily possess; and inasmuch as it is the natural Security for the most essential Obligations of man, and requisite to the existence of Parental Duty, it is a Duty.

179. *Conjugal Affection* is, in a like manner, a Duty. This affection produces the marriage union, or grows out of it, where it is not repressed by adverse feelings. It is supported by the sympathy and approbation of mankind; for all admire and praise a husband and wife, so far as they are bound together by a strong and steady mutual affection. It is this affection which alone gives moral significance to the legal union. Without the supposition of this tie of affection, there can be no moral relation between the two; no Duties, no Moral Claims; for duties and moral claims belong to the affections. Moreover, the married condition involves a Promise of such affection; and therefore the want of the affection, in that condition, implies a breach of promise, as well as a coldness of heart; and violates the Principle of Truth, as well as the Principle of Benevolence. Thus, the Conjugal Affection is a part

of the benevolent affections which a married person must possess, in order to be good; and being required by the Principle of Truth, and essential to the existence of Conjugal Duty, it is itself a Duty.

180. *Fraternal Affection* is a Duty. Such an affection is natural; it readily grows up under the usual circumstances of Family intercourse. Not to have this affection, implies a want of that warmth and tenderness of heart, out of which Family Affections are unfolded by the conditions of the Family. If a man is wanting in this disposition, we conceive that his Benevolence, in its more comprehensive bearings, will be feeble and cold. If he do not love his brother, he is little likely to love a stranger. This affection gives a moral significance to the mutual good offices which a Family requires and gives rise to. These good offices between brethren cannot be Duties, except the affection which prompts them be a Duty. And thus Fraternal Affection is a part of the Benevolent Affections which a good man must possess; and being essential to the existence of Fraternal Duties, is itself a Duty.

181. *The Love of our Fellow-citizens* is a Duty. This is a Fraternal Affection of a wider kind. A Community, a Tribe, a Nation, may be considered as a wider Family. The benevolent affections fasten themselves upon that part of mankind with whom we principally converse, and with whom we share many common influences. A common descent, a common history, a common language, common manners, common laws, draw fellow-citizens together, as, in a narrower way, the habits and common conditions of a family draw together the members of the family. And the mutual services and knowledge of each other, thus produced, tend to generate a mutual affection. This Affection gives a moral significance to all mutual Services; for the mutual Services of Fellow-citizens cannot be Duties, except their mutual Good-will be a Duty. And thus a Love towards his Fellow-citizens is part of the Benevolent Affections which a good man

will necessarily possess; and being necessary to the existence of social and civil Duties, it is itself a Duty.

182. In the same manner, it is seen that we have Duties of Benevolent Affection towards all persons who are connected with us by any less comprehensive social relations; as to our Servants, our Masters, our Dependents, our Employers, and the like.

183. A Duty of the same kind exists towards the whole human race. There is a Duty of *Universal Benevolence* which we ought to bear to men as men. We have already (118) stated, that in considering the conditions of the Supreme Law of Human Action, we are led to the Idea of absolute and Universal Benevolence, as a part of that which the Law must include. And we have stated the express Principle which represents this Idea (162), that we must love man as man. This Principle now comes before us as an expression of a Duty. In taking this view of it, we imply that the Principle is requisite to give a moral significance to our social relations; for this has been noted as a character of Duties (172). This character will now be seen to belong to the Affection of Universal Benevolence towards man as man. We have Duties to all men: Duties of Justice and Truth are to be performed towards all men. But these Duties cannot be performed as Duties, except they proceed from an internal Spring of Action. They must be the results of Affection. And thus an Affection towards all men, being essential to the existence of all other duties towards them, is itself a Duty.

184. As our love of the members of the same family, or of the same community, is unfolded by our being led to see and feel what their nature has in common with ours; so our love of mankind in general is unfolded, by our being led to see and feel that they have a human nature, which is identical with our own. We are by degrees led to look upon them as Members of the same Race; as Children, along with ourselves, of the *great human Family*. And thus, we love them

with an extension of the love which we bestow upon our brothers. We look upon all Mankind as our Brothers.

185. But this Duty of the Love of Mankind goes further. We come to feel a love for all mankind, of which we have spoken, by having brought before our thoughts, the common human nature which they share with us. But there is a kind of love which we far more readily feel for those who offer themselves to our notice, as under the infliction of pain or grief. There is (135) a natural impulse of *Compassion*, which draws, to such persons, our benevolent regard; and which prompts us to do them good offices by which their distress may be relieved. This compassion for the Afflicted, merely as afflicted, is a feeling which the whole human race sympathize in, and which is by all commended and loved. It thus naturally exists, among the benevolent affections, which are unfolded in a man's bosom, as he becomes more and more fully possessed of those Operative Moral Principles which belong to the Supreme Rule of Human Action, and in which man, as man, universally sympathizes. And the Acts which proceed from this affection of Compassion, are part of that course of action, which the Supreme Rule, drawing together all men, in virtue of that which belongs to all, directs and enjoins. Hence, Acts of Compassion are what men ought to do. They are Duties. But these acts cannot be Duties, except the Affection from which they proceed is a Duty. And thus Compassion, which, as we have seen, is a part of the benevolent affections possessed by a good man, being essential to the Duties of Charity, is itself a Duty.

186. And thus, we have established as Duties, the Affections of Gratitude, Reverence for Superiors, Filial, Parental, Conjugal, and Fraternal Affection, the Love of our Fellow-citizens, and the Love of Man as man, and Compassion.

But in some cases other Duties may interfere with these. Gratitude, Family Affection, Patriotism, may if blindly followed, prompt acts which are unjust or

otherwise immoral. The course which Duty in such cases directs must be determined by further consideration; particularly considering what is the exact meaning of *Justice* in such cases. This question of Duties apparently interfering will be resumed hereafter.

187. Other questions respecting the Duties of the Affections offer themselves when we take into account the irascible or resentful as well as the benevolent affections. The irascible affections act as a defence against harm or wrong, as we have already said (137): and so acting, have their moral value. But in themselves they are opposed to Benevolence, and are never to be indulged on their own account. All forms of Anger so operating are to be repressed and subdued. Thus Passion (in this special sense), Peevishness, Capriciousness, Obstinacy in rejecting explanation of offenses which we have taken, are all vicious tempers; and acts, internal or external, which belong to such tempers, are violations of Duty; or rather, they imply a neglect of that Duty of the Moral Culture of the Affections of which we shall speak in the next chapter.

188. But Resentment when it appears as Indignation against wrong and vice has, as we have said, a moral value. Such affections, rightly directed and controlled, tend to repress injustice, fraud, cruelty, foulness, disorder among men, and thus, tend to bind together the members of human society which would be separated and put in a state of mutual repugnance and conflict by such vices and wrongs. So directed and controlled, Resentment against wrong in general, that is, Virtuous Indignation, has the character of a Duty. But the degree in which this Sentiment may be pronounced to be required by Duty, must depend both upon the energy of the Affections which belong to each particular character, and upon the stage of culture where the affections have attained.

189. But when the wrong which excites our resentment and indignation is something done to ourselves, or to those nearly connected with us by affection, we are very liable to take an exaggerated view of the

amount of the wrong, through the partiality of self-love and the disposition of mental vision which anger produces. Now all indignation or resentment, on account of wrong done to ourselves, goes beyond the limits of Duty, when it is more than an impartial and calm person, judging on moral grounds, would feel. We may naturally feel more resentment for our own wrongs than for those of others; but this is right, only because we see our own wrongs more clearly, not because we may think our own rights more valuable than those of others.

190. There is no Duty of keeping alive the sentiment of indignation or resentment against a person for a particular wrong done us. On the contrary, as our resentment against wrong done to ourselves is commonly more lively than on mere general grounds it would be for like acts, it is our Duty to tame down this feeling, as soon as possible, to that measure which an impartial person would feel. That is: we ought to *forgive injuries* so far as they concern ourselves.

191. Moreover the resentment which we feel for wrong done to any one ought not to extinguish the affection of general Benevolence, which, as we have said, it is our Duty to feel towards all men, before we come to consider whether or not they have done us wrong. The indignation which we feel against persons for the evil they have done, may diminish our love for them; but still we have to recollect that they are men, and to love them as men, with such affection as our indignation for the evil done by them allows us to feel; which indignation, as we have said, ought not to be the stronger because the evil is done to ourselves. And so far as this, even reason teaches us to *love our enemies**.

192. And further it is to be considered that our benevolence towards men must regard their moral as well as their material advantage. We must grieve for their vices, as well as for their external sufferings. And

* See Butler, Sermon IX.

therefore their injustice, ingratitude, cruelty, and the like, are proper objects of compassion as well as of anger. And this feeling also prevents our indignation against vice from extinguishing our love of men who are vicious.

193. Since our resentment against wrong done to us must be thus limited, moderated, and modified, in order that it may be virtuous, it is plain that all mere Revenge (138), which regards the pain inflicted as an end, and not as a means to moral good, is vicious. Acts of vengeance, Retaliation of evil for evil, even vindictive intentions, are violations of Duty.

194. The Duty of Forgiveness of Injuries (190) has been often denied; and the Right, and even the Duty of Retaliation has been held in many ages and countries. To see and to feel the Duty of Forgiveness of Injuries, implies, no doubt, a considerable degree of moral culture. But the personal Right of Retaliation for wrongs done to us can only be conceived as belonging to a rude, stormy, and barbarous stage of social progress. With regard to wrongs from which we are not protected by the law, but which we think ought not to pass unpunished, the infliction of punishment by deeds of violence from private hands, is inconsistent with any order in society; for there can be no order if violence be not suppressed. Nor could such retaliation, if tolerated by law or custom in particular cases, answer its purpose: for the wrongdoer may be victorious in the personal conflict; besides which, the person seeking such redress makes himself or his friends the judges in his own case. And any attempts to give fairness to the personal conflict by excluding fraud, secrecy, and inequality, would make its result still more accidental and irrelevant with regard to the justice of the case. Where such personal conflict resulting from wrong alleged is practised, (as in the case of Duelling) the persons concerned, so far as they desire to hurt each other, are impelled by a resentment altogether immoral in its course and limits. It may be that they have no

such desire, and are rather merely obeying and perpetuating a barbarous and immoral custom: but in doing this they are violating another Duty;—that of preserving and promoting their own moral culture and that of the society in which they live.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE MORAL CULTURE OF THE AFFECTIONS AS A DUTY.

195. It has been shown that Gratitude to Benefactors, Reverence to Superiors, Compassion to the Afflicted, are Duties; as also are Filial, Parental, Conjugal, and Fraternal Affection, the Love of our Fellow-citizens, and the Universal Benevolence which embraces all men as men. These Affections we ought to possess. Such Affections therefore we ought to acquire. We ought to foster, cherish, cultivate them. We ought to establish these Affections in our Minds; to direct our Affections by these Forms of Duty. We ought to form our character in such a way that these Benevolent Affections shall belong to it.

To this doctrine, it may be objected, that we have not the power of doing what we are thus enjoined to do. It may be said, that we have not the power of generating or directing our Affections, and of forming our own character. It may be urged, that we cannot love a particular person, or love under particular circumstances, and with a particular kind of love, merely because we will to do so. Love, it may be said, cannot be thus compelled by command. Character cannot be thus formed by Rule.

But we reply, that the objection, thus stated, involves much too large an assertion. It is very far from being true, that we have no power over our own affections or our own character. The universal voice of mankind

recognizes the existence of such a power, by the condemnation which it awards to the want of the affections above mentioned. If a child do not love his parent, a father or a mother their child, a brother his brother; all men join in condemning the person thus destitute of natural affection. He offends against the common nature of man. And in like manner, all men look with repugnance and disapprobation upon the ungrateful or pitiless man. All men blame him who is irreverent towards a just and good Master. These, and the like moral judgments of mankind, imply that a man's affections are, in some way, his own act. The affections are thus declared to be part of that internal action for which he is responsible. He is a proper subject of praise or blame for what he feels; and so far, his *feeling* is his *doing*.

196. And we can perceive that we have, in various ways, power over our feelings. Even immediately, by the power which we possess of directing our train of thoughts, we can foster or repress an affection. We can call before our minds, and dwell upon, those features of character and situation, which tend to impress on our minds one Sentiment or another. We can, for instance, think on all that our parents have done and suffered for us, and can thus move our hearts to a love of them. And above all, the recollection that affections are natural and right, will fix and promote them. We shall constantly approximate to those benevolent affections, which we constantly regard as recommended by the universal sympathy of mankind, and as conformable to the supreme law of our being. While, on the other hand, coldness and hardness of heart,—still more, malevolence or perversely directed affection,—perpetually dwelt upon in our thoughts, as feelings which estrange us from our kind, make us a natural object of their abhorrence, and violate the very essence of our nature,—will be, by this means, repressed and extinguished.

197. The course of thought by which the virtuous affections are promoted, may sometimes be traced, in the progress of special Conceptions, and in the signifi-

cance of the terms by which they are denoted. Thus the clear apprehension of a common internal nature in all men, which suggests the use of the term *Humanity* to designate this common nature, leads, further, to the benevolent affection towards man as man; which affection is also termed *Humanity*. Thus, the apprehension of objective *Humanity* tends to promote subjective *Humanity* (126). We shall hereafter consider the progress by which some Conceptions of this kind have arrived at clearness and comprehensiveness of signification. We shall thus be led to see some of the steps by which the affections are cultivated.

198. Moreover, the Benevolent Affections impel us to endeavour to do good to the objects of them. We wish to promote the wellbeing of those whom we love. This their wellbeing thus becomes the object of our desires and intentions. But the conception of the Wellbeing of other persons, which we thus place before us as our object, may be variously modified and transformed by the operations of our thoughts. We may conceive it as merely their Pleasure, or as their Interest, or as their Happiness. And as some of these are truer and more moral views of Wellbeing than others, we may, by the exercise of our Faculties, advance from those views which are false and wrong, to those which are true and right. This possession of true conceptions of the ends to which our benevolent affections must direct us, is a part of our character: and this, depending upon our own course of thought, is in a great measure in our own power.

199. The exercise of thought and reflection may produce a moral culture with regard to the irascible as well as the benevolent affections. There are many trains of thought, for instance, which we may, for this purpose, call to mind, when we are disposed to anger against persons whom we suppose to have injured or slighted us. We may consider that we are prone to exaggerate, in our thoughts, offenses against ourselves*:

* Butler, Sermon ix. *Upon Forgiveness of Injuries*. "Without hearing particulars I take upon myself to assure all persons who think they have received indignities or injurious treatment, that

that anger is a false medium through which we see characters and actions as worse than they really are;— that to get rid of such exaggeration, distortion, and falsehood is required of us, not so much by meekness and humility as by common sense and love of truth :— that men are not naturally malevolent without some object to gain, so that the original offense to us did not arise from pure illwill to us :—to which we may add those reflections which strengthen our benevolent affections towards men, and thus subdue or moderate our anger :—the habitual recollection of our common nature :—the reflection that injustice, ingratitude, cruelty, are subjects of compassion as well as of anger ; and the like.

200. And besides this direct operation of thought upon the affections, there are many circumstances and conditions which have an influence in the formation of our character ; and which, being in our power, put the formation of our character in some degree also in our power. As we have already said, Acts of Duty generate Virtues : and our acts depend upon our will. We can, by directing our Acts, form our Habits ; and Habits of external action extend their influence to the internal feelings. Each link of this chain may be in some degree loose ; and yet the whole will exert a constant pressure upon the character, drawing it towards the line of Duty. The Acts of Duty may be imperfectly done ; the good Habits may be imperfectly formed ; the internal Feelings may imperfectly correspond to the Habits ; but yet, by the steady performance of Acts of Duty, the cultivation of a virtuous character is perpetually promoted.

201. It may be objected, that when we have done all that is possible in the formation of our character, still there will remain in it much of good and evil, the result of our original native qualities which we cannot alter, and of external circumstances over which we have no control ; and thus, that our character and disposition

they may depend upon it, as in a manner certain, that the offense is not so great as they themselves imagine." And see the rest of the Sermon.

is not in our own power. To this we reply, that, as we have before said, our character and disposition is in our own power, so far as to be a subject of praise or blame. For if praise and blame are not applied to character and disposition, to what can they be applied? We are endeavouring to define those dispositions which are the proper objects of approbation. An opponent, whose objections imply that *nothing* is a proper object of approbation or disapprobation, has no common ground with us; and with him, therefore, it is useless to reason. But further; when it is said that there will remain in our character much that is good and evil, the result of its native elements, even when we have done all that is possible to repress the evil, and promote the good; we reply, that we never can be said to have done *all that is possible*, in the improvement of our character. So long as life continues, thoughts of Duty, and acts of Duty, by which our internal being may be improved, are possible: and so long, therefore, we are responsible for not labouring to remove the evil which remains, and to forward the good.

202. We thus see, that as there are certain Affections which are Duties, so is it in our power to foster and cherish those affections; to form and improve our character, so that those dispositions shall make a part of it; and to continue this course of self-improvement to the end of our lives. This course may be termed our Self-cultivation, or Moral Culture; and the effect which it produces upon our character is our Moral Progress. This Progress is carried on, as we have seen, by giving earnestness and vividness to our Moral Affections, generality and clearness to the conceptions by which such affections are regulated, steadiness to our habits of Moral Action. It also requires us to give consistency to our Rules of Duty; and generally, to give consistency, comprehensiveness, and completeness, to the whole of our intellectual and moral being.

203. Our Moral Culture and Moral Progress can never be terminated in our lifetime: for we can never reach a condition in which there is no possibility of

giving more earnestness and vividness to our moral affections, more generality and clearness to our conceptions of moral objects, more steadiness to our moral habits. The formation of a human character is never ended. There will always be some part of it which does not fully conform to Virtue. It will always be possible to go further in these respects. The Supreme Law of our Being, by which we are directed to Duty and Virtue, is not satisfied, except the whole of our Being conform to it. Hence this Law demands a perpetual Moral Progress; and such a perpetual Moral Progress is necessary, in consequence of other changes also. New persons, new objects, are constantly presented to us: new thoughts, new views of ends and means, constantly arise in the mind. And as these arise, the feelings which they occasion, ought constantly to be conformed to the Supreme Law. The Affections must constantly expand and modify themselves, according to these developements of the mind, so as to remain in harmony with the Moral Ideas. The current of thought is constantly flowing, and constantly receiving accessions from fresh rills, put in motion by the course of the outer world. It thus becomes constantly wider and deeper through life, except when it is narrowed and constrained by external obstacles. The whole of this current of thought must be tinged by the virtuous affections; and there must, therefore, be a constantly flowing source of moral goodness to preserve the moral colour of the stream. As there is, in the head, a fountain of perpetual internal change; there must be, in the heart, a fountain which shall give to every change a character of good.

. 204. Thus there is a Duty of Moral Self-culture, which can never be interrupted nor terminated. With reference to that part of Morality of which we are now speaking, this is the Duty of the Culture of the Affections. It is our duty constantly to cultivate the Affections which have been described as Duties; Gratitude; Compassion; Reverence; Family Love; the Love of our Fellow-countrymen; the Love of our

Fellow-men; the Suppression of Violent or Obstinate Anger, Peevishness, Captiousness; the Forgiveness of Injuries; Good-will, even to those who injure and slight us. This Culture of the benevolent affections is a Duty which never stops nor ends.

205. Further; the Duty of thus cultivating these Affections includes the Duty of possessing such affections; and may often, in our consideration, take the place of the Duties which we have mentioned. The Duty of cultivating Gratitude and Compassion includes the Duty of feeling Gratitude and Compassion. That we are to cultivate such Affections, is a reason for feeling them, which is added to the other reasons, but which includes them all. We are to feel Gratitude and Compassion, because it is right: we are to cultivate them, because it is right to feel them; but we cultivate them by feeling them. The Duty of Self-culture enjoins upon us the same feelings which the Duty of Gratitude and the Duty of Compassion enjoined before.

206. The constant and interminable moral culture of the Affections which is thus a Duty, and includes the other Duties of the Affections, may suffer interruption and reverse. The progress at which such culture aims, is thwarted by every act which is morally wrong. The moral progress of our affections is *interrupted* by every malicious act, by every feeling of malice, by the want of love on occasions when the circumstances and relations of our position call for it. Our moral progress is *reversed* when such malice, or such coldness of heart, becomes habitual. The *transgression* of moral precepts, whether they regard external acts, or internal springs of action, is a suspension, and may be a termination, of our moral progress. And this effect of transgression, as being a contradiction of our moral culture, adds greatly to the importance of its moral aspect.

207. We may further add, that in this aspect of *transgressions* of Duty, that they interrupt or undo our moral progress, we have the aspect of them which most determines their moral weight; so that those transgressions are considered most grave, which most

interrupt our moral progress. As the interruption or inversion of this progress becomes more decided, the transgression becomes *more grievous*. This subject will be pursued afterwards.

We may likewise remark, as a point which will be hereafter pursued; that Moral Progress, the Supreme Law of our nature, must necessarily be the way to *Happiness*, the Supreme Object of our nature.

208. It may perhaps appear to some that there is nothing gained in Morality by the view just presented; since the Duty of Moral Culture is identical with other Duties already spoken of. But this is not so. By presenting to our minds the Conception of Moral Culture, our Duties often assume a different aspect from that which they have when considered separately; and we are able to establish Rules of Action, of a wider and completer kind than those to which the contemplation of more partial Duties would lead. For instance, the Duty of Compassion assumes a new and larger aspect, when we consider every compassionate act and compassionate feeling to be not only a relative Duty towards the distressed object, but a means of softening and improving our own heart; and this aspect of the Duty may be a better guide for our actions and feelings than any narrower view would be. And thus our Duties, when regarded as parts of our Moral Progress, may be looked upon as higher objects of moral desire, and higher aims, than more special objects and more partial aims could be.

209. Although Moral Culture can never reach its termination, it may be conceived as a Progress towards an Ideal Object by which its tendency is marked. Our Moral Progress may be conceived as a constant tendency towards an Ideal Point of complete Moral Perfection;—the same Ideal Center of Morality of which we have already spoken (125). The Elements of this ideal Moral Perfection are, as we have already said, the Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. To these we are constantly to tend. We are to establish them in our minds as Principles: that is (161) as Operative Principles—the Operative Princi-

ples of our Being. To do this, we may look upon as the Highest Object of our actions; as the *Greatest Good* of which our moral nature is capable.

For the present, we are considering only the Moral Culture of the *Affections*; which requires us to make Benevolence an Operative Principle of our Being, so that it may manifest itself in all its modifications, according to our condition and relations to other men. But what has been said of the Duty of Moral Culture, and of its bearing upon more Special Duties, and upon violations of Duty, applies equally to the other classes of Duties, as well as to those of the Affections. We now proceed to those other classes.

CHAPTER VIII.

DUTIES RESPECTING PROPERTY AND OTHER OBJECTS OF DESIRES.

210. THE Rules of Duty with regard to external things, as objects of possession, are consequences of the Principle of Justice, that Each man is to have his own; and of the Principle of Moral Ends, that Things are to be sought only as means to moral ends.

The Rule that each man is to have his own, is a Rule which regulates all external acts relative to Property. It thus prescribes external Duties. But these external Duties imply also an internal Duty, directing the Desires and Affections. We must desire that each man should have his own, and must desire things for ourselves, only so far as they are assigned to us by this rule. And this Duty enjoins a perfect Fairness and Evenness in our views of external possession; an Equality in our estimate of our own claims with those of other persons; and an absence of any vehemence of Desire which might disturb this equality. The Duty of a Spirit of Justice excludes all Cupidity or eagerness in our desires of wealth; all Covetousness, or wish to

possess what is another's; all Partiality, or disposition to deviate from equal Rule in judging between ourselves and others. The Rule of action is, Let each man have his own; but the Rule of desire is, Let no man seek his own, except so far as the former Rule directs him to do so. Justice gives to each man his own: but each ought to cling to his own with an affection entirely subordinate to the love of Justice. The good man has no love of possessions which can at all come into rivalry with his love of equal and steady laws. This Rule does not require us to abstain from the usual transactions respecting property:—buying and selling, getting and spending; for it is by being employed in such transactions, that property is an instrument of human action,—the means by which the characters and dispositions of men manifest themselves. A rich man may employ many men in his service by means of his wealth; nor does morality forbid this; but then, they must be employed for moral purposes.

211. Justice, as we have said, directs us to desire external things only in so far as an equal and steady Rule assigns them to us as our own. But further: even when they are our own, our desires must not turn to external things, as ultimate and independent objects. It belongs to our idea of a good man that he does not seek such objects for their own sake, but as Means to moral Ends. He does not desire gold and lands, as things in themselves desirable; but as things which will enable him to do good. We are not forbidden by morality to use our possessions in upholding and carrying on the usual relations of society; as those of Employer and Workman, Master and Servant; for the duties of men suppose the existence and fixity of these relations; but we must consider these relations, also, as means of our duty; and must maintain and direct them, only in such a manner as that they are such means of duty. We must in all things regulate our desire of wealth and its results by the Spirit of Moral Purpose.

Thus we are directed by Morality to regard Property

only as a mean of doing good. In the eyes of the Moralist no possessions are absolute and unconditional property; the possessor holds them only *in trust* for moral and benevolent purposes. He is a *Trustee* for the general benefit of mankind; and the Condition of the Trust is, not merely that he shall give something, in cases where benevolence directs; but that he should employ the whole so as to promote moral ends. Not only in giving, but in buying goods, paying wages, saving or spending, he is bound to act morally. When the proprietor asks, *Have I not a Right to do what I will with my own?* the Moralist replies, *No; you have not a moral Right to do what is wrong with your own.*

The same may be said of the other Desires. A good man may seek Rank, or eminent station in the state, and may desire the Power which Rank and Station give. But then, he will seek these his Objects only in entire fairness of act and spirit; and he will desire them only as means of doing good.

212. Thus, the Duties of the Desires are determined by the Principle of Justice, and the Principle of Moral Purpose. But these Principles, in order to have their proper place in the character, must become complete Operative Principles. The Spirit of Justice, and the Spirit of Moral Purpose must pervade the whole of the good man's being, must regulate all his thoughts and wishes. This is a condition of ideal moral perfection, towards which we may tend, but to which we can never fully attain. Yet, that we have it in our power to make some advance in this direction, is plain. We have it in our power to become in some degree just and morally minded; for if this were not so, we should deserve no condemnation for being unjust and sordid minded. Since, then, we can make progress towards the possession of these Principles of Justice and Moral Purpose, in which a large portion of our Duty is contained, our Duty requires us to make such Progress. There is, in these respects, as in the case of the Affections, a Duty of Moral Progress and of Moral Culture.

213. The conception of our Moral Culture being placed before us, as an object of our desires and endeavours, our Duties with regard to Wealth, and other external things, assume a new aspect, by which light may often be thrown upon the course of our Duty. We are to use Wealth only as a means of our Moral Culture and Moral Progress. Hence, though, as we have said, if we are rich, we may use Wealth in most of its ordinary applications, as in maintaining many servants, or in employing many workmen; we must take care that there is not, in our affections to such dependents, or in the occupation thus given to our thoughts, or in the results which we intend or expect, anything which prevents our moral progress. And since benevolence to our dependents is a part of moral excellence, we must give to our relation to them such a character as promotes their welfare.

214. As the rich man is bound in Duty to seek and to use wealth for moral ends only, and to make it a means of his moral culture; so the poor man, who has to labour in order to provide himself with the necessaries and comforts of life, is also bound to abstain from all labours that are immoral; and to combine, with a care for his bodily wants, a care also for his moral progress. A man may not, because he is poor, engage himself in the service of vice; or sell, for his own gain, what is committed to him as a trust. And however large a portion of his time and thought, a man's necessary labours may demand; he must always recollect that he has a soul, which is to be instructed and morally cultivated, as well as a body to be supported. The poorest, as well as the richest man, is a moral agent; and does not conform to the law of his being, except he make all other ends subservient to moral ends. He who seeks a mere livelihood, must still seek to make acting rightly, and doing good, the ends of his living. He who has the largest superfluity cannot live for a higher purpose, and may not live for a lower.

215. The power which wealth bestows upon its possessor, and any other power or influence over his

fellow-men, which any one may possess, must be used for their welfare, in obedience to the Principle of Benevolence, as we have already said. The welfare of men may be contemplated under various aspects; as Interest, Happiness, and the like. But our contemplation of the good of other men cannot be complete, except we include in it that which we consider as the highest good for ourselves; namely, Moral Progress. Our Benevolence, therefore, will not be consistent with our moral views, except we seek to promote the Moral Culture of those over whom our power extends.

The Moral Culture and progress of Man considered as an object which we may endeavour to promote, includes many comprehensive and complex conceptions; the Liberty, the Education, the Civilization of Man, may all be considered as elements of their moral culture, which we may make our objects in our efforts for their welfare; and above all, Religion may be looked upon as including the most important part of such culture. In order to follow, into further detail, the Duty of the Moral Culture of men, we must unfold into particulars and consequences these Conceptions of Liberty, Education, Civilization, Religion. This it will hereafter be our business, in some measure, to do. In the mean time, we proceed to another class of Duties.

CHAPTER IX.

DUTIES CONNECTED WITH TRUTH.

216. THE Duties connected with Truth, are those which result from the Principle of Truth already stated (162); that we must conform to the universal understanding among men which the use of language implies. This Principle is expressed more briefly by saying, that we must not Lie; for a *Lie* is a violation of the universal understanding of which we speak. This Rule of Duty is in agreement with the universal moral sympathy of mankind, which condemns the Liar as hateful and despicable. That a Lie is a violation of the general understanding of mankind, is the reason why the Rule, *Lie not*, is universally accepted by mankind as an absolute Rule, even when a lie infringes no positive Rights. The other absolute Rules, *Kill not*, *Steal not*, and the like, are requisite for the establishment of Rights of the Person, of Property, and so on. A Lie violates no Right, except the Right of knowing the truth; which is not a jural Right, though it may be a moral claim. But the Rule is acknowledged by men as absolute; because a Contract to speak the Truth is implied in the use of Language; and a Right to know the Truth is conveyed, by every speaker, to the person to whom he addresses his assertions.

Accordingly, when the common understanding among men is not violated, a declaration is not a lie, although in the common meaning of the term it would be false; as when a man says at the end of a letter, "I am your obedient Servant," though the letter itself may contain a refusal to obey or to serve the correspondent.

217. Not only Lying, but every mode of conveying a false belief, is prohibited by the Principle of Truth. This especially applies when we convey a belief of our own intention in a matter affecting him whom we address; that is, when we make a Promise. We are

bound by the Duty of Truth to promise only what we intend to perform. All Deceit, Fraud, Duplicity, Imposition, is excluded by the Duty of Truth.

But if I have promised what I intended to perform, and afterwards change my intention, does it cease to be my Duty to perform my Promise? It is plain that it does not. To break my Promise is to break the understanding between the *Promisee* and me. The understanding established between us was, not a doubtful understanding; namely, that, if I did not change my mind, I would do thus and thus; but an absolute one, that I would do thus. If a Promise were capable of arbitrary revocation by the Promiser, it would establish no common understanding, and could be of no use in enabling the Promisee to regulate his actions. At the time I make the Promise, I have the power of determining my future actions, by retaining my present intention. The engagement I make is, that I will retain it; and this the Promisee must be able to reckon upon, in order that the Promise may mean any thing. It is therefore a universal Duty to perform Promises.

218. The Duty of performing Promises is an extension of the Obligation of performing Contracts. A Contract is a Promise, sanctioned by the formalities which the Law prescribes, as necessary to make it valid. It is a Duty to perform Contracts, as well as a legal Obligation; but the Duty is not limited by the formalities which limit the legal Obligation. The legal Obligation depends upon the external form, as well as the intention; but the Duty depends upon the intention and mutual understanding alone; and therefore the Duty of performing Promises must exist, wherever the mutual understanding of the Promiser and Promisee existed.

It follows from this, also, that Promises are to be performed in the Sense in which they were made and received, by the mutual understanding of the two parties, at the time.

219. It is a Duty to avoid all Falsehood, Deceit, Fraud, Duplicity, Imposition. Hence it is a Duty to have the internal spring of action which impels us to

avoid such acts. It is a Duty to hate Lying, Deceit, Fraud, Duplicity: to have no wish to deceive or impose upon any one: to profess and assume no intentions different from those which we really entertain. Singleness of Heart, Simplicity of Character, Openness, Frankness, are the virtues which ought to give rise to our words and actions. We ought to have in us the Operative Principle, or Spirit, of Truth.

220. And as in the case of the other Principles, because we ought to have this Principle in operation within us, we ought to cultivate and encourage it in our hearts. Our Moral Culture in this respect also is a Duty.

The Spirit of Truth is to be cultivated by Acts of Truthfulness. That we have it in our power to be truthful, is evident. The difficulty and need of exertion, indeed, are on the other side. To say that which we know not to be true; to assume the appearance of that which we are not; requires effort, invention, and contrivance. Truth is the first thing that comes to our lips; and we must do some violence to ourselves, to substitute anything else for it. In this respect, then, in order to cultivate a Spirit of Truth in ourselves, we have only to obey our natural impulses, and to say what we think and feel. But yet there are many desires, purposes, and motives, which are constantly impelling men to falsehood and deceit. Men use language as a means to ends;—not always, nor principally, as the simple declaration of what they think and feel; but with a view to the effect which it will produce upon the person addressed. And as a falsification or distortion of the real state of the case, often seems likely to answer their purpose, better than a true representation, the natural impulses of Truth are checked and overpowered by other Springs of Action. Now the Moral Culture of the Principle of Truth in us, requires that all such working of our desires should be suppressed. To lie, to deceive, for any purpose whatever, is utterly inconsistent with any care for our moral progress.

It is impossible that the Operative Principle of Truth

should acquire that place in our character which morality requires, if we allow it to be thrust aside by the desire of pleasure, or gain, or power, or the like. The only way in which we can advance towards the moral standard, at which it is our Duty constantly to aim, is by a steady and solemn determination, under no circumstances, to be guilty of falsehood. A man earnestly aiming at his own moral progress, will be true in his assertion, true to his promises, true to his implied engagements, true in what he says, true in what he does. No prospect of any object of desire, or of any advantage, can sway him to any deceit or fraud; for objects of desire have no necessary tendency to further his purpose; whereas deceit and fraud are in direct contradiction to it.

221. We have spoken of a steady and *solemn* determination not to be guilty of falsehood, as means of moral culture. This expression supposes, that which our consciousness as moral beings assures us of, that we have the power of making such determinations of our future course of action. We can determine and resolve upon a future act or course of actions. We must do this, in order that we may promise, and fulfil our promise. But we may combine a greater than ordinary degree of earnestness and self-watchfulness with this determination; a more than ordinary degree of distinctness and gravity with the promise, or declaration in which we express the determination. We may *solemnly* resolve, and *solemnly* promise. If we do this, we connect the fulfilment of our resolution and promise more thoroughly with the progress of our moral culture. We entwine the two, so that the one cannot be broken, without great damage to the other. We embark a larger portion than usual of the moral treasure of our lives in one bottom, and risk a more ruinous wreck. If we break a solemn resolution, a solemn promise, what hope can we have of any steadiness and vigour in our future moral course? How can we retain the moral hopes and aspirations which are to carry us forwards? The growth of the Principle of Truth is arrested; the Principle itself seems to be eradicated. The interruption and reverse in our moral

progress is marked and glaring, and hence (206) the offense is grievous. The violation of a solemn promise is a moral offense of the highest kind.

There may be some cases in which there may be at first a doubt what course this Rule of the Duty of Truth directs us to take; but these cases we shall consider, when we have taken a view of the remaining Classes of Duties.

CHAPTER X.

DUTIES CONNECTED WITH PURITY.

222. THE Duties connected with Purity, are those which result from the Principle of Purity; the Principle that the Lower Parts of our Nature are to be governed by and subservient to the Higher Parts. Thus the Appetites and Desires, which find their gratification in meat and drink, with the accompaniments of a decent table, are to be indulged as subservient to the support of life, strength, and cheerfulness, and the cultivation of the social affections; the indulgence is to be limited by these purposes, and these purposes by moral rules. In like manner, other desires, mingled of bodily and mental elements, are to be indulged only in subservience to the affections and hopes which belong to them; and the affections and hopes are to be regulated by conditions which morality and law prescribe. In the gradation of the parts of human nature, we place bodily appetite, and all merely selfish desires, below affection; but mere blind affection we place below the moral affection which approves of goodness. The affections of the heart in some measure refine the desires of the body; but the affections of the heart may be greatly impure, if they are not regulated by the law of the heart which morality teaches. Affection alone does not make actions moral, or remove that stain of impurity which they derive from bodily appetite. The nature of man is purified, by having a moral character given to it. This moral

character purifies the affections, and the affections, thus purified, communicate their purity to the desires which are subservient to them. And thus, Morality does not require us to extinguish the desires, or to reject the pleasures arising from their gratification. Still, she directs us not to dwell on this gratification in our thoughts, as an object; but to accept from it that influence, which it can exercise in giving energy to our affections, without being itself a direct object of contemplation. The bodily desires are made the instruments and evidences of the affections; and are thus absorbed into the affections, and made conformable to the Principle of Purity.

223. The distinction of the Lower and Higher Parts of our Nature, by means of which we express the Principle of Purity, has been rejected by some moralists, and has been termed "Declamation." Such moralists contend that pleasure is universally and necessarily the object of human action; and that human pleasures do not differ in kind, but only in intensity and duration: so that, according to these teachers, there is no difference of superior and inferior, between the pleasures of appetite, the pleasures of affection, and the pleasure of doing good. Hence, say they, the only difference in the character of actions, is their being better or worse means of obtaining pleasure. But the universal reason of man assents to the opposite doctrine, delivered by Butler: who maintains that our principles of action do not differ in degree merely, but in kind also; some being, by the constitution of human nature, superior to others, and their natural governors. Thus, as he teaches, the Rule of our nature is, that Prudence shall control Appetite, and that the Moral Sentiments shall control the Affections. If we take the opposite view, we obliterate the difference between man and brute beasts. We make no distinction between the blame which we bestow upon Error, and upon Crime; for on this supposition, Crime is only miscalculation; and merely means an erroneous way of seeking pleasure. If we follow this view, we make a bad heart the same thing as a bad

head. According to this doctrine, we can have no *Supreme* Rule of Action; for if Pleasure be the *highest* object of action, it is also the *lowest*. With such opinions, we deprive the words *right* and *wrong* of their common meaning; for to men in general, they do not mean right and wrong roads to enjoyment, which this view makes them mean.

224. The Duties of Purity are those which follow from such an operation of the Principle. They allow no value to indulgence in the pleasures of the Table for the sake of bodily gratification alone; though they allow our meals to be so conducted, that they may not only satisfy the bodily wants of nature, but also minister to the cheerful and social flow of spirits and thought, which is a condition favourable to moral action. They reject, in like manner, the gratification of other bodily appetites when sought for their own sake; though they allow such gratification under the sanction of the conjugal tie, and with the hope of that extension of family affections, and family duties, which the birth of children brings.

225 As it is our Duty to regulate our actions by these Rules, it is our Duty also to acquire and possess an inward Principle, from which such a course of action will spring. It is our Duty to acquire and possess within us an Operative Principle, or Spirit, of Purity, which may of itself, and without the recollection of express Rules, direct us from all that is impure. A good man has dispositions, and habits of mind, which not only restrain him from acts of intemperance and unchastity, but repress and banish intemperate and unchaste desires and wishes.

And though it may sometimes be difficult for a man to arrive at this state of Purity of Heart and Mind; it is always the Duty of every man to aim at it. A moral Self-culture in such Purity, is a constant and universal Duty, of which the obligation can never relax nor terminate. A moral Progress in this, as in other respects, must be the constant aim of a good man.

226. Offenses against the Duties of which we are

now speaking, more distinctly than in other Classes of Duties, produce their effect, of impeding our Moral Progress, and turning our course backwards. The intemperate and unchaste person becomes, by every vicious act and every vicious purpose, plainly more and more prone to Vice. These Vices affect his habits of mind in a very direct manner. The Glutton and the Epicure, eager and curious respecting the pleasures of the palate, can hardly give due weight in their thoughts to higher objects; and they often stimulate and overtask the bodily functions, till the mind is oppressed, impeded, or arrested in its intellectual and moral operations. In the man who indulges a love of intoxicating liquors, this takes place more evidently and more rapidly. He speedily reduces himself to a condition in which neither reason nor moral restraint has its due power. The indulgence of other sensual appetites stimulates the bodily desires and inflames the imagination. Lust, obeyed as mere Lust, tends to fill the mind with obscene thoughts, and to make the intellect and the fancy mere ministers of Appetite. By such courses, the heart and affections are corrupted: the imagination is polluted: the character is depraved. Any steps in such a course are the opposite of a moral progress: they are steps in a course of moral degradation, of which the end is utter depravity, filthiness, and profligacy; in short, moral ruin. Transgressions of the Rules of Duty, of the kind now referred to, especially produce their effect, as steps of a course. The act of transgression leaves a more distinct trace in the habits, than in the case of mere mental desires. The appetites become more powerful by being gratified. Their craving becomes, by indulgence, more and more importunate and irresistible. The body will not let the mind turn away from the accustomed path of sensuality. Sensual acts leave a stain of material filth upon the soul; of which it takes long and earnest efforts to remove the trace, so that it shall not afterwards give a sensual tendency to the Will. And thus, every sensual act contributes to the moral degradation of which we

have spoken ; and is grossly at variance with the Duty of our own Moral Culture.

227. It is very important to dwell upon this Duty of Moral Self-culture, in reference to offenses of Impurity ; for these offenses are not mere extensions of the notion of jural wrongs, as some moral offenses are. Jurally speaking, each person may be said to have a Right over his own body, provided he injure no other person ; and two persons may appear to have a Right to agree to unite in acts of sensuality, when no Right of a husband or a father is violated. Accordingly, Fornication, and Concubinage, have not been generally prohibited by the Laws of ancient and modern countries. But yet such practices have almost always been condemned as impure and degraded. And the consideration of the Duty of Moral Self-culture, which we have insisted on, shows the propriety of this condemnation. No person can use his body for purposes of mere Lust, without utterly abandoning all aim at his Moral Progress, and all hope of it. He who thus gives himself up to the government of the Lower parts of his nature, neglects and despises the Higher. So far as he does this, he renounces his moral nature, reduces himself to the level of brute beasts, and goes on resolutely and recklessly to moral ruin. It is true, that men may continue to perform some Duties, and to aim at some Virtues, while they still do not refrain from the Vice of Impurity. But it is plain, that a man's desire of Moral Progress must be so feeble and inconsistent as not to deserve the name, if he contentedly and intentionally pursues a course which manifestly leads to the pollution and degradation of one main element of a moral character.

228. The different constitution of the heart and mind in the two sexes, as well as the difference in corporeal conditions, lead to some special considerations respecting their Duties. The Desires and Affections of both sexes lead to the Conjugal Union : but according to the natural feelings of most persons, and the practice of most communities, the man proposes and urges the

union, before it takes place; the woman yields and consents. The man is impelled by a love which he proclaims to the object of it; and he asks for a return in which he has the character of a conqueror. The woman is led to consent, not only by affection, but by the hope of a life filled with those family affections, and family enjoyments, for which, as her heart whispers to her, she was made. When these natural propensities operate under due moral restraint, they lead to the marriage union. But moral restraints may be disregarded in some cases; and in other cases may be so feeble, that the solicitation on one side overcomes the resistance on the other; and the woman is seduced to a bodily union without marriage. This is an act of sensuality; and thus, as we have already said, an offense against morality. And in consequence of the character and conditions of the two sexes, of which we have just spoken, after such an act, the woman continues to yield, but the man is no longer ready to bind himself to her by the marriage tie. She is betrayed, as well as seduced. In so far as the seducer breaks the engagements which he has expressly or implicitly made, he violates the Duty of Good Faith, as well as the Duty of Chastity. But what we have here to observe is, that by the act of unchastity, he not only renounces the Duty of Moral Culture, so far as he himself is concerned; but that he is a Violator of the Duty of Benevolence, as the author of her moral degradation; perhaps of her utter moral ruin. For, as we have already said, the Vice of Sensuality, once admitted, has an especial, and almost irresistible tendency, to extend itself over the whole character. The woman who has yielded to blind affection, afterwards, when her affections are chilled, and her character hardened by the disappointment and treachery she has experienced, and retaining the trace of sensual desire which unchastity produces, may, as we know she often does, become a Wanton; may give herself up to lasciviousness; may sink from one degree of impurity to another, till she end in a state of utter moral ruin. There are said to be men who intentionally,

and without remorse, practise the Seduction of women. It cannot but seem very strange, to a person of the ordinary kind of affections, that a human being should employ his skill and exertions in urging a woman, whom he pretends to love and admire, down this moral descent. Such conduct appears to involve a want of common humanity; for the moral degradation of the woman deprives her of almost all that is admirable and estimable, even in the eyes of her seducer himself; and would be mourned by him as the bitterest evil, and resented as the most grievous wrong, if it were inflicted upon any one for whom he has a family affection. To say nothing of the duty of Purity, a man who is not restrained by his Humanity from such a course of action, must look upon the moral destruction of women with the kind of indifference with which the sportsman looks upon the death and wounds of beasts and birds which he pursues. It is difficult to conceive a more monstrous degree of inhumanity than is implied in such a view of human beings. The cruelty is greater than if the pursuer were, in wilful levity, to inflict bodily pain and wounds: for this moral damage is, and is commonly held to be, a greater calamity than any bodily suffering. The moral ruin of a woman makes her an object of abhorrence to those who are bound to her by ties of family love; and produces in her and in them extreme bitterness of heart, and a gloom approaching to the blackness of despair.

229. The tendency of sensual indulgence to inflame the desires, defile the imagination, and corrupt the heart, makes the Duty of Purity especially important in the season of youth. Habits of indulgence, begun in that season, can hardly fail to give their impress to the character, throughout life. The common belief that this is so, appears in the contempt and condemnation which the loss of virginity in unmarried women, has in all ages and countries incurred. In its effects upon the moral culture of the character, unchastity is as destructive in men as in women. No young man who has any regard for his moral progress, will make his body the instrument of mere lust. And as connected with the govern-

ment of his bodily desires, both in the way of cause and of consequence, he will guard the purity of his mind. He will avoid admitting into his own thoughts, or suggesting to others, lascivious images. He will avoid placing himself in circumstances of temptation or opportunity. He will watch the affections which may arise in his heart towards particular persons, in order to suppress them; well aware how vehement may become the combined urgency of unlawful affection, and sensual desire; and in what a career of vice they plunge those whom they overmaster.

230. The direction of the Affections and Desires, here referred to, towards their proper object, Marriage, is the best mode of avoiding the degradation of character which is produced by their improper operation. Virtuous love, as it has often been said, is the best preservative against impure acts and thoughts. The Love which looks forwards to the conjugal union, includes a reverence for the conjugal condition, and all its circumstances. Such a love produces in the mind a kind of moral illumination, which shows the lover how foul a thing mere lust is; and makes him see, as a self-evident truth, that affection is requisite to purify desire, and virtue necessary to purify affection.

Other Duties arising out of the conjugal union depend upon the Principle of Order, and must be considered in reference to that Principle.

CHAPTER XI.
DUTIES OF ORDER.

231. THE Principle of Order is, that we must obey positive Laws as the necessary conditions of morality (162). This Principle leads to various Duties of Obedience towards persons connected with us by various social relations; for these social relations are established and recognized by Laws; or by Customs equivalent to Laws; and are the points on which our Obligations, and therefore our relative Duties, depend: and many of these relations give one person an authority over another. Thus, by the laws and customs of nations, parents have a large amount of authority over their children. In most places, the husband has by law and usage some authority over the wife; the master over the servant; and everywhere, there are magistrates and governors, in whom are vested authority over the members of the community in general. There is, for all, an Obligation to submit to this Authority; and, in order that such acts of Submission may be moral, there must be corresponding Duties of Obedience. There must therefore be Duties of Obedience of Children to Parents, of Wives to Husbands, of Servants to Masters, of Private Persons to Magistrates; and these, we term Duties of Order, or more specially, Duties of Obedience.

These Duties of Obedience, in order to be moral, must arise from a corresponding internal Disposition; from a Spirit of Obedience. It is therefore our Duty to possess such a Spirit of Obedience, and a corresponding Affection towards our Superiors. We have already spoken of certain Affections,—Reverence towards our Superiors, Love of Parents, Conjugal Love, and the like,—as Duties. We have there also remarked, that these Duties involve the Principle of Order, as well as the Principle of Benevolence; and that the Affections, thus enjoined, show themselves in acts of willing Obedience.

232. The Rules of the Duty of Obedience, be-

longing to each of the Relations of Society, that of the Child, that of the Wife, that of the Servant, and the like, must depend, in part, upon the Rules which Law and Custom have established in each community. For our Duties are such as give moral significance to our legal Obligations (173); and the Obligations of the various Members of the Family to each other, must depend upon the idea of the structure of the Family, entertained in each community. The limits of Filial Obedience are very different, in the customs of different countries; and these customs must have their weight in defining the Limits of Duty. In all states of Society, in the early stages of life, the Parent is the natural guide and governor of the child; and it is the Duty of the child to obey such government and guidance. But we cannot pretend to say, generally, how far or how long this Duty extends. For instance, we cannot lay down any universal Rule to determine whether the Parent may prevent the son from selecting a wife, or the daughter a husband, by their own choice; and whether, in such a case, it is the child's Duty to obey: or whether, supposing that obedience to a prohibition in such a case be a Duty, it be a Duty also to take the husband or the wife whom the Parent selects. In some countries, the marriage of the child is a matter usually managed altogether by the parents. In such cases, it is the child's duty to bring the affections, as far as possible, into harmony with the custom. But those communities and those parents appear to provide better for that special personal affection which the completeness of the marriage union requires, who allow to young men and young women freedom of choice in marriage. Where this is the case, it is the Duty of the man to select a partner to whom his heart tells him he is likely to bear a true conjugal affection; and of the woman, also, to give her hand only when she can give her heart. But even in such cases, filial duty requires, if not absolute obedience, great reverence and deference to the wishes of parents; especially while the children are young; and while, consequently, the habit of submitting to the

parent's guidance must be still in force, in a family directed by Rules of Duty. In the same manner, the kind of authority which the husband, by law and custom, has over the wife, is different in different communities. In all countries, the man is the head and representative of the family, and is the person to whom political offices are assigned. But to what extent the husband, and to what extent the wife, shall rule in domestic concerns, will be regulated by local usage, or by special understanding of the parties. And in every case, the Duties of the husband and of the wife are those which give a moral significance to the Rules which usage and mutual understanding establish. While established, Duty requires the married pair to conform to the Rules; but Duty requires, too, that this should be done in a spirit of Affection and Confidence; the acts thus performed expressing the common will of the two. And in the same way, the Obligations of obedience in Servants are variously determined by law, use, or agreement; and their Duties will vary with their Obligations: but in all cases, there are Duties corresponding to their Obligations; their offices must be performed faithfully and heartily, not with a grudging and merely formal service. And with respect to political relations, a willing obedience to the laws, an affection for his country, a love of its institutions and of its constitution, a loyalty to its sovereign, are proper feelings of a good man, in a rightly constituted state; and are Duties, except where, by some special historical facts, objects, on which such feelings can be employed, are wanting.

233. A willing obedience to the Laws of the Land is, as we have said, a Duty; for the Laws define those social relations which determine the course of our Duties; the Laws establish those Obligations of which our Duties are the expansion, and to which our Duties give a moral signification. But Laws themselves aim at a moral signification; they seek to be just and equitable Laws. We shall hereafter consider the moral character of Laws; but we may here remark, that so far as they have an obvious moral signification, it is our duty to

accept and obey them according to this signification. In cases where the Law is equitable, it is our Duty to conform to the Spirit as well as to the Letter of the Law.

234. There are, however, many cases in which the Law is arbitrary, and rests upon the Authority of the State alone; or in some other way, is devoid of any obvious moral signification. There are many forms, details, and magnitudes regulated by Law, merely because they must be fixed by some Rule, and Law is the proper Rule. In such cases we have no Duty, but to conform to the Letter of the Law. And accordingly, the Law itself so directs us; and the Courts of Justice pronounce their decisions, according to the Letter of the Law. In such indifferent matters, we are not to seek for a Spirit beyond the Letter. The State itself, to which our Duties refer, gives us to understand that we are to guide ourselves by the Letter. Nor, in such cases, is the Intention of the Legislator the measure of our Duty. It is not with any particular Legislator or Body of Legislators that we have to do. The State enjoins the Law; and we accept the Law as the State understands it. The State must be supposed to have accepted the Law, and to understand it, according to the meaning of the words; for the State has accepted and adopted the expressed words, not the unexpressed meaning of any man or set of men. If any set of Legislators failed in expressing what they meant, the State cannot be bound by their incapacity. And thus, in indifferent matters, the Letter of the Law, and not some supposed Spirit besides the Letter, is the proper guide of our obedience. The business of Legislation is to prevent our Duties depending upon anything so vague and obscure, as the Spirit of a Law not expressed in the Letter.

235. We have spoken hitherto of Duties of Obedience; but the Duties of Order include also the Duties which exist on the other side; the Duties of Command. As it is a Duty to give a cordial obedience to just authority, with a regard to the purposes for which the

authority subsists ; so is it a Duty to exercise Authority for its proper purposes, and in a spirit of benevolence, towards those who are its subjects. As it is the Child's Duty to submit to the guidance and government of the Parent, it is the Parent's Duty to guide the Child aright, and to govern it by Rules which the good of the child itself justifies. As far as it is the Wife's Duty to obey the commands of her husband, it is the Husband's Duty to command nothing harshly, capriciously, or unreasonably ; but such acts only as may fall in with an affectionate and confiding conduct of their united course of life. As it is the Servant's Duty to do his work willingly, and bear to his employer such respect as suits their relative condition ; it is the Employer's Duty, in directing those who labour in his service, to consider their powers and their comfort. It is his Duty, also, not to make the relation of employer and servant a source of estrangement between the two classes, by a hard and repulsive demeanour ; for this cannot be the true moral aspect of the relation between men, since they are bound together by the Duty of mutual Benevolence. As to their place in the social scale of a particular community, men may be called Superiors and Inferiors ; but no class of men are superior or inferior to others in their moral claim to kindness in our intention, and gentleness in our manner. So far as the relations of society receive their true moral significance, they bind together all the members of the society by a tie of benevolence ; which has, for its natural results, ready and willing good offices of all to all ; frank, affable, and courteous intercourse of all with all. If this feeling of benevolence had its due effect, the repulsive forces which social distinctions bring into play—the pride of rank and station, the capricious exclusions of fashion, the supreme regard of each class to its own comfort, the excessive jealousy of interference, the impatience of intrusion—would disappear before it ; and, so far as the influence of such a feeling operates upon the members of a community, those repulsive elements will diminish and melt away.

236. The Duties of Order, so far as regards the State, like other Duties, include the Duty of giving a moral significance to the social and civil relations with which they deal. Every man who has any power, or any function in the State assigned him, must exercise it in such a manner as to give a moral meaning to his office. He must act, on the part of the State, as a public representative of its moral character. If he be a Judge, he must administer the Laws impartially, and so as to make them instruments of justice. If he be an administrative officer, he must carry into effect the intentions of the Community; giving to it, as far as the Rules of his office admit, the character of a moral agent acting rightly. If he have assigned to him a vote by which he shares in the election of a legislator or a governor, the vote is a *Trust* for public purposes; and it is grossly immoral to convert such a Trust to purposes of private gain. All such Duties are *Public Duties*; and Public, no less than Private Duties, require us to use all our external means and powers for the furtherance of Morality.

237. The Laws and Customs which determine how far each person shall have a share in the government of the State, define the *Political Rights and Obligations* of men; and the general scheme of Government, thus constituted, is the *Constitution* of the Country. In every country, the Political Rights and Obligations of men ought to be in a great measure fixed; for otherwise the Laws could not remain fixed, and could afford no fixed points to serve as the basis of Duty.* It is therefore the Duty of a citizen to use his Political Rights, so as to give to the Laws the fixity which the purposes of Morality require. This is the *Political Duty of Conservation*. On the other hand, the Political Rights and Obligations of the citizens of a State may change from time to time; for by course of time and circumstance, it often becomes possible to alter the Laws in general, and Political Laws in particular, so as better to further the purposes of Morality. It is the Duty of

a citizen to use his Political Rights in promoting changes of this description. This is the *Political Duty of Progress*.

CHAPTER XII.

INTELLECTUAL DUTIES.

238. BESIDES the Duties of Kindness, which the Duties of Command include, there are other Duties of Command, which require our attention. He who has authority, ought to issue Commands, not only kind, but also prudent, and wise. He has faculties by which he is enabled to judge of such characters in Rules of Action: and he is bound to employ these faculties, as well as his Affections, in the performance of his Duty. Thus, there are Duties which belong to these faculties. We may term them generally, Duties of the Intellectual Faculties; but we may conveniently distinguish among them, the *Duty of Prudence*, and the *Duty of Wisdom*.

We have already said, that we conceive Prudence as the virtue by which we select right means for given ends; while Wisdom implies the selection of right ends, as well as of right means. Those who have authority over others, have to lay down Laws for their conduct; and these Laws may be considered as means, to ends which the Lawgiver contemplates. There are certain objects, which those who possess authority by their social position, may be assumed as having constantly and necessarily in their desires: thus, a head of a family desires sustenance for his family, tranquillity among the members of it, freedom from debts contracted by them; as an employer, he desires to have his work well and carefully done; and the like: and he manifests his Prudence by the Laws which he lays down, or the Rules on which he acts, with reference to these objects. But perhaps a father makes it his main object that his sons and his daughters should rise to riches and rank: and then, though

he may be prudent in the means he takes for such ends, we may doubt whether he is wise in selecting these as his highest ends.

239. But we have to select the ends of action, and the means to them, for ourselves, as well as for others; and Prudence and Wisdom are concerned in this selection, in the former, as in the latter case. We may therefore consider the Duty of Prudence, and the Duty of Wisdom, without any special reference to the offices of command over others, which men may have to execute.

The Duty of Prudence, like other Duties, implies that man has a power over the faculties, which such a Duty requires him to employ. That man has some power over his own thoughts, is evident. He can retain an object of thought in his mind: contemplate it in various aspects and bearings; scrutinize it; deliberate upon it. This is Inquiry and *Consideration*; and by this proceeding, he can often discover means to an end, and consequences of an act, which escape his notice, in a more rapid and slight mode of regarding the subject. Now the means to an end have their moral character affected by the end. The consequences of an act contribute to the moral character of the act. The points which Consideration and Inquiry bring into view, may determine whether the act be good or bad. And since we must employ all our Faculties and Powers in order to conform our actions to the Supreme Law, we must exercise this power of Consideration; and thus every man, as a moral agent, is bound by a *Duty of Consideration*, including a Duty of Inquiry.

240. The Intention is directed by the various Springs of Action, including the Moral Sentiments and the Reason. Morality requires that Intention be directed rightly: that is, towards the Ideas contained in the Supreme Law; Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. There is a Duty of right Intention, which is included in all other Duties. Now we have here to remark, that this Duty of Right Intention does not replace or supersede the Duty of Consideration. We must consider the means, as they are in themselves,

as well as in subservience to the end at which our intention points. We must consider the consequences which will follow upon our act, as well as the act which we directly intend. For a good end does not justify the means which we employ, if a due consideration would shew us that the means are wrongly selected: and that an act is in itself moral, does not justify it, if by a due consideration we might see that it would lead to evil consequences. I may have a wish to improve the character of my child: I may, possibly, hastily punish him, with such an intention. But the intention does not justify the haste. If a little thought and care, bestowed upon the subject, would have shown me that these courses would make him worse, and not better, I am to blame. I have violated the Duty of Consideration. And in like manner, the Duty of Consideration is transgressed by any want of a Regard to Consequences. I may, possibly, heedlessly indulge the desires of a child, or give what a man asks of me. But if the consequences of doing this be mischief to the child or to the man, and mischief which a little thought would have shown to be probable, or certain, I am culpable. Here, also, I have violated the Duty of Consideration. Haste and Heedlessness are grave offenses, in cases which concern the welfare of others. We shall hereafter see that the Law treats such offenses as violations of our Obligations: and our Duties, in this, as in other cases, are extensions of our Obligations. If Law require in us a care and consideration for the well-being of our fellow-men, Morality must require such care and consideration still more; and must require more care and more consideration than the Law can enforce. Benevolence aims at the good of those among whom we are placed: but she must take to her aid the best exertions of the Intellect, in order to determine by what means such good is to be brought about; and what will be the consequences of any acts which such a purpose may suggest to us.

241. It is in our power to deliberate; but even after deliberation, we may be mistaken. It may be asked, if we are responsible for such a mistake. Is it a violation

of any Duty to select wrong means to good ends, or to err in foreseeing the consequences of actions meant for good? If we here also follow the analogy of the Law, we shall be led to conclude that, in some cases at least, such an error is blameable. A physician who administers medicaments grossly pernicious, is condemned by the Law for his error, however right may have been his intentions, and with however much thought he may have gone to his error. And the common judgment of mankind throws a like blame upon similar errors. Men are indignant against folly and ignorance, when they affect important acts; as well as against evil intention. Men feel, and express, a strong moral indignation against a father, who ruins the character of his child by bad teaching, though he may have employed much pains upon its education: against a pilot who wrecks his ship by bad steering, though he may have steered his best: against a legislator who makes bad laws, though he thought them good. And if we look into the ground of this indignation, and of the moral condemnation which it involves, we shall see that the persons, in these cases, are judged to be to blame, because they deviated from the guidance of that Reason which is the common light of all mankind. They had a Faculty which points out the difference between what is good and what is bad, in such cases; between right means and wrong means, to the acknowledged ends. They cannot have duly employed this Faculty, or they would not have gone wrong. They acted irrationally, and in so doing, they violated a Duty; and thus we are led to recognize *the Duty of acting rationally*. It is our Duty, not only to be careful and considerate in our choice of means to ends, but also to choose rationally. We do not say that it is our Duty to choose rightly, for there may be inevitable errors: but at least, we must use our Reason in choosing, and avoid such errors as her light manifests to us.

We do not say that it is easy to determine what errors can, and what cannot be avoided: what selection of means for an acknowledged end is rational, and what is irrational. So far as such a distinction can be drawn,

it will be our business hereafter to examine it. But the difficulty of doing this, does not prevent our recognizing, in general, the Duty of acting rationally, as one of our intellectual Duties.

242. The Reason directs our course in various ways : among others, by accepting Rules of action, and directing the conduct in conformity to them. Such Rules have it for their office to control and regulate the variable and discordant action of men's Affections and Desires: to render permanent and consistent the guidance, which Reason, operating without Rules, exercises, in each person, doubtfully and interruptedly. Rules are the primary expressions of Duties. The Rules, *Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not lie*, and the like, are the basis of moral action. The formation, the establishment, the acceptance of such Rules, is the mode in which man becomes a moral agent. But besides such Rules, others, of a less absolute and general kind, are among the most suitable and efficacious means of controlling the conduct in a rational and moral manner. Such are those we have just mentioned: *Children, obey your parents : Masters, treat your servants with kindness*. Such Rules, accepted as right, and retained in the recollection as the constant guides of our conduct, extend the sway of Reason to times when, without them, we might be led wrong by passion or desire. They sustain us against the pressure of special seasons of temptation; and extend, to the worse periods of our rational and moral life, the influence of the better periods. To act by such Rules, is the very meaning of acting according to Duty. Further; not only are such Moral Rules means by which our Reason guides us, but other Rules also, not directly moral, but of a prudential character only, are among the proper means of directing our conduct rationally. Thus, we may avoid intemperance, by conforming to Rules which shall moderate our eating and drinking; we may escape debt and poverty, by conforming to Rules limiting our habitual expenses; we may suppress our tendencies to harsh and rude behaviour, by conforming ourselves to Rules of courtesy. Rules of this kind, more or less distinctly expressed in

words, are the proper guides of man, as a rational being. They are the modes in which the general convictions of the Reason are brought into contact with particular cases of action. It is our Duty thus to regulate our conduct ; and thus we have a *Duty of acting according to Rule*.

243. Moral Rules, in so far as they are moral, are absolute, being expressions of the Supreme Rule of human action, which nothing can overmaster or supersede. Prudential Rules, having for their object subordinate ends, may be set aside in particular cases, as these objects themselves may. They must give way, for instance, whenever they interfere with Moral Rules. Moral Rules only, are, in the highest sense, the proper guides of human life.

Hence, it is our Duty to accept or to frame Moral Rules, as the means of our guidance. This is a Duty, which has not, like the Duties of which we have been speaking, reference to any subordinate end, but to the highest ; it is the Duty of Wisdom, not a Duty of Prudence.

The Duty of Wisdom is the Duty of framing or adopting such Rules of action as are consistent with the Supreme Rule of Human Action. It is the Duty of having Rules of Duty : for, as we have seen, the Rules of Duty are determined, on the one hand, by those Moral Ideas which serve to express the Supreme Rule ; while, on the other hand, they are determined by the various social relations and conditions of man's life.

244. By what means can we obtain Rules of Duty which are truly moral, truly consistent with the Supreme Rule ? We have already been employed in laying down such Rules ; and we have seen, in some measure, by what process they may be arrived at. We find that there are external conditions necessary to the existence of man as a moral being ; that there are certain Rights and Obligations, according to which, as external Facts, man's Duties are regulated. There are, also, certain Ideas of Virtues, namely, Benevolence, Justice, and the like, according to which, as internal Ideas, the conceptions of Duty are regulated. By the combination of these two

elements, we have endeavoured to define, in some measure, the scheme of Duties which belong to man. But we have, in several instances, been led to see that some further steps are requisite, before we can describe our Duties in a complete manner; and before we can produce Rules which shall admit of definite application, in the cases which commonly offer themselves to our notice. Among the steps which are thus pointed out to us, as required for the formation of more definite Rules of Duty, are Determinations and Definitions, more exact than we have yet obtained, of some of the Conceptions, in terms of which our Rules must necessarily be expressed; such conceptions, for instance, as *Justice*, *Humanity*, *Happiness*, and the like. The next step which we shall take, in the establishment of Moral Rules, will be to attempt to analyse and define, more precisely than we have yet done, several such conceptions as these, and to apply, in particular cases, the Conceptions thus defined. We may, in this way, best hope to obtain, both Moral Truths of a general kind, and the determination of the questions which belong to special cases.

245. The precision of our Conceptions, which may thus aid us in arriving at Moral Truths, is a proper object for us to aim at, as a mode of promoting our Moral Culture. It is our Duty to aim at such an intellectual progress, as a means to our moral progress. And not only may this particular kind of improvement of the intellect, be an aid in our moral culture; but the improvement of the intellect in general, in its conceptions and operations, is fitted to have this effect. And it is therefore our Duty to aim at such improvement. Corresponding to the Duty of Moral Culture of ourselves, there is a *Duty of intellectual Culture*. To cultivate our Intellect, is, in itself, a source of gratification. The love of knowledge, which we have spoken of as one of the desires of man, impels him constantly to make his knowledge more and more extensive, more and more precise, more and more connected; and an advance of this kind, is indeed a Culture of the Intellect. But besides all other Truth, to which the love of knowledge leads, and where man

seeks for the satisfaction of knowing, this desire leads to Moral Truth, which is the proper guide of man's life; and which, therefore, he is impelled to seek, not only by pleasure, but by Duty.

246. Moral Truth is, as we have said, the proper guide of human life; and hence, those who have to guide others, are under a more peculiar necessity of knowing Moral Truth, and of possessing precise, and consistent moral conceptions. Those especially need such Truth, such Precision, and such Consistency, whose office it is to make Rules for others, or to teach them the Rules which they are to follow;—those, that is, who have to legislate for mankind, or to educate them. The Duty of Wisdom is especially incumbent on Legislators and on Educators.

Since the offices of Legislation and of Education especially require the possession of Moral Truth, we shall defer the consideration of those offices in detail, till we have, under our notice, those further elements of Moral Truth, which we still have to consider.

We will only observe, before we quit this part of the subject, that Legislation implies, not merely combinations of Conceptions, and mental results of Ideas, but also the external Facts, by which Law is realized. Laws are Moral Rules, clothed in an actual historical form. The Legislator must also be a Governor; or at least his ideas must be adopted and enforced by the Governor, in order to make them be Laws.

247. In like manner, Education, so far as it teaches Rules of action, implies external facts, which give reality to the precepts inculcated. The Educator teaches the learner the Laws of the Land, for instance, in order that he may guide himself by them; but in order that his teaching may have its effect, he must be able to speak of these Laws, as Laws actually in force; not as merely possible conceivable Rules. And when the Educator has to teach, not merely human Laws, but moral Rules, he must still be able to present these moral Rules, not merely as imaginable, but as possessing a real Authority. Moral Rules derive their substance from the Supreme

Rule of Human Action, of which they are partial expressions. Hence, this Supreme Rule must have a real authority, and an actual force. The Educator teaches his pupil to do what is absolutely right; and because it is right: but this teaching supposes that its being right includes a sufficient reason for doing it; estimating reasons according to the real condition and destination of man.

The Supremé Rule of Human Action derives its Real Authority, and its actual force, from its being the Law of God, the Creator of Man. The Reason for doing what is absolutely right, is, that it is the Will of God, through which the condition and destination of man are what they are.

We are thus led to Religion, as a necessary part of the Moral Education of men. But in order to complete the train of thought by which Morality leads us to Religion, we must pursue somewhat further the subject of Moral Transgression, of which we have already spoken (206).

CHAPTER XIII.

OF TRANSGRESSION.

248. IN our survey of the several classes of Duties (174—247) we have seen that, beside the direct Duties of action, and of affection towards others, there are reflex Duties which regard ourselves: the Duties, namely, of unfolding within us, or establishing in our minds, the Operative Moral Principles from which external Duties must proceed; the Duty of aiming at our own Moral Progress; the Duty of cultivating in our own minds the principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. We have it for our business and proper aim, to make our Lives a Moral Progress, in which these Principles constantly become more and more identified with our habits of action, thought, and feeling. We have to form our character, so that these principles are

its predominant features. We have to seek not only to *do*, but to *be*; not only to perform acts of Duty, but to become virtuous (195, &c.).

Further: there is an Intellectual, as well as a moral progress, at which we must aim; an Intellectual Progress, which is a means to a Moral Progress. We are to endeavour constantly to improve our powers of apprehending Truth, in order that we may be able the more readily and firmly to lay hold on that Moral Truth, which is the proper guide of our Lives (245).

249. We have to aim at this moral and intellectual progress as the Greatest Good which we can desire for ourselves (209). But further, the complete Benevolence which is part of the character at which we thus aim, and which seeks the good of others, must seek for them that good which for ourselves we esteem the greatest. Our benevolence, therefore, will seek the moral progress of others as well as our own; and intellectual progress for them, no less than for ourselves, as a means of moral progress. And thus, the complex Object, at which we shall constantly have to aim, is, the Moral and Intellectual Progress of Ourselves and of the rest of Mankind.

We may consider this as the highest object of action and thought which we can propose to ourselves; and in proportion as we make this our object, and direct our thoughts and purposes to it, we elevate our minds.

250. We have already seen (196, &c.) that we have the power, in some measure at least, of carrying on this moral and intellectual progress within ourselves. That this progress must be altogether incomplete and imperfect without the aid of Religion, we shall hereafter see; but it is at least so far possible for men to promote or neglect their own moral progress, that one man shall differ very much from another in the advance he has thus made. Two men may be, at least by comparison, one virtuous and another vicious; and by a like difference, they may be at very different stages of their moral progress; if, indeed, we may not say of some, that the course of their lives is a constant moral degradation rather than a progress.

251. This moral progress, as we have said (203), can never terminate while we remain on earth. So long as we live, we shall have room to make ourselves better and wiser: to increase the warmth of our benevolence, to purify our hearts, to elevate our thoughts, to make ourselves more and more virtuous. To do this, is a moral growth and nurture; a moral life, which can never end, while our natural life goes on. Or if the moral progress end, the moral life is turned to moral disorder. In the moral faculties, if there be not a healthy growth, there must be a morbid decay and foul disease.

252. The moral life is nourished by the perpetual aliment of moral actions, moral habits, moral thoughts, moral affections. All acts of Duty, and all affections which lead to acts of Duty, tend to promote our Moral Culture. On the other hand, all *Transgressions* of Duty interrupt our Moral Culture, arrest our Moral Progress, and are steps in a retrograde moral course. Unkind affections, unlawful desires, fraudulent intentions, impure imaginations, are inconsistent with our moral advancement, while they occupy us; and are proofs that we have much still to do, in giving a moral character to our being. If these things form frequent and common parts of our lives, they are proofs that we have made little moral progress; or rather, that we have made none, and are making none. If these things are acquiesced in by us, and allowed to grow into habits, we are not going forwards, but backwards, in moral character. So far as this is our case, we tend to become more and more degraded, depraved, vicious (206).

253. Thus, if wrong affections, desires, intentions, and imaginations, occur in our lives at all, they are interruptions of our moral progress; and evidences that, in our moral culture, we have still much to do. Yet such things may occur, so long as our moral culture is incomplete; and since, during our lives, it ever must be incomplete, they may occur so long as life remains. The Springs of Action, not fully converted into Moral Principles, may, under special circumstances, tend to deviate from the Law of Duty. Desires may be inflamed, Affec-

tions perverted, Reason misled, Consideration omitted, Rules neglected, lower aims put in the place of the highest; and man may fall below the line which morality draws. The circumstances which tend to produce such an effect are *Temptations*. By the impulses of the Springs of Action, not fully controlled by Rules of Duty, man is *tempted* to transgress such Rules.

254. It is the moral business of man to *resist* Temptation. The powers by which we guide ourselves, the Reason, and the Moral Sentiments, must be employed in controlling the Desires and Affections which impel us in an immoral direction. All the results of our Moral Culture must be called to our aid for this purpose. The express Moral Principles which we have learnt; the Operative Moral Principles which we have acquired; Consideration, Rational Action, and Rules of Duty, we must call into operation, that they may overcome the immoral impulses by which we are urged. This we must do as moral agents; although to these resources, Religion alone can give their full force.

If a man does not effectually resist Temptation; if he is overcome and yields, he transgresses the Rules of Duty; he offends against Morality; he commits a vicious act. The contemplation of man under this aspect, as liable to *Transgressions* and *Offenses*, introduces us to very important and serious views of his condition and destination.

255. Transgressions or Offenses are described by various terms, implying various degrees of condemnation. As defects from the standard of Morality they are *Faults*; and when we would ascribe them to weakness of Will, rather than to wrong intention, they are called *Failings*. As transgression becomes graver, more grievous, we have no term which directly expresses an enormous violation of morality (as do the Latin *scelus*, *flagitium*, *facinus*). *Vice* implies the disposition to transgress; *Guilt* and *Crime* properly express the violation of human laws; and *Sin*, an offense against God. But *Guilt* and *Crime* are terms also used of the violation of moral laws; and all Transgressions are Sins. Those

who commit Sins are *wicked*, (which is said to have meant, originally, *under the influence of evil spirits*). Sins are described, according to their character, as acts of cruelty, of injustice, of falsehood, of uncleanness, and the like. As they excite our moral abhorrence, they are termed *hateful, heinous, atrocious, shocking, abominable, detestable, execrable*. Crimes are said, figuratively, in proportion as they are greater, to be *higher, deeper, heavier, darker*. As their criminal nature is more manifest, they are *flagrant*.

256. It may be asked, according to what Measure and Standard do moral transgressions become greater and graver. Is there a definite gradation from slight Failings to atrocious Crimes; and if so, what circumstances fix the place of each Offense in this Scale? To this we reply, that the universal voice of mankind declares some offenses to be greater, some to be less; some heavier, some lighter. But yet, since the moral transgression consists in the perversion of internal affections, desires, and will; and since this internal condition cannot be fully known and compared in any two cases, at least in any two classes of cases; it must be almost impossible to declare one *class* of transgressions to be necessarily better or worse than another. This at least we may say; that to pronounce one kind of offenses better and slighter than another, would tend to convey a false opinion respecting the offenses thus in some degree preferred and palliated. For no transgression can be said to be so much better than another, as not to be utterly bad. No offense can rightly be deemed slight, since the slightest utterly interrupts our moral progress.

257. But in this aspect of offenses, that they interrupt or undo our moral progress, we have a kind of Measure of their magnitude. Those offenses are most grievous, which are most pernicious in their effect upon our moral culture. Some may interrupt our moral culture for a time, and it may nevertheless be resumed. Others may show that moral culture has no place in our thoughts; that we have no wish to be better than we are. Other transgressions may imply a recklessness or

despair of moral progress ; a state of mind which points to moral ruin as its natural sequel. The gravity of the offense will therefore be increased by all circumstances which indicate it to be the result of an habitually immoral state of the Affections and Desires, of settled and deliberate purpose, of a want or a rejection of moral aims. The hope that an offense may be only a transient interruption of the offender's moral progress, is favoured by its being the result of great and sudden Temptation, plainly at variance with the habitual course of the affections and will. Such circumstances, therefore, tend to make an offense less grave and mischievous to the offender.

258. I have already pointed out, of what nature the mischief is, which offenses do to the offender. So long as there is a suspension of the authority of Duty, there is a suspension of the proper moral functions of man. So long as immoral thought, purpose, and affection prevail, the moral progress, which is the proper course of man's life ; is arrested or inverted. Acts of Wickedness are steps towards moral ruin. Or, to resume a figure which we have already employed ; the moral life is nourished by the perpetual aliment of moral purposes, desires and affections. By an immoral act, poison is taken into the human being, which tends to enfeeble, distemper, and destroy the moral life.

We are now led to ask, whether there is any remedy for this mischief. When transgression has been committed, how is rectitude to be restored ? When the moral progress has been interrupted and turned back, how is the regress to be checked, the lost ground to be recovered, the progress to be resumed ? When poison has been taken into our moral being, how is it to be ejected, and the powers of life restored to their healthful action ?

The mode in which the poison of immoral purposes, desires, and affections, was taken into our being was, by their being *our* purposes, *our* desires, *our* affections. In order to expel their effect, they must be rejected as *our* purposes, *our* desires, *our* affections. They must

be repudiated, so that they shall no longer belong to us. They must be changed into their reverse; desire, into aversion; love, into hate; the purpose to do, into the purpose to undo; joy in what was done, to sorrow that it was done. This change must be carried, by an effort of thought, into the past. We must recall in our memory the past act of transgression, contradicting, as we do so, the motives by which we were misled, and condemning the purpose which we formed. This change, this sorrow, this renunciation and condemnation of our past act, is *Repentance*. The transgressor must *repent*. We do not say that this suffices to remedy the evil. It does not do so. But there can be no remedy of the evil without this. This, at least, he must do. He must make the effort of *Repentance*, in order to cast out of his being the poison of immoral act or purpose. He, for this purpose, must see his moral regression as what it is, a dire mischief, which, if not remedied, tends to immeasurable evil.

259. But the regression must not only be lamented, it must also be repaired. We must not only reject the past offense by repentance, but we must seek to resume the course which morality points out. We must endeavour to restore our moral progress; to regain the ground which we have lost; to avoid all repetition of the errors and offenses which we have committed. We must direct our Moral Culture to our recovery and renovation. We must *amend* ourselves. We must *reform* our lives. *Amendment* and *Reformation*, as well as *Repentance*, are the necessary sequel of transgression, in virtue of that Duty of Moral Culture and Moral Progress which is constantly incumbent upon all men.

260. The Moralist is thus led to teach, that after *Transgression*, *Repentance* and *Amendment* are necessary steps in our Moral Culture. But the Moralist cannot pronounce how far these steps can avail as a remedy for the evil; how far they can repair the broken completeness of man's moral course; how far they can restore the health of man's moral life; how far they can finally, and upon the whole, avert the consequences of sin from

man's condition and destination. These are points on which the Moralist necessarily looks to Religion for her teaching. These questions regard the effects of Sin upon the Soul, and the concerns of the Soul belong to Religion. They regard the provision made by God for saving man from the effects of Sin, and this is also a matter belonging to Religion.

261. There is, however, one consequence of what has been said, which we may notice. We have said, that when a man has deviated from the course of Duty, he cannot resume his moral progress without Repentance and Amendment. We may remark further, that the Amendment is required by Morality to be *immediate*. If a man repents in the middle of an immoral act, he will not go on with the act. As soon as the authority of Morality is acknowledged, the moral course of action must begin; and not at some later period, when pending acts have been completed. Duty is the perpetual rightful Governor of every man; and the man who merely promises to obey this Governor at some future time, is really disobedient. The man who completes an immoral act, knowing it to be immoral, commits a new offense. He yielded to temptation, in the first part of the act; he sins against conviction, in the second.

This remark may be of use when we come to consider some cases of Duty. For instance, if I have made an immoral promise, and see my fault, it is my Duty not to complete the act by performing the promise.

CHAPTER XIV.
OF CONSCIENCE.

262. THE Desires and Affections receive their Culture by being converted into, or comprehended in, the Operative Moral Principles. The Faculties which control and direct the Desires and Affections, namely, the Reason and the Moral Sentiments, must also receive their Culture, in order that the being of man may tend to its proper completeness. The Culture of these Faculties implies the formation or adoption, in our minds, of Rules of Duty, and the application of such Rules to our own actions, with the accompanying Sentiment of Approval or Disapproval of ourselves.

Thus, by the culture of these controlling and directing Faculties, we form habits, according to which we turn our attention upon ourselves, and approve or disapprove what we there discern. These Faculties, thus cultured, are the *Conscience* of each man. The word *conscious* implies a reflex attention of the mind to its own condition or operation; a contemplation of what we ourselves feel and do. We *feel* pain, but we are *conscious* of impatience. We start *unconsciously* at a surprize, but in danger we are *conscious* of fear. Our consciousness reveals to us not only our most secret acts, but our desires, affections, and intentions. These are the especial subjects of morality, and we cannot think of them, without considering them as right or wrong. We approve, or disapprove, of what we have done, or tried to do. We consider our acts, external and internal, with reference to a moral standard of right and wrong. We recognize them as virtuous or vicious. The Faculty or Habit of doing this is Conscience.

263. As *Science* means *Knowledge*, *Conscience* etymologically means *Self-knowledge*; and such is the meaning of the word in Latin and French, and of the corresponding word in Greek; (*conscientia*, *conscience*, *συνείδησις*). But the English word, implies a Moral

Standard of action in the mind, as well as a Consciousness of our own actions. It may be convenient to us to mark this distinction of an internal Moral Standard, as one part of Conscience; and Self-knowledge, or Consciousness, as another part. The one is the Internal Law; the other, the Internal Accuser, Witness, and Judge.

This distinction was noted by early Christian Moralists. They termed the former part of Conscience, *Synteresis*, the internal Repository: the latter, *Syneidesis*, the internal Knowledge. We may term the former, Conscience as Law; the latter, Conscience as Witness.

264. We have already (242) spoken of the steps by which we establish in our minds that internal Law which we call Conscience. It is established by such a Culture of our Reason as enables us to frame or to accept Rules which are in agreement with the Supreme Law; and by the agreement of our Moral Sentiments with such Rules. *Conscience as Law*, is the expression of the condition at which we have aimed, in our advance towards a knowledge of the Supreme Law. It is a Stage in our moral and intellectual Progress.

265. The Offices of *Conscience as Witness*, *Accuser*, and *Judge*, cannot easily be separated; for to be conscious of having done an act, to question its character, and to know that it is wrong, are steps which usually follow close upon each other. Yet these steps may often be distinct. It may require some consideration, and some careful exercise of the intellect, to discern the important features of an act, and to apply to it the appropriate Rules of Duty. The moralists who distinguish the *Synteresis* from the *Syneidesis*, represent the acts of Conscience as expressed by the three members of a Syllogism; of which the first contains the *Law*, the Second, the *Witness*, the Third, the *Judgment*. As an example, we may take this Syllogism:

He who dissembles, transgresses the Duty of Truth;
I have dissembled;

Therefore I have transgressed the Duty of Truth.

266. We may also note a further office which is ascribed to Conscience. She inflicts *Punishment* for the

offenses thus condemned. For the Self-accusation and Self-condemnation, of which we have spoken, bring with them their especial pains. Repentance is sorrow; Remorse is a pang, a torment. Transgression lies like a weight on the Conscience, and makes it feel burthened and oppressed. Again, the Conscience is spoken of as the *Record* of offenses committed; and as stained, polluted, blackened, by our transgressions.

267. Conscience, the Judge, must pronounce its decision according to Conscience, the Law. If we have not transgressed the Law of Conscience, Conscience acquits us. If we have violated the Law of Conscience, Conscience condemns us.

He who is condemned by his own Conscience, is guilty. He has really done wrong. He has really offended against the Supreme Rule. His actions are inconsistent with the Stage at which he has arrived, in his moral progress. They are therefore inconsistent with Morality. He who acts *against his Conscience* is always wrong.

268. The question naturally occurs, whether, on the other hand, he who acts *according to his conscience* is always right: whether he who is acquitted by his conscience is free from blame. Is it enough for the demands of morality, if each person compares his actions to the Standard of right and wrong which he has in his mind? Is this a complete justification?

It is evident, that to answer these questions in the affirmative, would lead to great inconsistencies in our Morality. For, under the influence of Education, Laws, Prejudices, and Passions, the Standard of right and wrong, which exists in men's minds for the time, is often very different from that which the Moralist can assent to. Men have often committed thefts, frauds, impositions, homicides, thinking their actions right; though they were such as all Moralists would condemn as wrong. Such men acted according to their Consciences. Were they thereby justified?

269. What has already been said, may suggest a Reply to such questions. It is the Duty of man constantly to prosecute his moral and intellectual Culture

(202). This requires, not only that we should conform our actions to the Standard which we have in our minds for the time; but that, also, we are to make this Standard truly moral. Whatever subordinate Law we have in our minds, is to be looked upon only as a step to the Supreme Law;—the Law of complete Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. Conscience, the Law, must be constantly directed with the purpose of making it conform to this Supreme Law. We must seek for such light, such knowledge, as may enable us constantly to promote this conformity. We must labour to *enlighten* and *instruct* our Conscience. This can never be ended. So long as life and powers of thought remain to us, we may always be able to acquire a still clearer and higher view than we yet possess, of the Supreme Law of our Being. We never can have done all that is in our power, in this respect. It never can be consistent with our Duty, to despair of enlightening and instructing our Conscience, beyond what we have yet done. Our standard of virtue is not high enough, if we think it need be made no higher. Virtue has never so completely taken possession of man's being, but that she may possess it still more completely; and therefore, any conception of Virtue, which we look upon as perfect, must, on that very account, be imperfect. Conscience is never fully formed, but always in the course of formation.

270. We may add, that in attempting to enlighten and instruct our conscience, and to carry on our moral progress, we are led to feel the want of some light and some power in addition to the light of mere reason, and the ordinary powers which we possess over our own minds; and that Religion offers to us the hope of such a power, which will, if duly sought, be exercised upon us.

271. It appears from what has just been said, that we cannot properly refer to our Conscience as an Ultimate and Supreme Authority. It has only a subordinate and intermediate Authority; standing between the Supreme Law, to which it is bound to conform,

and our own Actions, which must conform to it, in order to be moral. Conscience is not a Standard, personal to each man; as each man has his standard of bodily appetite. Each man's Standard of morals, is a standard of Morals, only because it is supposed to represent the Supreme Standard, which is expressed by the Moral Ideas, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Wisdom: As each man has his Reason, in virtue of his participation in the Common Reason of mankind, so each man has his Conscience, in virtue of his participation in the Common Conscience of mankind, by which Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Wisdom, are recognised as the Supreme Law of Man's Being. As the object of Reason is to determine what is true, so the object of Conscience is to determine what is right. As each man's Reason may err, and thus lead him to false opinion, so each man's Conscience may err, and lead him to a false moral standard. As false opinion does not disprove the reality of Truth, so the false moral standards of men do not disprove the reality of a Supreme Rule of Human Action.

272. Since Conscience is thus a subordinate and fallible Rule, it appears, that for a man to act according to his conscience, is not necessarily to act rightly. His conscience may be erroneous. It may be culpably in error; for he may not have taken due pains to enlighten and instruct it. If the conscience be in error, it must be so for this reason, that the man's moral and intellectual progress is still incomplete; and this incompleteness is no justification of what is done under its influence. A conformity to an Erroneous Conscience is no more blameless, than an act of imperfect Benevolence, or imperfect Justice.

273. Moreover, since Conscience has only this subordinate and derivative authority, it cannot be right for a man to refer to his own Conscience, as a supreme and ultimate ground of action. The making our Conscience a ground of action, to this extent, is in itself wrong; since it is abandoning that Duty of further enlightening and instructing our Conscience, which can

never cease to be a duty. That a man acts *according to his Conscience*, is not a reason for his actions, which can supersede the necessity of assigning other Reasons. If an action be according to his Conscience, it must be so because it is conformable to his Conceptions of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Wisdom; and his reason for the action is more properly rendered by showing that the act does conform to these Moral Ideas, than by saying that it is "according to his Conscience." To allege that an act is according to my Conscience; meaning thereby, that I act according to a Rule which is already fixed and settled in my mind, so that I will no longer examine whether the Rule be right; is to reject the real signification of moral Rules. It is the conduct of a person who pursues a wrong road to the place he aims at; and refuses to have it proved that the road is wrong.

Indeed, the very use of the term *Conscience*, in rendering moral reasons for actions, may tend to mislead us, by presenting Conscience to our minds as an authoritative and supreme guide. To dwell too much upon this abstraction, which, as we have said, merely denotes a step in our progress towards the Supreme Rule, may obstruct and disturb our further progress. We may confuse our minds, by fixing our consciousness too much upon our Conscience;—by reflecting upon this reflex habit. It has been said, that if I *talk* of my Humility, I lose it; something of the same kind may be said of Conscience.

274. But though a virtuous man may abstain from speaking much of his Conscience, he will not reverence its guidance the less on that account; or rather, his silence, if he be silent, will be that of reverence. For nothing can be more worthy of reverence than Conscience. It is, as we have said, the expression of the Supreme Rule, so far as each man has been able to discern that Rule. Conscience is to each man the representative of the Supreme Law, and is invested with the authority of the Supreme Law. It is the

voice which pronounces for him the distinction of right and wrong, of moral good and evil; and when he has done all that he can to enlighten and instruct it, by the aid of Religion, as well as of Morality, it is for him the Voice of God.

275. To disobey the commands and prohibitions of Conscience, under any circumstances, is utterly immoral; it is the very essence of immorality. In order to be moral, a man must be thoroughly *conscientious*; he must be careful to satisfy himself what the decision of his Conscience is, and must be resolved to follow the course thus prescribed, at any risk, and at any sacrifice. Nothing can be right which he does not do with a *clear conscience*. Whatever danger or sorrow lies in that direction, whatever advantage and gratification of the desires and affections in the other, he must not shrink or waver. Whatever may be gained by acting against his conscience, the consistency and welfare of his whole moral being is lost. His moral progress is utterly arrested. He commits a grievous transgression; and, as we have already said, morality can assure him of no means by which the evil may be remedied, and the broken unity of his moral being restored. To be steadily, resolutely, and carefully conscientious, is a Rule which every one, who aims at his moral progress, must regard as paramount to all others.

276. Inasmuch as each man's Conscience is the Supreme Law, so far as he has been able to discover that Law; and inasmuch as this discovery is a task to be performed only by a diligent and continued exercise of our faculties; there may be periods when each man is aware that the task has been imperfectly performed on special points, and may be uncertain what is right and what is wrong. In such cases, his Conscience is *doubtful*. The removal of such doubts, is to be sought by the further use of the means by which the Conscience is enlightened and instructed. When the doubts turn rather upon special points than upon the general course of action, they are *Scruples of Conscience*.

What a person can do without offending against his Conscience, when the question has been deliberately propounded and solved in his own mind, he does with a *safe conscience*, or with a *good conscience*.

CHAPTER XV.

CASES OF CONSCIENCE RESPECTING TRUTH.

277. It will appear from the preceding Chapter, that in all right action, the Conscience is employed, consciously or unconsciously. A man is *bound in Conscience* to do what he thinks right; but he is also bound to employ his faculties diligently, in ascertaining what is right. In cases in which he has not ascertained what is right, his Conscience is doubtful; and for the purposes of right action, it is requisite that these doubts be removed. Cases which are considered by Moralists with the view of doing this, are *Cases of Conscience*.

We are not to suppose that any particular Class of questions in Morals are Cases of Conscience. Every case of Moral action is, for the person who acts, a Case of Conscience. But in the greater part of such cases, the Rule of Duty is so plain and obvious, that no doubt arises, as to the course of action; and thus, no internal inquiry brings the Conscience into notice. In cases in which there appear to be conflicting Duties, or reasons for opposite courses of action, we must endeavour to decide between them, by enlightening and instructing the conscience; and these are especially termed Cases of Conscience.

278. Since, in Cases of conflicting Duties, whichever way we decide, one Duty is, or seems to be, evaded or violated, Cases of Conscience, as proposed by Moralists, have often the aspect of Questions as to when Duties may be evaded or violated. To discuss

such questions, has been supposed, by the world in general, more likely to pervert than to improve men's minds; and hence *Casuistry*, the part of Morality which is concerned with such discussions, has often been looked upon with dislike.

279. But the question, in every Case of Conscience, really is, not, How may Duty be evaded? but, *What is Duty?*—not, How may I avoid doing what I ought to do? but, *What ought I to do?* And this is a question which a virtuous man cannot help perpetually asking himself; and to which the answer may very often be far from obvious. In such Cases, he will be glad to know to what decision the Moralist, treating such questions in a general form, and free from the influence of personal temptation, has been led. We shall here consider a few Questions of this kind.

There occur Cases of Conscience respecting all Classes of Duties: but in many of these Classes, the decision of the question may require a more exact determination of the Conceptions involved in it; for instance, in questions concerning Duties of Justice, of Humanity, which Conceptions will be examined hereafter. But there are some Cases which we may consider by the aid of Rules and Maxims already laid down.

Such are particularly the Cases which respect the Duties of Truth (*Subjective Truth, Veracity*). The Rules *Lie not, Perform your Promise*, are of universal validity; and the conceptions of *Lie*, and of *Promise*, are so simple and distinct, that, in general, the Rules may be directly and easily applied. We shall consider first some such Questions relative to Promises.

280. In what sense are Promises to be *interpreted?* We have already said (218), that the Mutual Understanding of the two parties, at the time of making the promise, is the sense in which it is the Promiser's Duty to fulfil it. This is the right Interpretation of the promise, because the promise expressed and established this Mutual Understanding. If the Promiser, intending deceit to the Promisee, or to other persons, has used expressions, with a view to their being misunderstood,

he has already violated the Duty of Truth. If he repent of this, his only way of resuming a moral condition is, to carry back the effect of his repentance to the time of making the promise, and to act as if he had intended what he was understood to intend.

Since the Promiser may be the only speaker in the transaction, and the Promisee may imply his acceptance of the Promise, and the sense in which he understands it, only by his silence, or by words of assent; we may state, as the Rule in such cases, that the Promiser is bound in the sense in which he believes the Promisee to understand him. For this is the only Common Understanding between them.

281. It may be, that the Common Understanding of what the Promiser is to do for the Promisee, includes some suppositions which are afterwards discovered to be false: and it may be asked, if the Promise is still binding. This is the case of *Erroneous Promises*. And the answer to the question is, that the false supposition releases the Promiser, so far as it was included in the Common Understanding. Thus, a person solicits alms from you, telling you the tale of his distresses. Your purse being empty at the time, you promise to relieve him if he will call again. In the mean time, you discover that his story contained falsehood. How far are you bound by your Promise? It is plain that if the Promise was understood by both of you to be unconditional, and the delay, to take place merely on account of the state of your purse, the Promise is binding. But if the Promise was understood to be conditional on the truth of the tale, and if the falsehoods are material, the Promiser is released. Yet it must be very difficult for the Promiser to know how far his Promise is hypothetically understood. And therefore, to avoid the moral trouble which such doubts produce, it is wise in such cases to express the condition on which the Promise is given.

282. There is one circumstance respecting Promises which must be noticed. The Duty which they create, is not an absolute, but a *Relative Duty*. It is a

Duty relative to *the Promisee* only. He is the only person affected by the non-performance of the Promise. He has a Moral Claim for this performance; but he may relinquish this Claim, as he may relinquish any Right or Possession. And when he has done this, the duty of performing the promise ceases. Hence it is laid down, as a Rule of Morality respecting Promises, that *they are not binding when released by the Promisee.*

283. The principal Class of Cases of Conscience respecting Promises is, that of what are called *Unlawful Promises*; that is, Promises to do an *immoral act*; for we are not now speaking of law, but of morality.

When the immoral character of the act was known to the parties at the time, the Question of Immoral Promises is answered by recollecting what has been said (259) respecting violations of Duty. The transgressor ought to repent and amend; and as a part of his amendment, he ought not to go on with an immoral act which is begun. To Promise, and to Perform, are parts of the same connected Act. If the Performance be immoral, the Promise was so. To promise, was a transgression of Duty begun; to perform, is to complete the transgression. It is my Duty to stop in the mid course of the act, as it was my Duty not to enter upon it at first. When the question of Duty is proposed, there can be no other answer.

This applies at once to all promises to perform, or to participate in, any act of violence, injustice, fraud, or impurity. In all such cases, the Promiser, by his Promise, has rejected his moral nature; and can only resume it, by repudiating his own act. Even to do this, does not leave him blameless; for, as we have said, repentance does not obliterate past guilt; but this is necessary: this is the only way in which he can avoid the continuation and further degradation of his moral condition. He offended in the Promise; he offends again in the Performance. Whatever Temptation led him to sin, in the first part of the act; he sins against conviction, if he perform his promise, when the question has been brought before his conscience.

284. But in breaking my Promise, immoral though it be, I violate my Relative Duty to the Promisee; and the case may be one in which he denies, and even blamelessly denies, the immorality of the act promised. For instance, I have promised the less worthy Candidate for an office, that I will vote for him. I cannot expect to induce him to release me from my Promise, by representing to him his own unworthiness. Nevertheless, my relative Duty to him must give way to my absolute Duty of voting for the most worthy Candidate. But though I now do what I ought, I am not therefore blameless as to the past. The violation of a Relative Duty, is an offense against the Promisee. He has good reason to complain of me; and I have reason to feel repentance and shame, for having given him a claim upon me which I cannot satisfy. This is the unhappy consequence of making an immoral Promise.

In other cases, where the Promisee is aware that the act promised is immoral, he did wrong in accepting, as I in making, the promise. He ought to release me from the promise, not as an act of grace, but as an act of Duty. If he do not, my shame at not satisfying his claim upon me, is rightly lost in my shame at having given him such a claim.

285. When the Act promised was not immoral at the time of promising, but becomes so afterwards, it is not to be performed. For since we are asking what virtuous men would do, we are to suppose that they would not have made the promise, if they had known that performance would be immoral; and that they will release each other, now that it appears to be immoral. That the act should be lawful at the time of performance, was a part of the understanding which the promise conveyed. If a merchant promises his foreign correspondent to send him a ship-load of corn at a time appointed, and before the time arrive, the exportation of corn is forbidden by law; he is liberated from his engagement. Both parties must have understood that the promise was made, on the supposition that the act would be lawful;

and that the engagement was annulled, when it became unlawful, and therefore immoral.

286. In the case where one party sees that the performance is immoral, and the other does not, the difficulty is greater; but the Rule by which we may direct ourselves is, that the promise must be understood as a promise made between virtuous men, and involving such a conditional engagement as may morally be made: and so understood, it must be fulfilled.

Thus, if I promise to vote for an unworthy candidate, the promise was immoral, and is not to be kept, as we have said. But if I promise to vote for a candidate who, after my promise, becomes unworthy, not having been so before, am I bound? We say, No: for I promised on the supposition of his worthiness; and he, who ought to regard me as a moral man in making my promises, must have understood that this supposition was implied. But yet my refusal to fulfil my promise may give him ground to say, that it is not his worthiness, but my intentions, which have changed. And this must be a matter difficult of proof; at least to him; and therefore it will be difficult to show him that I have not violated my Relative Duty to him. The prospect of such difficulties, is a strong reason for not making promises respecting elections, in cases where the worthiness of the candidates, at the time of voting, ought alone to decide the election.

287. But there may be cases, in which an unconditional promise to vote for a candidate at an election may morally be given: and then it must be kept. There are cases in which the matter is left much to the discretion of the elector; and in such cases, though merit may determine his choice, he may fix his own time for making up his mind; and may promise when he has decided. Any candidate who offers himself after this, comes too late.

288. Or again, the Promise may imply an informal Contract; as when a person is elected to act on behalf of the Electors; or on the belief that he and they have

a common purpose. This is the case, when the Representative of a body of men is to be elected. They look out for a person whose character fits him to act for them, and they promise to vote for him. He, on the other hand, by his conduct and his professions, pledges himself to follow a course of action which they approve. Promises thus made, are not immoral. Such a mutual understanding is requisite, between the Electors and their Representatives; and can only be established, by their promising him their votes. The electors are bound to elect the fittest person; but the Candidate with whom they have come to this understanding is thereby and thenceforth the fittest. The election is like the election of an Agent; and as we have said, is rather of the nature of a Contract, than of an election on the ground of merit only.

But then, in order that this Contract may morally be made, it must be for moral purposes. Such would be an understanding between the Electors and the Candidate, that he, acting as their Representative, shall aim to preserve the Constitution, or to reform the Abuses, of the body into which he is elected. But if the understanding be, that he shall give them money in return for their votes, the Contract is an immoral one. The power of electing a Representative is in their hands for the sake of some public good; it is a violation of Duty, to turn such a power into a means of private gain (211).

289. It is sometimes made a Question, Supposing such an informal Contract immorally made, whether, when the immoral end is answered, it is a Duty to perform the rest of the Contract; for instance, if a person were elected to an office of public trust on promise of sums of money to the electors, whether, after the election, it is his duty to pay these sums. We may remark, that the question, here, is not, What he is to do as an innocent man; for by the supposition he is a guilty one; having been concerned in an immoral bargain. If the question be, What is he to do as a repentant man, convinced of his guilt, and wishing henceforth to do what is right, the answer is, that he

must pay. There is no reason why he should add, to the violation of his absolute Duty, the violation of his Relative Duty to the Promisees. If, in his repentance, he wishes not to complete an immoral transaction, he is to recollect that the immoral transaction is completed by his election. If he wish to mark his hatred of the offense, he may signify his meaning more clearly, by expressing his repentance, and paying the money, than by keeping it; which may be interpreted as adding avarice and falsehood to the violation of public Duties.

290. Promises are immoral, which contradict a former Promise, and therefore are not to be kept; but here, as in other cases, there is a violation of the Relative Duty to the promisee; and a ground for shame and repentance, so far as regards him. And here we have another warning, of the need of being cautious in making promises.

291. Promises which it is impossible to perform, are evidently not to be kept; but then, it can hardly be that such Promises can be made, without some want of due consideration and forethought on the Part of the Promiser, which gives the Promisee good ground for complaint. If the Promiser was aware of the impossibility at the time of making the promise, he is guilty of fraud; for by making the promise, he implied his belief of the possibility of performing it.

When the Promiser himself occasions the impossibility, it is a breach of promise.

292. Are Promises extorted by Fear or Violence binding? This is a question which has been much debated among Moralists. We must apply to it the Rule which we have already laid down; that the Promise, if morally made, must be kept. If I ought not to keep the Promise, I ought not to have made it. The question, therefore, will be, whether I could morally make such a Promise. And it may be remarked, that if I could not morally make the Promise, I cannot morally derive advantage from any Contract which was combined with the Promise; for to do this, is a part of the same Act, as to make the Contract. I cannot

morally derive advantage from one part of the Contract, and refuse to perform another part. If I find the Contract to have been immoral, I must undo, as far as I can, its effects; and go back, in my condition, to the state in which the Contract was made.

293. These Maxims may be applied to a case of this kind often discussed. A man falls into the power of a band of robbers, and, in fear of violence, promises them that if they will set him free, he will afterwards send them a certain sum of money. He is liberated on his promise: is he bound afterwards to send the money? According to the above considerations, if it was not immoral to make the Promise, it is a Duty to keep it. And this Rule is so obvious a one, and its application so direct, that we may wonder that any other should have been taken.

The reasons given for doubt, or for the opposite decision, are various. Thus Cicero says*, that, with robbers, we have no tie of common faith or obligation. But we shall, of course, answer, that we keep our word, not as what is due to robbers, but as what is due to ourselves, and necessary to our character of truthful men: not as what is an act of obligation to them, but an act of reverence to truth. We may add, that we can hardly say that we have no ties of common obligation with them, when we have made them a promise, and have received life and liberty as a consideration for it. We make a Contract with them, though it may be an informal one. They fulfil their part of the Contract: if we do not fulfil ours, we shall take a very strange way of exemplifying our asserted moral superiority over them.

It has also been alleged, as a reason why the Promise thus given should not be kept, that their confidence in Promises will thus greatly facilitate the perpetration of such robberies;—that in this way, such Contracts may be made the means of almost unlimited extortion†. Upon this we may remark, that it is right to regard the probable consequences of our actions; and we must

* *Off.* III. 29.

† *Paley*, B. III. c. 5.

agree, that it would be wrong to contribute to maintain a state of things in which lawless banditti levy ransoms upon peaceable citizens. But these considerations, if acted on, would prevent our making the Promise. And if, notwithstanding these considerations, we have made the promise, we must consider how far it is likely that to keep our word, rather than to break it, would make us the supporters of such a habit of extortion. Is it probable that the banditti will give up their practice, simply because their captives, liberated on such promises, do not perform them? Is it not likely that, their power remaining, such disappointments would induce them to seek some more effectual mode of extortion? Do we not, by making and adhering to such contracts, prevent their adding murder to robbery? And is not the most proper and hopeful course for suppressing such robbery, to call for, and, if required, to assist, the vigorous administration of the laws against robbers, which exist in every State. Till that can be done, may it not tend to preserve, from extreme cruelties, those who fall into the hands of the robbers, that they should have some confidence in the payment of the ransom agreed upon? Even on the balance of probable advantage, it would seem that such a promise is to be kept.

But on our principles, we should not look to these results so much as to our own moral culture. By keeping this promise, we cherish and exemplify our regard for truth. What moral quality do we cultivate by breaking it? If it be replied, that we thus cultivate a regard for consequences; we reply, that consequences, when both their existence, and their moral character, are so doubtful, are not the main objects for our regard. The consequences which take the shape of strict veracity in ourselves, and the consequent confidence of others in us, are proper objects of moral action. The consequences which take the shape of possible inconvenience produced to robbers by our own untruthfulness, are not proper objects for us to aim at.

294. It may be asked, whether, in order to avoid

thus contributing to robbers, we ought to refuse to make the promise; and whether, thus, we ought to incur violence, or even death. This is included in the general question, what we ought to do in *cases of extreme necessity*, when the adherence to the usual Rules of Duty brings with it danger of life, limb, and the like terrible consequences. And to such questions perhaps no general answer can be given. They are commonly put in this form: Whether in such cases of necessity it be *allowable* to violate Duty: and in this form, something may be said respecting them hereafter.

295. If it be said, that the Law denies the validity of such engagements, by annulling Contracts made under duress; we reply, that even the Law requires that men should not allege light fears, as reasons for the nullity of a Contract. The Law makes *Duress* nothing less than the fear of loss of life or limb; and thus shews that it expects that men will show some firmness, in refusing to be parties to illegal acts. It is true, that the law would annul a Contract made under the circumstances which we have described. It would also punish the robbers, if they were brought under its administration. But then we must recollect that Duty does not necessarily confirm the advantages to which the administration of the Law would entitle us; while Duty does necessarily confirm our obligations, and extend them, so as to give them a moral meaning. Duty interprets informal obligations, so as to make them evidence of internal principles. Duty requires the performance of promises, so as to make them evidence of a Spirit of Truthfulness.

296. Lies stand nearly on the same footing as promises; for a Lie is a violation of the general understanding among mankind, which the use of language implies, as we have already said (280). And, as has already been stated, that is a Lie which violates this mutual understanding, and nothing else. Hence the term *Lie* is not applicable, when no mutual understanding is violated. Such is the case in Parables, Fables, Tales avowedly fictitious, or notoriously so,

according to the literary habits of the time; as Novels, Dramas, Poems. A person, the most careful of his moral culture, may employ himself in such fictions. Yet there are provinces of literature in which the most rigorous attention to Truth is a Duty, as in History and Personal Narratives.

297. There are various understood *Conventions* in society, according to which, words, spoken or written under particular circumstances, have a meaning different from that which the general laws of language would give them. I have already noticed such phrases as, *I am your obedient servant*, at the foot of a letter; which, though not literally true, is not to be called a Lie. The Convention is here so established, that no one is for a moment misled by it. In the same way, if, when I wish not to be interrupted by visitors, I write upon my door, *Not at home*, and if there be a common understanding to that effect; this is no more a lie than if I were to write, *Not to be seen*.

298. But if I put the same words in the mouth of a Servant, and if the Convention be not regularly established in all classes of society, the Case is different. It is a violation of Duty in me to make the Servant tell a lie: it is an offense against his moral culture (249). He may understand the Convention to be so fully established in the class with which my intercourse lies, that the words, though not literally true, convey no false belief. In this case, he may use them, and I may direct him to use them, blamelessly. But it is my Duty to ascertain that he does thus understand the words, as a conventional form; and in order to give them this character, he should not be allowed to deviate from the form, or to add any false circumstance; as, that his master has just gone out, or the like. It is very difficult to be certain that the Servant does so completely understand this Convention, as to receive no moral harm from being made the speaker in it. In many cases he will be led to think that if he may thus tell, what appears to him a lie, for his master, he may tell one for himself.

299. The view that we have taken, of the nature

of a Lie, suggests an answer to some of the excuses sometimes offered for lies. For instance, some men tell lies in order to preserve a secret which they wish not to be known; and allege, in their justification, that the Questioner has no Right to know the truth. To such a plea we reply, that the Questioner has a Right not to be told a lie, for all men have such a Right. By answering his question at all, I give him a Right to a true answer. If I take my stand on the ground that he has no Right to an answer, I must give him no answer. I may tell him that he has no Right to an answer.

But it may be said, that to do this will in many cases be to disclose the secret which we wish to conceal. For instance, the author of an anonymous work, who wishes to remain unknown as the author, but is suspected, is asked whether he wrote the work. To refuse to reply, would be to acknowledge it. Such authors have held, that in such a case, they may deny the authorship. They urge, that the Questioner has no right to know: that the Author has a Right to remain concealed, and has no means of doing so but by such a denial. But this defense is wrong. The author has no moral Right to remain concealed at the expense of telling a Lie: that is, it is not right in him thus to protect himself. But on the other hand, he is not bound to answer. Nor need he directly refuse to do so. He may evade the question, or turn off the subject. There is nothing to prevent his saying, "How can you ask such a question?" or anything of the like kind, which may remove the expectation of an answer. If he cannot secure his object in this or some similar way, it is to be recollected that he has drawn the inconvenience upon himself, by first writing an anonymous work, and then engaging in conversation on such terms, that he cannot escape answering questions about the authorship of the work. He has no Right, moral or other, to insist that these two employments may be pursued jointly without inconvenience. Familiar conversation is a play of reciprocal insight and reciprocal

guidance of thought; and such weapons a man may very rightly use, to guard his secret. But he may not assume that it must be guarded at any rate, by means right or wrong; by declarations true or false. On the other hand, he may seek, as widely as he chooses, for some turn of conversation by which he may baffle curiosity, without violating truth. To discover such a turn, is a matter of skill, self-command, and invention. If he fail and be detected, he may receive some vexation or inconvenience; but if he succeed at the expense of truth, he receives a moral stain.

300. The like considerations apply in a case often discussed among moralists. A man is pursued by murderers who seek his life, and I conceal him. They ask me if I know where he is. Am I to say that I do not know? In this case, it is evident that I may blamelessly refuse to answer the question; but in this, as in the other case, not to answer, may be to speak plainly. I may also represent to the pursuers the wickedness of their purpose; I may call in the aid of the law. These latter courses are blameless.

But suppose that these resources fail, that the pursuers turn their fury upon me, and that they threaten to kill me, except I disclose to them the hiding-place of their victim. We have here a new case; the prospect of my own death if I do not make myself accessory to a murder, for, to give up the man to his murderers, would be to be accessory to his death. This is a Case of Necessity, and a Lie in such a Case is not to be judged of by common Rules.

301. *Lies of Necessity*, Falsehoods told for the purpose of saving one's life; or to avoid some other extreme peril, have found much sympathy among mankind. They are looked upon as at least excusable, and allowable. We must hereafter consider them among other Cases of Necessity. Lies of Necessity, told for the sake of saving a friend from some great misfortune, have met with a more decided approval, in the cases in which they are narrated. Such for instance was the falsehood told by Grotius's wife to save her husband,

when she represented the box in which he was contained as a box of theological books.

302. But when such falsehoods which thus save a friend from ruin are accompanied with some great foreseen calamity to the teller, they excite a still higher admiration, and may be termed *Heroic Lies*: as when Lucilius offers himself to the soldiers of Octavius to be killed, declaring himself to be Brutus. So far as such acts come under the Moralists's notice, they must be considered under a special head; for Heroic Virtue, as we have already said, is beyond the range of the Rules of Duty.

303. Though assertions, not literally true, may, by general Convention, cease to be Lies, we must be careful of trifling with the limits of such cases, and of too readily assuming, and acting upon, such Conventions. Carelessness in these matters, will diminish our habitual reverence for truth. Some Moralists have ranked with the cases in which Convention supersedes the general rule of truth, an Advocate asserting the justice, or his belief in the justice, of his Client's cause*. As a reason why he may do this, though he believe otherwise, it is said, that no promise to speak the truth was given, or supposed to be given. But we reply by asking; If there is no mutual understanding that he shall speak truly, to what purpose does he speak, or to what purpose do the judges hear?

By those who contend for such indulgence to Advocates, it is alleged, that the Profession of Advocate exists as an instrument for the administration of Justice in the Community; and that it is a necessary maxim of the Advocate's Profession, that he is to do all that can be done for his Client. It is urged, that the application of Laws is a matter of great complexity and difficulty: that the right administration of them in doubtful cases, is best provided for, if the arguments on each side be urged with the utmost force, and if the Judge alone decide which side is in the right; that for this purpose, each Advocate must urge all the argu-

* Paley, B. III. c. 15.

ments he can devise; and must enforce them with all the skill he can command. It is added, to justify the Advocate, that being the Advocate, he is not the Judge;—that it is not his office to determine on which side Justice is; and that therefore his duty, in his office, is not affected by his belief on this subject.

In reply to these considerations, the Moralist may grant that it is likely to answer the ends of Justice in a community, that there should exist a Profession of Advocates; ready^a to urge, with full force, the arguments on each side in doubtful cases. And if the Advocate, in his mode of pleading and exercising his profession, allows it to be understood that this is all that he undertakes to do, he does not transgress his Duties of Truth and Justice, even in pleading for a bad cause; since even for a bad cause, there may be arguments, and even good arguments. But if, in pleading, he assert his belief that his cause is just, when he believes it unjust, he offends against Truth; as any other man would do who, in like manner, made a like assertion. Nor is it conducive to the ends of justice, that every man however palpably unjust his cause be, should have such support to it.

To the argument, that the Advocate is not the Judge, and therefore, that he is not responsible for his judgment on the merits of the case; the Moralist will reply, that every man is, in an unofficial sense, by being a moral agent, a Judge of right and wrong, and an Advocate of what is right; and is, so far, bound to be just in his judgments, and sincere in his exhortations. This general character of a moral agent, he cannot put off, by putting on any professional character. Every man, when he advocates a case in which morality is concerned, has an influence upon his hearers, which arises from the belief that he shares the moral sentiments of all mankind. This influence of his supposed morality, is one of his possessions; which, like all his possessions, he is bound to use for moral ends. If he mix up his character as an Advocate, with his character as a Moral Agent, using his moral influence for the Advocate's

purpose, he acts immorally. He makes the Moral Rule subordinate to the Professional Rule. He sells to his Client, not only his skill and learning, but himself. He makes it the Supreme Object of his life to be, not a good man, but a successful Lawyer.

If it be alleged, that by allowing the difference of his professional and unprofessional character to be seen in his pleading, the Advocate will lose his influence with his hearers; the Moralist will reply, that he ought not to have an influence which arises from a false representation of himself; and that if he employ the influence of his unprofessional character, he is bound, in the use of it, to unprofessional Rules of Duty.

The Advocate must look upon his Profession, like every other endowment and possession, as an Instrument, which he must use for the purposes of Morality. To act rightly, is his proper object: to succeed as an Advocate, is a proper object, only so far as it is consistent with the former. To cultivate his Moral being, is his highest end; to cultivate his Professional eminence, is a subordinate aim.

304. But further; not only is the Advocate to cultivate and practise his profession in subordination to moral ends, and to reject its Rules where they are inconsistent with this subordination; but moreover, there belong to him moral ends which regard his Profession; namely, to make it an Institution fitted to promote Morality. He must seek, so to shape its Rules, and so to alter them if need be, that they shall be subservient to the Rules of Duty. To raise and purify the character of the Advocate's profession, so that it may answer the ends of justice, without requiring insincerity in the Advocate, is a proper aim for a good man who is a Lawyer;—a purpose on which he may well and worthily employ his efforts and his influence.

305. There are other Cases, in which the Duty of Truth may be violated by silence;—by that which we omit to say: as in selling defective wares, without notice of their faults; those faults being such as, by the uni-

versal understanding relative to such transactions, the Seller is bound to disclose. In these, as in the other cases, the Duty is, in a great measure, defined by the general understanding existing among Buyers and Sellers. In giving this Rule, we follow the guidance of the Law; which, in its decisions, recognizes such a general understanding with regard to sales. But here also Morality takes the Meaning, not the Letter of the Law, for her guide. We may apply this to a case stated by Cicero, and often since discussed by Moralists. In a time of great scarcity at Rhodes, a corn-merchant of Alexandria arrived there with a cargo of grain. The Merchant knew, what the Rhodians did not know, that a number of other vessels laden with corn were on their way to Rhodes: was he bound in conscience to communicate this fact to the buyers?

306. The universal Rule, that we may not deceive men, must apply in this case. The Moralist cannot doubt that it would be wrong for the merchant to tell any falsehood, in order to raise the price of his wares. (This even the Law forbids.) It would be plainly immoral for him to say, that he did not know that any other vessels were coming. But may he, the Seller, be silent, and allow the Buyers, ignorant of the truth which he knows, to raise the price by their mutual competition? This is a question belonging to trade in general; and must, as we have said, be answered according to the general understanding which we suppose to prevail among Buyers and Sellers. In common cases, both alike are supposed to have a regard to the prospect of an increased Supply, or an increased Scarcity. The Buyer does not depend upon the Seller, nor the Seller upon the Buyer, for this information. He who has, or thinks he has, superior information on this subject, takes advantage of it, and is understood to do so: and prices are settled by the general play of such opinions, proceeding from all sides. But, if a Seller possess information which he is not understood to have, and takes advantage of it, he violates the general understanding, and thus, is guilty of deceit. If the merchant in question

ask such an exorbitant price for his corn, as to imply that no further supply is probable, he falls under this blame. On the other hand, he is not bound to sell his corn to-day for the price to which it may fall to-morrow, when the other vessels arrive; for, as a trader, he may take advantage of the greater skill and foresight which has brought him first to the port. We cannot say that he is generally bound to reveal to the buyer any special circumstance which may affect the market-price; as for instance, the probable speedy arrival of other vessels: for to make this a part of his duty, would be to lay down a Rule which would place skill and ignorance, diligence and indolence, on an equality; and would thus destroy the essence of trade. But if the Buyer asks questions on this subject, the Seller may not tell a lie. And if the Seller is silent as to this circumstance, he takes upon himself the responsibility, as a moral agent, of making an equitable estimate of the gain to which his unsuspected superiority of knowledge entitles him. If it be said, that it is very unlikely that a trader will be content with this, when he can get more; we shall of course reply, that the question is not what a trader is likely to do, but what a good man, (*Vir bonus*, as Cicero puts the case,) ought to do.

307. Promises of Marriage often give rise to doubts and fears; for the Promise implies much;—no less than affection and general community of interests during a whole life. A person may well hesitate before giving such a promise, and having given it, may fear whether he is not engaging for more than he can perform. But on the other hand, the Promise, sincerely given, leads to its own fulfilment; for affection grows, in virtue of the confidence which such an engagement establishes between the parties; the marriage union adds new ties to those which drew them together; and the progress of a well-conducted married life makes conjugal affection continue as a habit.

But the intention of fulfilling the engagement in this sense, and the belief of a power to do so, can alone render it right to make the Promise. A Promise of

Marriage, though made, cannot morally be carried into effect, by him who does not intend thus to perform the engagement, or who despairs of doing so. If, before the Marriage takes place, he find the germ of conjugal affection wanting in his heart, the course of Duty is, to withdraw from entering upon the immoral condition of a mere external conjugal union. But still, in doing this, he violates a most serious Relative Duty to the person thus deceived. She may have to accuse him of no less an injury, than the blighted hopes and ruined happiness of her whole life. To a man of any moral feeling, or even of any natural feeling, the remorse of having done such a wrong, by the promise of affection and livelong companionship, must be intense. And his shame also must be profound: for he must be supposed to have well examined his heart before he made the promise; and if his affections be so dark to himself, or so fickle, that in spite of his self-examination, he has remained so long in error, and has been led to such a false step at last; how can he hope ever to be justified in making a like engagement with another person? A life of remorse and shame would be the proper sequel to such a fault.

The same remarks apply when the Promise is made on the other side.

308. We may notice here a Case of Conscience treated of by preceding Moralists*. A certain person in the lifetime of his wife had promised marriage to another woman if he should ever be free. The wife died, and the woman demanded performance of the promise. The man then alleged doubts whether the promise was binding, inasmuch as it was immorally given. The Question proposed has usually been, Whether the man is bound to marry the woman? But if we take the real Moral Question, Whether he *ought* to marry her? we must answer, that this does not depend on the Promise alone. If he wishes not to marry her, because he has ceased to bear her the affection which the conjugal union requires; according to what we have said, he ought not

* Paley, B. III. c. 5. I state the case as Paley states it Sanderson, from whom he professes to take it, states it differently.

to marry her. If, on the other hand, he still wishes to marry her, there is nothing in the immoral condition of the promise formerly given which need prevent it. That promise was an offense against Duty in itself, inasmuch as it implied a heart alienated from the former wife. But this does not necessarily vitiate all his succeeding dispositions to the woman to whom the promise was made. We may suppose the old promise annulled, and he may, after the first wife's death, promise the same thing without blame, and perform his promise.

309. Without there being an absolute Promise of Marriage, there are often manifest suggestions of such a common purpose, between man and woman, which lead to difficulties of the same kind. In all countries, and especially in countries in which men and women are left free, in a great measure, to choose for themselves their partners in married life, marriage is the great event of life; it is the point to which the thoughts and imaginations, the hopes and designs of the young of both sexes, constantly tend. This is still more particularly the case with women; inasmuch as their social position depends mainly upon that of the husband. Hence the manner and behaviour of young men and young women, have a frequent reference, tacit or open, to the possibility of engagements of marriage among them. Conversation, of almost any kind, may disclose features of character and disposition, by which one heart may be drawn to another; and indications of such inclination may be given, in all degrees, from the slightest to the most marked. Among such a variety of elements, it may often be doubtful how far such marks of preference, on the one side and on the other, may be equivalent to an Offer of Marriage, or to an Engagement. Nor can any general Rule be laid down; for much must depend upon the conventions of society. But we may say, in general, that Morality requires of us a most serious and reverent estimate of the marriage state; and of the union of heart, and community of moral purpose, by which the parties ought to be drawn together. Any behaviour, therefore, which, while it appears to tend to such a purpose, is

really frivolous and unmeaning, or prompted only by vanity, or love of amusement, is at variance with Duty. Such behaviour is a very unfit portion of a life which has our Moral Culture for its constant purpose; and which looks upon the prospect of marriage, and the tone of intercourse with women, as means to this end.

The above are given as Specimens only of Cases of Conscience respecting Truth; not as a complete Collection, or even as including all the more prominent classes of Cases. But the remarks made upon the above cases may serve to show the manner in which we are led, by the doctrines of Morality, to treat them; and the like Rules may be applied to other Cases.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF CASES OF NECESSITY.

310. THE discussion of Cases of Conscience, which we were pursuing in the last Chapter, led us, in several instances, to Cases of Necessity; and these, we stated that we must reserve for a separate consideration. Cases of Conscience are those in which conflicting Duties and conflicting Rules are weighed deliberately, the time and circumstances allowing of this. Cases of Necessity are those in which a man is impelled to violate Common Duties and Common Rules, by the pressure of extreme danger or fear; as when a man kills another in defense of himself or his family; or when he steals, or tells a lie, to save his life.

311. We shall first consider the Cases in which a man thus violates Common Rules under the pressure of danger *to himself*. The Law shows us that men judge such danger, when extreme, to justify the transgression of Common Rules. Thus, in the Laws of most countries, the Command, *Thou shalt not kill*, is suspended when I am attacked by a burglar or a robber;

and the Command, *Thou shalt not steal*, is suspended when I am perishing with hunger. And the common moral judgement of mankind looks with indulgence upon the transgressions of ordinary Rules in such extraordinary circumstances. The Moralist must, in like manner, allow, that there are Cases of Necessity, in which the Common Rules of Duty may be transgressed. But these Cases of Necessity must be treated with great caution.

312. In the first place, the Necessity, which is the condition of these Cases, must be very rigorously understood. It must be some such extreme peril and terrour of immediate death, or of some dreadful immediate evil, little short of death, as produces a pressure on the mind far beyond the usual course of human motives and passions. It is not every extraordinary emergency, when fear and other passions are excited somewhat beyond their usual bounds, that justifies acts which would otherwise be crimes. It is not a moderate danger, that justifies acts of violence and falsehood. The Law teaches us this, when it does not permit us to kill the diurnal housebreaker, or the flying robber; and when it requires, in order that a Contract, made under fear, shall be annulled, that the fear shall have been such as not a timid merely, but a firm man, might feel. To allow any looseness of signification in this condition of Cases of Necessity, would destroy all Morality. If not only the fear of death, but the fear of any great evil, would justify falsehood, there would be an end of the Duty of Truth. For any evil would appear great, when it was impending over us; and the Duty, being confined in its influence to cases in which there were no fears of inconvenience to overcome, would have no office left. And the same might be said of the other Duties. If it be said that fear excuses the violation of Moral Rules, because it carries us out of ourselves; we reply, that so far as fear carries us out of ourselves, it makes us cease to be moral agents; and that if we allow any ordinary fears to do this, we abandon our moral character. To be thus carried out of ourselves,

by fear and other passions such as commonly occur, is to be immoral and wicked. The precise office of Morality is, to condemn those who yield to such a necessity as this. We cannot make transgression blameless, merely by calling the Case "a Case of Necessity."

313. In excuse of transgression of Moral Rules under Constraint, it has been said, that when man's Liberty ceases, his moral agency ceases. But to make this maxim in any degree true, the notion of a Cessation of man's Liberty must be very rigorously understood. *In truth, man's Liberty, as a moral agent, never ceases, till he is moved as a piece of mere brute matter. Nothing but the man's own volition can move his muscles. No force, which other men can exert, can compel him, by physical means, to utter a word, or sign his name. It is not merely being put in close prison, and scantily fed, that can deprive man of the liberty which moral agency supposes. His liberty is not a liberty that can act only when all external obstacles and influences are removed; for in fact, that can never be. Moral Liberty shows itself, not in acting without external influences, but in acting in spite of external influences. To resist fear and danger, and still to do what we will to do, is the manifestation of our liberty. If we plead the limitation of our liberty as a reason why we are not bound by Moral Rules, we cast off such Rules altogether; for our liberty is always limited. It is not therefore by being deprived of Liberty merely, that we are placed in a Case of Necessity. Even when we are in prison, or otherwise under a constraint, we are bound by the ordinary Rules of Morality.

314. We have said, that the fear of *immediate* death constitutes a Case of Necessity. The fear of immediate death constitutes one of the most distinct and plain of such cases. The reason of fixing upon such a case, is that such a fear, in most persons, produces a paroxysm and agony of terrour and trouble which subvert the usual balance of the mind, and the usual course of thought and action. What is done under

such circumstances, may be considered as an exception to the common condition of the man's being. It has not the same bearing upon the man's moral culture as acts done in a more tranquil and deliberate manner. * In cases where the condition is so extreme, we may allow a deviation from Moral Rules, without infringing their general authority. In addition to this reason for taking the fear of *immediate* death as a prominent example of a Case of Necessity, this condition makes the danger more inevitable. It may be supposed, in general, that if the threatened death be not immediate, other means of averting that result may be found by the person threatened, besides the violations of Moral Rules, which are the alternative. If, however, a death not immediate can be presented to the mind as an *inevitable* danger, it may perhaps constitute a Case of Necessity, on the grounds above stated.

315. But though the fear of immediate, or of certain, death, as the alternative, must be allowed to constitute a Case of Necessity, so far as such Cases are to be recognized; we are not therefore to conclude that such fear liberates us from all Duties, or justifies all Acts. We do not say, generally, that a man may, without blame, tell a Lie, or violate other Duties, in order to save his life. If we were to decide thus, what would become of our moral approval of Martyrs, who incur death by their open assertion of the truth? and of our admiration of virtuous men in other cases, who perform acts of Duty, knowing that they lead to their death? Even in Cases of Necessity, the violation of Rule may not be without blame; but the blame may be mitigated, in consideration of the Necessity: or, reference being had to the circumstances of the case and of the person, the act may be even excusable and allowable.

316. We shall not attempt to define or enumerate Cases of Necessity. A consideration of the peculiar character of such cases will shew that the Moralist ought not to undertake such definition and enumeration.

In the Act which is excused as a Case of Necessity, there must be a struggle and compunction in the mind of the agent respecting the Duty violated; although the extreme urgency of the motives which act in the opposite direction, may prevail. For we are supposing the agent to be a virtuous man; and are considering what such a one may do, in a Case of Necessity. And we cannot suppose that such a man can violate the broadest Rules of Morality, without pain and trouble of mind. If we suppose a good man to be led, under the terrour of immediate death, not otherwise to be avoided, to tell a lie, or to stab the keeper of his prison; or a virtuous woman to give up her person to the lust of a man, we cannot suppose this to take place without great anguish and strong abhorrence of the acts thus committed. The intense vehemence with which man clings to life may overmaster this abhorrence; and even the best estimate which the person, at the moment, can form of the course of Duty, may direct such acts. But a person would not be virtuous who could commit them without repugnance, or look upon them with complacency. Any acquiescence in the acts, except as great though inevitable evils; any indifference with regard to the violation of the usual Rules of Morality; is at once immoral. When the act is over, there has been a dire and mortal struggle between Moral Rules and Self-preservation; and if we rejoice that we are preserved, we must still regret that, even for a moment, the general Rules of Duty were compelled to give way. We cannot look upon lying, or homicide, or being an instrument of lust, with approbation; even if, under the circumstances, we think that the acts have been, in this case, excusable. In such Cases of Necessity, we may excuse the act, but we cannot admire it. On the contrary, in such cases, our admiration is bestowed on the other side. We admire a man who suffers death, rather than tell a lie: we admire Socrates who would not escape from unjust legal bondage and death, even when he could do so without violence; we admire a

woman who suffers death rather than submit to violation. It is plain that those who act thus, conform to the law of Duty : those who, in such cases of necessity, act otherwise, may do what, in such cases, is excusable or allowable ; but the Moralist must not let them suppose that they take the course which is alone right, or eminently commendable.

317. This being the case, we must necessarily abstain from laying down any definition of the limits of Cases of Necessity ; and any Precepts for such cases. For if we were to define, beforehand, the conditions under which lying, or homicide, or submission to lust, is the proper course ; those who accepted our Rules, would, when the occasion came, take that course without the reluctance and compunction, which are essential to make an act allowable in virtue of Necessity. If we were to trace a definite boundary, beyond which the Common Rules of Morality no longer hold good ; men, in circumstances of temptation, would be looking out to see when they had passed this formal boundary, and were entitled to use the license which such a position would give. They would be inquiring at what moment they were beyond the jurisdiction of ordinary Morality ; in order that they might then disregard Moral Rules. Whereas this is not the disposition which the Moralist can approve or allow, even in Cases of Necessity. He requires, in order that he may give his approbation, or withhold his condemnation, a struggle in giving up what is commonly right ; as well as a wish to do no more than is, in uncommon cases, allowable. He cannot wish to aid any one in looking with composure upon the shock that his moral being must receive, by the emergencies of a Case of Necessity.

318. A further reason for not defining such cases, is this ; that the application of such Rules requires a calmness and fairness which cannot be looked for in a case of necessity. By the supposition of a case of necessity, the man is so thrown off his balance, that he cannot conform to the Rules of Duty in their exact and primary form. If we state these Rules in a relaxed

form. Cases of Necessity will occur, in which, from the like want of balance of mind, he will transgress even the enlarged Rule. - The Moralist cannot deliver, as a Precept, *lie not except in great emergencies*. If he were to say so, to a man, under the influence of passion, small emergencies would appear great; and thus such persons might learn to lie without compunction. The Moralist says, *lie not at all*. If an extreme emergency occurs, he grants that there are Cases of Necessity in which transgressions of Moral Rules may be excusable; and if he have to pronounce a moral sentence on the case he will take into account the circumstances of the case and of the person.

319. He will attend to the circumstances of the person, as well as of the case. For though the man who has to act in a Case of Necessity is not likely to look to the Moralist for Rules of Action; it is very likely, or rather, inevitable, that his course of action will depend upon his own previous Moral Culture. A man who, like Socrates, has cherished in his mind, for many years, a reverence for the laws, will wait his death from their operation, rather than evade them. A man who has carried the love of truth, a woman who has carried the love of chastity, to a high point, will die, rather than incur the guilt they abhor. Other persons, not so far advanced in Moral Progress, will yield to the present fear, and seek the allowable course, which, in such Cases of Necessity, may exist. The conduct, in such cases, is governed, not by Rules, but by the Operative Moral Principles which have been taken into the character so as to be the Springs of Action.

The conduct of a person in a Case of Necessity, as in any other case, must be considered with reference to his moral culture, in order that we may determine how far it is good or bad. Now in the case in which a person, whose moral culture has, up to that point been going on, violates the ordinary Rules of Duty in a Case of Necessity; his moral progress must, as we have said, receive a shock. There has been a mortal struggle between Moral Rules and Self-preservation; and Morality has

been overcome. So far, the event is a suspension or reversal of moral culture, like any other transgression. But this has not taken place in the ordinary course of the man's being: it has been at a moment of paroxysm and agony; when by the terrour of immediate death, or dreadful evil, his mind was thrown off its usual balance. This event in his moral culture, is, therefore, not to be reckoned as if it had happened at any other time. Perhaps, the struggle and the defeat of Morality, was but for a moment; and implies no real permanent depravation of the character. Perhaps, the shock, though severe, was transient. Perhaps the moral derangement was a sharp and critical disorder, brought on by special external circumstances; which, once past, does not affect the general moral health. In Cases of Necessity, when Rules have been violated, the Moralist may be willing to hope that such is the case; and in this hope, may abstain from condemning the actor, and may thus pronounce his act allowable. In delivering such a Sentence, the Moralist trusts that, as the Moral Culture has been interrupted by extraordinary circumstances, or turned into a strange channel; it will also afterwards be resumed with extraordinary zeal, and pursued with extraordinary advantage. The man who has had to take a merely allowable course, has great reason to examine his conscience and his heart, in order to see that they have received no stain or wrench; and to remove the defect, if they have. And if any more than native aid may be obtained in such a task, he has, more than others, reason to seek for it. If he do not need Repentance and Amendment after his act, at least he needs a renewed Recognition, in his heart, of the Moral Rule which he has violated.

320. We may remark, that we have spoken of cases in which the direct Rule of Duty leads to Death; as if Death were nothing more than one among many objects of human fear, although the greatest. Death is, however, also the end of our moral career, so far as this life is concerned. This consideration would not affect the merely Moral Question; which is a question con-

cerning the Course that Duty and Virtue require, *so long as life lasts*. But Religion, which presents Death to us as, not merely the end of this life, but the beginning of another, gives a new aspect to all such questions. Still, in the eye of Religion, as in the eye of Morality, Death is only one of the events of man's being; and every man's conduct with regard to this as to the other events, must be governed by the Law of Duty.

321. It appears from what has been said, that Cases of Necessity, in which the conflict is between Moral Rules and Self-preservation, are properly spoken of in the common maxim, which declares that *Necessity has no Law*; but the exception to Law amounts only to this; that transgression is allowable, provided the Necessity be extreme.

322. In the case in which moral Rules are transgressed, not for the sake of our own preservation, but in order to preserve some *other person* from great impending evil; we may have a Case of Necessity, which is also a *Conflict of Duties*: for to preserve another person from great evil, is a part of the general Duty of Benevolence; and when the person is connected with us by special relations, to do this, is involved in the Duties of the Specific Affections. Thus, when the wife of Grotius saved him by a lie; when Lucilius saved Brutus by falsely personating him; when Virginius preserved his daughter from pollution by her murder; when a man, in rescuing a neighbour from death, kills the robber who assails him; we have two Duties, placed in opposition to each other; on one side, the Duty of rescuing, from a terrible and impending evil, a husband, a friend, a daughter, a neighbour; on the other hand, the Duty of not telling a falsehood, or committing homicide.

These Cases of Conflict of Duties differ from the Cases of Conscience formerly considered, in having, as one alternative, death, or some extreme evil, immediately impending over a person whom we love; and hence, they hardly admit of a deliberate previous decision what we *ought* to do; but rather lead to some paroxysmal

act, of which we afterwards inquire whether it was *allowable*, as in other Cases of Necessity.

323. In these Cases, as in the other Cases of Necessity, the Moralist must abstain from laying down definite Rules of decision; and for the like reasons as before. To state General Rules for deciding Conflicts between opposing Duties, would have an immoral tendency. For such a procedure would necessarily seem to make light of the Duties which were thus, in a general manner, postponed to other Duties; and would tend to remove the compunction, which any Moral Rule violated, ought to occasion to the Actor. We may see these defects, in the Rules which have been proposed for such purposes. For example, it has been said by some, that the wife of Grotius and the friend of Brutus were justified in what they did, because the Duty of Truth is only a Duty to one's self; and Duties to a Husband or a Friend are of a higher order than Duties to one's self*. But the result of this Maxim would evidently be, that any Lie, however great, might be told to procure the smallest benefit to a Husband or Friend; which is a most immoral conclusion.

324. But though in such Cases of Conflict of Duties, no Moral Rules can be laid down, as of universal validity, the course taken by the Actor will depend, and ought to depend, upon his state of Moral Culture. And perhaps the best mode in which the Moralist can estimate any particular case, is to consider how the two sides of the alternative would have affected the Moral Culture and Moral Progress of the person. Thus, in the case of Grotius's wife, Conjugal Love was in Conflict with the Love of Truth. Both of these are Moral Principles, to be cultivated in our hearts, by their influence upon our actions. If the wife had neglected an opportunity which offered itself, of saving the husband from death, the shock to Conjugal Affection would have been intense; and the irremediable evil, when it had fallen upon her, must have brought with

* Eschenmayer, *Moralphilosophie*. Stuttgart, 1818. § 187. *Nothlüge*.

it a self-accusation and despair, against which the recollection of scrupulous veracity could hardly have supported her. If, on the contrary, in such extreme necessity she uttered a Falschhood; even if it had been to friends, it might have remained in her mind as an exception, without weakening the habitual reverence for Truth: but the deceit being, in fact, used towards enemies, with whom the same common understanding does not obtain, which subsists among friends, it would naturally still less be felt to be an act in which the Duty of Truth was lightly dealt with; so that there were reasons to hope, that if any wound were inflicted on the Love of Truth by the act, it might heal readily and completely.

325. But this mode of viewing the subject is not to be recommended to the person who has to act: for, besides the calm self-contemplation which it implies, and which is not conceivable under the circumstances of a Case of Necessity, it is difficult for any one, under any circumstances, to judge for himself, beforehand, in what degree any course of action will affect his moral culture*. Yet such considerations as have just been stated may lead the Moralist to look without condemnation on extreme cases, in which the duties of the affections have been preferred to the duties of truth and justice. But then, this must be understood only of Cases of Necessity, rigorously understood, that is, of death or other peril of the highest kind, incumbent upon the object of affection: for otherwise, such a Rule would destroy the duties of truth and justice altogether.

326. As we have said, in such Cases of Necessity, men will hardly, in general, look to the Rules of Moralists for the direction of their conduct. But though they may not do this, they will be determined, in their conduct on such emergencies, by their previous

* It may be observed however that in Cases of Conscience, when there is time for calm consideration, this mode of deciding what we ought to do, by inquiring what course will most promote our moral culture, will rarely fail to lead us right: for instance, it would prevent us from telling a falsehood in order to avoid disturbance to our vanity, pride, ease, or reserve.

moral culture and moral progress. A man who, acting under a momentary sense of duty, kills his daughter to preserve her purity, must have cultivated to a high degree his love of purity; and has probably not cultivated, in the same degree, his horror of homicide. Yet we can hardly blame him, in the same way as we should do, if mere Appetite or Desire had overmastered a moral Principle; for both those Principles are to be cherished in the Moral Culture of Man. If, in Cases of Necessity, the conflict of opposing Duties be decided by the energetic action of a Principle, which, though disproportioned to other Principles, is still moral, we may pronounce the act excusable; without pretending to decide that some other course might not have been selected, by a character of more even and comprehensive Moral Culture. Moreover the predominant Principle in each character, will show itself, not only by prevailing in the struggle, when the conflict is begun; but also by stimulating the invention, and suggesting a course of conduct, which, to a more indifferent mind, would not have occurred. It was the strength of conjugal affection, which suggested to Grotius's wife the device to save her husband; it was the strength of friendship, which suggested to Lucilius the thought of presenting himself as Brutus; it was the horror of shame and slavery, which inspired in the mind of Virginius, the thought of killing his daughter. A strong Moral Principle, like any other Spring of Action, shows its strength by the activity, vigour, and inventiveness which it calls out in the mind.

327. In such cases as have been described, when the course chosen implies self-devotion, or the sacrifice of strong special affections, along with great courage or fortitude, the act is often called an *Heroic Act*. Accordingly, men have described as "Heroic," the acts of Lucilius, and of Virginius; also (157) of the elder Brutus, Regulus, Socrates. Such "Heroic Acts" approach very near to those Cases of Necessity which involve Conflicting Duties. And they will be judged

by the Moralist, in nearly the same manner as such Cases. Such Heroic Acts arise from the energetic predominance of some Operative Principle, which, overpowering selfish desires and affections, doubt and fear, stimulates the mind to some act out of the common course of human action. If the Principle which thus manifests itself, be a Moral Principle, although disproportioned to other Moral Principles in the character; the Moralist may, not only pronounce the acts excusable, but may even admire them, as *Heroic Acts*; that is, as Acts out of the reach of Rule. But at the same time, it must be recollected, that the Origin of such Heroic Acts, in general, is a disproportion in the Moral Character. To aim at Heroic Virtues only, would be an extremely bad culture of ourselves. It would lead to an entire rejection of Duties; for as we have said (169), we speak of Heroic Virtues, but not of Heroic Duties.

328. Among the Cases of Necessity, there is one Class which may be specially noticed; namely, those in which, under the pressure of Necessity, the Duty of Obedience to Government is put aside—Cases of Resistance to Governors, and of Revolutions. Such cases have occurred, in the history of almost all nations; but they are usually defended, and can only be morally defended, as Cases of Necessity. Under all common circumstances, the Duty of Obedience to the Government historically established in the Community, is incumbent upon every Citizen. There may occur circumstances, in which the preservation of the Constitution of the Country, or the Welfare of the People, may make Resistance and Revolution necessary. But the Moralist must say, in such, as in other Cases of Necessity, that the Necessity must be extreme, before a violation of the Rules of Duty is allowable. All common means must be tried, all the resources of the Constitution exhausted, all other courses explored, before Resistance becomes moral. And we cannot define beforehand, at least, except in a very general way, what are those marks of necessity which thus justify Resistance to Government. The Moralist abstains from doing

this, in these, for the same reasons as in other Cases of Necessity. It would not answer the purposes of Morality, to draw lines, and mark points, to which discontented citizens might look forwards, in order to see when they had acquired the privileges of a condition free from the Rule of Obedience. We are not to class Resistance and Revolution among ordinary conditions of Society. On the contrary, they are to be looked forward to as dire calamities, whenever they come; with which the mind is never to be familiarized, any more than with any other great transgressions of Rules, which, in Cases of Necessity, may occur.

When the Case of Necessity occurs, the Necessity will be expressed in the language of historical facts and current opinions. Both the Necessity and the expression of it, will depend upon the Moral and Political Culture which the Community has attained. If, according to the historical Constitution, and actual condition of the Community, the Necessity be really extreme; and if, all Constitutional courses having been exhausted, the operation of Moral Principle in the Community has produced Resistance, and led to Revolution, the Revolution may be necessary, and even glorious. But even in this case, it is conducive to Morality that the deviation from the common Rules of the Constitution should be, and should appear to be, as small as is consistent with the object to be secured. There may be occasions, on which the Moralist may have to dwell with satisfaction upon such Revolutions; and on the heroic acts by which they were brought about; but in general, it will be his province to speak of the ordinary Rules of Duty, and of their application, rather than of the difficult and disquieting questions of Exceptions to Ordinary Rules.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF THINGS ALLOWABLE.

329. WE have been led, by our reasonings, to state that, in Cases of Necessity, certain courses of action may be declared *allowable* or *Permitted*, even though we may not be able to pronounce them absolutely right; as to tell a lie to save one's own life, or the life of a friend. There is a prevalent inclination among men to extend this notion of things which are permitted or allowable, though not rigorously right, to many other cases. It is often asked, with a latent persuasion that the Moralist cannot fail to return an affirmative answer, "Whether it be not allowable to utter a falsehood, in order to preserve an important secret:" "Whether, under very provoking circumstances, anger on our own account be not allowable:" "Whether, in deciding a question of merit, we may not allowably lean a little to a member of our own family:" "Whether, a slight occasional excess of moderation, in eating and drinking, be not allowable." These, and many questions of the like kind, are often propounded: and it may be proper to consider what reply the Moralist must make to them.

The notion of what is *allowable*, is admitted in Cases of Necessity, as expressing our acquiescence in certain actions as exceptions to General Moral Rules; so that, though the general Maxims of Morality will not authorize us to pronounce them right, our regard for the condition of human nature will not permit us to pronounce them wrong. But to extend this notion of *allowable* to Cases of common occurrence, when there is no necessity, and only such a temptation as is often arising, is to annihilate all Rule. The meaning of every Moral Rule is, that it is to be obeyed, in spite of temptation to transgress. If, professing to accept the Rule as our Rule, we still deviate from it, whenever any considerable temptation occurs, the Rule is not our Rule. It is no part of the habitual conduct of our thoughts; no part of our moral culture.

330. Further: the merely propounding such questions as the above,—Whether deviations from the Rules of Truth, and Benevolence, and Justice, and Temperance, be allowable,—of itself shows that the Moral Culture is very imperfect. It shows that the Love of Truth, of Benevolence, of Justice, of Temperance, is not established in the mind;—that the Moral Rules which express these Virtues are received as an extraneous constraint, which we would gladly escape from; not accepted as desirable means to a wisht-for end. To inquire whether, under specified circumstances, violation of Moral Rules be not *allowable*, is to show that our thoughts are seeking, not the way to conform to the Rule, but the way to evade it. To make a *Class of Allowable Things*, would be to sanction and confirm this disposition. We should place an insurmountable impediment in the way of the Moral Culture of men, if we taught them to classify actions as Good, Bad, and Allowable. For they might be led to fill their lives with Allowable actions, to the neglect of those which are Good: and it is evident that to do this, would be to remove all moral progress and all moral aim.

331. But it may be said, there must be a class of actions which are merely Allowable: those which are not either good or bad; where a person may take one course or the other without blame: as for instance, to choose Law or Medicine for his profession: to spend more or less upon his dress and table, within the limits which his fortune prescribes: to eat more or less: to study more or less; or to study one branch of literature or another. In these, and an infinite number of others, the like matters, it may be urged that it is allowable to adopt either side. Good men constantly do both the one and the other of the things, thus put as alternatives. There is no necessary character of good or bad on either side; and either side is allowable.

Upon this we remark, that if, in such alternatives, there be not on either side any necessary character of good or bad, a man is permitted by morality to choose one side or the other according to other considerations. If

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this be so, the things may be described as Things *Indifferent*, rather than as Things *Allowable*. And undoubtedly, there are, at every period of our lives, many things about us, which are, so far as we can discern, morally indifferent. We cannot see that Moral Rules are applicable to them. We cannot see that either alternative will affect our Moral Culture.

332. But we may further remark, that in many cases, in which no moral result appears at first sight, a moral result exists: and may even, by us, be discerned as probable. The choice of a profession, for instance, can hardly be a matter of indifference, in a moral point of view. We have already seen that there are wide moral questions, inseparably connected with the profession of an Advocate. Questions of the like kind might be stated, belonging to the profession of a Physician. How far either of the professions is, for each person, a moral one, must depend upon those solutions of such questions which are accepted by him. Moreover, each of these professions must, in many ways, produce a very great effect upon the moral culture of the person who exercises it. A man's profession determines the sphere and kind of his actions; and it is in the doing of these actions, that the man's moral character is to be formed. The choice of a profession, therefore, must be very far from indifferent, in its moral results, for each man.

333. But, though the choice of a profession be important in its moral bearings, it by no means follows from this, that it must be governed by any uniform Rule for all. What is good for one man, may be bad for another, according to the difference of native character and previous circumstances. The effect of a profession, as influencing the man's moral culture, will depend upon the moral culture which has taken place already. In a man's moral and intellectual progress, all the steps are connected: and his moral and intellectual Education, which has preceded his entrance upon his profession, may have made his Profession the best Sequel to his Education. We have said that, in the extraordinary exertions of moral principles, the energy of the principle

stimulates the mind to select and follow out appropriate trains of thought. The same is the case, also, in the ordinary operation of the principles by which the general course of a man's life is determined. The Operative Principles which are the strongest in his character, decide him to take one course or another; and if these Operative Principles are right Moral Principles, they will tend to continue his Moral Culture in the scheme of life to which they have impelled him. And thus, though we do not, in such cases, pretend to lay down Rules of choice which shall be applicable to all men alike; yet we see that the choice is, for each man, very far from a matter of indifference; that on the contrary, the congruity of his social position with his character, and with his moral and intellectual condition, may influence, very favourably, or very unfavourably, his moral culture throughout his life. To decide our choice in such alternatives, is one of the great offices of Prudence and Wisdom; of Prudence, if we consider the decision with reference to any object short of the highest Moral Progress: of Wisdom, if we decide so as most to further that highest object.

334. But there are other ways in which actions, at first sight seemingly indifferent, have really a character of good or bad. They may form or foster *Habits*, which are often plainly not indifferent, though the single acts may appear so. Slight changes, daily repeated, may produce an evident modification. To exaggerate a little the events of the stories which we tell in conversation; to overpoint the antithesis of our remarks; to eat or drink to the full gratification of appetite; to give way to slight impulses of impatience or anger; may, on each single occasion, appear so small a matter as to be allowable; and yet, in this way may be generated Habits of violating truth, justice, temperance and kindness, at least in some degree. And such Habits, existing in any degree, are necessarily very adverse to our moral culture. Habits are generated by successive acts; and, in their turn, produce a continuation of the acts; and every act in which we trifle with the suggestions of

truth, justice, temperance, kindness, or any other virtue, may, and more or less must, extend its consequences to the subsequent tenour of our lives. And in the same manner, acts in which we act with a strict and special regard to truth, to justice, to temperance, to kindness, in spite of minute temptations to the contrary, in matters however apparently small and unimportant, may, by the habits which they tend to form, or to uphold, be of service to us in our moral culture.

335. Acts which are thus performed, rather from a regard to their influence in the formation of habits, than from their own value, are practised as a *Discipline*. Many of the seemingly trivial acts, which make up the tissue of our common lives, require to be regarded in this view, in order that they may be duly regulated by moral considerations. The indulgence of selfish desires in small matters; ill-humour; sharp expressions; obstinacy in trifles; must be avoided; because the contrary habits,—self-denial in small matters for the sake of others; cheerful and kind words used to them; the habit of yielding to the wishes of others in trifles;—are not only manifestations of a benevolent disposition, where it does exist; but are a discipline of benevolence, by which its growth is fostered. We must avoid colouring a story in order to produce an effect; arguing for the sake of victory only; depreciating the characters and actions of men in order to show our wit and genius; because such habits are inconsistent with the disposition of an earnest and sincere love of truth and justice; and because such habits tend to make those who practise them, indifferent to truth and justice, in comparison of the gratification of vanity and pride. The opposite practices,—a strict fidelity in narration; a moderation in maintaining our opinion, even when we are confident we are right; an abstinence from speaking evil of any;—are a Discipline of truth and fairness. In like manner, the gratifications of the Table, even if they be not carried so far as to interfere immediately with moral action, by overloading the body, or clouding the mind, may interfere with our moral culture, by fostering a

habit of self-indulgence, rather than of self-denial. Rules of living, which make the satisfaction of the bodily appetites a discipline of moderation, are the proper mode of making that part of our nature subservient to our moral culture. And, as we have already said, our bodily appetites have in themselves no moral character. It is only by being thus made to contribute to our moral Discipline, that they can cease to be obstacles in the way of our moral progress.

336. In a character morally disciplined, the bodily Desires do not operate upon the actions in a direct and unmingled manner, but through the Habits. The direct operation of the desires is controlled; they are wrapt up and put out of sight, in the round of events by which the needs of the body are supplied. The more rigorous moralists have spoken of the bodily desires, as being killed, or *mortified*; and have taught that this Mortification of the Desires of the body is necessary for the full completion of our moral culture.

The Discipline, which consists in limiting or rejecting the indulgence of the Desires of the body, has been carried very far by some, with the view of mortifying such desires. With these persons, Discipline, *Askesis*, has been made a direct object; and they have adopted many practices to attain their object, which have hence been termed *Ascetic Practices*.

337. But it does not appear that this ascetic course, in which the mortification of the desires of the body is made a direct and primary object, is really well suited to the moral culture of men in general. The object of Discipline is not Discipline itself, but the unconscious Habits which Discipline generates. Discipline is not complete, till we do *spontaneously* the actions in which we have been disciplined. A man has not completed the discipline by which he learns to swim, till he can swim with no more effort, or thought than he requires to walk. An accomplished swimmer swims spontaneously, when he finds himself in the water. A man has not completed his discipline in a foreign language, till he can understand and use it without recalling

his rules of grammar ;—till, as it is often expressed, he thinks in the language. And such is the object, in this, and in other courses of bodily or mental discipline. The like is the case in our moral culture. Spontaneous, not Ascetic Virtue, is that which the Moralist desires to see among men. So far as ascetic practices may be requisite to generate habits of self-denial and self-control, they may be rightly employed : but we are not to forget that ascetic practices have, in themselves, no moral value. If they are good at all, they are good only as means to something else. Discipline is good as Discipline : but Discipline is completed, only by reaching the end of the ascetic struggle with inclination. In our moral culture, we are to aim, not at the means but at the end : not at the Ascetic Struggle, but at the *Disciplined Spontaneity*.

338. What has been said of the Discipline by which moral virtues are fostered, applies likewise to the *Discipline of the Intellect*. Many employments of the mind, apparently unimportant and indifferent, are important parts of our intellectual and moral formation. Intellectual employments, which are generally pursued for the mere pleasure of the pursuit ; favourite studies ; books of our own choice, and the like ; can hardly fail to have a great influence upon the intellectual habits, and thus may promote or impede the developement of the intellectual virtues. Studies and reading, which have in them no direct immoral tendency, may yet dissipate and distract the mind. The love of mere intellectual amusement may destroy the habit of solid thought, and interfere with those Duties of Consideration, and of acting rationally, of which we have spoken ; indulgence in the literature of mere imagination, humour, wit and the like, may destroy the love of truth ; the exclusive cultivation of the material and mathematical sciences may make the mind dull and captious in dealing with moral conceptions. Any course of intellectual employment, if allowed too much to absorb the mind, may check and pervert that balanced and complete intellectual culture, which is most conducive to the progress of the whole man.

339. Thus actions of all kinds, otherwise unimportant, become important as parts of a Discipline. Scarcely anything can be said to be indifferent, when considered with reference to the effect which it may produce upon our lives, through corporeal, intellectual, and moral habits. Every act, however slight, may be good or bad, when considered as an indication of good moral discipline, or of the want of it; as, in the eyes of those who are judges of manners, every act is an indication of good or of ill Breeding.

340. For this reason, the Moralist does not readily class any act as Indifferent; or pronounce any act Allowable, which is no more than allowable. It may be difficult, or impossible, to see the bearing of a single trifling act, on the actor's moral condition; and it would be unwise to lay down general rules for such acts. But the act may, nevertheless, have such an influence; and each man has it for a duty, to exercise a careful guidance and control over even trifling acts; recollecting how trifling Acts grow into Habits; and how important a part of a man's moral condition his Habits are. The more entirely a man's whole being is governed and directed by Moral Principles, the more does the circle of Things Indifferent narrow and dwindle. As the moral light grows stronger, everything assumes a colour of good or bad, between which he has to choose. Everything, however trivial or mean, affords aliment and occasions to virtue. And as all things thus become good or bad, nothing is merely allowable. If it be allowable, it is right; and is what must be done because it is right, not what may be done because it is allowable.

341. It is true, that thus to estimate every act, however trivial, as having a moral value from its influence upon our character, implies a clearness of view, as to the operation of such influences, which we can never fully attain to. This condition of mind, in which all acts are good or are bad, and none indifferent, is one which we may approximate to, but can never arrive at. When we have exercised all our sagacity and diligence, in determining what acts are right, and what are wrong;

there will still remain a residue, at every period of our lives, which will have the aspect of being indifferent. Nor need we be disturbed that this is so. If, habitually referring things to a moral standard, and exercising such care and thought as a serious conduct of the business of life requires, we keep our eyes open to the good and the bad of the actions which come before us, in order to choose the good and shun the bad; we carry on our moral culture, according to the stage at which we have arrived. But in order to do this, we must, at each step, ask, not what is allowable, but what is right; not what we may do, but what we ought to do. If to these questions we can obtain, on any particular subject, no definite response from our consciences, we may guide our course by the best lights of prudence which we can obtain; always recollecting, however, that our not being able to see that there is one course which we ought to take, rather than another, is an imperfection of vision, which arises from the defect of our intellectual and moral faculties; and which we may hope to see removed, when our minds are further enlightened, in a more advanced stage of our moral progress.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF IGNORANCE AND ERROUR.

342. IGNORANCE and Error are often referred to, among the causes which make Actions excusable. It will be proper to consider how far Actions which are generally wrong, are, by Ignorance and Error, rendered excusable in the Agent.

We have already spoken of Intellectual Duties; and the existence of such Duties leads to some Maxims which bear upon the question now before us. We have mentioned (§239—242) the Duty of Consideration; the Duty of acting according to Rule; and the Duty of acting rationally. We have further spoken of the Duty

of our own Intellectual Culture; and also (269) of the Duty of constantly enlightening and instructing our Conscience. These Duties cannot be neglected or omitted, without a transgression of that Duty of Moral Culture, which is our highest and most comprehensive Duty.

343. But Ignorance and Error may arise from other Causes, besides the neglect of these Intellectual Duties; for example, they may arise from our want of information, which we have not any means of obtaining; or from our receiving false information, which we have no reason to suspect of falsehood. In such cases Ignorance and Error are *unavoidable*: or, in the language sometimes used by Moralists, they are *invincible* Ignorance and *invincible* Error. They cannot be avoided or overcome by any obvious exertions of ours. We have performed, it is supposed, the Duty of Inquiry and Consideration (239) which is incumbent upon us, and still we remain in Ignorance or in Error. On this supposition, the actions which we ignorantly and erroneously perform are blameless. We have no way of avoiding or removing Ignorance or Error, but by Inquiry and Consideration. If we have done all that is in our power to free our actions from these defects; the defects may be considered as no longer belonging to us. If I purchase a horse, and have a suspicion that he has been stolen from a previous owner, I must inquire for the evidence of such a fact, and weigh it carefully. But if the result of my inquiry and deliberation is, to remove entirely the suspicion, I may blamelessly buy him, though he should afterwards be found to be a stolen horse. And in the same manner, I am blameless, if the circumstances of the sale are such as to banish suspicion; as for example, if he is sold in open market, it may be that this circumstance is, in consequence of the habits of the country, sufficient to remove the necessity of inquiry. In this case, Error, when it occurs, may be considered as unavoidable; and the erroneous action is still blameless.

344. But it is requisite, to the moral character of

the act, that we should direct ourselves by the real inward belief to which we are led, and not merely by any external result. A mere, formal inquiry, for the sake of saving appearances, or of complying with the letter of our maxims, cannot make the act moral: Such a pretended conformity to the Duty of Inquiry, is insincere and dishonest.

It will often be difficult for us to determine, whether we have been sufficiently persevering and minute in the Inquiries, which we have made, into the facts which guide our actions. When we have been deceived, and have thus been led to do what we wished to avoid, as soon as the deceit is discovered, we may perhaps wonder that we did not detect it sooner; and may regret that we did not carry our inquiry further. Thus, when I have bought a horse, and afterwards find him to have been stolen; I may regret that I did not inquire more carefully into the Seller's story. This regret includes some condemnation of the act which I have committed under the influence of the deceit, and approaches to the character of repentance. And such sentiments of self-condemnation and repentance are well founded, when we have been negligent in our inquiries. It is very difficult to know when we have done all in our power to ascertain the truth of facts; and therefore, difficult to know when we are quite free from the blame of such negligence.

Hence we are led to this Maxim; that *Unavoidable Ignorance or Errour removes the blame of the actions which it causes; but that we are to be very careful of not too easily supposing our ignorance to be unavoidable.*

345. Of course, as soon as we discover that, through ignorance or error, we have done a wrong to any one, it is our Duty to remedy the wrong. If we have bought what was stolen from him, we must restore the thing to him; and the like. Any resistance in our minds to this step, is immoral. When our ignorance ends, the excuse which it supplies to us ends. We may avoid blame, in virtue of our Ignorance or Errour, but we may not receive advantage from it. We *regret* our

Error; but if we retain the benefits of it, we shall have to *repent* of our Fault. There is dishonesty in resisting the consequences of the detection of our error; as there is dishonesty in willingly abstaining from detecting our error. •

346. When Ignorance and Error are of such a kind that they may be avoided by Inquiry and Consideration, the actions to which they give occasion are not freed from blame by the ignorance and the error. Yet Ignorance and Error, even when they are the consequence of a neglect of the Duties of Inquiry and Consideration, may exist for a time, without producing any external action which violates Moral Rules. So long as this is the case, the fault which we have committed is the *general* Neglect of that Intellectual Culture which is requisite to our moral progress. But when Ignorance and Error, thus produced, give rise to *special* violations of Moral Rules, such transgressions are not excusable on account of the Ignorance and Error. If a man remain, through Negligence, ignorant, or mistaken, as to the amount of his income, and in consequence, contract debts greater than he can pay, he is not blameless; though Ignorance and Error are the occasion of the wrong which he does to his creditors. He is culpable for not ascertaining what he could afford to spend, before he incurred his debts. If, with the same ignorance, he had not incurred such debts, he might still be blamed for Negligence in not ascertaining the conditions under which he had to act. But when his Negligence inflicts loss on other persons, it becomes a carelessness of Justice and Honesty embodied in act; and therefore a transgression of a graver kind.

347. Still, there is a difference between *Carelessness* of Justice and Honesty, and intentional *Injustice* and *Dishonesty*. Debts contracted through negligent ignorance of our income, are not so culpable as debts contracted with fraudulent intentions. In one case, the Duty of Consideration is, for the time, omitted; but it may be resumed. In the other case, the Duty of Justice or of Honesty is intentionally violated; and the Viola-

tion must be repented of. In one case, the moral progress is suspended; in the other, it is reversed. And thus, *Ignorance and Error arising from negligence, though they cannot excuse, may palliate our transgressions, by excluding intentional wrong.*

348. But besides Ignorance and Error with regard to the *Facts* on which the direction of our actions must depend; there may, also, be Ignorance and Error with regard to the *Rules* by which the moral character of actions is determined. And it may be made a Question, how far such Ignorance and Error render actions excusable, which are contrary to Moral Rules. If a man be ignorant that theft is a crime, is he guilty when he steals? If a man believe slavery to be consistent with morality, is he excusable in buying and selling men? If a man think that property is an immoral institution, is he justified in disregarding the Rights of Property in other men?

To such questions, we reply, in the first place, that a person labouring under Ignorance and Error, such as are here described;—ignorant that theft is a crime; that buying and selling men is immoral; that property is an institution necessary for moral action among men;—must be in a very imperfect state of moral culture. We have shown that, in virtue of man's moral nature, property is a necessary institution, and theft necessarily a crime; and we shall be able to show, in like manner, that buying and selling men is immoral.

These Moral Truths spring from the moral nature of man and are unfolded in an explicit form, by our moral and intellectual culture. They are virtually included in the Express Principles of Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose, which we formerly stated (162). Such general moral truths, thus derived from the Fundamental Principles of Morality, may themselves be termed *Moral Principles*. And as the denial of the express Principles of Morality implies a defect in the Operative Principles, namely, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Wisdom; so a denial of the Derivative Principles, which result from

the Fundamental Principles, also implies a defect in the same Operative Principles. A person who denies the necessity of Property, the criminality of Theft, and the like, must either be a person in whom the power and habit of intellectual deduction are feeble and confused; or he must be a person who denies the express Fundamental Principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. Denying these express Principles, he cannot possess, except in a very imperfect and obscure form, the Operative Principles which form the Cardinal Virtues of men. Hence a person who is in Ignorance and Error on such points as have been mentioned, the necessity of Property, the criminality of Theft, and the like, may be said to be *wanting in the Common Moral Principles of men.*

349. Putting off for a moment the Question how far this condition—the Want of the Common Moral Principles—may be said to excuse or exculpate actions arising from such a condition; we cannot hesitate to say that such a condition implies a low stage of moral culture. The man who is in this condition, has made a very small advance in that Moral Progress, at which, as Moral Agents, we must constantly aim. When Ignorance and Error take the form of a Want of the Common Moral Principles, they may easily suspend or reverse the Moral Progress of the Man, as much as many kinds of Transgression would do. And hence, they must produce upon the Man's Moral Being, the effects which the Suspension and Inversion of the Moral Progress does produce.

We shall not now attempt to determine what is the result of a suspended and inverted Moral Culture, when not retrieved by any subsequent progress. Perhaps Morality alone cannot decide this question; perhaps she must refer us to Religion, in order that we may learn what consequences such a final suspension and inversion of moral progress produces, upon man's destination and condition. But we must necessarily conceive thus of the result:—that the condition of the man whose moral progress is finally suspended and inverted is, in some

way, opposite to that of the virtuous man; and this, equally, whether the want of progress arise from transgression of moral principles, or the want of them. If Virtue lead to Happiness, as we have said it must (207), the Want of the Common Moral Principles must lead to an unhappy condition. The man who, wanting the Common Moral Principles, transgresses them, cannot be placed, by his Ignorance and Errour, on a like footing with the man who knows these Principles, and conforms to them in his actions. If such Ignorance and Errour be not faults, they must at least be considered as great moral misfortunes. Such Ignorance and Errour belong to a Conscience dark and erroneous; and a dark and erroneous Conscience is a great moral calamity.

350. But the general judgment of mankind regards the Want of the Common Moral Principles, not only as a Misfortune and a Calamity, but as a Fault. The man who shows this Want of Moral Principles by the declarations which he makes, incurs the disapprobation and repugnance which we give to moral wrong. We abhor a man who asserts that no affection is due from a child to a parent. We do not hear with patience men asserting that they have a Right to buy and sell their brother men as if they were cattle. We condemn, as immoral, a man who refuses to acknowledge any Duty of Kindness, or Justice, or Truth, towards other men. These are Errours which we do not hold to be innocent or excusable. We think they might have been avoided, and ought to have been avoided. Each man's Reason, and the Instruction which each man receives, in the general course of Society, might, we hold, have taught him better than this. And this, our conviction, agrees with what we have said of Intellectual Duties. We require of men that they should be rational; we have seen (241) that there is a Duty of acting rationally. And as there is a Duty of acting rationally, there is a Duty of thinking rationally; for rational thinking is a condition of rational acting. And to deny, or to be ignorant of, the Common Moral Principles of Man, is to be, to a certain extent, irrational. It is to neglect or

pervert the use of the human Reason, by which all men are capable of arriving at such Principles. And thus *Ignorance or Errour, in the form of the Want of the Common Moral Principles of Man, are blameable.*

351. Hence, as a general distinction, Moralists pronounce *Errours of Fact*, when not accompanied with negligence, to be *exculpations* of the actions which they occasion; but *Errours of Principle*, not to be *exculpations*. And in this distinction, they agree with the Jurists: who lay down these two cardinal maxims: *Ignorantia facti excusat: Ignorantia juris non excusat.* Ignorance of the Fact is an excuse; Ignorance of the Law is no excuse. A man is not criminal for not directing his actions by a Fact, which he did not know from observation or testimony; and which he could not know any other way. On the other hand, ignorance of the Law cannot be accepted by the Law as an excuse. The Law is requisite for the guidance of each citizen in his social transactions, and it is his business to make himself acquainted with it so far as it concerns him. The Law is Natural Justice, with such additional regulations, as are requisite to define its application; the Law, therefore, is requisite for each man's moral guidance. It is his duty, as well as his obligation, to guide himself by it, and, therefore, to make himself acquainted with it. And the Law, in assuming a knowledge of the actual Laws, assumes only a knowledge of that Rational Law which is the basis of Actual Laws, and of its special consequences in our own country. Such assumptions are requisite for the administration of Laws. If a man might plead ignorance of the Law, in excuse of a crime, it would be impossible to convict criminals; for men would remain wilfully ignorant of the Law, in order to avail themselves of this excuse; and even if they were not ignorant, it would be difficult, or impossible, to prove their knowledge. Hence, it is everywhere presumed that the citizen is acquainted with the Law of the State; and in like manner, it is presumed, by the Moralist, that man, as a moral being, is acquainted with the Laws to which his Moral Nature directs him: and

if he transgresses these Laws, or pleads ignorance, as his excuse, the excuse is generally not to be accepted.

352. But though the Moralist pronounces Ignorance and Errour, when they appear as the Want of common Principles, to be blamable; and rejects such a Want, when offered as an exculpation of immoral actions, because it implies a neglect or perversion of Reason; it is still proper for him to recollect, that it is by no means easy to avoid all imperfection and Confusion in the use of the Reason. It is our Duty to act and think rationally, as it is our privilege to be rational; but it is by no means easy to think in a manner perfectly rational. The original Endowments, internal Habits, and external Circumstances of men, make Ignorance and Errour, even with regard to the Common Moral Principles of men, very difficult to avoid. Few persons are able to see all that the light of Reason is capable of showing. Men may miss their way at many a point, in the path to and from the Fundamental Principles of Morality. We have been led to such Fundamental Principles (Express Principles (see 162)) by the examination of several abstract and general Conceptions. And we deduce from these Fundamental Principles, special Duties, also by means of abstract and general Conceptions. But in forming these abstract and general Conceptions, which are thus the objects of our thoughts, and the guides of our reasonings, we may perform these intellectual processes very imperfectly; and in attempting them, we may fall into confusion, ambiguity, inconsistency; and thus into Errour. Abstraction and Generalization are intellectual processes which are very inexactly and obscurely performed by most persons: and in the confusion and obscurity of the general and abstract Conceptions thus formed, there is a source of a great deal of irrationality and incoherence, which thus infuses itself into the Moral Principles held by men; even when they have not been negligent, nor intentionally perverse, in their moral reasonings. Thus, if a person maintain theft to be no crime, his Errour may arise from a very confused apprehension of that abstract conception,

the *Right* of Property; or from a very imperfect notion of that balanced *jural* Condition of Society, in which Rights are necessary. If a person deny the necessity of Property, perhaps his Error arises from some confused notion of *equality*, applied to the quantities of men's possessions, instead of the Rights of the possessors. If a man assert that buying and selling men is not immoral, his Error may arise from a very defective conception of *Humanity*, the brotherhood of man to man; as we shall afterwards endeavour to show. In these and the like cases, it may be difficult for some men to avoid those imperfect and confused notions which thus lead to Errors, that are, in themselves, contrary to Reason.

353. And this imperfection and confusion of moral notions is, in some measure, augmented and extended by the use of Moral Terms, as it prevails among men. For while many men's notions are thus defective and obscure, and on that account, as well as on others, different, under the same name; men reason as if the same Term always meant the same Conception, and thus fall into Error. Abstract and general Terms are not only marks of our Conceptions, and thus, helps to the memory in reasoning; they are also our instruments of Reasoning. Without the names of Conceptions, we cannot reason at all; and hence, if the names are applied in a confused and variable manner, we are led to false and inconsistent Principles. Principles are established and assented to, in one sense of their Terms; and then, they are applied and urged upon our assent, in another sense. And this cause may make a man inconsistent, even with himself; for we often remember and refer to Principles expressed in words, when we do not clearly retain in our minds the meaning of the Terms which they involve. This confused use of Terms, by ourselves and those around us, leads to many Moral Errors. We live in an atmosphere of Language, by which we see Moral Truths obscured and distorted. But still we must recollect, that without the use of Language, we should not be able to see Moral Truths at all; as without an atmosphere we should have no daylight.

354. Language is not only thus a source of moral obscurity and inconsistency difficult to be avoided ; but also, a source of Prejudices ; for it subjects our minds to the influences of those with whom we share the habitual use of language ; our families, our educators, our class, our nation. These Influences are Causes of Error difficult to avoid.

355. It will be well to recollect this, in order that we may abstain from applying to men, on account of the Express Principles which they assert, and which are contrary to true Moral Principles, that condemnation, which properly belongs to immoral Operative Principles. If, indeed, men carry out immoral Principles into immoral actions, we cannot be mistaken in condemning them. In that case, there must be something worthy of condemnation. But if, while they assert Principles which, in their expression, are immoral, the acts which they bring forth, as examples of their Principles, are kind, just, true, pure and orderly ; we may rather suppose that there is, not so much any distinct immorality in their Principles, as understood by themselves ; but rather some confusion in their language, or some incoherence in their generalizations.

For, though opinion leads to practice, and false opinion seems to be the first step to wrong action ; there is, in the nature of man, a very general inconsistency, which prevents this connexion from being at all certain or universal. Men who hold false general opinions, compensate an error of belief, by another error, of reasoning ; and derive, from false speculations, blameless or moral Rules of Practice. The recollection that this may be so, should temper, not the promptitude of our rejection of false opinions, but the vehemence of our condemnation of those who hold these opinions.

356. So to abstain from condemning seemingly wrong Principles, is to *tolerate* them ; and this *Duty of Toleration* is incumbent upon us, as we have just seen, in virtue of the imperfection of the human Faculties, and their general insufficiency for the task of constructing, in each man's mind, a perfect connected system of Moral

Truth. And thus, we are led to pronounce that *Ignorance and Errour, especially with regard to very general and abstract Principles, are to be tolerated.*

357. Further: Ignorance and Errour, on moral subjects, may arise, not only from the imperfection of the human Faculties, but also from external Circumstances, as Education, and the defects of the National Standard of Morality. These exert an influence upon our minds, through the use of language, as we have said (354); and in other ways. The Ignorance and Errour thus arising are not absolutely unavoidable; for every man may raise, by moral self-culture, his standard of Morality above that of his Education, or of his Nation; but they are difficult to avoid; for the very power of self-culture is affected by the Habits of youth, and by the national customs. Hence, we may consider the Ignorance and Errour, which arise from such causes, as *difficultly vincible*: and as in some measure, involuntary. Hence, such Ignorance and Errour excuse, in some degree, the transgression of Moral Rule, which they occasion. They do not remove altogether, but they diminish the blame. A youth of a savage nation, who has been bred up to look upon theft as innocent or meritorious, does not incur the same moral stain by praising an act of theft, as a boy who has been brought up amid a strict respect for property. But then, on the other hand, the moral culture of the former is very imperfect. His moral nature is very scantily unfolded, his conscience is very dark. This, as we have said, is a calamity, if it be not a fault.

358. A further reason why Ignorance and Errour, when they arise from external Causes, and are hardly avoidable, may be deemed to diminish the amount of the transgression, is, that in such cases, the moral defects of the character may often admit of remedy. The defective Moral Culture may afterwards be carried further onwards, by the help of external circumstances more favourable. A bad Education may be succeeded by a better. A low standard of Morality may be superseded by a higher, when this latter is brought before the mind.

The dark conscience may be enlightened ; and thus, the Ignorance and the Error may be in some measure removed. Hence, the interruption or inversion of the moral progress, produced or indicated by transgressions, which take place in such a condition of Ignorance or Error, are not so great, nor their remedy so hopeless, as when the transgressions proceed more entirely from the internal character, without this influence of external causes. And thus, according to what was said respecting the amount of transgressions (207), offenses, arising from such hardly avoidable Ignorance or Error, are diminished in their heinousness, by their being so occasioned.

359. Ignorance and Error may be considered under one other aspect, which it is important to attend to ; namely, when they are *wilful*, or as it is sometimes termed by Moralists, *affected*. Such would be, for instance, these cases : A man who will not examine the Title-deeds of his estate, because he fears to find that it is not his by Right : A man who will not inquire into the amount of his income, because he fears that, when he does so, he will discover the necessity of diminishing his expenses : A man who will not attend to the proofs of the immorality of a practice which he follows, for instance, slave-dealing ; A man who, really believing that negroes have human faculties, pretends to believe that they have not, in order to justify his making slaves of them : and generally, A man who either refuses to attend to the proofs of his duties, because he does not intend to perform them ; or who denies some proposition, merely because it would tend to establish the proof of such duties. Such *wilful and affected Ignorance does not*, in any degree, *excuse or exculpate* the transgressions which it accompanies. Indeed, it seems rather to aggravate them : for it adds to the moral regression which the offense implies, a perversion of the intellect, adopted with a view to a consistency in immorality.

It may be thought, perhaps, that assumed or affected Ignorance or Error should be spoken of as an Offense against Truth ; that is, against Truthfulness : and in many cases it may be so. But in moral doctrines, and especially

in those of an abstract and general kind, there is, as we have just said, room for considerable vagueness and incoherency, in the obscure region of transition from particular to general propositions: and hence, it may often be difficult to say whether or not a man really holds the opinion which he asserts. Some of those who assert property to be an immoral institution, have probably rather confused than immoral minds. Those who assert the negroes not to have human faculties, and yet make laws against their human faculties being educated, may perhaps not quite disbelieve their own assertion; though it is inconsistent with their conduct. There is room for some self-deceit on such subjects; and this may, to some extent, liberate a man from the blame of falsehood. But even if there be not falsehood, there is often, in such cases as we have described, and in many others, Ignorance and Error which may be called wilful: and such Ignorance and Error are no excuses for transgression.

360. Thus the general result of our view of this subject is, that Ignorance and Error, when unavoidable, are excuses for offenses: when difficultly vincibile, they diminish the offense; when wilful, they do not at all diminish it. We have seen, too, that on very general and abstract moral doctrines, Ignorance and Error are to be tolerated, out of regard for the imperfection of man's faculties.

CHAPTER XIX.

PROGRESSIVE STANDARDS OF MORALITY.

361. NATIONS and communities, as well as individuals, have their Standards of right and wrong, which assume the reality of a Universal Standard of right and wrong. They have not only Laws, which determine Rights and Obligations, but also current moral Precepts and Rules, which express the conceptions of Duties and Virtues. The assumed existence of a Standard of right and wrong shows itself in the sentiments which are associated with the conceptions and names of Virtues and Vices. Vices are, in all ages and countries, named only to be condemned. Violence, Fraud, Falsehood, Indecency, are objects of aversion at all times and places. There is no nation or language, which has not the means of expressing this; and none, which does not express it.

It is true, the actions, to which this aversion and condemnation are applied, are different in different ages and countries. In some countries, plunder of strangers, slavery, polygamy, have been regarded as blameless; to us, they are offenses and vices. This difference arises from the diversity of the *Definitions of Rights* in different times and places: for, as we have seen, Rights are defined by Law, and Virtues and Duties depend upon Rights. Yet the variety of Laws, in various nations, does not prevent Rights from being a necessary element of man's condition; and in like manner, the diversity of Standards of Morality does not prevent Virtue from being a necessary object of man's approval; nor hinder Conscience, which recognizes Virtue, from being a universal attribute of mankind.

362. There must be, in all cases, a great connexion between the National Laws and the National Standard of Morality. Both the one and the other express that which is deemed right. Laws are enacted, or upheld, because it is considered right that they should be so.

Actions also are approved or disapproved according as they are looked upon as right or wrong. And the consciences of individuals accommodate themselves, in a great measure, to the law. If the national law allow polygamy, or slavery, the individual commonly practises it without self-condemnation. The exhortation of the National Moralist is, in the first place, To obey the Law. The National Moral Precepts take for granted the National Laws. The national conceptions of the various relations of society, as Property, Marriage, the Family, the State, and the like, which are the basis of the Laws, are also the basis of the Morals, of the Nation.

363. But though, in every Nation, Law and Morality are connected, they are, for the most part, not identical. The difference of Law and Morality, is one which is generally understood. Law refers to definite external acts absolutely commanded or prohibited; Morality refers to internal springs of action; and as results of these, to acts of a less definite kind. The Precepts of Law are positive and absolute. The Precepts of Morality respecting actions, are *exemplary* and *relative*;—that is, they only *exemplify* the disposition from which the actions proceed; and they *refer* to the legal conditions of Society. The Precepts of Law, *Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not break thy promise*;—must be considered, in the first place, as fixed and absolute. The injunctions of Morality are to be understood as recognizing the authority of these commands; but as carrying the signification of them much further.

364. Law deals with matters external and visible, such as Objects of desire, (Things,) and Actions, and thus creates Rights. Morality has to do with matters internal and invisible; with Desires and Intentions, as well as with Laws and Rights. Desires and Intentions cannot be defined or described in any way, without some reference to Things and Actions; and therefore, cannot supply a basis of Morality independent of Law: and thus Morality, in the first place, is dependent upon Law. Rights afford the fixed points by which moral

positions are determined. Rights also supply some of the principal forces by which the moral sentiments produce their effect. Law affords a support to the frame-work of society; but Law does not suffice for the social life of man, without Morality. Law and Morality coincide in their general form and outlines; but Law is stiff and hard; Morality of a more flexible, yet more pervadingly active nature. Law is the rigid skeleton, which Morality clothes with living flesh and acting muscles. Law supplies the fixed positions, on which the Machinery of Duty can rest, so as to move the world.

365. But though Morality rests upon Law, Law is subject to the Authority of Morality: Law is the Basis of Morality, but yet Morality is the Standard of Law. Law is fixed for the moment, and Morality supposes its fixity: but Morality is a supreme and eternal Rule, which Law must recognize. Law must always attempt to conform to Morality. Thus, though the Law is, in the first instance, assumed to be fixed, and though its commands are accepted as absolute and peremptory; it is not to be considered as entirely and finally unchangeable. The commands of Law are themselves liable to be judged of, as good or bad. They, and their application in particular cases, may be morally wrong, as well as right.

The Law itself acknowledges this. It puts forward its Rules and Definitions of Rights, as not absolutely fixed and universal. They admit of exceptions in extreme cases. In many such cases, there are special moral considerations, which counteract the general Reasons of the Rule, and suspend its operation. The Law, *Thou shalt not kill*, admits of exception in cases of self-defense, burglary, and the like: the Right of Property gives way in case of necessity: and, in its general administration, the National Law either itself aspires to be the voice of Natural Justice, as the Roman Law did; or has, as in England, a jurisdiction of Equity combined with it, and proceeding by Rules of natural justice. Thus Law herself recognizes Justice, as a

Standard to which she must conform her commands, and which her definitions cannot alter.

And thus, again, as Rights are to be used as instruments of Morality by individuals, so also are they by communities. Rights are built upon Law, but Law is to be subservient to Morality. Morality sanctions Law, but Law must perpetually seek the sanction of Morality. Moral Rules at first agree with Laws; but if the Moral Rules are improved, the Laws ought to follow the improvement.

366. We must consider some of the steps by which Moral Rules are improved. We have already stated, that among these steps, is the more exact Definition of some of the Conceptions, in terms of which Moral Rules are expressed. We shall now therefore proceed to consider, with a view to such a more exact determination of their import as our subject may require, some of the Conceptions of this kind; such, for instance, as *The State, Justice, Humanity, Liberty*, and the like.

Such Conceptions, in the progress of nations, gradually become clearer and clearer among men. We may suppose that, at first, man's social and moral faculties are very imperfectly developed. His notions are mainly fastened upon objects of sense; his language refers, for the most-part, to such objects. His moral conceptions are dim and vague; and the words by which they are indicated, are employed in a loose and wavering manner. Such is usually the case with all terms of moral import, in the earliest history of a language and of a nation. As the intellectual culture of the nation proceeds, abstract words are used with more precision; and in consequence, the conceptions, designated by such words, grow clearer in men's minds. Wide and general, as well as limited and narrow terms, are employed, in expressing those moral truths upon which moral precepts rest; and by which the characters of nations are unfolded and fashioned: nor can we say to what extent this intellectual and moral progress may proceed.

367. The intellectual progress of individuals follows nearly the same course, in these respects, as that of

nations ; although the steps of the progress may succeed each other with far greater rapidity. In consequence of the influence of the opinions of past generations upon the views of the present, through the working of literature, language, institutions, and traditions, each man's mind may pass in a short time, through successive modes of thought which, in the course of history, have been slowly unfolded one out of another. The intellectual revolutions of centuries are compressed into a few years of a man's youth ; a man's moral conceptions, such as they are in our time, are affected by those of the Greeks, of the Latins, and of the earlier times of our own country ; not to speak here of the influence of Religion, greater than all the rest.

But though the intellectual progress of the individual is thus a compendium, and a very brief compendium, of the intellectual progress of man, the two careers are of the same kind ;—a constant advance from the material to the abstract ; from the particular to the general ; but, in what is abstract and general, an advance from the dim and vague to the distinct and precise. And we now proceed to trace, in several instances, what the steps of this advance have been, in order to determine what they necessarily must be, and at what point we may consider ourselves as having arrived.

368. Among these steps, one of the first is the formation of a conception of a *Person*, as something having active and conscious Will and Thought, as we ourselves have : and differing, thus, from *Things*, which are unconscious and merely passive. We have already remarked that this distinction of Persons and Things is one of the foundation-stones of man's moral nature (45).

Again ; another important fundamental step in Morals, is the recognition of Things as belonging to Persons ; to ourselves and others ; the distinction of *meum* and *tuum* (78). This relation is at first indicated only by grammatical modifications denoting possession ; such as the pronouns which have been mentioned. But Things, viewed under this aspect, are soon denoted by a general abstract Term, and are called *Property*.

Property is assigned to different persons by general

Rules, and each man's Property is his *Right*. And in like manner, other abstract Conceptions, vested as possessions in particular persons by general Rules, are Rights; as we have already said. This Conception of *Rights* is established among men, wherever there is settled and tranquil society.

Some of the succeeding steps in the progress of Moral Conceptions we must consider more in detail.

CHAPTER XX.

THE STATE.

369. IN order to proceed in a distinct manner with our reasonings, we must have a Conception of *The State*; a conception which is one of the foundations of Morality (94). By *the State*, we mean the Community, as the Source of the reality of Rights. The State implies a collection or aggregation of men: but it is not a mere Collection, like a herd of cattle, in which there are no Rights. The State implies Society: but not a voluntary association; for the State is a necessary Society: man cannot exist out of such a Society. The State implies Rulers and Government: but the Rulers and the Government are not the State: for the State may change its Rulers and its mode of Government, and yet remain the same State. The State implies Laws; but the State is not the Laws; it is the Origin and Enforcer of the Laws: it is the Being whose mind and voice the Laws are. It may be said that the State, thus understood, is a mere Abstraction: but as we have all along seen, Moral Truths cannot be expressed but by Abstractions, and human life is governed by Abstractions. Law itself is an Abstraction: Property, Power, Security, Life, the objects of human desire, are Abstractions: even Home, Food, Raiment, when we speak of them in the general way which moral reasonings require, are Abstractions. In like manner, the Family, the Tribe, are Abstractions; and the State is an extension of these

Abstractions; including in the conception, some special attributes which belong to our subject; as for instance, that already mentioned; that the State gives reality to Rights, delivers and executes the Laws.

370. This conception prevailed from an early period. In the Jewish People, indeed, the Laws were God's Laws, supported by his sanction; and the conception of the State, as the origin of Law, was, among them, not brought into clear view. But the conception of the State as the origin of Rights and Obligations, was familiar among the Greeks. "It is manifest," says Aristotle*, "that the State (*ἡ πόλις*) is one of the things which exist by nature: and that man is by nature an animal living in States (*πολιτικὸν ζῶον*, a political animal). A man belonging to no State, is less than man, or more. And thus we find in Homer, a savage man reviled as

ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνίστιος.

A Tribeless, Lawless, Homeless Wretch." (Il. ix. 62.)

He further adds, "The State exists before the family or the individual, as the body exists before the members; for if the body do not exist, the hand or the foot is not really a hand or a foot." Where, as we find by the context, he means, that the State exists before the Individual, in the order of reasoning. The Conditions of the Individual's being, are to be derived from the Conditions of the State, and not reversely.

The variety of forms of Government which prevailed among the Greek cities, and the changes of form which often succeeded each other in the same city, prevented the philosophers of that nation from confounding the State with the Governors, as was often done in long-enduring monarchies; while the strong constraint which the Laws, in many Grecian States, exercised over individual inclinations, made it unlikely that men should then view the State as a *voluntary* association; a doctrine which was adopted at a later period. That the State, notwithstanding this constraint, was an object of great reverence, not only as the Origin of Law, but the Teacher of Justice and

* *Polit.* 1. 1.

Virtue, the reader of the Greek authors of the Republican time, will recollect abundant proofs. I may mention, for the sake of example, the expostulation which Socrates, in his dialogue with Crito, makes the State address to himself, on the supposition that he had attempted to escape from prison*.

371. The Romans were, in like manner, familiar with the conception of the State, as the condition of a society in which Rights exist. In Cicero's work *De Republicâ* he says†, "Est igitur Res publica res populi: populus autem, non omnis hominum cœtus, quoquo modo congregatus; sed cœtus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus."

372. The Conception of the State became, in later times, less clear and steady. The creation and destruction of Kingdoms and States which took place between the epochs of Alexander and Augustus; the concentration of all the powers of the Roman Commonwealth in the Emperor: the separation of the Roman Empire into new kingdoms; the further subdivision of the powers of government which prevailed under the Feudal System; the nearly absolute power of Kings in most European countries;—all tended to unsettle and confuse in men's minds the Conception of the State. On the one side, men confounded the *King* with the State, and conceived that in him was the source of Law and Authority. And in opposition to this, theregrew up, in modern times, opinions in which the doctrine of the State, as the source of Rights, was rejected; and Society was represented as a mere *Concourse of Individuals*. According to this doctrine, individuals compose a State by contributing, to a common stock, the Rights which they naturally possess; sharing the aggregate of such Rights among themselves by common consent; and establishing officers, to carry their agreement into effect.

* Plato, *Crito*, §. 11.

† Lib. i. 25. The State, or the Commonwealth, is the Community: but a Community is not every assemblage of men, anyhow gathered together; but an assemblage connected by agreement respecting Rights, and common participation of Advantage.

373. This latter doctrine is quite untenable. Without the existence of a State, we have no Rights; nor can the Rights of the State be at all explained, by any aggregation of the Rights of Individuals. Has the State of England its Right to the National Territory, by summing up in itself the Rights of Individual Landholders? Or does not, rather, each Landholder derive his Right to his Property from the State? It is plain that the latter, not the former, is the case. The Right to Land is derived from the Law of *the Land*; that is the Law of the State. Independently of the Law of the Land, no man has a Right to land in England. The National Right is not the result, but the origin of the Right of individuals. And in like manner, of other National Rights. England, as a State, may make war upon France; and in the course of war, may kill Frenchmen, and seize French possessions. But an individual Englishman has no fraction of such a Right. Even if he declares that he will withdraw himself from a share in the national compact, and will act for himself, he is not allowed to do, on a small scale, what the nation does upon a large one. The Right of the State to make War, depends on its being the State; not on its being a Collection of Individuals.

374. The State is conceived as *one*; the Individuals of which it is composed being many: the State is conceived as *permanent*, while the individuals are born and die. Individuals derive, from the State, their Possessions, Privileges, and Condition, in the community; either directly, or by the State determining the Possessions, Privileges, and Condition of the Family, and the Laws of their derivation. The State, as a single permanent agent, in its proper functions, acts for the many constantly changing individuals, of which it consists. States have, with each other, intercourse of various kinds; making Treaties of Peace, Commerce, or Alliance with each other; and making War on each other, if the necessity arises. The State bounds the legal relations of the individual: the citizens of different states have no legal relations with each other, except through their States.

375. The State is, thus, the necessary Origin of all the Rights which exist within itself. It is an Authority, superior to all other Authorities; and from which they are all derived. This Supreme and Original Authority, thus residing in the State, is its *Sovereignty*. A State which is, in all its internal relations, independent of all other States, is a Sovereign State. In the monarchies of modern Europe, the Supreme Power has been conceived as vested in the Monarch; and he has been looked upon as the Origin of all other power. In such cases, the Monarch is termed the *Sovereign*: but in Republics, such as the United States of North America, no person is Sovereign. The term *Sovereign* has also been applied to the People; but a people, deprived of that organization which makes them a State, are not sovereign. They cannot exercise or impart Authority. We can with no propriety speak of the *Sovereign People* of England; except we mean the State of England; and thus include King, Lords, and Commons, in the term *People*: if *People* denote individuals, without governors and magistrates, we can with no more propriety speak of the Sovereign People of England, than of the Sovereign People of Yorkshire. If the People of Yorkshire be not sovereign, because they are under the authority of England; the People of England are not sovereign, because, by the same rule, they are under the authority of King, Lords, and Commons. If there be any established Authority, the Rule of such Authority determines where the Sovereignty resides. If we suppose all established authority annihilated, no body of men is sovereign over any individual; and each man is sovereign, with as good a Right as any other man or any collection of men.

376. If it be said that the People is really the Sovereign Authority, and the source of Rights, because it is by the common consent of the People that the Supreme Authority is conferred upon the sovereign governors of the State: we reply, that such a transfer of sovereign power to governors, by the common consent of the members of a society, has very rarely taken place;

and if in a few societies it have ever occurred, such uncommon and extraordinary events afford no grounds for the existence of Rights, in communities in which nothing of the kind has ever taken place. And in the next place, we remark, that whenever the members of a society have thus conferred supreme authority upon their governors by common consent, they have, in their actions, presupposed the existence of Rights derived from States. If a body of men, for instance, by common consent frame a government for the country in which they live; or for another country, which they have purchased, and into which they are migrating: they suppose, in the first instance, that the country is theirs as being their native land; and in the second instance, as being a purchase. But yet mere individuals alone cannot have such Property: for Property in land, as we have seen, and purchase of Land, for the like reasons, are creations of the Law.

377. Thus the Conception of a Sovereign State, as the origin and guardian of Rights, is necessary, in order that we may conceive Rights as realities. We may add, that the State is necessarily conceived as a Moral Agent; since it makes war and peace, which it may do justly or unjustly; keeps Treaties, or breaks them; educates its children, or neglects them. What are the Rules of Justice in the actions of States, we must afterwards consider: but it is plain that we must consider the State as an Agent, to whose conduct such Rules are applicable.

378. Since the State is thus a Moral Agent, we may apply to it the Rules of Duty, and the doctrines of Morality, which we have already established. The State has its Duties; Duties of Truth and Justice, as all agree; for all hold it to be the Duty of a State to observe its Treaties, to abstain from the Possessions of another State; and the like. A State has also Duties of Benevolence; To relieve its poor, to liberate its slaves, are often urged upon a State, as manifest Duties of this kind.

And, as the condition of other Duties being performed, the moral Education of its citizens, and consequently of

itself, is a Duty of the State. It is its Duty to establish in the minds of its children, and to unfold more and more into constant and progressive operation, the Moral Ideas of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order.

379. Thus Moral Progress is the Duty of States, as well as of individuals. States, like Individuals, have a continuous existence; a series of purposes and actions; a connected course of being; a *Life*. During this *Life*, it is their Duty to conform their being more and more to the Moral Ideas; and this Duty extends to all their actions, and all times of their action.

CHAPTER XXI.

JUSTICE.

380. RIGHTS are, as we have formerly said, necessary conditions of man's action as man; and the State is the necessary origin and basis of Rights: the State defines them and realizes them. But though Rights are thus, in each case, what, by the State, they are defined to be; there is yet, in men's minds, a fundamental conviction, that Rights are not arbitrary. It is conceived that there is a higher Rule, to which Rights ought to conform; that they should be, not only *ordered*, but *just*; that there are not only positive Laws, enacted by special bodies of men, but a Natural Law, depending upon the nature of man.

This conception of Natural Law, appears among the Greek Philosophers. "There are," says Aristotle*, "two kinds of Law; that which is proper to each community; and that which is common to all. For there is, as all men perceive more or less clearly, a Natural Justice and Injustice, which men in common recognize,

* *Rhet.* I. 13.

even if they have no society nor compact with each other. Thus the Antigone of Sophocles is made to say, that it was right for her, in spite of the tyrant's command, to bury her brother Polynices, as a part of a Natural Law:

“ For this is no command of yesterday,
But everliving Law, its source unknown. ”

* The Books of the Laws of Plato proceed upon the same supposition; and are an attempt to draw out, in detail, the Code of Natural Law which was thus assumed to exist.

381. This Conception of a Natural Law, derived from Reason, and universally valid for all men, was still more distinctly entertained by the Romans. This appears in Cicero's Dialogues on the Laws in several places*, and still more emphatically in a passage in the work *De Republica*†: “ Law is right Reason, congruous to Nature, pervading all minds, constant, eternal; which calls to Duty by its commands, and repels from wrong doing by its prohibitions; and to the good, does not command or forbid in vain; while the wicked are unmoved by its exhortations and warnings. This Law cannot be annulled, superseded, or overruled. No Senate, no People can loose us from it; no Jurist, no Interpreter, can explain it away. It is not one Law at Rome, another at Athens; one, at present, another at some future time; but one Law, perpetual and immutable, includes all Nations and all times‡.”

The Law, thus described by Cicero, includes Justice, as well as Law. In the notion of Natural Law, the distinction of Obligations and Duties is not recognized.

382. But it may be said that the Natural Law, thus described by Cicero, nowhere exists. The actual Law is different at Rome and at Athens, and in every

* *Legg.* I. 6; II. 4.

† *De Rep.* III. 22. quoted Lactant. *Inst.* VI. 8.

‡ I have omitted the concluding clause of the paragraph, “ Of this Law the Author and Giver is God; ” as belonging to another part of my subject.

different State. And since the Natural Law, of which we speak, cannot be the same as *all* these Codes, it cannot be the same with *any*; and is actually nothing.

The reply to this difficulty is contained in what we have already said (96, 97); That the *Conceptions* of the Fundamental Rights, which Law establishes, are necessary and universal for all men; but that the *Definitions* of these Rights are Facts, which grow out of the History of each community, and may be different in different times and places. The Fourth Book of this Work will contain a view of this Natural Law; the Laws of Rome and of England being there employed, as the exemplification, not as the necessary form, of Natural Law. We shall there see, that in many instances, the Commentators on these Laws have announced Maxims of Natural Law, as the basis of the actual Law.

383. The Roman term, *Jus*, (in its sense of a body of Laws, and of Doctrines on which Laws depend,) is especially adapted to denote this Natural Law; for it implies, at the same time, Law and Justice (90). The consistency of the Law with Justice, is assumed throughout the Roman Jurisprudence. Thus in the commencement of the Institutes we read*: "*Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi. Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum scientia, justii atque injusti cognitio.*" But Justice, thus assumed as identical with *Jus*, in its results, is a conception which requires to be more exactly defined and developed than we have yet done, before we can so apply it. This we must now attempt to do. •

384. As we have said, Law, in every form in which it exists, must involve actual Definitions, as well as the general Conception of Natural Law or Justice. These Definitions will depend upon past events. Thus, the tenure of land in each country depends upon past conquests and migrations of the races which inhabit the

* *Inst. l. 1.* Justice is the constant and perpetual intention of giving to each his own Right. Jurisprudence is the knowledge of divine and human things, (as required for that intention): the science of what is just and unjust.

country; upon many inheritances, many contracts of buying and selling, and the like, which have taken place among individuals; upon Laws which have been made, relative to such property, and such transfers; and upon various other circumstances. Justice gives to each his own; but the actual Law must define what is each person's own, according to all these circumstances. And the like may be said of all other branches of Natural Law.

385. According to our idea of Rights, as assigned by Natural Law, each person must have those Rights which it is just he should have. A person cannot have Rights which it is unjust he should have. If the actual Laws of any State give him such Rights, those Rights are unjust; and that they are so, is a reason for altering the Law, or its application. If a man has acquired a seeming Right, in violation of Justice, Natural Law rejects such Rights. According to Natural Law, *Rights cannot be founded on Injustice.*

386. On the other hand, existing Rights, in each country, as we have seen, depend upon its History: and the History of every country contains many acts of injustice. It cannot be doubted that the present Rights of Property in Land, for instance, have, in every country, been brought into being by transactions, many of which have been unjust. Shall we say that Justice requires us to deprive persons of such Rights, when any Injustice can be discovered in their origin or transmission; however remote may be the blemish, and however blameless the present holders? If an estate were acquired by fraud centuries ago, and have since been possessed, without dispute, by generations of unconscious successors; or sold to a multitude of poor and honest purchasers; shall we say that it still, in Justice, belongs to the heirs of the defrauded person; and that, according to Natural Law, the present possessors ought to restore the property to those heirs? No one, probably, would assert it to be just to destroy supposed existing Rights on such grounds as these. All would allow that Justice is, in such a case, with the Possessors.

387. Indeed, to assert the contrary, would be to make that Law of Descent, by which the heirs of the defrauded person might claim the property, paramount over all other Laws. It would be to make that Rule of inheritance absolute and indestructible, while other Rules, as for instance, *bonâ fide* purchase, prescription, and the like, are comparatively rejected. There can be no reason, in Natural Law, for erecting any one Rule of Derivation of Rights into this absolute Supremacy over all others.

388. Thus the maxim, that Rights cannot be founded in Injustice, is not to be applied in such a way as to make every past Injustice overturn present possession. Injustice is an arbitrary act, done in disregard of Rule and Reason. Justice abhors all that is arbitrary; for it requires all things to be done according to Reason, and therefore, according to Rule. But then, the Law of Inheritance is an arbitrary thing, as well as the Act of Fraud. The Law of Inheritance is quite different in different countries; and might, in this country, have been different from what it is, if the Law had so ordered it. Justice accepts, in general, the Law of Inheritance, as her Rule; yet not absolutely, as Supreme, but relatively, as a means to her end. Justice annuls, in general, the Effect of acts of Fraud; but still, not without limit in the contemplation of *Effects*; but only, so far as the condemnation of such effects is a means to her end. Justice cannot disregard the existing state of possessions, and turn her attention only to their origin. She cannot found her sentence on one particular past event, and take no account of the more recent events and the present conditions. On the contrary, it is the present with which she has especially to do. She has to pronounce upon existing Rights, as to whether they are valid or not; and she must look at them, as they exist. And hence, as a balance to our former maxim, we must lay down this: *Justice assigns Rights according to existing conditions.*

389. Thus justice rejects that which is arbitrary, alike in the past and in the present. She condemns the

perfect Equality; but in Fact, the Terms of the Contract must be regarded by Justice, because Equality is too obscure and indefinite a foundation for a just decision. And the like may be said in other cases.

391. The Steps by which the Conception of Justice has been unfolded and defined among men, have involved a recognition of both the maxims which have been stated. The Laws of all Countries annul Rights acquired in violent and illegal ways; and the Laws of all Countries allow undisturbed Possession, in the sincere belief of Right, to give, at least in some cases, and

393. What has now been said, agrees with what was said formerly (362) in speaking of the Standards of Morality; namely, that though, in general, Morality is determined by Law, the Law must be framed in accordance with Morality. Justice is directly and positively determined by Law; for a man's just Rights are those which the Law gives him. The Law must be framed in accordance with Justice; and must therefore reject all that is arbitrary and unequal, as soon as it is seen to be so. Hence the Law, in order that it may accord with

ancient fraud, from which the present possession is derived: she limits the Rule of inheritance, on which the opposing present claim is founded. She pronounces that no Right can be founded in Injustice: but she pronounces the Right of the present holders to be founded, not on the ancient Injustice, but on the recent transactions; which are free from the stain of Injustice, and by which the ancient stain may be diluted or obliterated. A thing unjustly acquired, may, by long undisturbed possession, and *bonâ fide* tenure, become a just property: and accordingly, so the Laws of States decide.

390. The opposition of the two maxims respecting Justice, which have just been stated, is a result of the universal opposition of Ideas and Facts which exists in every subject of Thought (97). In the *Idea*, Justice cannot admit of anything arbitrary; for what is arbitrary is unjust. In the *Fact*, every transaction must have in it something arbitrary, for it must depend upon external circumstances, which are not governed by our Ideas. In *Idea*, Justice would assign Property without regard to previous possession; but in *Fact*, by rejecting the regard to previous possession it ceases to be Property.

The same opposition may be remarked, in other parts of Natural Law. In *Idea*, for instance, Justice requires that all classes of men should have equal Rights: but in *Fact*, men form themselves into Classes, and by that very act make their Rights unequal. In *Idea*, men should make and perform their Contracts according to perfect Equality; but in *Fact*, the Terms of the Contract must be regarded by Justice, because Equality is too obscure and indefinite a foundation for a just decision. And the like may be said in other cases.

391. The Steps by which the Conception of Justice has been unfolded and defined among men, have involved a recognition of both the maxims which have been stated. The Laws of all Countries annul Rights acquired in violent and illegal ways; and the Laws of all Countries allow undisturbed Possession, in the sincere belief of Right, to give, at least in some cases, and

after some lapse of time, a complete Right. To all men, when the origin of existing Rights is shown to be some violent and unjust act, the Rights appear to be unjust. But when it is shown, on the other hand, that the traces of this arbitrary origin are only such as inevitably exist in all Rights, the Rights again seem just. When we consider how greatly the existing tenure of Land, in this country, depends upon the violent confiscations which took place in the Norman Conquest, the Rights of many of our landlords may appear to be unjust. But when we recollect that the Saxons, whom the Normans conquered, had themselves obtained possession of the land by a similar conquest; and that the transactions respecting property in England have, for nearly eight hundred years, assumed the validity of the Rights acquired by the Norman Conquest; we see that it would be unjust to fix our attention on that particular event, as especially vitiating Rights.

392. The remoteness of an act of violence in point of time; the complexity of the events which have succeeded it; the degree in which it has faded into oblivion; the habit of disregarding it established in the community;—all these, are circumstances which make it just to disregard the bearing of the event upon existing Rights. Every circumstance, by which the effect of a past event upon men's thoughts and actions is enfeebled, makes it less of a reality in the present condition of things; and therefore, less an element for consideration in the assignment of Rights according to justice.

393. What has now been said, agrees with what was said formerly (362) in speaking of the Standards of Morality; namely, that though, in general, Morality is determined by Law, the Law must be framed in accordance with Morality. Justice is directly and positively determined by Law; for a man's just Rights are those which the Law gives him. The Law must be framed in accordance with Justice; and must therefore reject all that is arbitrary and unequal, as soon as it is seen to be so. Hence the Law, in order that it may accord with

Justice, may be changed from time to time, in proportion as different external facts are made objects of attention. For instance, if one State, (suppose Helos,) act with great violence and cruelty towards another; (suppose Sparta;) it may be just in Sparta to punish Helos, by reducing its citizens to a condition of subjection, and depriving them of their property. But after several generations, when the transgression is fallen into oblivion, it would be unjust to make any Laws, on the ground of such transgression. When such a time has arrived, it may be just to make laws, in order to render the condition of the Helots less subject; or in order to restore to them their territory.

394. On this imaginary case, we may make one or two further remarks. It may be objected to the above statement, that it cannot be just to punish a whole State for the offense of some of its citizens; still less to continue the punishment to succeeding unoffending generations. And this is true, so far as such a remark can be applied, consistently with the nature of Punishment, and of a State. But when one State is injured by another, it must deal with the offending State as a whole; and it cannot extend its regard to individuals, in such a manner as would render impossible the punishment of injuries done by the State. If individuals have offended against a foreign State; and if the State to which they belong, refuses to punish them, or to give them up; it makes itself a party to their wrong. And when, on this ground, a penal infliction takes place, this infliction must operate alike on the offenders and their fellow-citizens; alike on those citizens who were in being at the time of the wrong, and on succeeding generations. For the State, according to the conception of it, is a collective and perpetual body (374); its condition is communicated to contemporary and to successive members of it, by their being Members. In this, there is no injustice; any more than there is in the transmission of the Possessions, or of the Rank, of a Family, to its Members, and to successive generations. Nations derive their prosperous or adverse condition

from their history, and from their transactions with other nations; and individuals, more or less, share in the prosperous or adverse condition of the nation.

395. States have not, nor can have, any way of punishing Injuries, or of asserting their Rights against other States, except War. They have no common Superior Tribunal to which they can appeal (375): and they can seek Justice in no other way. Also War would not answer its purpose, nor would it *be* War, if it did not produce some inconvenience to the vanquished State, and consequently to its citizens. Innocent citizens must be involved with the guilty, in the punishment; as the children of a guilty parent are necessarily involved in his punishment.

With regard to the seizure of the Property of the vanquished by the victorious State; it may further be remarked, that the citizens of the vanquished State derived Rights from their State; and that, therefore, they necessarily lose their Rights, when their State loses its power of maintaining Rights*.

It is not therefore necessarily unjust that there should take place, between States, acts of violence, which affect, through succeeding generations, the distribution of property and the relation of classes. The possibility of such events, is a necessary condition of the existence of States. The Actions of States, as of individuals, produce permanent consequences. If they did not do so, questions of justice and injustice respecting such actions would be of little importance.

396. But if such violent events have at some time taken place, must their consequences remain unchanged? If calamities have been inflicted by one nation upon another, even as a just punishment; does justice require these inflictions to be perpetuated without limit? If a nation have been enslaved and despoiled, even for their wrongs, may not the time come when they may be restored to freedom and property? We reply, in accordance with what has been said, that in proportion as

* Such maxims may be much mitigated in practice by International Law, as we shall see hereafter.

things, new Rights, which it would be unjust to annul. What has once happened, can never cease to have happened. In the course of a nation's history, what has been done, cannot be undone. We may do something of an opposite tendency ; and when what has been done was unjust, it is just to do something to remedy the injustice. If we are asked whether the consequences of events are to be perpetual ; we may answer, that the consequences of events *are* perpetual ; but that the consequence of a second event may counteract those of a former one. And we pronounce that such a second

the traces of the wrong are obliterated in men's minds, Justice will aim at obliterating them in their condition also. The privations and subjection of the subjugated class, so soon as they cease to be looked upon as penal, appear as arbitrary, and therefore unjust. As soon as the inequality appears as an arbitrary one, Justice requires that it shall be removed.

But then, no present inequality can be quite arbitrary, because every actual inequality depends upon the Laws and Habits by which the present is derived from the past; and such Laws and Habits are requisite, in order that there may be, between the present and the past, that connexion which the continuity of the Life of States (379) requires. The Events of History have, at every step, led to present inequalities; to a difference of high and low, rich and poor. Justice does not require that we should abolish all such distinctions; for to do this, would be to abolish Rights, the necessary conditions of Justice. What then is the course which Justice prescribes?

397. We answer, that *Justice requires us to aim constantly to remedy the inequalities which History produces.*

We do not say that Justice requires us to *restore* any previous condition which has been unjustly changed, but to *remedy* the effects of the change. For, in fact, a previous State of things never can be restored: and when a change takes place, then, after a short time has elapsed, there have grown up, under the new State of things, new Rights, which it would be unjust to annul. What has once happened, can never cease to have happened. In the course of a nation's history, what has been done, cannot be undone. We may do something of an opposite tendency; and when what has been done was unjust, it is just to do something to remedy the injustice. If we are asked whether the consequences of events are to be perpetual; we may answer, that the consequences of events *are* perpetual; but that the consequence of a second event may counteract those of a former one. And we pronounce that such a second

event ought to take place, when there exist inequalities, originating in the injustice of a former event.

398. Such remedying of Injustice is a part of the general Duty of Moral Progress, which belongs to States as well as to individuals (379). We have already said, that the Law must perpetually and slowly tend to the Idea of Justice. We now see further the import of this assertion. The Law must tend *slowly* towards Justice, because the influence of the Facts of History upon existing Rights must always be great: and it is not just to disregard this influence. The influence itself is, however, weakened by the lapse of time, and the intervention of new events. It is the Duty of men to act justly, in these new events: it is the Duty of States, to make just Laws, in reference to the new aspect which those new events give to History. And Justice, thus, and History as regulated by Duty, constantly, but slowly, mould each other.

399. Again, the Law must tend *perpetually* towards Justice, that is, its progress in that direction can never be looked upon as terminated. For the influence of the past Facts of History upon Law, though constantly wearing out, can never be quite obliterated. Even if, in all present events, men did act justly and legislate justly, still there would remain traces of the ancient order of things. For instance, the distribution of landed property at present, must always continue to depend upon the original and ancient migrations of mankind, by which each Nation became possessed of its present territory; and upon many succeeding events; some of which have been acts of Injustice. The administration of Law, and the progress of Legislation, can never obliterate the effect of these bygone arbitrary and unjust acts; while new arbitrary and unjust acts are constantly happening. Thus Law, who must constantly travel onwards towards Justice, must always have some part of her journey still to perform. Or to use another image: the pure waters of Justice are constantly poured into the mingled stream of the Law, in order to purify it; but we cannot hope to see the time

when all the impurities which the latter has collected, in its passage through the realms of History, shall have disappeared; and the clear united current shall flow on indistinguishable.

And thus both the maxims which have been stated retain their truth and validity. *Right cannot be founded on Injustice*: such is the negative maxim which serves to define the idea of Justice. *Justice assigns Rights according to existing Conditions*: such is the positive maxim which makes Justice applicable to Facts.

We have taken the exemplification of the conditions of Justice from imaginary relations between States, because in such a case there is not, as in all transactions between individuals there is, a mixture of the considerations of Law, with the question of Justice. But still Justice, as distinguished from Law, is to be considered in questions between individuals. The term employed to designate Justice in this point of view, is *Equity*.

CHAPTER XXII.

EQUITY.

400. *Equity* derives its Name from *Equality*; and in the Conception, also, is understood to imply, in some way, equal advantages assigned to the parties contemplated. In this sense, attempts have been made, at various periods, to introduce the Conception of Equity, as explanatory of, or supplementary to, the Conception of Justice. It will be found that this mode of conceiving Equity, has led to some Maxims which are worthy of notice.

Aristotle* says that Inequality is one kind of Injustice; and that Injustice is to be remedied by Equality;—by Equality of Ratios, in Distributive Justice;—by Equality of Shares, in Corrective Justice. Thus Distributive Justice makes A's share be to B's share as A's

* *Eth. Nich.* v. 2.

right is to B's right: Corrective Justice takes from A, the wrong doer, and gives to B, who is wronged. But this view of the equality which constitutes Justice is partial and fanciful: it cannot be extended to cases in general. Still, there is a notion of Equality, as a kind of Justice. Cicero says*, "Jus constat ex his partibus, Natura, Lege, Consuetudine, Judicatio, Bono et Æquo, Pacto." This expression *Bono et Æquo* was familiarly used in this sense by the Roman Lawyers. Thus Ulpian†, "Jus est Ars Boni et Æqui." And this notion of equal Justice has been carried into some detail. Thus Grotius makes Equality the Rule of Contracts‡; they require equality of knowledge; equality of liberty; and, within certain limits, equality of advantage.

401. Justice and Equity, originally conceived as identical, in the course of time were separated; for Justice, in its administration, was necessarily fixed and limited by Laws and Rules; while Equity was conceived as not so limited. And as Laws and Rules, however much meant to be just, and however carefully constructed, will yet press upon individual cases in a way which seems hard; Equity was conceived as that kind of Justice which was not thus bound by Laws and Rules, and which was disposed to relieve such hardships. The Virtue which exists in such a disposition, is termed by Aristotle§, *Ἐπιείκεια*; and he defines it to be, The Correction of the Law, where it is defective by reason of its universality. The Law, he says, is necessarily universal in its expressions: but some things cannot rightly be expressed universally. There is a defect, not in the Law, nor in the Lawgivers; but in the nature of things. And the *ἐπιεικὲς*, or *equitable*, is opposed to the *ἀκριβοδίκαιον*, or *rigidly just*. The same opposition is repeatedly recognized in the Roman Law. Thus||,

* *Ad Herenn.* II. 13. Jus consists of these portions; Natural Law, Positive Law, Custom, Decisions, Equity, Contract.

† *Dig.* I. i. 1.

‡ *B. et P.* II. XII. 8.

§ *Eth. Nich.* V. 10.

|| *Codex* III. 1. 8. It has been thought good that regard be had to Justice and Equity, rather than to strict Rights.

“Placuit in omnibus rebus præcipuam esse justitiæ æquitatisque, quam stricti juris rationem.” And in another place*, “Hæc Æquitas suggerit, etsi jure deficiamus.” And the Prætor’s judicial office was sometimes described, as if its object were to administer Equity in this sense†: “Jus Prætorium est quod Prætores introduxerunt, adjuvandi, vel supplendi, vel corrigendi juris civilis gratiâ, propter utilitatem publicam.” Similar functions have often been ascribed to the Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in England. Thus Bacon, on occasion of assuming the office of Chancellor, says‡, “Chancery is ordained to supply the Law, not to subvert the Law:” and Chancellor Finch says, that the nature of Equity is to amplify, enlarge, and add to the letter of the Law. This has sometimes been stated by saying, that Equity decides§ “de rebus quas Lex non exactè definit, sed arbitrio *boni viri* permittit.”

402. But this description of Equity is too vague to be applicable; and has not been really accepted and acted upon in the administration of Justice, either in Rome or in England. For a Justice, administered, not according to Rules, but according to the immediate aspect of each case, would be deficient in the first requisite of Justice, that of being consistent with itself. We have already said (242), that Rules are necessary in Morality, to subdue the temptations of special cases; they are especially necessary as regards Justice, to correct the delusive aspect of particular cases. To leave the decision of cases to the conscience of the Judge, however wise and good, would lead to those arbitrary decisions which Justice especially abhors. In this view, Selden’s condemnation of Equity is deserved||; “For Law we

* *Dig.* xxx. iii. 2. 5. This is suggested by Equity, although Law fails us.

† *Dig.* i. 1. 7. Prætors’ Law is that which the Prætors have introduced, for the public good, for the sake of helping out, supplementing, and correcting the Civil Law.

‡ Bacon’s Works, iv. 488.

§ *Grot. De Æquitate.* Concerning things which the Law does not exactly define, but leaves to the discretion of a good man.

|| *Table Talk.*

have a measure, and we know what to trust to. Equity is according to the Conscience of him who is Chancellor; and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure of the Chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would this be!" Since Morality is governed by fixed Rules, Equity, which is a part of Morality, must also have its fixed Rules. And as the Rules of Law are the foundations of Justice, the Rules of Equity cannot be in general inconsistent with those of Law.

403. Accordingly, the Prætor's power did not extend to the overthrow or disregard of the written Law. When the Law was applicable, the Prætor was to stand by it*; and we find such remarks as this†: "Quod quidem perquam durum est; sed ita lex scripta est." Nor does a Court of Equity in England decide differently from a Court of Law, except in cases which involve circumstances to which a Court of Law cannot advert. Equity, as we have said, has its Maxims; and one of the first of these Maxims is‡, *Æquitas sequitur Legem*; Equity follows the Law.

404. Nor does Jurisprudential Equity fill up the measure of the description of Moral Equity, that it *abates the rigour of the Law*. Blackstone has shown how far this is from being a description of the Equity of English Courts. No such power of abating the rigour of Law, he says, is contended for by the Court of Chancery§. The Law is rigorous, which declares that land which a man bequeaths to a legatee shall not, after his death, be liable to simple contract debts, even if the debt be for money employed in purchasing this very land. The Law is rigorous which commands that the father shall never immediately succeed as heir to the land of the son: yet in these cases, a Court of Equity can give no relief. Jurisprudential Equity, therefore, does not extend to cases of legal hardship in general.

* Story, *Commentaries on Equity*, p. 6.

† *Dig.* XL. ix. 12. 1. This is very hard: but this is the written law.

‡ Story, *Eq.*

§ *Comm.* III. 430.

405. In a certain sense, however, and to a certain extent, Equity does supply defects in the Law. Equity, as a branch of Jurisprudence, must, like all branches of Jurisprudence, act by definite Procèsses, and according to fixed Rules. But the Processes and the Rules of Equity Jurisprudence, came into being, at first, as remedies to the defects of Law: and though, by being reduced to a fixed form and settled maxims, they can no longer be appealed to as remedies for all hardships and defects of Law, they have still a remedial and suppletory character.

This agrees with the account which the best authorities give of the origin of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in England. In the Common or traditional Law of England, the process of an action began by certain writs or documents of prescribed form, which were issued from the King's Chancery, on application made there; and which brought the action into the Courts of Common Law. The Chancellor, therefore, (according to Lord Hardwicke,) when any petition for such a writ was referred to him, was the most proper judge, whether such a writ could be framed and issued, as might furnish an adequate relief to the party; and if he found the Common Law remedies deficient, he might proceed according to the extraordinary power committed to him by the reference*; "Ne Curia Regis deficeret in justitiâ exercendâ." Thus the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction by the Chancellor, arose from his being the Officer to whom applications were made, for writs on which no ground actions at the Common Law. Where that Law afforded no remedy, he was led to extend a discretionary remedy; and thus, the forum of Common Law and the forum of Equity were separated in England †.

406. It is not necessary to prosecute further our account of *Jurisprudential* Equity; since our business is rather with *Moral* Equity. And by tracing the course of the development of this Conception, as we

* Lest the King's Court should be deficient in administering justice.

† Story, *Eq.* 44.

have now stated it, we are able to give a connected account of this moral quality. We may accept, as a starting point, Aristotle's Definition: *Equity is a Correction of Law where it is defective by reason of its universality.* But Equity itself must proceed by fixed Laws, otherwise it would be defective in consistency. As the Rules of Equity thus become fixed, Equity ceases to be able to correct all the defects of Law; and becomes itself, as Law was at first, an imperfect expression of Justice; and thus we have, in the notion of Equity, a recognition of two Maxims to a certain extent opposite to each other; that *Fixed Rules are requisite for the expression of Justice*; and that *No Fixed Rules can so completely express Justice, but that the conception of Justice will, in some particular cases, seem to require exceptions to the Rules.*

407. The administration of Equity has led to the currency of many Maxims, which may be considered Maxims of Moral, as well as Jurisprudential Equity; since their acceptance in the Courts of Law has been due to their presumed agreement with Justice. We may notice some of these Maxims; not as being always universally true, or free from doubt and difficulty in their application; but as bringing forwards some of the points on which Equity must principally depend; and as showing, by examples, the kind of *Equality* in which it consists. Among such maxims are the following.

408. *Æquitas sequitur Legem*; "Equity follows the Law." And this may be understood in two senses; either that Equity is based upon the Relations which the Law establishes; or that Equity follows the Analogy of the Law. We have already said, that Justice assumes the Definitions of Rights which Law gives. Hence Equity supposes *that* to be a man's Property, that to be a Marriage, that to be a Contract, which the Law makes such. Yet if there be merely some formal defect in a contract, moral Equity will still hold it valid. Again, Equity follows the Analogy of Law; thus in England, where the Law gives the whole landed property

to the eldest son; that would not be an equitable decision which should divide the property amongst the children equally.

409. *In equali jure melior est conditio possidentis*; "Where Rights are equal, Possession is a ground of preference." As if two persons have been equally innocent and equally diligent, the one in trying to recover a property lost by fraud; the other in transacting a *bonâ fide* purchase of the property; he who is in possession is preferred.

But there are other maxims, which throw the task of judging of deficiencies in the property on one side especially: for instance, in matters which are apparent on due examination, the Rule is *Caveat emptor*, Let the buyer take care of himself.

410. *Qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commodum*; *qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus*; "He who bears the burthen ought to receive the profit; he who reaps the profit ought to bear the burthen." Thus, if a man, dying, leaves his wife pregnant, so that it is uncertain who will be heir to his lands; if the next presumptive heir, in the mean time, sow the land, it is equitable that the harvest also shall be his. And on the other hand, they who enjoy the benefit of any improvement of land arising from public works; as, for instance, from a general drainage; ought to contribute to the expense of the works.

411. There are other maxims which refer to the general responsibility of actions, as for instance, *Necessitas non habet legem*; "Necessity has no law;" which we have referred to in speaking of cases of necessity (321). And again: *Qui facit per alium facit per se*; "What a man does through the agency of others is his act." Others refer to the mode of interpreting Laws or Contracts, and administering Justice: as, *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*; "The mention of one person is the exclusion of another." *Nemo debet esse jules in propriâ causâ*; "A man is not to be judge in his own cause." All these maxims may be looked upon as

indications and fragments of a supposed Natural Law ; which can never be expressed except by indications and fragments ; since, as we have said, no Rules can express Equity, so as not to require exceptions.

412. Other indications of the assumed existence of a Natural Law, the necessary result of Justice and Equity, may be traced in expressions, which are often used in moral and political discussions. Thus, we hear of the *Natural Rights* of man ; and as examples of these, of the *Right to Subsistence*, the *Right to Freedom*, and the like. In speaking of these Rights as *Natural*, it is not meant that they are universally recognized by the Laws of States. In truth, Rights of the citizens to Subsistence and to Freedom, are so far limited and modified by the Laws of most States, that they can hardly be said to exist as *general Rights*. By speaking of such *Rights*, and describing them as the dictates of *Natural Justice*, as is often done, it is meant that the Laws *ought* to recognize and establish them. But something more than this seems to be meant, by speaking of the *Natural Right* to Subsistence, and the like ; for to say that such a Right is what the Law *ought* to establish, is merely to class the recognition of this Right with all the other prudential improvements, of which the Laws of any State are susceptible. The Laws *ought* to aim at securing the Purity and Rationality, as well as the Subsistence, of the people. By speaking of the Claim of men to Subsistence as a *Right*, it appears to be meant that it is not only conformable to the Duty of States, in the general sense in which it is their Duty to make their laws constantly better ; but that it is conformable to Justice in some more special sense, in which Justice is expressed by definite and universal Principles.

413. Yet the Principles of Justice which have been propounded as the basis of the Natural Rights of Men, are such as it is difficult to establish, in a definite and universal form. It has, for instance, been said, that *All men are born equal*. But it is evident that this is not true as a fact. For not only are children, for a long time after birth, necessarily in the power of

parents and others; but the external conditions of the society in which a man is born, as the laws of property and the like, determine his relation to other men, during life. If it be said that these are extraneous and accidental circumstances, not born with the man; we answer, that if we reject from our consideration, as extraneous and accidental, all such conditions, there remains nothing which we can call intrinsic and necessary, but the material conditions of man's existence; and if we were to adopt this view, the principle might more properly be stated, *All men are equally born*. The relations of Family, Property, and the like, are as essential to man's moral being, as Language, without which his mind cannot be unfolded to the apprehension of Rules, and the distinction of right and wrong. If therefore our assumed equality rejects the former circumstances, it must reject the latter.

414. But though in Fact men are not born equal, they are all born with a capacity for being moral agents: and this Idea is the basis of all Morality. And we may lay it down as a universal Principle, from which we may hereafter reason, that *All men are moral beings*.

This Principle may be perhaps considered as rather a Principle of Humanity, than a Principle of Justice. For this, and any other Principle from which we derive the claims of men to Subsistence, Freedom, &c., must involve a recognition of that Common Human Nature, by which all mankind are bound together. We shall therefore treat of such Rights in treating of the Conception of Humanity.

CHAPTER XXIII.

HUMANITY.

415. It has already been stated, that a universal Benevolence towards all men, as partakers of the same Common Human Nature with ourselves, is a part of the Supreme Law of human being. But the lapse of time, the growth of institutions, and the development of man's moral nature, are requisite to bring this affection into its due prominence. The affections of men, in a rude condition, are confined within narrower limits; and have, for their main or sole objects, the persons who are bound to them by especial ties. The family affections which connect parent and child, husband and wife, brothers and sisters, have their force in every form of human society. The sympathies which bind together a kindred in a wider sense, the feelings of clanship, are powerful, in communities in which a more comprehensive kind of benevolence is unfelt. In rude and half-savage tribes, in which clansmen assist each other with unbounded zeal, the stranger is looked upon as naturally an object of enmity. The historians of Greece and Rome notice indications of this having been the early condition of man's feelings in those countries. But the progress of the culture of those nations led to a more moral state of the affections. The Greeks had a name for the Love of man as man. This affection they termed *φιλανθρωπία*, and reckoned it a virtue. Aristotle expresses this* by saying that all men have a feeling of kindred and good-will to all. And the Stoics called this tie of general good-will by a name borrowed from the word which Aristotle here uses (*οικείωσις*), as *kindness* is connected with the word *kin*. The Romans in like manner, though at first they had but one word to designate a stranger and an enemy (*hostis*), came to be sensible of the universal bond of good-will which unites

* *Anth. Eth. Nich.* VIII. 1. ὡς οικεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον.

man to man. They received with applause the verse of Terence :

Homo sum : humani nihil a me alienum puto.

A man am I, and feel for all mankind.

And their philosophers followed the Greeks, in assuming the common social feeling of mankind as one of the foundations of their morality. Thus Cicero adopts, what he calls the *Formula* of the Stoics* : “Detrahere aliquid alicui, et hominem hominis incommodo suum augere commodum, magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam cætera quæ possunt aut corpori accidere, aut rebus externis ; nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem.” In the same strain Seneca says †, “Societatem tolle, et unitatem generis humani quâ vita continetur, scindes.”

416. The Roman conception, of a Law, identical with Natural Law, and yet the benefits of which were the peculiar privilege of Roman citizens, for a time impeded the application of such maxims ; for men who had no right to justice, could have little claim to kindness. The current conception of a true marriage, as being limited to the union of Roman citizens, and of domestic slavery as being a part of the order of society, were circumstances unfavourable to the development of a benevolence equally embracing all men. But these circumstances gradually lost their hold on men's minds. The distinction of Roman and Provincial marriages faded away ; and there grew up a feeling of horror towards the cruelty which slavery involved. We find a recognition of this view in the Roman Lawyers. Thus Ulpian says ‡, “Manumissio a jure gentium origi-

* *Off.* III. 5. For a man to abstract anything from another man, and to increase his own comfort by the discomfort of another, is more against Nature, than death, than poverty, than any other thing which can happen, either to his body or to his external havings. For in the first place it takes away human society and community of life.

† *De Benef.* IV. 18. Take away society, and you rend asunder the unity of the human race in which our life is bound up.

‡ *Dig.* I. I. 4. Manumission of Slaves had its origin not in

nem sumsit, utpote quum jure naturali omnes liberi nascerentur, nec esset nota manumissio, quum servitus esset incognita. Sed posteaquam jure gentium servitus invasit, secutum est beneficium manumissionis; ut quum uno naturali nomine homines appellarentur, jure gentium tria genera esse cœperunt, liberi, et his contrarium servi, et tertium genus, liberti, id est, qui desierant esse servi." And with regard to marriage, the Roman lawyers sometimes appear to incline to extend the notion of "it even to Brute animals*. "Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam jus istud non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium quæ in terra, quæ in mari nascuntur, avium quoque, commune est. Hinc descendit maris et fœminæ conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio: videmus enim cætera quoque animalia, feras etiam, istius juris peritiâ censi." Attempts such as this, to extend the meaning of *Jus*, in any sense, to brute animals, can only perplex the subject. The word *Rights* has no meaning, as applied to animals, which cannot understand the word. Our Rights and our Obligations are necessarily limited by the limits of human nature. They all spring out of the recognition of our common Humanity. Our duties with regard to brute animals depend upon no mutual Rights; but upon the Duty of Self-culture; to which our treatment of them, like our other actions, must be made sub-

natural but in positive Law. For by the Law of nature all are born free, and when there was no slavery there could be no manumission. But when by the positive Law of nations, slavery was introduced; the relief from this infliction by manumission was also introduced. And thus men, who by nature were all alike men, were divided into three kinds, freemen, slaves, and freed men who had been slaves.

* *Dig. 1. i. 1.* Natural Law is that which nature teaches all animals: such Law is not peculiar to the human race, but common also to beasts, fishes, and birds. Hence arises the union of male and female which we call marriage, hence the procreation and nurture of children; for we see that brutes, and even wild beasts, are acquainted with the Natural Law which regulates such matters.

servient. Animals offer to us images of some of the lower parts of our nature; but except so far as these elements are directed and governed by the higher elements, they are not subjects of moral consideration. As far as the limits of humanity extend, however, there are mutual ties of Duty which bind together all men; and as the basis of all others, a Duty of Mutual Kindness; which, as we see, is acknowledged by the Jurists, as well as by the Moralists, of Rome, in spite of the originally narrow basis of their Jurisprudence.

417. The progress of the Conception of *Humanity*, as a universal bond which knits together the whole human race, and makes kindness to every member of it a Duty, was immeasurably promoted by the teaching and influence of Christianity. In the course of time, domestic slavery was abolished; and marriage received the sanction of the Church, and was alike honourable in all. The antipathies of nations, the jealousies of classes, the selfishness, fierceness, and coldness of men's hearts; the narrowness and dimness of their understandings, have prevented their receiving cordially and fully, the comprehensive precepts of benevolence which Christianity delivers; but as these obstacles have been more and more overcome, the doctrine has been more and more assented to, and felt to be true, by all persons of moral culture; that there is a Duty of Universal Benevolence which we are to bear to all men *as men*; and which we are to fulfil, by dealing with them as men; as beings having the like affections and reason, rights and claims, which we ourselves have.

418. This conception of *Humanity*, as a Principle within us, requiring us to recognize in others the same Rights which we claim for ourselves, may be further illustrated. Such a principle of *Humanity*, requiring us to recognize men as men, requires us more especially to recognize them as such, in their capacity of moral agents. They have not only like desires and affections with ourselves; but also, like faculties of Reason and Self-guidance; by which they discern the difference of

right and wrong, and feel the duty of doing the right, and abstaining from the wrong. This view of their condition, as Moral Agents, is that by which we most entirely sympathize with them; as it is the view of our own condition, in which we are fully conscious of ourselves. Humanity requires that we should feel satisfaction in the desires and means of enjoyment of our fellow-men; but Humanity requires, still more clearly, that we should feel a satisfaction in their having the desires and the means of doing their Duty. Now the fundamental Rights of which we have so often spoken, the Rights of the Person, of Property, and the like, are means, and necessary conditions, of Duty. It is necessary to moral action, that the agent should be free, not liable to unlimited and unregulated constraint and violence; that is, that he should have Rights of the Person. It is necessary to moral action, that the agent should have some command over external things; for this is implied in action; that is, it is necessary that he should have Rights of Property. And in like manner, in order that any class of persons may exist permanently in a community, as moral agents, it is requisite that they should possess the Right of Marriage; for without that Right, some of the strongest of man's desires cannot be under moral control; nor can the sentiment of Rights be transmitted from one generation to another. The Right of Contract is a necessary accompaniment of the Right of Property; for if the person can possess, he may buy and sell. And thus, these Rights are means, and necessary conditions, of men's being moral agents; and the Humanity which makes us desire that all men should be able to regulate themselves by a Love of Duty, requires that all should be invested with these Rights.

419. These Rights, which humanity requires that all men should possess, may be called *Natural Rights*; and in this sense, we may say that Man has Natural Rights of Personal Security from Violence, of Sustenance and Property so far as is implied in moral agency, and of Marriage. But we must distinguish these *Natural*

Rights, which men *ought* to have, from the Rights of which we have hitherto spoken, which men really *have* in Civil Society, and which may be called *Civil Rights*.

420. As the Natural Rights, of which we speak, are those which are implied in Moral Agency; so, on the other hand, they imply Moral Agency, and consequently imply Duties, or Moral Obligations. As there is a Natural Right of Security against violence, there is a Natural Obligation to abstain from violence. As there is a Natural Right of Property for every man, to some extent or other; so there is a Natural Obligation to abstain from the Property of others, and to fulfil our Contracts. As there is a Natural Right of Marriage, so there is a Natural Obligation of Forethought, which directs men to make provision for the Sustenance of a Family, before they add to the existing numbers of the Community.

421. Humanity requires us to insist upon these Rights, and upon the corresponding Obligations, with equal Force. We may declare such Rights to be natural, universal, necessary; but we must declare the Obligations to be equally natural, universal, necessary. Humanity requires that men should have the means of doing their Duty; she requires also no less that they should do it. She is solicitous about their welfare; in the first place, about their welfare in the subordinate sense, the means of enjoyment and of action; in the next place, about their welfare in the superior sense, the pursuit of right ends by right means. To insist upon man's Natural Rights, and to lose sight of the corresponding Obligations, is not the tendency of the Humanity of a moral man.

422. Such Natural Rights as we have mentioned, are sometimes spoken of as *indefeasible*, and *inalienable*. When, by such expressions, it is meant that no act, either of a man's own or of other men, can make it cease to be an object of Humanity that he should possess such Rights, the expressions are just. No constraint and violence, actually exercised upon men, can prevent the humane man from desiring that they should

have Rights which may protect them from such inflictions; and even if a man, for himself, renounce the Rights which are requisite to his being a moral agent, the humane man must still desire that they should be restored to him. If these Rights are taken away, or given away, it is right that they should be given back to every man; and in this sense, they are indefeasible and inalienable.

But if it be meant, that when the Law takes away, or the act of the individual gives away, these Rights, the Law and the Act are not to be regarded, this application of the words is not admissible. The Laws of every State have their validity; and if these Laws are contrary to Humanity or to Justice, such vices of the Laws are to be remedied, not by the Moralist declaring such Laws null and void of themselves; but by the Legislator annulling them, or substituting better Laws in their room. And although it may be humane and right, that the Laws should not sanction Contracts by which a citizen renounces the fundamental Rights of man; yet if such a Contract is made according to Law, the Law enforces it, and the Moralist, as before, may say that the Law ought to be changed; but he may not say that, till changed, it ought not to be executed.

423. Thus, those which we have called the *Natural* Rights of man, may be, for a time at least, superseded by their not being *Civil* Rights. They may be Rights in the eye of Humanity; that is, such as *ought to be* the Rights of all members of every community; but not Rights in the eye of Law, that is, such as *are* the Rights of all members of a given community. Natural Rights are the Ideal conditions of moral society; they may be suspended in Fact; the Idea being imperfectly realized. When this is so, it is the business of all good men constantly to make the Fact approach to the Idea; to make Law agree with Humanity: to make Civil Rights coincide with Natural Rights.

In many communities, this task may at the present,

or at any given time, be imperfectly fulfilled; and in such cases, there exist Classes of the Society which possess, in an imperfect degree, or in no degree, the Natural Rights of Man. It will be proper to examine more particularly some of these States of Society, with their characteristic Classes: and to consider the manner in which they exemplify the doctrine which we have been propounding.

CHAPTER XXIV.

SLAVERY.

424. IN ancient nations, we find the existence of Slaves everywhere familiar. Bondmen and Bondwomen, and the buying and selling of men, occur frequently in the Books of Moses. In Homer, and the Greek tragedians, domestic slavery is contemplated as the general lot of those conquered in war, their wives and children. The slaves, thus obtained, were employed, both in the business of the house, in the labours of agriculture, and as workmen in various handicrafts. They were so universally thus employed, that they were considered as a necessary portion of society. A State, says Aristotle*, consists of Families; a Family, of Freemen and Slaves. And in like manner, the Roman Law lays this down as the primary division of persons†, “Omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi.” Slavery, thus derived from the ancient world, was, in the course of time, nearly extinguished in Christian States. But in modern times, a new form of slavery has grown up; the slavery of the negroes, who are carried from Africa to America; and employed there, they and their descendants, as domestic servants and agricultural labourers.

425. The character of complete Slavery is, that the Slave has no Rights. And this complete kind of Slavery has been recognized and ordained by the Laws

* *Polit.* 1. 2.

† *Inst.* 1. 3.

of many nations. Gaius, the Roman Jurist, says *, “In potestate sunt servi dominorum. Quæ quidem potestas juris gentium est; nam apud omnes peræque gentes animadvertere possumus dominis in servos vitæ necisque potestate fuisse, et quodcumque per servum acquiritur id domino acquiri.” Thus the Slave had neither the Right of protection from extreme violence and death, inflicted by his master, nor the Right of property in anything which he might happen to produce or acquire. The Slave is the property of the Master, in the same manner as a horse or a cart is. And these maxims are promulgated in modern Laws. “A Slave,” says the Louisiana Code †, “is in the power of the Master to whom he belongs. The Master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, his labour; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but which must belong to his master.” The Laws of South Carolina say, “Slaves shall be deemed, taken, reported and adjudged, to be chattels personal in the hands of their Masters, and possessions to all intents and purposes whatsoever.” Accordingly, it is held in America that the cohabitation of slaves, being limited by the pleasure of the master, cannot be marriage; and that a slave cannot be guilty of theft; just as dogs and horses cannot marry and cannot steal. It is true, that in some countries, in which the most complete slavery prevails, the master is not allowed by the Laws to put his slave to death; and some punishment is inflicted if he does so. But such a Law does not invest the slave with any Rights. It is only a Law against what is shocking to the general feeling, like the English Laws against cruelty to animals. It is now penal in this country to torture a horse or a dog; but a horse or a dog are still

* *Dig. i. 6. 1.* Among the “things in our power” are the slaves of which we are masters. And this “power” is a general institution of nations; for we may observe that in all nations alike the master has the power of life and death over the slave; and whatever is acquired by the slave, is acquired for the master.

† Channing’s Works, Vol. 11, p. 17.

only objects of possession, without any Rights or any acknowledged moral nature.

426. Slavery is contrary to the Fundamental Principles of Morality. It neglects the great primary distinction of Persons and Things (45); converting a Person into a Thing, an object merely passive, without any recognized attributes of Human nature. A slave is, in the eye of the State which stamps him with that character, not acknowledged as a man. His pleasures and pains, his wishes and desires, his needs and springs of action, his thoughts and feelings, are of no value whatever in the eye of the community. He is reduced to the level of the brutes. Even his Crimes, as we have said, are not acknowledged as Wrongs; lest it should be supposed that, as he may do a Wrong, he may suffer one. And as there are for him no Wrongs, because there are no Rights; so there is for him nothing morally right; that is, as we have seen, nothing conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human Nature; for the Supreme Rule of his condition is the will of his master. He is thus divested of his moral nature, which is contrary to the great Principle we have already laid down; that all men are moral beings;—a Principle which, we have seen (414, 418), is one of the universal Truths of Morality, whether it be taken as a Principle of Justice or of Humanity. It is a Principle of Justice, depending upon the participation of all in a common Humanity: it is a Principle of Humanity as authoritative and cogent as the fundamental Idea of Justice.

427. All men are moral beings, and cannot be treated as mere brutes and things, without an extreme violation of the Duties of Humanity. In some communities, the Conception of Humanity may be dimly and vaguely developed; and the guilt of this violation of Duty, in this as in other cases, may be modified by this circumstance. The offense of the defender and promoter of Slavery, may not be that of acting against Conscience, but of not enlightening his Conscience; of not raising his standard of morality. And this offense,

again, may be modified by the circumstances in which a person is placed. In the ancient world, especially in the earlier periods, when the friendly intercourse of nations was rare, the feeling of Humanity very imperfectly unfolded, and the thoughts by which such feelings are fostered and supported not yet familiar among men; the opportunity of enlightening the conscience and raising the moral standard were wanting, and if, in such cases, virtuous men practised slavery without doubt or misgiving; and with the natural mercy, in their treatment of slaves, which benevolence cultivated in the other relations of life would usually produce in this; we may pronounce them to have been excusable, on the ground of the defects of their national standard of morality (357): though upon such men, and upon all men, there was a duty incumbent, of raising the national standard of Morality. But now, after morality and religion have so far raised the standard of morality in Christian nations, that among them, the Slavery which they inherited from the ancient world has been extinguished; Nations, which do not adopt the Standard of Morality thus elevated, are chargeable with a voluntary preference of inhumanity and injustice to humanity and justice (359).

428. A very little progress in humanity, is sufficient to lead men to see the cruelty and immorality of making slaves, of men *of our own race*. Plato* notices it as a necessary result of an improved morality, that Greeks should not make slaves of Greeks. This injunction had already been given to the Jews†: *If thy brother* (which in this place and others means thy fellow-countrymen) *be sold unto thee, thou shalt not make him serve as a bondman*. No man can think it conformable to Justice and Humanity that he, or his Family, should be thrown into a state of slavery; and in considering his fellow-countrymen, he can readily sympathize with them, and identify his case with theirs; and thus, he acknowledges that to make *them* slaves, is inhuman and unjust. The Romans, as we

* *Rep.* v. 14.

† *Levit.* xxv. 39.

have seen, extended this feeling to all the world; and their Jurists declared, that no man was a slave by nature. It is indeed plain, that our Humanity, in order to be consistent, must extend to all men. To conceive slavery a cruel and unjust lot for our countrymen, but a reasonable and tolerable fate for foreigners, can arise only from dulness and narrowness of mind, and benevolence scantily cultivated. In the eye of Morality, all men are Brothers; and the crime of maintaining Slavery, is the crime of making or keeping a Brother a Slave.

429. There is one defense of negro slavery, which represents the negro as a being inferior to the white man in his faculties. He is asserted to approach in his nature to the inferior animals; and hence it is inferred that he may be possessed as a Thing, like the animals. But this defense is manifestly quite baseless. The same faculties of mind have appeared in the negro, as in the white, so far as the condition of negro nations and negro classes has afforded opportunities for their development. The negroes do not appear to be duller, ruder or coarser, in mind or habits, than many savage white nations; or than nations, now highly cultured, were, in their early condition. The negro has a moral nature, and is therefore included in the consequences which follow from the Principle, that all men have a common nature. The negro has the same affections and springs of action as we ourselves. He loves his wife, his children, his home, and any security and stability which is granted him. He can buy and sell, promise and perform. He has, as much as any race of men, moral sentiments. He can admire and love what is good; he can condemn and hate what is bad. He has the Sentiment of Rights and Wrongs also. Though the Law allows him no Rights, he can feel bitterly the monstrous Wrong of the Law. His Reason is the Universal Reason of men. He understands the general and abstract Forms in which Language presents the objects and rules, with which Reason deals. He recognizes, as we do, a Supreme Rule of Human action and Human being; for, like us, he can direct his

thoughts and acts to what is absolutely right. In short, there is no phrase which can be used, describing the moral and rational nature of man, which may not be used of the negro, as of the white. The assertion that there is, between the white and the black race, any difference on which the one can found a Right to make slaves of the other, is utterly false.

430. If it be said, that the negro approaches in his external form to some kinds of monkeys; and if it be asked how we draw the line between man and such inferior animals; we reply, that all beings are men, who have a moral and rational nature, such as we have described: but if some plain and simple criterion of the difference between man and brutes be required; we can point at such a character at once, in the use of *Language*. A being who can understand and apply the general terms of which language consists, can apprehend Rules of action, Means and Ends, and hence, the Supreme Rule. He is a rational, and consequently a moral being. He is our brother.

431. It is difficult to believe that those who, in defence of their own practice of slavery, allege the inferiority of the negro race, do really think their assertion true. To such persons, negro women are objects of sexual desire. Upon their asserted view, they are thus guilty of an offense which men have everywhere looked upon as bestial and horrible. Moreover, the Laws of Nature contradict their assertion; for the offspring of such mixtures are marked with the physical and moral characters of both parents, as in other human unions. And when the slave-owner treats his own child, thus produced, as a slave; and works him, tortures him, or sells him, as he would a brute animal; (which it is said slave-owners do;) he tears out of his heart those affections which are the roots of all Morality, and the absence of which makes lust entirely brutal.

432. Again, in States where negro slaves are numerous, to teach them to write or to read is forbidden by Law, under the severest penalties. Such Laws suppose the capacity of negroes for intellectual culture; and are

an implicit confession that it is necessary to degrade their minds, in order to keep their bodies in slavery. When such practices and such Laws prevail, to defend negro slavery by asserting the inferiority of the negro race, can hardly be free from the guilt of wilful blindness of conscience, persisted in, in order to uphold conscious wrong.

433. The Moralist, then, must pronounce Slavery to be utterly inconsistent with Humanity; and with Principles, which, being derived from the universal nature of man, may be deemed fundamental Principles of Justice. Slavery is utterly abhorrent to the essence of Morality, and cannot be looked upon as a tolerable condition of Society, nor acquiesced in as what may allowably be. Wherever Slavery exists, its Abolition must be one of the great objects of every good man.

434. It will, of course, be understood, from what has already been said, that this Abolition is to be sought by legal and constitutional means only. When Slavery exists, its annihilation is an end which must be constantly kept in view; but to which we must sometimes be content to approach by degrees. It is an Idea to which we must endeavour to make the Fact conform; but the conformity may not be immediately brought to pass. The Laws of the State are to be submitted to, even when they enact Slavery; for the Moralist cannot authorize the citizen to choose what Laws he will obey, and what he will not. Natural Rights must yield to Civil Rights, in the hope that Civil Rights will be more and more made to harmonize with Natural Rights. Slavery is never to be acquiesced in, always to be condemned; but we may, and must, tolerate a gradual transition from Slavery to Emancipation, such as the conditions of Legislation and even the benefit of the slave, render inevitable. Still, on the other hand, we are to recollect, that delay is to be tolerated, only so far as it is inevitable: and that to quicken the course of Emancipation is no less humane and just, than it is to give Legislation this direction, and to prepare both slaves and masters for the change.

435. It may be hoped, by the Moralist, that the

emancipation of the negro race will go on with accelerated rapidity; for every State in which free negroes live, as moral and rational beings, is a refutation of the solitary argument in defense of negro slavery, drawn from the asserted unfitness of the negro for freedom. When the free negro population of cultured communities have, by the manifestation of their moral and rational nature, made themselves recognized as brethren by their white fellow-citizens, it cannot be that *their* black brethren will long be kept in slavery in neighbouring States professing a like reverence for freedom.

436. Slavery nowhere exists in Europe in a form so repugnant to Humanity as is negro slavery. But there are, in some parts, many vestiges of slavery, and classes intermediate between slaves and freemen. The *Serfs*, who have existed and still exist in different countries, may be considered as holding such an intermediate place; and in different countries in different degrees. In Russia, serfage is hardly distinguishable from slavery. The labourers are bound to the soil by the Law: they are *prædial* serfs. By the general custom of the country, they are bound to work on the demesnes of the landowner three days in the week; and have land allotted to them from which they extract their own subsistence. But the peasant is, with all his family and descendants, at the disposal of the lord. In some parts, the Serfs have been allowed the privilege of acquiring and transmitting personal property; and in some, they may even purchase or inherit land. In other parts of Europe, Serfage has assumed a less slavish character. In some parts of Germany, the peasant is no longer attached by the law to the soil: and his labour which he owes to his landlord is definite in kind and amount. Such peasants are called *Leibeigener*. In other parts this labour-rent is commuted for a corn-rent or a money-rent, though the tenant is still liable for some trifling services. Such tenants are called *Meyer**.

437. The social structure of England has gone through these several forms. For two centuries after the Norman Conquest, a large proportion of the body of

* Jones *On Rent*.

cultivators was in the situation of the Russian serf; they were termed *Villeins*. During the next three hundred years the unlimited labour-rents paid by the Villeins were gradually commuted for definite services, still payable in kind; and they had a legal Right to their lands which they occupied, which legal Right was called *Copyhold*. It is only about two hundred years, since the personal bondage of the Villeins ceased to exist in England.

438. The contemplation of the change which has taken place in this country, and which appears to be taking place elsewhere, from a condition in which men are little better than Slaves, to one in which they are Freemen; and of the manifest and immense advance in moral and intellectual culture, which such a change has brought with it; must strongly stimulate the Moralist to recommend and promote the progress of social freedom and the removal of every law and custom that contains any trace of Slavery.

439. We distinguish *social* from *political* freedom; the former depending upon the domestic or prædial relation of Servant and Master; the latter, upon the relation of Subject or Citizen, and Government. If men have Rights of the Person, of Property, and the like; they may be *socially* Freemen; however despotic the established government be. They are *politically* free, when each Class has such a share in the Government, as enables it to assert and secure its Rights. But Social Freedom can hardly exist, without Political Freedom: the Lowest Class can hardly have and retain Rights, without possessing some political power of maintaining them. In countries where Serfage prevails, the Serfs have no political power. The landlords form an Aristocracy; and the Sovereign and they, possess, between them, the powers of the State. When Serfage gives place to Social Freedom, there must be, in the Constitution, an *Estate* of the People, or some other Political Authority, representing and protecting the general body of free citizens.

But the subject of Political Freedom must be considered hereafter.

CHAPTER XXV.

PLEASURE, INTEREST, HAPPINESS,
UTILITY, EXPEDIENCY.

440. WE may follow the subject of Humanity or Benevolence somewhat further. Humanity is, as we have said, a Principle, in virtue of which we represent to ourselves other men as of the same nature with ourselves, and enter into their feelings, hopes, and prospects, as if they were our own. We desire the good of others as we desire our own good.

But the *Good* which we desire for ourselves is contemplated under various aspects. We may have, as the Object of our desires in a general form, *Pleasure*, *Enjoyment*, or *Gratification*; we may have *Interest*, or *Advantage*; we may have *Happiness*. And as our desires point to one or other of these general Objects for ourselves, they may also aim at the like Objects for others. Our Benevolence may urge us to give pleasure to others, or to promote their interest, or to make them happy.

In order to see how these views affect the Duties of Benevolence, we may examine further the Conceptions of *Pleasure*, *Interest*, and *Happiness*.

441. *Pleasure* arises from our attaining the objects of our Desires. It is what we feel, when our Desires are satisfied, or in some measure gratified. All actions which are not directed by the Reason, may be conceived as performed in order to obtain *Pleasure*, or to avoid its opposite, *Pain*. Actions directed by Reason, may also be directed to *Pleasure*. They may be directed to the objects of Mental Desires, which Reason presents to us under general abstract forms; as *Wealth*, *Power*, and the like: and to obtain such objects, may give us *Pleasure*. But *Pleasure* is more especially considered as the object of less abstract and reflective Desires, as *Bodily Pleasure*, and the like. *Pleasure* is sought simply and *for itself*; not as a means to an end, nor in obedience to a Rule. If we seek *Wealth* or *Power*

as means to an end, we do not seek them merely *as pleasure*.

442. Since Pleasure is sought, not in obedience to a Rule, but simply for itself, to make Pleasure our object, is not consistent with the Supreme Rule of Human Action. To make Pleasure the object of human action, is to reject the supposition of a Supreme Rule, and a Supreme Object. For if Pleasure be the Highest Object, it is also the Lowest. If Pleasure be the Highest Object of Human Action, nothing can be absolutely *right*; nor can be right in any other sense, than as the right road to Pleasure. If Pleasure be the object of human action, we must reject Duty as the guide of Human Actions. The good man makes Pleasure his object, only so far as it is consistent with the Supreme Rule of Duty. He does not desert Duty for Pleasure, but he finds his Pleasure in Duty.

443. Since we cannot rightly desire for ourselves Pleasure, as our ultimate object, we cannot rightly desire it for others, whom we love in some degree as ourselves. Merely to give Pleasure to men, without regarding whether the Pleasures be right or wrong, is not a moral kind of Humanity.

But though we may not make it our business to promote the Pleasures of those around us, as an ultimate object, for them and for us; we may rightly make the promotion of their Pleasures, so far as they are not wrong Pleasures, one of our main objects; both as a manifestation of Benevolence, and as a means of cultivating that affection. The sympathy with other men, which *Morality* requires of us, is best fostered and strengthened, by an habitual participation in their efforts to obtain those objects which give them pleasure.

444. Though Pleasures are sought, as independent and ultimate objects of desire, they often involve references and consequences, and trains of feeling and thought, which connect them with higher objects, and with Moral Rules. The Desires of the Body point simply to Selfish Pleasures; but the Pleasures of the Affections imply a Sympathy with other persons, which

is a kind of benevolence ; and therefore, of the nature of virtue. The Pleasures to which the Love of Knowledge leads, involve a culture of the mind, which gives activity to the Reason ; and which, thus, may aid the moral culture. And when the moral culture is so far advanced, that Conscience is heard clearly, and Virtue is beloved ; the approval of Conscience, and the conscious activity of Virtue, may be sought, as the greatest Pleasures of which man's nature is susceptible.

But in general, *Pleasure*, as an object of action, is distinguished from, and opposed to, *Duty* ; and so far as this is done, although we may aim at promoting the Pleasures of others, as a step in our moral culture, a due regard for the moral culture of others will not allow us to make their Pleasure a supreme and ultimate object.

445. Another general form under which the object of action presents itself to us, is *Interest*. We seek our own Interest : and hence we are bound, by the Duties of Benevolence, to seek the Interest of others also. Interest is conceived as an object of affection or desire, approved of, to some extent, by Reason. A prudent man seeks his own Interest. When Interest and Pleasure come in competition, Reason directs us to follow our Interest, and to resist the temptation of Pleasure. We may estimate our Interest according to various Standards ; but in speaking of Interest, we suppose *some Standard*. We say that one thing is *more* for our Interest than another : for example, we may say that it is more for our Interest to be honest, than to be cunning. In stating such a maxim, we take, for our standard of Interest, the acquisition of wealth, or the establishment of our good name. The Standard of Interest is not an absolute, but an assumed Standard ; just as the ends aimed at by Prudence are not absolute, but assumed ends (151). But we sometimes suppose an absolute and supreme Standard of Interest ; we speak of our *true* Interest, our *highest* Interest. We say that our true and highest Interest is, the elevation and purification of our moral being. Also, the Affection which

we feel towards a person, or for a mental object, is spoken of, as an *Interest* which we take or feel: that is, the person or object is conceived as of considerable amount, according to our Standard of Interest. But we may estimate another man's Interest differently from his own feeling respecting it. We may say, it was such a one's *Interest* to improve his estate, but he *took no Interest* in it. Again; different classes of objects of action imply different Standards of Interest. A man's affections are employed on one set of objects, his thoughts on another. Hence we have the Interests of the Heart, and the Interests of the Intellect. The Interest of the Individual may point one way: the Interest of the State, another.

446. Of course, Benevolence directs us to promote the true and highest Interest of other men, as it directs us to seek our own. We may also seek to promote the Interest of others, in a lower and narrower sense; as we may seek to promote their Pleasures: and such a course may be a part of morality, either as a manifestation, or as a discipline, of Benevolence. But to promote any Interest of men, which is not the highest; or any seeming Interest, which is not a true one; cannot rightly be made our ultimate object.

447. It has sometimes been said, that men, in all their actions, necessarily *seek their Interest*, or what appears to them their Interest. The notion involved in this assertion appears to be, that every action may be considered as a tendency to some object, which may be included in the term *Interest*. The brave man, when he rushes into battle, seeks victory, or glory, which, for the time, he thinks are his Interest. The timid man, when he runs away from the enemy, seeks safety, which seems to him his Interest. But the assertion thus made, involves a confusion of thought and language, such as not only would prevent our being able to state any distinct doctrines of Morality, but such as even common usage may teach us to correct. The brave man is not impelled to seek victory or glory, nor the timid man, to seek safety, by any view of Interest, such as that with

which the prudent man thoughtfully seeks his Interest. The springs of action in these cases are Courage, and Fear: not any seeking of an Abstract Object, which Interest is; still less, any seeking of an Abstract Object involving a Standard of value by which all things are compared, which Interest also is. If we say that the brave man rushes into the battle, and the timid man rushes out of it, each seeking his Interest, we must also say, that the Bull-dog attacks his antagonist, and the frightened horse runs away from his master, seeking his Interest; which it would be reckoned absurd to say. The proposition, that all actions are prompted by the prospect of our own Interest, is, not asserted, in general, as any thing more than an identical proposition. But to make it true, even in that character, the common usage of language must be violated.

448. *Happiness* is the object of human action in its most general form; as including all other objects, and approved by the Reason. As Pleasure is the aim of mere Desire, and Interest the aim of Prudence; so Happiness is the aim of Wisdom. Happiness is conceived as necessarily an *ultimate* object of action. To be happy, includes or supersedes all other gratifications. If we are happy, we do not miss that which we have not; if we are not happy, we want something more, whatever we have. The Desire of Happiness is the Supreme Desire. All other Desires, of Pleasure, Wealth, Power, Fame, are included in this, and are subordinate to it. We may make other objects our ultimate objects; but we can do so, only by identifying them with this. Happiness is our being's end and aim.

449. Since Happiness is necessarily the Supreme Object of our Desires, and Duty the Supreme Rule of our actions, there can be no harmony in our being, except our Happiness coincide with our Duty. That which we contemplate as the *Ultimate* and *Universal* Object of Desire, must be identical with that which we contemplate as the *Ultimate* and *Supreme* Guide of our Intentions. As moral beings, our Happiness must be found in our Moral Progress, and in the consequences

of our Moral Progress: we must be happy by being virtuous.

450. How this is to be, Religion alone can fully instruct us: but by the nature of our faculties, this must be. And as this is the nature of the Happiness which we are to seek for ourselves, so is it the nature of the Happiness which we are to endeavour to bestow upon others. We are directed by Benevolence, to seek to make them happy, by making them virtuous; to promote their Happiness, by promoting their moral Progress; to make them feel their Happiness to be coincident with their Duty.

The identification of Happiness with Duty on merely philosophical grounds, is a question of great difficulty. It is difficult, even for the philosopher, to keep this Identity steadily fixed in his mind, as an Operative Principle; and it does not appear to be possible to make such an identity evident and effective in the minds of men in general. But Religion presents to us this Truth, of the identity of Happiness and Duty, in connexion with other Truths, by means of which it may be made fully evident and convincing, to minds of every degree of intellectual culture: and the minds of men, for the most part, receive the conviction of the Truth from their Religious Education.

451. We may also, as an exercise and discipline of Benevolence, seek to make them happy, in a more partial view; namely, by placing them in a condition in which they have no wants unsupplied; for, as we have said, this is part of the conception of happiness. If we make this our object, we shall have to supply those wants which are universal, and do not depend upon special mental culture; and we shall have to impart such mental culture, as may make them feel no wants which cannot be supplied. We shall have to minister to their human needs; and to moderate their wishes: in short, to make them content. *Content* is a necessary part of Happiness; and men may be rendered content, by gratifying their desires in part, and limiting them in part, till none remain unsatisfied. That men's

desires should be moderate and limited, is a condition very requisite to Content ; and therefore, to Happiness : for except some moderating influence be exercised, the Desires, both bodily and mental, grow with indulgence. Hence, we promote the Happiness of men by moderating their Desires : and any influence of this kind, which we can exert upon them ; as for instance, by teaching and discipline, may be a work of Benevolence. But on the other hand, we must recollect that the objects to which many of our Desires tend, are means of moral action ; and that it is necessary to the moral activity and moral culture of a man, that he should desire and obtain such objects. We ought not to wish to reduce a man to a state of Content, by taking away the desire of the fundamental Rights of man. We ought not to wish the Slave to be contented in his Slavery ; living like a brute animal in dependence upon his master, and looking to no law, higher than his Master's Will. On the contrary, we ought to wish that he should both desire and have Liberty, in order that he may enter upon that course of moral agency and moral progress, which is the only proper occupation of his human faculties. In order to promote the Happiness of mankind, we must endeavour to promote their Liberty : both the Social Liberty, which invests them with the Fundamental Rights of man ; and the Political Liberty, which is the guardian of such Rights, and the most favourable condition for moral and intellectual progress. We shall pursue this subject hereafter.

452. In some Systems of Morality, the Desire of our own *Happiness*, and of that of mankind, has been made to occupy a larger space than we assign to it. This Desire has, indeed, been made the basis of the whole of Morality, and the ground and measure of all our Duties. It has been said, that our Principle of action, so far as we ourselves are concerned, must be to attain, as much as possible, our own Happiness ; and that the Rule which is to guide us in actions which affect others, is to increase as much as possible their

Happiness. This view of the subject has been so much insisted on, that we may make a few remarks upon it.

We may remark, that according to the explanation which we have given above, of the Conception of Happiness, it is quite true, that we ought to act so as to increase as much as possible our own Happiness and the Happiness of others; but we must add, that this Truth cannot enable us to frame Rules of Duty, or to decide Questions of Morality. It is an *identical* Truth. Since Happiness is the ultimate object of our aims, and includes all other objects; whatever else we aim at, we identify with Happiness. Whatever other end we seek, we seek that as the *far* end. And with regard to other persons; Benevolence urges us to promote their Happiness; for in that, all good is included, and we wish to do them good. But these Maxims, though true, are, of themselves, altogether barren. The Questions still occur, *What* are the things which will increase our own Happiness? What will increase the Happiness of others? Of what elements does Happiness consist? According to our account of it, Happiness does not imply any special elements; but only a general conception of an *ultimate* and *sufficing* Object. How are we to measure Happiness, and thus to proceed to ascertain, by what acts it may be increased? If we can do this, then, indeed, we may extract Rules and Results, from the Maxim that we are to increase our own and others' Happiness: but without this step, we can draw no consequences from the Maxim. If we take the Conception in its just aspect, how little does it help us in such questions as occur to us! I wish to know whether I may seek sensual pleasure; whether I may tell a flattering lie. I ask, Will it increase or diminish the Sum of Human Happiness to do so? This mode of putting the question cannot help me. How can I know whether these acts will increase or diminish the Sum of Human Happiness? The immediate pleasures of gratified sense or of gratified vanity, I may, perhaps, in some degree, estimate; but how am I to estimate the indirect and

remote effects of the acts, on myself and others; and how am I to measure the total effect thus produced, on Human Happiness? By a sensual act, or by a lie, I weaken, it may be said, the habit of temperance and of truth in my own mind; and by my example, I produce a like effect on the minds of others. Suppose, then, that I regard this consequence, and see that the act thus leads to something of unhappiness; still, this effect is perhaps slight and precarious; how am I to balance this result, against those direct gratifications which are produced by the acts now spoken of? It does not appear that, under this form, the question admits of an answer.

453. The mode in which Moralists have been able to apply this Principle, of aiming at the greatest amount of Human Happiness, to the establishment of Moral Rules; has been, by assuming that man must act according to *Rules*. I say *assuming*; for it does not appear, that we can *prove* that the Principle of increasing as much as possible the Happiness of man requires us to act by general Rules. The man who is tempted to sensual pleasure, or mendacious flattery, may say, I do not intend that what I do now should be a Rule for myself, or for others. At present I seek to promote Human Happiness, by making an exception to Rules: in general I shall conform to the Rules. To this, the Moralist replies, that to speak and think thus, is to reject Rules altogether: that Rules are not recognized, except they be applied in all cases, and relied upon as the antagonists of the temptations which particular cases offer. In short, he says, that man, by his nature, must act by Rules; and that he, the Moralist, who has to decide respecting the character of human action, has to establish Rules of human action. Thus he assumes, in addition to his Principle of the Greatest Amount of Human Happiness, another Principle, of the Universality of Rule; and it is this latter Principle, which really gives a Moral character to his results. If we are to have Rules of action, we must have Rules, that men are to be temperate and truthful; though special violations of temperance or of truth may seem to offer an

increase of human happiness. Such Rules as, that we may lie to please^d a friend, or may seek bodily pleasure where we can find it, are inconsistent with man's nature. But that they are so, is shown, by reasoning from the necessary conditions of Rules of action, not by considering the notion of Happiness; for the pursuit of Happiness does, really, often lead men to follow such immoral Rules as have just been mentioned. The Rules, *to be temperate* and *to be truthful*, are not established by showing that they lead to the greatest amount of Human Happiness; for we have no means of estimating the amount of Human Happiness which results from any given hypothesis. These Rules may, indeed, be said to be proved by a consideration of the intolerable unhappiness which would result from the absence of such Rules. We have already (66) used this consideration in establishing Moral Rules in general. But this line of reasoning is quite a different course from employing the Conception of Happiness, as a means of comparing one particular Rule of Duty with another; an employment of the notion of Happiness for which it is, as I have said, quite unfit.

454. The Principle of aiming at the greatest amount of Human Happiness, has been strangely dealt with by the Moralists who have principally employed it. As we have already said, in order to deduce Moral Rules from it, it seems to be necessary to find some measure of Happiness; or to resolve it into some more definite elements; and then, to estimate the moral value of actions, by means of this measure, or those elements. But this course has not been usually followed by such Moralists. Dr. Paley, who rests Moral Rules upon their tendency to promote Human Happiness, has, indeed, begun by giving some account of his view of Happiness. It does not, he says, consist in the pleasures of sense; nor in exemption from pain, labour, and care; nor in greatness and elevated station: it consists in the exercise of the social affections; in the exercise of the faculties of body or mind in the pursuit of some engaging end; in the prudent constitution of the habits; and in health: and,

as he suggests in a note, perhaps in a certain condition of the nerves. Having given this analysis of Happiness, we naturally look to see how he next brings the word into use in his reasonings. We find the word occupying a very prominent place in the first sentence of his next chapter; in which he tells us, that "Virtue is the doing good to mankind for the sake of everlasting Happiness." But it is plain that, in this use of the word, there is no reference to the analysis of Happiness contained in the preceding chapter; and we are therefore, so far as reasoning is concerned, here thrown back upon the general notion which the word *Happiness*, without any special explanation, suggests.

455. When Paley proceeds, a little further on, to establish Moral Doctrines, for instance the Right of Property, he rests the propriety of this Institution of Property upon its advantages;—that it increases the produce of the earth; preserves this produce to maturity; prevents contests; and increases the conveniency of living. Doubtless, all these results may be understood, as *additions* to the Sum of Human Happiness; but there is no attempt made to show that these additions counterbalance the *subtraction* from Human Happiness arising from the wants of some persons, the superfluity of others, the contests and crimes of many, which Property produces. The Principle of the Greatest Human Happiness, thus loosely applied, leaves the Right of Property to stand upon a general apprehension of its advantages. The same is the case with the other Fundamental Rights of Man, and the Fundamental Rules of Morality. They are not proved, in Paley's work, by showing, in any distinct manner, that they increase the Sum of Human Happiness; for no way is offered of measuring this Sum, or its Increase. But the Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Rules are asserted; and the student is told that they are necessary to Human Happiness. This all can readily assent to; for the end for which Rights and Rules exist, whatever other name it bear, may be considered as included in the term *Happiness*. And thus, Fundamental Rights and Rules, and

the vague general notion of Human Happiness as their ultimate end, stand side by side in such systems of Morality, but have not really any logical connexion.

456. There is, however, one character of such Systems which is implied in this mode of employing the term *Happiness*. They seek to deduce the Rules of Action from a Supreme *Object of Desire*; whereas we have deduced them from a Supreme *Rule of Action*. They direct men to aim at Happiness; we direct them to aim at Acting Rightly. We deduce our Rules from the Constitution of man's nature; they, from the Objects of his desires. As expressing this difference, the Terms and Reasonings employed in such systems may be worthy our consideration.

457. There is an expression often used by Moralists of this class, which may be noticed in this point of view. They often declare *Utility* to be the Ground and Measure of the Morality of actions. Now Utility cannot be in itself an Ultimate End. That is *useful*, which is subservient to some further end. A wheel is useful as a portion of a carriage; a carriage is useful, in order to take a journey; a journey is useful, in order to visit a friend; to see and talk with a friend is useful if it makes us happy. All things which have a value for their utility, have a reference to some ulterior end; and if we assume some Ultimate End, such as Happiness is conceived to be, all things may be estimated by their Utility. Thus the estimate of actions by their Utility may be conceived as identical with the estimate of them as contributing to Human Happiness; and accordingly, the two phrases have been principally used by the same school of Moralists.

458. The judgment which we have to pronounce upon Utility, as a ground of estimating the character of actions, is implied in what has been already said. We cannot estimate the value of anything, as being useful to an End, except by assuming the value of the End. If a Coach be a thing of no value, a Coach-wheel must be a thing of no value. If travelling be of no use, a travelling carriage is of no use. The measure of the

value of actions by their Utility, is liable to all the inconvenience and indefiniteness of the determination of the End for which they are useful; and besides, to the difficulty of determining how far they are useful to the end. A system in which actions are estimated by their Utility in promoting Human Happiness, will be liable to the objections already stated against the Principle of the Greatest Human Happiness; and will also require a just mode of measuring the value of Actions as Means, the End being given. We have all along been applying a very different method, in order to judge of actions. We ask, What is *right*? not, What is *useful*? acknowledging, as we have said, a Supreme Rule, and not being content with seeking Means which derive their value from the assumed value of their Ends.

459. Another Term which has been much used by Moralists of this School is *Expediency*. "Whatever is expedient," says Paley, "is right*." Now we have to observe here, as before, that the main significance of such assertions is in the rejection, which they imply, of any independent and fundamental meaning in the term *right*. Those who make such assertions, intend to say, that Actions are right because they promote some object; Human Happiness, for instance; and that those who speak of acts, as absolutely right, are in error. In the common use of language, we speak of actions as *expedient*, when they promote some end which we have selected, and which we do not intend to have questioned. If we are prepared to put forwards the end of our actions as the Proper End of action, we call them, not *expedient*, but *right*. It may be expedient for a man to lie, in order to free himself from captivity. He may stay in captivity, because he will not tell a lie; but in this case, we say, he does what is right, and rejects what is expedient. *Expedient* implies, according to its etymology, a way out of difficulties. But Morality places before us a higher object than merely to escape from difficulties. She teaches us to aim at what is right. What is expedient, may be expedient as a means to what

* Paley, B. I. c. b.

is right. It may be expedient to tell the truth, in order to rescue an innocent person from death. But we do not describe such an action properly by calling it *expedient*. It is much more than expedient, it is right: it is recommended, not by Expediency, but by Duty. In such cases, we can speak approvingly, not only of the action, as a right means, but of the end, as a right end. Truth is not properly commended, when it is described as a good way of getting out of a difficulty, or of gaining our ends.

Those who use this term, *Expediency*, to describe the proper end of human action, are prompted to do so by a wish to reject Terms which imply a Supreme Rule of action; they wish to recognize none but subordinate Rules determined by the Objects at which men aim. And it is true, in this sense, that whatever is expedient with a view to an end, is the right way to the end: but this does not justify the Moralist in confounding what is *relatively expedient* with what is *absolutely right*: nor in speaking of things as expedient *absolutely*, without pointing out *the purpose* which they are expedient for.

BOOK III.

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RELIGION.

OF DIVINE LAWS, AND THEIR
SANCTION.

BOOK III.

RELIGION.

OF DIVINE LAWS, AND THEIR SANCTION.

CHAPTER I.

NATURAL RELIGION.

460. THE Moral State and Moral Progress of each man are maintained by his conviction of certain Truths which are the foundations of Morality; and among these Truths, one of the most important is this: that the course of action which is his Duty, is also his Happiness, when considered with reference to the whole of his being (450). This conviction, men for the most part derive from Religion; that is, from their belief respecting God, and his government of Man. We believe God to be the Governor of Man, as a moral being (9). The Moral Law is his command; Conscience is his voice; He sees and knows all the internal actions of which we ourselves are conscious; He possesses an unbounded power to determine the Happiness or Misery of every one of us; He exercises this power so as to give a sanction to his Laws; appointing misery as the punishment of transgressions, and making a conformity to his Laws lead us to Happiness; which Happiness will continue in another life when this life is past.

This is Natural Religion: but further, as we have seen (260), we require to be taught by Religion how, when we have transgressed, Repentance and Amendment can avail, as a remedy for the sin committed; how they can restore the health of man's moral life, and avert from man's condition and destination the consequences of sin. We also (270) require from Religion the hope

of some power, in addition to the ordinary powers of our own minds, which is to be exercised upon us, in order to enlighten and instruct our conscience, and to carry on our moral progress. These requirements are responded to by Revealed Religion.

461. The belief which constitutes Natural Religion, takes possession of men's minds, in the course of their intellectual and moral progress. The idea of God is unfolded and fixed, and the points of belief which we have stated, are established, by the intellectual and moral culture of the mind. The steps of thought, which lead to these points of belief, may be different in different minds, according to the course which their intellectual and moral culture takes. In the mode of arriving at a belief in God, and in his moral government, the procedure of one mind is not a rule for other minds. To some persons, the Truths of Natural Religion may seem to be self-evident; to other persons, they may become more evident, when connected by various steps of analogy and reasoning. We shall state some of the reasonings respecting God and his Government, which may prove the doctrines we have stated, to the satisfaction of those persons who require proofs of them.

We proceed with these reasonings.

462. From the existence of the world, we necessarily infer the existence of a Supreme Being, who is the cause of the world's existence. The assemblage of things and events which we describe by the abstract term *Nature*, directs us to a belief in an Author of Nature. Every thing and every event must have a Cause; that cause again must have *its* Cause, and so on. But this Series must terminate: there must be a First Cause. This Supreme Being, this Author of Nature, this First Cause, is God; the Creator of the World and of all that it contains, including Man.

463. But further; in many things which exist, and in many events which take place in the world, we see irresistible evidence, not only of a Cause, but of a Final Cause. We discern an End, an Intention, of the

Creator of the world. Things are constructed so as to answer a Purpose, and we cannot help believing that they were *intended* to answer this Purpose. The eyes are made so that we can see; and on examining their structure, we are irresistibly led to believe that they were made *in order that* we might see. In the same way by an examination of the structure of man's body, we are led to believe that the muscles were made in order to move the limbs; and that the nerves were made, among other purposes, in order to excite the muscles to action.

That we see with our eyes; that the nerves excite the muscles, and the muscles move the limbs;—these are Laws of our Nature. But these Laws indicate the Intention of the Author of Nature. They are his **Laws**; the manifestation of his Purpose; the expression of his Will.

464. The Structure of our Minds, as well as of our bodies, is the work of God the Creator. Our Appetites, Desires, Affections, Reason, are given to us by him, as well as our Organs, Muscles, Nerves, Brain. And in the structure of our minds, as in that of our bodies, the faculties were assigned with intention and purpose. It was intended that Appetite should operate for the preservation of the individual; that the Affections should collect men into Families and Societies; that the Reason should direct and control both the Appetites and the Affections; that the Sentiments of Approbation and Disapprobation should aid the Reason in this office. It was intended, for instance, that Shame should prevent our doing shameful actions.

465. Further; in virtue of his Reason, man seeks objects, as Means to Ends. We cannot believe otherwise than that it was intended, by his Creator, that he should do this; and should conform to Rules of action, derived from his doing this (18). It was intended, therefore, that he should conform to the Supreme Rule of Action; which is a necessary condition of these subordinate Rules (72). Consequently, this Supreme Rule of Action, namely, the Moral Law, is the Law intended

for him by his Creator. The Moral Law is the Law of God, and the Will of God.

466. The Moral Law is expressed by means of certain Moral Ideas, namely, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order (118). These Ideas, therefore, express the Will of God, with regard to human actions. These Ideas were given to man, in order that he might, by them, direct his Actions. And when man frames his internal Standard of Action, his Conscience, in conformity with these Ideas, this internal Standard represents the Will of God; and his Conscience may be considered as the Voice of God (274).

467. But again; human action may be contemplated, not only as governed by Rules, successively subordinate to each other, and ultimately, by a Supreme Rule; but also, as directed to objects successively subordinate to each other, and ultimately to a Supreme Object (74).

The Supreme Object of human action is Happiness. Happiness is the Object of human action contemplated in its most general form, and approved by the Reason (448).

The Subordinate Rules of human action are enforced and sanctioned by the belief of success or failure, in the pursuit of some corresponding object. Thus, the Rule, that the Appetites must be controlled by the Reason, is enforced by our expectation of obtaining health and comfort, if we obey the Rule, and of forfeiting these benefits if we disregard the Rule. In like manner, the Rule that we must respect the Rights of all men, is enforced by the hope of Security and Tranquillity, which the general observance of such a Rule produces; by the Prospect of the Turbulence and Insecurity which exist in rude states of Society; and by the fear of the condemnation and punishment which, in more settled Society, the violation of Rights produces to the offender.

In like manner, the *Supreme Rule* of Human Action is enforced and sanctioned by a belief that it leads to the *Supreme Object* of Human Action. As the Rule of

Temperance points to Health and Comfort; as the Rule of Respect for Rights points to Security and Tranquillity; so the Supreme Rule of Rightness points to Happiness, which includes all other objects; and which is an internal Comfort and Tranquillity requiring nothing beyond itself.

468. The Subordinate Rules are enforced and sanctioned by the belief that they lead to their respective objects; and this belief is confirmed and verified by the result. Temperance *does*, as a general Rule, lead to Health and Comfort. Respect for legal Obligations *does* maintain social Tranquillity and individual Security. By the analogy of these Cases, we are confirmed in our belief that Moral Rightness leads to Happiness.

The Rules of Human Action, approved by the Reason; may be considered as *Laws* given to man by God; and the Objects of Human Action, which are foreseen and obtained by conforming to such Rules, may be considered as *Promises* to man made and fulfilled by God. The general declarations of God to men, made through his Reason, may be considered as conditional Promises. "If you are temperate, you shall be healthy." "If you conform to the laws of Society, you shall enjoy the benefits of Society." In like manner, there is a conditional Promise, made to man through his Reason, that conformity to the Supreme Rule, will be attended with the Supreme Good of his Nature. "If you are virtuous, you shall be happy." And as the Promises, thus made in the other cases, are verified by the result, we are led to believe, by analogy, that the Promise, in the last case, will also be verified by the result.

Hence the results of obeying and violating Moral Rules of Action, made known to us by our Reason, may be considered as Rewards and Punishments appointed by God. And thus we are led to look upon Happiness as the appointed Reward of Virtue, and Unhappiness as the appointed Punishment of Vice.

469. We conceive not only Will and Purpose, as

residing in God, but also Affections. His creation abounds in Contrivances, which have, for their objects, the health, comfort, and enjoyment, of his creatures; and nowhere exhibits Contrivances which have, for their object, pain or disease. Hence, we conceive God as benevolent towards his creatures. Moreover, being led, as we have just said, to believe him to exercise a Moral Government, in which he rewards Virtue and punishes Vice, we conceive him as loving virtuous men, and hating vicious men; and as loving Virtue, and hating Vice, in the abstract. We conceive Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order, as the objects of his Love. And we are thus led to conceive these Ideas, as elements in our Idea of God. We conceive him as, in the most perfect degree, Benevolent, Just, True, Pure, and Wise. This Moral Perfection is *Holiness*.

470. Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, are the proper objects of our Love (129); and therefore God, in whom these Ideas are all comprehended, is the proper object of Love. With the Idea of God in our minds, the Love of God becomes a part of our Moral Progress. Our belief in the Holiness of God, and our Love of Him, confirm and uphold our expectation and belief that Happiness is the appointed Reward of Virtue, and Unhappiness the appointed Punishment of Vice.

471. The expectation and belief which are supported by these reasonings and analogies, become constantly stronger, as our moral and intellectual culture proceed. But though men have such a general and settled expectation and belief, that Happiness is the appointed Reward of Virtue; it is a matter of great doubt and obscurity, to the eye of Reason, in what manner this is to be brought to pass. Some have taught that the virtuous man is always happy, by that condition of his mind which Virtue produces. Some have inferred that, since happiness is not always the Reward of Virtue in the life of men; this life must be succeeded by another life, in which the Promise is fulfilled, and the Reward bestowed. They have taught

that man has a *Soul*, which is not destroyed by the accidents which happen to the body; and that the *Soul*, surviving the death of the mortal *Body*, is the subject of God's Rewards and Punishments in another world.

472. The doctrine, that man has a *Soul*, of which Consciousness, Will, Reason, Affections, Memory, Imagination, are Faculties, as Motion, Sensation, Nutrition, are Faculties of the *Body*, has been generally believed on other grounds also. I am conscious of remaining the same person, while my body is constantly changing by the process of nutrition. I will certain acts, in which the body is only the instrument of the will. I reason; and in doing so, refer to Ideas, or principles of reasoning, common to me along with all mankind: these Ideas or principles cannot be conceived as residing in the body. I love my parents, my brothers and sisters, my children; these affections do not belong to the body. By acts of duty, habits of duty and virtue are formed; which are not habits of mere bodily action. And by all these processes,—Will, Reason, Affection, Acts of Duty,—permanent effects are produced upon our being, which can be understood most simply as effects produced on the *Soul*. It is the *Soul*, which is permanently affected by the intellectual and moral culture of which we have spoken (202); as the body is permanently affected by bodily exercises. It is the *Soul*, which is tainted and distempered by transgression (252); and it is the *Soul* which is to be restored by Repentance and Amendment, if restoration be possible (260). It is the *Soul*, in which must take place the constant and unlimited moral progress, of which we have spoken (203): which, as we have said, must go forwards to the very end of life. And it is very natural to suppose that by this Progress, the *Soul* is fitted for Another Life, in which its condition will correspond with the nature of its Moral Progress in this life. If the *Soul* have reached a high point of Moral Progress on this side of death, we may suppose that it will, on the other side of death, if not on this,

find a corresponding state of Happiness. If, on the contrary, habits^t of virtue have been neglected, transgressions committed, and habits of vice formed here, the Soul must be unfitted for enjoying, hereafter, any Happiness, such as we can suppose God to give to men's Souls.

473. Thus we are led to believe in a Future State of being, in which God's Moral Government will be carried on to its completion. But even in this present state of being, we must conceive ourselves and the world to be under the Government of God. God must be the Governor, as he is the Creator, of the world; for as the Creator, he formed, and placed in it, those springs of Progress by which its course is carried on and regulated. We cannot help believing that, like all other parts of the Creation, the course of the world of human doing and suffering, must have a Purpose; and this Purpose must be in harmony with the Moral Government of God, to the belief of which we have already been led (469). The Course of this world, we cannot but believe, is directed by God's *Providence*. It is a Divine Dispensation.

474. The doctrines of Natural Religion, as we have stated them, thus present to us these Ideas; the Moral Government of God, and his Providence. So far as we borrow our Light from Natural Religion, we assume these Ideas, of Moral Government and Providence, to be realized in the World to Come; and we regard this world, as the Prelude and Preparation to that. But we cannot reasonably be satisfied with a mere *Idea* of the Course of this World. We must attend to the *Fact* also, that is, to the History of the World: and thus we are led to Revealed Religion.

CHAPTER II.

CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

475. THE *Idea* of the Course of the World, according to Natural Religion, is that it is directed by God's Providence so as to be in harmony with his Moral Government. The *Fact* which corresponds to this *Idea* is supplied to us by the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament.

We learn, from these Scriptures, that besides the transactions of men with men, the course of the world has also included transactions of God with men. There have taken place, in the History of the World, *Revelations* of the Commands and Promises of God, and of the Methods by which men are to be enabled to obey these Commands, and to receive the benefit of these Promises.

The central point of these Revelations is the coming of Jesus Christ upon Earth. To this point, all ancient History converges, by means of Early Revelations, Prophecies, the Selection of a special nation, the Jews, as the depositaries of Prophecy, and the successive failure of all attempts, made by moral and philosophical teachers, in other nations, to solve the perplexities of man's condition, by the light of Reason, without the aid of Revelation. From this point, a new Dispensation begins.

476. A Revelation was made from God to man, through Jesus Christ. And this Revelation amply and entirely confirms the expectation and belief which Natural Religion offers to us (470, 472,) that Happiness is the appointed Reward of Virtue, Unhappiness the appointed Punishment of Sin; that there is a life, after this, in which this Promise and this Threatening are realized; that the Soul survives the death of the present Body, and is the subject of God's Rewards and Punishments in another world.

477. Along with this confirmation of the expec-

tation and belief which Natural Religion offers, the Revelation made to man, through Jesus Christ and his Disciples, conveys to us many Precepts of Duty, and Doctrines concerning the grounds of Duty, and concerning the best means of attaining Virtue. These Precepts and Doctrines confirm the Precepts and Doctrines of Morality which we have delivered, as far as these go: but the Christian Revelation offers to us many Truths concerning the grounds of Duty, and the means of attaining Virtue, which Morality alone cannot arrive at. These Precepts and Doctrines constitute Christian Morality.

478. The ground of our Duty, as presented to us by Religious Teaching, is, that it is the Will of God. The Will of God is the Supreme Rule of our Being.

. But we also conceive (469) the Ideas which are contained in the Supreme Rule of our Being, namely, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, as parts of the Character of God. Hence, to conform our minds to those Ideas, is to conform our character to the Character of God. To approach to this Character, is to approach to *the Image of God*; and our Moral Progress may be spoken of as an approach to the Image of God. But in using such language, we must ever bear in mind the Supreme Reverence which is due to God, as the Perfect and Central Source of those moral qualities, in which we very imperfectly and distantly participate.

479. The Character of Jesus Christ, while upon the earth, was a Human Character of the highest Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Obedience to Law. In his Character, we have the moral perfections, which we conceive in God, embodied and realized in man. Hence, *the Image of God in Christ* is the summit of the Moral Progress, which it is our Duty to pursue: and this object is presented to us by Christian teaching, as the aim and end of our moral career.

480. But Jesus Christ did not only teach the Will of God, and exemplify the highest moral excellence

of man. He also suffered death upon the cross ; was buried ; rose again the third day ; and ascended into heaven. And we learn, from Christian teaching, that these events were most important and essential parts of the New Dispensation. We learn, that, through the efficacy of these events, we may be saved from the consequences of our sins.

481. This part of Christian Doctrine contains an answer to the inquiries which, as we have already said, the Moralist is driven to make of the Religious teacher, respecting the efficacy of Repentance, and the provision made by God for saving man from the effects of sin (260). The Christian Revelation speaks to us of God's Pardon and Forgiveness of Sins, through which those who have transgressed and repented of their transgressions, may in some cases be saved from the punishment of sin, and restored to his favour. It teaches us also* that the Rules of God's Government are such as not to admit of pardon directly and immediately upon Repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it. But it teaches, at the same time, what, without a Revelation, we could only have hoped, that the Moral Government of the world from the beginning was such as to admit of an interposition which might avert the fatal consequences of vice ; and that vice, by that means, does admit of pardon. Christian Revelation teaches us, that the Laws of God's Government are compassionate, as well as simply good ; and that he has provided an interposition, to prevent the destruction of human kind by the infliction of merited punishment, whatever that destruction, if not prevented, would have been. It was a part of the teaching of Jesus Christ, that (John iii. 15) *God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved.* He interposed by sending his Son Jesus Christ, so as to prevent

* Butler, *Anal.* B. II. c. 5.

that execution of justice upon Sinners, which must have followed, if it had not been for such interposition.

482. Further: the Christian Revelation contains important teaching upon another of the difficulties of Morality (270); namely, the means provided for carrying on our moral progress, in addition to the ordinary powers of our own minds.

Natural Religion suggests to us (472), that by this Progress the Soul is fitted for another Life; but we learn from Christian Revelation, that there are conditions of this Progress, of which Natural Religion and Morality cannot inform us. These means are described to be; a Belief in Jesus Christ, the Son of God; and a Participation in the Spirit which God sent upon earth at his coming, and infused into the Souls of his Disciples. In the same portion of Christian teaching to which we have already referred, it is said (John iii. 18 and 36), *He that believeth on him is not condemned; but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God. . . . He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life: but the wrath of God abideth on him.* Jesus Christ himself said (John iii. 5): *Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.* He promised to his Disciples a Spirit which was to *guide them into all truth* (John xvi. 13). They were taught that it *helped their infirmities* (Rom. viii. 26). Hence this Spirit was called *the Comforter* (John xiv. 16), and was to *dwell in them* (Rom. viii. 9): and when Jesus Christ left the earth, his parting command was (Matth. xxviii. 19), *Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit: and, lo, I am with you always, to the end of the world.*

483. By the help of the means thus provided by God, and by the aid of this Spirit, a Christian man is led to approach to the Image of God in Christ (479): he is in a special sense united with Christ, as the branch is united with the tree (John xv. 5), or as the members are united with the body (1 Cor. xii. 27; Eph. v. 30).

His Soul receives nutriment from Christ; which is expressed by saying, that he feeds upon Christ (John vi. 51); and is symbolically expressed by eating bread and drinking wine, in remembrance of him (Luke xxii. 19), and in obedience to his command.

484. Believers in Christ, thus united with him, are united with each other, as members of a living Body (Rom. xii. 4; 1 Cor. xii. 12; Eph. iv. 25). This Body, of which Christ is the head, is the Church (Col. i. 18). *He is the head of the body the Church.* To this Body, thus united in Christ, belong unity in itself, perpetual existence, and the possession of religious Truth, through the guidance of the Holy Spirit. This Body is the Universal or Catholic Church of Christ.

485. The Association of Believers in Christ, of which we have spoken, the Church, is bound together by means of certain habitual formal social acts. There is one such act by which members of the Church are admitted into it, namely, *Baptism*. There is another such act by which they commemorate their union with Christ according to his command, namely, *the Lord's Supper*. There are acts by which they express their affections towards God, namely, acts of worship, *Prayer and Praise*. There are acts in which they express their Christian belief, or receive Christian Instruction from their Teachers; *Profession of Faith*, and *Preaching*. All these are *Christian Ordinances*.

486. The Souls of men are often also called their *Spirits*; especially when they are considered as the subjects of God's government. His government extending over such subjects is his *Spiritual Kingdom*. Hence religious matters are called *Spiritual*: and to these, as the concerns of an eternal world, are opposed *temporal* or *secular* matters, which belong only to time or to this world (*tempus, seculum*).

CHAPTER III.

CHRISTIAN MORALITY.

487. WE have now to treat of Christian Morality; not as being a different Morality from that Rational Morality of which we have hitherto treated; but as throwing new light upon the Morality of mere Reason, and giving it new supports. The Christian Religion recognizes the same Duties, which we have put forward on grounds of Reason; Duties of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order; and the general Duty of Moral and Intellectual Progress. But the Christian Religion invests all these Duties with new Sanctions; and carries our Progress much further, by making it not only a moral and intellectual, but a Religious Progress. The Religious Progress of our affections and thoughts, carries us towards a condition, in which all Special Duties are the necessary developement and manifestation of Religious Principles of Action. If we had, in this work, to treat of Religion as our primary and principal subject, it might be the more proper course to begin with Religious Principles of Action, and from them, to deduce Special Rules of Action. Such is the course often followed by Religious Teachers. But since our primary and principal subject is Morality, we shall adopt, in treating of Religious Morality, that order of matters which we have already found to be presented to us, by the nature of our subject.

488. We may add, that Christian Teaching nowhere presents to us any Authoritative Scheme or System of Duties and Principles, which we reject, in taking the guidance of our own. The indications of System, in the notices which we have on such subjects, in the New Testament, are vague and various. Christ, in his teaching, recognizes the division of Duties, into Duties towards God, and Duties towards our neighbours. Matth. xxii. 37: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second*

is like unto it: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets. And in like manner, in Mark xii. 30. This is said of the Law of Moses; but it is spoken of that Law, as being, what in the apprehension of the Jews it was, a complete body of human Duties. We shall explain our Duties towards God, when we come to speak of our Religious Culture. Taking the Ten Commandments as the summary of the Law of Moses, the first four refer to Duties towards God. The fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth commandments declare Obligations, rather than Duties. We have already referred to the Rules, *Thou shalt obey thy Parents; Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not utter a solemn falsehood;* as expressions of the Rights of Obedience, Personal Security, Marriage, Property, Contract. The tenth commandment, *Thou shalt not covet*, is, however, a Moral Precept, and not a Law, in the strict sense of the term.

489. The Christian teachers justly considered that Obligations are included in Duties, and do not need to be separately enjoined by the Moralist. They also conceived all Duties to be included in the Duty of Benevolence. Thus St. Paul says (Rom. xiii. 8), *Once no man anything (that is, reckon no Duty), but to love one another. He that loveth others hath fulfilled the Law. This, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet, and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.* When we come to treat of our religious progress, we shall have to speak of this Benevolence or Love, as a Christian Principle of action.

490. In following out the moral Principles of action into their results, in special Duties, the Relative Duties formerly mentioned (171) are naturally arranged according to the Relations to which they belong. Accordingly, we have enumerations of the principal Relations, with their corresponding Duties, in various parts of the

New Testament; especially in the two Epistles of St. Paul, to the Ephesians (chap. vi.), and to the Colossians (chapters ii. iii.) These two enumerations agree very nearly: and state the Relative Duties of Wives and Husbands; Children and Parents; Servants and Masters. In the Epistle to the Romans (chap. xiii.), we have the relative Duties summarily enjoined; *Render unto all their dues*; with an especial notice of the Duty of Obedience to government.

Duties, as enjoined upon us by Christian teaching, and on Christian grounds, are *Christian Duties*.

491. We shall now proceed to collect the principal Precepts with regard to Duties, which occur in the New Testament: arranging them according to the Heads of Duty which we have already found it convenient to adopt: namely; Duties of the Affections: Duties respecting Property and other objects of Desire: Duties connected with Truth: Duties connected with Purity: Duties of Obedience and Command. We had, besides these, to speak of Intellectual Duties, and in doing this, we are led to speak of man's Moral Education and of Religion, as a necessary part of this. The Duties thus arising have, for their object, man's Religious Progress.

CHAPTER IV.

CHRISTIAN PRECEPTS CONCERNING DUTIES OF THE AFFECTIONS.

492. THE Christian Precepts concerning Duties of the Affections include the *Moral* Precepts formerly given (174—185); but carry the teaching farther, both as to its requirements and its motives. Beginning from the obligation to abstain from all violence, these precepts inculcate the duty of controlling and repressing all intention of violence, and the affections which give rise to such intentions: they inculcate also the duty of fostering

and exercising affections of good-will with corresponding intentions and actions. They enjoin the virtues which consist in the habits of such affections, intentions, and actions. These duties and these virtues are enforced by motives depending upon religious truths. Some of these Precepts are the following.

493. In Matth. v. 21, Christ says, *Ye have heard it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgement.* This is the command of law; but the precept of duty goes much further: *Whosoever shall be angry with his brother man without a cause, or who shall use reviling and contemptuous words to him, shall be in danger of the judgement of God and the fire of hell.* And again, ver. 24, *Leave thy gift before the altar, and go thy way: first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift,* and hope for the favour of God. And these duties extend to adversaries, as well as to friends (191). Thus ver. 25, *Agree with thine adversary quickly whiles thou art in the way with him.* Be ready to dismiss thine enmity, and to disclaim it on the first occasion. It is a duty to dismiss from our hearts all desires of revenge and retaliation. Thus ver. 38, *Ye have heard that it hath been said (in the Law of Moses), An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you, that ye make not any such rule the measure of your affections.* Instead of retaliating evil, be ready to submit to it. *Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.* Suppress all emotions of anger, even such as are excited by personal violence, so far as your personal resentments are concerned. Not only is anger to be thus suppressed, but the opposite affection of love is to be entertained instead. Thus ver. 43, *Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies. . . Bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and*

sendeth rain on the just and the unjust. These precepts are also recorded in St. Luke vi. 29—35, where they are summed up with this (verse 36), *Be ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful.* †

494. The like precepts against revenge and anger are given by the Apostles of Christ. Thus St. Paul says to the Romans (xii. 19), *Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath:* (either, give way to the wrath of an adversary; or rather, leave the punishment of wrong to God; according to what follows:) *for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.* In like manner he writes to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. v. 14), *Be patient toward all men: see that none render evil for evil to any man.* And St. Peter (1 Pet. iii. 9) says the same thing, *Not rendering evil for evil, or railing for railing: but contrariwise, blessing; knowing that ye are thereunto called that ye should inherit a blessing.* St. James (i. 19) says, *Let every man be slow to wrath: for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.* St. Paul says to the Ephesians (Eph. iv. 31), *Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour, be put away from you, with all malice.* He gives the same injunction in nearly the same words to the Colossians (Col. iii. 8). To the Corinthians he says (1 Cor. xiv. 20), *In malice be ye children, but in understanding be ye men.* He calls the angry affections carnal (1 Cor. iii. 3; so St. James iv. 1); and speaks of *the works of the flesh* (Gal. v. 19), among which he mentions *hatred, variance, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders.* The forgiveness of injuries is inculcated. Christ taught his disciples (Matth. vi. 14), *If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.* And accordingly, St. Paul says (Col. iii. 12), *Put on therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, longsuffering; forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any; even as Christ forgave you, so also do ye.*

495. The opposite affection, Love, is inculcated by Christ, at first as including in its spirit our obligations towards men: as in Matth. xix. 19, and xxii. 39, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: on these commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets.* So Mark xii. 31. Yet in referring to the nature and extent of the affection which he enjoined, he called it a *new* commandment. (John xiii. 34), *A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another:* which again is repeated John xv. 12, and again, xv. 17. Accordingly St. John often repeats such injunctions in his Epistles; as 1 John iii. 11, *This is the message that ye heard from the beginning, that we should love one another.* And so, 2 John 5, and 1 John ii. 7. Though the commandment was old, the light which Christ had brought into the world made it new. 1 John ii. 8, *A new commandment I write unto you, because the darkness is past and the true light now shineth. He that saith he is in the light, and hateth his brother, is in darkness even until now. He that loveth his brother abideth in the light. But he that hateth his brother is in darkness.* Again, 1 John iv. 7, *Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love.* And after referring to the love of God for us, as shown in his sending his Son to be the propitiation for our sins, he adds, ver. 11, *Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another.*

St. John extends his injunctions to actions. (1 John iii. 18, 17, 16), *My little children, let us not love in word, neither in tongue, but in deed and in truth. Whoso hath this world's goods, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him? We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.* In the same manner, St. Paul says (Rom. xiii. 8, 9, 10, and Gal. v. 14), that *all the commandments are comprehended in this one saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: that he that loveth another hath fulfilled the Law: for he*

adds (Rom. xiii. 10), *Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.* To the Ephesians he says (Eph. v. 2), *Walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us.* To the Thessalonians, (1 Thess. iii. 12), *The Lord make you to increase and abound in love one towards another:* and in many other places. St. James calls the precept above referred to a Royal Law, as governing all our duties. James ii. 8, *If ye fulfil the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, ye do well.*

496. The affection here inculcated is described also by other names, as *brotherly love* (φιλαδελφία) (Heb. xiii. 1). The term particularly used by the Apostles, and especially by St. Paul is that which we usually translate *charity* (ἀγάπη, translated in the Latin *charitas*, from *charus* or *carus*, whence *charity*.) St. Paul (1 Cor. xiii. 4) describes this affection; *Charity suffereth long, and is kind; envieth not; vaunteth not itself; is not puffed up; doth not seek her own; is not easily provoked; thinketh no evil; [beareth all things πάντα στέγει;] hopeth all things; endureth all things.* And this virtue he describes as a proper object of Christian pursuit (1 Cor. xiv. 1), *Follow after charity.* (Col. iii. 14), *Above all these things, put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness.* So 1 Tim. vi. 11, 2 Tim. ii. 22, where the word is the same, though translated *love* in the former place. So Peter (2 Pet. i. 7), *Add to brotherly kindness, charity (ἐπιχορηγήσατε... ἐν τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ ἀγάπην)* as an additional step in Christian virtue. And this is the word which is translated *love* in many of the passages above quoted, as 1 John iv. 8, ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν.

Other terms are also used for the affections of this kind. Thus Matth. v. 7, *Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy* (ἐλεήμονες: but in Luke vi. 36 the Greek word is οἰκτιρῶνες). Σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρῶν, *bowels of mercies*, are enjoined (Col. iii. 12). In 1 Pet. iii. 8, we have a similar expression translated *pitiful* (εὐσπλαγχοί); but Eph. iv. 32 *tender-hearted.* *Compassionate*, συμπαθεῖς, (1 Pet. iii. 8) is a term also used.

497. The word, for *pity*, (ἐλεημοσύνη) came to signify the evidence of pity which is given by bounty to the poor. It had this signification among the Jews. So Matth. vi. 1, *Take heed that ye do not your alms before men to be seen of them.* The word *alms* is contracted from ἐλεημοσύνη, *eleemosyne*; as is the case with the corresponding words in other European languages, (Ital. *Elimosina*, *Limosina*. Span. *Limosna*. Old Fr. *Almosne*, *Aumosne*, whence modern Fr. *Aumône*. German *Almosen*. Anglo Saxon *Ælmesse*, *Ælmes*). In Luke xi. 41; xii. 33, we have *give alms*. (So Acts iii. 2; ix. 36; x. 2, 4, 31; xxiv. 17.) In like manner the word *charity* in English is often used in the sense of alms.

498. *Meekness* is a Christian virtue often enjoined. Thus Matth. v. 5, *Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth* (οἱ πραεῖς). And xi. 29, *Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls.* St. Paul (Gal. v. 23) enumerates *meekness* among the *fruits of the spirit*, and enjoins it in many places, (Gal. vi. 1; Eph. iv. 2; Col. iii. 12; 1 Tim. vi. 11; 2 Tim. ii. 25; Tit. iii. 2; so Jam. i. 21, and iii. 13; 1 Pet. iii. 15.)

499. We are to be meek as to our own claims, and attentive to the claims of others. (Phil. ii. 4), *Look not each man on his own things, but each on the things of others.* (Eph. v. 21), *Submitting yourselves one to another in the fear of God.* (1 Pet. v. 5), *Yea, all of you be subject one to another, and be clothed with humility.* (Phil. ii. 3), *In lowliness of mind let each esteem other better than themselves.* (Rom. xii. 10), *Be kindly affectioned one to another* (φιλόστοργοι), *with brotherly love, in honour preferring one another.* So (Rom. xiii. 7), *Render honour to whom honour is due.* Which St. Peter (1 Pet. ii. 17) puts more largely, *Honour all men.* The expression of this feeling is, *courtesy*. (1 Pet. iii. 8), *Be courteous* (φιλόφρονες). Other marks of good-will are inculcated; as to exercise hospitality (1 Pet. iv. 9); *Use hospitality one to another without grudging: to*

avoid quarrels. (Rom. xii. 18), *If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men.*

500. The above precepts condemn anger when it is caused by something which thwarts our desires. But religion, as well as morality, encourages virtuous indignation against what is wrong; and permits the expression of this affection by words and acts. Of this we have examples in Jesus Christ himself, (Mark iii. 5), *He looked round about him on them with anger, being grieved at the hardness of their hearts.* And the like feeling is expressed (Matth. xxiii. 13—17) in words, where he says, *Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! Woe unto you, blind guides! Ye fools and blind!* And this language he uses even to his disciples (Luke xxiv. 25), *O fools and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken.* St. Paul uses the like language (Gal. iii. 1), *O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, that ye should not obey the truth?* St. James's expression is nearly equivalent (Jam. ii. 20), *Wilt thou know, O vain man, that faith without works is dead?* We have the like feeling expressed in act (John ii. 15), *When he had made a scourge of small cords, he drove them out of the temple, and poured out the changers' money, and overthrew the tables.* St. Paul recognizes blameless anger, and only limits its duration (Eph. iv. 26), *Be ye angry, and sin not; let not the sun go down upon your wrath.* And to the Corinthians (2 Cor. vii. 11) he reckons certain feelings of this kind among the results of *godly sorrow.* *What carefulness it wrought in you, yea, what clearing of yourselves, yea, what indignation, yea, what fear, yea, what vehement desire, yea, what zeal, yea, what revenge.* (πόσῃν σπουδῇν; ἀλλὰ ἀπολογίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀγανάκτησιν, ἀλλὰ φόβον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιπόθησιν, ἀλλὰ ζῆλον, ἀλλὰ ἐκδίκησιν.) And he rejoices that they had vindicated themselves with such feelings. Indignation, and carefulness, or earnestness, are here combined with *zeal*; which is often mentioned as a term of praise (Rom. x. 2), *I bear them (the Jews) record, that they have a zeal of God, but not*

according to knowledge. So (2 Cor. ix. 2), *Your zeal hath provoked many.* And so in other places (Acts xxii. 3; Phil. iii. 6), *Zeal* is spoken of approvingly, so far as it is Zeal, though*condemned as Mistaken Zeal. The term is used with reference to special objects. Thus to the Corinthians (1 Cor. xiv. 12), *Forasmuch as ye are zealous of spiritual gifts, seek that ye may excel to the edifying of the church.* (Tit. ii. 14), *He gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works.*

501. Earnestness is enjoined in other expressions, as (2 Cor. viii. 16), *God put the same earnest care in the heart of Titus for you* (σπουδὴν). (Heb. ii. 1), *We ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest at any time we let them slip* (περισσοτέρως ἡμᾶς προσέχαιν). (Jude 3), *Beloved, when I gave all diligence to write unto you of the common salvation, it was needful for me to write unto you and exhort you that ye should earnestly contend for the faith which was once delivered unto the saints* (ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι). Expressions including the notion of *striving* and *contending* are often used. As (Luke xiii. 24), *Strive to enter in at the strait gate* (ἀγωνίζεσθε). So 1 Tim. vi. 12, *Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal life* (ἀγωνίζου τὸν καλὸν ἀγῶνα). And 2 Tim. iv. 7, *I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith.* (Col. i. 29), *That we may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus. Whereunto I also labour, striving according to his working, which worketh in me mightily* (ἀγωνιζόμενος κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ). Also (2 Pet. iii. 14), *Be diligent that ye may be found of him in peace, without spot and blameless,* (σπουδάσατε). (2 Cor. viii. 7), *Ye abound in everything, in faith, in utterance, in knowledge, in all-diligence* (πάση σπουδῇ).

502. The injunctions not to return evil for evil, and rather (1 Cor. vi. 7), *to take wrong,* and to submit to revilings and blows, do not prohibit Christians from protecting themselves by the aid of laws against violence and contumely. The Magistrate is described by St.

Paul as a minister of God, appointed to execute wrath on the man that doeth evil (Rom. xiii. 1); and by St. Peter, as sent for the punishment of evildoers (1 Pet. ii. 13). Accordingly, we find St. Paul appealing to the existing laws, and expressing indignation at the violation of them. Thus when the magistrates who had put St. Paul and Silas in prison at Philippi offered to release them (Acts xvi. 37), *Paul said unto them, They have beaten us openly uncondemned, being Romans, and have cast us into prison: and now do they thrust us out privily? nay verily; but let them come themselves and fetch us out.* When Ananias commanded those who stood near Paul to smite him on the mouth (Acts xxiii. 3), *Paul said unto him, God shall smite thee, thou whited wall: for sittest thou to judge me after the law, and commandest me to be smitten contrary to the law?* And when at Cæsarea Paul was urged to go to Jerusalem, to be there tried on the charges which were brought against him by the Jews, he protected himself by his legal privilege, and said, *I appeal unto Cæsar.*

503 These precepts which have been adduced are not to be received as positive and rigorous laws which are to be applied literally to external acts. When they make mention of external acts; as in the precept, *Whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the left. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also:* that these precepts are not to be thus literally interpreted, is evident from what has been said respecting the conduct of the Apostles themselves. The precepts are to be understood as Moral Precepts; that is, as enjoining internal acts, control of the will and intention, a discipline of the affections, and the promotion of a certain disposition. The precepts indicate the disposition at which Christians are to aim, as the opposite of that resentful unyielding temper, which would return a blow for a blow, and would insist on every particle of its right.

504. The reasons which in these precepts are connected with the injunction, must be accepted in

several cases as imperfectly expressing the Christian ground of the duty. Thus, in the injunction Matth. v. 25, *Agree with thine adversary*, it is added, *lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison: verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing.* Such a suggestion must be considered as recommending a placable disposition for its external advantages, in the first place; in order that the acquisition of such a disposition on grounds of prudence, might prepare the way for a true application of it on grounds of religion. In like manner, he who is angry with his brother without a cause, and who reviles him, is said to be in danger of the judgment and of the council, that is, of human tribunals; but from the context it appears, that the condemnation of God is implied, as the true ground of the warning, in these clauses, as well as where it is expressed by the fire of hell. The Benevolent Affections are enjoined as the command of God.

505. But further: Christians are urged to imitate their heavenly Father and their Saviour Christ. *Do good to them that hate you, that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: Be ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful. If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: forgiving one another, even as Christ also forgave you.* So St. Peter (1 Pet. ii. 23), *Christ left us an example, who when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not.* And Christ enjoins, *As I have loved you, that ye also love one another.* So St. John, *If God so love us, we ought to love one another. Love is of God. God is love.* Again, our love of our neighbour is the evidence of our love of God. *Whoso shutteth up his compassion from his brother, how dwelleth the love of God in him?* So (1 John iv. 20), *If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen? And this commandment have we from him, That he who loveth*

God love his brother also. Christians are also reminded that they are brothers, by being all children of one Father; and as brothers, bound to love one another. In opposition to the *works of the spirit* (Gal. v. 22) which are required of Christians, and which are *love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance*; all angry affections are called *works of the flesh*, as it is declared that *they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.*

CHAPTER V.

CHRISTIAN PRECEPTS CONCERNING PROPERTY AND OTHER OBJECTS OF DESIRE.

506. SUCH kindly affections towards our neighbours as have been above spoken of, show themselves in giving to them what they need: and Christian Precepts enjoining such duties are mixed with those just quoted. But the kindly affections were there urged upon us in opposition to the angry ones; we are now to consider the precepts in which they are urged in opposition to the love of property, which when predominant, is *covetousness*. Thus, in the Sermon on the Mount (Matth. v. 42), *Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn thou not away.* So (Luke xiv. 13), *When thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind: and thou shalt be blessed; for they cannot recompense thee: for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just.* (Acts xx. 35), Paul says to the Ephesian elders, *I have shewed you all things, how that labouring ye ought to support the weak, and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, that it is more blessed to give than to receive.* So to the Corinthians (2 Cor. ix. 6, 9), *He which soweth sparingly, shall reap also sparingly; and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap also bountifully. Every man according as he purposeth in his heart, so let him*

give; for God loveth a cheerful giver. And God is able to make all grace to abound toward you, that ye always having all sufficiency in all things may abound to every good work. So Paul commends the Philippians for their sending him assistance: and says (Phil. iv. 17), *Not because I desire a gift, but I desire fruit that may abound to your account.* He calls it *a sacrifice acceptable, well pleasing to God*; and adds, *But my God shall supply all your need according to his riches in glory by Christ Jesus.* So (1 Tim. vi. 17—19), *Charge them that are rich in this world, that they be not highminded, nor trust in uncertain riches, but in the living God, who giveth us richly all things to enjoy; that they do good; that they be rich in good works; ready to distribute, willing to communicate; laying up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life.* (Heb. xiii. 16), *To do good and to communicate forget not, for with such sacrifices God is well pleased.* And St. James (Jam. ii. 15, 16), *If a brother or sister be naked and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be ye warmed and filled (that is, express a good wish for them); notwithstanding ye give them not those things which are needful for the body, what doth it profit?* So St. John (1 John iii. 17), *Whoso hath this world's good, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?* and St. Peter says (1 Pet. iv. 10), *As every man hath received the gift, even so let him minister the same one to another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God.*

507. The considerations by which these duties are urged upon Christians, are, that they are the means of obtaining God's favour. In some of the passages, it might appear as if the act of giving money, were represented as directly leading to a reward in heaven: as when Christ (Luke xvi. 9) exhorts his disciples, *Make to yourselves friends of the unrighteous Mammon.* So St. Paul (2 Cor. ix. 6, 9), *He which soweth sparingly, shall reap also sparingly, and he which soweth bountifully,*

shall reap also bountifully. (Heb. vi. 10), *God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labour of love, which ye have shewed toward his name, in that ye have ministered to the saints, and do minister.* But it is evident, by the general tendency of Scripture, that such acts are enjoined, as evidences of our love to men; and thus, of our love to God. St. Paul says that when they are not the results of such affections they are valueless. (1 Cor. xiii. 3), *Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.*

508. The first Christians were a small portion of the civil community in which they lived; and had it for a main object of their lives, to exhibit their abhorrence of the prevailing vices of the society, out of which they had been called. Among these vices, love of money and want of compassion for the poor had a prominent place. The Christians made their protest against these vices, by discarding all regard for money. Christ had said to the rich young man who asked what he should do to attain eternal life (Matth. xix. 21; Mark x. 21; Luke xviii. 22), *If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven.* And in pursuance of such injunctions, the early Christians had their property common (Acts iv. 32), *The multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul; neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common.*

509. Still this was not carried so far as to put an end to difference of wealth. Peter said to Ananias, respecting his property: (Acts v. 4), *Whiles it remained, was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power?* For (Acts xi. 29) *The disciples (at Antioch), every man according to his ability (which was therefore various), determined to send relief unto the brethren which dwelt in Judæa.* So (1 Cor. xvi. 2), *Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him (for the collection for the saints);* which expression implies that each person possessed the produce of his

own employments. So (1 Tim. vi. 17), *Charge them that are rich in this world*, implies that some Christians were rich.

510. It is evident that St. Paul did not approve of the poor living at the expense of the rich; for even though engaged in the labours of his ministry, he wrought for his own living, and repeatedly urges his example upon his converts. Acts xx. 34, 35. *Ye yourselves know that these hands have ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me. I have shewed you all things, how that so labouring ye ought to support the weak, and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive.* So (1 Thess. ii. 9), *Labouring night and day, because we would not be chargeable unto any of you, we preached unto you the gospel of God.* And (2 Thess. iii. 8), *Neither did we eat any man's bread for nought, but wrought with labour and travail night and day, that we might not be chargeable to any of you: not because we have not power, but to make ourselves an ensample unto you to follow us. For even when we were with you, this we commanded you, that if any would not work, neither should he eat.* And thus (Eph. iv. 28), *Let him that stole steal no more; but rather let him labour, working with his hands, that he may have to give to him that needeth.* So (Tit. iii. 14), *Let our people learn honest works (or trades), that they be not unfruitful.* The Corinthians are repeatedly reminded that he had not been burdensome to them (2 Cor. xi. 9; xii. 13). And he adds (14), *Behold, the third time I am ready to come unto you; and I will not be burdensome to you: for I seek not yours, but you: for the children ought not to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children.*

511. As each person was thus exhorted to support himself, so was it urged as his duty to support the members of his family. (1 Tim. v. 8), *If any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he is worse than an infidel.* (16), *If any man or woman that believeth have widows, let them relieve them, and let not the church be charged, that it may relieve them that*

are widows indeed; that is, that are destitute of natural supporters. And (4), If any widow have children or nephews, let them (the children) learn first to shew piety at home, and to requite their parents; for that is good and acceptable before God.

512. Hospitality is often recommended in such passages. Hospitality to our friends is a practice that does not need a religious sanction. Hospitality to strangers was urged upon the early Christians with some reference to their special circumstances, and those of the times. Thus (1Pet. iv. 9), *Use hospitality one to another without grudging.* (Heb. xiii. 2), *Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.* (Rom. xii. 13), *Distributing to the necessity of the saints; given to hospitality.*

513. With regard to riches, Content is recommended. 1 Tim. vi. 6, *Godliness with contentment is great gain; for we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain that we can carry nothing out. And having food and raiment, let us be therewith content.* St. Paul urges this by his own example (Phil. iv. 11), *I have learned, in whatever state I am, therewith to be content.*

514. In connexion with such precepts, are the warnings to Christians not to set their hearts on riches. (Matth. iv. 19), *Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal...for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.* And to this effect is the saying of Jesus after his answer to the rich young man (Matth. xix. 23; Mark x. 23; Luke xviii. 24), *How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God!* which is more distinctly explained in (Mark x. 24), *How hard is it for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God!* This is further illustrated by St. Paul (1 Tim. vi. 9), *They that will be rich, fall into a temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition. For the love of money is the root of all evil; which while some have coveted after, they have erred*

from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows. So (Luke xii. 15), *Take heed, and beware of covetousness; for a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth.* And covetousness is enumerated among the vices (Rom. i. 28; 1 Cor. v. 11; vi. 10.) And (Eph. v. 5; Col. iii. 5), we are told that *a covetous man is an idolater*, and that *covetousness is idolatry*; money being the idol.

Christians are to be *not greedy of filthy lucre* (*αισχροκερδεις*); this is said of bishops (1 Tim. iii. 2; Tit. i. 7), of deacons (1 Tim. iii. 8), of elders (1 Pet. v. 2).

515. Christians are warned, not only against the love of money, but also against tenaciousness with regard to their rights. Thus (1 Cor. x. 24), *Let no man seek his own, but every man another's advantage.* (xiii. 5), *Charity seeketh not her own.* (vi. 7), *Now therefore there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law with one another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? Why do ye not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?*

516. When the desires and affections with regard to human possessions are thus controlled and subdued, it becomes easy to carry into effect the rules of justice relative to such matters. Accordingly, St. Paul reproves the Corinthians for finding any difficulty in doing this. (1 Cor. vi. 5, 4), *I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is not a wise man among you? no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? If ye have judgments of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the church.* The most eminent persons in the early church had higher offices than judging concerning property. The objects of Christian teaching, at that time, were not the reformation and pure administration of the laws, for which civil society itself provides; but the reformation and purification of men's hearts. Hence, we do not find in the New Testament such earnest and frequent condemnation of injustice and false judgment as are common in the Old Testament. These latter refer to a community, in which religion was the acknowledged basis of law; and where, therefore, the just administration of law was a high religious duty.

517. Justice, in the wider sense of Equity, is enjoined. (Col., iv. 1), *Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven.* (Phil., iv. 8), *Things which are just* are recommended along with things which *are true, honest, lovely, of good report.* And (Tit. i. 8), *A bishop must be just, as well as a lover of hospitality, a lover of good men.*

518. Perhaps to some readers, justice in matters of property may seem to be made light of, in the parable of the unjust steward, whom *the lord* (that is, his lord) *commended* (Luke xvi. 8), and of the unjust judge (Luke xviii. 6) of whom Christ said, *Hear what the unjust judge saith.* But it is to be recollected that a parable is a mode of illustrating some one truth; and is not to have its subordinate parts drawn into inferences. The parable of the unjust steward is put forwards to illustrate the duty of foresight; the prudence of godliness. The steward's lord commended him as having acted with foresight and prudence, which evidently he had, though not with honesty. The parable is intended, not to illustrate the relative value of prudence and honesty, but of prudence and that imprudence which disregards a future life. The unjust steward is put forward as an example of the *children of this world*, who are opposed to the *children of light.* They are the wiser of the two *in their generation*; but if we look beyond their generation, their wisdom is folly. In the same manner, the parable of the unjust judge is put forth to illustrate the efficacy of prayer, and not the character to which prayer is addressed, as it is stated (ver. 1), *He spake a parable to them to this end, that men ought always to pray, and not to faint.*

CHAPTER VI. •

CHRISTIAN PRECEPTS CONCERNING
TRUTH.

519. THE same desires and affections which tend to the appropriation of the property of others, often lead to fraud and falsehood; and thus, the warnings to Christians already quoted, bear upon the subjects now under consideration. But there are many precepts more especially directed to these subjects; as (1 Thess. iv. 6), *This is the will of God: that no man go beyond and defraud his brother in any matter: because that the Lord is the avenger of all such, as we also have forewarned you and testified.* And to the Corinthians he says reproachfully (1 Cor. vi. 8), *Ye do wrong, and defraud, and that your brethren. Know ye not that the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God?* To the Ephesians (Eph. iv. 25), *Putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour; for we are members one of another.* And to the Colossians (Col. iii. 9), *Lie not one to another, seeing ye have put off the old man with his deeds; and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him.*

520. Such attributes as *true*; *faithful* as a promiser (Heb. x. 23; xi. 11); *faithful* to him that appointed him (Heb. iii. 2); *sincere*; are constantly used as praise. It is mentioned among the signs of the perilous times that shall come (2 Tim. iii. 2), that men shall be *truce-breakers, false accusers* (ἄσπονδοί, διάβολοί). But such terms as *faithful, sincere*, and the like, are more commonly used with reference to the relation between God and man. The constant exhortations of Christian teachers to the love of our neighbour, and their warnings against those desires which lead to fraud, lying, breach of promise, and the like; make it almost unnecessary for them to condemn such offenses expressly. The words which are translated by *honest*, in our version, are, for the most part, such as imply qualities respected and

admired by men, like *honestum* in Latin: as *καλὰ* in (Rom. xii. 17), *Provide things honest in the sight of all men.* (2 Cor. viii. 21), *Providing for honest things, not only in the sight of the Lord, but also in the sight of man.* (xiii. 7), *I pray to God that ye do no evil...but that ye should do that which is honest.* (1 Pet. ii. 11), *I beseech you, abstain from lusts...having your conversation honest among the Gentiles; that, whereas they speak against you as evil-doers, they may by your good works, which they shall behold, glorify God.* So *σεμνὰ* (Phil. iv. 8), *Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.* (1 Tim. ii. 2), *Pray for kings, and all that are in authority: that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty* (*σεμνότητι*).

CHAPTER VII.

CHRISTIAN PRECEPTS CONCERNING PURITY.

521. THE Christian is enjoined to be free from the dominion of sensual, as well as of covetous, desires: pure, as well as honest. These epithets are joined (Phil. iv. 8), *Whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure* (*ὅσα ἀγα*). The same word is used (1 Tim. v. 22), *Keep thyself pure.* (1 John iii. 3), *Every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as he is pure.*

The same word is used to express conjugal chastity (Tit. ii. 5; 1 Pet. iii. 1). But much more than mere observance of legal obligation is required, in this as in other cases. (Matth. v. 27), *Ye have heard that it was*

said by them of old time, *Thou shalt not commit adultery: but I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.* And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell. So by St. Paul lasciviousness (ἀσέλγεια) is condemned, as well as the acts to which it leads, (Gal. v. 19), *The works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness...of the which I tell you before, as I have told you in time past, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.* So 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10. Also (Eph. v. 3), *Fornication and all uncleanness...let it not be once named among you; as becometh saints; neither filthiness (αἰσχροτήτης), nor foolish talking and jesting, which are not convenient.* (Col. iii. 5), *Mortify your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, inordinate affection (πάθος), evil concupiscence (ἐπιθυμίαν κακὴν)...for which things' sake the wrath of God cometh on the children of disobedience.*

Other expressions are also used; as (1 Tim. v. 6), *She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth (σπαταλώσα).* This word is also used by St. James in his denunciation of woe against luxurious and tyrannical men. (James v. 5), *Ye have lived in pleasure in the earth, and been wanton (ἐτρυφήσατε καὶ ἐσπαταλήσατε).*

522. Christian teaching urges an especial argument against fornication (1 Cor. vi. 15—20), *What! know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God; and ye are not your own? for ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and in your Spirit, which are God's.* The same argument is used (1 Cor. iii. 16), *Know ye not that ye are the temple of God? If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy.*

523. Other sins of lust are spoken of as the extremes of human depravity, when God gives men up unto vile affections (Rom. i. 20, and 1 Cor. vi. 9).

524. The conjugal union is commended, and its duties sanctioned. (Heb. xiii. 4), *Marriage is honourable in all, and the bed undefiled.* (1 Cor. vii. 3), *Let the husband render unto the wife due benevolence; and likewise also the wife unto the husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband: and likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife.* (1 Thess. iv. 3), *This is the will of God, even your sanctification, that ye should abstain from fornication: that every one of you should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honour; not in the lust of concupiscence, even as the Gentiles which know not God.* (1 Tim. v. 14), *I will that the younger women marry, bear children, guide the house.*

525. There are passages in which St. Paul intimates it to be his private opinion, that, under the circumstances of the time, it was better then for Christians to abstain from marriage: but he does not deliver this as the Divine command. Thus (1 Cor. vii. 25), *Concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord: yet I give my judgement as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful. I suppose therefore that this is good for the present distress; I say, that it is good for a man so to be; namely, to be a virgin or unmarried.* In verses 32, 33, he explains further the reasons of this advice, which belong especially to the condition of his disciples as Christians, occupied by religious duties. *I would have you without carefulness. He that is unmarried careth for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please the Lord. But he that is married careth for the things that are of the world, how he may please his wife.* He ᾤδῃ (28), *But and if thou marry, thou hast not sinned; and if a virgin marry, she hath not sinned.* He had in the previous part of the chapter (6—9) given the same advice to unmarried and widows, with the same limitation: *I speak this by permission, and not of commandment:* and he repeats it again in like manner in the end of the chapter.

526. The conjugal union is further invested with a religious significance. (1 Cor. xi. 11), *Neither is the*

man without the woman, neither the woman without the man, in the Lord. For as the woman is of the man, even so is the man also by the woman. (Eph. v. 23), The husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church... Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for it... So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever yet hated his own flesh: but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the Church. For we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh. This passage (Gen. ii. 24) had already been quoted by Christ (Matth. xix. 4; Mark x. 5), He answered and said unto them, Have ye not read that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female; and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

527. The precepts of the New Testament which speak of cases in which marriage may be annulled, have a reference to the law of the Old Testament. Moses had commanded (Dent. xxiv. 1), That if a man marry, and his wife find no favour in his eyes, he should write her a bill of divorcement, and send her away. After this, she might be married to another man, but never to her former husband. The practices which, in virtue of this law, prevailed among the Jews at the time of Christ's coming, led to a question which was proposed to him, (Matth. xix. 3; Mark x. 2), *The Pharisees came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? He answered as in the passage just quoted, referring to the first institution of marriage by God, and ending, What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give her a writing of divorcement, and*

to put her away? He saith unto them; Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery, and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth, commit adultery.

528. The part of this passage in which it is said that Moses gave the Jews his command *because of the hardness of their hearts*, appears to imply, like the rest of Christ's teaching, that the Christian was to aim at a higher degree of moral purity than was placed before the Jew. The Jew was commanded or permitted to put away his wife *if she found no favour in his eyes*: the Christian was enjoined to aim at making the marriage union as complete as it was *in the beginning*, at its first institution. The latter part of the passage appears, to some commentators, to refer to a case in which the putting away the wife and the marrying another are part of the same design; such a design is declared to be adulterous. They urge, that if the passage be understood without this connexion, the Law of Moses permitted or commanded adultery. They also urge, that a settled unfitness in the minds of two persons may be a greater obstacle to the ends of marriage, than the condemnation, mistrust, and grief occasioned by a bodily sin. But to this latter argument, it may be replied, that bodily sin may properly be made the ground of a judicial proceeding, because it is a thing capable of proof, and for the most part operating inevitably upon all persons' minds in the same manner, in virtue of the universal affections and habits of mankind: but that the permanent unfitness of two minds to the conjugal union is not capable of proof, since the effects of transient passion, caprice, or design, are not distinguishable from permanent unfitness of mind; and further, that it does not appear that, in any case, such unfitness may not be overcome, by cultivating those affections which religion and morality enjoin us to cultivate; kindness, gentleness, meekness, patience, cheerfulness. It may also be remarked, that

the cultivation of such affections, in such a case, will be prosecuted more resolutely and successfully, if the parties believe that the marriage cannot be dissolved, merely because this task of self-cultivation is imperfectly executed; and if they further believe that such an ordinance respecting marriage is sanctioned by the Divine command.

529. It was a question among the early Christians, whether religious disbelief in Christ, on the one side, annulled the marriage. St. Paul gives his opinion, not the Divine Command. (1 Cor. vii. 12), *To the rest speak I, not the Lord: If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And the woman which hath an husband that believeth not, and if he be pleased to dwell with her, let her not leave him. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband: else were your children unclean, but now are they holy. For what knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? Or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?* It is to be observed, that the Greek word by which the consent is expressed (*συνευδοκεῖ*) implies mutual consent, according to the opinion of some.

It would appear, however, that if the wife or the husband were deserted on this account, St. Paul held the marriage bond to be broken. Verse 15, *But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart; a brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases; but God hath called us to peace.*

530. Christian teaching exhorts us to moderate, and rightly direct, other bodily desires, as well as those which belong to the conjugal state. Christians are enjoined to be sober and temperate. Thus, (1 Tim. iii. 2, and Tit. i. 7), *A bishop must be blameless as the steward of God; not self-willed, not soon angry, not given to wine, no striker, not given to filthy lucre, but a lover of hospitality, a lover of good men, sober, temperate. So (Tit. ii. 2), Teach that the aged men be sober, grave, temperate...The aged women likewise that they be in*

behaviour as becometh holiness, . . . not given to much wine, teachers of good things ; that they may teach the young women to be sober. (1 Tim. iii. 8), Likewise must the deacons be grave, not double-tongued, not given to much wine, not greedy of filthy lucre. And (ver. 11), Even so must their wives be grave, not slanderers, sober, faithful in all things. (Eph. v. 18), Be not drunk with wine, wherein is excess (ἀσωτία, intemperance), but be filled with the Spirit.

531. But the exhortations to Sobriety imply generally Sobriety of Mind, as well as bodily temperance. We see that *grave* is joined with *sober*. So (Eph. v. 4), the Apostle forbids *foolish talking and jesting* (μωρολογία καὶ εὐτραπεία): though the latter disposition, in Aristotle's Ethics, (there usually translated *facetiousness, pleasantry, wit,*) is enumerated among the virtues, and described as intermediate between the opposite vices of βωμολοχία and ἀγροικία, buffoonery and churlishness.

532. The Christian condition affords special reasons for this sobriety of mind. Thus (1 Thess. v. 5), *Ye are all the children of light, and the children of the day : we are not of the night nor of darkness. Therefore let us not sleep as do others, but let us watch and be sober.* (1 Pet. i. 13), *Gird up the loins of your mind, and be sober.* (iv. 7), *The end of all things is at hand : be ye therefore sober, and watch unto prayer.* (v. 8), *Be sober, be vigilant ; because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking whom he may devour.* (Tit. ii. 11, 12), *The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world.*

533. Moderation in dress and ornaments is also enjoined. (1 Tim. ii. 9), *I will that women adorn themselves in modest apparel, with shamefacedness and sobriety ; not with broided hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly array.* (1 Pet. iii. 3), *Ye wives ; your adorning let it not be that outward adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, or of putting on of apparel.*

534. In addition to this, are enjoined regard to

domestic duties, and moderation in the enjoyment of company, (Tit. ii. 4), *Teach the young women to be sober, to love their husbands, to love their children, to be discreet, chaste, keepers at home* (οικουρὸς).

535. Among the duties thus enjoined upon women, is that of being *obedient to their own husbands* (Tit. ii. 3). So (1 Pet. iii. 1), *Likewise, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands.* And St. Paul says (Eph. v. 22), *Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church.* In 1 Cor. xi. 7, St. Paul says, *The man is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man.*

This Duty, however, more properly belongs to the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII.

CHRISTIAN PRECEPTS CONCERNING OBEDIENCE AND COMMAND.

536. THE duty of obedience of children towards their parents, which is recognized by the laws and customs of all countries, is sanctioned by Christian teaching. (Matth. xv. 3), *Christ said unto them, Why do ye transgress the commandment of God by your tradition? For God commanded, saying, Honour thy father and mother, and, He that curseth father or mother, let him die the death: but ye say, that if a man refuse to his parents what they require on pretence that he has vowed it to sacred uses, and honour not his father or mother, he shall be free. Thus have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition.* And St. Paul, in the same manner, refers to this part of the law of Moses (Eph. vi. 1), *Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is*

right. Honour thy father, and mother; which is the first commandment with promise: that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest live long on the earth. So (Col. iii. 20), *Children, obey your parents in all things, for this is well-pleasing unto the Lord.* And disobedience is mentioned (2 Tim. iii. 2) among the signs of the *perilous times* that shall come. *Men shall be lovers of their own selves, covetous, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, without natural affection.*

537. Natural affection, thus sanctioned by religion, is termed *piety* by the Christian teachers; as it was by the Roman and Greek writers. This piety must show itself in acts. (1 Tim. v. 4), *If any widow have children, or nephews, let them learn first to show piety at home, and to requite their parents; for that is good and acceptable before God.*

538. Along with the duty of obedience in children, is inculcated the duty of good and gentle government in parents. (Eph. vi. 4), *Ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath, but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.* (Col. iii. 21), *Fathers, provoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged.*

539. There are other duties of the heads of families: as provision for bodily needs. (1 Tim. v. 8), *If any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he is worse than an infidel.* And (though said in the way of illustration) (2 Cor. xii. 14), *The children ought not to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children.* Also government (1 Tim. iii. 4), *A bishop must be one that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection with all gravity.* A family contains servants, as well as children; and Christian teaching enjoins, between them and the masters, the duties of obedience on one side, and good government on the other. (Eph. vi. 5), *Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ: not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but as the*

servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart: with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men... And, ye masters, do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening: knowing that your Master also is in heaven, neither is there respect of persons with him. Nearly the same precepts and reasons are given (Col. iii. 22; iv. 1). So (Tit. ii. 9), *Exhort servants to be obedient unto their own masters, and to please them well in all things, not answering again; not purloining, but shewing all good fidelity, that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things.* Also (1 Pct. ii. 18), *Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. For this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience towards God endure grief, suffering wrongfully. For what glory is it, if, when ye be buffeted for your faults, ye shall take it patiently? but if, when ye do well and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God.*

In this passage in St. Peter, the word translated *servant* is οικέτης, *domestic*; in the passage from St. Paul, it is δούλος, *slave*.

540. Some of the precepts respecting servants have an especial reference to their being bound to their masters as slaves; and also to the change which, it appears to have been expected by some, the acceptance of Christianity by masters and servants might produce in their domestic relation. (1 Tim. vi. 1), *Let as many servants as are under the yoke (slaves), count their own masters worthy of all honour, that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed. And they that have believing masters, let them not despise them, because they are brethren (Christians), but rather do them service, because they are faithful and beloved, partakers of the benefit (of the Gospel).* And (1 Cor. vii. 21), *Art thou called being a servant (a slave)? care not for it: but if thou mayest be made free, use the opportunity, rather than omit to do so. For he that is called in the Lord, being a bondman, is the Lord's freeman: likewise he that is called, being free, is Christ's bondman. Ye are bought with a price (by Christ); therefore be not the servants of*

men, so that this shall interfere with your service of Christ.

541. As Christians were thus enjoined to observe, respect, and heartily conform to the relations in families which were at that time established by law or usage, so were they enjoined to do the same with respect to the relations established in the State. Thus, Christ paid tribute to the State (Matth. xvii. 24—27), saying to Peter, *Lest we should offend them, go thou... thou shalt find a piece of money, that take, and give unto them for me and thee.* And (xxii. 21), he enjoined others to pay tribute: *Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's.* So St. Paul (Rom. xiii. 7), *Render to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour.* And this is joined with general injunctions of obedience to magistrates (xiii. 1—5), *Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.* And (Tit. iii. 1), *Put them in mind to be subject to governments (ἀρχαῖς) and powers, to obey magistrates.* Also St. Peter (1 Pet. ii. 13), *Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of God, that with well-doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men, who speak of you as bad subjects. As free (in spirit), and not using your liberty for a cloke of wickedness (or sedition) (κακίας), but as the*

servants of God. Honour all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the King.

542. The early Christians are here enjoined submission to the magistrates, as a course not only prudent, but also right and religious; *not only for wrath* (by reason of the menace of punishment), *but also for conscience sake: for the Lord's sake.* These powers, and the higher powers especially, are said to be *of God*; to be *ordained of God*; to be *the ministers of God*: to resist them is to resist the ordinance of God, and to incur danger of damnation.

The powers to which this applied, as appears by the condition of the early Christians, and by the facts, are the powers of the established government; they are called by St. Paul *the powers that be*; and by St. Peter, *every ordinance of man.* The term *King* appears to be also used, only because it was the name of the supreme magistrate at that time in that country.

543. And thus, in general, it is a Duty to obey the government established in the land where the Christian resides. The passages just quoted do not restrict this Duty to any form of government; and from the history of the times, we may infer that it is not confined to cases in which the ancient constitution, or the ancient line of sovereigns, subsists. For the constitution of the Roman State had recently been altered by violence, from a republican to an imperial form; and the ancient line of kings no longer ruled in Judæa.

Such passages, therefore, cannot afford any reason for imagining a religious Duty to oppose or disturb the existing government, in order to restore an ancient Constitution or an ancient Dynasty.

544. On the other hand, these passages do not at all show that, in any State, it may not be the duty of *the powers that be* to alter the laws, to appoint new magistrates, new magistracies, and the like; and allowable in extreme cases, in cases of necessity (328), to alter the Constitution of the country, or to depose the Sovereign. Whether this is the case, must depend upon considerations

belonging to Polity; in which religious as well as civil Polity must be taken into the account.

545. In a constitutional form of government, in which the whole or a large part of the citizens possess more or less political power, the Constitution, as much as the person or family of the Sovereign, may be considered as *the ordinance of man*, to which all are commanded to submit themselves. And every citizen, who thus possesses by Law a share of political power, is one of *the powers that be*. Every Christian, in such a situation, may and ought to exert his constitutional Rights, so far as they extend, both to preserve the State and the Laws from all needless and hasty innovation, and to effect such improvements in both as time and circumstances require; using the light of Religion as well as of Morality and Polity, to determine what really is improvement (see 237).

546. It is the office of the State to make Laws regulating the details of its Institutions, and the Duty of the Citizen to obey them (233). In like manner, in religious matters, it is the office of the Church to make laws respecting the detail of its Institutions; and it is the Duty of the Christian to conform to such Laws. Laws, Rules, and Customs on such subjects, are *Christian Ordinances*; and will be treated of hereafter.

CHAPTER IX. •

THE CHRISTIAN RULE OF CONSCIENCE.

547. WE have already spoken of Conscience; and have distinguished it into Conscience as Law, and Conscience as Witness (263). We have further stated, that our Conscience as Law, is that view at which we have arrived, of the Supreme Law of our being; and is thus, a stage in our Moral and Intellectual Progress (264). We have added, that we can never rightly assume that we have reached an ultimate stage in this Progress; we must always continue to labour further to enlighten and to instruct our Conscience (269). We have further added, in anticipation of the present part of our work, that in attempting constantly to carry on this process towards its completion, we find the need of light and power which we can only hope to obtain from Religion (270).

Religion presents to us the Supreme Law of our being as the Will of God; and hence, if we now inquire what is the Supreme Rule of Conscience, the answer can only be, that it is the Will of God. But the Will of God becomes the Rule of our Conscience, only by becoming known to us; and it is an important question, where we are to look for that knowledge of the Will of God, which is to be the Rule of our Conscience. Religion is to aid us to instruct and enlighten our Conscience; and we are led to inquire in what forms this instruction, and this light, are to be obtained.

548. The answer, in a general shape, can be no other than this; that the Will of God, so far as it is made known to man, in whatever manner, is the Rule of man's Conscience. Conscience, as Law, is Morality, the Law of our being. But we have already seen, that we are led to consider Morality under two main aspects; the Morality of Reason, and Christian Morality: both these give us a knowledge of the Will of God; and these are the two main portions of the Supreme Rule of Conscience.

549. Christian Morality is the Will of God as revealed to us by the coming of Christ; of which Revelation, the authoritative account is contained in the Scriptures. We here include the Scriptures of the Old, as well as of the New Testament, for both are parts of the same revelation. The Christian Morality, thus revealed, includes and comprises Rational Morality; carries its claims much deeper into our Spiritual Being; and invests it with far more certain and more powerful sanctions. Hence it may perhaps be thought by some, that Christian Morality supersedes the Morality of Reason; and that the Scriptures alone may be declared to be the Supreme Rule of the Christian's Conscience.

But a little consideration will show us that we cannot look upon the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament as the Supreme Rule of Conscience; that is, as the sole and complete Rule of Human Action.

550. This will appear from the Scriptures themselves, as well as from the reason of the case. The Scriptures themselves take for granted the light of reason, and the natural knowledge of moral rules to which men are thus led. Thus St. Paul says (Rom. ii. 14), *When the Gentiles, which have not the law (of the Scriptures), do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves. They show the work of the law written in their hearts; their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.* The precepts of Scripture cannot be a rule to those who have not received the Scripture: and such persons have for their proper guide the suggestions of reason, *the law written in their hearts.* The writings of heathen moralists, and the whole history of heathen life, show that the heathen were aware of a moral rule, and of the guilt incurred by its violation. The conception of sin implies the assumption of a law: as St. Paul says (Rom. iv. 15), *Where no law is, there is no transgression.* As St. John also says (1 John iii. 4), *Sin is the transgression of the law.* Since then we ascribe sin to heathens, we must suppose them to have a moral law; and this law cannot be the

precepts of Scripture, which have not found the way to them. The precepts of Scripture are not the sole rule of action for mankind.

551. But further, even Christians are referred to the natural sense of right on many occasions. Thus Christ says (Luke xii. 57), *Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?* St. Paul says (1 Cor. xi. 13, 14), *Judge in yourselves. . . doth not nature itself teach you?* and again (1 Cor. x. 15), *I speak as to wise men: judge ye what I say.* And the same application of the light of the reason, to judge of right and wrong, is implied, whenever Christ and his Apostles express indignation at offenses, not expressly forbidden in Scripture, but only necessarily condemned by inference from commands which are given. But it is to be remarked that, in Scripture, appeals to the natural conscience of man are very much mixed up with references to the revealed Divine commands. This results from the nature of the case; since the Divine commands contain a distinct promulgation of the main points of the natural moral law; and the law thus promulgated was appealed to, both as agreeable to reason, and enjoined by the will of God.

The religious teacher, instead of looking upon the moral law as the dictates of man's Reason, considers it as the law of God, who gave to man his Reason. But this does not prevent his recognizing the law written on the heart of man, as well as the law inscribed on the tables of the Mosaic covenant.

552. There is another reason why we should not look upon the precepts of Scripture as the sole and complete rule of human action. Namely this: it was not the main object of the Scriptures to promulgate laws of human action, but to publish the mode by which men were to find favour with God. St. Paul describes this very distinctly when he speaks to Timothy (2 Tim. iii. 15) of the *Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise to salvation.* For this purpose, Scripture has to teach us Doctrines, such as have already been spoken of, which the light of human reason could not discover. And the rules of human duty are there set forth, rather in propor-

tion as their connexion with those Doctrines requires, than in such manner as to produce a complete body of moral rules, requiring nothing besides itself for the guidance of human life.

553. Further: if we consider the form, character, and spirit of the books of Scripture, it will appear that we cannot expect to find in them a complete and systematic body of moral rules. For the precepts which the Scriptures contain are of various kinds; some refer to moral conduct, others to ceremonies; some apply to all men, others to particular persons; some are temporary, others perpetual commands. Some precepts are delivered *by opinion*, or *by permission*. 1 Cor. vii. 6, *I speak this by permission* (κατὰ συγγνώμην): and verse 40, *After my judgment* (κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην), as counsels directed to particular times and conditions: other precepts are delivered *by commandment* (1 Cor. vii. 6) (κατ' ἐπιταγήν), as to be observed by all at all times. We must distinguish these kinds of precepts from each other; the particular from the general, the temporary from the perpetual; and this must be done by the light of reason.

Scripture itself does not always separate these kinds of precepts. Thus (Levit. xix. 18), we have the general precept, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*; and in the next verse we have, *Thou shalt not sow thy field with mingled seed, neither shall a garment mingled of linen and woollen come upon thee*. No one will doubt that the former precept is a command for all men at all times, the latter a ceremonial command confined to the Jews. We allow the common reason of mankind to draw this distinction between the obligation imposed by these two successive verses; and we thus recognize the authority of human reason conjointly with that of Scripture, in defining the rules of human action.

554. Thus the precepts of Scripture are not the complete and sole Rule of human action *for us*, because they are evidently not intended by God to be so. The Will of God, in whatever manner made known to us, whether by Scripture, or by Reason, or by the joint light of the two, is our Rule of action. That by taking advantage of both, we may obtain a body of rules of

action in harmony with the will of God as revealed in Scripture, we have endeavoured to show, in the Chapters on Christian Morality.

555. This body of morality is enjoined upon us as a part of the plan of man's salvation. James iv. 12, *There is one forgiver, who is able to save and to destroy.* And any part of the legislation which thus expresses the will of God, cannot be superseded by any other obligation. Thus St. Peter and the Apostles declared (Acts v. 29), *We ought to obey God rather than men.* And (iv. 19), *Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye.*

556. Having thus taken a survey of the Christian Precepts which relate to special classes of Duties, we have still to speak of those religious Principles of action, of which all Duties are manifestations and developments (450). Our Progress towards the condition in which such Principles become operative in us, is our Religious Progress; as our progress towards the condition in which Moral Principles become operative in us, is our Moral Progress. It is a Duty to aim at Religious Progress, as it is a Duty to aim at Moral Progress; for our Moral Progress is incomplete, except it go onwards so as to be also Religious Progress. A Belief in God is a part of our Moral and Intellectual Progress; and this Belief, once arrived at, gives a new aspect to our views of Duty and its foundations. We cannot stop short of this belief, and of its influence, without making the progress of thought with regard to the foundations of Duty come to a termination; and to acquiesce in such a termination, is contrary to the nature of the moral and intellectual progress at which we are bound to aim.

Our endeavours to promote this religious Progress in ourselves, or in others, may be termed *Religious Culture*. Such Religious Culture is one of our Duties: and as was said before of the Duty of Moral Culture (208), this Duty is of so fundamental and comprehensive a character as to include all other Duties. We must now attend to some of the parts of this Duty of Religious Culture of ourselves.

CHAPTER X.

NATURAL PIETY.

557. THE belief in God, which most men possess, as a part of their mental habits, from the first dawn of thought; which is unfolded into a distinct form in the course of their moral and intellectual culture; and which is supported and confirmed by many reasonings, drawn both from the material and the moral world, brings with it corresponding Duties of the affections. We have already said (176) that man has, among his natural affections, a deference for something better, wiser, more stable, more permanent than himself. This feeling finds its employment in our regards towards human Authority, especially when this Authority is manifestly combined with Goodness and Justice; and makes Reverence and Obedience to such Authority to be Duties. But in order that our view of Duty may be consistent with itself, these Affections of Reverence and Justice must be conceived as equally due, wherever these conditions of Authority, combined with Goodness and Justice, are conceived to exist; and as due in a greater and greater degree, in proportion as the Authority, the Goodness, and the Justice, are more complete. In our Idea of God, we include Supreme Authority over his creatures, along with perfect Goodness and Justice. To him therefore, in an eminent and especial manner, Reverence and Obedience are due.

558. This Duty has been acknowledged by the universal feelings of mankind in all nations and in all ages. Men have always and everywhere declared their belief in God, and have looked upon him as the proper object of the most profound Reverence. In rude nations, whose moral and intellectual nature was very imperfectly developed, the idea of God has been entertained in a coarse and confused manner, under the forms of Polytheism, Hero-worship, and the like. In such cases, the Character ascribed to Deity has been Power, rather

than Authority, Justice, and Goodness; and the Affection has corresponded to the conception of the Character, and has been Fear, rather than Reverence. But when the moral attributes of God are more steadily apprehended, the Fear receives a mixture of Love, and becomes Reverence. And in proportion as the Goodness of God becomes more and more fixed in man's belief, Love predominates over Fear in the feelings which they have respecting him.

559. In like manner, Obedience to God has everywhere been recognized as a Duty. That he has made us what we are, and given us the faculties which we have, makes it right that we should obey him; for the Supreme Rule of our being, according to which right things are right, is what He has made it by his Will. The Rule of human action has been, in all stages of man's progress, commonly apprehended as identical with the Will of God. In proportion as the Rule of human action has been more completely conceived, and reduced to the Moral Principles of which we have spoken, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, those Principles have been conceived as attributes of God. And this identity, between the Will of God and the Supreme Rule of Human Action, being assumed, any special indications of the Will of God have been accepted, as having a supreme claim to our Obedience.

560. This is universally recognized with regard to those indications of the Will of God, which we discern in the constitution and circumstances of man. That man was *intended* by God, or by Providence, to follow this or that course, if the intention be allowed, is universally accepted as proving it *right* that he should follow such course. There are many indications of this kind, which all thoughtful men agree in acknowledging. We cannot doubt whether it was intended by the Creator that certain kinds of birds should do what they invariably do;—build nests, pair, feed their young, live in flocks, migrate. And when we look at man, as the naturalist looks at him, and find that property, marriage,

civil society, trade, are habits of men quite as universal as the habits of birds just mentioned, we cannot doubt that the institutions are a part of the intention of Providence in the Creation of man, just as the habits of birds are a part of the intention of Providence in the creation of birds. And this intention of Providence makes it *right* that man should conform himself to these Institutions, and to the Rules which are necessary for the existence of the Institutions in each community. We do not say that it is *right* for mere *animals* to conform themselves to these intentions of Providence; because for animals there is no rightness. They act by Instinct, which feels, not by Reason, which sees, a Rule. They are driven forward by implanted impulses, men by conscious intention. But man, himself capable and conscious of intention, can apprehend the existence of intention in his Maker, and cannot help apprehending it as a paramount Rule for his own intention.

561. The acknowledgment of the intention of the Creator as the proper Rule of man's actions, has sometimes been expressed by saying that man ought to live according to Nature; and that Virtue and Duty are according to Nature, Vice and moral Transgression contrary to Nature. For man's nature is a Constitution, in which Reason and Desire are elements; but of these elements, it was plainly intended that Reason should control Desire, not, that Desire should overmaster Reason. And in a like form might be presented some of the reasonings which we have employed. In order to establish the Duties of the Affections, for instance, we might have said, that it is plainly according to nature that men should be drawn together by Affection, and yet should possess distinct Rights;—that therefore those benevolent Affections are Duties, which draw men together, as family affection, and the like; and those defensive Affections are also Duties, which tend to the maintenance of Rights, as indignation at wrong.

562. The acknowledgment of the Intention of the Creator, as the proper Rule of our being, implies the acknowledgment of Obedience to his will as our Duty,

and as the Source of Duties. When we include in our view the Idea of God, his Will, whether learnt from Revelation, or from reasoning, and from whatever course of reasoning, becomes the Supreme Rule of Human Action, and that from which all other Rules are derived. He it is who makes our Duty and our Happiness coincide; and whether we say that Moral Action will lead to Happiness because it is our Duty, or that it is our Duty because it will lead to Happiness, we rest the reality and force of our Moral Rules upon the idea of God, who has established this coincidence of Duty and Happiness.

563. But we are not bound to God merely by the bonds of the Duty of Obedience. There are Affections which are naturally and necessarily due to him, and which further bind us to him. We are bound to him by the ties of Gratitude for innumerable and immeasurable benefits which we have received; for from him we have received all that we have or are. We are bound to him by relations of Order, as being, by the nature of things, our Sovereign Master and Lord. We are bound to him by Love and Admiration, as containing in his essence the perfection of that Goodness and Justice which are the proper objects of Love and Admiration.

564. This, our Connexion with God by ties of Dependence, Obedience, and Affection, is often and fitly expressed by speaking of him as our Father, and the Universal Father of mankind. We are his children, and he is the proper object of our Filial Affection; only that our filial affection to Him may assume, and ought to assume, a character of entire and confiding Reverence, which has no reserve, doubt, or limit; as the affection to our human parents sometimes may or must have.

565. Looking upon God as our Father, and the Father of all men, we are naturally led to look upon all men as our Brethren. All mankind form one great Family; and as all the mutual Duties and Services between the Members of a Family become manifestations and results of the Family Affections, when these

are fully and freely unfolded, so all Duties and Services between the members of the Great Human Family (184) become results of the fraternal love which belongs to their condition as common children of one universal Father.

566. A sense of our Dependence, our Gratitude, our Reverence, when these feelings exist towards men, find their expression in various forms of language and other indications. God does not present himself to us as a Person to whom we can speak face to face. We conceive him as an Energy and Intelligence, producing, upholding, pervading, seeing, knowing, and judging all things. He created and unfolded, he continually preserves, continually observes us. In him we live and move. He is not far from every one of us. He is acquainted with our thoughts and feelings, as soon as they arise in our minds. Hence when our feelings of Dependence, Gratitude, and Reverence, take any definite shape in our thoughts, and become clothed in Conceptions and Images, we may conceive that these forms of our affection become known to him of themselves, without the use of words on our parts. But in fact, our affections cannot be very definitely clothed in conceptions and images, without at least the mental use of words; and for the most part, these forms of feeling, become more distinct by being uttered and heard by men among men. Besides, in the common participation of such feelings, and in the common contemplation of the conceptions and images in which they are clothed, there is an influence by which they become more intense in men's minds, and are communicated from one mind to others. Hence, to mould our feelings of Gratitude and Reverence towards God into words, will tend to cultivate these feelings both in our own minds, and in the minds of other men. Such feelings are *Natural Piety*; and this Piety may be promoted, by being expressed both in solitude, and in the company of men.

567. But we may not only express our feelings of Piety; we may direct these expressions to God. God is a Mind, in which are Intelligence, Purpose, Will,

Thought, as in our own. We necessarily conceive him as a Person, and we can address ourselves to him as a Person; this address must be made in our thoughts; for though God is near to each of us here, he is far off, or rather unapproachable, as an object of outward apprehension. And our internal addresses to God must necessarily be such as to imply that entire Dependence upon him, which is the first of the affections due to him. This may be implied, by humbly asking from him some of the benefits which he can give us. Such internal address of our thoughts to God, in which our dependence is expressed by words of Petition, are *Prayers*. Benefits, as they come from him, and express his Benevolence to us, are *Blessings*. And as we pray to God for future or continued Blessings, we express our gratitude for past Blessings in *Thanksgivings*. We express our admiration of God's character in *Praises*. Such expressions of Natural Piety have been common in all ages; although, for the most part, mixed with vague or arbitrary images and conceptions, arising from the imperfection of men's moral and intellectual, and still more, of their religious culture.

568. Prayer, Thanksgiving and Praise, are properly and primarily the language of each man's thoughts to God; when the feelings of Natural Piety have been duly unfolded. A man, in his Private Prayers, asks for Blessings for himself, and especially for such Blessings as may aid him in his moral progress; for strength to resist temptation, and to elevate and purify his mind. But also, since the affections which are due to God, arise from the condition of human nature which is common to all men, men feel that a common expression of such feelings by assemblies of men is also suitable to their condition. Accordingly, Public Prayer, by assemblies of men, and other public expressions of religious feelings, have been employed in all ages and nations. Such acknowledgments of the dependence of man on God, and man's reverence for God, expressed in words or by other indications, are *Worship*; and men have in all times and places worshipped God; although their

notions of Deity have often been gross and fantastical, and their worship often inconsistent with moral and rational views.

569. Public Worship by assemblies of men necessarily implies Places and Times appointed for such Ceremonies: and these Places, Times, and Ceremonies themselves, are naturally looked upon by men with a religious reverence: they are fixed by a rule, and separated from all common uses: they are *Sacred*. Special Sacred Places, as Temples; Fixed Sacred Times, as Festivals; appear to be universal dictates of Natural Piety. Religious Ceremonies are very various in various countries; but some, which may appear to our Reason to be arbitrary, prevailed very extensively among the ancient nations, and from the earliest times; as *Sacrifices* of Animals. These Sacrifices were understood as an acknowledgment of Sin on the part of the Worshippers, a Supplication for Forgiveness, and a Means of Propitiation.

570. The Natural Piety, of which we have spoken, is a part of our Duty; for it is a part of the Christian Piety, of which we shall have to speak. Paul spoke to the people of Lystra of God, as manifested to man's natural reason by the works of nature. God, he said, even before the teaching of Revelation, *left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness* (Acts xiv. 17). And when he preached to the Athenians, taking occasion from an altar with the inscription to the Unknown God, he said (Acts xvii. 23), *Whom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.* And he went on to deliver the views of Natural Piety: *God that made the world and all things therein...hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell upon the face of the earth; and hath determined their appointed time, and the bounds of their habitation: that they might seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him till they found him. And yet he is not far from every one of us; for in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said,*

For we are his offspring. So too the Psalms of David, which are adopted and confirmed by Christ and his disciples as a part of the Revelation of God, are full of the Recognition of God and his character, as manifested in the works of his creation. In these songs of Praise, God is constantly spoken of, as alike declared to us by the visible heavens and earth which surround us, and by the moral law which is within us; as in the nineteenth Psalm; *The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy-work;* and a few verses later, *The Law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul.* And Jesus Christ himself speaks to us of God *who clothes the lilies of the field, and without whom not a sparrow falls to the ground.* Thus the convictions of Natural Piety are adopted as a fundamental part of that belief which Christ and his Apostles taught.

The dictates of Natural Piety, in so far as they direct us to fixed times, places, and forms of worship, are also adopted and carried into detail by Christian ordinances; but for our purpose it is not necessary to dwell upon these in detail.

CHAPTER XI.

CHRISTIAN PIETY.

571. THE Duties and Affections which belong to Natural Piety are also, as we have said (570), a part of Christian Piety. The Duty of Obedience to God (548) is the foundation and measure of all other Duties. That which is wrong, is so because it is contrary to his Will. Moral Transgression derives an especial depravity from its being Sin against God: Sin is the object of his condemnation; it is spoken of, in figures borrowed from the constitution of humanity, as the object of his *Anger*. Obedience to his Will, and the Dispositions which produce such Obedience, are the object of his Love.

Sin will be the subject of his Punishment, Obedience of his Reward. • There will be a *Resurrection of the Dead* to this end (John v. 28): The hour is coming, when all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and shall come forth: they that have done good unto the *Resurrection of Life*, and they that have done evil to the *Resurrection of Damnation*. And the life here spoken of is elsewhere called *Eternal Life*. Thus the Supreme Rule of Human Action, on which the final happiness or misery of each man depends, is identified with the Will of God, and receives its Sanction and its force from this identity.

572. The Will of God with regard to Human Actions is known to man, partly by Reason, and partly by Revelation. We have, in the preceding Book, given a view of that Morality which is supplied to us by our Reason; and in the present Book, we have added to it a view of Christian Morality, as it is supplied to us by the Scriptures of the New Testament. The Precepts there given point out the Christian's Duties, as they are expressed by means of special Precepts.

But the general views which the Christian Revelation discloses to us, also give us new light with regard to our Duties, and with regard to the Dispositions which are to lead us to perform them. We are taught, That our failures in Obedience to God's Will, our Sins, are to be repented of; that our Repentance must necessarily be addressed to God, and must take the form of a Supplication for his mercy and Forgiveness, to be extended to us, notwithstanding our Sins: that (481) God has provided a means by which we may find Mercy and Forgiveness; namely, the sending of his Son Jesus Christ upon earth to suffer death for our sins, and to rise again for our Justification (Rom. iv. 25). We are taught further (482), that God has provided means not only for our Justification, but for our Sanctification; not only for the Remission of our sins, but also for the elevation of our nature to that Holiness (470) without which we cannot be admitted to his Blessedness.

573. These provisions for the Instruction, Pardon,

and Sanctification of man, impose upon us a far larger Duty of Gratitude than the benefits which Natural Piety contemplates; inasmuch as the eternal life, and blessedness of the soul, thus provided for, are far greater benefits and evidences of God's Love, than mere human life, with its accompaniments as discerned by reason. The Christian's gratitude to God is founded mainly on his Christian blessings; and ought to be infinite as those blessings are infinite.

574. The Christian is especially taught to look upon God as his Father. Christ taught his disciples to begin their prayers with a recognition of this relation: *Our Father, which art in Heaven*. The special manner in which Christians become the sons of God, is often referred to. Thus 1 John iii. 1, *Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God*.

This privilege of being the sons of God, implies, we are told, not only that we have had great benefits brought within our reach by his coming on earth, but that we may, as one of the greatest of these benefits, become like him. Thus in the passage just quoted, St. John adds: *Therefore the world knoweth us not, because it knew him not. Beloved, now are we the sons of God: and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him*. St. Paul carries this further (Rom. viii. 14): *As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear (ye are not in the condition of slaves, who obey through fear merely); but ye have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God; and if children, then heirs; heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together.* And, in the same way elsewhere (Gal. iv. 5) we are told that *God sent forth his Son...that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. Where-*

fore thou art no more a servant, but a son; and if a son, then an heir of God through Christ. And the Apostles naturally and forcibly urge this as a ground of the Love of God: as 1 John iv. 9, 19, *In this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. . . And we love him, because he first loved us.*

575. The Love of God, our heavenly Father, like the love of a Human Father, tends to produce an Obedience of the Heart (284). So far as the Love of God is unfolded and established in the Christian's heart, it supersedes all other motives to obedience to the Moral Law, and becomes his constant and universal Principle of Action.

576. The relation of Christians to each other, as Children, in an especial manner, of God their common Father, is urged upon them by the Apostles, as a motive for a brotherly Love, which ought to exist between them, and out of which all Duties to men must spring. Thus St. John says, in a passage lately quoted (1 John iv. 11), *Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another.* This mutual Love is constantly enjoined by the same Apostle as the evidence of our Love of God: (1 John iv. 20), *If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar.* The same is the general tenour of the whole of the Epistles of St. John. St. Paul, following the teaching of Christ, says (Gal. v. 14), that *all the commandments are comprehended in this one saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.*

577. This Christian Love of men as our brethren includes, as St. Paul states in the passage just cited, all other duties; and includes them in a form more complete than mere Morality can give them. This love will necessarily exclude all thought of mutual injustice and falsehood. The Christian teacher says (Acts vii. 26), *Ye are brethren; why do ye wrong one to another?* And (Eph. iv. 25), *Speak every man truth to his neighbour; for we are members one of another.* Christianity taught men that they were to reject the tenacity of their own Rights, out of which opposition and unkindness rise,

and were to seek each other's good as members of one family. The effect of this teaching showed itself in the manner in which, at the first preaching of the Apostles, the converts threw their possessions into the common stock (Acts iv. 34); and has constantly operated since, to make those who are Christians in spirit ready to give and glad to distribute, and specially careful of the interests and comforts of their neighbours. In this respect Christian Morality has introduced into the world a standard much higher than the Morality of Reason.

578. The Duty of Prayer to God, which is suggested by the feelings belonging to Natural Piety, is confirmed and more strongly enjoined by Revealed Religion. The Old Testament contains the account of God's more especial dealings with men, as shown in the History of the Jews, the nation selected to be the especial channel of his Dispensations. The passages in the Old Testament, which enjoin or take for granted this Duty, are too numerous, and too familiar to our minds, to require to be cited. In the New Testament, this duty is still more earnestly enjoined. Christ taught his disciples (Luke xviii. 1), *That men ought always to pray, and not to faint* in such exertions. And he himself taught his disciples how to pray; and spoke of many special occasions of prayer: thus (Matth. v. 44), *Pray for them that despitefully use you.* (Matth. ix. 38), *Pray ye the Lord of the harvest, that he will send forth labourers into his harvest.* And he was himself frequently engaged in earnest prayer. (Matth. xiv. 23; Mark vi. 46; Luke vi. 12; ix. 28; John xiv. 16; xvi. 26; xvii. 9; Matth. xxvi. 36; Mark xiv. 32). The injunctions and examples of the Apostles on this subject are perpetual. The same is the case with Thanksgiving. Christ says (Matth. xi. 25), *I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth.* And (John xi. 41), *I thank thee, Father, that thou hearest me.* In Acts xvi. 25, *Paul and Silas prayed, and sang praises to God;* and so on, in innumerable other places. No duty is more frequently and strongly enjoined than these are.

579. It has been suggested, as a difficulty respect-

ing the Duty of Prayer, that in prayer we desire God to alter the course of the world, in order to comply with our wishes, as if we mistrusted his goodness and wisdom. But to this we reply, that the things which we desire of God in our prayers are, for the most part, spiritual blessings. *Forgive us our trespasses. Lead us not into temptation. Deliver us from evil.* The course of things to which these events belong is the Spiritual Government of God (486), and to that Spiritual Government our prayers also belong. In the spiritual world, the prayers of believers are events as real as their temptations, their deliverance, their forgiveness; and the former events may very naturally be conceived to produce an effect upon the latter. There is therefore, in such prayers, nothing inconsistent with our belief in God's goodness and wisdom. And prayers for temporal blessings, as, *Give us this day our daily bread*, are rather to be understood as expressing our sense of our dependence upon God, than our desire that he should direct the course of the world according to our wishes. Such prayers are the expressions by which our mere natural desires show, that though submitted to the will of God, they are not annihilated. We know that, except through the goodness of God, we cannot receive even our daily bread; and the desire of life, and of the supports of life, which religion cannot and does not seek to extinguish, she converts into a desire that God would give us what we need.

580. We are taught to combine, with our prayers to God, a *Resignation* to his will, whatever it may be, and a belief that what he does is for the best; whether he grant or refuse our prayers, and whether he give or take away apparent benefits. In the Prayer which Christ taught his Disciples to offer, he bids them say, *Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven.* And though this clause expresses our Hope of the religious progress of men on earth, it also expresses our Acquiescence and Submission to the Will of God, whatever it may be. And Jesus Christ himself used this language in prayer as an expression of Resignation (Matth. xxvi. 42). The same lesson is enforced by the Apostles in their

teaching. Thus (1 Pet. v. 6), *Humble yourselves under the mighty hand of God, that he may exalt you in due time; casting all your care upon him, for he careth for you.* And so iv. 19, *Let them that suffer according to the Will of God, commit the keeping of their souls to him in well-doing, as unto a faithful Creator.*

581. A main use of Prayer, however uttered, is to express and confirm a habit of Mental Worship. Christ himself said, when speaking of external forms of worship (John iv. 24), *God is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.* And in comparison with the practice of ostentatious individual prayer which prevailed among the Jews, he enjoined Private Prayer (Matth. vi. 5). Such Private Prayer is indeed the natural utterance of piety, as we have already said. And this utterance will be both more significant and more likely to confirm the affections of piety, if it form a part of the business of each day. Private Prayer every Morning and Evening may be so employed, as to tend to fix upon our minds the thought of God, of his blessings, his laws, and the hopes and encouragements which he sets before us; and thus may aid in giving a moral and religious turn to our disposition and will during the whole course of our days.

582. Public Prayer and the other acts of Public Worship, which, as we have said, are universally practised among nations through the impulse of Natural Piety, are also recommended by other considerations, so that they become Christian Duties.

CHAPTER XII.

RELIGIOUS BELIEF.

583. IN order that the Christian may have the benefit of God's provisions for his justification, sanctification, and final blessedness, the relation between God and himself must be brought home to his mind. He must believe in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ his Son our Saviour, as we have already said (480). Such belief is so essential to the Christian's condition, that the terms *Believers* and *Unbelievers* are employed to describe those who are truly Christians and those who are not. The Christian may say, as St. Paul says (Gal. ii. 20), *I live by faith in the Son of God.*

This Belief, or Faith, includes an act of the Intellect by which Truths regarding man's relation to God are assented to and accepted; and thus such Assent and Belief are Duties of the Christian.

We have already stated (350), that a Belief in the Principles of Morality is requisite, in order that a man's character may be moral. This Belief must be, finally and specially, a man's own internal act, although he may be led to his belief by various external influences, which constitute his moral Education.

584. The Effect of a man's Education in the formation of his Belief is so great, that it sometimes appears to amount to an invincible cause of Error or Ignorance; and such causes, as we have said (344), render Ignorance and Error excusable. Hence it may appear that Christian Teaching, when it represents Belief in Christian Verities as necessary to a man's salvation, is opposed to the Morality of Reason.

But we have already said (350), that Ignorance and Error with regard to Moral Principles are not acknowledged, either by Moralists, or by men in general, to be invincible, and therefore excusable. We have stated that there is a Duty of thinking rationally; and that a

man is not excusable who denies the Duties of Kindness, Justice, and Truth. We further remarked (349), that if such Error were not an offense, it would be a calamity which must produce the same effect as an offense, upon man's destination. It must exclude him from that consummation of a good man's life, whatever it be, to which a continual moral progress leads; and to miss which is unhappiness.

585. What was thus said of Moral Error, must be said also of Religious Unbelief. A man is not excusable who disbelieves the Existence of God; for this is to disbelieve the identity of Virtue with happiness (450), and consequently the reality of Morality. A man is not excusable who disbelieves the Providential Government of the world; for we cannot believe God's Government to be a Moral Government, and yet to have no influence on the course of the world which he has created.

586. And the same must be extended to Disbelief in Revealed Religion. For the Christian Religion is the necessary completion of Natural Religion. The History of Christ and of Christianity is the *Fact*, by which alone the *Idea* of the Providential Government of the world is realized (474). Christian Morality is the necessary confirmation and purification of the Morality of Reason. And the Christian view of God's Provisions for the salvation of men's souls, is necessary to give effect to men's Repentance, and to their efforts at Continual Moral Progress. A person, therefore, to whom the Truths brought to light by the Christian Revelation have been fully presented, and who disbelieves them, is as blameable, or as unhappy, as a man would be, who should deny the Government of Providence, the reality of Morality, the necessity of Repentance in Transgressors, and of moral Progress in all men.

587. It may be objected to this, that a large portion of the human race lived before the coming of Christ on earth; and a large portion of those who have lived since that event, have not had Christian Doctrine presented to them; that for the former, there was no Christian Revelation to believe; and for the latter, no

means of coming to the belief of it: that belief in the Christian Religion could not be necessary for the moral progress and final happiness of those portions of mankind; and therefore, cannot be generally necessary for the moral progress and final happiness of man; that therefore, Belief in Christian Doctrine cannot be a Duty, nor Unbelief culpable.

To this we reply, that those who have not had Christian Truths presented to them, are not blameable for their ignorance of them. Christianity is a Fact: the coming of Christ on earth is a Fact; and the Disclosures made by him and his Disciples, concerning God's dealings with men, are Facts, which men could not know by the aid of Reason alone. Involuntary Ignorance of Facts is not culpable, as we have already said (343). But this does not excuse those to whom these Facts have been presented with adequate evidence. Such persons fall under the blame which lies upon all persons who neglect or reject the evidence of Facts, which are of the highest importance in the right conduct of their lives.

588. When it is said, that—because the belief in Christian Religion was not necessary for the moral progress and final happiness of the ancients, or the heathen, who never heard of Christ,—therefore it cannot be necessary for us; we reply, that our moral progress is checked and destroyed, if we willingly stop, when we might go further; and if we do not use means of advance which are presented to us. Christianity affords to us means of moral progress, which the ancients and the heathen had not. If we refuse these, we are not in the condition in which they were, who never had them offered. If we reject the opportunity of becoming, in the especial Christian sense, the sons of God, we are in a very different condition from the pious heathen, who did all that their light enabled them to do, in order to approach to God. And this may be said, without our knowing, what perhaps the Christian revelation does not very distinctly teach,—the nature of the advantage, in the condition of final happiness, to which man's moral and religious progress leads—which the man, who has

lived in Christian light, has, over the devout heathen who lived in unavoidable darkness.

589. In stating that men are blameable in disbelieving truths, after they have been promulgated, though they are ignorant without blame, before the promulgation; we follow the judgment of mankind, as formed in other similar cases. We attribute to a man an intellectual fault, we despise him as ignorant and confused in his thoughts, who thinks the earth to be flat, *now*, that it has so long been ascertained to be globular. We regard him as blind and foolish, if *now* he is not satisfied that the earth moves round the sun; though for so many centuries, the wisest and most clear-sighted of men never doubted that the earth was at rest. When such truths are once indisputably established as facts, we cannot help condemning those who reject the evidence of them. They violate the Duty of rational thought, of which we have spoken (350). And this is still more the case, in regard to moral truths: We excuse those who in early and rude stages of society practise or praise plunder of strangers, slavery, polygamy, concubinage; but when the progress of the Standard of Morality (365) has shown that such things are immoral; if any one among us defends such practices, we no longer think him free from blame. We are indignant at the low morality of his doctrines; or at least we lament his moral blindness as his calamity. And in like manner with regard to Religion, although we do not blame, for their religious ignorance, the ancients, who could not know the Revelation of Christ, and the heathen, to whom it has not been preached; we do not excuse the moderns, who, now that there has taken place this great Revelation, elevating the moral views and spiritual hopes of men, refuse to believe the Truths thus established. They who do this, reject a light which has come into the world; and the blindness in which they remain is not only their misfortune, but their fault.

590. This view of the Duty of accepting Christian Truth; namely, that the Duty is incumbent upon men

according to the opportunities which belong to their condition; agrees with the lessons of the Christian teachers. The duty of Believing in Christ, of accepting Religious Truth in general, is strongly urged by Christ and his Apostles. Yet this is not urged without regard to difference of opportunities. Christ taught (Luke xii. 48), *Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required.* When St. Paul preached to the Athenians, after describing their past idolatry, he added (Acts xvii. 30), *And the times of this ignorance God winked at; but now commandeth all men every where to repent.* To the same effect, he preached at Lystra, (xiv. 15), *The living God, which made heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein: in time past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways: nevertheless he left not himself without witness.* This was joined with an exhortation to turn, now at length, to the living God. The whole scheme of the Christian Religion represented the Jewish Dispensation as an inferior and preparatory condition; in which men did not see the meaning and tendency of the commands which they obeyed, and were to be judged according to the imperfect light which they thus possessed. The Epistle to the Hebrews states this. (Heb. i. 1), *God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken to us by his Son;* and then goes on to explain the superiority of Christ, in nature and office, to the ministers of the Old Testament. Again, St. Paul says (Rom. ii. 12), *As many as have sinned without law (the law of Moses), shall also perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law.* So in St. John (xv. 22), Christ says, *If I had not come and spoken to them, they had not had sin; but now have they no excuse (πρόφασις) for their sin.*

591. When the truth of the Gospel is presented to men, those who do not accept it are charged with blindness and hardness of heart. Thus (Mark vi. 52), *They considered not the miracle of the loaves; for their heart was hardened.* And when the Disciples referred

his warnings to earthly matters, Christ said (Mark viii. 17), *Perceive ye not, neither understand? Have ye your heart yet hardened? Having eyes, see ye not? and having ears, hear ye not?* So (Mark iii. 5). And (John xii. 40), the expressions of Isaiah are applied to the Jews who had seen the miracles of Christ, and did not believe: *He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart: that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted.* • So Acts xix. 9, *Divers were hardened, and believed not.* And Christ (Mark xvi. 14) *appeared unto the eleven as they sat at meat, and upbraided them with their unbelief, and hardness of heart, because they believed not them which had seen him after he was risen.* And to the two disciples on the way to Emmaus he said (Luke xxiv. 25), *O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken!*

592. As in these and many other passages, blame is imputed to men when they reject revealed truth, so is it represented as a merit to believe and accept such truth. Thus Acts xvii. 11. The Berean Jews were *more noble* (ἀγαθέστεροι, of a better disposition) *than those in Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so.* And this is implied in all the commendation bestowed upon *faith*; which, although it be not merely a speculative belief, includes belief of Christian truths. And as unbelief is threatened with punishment, (Matth. xi. 21; Luke x. 13), *Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida!* so is belief represented as the occasion of God's favour. (John i. 12), *As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.*

593. We have spoken (589) of the Progress of Science, as illustrating the manner in which errors which are excusable at an earlier time, are inexcusable at a later period, when the truth has been more fully discovered and promulgated.

There is one material difference, however, between the

course of truth and knowledge, in Science, and in Religion. In the knowledge of scientific truth, men go on from step to step, at every step advancing to the knowledge of a new Truth; which new truth includes all that was true in previous knowledge, while it adds to it something more. Thus, the cycles and epicycles in which, according to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, the planets moved round the earth, explained their motions, for the most part. The step made by Copernicus, consisted in adopting this explanation; adding to it the new truth, that the sun, not the earth, was the center of the motions. Kepler still retained the same explanation of the motions; but added again the new truth, that the epicycloid motion, duly corrected, might be conceived as elliptical motion. Such is ever the progress of human knowledge, retaining old truths, in spite of their mixture with error; and correcting them, where they are erroneous, by means of new truths. The last true doctrine contains all the previous true doctrines in the most general form; and contains, moreover, the new general truth.

But in Revealed Truth, the case is necessarily different from this. There, the Revelation contains all the Truth; and to this Truth, succeeding thoughts of men cannot add, though they may develope and methodize it. The Doctrine, as revealed, contains all the true Doctrines which can be unfolded out of it. The first form of the Truth is, here, the most comprehensive and fundamental. In Science, earlier views, so far as they are true, are summed up in the latest Discovery. In Religion, later views are true, so far as they are derived from the original Revelation. If Christianity were a Science, additions might be made to it from time to time; but as it is a Revelation, we can only have, from time to time, new expressions, arrangements, and combinations, of the same original fundamental Truths.

594. We may, however, observe further, that the progress of moral and intellectual culture among men, and the changes which philosophical opinions undergo, may make it necessary, for the sake of a due apprehension

of the truth, and for the sake of a mutual understanding among men, that the original and fundamental Truths of the Christian religion should be expressed in various manners, on various occasions, and at various times. Abstract terms, and especially those which contain a reference to the powers of the mind, the operations of thought, and the most general relations of things, derive their significance and force, in a great measure, from the prevalent systems of philosophy. Such terms are necessarily employed, in expressing the relation of man to God, and the facts which affect the religious condition of the human soul. Hence, it may be necessary to modify the expression of religious belief, in consequence of revolutions in philosophy, or other changes in the prevalent habits of thought. Statements, which, at one time, did not convey an erroneous meaning, may come to be assertions of error; if the significations of the terms which they involve be, in the course of years, so limited or enlarged, so defined and distinguished, that the statements declare more or less than the truth. In such cases the *Creed*, or formal Declaration of Religious Belief, may need to have some Articles added or altered. But it is to be remarked, that such additional Articles are not additions to the matter, but corrections of the form, of the *Creed*. They do not denote the acceptance of Truths hitherto unknown, but the exclusion of Errors hitherto unnoticed. The Truths of Revelation are always the same; but the means which man possesses, to express them without Error, vary, as the habits of thought and of language vary; and it has been possible, and being possible, it has been the Duty of the Church of Christ, to make, from time to time, such alterations in her Creeds, that they might express, with more complete exclusion of Error, the Truth as revealed by God to man.

595. Our Religious Belief is a part of that Religious Culture, of which we have spoken (450). A true apprehension of our relation to God, and of the conditions of his dealings with us, is the foundation and source of the Affections of Christian Piety, which we have already noticed.

CHAPTER XIII.

CHRISTIAN EDIFICATION.

596. As it is our business to seek a knowledge of Christian Truth, and to aim at Christian Dispositions for ourselves; so is it our Duty, also, to endeavour to impart these benefits to other persons. As it is (249) a Moral Duty to promote the Moral Progress of other men, as well as our own; so is it a Christian Duty to promote the Christian Progress of other men. Christian Love is a stronger motive for doing this than any other kind of benevolence can be; and the Christian Progress of the Soul is a so much higher object to aim at, than mere moral progress of the Mind, that it may very fitly excite men to more strenuous exertions. The Christian, who has made any progress in Christian knowledge and Christian dispositions, cannot help wishing that all other men should be as he is. He has received a Gospel of Good Tidings, which he must needs impart to all whom he loves; and this very Gospel has taught him to love all men. He would, if possible, communicate to every human creature the Call to Repentance, the Offer of Pardon, the Light, the Purification, the Hope, and the Joy, which he has, in a greater or less degree, found.

597. This Christian desire impels men to teach Christian truths and Christian precepts, to those who are under their more immediate influence; to their children, and their dependents. They bestow, on those who thus belong to them, *Christian Education*. They employ themselves in forming, in such persons, Christian Dispositions, and in unfolding their minds to the Truths of the Christian Revelation. But further; the Christian is naturally impelled by Christian love to endeavour to promote a Christian progress, not only in those whose Education in some measure especially belongs to him, but also in all whom he has any occasion of influencing; his neighbours, his fellow-citizens, the whole world, so

far as his opportunities extend. He is bound to aim at the Christian improvement of those with whom he has intercourse; to teach them, if by position or gifts he be especially qualified as a Christian Teacher: above all, to avoid doing or saying anything which may interfere with their Christian progress.

This Duty of mutual religious improvement and Christian culture is frequently enjoined in the Scripture. (Eph. vi. 4), Parents are directed to *bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord*. The Colossians are exhorted (Col. iii. 16), *Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly . . . teaching and admonishing one another*. And Heb. iii. 13, *Exhort one another daily*; (x. 24), *Let us consider one another, to provoke unto love and good works*. Thus the Christians were to exhort each other to what was good; to admonish and warn them who were in danger of transgression; and if need were, to rebuke transgressors (1 Tim. v. 20).

598. The notion of Mutual Instruction in Religion so familiarly occurs in the writings of the Apostles, that the metaphor by which it is expressed no longer suggests the figure from which it was originally derived. A Christian's mind is *edified*, that is, literally, *built up*, by religious instruction; indeed the term *instruction* itself has, originally, nearly the same sense. Thus Acts xx. 32, *The word of his grace is able to build you up*. Col. ii. 7, *Walk ye in Christ, rooted and built up in him*. And in this sense, the term *Edification* (οικοδομη) is commonly used; as 1 Cor. xiv. 3, *He that prophesieth speaketh to edification**.

599. As a necessary requisite of their common and mutual culture, it is the duty of Christians to preserve, unimpaired and pure, the Truth originally revealed

* In other cases, however, the metaphor is differently applied, when mention is made of building up a Church, as a body of Christians; as (Rom. xv 20); and under this form of expression, the duty is often enjoined; as Eph. iv. 29, *Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good to the use of edifying* (πρὸς οἰκοδομὴν τῆς χρείας). So Rom. xiv. 19; xv. 2; 1 Cor. xiv. 5; 1 Thess. v. 11.

through Christ. (Jude 3), *It was needful for me to write unto you, and exhort you that ye should earnestly contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints.* St. Paul says to Timothy (2 Tim. i. 13), *Hold fast the form of sound words, which thou hast heard of me, in faith and love which is in Christ Jesus. That good thing which was committed unto thee keep by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in us.* It is plain that the good thing thus committed to Christian ministers, was Christian Truth. So St. Paul again, (1 Tim. i. 11 and 18), *The glorious gospel of the blessed God, which was committed to my trust... This charge commit I unto thee, son Timothy.* And those who deviate from the truth of the Gospel, are spoken of with strong condemnation. Thus (Gal. i. 7), *There are some that trouble you, and would prevent the gospel of Christ. But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel than that ye have received, let him be accursed:* which condemnation he instantly and emphatically repeats (ver. 9). St. Peter says (2 Pet. ii. 1), *There shall be false teachers among you, who shall privily bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them.* St. John (2 John 10), *If there come any man to you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed.*

Thus, as unbelief and false doctrine are calamities to our own souls, and, in that sense at least, transgressions against ourselves; the promulgation of false doctrine, or of unbelief among others, are evil done to them, and violations of Christian Duty.

§60. To this condemnation of religious unbelief and false doctrine, objections are sometimes urged of the following kind: That thus to declare one selected form of Opinion to be the only form which men can blamelessly entertain, is hurtful to the Progress of Truth; for the Progress of Truth among men requires free Inquiry and Freedom of Opinion: that free Inquiry is a Right, and the Love of Truth a Duty; both of which are infringed by proscribing certain condemned Opinions, since these may be the very Opinions to which the Love of Truth and the pursuit of Inquiry lead some men: that our

supposition that *our* Opinions are true, and the contrary ones false, is mere assumption, which may with equal Right be made on the other side: and that a condemnation of men, founded upon this assumption, is, therefore, unjust, and unreasonablc.

601. In reply we say, that, in other subjects than Religion, men do not proceed on the supposition that persons holding two opposite Opinions have each an equal Right to assume his Doctrine to be the true one: that on the contrary, we go upon the supposition that there is Truth and Falschood, as well as mere Opinion; and we condemn the man who holds false opinions, when he has had the means of knowing the Truth. If a geographer reasons on the hypothesis that the earth is flat, not round; if a physician gives his direction on the supposition that a well-known poisonous drug is harmless: we do not say that he is blameless, and has a Right to his Opinion. We think him foolish and irrational; and if his error lead to mischief, we blame him as criminal. In like manner we go, and must go, upon the supposition that, in Morality and Religion, as well as Geography and Physiology, there is a Truth which it is the Duty of every one to hold; or, at least, without which his Progress towards Truth is altogether incomplete. If a man stop short of this point, or turn aside in any other direction, he must be in the wrong. Whether we call him culpable or unhappy, he is at least not moral and religious. And when he attempts to draw other people after him in his error, we cannot abstain from condemning him.

602. The belief in the coincidence of Virtue with Happiness, in the long run, depends upon the belief in God's government of the world; and thus, this belief is the foundation of Morality. Without this belief, the Conceptions of Duty, and of right and wrong, have no reality and no force. When we say that the Love of Truth is a Duty, we cannot so understand the word *Truth*, that there shall be no such thing as Duty. If the Love of Truth be a Duty, Truth must include the foundation of the reality of Duty; which is, as we have

said, the belief in God. And so, of the Right of free Inquiry; there cannot be a Right of free Inquiry in such a sense, that Inquiry may lead to the result that nothing is right or wrong. If there be a Right of Inquiry, there must be some real basis of Rights; which, without the belief in God, there cannot be.

603. The general judgment of mankind has given its sanction to these views. As we have already said (350), men do not consider those persons to be blameless who hold immoral Principles: and in like manner, they have always bestowed strong condemnation on those persons who have rejected or opposed that belief in God, which, in common apprehension, as in reality, is the necessary basis of Morality. Atheists have always been odious. The universal voice of human nature has pronounced condemnation on those who say, "There is no God." The Right and the Duty of Inquiry have always been asserted in vain, when Inquiry has led to this result. Men have constantly, and everywhere, felt that the Right and Duty of Inquiry could not be things more certain, than the being of God, who made them able to inquire and to conceive Duty. And the Atheist has been regarded as a man who broke a universal and fundamental tie, by which all mankind are held together; and hence, has been looked upon as a common enemy.

604. The mere belief in God, on grounds of Reason, is too vague and incomplete a doctrine to satisfy men. If there be a Creator and Moral Governor of the world, there must be also a Providential Government of the world. The History of Man must bear traces of the Mind of God. The first origin of man on earth, for instance, cannot be an event in the common course of things; and we can easily conceive this origin of man to have been accompanied by something of the nature of a Revelation. Men have everywhere felt, thoughtful men still feel, the need of something more than our natural powers afford, to purify and elevate their minds. To carry on the Moral Progress of man, the Ancient World needed to be transformed into the Modern World;

but this could not take place by natural means. The Christian sees the only consistent and possible solution of these difficulties, in the Christian Revelation; according to which the coming of Christ upon earth is the Central Point in the Providential History of the world; giving definiteness to the relations of God and man; and supplying the needs of man's spiritual nature. Thus, he sees, in Revealed Religion, the necessary completion of Natural Religion; and is compelled to look upon the infidel, who does not believe in Christ, as believing in God to no purpose. The Christian judges, as we have already said, that such unbelief is either a violation of Duty, or a calamity which produces the same effect upon the person's mind as a transgression of Duty; since, without a belief in Christ, a man cannot have the benefits which Christ's coming brings to believers. And the promulgation of such infidel doctrines, he deems to be a heavy calamity to those who fall under such influence. The tie of a common belief in God is, among Christians, identified with the tie of a common belief in Christ; and hence, he who denies the truth of the Christian Revelation, is necessarily looked upon in nearly the same light as the Atheist.

605. It by no means follows, that we check or limit the Progress of Speculative Truth among men, when we condemn the denial of certain fundamental Principles which are assumed in the very idea of Speculative Truth. Such Principles are these:—that there is a difference of true and false; a distinction of right and wrong; that there is a God who gives reality to that distinction; that there is a duty of unlimited progress towards what is right. These doctrines being assumed as steadfast and unquestionable, there is still abundant room for Inquiry; and for various views to which Inquiry may lead. The wide space between General Principles and Special Instances, is occupied by a region of obscurity and confusion, in which we need all the clearness which we can give to our intermediate chain of conceptions, in order that our reasonings may be coherent and conclusive. Different minds

may form such chains of conceptions, various, yet each consistent with itself; and depending for their variety, only upon different kinds of intellect and of intellectual culture. It is our business to seek to establish such a clear and firm connexion among our thoughts. It is a part of the Duty of Intellectual Culture, of which we formerly spoke (245). The pursuit of speculative Truth, under the conditions already stated, and in proportion to our powers and habits of speculation, is a part of the life of a good man. He must think as well as feel. As we have said (241 and 350), it is his duty to act and to think rationally; and what is rational thought, he can know only, by carefully unfolding his Reason. So far as he really arrives at Speculative Truth, he will see more distinctly the Supreme Law of his Being, and will have increased means of conforming to it. It is his business constantly to aim at Truth; and his Progress towards Truth, like his Progress towards Moral Perfection, can never rightly have an end. Hence, if any one were to argue that the opinions to which he had been led must be blameless, since he had done all he could to arrive at Truth; we should reply, that a man has never done *all he can* to arrive at Truth; that every man should go on to the end of his life, constantly endeavouring to obtain a clearer and clearer view of the Truths, on which his Duty depends; and that his renouncing this task, and making up his mind that he has done all which he needs to do, is itself a Transgression of Duty, which prevents his Error and Ignorance from being blameless.

606. The Inquiry after the Truths which are connected with Morality and Religion, must be conducted in a *serious* and *earnest* disposition. To bring to the task any spirit of levity, or of ready-made contempt for the doctrines whose Truth we have to examine, is to trifle with or pervert our Duty. Such a spirit makes our inquiry worthless; and may make us both mischievous and culpable in the influence which we exert upon others. Levity or Ridicule, which has any tinge of impiety, is a most grave offense; implying the ab-

sence of all due appreciation of the importance of religion : and such behaviour is the more plainly culpable, inasmuch as the spirit of Levity and Ridicule is inconsistent with calm and candid Inquiry. As we have said (140), Ridicule implies that the object ridiculed is compared with some standard, and is deemed so glaringly below the standard, as to make comparison absurd. To ridicule Religious Opinions, is to take for granted that they are unworthy of serious examination. To ridicule Religious opinions, does not prove, but assumes their falsity. Ridicule is no test, either of truth or falsehood, in the opinion ridiculed ; but it is a test of assumption, combined with levity, in the person who so uses it. Yet such assumption often carries away with it by sympathy the weaker kind of intellects, and puts them out of the frame of mind in which they can attend to serious inquiry. Ridicule often influences men more than argument ; and is more difficult to reply to ; because the replicant has first to overcome the feeling of Contempt, in the expression of which the force of Ridicule dwells. But this feeling of Contempt is not really any advance towards a discernment of Truth. It may be assumed on the side of Falsehood as well as of Truth. It may be communicated by sympathy, by the play of fancy, the ambiguities of language, and the fallacies of shallow thinking, in favour of what is false, as well as of what is true. Hence, even those Moralists who allow an unlimited Freedom to the Inquiry after speculative Truth, still condemn the use of Ridicule with regard to Religious Doctrines. To employ Jests and Grotesque Images, Sarcasms and Sneers, on such subjects, is to intoxicate men, while we are leading them among the most difficult and dangerous paths.

607. As implying a degree of Levity, the familiar mention of the deeper matters which belong to Religion is not without evil. For the deeper matters of Religion cannot be properly apprehended and meditated upon, without a degree of reflexion and abstraction which is inconsistent with familiar mention of them. This is especially the case with the Idea of God. The thought

of God, the Author of Duty, the end of Hope, the ever-guiding Intelligence of the World, the ever-present Witness of our Thoughts, our Holy Lawgiver, our Righteous Judge; cannot fitly be called up in our minds, without being detained a moment, as the object of Reverence. To turn our thoughts towards God, is almost to address ourselves to him; and we are not thoughtlessly to use words which may make this demand upon us.

608. Hence a good man will employ the Name of God cautiously and sparingly in his speech; and will never introduce it on any slight occasion, or in any trifling spirit. Still less will he employ it as an indication of some confused vehemence or reckless fierceness in his thoughts; as is done in common *Profane Swearing*. Such are the dictates of Natural Piety. They are confirmed by being enjoined by God himself, in one of the Ten Commandments given to the Israelites. *Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain.* And this is further indicated in the teaching of Christ (Matth. v. 35). For the Jews had apparently applied the commandment to the name JEHOVAH only; but Christ extends it to every expression, in which the thought of God is virtually referred to. *I say unto you, Swear not at all; neither by heaven, for it is God's throne; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool; neither by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the Great King.*

609. All the Duties of which we have been speaking may be included in the term *Christian Edification*, of which we have already spoken. But it is the Christian's duty to edify or communicate religious instruction to those around him, in a larger sense. The body of Christians who are in the world at every period, have it for their business to diffuse, to the whole world, the knowledge and the spirit of Christ; as the first Disciples, in their time, had this for their business. The true Disciples of Christ are always a *Church*, an *Ecclesia*, a Body called out of the great body of the

world; not only to be themselves brought to God, but to bring all men to God. They are always the Salt of the earth; the element by which it is to be preserved from corruption. Every Christian is bound to labour to make other men truly Christians, as far as his influence extends;—first, as we have said, his family and neighbours; next, his nation; and then the whole of mankind—the whole Human Family of his Brethren. Every Christian, and every Community of Christians, so far as they possess this Christian spirit, will be led to look upon themselves as Christian *Missionaries*, whose business it is to impart to all men Religious Truth.

CHAPTER XIV.

OATHS.

610. THE injunctions of Jesus Christ which we have referred to (608), and corresponding precepts given by several of his disciples in the Epistles, have led some persons to doubt whether it is allowable for Christians to confirm their testimony by Oaths, as the laws of all States, ancient and modern, have in some cases required them to do. In order to examine this point, we shall begin by considering Oaths as they are regarded by the light of Natural Religion. As we have already said (221), we may make, or may wish to make, a promise or a declaration in a manner more earnest, more considerate, more *solemn*, than ordinary. Natural Piety suggests, as the most solemn way in which this can be done, the doing it with express reference to our belief in God, in the presence of other men, in some form of this kind: I promise, or I declare, *in the presence of God; as God is my Witness; as God is my Judge.* We stated that, in the violation of a solemn promise or declaration, the transgression of morality is very great, because we have willingly and purposely rested a great share of our moral progress upon our truthfulness in this instance. It is

consistent with this view to confirm a solemn promise by an Oath. For in the eye of the religious man, the end and aim of our moral progress is the happiness which God makes to be the consequence of moral progress rightly pursued. By acting as in his presence, by purposely referring to him as our Witness, and as our Judge, we involve in the consequences of our acts, so far as we can, our total future happiness in this world and the next. If we transgress, we renounce our claim to the happiness which God will give to Truthfulness, without which no character can be otherwise than depraved.

611. It may perhaps be objected to the use of such expressions as this; *In the presence of God*; and the like, we make a difference between one action and another, which we ought not to make; since a religious man will do all things as in the presence of God. But to this the reply is obvious; that the use of such words brings the thought more home to us, for the moment, however familiar it may commonly be; and that such public references to the truths which we believe in common with other men, are among the means by which the belief becomes specially effective on our actions. We may add, that in those acts which especially consist of words, as promises and assertions, the religious thought, which ought to accompany our words, may very justly be also expressed in words. To avoid sins of thought, it may be enough that we *think* ourselves in the presence of God: but when we have to speak, we may utter this thought among the rest, and say that we *speak* as in the presence of God.

612. As an Oath implies hope of the happiness which God gives to virtue; it implies also fear of the unhappiness with which he will punish falsehood, and especially falsehood committed in a case in which he has been thus appealed to by an Oath. God is regarded as the avenger of Perjury. And this has sometimes been expressed in the Oath; God being spoken of, not only as the *Judge* of men, but as the *Punisher of Falsehood*. In some cases, there have been added *Imprecations*, that is, prayers for evils upon the swearer, if he break his

Oath. But it is more suitable to the Reverence which we owe to God as our Judge, that we should leave the details and mode of his Justice to him. On the other hand, an oath seems to imply a prayer for Divine assistance to enable us to keep our Oath. Man's command over his future actions, still more over his affections and wishes, is not absolute; and temptations may occur, when the assistance, which religious men seek to obtain by prayer, may be needed, in order that the sworn man may keep his Oath inviolate. This appears to be implied in the phrase used in many Oaths, *So help me God; Ita me Deus adjuvet.*

613. It has been said by some, that these phrases mean: *On that condition alone, and no other, may God help me: If I break this oath, may he cease to help me, and leave me to misery.* On this view, the clause, *So help me God*, has been spoken of as a kind of Imprecation. But it is difficult to accept this view. If this were the sense intended, the more proper expression would be, *So bless me God, So reward me God, or, So save me God;* expressions which are not commonly used in Oaths. The expression, *So help me God*, agrees very well with the view which we have given of a solemn promise, that upon our truthfulness in this instance, we are willing to risk our whole moral progress; or, as the religious man rather views the matter, our favour in the eyes of God, and the happiness which he can give. For in incurring such a risk, a man may well say, "May God help me to escape this danger." And the word *So*, in this formula, must then mean; "May God so truly strengthen me when I am weak, as I truly intend to use all my strength in order to keep my Oath*."

* This view, that the expression *So help me God* cannot be understood as imprecatory, is still more manifestly true, when we take into consideration the forms equivalent or nearly equivalent, which are used on various occasions. *So help me God and his Holy Gospels*, one of these forms, cannot, without great violence to its obvious meaning, be taken as an imprecatory expression. And in the Ordination Services, where the most solemn declarations are plainly intended, the expression *So help me God* is varied and paraphrased in accordance with the view maintained in the text.

614. It has sometimes been objected to the use of Oaths, that it is irreverent towards God, to employ his name, and invoke his agency, for the purpose of carrying on human affairs. But we reply to this, that an Oath is really an act of reverence. We do not doubt that God does so far attend to human affairs, that he judges our actions, and will punish us if we commit wilful and deliberate falsehood. We do not pretend to call in his agency; but to express our conviction that he will act as our judge. A falsehood, uttered with this thought brought before us, is really a more flagrant sin against him, and must be supposed to draw upon us a heavier punishment, than an offense done thoughtlessly. In short, in an oath we do not pretend to direct the attention of God to man, but the attention of man to God.

615. We may add, that an Oath, by referring the matter to the Providence of God, secures us from all claim of regard to man. If we had, unsworn, to give evidence which would inflict loss or disgrace upon a very powerful man, or a very dear friend, the person might, if he were one who thought that some falsehoods are excusable, expect us to withhold or distort the truth, for his benefit or exculpation; but no one holds Perjury to be excusable; and the fact of our giving our evidence on Oath, at once destroys all expectation that we will violate or trifle with the truth. It destroys this expectation so completely, that even the person proved to be guilty, feels commonly no resentment against the Witnesses who prove him so. This could result from nothing but from the establishment of an absolute and supreme obligation to tell the truth, such as an Oath alone can establish.

616. Instead of using the name of God, the phrase *I solemnly affirm*, and the like, have sometimes been used. The reason for this substitution would be intelligible if the phrase were employed to avoid a recognition of the existence of God: but among men who believe

The answers to questions there proposed—*Will you do thus and thus?*—are these: *I will do so by the help of God: I will do so, the Lord being my helper: I will endeavour myself, the Lord being my helper.* Surely no one would call these Imprecations,

that God will judge them, it does not appear what sense can be conveyed by the word *solemnly*, except that they recollect that there will be such a judgment. If the expression do not excite the same thought as if they had said, *In the presence of God*, it does not seem to have any meaning.

617. It is sometimes said, that if a man cannot be believed upon his word, he cannot be believed upon his oath; that if he will commit falsehood, he will commit perjury. And undoubtedly, a perfectly good man is as incapable of the one, as of the other. A person in whom the operative principle of Truth is completely established and developed, will not tell a lie; and on him, an Oath would produce no effect which could not be produced without it. But the world is not composed of perfectly good men. The moral culture of many, we may say, of most persons, is very imperfect, with regard to Truth. Besides that they often speak thoughtlessly, there are kinds and occasions of falsehood, which they deem allowable or excusable. We have noticed some of these, in speaking of Cases of Conscience respecting Truth. We have there stated that our moral culture requires entire truthfulness; or, as the religious man will express this, that God's approval cannot be given to anything short of entire truthfulness. But men, in their common daily actions, do not think much of their moral culture, and of God's approval. The object of an Oath is, to raise them from their common mood, in which they claim excuses and allowances for falsehood, into that state of mind which the thought of God's judgments is fitted to call forth. And Oaths do produce this effect. Men's minds are solemnized by this form of an engagement. Under this impression of an Oath, they no longer claim excuses and allowances for their falsehood. They speak with consideration and gravity. If they give testimony on Oath, they are careful in their recollection of the fact. If they promise on Oath, they are watchful over themselves for the future.

618. The Oaths commonly in use among men are principally of the two kinds just referred to; Oaths of

Testimony or Assertion, and Oaths of Promise or Engagement for the future. Oaths of Testimony impose upon us an especial duty of careful recollection and exact narration. The formula used in the administration of English law expresses this; it requires men to speak *the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, touching the matter in question.* But in the cases in which this is employed judicially, it is for the Tribunal, rather than for the Witness, to determine what is the *whole truth touching the matter in question*: and the English Courts of Law expect only that the Witness shall answer the questions put to him. They also excuse him from doing this, when the answer would criminate himself. These definitions of the Obligation of the Witness, are also the definitions of his duty *as a Witness.* As a lover of Justice, it will often be right for a man to do much more than this.

619. In the same manner, Oaths of Assertion; as when we declare the value of our income, or of anything belonging to us; impose upon us a Duty of careful examination of the matter concerning which we assert; and an entire sincerity in asserting, without reserve, equivocation, or straining of the truth. Thus an Oath that we have not received or paid money, or reward, (as in oaths against bribery at elections, sale of ecclesiastical offices, and the like,) is violated not the less, if the money be received and paid by some contrivance which escapes detection, or evades the law.

620. Oaths of Promise with regard to special acts are not much in use among us. We do not require a man to swear that he will perform a contract, or resign an office, or the like. The Law has other ways of enforcing its Will, on such points. Our Oaths of Engagement for the future are, for the most part, promises of a general course of action; and promises of certain dispositions as suitable to the condition to which we look forward. Thus we have Oaths of Office administered to Magistrates, Judges, Jury-men, Legislators, and to the Sovereign himself; and Oaths of Allegiance, administered to the subject. In these Oaths, the Swearer

engages to conform to the Laws of the Land in the discharge of his office; and also, generally, to act with care, impartiality, and equity. He promises to be faithful to the law, and to the intention of the law; which intention is understood to be, the administration of justice. The subject promises *Allegiance* to the Sovereign; which was formerly further explained in the Oath itself: *I promise to be true and faithful to the King, and not to know of any ill or damage intended him without defending him therefrom.* These Oaths all engage the swearer to that conduct, and those dispositions, which morality would require without the Oath. For the Magistrate's Duty is generally to administer the law, to regard the intention of the law, and to identify this intention with justice (235). And the Subject's Duty is generally, as we have already said (233), a willing obedience to the laws, an affection for his country, a love of its institutions and of its constitution, a loyalty to its sovereign. There may be special cases of exception to these Duties; as when the Magistrate cannot look upon a particular law as other than unjust: or when the Duty of Allegiance is broken, under the pressure of a case of extreme necessity. Oaths such as we have just mentioned, which engage the Swearer to that course of action which forms the General Rule of Morality, are inconsistent with a contemplation of the cases of Exception, as prominent or frequent. A person cannot, without the guilt of Perjury, take an Oath to administer the laws faithfully and justly, if he believe that to administer the laws faithfully will be to commit habitual injustice. A Subject cannot swear allegiance to the reigning Sovereign, if he not only believe him to be an usurper, but if he also be ready to join in a scheme for deposing him, if a favourable occasion should arise. Oaths of Office, of Allegiance, and the like, are to be taken in such a manner, as to identify the citizen's Duties with his Obligations: and by being Oaths, they further express his conviction that the discharge of Duties, and therefore of legal Obligations, is the only way to obtain the approval of God, and the happiness which he bestows with his approval.

621. Besides the general moral engagements contained in Oaths of Office, such Oaths often include some specification of a particular subject, with a prescribed course of action relative to it; thus, the English Sovereign, at his Coronation, swears that he will maintain the Protestant Reformed Religion as established by Law: Members of Parliament take a similar Oath: Officers of special bodies, as Colleges and Corporations, in many cases take Oaths to observe the Special Laws of their body, to maintain its privileges, and the like. Along with the Oath of Allegiance to the Sovereign, there has often been demanded an Oath of Allegiance also to his Heirs; or an Oath of Renunciation of the Obligation of Obedience to some rival Authority: as in this country, we have, in addition to the Oath of Allegiance, the Oath of *Abjuration*, in which we abjure the Authority of the Pope.

622. All such Oaths require of him, who takes them, a sincere and unchanging purpose to do what he thus engages to do.

For instance, If an officer of a corporation, having sworn to maintain the Established Religion, should afterwards endeavour to overthrow it, by the use of his official power; it would be no exculpation for him to say that he had become convinced that the Established Religion was erroneous. If a man has entered upon an office engaging himself to a certain course of official conduct, and afterwards, thinks such conduct wrong; he is bound by Justice and Truth to give up his office; and cannot honestly pursue any other course. In this case, as in others, Law supplies the Definition, which is requisite to give form to Justice. The Oath of Office is the expression of a Contract between the Body and the individual. If he breaks the Contract, and keeps his share of the advantage which it gave, he is guilty of fraud and falsehood, aggravated by Perjury.

623. An important question in many cases of this kind is, how the Oath is to be *interpreted*. Of course, a Promise so made, like other Promises, is to be interpreted according to the common intention of the two parties; or according to what is the intention of the

party imposing the Oath, and is understood to be its intention by the party taking the Oath. And this is, accordingly, the Rule generally given. The Rule is stated by saying that the Oath is to be understood *secundum animum imponentis*. But here the question occurs, in Oaths of office, and the like, Who are the Parties between whom the transaction takes place? Who is the Imposer of the Oath?

624. We reply, that in Oaths of Office, the Imposer is *The State*; which we have already described as a permanent Moral Agent; and which is, of course, capable of being Party to a Contract. The State is the Imposer of all such Oaths; for all Offices derive their Authority from the State, and all Special Corporations derive, from the State, their power of making Laws; and therefore, the Authority of their Laws. Hence those Oaths, which express the conditions on which the authority, or the advantages of the Office, are assigned to the individual, express the conditions imposed upon him by the State.

625. The State, as we have said (374), is one and permanent, while the persons of whom it consists are many and transitory. The Intention of the State is expressed in the language of the Oath; and if there be, in this, anything which requires interpretation, the Laws and Legislative Proceedings which accompanied the enactment of the Oath may often aid in pointing out the right interpretation. But this is not the main source of interpretation. The State continues to exist after each such act of Legislation: and the State which to-day imposes the Oath, is not identical with the Legislature which, many years, perhaps centuries ago, enacted it. The State may itself interpret the Oath, by a Declaratory Act; and may often prefer this course to the substitution of a new and clearer Oath; on the ground of many inconveniences which attend the change of ancient and usual forms. There are also other ways, in which the State may give its interpretations of the Oaths which it imposes; as in the decisions of Courts of Law, and the like. But yet, if these interpretations

be in apparent contradiction with the most obvious meaning of the words of the Oath, religious men and lovers of truth, especially if they have not fully considered the difficulties of such legislation, will be shocked with the incongruity; and the offence thus given to them, may be a reason for the State changing the form of the Oath.

626. There are cases in which even the silence and inaction of the State may be looked upon as implying, in some measure, its view of the meaning of an Oath. If an Oath contain clauses which plainly imply usages or conditions notoriously obsolete, and if it be still enforced by Authority; it may be reasonably supposed that the State, the Imposer of the Oath, is aware of the practical omission of what is obsolete, and acquiesces in it. But here, also, when the discrepance between the words of the Oath and the practice becomes glaring, it is desirable, on that account, to alter the words, in order to avoid the shock which the incongruity causes to religious men and lovers of truth, who have not fully considered the difficulties of such legislation.

627. Yet there may be other reasons which may, for a time, balance this; and may reasonably prevent the change from taking place. The doctrine, that an implication of, and reference to, obsolete conditions, in the words of an Oath, renders it desirable or right to alter the Oath, cannot be carried out rigorously. For such is the constant progress of human affairs, and such, in consequence, the constantly proceeding changes in the use of terms, that we cannot employ words which will not, after a time, imply something no longer existing in practice. And this implication of obsolete things does not necessarily make the words of an Oath unfit to be retained. When we swear *Allegiance* to our *Sovereign Lord* the King, the terms *Allegiance* and *Sovereign Lord*, imply the relations of the feudal system; but the Oath has been still properly retained; it being understood, by the State and by the Swearer, that the fidelity which is thus denoted, is such as suits the

altered relations of the Governor and the governed; and this has been supposed, at every step of the gradual change, from the original to the present condition of the Constitution. The same implication would be involved in an Oath in which the terms *fealty*, *loyalty*, *homage*, should occur; but such an Oath would not, on that account, be a bad one. In like manner, if the term of an ancient form should engage us to *worship* a person, the sense being to show personal respect and regard, (as in the English Marriage Service) we might still use the form with a safe conscience. And thus, when the terms of an Oath have gradually changed their meaning, or become obsolete, or inapplicable to the existing state of things, if the State continue to impose the Oath, it may be supposed that in imposing it, the State assents to the modification of meaning which is necessary, in order to make the declaration significant and applicable. And the person taking the Oath, if he intends to fulfil the engagement as nearly as the altered condition of things allows him to do, may be considered as taking it *in the sense of the Imposer*; and therefore may do so with a good conscience.

628. If it be objected to this, that we thus make Custom the Interpreter of the Law, instead of making Law the Regulator of the Custom; we reply, that the Custom, which we take for this purpose, is Custom sanctioned by the State; that is, by the Giver and Guardian of the Law. We may add, that to a great extent, we cannot avoid making Custom, or, more properly speaking, History, the Interpreter of the Law; for Custom and History determine the meaning of words and phrases; and often determine them to have a different sense, when used in official formulæ, and when used in common speech; as we see in innumerable examples in laws and law proceedings. History modifies the relations of men, classes, offices, and occupations, from time to time; and must necessarily modify the meaning of the language in which such things are spoken of.

629. If we were to insist upon this;—that Laws

and Oaths should always be interpreted according to the *common usage* of speech at the present day;—we should make it necessary to alter a great part of our present law language; and on such a supposition, no oaths could be employed, except their terms were—either so general as to apply alike to all periods of history, which would deprive them of all special meaning, and of all effect;—or else, except their terms were constantly changed, as fast as common Language and the relations of men change; and the changes thus requisite would need to be made every few years. This would defeat the purpose of many of our Oaths; which is, to produce a permanence, and continuity, in the general structure of our institutions (as, for instance, Colleges,) in spite of the constantly proceeding historical changes. Such a course of public administration would require a perpetual interference of the Legislature, for the purpose of remodelling Oaths; which interference would, in fact, be a constant innovation. Those who wish for the permanence of ancient Institutions, are aware of this; and are very reluctant to alter ancient *forms*; and Oaths among the rest.

630. If the person, taking an Oath, of which the object is plainly the permanence of the Institutions to which it refers, assent cordially to this purpose, this cordial agreement in purpose with the Imposer, (for the State, by retaining the Oath, must be supposed to assent to the object of the Oath,) will enable the Juror to interpret, also, in the sense of the Imposer, the parts of it which are obsolete and inapplicable. He will necessarily* interpret such parts, so that they shall be in consistency with the main purpose. There are many cases, in which great changes have been gradually effected in the Institutions to which Oaths refer; changes, not produced at any period wilfully, but brought in necessarily, in order to keep the Institutions in coherence with the general state of the nation, and to carry on the design and business of the Institution. It is evident, that in such cases, to revive, at the present day, the obsolete usages and conditions which the terms of such

Oaths originally denoted, would be to defeat the main purpose of the Oaths; namely, the Stability of the Institutions. Such restoration of Antiquity would be a most perilous innovation. Such a literal fidelity would be a real treachery; or at least a practical hostility, to the purpose of the Founders.

631. Even if the predecessors of the present generation were to blame in admitting such changes, (although in many cases they had no choice in the matter,) still the present generation have inherited the changed state of the Institution, and cannot, however much they might wish and try to do so, recall the original condition of things. All they can do, so long as the State does not change the Oaths, is to observe them, interpreting them in good faith, according to existing conditions, notorious to the State as well as to the jurors. But probably, in such cases, there may be no need to blame preceding generations, in order to exculpate the present. Probably each generation, in its turn, has had the same excuse. The changes were gradual; each generation interpreted the ancient Oath in good faith; and intended to fulfil it, as nearly as altered circumstances permitted, in the sense of the Founders; and, therefore, as we have said, truly in the sense of the Imposer. And if there have been this continued good faith, regulating the practice of succeeding generations, such practice may be taken as an Interpretation of the engagement, sanctioned by the Imposer.

632. It is however quite necessary to attend carefully to the condition, that the practice of each generation should be adopted *in good faith*; in order to give it authority as an Interpretation. If men deviate from the course which the terms of their engagement imply, wantonly, carelessly, or unnecessarily, they are, no doubt, guilty of breaking their engagement; and if an Oath have been taken as a confirmation of it, guilty of Perjury. If they have disregarded both the Purpose of the Founder, and the Letter of the Oath which he framed, they are without any excuse. The changed circumstances of the times, which make literal ob-

servance of the engagement impossible, do not thereby make the Oath unmeaning. It must be carefully interpreted according to the intention of the Founder; admitting, into the Interpretation, only such changes of the meaning of terms and details, as have been produced by the general progress of change; and not by any purposes different from those of the Founder. Each generation of the members of an Institution, endeavouring, in care and good faith, to conform to their engagements, may have authority as Interpreters of their own Rules, but not as Rivals of the Founder.

633. Moreover, in order thus to act in good faith, it is not sufficient that the existing members of the Institution so conduct it, and so apply its Laws, that they do what they conceive the Founder *would have wished* to be done, if he had lived in present times. This Supposition, of what the Founder *would have wished*, is far too vague to afford any good ground of action. To make such a Supposition the Interpretation of the engagements prescribed by the Founder, is contrary to the nature of an engagement. In a Contract, it is not sufficient to do what we suppose the other party *would wish*; we must do what we *have contracted* to do. The same is the case in an Institution with written Laws, which we have engaged to observe. The Founder has made his body of Laws, and his Oaths, because he was not content with a general statement of the purposes which he wished to promote; just as all Legislators prescribe detailed modes of action, and not merely general courses of action. The Founder has prescribed means, in subservience to his end. If some of these have been silently excluded by time, without any choice of ours, we may blamelessly acquiesce in the exclusion; and perhaps we may deem the Founder short-sighted; as, in truth, no Legislator is long-sighted and sagacious enough to provide for all the changes which arrive. But we may not, without blame, substitute other means for his, when we have a choice. We may not, after engaging to conform to his plan, reject it, and substitute one of our own.

634. What degree of particularity it is prudent to introduce into the special Laws of Institutions, with a view to their permanence, is a question of Polity, which we shall not here consider. But it is evident that if particular details and arrangements, which are judicious at first, are prescribed by Laws; and if the Laws are interpreted according to the Rules above laid down; such Laws will contribute greatly to the permanence of the Institutions, so regulated; and will tend to secure their consistent effectiveness in promoting their original object, amid the external changes which the course of the national history brings.

635. But though we must thus allow to the State,—the Imposer of the Oaths, and other Engagements, which we are now speaking of,—some range of power, in interpreting the terms of such engagements in a sense different from the original sense; and though we must hold that the Interpretation of the Imposer relieves the Conscience of the Juror; we must not carry this doctrine and its application too far. There are strong moral reasons for being careful on that side. The State may be regarded as having, for one of its objects, the moral Education of the people; and its Laws, and the administration of its Laws, are among the means by which it promotes this object. And it will fail in teaching lessons of Truthfulness by its Laws, if it lightly sanctions an interpretation of an Oath which differs from the obvious sense of the words. By the currency of such *forced* interpretations, so sanctioned, many persons will be led to carelessness and indifference about Truth, in taking such engagements; and thus the State becomes a teacher of immorality.

636. And again, on the other part; though the Juror's conscience may be relieved in such cases, it can hardly be quite satisfied; especially when the interpretation is only *presumed*, from the silent acquiescence of the State in notorious changes. For the notoriety may be imperfect, and the acquiescence must be more or less doubtful. The silence of the State may imply, not that it acquiesces in the existing practice, but

that, though it disapproves of the practice, the time and the occasion for legislative interference have not yet arrived. In this case, the Juror does not swear according to the interpretation of the Imposer; and his conscience must be the more disturbed, according as this is more probably the case.

637. Hence, in all cases in which there is a manifest contradiction between the words of an engagement, and the sense in which it is commonly performed; and especially if there has not been any authoritative sanction of the usual practice; it is desirable, on moral grounds, to alter the words, so as to remove the contradiction. The Legislators ought to endeavour to do this, as acting for the State, and being, on its behalf, desirous of promoting Truthfulness and Integrity. The Jurors ought to aim at the like alteration, as being desirous of having no grounds for dissatisfaction in their consciences. And since in England, every man has, by Petition or otherwise, the means of seeking a Legislative change; the persons who are required to take an Oath or an Engagement, under circumstances such as have been described, are bound in conscience, when the contradiction between the words and the practice is apparent, and still more, if all sanction of the practice be wanting, to aim, by constitutional means, at the removal of the contradiction.

638. In this discussion on the subject of the interpretation of Oaths and Engagements, we have had to touch upon questions which rather concern the Duties of Truth, than the subject of Natural Piety, with which we began. But this could not easily be avoided: for the Duties of Truth, though they belong to all our engagements, are never so carefully studied as when they depend upon our *most solemn* engagements; namely, those which are confirmed by Oaths. And though the breaking of an Oath is an Offense against Piety, a transgression of the Reverence due to God, and a disregard of the Fear of his Punishment; it is so, because he is the God of Truth, and will punish Perjury as aggravated Falsehood.

CHAPTER XV.

OATHS OF CHRISTIANS.

639. WE have already spoken of Oaths in general, as a custom arising from the dictates of natural Piety; we have now to speak of Christian Oaths as a Christian Ordinance. The Oaths commonly used in this country contain a reference to Christianity. The ancient form of the Oath was that the Juror touched the Gospels, and said, *Ita me Deus adjuvet et hæc Sancta Dei Evangelia*; and the present form is, that in taking the Oath he holds the Gospel in his hand, and kisses the book after saying *So help me God*.

640. Christian Oaths have been taken in various forms. As to its general character, the Ordinance is supported by various grounds; Natural Piety has made the use of Oaths universal. In the Jewish Revelation we find them abundantly used, and approved and enjoined by God. Christ and his Apostles sanctioned the use of Oaths by their practice, but nowhere clearly enjoined them. There are even some passages in the New Testament which have been understood as forbidding Oaths, but without good ground for such an interpretation. And the Universal Usage of Christian Communities, down to modern times has given its authority to that interpretation of the Christian Precepts, which allows the use of Oaths on solemn occasions. We shall further illustrate some of these assertions.

641. Among the Israelites, the custom of swearing on solemn occasions existed, and is constantly taken for granted in the Old Testament. Oaths are there commanded as a part of the usual judicial procedure: Thus Exod. xxii. 11, if a man deliver unto his neighbour an ox, &c. and it die, or be hurt, or be driven away, no man seeing it, *Then shall an oath of the Lord be between them both*. And Psalm xv. 4, it is mentioned among the characters of a good man, that *he sweareth to his*

neighbour, and disappointeth him not, though it be to his own hindrance. The denunciations of God's anger against false swearing, imply a sanction of swearing when truly employed; and we cannot suppose God to disapprove of the practice, when he is repeatedly represented as himself having sworn an oath to Abraham (Gen. xxii. 16), to David (Psalm lxxxix. 3), and to the people of Israel on various occasions (Isai. xlv. 23; Jerem. xlix. 13; li. 14; Amos vi. 8). The command, *Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain*, implies that the name might be used on important and fit occasions; and the command appears fitted to keep up the solemn reverence for the thought of God, which an Oath implies.

642. When Jesus Christ taught the true import of the law of Moses, he noticed, among other things, the Jewish practice of Oaths. His injunctions, on this subject, were to the same effect as with regard to other parts of the Jewish usages. As with regard to retaliation, to divorce, to honouring of parents, to angry expressions, the Jewish teachers had made subtle distinctions as to what was and was not a transgression of the law, while they had neglected the spirit of the law; so with regard to swearing. The trivial and thoughtless use of forms of swearing had become common, and the teachers had laid down rules as to which of these forms were binding, and which were not so. In this, as in the other cases, Christ rejects these distinctions, and says of such cases (Matth. v. 34), *I say unto you, Swear not at all.* That this is the import of his words, is plain from the course of teaching in this place. Christ begins by saying (v. 17), *Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets;* and then goes on to various points, with the expressions, *Ye have heard it hath been said by them of old time... But I say unto you* (v. 21, 22, 27, 28, 31, 32, 38, 39). And the same form he uses here: *Ye have heard that it hath been said* (v. 33), *Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: but I say unto you, Swear not at all.* If, in this instance, he had

forbidden judicial Oaths, it is plain that he would have been destroying the law and the prophets. For the Law enjoined judicial Oaths, as we have seen; and if a hearer of Christ, thinking to obey him, had refused to answer upon his Oath before a judge, he would have been violating the law of Moses, and of his country, as we have seen. We do not find that Christ was ever accused of having violated the law of Moses in this part of his teaching. And when we consider how different the Oaths he spoke of were in form from the judicial Oaths of the Jews, it seems impossible to suppose that his hearers would understand him to speak of these.

643. In this passage, Christ refers to what had been said, namely, *Thou shalt perform unto the Lord thy oaths.* But we learn from another passage that this had been said with various distinctions. In Matth. xxiii. 16, Christ reproaches the Scribes and Pharisees on this subject: *Woe unto you, ye blind guides, which say, Whosoever shall swear by the temple, it is nothing; but whosoever shall swear by the gold of the temple, he is a debtor! . . . And whosoever shall swear by the altar, it is nothing; but whosoever sweareth by the gift that is upon the altar, he is guilty.* And he then explains, that all these distinctions, which were used to show Oaths to be no Oaths, were futile. (v. 17, 19, 20, 21, 22), *The temple sanctifieth the gold. . . the altar sanctifieth the gift. Whosoever shall swear by the altar, sweareth by it, and by all things thereon. Whoso shall swear by the temple, sweareth by it, and him that dwelleth therein. He that shall swear by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God, and by him that sitteth thereon.* These are very forcible considerations against the light or familiar use of Oaths; but of no apparent force to overthrow the Jewish law which, given by God himself, had till then permitted and enjoined Oaths. Indeed, the precept given by Christ, *Swear not at all,* cannot be considered as having reference to judicial Oaths. The forms mentioned of swearing, *by heaven, by Jerusalem, &c.,* were

not judicial forms, and the precept is combined with other precepts which would put an end to all judicial contests: *Resist not evil... And if any man will sue thee at law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also* (Matth. v. 40). When Christ says (ver. 37), *Let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil*, we may readily apply this to judicial Oaths, for these come as lawsuits come, from the cupidity and anger, the falsehood and levity of man. Oaths come of evil sources, and judicial Oaths among others; but there is in the precepts now referred to nothing which denies them, so far as they are evils, to be necessary evils, as all judicial proceedings may be said to be, if we look at their origin.

644. Accordingly, it is related that Christ (Matth. xxvi. 63) held his peace when he was accused till *the high priest said unto him, I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell me whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God. He then answered, Thou hast said; or, as St. Mark gives the answer (xiv. 62), I am.* This is conceived by commentators to be a submission to an Oath imposed in a judicial procedure. An Oath for judicial purposes is mentioned with apparent approval in the Epistle to the Hebrews (vi. 16), *An oath for confirmation is the end of all strife; and this is stated, in order to explain God's condescension, in accommodating "himself to the customs of men, as when he swore to Abraham; thus adding to one immutable thing, God's "promise," another immutable thing, his oath. It cannot be supposed that such illustrations and expressions would have been used by the writer, if he had held the oaths of men to be sinful.*

645. For the like reasons, we cannot understand the precept given by St. James as applicable to Judicial Oaths. It is almost a verbal repetition of the words of Christ (James v. 12), *But above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath; but let your yea be yea; and your*

nay, nay ; lest ye fall into condemnation. This precept occurs in an Epistle in which the government of the tongue is especially dwelt on (ch. iii). It does not occur along with precepts for the conduct of Christians in their intercourse with the world ; but is connected with injunctions of the feelings which were to be excited by the approaching coming of the Lord. Thus ch. v. 8, *Be patient . . . for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh.* ver. 9, *Grudge not one against another . . . behold, the judge standeth before the door.* ver. 10, *Take the prophets for an example of patience.* ver. 12, *Above all things, swear not.* ver. 13, *Is any afflicted ? let him pray. Is any merry ? let him sing psalms.* It is plain that we have here a train of injunctions respecting the seriousness of thought and demeanour which were suited to the near coming of the Lord ; and it is evident that any light or trivial mention of sacred things, such as familiar swearing involves, was grossly at variance with this seriousness : but, we have here no ground for concluding anything against the serious and faithful discharge of an important task, like that of giving to our solemn declarations a religious sanction.

646. Besides the allowance given to judicial Oaths by the above passages, we find countenance given to religious asseverations in other cases by the example of St. Paul (Rom. i. 9), *God is my witness . . . that I make mention of you always in my prayers.* (2 Cor. i. 23) ; *I call God as a witness on my own soul, that to spare you I came not to Corinth.* These expressions so far assume the form of an Oath as to show us that in that form there was nothing repugnant to the religious views of St. Paul.

647. The examples of swearing which are given in the precepts above quoted are all of the same form : *by heaven, by earth, by the altar, by the temple.* The forms of asseveration used by St. Paul are different : *God is my witness ; I call God as a witness.* The forms used in other cases are still different, but nearly

resembling those employed by St. Paul: *God do so to me, and more also, if ought but death part thee and me* (Ruth i. 17). *As I shall answer to God at the day of judgment* (which is the form of Oath in Scotland); *So help me God*, which is the usual form in England: or more completely, *So help me God and his Holy Gospels*; or, *So help you God, and his Holy Gospels*.

The meaning of these last expressions has already been considered. See (613) and the note.

END OF VOLUME THE FIRST