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

















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HISTORY  
OF THE  
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.

BY  
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AUTHOR OF "A TREATISE ON HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY," "A HISTORY OF  
THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE," ETC., ETC.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

CONTAINING THE EVENTS FROM THE PROCLAMATION OF THE EMAN-  
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## INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD VOLUME.

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IN the work now completed by this volume I have endeavored to convert the annals of the Civil War into a history.

In the annals of a nation, each occurrence, whether important or unimportant, is presented as an isolated fact, irrespective of its bearing on the general course of affairs. Its philosophical connection with other occurrences is not necessarily traced out.

The first duty of one who would write a history is to take such annals of the events with which he has to deal, and to discover among them what may be termed the master-facts. In his narrative he must bring these into prominence, making them the conspicuous centres around which the minor or subordinate facts are grouped. The impression which he will finally leave on the mind of his reader depends upon the clearness of his narrative, and this, in its turn, depends upon the completeness with which the rule here indicated has been observed.

The events considered in this volume occurred between the Proclamation of Freedom to the Slaves and the end of the war. Chronologically they range from the 1st of January, 1863, to the close of the spring of 1865.

Applying the foregoing rule to them, they may be classified in the nine following sections, the enumeration being continued from the thirteenth section of Volume II.:

Section

- XIV. The Conquest of the Central Region of the Confederacy.
- XV. The Contest in the Atlantic region.
- XVI. The Pressure on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Mississippi fronts of the Confederacy.
- XVII. Operations preliminary to, or in connection with the final Campaigns.

## Section

- XVIII. Piercing of the Cotton States by the Army of the West.  
 XIX. Forcing of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia into the fortifications of Richmond by the Army of the East.  
 XX. Interior affairs of the Republic and the Confederacy.  
 XXI. The Downfall of the Confederacy.  
 XXII. Conclusion.

Adopting this as a convenient grouping of the facts to be considered, I have used the reports of the commanding generals on each side as a basis for the description of campaigns and battles. These I have compared with the reports of the subordinate officers, often thereby obtaining a clearer comprehension of the facts. Frequently I have corroborated the result by subsequent conversations or correspondence with the authors themselves. In every case I have preserved the original language as far as I consistently could, intending that my reader should feel that he is perusing an authentic history, in which the ideas, and even the language of the chief actors are preserved.

No graphic history of this war can be composed without consulting the publications of the newspaper army correspondents. They not only give glimpses of scenery and passing events—durable photographs of transitory things—but, often with extraordinary penetration, divine the reasons of military movements, and interpret the meaning of political acts.

I have been permitted to have access to sources of information of the most authoritative and private kind. Correspondence between eminent persons intimately concerned in the conduct of the war, and documents of the highest value, which probably may not become public for many years, have been confidentially granted for my guidance. In the course of the composition of these volumes I have perused many thousands of such manuscript pages.

It has not been my intention to limit my work to a mere narration of facts: I have endeavored to rise to a perception of their inter-relation. In this consists the philosophy of history. The success with which it is accomplished is the true criterion of the merit of any historical composition.

I will here repeat the remark made in the Introduction to the second volume, that "in the composition of this work I have been


greatly indebted to some of the chief actors in the events described. I can not sufficiently express the obligations I am under to them. They have not only given me much important—often confidential—information, but have added invaluable counsel as to the treatment of the whole subject.

“I shall esteem it a favor if any of my readers who may find on these pages errors in the narrative of facts will communicate to me such statements as they may consider nearer to the truth. I will give to their suggestions my earnest attention. Contemporary history must pass the ordeal of examination of many thousand eye-witnesses of the events with which it deals, and this, indeed, constitutes its best recommendation to future times.” But, if contemporary history has to confront so strict a tribunal, it is not without advantages, for by the evidence of eye-witnesses and actors alone can many events be understood and explained.

JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER.

*University,*  
*Washington Square,*  
*New York.*

December, 1869.



# C O N T E N T S.

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# THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.

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## SECTION XIV.

### CONQUEST OF THE CENTRAL REGION.

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#### CHAPTER LXV.

##### PROSPECTIVE SURVEY OF MILITARY AFFAIRS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION.

In this chapter it is intended to ascertain the correct point of view for an examination of the campaigns which followed the Proclamation of Emancipation of the slaves.

A preliminary survey shows that the Confederate line of defense was first broken by the Army of the Tennessee. The Army of the Cumberland was then brought into action. The central region of the Confederacy was conquered, and a secure lodgment made at Chattanooga, the portal through the Alleghany Mountains.

Hence the movement of the Army of the West claims precedence in the order of relating the events of this portion of the war.

At the opening of 1863, the beleaguering of the Confederacy was strictly maintained by a military force, as appears from the report of the Secretary of War, of more than 800,000 men. The navy consisted of more than 400 ships, many of them iron-clads. Neither of these forces had as yet reached its maximum; both were rapidly increasing. Their pressure was continually becoming more and more severe.

Military condition at the opening of 1863.

Though the proclamation of freedom to the slaves was ostensibly received throughout the South with contemptuous defiance, and in all directions it was declared that "Lincoln could only enforce it as far as his gun-boats could go," in reality it excited profound alarm. That this alarm was not groundless soon appeared from the facility with which black regiments were

Alarm in the South at the emancipation of the slaves.

organized, and more than a hundred thousand black troops armed in the national service.

Previously to the issue of the proclamation, the employment of colored troops was restricted to a few localities. General Hunter had organized some at Hilton Head, in South Carolina, but, as there was no express authority for so doing, there was no warrant for paying them. That difficulty was, however, remedied by a special order from Stanton, who from the beginning of the conflict had perceived that the decisive method of action in a war with slaveholders is to resort to the military use of slaves. General Phelps, commanding under Butler in Louisiana, had also proposed to raise three regiments of Africans, to be used, not as laborers, but as soldiers. Butler resisted this at first, and Phelps resigned his commission. Butler, however, soon found himself constrained to pursue the same course, and organized several colored regiments.

But Jefferson Davis saw as distinctly as Stanton the effect of this use of the slaves. He therefore, with characteristic impetuosity, issued an order that any captured commissioned officer who had been employed in organizing, drilling, or instructing them, should not be treated as a prisoner of war.

In the Confiscation Act, and in another act passed in July, 1862, Congress had authorized the employment of colored troops. These laws had, however, in contemplation colored men who by the course of the war had been released from slavery.

After the Proclamation of Emancipation was issued, measures were introduced in the Senate and in the House for the enlistment of blacks. It was, however, decided that the Conscription Act gave the necessary authority without any farther legislation. On the 20th of January, 1863, Stanton authorized the Governor of Massachusetts to raise such troops, and organize them in a separate corps. Other

Measures for the organization of colored troops.



free states soon followed that example. In March the government dispatched the adjutant general to the Southwest to take charge of the matter in the Mississippi Valley. At the close of that year about 50,000 colored men were in actual service, and this number was tripled before the end of the next year. In those states or regions exempted from the Emancipation Proclamation by its own provisions, loyal slave-owners offering slaves for enlistment were to receive \$300 for each recruit accepted, upon filing a deed of manumission for him, and giving satisfactory proof of title. In certain specified cases enlistments might be made without the consent of owners, and compensation awarded on the same terms as if the slave had been offered for enlistment.

The military effects of the Emancipation Proclamation were therefore gradual; for, though colored troops appear at the siege of Port Hudson and elsewhere during the latter portion of 1863, their effect was comparatively unimportant. We have to examine the movements of the great armies at that time in the field to acquire a clear conception of the character of the campaigns of that year.

For the sake of perspicuity, I shall continue to speak of the armies on the east of the Alleghany Mountains as the Army of the East; of those between the mountains and the Mississippi as the Army of the West; of those beyond the Mississippi as the trans-Mississippi Army. This is not in accordance with the official designations, but it renders the description of the movements less confused.

The events of the past year had shown that the only portion of the line of investment encircling the Confederacy which had been distinctly and definitely advanced was that which lay on the northwest of the central region. This part, originally, for the most part, parallel to the Ohio River, had, through the fall of Donelson and the Battle of Shiloh, assumed the form of a vast crescent, one cusp of which rested

Advance of the national forces on the central northwest.

on Nashville, the other in the vicinity of Vicksburg, the convexity presenting to the Mississippi River, the concavity to the Alleghany Mountains. Elsewhere all partial front attacks on the Confederacy had either proved abortive or had merely given a foothold. The most energetic of them had been made by the Army of the Potomac, and had been repelled. That army and its antagonist, the Army of Northern Virginia, balanced each other. After repeated attempts, each had failed to obtain a positive superiority.

The central portion of the north line of investment was held by three armies: (1), that of the Ohio, Subdivision of the Western armies. under Burnside, in Kentucky, looking to Knoxville and East Tennessee; (2), that of the Cumberland, under Rosecrans, in Tennessee, looking to Chattanooga; (3), that of the Tennessee, under Grant, occupying West Tennessee, and threatening Vicksburg.

The topographical advantages of this region were very great. Events soon showed that it was the Advantages possessed by the Army of the Tennessee. movements here executed which would give rise to decisive results. These advantages were mainly due to the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers, of which use was skillfully made. As the Army of the Tennessee opened the Mississippi, it continually found itself sustained by a powerful co-operating fleet in the river.

This also was the weakest portion of the whole Confederate line of defense—a weakness which was not compensated by increased army-strength. On the contrary, erroneous political considerations led the Richmond authorities to concentrate their military force in Northern Virginia, to the disadvantage of this more vital part.

No one can study the history of this civil war without being struck with the incompetency with which the affairs of the Confederacy were managed. In all its military transactions may be seen the ideas of the politician dominating over those of the soldier. In truth it may be said, that while on the national side there was a definite plan,

consistently, resolutely, and at length successfully carried out, on the Confederate side there was no plan whatever.

To the topographical advantages possessed by the Army of the Tennessee were added others too important for us to overlook. It had in its command two of the ablest officers in the service—Grant and Sherman. Its duty, the opening of the Mississippi River, was sharply defined, thoroughly understood, enthusiastically approved of, and—which added not a little to its morale—more than half accomplished.

Vicksburg was taken by the right wing of the Army of the West, under Grant, about midsummer, 1863. The fall of that fortress drew with it the capture of a great Confederate army, its garrison; the immediate surrender of Port Hudson, and the complete opening of the river down to New Orleans.

Synopsis of the  
movement of the  
Western Army.

At this time the other wing of the army, the Army of the Cumberland, under Rosecrans, at Nashville, had not moved. It was Halleck's intention that Rosecrans and Grant should have pressed forward simultaneously, the former marching upon Chattanooga, while the latter besieged Vicksburg. He spared no exertions to carry his intention into effect—a correspondence, not without acerbity, passing between him and Rosecrans. Nevertheless, Rosecrans could not or did not move until the fall of Vicksburg. He then proceeded to the execution of his orders, and in a short campaign, without much difficulty, obtained possession of Chattanooga.

At this moment it seemed as if the Western Army had accomplished the duty to which it had been assigned. On its right Vicksburg had been captured and the river opened; on its left Chattanooga had been taken. In truth, there was, however, a great difference in what had been done by its two wings. Grant had made prisoners of war of the army of Pemberton, his antagonist; but Bragg, who was Rosecrans's antagonist, had simply receded, and was hold-

ing in force a position of great strength in the mountains of Georgia.

Rosecrans therefore advanced upon Bragg to attempt his destruction; the battle of Chickamauga was fought, and Rosecrans, instead of obtaining the victory, was beaten. He was now shut up in Chattanooga, his lines of supply severed; he was reduced to the direst peril, and not without reason was it expected that his army would have to surrender.

In this extremity the national government took the course that reason suggested. It promptly brought over from the Mississippi to Chattanooga the general who had conducted the campaign on that river so admirably. Within a few days after he had arrived, Grant had reopened the lines of supply, relieved the famishing army, and rendered Chattanooga secure.

Then he renewed the attempt in which Rosecrans had failed—the disposal of Bragg's army in his front. With the utmost speed he brought up Sherman and his army, and on the moment of the arrival of that officer fought the battle of Chattanooga, one of the best planned and best fought battles of the war. Bragg was overthrown. Henceforth Chattanooga was permanently secured to the nation, the siege of Knoxville was raised, and the Atlantic States of the Confederacy placed in the most imminent danger.

In the contemplation of these movements, the details of Summary of its acts. which I shall now give, the reader will find very much to admire. There is something grand in the conception and execution of this Western campaign. Its combinations are exceedingly picturesque, and its incidents alternately offer enough of disaster and glory. The brilliant movement of the Army of the Tennessee on Vicksburg, the siege and capture of that fortress, the march of the Army of the Cumberland to Chattanooga, the seizure of that portal into the South Atlantic States, the overthrow of Rosecrans at Chickamauga, the famine, the trans-



fer of Hooker's troops from the Rapidan to the Tennessee, more than a thousand miles, in a week, the coming up of Sherman from the Big Black, the battle of Chattanooga, the planting of the national flag on the crest of the Alleghanies at Lookout, the expulsion of the Confederates from the fastnesses of those mountains, the wintry march of Sherman to Knoxville, and the raising of the siege of that place—these furnish the materials of a romantic and noble story.

Though the actual operations of the Western Army were not precisely such as had been intended in Washington, they assumed a signally imposing and satisfactory character. Their issue was the possession of Kentucky, Tennessee, and the northern portion of the Gulf States; for the forays and excursions subsequently made, chiefly by the Confederate cavalry, were without military significance—a remark which applies even to Hood's final and disastrous sortie.

Very important consequences followed the translation of Grant and Sherman from the line of the Mississippi to Chattanooga, to which I must refer before I close these preliminary remarks. So long as these officers were restricted to the task of opening the Mississippi and consolidating the national possession of it, they gave to that task their undivided attention, and all their proposed movements had reference to the thorough completion of their work. Immediately after the fall of Vicksburg, we find them projecting operations both on the right and left banks of the river—expeditions toward Shreveport on one side, and toward Mobile on the other. But after the battle of Chattanooga, when Grant had been raised to the chief military command, their sphere of duty was increased; it was no longer the minor problem of completing the work on the Mississippi with which they had to deal, but the great and fundamental one—the military overthrow of the Confed-

Change in the purposes of its commanders.

eracy. The movements they had heretofore proposed now fell into neglect, and in their place appeared those grand manœuvres which brought the war to a close.

Conceding, therefore, to the foregoing considerations the weight which they appear to possess, I shall consider the movements of the Western armies in 1863 as having the precedence of all others. The various events to be described fall at once spontaneously into their proper places—the siege of Vicksburg, the opening of the river, the march of Rosecrans to Chattanooga, the capture of that place, the battle of Chickamauga, the transfer of Grant from the Mississippi, the relief of Chattanooga, the great and decisive battle of that name, and the raising of the siege of Knoxville. With that I consider that this act of the Great Drama closes.

Then, in the next section, I shall relate the struggles of the Army of the Potomac with the Army of Northern Virginia.

The Western Army leads in the decision of the campaigns.

## CHAPTER LXVI.

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.—THE SECOND VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.—SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG.—THE OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER ACCOMPLISHED.

Grant, after several unsuccessful attempts on the west and east banks of the Mississippi to gain access to Vicksburg, commenced a second and formal campaign. He marched his army down the west bank of the Mississippi, crossed the river at Bruinsburg, defeated the Confederates in five battles, captured the capital of the State of Mississippi, shut up the Confederate army in the fortifications of Vicksburg, besieged it, and eventually compelled it to surrender unconditionally. Sherman forced the Confederate General Johnston to retreat to Meridian. Port Hudson was surrendered, and the Mississippi opened throughout its entire length.

THE capture of New Orleans by Farragut had opened the Lower Mississippi; the victories of Shiloh and Memphis had removed all obstructions down to Vicksburg.


Vicksburg occupies a high bluff immediately below the mouth of the Yazoo. A railroad eastward connects it with all the roads of the South, and one westward was in course of construction toward Shreveport.

The point of intersection of this west-east line of railroads with the Mississippi, the strategic directrix of the North American continent, was therefore of vital importance to the Confederacy. The loss of Vicksburg meant not only the surrender of the great river, but also the bisection of the Confederate territory.

Accordingly, no pains had been spared to render this position impregnable. Batteries had been placed at every available point, and at the time now under consideration the defenses were held by a powerful army under Pemberton.

Though other points on the river toward New Orleans were guarded, and one of them, Port Hudson, had been

Importance of  
Vicksburg to the  
Confederacy.



THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.



strengthened by formidable works, they could only be considered as presenting a subordinate character—the fall of Vicksburg necessarily implied their surrender. Practically, therefore, all that was necessary for the reopening of the Mississippi throughout its entire length was the capture or neutralization of that strong-hold.

The capture or neutralization—for either was possible.

Possibility of neutralizing it.

Looking at the map, it may be seen that in front of Vicksburg the Mississippi makes a sharp bend, forming the peninsula on which De Soto stands. Now if a canal were cut across this tongue of land, a direct passage being given to the river current, Vicksburg would be thrown inland, its military capabilities be rendered useless—it would be neutralized.

When General Williams came up the river with Farragut

Construction of Williams's canal.

in the summer of 1862, he undertook to cut such a canal, and for that purpose gathered more than 1200 negroes from the adjacent plantations. His intention was to make a water-way of such width that vessels might pass through it out of reach of the guns of Vicksburg. Owing to an error committed in locating its mouth, the canal proved to be a failure—the river was not diverted from its course. Toward the close of that year Grant commenced his first operations for the reduction of Vicksburg. These were checked by the capture and destruction of his dépôt at Holly Springs, and by the repulse of Sherman at Chickasaw Bayou (vol. ii., p. 321). The Army of the Tennessee at this time consisted of four corps: the 13th (McClermand), the 15th (Sherman), the 16th (Hurlbut), the 17th (McPherson). On the return

Grant, with the Army of the Tennessee, prepares to attack Vicksburg.

of the successful expedition from Arkansas Post, Grant ordered it back to Young's Point, the nearest landing west and north of Vicksburg, with the intention of operating from the river. By degrees, however, he saw that a decisive blow could only be delivered from the south. He therefore spared no pains

to secure transportation below the strong-hold, either through the abandoned canal of Williams, or by cutting channels from the Mississippi into the bayous. These laborious but abortive attempts constitute the prelude to a more daring and successful operation.

On the 22d of January, Grant, encouraged by the circumstance that the river was rising very fast, recommenced the cutting of Williams's canal. He hoped to make a channel which would pass transports for moving the army and carrying supplies to a new base of operations against Pemberton's army. The work was energetically pushed forward by a large force day and night, the task proving more herculean, as Grant himself reports, than was expected. To the labor was added discomfort and embarrassment arising from heavy rains, which fell during the whole time.

To turn the Mississippi from its course was certainly a daring adventure, but it had already been done successfully at Island No. 10 (vol. ii., p. 276). Some of the celebrated sieges of antiquity had been illustrated by similar engineering triumphs. Thus Cyrus, the Median general, after besieging Babylon ineffectually for two years, took that city by turning a branch of the River Euphrates from its course, his troops penetrating the defensive works through the drained bed of the river.

Grant's attempt was, however, unsuccessful. On the 8th of March the pressure of the rising river broke the dam across the canal near its upper end. A torrent of water inundated the works. The middle of the peninsula was lower than the sides, and hence the water spread out and flooded the central swamp. Some endeavors were made to repair the damage, but it was found that the plan must be abandoned.

In the mean time the engineers had surveyed a route through the bayous from Milliken's Bend on the north, and New Carthage on the south,

He recommences Williams's canal,  
He attempts a passage through Roundaway Bayou,

but is obliged to abandon it.

through Roundaway Bayou, into the Tensas River. Excavations were executed speedily, and a small steamer and some barges passed through the channel thus opened. But about the middle of April, the river, beginning to fall, made it impracticable to open water communication between Miliken's Bend and New Carthage, and, the roads becoming passable, rendered it unnecessary to do so.

Having more troops than could be employed to advantage at Young's Point, and knowing that Lake Providence, which is a portion of the old bed of the river, is connected by Bayou Baxter with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream through which transports might pass into the Mississippi below, Grant thought it possible that a route might be opened in that direction. He therefore caused a channel to be cut from the Mississippi into Lake Providence; but this also proved to be a failure.

While these attempts were being made on the west side of the river, others were in progress on the east side. Yazoo Pass had formerly been used by boats as a means of gaining access into the interior of the country. It opens into the Coldwater, and that into the Tallahatchie, which, receiving the Yallabusha at Greenwood, forms with it the Yazoo River—a tortuous passage of 250 miles. By the Yazoo Pass Grant only expected at first to get into the Yazoo River with some of the lighter gun-boats, and to destroy the enemy's transports and gun-boats in that stream. The navigation proving better than was expected, he hoped that there might be a possibility of obtaining a foothold on high land above Haines's Bluff.

The mouth of the pass had been obstructed by a levee, and, the water having been thus diminished, a rank growth of cottonwood and willow had spread all over the swampy track. As soon as this levee was cut, the water of the Mississippi, which was nine feet higher than the adjacent country, swept every thing before it, and tore a passage

through the woods by which steam-boats could make their way.

About the first of March, an expedition, consisting of some gun-boats and transports, carrying about four thousand troops, attempted this passage. It reached the Cold-water with difficulty, forcing its way through the midst of a dense forest of wild cypress, ash, bitter pecans, cotton-wood, swarming with ducks, cormorants, and black squirrels, the half-stagnant waters abounding with turtles, alligators, moccasin and copperhead snakes, the marshes covered with a thick growth of huge trees and masses of cane. Concealed in these recesses, supposed to be inaccessible, were great numbers of slaves busily employed in raising crops, not of cotton, but of corn. Here and there a white smoke floating through the trees indicated that hidden stores of that valuable staple had been set on fire. As the expedition advanced its difficulties increased; in three days it could force its way only eight miles. The limbs of moss-covered and enormous trees overarching the passage broke down the funnels and upper works of the steamers. The confluence of the Tallahatchie and Yallahusha at Greenwood was at length reached, but here the advance of the expedition ended; for at this point the Confederates, alarmed at the progress of the invaders, had constructed a battery—Fort Pemberton—on a spot where the ground was low and now overflowed.

The expedition checked at Fort Pemberton.

The land forces of the expedition could render no assistance; and, after an engagement of several hours, it was found that the gun-boats were unable to silence the enemy. Subsequently, however, it appeared that, had the attack lasted an hour longer, the post must have surrendered, as the garrison were almost out of ammunition.

While the expedition was thus held in check at Greenwood, Grant received information from Admiral Porter that he had found a better passage through Steele's Bayou and Black Bay-

Another attempt is made through Steele's Bayou.



ou into Deer Creek, and some negroes had informed him that that creek could be navigated to Rolling Fork, and thence down the Sunflower into the Yazoo. Grant saw that if an enterprise on this line were successful, it would place Greenwood between two bodies of his forces, and cause its abandonment. Moreover, thirty of the enemy's steam-boats, which had sought refuge in these secret waters, would fall into his hands.

Accordingly, five gun-boats, several transports, and one of Sherman's divisions were ordered to attempt the new passage. The strength of the iron-clads enabled them to override obstructions of willow and cypress, or to break through their entanglements; but here and there the vessels were wedged between trees, or had every thing swept from their decks by overarching limbs. In Black Bayou the way was forced or torn through dense forests: trees sometimes not less than four feet in thickness had to be cut down. The nights were not only moonless, but the gloom of the forests made them pitch-dark. Rain fell incessantly. So formidable did the obstructions become, that on one day not more than half a mile of advance was made. The enemy added to the natural difficulties by felling trees across the streams, and by firing upon the boats wherever riflemen could be secreted or guns advantageously placed. The expedition eventual-

This also proves to be a failure.

ly failed, as Grant remarks, probably more from a want of knowledge of what was required to open the route than from any impossibility. It was stopped when within a few hundred yards of a free passage to the Yazoo, and at the same time orders were given for the withdrawal of all the forces engaged in the Yazoo Pass expedition. Grant, now recognizing that all these attempts above Vicksburg would be unsatisfactory, determined to turn that strong-hold from the south, and proceeded at once to concentrate his army at Milliken's Bend.

His plan was very audacious. He resolved to march

Grant's final and successful plan. his army down the west bank of the Mississippi below the enemy's works, to run the gun-boats and transports past the batteries, and by their aid force a passage across the river. Gaining its east bank, he determined to cut himself loose from his base, to swing round the rear of Vicksburg, to obtain possession of the heights of Yazoo, and there open a new base of supplies. Rising with true military genius to a just conception of the problem, he saw that he must attempt not merely to capture Vicksburg, but also Pemberton's army, and that while with his left hand he secured those great results, he must with his right keep off any relieving force. To insure the success of his main operation, he ordered a cavalry force under Grierson to ride from Lagrange, Tennessee, down to Baton Rouge, cutting all the approaches in the rear of the devoted strong-hold; and, to distract Pemberton's attention while the critical portion of the plan was being executed, he directed Sherman to make a feint on the Yazoo.

The execution of Grant's plan turned, therefore, on the possibility of the gun-boats and transports passing the Vicksburg batteries with impunity. Could this be done?

It turns on the possibility of steam-boats passing the Vicksburg batteries.

It has been already stated (vol. ii., p. 342) that Farragut had carried his ships past the batteries of Vicksburg, and had come into communication with the national fleet above (June, 1862). While in this position, he had organized an expedition to go up the Yazoo River for the purpose of capturing the Arkansas, a Confederate ram iron-clad, and protected with cotton-bales. Three gun-boats, which he had sent to reconnoitre, unexpectedly met her coming down the Yazoo. They at once took to flight, and, in their haste, one of them ran ashore. The ram passed on her way, arriving safely under the guns of Vicksburg. Unwilling to let her escape, Farragut himself fol-

lowed her, running his ship past the Vicksburg batteries again. He did not succeed in destroying her, but remained in his new position for the protection of Porter's mortar-boats, which it was supposed that she intended to attack. The passage had also been made by several of the river fleet. The ram *Queen of the West* ran the batteries on February 2d without injury, and steamed down to the Red River. The iron-clad *Indianola*, on February 13, passed safely through their fire. The rams *Switzerland* and *Lancaster*, on March 25, attempted the passage in the daylight. They were intended to aid *Farragut* in patrolling the river. The *Lancaster* was sunk, but the *Switzerland*, though much injured, succeeded.

*Farragut*, referring to his passing Vicksburg on June 28th, 1862, says, "The forts can be passed; we have done it, and can do it again as often as may be required of us."

The 13th Army Corps (*McClelland*) moved on the 29th of March for New Carthage. The roads, though level, were found to be intolerably bad, and the progress was therefore necessarily slow. That officer says, "Old roads were repaired, new ones made, boats constructed for the transportation of men and supplies. Twenty miles of levee were sleeplessly guarded day and night. Every possible precaution was used to prevent the rising flood breaking through and engulfing us." Two thousand feet of extemporized bridging was constructed, and a military road completed to forty miles below Vicksburg. Two miles above New Carthage the levee was found to be broken at several points, thus making that place an island. It was here that old boats were collected and new ones built; but, this proving to be too tedious, the march was resumed, and continued down to *Hard Times*, seventy miles from *Milliken's Bend*.

All things were now ready for the gun-boats and transports to run the Vicksburg batteries. On the night of  
III.—C

Passage of the batteries by the gun-boats.

the 16th of April the attempt was made by seven iron-clads, one unarmored gun-boat, and three transports, the boilers of which were protected with hay and cotton. The gauntlet of batteries they had to run extended eight miles. They were to leave the mouth of the Yazoo at 11 P. M. The night was starlight, but gradually a haze settled on the river. At the entrance of Williams's Canal there was light enough to distinguish the outline of the opposite shore. The first gun-boat crept silently down, half hidden by the foliage lining the river-bank. She steered first for the western, and then crossed over toward the eastern side. The others followed, their lights put out, their fires hidden. Soon, however, it was obvious that they had been discovered, for in succession the enemy's batteries came into action. A bonfire was kindled at Vicksburg for the purpose of showing their position. Its light was so bright that the observer from whose report these facts are quoted states that on the opposite side of the river it showed the shadow of a hand held a foot from a boat's side. At length the upper batteries ceased firing, and the roar of the lower batteries announced that the vessels were passing them. Midway between the bonfire, now dying out, and the lower or Warrenton batteries, another light appeared slowly moving down the stream. Volumes of thick, white, curling smoke left no doubt that it was cotton which was burning, and that one of the transports was on fire. The other two transports and the gun-boats, though repeatedly struck, made the passage safely.

As this operation had succeeded so well, Grant ordered six other boats to make the attempt. They did so on the 22d of April, five of them successfully, though in a somewhat damaged condition. They were, however, speedily repaired.

While Grant was thus concentrating his troops, and bringing down his gun-boats and transports to the front



Grierson's cavalry expedition to Baton Rouge. of Grand Gulf, with a view of forcing the passage of the Mississippi at that point, Grierson, by his orders, was making a cavalry march with three regiments, 1700 strong, and a battery of artillery. He set out from La Grange, Tennessee, on the 17th of April, riding in the rear of all the Confederate forces opposing Grant down to Baton Rouge, destroying the railroads, burning dépôts, cars, bridges, and large quantities of arms and supplies. In sixteen days he rode 600 miles, sometimes making forced marches of forty-eight hours. He sent out detachments right and left to destroy telegraphs, manufactories, magazines. On the fifth day after their departure his men rode eight miles through a swamp in which the water was every where from three to four feet deep; twenty of their horses were drowned. During the last thirty hours they marched eighty miles, fought two skirmishes, swam a river, destroyed a Confederate camp, and captured several prisoners. They were now altogether without food. On entering Baton Rouge, so completely were they worn out that it was said three fourths of them were asleep in their saddles. They had effectually accomplished their purpose in cutting, for the time, the communications of Vicksburg with the East.

Sherman's feint on the Yazoo. Grant had written to Sherman saying that a feint on the Yazoo near Haines's Bluff, made simultaneously with the passage of the army across the Mississippi from Hard Times, would be very desirable, provided it could be done without ill effect on the troops, or being mistaken by the country for a repulse. Sherman, although well knowing that it exposed him to the imputation of a second defeat, replied, "I believe that this diversion at Haines's Bluff is right, and I will make it, no matter if they do say that I am repulsed." Accordingly, on April 30th, and again on the following day, he made demonstrations with all the show possible. The ruse succeeded perfectly. Pemberton, alarmed at Grierson's movements in the east, and

at Sherman's demonstrative attacks on the north, recalled troops he had sent from Vicksburg to re-enforce Bowen at Grand Gulf, and sent them to Haines's Bluff. Sherman, having accomplished his object, with the utmost speed hurried back to the Mississippi, and led his corps by the west bank to make a junction with Grant.

On the 29th of April Grant was in readiness to force the passage of the Mississippi. His plan was that the gun-boats should silence the batteries of Grand Gulf, and, under cover of the fire, the troops should land and carry the place by storm. At 8

Grant fails to cross the Mississippi at Grand Gulf,



THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

A.M. the vessels commenced an attack, and kept it up for more than five hours. From a tug in the stream Grant watched the engagement; but, perceiving that the Confederate batteries were too elevated to be reached, and the fortifications too strong to be taken from the water, he determined to debark the troops, to run the transports past, and cross the river lower down. Accordingly, at dark

the gun-boats renewed their attack, and, screened by this, the transports passed without injury. In the course of the night a mulatto was brought in—he had been selling home-made beer in the Confederate camp at Grand Gulf. He said that there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson. Bruinsburg is a landing at a deserted plantation. At Bruinsburg Grant therefore determined to land.

At day-dawn the passage of the river commenced, both gun-boats and transports being used; it was conducted with the utmost celerity. Without a moment's delay, as soon as the 13th Army Corps was across, it was marched on the road to Port Gibson, the 17th Corps following it as quickly as possible.

Grant thus had crossed the Mississippi, made good his footing on its east bank, and had resolved to cut loose from his base without consulting the authorities at Washington. Halleck had counseled him to make a junction with Banks; Lincoln also thought that he ought to go down the river. With the inspiration of genius, he acted promptly, foreseeing that the results of the movement would justify it before it could be countermanded. Pemberton, bewildered, hardly knew what to do. For a fortnight past he had been perplexed and mistaken. On the 13th of April he had telegraphed to Johnston, "I am satisfied that Rosecrans will be re-enforced from Grant's army. Shall I order troops to Tullahoma?" but on the 29th he telegraphed again that there were "indications of a purpose to attack Grand Gulf with a view to Vicksburg."

Keeping steadily in view his intention not only to capture Vicksburg, but also to secure Pemberton and his army, Grant pressed energetically forward. About 2 o'clock on the 1st of May the advance of the enemy was met eight miles from Bruinsburg, on the road to Port Gibson. He was forced

but makes a landing at Bruinsburg.

In this movement he acts on his own responsibility.

He defeats the Confederates near Port Gibson.

to fall back, but as it was dark he was not pursued far until daylight. Early on that morning Grant went out, accompanied by the members of his staff, and found McClermand with his corps engaging the enemy about four miles from Port Gibson. At this point the roads branched in opposite directions, both, however, leading to Port Gibson. The enemy had taken position on both branches, thus dividing, as he fell back, the pursuing forces, the nature of the ground being such that a very small force could retard the progress of a much larger one for many hours. The Confederate General Bowen had come down from Vicksburg, and was in the position where the whole of Pemberton's army ought to have been. With less than 6000 men he made a strong resistance, and, though after hard fighting he was driven from both roads, he retired in good order. Grant's loss was 130 killed, 780 wounded. He captured 3 guns, 4 flags, and 580 prisoners. The Confederates continued their retreat through Port Gibson, and beyond the Bayou Pierre. They burned the bridges across the forks of the bayou, and fell back next day to the north side of the Big Black River, having blown up the magazine, spiked the guns, and abandoned Grand Gulf on the night of the 1st of May.

Grant now changed his base of supplies from Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf, and paused at Hankinson's Ferry for Sherman to come up.

Sherman crossed the river on the 7th of May. That day Grant ordered a general movement on two parallel roads on the southeast bank of the Big Black, McPherson keeping the road nearest the river, McClermand moving on the ridge road, and Sherman, his corps divided, following them both.

McPherson, on advancing toward Raymond, met two brigades of the enemy under Gregg and Walker, which he defeated after a very sharp conflict. They lost 103 killed, and 720 wounded

Sherman crosses  
the river.

The Confederates  
again defeated near  
Raymond.



and prisoners. Grant's loss was 69 killed, 341 wounded, and 32 missing.

The Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had been placed by the Richmond government in command of their military operations in the southwest. His head-quarters were with Bragg at Tullahoma. Alarmed at what was now taking place in the vicinity of Vicksburg, he had collected all disposable troops, and was hastening to make a junction with Pemberton. Grant, perceiving his intention, spared no exertion to intervene between them.

McPherson's column was directed on Jackson by the Clinton Road. It reached the railroad near Clinton at 2 P.M., May 13, and destroyed a section to prevent supplies going to Vicksburg. Sherman was moved on the Raymond Road. When within two miles of Jackson,

Grant captures the city of Jackson. both columns met the enemy, and drove him through the place toward Canton. Grant entered the city with Sherman's head of column. His soldiers patrolled the streets, collecting the prisoners at the State-house. While the citizens were looking sullenly from behind screens and closed window-blinds, leering negroes were giggling on the sidewalks. The governor and state treasurer, terror-stricken at the thunder-bolt that had so unexpectedly fallen on them, took to flight, carrying with them the state papers and funds. Here Grant found that Johnston had arrived, and had ordered Pemberton to leave Vicksburg.

Directing Sherman to remain in Jackson long enough to destroy every thing that could be of value to the enemy, Then he turns upon Pemberton. Grant now faced round for the purpose of pushing the vacillating Pemberton before him so vigorously as to render his junction with Johnston hopeless, and to shut him up in Vicksburg. Intervening between the two Confederate armies, Grant, with his right hand, was warding off Johnston, with his left he was delivering against Pemberton mortal blows. He ordered

McPherson to retrace his steps with all speed on the Clinton Road, and McClernand to move toward Edwards's Station, marching so as to feel the enemy, but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident that he could win.

General Johnston, who was probably the ablest officer in the Confederate service, had fully recognized in the military genius manifested in the conception of the campaign, and the terrible energy with which it was being executed, the formidable character of his antagonist, and that Pemberton, though animated with the best intentions, was utterly inadequate to the occasion.

With incredible folly, Pemberton expected by a movement toward Raymond to cut Grant's line of communications, when, in fact, Grant had cut it himself: his men were carrying their supplies with them, and hastening with no uncertain steps to establish a new base on the Yazoo. On the 15th Pemberton set out from Edwards's Station toward Raymond, while at that instant Grant was making forced marches westward. Pemberton, when too late, saw his danger, and was compelled to order a movement backward, and, indeed, to attempt to pass north of the railroad, so as to unite with Johnston, who long before had directed him to make this northward move. In doing this he had now to cross Grant's front, and was caught in the act of so doing. He was thus constrained to fight the battle of Champion Hills, and had to fight it alone. A man who had ostensibly been drummed out of Memphis as a rebel, but who was, in fact, a spy, brought Grant a dispatch, which Johnston had intrusted to him, instructing Pemberton to attack Sherman at Clinton.

Before dawn on the 16th Grant had also learned, from two railroad employes who had passed through the Confederate army the night before, that it consisted of about 25,000 men and 10 batteries of artillery. He also learned its position. He therefore ordered Sher-

The battle of Champion Hills.

Pemberton's false movements.

man to come up instantly to Bolton ; and with so much activity did that general move, that his advance division was in motion one hour after the order was received. Grant himself, at an early hour, had reached the crossing of the Jackson Railroad with the road from Raymond to Bolton, and there had found McPherson's advance and his pioneer corps engaged in rebuilding a bridge. The train of Hovey's division was blocking up the road ; he ordered it aside, and pushed the troops through. Passing to the front, he found Hovey getting into line, and nearly ready for battle. The enemy, from 23,000 to 26,000 strong, had taken up a position on a narrow ridge, his left resting on a height where the road makes a sharp turn to the left, approaching Vicksburg. Grant did not wish the attack to begin before he could hear from McClernand, to whom he sent messages to press forward rapidly. Firing, however, commenced, and by 11 o'clock it increased to a battle. For a while Hovey's division bore the brunt of the conflict ; but, the enemy proving too strong, that division had to be re-enforced. Meantime Logan's division was working to the enemy's left and rear, and greatly weakening his resistance on the front. Grant had no fear for the issue, knowing that McClernand would presently be up. Before he arrived, however, the Confederates had been driven from the field, after a fierce conflict, with heavy loss. It was subsequently found that the Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for about a mile, turns almost to the west, across the valley in which Logan was operating in the rear of the enemy. One of Logan's brigades, without knowing this important fact, had penetrated nearly to this road, and compelled the Confederates to retreat to prevent capture. As it was, much of their artillery was taken, and Loring's division of their army narrowly escaped, being compelled to retreat southward. The battle of Champion Hills was fought mainly by Hovey's division of McClernand's corps,

The Confederates  
totally defeated.

and by Logan's and Quimby's divisions of McPherson's corps. Grant's losses were 2457, of whom 426 were killed. The Confederate losses in killed and wounded were probably not less, and, in addition, 2000 prisoners were captured from them. Among their killed was General Tilghman, who had formerly defended Fort Henry (vol. ii., p. 262). He was struck by a fragment of shell, and died almost instantly.

On the morning of the 17th the pursuit was continued, with McClernand's corps in advance. Sherman, who was at Bolton, was ordered to turn northward to Bridgeport. The enemy was found strongly posted on both sides of the Big Black River. Here, on the west bank, the bluffs extend to the water's edge; on the east is an open cultivated space, nearly a mile in width, surrounded by a bayou of stagnant water from two to three feet in depth, and from ten to twenty in width, reaching from the river above the railroad to the river below. On the inside line of the bayou, which therefore served as a ditch in his front, the enemy had constructed rifle-pits. At this point Carr's division of McClernand's corps was checked for some time, until Lawler, who commanded the right brigade, discovered that by moving under cover of the river-bank he could gain a point from which the position could be successfully assaulted. Notwithstanding the level ground over which a portion of the troops had to pass, and the obstacle of the ditch in front of the enemy's works, the charge was successfully made. No shot was fired until the water was crossed; then a volley was given, and, without reloading, the position was carried with the bayonet. A great number of prisoners and seventeen pieces of artillery were the trophies of this brilliant and daring movement. A temporary bridge had been constructed of a steam-boat by Pemberton, and over this and the railroad bridge a portion of the fugitives escaped, and then set the bridges on fire.



Grant's plans were now fast approaching their consummation. He had made sure of Pemberton, whose routed troops that night fell back into the fortifications of Vicksburg; with them also entered many planters and their families, who had been living near the city. A scene of uproar and confusion ensued, in which the blasphemous oaths of soldiers, the cries of young children, the lamentations of women, commingled. The remorseless pursuer, detained by the burned bridges of the Big Black, was busy constructing floating ones. One was of cotton-bales, one of timber and planks. He had them finished in the night, and by nine the next morning was crossing. The only pontoon train in the army was with Sherman, who, without delay, laid it and crossed his troops, marching toward Vicksburg by the Bridgeport Road. "That night, soon after dark, Grant rode up and had an interview with Sherman. The two commanders crossed the bridge, and seated themselves on a fallen tree, in the light of a pile of burning fence-rails, while the eager and swift-marching men of the 15th Corps filed by them and disappeared in the darkness. Grant had marched 200 miles, had fought four battles, taken 90 guns, captured 6000 prisoners—more than all, he had cut off Pemberton's escape. He detailed his plans for the next day, after which he returned through the forest to his own head-quarters." When Sherman's troops, the next morning, were within  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles of Vicksburg, that general turned to the right, to get possession of the Walnut Hills and the Yazoo River. He accomplished it before night. Communications were opened with Admiral Porter, who was on the Yazoo, and the new base of supplies was secured. McPherson followed Sherman, halting at the point where Sherman had turned off. McClernand came up by the Jackson Road, turning at Mount Alban's to his left. By these dispositions the three army corps completed the investment of Vicksburg on the morning of the 19th.

Pemberton is forced into Vicksburg.

Investment of Vicksburg by Grant.

Johnston had feared the worst, but he had not expected this terrible energy. He saw that he had on his hands no repetition of the Virginia peninsular campaign, but that the national army had at last learned how to make war. As soon as he heard of Pemberton's repulse at Champion Hills, he sent a dispatch to him. "If Haines's Bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value; it can not be held. If you are invested in it you must ultimately surrender. Instead of losing both troops and place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies forthwith, and march northeast." But it was too late.

The Confederates abandoned their works at Haines's Bluff on the 17th. Admiral Porter, speaking of them, says, "Such a network of forts I never saw." Not without reason did Sherman, in a letter to General M. L. Smith, say, "As soon as we had fixed things in Jackson, I made good time in reaching the very point above Vicksburg that we had worked so hard and thanklessly for last January. It has fulfilled all my expectations, and we now have high and commanding ground, and haul our stores from our old landing at Chickasaw Bayou. The very roads made by the enemy, which enabled him to mass his troops so promptly before us, are now ours, and answer an admirable purpose. I ride often to the very signal hill from which all our movements were telegraphed, and enjoy an internal satisfaction that, after five months' patient labor and fighting, I can now reciprocate the compliment. We are close upon the enemy; our artillery reaches every part of the city, which, I am told, has become like a prairie-dog village, all burrowed in the earth."

There was nothing now to prevent the gun-boats passing up the Yazoo. Accordingly, five went up to Yazoo City. They reached it on May 20. It was here, in an extensive yard for the construction of war-

The Confederates  
evacuate Haines's  
Bluff.

Destruction of ship-  
ping at Yazoo City.

vessels, that the Arkansas was built. The Mobile was ready for her plating; the Republic was fitting for a ram with armor of railroad iron; on the stocks there was a new steamer 310 feet long and 70 feet beam. She was to be plated with  $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch iron. These, with the machine-shops and other establishments, were destroyed.

At this time Grant's army was about 30,000 strong.

Posting of the armies at Vicksburg. Sherman was on his right, McPherson in the centre, McClernand on the left. The force increased to nearly 70,000, in 16 divisions, during the siege. On the Confederate side Stevenson occupied 5 miles from the Warrenton Road to the railroad, Forney 2 miles from the railroad to the Grave-yard Road, Smith  $1\frac{1}{4}$  from the Grave-yard to the river front on the north. Bowen was in reserve. On the entire line there were 102 guns. From the extreme right of Stevenson's position to the left of Smith was about eight miles, the shortest possible distance which the topography of the country permitted. Thus arranged, the garrison of Vicksburg was about 25,000 strong. It had provisions for nearly two months. The fortifications were bastioned earth-works on the right, centre, and left, with an exterior line of intrenchments.

Grant fails in his first assault. On the first day of the investment, Grant, relying on the demoralization of the enemy in consequence of their repeated defeats, ordered a general assault at 2 P.M. It proved unsuccessful. Two days were then spent by him in obtaining and distributing supplies; on the third he renewed the attempt. He was induced to do this by the expectation that Johnston might attack him in the rear in hopes of raising the siege; by the consideration that the possession of Vicksburg would enable him to turn upon that general and drive him from the state, thereby effectually securing all territory west of the Tombigbee, and saving the government the necessity of sending re-enforcements, which were needed elsewhere; and finally by the persuasion that the troops themselves,

being impatient to possess the place, would not work in the trenches with zeal, believing it to be unnecessary.

The assault was ordered to commence at 10 A.M. on the 22d. Grant caused the corps commanders to set their watches by his, so that there should be no difference between them in the movement. Promptly, at the designated moment, all three army corps advanced, Grant taking a position near the centre of the front, from which he could see all McPherson's, a part of Sherman's and McClelland's advancing columns. Sherman was resisted by Baldwin's and Shoup's brigades of Smith's division; Hurlburt's brigade, of Forney's division, met the attack on both sides of the Jackson Road. On the Confederate right the brigades of Moore and Lee resisted McClelland. The assailants succeeded in planting their flags on the outer slopes of the bastions, but the position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken by assault. No one entered any of the works except Sergeant Griffith, a youth not 18 years of age, and eleven privates of the 21st Iowa Volunteers. But about 12 o'clock Grant received a dispatch from McClelland stating that he had taken two of the forts, and requesting that Sherman and McPherson should make a diversion in his favor. That was accordingly done. It eventually proved that McClelland was mistaken, and that the two forts had not been carried. In this assault Grant lost about 3000 men, one third of them through the renewal of the attack at McClelland's request. The Confederate loss was more than 1000. Little resistance was made by their artillery. Porter aided the attack by keeping up a bombardment with his mortar-boats, and by sending four gun-boats to silence both the water and hill batteries. They engaged the water batteries at a distance of 440 yards, but so great was the noise and smoke that Porter neither heard nor saw any thing of the battle that was going on in the rear. Grant, now perceiving the hopelessness of a direct assault, determined to

And again in a second assault.



He prepares for a regular siege.] proceed against the strong-hold by a regular siege. He sent to West Tennessee for all the troops that could be spared. Halleck re-enforced him with others from West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri. Within a fortnight the besieging army was strong enough to invest Vicksburg on its front, and ward off Johnston in its rear.

The besiegers had the great advantage of being sheltered from the hot sun by the woods; they also found many springs of fine water in the ravines. Besides the investing line on the land-side of the town, stretching from Haines's Bluff to Warrenton, they had a line of infantry on the other side of the Mississippi, across the peninsula which Vicksburg overlooks. There were gun-boats both above and below; one of these, the Cincinnati, was sunk on the 27th of May while attempting to silence a water battery. She was riddled through and through. There were, in addition, six 13-inch mortars, and two 200-pound Parrot guns mounted on rafts.

The difficulties encountered by Pemberton.] Pemberton had very great difficulties to encounter, arising partly from the exhaustion of the military resources and spirit of the Confederacy, and partly from his relations with his superior, General Johnston.

As respects the former, he complained bitterly of his want of cavalry for the purpose of checking raids, declaring that they were so incessant that it was absolutely impossible for him to protect his communications. Of Grierson he says, "So great was the consternation that it was impossible to obtain reliable information of his movements, rumors placing him in several points at the same time." He declared that if he had only had cavalry, Grant would never have reached Vicksburg, or even Jackson. In other particulars his resources were very inadequate: he had to take guns out of the Vicksburg batteries to supply those



of Grand Gulf; and, at the very outset of Grant's southward movement, he had to notify the officers across the Mississippi that it was impossible for him to do any thing to prevent it. He had constantly to struggle against the cupidity of private parties, and the interests they exerted at Richmond for the promotion of their schemes of gain. A most serious embarrassment arose from the wretched condition of the railroads, which were fast wearing out. The planters refused to hire their slaves to repair them; he had to solicit that slaves might be impressed for the purpose. He had received assurances from Davis that assistance should be sent him, but it never came. He was perpetually instructed not only to hold Vicksburg, but that it was also necessary to hold Port Hudson and keep up the trans-Mississippi communications; but he saw distinctly, the moment the gun-boats had proved they could run the batteries of Vicksburg and Port Hudson with impunity, that, so far as the Confederacy was concerned, the free navigation of the Mississippi and Red Rivers was lost. Notwithstanding all the care he had taken to fortify Grand Gulf, the works at that point became useless as soon as Grant had sufficient transportation below Vicksburg. What was worse, with so much rapidity did that general move, that the heavy guns which had been carried down to Grand Gulf could not be withdrawn.

To add to all this, his troops had lost confidence in him.

The morale of his army destroyed. They had become persuaded that he owed his command over them to favoritism and sinister influences at Richmond. He himself says that they were very much demoralized, and could not be made to stand. It was painfully apparent that the morale of his army was such as not to justify an attempt to hold the line of the Big Black. During the siege it became necessary to secure the magazines against the designs of disloyal persons. Yet his refusal to comply with Johnston's order to evacuate Vicksburg was not without political excuse, if, indeed, any

thing can ever excuse a soldier in disobeying the orders of his superior. He saw clearly what the evacuation meant. "The evacuation of Vicksburg means the loss of the valuable stores and munitions of war collected for its defense; the fall of Port Hudson; the surrender of the Mississippi River; the severance of the Confederacy. These are mighty interests!"

His reluctance to evacuate Vicksburg.

With respect to his relations with his superior, General Johnston, that officer, in his report of these transactions, visits him with the severest condemnation. He says, "General Pemberton made not a single movement in obedience to my orders; he regarded none of my instructions; and, finally, did not embrace the only opportunity to save his army—that given by my order to abandon Vicksburg."

Johnston condemns Pemberton's acts.

The people of the Confederacy placed very great confidence in Johnston's abilities, but Davis regarded him with unfriendly eyes. The blunt soldier had told the President that things had come to such a pass in the West that it was no longer possible to hold both Mississippi and Tennessee, and that the government must make its choice between them; he had added that he considered the saving of Vicksburg hopeless, and that the only time at which that could have been done was when Grant was landing at Bruinsburg. Pemberton had disobeyed his injunctions to attack Grant, and again to attack Sherman. "Convinced of the impossibility of collecting a sufficient force to break the investment of Vicksburg, should it be completed; appreciating the difficulty of extricating the garrison, and assured that both that fortress and Port Hudson had lost most of their value by the repeated passage of armed vessels and transports, I ordered the evacuation of both places. Vicksburg was greatly in peril when my instructions from Tullahoma to concentrate there were neglected; it was lost when my orders of the 13th and 15th of May were disobeyed. To this loss were added the labors, privations, and

certain destruction of a gallant army when my orders for its evacuation were set aside.”

Grant's position now was like that of Cæsar when attacking Vercingetorix in his fortified camp; but no ray of hope gleamed on the ramparts of Vicksburg, as on those of Alesia when the Gaulish relieving army came up in the rear. Grant remorselessly pressed on the siege. On June 25th a mine was exploded under the parapet of Forney's works; through the breach a charge was made, but it was repulsed. Some men of the Forty-third Mississippi, who were in the shaft countermining at the time of the explosion, were buried and lost. On the morning of July 1st another mine was sprung on the right of the Jackson Road; the result was the demolition of a redan, leaving an immense chasm where it stood. The Confederate interior line was much injured. Not one of the garrison could show his head without being instantly shot by the riflemen. Pemberton at last began to feel the want of provisions. He drove out many of his mules and horses, partly in hope that some of them might reach Johnston, and partly to save forage. By the end of May his meat-ration was reduced to one half; when his stock of bacon was exhausted, mule-flesh was issued. The sick and wounded in his hospitals were daily increasing; eventually they reached 6000. Though he had a sufficiency of ammunition, his stock of percussion-caps was reduced so low that at one time he had only ten for each man; additional quantities were, however, occasionally brought by persons who managed to get in through Grant's lines. His heart sank within him as he felt himself abandoned by the authorities at Richmond, and, notwithstanding all the promises that had been held out, deserted in his dire extremity by Davis. Wistfully, hour after hour, he gazed to the east, and still there were no signs of Johnston's appearance in Grant's rear. For

Grant's progress in  
the siege.

Exhaustion of the  
garrison.

forty-seven days and nights his men had been in the trenches unrelieved; their limbs had become cramped and swollen for want of exercise; they were constantly exposed to a murderous fire of shot and shell, and, if they showed themselves but for a moment, to the deadly rifles of the sharpshooters.

On the 3d of July Pemberton saw that Grant was ready to make a final and fatal assault. That afternoon he wrote to his besieger asking an armistice, and the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place. To this Grant promptly replied, declining the appointment of such commissioners, and requiring an unconditional surrender. At 3 P.M. an interview between them took place beneath an old oak-tree. Pemberton was irritable and indiscreet. Great and merciful, the conqueror bore, without an unkind remark, the petulance of his vanquished adversary, and returned him no railing reply, but closed the interview by saying that he would send his ultimatum in writing.

At 10 A.M., July 4, 1863, Vicksburg was surrendered to Grant. The entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by proper authority. The officers to be allowed their side-arms and private baggage, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file to be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. They were to take rations from their own stores sufficient to last them beyond the national lines. They were also to have the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food, and thirty wagons for the transport of such articles as could not well be carried.

Much dissatisfaction was expressed throughout the Confederacy that Pemberton should have thus surrendered on the national anniversary—the Fourth of July. He alleged that, knowing the vanity of his enemies, he thought

Interview between  
Grant and Pembro-  
ton.

Vicksburg is sur-  
rendered to Grant.



they would give him better terms for the sake of obtaining a triumph on that day. His true reason was that he did not dare to abide the impending assault.

On the morning of the surrender Grant rode into Vicksburg. The day was very sultry, and the roads in many places a fine dusty powder to the depth of ten inches. He repaired to the house which had been Pemberton's headquarters, and, on entering the piazza in which that general and his staff were sitting, asked for water. Of the sullen and sulky assemblage, no one returned his courteous salutations—they pointed to him where he might supply his want himself.

There was great anxiety among the Confederate officers to carry off their negroes under the title of personal property, but it was positively forbidden by Grant.

Nearly every house in the city had been shot through. Condition of Vicksburg after the siege. Some had a corner blown off; of many the walls were bulged. In the streets there were huge craters where the 13-inch shells had burst; the pillars of the piazzas were split to pieces. It was affirmed that there was not a whole pane of glass within five miles. Not less than three hundred houses were occupied as hospitals. The inhabitants had amused themselves by piling at their doors fragments of iron and exploded shells. In the bluff caves had been dug, into which the citizens retreated whenever the fire was heavy. Sometimes as many as twenty-five had crowded into one of these holes.

The result of the campaign, as summed up by Grant, Grant's summary of his operations. was "the defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi; and the capture of Vicksburg, its garrison, and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of 37,000 prisoners, among whom were 15 general officers; at least 10,000 killed and wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman, and Green; and hundreds, perhaps thousands of stragglers who can



never be collected and reorganized. Arms and munitions of war for an army of 60,000 men have fallen into our hands, besides a large amount of other public property, consisting of railroads, locomotives, cars, steam-boats, cotton, etc.; and much was destroyed to prevent our capturing it." Grant's losses in the campaign were 8573, of whom 943 were killed.

Vicksburg and Pemberton secured, Grant lingered not a moment, facing eastward to confront Johnston. The national flag was hoisted on the court-house of the captured strong-hold at half past eleven — at two Grant had his columns in march to deal with Johnston. He had given to Sherman a detached command, consisting of the forces at Haines's Bluff, a division from the 13th, one from the 15th, one from the 17th Corps, and Lauman's division. Johnston's army did not exceed 24,000, badly organized and poorly equipped. About the close of June he had marched toward the Big Black, intending to make an attack on Grant from the south, and on the night of the 3d of July had sent word to Pemberton that he was ready to offer a diversion in his favor to enable him to cut his way out, but, before the messenger could reach Vicksburg, it had surrendered. As soon as he heard of that event he fell back to Jackson. It was from this place that Sherman now prepared to expel him.

Sherman had established a defensive line from Haines's Bluff to the Big Black. The hopelessness of attempting to force this line had determined Johnston to try an attack from the south. On the 9th of July he had the four divisions of Loring, Walker, French, and Breckinridge covering Jackson. That day Sherman appeared before it, having marched through fifty miles of a country almost destitute of water. On the 12th the town was invested. Sherman had nearly 50,000 men and 100 guns. He was only waiting for the arrival of his ammunition trains.

Meantime Johnston had inflicted a severe blow on Lau-

Pursuit of Johnston  
by Sherman.

Johnston retreats to Meridian. man's brigade, which, under a misapprehension, came needlessly under his fire, killing and wounding 250 men, and capturing 250. Finding, however, that it was impossible for him to hold his ground, and that Sherman was on the point of attacking him, he evacuated the place on the night of the 16th, retreating across Pearl River through Brandon to Meridian, about 100 miles distant, and burning the bridges behind him.

Operations at Milliken's Bend. During the operations before Vicksburg, Grant had been obliged to withdraw troops from all the posts within his reach for the purpose of strengthening his main army. This invited upon those posts Confederate attacks; thus Milliken's Bend was assailed by some Louisiana troops, and the forces left in charge of it would have been overwhelmed had not two gun-boats opportunely arrived. The Confederates advanced to the assault with cries of no quarter to negroes and officers of negro troops, but they were driven off by the gun-boats.

Operations at Helena. So also Helena, in Arkansas, was attacked by the Confederate General Holmes, who for that purpose left Little Rock for Clarendon, June 26. He had expected to take the place by surprise, but in that was disappointed. Prentiss, who was in command at Helena, having been informed of his approach, had established batteries for its defense, and had a force of about 3800 men. The Confederates had nearly double that number, but still were altogether insufficient for the work. They arrived in the vicinity of Helena on the 3d of July, and early the next morning, with 3000 men, attempted to carry one of the batteries. They succeeded in getting possession of some of the guns, but, being exposed to the fire of other batteries, they were completely disorganized. In this attack 1111 of them were killed, wounded, or missing.

Another portion of the force, consisting of four regiments, assaulted a fort on Hindman Hill. Leaving their

artillery, they tried to carry the work by a charge; in this, however, they did not succeed, the guns of the fort so thinning their ranks that Holmes was compelled to order a retreat.

A third portion, under Marmaduke, consisting of 1750 men, in like manner endeavored to carry a fort on the north side, and in like manner failed, being driven back by its direct fire, and a flanking fire of artillery and musketry. The Confederate movement upon Helena thus totally miscarried, the loss being more than one fifth of the whole attacking force.

As will be elsewhere related, while Grant had been besieging Vicksburg, Banks had been besieging Port Hudson, defended by the Confederate General Gardner. So closely had the siege been pressed that it was impossible for the place to hold out much longer. When, on the 6th of July, news came that Vicksburg had surrendered, it was needless and hopeless to continue the defense any longer. Gardner therefore made inquiry of Banks whether the rumor that had reached him was true, and, on being assured of its authenticity, he agreed to terms of capitulation, and on the 9th of that month Port Hudson was surrendered.

“All round Port Hudson,” says an eye-witness, “there was not a square rod but bore some indisputable mark of the iron deluge that had passed over it. The earth was plowed up; trees might be seen with their bark completely shot off, and some, twice the bulk of a man’s body, fairly cut in two by solid shot. The river fortifications were terribly effective, and might have resisted any attack had they been impregnable elsewhere. Far down in the bowels of the lofty bluffs the garrison had dug deep recesses, approached by steps cut out of the earth, and here their magazines were placed quite safely.

“As we rode along the earth-works inside, it was curious to mark the ingenious ways in which they had burrowed

The fall of Port Hudson.

Its condition after the siege.

holes to shelter themselves from shell and from the intolerable rays of the sun; while at work they must have looked like so many rabbits popping in and out of their warrens."

As soon as Vicksburg was taken, Grant prepared to send re-enforcements to Banks; but scarcely were the troops embarked when news came of the fall of Port Hudson. They were therefore put upon lighter vessels, and on July 12th were dispatched up the Yazoo, for the purpose of destroying a large number of Confederate steamers which had taken refuge in that river. With these troops were sent the iron-clad De Kalb and two tinclads. When near Yazoo City the De Kalb was blown up by a torpedo. The Confederate garrison retired on the approach of the expedition. One steam-boat was captured, and twenty-two others were burned or sunk.

Thus the Western armies had accomplished their object, and the Mississippi was now open to the Gulf of Mexico. The Confederacy was cut asunder; its right zone was isolated. On the 16th of July the merchant steam-boat Imperial, opening the way that had been closed for two years, went down from St. Louis to New Orleans.

Destruction of shipping in the Yazoo.

The Mississippi is opened to New Orleans.



## CHAPTER LXVII.

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. THE CAMPAIGN OF CHICKAMAUGA. CAPTURE OF CHATTANOOGA, A POSTERN INTO THE ATLANTIC REGION. THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Chattanooga was defended by a Confederate army under General Bragg, confronted by a national army under General Rosecrans, these armies being in the vicinity of Murfreesborough.

General Rosecrans compelled the Confederates to fall back to Lafayette, in Georgia, and, without much loss, captured Chattanooga.

The Confederate government re-enforced Bragg, who, turning upon Rosecrans, defeated him at the BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Rosecrans was then besieged in Chattanooga.

IN Chapter XLI. it has been shown that the seizure and occupation of the strategic point Chattanooga was an essential part of the campaign by the national forces against the Confederates.

The Atlantic portion of the Southern States is separated from the Mississippi Valley by majestic folds of the earth's surface, constituting the Appalachian Ranges. These folds run, in a general manner, parallel to each other, and at intervals are crossed by transverse depressions or gaps. Such passages or gateways are therefore of great commercial, political, and military importance.

Chattanooga, which in the Cherokee language means "The Hawk's Nest," is a little town seated in one of these transverse depressions, through which the Tennessee River and a system of railroads pass. Though of great value from the mineral products, nitre, coal, iron, which the surrounding country yields, it is of far more importance on account of its military relations: it was the postern to the strong-hold of the Confederacy. If the recovery of the Mississippi by the national

The topography of the Appalachian region.

Military importance of that region.



arms effectually separated the trans-Mississippi states from the Richmond government, the seizure and holding of Chattanooga not only tended to shut that government out from the Mississippi Valley, but also exposed it, while threatened by powerful armies in front from Washington, to dangerous, and, as the event proved, to mortal attacks in the rear. The possession of Chattanooga cost the nation two pitched battles and a loss of more than 20,000 men; but perhaps the price can not be considered too great.


From the region of Chattanooga the earth-folds range in a southwesterly direction. Enumerating such of them as are of interest on the present occasion, they are from west to east as follows: Raccoon or Sand Mountain, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, Chickamauga Hills.

The mountain ranges and valleys near Chattanooga.

The town of Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee River, at the mouth of Chattanooga Valley. This valley, through which runs a stream of the same name, is formed on the west by Lookout Mountain, here about 2400 feet high, and on the east by Missionary Ridge, so called because Catholic missionaries had established, many years ago, churches and schools upon it among the Cherokee Indians. From the summit of Lookout portions of not fewer than six states may be seen. At its foot is the silvery Tennessee, winding through a green landscape. Palisades of gray rock encircle the head of Lookout like a crown. The depression between Missionary Ridge and the Pigeon Mountains beyond is the Valley of Chickamauga. These two valleys, Chattanooga and Chickamauga, seem to spring from a common centre, McLemore's Cove, which is inclosed between Lookout on the west and Pigeon on the east. Again, between Lookout and Raccoon Mountains is Will's Valley, traversed by a railroad branch to Trenton.

A traveler through this country must therefore cross a succession of mountain ridges with their intervening val-

THE CAMPAIGN OF ROSECRANS TO CHICKAMAUGA.



leys. In each of the latter flows a stream, making its way northeastwardly to the Tennessee River.

It has been already related (vol. ii., p. 310) that Halleck, after the capture of Corinth, had dispatched Buell to take possession of Chattanooga. Marching slowly to that objective, partly because he carried his supplies with him, he was outstripped by Bragg, who lived off the country. The Confederate general secured the important position, and, consolidating himself in it, used it as his strong point in the campaign which ensued against Buell, and subsequently in that against

Rosecrans.

After the battle of Murfreesborough (vol. ii., p. 365) Rosecrans remained without making any farther advance for half a year. Several insignificant movements, chiefly of cavalry, such as those of Colburn, Hall, Minty, etc., some of which are elsewhere referred to in these pages, scarcely served to keep alive the enthusiasm of the army of the Cumberland, which, under Rosecrans, was confronting Bragg. The national government became very solicitous that this inactivity should end, and information coming that detachments had been withdrawn from Bragg's army to re-enforce that of Johnston attempting to relieve Vicksburg, Rosecrans was urged to move while his antagonist was thus supposed to be weakened, and drive him into Georgia.

Bragg's force, however, had not been diminished to the extent stated. He had 52,000 men at the end of April, and 46,000 in June, on the line of the Duck River, guarding the railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga. He had, in addition, 10,000 under Buckner in East Tennessee.

Rosecrans, however, was very unwilling to move until Grant's operations against Vicksburg had terminated. A sharp correspondence passed between him and Halleck, who earnestly urged him to ad-

Bragg, with a Confederate army, defends that place,

and the Army of the Cumberland, under Rosecrans, confronts him.

Strength of Bragg's army.

Rosecrans falls into inactivity,



vance and seize Chattanooga. Among the weighty reasons alleged for this delay was the want of forage for the horses. Rosecrans was without any restriction as to his line of operation, but he was instructed to connect his left, as far as practicable, with the army of Burnside, and Burnside was ordered to connect his right with Rosecrans's left, so that they might mutually support each other.

At length, however, on the 25th of June, Rosecrans moved forward. The strength of his army was about 60,000. His supplies had to be drawn from Louisville over a single line of railroad.

but, urged by Halleck, at length begins the campaign,

Of Bragg's army, 18,000 were at Shelbyville, 12,000 at Wartrace, with outposts at Hoover's and Liberty Gaps, about ten miles from Murfreesborough. The remainder was at Tullahoma. These forces were strongly intrenched.

Rosecrans's plan was to turn the Confederate right, and, by moving on their communications at the railroad bridge on Elk River, compel them to fight on ground of his selection, or retreat on a disadvantageous line. His superiority in aggregate numbers was balanced by the inferiority of his cavalry, and, in fact, it was the knowledge that Bragg was sending Morgan with a large detachment of cavalry into Kentucky that induced him to advance when he did. The difficulties he experienced in accomplishing his movement were very great. A rain, which lasted 17 days, rendered the roads almost impassable. One of his divisions was three days in marching 21 miles. Threatening to advance on the Confederate left at Shelbyville, the mass of his army seized Hoover's and Liberty Gaps, and moved thence on Manchester. Turning the right of the enemy's defenses at Duck River, he compelled Bragg to fall back to Tullahoma, pursued by Granger, who had carried Shelbyville on the evening of the 27th. Rosecrans now sent his cavalry to cut the railroad

and compels Bragg to retreat.

at Decherd, in Bragg's rear, whereupon Bragg, on June 30, abandoned his intrenched camp, and fell back to Bridgeport, Alabama. Rosecrans had expected to fight a battle in Tennessee; he did not suppose that his antagonist would retreat so rapidly. In his report he says, "Thus ended the nine days' campaign, which drove the enemy from two fortified positions, and gained possession of Middle Tennessee. Conducted during one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in that country at that period of the year, and over a soil that seemed almost a quicksand, our operations were retarded 36 hours at Hoover's Gap, and 60 hours at and in front of Manchester, which alone prevented us from getting possession of his communications and forcing the enemy to a very disastrous battle." Rosecrans's losses in these operations were 560 killed, wounded, and missing. Bragg lost 6000 men in his retreat, two thirds of them by desertion and straggling. He carried his guns and supplies with him on the railroad, destroying it as he went. He crossed the Cumberland Mountains and the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, burning the railroad bridge at that place, and making his way to Chattanooga. Rosecrans followed him, and repaired the railroad down to Stevenson; but, owing to the time thus spent, and the delay in obtaining supplies, it was not until the 16th of August that he commenced crossing the Cumberland Mountains. In order to command and avail himself of the most important passes, he had extended the front of his movement from the head of the Sequatchie Valley in East Tennessee, to Athens, Alabama, thus threatening the line of the Tennessee River from Whitesbury to Blythe's Ferry, a distance of 150 miles.

Rosecrans advances toward Chattanooga.

He again becomes inactive.

Thus a well-conducted flank movement on its right had forced Bragg's army from Shelbyville and Tullahoma down to Chattanooga. Rosecrans then fell into a period of apparent inaction for more than a month. During this time he was, however, engaged in



repairing the railroads in his rear, and concentrating supplies at Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Tracy City.

We may take advantage of this pause in Rosecrans's operations to refer to Bragg's cavalry movements under Morgan, which, as we have said, led to the opening of the campaign.

On the 27th of June John H. Morgan crossed the Cumberland land, near Burkesville, with 2000 men and 4 guns, on an expedition into Indiana and Ohio, passing through Columbia, which was sacked contrary to his orders. At Lebanon he compelled the national commander to surrender with 400 of his men. Making his way through Bardstown, he crossed the Ohio at Brandenburg on two steam-boats which he seized. His force, as it passed through Kentucky, had increased to 4000 men and 10 guns. Directing his course through Indiana toward Cincinnati, he burnt such mills and factories as were not ransomed, and, riding at a distance of a dozen miles round the city, he reached the Ohio near Parkersburg, breaking railroads and throwing off trains.

Some gun-boats, which had been sent from Louisville, prevented his crossing the river. After several attempts to escape, his force was obliged to surrender, and on the 26th of July he himself was captured.

To return to the movements of Rosecrans and Bragg.

The Richmond government, perceiving the imminent peril in which the Atlantic States were about to be placed by the falling back of Bragg and the unresisted advance of Rosecrans, used every exertion to re-enforce their army under the former general, sending to him Buckner from East Tennessee, Longstreet from Virginia, and Polk from Alabama. Bragg was enjoined to turn forthwith fiercely on Rosecrans, and stop his advance. As we are now to see, the battle of Chickamauga was the result.

Morgan's raid into the Free States.

The Confederate government re-enforce Bragg.

Bragg posted Polk's corps around Chattanooga, Hardee's being placed along the Knoxville Railroad. Rosecrans, not being strong enough to attack Bragg in Chattanooga, determined to turn his left, and reach his rear between Dalton and Atlanta. To do this, he had to cross the Tennessee River below Chattanooga, and then to pass the three or four successive mountain ridges.

The details of his plan were, that Crittenden, with the left wing, was to cross the Tennessee at Battle Creek, and move on Chattanooga; Thomas, with the centre, was to pass over Raccoon Mountain, and seize Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps, leading through Lookout Mountain into McLemore's Cove, twenty miles south of Chattanooga, and make his way toward Lafayette; McCook, with the right wing, was to cross the mountains still farther south, to Valley Head, turning the southern extremity of Pigeon Mountain, and threatening Rome. It was expected that these combinations would compel Bragg to abandon Chattanooga.

Rosecrans reached the Tennessee River on the evening of the 20th of August, and shelled Chattanooga from the heights on the north bank on the 21st. Bridges were thrown over the river at Caperton's Ferry, mouth of Battle Creek, and Shell Mound, and the army, except the cavalry, safely crossed in face of the enemy. By the 8th of September Thomas had moved on Trenton, seizing Frick's and Stevens's Gaps, on Lookout Mountain; McCook had advanced to Valley Head, and taken Winston's Gap; while Crittenden had crossed to Wauhatchie, communicating on the right with Thomas, and threatening Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout Mountain.

Bragg did not disturb Rosecrans in these operations.

When, in the first days of September, news came that that general had laid a pontoon near Caperton's Ferry, and that he was crossing in the direction of Will's Valley and Trenton, Bragg did not believe

Movements of the  
national troops  
round Chattanooga.

Bragg's counter-  
movements.

it; it was, however, soon confirmed by the approach of the national cavalry, and its advance up the Will's Valley Railroad as far as Wauhatchie. Supposing that he was now about to be flanked on his left, Bragg, on the 7th of September, ordered Hill's corps to move toward Lafayette; Polk to Lee and Gordon's Mills; Buckner, with the Army of East Tennessee, and Walker, with his division of the Army of Mississippi, to concentrate at Lafayette; Pegram was to cover the railroad with his cavalry, and the stores in Chattanooga were to be withdrawn to points on the railroad in the rear.

Chattanooga was abandoned by the Confederates on September the 8th, and Crittenden's corps took possession of it. The capture of Chattanooga. Rosecrans, with the remainder of his army, was moving through the passes of Lookout and Missionary Ridges, and directing his march toward Lafayette and Rome.

Thus the first object of Rosecrans's campaign was accomplished: the important strategic point Chattanooga was obtained. There were now fair hopes that by pressing the pursuit the Confederate army might be destroyed. In Richmond there was the utmost alarm. Within a few weeks Pemberton had surrendered a large army at Vicksburg, Lee had retreated from Pennsylvania with awful loss, and now Bragg was falling back from Chattanooga.

Rosecrans, believing himself perfectly secure in Chattanooga, and being convinced that Bragg was fleeing southward, did nothing to fortify himself. Taking measures to pursue his antagonist, he directed Crittenden to leave one brigade at Chattanooga as a garrison, and with the rest move forward to Ringgold. Thomas was to march to Lafayette, and McCook upon Alpine and Summer Creek.

But Bragg, so far from continuing, had stopped his retreat—he was concentrating at Lafayette. Bragg concentrates at Lafayette, He had received, or was on the point of receiving, the powerful re-enforcements directed to join him. He was

strictly ordered to check the farther advance of the Army of the Cumberland. The militia of Georgia were employed in guarding bridges and dépôts, so as to leave the effective soldiers for service in front. The Confederate authorities, using every means to increase their fighting force, had also declared as released from parole the prisoners of war captured by Grant at Vicksburg, and by Banks at Port Hudson.

Rosecrans had separated three corps of his army by mountain ridges and by distances greater than those intervening between each of them and the enemy. Bragg had concentrated opposite his centre, and was holding such a position that he could attack any of them with overwhelming numbers. He had caused deserters and citizens to go into Rosecrans's lines to confirm him in the impression that the Confederates were in rapid retreat. On the 9th, while Rosecrans was giving orders for pursuit, Bragg was preparing to assail Thomas in McLemore's Cove, and, had it not been for his misunderstandings with his officers, and their reluctant movements, he might have met with success.

But already misgivings were entertained in the national army. Negley, in a letter to Thomas, remarks that he is "confident that Rosecrans is totally misinformed as to the character of the country, and the position, force, and intentions of the enemy." So early as the 10th a negro had reported to Wood that "the bulk of the rebel army, under Bragg in person, was at Lee and Gordon's Mills." Wood says "it is due to the humble individual who furnished me this important information to record that subsequent developments proved his report to be singularly correct." Next night the enemy's camp-fires could be distinctly seen on the other side of the creek; their light, reflected over a wide section of the horizon, and extending far up in the heavens, showed that they were present in considerable force.

On the 11th of September, Crittenden, not stopping to

and the national forward movement is checked.



fortify Chattanooga, pushed on toward Ringgold to cut off Buckner, who he had heard was coming from East Tennessee to the support of Bragg. Finding that Buckner had already passed, he turned toward Lafayette to follow him, going up the east side of the Chickamauga, but, meeting a steadily increasing resistance, he took alarm, and fell back across that stream at Lee and Gordon's Mills. The forces he had encountered were Cheatham's and Walker's divisions.

Thomas, who had now discovered Bragg's position, directed McCook, who was advancing on Rome, to fall back instantly and connect with him.

Rosecrans's troops had thus become scattered along an extended line from Lee and Gordon's Mills to Alpine, a space of about forty miles. By the 17th they were brought more within supporting distance, and on the morning of the 18th a concentration was begun toward Crawfish Spring, but it was slowly executed.

At this time the two armies were confronting each other on the opposite banks of the Chickamauga, a stream which, rising at the junction of Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain, at the southern extremity of McLemore's Cove, flows northwardly down the Cove by Crawfish Spring, and at Lee and Gordon's Mills reaches the Lafayette and Chattanooga Road; its sluggish current, joining the main creek, empties into the beautiful Tennessee River above Chattanooga. In the Indian tongue Chickamauga means "The Stagnant Stream," "The River of Death"—a name, as we shall soon find, of ominous import.

Rosecrans was on the west bank of the Chickamauga; his right had been up in McLemore's Cove; his left toward Lee and Gordon's Mills; his reserves scattered through a dozen miles toward Chattanooga and Bridgeport, in the rear of the left. He was now moving all his corps by the left, so that on the 18th his right was where his left had been, at Gordon's

Position of the troops on the Chickamauga.



Mills, his left near the road across from Rossville. Bragg's intention was to flank this left, and interpose between it and Chattanooga. He had dispatched Wheeler's cavalry to press Rosecrans's right in the Cove, and draw attention from the real movement he was about to make. On the 18th Longstreet's troops were arriving from Virginia, and Bragg was ready.

The evening of that day was pleasant, but "toward midnight it turned very cold. During the march of Rosecrans's troops, long, wearisome halts took place, and the men who were not skirmishing began to kindle fires at every stopping-place, making them of logs of wood and rails of fences. After a while they ceased to trouble themselves about moving the rails, and, wherever they chanced to stop, set the fences on fire. A line of light stretched all along the Lafayette Road, illuminating the clouds above, and showing the silent columns of Thomas gliding by like an army of spectres. The weary march came at last to an end, the artillery was wheeled into position, and the columns, facing to the right, stood in order of battle, looking toward the east. In an hour or two the sun rose, thawing the crisp white frost that had collected on the grass, and, dispersing the mist, revealed the national army in battle array."

The battle of Chickamauga commenced on the morning of the 19th. McCook formed the right of Rosecrans's line, Crittenden the centre, Thomas the left. During the night of the 18-19th Bragg had crossed more than 30,000 men over the creek. Polk was in command on his right, Hood on his left; the former was to execute the flanking movement.

At 10 A.M. Thomas perceived an apparently isolated Confederate brigade on his side of the Chickamauga, which he thought he could cut off; but the force proved much stronger than had been expected: his troops, who were making the attack, were driven back by the Confederate

The battle of Chickamauga.

divisions of Walker and Cheatham, with the loss of several guns. Receiving re-enforcements, however, they at length outnumbered and drove back the Confederates, and retook the lost guns.

Cleburne's division of Hill's corps now coming up, the attack was renewed on Thomas, not, however, on his left, but on his right. At first he was thrown into disorder, but this was without difficulty retrieved. Hazen, of Crittenden's corps, brought twenty guns to bear on the enemy's charging column, and drove it back.

Such was the general operation on Rosecrans's left; the attempt to turn it and occupy the road to Chattanooga had proved abortive. The centre was then assailed and pressed back, but, having been re-enforced, it recovered its ground. Night came, and the battle was thus far indecisive. As soon as the engagement closed, Bragg summoned his generals to his camp-fire, and there gave them instructions. At midnight Longstreet arrived in person at head-quarters, and the last of his troops

Results of the first day.

Results of the first attempt to turn it and occupy the road to Chattanooga had proved abortive. The centre was then assailed and pressed back, but, having been re-enforced, it recovered its ground. Night came, and the battle was thus far indecisive. As soon as the engagement closed, Bragg summoned his generals to his camp-fire, and there gave them instructions. At midnight Longstreet arrived in person at head-quarters, and the last of his troops

were fast coming up. Bragg divided his army into two wings, and, making Hood subordinate, gave the right wing to Polk, the left to Longstreet. The right wing comprised four divisions: Cleburne and Breckinridge, of the corps of Hill; Cheatham, of that of Polk; and the division of Walker, of the Army of Mississippi. The left wing had six divisions: Stuart, Preston, and Johnston, of Buckner's corps; Hindman, of Polk's; Hood and McLaws, of the Army of Virginia: the last were without artillery.

Re-arrangement of the armies in the night.

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The order of battle, from right to left, in the first line, was Breckinridge, Cleburne, Cheatham, then Stuart, Hood, Hindman, and Preston; in the second line, and in reserve, Walker on the right, Johnston and McLaws on the left. The cavalry of Pegram was on the extreme left: it could do but little in such a broken and wooded valley.

In Rosecrans's army McCook held the right, his right

wing refused; Crittenden had his two divisions in reserve, and in the rear of the centre; Thomas remained on the left, re-enforced by the two divisions of Johnson and Palmer; Brannan and Negley were in reserve. The mass of the cavalry was on the extreme right. Granger formed the principal reserve toward Rossville.

The night was spent in preparation. Thomas constructed

The battle of the second day.

abatis and breastworks before his lines.

A haze pervaded the breathless air, and a blood-red sun rose on the Chickamauga. Between the two armies an impenetrable mist covered the field. Rosecrans, whose head-quarters were at the Widow Glenn's house, intended to stand on the defensive, and only concentrate more to the left. Bragg was still determined to flank the national left, and intervene between it and Chattanooga. He had ordered Polk to begin the battle as soon as it was light enough to see; the attack was then to go on in succession toward his left; then the whole line was to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the enemy. Bragg was in the saddle before daybreak, listening anx-

Polk opens the battle tardily.

iously for the sound of Polk's guns. After sunrise, his patience becoming exhausted, he sent off one of his staff to ascertain the cause of the delay. The officer found Polk seated at a comfortable breakfast, surrounded, as was his wont, by a group of brilliantly-dressed officers—for, though a bishop, he delighted in the adornments of dress—and delivered his message with military bluntness and brevity. Polk replied that he had ordered Hill to open the action, that he was waiting for him, and added unctuously, "Do tell General Bragg that my heart is overflowing with anxiety for the attack—overflowing with anxiety, sir." The officer returned, and reported the reply literally. Bragg uttered a terrible exclamation, in which Polk, Hill, and all his generals were included. For this delay Bragg blamed Polk severely, but not justly, if it were true, as Polk affirmed, that Longstreet's right

had been permitted so to overlap him that he could not move.

At 10 o'clock Breckinridge's division, followed by Cleburne's, advanced against the breastworks of Thomas, which were mostly in Cleburne's front. Cleburne moved directly upon them, Breckinridge swinging round to flank them. With so much energy were these attacks made, that Thomas had to send repeatedly to Rosecrans for help. The Confederates had been gaining ground, but with these reinforcements Thomas succeeded in driving back Cleburne with very great loss, and even in advancing on the right of Breckinridge. The Confederate division of Walker, which had been in reserve, was brought to that point, and succeeded in re-establishing the battle. At midday all the Confederate right was engaged, except one brigade of Walker's and one of Cheatham's. Division after division was pushed from Rosecrans's centre and right to resist the attacking masses of the enemy on his left, when, according to that general's report, General Wood, overlooking the direction to close up on Reynolds, supposed he was to support him by withdrawing from the line and passing in the rear of General Brannan. By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which Hindman, of Longstreet's corps, took instant advantage, and, striking Davis in flank and rear, threw his whole division into confusion. General Wood, however, declared that the orders he had received were of such a character as to leave him no option but to obey them in the manner he did.

An eye-witness of this incident relates that "when Wood was ordered to support Reynolds, Davis and Sheridan were to shift to the left and close up the line. The occasion being urgent, Wood withdrew hastily, and the Confederates, thinking he had fled, pushed into the gap. The men could not keep their files; the regiments spread out like a fan, wider and wider, till they

The national army  
pierced.

The centre and right  
dispersed.



were torn to pieces. Davis, coming up at this moment to fill the vacancy, was caught on the left flank by the fiery torrent, and pushed off toward the right in utter disorder, like a door swung back upon its hinges and shattered by the blow. That break in the line was never repaired."

Longstreet's masses charged with such terrible energy that it was impossible to check them. The national right and centre were dispersed, flying toward Rossville and Chattanooga. Sheridan, however, at length succeeded in rallying a considerable portion of his division, and managed to reach Thomas.

On Thomas, who, in allusion to these events, is often justly called "The Rock of Chickamauga," the weight of the battle now fell. Every thing depended on his firmness. If he, too, should be swept away, there was nothing but a flight across the Tennessee, nothing but a retreat to Nashville, and perhaps such a retreat was impossible. One of those moments which may be termed historical had come—historical, for on its issue depended the train of future events. It is the opinion of an officer who has seen things from the highest and most advantageous point of view, that the crisis of the battle of Chickamauga rivals in national interest the crisis of the battle of Gettysburg. In this supreme moment Thomas proved equal to his task. Though more than half the army had abandoned him, with inflexible resolution he held his ground. The whole Confederate force could not shake him. As for Rosecrans, he had lost his presence of mind. Even on the previous day he had failed to display that self-possession which had characterized him at Murfreesborough; on this he was completely unnerved.

In the flight of the right and part of the centre from the field, Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden were enveloped and carried away. As Rosecrans and Garfield, his chief of staff, approached Rossville, they reached a point where two roads diverged, one to Chatta-

Conduct of Thomas  
and Rosecrans.

He retires to Chat-  
tanooga.



nooga, the other to Thomas's position. Listening attentively, Garfield concluded that Thomas was still resisting, and therefore rode forward and joined him. Rosecrans, on the contrary, believing that Thomas was defeated, went to Chattanooga, and thence telegraphed to Washington that his army had been beaten.

Thomas still remained immovable in his position, his line having assumed the form of a crescent, with its flanks supported by the lower spurs of the mountain. Polk was furiously assailing his centre and left, Longstreet his right. One after another the Confederate regiments surged up against him, and broke at his feet like billows of the sea. About half past three P.M. Longstreet discovered a gap in the hills in the rear of his right flank, and commenced pouring massive columns through the opening. At this critical moment, Granger, who had been posted with his reserves to cover the national left and rear, arrived upon the field. Thomas pointed out to him the gap through which the enemy was debouching. He instantly threw forward a brigade of cavalry, and got a battery of six guns in the gorge. Two divisions of Longstreet's corps attempted to force their way, and advanced to within a few yards of the guns, but the fire was too severe for them. It was about sunset when they made their last charge. It was repelled, and they gave way to return no more.

In the mean time, Thomas was repelling every attack made upon his left and front. Night came, and the Confederates were still unable to shake him. But, as most of the army had retreated to Chattanooga, he now deliberately fell back to Rossville, retiring in good order, and even capturing five hundred men who happened to have come into the rear. The dead and wounded he left in the hands of the enemy. On the 21st he offered battle again, and that night with-

Thomas still maintains the battle on the left.

He repulses every Confederate attack.

Bragg, having now the victory, refuses to pursue,

drew into the defenses of Chattanooga. Bragg made no pursuit, though the moonlight was very bright, and his officers urged him to press his routed enemy. They were assured by persons who had witnessed its retreat that Rosecrans's army was a mere mob, and that if it were only pressed upon it would be driven beyond the Tennessee.

Bragg, though he had thus won a victory and driven his enemy from the battle-field, had not succeeded in his object—he had not recovered Chattanooga. Rosecrans's loss was about 16,350, and 51 guns. Bragg's loss was about 18,000: he estimated it at two fifths of his whole army.

On the 24th Bragg advanced on Chattanooga, but, encountering on Missionary Ridge a strong resistance, remained there for several weeks.

but he besieges  
Rosecrans in  
Chattanooga.

In the mean time Rosecrans had fortified that place, and commenced making an intrenched camp. Bragg, being without suitable transportation and pontoons, was obliged to resort to a methodical investment, and so the autumn passed away.

So great was the dissatisfaction of the national government, that Rosecrans would have been relieved immediately after the battle had it not been for political considerations connected with an election in Ohio. On the 19th of October General Thomas was ordered to assume command in his stead.

## CHAPTER LXVIII.

### CONSOLIDATION OF THE NATIONAL POWER IN THE ALLEGHANIES. BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. RAISING OF THE SIEGE OF KNOX- VILLE.

The Army of the Cumberland, driven by the Confederate army into Chattanooga, was reduced to the greatest extremity.

Grant, ordered to Chattanooga, carried into effect measures for its relief, which were successful.

Re-enforced by troops under Hooker from the Army of the Potomac, and by Sherman with the Army of the Tennessee, he prepared to wrest the Heights of Chattanooga from the Confederates.

THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. The national flag was planted on the crest of the Alleghanies, and the Confederates defeated.

The siege of Knoxville was raised.

A FEW days after the battle of Chickamauga, Rosecrans's army, as we have seen in the last chapter, was closely beleaguered by Bragg in Chattanooga.

It had opened the campaign—such is the report of the quarter-master general—with a magnificent train. The long rest at Murfreesborough had brought its animals into good condition.

They had made their march into Georgia with very little injury, and had experienced little loss in the battle of Chickamauga.

But Bragg had now occupied the passes of Lookout Mountain; he had broken the line of communication along the south bank of the Tennessee with Bridgeport. The destruction of the bridge at that place had severed the railroad communication with Nashville, the base of supplies; this compelled the wagon-trains which fed Rosecrans's army to move by a circuitous route along the bottom-land of the Tennessee and Sequatchie Valleys for some distance, and then to ascend and descend the Waldron Ridge by very steep, narrow, and rough roads.

Deplorable condition of the national army at Chattanooga.

Bragg, therefore, not only commanded the railroads connecting Chattanooga with the North and West, but also the navigation of the Tennessee River, and the roads upon its banks.

Rain commenced early in October. The roads became almost impassable. The Confederate cavalry, crossing the Tennessee above Chattanooga, fell upon the trains entangled in the mud of the Sequatchie Valley and on the rocky western ascent of Waldron's Ridge. In one day they destroyed about 300 wagons, and killed or captured 1800 mules. Distress began to reign in the camps: the animals of the trains starved to death—the road-sides were lined with their bodies; the artillery-horses died at their picket-ropes.

It was doubtful whether the national army could hold Chattanooga much longer. Starvation had so destroyed the animals that there were not artillery horses enough to take a battery into action. The number of mules that perished was graphically indicated by one of the soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee, "The mud was so deep that we could not travel by the road, but we got along pretty well by stepping from mule to mule as they lay dead by the way."

Under these circumstances, it was clear that something must be instantly done to extricate the army from its perils. The government determined to order General Grant to Chattanooga. He was, at the time, at New Orleans, confined by an injury he had received by a fall from his horse; as soon as he was able to move he went to Indianapolis, and there held an interview with the Secretary of War, Stanton, and both together proceeded thence to Louisville.

On the 16th of October Halleck directed Grant to go at once to Chattanooga. Four days subsequently he informed him by letter of the objects of Burnside's and Rosecrans's movements. From this we

Its sufferings by  
famine.

Grant is ordered to  
its relief.

Halleck gives instructions  
by letter to him.



learn that Halleck had by no means risen to a just appreciation of the military advantages to be derived from the occupation of that town; he considered its primary value to consist in its relations to East Tennessee. An exaggerated estimate of this mountain country was also entertained by the Cabinet; even Stanton declared that he would almost as soon lose Washington as lose East Tennessee. It was reserved for Sherman to recognize the decisive use that could be made of this portal to the political strong-holds of the Confederacy.

Grant thus took command of the new military division of the Mississippi, comprising the three Departments and Armies of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee. At his request, the Department of the Cumberland was given to General Thomas, and that of the Tennessee to General Sherman. Deducting Burnside's force, which did not take a direct part in the operations before Chattanooga, but including Hooker's detachment, Grant's total strength was about 80,000. The strength of the Confederates, under Bragg, was about 60,000.

The government had been filled with apprehensions that Rosecrans would abandon Chattanooga and attempt a retreat, which could only end disastrously. At a consultation, Lincoln seemed to be almost in despair. "I advise," said Stanton, "that a powerful detachment should be sent from the Army of the Potomac to open the road." Lincoln smiled incredulously; Halleck considered such an attempt impracticable. "I do not," said the Secretary of War, "offer you this opinion without having first thoroughly informed myself of all the details. I will undertake to move 20,000 men from the Army on the Rapidan, and place them on the Tennessee, near Chattanooga, within nine days." Not without reluctance did Lincoln give his consent that the 11th and 12th Corps should be so moved; his impression was that they were

Grant assumes command of the three armies.

Stanton sends two corps, under Hooker, to Chattanooga.



not more than 15,000 or 16,000 strong, for, since the time of the peninsular campaign, it had been the habit of officers to under-estimate their strength. The measure once determined upon, the energetic secretary had every thing cleared off the roads, and soon an almost continuous line of cars was transporting the troops. They were fed as they went along; not a moment's delay was permitted.

In this surprising movement but a single man was lost. With so much celerity and accuracy was it conducted, that the Confederates knew nothing whatever of it until Hooker was in their front. Hooker's troops were kept along the railroad, that they might not aggravate the suffering at Chattanooga.

The strength of these two corps was 23,000, and thus, with their artillery-trains, baggage, and animals, they were transferred from the Rapidan in Virginia to Stevenson in Alabama in seven days, a distance of 1192 miles. They crossed the Ohio River twice.

The first thing to be done was to prevent the abandonment of Chattanooga. Grant therefore telegraphed to Thomas on the 19th to hold fast at all hazards. "I will do so till we starve," was the characteristic answer—and so accordingly he did. Grant reached Nashville on October 21st, and there had an interview with Rosecrans and Hooker. On the night of the 23d he reached Chattanooga, after lying out upon the mountains in a drenching rain, and receiving a severe bruise from his horse falling upon him.

He found that Rosecrans had suffered all the heights around his position to be occupied, so that neither the river nor the railroad could be used. Not less than 10,000 animals had perished by famine. Unless the roads could be opened the army must retreat, and that would be certain destruction: the men must have carried their own supplies. But Thomas and his chief engineer, General William F. Smith,

Thomas holds the place firmly until Grant arrives,

and had already devised a plan for its relief.

had already prepared a plan, having for its object the re-possession of Lookout Valley, and the re-establishment of communications by way of Brown's Ferry with Bridgeport. Thomas had ordered a concentration of Hooker's command at the latter place to aid in carrying it into effect.

On the morning after his arrival Grant made a reconnaissance and settled on his plan of action. Grant's reconnaissance and its results. (1.) Hooker was to cross at Bridgeport, and move on the main wagon-road by Whiteside to Wauhatchie. (2.) Palmer was to go from his position opposite Chattanooga to a point opposite Whiteside, and, there crossing the river, to hold the road passed over by Hooker, this and the preceding movement being open to the observation of the enemy. (3.) In the mean time, and with the utmost secrecy, W. F. Smith was to cross near Brown's Ferry, and seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley. (4.) A pontoon was then to be thrown across at Brown's Ferry, and communications opened between Hooker and Thomas (see Map, page 59).

The Confederates, under Longstreet, held the road round the foot of the mountains from Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley, and hence the importance of seizing the range of hills. A shorter line was thereby obtained for re-enforcing the national troops.

Smith's force was 4000 men. Of these, 1800, under Hazen, dropped down in 60 pontoon-boats, on the morning of the 27th, to Brown's Ferry, moving past seven miles of pickets. It was thought better to take the risk of Hazen's floating down the river than to attempt to launch the boats near the ferry. The night was moonlight, but the sky was obscured by clouds. The current in the river was so strong that there was but little necessity to use oars, the boats floating gently down, occasionally striking a snag or touching the overhanging branches of trees. These were the only

Hazen's night passage down the Tennessee.

sounds that broke the monotonous rippling of the water. The Confederate pickets could be seen passing before their watch-fires. Lookout Mountain and its dark shadow were passed safely, when, the rear boats falling a little behind, a low voice came from the bushes on the northern bank, "The general orders you to keep close up," and all was silent again. Day was breaking, and reveillé sounding in the camps at Chattanooga when the landing-place was reached. The Confederate pickets were scattered; they fired and fled. A firm foothold was at once gained, skirmishers were thrown forward, the axemen commenced felling trees and constructing defenses. Very soon Hazen's brigade was securely fortified with an abatis of slashed timber. A fierce attack was repulsed. The remainder of Smith's force was rapidly ferried across, and joined Hazen before sunrise. By 10 A.M. a pontoon across the ferry was laid, and before night Howard was connected with Smith. Grant's artillery commanded the roads leading from the enemy's main camp at Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley. Next morning Hooker reached Wauhatchie; Palmer also gained his destination. Good roads for supplies were thus secured, and Chattanooga was effectually relieved.

Grant telegraphed to Halleck, "General Thomas's plan for securing the river and Southside Road to Bridgeport has proved eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled."

But Bragg did not submit to that result without a struggle. He had lost the control of the roads by a surprise, and determined to recover it by a night attack. From Signal Rock he saw the situation of Geary's weak division encamped in the valley near Wauhatchie, and ordered Longstreet, on the night of the 29th, to assail it. After a three hours' conflict the Confederates were repulsed with great loss.

Complete success of the operation for relieving the place.

Bragg attempts to surprise Geary.

Not only was Longstreet's attack repelled, but the remaining heights west of Lookout Creek were carried, and quiet possession of the roads south of the Tennessee River obtained.


About a fortnight previously to this, Jefferson Davis had made a visit to Bragg, and, from the Heights of Lookout observing the national army, expressed the opinion that it was in a trap from which it could not escape. In his consultations with Bragg, it was determined that Longstreet should be sent north to take Knoxville from Burnside, and thence descend by the mountains in the national flank.

Accordingly, in the beginning of November, Longstreet set out on his march with about 15,000 men—a fatal weakening of Bragg's army, and that at a time when Grant was about to receive powerful re-enforcements under Sherman. At first Grant regretted Longstreet's departure, and proposed a movement against Missionary Ridge, with a view of detaining him. However, on reconnoitring, it was judged best to leave Burnside for the moment, and wait until Sherman could come up. Grant therefore telegraphed to Burnside to stand firm.

Grant was now anxiously expecting the arrival of Sherman, who, on his part, was using the utmost exertion to reach Chattanooga.

During the month of September the 15th Corps (Sherman's) was camped on the Big Black, 20 miles east of Vicksburg; the 17th Corps (McPherson's) in Vicksburg; the 16th (Hurlbut's) at Memphis and along the Charleston Railroad. General Grant, in Vicksburg, first ordered one division of each corps to be sent to Rosecrans, via Memphis, when the divisions of Osterhaus and John E. Smith were dispatched





SHERMAN'S MARCH FROM THE MISSISSIPPI TO CHATTANOOGA.

by boats from Vicksburg; but the next day (September 23) he ordered Sherman, with all the

He had been ordered to re-enforce Rosecrans. 15th Corps, less the division of

Tuttle, which was to remain at Vicksburg, in place of that of John E. Smith, already started.

On September 27th Sherman embarked in person for Memphis, followed by a fleet of steam-boats carrying his troops. Their progress up the Mississippi was slow, by reason of low water and scarcity of seasoned wood; they were compelled to land repeatedly to gather fence-rails and obtain wood from the country. Nevertheless, Sherman reached Memphis on October 2d, the other boats coming up on the two following days. His orders were to conduct the 15th Corps, and as much of the 16th as could be spared, to Athens, Alabama, thence to report to General Rosecrans at Chattanooga, to repair the railroad eastward as he advanced, and to depend on his own line, and by no

means on the resources of Rosecrans, for supplies.



Osterhaus's division was already beyond Corinth. John E. Smith was at Memphis, moving his troops and material onward by the railroad as fast as its limited stock could carry them: though it was worked incessantly night and day, its capacity was so small that it soon became obvious that the movement could be made more expeditiously by marching. The artillery and wagons were therefore dispatched, under escort, by the road, and finally the entire fourth division was moved by marching.

The enemy seems to have had early notice of this movement, and soon assumed a threatening attitude. Sherman in person, leaving for Corinth in a special train, with a battalion of United States regulars as an escort, on reaching Collierville Station, twenty-four miles out, found that it was being attacked by 3000 cavalry, with eight pieces of artillery. He took part in repulsing them, repaired the damage to the road, and reached Corinth the next night.

He ordered General Blair, with the 1st division, to Iuka, and, as fast as the troops got up, pushed them forward to Bear Creek, the bridge of which had been completely destroyed: an engineer regiment was engaged in repairing it. A considerable force of the enemy was in his front at Tusculumbia to resist his advance. Heavy rains had set in, and marching was very difficult.

Foreseeing difficulty in crossing the Tennessee, he had written to Admiral Porter, at Cairo, to send some gun-boats the moment the stage of water in the river permitted. He had also sent to St. Louis for a steam ferry-boat to be dispatched to Eastport. Accordingly, two gun-boats were at Eastport the day after he reached Iuka, and a coal-barge, decked, served to cross over horses and wagons until the ferry-boat arrived.

Still following General Halleck's instructions, he pushed forward the repairs of the railroad, and ordered Blair to drive the enemy beyond Tuscum-

and marches eastward, repairing the railroad.

Is resisted near Corinth,

bia. This was done after a severe action at Cane Creek, and Tuscumbia occupied on October 27th.

In the mean time Grant had been called to Chattanooga, and the Department of the Tennessee devolved on Sherman.

On the 27th of October Sherman ordered Ewing, with the 4th division, to cross the Tennessee at Eastport by means of the gun-boats and barge as rapidly as possible, and move forward to Florence. That same day a messenger from Grant floated down the Tennessee over Mussel Shoals, landed at Tuscumbia, and reached Sherman at Iuka, with orders to cease all work on the railroads east of Bear Creek, and push forward without delay to Bridgeport. That was at once undertaken; the order of march was reversed; all columns were directed to Eastport, the only place where the Tennessee could be crossed. The work of crossing was executed with all vigor possible, though at first there were only the gun-boats and the coal-barge, but the ferry-boat and two transports arrived on the 31st. On reaching Elk River it was found to be impassable; it was necessary to move up that river to Fayetteville, where it was crossed on a stone bridge, and the march continued to Winchester and Decherd.

At Fayetteville Sherman received orders from Grant to come in person to Bridgeport; he therefore proceeded by Sweedon's Cove and Battle Creek, reaching Bridgeport on November 13th. He was then summoned to Chattanooga, which he reached on the 15th. General Grant met him, and explained his purpose of attacking Bragg the moment the Army of the Tennessee could reach him. On the next day they rode along Thomas's lines, and then to a point on the west bank of the Tennessee, where, unobserved, they could see the enemy's camps from Lookout Mountain to the Chickamauga, and examine closely the point suggested for

A messenger from Grant reaches him,

and Sherman hastens onward to Chattanooga.

With Grant, he reconnoiters the enemy's position.

the passage of the river. The pontoon barks and chasses had been provided in advance, with a foresight which elicited Sherman's admiration, and nothing remained for him but to conduct his troops to their position.

This brings us to the battle of Chattanooga, the most brilliant of the battles fought by Grant, and certainly the most picturesque one of the war.

There is something very imposing in the manner in Outline of Grant's proposed plan. which Grant handled his army. He brought Sherman's troops by forced marches from Iuka, a distance of more than 200 miles, to take their appointed place. He had every thing arranged for their arrival; they constituted his left wing; on them fell the weight of the battle. He took Hooker's detachment of the Army of the Potomac, making it his right wing, and with it forced the enemy from positions that seemed to be inaccessible and impregnable on Lookout Mountain. With Rosecrans's army, the Army of the Cumberland, he stormed Missionary Ridge, breaking through his antagonist's centre. Pemberton had been no match for him on the Mississippi; Bragg, in the Alleghany Mountains, only illustrated his transcendent military talent. With an imperturbability possessed only by the greatest captains, he did not suffer himself to be blinded by the glory of his magnificent victory, but, in the very moment of his triumph, dispatched the torn, the bleeding, the barefoot troops of Sherman over dreadful roads, and raised the siege of Knoxville, a hundred miles in his rear.

The battle of Chattanooga consists of three distinct acts:


1st. The passage of the river by the Army of the Tennessee, which, under Sherman, constituted Grant's left wing. On this army, as I have said, fell the weight of the battle. It was its duty, by persistent and fierce attacks on Bragg's right, to compel him to weaken his centre. On his part, Bragg, believing that Sherman was attempting to

turn him and intercept his communications, sacrificed every thing in the furious resistance he made.

2d. The seizure of Lookout Mountain by the detachment from the Army of the Potomac, which, under Hooker, constituted Grant's right wing.

3d. The storming of Missionary Ridge by the Army of the Cumberland, which, under Thomas, constituted Grant's centre.

Grant, having reconnoitred the country above Chatta-



THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA.



nooga as far as could be done without exciting suspicion, acquired a knowledge of the roads, and found that the north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, as also was the river bank from the mouth of the South Chickamauga southward to his main line in front of Chattanooga.

The plan now was to mass all the forces possible against Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end of it. Sherman was to cross the Tennessee just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel. In doing this, Thomas was to give him aid. Thomas was to concentrate his troops on his left flank, leaving force enough to defend the fortifications on the right and centre, and one division to threaten an attack on the most practicable line of the valley. A junction was to be made with Sherman, and the ridge carried.

Sherman's forces prepared to move from Bridgeport, and pontoons were built and secreted. It was thought that the crossing could be made on the 21st of November, but heavy rains delayed it. The pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry having been broken, Sherman had to leave Osterhaus on the south side of the river.

From a deserter, Grant learned that Bragg was falling back, and this seemed to be confirmed by a letter which was received from that general, desiring that non-combatants should be removed from Chattanooga. Determined that he should not retire in good order, Grant directed Thomas, on the morning of the 23d, to make him develop his lines. The day was bright and beautiful. The rays of the sun were glitteringly reflected from the bayonets of Thomas's columns. The men were in their best uniforms, and accompanied by their bands of music. Every eminence round Chattanooga was crowded with spectators. The Confederates thought

The parts of Sherman and Thomas in it.

Thomas surprises and seizes Orchard Knob.

that it was a dress parade or review; their pickets could be seen leaning on their muskets and quietly watching the spectacle. Advancing at double-quick, Thomas's men broke the first Confederate line, and seized Orchard Knob, a steep craggy knoll, rising above the general level of the valley of Chattanooga. The Confederates had held it as an outpost of Missionary Ridge since the investment was first established. As soon as they discovered their mistake, and that something more important than a review was going on, they fell back through a strip of cottonwoods to their first rifle-pits. From these they were expelled, and the low range of hills south of the Knob secured. Thomas's troops at once intrenched themselves, and artillery was put on all available points.

Bragg's works were twelve miles in length—a line far too extensive to be defended properly by his force. If he held the two ridges, Lookout and Missionary, his centre might be pierced; if he abandoned either, he must retreat from Chattanooga. So greatly, however, did he misjudge of his true position, that when Grant was moving upon him he had sent one division to re-enforce Longstreet, advancing on Knoxville; a second had started, but Grant's attack brought it back.

On the 23d Grant also caused a brigade of Thomas's cavalry to make a raid on Bragg's line of communication with Longstreet. It burnt Tyner's Station, cut the railroad to Cleveland, captured 100 wagons, more than 200 prisoners, and destroyed a quantity of stores. Thomas had done on the 23d with his troops what had been intended for the 24th; he therefore now merely strengthened his position, and the 11th Corps was pushed forward, on the south bank of the Tennessee River, across Citico Creek. One brigade, with Howard in person, reached Sherman just after he had crossed the river.

Bragg again detaches troops from his army.

Grant breaks Bragg's connection with Longstreet.

On the night of the 23d Sherman was ready at an hour sufficiently early to secure the east bank of the river.

Sherman crosses the river, One brigade of his men occupied the pontoon boats concealed in North Chickamauga Creek, on the west of the Tennessee, about eight miles above the point chosen for the bridge. As soon as it was dark they drifted down, landed a regiment to capture the enemy's pickets above South Chickamauga Creek, and about mid-  
and gains a foothold beyond. night reached their destination. At once the division that awaited their arrival began its crossing. Before daylight one division was over and well intrenched, and the construction of the two bridges was begun. By 11 A.M. these were finished, and the remainder of the troops, two divisions, passed over with their artillery and necessary wagons. At 1 P.M. the march was taken up by three columns in echelon, each head of column covered by a line of skirmishers with supports. A light, drizzling rain prevailed, and the clouds hung low, cloaking the movement from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout. The foot-hills were soon reached, the skirmishers creeping forward, followed by their supports. At 3½ P.M. Sherman had possession of the whole northern extremity of Missionary Ridge to near the railroad tunnel. During the night he fortified his position strongly.

The battle of Chattanooga. Grant's plan, as we have seen, was to break Bragg's centre; but, to do this, it was necessary to weaken it. Sherman and Hooker were therefore to press on the two flanks, so as to compel re-enforcements to be detached to them from the centre. As soon as that was sufficiently weakened, Thomas was to assault it.

Hooker's operations on Grant's right. While Sherman had thus executed his preliminary portion of the general plan, Hooker had also carried out his part successfully on Lookout Mountain, with its high palisaded crest, its steep, rugged, rocky, and deeply-furrowed slopes. On the northern face, midway between the summit and the Tennessee, a plateau or belt of arable land encircles the crest. Here a continuous line of earth-works had been thrown up, and redoubts,

redans, and pits lower down resisted all assaults from the direction of the river. On each flank were rifle-pits, epaulements for batteries, walls of stone to oppose attacks from either Chattanooga or Lookout Valley. In the valleys themselves were earth-works of still greater extent.

Hooker marched up the valley west of Lookout Mountain to a mile south of the enemy's position; he then ascended the ridge until he reached the palisades which form the crest. Meantime a feint was making on the rifle-pits at the north point; and while the enemy's attention was distracted to it, Hooker formed at right angles to the palisade, and, marching forward, took the whole works in flank and rear, and secured about 1300 prisoners. His troops on the right passed directly under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over ledges and boulders, and driving the enemy from his camp, and from position after position. This lasted until 12 o'clock, when Geary, in the advance, rounded the front of the mountain. Not knowing to what extent the enemy might be re-enforced, and fearing; from the rough character of the field of operations, that the lines might be disordered, directions had been given to the troops to halt on reaching the high ground; but, fired by success, with a panic-stricken, flying force before them, they pressed impetuously forward. All efforts to resist rendered the success more thorough. After two or three sharp conflicts the plateau was cleared. The enemy, with his re-enforcements all broken and disorganized, was driven back over the rocks and precipices into the valley.

It was now near two o'clock. All day long there had been a misty rain. The clouds which had hovered over and enveloped the summit of the mountain during the morning, and to some extent favored the movements, gradually settled into the valley and completely veiled it from view. Indeed, from the moment that the front of the mountain was rounded, it was only

He drives the Confederates from Lookout Mountain.

The battle above the clouds.



from the roar of the battle and the occasional glimpse that the troops in the valley could catch of the lines and standards that they knew of the strife and its progress. It was a battle above the clouds. Deeming a descent into the valley imprudent without more accurate information of its topography, and also of the position and strength of the enemy, Hooker established his line on the east side of the mountain, the right resting on the palisades, the left near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek.

At nightfall the sky cleared. The twinkling sparks on the mountain side showed that picket skirmishing was going on. When it was just dark enough to see the flash of the muskets, and light enough to distinguish the general outline of the contending masses, the national troops in front of Chattanooga could observe without difficulty the progress which Hooker was making. The advancing fires built by his reserves marked out his track. Loud cheers for "old Hooker" rose from the soldiers in the valley below. A full moon ushered in a calm and magnificent night.

When Hooker was approaching the northern extremity or front of the mountain, he was obliged to send for ammunition. Carlin's brigade, of Johnson's division, crossed Chattanooga Creek, and brought him a supply strapped on the backs of the men. It was about a quarter past five when Carlin got up.

The position which Hooker had now reached commanded the enemy's line of defense, stretching along Chattanooga Valley, by an enfilading fire, and also by a direct fire many of his camps. To prevent artillery being brought forward, the Confederates had undermined the road and covered it with felled timber. It was at once repaired and placed in serviceable condition.

Before daylight, Hooker, anticipating the withdrawal of the enemy from the summit of the mountain, dispatched parties from several regiments to

The national flag hoisted on the peak of Lookout.

Scene from the valley beneath.

scale it. The 8th Kentucky gained the distinction of having been foremost to reach the crest, and plant on it the national flag.

During the night the enemy had quietly abandoned the mountain, and, when the fog vanished from the valley, that was found to be abandoned too. Nothing was to be seen but deserted and burning camps.

It took some little time, when morning came, for the November sun to dissipate the clouds that encircled the heights at dawn; but, as they dissolved away, the national flag was hailed with a deafening cheer by the vast army around Chattanooga, who quickly caught a glimpse of its folds waving in the sunlight on the crown of Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain! forever an emblem of the Republic!

“As some tall cliff uplifts its awful form,  
 Swells from the vale, and midway leaves the storm;  
 Though round its breast the rolling clouds are spread,  
 Eternal sunshine settles on its head.”

Thus, on the night of the 24th, Grant's army was in an unbroken line, with open communications from the north end of Lookout Mountain, through Chattanooga Valley, to the north end of Missionary Ridge. Bragg's army stretched along that ridge from Tunnel Hill to Rossville, the valley of the Chattanooga having been abandoned. Hardee commanded the right, consisting of Cleburne's, Walker's, Cheatham's, and Stevenson's divisions; Breckinridge the left, consisting of his old division, and those of Stewart and Anderson.

On the morning of the 25th Hooker moved down the east slope of Lookout Mountain, and swept across Chattanooga Valley. He had been ordered to reach Rossville Gap, in Missionary Ridge, four miles in Bragg's rear. The centre of the army was to delay attacking until he could get into position there. On arriving at Chattanooga Creek, it was found that

Position of the armies on the night of the 24th.

Hooker crosses Chattanooga Valley,

the bridge had been destroyed, and a delay of three hours was occasioned in its reconstruction. The stream crossed, the enemy was forced through the gorge in Missionary Ridge, and Hooker now proceeded to carry out his instructions to clear the ridge. For this purpose Osterhaus moved on its east, Cruft on the ridge itself, and Geary on its west. The batteries were with Geary.

and proceeds to clear Missionary Ridge.

The Confederates had selected for their advanced line of defense the breastworks thrown up by Rosecrans's army on its retreat from Chickamauga, but their front line was routed before an opportunity was afforded to prepare for a determined resistance. Many of the fugitives ran down the east slope to the lines of Osterhaus, who took 2000 prisoners; a few to the west, who were picked up by Geary. Most of them, however, sought refuge behind the second line, where they were soon routed. This continued until near sunset, when those who had not been killed or captured gave way, and, in attempting to escape along the ridge, ran into Johnson's division of the 14th Corps, and were captured. At sunset Hooker halted, there being no enemy before him.

While Hooker was thus effectively engaged on Grant's right, Sherman, on the left wing, was not idle. About midnight he had received from Grant orders to attack the enemy at dawn, and a notice that Thomas would move in force early in the day. Before it was light Sherman was in the saddle.

Sherman's operations on Grant's left.

The sun had already risen before the preparations were complete, and the bugle sounded the "forward."

Sherman's attack upon the enemy's position was vigorously kept up all day. The assaulting column advanced to the very rifle-pits of the enemy, and held that ground without wavering. The right of the column being liable to be turned, two brigades were sent to its support. These advanced over an open

He furiously assails Bragg's right.

field on the mountain's side to near the enemy's works, their right resting on a gorge. Troops, covered from view, were sent against them, and compelled them to fall back; but these troops were speedily driven to their intrenchments by the assaulting column proper.

These movements, as seen from Chattanooga, five miles off, gave rise to the report that Sherman was repulsed on the left. Not so. The real attacking columns were never repulsed. They persistently engaged in a close struggle all day. The reserve brigades, indeed, fell back, and the enemy made a show of pursuit, but were caught in flank by the well-directed fire of a brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought cover behind the hill.

Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy, but, from his occupying a line extending across the mountain, and to the railroad bridge across Chickamauga Creek, his rear and stores at Chickamauga station. This caused the Confederates to move heavily against him. Could Sherman withstand such shocks? Grant remembered how he had stood fast on the field of Shiloh, at the foot of the bridge over Snake Creek, and, without a misgiving, patiently and impassively waited.

Bragg weakens  
his centre to re-  
sist Sherman.

Sherman himself says: "Thus matters stood at 3 P.M. The day was bright and clear. I had long been watching for Thomas's attack on the centre. Column after column of the enemy was streaming toward me; gun upon gun poured its concentrated shot on my troops from every hill and spur that gave a view of any part of the ground held by me. An occasional shot from Orchard Knob, and some musketry and artillery fire over about Lookout, was all that I could detect on our side. But about 3 P.M. I saw a white line of smoke in front of Orchard Knob; it was extending farther and farther, right and left. I knew that my attacks had drawn vast masses of the enemy to me. Some guns that had been firing on me all day were now



silent, or were turned in a different direction. The line of musketry fire from the knob disappeared behind a spur and passed out of sight." Sherman knew that something decisive was happening. On his part, he had done all that was required of him: he had compelled Bragg to weaken his centre.

Grant was standing on Orchard Knob, from which every thing could be seen as in a vast amphitheatre, trustfully relying on Sherman, who, at his left, was hard struggling against overwhelming masses. He was anxiously looking for Hooker coming northward toward him on Missionary Ridge, intending that his approach should be the signal for storming the ridge with the Army of the Cumberland, under Thomas. To those who were on the knob, where operations could be seen plainly, it appeared impossible that against such masses as were being hurled against him Sherman could long hold his ground. There is a moment in every great battle which determines the victory: Grant saw that, though Hooker had not yet approached, the crisis had come. Discovering that Bragg, in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman, had sufficiently weakened his centre on Missionary Ridge, he resolved to advance at once. Thomas was ordered to move Wood's and Sheridan's divisions, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, re-form his line, and then carry the crest.

View of the battle from Orchard Knob.

Grant seizes the critical moment, and storms Missionary Ridge.

The thunderbolt was hurled. At a given signal—the discharge of six field-pieces—the troops moved forward promptly, receiving on the way the concentric fire of not less than thirty guns. The brigades of Hazen and Willich were in advance, and, having a less distance than Sheridan to pass over, reached the lower works first. It was the affair of a moment: the gray Confederates streamed out of them and ran up the hill. The men had been ordered to carry the line of intrenchments at the base of the ridge, and there halt: their enthusiasm carried them forward—

they were bent on winning a victory for themselves. Grant, seeing this, ordered the troops on the right and left to move forward also.

The fire of the enemy became very deadly. The men The crest of the ridge is carried. flocked into the ravines and covered places on the hill-side. All semblance of lines was lost; each of the brigades was broken into some half dozen groups, each group headed by a flag, and every one struggling to go forward. They fired but few shots. The colors were repeatedly struck down, but were immediately caught up and pressed forward. The 1st Ohio had six color-bearers shot; at length, Langdon, its colonel, waving forward the group he headed, leaped over the crest, and was instantly shot down; but there were fifty men beside him, and in a twinkling a hundred more. Both brigades gained the top.

It was at this time that Sheridan's conduct fixed the attention of Grant. Thenceforth destined for great things, he became one of Grant's most trusted lieutenants.

Bragg, with his staff, was near his head-quarters, in plain Bragg leaves the field of battle. sight. Four or five hundred men, called together by Hazen, and, without any formation, led by him, rushed forward; they seized some Confederate guns, and turned them on the enemy: a corporal fired the first of these prizes by discharging his piece over the vent; another soldier, seeing a caisson, filled with ammunition, smoking and ready to explode, pushed it deliberately, by hand, over the hill. There were desperate hand-to-hand struggles between the victors and brave men who disdained to fly. Down the ridge rode Bragg, with his cortége of officers and a rabble rout of soldiery. He had lost the battle of Chattanooga.

Bragg had misinterpreted Grant's operations. He had considered Sherman's attacks on his right as constituting the main movement, intended to turn him and get possession of his communications: he was afraid that he was about

to be severed from Longstreet. But when he found his centre pierced, Sherman still tenaciously holding his ground on the right, and Hooker victoriously coming along Missionary Ridge in the rear of his left, he gave up all for lost.

Darkness, and the resistance which was made to the advance of Thomas's left, prevented an immediate pursuit; but at length, that resistance being overcome, the Confederates abandoned their position near the railroad tunnel, in front of Sherman, and at midnight were in full retreat. All their strong positions on Lookout Mountain, and Chattanooga Valley, and Missionary Ridge fell into the hands of Grant, together with a large number of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms. Orders were given to Thomas, Hooker, and Sherman to pursue next morning. Hooker met with a severe resistance at Ringgold, in which many valuable officers were lost.

The pursuit was stopped. It was imperatively necessary now to relieve Burnside in Knoxville. The raising of the siege of that place forms a brilliant episode in the Chattanooga campaign.

Burnside, after being relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac (vol. ii., p. 475), was assigned, March 26, 1863, to the command of the Department of the Ohio. He established his headquarters at Cincinnati. His army at Camp Nelson, near Richmond, Kentucky, was about 20,000 strong.

On the 16th of August he commenced moving toward Knoxville, in East Tennessee, while Rosecrans was moving toward Chattanooga. The possession of East Tennessee was, as we have seen, considered by the government a highly important political object. Passing over the mountains to Kingston, where the Holston and Clinch Rivers unite to form the Tennessee, Burnside made a forced march to Loudon, in the hope of saving the railroad bridge, 2000 feet long, over the Holston, but he arrived too late.

III.—G

The march was very difficult. Burnside was obliged to employ pack-mules for transportation. His early successes. Buckner, who was in command at Knoxville, evacuated that place on his approach, and Burnside occupied it on the 3d of September. The retreat of the Confederates from Knoxville left Frazier's command at Cumberland Gap without support. Burnside, on the 9th of September, compelled it to surrender; he captured 14 pieces of artillery and 2000 prisoners. The restoration of East Tennessee to the Union was effected with scarcely any loss.

Buckner, in falling back from Knoxville, re-enforced He gives no assistance to Rosecrans. Bragg. It was the intention of the government that Burnside should re-enforce Rosecrans; but, though orders were repeatedly given for that purpose, they were not carried into effect, Burnside occupying himself with various movements for more perfectly establishing himself in East Tennessee.

At this period the weather was superb for military operations. Nothing could be more picturesquely beautiful than the scenery of East Tennessee. The distant mountains, seen through the Indian summer haze, were covered with the gaudily-tinted leaves of autumn, and here and there were gray craggy cliffs rising to the sky far above the pines.

Early in November, Bragg, under orders from Richmond, detached Longstreet, with 12,000 infantry and a heavy body of cavalry, to move Longstreet advances on Knoxville, against Burnside. Much mismanagement, however, occurred. Re-enforcements promised to Longstreet did not arrive, and, instead of receiving supplies, he had to delay in foraging, thrashing, and baking. His men were in a deplorable condition for want of clothing, shoes, blankets, and tents, so that it was not until the 14th of the month that he crossed the Tennessee at Hough's Ferry, six miles below Loudon. Burnside's troops retreated before him until they reached Campbell's Station, where, on



the 16th, they turned upon their pursuers. The Confederates advanced, alternately surmounting the crests of the little knolls in beautiful undulating lines, and disappearing again in the hollows beneath. The national forces opened at long range, but still the enemy pressed forward, heedless of the shower of bullets, until they reached a suitable position, when they began to return the fire. After a severe action, Burnside was compelled to retire into the defenses of Knoxville. Longstreet followed, beleaguered the town on the 17th, and tried to carry it by and attempts to carry it by assault. assault. In this, however, he failed; and, though very anxious to return to the assistance of Bragg, resolved at length to attempt to reduce it by famine. The place had provisions for about three weeks, and the fortifications had been made very strong.

News reaching Longstreet of the defeat of Bragg at Chattanooga, he determined again to try an assault, foreseeing that troops would be quickly dispatched by Grant, and the siege raised. The key of the works of Knoxville was Fort Sanders. On this he determined to make an attempt on the 29th.

In the gray of that morning the assault was delivered. He renews the assault, and again fails. The Confederates were received with a deadly fire. They burst through the abatis, crossed the ditch, pushed each other up the parapet, a few forced their way through the embrasures. An officer, advancing with a flag in his hand, demanded the surrender; he was dragged in and made a prisoner; others were hurled back into the ditch, and hand grenades thrown after them. The assault failed: it was tried again by another column, and with the same result. A truce was granted to permit the Confederates to remove their dead and wounded, 500 in number. The loss in the fort was insignificant. A simultaneous assault on the south side of the Holston was likewise repulsed.

Grant was full of anxiety for the fate of Burnside.

Grant orders Sherman to the relief of Knoxville.

While the battle of Chattanooga was yet in progress, he ordered Thomas to have Granger's corps, and other detachments, in readiness to go to Knoxville as soon as the action was over; but, on returning from the front on the 28th, he found that Granger had not yet got off, and was moving reluctantly, and with complaints.

In a letter to Sherman, he said:

\*\*\*\*\* "I am inclined to think, therefore, I shall have to send you. In plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee."



THE MARCH TO KNOXVILLE.

“Seven days previously,” says Sherman, “we had marched from our camps on the west side of the Tennessee with only two days’ rations, without a change of clothing, and with but a single blanket or coat to a man, from myself to the private inclusive. We had no provisions save what we gathered by the road, and

Sherman's description of the march.

were ill supplied for such a march. But 12,000 of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered at Knoxville, 84 miles distant, and they must be relieved in three days. Accordingly, General Howard repaired and planked the railroad bridge, and at daylight the army passed the Hiwassee, and marched to Athens, 15 miles. On the 2d of December we moved rapidly toward Loudon, 26 miles distant. About 11 A.M. the cavalry passed to the head of the column, and were ordered to push on to Loudon, and, if possible, save the pontoon bridge across the Tennessee. In this, however, they did not succeed, but the enemy abandoned the place in the night, and destroyed the pontoons, and ran 3 locomotives and 48 cars into the Tennessee. We were therefore forced to turn east, and trust to General Burnside's bridge at Knoxville. It was all-important that Burnside should have notice of our coming, as but one day of the time remained.

“Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of the 2d of December, I took measures to send Burnside notice of our approach. The distance to be traveled was 40 miles, the roads dreadful. Before the cavalry command was off, the 15th Corps was turned from Philadelphia for the Little Tennessee, at Morgantown, where the maps represented the river as very shallow, but it was found too deep for fording; the water was freezing cold; the width 240 yards; the depth from 2 to 5 feet. Horses could ford it, but artillery and men could not. A bridge was indispensable. General Wilson, who was with me, undertook to superintend it, and, working partly with the material obtained from the houses of Morgantown, pushed it forward so quickly, that by dark on the 4th of December the troops and animals were passing over it, and by daybreak next morning the 15th Corps was over. I now heard from Burnside, with whom the cavalry commander communicated, that all was well in Knoxville, but Longstreet still lay before the place, though there were symptoms of his

speedy departure. Our bridge had, however, broken before all the troops were over, which caused a little delay;

He raises the siege. but, on the night of the 5th, a messenger from Burnside arrived, announcing that Longstreet had retreated toward Virginia, followed by Burnside's cavalry. Here I ordered all the troops to halt and rest, except two divisions of General Granger, which were originally intended for the re-enforcing of Burnside.

"In an interview with Burnside it was settled that I should return to the line of the Hiwassee, leaving nothing but Granger's command. It was thought that Bragg, reinforced, might take advantage of our absence, and assume the offensive against Grant.

Summary of his march. "It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion since our march from the Big Black, in Mississippi. For long periods we have been without regular rations, and the men have marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a murmur, without a moment's delay. After a march of over 400 miles, without sleep for three successive nights, we crossed the Tennessee, fought our part in the battle of Chattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned more than 120 miles north, and compelled Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville."

Not without just pride did Sherman thus speak of this march. It showed what might be done with troops ably handled, but which, before that time, had not been done. It was the harbinger of the March to the Sea.

In the Chattanooga campaign the national loss was about 5616, of whom 757 were killed; the Confederate about 10,000, of whom 6142 were prisoners; to this are to be added 42 guns.

Losses in the Chattanooga campaign. Constrained by popular opinion, the Confederate government removed Bragg, replacing him by Johnston. Bragg is removed from command. Jefferson Davis, however, was far from



imputing the blame of the disaster to Bragg: he severely criticised the soldiers. In his message to Congress (December 7, 1863), he said:

“Some of our troops inexplicably abandoned positions of great strength, and, by a disorderly retreat, compelled the commander to withdraw the forces elsewhere successful, and finally retire with his whole army to a position some twenty or thirty miles to the rear. It is believed that if the troops who yielded to the assault had fought with the valor they displayed on previous occasions, and which was manifested in the battle on other parts of the lines, the enemy would have been repulsed with very great slaughter, and our country would have escaped the misfortune, and the army the mortification, of the first defeat that has resulted from misconduct by the troops.”

Bragg reported that his artillery was shamefully abandoned, and that no satisfactory excuse could be possibly given for the conduct of the troops on the left.

It must be remembered that Bragg's efforts were paralyzed by his misunderstandings with his chief officers, two of whom—Polk and Hill—had been already relieved for disobedience of orders.

Grant, on the contrary, received a letter of congratulation from the President of the United States, and on the 17th of December a vote of thanks from Congress. On the 1st of the following March the grade of lieutenant general was restored in his favor, and on the 9th of that month he was appointed to that dignity.

General Halleck then became chief of staff of the army; Meade was continued in command of the Army of the Potomac; Sherman replaced Grant in the military division of the Mississippi, and McPherson replaced Sherman in the Department and Army of the Tennessee.

Conduct of the Confederate troops.

Grant is made lieutenant general.

Other changes in the command of the armies.

## SECTION XV.

### THE CONTEST IN THE ATLANTIC REGION.

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#### CHAPTER LXIX.

##### ADVANCE AND DEFEAT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

General Hooker, having reorganized the Army of the Potomac, caused a demonstration to be made in front of the Confederate Army at Fredericksburg, while he was turning its left.

In the midst of a successful advance, he suddenly abandoned his plan, and assumed the defensive at Chancellorsville.

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE was fought, the Confederate generals turning his position, and completely routing his right wing. In accomplishing this, General Jackson was mortally wounded.

On the following morning Chancellorsville was carried by the Confederates; but their movements were arrested by the news that Sedgwick had carried the Heights of Fredericksburg, and was advancing in their rear.

They checked the advance of Sedgwick at Salem Church, and forced him across the river; but, before they could resume their attack on Hooker, he also had recrossed: his campaign had proved to be a failure.

IN the last section we have traced the movements of the Army of the West to their successful result—the occupation of Chattanooga. In this I have to relate the operations of the Army of the East, or, more correctly, of its chief element, the Army of the Potomac, and its powerful antagonist, the Confederate army under Lee.

But, before describing these military events, it is necessary to allude briefly to certain circumstances which greatly affected the efficacy of the Army of the Potomac.

Effects of the Proclamation of Emancipation.

The proclamation of freedom to the slaves was far from being sustained unanimously at the North. Many of the Republican party had misgivings as to its effect, and that section of the Democratic party which believed that restoration to place and power depended on an alliance with the

South, loudly declared that it was really of "no more avail than the pope's bull against the comet." As if two years of war, with all their privations and horrors, had not already exasperated the seceding communities as much as could possibly be, it was affirmed that an open avowal of a determination to adopt the policy of emancipation would only serve to irritate them still more.

The mass of the nation was, however, gradually assenting to that policy: some through a conviction that it was the only mode of confronting successfully the states that were banded together by slavery; some through moral considerations and the rebukes of conscience; some, also, from baser motives, the suggestions of personal interest. Among the last there were many, liable to be drafted, who began to perceive that the enlistment of black soldiers would diminish the demand for white ones; and of the manufacturers of New England there were some who were not unwilling to retain their skilled operatives by filling up the quotas of their states with colored recruits, obtained in the South as the national armies advanced.

The Army of the Potomac, acting in the vicinity of Washington, was under the weight of an incubus—  
Political influences in the Potomac army. political influence—which unceasingly embarrassed, and frequently paralyzed it. The aspirants for the presidency, of whom there are always many in the capital, had each his upholders and antagonists in that army, and each aspiring officer in the army had his upholders and antagonists in the capital. To such influences the enemies of McClellan attributed his rise, and he himself attributed his ruin. It was the same with Pope, and again the same with Burnside, and again the same with Hooker.

General Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac on the 26th of January, 1863. He  
\*Hooker finds it much demoralized. found it in a very disorganized condition.

Among its officers the Emancipation Proclamation met with much disapproval, many declaring that they never would have joined the army had they known that they were to be used for the freeing of slaves. A very influential portion was determined to bring McClellan back again; they thought that it was better to overthrow the Confederates rather by the display of force than by its use. They were unwilling to do any thing that might injure or even jeopardize the institution of slavery, and could not forgive Hooker for his declaration that the peninsular campaign had failed through the want of generalship. The disaster at Fredericksburg, and the deplorable issue of what was termed Burnside's mud campaign, had greatly demoralized the troops. At one time it was found that 200 men were deserting each day: not less than 2922 commissioned officers, and 81,964 men, were reported absent; of these, though many were on leave, the majority had deserted. In spring the term of 40,000 nine months and two years men would expire.

Hooker lost no time in reorganizing, and, as far as was possible, restoring the spirit of his army. In He reorganizes it. place of the grand divisions he substituted seven corps: the 1st (Reynolds), 2d (Couch), 3d (Sickles), 5th (Meade), 6th (Sedgwick), 11th (Howard), 12th (Slocum). The cavalry, under Stoneman, was in four divisions: Pleasonton, Buford, Averill, Gregg, constituting one separate corps. The strength of his infantry and artillery was 120,000; his cavalry, 13,000; he had more than 400 guns.

Hooker lay at Falmouth. Confronting him, on the Position and strength of the opposing army. opposite side of the Rappahannock, was Lee's army, 62,000 strong. It consisted of Jackson's corps, in four divisions, commanded respectively by A. P. Hill, Rodes, Colston, Early; there were also two divisions of Longstreet's corps, those of Anderson and McLaws, Longstreet himself, with the others, having been detached to the south of James River. Of the above-mentioned,




force, the cavalry numbered 3000. During the winter Lee had constructed an impregnable line from Banks's Ford to Port Royal, a distance of twenty-five miles.

The detachment of Longstreet seemed to Hooker to offer a fitting opportunity for making an attack upon Lee. Perceiving that his duty was not to displace the Confederate army by driving it toward Richmond, but to destroy it, and being authorized by the government to select his own time and line of attack, with the single restriction that he must move so as to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry, he determined not to renew Burnside's front movement, but to endeavor to turn Lee's left.

With a view of concealing from the enemy the real character of the proposed operation, Sedgwick, with a powerful force, was to pretend to renew Burnside's plan of attack by crossing the river below Fredericksburg, and making a vigorous demonstration. Meantime Hooker himself was to move rapidly and secretly to his own right, and, crossing the Rappahannock and the Rapidan above their confluence, to drive off the Confederate guards from the fords, and, facing his army eastward by pivoting it on its left, was to march down the roads perpendicularly to the river, thereby emerging from the Wilderness into the clear country, a movement which would bring him into the rear of the Confederate position at Fredericksburg, and threaten Lee's communications with Richmond.

In expectation of success, all the cavalry, except about 1000 under Pleasonton, was to be detached to Lee's rear to break the railroads, destroy the bridges, and cut off the Confederate army as completely as possible from Richmond.

Preference was given to this movement by the right over one by the left from considerations connected with the greater width of the Rappahannock lower down its stream, and the consequent greater difficulty of crossing.



THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

It was also supposed that a movement to the left could not be accomplished without being detected. On the other hand, though the fords of the river to the west were carefully watched by the Confederates, it was considered possible to make the crossing high up, and then, by marching swiftly to the eastward, to sweep the guards away and bring the army across.

From the map it will be seen that three miles above Fredericksburg in a straight line, or five following the river, is Banks's Ford, and seven or eight miles above that, and near the confluence of the Rappahannock and Rapidan, is the United States Ford. At this time the water in the river was high. On its south end each ford was strongly guarded.

Hooker's battle-plan, which was not a simple, but a combined operation, presents, therefore, three parts: 1st, his own turning movement and flank attack on Lee; 2d, Sedgwick's operations near Fredericksburg; 3d, Stoneman's cavalry movement on Lee's rear.

It consists of three distinct parts.

On the 12th of April Stoneman set out on his expedition. He rode up the Rappahannock, and on the 14th threw a division across. A storm came on, and the division was obliged to recross by swimming.

At length the weather proved propitious, and on the 27th of April the main movement commenced. The turning column consisted of the corps of Meade, Howard, and Slocum. They crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on a canvas pontoon bridge. Slocum and Howard crossed the Rapidan at Germanna, and Meade at Elley's Ford. The united columns then moved eastwardly along the south side of the river, and, on reaching the United States Ford, drove off the Confederate force who were guarding it on that side. Thereupon Couch, who was waiting with two of his divisions, laid pontoons and crossed over. The whole force

March of Hooker's turning column.

now marched southwardly, and on the 30th reached Chancellorsville, whence several roads led to the rear of Lee's position at Fredericksburg. Hooker had personally superintended Couch's crossing, and went over to Chancellorsville, where he established his head-quarters.

Chancellorsville consisted of a substantial brick house, with out-buildings. It is eleven miles from Fredericksburg, and near the crossing of the Orange Turnpike with the plank road. Around the house was an open cultivated space, extending to the west. In front there was a little stream running into the Rappahannock.

Hooker now prepared to pivot his army on its left, so as to face it eastward. There are three main roads from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg: the plank road on the right, the river road on the left, and the turnpike between them. He put his troops in movement in three columns: on the river road were two divisions of Meade's corps, those of Griffin and Humphreys; on the turnpike, or central road, was Sykes's division of Meade, supported by the division of Hancock; on the plank road, to the right, was Slocum's corps. Hooker had, therefore, thus far carried out his plan. At this stage of his action let us leave him for a moment.

For meantime Sedgwick was making threatening demonstrations near Fredericksburg. He had performed the duty of enabling Hooker to establish himself in strength on the south side of the Rappahannock. That done, Sickles moved swiftly and secretly from Sedgwick up the river, crossing the United States Ford to Chancellorsville. Reynolds, after making a display, followed him, and thus the force immediately with Hooker was more than 70,000 men.

So far an admirable plan had been well executed. Had Hooker now pressed vigorously forward, as was his original intent, Lee would have found himself, on turning to meet

Position of Chancellorsville.

Advance of the troops eastward.

Sedgwick's operations at Fredericksburg.



his antagonist, with 70,000 men in his front, 30,000 in his rear, and his retreat to Richmond cut off by 12,000 cavalry.

To return to Hooker's advance. Of the three columns thus moving eastward, the left one reached near to Banks's Ford without opposition; the central met with some little resistance, but gained the position assigned it; the right advanced to its destined point without trouble. Thus, on Friday afternoon, May 1st, they were out of the Wilderness; every thing proposed had been successfully carried out; the open, clear country, where artillery and cavalry could act, was before them; they were in communication with Sedgwick by Banks's Ford, and from the admirable position they had gained they could command the heights occupied by Lee in the rear of Fredericksburg.

With very great astonishment, they suddenly received orders from Hooker to return to Chancellorsville. Warren, Couch, Hancock, protested.

Hooker orders the advance to fall back.

In the Wilderness it is difficult to know what is transpiring at the distance of a hundred yards, so dense is the forest, and Hooker was afraid that, from this impenetrability and the nature of the ground, which was broken by ravines running down at right angles to the Rappahannock, and therefore offering many formidable positions for defense, he could not take the rest of his troops through quickly enough, and might be beaten in detail; but the Confederates disdained all these obstacles, and marched over this very ground. In accordance with the order, the retirement was executed, though not without difficulty in the case of Sykes. When too late, Hooker, moved by the remonstrances of his officers, countermanded his own order.

Hooker thus, though superior to his antagonist, voluntarily took the defensive. He arranged his forces around Chancellorsville, a position greatly inferior to that abandoned, since it was commanded in front by high grounds, and the movements of the Confederates were hidden by the Wilderness. The post-

Posting of his army on the defensive.

ing of the troops was somewhat in the form of the letter **U**, with its convex side toward the enemy. The left branch of the **U**, looking eastward toward Fredericksburg, was held by Meade and one division of Couch; Slocum and one division of Sickles held the centre, Howard the right. The front was strengthened by abatis, rifle-pits, etc. As Howard did not expect an attack, he, with fatal remissness, took no means to prevent a surprise. In front of him, at a little distance, was the thick forest. His corps, 11,500 strong, though called German, contained only 4500 men of that nationality.

Thus, instead of swiftly pushing forward on Lee, Hooker He issues a congratulatory order. halted, though there was no adequate force to oppose his march. He issued a congratulatory order to his army, announcing that "the enemy must either ingloriously flee, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him." But Lee, having ascertained, on the night of the 30th, that Sedgwick's movement was merely a feint, left 10,000 men, Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, to deal with him, and hastened with the rest to confront Hooker.

Lee had now learned that Hooker was waiting for him Jackson's plan of attack. in the position at Chancellorsville. He commenced by feeling Couch, then Slocum, then still farther on toward Hooker's right. Seated on cracker-boxes under a pine-tree, he and Jackson consulted as to what was to be done. Jackson proposed to divide the army, to leave with Lee the divisions of McLaws and Anderson, and himself to march with the rest along some obscure country roads, and come round undetected on Howard's right. The distance to be marched would be about 15 miles.

Lee's army was thus divided into three parts: one portion at Fredericksburg dealing with Sedgwick; a second, under himself, in front of Hooker; a third, under Jackson,

circumventing Howard. This perilous division was made in face of a greatly superior army, and would have been fatal if practiced before a competent general. The only military excuse that can be made for it, if indeed it be any excuse, is, that the three forces might be reunited by falling back.

On Saturday, May 2d, Jackson commenced his turning movement, Stuart's cavalry attempting to screen his column from view. Nevertheless, for two hours he was seen crossing a hill in Sickles's front, with his trains and ambulances. Sickles therefore ordered Birney forward to reconnoitre the passing column. He opened upon it a rifle battery. The 23d Georgia was guarding the flank of Jackson's train. It managed to keep the assault off until the train had passed, but, re-enforcements coming up, nearly the whole of the regiment was captured. As the road the Confederates were taking here trended to the south, it was the general impression that Lee was retreating toward Richmond. Jackson, on reaching the plank road, made a reconnoissance, and found that he must pass forward to the turnpike before he could gain Howard's rear. At 5 P.M. his circuitous march had brought him out on that road about five miles in the rear of Chancellorsville. He now turned down it. He was only about six miles from his starting-point. From a commanding hill he again secretly reconnoitred Howard, and then, under the screen of the thick forest, arranged his lines of attack. He saw that while Howard's line faced the plank road, his extreme right brigade fronted westward. He therefore confronted that, arranging his line perpendicularly to the road, and extending about one mile on each side of it. The forest was full of game, which, startled from their hiding-places by the unusual presence of man, ran in numbers to and over the national lines. Deer leaped over the works, and dashed into the woods behind. That was the first intimation of Jackson's ap-

He routs Howard's corps. proach. But at 5 P.M. his troops rushed forth from the woods with their customary yells. Howard's men, wholly unconscious of what was coming, were scattered around, busily preparing supper. At once they were panic-stricken; their rout became uncontrollable. The Confederates met with scarcely any resistance. Soldiers and ambulances, pack-mules and cattle, in indiscriminate confusion, went down the road. Rodes, who commanded the first Confederate line, found that there was nothing between him and Hooker's head-quarters at Chancellorsville except the wreck of the fleeing right wing.

Sickles had been preparing to renew Birney's attack in greater force, and had been joined by Pleasonton's cavalry, 1000 strong, for that purpose, when news reached him of Howard's disaster. No firing having been heard, he discredited it at first, but soon the evidences of it became undeniable. He at once called Birney from his advanced position, and made ready to check the onrush of the enemy. At that moment Pleasonton came back from the front with about 500 cavalry, and, seeing the disaster, caused a charge to be made by the 8th Pennsylvania. Its commander, Keenan, was instantly killed, and the regiment overwhelmed. This gallant charge, however, accomplished its object. For a few moments the Confederate onrush was stayed, and Pleasonton got his own battery of horse artillery into position, along with other guns belonging to the routed corps, and some of Sickles's, which had not been used in Birney's advance, and, having double-shotted and trained them low on the ground, swept off the Confederates again and again as they repeated their charges.

It was the divisions of Rodes and Colston which had thus routed Howard's corps. In so doing, they had fallen into confusion in their rush through the thick and tangled woods. Jackson therefore ordered A. P. Hill's division to take their place, and rode

Wounding of General Jackson.



to the front to reconnoitre. It was now night, but not dark, for there was a full moon. Having completed his examination, Jackson rode back toward his own men, accompanied by his staff and escort. They were mistaken for national cavalry. Hill's regiments, on the right and left of the road, fired a volley at them, killing and wounding several of the party; among the latter was Stonewall Jackson, who received three balls. The firing was followed by an advance of the national troops, who, repulsing the Confederates, charged over Jackson's body. When they drew back, Jackson was placed on a litter; but, Berry's guns firing up the road, one of the litter-bearers was killed, and the wounded general fell to the ground, receiving a severe contusion. He had to be left again for a few minutes until the fire slackened, when at length he was safely conveyed to the hospital. His arm was amputated. He died on Sunday, the 10th of May.

Of all the generals in the Confederate armies, no one so completely commanded the devotion of the troops as "Stonewall" Jackson—"Stonewall," an affectionate name they had given him. It was felt throughout the South that his death more than counterbalanced the advantages, great as they were, of the victory of Chancellorsville. He fell in the midst of a triumph won by his own hand, and, happier than many of his comrades, was not permitted to witness the days of misfortune that were approaching.

To replace Howard's troops, a new front had to be extemporized with Sickles and Berry. Reynolds's corps, coming up from Fredericksburg, joined Hooker during the night.

After Jackson was wounded Hill renewed the attack, but, being himself wounded and repulsed, the command devolved on Stuart. The confusion into which the Confederates had been thrown was increased by a night attack made by Birney, who recovered some of Howard's guns, and Pleasonton, diligently working, got 40 guns in position.

While Jackson was making the flank attack, Lee, with Anderson's and McLaws's divisions, had been occupying Hooker in front. To conceal his weakness, his troops appeared and reappeared at different points. It was while Hooker was occupied in resisting these demonstrations of Lee that he was astonished by the tempest which burst upon him.

Lee, meantime,  
attacks Hooker's  
front.

In the woods on the north side of the plank road a fire broke out and spread rapidly among the dry leaves; the heat was excessive; the smoke arising from burning blankets, oil-cloths, etc., very offensive; the ground was so hot as to be painful to the feet; the dead and dying could be seen on all sides enveloped in the flames; it was impossible to remove in time all the wounded: many of them were burnt.

All night Hooker was engaged in rearranging his lines, and at daybreak on Sunday morning he was ready. His army again presented a front like the letter **U**, its extremities resting on the river, and covering the United States Ford. On the left branch of the **U**, facing eastward, was Hancock's division of Couch's corps; on the curve of the **U**, facing southward, was Slocum's corps; on the right branch, facing westward, was Sickles, with Berry's division of Slocum, and French's division of Couch. Sickles's left projected a little beyond the line of the curve, holding a position on an eminence called Hazel Grove, that commanded the curve. From this position Slocum's whole line might be enfiladed: it was the key-point of the battle-ground. Not without surprise did Sickles receive orders from Hooker, who evidently was not aware of its importance, to abandon it.

Hooker reposts his  
army by night.

The two opposing armies were therefore in this attitude: Hooker, compactly placed, was on intrenched ground of his own selection; Lee separated into two parts, with six miles of forest between them. On assuming the offensive, Lee must attack intrenchments.

Condition of the op-  
posing armies.

The lines of direction of these attacks converged upon Chancellorsville.

On the next morning, Sunday, May 3, as soon as the sun dispersed the mist, Stuart discovered the importance of the ridge on the national right which Sickles, in compliance with Hooker's orders, had just abandoned. It is the most commanding point except Fairview. He at once put 30 guns upon it, and reported that the effect of their fire was superb. He threw his whole force on Sickles's lines, which were separated from him by a little valley, in which flowed a creek. At 8 o'clock Stuart stormed the position in his front; it was taken and retaken repeatedly. Sickles was compelled to send for re-enforcements. It so fell out that a pillar of the veranda of the Chancellorsville House, against which Hooker happened to be leaning, was struck by a cannon ball, and the general was thrown down senseless.

There was no one who would take the responsibility of acting. Couch, who ought to have assumed command, did nothing when he should have done every thing. Sickles sent again, still more urgently renewing his demand; but still receiving no reply, and his ammunition being exhausted, he was compelled to withdraw his troops. Though the ground was not favorable for artillery, the success the Confederates were now obtaining was mainly due to its use; it silenced the national batteries by a destructive enfilade fire, and opened the way for the advance of the troops.

We have now to relate what took place on Hooker's front, where Slocum was holding the curve of the U, which was enfiladed by the guns at Hazel Grove, and on which Lee, with Anderson's and McLaw's divisions, was making incessant attacks, and so guiding his movements toward his left as to be constantly approaching Stuart. A little before 10 A.M. they were in contact, and now commenced directing their converging pressure toward Chancellorsville. Hooker, con-

The Confederates seize Hazel Grove.

Hooker is stricken down.

Sickles and Slocum are compelled to fall back.

tinuing in his stunned and insensible condition, could give no orders, and Sickles, French, and Slocum had to resist alone the Confederate attacks, while the corps of Reynolds, Meade, and Howard, more than 40,000 men, were doing nothing. Sickles, without ammunition, was depending on the bayonet. The national troops were forced to abandon their position, and with it the plank road, by which the advance of Sedgwick was expected. In confusion, and under the most galling fire, which swept the plains of Chancellorsville in every direction, they gave way, Anderson vigorously pressing them, and McLaws closing in from the east. A number of prisoners were captured at the Chancellorsville House, which was taken. At 10 A.M. the Confederate forces held the field of battle. The national army, thus driven from the field, had retired to a line in the rear, and formed a flatter U, which, from the character of the ground, was assailable only in front.

Chancellorsville is captured by the Confederates.

Flushed with this success, Lee was now ready to throw his reunited forces on Hooker in his new position. But the attack was arrested by ominous news which he at that moment received from Fredericksburg. Sedgwick had carried the heights at the back of the city, had overthrown Early and Barksdale, who had been left there to resist him, and was advancing on Lee's rear with nearly 30,000 men.

Effect of the news of Sedgwick's success.

We have now to consider what these movements of Sedgwick had been.

His corps, the 6th, with the 1st and 3d, during the crossing of the Upper Rappahannock by the main body, commanded by Hooker in person, had been sent below Fredericksburg, at and near Franklin's Crossing, to make a diversion.

Sedgwick's operations at Fredericksburg.

A portion of the 1st and 6th crossed the river, occupying positions near its bank, the 1st below the 6th at Franklin's Crossing. At the proper moment the 3d Corps, and



subsequently the 1st, joined Hooker; that portion of the 6th which was over the river had frequent and severe skirmishes with the enemy in positions on its front.

On Saturday, the 2d of May, Newton's division was ordered to pass the river after dark. A little after 11½ P.M. Sedgwick directed it to take the route to Fredericksburg, news having come from Hooker's head-quarters that the Confederate force in Fredericksburg that afternoon was only 300 men.

The officers and men of the command were in a profound sleep, and it was midnight before the orders could be communicated. About 1 A. M., May 3, the head of the column commenced moving. It had advanced but a short distance when a delay of nearly half an hour occurred through an accidental encounter of pickets. On the right of the column was the river, about a mile distant; on the left was the range of heights occupied by the enemy, who could be distinctly seen by the light of their watch-fires upon the hills.

It was a critical march—a long column exposing its whole flank to the enemy, and ignorant of the features of the locality. Though the road was lighted by the moon, there was a fog gradually settling on the low ground, and momentarily becoming thicker. As the best that could be done, Newton directed that, in the event of attack, the regiments involved should face the hills and charge, without awaiting farther instructions. When the head of the column reached a small creek marking the boundary of Fredericksburg, and flowing into the Rappahannock, the enemy was found posted on the opposite bank in and about the houses. They were, however, surprised and driven from the ground, and the column reached within a short distance of Marye's Heights, the road it was upon skirting the southern suburb of Fredericksburg. The whispering of men, and the noise of artillery wheels moving into position, were heard in the front,

The night-march  
of his troops.

The attack at Fred-  
ericksburg.

but the fog had been so dense that it was impossible to see fifty feet ahead. Newton asked the guide to point out the Marye Heights, through which the road led. By standing in his stirrups, he could just make out through the fog the top of a tree said to be on the heights. This was about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  or 3 A.M.

The artillery was now silently moved to the rear, and the men got into position. It was then necessary to wait until the fog should clear, or it became otherwise light enough to see the position and that of the enemy. As the light gradually improved a reconnoissance was made, though it was barely possible to see. There was a dead silence until the regiments reached within about forty feet of the stone wall—that stone wall from which Burnside had formerly recoiled; then the enemy opened with artillery and musketry, manifesting a large force. Under cover of the fog, the regiments withdrew.

At this moment Sedgwick came up, and, after a consultation with Newton, Howe's division was ordered to attempt the ascent of a large spur on the left of the Marye Heights, and distant about three quarters of a mile from them. Gibbon's small division of the 2d Corps, which commenced preparations for crossing at Fredericksburg as soon as the town was occupied, was directed to go to the right of Fredericksburg, and, attempting the passage of the canal, to carry the right of the enemy's position.

Howe's division, after a little progress up the spur, was brought to a stand by the resistance it met. Gibbon found the canal impassable. Shortly before 10 A.M. an attack was made by the forces under Newton, consisting of the light brigade and his division (3d), in all 9500 men, of which there could be brought into action but about 3500, owing to the limited space.

Eustis's brigade marched by the flank, four abreast, down the street, over the canal bridge, and attacked where the

Burnside's stone wall  
is at length carried.

Telegraph Road pierces the Marye Heights ; Shaler's brigade passed down a parallel street, four abreast, over the canal bridge. The light brigade, in line, and one or two regiments of the division, attacked in front of the stone wall. The light brigade and Eustis's entered the enemy's works at about the same moment. The head of Shaler's column was blown away by the heavy artillery fire. The attacking force reeled and staggered, large gaps were rent in it, and when it reached the enemy's works it had apparently dwindled to a skirmish line. About 1000 men were lost in ten minutes, but the object was accomplished.

The Confederate works thus carried, the 3d division and light brigade were immediately ordered in pursuit. In the attack there were captured 9 guns, and from 300 to 400 prisoners,

The troops had thus been marching during the night, many of them fighting during the day: a halt was therefore called at 1 P.M. On resuming the march, the road was followed toward Salem Heights, the enemy's cavalry, with a horse battery, annoying the head of the column. Sedgwick at first advanced on the Telegraph Road, but was checked by Early, who had halted the commands of Barksdale and Hays about two miles from Marye's Heights, and re-enforced them with three regiments of Gordon's brigade. Thence Sedgwick moved up the plank road, but was resisted by Wilcox, who, however, fell back to Salem Church, five miles from Fredericksburg.

Lee received the news of Sedgwick's approach just as he was making ready for a final attack on Hooker. It was absolutely necessary to confront this new assailant: he therefore dispatched four brigades of McLaws and Anderson to re-enforce Barksdale and check Sedgwick. They encountered him near Salem Church, but night put an end to the conflict, both

Lee dispatches re-  
enforcements to  
check him.

parties retaining their ground. In the mean time, Lee kept up a furious cannonade in front of Hooker.

On Monday morning, May 4, Sedgwick telegraphed to Hooker informing him that large masses of the enemy were in motion from his right to his left, and asking whether the main army could support him. The reply was that no support must be expected. The enemy were now reoccupying Fredericksburg. Mean-time Sedgwick slowly retired to Banks's Ford, at which pontoon bridges had been placed. About 6 P.M. an attack was made upon him, which he successfully resisted. He then telegraphed for permission to cross the river during the night. Leave was granted, and the withdrawal commenced, the enemy shelling the bridges. When about half the corps was over, Sedgwick received counter orders, but it was then impossible to reverse the movement. Before daylight he had recrossed the river. His loss had been about 5000 men.

I have related Sedgwick's movement in detail, desiring to give the reader the means of deciding for himself whether that officer deserved the blame, imputed to him by some, of causing the disaster at Chancellorsville. It has been said that his movements were altogether too sluggish; that the night was clear and moonlight; that he ought, had he used due energy, to have been at Chancellorsville when he was only entering Fredericksburg; that, had he pressed forward, and fallen on Lee's rear while Hooker was hotly engaged with him in front, nothing could have prevented a disaster to the Confederates.

By Confederate writers it is affirmed that the delay at Fredericksburg caused Hooker to be beaten in detail, it being nearly 3 P.M., five hours after Chancellorsville had been carried, before the 6th Corps moved out on the plank road. The action at Salem Church destroyed the last hope of a junction between Sedgwick and Hooker, and the designs against Lee's rear were completely frustrated.



The assertion that there were only 300 men defending Fredericksburg when it was attacked was altogether erroneous. Sedgwick took more than that number prisoners. There possibly may have been that number only in the city, but Early had a large force on the hills commanding the roads leading to it. The Confederates admitted it to be 8500 infantry. As to the delay in assaulting the works, it was the opinion of the officer who conducted the operation that, had it been attempted before movements had been made to divert and divide the forces of the enemy, it would probably have proved a failure.

Lee now determined to renew his attack on Hooker, but a rain-storm occurring, the movement of the Hooker recrosses the river. artillery was delayed. The river was rising, the bridges in peril of being broken. At a council of Hooker's officers, Howard advocated an advance, Sickles and Couch thought it more prudent to withdraw, Meade believed that there would be great difficulty in crossing the river. It was decided, however, to make the attempt. Straw and branches were laid on the bridges to deaden the noise of the trains, which were sent over first, the corps in succession following. On Wednesday morning Lee advanced to attack, but found his enemy gone.

Hooker returned to his old encampment, having lost 17,197 men, of whom 5000 were unwounded prisoners. He had also lost 13 guns and 20,000 muskets.

Lee's loss was about 13,000, of whom 1581 were killed, 8700 wounded, and nearly 3000 prisoners.

Such was the fate of Hooker's main movement, and of Stoneman's cavalry expedition. Sedgwick's operations on the Confederate right. Stoneman's cavalry expedition, which constituted the third portion of Hooker's plan, exerted very little influence on the campaign. Intended to destroy the railroad communications in Lee's rear, the damage it accomplished was of so little moment that repairs were easily made, and trains running again in three days.

Stoneman's expedition may therefore be dismissed with brevity.

The expedition, as we have seen, had set out on April 13, but had been forced to return chiefly on account of the tempestuous weather. On the 27th Stoneman advanced again, and moved southward within 30 miles of Richmond. He divided his force into six bodies, with orders to destroy the railroads, bridges, telegraphs, etc. Some of his regiments made their way within the works of Richmond, but nothing effective was accomplished. These separate forces were so small that, instead of destroying the Confederate cavalry, they had to flee before it. Some returned with difficulty across the Rappahannock to the national lines, and some escaped eastward down to Gloucester.

Military critics will always read with a sentiment of wonder the story of the Chancellorsville campaign, but they will hardly think it worth while to apply their customary rules of examination to operations which, though they may offer instances of fighting, are certainly not an example of war.

One general fell back from a successful advance, and then became passive; his antagonist audaciously violated the first principles of the military art.

To the mind of an unprofessional observer it may, however, occur, that traces of influences which have hitherto escaped being brought plainly into view are here and there to be detected. The campaign of Chancellorsville will, for many years—perhaps forever—remain one of the mysteries of the American Civil War.

## CHAPTER LXX.

### THE CONFEDERATE SORTIE TO THE SUSQUEHANNA. THE ADVANCE. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

The Confederate government determined to make another sortie.

The Army of Northern Virginia, under Lee, left the Rappahannock, and crossed the Potomac, intending to advance to Philadelphia, and there exact peace.

It was followed by the Army of the Potomac, under Hooker, who, however, resigning his command, was succeeded by Meade.

Lee, finding his communications threatened by Meade, ordered his forces to concentrate near Gettysburg.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. The Confederate army was defeated, and compelled to retreat.

THE battle of Chancellorsville was the culmination of a

Misfortunes had befallen the national cause in the spring of 1863.

series of national disasters which had occurred since the beginning of the year (1863): Galveston had been retaken by the Confederates;

Burnside's march upon Lee had been stopped by storms and mud; Dupont's naval attack on Charleston had failed; the Confederate cruisers were destroying Northern commerce at sea; the reduction of Fort McAllister had been vainly attempted; Bragg was holding Rosecrans in check; Banks had not been able to take Port Hudson; Grant had not accomplished the capture of Vicksburg; the Army of the Potomac, beaten in two great battles, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, had become demoralized—desertions from it to an unexampled extent were occurring; the political allies of the Confederates in the Northern States had taken advantage of the draft to produce a dangerous public excitement, and to clamor for peace.

It was not surprising, then, that, under such circumstances, a demand should arise in the Confederacy

The Confederates resolve on a sortie.

for a renewed attempt to break through the

line of investment, to carry the war into the Free States, and to exact separation and peace in Philadelphia or New York.

Since the battle of Chancellorsville Hooker's army lay on the north side of the Rappahannock, its strength reduced to about 80,000 by the discharge of 20,000 men whose term had expired. On the contrary, Lee's army, which still confronted Hooker, had become 105,000 strong. It was in three corps: (1), Longstreet's, consisting of the divisions of Pickett, McLaws, Hood; (2), A. P. Hill's, consisting of Anderson, Heth, Pender; (3), Ewell's, consisting of Rodes, Early, Johnson. The cavalry was under Stuart; the artillery, 280 guns, under Pendleton.

To insure the success of this sortie, and secure the grand advantages expected from it, the Confederate government made the utmost exertions. Longstreet's corps had been brought up from beyond the James, and Lee set out on his expedition with an army which, though it had lost much of its best material at Chancellorsville, still contained the flower of the South. The resources of arbitrary power were exhausted for its equipment and organization. Even Richmond was stripped of every thing but an insignificant force. A conscription the most relentless filled its ranks; seizures the most grinding gave it supplies. Hitherto no Confederate army had been so well clothed, so well provided, so confident of success—a very different state of affairs from the sortie of the preceding year.

On the 3d of June Lee set out on his ill-judged and ill-fated expedition. He put his troops in motion towards Culpepper Court-house, leaving Hill's corps at Fredericksburg as a screen; but Hooker, suspecting the movement, caused a cavalry reconnoissance to be made. It was ascertained that the enemy was moving northward, toward the Shenandoah Valley. There had been a review at Culpepper, and Hooker's spies reported that it had taken one column 3½ hours to pass through Sperryville.

Condition of the  
two armies.

Lee begins the  
sortie.




It was not possible that this northward movement could be undertaken without many misgivings. A concession of politicians to a popular clamor, it was entered on in the expectation of aid from riots in Philadelphia and New York, and was intended to be completed by a solemn embassy to Washington. Experienced military men knew well the folly of such schemes; they understood the peril of a march along such an extended and exposed line, with an opposing army of a hundred thousand men ready to touch the communications. In fact, as the event proved, it did not require so much as a touch: a rumor was enough to stop the whole proceeding, and bring the sortie to its inevitable issue—a pitched battle. Nor were those misgivings diminished when it was found that Lee, almost at the outset of the campaign, had detached his cavalry, and thereby deprived himself of his military eyes.

Hooker lingered a short time upon the Rappahannock, in doubt whether this was another sortie into the Free States, or a movement on Washington. Making suitable preparations for either event, he sent to that city his sick and wounded. On the 13th of June he left the front of Fredericksburg, moving northward so as to cover the capital. Hereupon Hill's corps left Fredericksburg, and marched swiftly to join Lee, the Confederate army now directing its course upon Winchester.

At Winchester there lay a national force, about 7000 strong, under Milroy. That officer, unaware of the impending danger, or misinformed as to the strength of the enemy moving upon him, held his post until it was nearly too late; then, finding that the whole corps of Ewell and Longstreet were at hand, he attempted to retreat on the 15th. He was almost enveloped. His entire losses were nearly 4000 men taken prisoners, 29 guns, 277 wagons, and 400 horses. Of the fugitives, a part escaped to Harper's Ferry, a part into Pennsylvania.

It is ill judged and ill conducted.

Hooker correspondingly moves.



THE SORTIE TO GETTYSBURG.

In that state and Maryland there was at once the greatest alarm. The President, on the 15th of June, issued a proclamation for 120,000 militia. Pennsylvania was to furnish 50,000, Ohio 30,000, Maryland 10,000, West Virginia 10,000, New York 20,000.

While the Confederates thus moved on the west side of the Blue Ridge, Hooker moved on the east side, keeping between them and Washington, with his cavalry on his left flank. On the 26th of June the Confederate army completed the crossing of the Potomac at Williamsport and Shepardstown. The day was cool and rainy, but the men waded in cheerfully, and the air was rent with shouts and laughter when any one stumbled into the water. The advance was now toward Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania. On that day Hooker also crossed at Edwards's Ferry, moving toward Frederick. To the astonishment of the public, it was announced that on the 27th he had resigned, and that the command of the army had been given to General Meade—a portentous event on the eve of a great battle.

In explanation of this, it was alleged that, perceiving the inferiority of his force, Hooker had demanded that 11,000 troops which, under French, were at Harper's Ferry, should be given to him; that the general-in-chief had refused, and therefore Hooker had resigned.

Doubtless this was the ostensible cause of Hooker's resignation; but there were other reasons of a less obvious nature which were not without their influence.

Very soon after the organization of Lincoln's Cabinet, it became apparent that there were two powerful and rival agencies in it: one represented by the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward; the other by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase. General Scott, by reason of his great age and bodily infirmities, was obviously unable to command

the army, though for a time he retained his position, with the patriotic intention of setting an example of loyalty in the midst of so much treachery.

Through the influence of Mr. Chase, General McDowell received command of the army which fought at Bull Run. The result of that engagement indicating that a change was necessary, under the influence of Mr. Seward, General McClellan, who by that time had distinguished himself in Northwestern Virginia, succeeded. After the final removal of McClellan, Hooker was excluded by the appointment of Burnside, though the latter assumed the duty with no little reluctance and many misgivings. But the battle of Fredericksburg rendered it impossible to resist Hooker's claims, and at length he was assigned to the command.

Hereupon the President wrote to him a very characteristic letter, telling him, among other things, that ambitious desires, and an intention to raise himself to a dictatorship had been imputed to him; that, should he so use the Army of the Potomac as to overthrow the insurgents and end the rebellion, there would be no difficulty in his way, for the people themselves would save him all trouble, and in due course of time would inevitably place him at the head of the government, and that no one would more heartily rejoice in, and do more to promote that result than the present President; but that if, on the contrary, he permitted disaster to befall that army, he might rest assured that he would never be at the head of the American, or of any other government.

Without difficulty may we present to ourselves the thoughts that occupied Hooker's mind as he marched from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, intervening between Washington and Lee. He knew that the Confederate army was much stronger than his own—how much stronger he could not certainly tell. Forty-five thousand Confederates had wrested from him

Lincoln's letter to him.

The state of his army.



the battle-field of Chancellorsville, and compelled him, though seventy thousand strong, to seek safety by a midnight passage over the river. What might he not reasonably expect, now that his adversary had gained preponderating numbers?

If from the strength he turned to the morale of his army, there was no cause for congratulation. His relations with the government. Too often had he been made to feel that baneful influence of which Pope and Burnside had so bitterly complained. When he took command, a majority of the officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the policy of the government in the conduct of the war. They were opposed to the Emancipation Proclamation. One of the most loyal generals declared to a committee of Congress that "no one who is an anti-slavery man can expect decent treatment in that army, as at present constituted." On the 14th of May Lincoln wrote to Hooker, "I must tell you that I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous, if true." Well, therefore, might Hooker declare that he entered upon his duties with many misgivings and apprehensions. If from the army he turned to the authorities at Washington, he felt that there was mutual distrust. But a little time previously he had desired to cross the Rappahannock and strike at Hill's corps, believing that he could either destroy it or compel Lee to fall back to its support; but the President had expressed his disapproval. Still more lately, even within a few days, while he was following on an interior arc the movements of Lee, and covering Washington, the President had instructed him that in the long line of the enemy's advance there must be a weak point, and that he ought to break through it. Hooker felt that this was not the proper course for him to take. He declared to the President that the enemy had no design to look after his rear; that his movement was

only an act of desperation, and that his invading and living on the Free States would kill Copperheadism in the North. With the general-in-chief he was at open variance. "The commanding general," he said, "has to a limited extent been identified with the Army of the West, and seems to think that there is no other army in the Republic." He tells us that "if the general-in-chief had been in the rebel interest, it would have been impossible for him, restrained as he was by the influence of the President and of the Secretary of War, to have added to the embarrassment he caused me from the moment I took command of the Army of the Potomac to the time I surrendered it."

But the distrust of the authorities at Washington was not without reason. General Hooker, at the battle of Chancellorsville, had not handled his army in the way that his friends had expected. A cruel calumny had been circulated respecting him that his incompetence arose from intoxication. From this a copious and convincing body of evidence had vindicated him. It left the conviction, however, that his mental constitution was such as to incapacitate him from supreme command.

Hooker, as we have said, demanded the troops at Harper's Ferry; Halleck refused them. To both the incident was not unacceptable. Hooker resigned; and, without a moment's delay, for the event was not unforeseen, Meade was appointed, on June 28th, in his stead.

It was night when an officer brought to Meade's tent the President's order for him to assume command of the army. So little had Meade anticipated this, that, on being awakened suddenly by the messenger, his first thought was that the visit was for the purpose of putting him under arrest. He issued at once a modest and very appropriate order to the army, and discreetly made no other changes than those which were essentially necessary. Sykes took

Reasons of the distrust of the government.

Meade in command of the army.

the 5th Corps, which had been Meade's; Hancock the 2d, in place of Couch, assigned to the Department of the Susquehanna; Reynolds retained the 1st; Sickles the 3d; Sedgwick the 6th; Howard the 11th; Slocum the 12th. The cavalry was under Pleasonton. The entire strength of the army was about 100,000. There had been taken 15,000 from Washington, leaving only 11,000 under Heintzelman in the fortifications. Schenck had furnished 2100 from the Middle Department. Meade was ordered to make what disposition he thought proper of the force at Harper's Ferry.

The opposing armies were now not far from being equal in strength. Lee's force was counted as it marched through Hagerstown, and made to be 97,000, with 280 guns. To this were to be added the cavalry under Stuart, absent from that place. This body, having watched the passage of the Potomac by Hooker's army, kept on his right, intercepting many wagons and a number of officers. It moved eastward as far as Westminster, and then crossed the national front to Carlisle. There it received orders to join Lee as quickly as possible at Gettysburg.

Strength of  
Lee's army.

Its cavalry under  
Stuart is detached.

Advance of Lee into  
the Free States.

The South Mountains are a continuation of the Blue Ridge, and as the latter had separated the contending armies in their march through Virginia, so the former separated them after they had crossed the Potomac. Lee, as we have seen, having originally many days' start, was northward of Meade. His advance, under Ewell, was on its way to Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, Early's division of that corps being at York, and Johnson's at Carlisle. Longstreet and Hill, with Lee himself, were halting at Chambersburg. The Confederates were now living on the country, and subjecting it to the usages of war, exacting requisitions from the farmers and tradesmen, and ransoms from the towns. Thus there were required from the little town of York 165 bar-

rels of flour, or 28,000 pounds of baked bread; 3500 pounds of sugar; 1650 pounds of coffee; 300 gallons of molasses; 1200 pounds of salt; 32,000 pounds of fresh beef, or 21,000 pounds of bacon or pork. These articles were to be delivered at the market-house at 4 P.M., as also 2000 pairs of shoes or boots, 1000 pairs of socks, 1000 felt hats, and \$100,000 in money.

At Chambersburg Lee paused, impatiently expecting intelligence from the Northern cities.

That portion of the Democratic party to which reference has been made as seeking restoration to power and place through an affiliation with the slave party of the South, and which had become popularly known by the title of the "Copperheads," a name derived from a very venomous serpent, was pursuing an increasing opposition to the government, exaggerating the national losses, declaring that the war was a failure, that the Southern people were innocent victims, who had nothing whatever to do with the bringing on of hostilities, but who were merely defending their firesides from abolitionists and invaders. It raised a clamor for peace. Conspiracies had been organized in several of the large cities, more particularly in New York, to embarrass the government by resisting the draft. The Irish laborers in that city were exasperated to a pitch of frenzy by rumors industriously circulated among them that the war was a scheme for killing them, and thereby diminishing the Democratic vote; and that now, through the Emancipation Proclamation, swarms of negroes would come from the South, and wages would go down. The Roman Catholic archbishop used all his influence to appease the trouble, without avail.

But, as will elsewhere be related, those who were fostering these guilty proceedings could not expedite their measures as much as the circumstances required. It was not until the 11th of July that the Irish rioters got possession of New York, and then it was too late for Lee.

He waits at Chambersburg, expecting riots in the North,



The Richmond government had hoped that, by the unresisted advance of its army toward Philadelphia, and the promised rising of the Irish in that city, in New York, and in Boston, the national government would be terror-stricken, and listen to separation and peace. It therefore, on the 2d of July, dispatched Alexander H. Stephens, the Vice-president of the Confederacy, to seek an interview with Lincoln. This embassy proved abortive; the expected riots in the Northern cities had not yet taken place, and Lee, instead of being victorious, was overthrown. Mr. Stephens's application to pass the national lines did not receive that abject compliance which had been looked for, but an imperious answer: "The customary agents and channels are adequate for all needed communications and conferences between the United States forces and the insurgents."

Political considerations thus caused Lee to linger at Chambersburg. No news came from the North. Military considerations assured him that he could not wait there long: Meade might at any moment move through the unguarded passes of the South Mountains, and disturb his communications. Lee says that the absence of Stuart's cavalry rendered it almost impossible for him to obtain accurate information. On the night of the 29th he, however, received intelligence from a scout that the national army had crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountains. As his communications with the Potomac might thus be touched, he resolved to prevent Meade's farther progress in that direction by concentrating the Confederate army on the east side of the mountains.

Thus what might have been foreseen from the beginning took place—nay, more, an actual touch was not required: a rumor was enough; the march to the Susquehanna was stopped, and,

and Stephens attempts negotiations for peace.

Lee's communications threatened, he stops his advance.

The opposing armies converge to Gettysburg.

pressed by the finger of Destiny, the Confederate army went down to Gettysburg.

Lee had hesitated and lingered at Chambersburg, influenced, perhaps, by moral as well as by military considerations; when he moved, it was with irresolution; when, at last, he acted, it was with impetuous indiscretion. No one can study this sortie without perceiving how greatly it was mismanaged. At the outset, the detaching of the cavalry was a fatal error. The Confederate general was in a false position. Was it for him to consort with such base allies as were proffering their aid in New York? Was it for him to use that sword which he had vowed should be dedicated to the defense of his native state alone in a very different cause? The traditions of his own house clouded his intellect and paralyzed his arm.

Meade had intended to fight a defensive battle, in a position he had selected at Pipe Creek, about fifteen miles southeast from Gettysburg. On the 30th of June the right wing of his army was at Manchester, the left at Emmetsburg, close upon the boundary-line which separates Maryland from Pennsylvania. The left, which was under Reynolds, consisted of the 1st, 11th, and 3d Corps. It was sent toward Gettysburg as a mask to screen the Pipe Creek movement.

Gettysburg, a town destined to enduring celebrity in American history, is about ten miles east of the South Mountain range, and, though in a valley, its site has such a topographical elevation that it parts the streams flowing southward into the Potomac from those which take a northeasterly course and empty into the Susquehanna. So many roads converge toward it that it has been compared, not inaptly, to the hub of a wheel, receiving spokes in every direction. Of these roads, some of the more important are the Chambersburg from the northwest, the Carlisle from the north, the Harrisburg from the northeast, the York from the east, the Baltimore from the

The topography  
of Gettysburg.

southeast, those toward the Potomac from the southwest. In the vicinity of Gettysburg, to the south, is a ridge which in shape resembles a fish-hook, presenting the convexity of its bend to the town; its nearer part had been used as a cemetery. To a spectator looking from this upon Gettysburg, the barb of the hook is behind on his right, the stem is behind on his left. The point of the hook is Wolf's Hill, the barb is known as Culp's Hill; between them flows Rock Creek. Two thirds of the stem of the hook are Cemetery Ridge, a succession of hills which ends in Little Round Top and Round Top, the head of the shank. The former is 280 feet high; it throws out a granite spur toward the west. The latter, on which are scattered many grotesque boulders of syenite, is 400 feet high; from it, in all directions, the scenery is very picturesque. The two Round Tops are not separated by a gap, but merely by a depression; their western slope descends to a little marshy stream, Plum Run. These Tops are the military keys of Cemetery Ridge. It may be remarked that, on the map, where a cross-road comes from the Emmettsburg Road, a peach-orchard is laid down; and near by, on the western side of Plum Run, is a wheat-field.

This fish-hook of mountains incloses within its curve rocky ledges and broken fields. Its western slope is in cultivation, except small patches here and there, where the mountain-side is too precipitous for the plow. It is interspersed with fields of wheat, and peach and apple orchards.

Looking from Cemetery Hill westward over an orchard of gnarled old trees is a ridge somewhat less in height, ranging north and south for several miles, and in a general manner parallel to Cemetery Ridge, the valley between them being from half a mile to a mile wide. This succession of hills is known as Seminary Ridge, from a cupola-crowned brick building—a theological seminary which stands conspicuously upon it. It is also locally

known as Oak Ridge, from the many beautiful oak-trees growing upon it.

In the valley between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges is the road from Emmettsburg to Gettysburg, running along a gentle elevation. Behind Cemetery Ridge are those from Taneytown and Baltimore. The cross-road leaving the Emmettsburg Road at the peach orchard skirts the north of Little Round Top. Within the curve of the hook the main roads are connected by this and other cross lines. There is, therefore, easy communication to all parts of its interior.

At 9 A.M. on the 1st of July, Buford's cavalry, which had moved out westward from Gettysburg on the Chambersburg Road, encountered the leading division of Hill, under Heth, advancing on that road. As it was but a couple of miles from Gettysburg, just across Seminary Ridge, and Reynolds was already in the town, he determined to hold the Confederates in check until Reynolds could arrive. By the time that the leading division had come up, Buford had been forced back to the ridge. The division was at once deployed, the enemy attacked, and orders sent for the 11th corps, Howard, to advance as promptly as possible. Scarcely had this been done when Reynolds was mortally wounded by a shot through the neck. He had advanced, perhaps, with an insufficient reconnoissance. The command of the first corps now devolved on Doubleday, and the command of the field on Howard. The latter arrived at about 11½ A.M. with the 11th Corps, and pushed forward two divisions of that corps to the support of the troops engaged. By a happy inspiration, he posted his third division, with three batteries of artillery, on Cemetery Hill, on the south side of the town.

The contest, at first, had been with the forces of the enemy debouching from the mountains—Heth's division of Hill's corps. Success was on the national side, Wads-

The battle of Gettysburg—first day.

Reynolds is killed,



worth's division having driven the Confederates back some distance, capturing numerous prisoners, among them General Archer. Re-enforcements arriving for the Confederates along the Chambersburg Road enabled them at length to push back the national forces, and "at about half past two in the afternoon from Cemetery Hill might be seen a long gray line creeping down the road on the northeast of the town. There was little pomp, but much haste in its march; few wagons, but the ammunition trains all up; the battle-flags floating over their brigades were not national flags. That gray serpent, winding in and out through the distant hills, had come to decide the day." It was the corps of Ewell from York and Carlisle. He had heard the cannon calling to him, and marched straight to the point of conflict. There he outnumbered and outflanked the national line of battle, pressing it so severely that Howard withdrew to the Cemetery Hill; not, however, without very great loss, arising from the troops passing through the town and getting into confusion in the streets. It could not be otherwise; for Ewell's whole corps and two thirds of Hill's—50,000 men—had been thrown upon Reynolds and Howard, only 21,000 strong; Hill assailing them in front, and Ewell on their right flank, inflicting on them a loss of nearly 10,000 men and 16 guns.

Gettysburg was at once occupied by Ewell, who advanced from it toward the cemetery. As the national troops were in the act of receding to that position at 4 P.M., Lee and Hill, from the edge of the pine woods on the top of one of the adjacent ridges, were reconnoitring. They made a fatal mistake. Instead of at once assaulting the cemetery on Culp's Hill, they put off the attack until the next day, though they had force amply sufficient to carry the position at once. Lee says they were induced to do this because the enemy's force was unknown. It wanted several hours to sunset. These

and the national  
troops driven  
through Gettys-  
burg.

Lee fails to attack  
Cemetery Hill.



BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

were the longest days of the year. But they preferred to wait until Longstreet's corps could come up, forgetting that if re-enforcements were swiftly advancing on one side, so, too, they were probably on the other.

Meade was at Taneytown, fourteen miles south of Gettysburg, considering the defensive line he had projected on Pipe Creek. Every thing was in confusion. At 1 P.M., like a thunder-clap out of a clear sky, news reached him that a battle had taken place near Gettysburg, and that Reynolds was killed. At once he ordered Hancock forward to take command. That officer drove in an ambulance to the field as fast as he could, studying the maps as he went, and arrived at the moment that the Confederates were seizing Gettysburg. Without delay, he, in conjunction with Howard, proceeded to post the troops on the Cemetery, and made ready to repel any attack; and, per-

Hancock advises Meade to bring on the whole army.

ceiving the advantages of the position, he advised Meade to bring on the whole army.

The moon was at the full, but the air was misty. Meade came into the Cemetery soon after midnight. Among its glistening sepulchral monuments—some of them already overturned and broken—he made arrangements for the moment. The corps of Sickles, Hancock, Slocum, Sykes, were all up before morning, though many of the men were barefooted. Sedgwick's corps marched all night, but, having a distance of 32 miles to accomplish, did not arrive until 2 P.M. of the 2d.

As soon as it was light Meade inspected the position.

It is posted on Cemetery Ridge.

Slocum was posted on the extreme right, on Culp's Hill, the barb of the fish-hook. On his left was Wadsworth; on his left, at the bend, was Howard; and in successive order followed, along the stem of the hook, Hancock, Sickles, Sykes. When Sedgwick arrived, he was to be placed on the extreme left, behind the Round Tops. Reynolds's corps, commanded by Newton, was in reserve. The whole army was thus concentrated

on an area of about three square miles. The reserve was within thirty minutes' march of any part of the line. Batteries were placed along the crest of the ridge, and signal-flags set on points overlooking the scene. Rock-ledges on the slope in the rear gave shelter to the soldiers, who also quickly improvised breast-works and stone walls. From Cemetery Hill the line, therefore, extended southward to the Round Tops. In the other direction it stretched across the Baltimore Road to the woodlands bordering on Rock Creek and the ravines of Wolf's Hill.

While Meade was thus employed—at the same hour, 5 A.M.—Lee, Hill, Longstreet, and Hood were in consultation on Seminary Ridge, the two latter aiding their thoughts by the whittling of sticks. The hills of that ridge were covered with oaks and pines at the tops, and generally on their west slopes. These woods afforded concealment to the troops. Along their eastern edges the Confederate artillery confronted the national batteries. Lee's army was arranged along Seminary Ridge, and round to the east of Gettysburg, in the form of a vast crescent, five miles in length, its concavity facing his antagonist. Longstreet, who had the character among the soldiers of being the best fighter in the whole army, was on their right, Hill in the centre, Ewell on the left. Between Ewell's right and Hill's left there was a break of nearly a mile. The armies were of equal strength, their force being about 80,000; but, while all portions of Meade's line were in easy intercommunication, Lee's were compelled to make long detours. Down in the valley which parted the combatants were fields of ripening wheat, and here and there, unconscious of the impending tempest, cattle quietly grazing.

At first it was not Lee's intention to fight a battle here: Fredericksburg had shown him significantly what may be expected in an assault on intrenched lines; but, lured by the success of the preceding

Lee posts his army on Seminary Ridge,

but does not design to bring on a battle.



day, which had produced much enthusiasm in his army, though Pickett's division, the best of Longstreet's corps, and Stuart's cavalry, were absent, he resolved to attack, and consummate the victory which he thought already more than half achieved. He did not know that in the darkness of the night 80,000 men had concentrated behind the rocky ridge in his front.

Meade, in the posting of his troops, had intended to occupy the ridge continuously from Cemetery Hill to the Round Tops, but Sickles, finding a depression at the point designated for him, advanced three fourths of a mile to the lower ridge in front. He posted his troops along the Emmettsburg Road, but was constrained to refuse his left toward the Round Tops, his position thus forming a salient beginning in the wet pasturages of Plum Run, its apex being in the peach orchard. This line, instead of being continuous with Hancock's, was in a general manner at an angle of forty-five degrees to it. The front was held by Humphreys's and Graham's brigades, the refused left by two brigades of Birney's division. There was a gap of from a quarter to half a mile between him and Hancock.

About 3 P.M., Meade, visiting this part of the line, saw the peril in which Sickles was placed, and was in the act of discussing with him the propriety of withdrawing, when the enemy, quick to detect a weak point, opened upon him. Troops were now hurried up to support or extricate him. As Sykes was in the act of doing this, Warren recognized the importance of Little Round Top, and saw with surprise that it was unoccupied; he therefore sent Vincent with his brigade to secure it. This was not a moment too soon, for it had so happened that, in the posting of the troops, Hood's division, on the Confederate right, overlapped the national left. Hood was advancing with the intention of seizing Little Round Top. It was the key of Meade's position; it could enflade his

Sickles takes a position beyond Meade's line.

The battle of Gettysburg—second day.

whole line along Cemetery Ridge. "If the enemy had gained it," says Meade, "I could not have held my line." They had already commenced climbing it when Vincent had reached its top. A desperate conflict for its possession ensued, in which Vincent lost his life, but the Confederates were repulsed.

A struggle takes place for Little Round Top.

In the mean time Longstreet had attacked Sickles's salient in the peach orchard, and his artillery having gained an enfilading position, the infantry advanced under its cover, and the orchard was carried. Sickles was severely wounded, losing his leg. Birney's troops were thus driven back to the main line on Cemetery Ridge, and Humphreys's division, with Graham's brigade, were left alone on the Emmettsburg Road. They were in the utmost peril. With great difficulty, but with great skill and resolution, Humphreys made good his passage to the ridge, losing almost half his command in so doing. There, aided by Hancock, he arrested the Confederate attack.

Sickles is forced back from his advanced position,

After Birney was driven back, the Confederates made renewed and desperate exertions to gain the Little Round Top; but now it was held in force, and, after a bloody but vain struggle, they retired to the wheat-field. Hood had lost an arm. The advantages gained by Longstreet were apparent rather than real: the line originally intended for Sickles was finally occupied by the national troops, and held to the end of the battle.

but Meade holds Little Round Top.

Soon after the cannonade had fairly begun, there was a dense smoke for six miles, and little wind to drive it away. The air was alive with shells. Lee had gone over to Hill's position, and remained there nearly all the time, watching the engagement through his field-glass. For the most part he sat, inactive and alone, on the stump of a tree. During the firing he sent only one message and received only one report.

Such were the events on the national left. On the right,

Ewell secures a foothold on Meade's right.

the force of Slocum, on Culp's Hill, had been greatly weakened by detachments that had been sent to the critical point on Little Round Top; and Ewell, late in the afternoon, making a very vigorous attack, succeeded in getting a foothold within the exterior intrenchments.

To an eye-witness who stood on Cemetery Hill on the forenoon of this day, there was visible "a long line of national skirmishers stretching far away from the centre to the left, well advanced, and firing as they lay flat on the ground in the meadows and corn-fields. The streak of curling smoke that rose from their guns faded away in a thin vapor that marked the course of their lines down the left. With a glass the Confederates could be distinctly seen, every man with his blanket strapped over his shoulder. The afternoon opened with a calm and cloudless sky; it was quiet every where. The men were stretched lazily on the ground in line of battle; horses attached to the caissons, batteries unlimbered, the gunners resting on their guns. When night came there had been a battle of nearly four hours. Meade had been forced back on both flanks. What losses the Confederates had met with could only be conjectured from the piles of dead that the last rays of the sun showed along the front."

The events of the day.

It was true, indeed, that the losses had been heavy; they amounted on the national side to 10,000. Of these, three fifths belonged to Sickles, who had lost half his numbers; on the Confederate side they had been still greater. It was also true that Lee had apparently succeeded on both flanks of the national army, but that success was to him a dire deception. At Round Top he had brought Meade's line into the position which it was Meade's intention it should hold; at Culp's Hill the advantage was only ephemeral, due to the transient withdrawal of troops; the lost ground was recovered in the morning.

Lee himself was deceived in the interpretation he gave

Lee is deceived as to the result,

to these events, and was beckoned on by Fate.

He had formed no plan for the battle—indeed, owing to the absence of his cavalry, he knew so little of the enemy before him that he could form none: he was guided simply by the circumstances of the moment. He saw Sickles isolated, and thought he could destroy him, gaining thereby an advantageous position. Ewell, feeling at Culp's Hill, found it weakly defended. The Confederates interpreted these events as constituting a true success. Lee says, "In front of General Longstreet the enemy (Sickles) held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. These partial successes determined me to continue the assault the next day."

and determines to renew the battle.

my. These partial successes determined me to continue the assault the next day."

On Friday, the 3d of July—a day ever memorable in

The battle of Gettysburg—third day.

American history—the morning sky was covered with broken clouds, here and there at intervals the sunbeams fitfully gleaming between them. Pickett's division and Stuart's cavalry had joined Lee, who was busily engaged on Seminary Ridge preparing to continue the assault of the preceding day; intending, however, to direct it, not against Little Round Top, which was now too strong, but against the low ridge just north of it, at the national left centre, commanded by Hancock. He concentrated against this point 145 guns.

At early dawn, Geary's division of the 12th Corps having returned to Culp's Hill during the night, the enemy was attacked, and, after some hours of desperate fighting, the position he had gained was reoccupied. With this exception, the quiet of the line was undisturbed until 1 P.M.



Just before that hour the clouds broke away, the air was still and sultry. Longstreet had completed his dispositions; his troops were deployed in the woods; he had then sought a few moments' sleep. Along the whole Confederate line signal flags were giving intelligence. At length the shrill report of a Whitworth gun broke the silence, and the Confederate batteries opened. Longstreet, on whom the weight of the battle was about to fall, sat on the top of a fence by the edge of the woods, anxiously watching the fire.

Though Meade's position was very strong, it had the imperfection of being so rugged that out of 300 guns he could reply with only 80. Until 3 o'clock there was an incessant cannonade. As the national artillerymen exhausted their ammunition, more was brought up from the rear. Disabled guns were replaced. The troops screened themselves from the enemy's fire in the best way they could. "We lay behind a slight rise of ground just sufficient to hide us from the view of the rebels. It was awfully hot. The sun smote down upon us, and we were so close to the ground that not a breath of air could reach us."

After an artillery duel of two hours, Hunt, Meade's chief of artillery, ordered the national fire to be gradually slackened, to have sufficient ammunition on hand to meet the impending assault. Warren, from the Round Tops, perceived that it was inexpedient to fill the valley with a screen of smoke. Lee's fire now became more and more violent. Dismounted guns, exploding caissons, and the fierce neighing of wounded artillery horses, proclaimed how great the destruction had been. On Seminary Ridge the cannon were forming a dense cloud that hovered above the dark woods. Lee thought that he had silenced all his enemy's guns except six or eight in a clump of woods.

The cannonade lulled. A thrill of generous admiration ran down the national line as the Confederate columns of attack, at 3 P.M., with a

The charge of Pickett on the national position.

front more than a mile in extent, emerged from the woods on Seminary Ridge, and descended their slope of the valley. They were preceded by a line of skirmishers of double or triple the usual strength; next a line of battle for the charge; then another, equally strong, in reserve. They had additional lines, or wings, to prevent the main force being flanked. On the right, as they marched, was Pickett's division; on the left, two or three hundred yards in the rear, was Heth's, commanded by Pettigrew. In strength they were about 18,000 men. In Pickett's charge Kemper led the right, Garnett the left, with Armistead in support. The distance to be passed was more than half a mile, and the ground sloping up to the national position.

In a few moments the question was to be settled whether Slavery or Freedom should be master on this continent.

"Why don't the guns support them?" was anxiously asked on the Confederate side, and with intense curiosity on the national. "I had intended it," subsequently said Lee, "but the protracted cannonade had nearly exhausted the ammunition. This fact was unknown to me when the assault took place."

Not only was Lee not informed of the exhaustion of his ammunition—he did not know of Ewell's dislodgment from the foot of Culp's Hill.

Unprotected, but unflinching, Pickett's column came over the valley, slippery with the last night's rain. They were veteran Virginians, and moved silently, without those yells of defiance that characterize the troops from the Gulf. Almost a hundred guns, from Cemetery Hill to the Round Tops, quiveringly awaited the word. It was given, and they tore vast gaps in the advancing ranks. Fredericksburg had already shown what an awful thing it is to pass through the hail of rifled musketry and the cannonade of modern artillery.

The charge was first directed toward Doubleday's lines, but the fire from Round Top made the assaulting array

It falls on Webb's brigade, bend toward its left, and brought the attack more on Hancock's position. Two regiments of Stannard's brigade, who were in a grove in front of Hancock's left, at an angle with the main line, gave to the charging force an appalling flanking fire, while it was subjected to the artillery in front; this caused it to bear still more to the left, and brought the weight of the attack upon Webb. When the column had come within 300 yards it received the fire of the divisions of Hays and Gibbon. That fire it returned. In front of Hays it broke, and he took 15 colors and 2000 prisoners. The right of that portion of the enemy before Gibbon was at the same time checked. It doubled in toward its left, thus reinforcing the centre, and throwing the point of contact in full force on Webb's brigade. The Virginians were now in the very focus of the fire.

Webb's brigade was posted in two lines, two of its regiments being behind a stone wall and breast-work, the third behind the crest, sixty paces in the rear, so disposed as to be able to fire over those in front. As the smoke enveloped the attacking mass, the last glimpses that were caught showed that it was reeling and breaking into fragments; but, though its organization was lost, the Virginians individually rushed forward. Coming out of the cloud that inclosed them, headed by Armistead, they touched at last the stone wall. The two regiments holding the wall fell back to the regiment in the rear; there they were re-formed by the personal efforts of Webb and his officers. Encouraged by this apparent retreat, the Virginians planted their battle-flags on the wall, and pushed over the breast-works. A desperate hand to hand conflict now ensued: the clothes of the men were actually burned by the powder of the exploding cartridges; the national cannoneers were clubbed and bayoneted at their guns. Re-enforcements were coming to Webb from all sides. Men and officers were all fighting

together. The assailants were literally crushed. Of fifteen field officers, but one was unhurt; of the three brigade commanders, Garnett was killed, Armistead mortally wounded and left on the field, and Kemper carried away to die. Companies and regiments threw down their arms, rushing forward to be taken prisoners out of the horrible fire. Gibbon's division took 12 colors and 2500 prisoners. The wreck of the mass fled back toward Seminary Ridge, diminished every instant by the remorseless cannonade that was still directed upon it.

Such was the fate of the grand assault by the right Confederate column. That on their left, under Pettigrew's column is driven back. Pettigrew, was by no means so resolutely made. Pickett's men were, for the most part, veteran Virginians; Pettigrew's, new recruits. Almost as soon as the latter advanced they began to waver, but when they came toward the enflading fire of the national guns they hesitated. Perceiving that their enemy was moving round them strong flanking bodies, they were panic-stricken; their lines dissolved, they were huddled into knots. They fled in confusion to the rear, with the loss of hundreds taken prisoners. All but one of their field officers had been killed or wounded; they fell back under command of a major. Pettigrew's brigade had mustered 2800 strong on the morning of the 1st of July; at roll-call on the 4th only 835 answered to their names.

The battle of Gettysburg was now substantially over. Nevertheless, Wilcox, who had not advanced in support of Pickett, as had been originally intended, made a demonstration of moving forward, as if to renew the assault, but returned in confusion.

On the other hand, Sykes forced back Hood's division a mile, taking 300 prisoners and many small-arms. Attacks were made by McLaws on the right and Ewell on the left, but they were mere feints to cover the main one on the centre.



In a military point of view, Gettysburg must yield the palm to the battle of Chattanooga. On neither side was there great generalship displayed; there were no combinations. The profuse use of ammunition by the Confederates in their appalling cannonade showed that they were staking every thing on that battle; their reckless assaults, that they were determined to carry the day, cost what it might, by main force.

Character of the battle of Gettysburg.

Lee stated to an English officer soon after the battle that, had he been aware that Meade had been able to concentrate his whole army, he certainly should not have attacked him; indeed, it had not been his interest or his intention to bring on a great battle at all. He was led away partly by the success of the first day, believing that Meade had brought up only a portion of his army, and, seeing the enthusiasm of his own troops, he had thought that a successful battle would cut the knot so easily and satisfactorily that he had determined to risk it. His want of knowledge of the enemy's movements he attributed to Stuart's being too far away from him with the cavalry.

Causes which induced Lee to fight it against Longstreet's opinion.

On his part Stuart had been disappointed. He had expected to rendezvous with the main army on the Susquehanna, not anticipating Lee's delay at Chambersburg for so many days. It was against the judgment of Longstreet that the assault was made. Strong though the position was in front, Lee could have turned it on its left, and compelled its instant evacuation without the loss of a man. He might have interposed his army between it and Washington. Nor is it true that he would necessarily have had to scatter his forces in doing this, as being on the outer circle. In vain Longstreet interceded with Lee to take this wiser course.

The national loss at Gettysburg was 23,210, of whom 2834 were killed, 13,733 wounded, 6643 missing. The Confederate loss reached the awful aggregate of 36,000, of whom 5000 were killed, 23,000

Losses of the battle.

wounded. "All this has been my fault," said Lee to Wilcox; "it is I who have lost this battle." The dream of the passage of the Susquehanna was at an end; there was nothing now for the Confederates but a retreat to the Rappahannock. Freedom was master on the continent.

A few months subsequently (Nov. 19, 1863), a great Consecration of the battle-field. course of Americans assembled at Gettysburg to dedicate a portion of the battle-field as a cemetery for the remains of those national soldiers who had fallen. Hither, among others, came Abraham Lincoln, attended by many great officers of state. When the appointed funereal oration was completed, a low murmur ran through the audience, and the care-worn President, rising, bent reverently forward, and unpremeditatedly and solemnly said:

"It is intimated to me that this assemblage expects me Mr. Lincoln's address. to say something on this occasion. We are met here on a great battle-field of the war. We have come to dedicate a portion of this field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that our nation might live. It is fitting that we should do this. But in a larger sense we can not dedicate, we can not consecrate this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who fought here, have hallowed it far beyond any thing that we can do. The world will little regard what we *say* here, but it will never forget what they *did* here. It is for us, the living, rather to dedicate ourselves to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced; to consecrate ourselves to the great task remaining, and to gather from the graves of these honored dead increased devotion to that cause for which they gave their lives. Here let us resolve that they shall not have died in vain; that this nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom; and that government *of* the people, *by* the people, and *for* the people shall not perish forever from the earth."

## CHAPTER LXXI.

### THE CONFEDERATE SORTIE TO THE SUSQUEHANNA. THE RETREAT.

The Confederate army abandoned the field of Gettysburg, and in a painful retreat fell back to the Potomac, the national army following it slowly. The Confederate army, unmolested, recrossed the river, and successfully regained the position beyond the Rappahannock from which it had set out on the sortie.

A NORTH wind, blowing gently as the battle of Gettysburg closed, drifted the smoke from the field down into the valley of the Monocacy, unveiling the dark blue Alleghanies in the west. It revealed, too, the awful destruction that had been occasioned by Lee's ill-judged attack. Seen from Cemetery Ridge, the track of Pickett's charge was marked with corpses, and wounded men writhing in agony—a spectacle even more appalling than that of Malvern Hill.

As a weapon of offense, to be used in the Free States, Lee's army was totally ruined. All night long that general ruminated on the dreadful disasters that had befallen the Confederate cause, yet even he did not know their full extent. At the very moment that Pickett's charge was being repulsed—4 o'clock at Gettysburg, 3 o'clock at Vicksburg, seven hundred miles to the southwest, Pemberton, reduced to the direst straits, was sitting with Grant under the oak-tree (vol. iii., page 51), surrendering his fortress and army, and with them the Mississippi River.

False news had come to the Confederate capital, exaggerated, as is always the case, by each one who transmitted it, that the Army of the Potomac had been defeated; that Lee had taken 40,000 prisoners, and was now hesitating whether to conduct his victorious troops to Philadelphia or Washington

Rumors in Richmond respecting the battle.

first. Richmond was in a delirium of delight; the papers were full of gratulations on Lee's magnificent victory. The war was over, the slave-power master of the continent. It only remained to settle how best to deal with the vanquished North—to determine what penalty would be sufficient to exact from the conquered, the abject Yankees.

But soon sinister rumors floated in the air—no one could tell whence they came. Lee's victory was not so complete as had been said—there had been some heavy losses. At last the dreadful truth made itself heard: Lee was in full flight for the Potomac, and it was doubtful whether he could ever recross it.

There was grim truth in Lee's report, that, owing to the strength of the enemy's position, and the reduction of the ammunition of the Confederates, they could not renew the engagement; that the difficulty of obtaining supplies made it impossible for them to stay where they were, and hence they remained at Gettysburg only during the 4th, and retired at night to Fairfield with 4000 prisoners.

On his part, Meade caused a reconnoissance to be made. It was found that the enemy had drawn back his left flank, apparently assuming a new line parallel to the mountain. A council of war determined that it was advisable to remain during the day, and await the development of Lee's plans. On that and the following day the dead were buried, the wounded succored. It was ascertained that the Chambersburg Road was filled with the wreck of the defeated army.

Notwithstanding that a severe storm came on, Lee perceived the necessity of retreating at once. He knew that, if the rain should continue, very serious difficulties might ensue at the passage of the Potomac. In spite of the dreadful weather, he therefore began to fall back, though such was the delay that the rear of the column did not leave Seminary Ridge till after daylight on the 5th.



On the tops of the hills the Confederate officers lingered to watch the movements of their pursuers on the roads in the valleys below.

Meade soon discovered that the retreat was taking place by the Fairfield and Cashtown Roads. Those roads resounded with wails and groans of agony. It was a repetition of the retreat from Shiloh. At every step, from its wagons and ambulances, the caravan of horrors cast forth its dead on the road-sides. The air was poisoned by putrid effluvia engendered by the sweltering July sun and the pitiless storm—a pollution reaching afar, like the stench of a slave-ship. In many places the water was half-knee deep. Night and day the retreat was pressed on—a march of men mailed in mud. The adjoining fields were full, not so much of stragglers as of soldiers true and brave to the last, but foot-sore and utterly exhausted, who could not take another step. Fate had not intended for them the neatly-paved and gas-lit streets of Philadelphia. The rain was almost blinding. What would have become of the Army of Northern Virginia had Grant and Sheridan been here?

Meade had dispatched the 6th Corps in pursuit on the Fairfield, and the cavalry on the Cashtown Road, and by the Emmettsburg and Monterey Passes. The 6th Corps, on reaching the Fairfield Pass, found that position very strong—one in which a small force could hold in check for a considerable time any pursuer. Meade therefore determined to follow the enemy by a flank movement, and, leaving a detachment to harass him, put his army in motion for Middletown, Maryland.

Lee was now making his way as quickly as he could to Williamsport, on the Potomac, a march of 40 miles. In spite of the great difficulties of the roads, with so much energy was his movement conducted that he reached that place on the 7th. He found, to his dismay, the river so swollen as to be unfordable. His

The horrors of  
the retreat.

Meade follows on  
Lee's flank.

The Confederates  
reach the Potomac,

communications with the South were intercepted. It was hard to procure either ammunition or subsistence, the difficulty as to the latter being enhanced by the high waters impeding the working of the neighboring mills.

Meade had sent orders to French, at Frederick, to re-occupy Harper's Ferry, and to dispatch a force to occupy Turner's Gap. French had, however, not only anticipated these orders, but had pushed some cavalry to Williamsport and Falling Waters, where they had destroyed the enemy's pontoon bridge and captured its guard. On the 12th of July Meade was in front of Lee, who occupied a strong position on the heights of Marsh Run, in advance of Williamsport. That day Meade held a council of his corps commanders to consider the expediency of attacking next morning. Two were in favor of it, five against it until reconnoissances were made. The following day (13th) was therefore devoted to that object.

In the mean time Lee had recovered part of the pontoon bridge, and had built new boats, so that and escape over it into Virginia. he had now a bridge at Falling Waters; and the river, though still deep, being pronounced fordable, he began to withdraw to the south side on the night of the 13th, a part of his forces crossing by fording, and a part over the bridge. The movement was attended with no loss of material except a few disabled wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to move through the deep mud. During the slow and tedious march to the bridge, in the midst of a violent rain-storm, some of the men lay down by the way to rest. Officers sent back for them failed to find them in the obscurity of the night, and these, with some stragglers, fell into the hands of the enemy.

Lee had vanished into Virginia. His escape was reported at daylight by a negro who came from Williamsport. At first the rumor was discredited; but, to the bitter vexation of the army, which thus a second time had forced its

antagonist to the brink of the Potomac, it proved only too true.

In 1862 Lee crossed the Potomac on September 5th, and, having fought the battle of Antietam, recrossed on the 18th. In 1863 he again crossed on June 26th, and, having fought the battle of Gettysburg, recrossed on July 13th. In his first sortie he was 13 days in the Free States, and lost 30,000 men; in his second he was 17 days in those states, and lost 60,000 men. Few facts are more instructive to those who desire to compare the resources of the National government and the Confederacy, and the generalship of the commanders on the two sides, than those connected with these invasive movements. To say nothing of his Vicksburg campaign, Grant crossed the Rapidan, in his final campaign, on May 4, 1864, and maintained himself in the heart of Virginia for nearly a year, not coming back until his purpose was completed by the surrender of Lee. Sherman left Chattanooga on May 5, 1864, fought his way through three states, and never turned back. Even after he had received the surrender of his antagonist, Johnston, he marched onward through Virginia to Washington. They who amuse themselves with speculations on the abilities of the opposing generals should compare them not only in what they did against each other, but in what each did for himself under circumstances that were similar, as in these invasive movements.

Lee now continued his retreat up the valley of the Shenandoah, and through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, till he reached the south bank of the Rapidan, near Orange Court-house, where he took a defensive position to dispute the crossing of the river. Meade continued his flank pursuit by Harper's Ferry, Berlin, and Warrenton. His cavalry had crossed the Potomac on the 14th at Harper's Ferry, moving thence toward Martinsburg, where it had a combat with the Confederate

Comparison of the  
invasive move-  
ments of the war.

Lee reaches the  
Rapidan.

cavalry. Meade himself did not cross the river until the 18th. On reaching Culpepper Court-house he halted his army, not deeming it prudent to cross the Rapidan and attack the enemy, who was now intrenched on the south side, and completely commanded the approaches on the north. During these movements several cavalry skirmishes took place, but without serious loss on either side. Lee, by moving rapidly, had accomplished his object and regained his old position.

The government and the nation were deeply disappointed at this issue of the battle of Gettysburg.

Dissatisfaction of the government at Lee's escape. They knew that the neglect to utilize a victory involves the fighting of another battle, in which every thing may be lost. On a subsequent occasion, when Lincoln was asked by a friend if he thought there had ever been periods at which better management might have terminated the war, "Yes," he said, "there have been three: at Malvern, when McClellan failed to command an immediate advance on Richmond; at Chancellorsville, when Hooker failed to re-enforce Sedgwick; and at Gettysburg, when Meade failed to attack Lee in his retreat at the bend of the Potomac." Halleck, on the 14th of July, in a telegram to Meade, said, "I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active, an energetic pursuit on your part, to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore." To this Meade replied, "Having performed my duty conscientiously, and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President is, in my judgment, so undeserved, that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army." He was informed, in reply, that the remark was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to active pursuit. His application to be relieved was declined.

Lee's sortie had cost him 60,000 men: it had reduced



his army from 100,000 down to 40,000. Detachments are sent from both armies to the South. Davis put forth an urgent appeal to the South, and with such effect that by it and the conscription Lee's force at the end of August had reached 56,000. The Confederate government, considering that operations had closed for a time in Virginia, and unable to resist any longer the importunate demands of Georgia, detached a part of Lee's army, under Longstreet, to re-enforce Bragg. In like manner, one fourth of Meade's army was taken away, the 11th and 12th Corps being sent, under Hooker, to Chattanooga. Hereupon Lee assumed a threatening attitude, manœuvred to turn his antagonist's flank, and forced him back to the line of Bull Run. Having taken 2000 prisoners, and destroyed the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Manassas to the Rapidan, he again fell back to his former position near Orange Court-house.

During these operations there were several severe engagements between detached forces, but no Subsequent military minor movements. general battle: on October 10th and 11th, at Robertson's River; 12th, at Brandy Station; 14th, at Bristoe Station; 19th, at Buckland Mills; 24th, at Bealton and the Rappahannock Bridge; and on the 7th of November on the south bank of the Rappahannock. On that day Sedgwick and French made an attack at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford, capturing several redoubts and about 2000 prisoners. A week subsequently Meade prepared a more formidable attack at Mine Run, but, the combinations for it failing, it was not made. On the 1st of December he recrossed the Rapidan, and the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac closed for the year 1863.

## SECTION XVI.

### THE PRESSURE ON THE ATLANTIC, THE GULF, AND THE MISSISSIPPI FRONTS OF THE CONFEDERACY.

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#### CHAPTER LXXII.

##### NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF CHARLESTON. DESTRUCTION OF FORT SUMTER. MIDNIGHT ASSAULT ON ITS RUINS.

It being believed that turreted iron-clad ships could successfully attack land fortifications, Admiral Dupont attempted to force the harbor of Charleston with a fleet of such vessels, but totally failed.

The national government determined to demolish the outer defenses of that harbor. General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren conducted the operations. They took Forts Wagner and Gregg. Fort Sumter was battered down by Gillmore.

In view of the building of Anglo-Confederate iron-clads, the government would not permit the fleet to renew its attempt to force the harbor.

The artillery power of Fort Sumter being destroyed, the Confederates converted that work into an infantry outpost.

Dahlgren made a midnight attack upon it, but, not being supported by the land forces, failed.

THE engagements in which turret iron-clads had been concerned had given to the government and the public a high opinion of their offensive and defensive qualities. It seemed as if nothing could withstand the blow of their heavy shot, and no projectile penetrate their invulnerable turrets.

Problem of the military value of turret iron-clads.

It was supposed that a fleet of such ships could without difficulty force a passage through Charleston Harbor, in spite of its numerous defenses, and, appearing before the city, compel its surrender.

No military advantages were anticipated from such a capture. The North, it is true, would have regarded the event with satisfaction, altogether, however, from sentimental considerations. Charleston was looked upon as

“the Culprit City.” She had recklessly plunged the nation into the calamities of civil war, and therefore, it was thought, deserved to be visited with signal punishment.


Military men, however, uninfluenced by such considerations, and knowing that, so long as Charleston remained in the Confederacy, it involved the neutralization of an army of 30,000 men remaining idle in garrison there, saw in the proposed attempt the solution of one of the most important problems of modern warfare—the determination of relative qualities of the floating iron-clad and the land fortification.

On the 7th of April Admiral Dupont made the experiment. He had seven Ericsson monitors, the frigate Ironsides, partially iron-clad, and a frailer iron-clad, the Keokuk, constructed on a plan differing from that of the monitors. His intention was to disregard the batteries on Morris’s Island, attack the northwest face of Sumter, and force his way up to the city. His fleet had 32 guns; the opposing forts, in the aggregate, 300.

At noon on that day the signal was given to weigh anchor. The Weehawken, a monitor, took the lead. She had a raft-like contrivance attached to her bows, for the purpose of removing obstructions and exploding torpedoes. This occasioned some delay at the outset, through its interference with her movements. On her way up she exploded a torpedo, which, though it lifted her a little, did no damage. At 2.10 P.M. she encountered obstructions extending across the harbor from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter; beyond these, piles were seen extending from James’s Island to the Middle Ground.

At 2.50 P.M. the guns of Fort Moultrie opened upon her, followed shortly after by all the batteries on Sullivan’s Island, Morris’s Island, and Fort Sumter.

Not being able to pass the obstructions, the Weehawken, and subsequently other monitors, the Passaic, Nahant, etc.,



THE DEFENSES OF CHARLESTON.



were obliged to turn, which threw the line into confusion, as the other vessels, advancing, approached. This was particularly the case with the flag-ship Ironsides, which became entangled with the monitors, and could not bring her battery to bear upon Fort Sumter without risk of firing into them; she was obliged, on her way up, to anchor twice to avoid going ashore, on one of these occasions in consequence of having come into collision with two of the monitors.

The plan of the Confederates was, by means of obstructions, to detain the ships, while a concentrated fire was poured upon them in this the "first circle," as it was termed. Two other still more powerful circles of fire must be passed before the city could be reached.

While in the centre of the first circle, it was apparent that the monitors were at a fearful disadvantage. The forts and earth-works were armed with heavy guns of the best construction. No ship was exposed to the severest fire of the enemy for more than forty minutes, yet in that brief period five of the iron-clads were wholly or partially disabled. In these forty minutes the battle was substantially over, the question settled. The Keokuk was struck 99 times, of which 19 were under her water-line. She was in a sinking condition. She had been able to return only three shots. The Passaic was struck 27 times; her turret was jammed, and could not for some time be turned. The Nahant was most seriously damaged; her turret was jammed, her captain wounded, her quarter-master killed by a bolt which flew off and struck him on the head. Many of the

The monitors fail in rapidity of fire,

and are overwhelmed by the fire of the forts. bolts of both turret and pilot-house were thus broken; the latter became nearly untenable in consequence of the nuts and ends flying across it. All the other monitors had received damages more or less severe. The mailed frigate Ironsides had lost one port shutter, her bow was penetrated by a red-hot shot. The damage inflicted on Fort Sumter was comparatively insignificant.

It was Dupont's belief that, had the iron-clads been in action half an hour longer, they would all have been disabled. "To my regret," he says, "I soon became convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force under my command. I had hoped that the endurance of the iron-clads would have enabled them to bear any weight of fire to which they might have been exposed; but when I found that so large a portion of them were wholly or one half disabled by less than an hour's engagement, I was convinced that persistence in the attack would only result in the loss of the greater portion of the iron-clad fleet, and in leaving many of them inside of the harbor to fall into the hands of the enemy." The commander of the Nantucket says: "I must say that I am disappointed beyond measure at this experiment of the monitors overcoming strong forts. It was a fair trial." The commander of the Montauk, Worden, says: "After testing the weight, of the enemy's fire, and observing the obstructions, I am led to believe that Charleston can not be taken by the naval force now present; and that, had the attack been continued, it could not have failed to result in disaster."

The iron-clad fleet had therefore been unable to pass the first line of obstructions, or to get out of "the first circle of fire." The slowness of its fire was no match for the rapidity and weight of that of the forts. The iron-clads were able to fire only 139 times from the 14 guns they could bring into action; the forts, from 76 guns, fired 2209 times. The projectiles they used were wrought-iron bolts, some of them tipped with steel, solid shot, shells, of which 40 were filled with melted cast iron, others with incendiary composition. The total amount of cannon-powder used by the forts was 21,093 pounds.

The government, thus satisfied that its iron-clad fleet was insufficient for the forcing of Charleston Harbor and the capture of the city, now changed its purposes, restricting its attempts to a more

Change in the intentions of the government respecting Charleston.

complete blockade, the detention of a large Confederate force in the vicinity by continually threatening military operations, and the destruction of Fort Sumter for the sake of a moral effect.

It was obvious that, of these operations, the success of the third insured the success of the first, and, indeed, it may be said of the second also, for the influence of South Carolina in the Confederacy was still such that she could insist successfully on the retention of a large military force for the protection of Charleston, no matter how urgent might be the necessities of the service elsewhere.

The destruction of Fort Sumter was then the essential point in the new operations, and General Gillmore, who, as we have seen, had greatly distinguished himself in the reduction of Fort Pulaski (vol. ii., p. 487), was charged with the reduction of Fort Sumter. He replaced General Hunter, who had hitherto been in command, and Admiral Dupont was succeeded by Admiral Dahlgren, an officer distinguished not only for professional ability, but who had made the subject of artillery his special study. He was the inventor of the gun which bears his name.

Gillmore assumed command of the land forces on the 12th of June, 1863. His means for carrying on offensive operations were 11,500 men, 66 guns, and 30 mortars. The force at Dahlgren's disposal was the frigate Ironsides and six monitors, three of which were being repaired at Port Royal.

Gillmore's intention was to seize the southern end of Morris's Island, and, assisted by the fleet, to capture Fort Wagner, a strong work near the north end, and Fort Gregg, which was beyond. The possession of the latter would be determined by that of Wagner. These obtained, he would then attempt the destruction of Sumter with shore batteries.

It is resolved to reduce Fort Sumter.

Gillmore placed in command of the land forces. Dahlgren in command of the fleet.

The general plan of operation.

Fort Wagner was a sand-work a quarter of a mile wide, extending from high-water mark on the east to Vincent's Creek and the impassable marshes on the west side of the island. Its armament was 16 guns. It had a very strong and well-built bomb-proof. The approach to it from the south was commanded not only by its own guns, but by those of Sumter, and by the batteries on James's Island and Cumming's Point. Its rear was in open communication with Charleston.

Position and strength of Fort Wagner.

The project for obtaining a lodgment on Morris's Island comprised three distinct operations:

Operations for a lodgment on Morris's Island.

1st. The real attack from Folly Island, to partake of the nature of a surprise, more or less complete.

2d. A demonstration in force on James's Island by the way of Stono River, designed to prevent re-enforcements to the enemy on Morris's Island from that quarter, and, if possible, to draw a portion of the Morris Island garrison in that direction.

3d. The cutting of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad at Jacksborough by ascending the South Edisto River, in order to delay re-enforcements from Savannah, should the real attack be temporarily checked or prematurely divulged.

Of these, the second operation was eminently successful; the third was a signal failure: it caused a loss of two pieces of field artillery and a small steamer, which was burnt to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy.

Folly Island, at this time, was occupied by a brigade under General Vogdes. The dense undergrowth covering this island gave facilities for concealing military movements. He had established a battery on the south end of it to control the mouth of Stono River.

A lodgment is secured.

The movement was commenced by sending a force up Stono River to make a demonstration on James's Island,



and draw the enemy's attention from the true point of attack. At night a body of 6500 troops were placed on this island. On the 9th of July, 2000 of them, under General Strong, were transferred in boats from the island to the junction of Folly River and Light-house Inlet, and there they lay in concealment. At daylight on the 10th the batteries that had been established on the north end of Folly Island suddenly opened, and Dahlgren's fleet commenced firing on Fort Wagner. Every shot from the 15-inch guns of the monitors sent a mass of rubbish into the air. The side of the fort facing the sea soon looked like a mere sand-heap. A heavy cloud of smoke and dust, occasioned by the constantly exploding shells, hung over the fort; it was only when the wind drifted it away that the damage could be seen. While this was going on, Strong landed his troops from their concealment, and, carrying the Confederate batteries on the south end of Morris's Island, advanced within musket-range of Wagner. By 9 A.M. all the works on the south of the island were in Gillmore's possession. He did not advance at once, but put off the assault until next morning, imputing the delay to the heat of the day and the exhaustion of the troops. Next morning the assault was made. It was repulsed. Gillmore's loss in these operations was about 150; the Confederate 300, including 16 commissioned officers.

The assault on Fort Wagner fails.

Siege operations resorted to.

Gillmore now determined to assail the fort by regular approaches, the narrowness of the island affording opportunity for the fleet to aid him by its enfilading fire.

On the 18th of July he opened upon the fort a little after midday. His fire, assisted by that of the fleet, was kept up till dark. Fort Sumter, as well as Wagner, answered, the latter, however, but feebly from two guns, the garrison securing themselves in their bomb-proof. To all appearance the fort suffered severely, and it was thought that the garrison must be demoralized, and an assault practicable.

Between the ceasing of the cannonade and the assault the sun went down, and there was a violent thunder-storm. Strong's brigade was in advance, supported by Putnam's. Their strength was about 6000. In Strong's brigade was the Fifty-fourth Colored Regiment, Colonel Shaw. The distance to be passed over was about 1800 yards. It had now become so dark that it was very difficult to see. When within 200 yards the storming column received the fire of the fort. The ranks were torn to pieces. The men, however, managed to get across the ditch, in which there were three feet of water. They then rallied, and rushed up the parapet, planting on it their flag. It was only for a moment. Shaw was killed on the parapet, Strong mortally wounded. The colored troops suffered severely—the brigade was completely repulsed. The attempt was then repeated by Putnam's brigade, but this also was repulsed, Putnam being killed. At midnight the ocean beach was covered with the dead and dying. In sand-holes and rifle-pits lights were glimmering, where the wounded were being attended by their friends. The loss was about 1200, the dead being left, for the most part, in the hands of the Confederates, who, with the intention of showing indignity to the remains of Colonel Shaw, "threw his body into the same pit with his niggers."

Though the difficulties of the ground were very great, Gillmore pushed forward his works with energy. On the 24th of July the first parallel was opened at 1300 yards from Wagner. It was soon followed by a second, 600 yards in advance, the guns of which were trained not only on Wagner, but also on Sumter and Battery Gregg, the battery on Cummings's Point. This parallel ran diagonally across the island northwest and southeast. Two booms were placed in the creek on the left to resist the enemy's boats.

On the 9th of August the third parallel was commenced about 330 yards in advance of the right of the second. It was less than 400 yards from Wagner.

From this period forward the fire from the James's Island batteries, from Wagner, Gregg, and Sumter, and especially from the sharpshooters in Wagner, was severe, and almost unceasing. Indeed, on the 10th the advance was stopped entirely by it, and it became a question whether the trenches could be pushed forward much farther. It was decided not to continue the sap toward Wagner beyond the third parallel until fire upon Fort Sumter had been opened. At this time Beauregard had twice as many men, and five times as much artillery for the defense of Charleston as Gillmore had for the attack.

Gillmore had now in readiness 12 batteries, mounting 28 heavy guns and 12 mortars. The distances of the batteries from Sumter were from 3428 to 4290 yards. On the 17th he opened on the fort. On the morning of that day he fired 612 shot and shell, most of which struck, the fort being seriously injured on its northwest face, and five of its guns disabled. In the afternoon the gorge wall was deeply cut, adding much to the damage of the northwest face, and disabling a 10-inch gun. By night 948 shot had been thrown, of which 270 missed. On the 18th the remaining guns on the northwest face had been disabled, two 10-inch guns on the northeast face, two on the west face, and one on the southeast angle. At 7 P.M. there had been thrown 876 shot and shell, of which 180 missed. By 10 o'clock next morning the cannonade had become more serious. The walls were much damaged. Fire was continued steadily all the afternoon. A 10-inch mortar in the parade was dismantled. Twenty feet of the gorge wall fell during the night. During the day there were fired 780 shots, of which 131 missed.

On the 20th more damage was done. Of 879 shots only 175 passed over. The greater portion of the gorge wall had now fallen, but the débris

It is found necessary to silence Fort Sumter.

Fort Sumter is battered down.

Its artillery power is destroyed.

from the upper revetted in a manner the lower rooms. On the 21st, 923 shots were fired, 219 missing. On the 22d, 604, 185 missing. On the 23d, 692 were fired, 158 missing. That day General Gillmore reported that Fort Sumter was practically demolished, that it had become a mere ruin. It was effectually disabled from interfering any farther in the operations against Wagner. This also, a few days later, was the conclusion of Colonel Rhett, the commander of the fort, who reported: "I consider it impossible either to mount or use guns on any part of the parapet; and I deem the fort, in its present condition, un-serviceable for offensive purposes." The total number of shots fired against it, up to the 24th, was 5750, of which 1336 missed. The garrison of artillerists were now withdrawn by the Confederates and replaced by an infantry garrison.

It was the popular expectation that, when Sumter was thus deprived of its artillery power, the fleet would force its way up the harbor and capture Charleston. The government, however, had no such intention.

The Navy Department had informed Dahlgren: "This department is disinclined to have its only iron-clad squadron incur extreme risks when the substantial advantages have already been gathered. In case of a foreign war, which has sometimes seemed imminent, these vessels will be indispensable for immediate use." In this, reference was made to the "Laird rams" then building in England.

One of these rams was launched on the 4th of July, and in a state requiring so little preparation for sea that the American minister resorted to urgent remonstrances as indispensable to the emergency. Writing to the British government (July 11), he spoke of the ram as a vessel "of the most formidable kind now known," and of her purposes as "the last and gravest act of international hostility yet committed."

The Navy Department will not permit the fleet to be risked.

The determination connected with the building of the Laird rams.



On the 30th of July the State Department informed the American minister, Mr. Adams, that "we feel we are drifting toward a war with Great Britain." Hereupon Mr. Adams again (Aug. 14) drew the attention of Lord Russell to the fact that "the preparation of the dangerous armed vessels is not intermitted. By this time the depositions showed that there was no effort to conceal that "the rams were to open the Southern ports."

Correspondence  
with the British  
government.

Mr. Adams next apprised the State Department (Sept. 3) that "the second ram has been launched, while the first is reported to be so far prepared for departure as to bring the question of stopping her to a point calling for prompt decision."

On the 4th of September Mr. Adams made to the British government, "in the name of his government, his last solemn protest against the commission of such an act of hostility against a friendly nation." This was neither too soon nor too strong, for on the previous day the United States' Consul at Liverpool gave notice that "the ram is taking coal on board," and he "apprehends that she may go to sea at any time, unless detained."

Lord Russell, but a few days before, had notified Mr. Adams that the British government "can not interfere in any way with these vessels." But the solemn protest of the minister had given rise to other reflections, and he was informed that "the matter is now under the serious consideration of her majesty's government."

On the 5th of September Mr. Adams wrote to Lord Russell: "At this moment, when one of the iron-clad vessels is on the point of departure from this kingdom on its hostile errand against the United States, it would be superfluous for me to point out to your lordship that THIS IS WAR."

The answer (Sept. 8) was: "Instructions have been issued which will prevent the departure of these two iron-clad vessels from Liverpool."

Still the decision of the British government was but a postponement, for Mr. Adams wrote (Sept. 17): "The departure of the rams seems to be uncertain." This was confirmed by what he heard from Lord Russell (Sept. 25), that "the departure of the rams is under consideration."

As these events successively transpired, the commander of the fleet off Charleston was kept informed of them. In view of the apparent imminent danger, he asked that the Puritan or Dictator—monitor frigates—should be sent to him, and suggested other means of maintaining the position off Charleston in spite of the rams. He saw how embarrassing would be the arrival of the rams on his line of blockade, which would have been raised at all the twenty ports it included, except at Charleston and Wassaw, where the monitors were. The enemy's intention would have been to unite with the Confederate ram at Savannah and the three at Charleston, which were held in by the national iron-clads, and these combined would have constituted a force of six iron-clads.

What might have been reasonably expected from this element of offense if a disastrous foray had been made in Charleston Harbor with the only sea-going iron-clad squadron of the Union?

England and France would have seen additional inducements to active intervention in American affairs had a serious disaster to the naval force off Charleston occurred. As it was, the British government was scarcely able to withstand the urgent demand of some of its most influential classes, and the covert inducements presented by the French emperor.

In view of the opinion of the Navy Department that the capture of Charleston was of no importance as a military event, and that, with such foreign complications before it as have been referred to, it would not permit the iron-clad fleet to be put in peril for the sake of securing such an object, no attempt to force the harbor was made.

That this resolution was correct is manifest when we consider the defenses of the harbor before and subsequently to the demolition of Fort Sumter.

The defenses of Charleston Harbor.

Fort Moultrie, with its adjacent batteries, stands on Sullivan's Island, at the right when entering. It looks directly across the entrance, while the batteries extending from its left overlap, and not only cross-fire with it, but look down the channel by which vessels approach. The works extending from the right of Moultrie cross-fire with the others upon the entrance, and, overlapping, command the channel. Their whole length is nearly one mile and a half along the beach, and they are placed as close to the water as practicable. There are three powerful batteries: Fort Moultrie in the centre, Fort Beauregard on its left, and Battery Bee on its right.

Fort Moultrie, previously to the war, was of brick, and unsupported by contiguous batteries; subsequently its brick walls were incased in earth and sand until nearly twenty-five feet thick; smooth-bore and rifled cannon of the heaviest calibre were mounted on it, and traverses of great thickness were constructed. Bee and Beauregard were not inferior in defensive power, and were heavily armed. These three powerful batteries were connected by lines which included other batteries, as Marion, Rutledge, etc., all powerfully constructed and armed.

As the shore-line of Sullivan's Island eastward of Beauregard was not approachable by vessels of force, it was only covered by some small detached batteries, to interdict landing; but the extremity of the island seaward had a very heavy work, Fort Marshall. In these works 67 pieces of various kinds were mounted, smooth-bores and rifles, some of them of 8 and 10 inches calibre, mortars, etc. As will be presently seen, their powers were shown on the 8th of September, when, in an action of three hours, no impression of importance was made on them, but the monitors were much injured.

Opposite Sullivan's Island stands Fort Sumter, at a distance of about a mile. The operations in July and August, 1863, brought about important changes in its character. As soon as Gillmore had secured his footing on Morris's Island, the Confederate authorities discovered that the fall of Sumter was only a question of time: they proceeded to substitute for Sumter other works inside, and to remove from it its numerous guns, which they could not afford to lose.

The protracted defense of Fort Wagner enabled them to effect a complete substitution for Sumter. By the 6th of September they had given to Fort Johnson, and other works in system with it, all the strength that was desirable. They had also learned by experience that the loss of Sumter was not a necessary consequence of the loss of Morris's Island, and were able to hold it, after losing its artillery power, as a species of outpost to Johnson and Moultrie.

Fort Johnson thus became, to ships entering, the principal substitute for Sumter. If they succeeded in passing the fire of Sullivan's Island and the obstructions, they must, following the main channel, turn sharply to the left, and steer nearly for Fort Johnson, receiving its fire ahead, and that of Sullivan's Island astern. On this track lay three large torpedoes, each containing a ton of powder.

Fort Johnson was a series of earth-works constructed like those of Sullivan's Island, with strong traverses and a large bomb-proof. It was armed with 12 heavy cannon, smooth and rifled, 8 and 10-inch. On a sand-spit on its right were some detached batteries having six heavy pieces. It should be understood that this was not the "old Fort Johnson," of which there were but few remains, but new earth-works, near the shore-line, and conforming to its contour.

About 1300 yards above Johnson was Battery Wampler, a small but very strong earth-work, armed with two 10-

Fort Sumter an  
infantry outpost.

The batteries with-  
in the harbor.





sappers and the guards of the advanced trenches. Thirteen heavy Parrott rifles, 100, 200, and 300-pounders, pounded away at short though regular intervals at the southwest angle of the bomb-proof, while during the day the New Ironsides, with remarkable regularity and precision, kept an almost incessant stream of 11-inch shells from her eight-gun broadside."

What was the condition of Wagner after all this?

Colonel Turner reports: "Notwithstanding the heavy fire of this bombardment, together with all the fire Fort Wagner had been subject to since the commencement of our attack from land and naval batteries, its defenses were not materially injured." "Our fire of rifle-shells on the 5th and 6th instant at the bomb-proof did little or no damage." General Gillmore says: It "could never have been reduced by a naval force, or any other means than those adopted."

From this it may be inferred that works constructed in the manner of Fort Wagner could not be destroyed by such a fire as the shipping would be able to bring upon them in the interior of Charleston Harbor, and that in a conflict of any considerable duration the monitors would probably be defeated.

In addition to these works, the harbor was defended by three iron-clad rams, mounting in all 14 guns, most of them rifled. These vessels were like the celebrated Merrimac, though not so long.

Speaking of these defenses, General Ripley, who was second in Confederate command at Charleston, who had planned the defensive operations, and who had himself directed the details, said: "The whole policy of the defense rested on the principle of making the outer batteries only the first crust; the farther the enemy got in, the worse off they would have been." "If they had passed the outer batteries they would have come within another circle of fire; had they succeeded in

They present three circles of fire.

passing that, they would have been in the centre of still another circle of fire: some of the heaviest guns we had were on these interior batteries."

In the circular issued by that officer, December 26, 1862, he says: "The guns of Beauregard Battery, Fort Moultrie, Battery Bee, and the eastern, northeastern, and northwestern faces of Fort Sumter will be used to form the first circle of fire. Its centre is a little eastward of the line between the forts, and midway.

"The second circle is formed by the heavy guns of Fort Johnson, Fort Ripley, Castle Pinckney, Battery Bee, the northwestern and western faces of Fort Sumter. Its centre is at a point about midway between Forts Sumter and Ripley, and to the southward of the Middle-Ground shoal.

"The third circle of fire is formed by the guns of White Point Battery and Battery Glover, with such guns of Forts Johnson, and Ripley, and Castle Pinckney as will bear.

"The great object of the enemy will probably be to run by, and every effort must be made to crush him in each successive circle of fire which he encounters."

Such were the fortifications defending Charleston Harbor. Certainly it would not have been correct to divide the land and sea forces which, acting together, had found it so difficult to deal with Wagner, which was only an outpost, and voluntarily place a system of powerful batteries between the two parts, in expectation that the enemy would abandon Sullivan's and James's Islands. It would have been to cut the iron-clads off from their coal, powder, shells, and to deprive their crews of air and water, for the monitors were ventilated by their engines, which also supplied fresh water.

As we have seen, when the Confederates anticipated the fall of Sumter, they used every exertion to improve their interior defenses. Guns were transferred from that fort to these earth-works. Beauregard, on August 7, 1863, says: "Many of the long-range guns on Sumter not absolutely re-

It is not advisable for the fleet to attempt to force them alone.

quired for its defense have been removed to arm the new batteries under construction." Entanglements, such as floating ropes and booms, were set in the channel, and torpedoes planted at suitable points. These obstructions were watched at night by picket-boats, by day the fire converging upon them defied all attempts at their removal. Nothing could be done but to take the chance of running through them, and that must be accomplished in a winding channel lined with batteries and shoals, the buoys removed. In the monitors compasses could not be used, the leadsmen could not get soundings, and the only view to be had was through the narrow slits of the pilot-houses.

But, even were these difficulties surmounted and a passage forced, the monitors must either go up Cooper River, remain under fire, or retreat. To the lower portion of Charleston they could do no more than Gillmore's shells were already doing.

In the marsh on the west of Morris's Island, at a point midway between that and James's Island, where the mud was nearly twenty feet deep, and covered over with reeds and grass, piles were driven down into the sand, and a strong platform raised upon them. On this marsh battery an 8-inch rifled Parrott gun was placed, called by the soldiers "the Swamp Angel." Its distance from the lower part of Charleston was five miles. It was protected by sand-bags. From this gun shells could be thrown into the city. It burst, however, on the 36th round, and the bombardment was subsequently continued from Cummings's Point irregularly until the evacuation of the city.

On the 21st of August Gillmore demanded of Beauregard the evacuation of Morris's Island and Sumter. A prompt answer not having been received, he fired some shells from the "Swamp Angel" into the city. Hereupon a correspondence ensued,

Gillmore throws shells into Charleston.

The Swamp Angel Battery.



Beauregard declaring the act to be atrocious, and unworthy of any soldier.

Though Gillmore's works were seriously injured by a storm, on the night of the 21st a fourth parallel was opened. There was a ridge in front which afforded protection to the Confederate riflemen. They were forced from it with the bayonet, and a fifth parallel established close behind it, and within 240 yards of Wagner, on the evening of the 26th. At this point the island is only 25 yards wide, and barely two feet high, so that in rough weather the sea sweeps across it. On August 27th the trench had reached within 100 yards of the fort.

Progress of the  
siege operations.

The dark and gloomy days of the siege of Wagner had now come. Gillmore's daily losses were on the increase, while his progress became discouragingly slow, or even extremely uncertain. The converging fire from Fort Wagner alone almost enveloped the head of the sap, delivered, as it was, from a line subtending an angle of nearly ninety degrees, while the flank fire from the James's Island batteries increased in power and accuracy every hour. To push forward the sap in the narrow strip of shallow shifting sand by day was impossible, while the brightness of the prevailing harvest moon rendered the operation almost as hazardous by night. Matters indeed seemed to be at a standstill, and a feeling of despondency began to pervade the rank and file of the command.

In this emergency, it was determined to commence two distinct modes of attack:

1st. To keep Wagner perfectly silent with an overpowering curved fire from siege and cohorn mortars.

2d. To breach the bomb-proof shelter with rifled guns.

Accordingly, all the light mortars were moved to the front and placed in battery, the capacity of the fifth parallel and the advanced trenches for sharpshooters was greatly enlarged and improved, rifled guns in the left breach-

ing-batteries were trained upon the fort, and powerful calcium lights, to aid the night-work of the cannoneers and sharpshooters, and dazzle the eyes of the enemy, were prepared.

These final operations were brought into play at day-break on the 5th of September. For forty-two consecutive hours the bombardment was then maintained from 17 siege and cohorn mortars, 13, Parrott rifles, and by 11-inch shells from the Ironsides—these, ricochetting over the water against the sloping parapet of Wagner, deflected upward with a low remaining velocity, and dropped nearly vertically, exploding within or over the work, and rigorously searching every part of it except the subterranean shelters. The calcium lights turned night into day, and, while throwing around the assailants an impenetrable obscurity, they brilliantly illuminated every object in front, and brought the minutest details of the fort into sharp relief.

In a few hours the fort became practically silent, exhibiting but few signs of life, and none of activity. The garrison had sought safety in their bomb-proof shelter, and Gillmore's sappers rapidly pushed forward their works.

During the cannonade the confinement of the Confederate troops to the shelter of the bomb-proof so dispirited them that, in the opinion of their chief officers, it was unsafe to rely upon them to repel an assault.

The assault was to have been made at 9 A.M. September 7, at ebb tide, when the beach was broadest, but during the night the fort was evacuated. Beauregard did not escape criticism and condemnation among the Confederates for the manner in which this had been accomplished. There were left in Wagner eighteen guns, and seven in Gregg. During the last days 122,300 pounds of metal were fired from the breaching guns, and yet the bomb-proof was found substantially uninjured. In these operations against Wagner

Bombardment of Fort Wagner.

The garrison evacuate that fort.

Summary of the operations against it.

33,500 days' work of seven hours each were expended. Of this, 9500 days' work, or two fifths of the whole, were by blacks. The whole of it was done under a fire of artillery or of sharpshooters, or both, and the greater part of it in the night. General Halleck, in his report, declares that General Gillmore "overcame difficulties almost unknown in modern sieges, and that his operations on Morris's Island constitute a new era in the science of engineering and gunnery."

On the night of September 8th an expedition of thirty boats was sent from the fleet for the purpose of carrying Fort Sumter. This assault has been much misunderstood. It has been looked upon as an isolated incident in the naval operations before Charleston, unconnected with any general plan, having no important object, and rashly executed without assistance from the army.

The midnight  
assault on Fort  
Sumter.

But, in truth, the occupation of Sumter was an indispensable condition to operations after the acquisition of Morris's Island, justifying any effort to possess it, and not made until assurances had been received of co-operation by the army.

When the cannonade from land and sea terminated on the 23d of August, the dilapidation of Sumter appeared so complete as to give rise to the belief that when Morris's Island was evacuated, Sumter must also be abandoned. This, probably, was the view entertained by the Confederates themselves.

To them, however, Sumter was indispensable for the maintenance of the obstructions nearest to it. Their picket-boats patrolling from it quickly discovered all attempts of the fleet to remove those obstructions; but if it fell into the hands of the national sailors, they could remove the booms, floating ropes, and torpedoes nearest to it, and the iron-clads could pass in and out at pleasure on the Sumter

side of the channel; so that, although the fire of Forts Moultrie and Johnson might prevent a restoration of the artillery power of Sumter, it could not make the ruin untenable as a military outpost, just as the national fire from Morris's Island was equally unavailing against the tenure of it by the Confederates for a similar purpose.

With these views, Dahlgren made a personal reconnoissance on the night of the 21st of August, but in the darkness the leading monitor ran aground, and with difficulty was got off before morning. Next night the attempt was renewed: a fog coming on interfered with observation; the monitors were, however, discovered, and fired at heavily. Several days of bad weather intervened, and nothing could be done. On the night of the 26th, though it was blowing and raining, the monitors went up again, anchoring in the squalls, and pushing ahead in the lulls. At about 2 A.M. it became so thick that the vessels could not discern each other. With great difficulty orders were conveyed to them to retire.

On the night of September 1st another reconnoissance was made in force. It involved the monitors in a sharp action with the forts. Dark as it was, they were so near that they were struck more than seventy times.

Dahlgren now began to perceive that the Confederates had no intention of surrendering Sumter, though it was a ruin; but, expecting that on the fall of Wagner they would yield Sumter, and foreseeing that that would soon take place, he considered that a direct attack would be unwarrantable when no great delay would accomplish the object without risk. He believed it better to advance with a united force, gradually reducing the enemy's positions, than to emasculate the attacking power by dividing it.

At length Wagner was taken, but the Confederates showed no disposition to evacuate Sumter. Wagner had resisted for eight weeks; it had yielded neither to artillery nor assault, but

Fort Sumter could  
be taken only by  
assault.



only when the engineers had pushed their sap to the work itself. But Sumter, seated in the midst of the water, was not accessible to such an operation. Its rubbish and fragments were as good a protection against shot and shell as the sand of Wagner. Cannon could not be planted nearer than three quarters of a mile. It was clear enough, then, that nothing could be done except by assault.

An assault was therefore resolved on.

Viewed from the vessels, the ruins of the gorge wall exhibited a regular slope upward from the water, apparently practicable to the footsteps of active and determined men.

But the men were not to be exposed without assistance.

Dahlgren's plan of operations. The monitors were first to place the work between their fires, the main body in the channel, and one of them off the gorge wall; afterward this monitor would serve as a base for the column, and open the way with shells and grape. It was requisite that it should be carefully posted in a vein of deep water that intersected the wide stretch of shoal water between Sumter and the north extreme of Morris's Island; this, having hitherto been under Confederate control, was practically unknown. Accordingly, a few hours after the capture of Wagner, a monitor was sent to buoy the channel; unfortunately, she got aground, and the attempt made at once to float her proved fruitless.

Preliminary battle between the iron-clads and forts. As the artillery operation was to be executed that night, the iron-clads were sent to the channel inside of Sumter, and about dark opened on it with a heavy fire; but the batteries on Sullivan's Island returned the fire, and a portion of the guns had to be turned that way. This proceeding was continued until 9 P.M., when the fleet drew off, in order that attention might be given to floating the monitor at high tide, which occurred during the night.

In spite of every effort, daylight found the monitor still on the shoal, the tide falling, and, as it fell, exposing the

frail side beneath the armor of the overhang to the full play of the heavy Confederate batteries, which did not fail to take advantage of the circumstance. The other iron-clads had to be ordered up to cover the endangered one, which did not get off until late in the afternoon. This not only crippled the arrangements for the assault, but reduced the iron-clad force in numbers and efficiency. One monitor was entirely disabled, a second had her engine damaged, the 11-inch gun of a third could not be used.

About 1 P.M., while the action between the iron-clads and the Confederate batteries was still in progress, Dahlgren telegraphed to Gillmore: "I will assault Sumter to-night." The latter returned an answer that he intended to do the same thing, and sent an aid to know whether the naval party would join his. To avoid misapprehension and establish a sure co-operation, Dahlgren sent his chief of staff to make final arrangements with the general.

It was after midnight when the officer returned, and reported that the arrangements had been satisfactorily made for the naval and military columns to assault in concert. A column of boats had been towed up by a steamer near to the scene of action, and was in readiness. The flag-ship steamed up the roads as near Sumter as the shoal would permit.

The naval expedition was composed of three divisions of seamen and one of marines. It found no difficulty in landing nor in ascending the slope of rubbish, but was stopped at the summit by the head of the wall.

Dahlgren steered directly for the firing, and, in the darkness, encountered the monitor sent up to cover the column. Soon the firing from the fort ceased, though it was maintained from Sullivan's and James's Islands. The signal that the assaulting party had succeeded was not displayed. It was only too plain that the attempt had failed.

The whole force engaged was about 400. Of 107 who

The assault is made,  
and fails.

landed, nearly every one was killed, wounded, or captured.

The land forces did not move. It was subsequently explained that this was owing to the low tide, which detained them. "It is impossible," says Dahlgren, "to say now what the result would have been had the land column joined in the attack; but, had I known that it would not have been put forward, the naval column would not have gone on that night."

The land forces do not move.

And now it appeared how little the importance of this seeming ruin had been understood, how necessary was its possession to either side. Had the unsupported sailors succeeded in their gallant attempt, and effected a lodgment for the national troops, the Confederate batteries might have wasted their guns and ammunition on it as the national batteries had done. Obstructions and torpedoes would no longer have impeded the way, and the iron-clads, pivoting on this point, would have been free to strike whenever the opportunity presented.

I have described somewhat at length the circumstances connected with the assault of Fort Sumter, because to the navy there was not accorded the approval which it deserved. The whole train of events was regarded as a succession of isolated incidents, without purpose or connection. The assault itself was considered a needless sacrifice, and the seamen who stepped on the ramparts of Sumter were denied the praise so well merited by the gallantry of the act. At the time of the occurrence, no explanation could be made without exposing the weakness of the naval force, and, notwithstanding this assault, there was wide-spread dissatisfaction that the fleet did not reduce the other coast defenses, or force its way into the inner harbor.

Unreasonable dissatisfaction at this failure.

As regards such a reduction, it should have been enough to recall what Fort Wagner had cost, and to reflect that the other works were far stronger. A council of naval officers

decided unanimously that Forts Moultrie and Johnson could not be reduced by the iron-clads unsupported by the army; and as to a forced passage up to Charleston, it was the opinion of the ablest military officers, among others of General Sherman, that the attempt was altogether inadmissible.

Though we may justly admire the brilliant engineering of the national general, and the persevering courage of the national admiral, they serve only to bring into relief the signal ability and matchless tenacity of the Confederates. The page of history has not a more striking incident to offer than the defense of the pile of ruins in Charleston Harbor; not one more picturesque than the midnight victory gained by the soldiers who started forth from the recesses of rubbish to defend the wreck of Sumter.

Great merit of the  
Confederate de-  
fense.



## CHAPTER LXXIII.

### NAVAL PRESSURE ON THE WATER-FRONTS OF THE CONFEDERACY. NAVAL AFFAIRS ON THE OPEN SEA. THE ANGLO-CONFEDERATE CRUISERS.

The national navy maintained the blockade so stringently as to destroy the financial system of the Confederacy.

That portion of the Mississippi which intervenes between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and receives the Red River, became of great importance to the Confederacy as an avenue of supplies from the trans-Mississippi countries: attempts were made by the squadron below Port Hudson, and by that above Vicksburg, to obtain control of it; they were strenuously resisted by the Confederates.

Confederate cruisers were built in Great Britain, among them the Alabama. By these ships American commerce was nearly destroyed. The United States required of Great Britain redress for the national and the private injury thus sustained.

For the clear appreciation of any great social movement, such as the American Civil War, it is needful to contemplate attentively those events which control the progress or mark the culmination of profound political purposes and grand military operations. A vast mass of details must be grouped in the background, or, perhaps, kept altogether out of view. To bring things intrinsically insignificant out of their proper subordinate position is only to confuse.

The minor naval incidents of the war.

Yet sometimes it happens that such details, considered in the aggregate, present a result too important to be overlooked. The chasing of blockade-runners into an Atlantic port, or the duels of cotton-clad steamers on Western rivers, may be in themselves of little moment, but the aggregate of such incidents, in one case constituting the coast blockade, in the other the patrolling of the Mississippi, were connected in no insignificant degree with the fortunes of the war.

I propose, therefore, in this chapter to group together incidents of the kind here referred to occurring in the naval

service in 1863-4, and in a following chapter shall deal in like manner with several of the minor movements of the military service; and though, perhaps, at the risk of not rendering full justice to many gallant acts, I shall secure for my reader what, after all, is the main object of a general history, an unobstructed view of those grander events on which the issue of the war more immediately depended.

The growth of the navy during 1863 was very rapid.

Growth of the navy in 1863-4. At the close of that year there were, of iron-clad steamers, 75; of side-wheels, 203; of screws, 198; of sailing vessels, 112: total, 588. The number of guns was 4443, and the aggregate tonnage 467,967. The number of seamen in the service on the 1st of July was 34,000, and during the year enlistments averaged over 2000 per month; in the previous year they had averaged 1529.

In 1864 the number of vessels had increased to 671, the number of guns to 4610, and the tonnage to 510,396.

There were 7600 men in service in the navy at the beginning of the war, and 51,500 at its close. In addition to these, the aggregate of artisans and laborers employed in the navy yards was 16,880, instead of 3844 previously employed. Of vessels, 208 were commenced and most of them completed; 418 were purchased, of which 313 were steamers.

The blockade of a coast-line greater in extent than the

The blockade and its results. whole coast of Europe from Cape Trafalgar to Cape North was stringently maintained.

In addition, the rivers of the Confederacy were patrolled by a naval force of more than 100 vessels. The distance thus traversed and patrolled by the gun-boats on the Mississippi and its tributaries was 3615 miles.

The following statement shows the direct effect of the blockade. The number of vessels captured and sent to

the courts for adjudication from May 1, 1861, to the close of the war, was 1149; the number destroyed during that time, 355; making a total of captured and destroyed, 1504.

The gross proceeds of property captured was above twenty-two millions of dollars; the value of the captured vessels about twenty-four and a half millions; the value of those destroyed, seven millions.

But these direct results are far from showing what the blockade really accomplished. We must Indirect results of the blockade. measure its value not so much by what it thus apparently *did*, as by what it actually *prevented*. It prevented the exportation of cotton, and thereby broke down the basis on which the financial system of the Confederacy was founded. That system, as Davis tells us, rested on a gold basis, to be created in England by the sale of cotton. It was hoped that sales might take effect to the value of three hundred millions of dollars a year. Compared with this, the quantity that actually escaped the blockade was insignificant. Still more, the blockade struck at the usefulness of the slave, and took away more than half his value. From being a gold producer he became a mere food producer, his main function being, apart from plantation service, the supplying of the army. Even in this respect he could only be very inadequately used, for the difficulty encountered by the Confederate government was not in the production of supplies, but in their transportation over decaying or worn-out railroads.

But besides this, the navy, either alone or in co-operation with military forces, secured a firm foothold on all the water-fronts. After the capture of Forts Hatteras and Clark in August, 1861, port after port was wrested from the Confederacy, until the national flag was restored to every harbor, and along the entire coast, and on the banks of the Mississippi.

I shall now select from the large and interesting mass of incidents presented by the history of the navy some

which, perhaps, may be regarded as occupying comparatively a more prominent position. Incapable of being presented in a continuous or consecutive narrative, they may be grouped in three divisions: (1), those occurring on the coast; (2), those occurring on the rivers; (3), those occurring on the open sea.

The national General Wessells was holding Plymouth, near the mouth of the Roanoke River, with 2400 men and three gun-boats. On April 18th, 1864, Hoke, the Confederate commander, attempted to surprise him, an iron-clad ram, the Albemarle, joining in the attack. Hoke was within two miles before Wessells discovered him. He first assailed Fort Warren, an outpost, and disabled the gun-boat Bombshell, which went to its relief. Then he attacked Fort Wessells, a mile lower down; and, though several assaults were repulsed, the fort was at length compelled to surrender.

Hoke's iron-clad ram, the Albemarle, now engaged the remaining gun-boats, striking one of them, the Southfield, so heavily as to sink her, and putting the other to flight. The Albemarle then shelled the town, damaging it considerably.

On the morning of the 20th Hoke assaulted the place, and compelled Wessells to surrender. He captured 1600 prisoners, 25 guns, and 2000 small-arms. In consequence of this event, Washington, at the head of Pamlico Sound, was evacuated.

The Albemarle, on the 5th of May, made an attack on some gun-boats that were lying twenty miles south of the mouth of the Roanoke. For this purpose she brought down with her the captured gun-boat Bombshell. The national gun-boat Sassacus gave the Bombshell a broadside, which compelled her to strike her flag; then she butted the Albemarle, forcing her hull under the water. The shots that struck the armor of the ram glanced off. At length the Sassacus received a bolt

Naval operations  
on the coast of  
North Carolina.

The iron-clad  
Albemarle.



through one of her boilers. She was filled with a cloud of steam. Many of her crew were dreadfully scalded. Under that cloud the Albemarle retired, leaving her consort, the Bombshell, in the hands of the enemy.

Lieutenant Cushing, a youth of 21, was put in command of a steam launch equipped as a torpedo-boat. She is blown up by a torpedo. On the night of October 27th he went up the Roanoke with a crew of thirteen officers and men, and arrived within 20 yards of the Albemarle before he was discovered. He then steered his torpedo-boat directly for the ram, which lay at the wharf at Plymouth, protected by a raft of logs extending 30 feet. The enemy's fire was at once very severe. The torpedo-boat pressed in the logs a few feet; the torpedo-boom was lowered so as to come under the Albemarle's overhang. Cushing, in his report, says: "The torpedo was exploded at the same time that the Albemarle's gun was fired. A shot seemed to go crashing through my boat, and a dense mass of water rushed in from the torpedo, filling and completely disabling her. The enemy then continued to fire at fifteen feet range, and demanded our surrender, which I twice refused." Cushing leaped into the water, and, with one of his party, made his escape. The rest were either captured, killed, or wounded. The Albemarle was destroyed.

Three unsuccessful attempts were made on Fort McAllister, a work constructed at a bend on the Attempts to reduce Fort McAllister. Ogeechee River, near Savannah, Georgia, and under the protection of which the Confederate steam-ship Nashville lay. The river was obstructed by a row of piles, and defended with torpedoes. On the 27th of January, 1863, Lieutenant Worden attacked the fort with the monitor Montauk, three gun-boats, and a mortar schooner. He was unable to damage it materially. On the 1st of February he repeated the attack, with no better success: his monitor received 61 shots. On the 3d of March a still more formidable attempt was made by Captain Drayton,

with four monitors and several mortar schooners. The former kept up their fire all day, the latter continued it at night. About 250 shot and shell were thrown into the fort with so little effect that on the second day the attack was abandoned.

On the 27th of February the Wissahickon signaled that the Nashville was coming down the river. Destruction of the Nashville. After steaming a short distance the Nashville suddenly stopped, having run aground. During the night, which was mild and hazy, she still remained fast, and, when day broke, the monitor Montauk fired at her. The fort returned this by a 10-inch solid shot, which struck the pilot-house of the monitor, and then broke into halves, one part falling on the top of the turret, the other rolling on the deck. At the fifth fire the Nashville received a shell which burst through her deck near the foremast. Soon afterward she blew up, the explosion carrying into the air charred and broken timbers and burning bales of cotton. Nothing remained but the iron skeletons of her wheels.

But perhaps the most interesting conflict in this locality was that which took place on the 17th of June, 1863, between the monitor Weehawken and the iron-clad Atlanta.

A British blockade-runner, the Fingal, had gone into Savannah on the 12th of November, 1861, Capture of the iron-clad Atlanta. with a cargo of arms, and, being unable to escape after the capture of Fort Pulaski, had been turned into an iron-clad, and named the Atlanta. Attended by two steam-boats, she came out from Savannah to meet, and, as was expected, to capture the monitor Weehawken. Her fire was not returned until the distance had diminished to 300 yards. The first shot from the Weehawken's 15-inch guns shivered the shutter of one of the Atlanta's port-holes; the second knocked off her pilot-house; another, fired at 100 yards, passed through her side-armor, killing and wounding 13 of her men. The Confederate captain was obliged to haul down his flag after the action had lasted

15 minutes, and the two steam-boats, the decks of which were crowded with ladies who had come down to witness the capture of the monitor, returned back to Savannah.

An English blockade-runner, the Princess Royal, was captured on the 29th of January, 1863, while

Attempt to recapture the Princess Royal.

attempting to run into Charleston Harbor.

Her cargo was very valuable; she had on board two marine engines, several rifled guns, and large quantities of arms, munitions, and medicines. An expedition was therefore fitted out for her recapture. It consisted of the Confederate iron-clads Palmetto State and Chicory. On the 31st of January they made an attack in the obscurity of a haze that enveloped the blockading fleet. The Palmetto State ran into the blockader Mercedita, and at the same time fired into her a 7-inch shell, which blew a hole four or five feet square in her side; her steam-drum was also perforated, and, several of her men being scalded, her captain was compelled to strike his flag. Another of the blockading vessels, the Keystone State, was set on fire by a shell, but, the flames being extinguished, her captain attempted to run his antagonist down; his ship was, however, disabled, the steam-chest being shot through, and many of the men scalded. Daylight now breaking, and the other blockading vessels coming up, the assailants escaped back to Charleston, their main object, the recapture of the Princess Royal, unaccomplished. General Beauregard, who was in command in Charleston, considered it expedient to take advantage of the adventure by declaring

The Confederates declare the blockade of Charleston raised.

that the entire hostile fleet had been sunk, dispersed, or driven off, and that the blockade was raised. His statement was corroborated

by the British Consul at Charleston, and the commander of the British war steamer Petrel, who affirmed that they had gone five miles beyond the usual anchorage of the blockading vessels, but could see none of them with their glasses. Hereupon the Confederate Secretary of State,

Benjamin, issued a circular declaring the port of Charleston open; but the statements made by the British captain and consul were contradicted by the officers of the blockading squadron, and denounced by them as untrue.

Admiral Farragut, for a considerable portion of the year 1863, felt himself compelled to employ many of his most efficient vessels in active river service, co-operating with the army in the reopening of the Mississippi, and expelling hostile forces from its banks. He committed the matter of the coast blockade to others of his command, and devoted his unremitting personal attention to the removal of every obstacle to the free navigation of the river. Had an adequate co-operating land force been furnished in 1862, Vicksburg might easily have been taken; but, so much had it been strengthened in the interval, that this was, as we have seen, a work of great difficulty in 1863. It was indispensable that communication should be opened with Porter, commanding the Mississippi squadron, and with Grant, while they were operating against Vicksburg: in March, Farragut therefore moved up in strong force from Baton Rouge, intending to pass the batteries of Port Hudson while Banks advanced on the place by land. The batteries were in the form of a crescent, the central one being on a bluff so high that a passing vessel could not elevate her guns sufficiently to reach it, nor could the guns of the battery be sufficiently depressed to bear on a ship underneath; but the batteries on the two horns of the crescent could give an enfilading fire.

On the 14th of March, Farragut, in the Hartford, with the Albatross lashed to her side, and followed by the frigates Mississippi, Richmond, Monongahela, and the gun-boats Essex, Genesee, Kineo, and Sachem, prepared to pass Port Hudson before midnight. As they approached the Port, signal-lights were seen and answered by others on the opposite shore. A large fire was kindled to show the passing ships. The

Naval operations on  
the Mississippi.

Farragut runs the  
batteries of Port  
Hudson.



Confederates did not commence their attack until the whole fleet was completely under their guns. Farragut passed the batteries so deliberately that, in the dense smoke settling on the river, the Richmond was repeatedly in danger of running into his ship. Soon it was impossible to see the several vessels, or to distinguish them from the batteries. The ships had repeatedly to cease firing for fear of injuring their consorts. In passing, the distance between them and the enemy's works was in some places not more than 20 yards. The fire was considered, by those who had been present at other engagements on the river, as the severest that had been witnessed. There was hardly a breath of wind; the smoke moved very slowly: this gave the Confederates a great advantage, for they might fire without intermission across the river, and were in no danger of damaging their friends. The Hartford and Albatross alone rounded the point above the batteries; all the other ships were obliged to return. The Richmond came to anchor on the west side of Prophet Island, so near to the shore that her poop-deck was strewn with the blossoms and leaves of the budding trees which she had brushed back. As she was in the act of turning round on her retreat, a torpedo exploded under her stern, throwing the water nearly as high as her mizzenmast-head.

The frigate Mississippi ran aground, and in that helpless condition was riddled through and through. Burning of the frigate Mississippi. A shell fired into her ignited some turpentine: she was soon in flames. All hands, including the wounded, were put ashore on the bank opposite Port Hudson. As the ship lightened by burning, she swung off into deep water, and then drifted down the river, bows foremost, as if steered by a pilot. It was not until she had gone down eight or ten miles that the fire reached her magazine and she blew up.

With the Hartford and Albatross Farragut thus succeeded in approaching Vicksburg, and in communicating

Farragut controls  
the river between  
Vicksburg and  
Port Hudson.

with Porter. He had now command of the river between that place and Port Hudson, and was able to intercept supplies from Texas destined for the Confederate armies. This accomplished, he left his flag-ship, the Hartford, and, returning below by way of the Atchafalaya, resumed operations for a final attack on Port Hudson. In the siege of that place the navy very effectually aided. Nearly 3000 13-inch shells were thrown into it by the mortar vessels.

The Mississippi squadron, under command of Porter, performed very important services. It aided in the capture of Arkansas Post (Chap. LI.) in January, 1863; destroyed the batteries of

Operations of the  
Mississippi squad-  
ron.

Grand Gulf in May, and co-operated in the reduction of Vicksburg. It obtained control of the Yazoo; was concerned in the Yazoo Pass expedition, and the expedition of Steele's Bayou and Deer Creek. It patrolled the Cumberland and Tennessee; some of its steamers on the Ohio chased Morgan over a distance of 500 miles, and intercepted him and his band when trying to escape. At Vicksburg it performed a conspicuous part. For forty-two days,

It aids in the siege  
of Vicksburg.

without intermission, the mortar-boats threw shells into all parts of the city, and even into the works beyond. Heavy guns, mounted on scows, commanded the water batteries, and for fourteen days maintained an incessant fire upon them. The gun-boats below the city, in co-operation with the army, were continually engaged in shelling the place. During the siege 16,000 shells were thrown from the mortar gun-boats and naval batteries upon the city.

Importance of con-  
trolling the river  
between Vicksburg  
and Port Hudson.

The national government had obtained control of the Mississippi on the north as far down as Vicksburg, and on the south up to Port Hudson. It was of great importance to secure possession of the stream between those places, and blockade the mouth of the Red River. Across this portion of

the Mississippi the Confederates drew very large supplies. We have seen that Farragut ran the Port Hudson batteries to bring a part of his force into this position, and Porter made repeated attempts with the same intention, passing the Vicksburg batteries. On their part, the Confederates made the most strenuous exertions to oppose these attempts.

Colonel Ellet, with the ram Queen of the West, the gun-boat De Soto, and a coal-barge, ran past the Vicksburg batteries on the 2d of February, 1863, with a view of patrolling the Mississippi and its affluents below. Hearing that there were three steamers at Gordon's Landing, he determined to capture them. On rounding a point behind which they lay, he came under the guns of a battery, and so severe was the fire that he was compelled to order his pilot to back the Queen. Instead of doing this, the pilot ran her ashore. It was impossible now to escape. Her steam-pipe was presently cut in two. Her crew, throwing overboard the cotton-bales with which she was protected, floated away on them. The interior of the boat was full of steam, the lights had gone out, the passages were so blocked with cotton and shattered furniture that the wounded on board could not be removed, and therefore the ship could not be set on fire. The De Soto could not be brought alongside, as the light of her furnace would have rendered her conspicuous, and involved her in the same fate. She lay, at the time, about a mile below.

Ellet was soon afterward obliged to burn the De Soto and her coal-barge, and escape on the Era, a steam-boat he had captured. He was pursued by the Confederate steamer Webb, and rescued by the Indianola, which had just come from the mouth of the Yazoo.

The Indianola had passed the batteries of Vicksburg a few days after the Queen of the West, and had been occupied in blockading the

The Queen of the West passes Vicksburg,

and is captured by the Confederates.

The Indianola passes Vicksburg,

mouth of the Red River. She had left that position on the 21st of February for the purpose of obtaining cotton-bales to fill the space between her casemate and wheel-houses, so as to be better protected from boarding-parties. On February 24th, at 9½ P.M., four Confederate steamers were discovered in pursuit of her. They were the Queen of the West, which, after her capture, as above related, the Confederates had managed to repair, the Webb, and two cotton-clads full of men. The Queen struck the coal-barge fastened to the side of the Indianola, and cut through it. The Indianola and Webb then ran at each other. When they struck, the concussion was so violent that nearly every one on both vessels was knocked down. The Webb's bow was cut to a depth of eight feet, but the Indianola escaped the shock without injury. Though the night was very dark, her assailants eventually managed to cripple her so much that her captain was obliged to run her ashore and surrender her. Her capture placed the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and also the Red River, once more under the control of the Confederates. Her eventual destruction was a ludicrous and yet important incident of the war. An old coal-barge, picked up in the river, was turned by Admiral Porter's men into a monitor. "It was built of old boards in twelve hours, with pork-barrels on top of each other for smoke-stacks, and two old canoes for quarter-boats; her furnaces were built of mud, and only intended to make black smoke, and not steam;" a small house, taken from the back-yard of a plantation, stood for a pilot-house; some pitch served for fuel.

As soon as the "dummy," turned adrift on the Mississippi, came in range of the Vicksburg batteries, they opened upon it. Not without amazement did the garrison perceive that they could make no impression upon "the turreted monster." It was full of water before it started, and therefore could not sink; it

and is captured by  
the Confederates.

She is blown up  
by them.



had not a gun nor a man on board, and therefore could not return their fire. In ominous and silent disdain, it seemed to be making for the Confederate iron-clads: the Queen of the West, leaving part of her crew ashore, fled, making the best of her way to the Red River; the Indianola was ordered to be blown up, which was accordingly done.

The Confederate government constructed several powerful iron-clads, the Merrimac, the Albemarle, the Tennessee, the Atlanta, the Louisiana, the Manassas, the Mississippi, the Arkansas, the Virginia: these were intended for harbor defense. I have already (Chapter LIX.) referred to the earlier Confederate privateers—the Savannah, the Petrel, the Sumter, the Nashville, etc.; some of them were of insignificant size, and some had a brief career. Of the iron-clads, all, without exception, were either captured or destroyed; and by these earlier cruisers comparatively little damage was done to the national commerce.

But at length, in some of the British ship-yards, powerful vessels were constructed for the Confederate service. Of these, the Oreto was the first completed, nominally for the Italian government. She was built at Birkenhead; left England without any difficulty, in spite of the remonstrances of the American minister; made the island of Nassau; thence she ran into Mobile, still carrying British colors. In January, 1863, she escaped out of Mobile, and now, under the name of the Florida, commenced a destructive cruise. In three months she had captured 15 vessels, turned two of them into cruisers, and burnt the rest. In August she crossed the Atlantic, reaching Brest September 4th; was there detained, and then released. Again crossing the Atlantic, she reached Bahia, in Brazil; was unlawfully captured in that port by a United States ship, for which act the Brazilian government demanded and received reparation. She was brought into Hampton Roads, and was there sunk by, as it was affirmed, an accidental collision with another vessel.

Earlier Confed-  
erate cruisers.

The Anglo-Confed-  
erate cruisers.

Great Britain had now become the naval base of the Confederacy. In her ship-yards were built many fast steamers intended to run the blockade, and some formidable as cruisers. These Anglo-Confederate ships succeeded in driving American commerce from the sea. The Tallahassee, in a cruise of 10 days, destroyed 33 vessels; the Chickamauga burnt vessels to the value of half a million dollars; the Georgia, which had been built, under the name of the Japan, at Glasgow, was, after accomplishing much destruction, captured by the national frigate Niagara about 20 miles from Lisbon. Of the Confederate cruisers there were only seven that were formidable, and of these five were built in Great Britain.

Of the British-built ships, by far the most important was the Alabama. She was constructed, under the name of "The 290," expressly for the Confederates, by Laird, a Liverpool ship-builder, who was also a member of the House of Commons, and, against the urgent remonstrances of the American minister, was permitted by the British government to escape (July 29, 1862). Under command of an English captain, she went to Terceira, and there was joined by another English vessel, from which she received her armament; and, soon after, still another brought her Semmes, the former captain of the Sumter, and a crew.

On Sunday, August 26, 1862, having received her armament, and being in other respects ready, "The 290" steamed out of port. When in the open sea, Semmes appeared on deck in full uniform, and announced that the ship was henceforth the Confederate steam-ship Alabama. The British flag was hauled down, the Confederate hoisted and saluted. The crew were British. On the 29th of August she began her cruise; on the 5th of September she made her first capture, burning the ship, and putting the crew into irons. By the close of October she had made 27 prizes. Her manner of operation, as in-

Great Britain becomes the naval base of the Confederacy.

The 290, or Alabama.

Manner of her equipment.

The devastation she occasions.

deed was the case with all the Anglo-Confederate cruisers, was to approach, under the British flag, her prey, and when it was entrapped, to hoist the Confederate; Semmes then either burnt or bonded his victim. Having received a supply of coal at one of the West India Islands, he lay in wait for the California treasure-ships, capturing one—the Ariel—which, however, was outward, and not inward bound, and therefore not a very profitable prize. On January 11th he sunk the Hatteras, one of the blockading ships off Galveston, having lured her within reach by hoisting British colors and hailing as her majesty's ship Petrel. The broadside of the Alabama was 324 pounds, that of the Hatteras 94. After a battle of a quarter of an hour the Hatteras went down. Semmes subsequently cruised in the West India seas for a time, and then went to the coast of Brazil. He then crossed the Atlantic to Cape Town, August 5th, and thence to the Malay Archipelago, which he reached in November. After an unproductive cruise of three months in those waters, he returned homeward, destroying on his way but few American vessels, for there were but few now at sea. On the 11th of June he went into the French harbor of Cherbourg.

Captain Winslow, commander of the national ship of war Kearsarge, learning that the Alabama was in Cherbourg, at once sailed for that port, and a battle took place between the two ships on Sunday, June 19th, 1864. Their proportions and armaments were about equal. The Alabama was 220 feet long, 1150 tons; she carried one 7-inch Blakely rifle, one 8-inch smooth-bore 68-pounder, six 32-pounders. The Kearsarge was 214½ feet long, her tonnage 1030; she carried two 11-inch Dahlgren guns, one 30-pounder rifle, four 32-pounders. The Alabama had about 140 officers and men, the Kearsarge 22 officers and 140 men. As a protection, Winslow hung his anchor cable over the midship section of his ship on each side. The gunners of the Ala-

Her battle with the Kearsarge, and destruction.

bama were trained artilleryists from the British practice-ship *Excellent*.

At twenty minutes past 10 the *Alabama* was seen coming out of Cherbourg Harbor, attended by an English steam-yacht, the *Deerhound*. Winslow at once retired out to sea, so that there should arise no questions about the line of jurisdiction. When seven miles out, he turned and steered directly for the *Alabama*, which had followed him. The *Alabama* opened fire at the distance of a mile. When within about 900 yards, the *Kearsarge* returned it, and so manœuvred as to compel the *Alabama*, with a full head of steam, to move in a circular track during the engagement, and cut off her retreat to the French shore.

In one hour and two minutes the battle was over. The *Alabama* was dreadfully shattered. Semmes had hauled down the Confederate flag and hoisted a white one. The bow of his ship rose high in the air, the stern rapidly settled, her mainmast broke off as she sunk. Though she had fired 370 shell and shot, she had not inflicted any severe damage on the *Kearsarge*.

The officers and crew of the *Alabama* were in part rescued by the boats of the *Kearsarge*; in part, at the request of Winslow, by the *Deerhound*; in part by two French pilot-boats. Among those taken out of the water by the boats of the *Deerhound* was Semmes. The *Deerhound*, instead of delivering up those she had rescued, steamed off to the English coast, and there landed them.

The *Alabama* had captured, during her cruise, 65 vessels, and had burnt all except when there was a motive for sparing them. She had destroyed property supposed to be worth ten millions of dollars; she had driven American commerce from the sea. She was built by British hands in a British ship-yard; her crew, her guns, her gunners were British. She sailed under the British flag, and found a welcome in British harbors. She never was in Confed-

Escape of her captain to England.



erate waters, never saw Confederate land, and used the Confederate flag only when in the act of making a prize.

In 1863, the *Shenandoah*, under the name of the *Sea King*, was built at Glasgow. The Confederates bought her in September, 1864. She went out to Madeira to receive her arms, stores, and crew, and thence sailed to Australia and the North Pacific. She burnt 25 ships and bonded 4, continuing the destruction long after the war was over. The captain, at length finding that the Confederacy was overthrown, returned to England, and surrendered his ship to the British government.

Another of these Anglo-Confederate cruisers, the *Stone-wall*, was built in a port of France for the Danish government, and sold to the Confederates; she was eventually surrendered to the Spaniards at Havana, and by them given up to the United States.

The international relations of Great Britain and the United States were thus, by the affair of these Confederate cruisers, brought into a most perilous condition. While the *Alabama* was yet occupied in her destructive career, the American minister, Mr. Adams, was directed "to solicit redress for the national and private injuries already thus sustained, as well as a more effective preventive of any repetition of such lawless and injurious proceedings in her majesty's ports hereafter." Under this form of urbanity—this courteous solicitation of a twofold redress for the national and the private injury—was presented to the consideration of the British administration one of the most momentous questions which has ever occupied the attention of that country.

Other Anglo-Confederate cruisers.

The American government demands reparation for these wrongs.

## SECTION XVII.

### OPERATIONS PRELIMINARY TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS.

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#### CHAPTER LXXIV.

##### THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. SALLY OF THE CONFEDERATES. THE FORT PILLOW MASSACRE.

An expedition for the destruction of the railroad system centering at Meridian was undertaken by General Sherman.

Though a powerful cavalry force which was to have co-operated with him failed to do so, he was completely successful. Many fugitive slaves accompanied the returning expedition.

Forrest, with the Confederate cavalry, made a sally, and captured Fort Pillow; under circumstances of great atrocity, the garrison was massacred in cold blood. Results of the Meridian expedition.

THERE were three important strategic points demanding the attention of the national commanders in the Southwest. They were: (1), Meridian; (2), Mobile; (3), Shreveport.

The three objective points at the Southwest.

(1.) As respects Meridian. With the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson the Confederate government lost control of the Mississippi River; it still, however, possessed means of rapid communication north and south along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, east and west along the Southern Mississippi. The point of intersection of these two railroads is at Meridian.

(2.) As respects Mobile. With the exception of Wilmington in North Carolina, Mobile was the only port open to the Confederacy, and, notwithstanding the stringency of the blockade, blockade-runners occasionally made their way into that harbor with very valuable cargoes.

(3.) As respects Shreveport. Immense supplies for the


use of the Confederate armies had been derived from the Red River country and from Texas. Though these had been very seriously diminished by the loss of the navigation of the Mississippi, communication still continued to be stealthily carried on with the trans-Mississippi states Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas. Shreveport is the most important strategic point of that region.

Hence it was necessary that the railroads centering at Meridian should be destroyed; that the forts at the entrance of the harbor of Mobile should be captured, and that place closed to surreptitious commerce. It was desirable that Shreveport should be occupied.

I shall therefore devote three chapters of this section to a narrative of the movements undertaken for the accomplishment of these objects. In a fourth chapter—for this is the most convenient place to dispose of those subjects—I shall add a brief statement of some minor military affairs, thus clearing the way for an unobstructed view of the great and decisive campaigns.

The Meridian expedition, on the description of which we now enter, is essentially connected with Sherman's campaigns in the Atlantic States, to which it was the prelude. Its bearing on those campaigns is shown by the fact that it greatly aided Thomas in obtaining his victory at Nashville. The breaking up of the Meridian roads compelled Hood to linger long at Florence, waiting to obtain supplies for his men. Until the railroads were repaired, these could reach him only by wagoning. The delay thus arising gave an opportunity to prepare the army at Nashville, and, when Hood did advance, to deliver against him a decisive blow.

By the destruction of Meridian and its railroads, not only were the interior communications of the Confederacy seriously damaged, but it became possible to strip with



THE RAILROADS OF MISSISSIPPI.



impunity the garrisoned places on the Mississippi, and to make 15,000 national troops available elsewhere.

After the capture of Vicksburg it was intended to carry the Meridian expedition into execution, but the intense heat of the season, the drought, and the condition of the men, caused it for the time to be deferred. In September it was necessary for Sherman's forces to march to the relief of Chattanooga, and subsequently to that of Knoxville. These objects accomplished, the original intention was resumed.

No one can peruse a narrative of the Meridian expedition and of the collateral Confederate movements without perceiving that an important epoch of the war had been reached. The military object of the expedition was sufficiently great, but something even more important was obviously taking place spontaneously. The social system of the South was breaking up. Crowds of slaves, escaping to freedom, accompanied the returning marches. The Emancipation Proclamation was proving itself to be something more than an idle threat.

This crowding of fugitive slaves to the national columns was often a source of much embarrassment to the commanding officers. Humanity required that these unfortunates should be provided for and protected. On many occasions this could be done only with difficulty, and much unavoidable suffering ensued.

For the national government to enlist able-bodied Africans as soldiers was eminently proper, but it is to be recorded, to the discredit of some of the Free States, that they made attempts to obtain among these fugitives recruits for the purpose of filling up the quotas for which they were liable, desiring to keep at home in their factories their skilled operatives. Their agents in this shameful business met with the indignant rebukes of the soldiers and officers of the armies they were haunting, and eventually the scheme had to be abandoned.

It shows the effect  
of the Emancipation  
Proclamation.

Toward the colored troops in the national service the Confederate authorities exhibited much severity. A determination not to concede to them the rights of soldiers put an end to the exchange of prisoners, and, as will be seen in this chapter, sometimes led to the perpetration of atrocities, as on the occasion of the massacre at Fort Pillow.

Sherman had returned to Nashville about the 20th of December, 1863, and went thence to Memphis by way of Cairo. "Now is the time," he wrote to McPherson (January 10th), "to strike at Meridian and Selma. I think Vicksburg is the proper point of departure." He ordered Hurlbut to evacuate all minor points, to draw in all public property to Cairo and Memphis, and especially to abandon Corinth and Fort Pillow. In respect to the latter place he was not obeyed. Some black troops were left there, and, as we shall shortly find, a dreadful tragedy was the result.

Hurlbut was further ordered to prepare two divisions of 5000 men each, and have them ready to embark by January 25th. General W. Sooy Smith, chief of cavalry on Grant's staff, had 2500 men at Memphis; to these were added, from Hurlbut's command, sufficient to make over 10,000 effective men. To McPherson similar orders were given for two divisions of infantry and artillery.

A spy brought from Meridian to Vicksburg an official, and, therefore, an authentic statement of the strength and position of the Confederate forces. Polk was in chief command at Meridian. There were scattered companies of infantry and cavalry all over the state, collecting taxes and forcing conscripts; at Canton was Loring's infantry division, 7000 men and 18 guns; at Brandon, French's broken division, 3000 men and 10 guns. It was subsequently re-enforced from Mobile up to 5000 men. Forrest commanded the

Preparations for the expedition.

Forces engaged in it.

Strength of the Confederates at Meridian.

cavalry district of North Mississippi; his force was about 4000. Stephen E. Lee commanded the South cavalry district; his force also about 4000.

Sherman's object was to break up the railroads about Meridian during the month of February, and Objects of the expedition. be prepared, by the 1st of March, to assist Banks in a movement on Shreveport. Then he expected to be ready to join Grant's operations in the summer campaign. In a letter to Banks he says: "I propose to avail myself of the short time allowed me in the department here to strike a blow at Meridian and Demopolis. I think I can do it; and the destruction of the railroads east and west, north and south of Meridian, will close the door of rapid travel and conveyance of stores from the Mississippi and the Confederacy east, that will make us all less liable to the incursions of the enemy toward the Mississippi. I intend to leave Vicksburg about the 25th instant, and hope to be near Meridian about February 8th and 10th."

Sherman then requests Banks to have a feint made on Mobile, so as to prevent the enemy's drawing forces from that place to resist him. He reminds him that if the Meridian railroads can be destroyed, Mobile will have no connection with the interior save by the Alabama River; that the single track from Meridian to Selma is the only link that unites the Mississippi to the East, and that its destruction will do more to isolate the State of Mississippi than any other single act; he thinks that it should succeed if Polk is not too heavily re-enforced from Mobile and Atlanta, and adds that this and a similar movement on Shreveport would, he believes, settle the main question in the Southwest.

To Porter he says he does not think it "to our interest to go beyond Meridian until we can take Mobile and the Alabama River."

To carry these intentions into execution, Sooy Smith was to move from Memphis on or before February 1st with

A co-operating cavalry force is to come from Memphis.

an effective force of 7000 cavalry lightly equipped, and march direct on Pontotoc, Okalona, and Meridian, arriving at the last place about February 10th, the distance being 250 miles. He was "to disregard all minor objects; to destroy railroad bridges and corn not wanted; to break the enemy's communications from Okalona to Meridian, and thence eastward to Selma; if convenient, to send to Columbus, Mississippi, and destroy all machinery there, and the bridge across the Tombigbee, which enabled the enemy to draw resources to the east side of the valley." Sherman himself, with four divisions of infantry and artillery, would, at the same time, move from Vicksburg on the same objective point, the distance being 150 miles; and, to mask the main movement, he arranged a feint to be made up the Yazoo River as high as Greenwood.

Sherman left Vicksburg on the 3d of February, in two columns: Hurlbut's by Messenger's, and McPherson's by the railroad bridge. All unnecessary baggage was left behind. The soldiers took twenty days' rations. The weather by day was beautiful, the nights cool and frosty; in some places ice formed thickly. No tents were taken. From the commanding general to the private, all bivouacked by camp-fires in the open air. The roads were in excellent condition; they were mostly in a soil of red clay mixed with sand.

At first there was no opposition, but on the 5th there were continual skirmishes for 18 miles. That night Jackson was reached just as the enemy were leaving it. The expedition was a complete surprise. In their precipitate flight from that city the Confederates had no time to destroy the pontoon bridge across Pearl River. They could only cut the ropes. The bridge, thus secured, was at once repaired, and the army commenced crossing. On the 9th it reached Morton, McPherson in the advance. Here, however, he was halted in order to break railroads; and Hurl-



but, taking the lead, kept it to Meridian. The march was steady and easy; and, though the enemy's cavalry hovered around, it gave but little trouble. Beyond Morton great numbers of dead mules and horses lay along the road; wagons, ammunition, clothing, and guns were scattered by the wayside, the disastrous effects of the disorderly Confederate retreat.

At Tallahatta, 20 miles from Meridian, obstructions of felled timber were encountered. Sherman, It reaches Meridian. inferring from this that the enemy were trying to gain time to cover the movement of railroad property from Meridian, dropped his trains, leaving them with strong escorts, and hastened to the Octibibeha, where the bridge was found burning; however, a large cotton-gin close by furnished material, and a couple of hours sufficed for building a new bridge. Meridian was entered at 3.30 P.M. on the 14th, with little opposition, the enemy having already retired. So secure did the Confederates consider themselves in this place that several of their officers were building fine residences. Polk had gone to Demopolis at 10.30 that morning in the cars. One locomotive and train were burning at the dépôt, but all the other rolling-stock had been removed to Mobile, or toward Selma, 107 miles distant. Sherman, knowing that the enemy could not be overtaken before he could cross the Tombigbee, and not wishing to be burdened with the wounded at so great a distance from the river, did not pursue, but, resting on the 15th, began next day destroying the railroads intersecting at Meridian. The immense dépôt, warehouses, and length of side-track demonstrated how important this place was to the enemy. Through it they had heretofore transported their armies and vast supplies.

For five days 10,000 men worked hard with axes, sledges, Destruction of the railroads. crowbars, clawbars, and fire: Meridian, with its dépôts, store-houses, arsenals, offices, hospitals, hotels, and cantonments, was totally destroyed. Noth-

ing was spared except the inhabited houses. It was made a smoking ruin.

To Hurlbut was intrusted the north and east, to McPherson the south and west of the town. The former reported the destruction of 60 miles of ties, and iron burnt and bent, 1 locomotive destroyed, and 8 bridges burnt; the latter reported 55 miles of road destroyed, 53 bridges, 6075 feet of trestle-work below Quitman, 19 locomotives, 28 cars, 3 steam saw-mills burnt or ruined. The soldiers soon became expert at the work. The rails were first torn up; the ties were then dug up and piled together; the rails being then placed across the pile, it was kindled, and when they were red hot they were twisted. Twisting was found to be far more effective than simple bending—a bent rail might be straightened, but nothing could be done with a twisted one. The railroads were thus ruined as far south as below Quitman, east to Cuba Station, 20 miles north to Lauderdale Springs, and west all the way back to Jackson.

Sherman remained at Meridian till February 20th, giving himself 10 days to reach Vicksburg and keep his appointment with Banks in the Shreveport expedition. The return march of the army was through Canton, north of the line of advance. At Canton, a pretty village with many fine residences, 15 locomotives were captured. Crowds of fugitive

The return march of the expedition.

slaves flocked to the army to make their escape. An eye-witness says, "They form a mournful curiosity, with their lacerated backs, branded faces, and ragged garments. They are of both sexes, and of every shade of complexion. They vary in age from one month to one hundred years. The simple tales of horror they relate are sufficient to chill the blood." "Some were on foot, some on horseback, some in ox-carts. Some were clad in their 'Sunday best,' the cast-off clothes of their masters. Of the women, some had bandana handkerchiefs twisted in turban fashion round their heads, or were dec-

Vast numbers of fugitive negroes accompany it.

orated with scraps of ribbon and fantastic finery of every conceivable hue. I saw one carrying a little child in her arms; she had another on her back, and still another was holding by her skirts. The father strode in front; a pile of bundles was sustained by a stick on his shoulder, and all sorts of kitchen utensils and household trumpery were hanging upon his body. So vast was the crowd that families were separated, and women and children lost in the throng. These simple people believed that 'the day of Jubilee,' of which they had so often sung in their hymns and begged for in their prayers, had come at last."

Another eye-witness says, "From four to seven thousand slaves accompanied the return of the expedition. I defy any human being to look on the scene unmoved. Old men with the frosts of seventy years upon their heads; men in the prime of manhood; youths, and children that could barely run; women with their babes at their breasts. They came, some of them, it is true, with shouts and careless laughter, but silent tears coursed down many a cheek—tears of thankfulness for their great deliverance. There were faces in that crowd which shone with a joy almost inspired. Smile who will, but the story of the coming of the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt can never recall to my mind a more profound emotion than the remembrance of that scene. The Carnival at Rome, with the fantastic costumes of the populace, presents nothing more varied and promiscuous than did the attire of this assemblage.

"When I looked upon the long line of national soldiers filing through roads in which our slaughtered brothers lie buried thicker than sheaves in a harvest-field, and reflected on the horrors to which this race has been subjected by the foes whom we are fighting, I felt faith in a God of justice renewed in my heart."

From Canton the fugitive negroes were sent forward to Vicksburg with the train in advance of the army. On

the third day it rained heavily. The negroes, shivering with the cold, their children crying, and women moaning piteously, endeavored, to the best of their ability, to keep up with the train.

Thus far nothing had been heard of Sooy Smith. Had he come as ordered, Polk's army could not possibly have escaped, and the expedition might have advanced as far as Selma before it returned. Cavalry were sent in various directions in search of him. Sherman now left his army, hastened to Vicksburg, and went down quickly to New Orleans to arrange with Banks and Porter the Shreveport expedition. Not until his return did he learn that Smith had not started from Memphis until the 11th, advancing no farther than to West Point, and had turned back on the 22d. "His reports to me," says Sherman, "are unsatisfactory. He delayed his start until the 11th, when his orders were to be at Meridian on the 10th, and when he knew that I was marching from Vicksburg. The mode of his return to Memphis was not what I had expected; he had nothing to deal with but Forrest and the militia. I hope he will make these points more clear to the general-in-chief."

Polk, having retired safely behind the Tombigbee, determined to send out his cavalry on a sally. He ordered it to join Forrest, who had now about 7000 men, and to resist the advance of Smith, then marching toward Meridian. An action occurred at Okalona, in which Forrest had the advantage, taking from Smith six guns, and compelling him to retreat over the country he had laid waste.

Forrest now advanced into Tennessee, devastating the country as he advanced. He captured Jackson, in that state, on the 23d of March, and, moving northward, appeared before Paducah, held by Colonel Hicks with 650 men. His demand for a surrender was accompanied with a threat: "If you surrender, you

The cavalry co-operating force fails.

Sally of the Confederate cavalry under Forrest.

It is repulsed from Paducah.



shall be treated as prisoners of war; but if I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter." He made three assaults, and then retired, having lost 1500 men.

On the 12th of April he was at Fort Pillow, which was garrisoned by 19 officers and 538 men, of whom 262 were negroes. This force was not a part of the army, but a nondescript body in process of formation, placed there to cover a trading-post for the convenience of families supposed to be friendly, or at least not hostile; it had been left in violation of Sherman's peremptory orders. The attack was made before sunrise; and, after some severe fighting, Major Booth, the commanding officer of the garrison, was killed. Major Bradford, who succeeded him, drew the troops from the outer line of intrenchments into the fort, and continued the contest until afternoon. A gun-boat, which had been co-operating in the defense, withdrew to cool or clean her guns, and, the fire slackening, Forrest sent a summons to surrender, and shortly after a second, demanding that the surrender should be made in twenty minutes. These terms were declined by Bradford. But, while the negotiations were in progress, the assailants were stealthily advancing, and gaining such positions that they could rush upon the fort.

Accordingly, as soon as Bradford's answer was received, they sprang forward. The fort was instantly carried. Its garrison threw down their arms and fled, seeking refuge wherever they could. And now was perpetrated one of the most frightful acts of all recorded history. The carnage did not cease with the struggle of the storming, but was continued as a carnival of murder until night, and renewed again the next morning. Without any discrimination of color, age, or sex, the fugitives were dragged from their hiding-places and cruelly murdered. Wounded men, who had made a gallant defense, were atrociously compelled to stand up and be shot; some were burnt in their tents,

He appears before  
Fort Pillow.

Capture of that  
fort.

Massacre of the  
garrison.

some were stabbed. For the black soldiers there was no mercy. "They were massacred because they were niggers," and the whites "because they were fighting with niggers." General Stephen E. Lee, the superior of Forrest, partly denying and partly excusing this atrocity, says, "It is generally conceded by all military precedent that, when the issue has been fairly presented and the ability displayed, fearful results are expected to follow a refusal to surrender. The case under consideration is almost an extreme one. You had a servile race armed against their masters, and in a country which had been desolated by almost unprecedented outrages."

The Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War appointed a sub-committee to go to such places as they might deem necessary, and take testimony in relation to the Fort Pillow massacre.

Report of the Congressional Committee on the subject.

Their report presents facts in connection with this massacre of the deepest atrocity. Men were not only shot in cold blood and drowned, but were even crucified, buried alive, nailed to the floors of houses, which were then set on fire. "No cruelty," says this committee, "which the most fiendish malignity could devise, was omitted by these murderers." "From three to four hundred men are known to have been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom at least three hundred were murdered in cold blood after the post was in possession of the rebels, and our men had thrown down their arms and ceased to offer resistance."

The evidence collected by this committee is very voluminous. I may here quote portions of it. It should be mentioned in behalf of General Forrest that one of the witnesses, who had been rewounded, testified that "Forrest gave orders to stop the firing."

Evidence given before that committee.

One white officer, John C. Akerstrom, 2d Lieutenant of

Some of the garrison are crucified.

Company A, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, was more than crucified. It appeared in evidence that he was nailed through his hands and feet to the side of a house, which was then set on fire. One of the witnesses stated, however, that "the nails were not driven through his hands, but through his wrists; but there were some black sergeants nailed through the hands to logs, and the logs were then set on fire."

The master's mate of the gun-boat *New Era*, who was sent ashore the next day with a detail of men, under a flag of truce, to collect the wounded and bury the dead, testified: "I saw one black man that I took up off a tent-floor. He lay on his back with his arms stretched out. Part of his arms were burnt off, and his legs were burned nearly to a crisp. His stomach was bare. The clothes had either been burnt off or torn off. In order to take away the remains, I slipped some pieces of board under him, and when we took him up the boards of the tent came up with him, and we then observed that nails had been driven through his clothes and his cartridge-box so as to fasten him down to the floor. His face was not burned, but was very much distorted, as if he had died in great pain." This awful statement was corroborated by several others of the burial-party who helped to remove the corpse.

A colored private of the Sixth United States Heavy Artillery testified: "I saw them bury one man alive. He was shot in the side, but he was not dead, and was breathing along right good. Every once in a while, as they put dirt on him, he would move his hands. I was standing right there, and saw him when they put him in, and saw that he was not dead."

Some are buried alive.

Another colored private of the United States Sixth Heavy Artillery gave evidence: "Toward evening General Forrest issued an order not to kill any more negroes, because they

wanted them to help to haul the artillery out. I saw them pulling the artillery, and I saw the Secesh whip them as they were going out just like they were horses."

No event of the Civil War was, in a moral point of view, more detrimental to the Confederacy than this murder of the garrison of Fort Pillow. Christianity every where was shocked. Even in Europe, among persons who had been supporters of the Southern cause, many were permanently alienated; nor was their just indignation limited to those who perpetrated the crime. Davis and the Richmond government were considered responsible, because, out of deference to the slaveholding interest, they failed to punish, or even to rebuke, the authors of this atrocity.

Forrest now retreated into Mississippi, and 12,000 men, under General Sturgis, were ordered to follow him; but he evaded them. Early in June Sturgis was again sent after him; but, through mismanagement, the expedition not only disastrously failed, but Sturgis was pursued almost to Memphis, losing between three and four thousand men. In the early part of July another command was sent against Forrest, under A. J. Smith. An action occurred at Tupelo, and Smith was compelled to retreat to Memphis. It set out again from that place in the beginning of August, but Forrest was not to be found.

Sturgis pursues Forrest, and fails. While the expedition from Memphis was seeking him, he made a sudden and very unexpected dash upon that city; occupied it for a few hours, and then retreated into Mississippi.

Dash of Forrest into Memphis. Sherman's Meridian expedition secured all the military results that had been contemplated. He marched about 400 miles during the shortest month of the year, and had his army in better health and condition than when he started. His loss was 21 killed, 68 wounded, 81 missing. The general results of the movement, including those of Sooy Smith, are stated to have been as follows: One hundred and fifty miles of railroad,

Results of the Meridian campaign.



sixty-seven bridges, seven hundred trestles, twenty locomotives, twenty-eight cars, several thousand bales of cotton, several steam-mills, and over two million bushels of corn were destroyed. Upward of eight thousand negroes and refugees came in with the various columns. Nothing could more plainly show the intrinsic weakness of the Confederacy than the success of this march.

The diversion which was made by Farragut at Mobile in Sherman's behalf proved to be completely successful. It thoroughly deceived the enemy. Of the expedition—also intended as a diversion in his favor—which went up the Yazoo, Sherman says, "I suppose it fulfilled its objects; but, for some reason, after going up as far as Fort Pemberton, Colonel Coates sent his boats back to Vicksburg with cotton and forage." We may perhaps infer what was Sherman's opinion of the nature of its success from his remark, "When Colonel Coates makes his official report of his operation up the Yazoo River, I will indorse it according to my judgment at the time."

## CHAPTER LXXV.

### CLOSURE OF THE REMAINING GULF PORT. BATTLE OF MOBILE HARBOR.

Admiral Farragut was ordered to reduce the forts guarding the entrance of the harbor of Mobile.

In addition to the forts, the harbor was defended by a powerful iron-clad ship, the Tennessee, and several gun-boats.

Farragut carried his fleet past the forts; he compelled the iron-clad ram to surrender, and captured or put to flight the gun-boats.

The forts surrendered.

It had at one time been resolved by the national government that the city of Mobile should be reduced. This intention was, however, subsequently modified, it being concluded that the capture of the outer forts and the possession of the bay would suffice to put an end to blockade-running. A very considerable Confederate army, garrisoning the inner forts and protecting the city, would thus be held in neutralization by shipping.

The forts, but not the city of Mobile, to be attacked.

The entrance into the Bay of Mobile is divided by Dauphin Island into two channels. That on the east is four miles wide and twenty feet deep; that on the west is shallow. The main channel is guarded by Forts Gaines and Morgan. The former, having an armament of 21 guns, is on the eastern end of Dauphin Island; the latter, on the western end of Mobile Point, is a stone casemated fort mounting 48 guns. Grant's Pass, west of Dauphin Island, is guarded by Fort Powell. In the bay itself were the iron-clad ram Tennessee, and the gun-boats Gaines, Morgan, Selma. Obstructions and defenses of all kinds had been placed round the harbor, and thirty torpedoes set across the channel.

The success of the Merrimac at Norfolk, and of the Al-

The iron-clad ram  
Tennessee.

bemarle at Plymouth, had so excited the expectations of the Confederates that they insisted on the Tennessee going out and destroying Farragut's wooden fleet which lay off the harbor. With that iron-clad they expected to raise the blockade. On the 17th of March, 1864, the Tennessee appeared in the bay, having come out of Dog River. She was floated over the bar by camels, but she made no attempt to attack Farragut's ships.


In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Farragut says: "Thus, you perceive, I am in hourly expectation of being attacked by an almost equal number of vessels, iron-clad against wooden vessels, and a most unequal contest it will be, as the Tennessee is represented as impervious to all their experiments at Mobile; so that our only hope is to run her down, which we shall certainly do all in our power to accomplish; but, should we be unsuccessful, the panic in this part of the country will be beyond all control. They will imagine that New Orleans and Pensacola must fall."

Farragut had already made reconnoissances in person.

Farragut recon-  
noitres the bay.

He says: "On the morning of the 20th of January (1864), I made a reconnoissance of Forts Morgan and Gaines. The day was uncommonly fine, and the air very clear. We were distant from the forts three or three and a half miles, and could see every thing distinctly. I could count the guns and the men who stood by them; could see the piles that had been driven across from Fort Gaines to the channel opposite Fort Morgan, the object of which is to force the ships to keep as close as possible to the latter."

On the 25th of May he writes: "I ran in shore yesterday, and took a good look at the iron-clad Tennessee. She flies the blue flag of Admiral Buchanan. She has four ports on a side, out of which she fights, I understand from the refugees, four 7-inch Brooks's rifles and two 10-inch Co-



THE DEFENSES OF MOBILE BAY.

lumbiads. She has a torpedo fixture on the bow. Their four iron-clads and three wooden gun-boats make quite a formidable appearance.”

The national fleet. The national fleet, which was to attempt to force its way into the harbor of Mobile, consisted of fourteen wooden ships. Four monitors, the Tecumseh, Winnebago, Manhattan, and Chickasaw, were to be added. It was toward the close of July before they arrived, and Farragut then prepared for action.

Plan of operations agreed on. A consultation was held on board the flag-ship Hartford between the Admiral and Generals Canby and Granger. It was agreed that Canby should send all the troops he could spare to co-operate with the fleet. Subsequently it proved that a sufficient force could not be spared to invest both forts, and, at Farragut's suggestion, it was determined that Fort Gaines should be attacked first.



The attempt to force an entrance into the harbor was made on the morning of August 5th. It proved to be a brilliant success.

The attacking fleet was under way by 45 minutes past 5 A.M., two abreast, and lashed together in the following order: The Brooklyn, with the Octorara on the port side; Hartford, with the Metacomet; Richmond, with the Port Royal; Lackawanna, with the Seminole; Monongahela, with the Kennebec; Ossipee, with the Itasca; and Oneida, with the Galena.

On the starboard side of the fleet were the monitors or iron-clads, in the following order: Tecumseh, Manhattan, Winnebago, and Chickasaw. They were therefore between the wooden ships and Fort Morgan for the double purpose of keeping down the fire from the water battery and the parapet guns of the fort, as well as to attack the ram Tennessee as soon as the forts were passed. The wind was light from the southwest, and the sky cloudy, with very little sun.

Farragut reluctantly permitted the Brooklyn to assume the lead, because she had four chase-guns, and an ingenious contrivance for picking up torpedoes. He himself took an elevated position in the main rigging of the Hartford, near the top, from which he could overlook all the vessels of the fleet.

The attacking fleet steamed steadily up the main ship channel, the Tecumseh firing the first shot at 47 minutes past six. Soon afterward Fort Morgan opened. It was replied to by a gun from the Brooklyn, and immediately the action became general.

In a few moments the monitor Tecumseh, about three hundred yards ahead, and on the starboard bow of the Brooklyn, struck a torpedo and instantly sunk, carrying with her her commander, Captain Craven, and almost all her crew. Hereupon the Brooklyn, which was nearly abreast of the fort, heavily engaged, and

Arrangement of  
the ships.

The fleet attacks  
the forts.

The monitor Te-  
cumseh sunk.

suffering so severely that two thirds of her whole loss had already occurred, paused and backed in order to go round what evidently was a nest of torpedoes. This brought the whole fleet into imminent peril. Had Farragut also halted, the ships would all have been huddled helplessly together under the guns of the fort, as the monitors were at Charleston at the time of Dupont's attack, and a similar catastrophe would have been the result.

It is in such a moment of imminent peril that the qualities of a commander are seen. Farragut instantly ordered his own ship ahead, and, under a full press of steam, led the fleet forward through the line of torpedoes.

The Brooklyn was quickly under headway again, following the Hartford. At the time of his taking the lead, Farragut ordered the Metacomet to send a boat to save, if possible, some of the perishing crew of the Tecumseh. Only 17 of them were thus rescued.

From the moment he turned to the northwestward to clear the Middle Ground, Farragut kept such a broadside fire upon the batteries of Fort Morgan that its guns did comparatively little injury.

Just after the Hartford had passed the fort, which was about ten minutes before eight o'clock, the ram Tennessee made a dash at her. She had been lying in wait, expecting that the ships would be in a crippled condition. The gun-boats Morgan, Gaines, and Selma aided her in this attack. The Hartford suffered severely. Her captain, Drayton, says: "We could direct our fire only on one of them at a time. The shots from the others were delivered with great deliberation and consequent effect, a single one having killed ten men and wounded five." Farragut therefore ordered the Metacomet to cast off and go in pursuit of the Selma, which had thus annoyed him excessively with her three

The Brooklyn  
hesitates,

and Farragut takes  
the lead in his ship.

He is attacked by  
the Tennessee and  
three gun-boats.

stern guns, and which he could not answer, owing to his rifle gun-carriage having been destroyed by a shell. In an hour the Selma was captured.

The gun-boats driven off or captured.

The Morgan and Gaines succeeded in escaping to the protection of the guns of Fort Morgan. The latter, however, was so injured that she had to be run ashore, and was subsequently burned. The Morgan found her way up to Mobile in the night.

Having passed the forts and dispersed the enemy's gun-boats, Farragut had ordered most of his ships to anchor, when he perceived, at 45 minutes past 8, the ram Tennessee making directly for him. He saw at once that it was the intention of Buchanan, the Confederate admiral, to assail the whole fleet. He therefore ordered the monitors, and such other vessels as he thought best adapted for the purpose, to attack the ram not only with their guns, but "bows on at full speed."

Battle with the Tennessee.

The Tennessee was built on the plan of the celebrated Merrimac, which had caused so much destruction in Hampton Roads. She was very strongly constructed of oak and yellow pine, with iron fastenings. Her length was 209 feet; breadth, 48 feet; draught, 14 feet. Her deck was covered with iron 2 inches thick, her sides with two layers of 2-inch iron; the thickness of the sides was 8 feet. Her casemate was very strong, its plating 6 inches thick. Her armament was six rifles, two pivots of  $7\frac{1}{8}$  inches bore, and four 6-inch broadsides.

Her construction and strength.

The Confederate admiral believing, from the result of the battle of the Merrimac in Hampton Roads, that he could destroy Farragut's wooden ships, had resolved to make the attempt. Of the fourteen wooden ships, three were large sloops of 2000 tons burden, carrying very heavy armaments of 9-inch Dahlgrens and 100-pounder rifles. The smaller vessels were also heavily armed. Two of the monitors had 11-inch guns; one, the Manhattan, had 15-inch

Number and armament of her opponents.

guns. "Although the Merrimac had been defeated by the Monitor, it was thought that she was not seriously injured by 11-inch shot. The monitors had failed in their attack on Charleston; the Albemarle had beaten off a whole fleet; and, though the Atlanta had been captured, her armor was only four inches thick. The casemates of the Tennessee were covered with six inches of iron, an armor which, up to this time, had never been penetrated. Buchanan knew that his ship was invulnerable not only to the 9-inch guns and rifles of the wooden ships, but to the 11-inch Dahlgrens of the monitors. The experience which wooden ships had thus far had in ramming iron-clads was not calculated to alarm him, while the destruction wrought on wooden vessels by armored ships assured him that he would be likely to destroy any one that he could fairly strike. There was but one vessel in the fleet whose guns he had reason to fear, the monitor Manhattan; and there were not then many naval officers in America or in Europe who believed that the 15-inch gun could penetrate armor 6 inches thick."

The ram was now fast approaching Farragut's fleet, and all such questions were soon to be settled. The Monongahela, of fourteen hundred tons, carrying thirty pounds of steam, and her screw working sixty revolutions, was the first vessel that struck the Tennessee. She gave her a fair blow at full speed. In so doing she carried away her own iron prow and her cutwater; then, swinging round, she fired into the iron-clad her 11-inch guns at the distance of a few feet. The Tennessee apparently received no injury. The Lackawanna was the next vessel to strike her, which she also did at full speed; but, though her own stem was cut and crushed to the plank ends for the distance of from three feet above the water's edge to five feet below, the only perceptible effect on the ram was to give her a heavy list. The Hartford was the third vessel which struck her; but, as the Tennessee

Previous battles of iron-clads.

Effect of ram-blows on the Tennessee.



quickly shifted her helm, the blow was a glancing one, and as she rasped alongside, the Hartford gave her whole port broadside of 9-inch solid shot within ten feet of her casemate.

The monitors worked slowly, but delivered their fire as opportunity offered. Effect of cannon-shot on her. The Chickasaw succeeded in getting under the Tennessee's stern, and a 15-inch shot from the Manhattan broke through the iron plating and heavy wooden backing of her casemate, though the missile itself did not enter the vessel.

Immediately after his collision with her, Farragut ordered his captain to bear down for the ram again. The Tennessee strikes her flag. He was doing so at full speed, when the Lackawanna ran into the Hartford just forward of the mizzen-mast, cutting her down to within two feet of the water's edge. However, she soon got clear again, and was fast approaching the ram, when Buchanan struck his colors.

The Tennessee was at this time sore beset. The Chickasaw was firing at her stern; the Ossipee was approaching her at full speed; the Monongahela, Lackawanna, and Hartford were bearing down upon her. Her smoke-stack had been shot away, her steering-chains were gone, several of her port-shutters were so jammed that they could not be opened. Indeed, from the time the Hartford struck her until her surrender, she never fired a gun. Her crew could not keep their feet under the tremendous blows she was receiving. They had become demoralized. As the Ossipee was about to strike her, she hoisted the white flag; and that vessel immediately stopped her engine, though not in time to avoid a glancing blow.

During this contest with the gun-boats and ram Tennessee, which terminated in her surrender at Losses in the battle. ten o'clock, many more men were lost than by the fire of the batteries of Fort Morgan. On the Confederate side, Buchanan was severely wounded. The cap-

tain of the Tennessee came on board the Hartford to surrender his sword and that of Buchanan.

Farragut's loss was 165 killed and drowned; of these, 113 went down in the Tecumseh. He had 170 wounded. On board the Hartford there were 25 killed and 28 wounded. The Oneida had 8 killed and 30 wounded, among them her commander. This loss was mainly due to the explosion of one of her boilers by a 7-inch shell, nearly all her firemen and coal-heavers on duty being scalded by the steam. Nevertheless, while her steam was still escaping, her guns were fired without intermission. An exploding shell set fire to the top of her magazine; but it was extinguished, the serving of the powder still going on.

It is interesting to remark that, setting aside the loss in the Tecumseh, while there were 52 killed and 170 wounded on board the wooden vessels, there were none killed and none wounded on board the monitors. The ships were more severely injured at Mobile than at New Orleans, and, except in the case of the Brooklyn, the damage was mainly caused by collisions with the Tennessee, and by her shot and shell.

Thus far the forts had been passed, not taken. But, during the ensuing night, Fort Powell was abandoned and blown up. Fort Gaines was shell-  
Surrender of the forts. ed the next day by the Chickasaw, and compelled to surrender. The fleet was on one side of it, Granger's troops on the other. With it were taken 800 prisoners.

Fort Morgan was captured on August 23d. Granger's troops had been transferred to the rear of it. On the 22d it was bombarded. A fire broke out which compelled the garrison to throw 90,000 pounds of powder into the cisterns. The fort was soon reduced to a mass of ruins. Its commander, Page, resisted one day, and then surrendered at discretion. Before surrendering he threw his sword into a well, and injured his guns and other material of war. With the defenses of Mobile there were taken 104 guns and 1464 men.

## CHAPTER LXXVI.

### THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION.

An expedition for the capture of Shreveport, on the Red River, was undertaken by General Banks.

He was defeated in a battle at Sabine Crossroads, and abandoned the expedition.

The co-operating fleet was with difficulty extricated. Colonel Bailey constructed a dam across the Red River, by the aid of which it escaped.

This expedition was connected with discreditable cotton operations.

A co-operating force under Steele, at Little Rock, advanced as far as Camden, in Arkansas, but was compelled to retreat.

THE Meridian expedition completed, every thing was made ready for the Shreveport campaign.

The operations of the French in Mexico had rendered it necessary that the United States should hold some point in Texas. Military considerations had inclined General Halleck to take possession of the Red River. He considered Shreveport as the most important objective point for operations in a campaign of troops moving from the Teche, the Mississippi, and the Arkansas Rivers to establish a position within the State of Texas which should be permanently held. In his instructions to Banks (November 9th, 1862), he says: "Having the Red River in our possession, it would form the best base for operations in Texas."

There were several, and, it should be added, conflicting motives in undertaking this Red River campaign. The State Department desired it for the reason just assigned, as called for by the movements of the French in Mexico. The President added to that a wish for the establishment of a loyal government in Louisiana. Banks saw in it the opportunity of obtaining a supply of cotton, for there were large quantities of that staple in the region about to be invaded. Rumors pre-

Military importance  
of Shreveport.

Motives for the Red  
River expedition.

vailed that the Confederate General Kirby Smith had entered into an arrangement with some cotton speculators that his army was to fall back while the cotton was secured.

Grant, appreciating thoroughly the military insignificance of the trans-Mississippi states, never heartily approved of the Red River Expedition. He believed that the machinations of the French in Mexico would be more effectually neutralized by victories in Virginia than in Louisiana—by the capture of Richmond rather than by the capture of Shreveport. Sherman considered the Red River expedition admissible only under the condition that it should be executed with rapidity. He would not give to it more than 30 days, and would not have inclined to it at all had he not foreseen the necessary delay of operations in Virginia and the West, owing to the time that must elapse before the furloughs to the veteran soldiers would expire.

Opinions of Grant and Sherman on the subject.

These great soldiers clearly discerned certain principles in the military administration of the Western states: that the Mississippi is better protected by means of the Yazoo and Washita Rivers than by guarding its own banks; that Arkansas can be best defended on the line of the Red River; that Alexandria and Shreveport are the strategic points of Louisiana—the latter, if held in force, covers all Arkansas and Louisiana, and is the proper offensive point against Texas—that, in fact, it is the strategic centre of the trans-Mississippi.

Considered thus as a movement of local or Western policy, the expedition to Shreveport presented important advantages; but, considered as a movement of national policy, its value was comparatively trifling. Nevertheless, it was determined upon, and Banks attempted to carry it into effect. He was, however, unskillful in military operations, excelling rather in schemes of civil experiments—a qualification which is unsuited to the conduct of a perilous campaign.


Banks undertakes the Shreveport expedition.



Sherman, on completing his Meridian expedition, went immediately to New Orleans, and had an interview with Banks. A plan of campaign up the Red River was agreed upon, having Shreveport, which is at the head of steam-boat navigation on that river, for its objective.

About the beginning of March, 1864, Franklin moved from New Orleans, by railroad, to Brashear City, and thence by the Bayou Teche and Opelousas to Alexandria. A powerful fleet, under Admiral Porter, was brought to the mouth of the

Franklin commences the campaign.



THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION.

Red River; it consisted of twenty steamers, several of them being monitors and iron-clads. Franklin, who had formerly held a command in the Army of the Potomac (vol. ii., page 471), was intrusted with the initiation of the movement, Banks being for the moment detained in New Orleans, supervising certain political operations.

In accordance with their agreement, Sherman sent to

A detachment under A. J. Smith from Vicksburg, and one under Steele from Arkansas, added.

Banks A. J. Smith, with 7500 men of the 16th Corps, and 2500 of the 17th Corps. Smith embarked at Vicksburg on the 10th of March to join Porter's fleet. He was then to unite with Banks's force, and a force under General Steele, from Arkansas, was to be added. At this time the Confederate trans-Mississippi force under Kirby Smith was 41,000, of whom 31,000 were serviceable. A large part of it, under Taylor, lay at Shreveport, expecting to be joined by troops from Price and Walker.

On the 12th the fleet moved up the Old Red River, and anchored off the ruins of Semmesport, that place having been burned in former military operations. As nothing could be heard of Banks, Smith disembarked some troops to reconnoitre, and learning that a Confederate force had retreated to Fort De Russey, thirty miles distant, he determined to follow it. The fort consisted of two earth-works, connected by a covered way. After a cannonade of two hours a charge was ordered, when, as it was about to be made, the garrison surrendered. While this was happening a portion of the fleet came up. More than 200 prisoners, 1000 muskets, and about 10 guns, were taken, and the works destroyed. The troops were then embarked for Alexandria, which place they reached on the evening of the 16th, and were joined by the remainder of the fleet. Here several thousand bales of cotton were collected, and on the 20th a cavalry force under General Lee, from Banks's command, arrived. It was understood that there were three large Confederate iron-clads at Shreveport.

Natchitoches, a town as old as Philadelphia, was taken on the 21st. Smith's force left Alexandria for Shreveport; Banks, whose column was now coming up, followed. He himself reached Alexandria on the 24th. The road from Natchitoches toward Shreveport is through a dense forest of pines, the surface

March toward Shreveport.

of the country being hilly and broken. These pine districts extend from Opelousas northward for thousands of square miles. Here and there are sparsely scattered cabins built of logs, thatched and plastered with mud. The only practicable road to Shreveport lay through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield, over a barren sandy country, with little water and no forage, and, for the most part, through one of these unbroken pine forests.

On the 8th of April the main body of the enemy was encountered in the vicinity of Sabine Cross Roads, and a battle ensued. Banks's army was little prepared for such an event. The cavalry was in advance; then came a train of 200 wagons, then the infantry followed. The line extended from twenty to thirty miles over a single road. An army correspondent who was present says:

“A long, thin line of clay-colored Confederates came out of the woods and drove back the cavalry. The battle took place in a pine-wood clearing. Suddenly there was a shout, the crashing of trees, the breaking of rails, the rush and scamper of men. Banks's line of battle had given way. Bareheaded riders rode with agony in their faces, and for ten minutes it seemed as if every thing was going to destruction. The flight continued for nearly three miles, until at Pleasant Grove, on the edge of a ravine, which might formerly have been a bayou, Emory's division of the 19th Corps was met drawn up in line. The fugitives fled beyond this line, and Emory prepared to meet the pursuers. They came on with a rush as the shades of night were creeping over the tree-tops. Emory fired three rounds, the pursuit was checked, the battle over. Banks now fell back to Pleasant Hill.”

Banks's loss was more than 3000 in killed, wounded, and missing, out of a force of about 8000. The Confederates captured 19 guns, and an immense amount of transportation and stores. At Pleas-

Battle of Sabine  
Cross Roads.

Battle at Pleasant  
Hill.

ant Hill they overtook him, and at 5 P.M. of April 9th another battle occurred. After a fierce engagement the Confederates were checked, and some of the guns that had been lost retaken. Smith and his soldiers now desired to advance. Banks, however, determined to retreat. There was no water, and the horses had been without food for 36 hours. He accordingly did retreat before daylight, leaving his dead unburied, his wounded in the hands of the enemy, and many muskets scattered over the field.

Banks retreats to Grand Ecore. He directed his march back toward Grand Ecore, having lost in the campaign 18 guns, many small-arms, 5000 men, 130 wagons, and 1200 horses and mules.

Porter's fleet of 12 gun-boats and 30 transports had Porter's fleet at Grand Ecore. meanwhile ascended the falls and reached Grand Ecore. This was at the time that Banks was preparing to advance from Natchitoches. Some of the smaller and lighter vessels continued to ascend, and on the 10th of April reached Springfield Landing. They had on board a portion of General Smith's troops. Here news reached them of Banks's disaster, and orders soon came for them to return to Grand Ecore. They did so, running the gauntlet of the enemy, who perpetually annoyed them from the river banks. It was a snaggy channel down which they had to return. An attack was actually made on them by 2000 Texas infantry. Nothing could be more reckless, more infatuated. "They fancied that they could carry gun-boats in that narrow, crooked channel by infantry charges, and it was not until their The Texas infantry charge the ships. leader, General Tom Green, had his head blown off by a shell that they could be quieted." The gun-boats got them under a raking fire of canister, and the bank, for a mile, was strewn with the bodies of five hundred of them.

It is the testimony of those who have served with them that the Texans are brave to rashness, generous, good-na-



tured, and that they treat their prisoners with much kindness. They are splendid horsemen, fine marksmen, and can go for days with but a morsel of uncooked food. But, though brave, they are perfectly undisciplined; they break ranks as soon as they commence firing. "Each man is a host in himself, and each leads his own host." Even in the opinion of Western soldiers—good judges of that matter—"they brag beyond all reasonable bounds."

On the 21st of April Banks recommenced his retreat, falling back to Alexandria, Smith's force now forming the rear guard. The Confederates continued the pursuit. On reaching the crossing of Cane River they were found in a strong position. But a flank movement being made through an almost impassable wood, the position was turned, and Banks reached Alexandria in safety on the 27th.

Banks continues his retreat toward Alexandria.

But, though Banks had managed to withdraw his army, it was very doubtful whether Porter could extricate his fleet. One of his best boats, the Eastport, he was compelled to blow up. She had grounded, and could not be got afloat. In the story of this campaign, so disgraceful to the national arms, there is but one redeeming feature—it is the engineering operation of Colonel Bailey, who succeeded in saving the rest of the fleet. In his report to the Secretary of the Navy (May 16th, 1864), Admiral Porter says:

Difficulty in extricating the fleet.

"I have the honor to inform you that the vessels caught by low water above the falls at Alexandria have been released from their unpleasant position. The water had fallen so low that I had no hope or expectation of getting them out this season; and, as the army had made arrangements to evacuate the country, I saw nothing before me but the destruction of the best part of the Mississippi squadron.

"Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, acting engineer of the 19th Army Corps, proposed a plan of building a series of dams across the rocks at the falls, and raising the water high enough to let the vessels pass over. The proposition looked

Bailey devises a plan of escape.

like madness, and the best engineers ridiculed it; but Colonel Bailey was so sanguine of success that I requested to have it done. Provisions were short, and forage was almost out; but the dam was promised to be finished in ten days, or the army would have to leave us. General Banks placed at the disposal of Colonel Bailey 3000 men, and 200 or 300 wagons."

Trees fell with great rapidity, teams were dragging trunks denuded of their branches to the river. Quarries were opened, flat-boats were extemporized to bring down stone from above. Cotton bales were rolled along. The soldiers entered heartily on the work, lightening their toil with favorite army songs, and among the dusky Africans arose "John Brown's body lies mouldering in the grave," and many plantation melodies. To all the task looked formidable, to many impossible. The falls are about a mile in length.

He constructs a dam at the falls.

"The work was commenced by running out from the left bank of the river a tree-dam made of the bodies of very large trees, brush, brick, and stone, cross-tied with heavy timber, and strengthened in every way which ingenuity could devise. This was carried about 300 feet into the river; four large coal-barges were then filled with brick and sunk at the end of it. From the right bank cribs filled with stone were built out to meet the barges, all of which was successfully accomplished, notwithstanding there was a current running nine miles an hour, threatening to sweep every thing before it.

"The dam had nearly reached completion in eight days' working time, and the water had risen sufficiently on the upper falls to allow the Fort Hindman, Osage, and Neosho to get down and be ready to pass. In another day it would have been high enough to enable all the other vessels to pass the upper falls. Unfortunately, on the morning of the 9th, the pressure of the water became so great that it swept away two of the stone barges, which swung in below the dam on one side. Seeing this, I ordered the Lexington to pass the upper falls, if possible, and immediately attempt to go through the dam.

"She succeeded in getting over the upper falls just in time, the water rapidly falling as she was passing over. She then steered directly for the opening in the dam, through which the water was rushing so furiously that it seemed as if nothing but destruction awaited her.

“The silence was so great as the Lexington approached the dam that a pin might almost have been heard to fall. She entered the gap with a full head of steam on, pitched down the roaring torrent, made two or three spasmodic rolls, hung for a moment on the rocks below, was then swept into deep water by the currents, and rounded to safely by the bank.

“Thirty thousand voices rose in one deafening cheer, and joy seemed to pervade the face of every man present. The Neosho followed next—all her hatches battened down, and every precaution taken against accident. She did not fare as well as the Lexington, her pilot having become frightened as he approached the abyss, and stopped her engine. The result was that for a moment her hull disappeared from sight under the water. Every one thought she was lost. She rose, however, swept along the rocks with the current, and fortunately escaped with only one hole in her bottom, which was stopped in the course of an hour. The Hindman and Osage both came through beautifully without touching a thing.

“The accident to the dam, instead of disheartening Colonel Bailey, only induced him to renew his exertions. The men had been working for eight days and nights up to their necks in water in the broiling sun, cutting trees and wheeling bricks, yet nothing but good-humor prevailed among them.

“The force of the water being too great to construct a continuous dam of six hundred feet across the river in so short a time, Colonel Bailey determined to leave a gap of fifty-five feet in the dam, and build a series of wing-dams on the upper falls. This was accomplished in three days’ time, and on the 11th instant the Mound City, the Carondelet, and Pittsburg came over the upper falls, a good deal of labor having been expended in hauling them through, the channel being very crooked, and scarcely wide enough for them. Next day the Ozark, Chillicothe, Louisville, and two tugs also succeeded in crossing the upper falls.

“Immediately after, the Mound City, Carondelet, and Pittsburg started in succession to pass the dam, all their hatches battened down, and every precaution taken to prevent accident.

“The passage of these vessels was a beautiful sight, only to be realized when seen. They escaped without an accident, except the unshipping of one or two rudders. This was witnessed by all the troops, and the vessels were heartily cheered. Next morning the Louisville, Chillicothe, Ozark, and two tugs passed over without any accident except the loss of one man, who was swept off the deck of one of the tugs. By three o’clock that afternoon the vessels were all

coaled, ammunition replaced, and all steamed down the river with the convoy of transports in company. Words are inadequate to express the admiration I feel for the ability of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey."

On the 14th of May Banks evacuated Alexandria, which was burnt. The origin of the fire was unknown; it was kindled in many places at the same time. Banks had given out, when the army first came, that the occupation would be permanent, and, induced by this, many of the inhabitants had joined the national cause: the men who had entered the army were marched off to the front at Semmesport; the women and children, who, frantic with terror, clamored on the wharf to be taken away on board the transports, were left to their Confederate enemies. The guns taken from the boats above the falls were destroyed.

Banks's army crossed the Atchafalaya by means of a bridge ingeniously constructed by Colonel Bailey: it was formed of 22 steam-boats placed side by side, with their bows lashed together. The troops then made their way to the Mississippi, and finally returned to New Orleans. At the crossing of the Atchafalaya, Banks met General Canby, who had been sent to relieve him, and turned over to him the command of the army.

As a military movement, the Red River campaign was conducted without capacity or discipline. The flight from the battle-field of Sabine Cross Roads recalls the flight from Stonewall Jackson down the Shenandoah Valley (vol. ii., page 393). Its only results, in addition to the disgraceful military disasters that attended it, were of a commercial and political character. The commercial transactions were conducted in part by those who ascended Red River by authority of the permit of the President, who is to be blamed for the weakness with which he too often gave such passes, and in part by speculators who, without any permit or other authority, so far as is shown by the evidence of the command-

Banks evacuates  
Alexandria.

Discreditable char-  
acter of the cam-  
paign.



ing general, came up on the head-quarters boat of the army, bringing with them bagging and ropes for the cotton they might secure.

In his evidence before the Congressional Committee, General Banks stated, "My judgment has been against allowing individuals to trade beyond our lines. I have never, under any circumstances, given permission to any one to do so, except when a man was sent into the country to get information. I have sometimes given permission to take a little stuff along—a sort of peddler's pack. If I had allowed individuals to take the three millions which we paid into the Treasury, and given them a sniff at the sixty or one hundred millions that might have been obtained, then there would have been much less complaint about the affairs in that department. The quartermaster thinks the three millions we paid over to the government has been the cause of all our trouble."

It is concerned in cotton speculations.

General Banks farther states, in relation to the seizure of cotton, "Under the general prize law, the naval authorities, upon their arrival at Alexandria, commenced the capture of cotton on both sides of the river, extending their operations from six to ten miles into the interior. Wagon-trains were organized, cotton-gins were put in operation, and the business followed up with great vigor. Some difficulty occurred with the marines, who insisted upon their right to pass the lines of the army, and threatened at one time to turn their guns against the troops."


Banks's disastrous retreat left the Confederates at liberty to march into Arkansas and act against Steele, who was moving toward Shreveport. It had been intended that Steele should take part with Banks in the operations against Shreveport. He had accordingly left Little Rock, on March 23d, with 12,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry under Carr. He was to be joined by 5000

Steele's movements toward Shreveport.

men under Thayer, and a small force under Clayton. At this time General Price, with 12,000 Confederates, was in Southwestern Arkansas.

Crossing the Little Missouri at a point menacing Shreveport, Washington, and Camden, Steele concealed his real destination, which was Camden. The Confederates were misled into the belief that

He obtains possession of Camden,



OPERATIONS IN ARKANSAS.

he intended to attack Shreveport, and Steele, moving vigorously, obtained possession of Camden.

News now coming of Banks's failure on the Red River, and the force of the enemy being not less than 25,000 men, there was nothing for Steele but to fall back. One of his foraging parties, sent out on the 21st of April, was attacked,

and lost 250 men, 4 guns, and 150 wagons. On the 23d he sent out a train of 250 wagons, 6 ambulances, an escort of 200 cavalry and 1200 infantry, with 4 guns, to Pine Bluffs, for supplies for the army. It was attacked by the Confederates; all the officers, and nearly all the men, were killed, wounded, or captured, and the guns and wagon-train taken.

On the 26th Steele determined to evacuate Camden, conducting his retreat over dreadful roads, and in the midst of torrents of rain. The Confederates overtook him at the crossing of the Saline River at Jenkins's Ferry, and an action ensued, lasting seven hours, in which they were repulsed, Steele losing 700 men, but securing a safe retreat to Little Rock, which he reached on the 2d of May. Steele's reverses gave back two thirds of the state to the Confederacy.

but is compelled to  
retreat to Little  
Rock.

It was evident that the trans-Mississippi military affairs must be placed in more skillful hands: Major General Canby was assigned to the command of "the Military Division of West Mississippi." He was directed to send the 19th Army Corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied.

Canby is placed in  
command of West  
Mississippi.

III.—Q

## CHAPTER LXXVII.

### MINOR MILITARY AFFAIRS.

There were several minor military affairs occurring during the years 1863 and 1864, which, though they have attained a certain celebrity, did not in any important manner influence the war.

Of these, some of the more prominent, such as the Florida, the Texas, the Arkansas Expeditions, are related. They are grouped in order, according to the departmental military system.

In this chapter I shall collect together a number of minor incidents furnished by the military service, as I have collected in Chapter LXXIII. similar incidents furnished by the naval service.

Classification of the minor military affairs.

These, though frequently presenting considerable intrinsic interest, can not be regarded as influencing in any important manner the course of the war. Accidental circumstances have given them celebrity, but in the great campaigns of Grant and Sherman there were many of equal moment which are now almost forgotten.

The military departmental system offers, perhaps, the most convenient means of grouping somewhat in order such miscellaneous facts. The departments were, in 1863, (1), West Virginia; (2), Virginia and North Carolina; (3), the South; (4), the Gulf; (5), the Tennessee; (6), the Missouri; (7), the Northwest; (8), the Pacific; (9), New Mexico; (10), the Ohio; (11), the Cumberland. Of these, the 7th, 8th, and 9th may with propriety be omitted, since happily they escaped the afflictions of the Civil War, and only experienced the troubles of conflicts with the Indians.

The military departments.

*The Department of West Virginia.*—In this department the military force was too small to attempt any important campaign. It acted chiefly on the defensive in repelling raids and breaking up guerrilla

Incidents in West Virginia.



bands. The insignificant character of these affairs may be estimated from the following instances: On the 24th of July, 1863, the Confederates were attacked at Wytheville; 2 pieces of artillery, 700 muskets, and 125 prisoners were taken from them. Their killed and wounded were 75, the national 78. In August, General Averill attacked a Confederate force under General Jones, at Rocky Gap, Greenbrier County, capturing 1 gun, 150 prisoners, and killing and wounding 200. His loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 130. On the other hand, the Confederate General Imboden made an attack (Sept. 11th) on the national troops at Morefield, killing, wounding, and capturing about 170.

*In the Department of North Carolina* the force was also small, and restricted to the defensive, holding important positions which had been previously captured. In March, 1863, the Confederate General Pettigrew made demonstrations on Newbern, but was forced to abandon his attempts. The national loss was 2 killed and 4 wounded. In April the Confederate General Hill laid siege to Washington, a town on Tar River, but was unsuccessful. He then marched toward Nansemond to re-enforce Longstreet, who was investing Suffolk. Failing in their direct assaults on that place, the Confederates established batteries for its reduction. The national General Peck made a vigorous defense, until the attempt was abandoned. His loss was 44 killed, 202 wounded, 14 missing. He captured 400 prisoners and 5 guns. On the 3d of May Longstreet withdrew, returning to Lee on the Rappahannock. After the retreat of the Confederates the garrison was withdrawn to other lines constructed round Norfolk.

In the following year, Pickett, who was now the Confederate commander, encouraged by the weakness of the national forces—12,000 troops having been made over from this department to that of the South—attacked and car-

ried a national outpost eight miles from Newbern, taking 100 prisoners. He also took by boarding the gun-boat Underwriter lying at the wharf, and set her on fire. He did not, however, make any attempt on the defenses of Newbern.

Some other affairs which took place on the coast of North Carolina, particularly those connected with the iron-clad ram Albemarle, have been alluded to on former pages (Chapter LXXIII).

While Lee was conducting his sortie to the Susquehanna, Dix, who was in command at Fortress Monroe, sent an expedition up the York River for the purpose of cutting Lee's communications with Richmond, and of attacking that place, then defended by only a handful of militia. The expedition, however, failed to accomplish a single object for which it had been fitted out; a failure resulting, it was alleged, from the inefficiency of one of the generals in command. Dix therefore ordered its return, and sent the troops of which it was composed to re-enforce the army of Meade north of the Potomac.

The expedition  
from Fortress  
Monroe.

*In the Department of the South* there were some events of interest. Toward the close of 1863, information had reached the government which led to the belief that Florida might be restored to the Union. There was a lull in the operations before Charleston, Gillmore having demolished Fort Sumter.

Incidents in  
Florida.

With the approval of Lincoln, who sent one of his private secretaries to join it, Gillmore undertook an expedition to Florida. It was under the immediate command of General Truman Seymour, who embarked from Hilton Head February 6, 1864, with 20 steamers and 8 schooners, and, reaching Jacksonville, occupied it the next afternoon. The place was found to be in ruins and abandoned by its inhabitants. Two days subsequently the cavalry under Colonel Henry moved

The expedition  
of Seymour.

westward, parallel to the railroad, with the intention of surprising a camp of the enemy. They succeeded in capturing 4 guns and a large amount of stores. Thence they marched to Baldwin, where they captured another gun, and, as was affirmed, half a million dollars' worth of stores. From this place Henry moved toward Lake City, half way from the coast to Tallahassee; but, finding the enemy in a strong position, he fell back four miles, and telegraphed to Seymour for orders and supplies. It was reported that the Confederate General Finnegan also fell back at the same time from Lake City.

Gillmore had gone with Seymour as far as Baldwin; but, not intending that any farther advance should be made, had returned thence to Hilton Head. He was, therefore, not a little surprised to find, by a dispatch from Seymour, February 17th, that that officer was contemplating an expedition to the Suwannee River, and even proposing to go without supplies. He immediately sent a remonstrance to him, for it was plainly pitting his 6000 troops against all the Confederate forces that could be gathered together from the adjoining states. But it was too late; Seymour had already been defeated disastrously at Olustee.

Seymour had set out on the 20th of February with about  
The battle of  
Olustee. 5000 men, marching westward parallel to the railroad, and had fallen into an ambush which Finnegan had prepared for him under cover of a pine forest near Olustee. His gunners and horses were shot down by the concealed riflemen. In twenty minutes his artillery lost 40 out of 50 horses, and 45 out of 82 men. A colored regiment, the Eighth United States, lost 350 men killed and wounded. Two other colored regiments, the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts and the First North Carolina, though at first overpowered, succeeded in checking the enemy. Seymour himself behaved with great gallantry, but was compelled to retreat with the wreck of his command. His loss was about 250 killed and more than 1200 wound-

ed. The Confederates had about 80 killed and 650 wounded. Seymour retreated to Jacksonville, and there destroyed about one million dollars' worth of national stores.

*In the Department of the Gulf*, General Banks relieved General Butler at New Orleans, December 17th, 1862. The strength of his army was 30,000 men. It constituted the 19th Army Corps. The chief military objects to which he devoted his attention were operations in Louisiana and Texas, and the capture of Port Hudson.

He ordered a detachment to Galveston to occupy that place under protection of gun-boats. Three companies of the Forty-second Massachusetts Volunteers, 240 men, in advance of the expedition, arrived on the evening of the 24th of December, 1862. They were landed upon the wharf, and took possession of the city. They were without artillery. The gun-boats were the Westfield, Harriet Lane, Owasco, and Clifton. They were in charge of Commander Renshaw. There were, in addition, two other vessels, but they were of little use.

General Magruder, who had already distinguished himself by his resistance to McClellan in the Peninsula, having been appointed to the Confederate command in Texas, resolved not only to attempt the recovery of Galveston, but likewise the capture or destruction of the blockading vessels.

The island on which Galveston stands is a sand-bank 30 miles long and 2 wide, connected with the main land by a bridge 2 miles long, over which the Galveston and Houston Railroad passes.

At 3 A.M., January 1st (1863), Magruder attacked the Massachusetts troops, who vigorously defended themselves. They had torn up the planking of the wharf on which they were posted so as to form a breastwork, and the gun-boats, opening fire on the assailants, soon repulsed them.

Two Confederate steamers—one of them a two-story boat,

Capture of Galveston by the Confederates.



Destruction of national shipping. piled with cotton-bales to protect her machinery; the other a stern-wheel boat, faced with railroad iron to the top of her funnel, so that the smoke seemed to come out of a conical roof—were descried through the haze coming down the harbor, and making for the Harriet Lane. One of them struck that gun-boat, in-



THE GULF COAST.

tending to run her down, but was disabled in so doing. She backed off on the flats, and then sunk. Men from the other boarded the Harriet Lane. In the struggle that ensued the captain of the Lane was killed, and her crew overpowered. The Owasco came to her relief, but was driven off by the rifles of the captors.

The Westfield ran aground in the confusion of the first alarm; and, after many attempts to get her off, Renshaw was compelled to order her to be blown up. A Confederate officer had come on board demanding the surrender of all the ships, but this Renshaw refused. As Renshaw

was in the act of stepping into a boat, the forward magazine exploded, having been prematurely fired by a drunken sailor. A flash of fire in the form of a fan shot up into the air, scattering in every direction exploding shells. The boats alongside were sunk. The soldiers ashore, seeing what had taken place, surrendered at discretion. The Owasco escaped to carry the news to New Orleans. Farragut at once re-established the blockade, sending vessels to prevent the Harriet Lane getting out to sea.

Magruder's loss in this achievement was 26 killed and 117 wounded. On the 11th of February, Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, addressed a circular to foreign consuls, informing them that the national fleets had been dispersed at Galveston and Sabine Pass, and that those ports were open to the trade of the merchants of their several nations.

The remainder of Banks's expedition did not arrive off Galveston till the 2d of January, the day after the forces there had been captured or destroyed by the Confederates. It did not attempt to land, but returned to New Orleans.


Among the minor affairs proper to be referred to here is the Teche Expedition of General Banks in the spring of 1863. The reader will bear in mind that this preceded the Red River Expedition described in the last chapter. I have been constrained to depart from a strictly chronological order in the narrative of these events, since otherwise it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to present them in their proper historical attitude.

In April, 1863, Banks sent an expedition along the Bayou Teche. It encountered the enemy at many points, and defeated them in every engagement. It reached Alexandria on the 8th of May, the Confederates retreating toward Shreveport and into Texas. It captured 2000 prisoners, 22 guns, 2 transports, and a large amount of public property. Three gun-boats and eight transports were destroyed. All Louisiana west of New Orleans and south

of Red River, and Red River from its mouth to Shreveport, fell into the national possession.

Banks now returned to the Mississippi River, crossed his army to Bayou Sara, where he formed a junction with General Augur's forces from Baton Rouge. The latter had an engagement with the enemy on Port Hudson Plains on the 22d of May, and immediately afterward invested Port Hudson. The neces-

Siege and capture of Port Hudson.



THE EXPEDITIONS IN LOUISIANA.

sary preparations having been completed, Banks gave orders for a general assault on May 27th. Though Farragut, with his fleet in the river, kept up a very heavy fire, the attack proved to be a failure. On this occasion negro troops were brought into action, and Banks, referring to their conduct, says that no men could be more determined or more daring. The loss was heavy, 293 being killed and 1549 wounded.

A second assault was attempted on the 14th of June,

and, though not completely successful, ground was gained and batteries established nearer the enemy's works. The garrison now began to be severely pressed by famine, mules and even rats being eaten. Nevertheless, it held on gallantly, in hopes that the siege would be raised. As previously related, it was compelled to surrender on the 8th of July, immediately on hearing of the fall of Vicksburg. With Port Hudson were captured 6233 prisoners, 51 guns, 2 steamers, 4400 pounds of cannon powder, 5000 small-arms, and 150,000 rounds of ammunition.

While Banks was engaged at the siege of Port Hudson, the Confederates in Northern Louisiana captured Alexandria and Opelousas, and moved down the Atchafalaya toward New Orleans. They were in hopes that they might compel Banks either to raise the siege of Port Hudson, or submit to the loss of New Orleans. They captured Brashear City, taking 1000 prisoners, 10 heavy guns, many small-arms, and supplies valued at two millions of dollars. Taylor, the Confederate commander, having only about 4000 men when he reached Brashear, did not feel himself strong enough to make an attempt on New Orleans. He therefore moved northward, and captured some small places on the river, successes which were, however, of no importance.

Banks's forces being ready for other operations after the fall of Port Hudson, the Confederates at once retreated from the east of the Atchafalaya (July 22d).

It was expected that Banks would now be directed to move toward Mobile, but considerations of foreign policy determined the government to occupy some point in Texas. The general was permitted to choose his own objective, though a movement on Natchitoches and Shreveport was preferred. He determined, however, to secure Sabine City, at the mouth of the Sabine River. For this purpose an expedition of 4000 men was

Advance of the Confederates toward New Orleans.

They are compelled to retreat.

The Sabine River expedition.



dispatched (September 5) to the Sabine, under Major General Franklin, a co-operating naval force being ordered by Farragut from the fleet. Franklin was expected to move his troops on the Confederate works at Sabine Pass, but he decided to make the attack with the gun-boats alone. These, being nothing more than merchant steam-boats which had been but slightly fitted up, were unable to contend with the batteries; several were disabled, some obliged to surrender. Franklin, without making any use of his troops, returned (September 11th) to New Orleans, his object unaccomplished.

Banks, finding that there would be great difficulties in a direct advance upon Shreveport, determined on another marine expedition. With a view of concealing his intention, he dispatched a small force to Opelousas. But this, on commencing its retreat from that place, was attacked by the Confederates (November 3d, 1863) at a moment when the Wisconsin troops were busy holding a political election, and suffered a severe loss of 716 killed, wounded, and missing.

In the mean time Banks's main force of about 6000 men reached Brazos Santiago, and advanced to Movement on Brownsville and Aransas Pass. Brownsville, capturing the works at Aransas Pass. But, supposing himself not strong enough to encounter the Confederate force in Texas, he withdrew, and returned to New Orleans.

The operations, thus feebly conducted, were determined Motive of these Texan expeditions. upon by the government, not for military, but for political reasons. Throughout the war strategic considerations indicated that the correct course was simply to maintain the defensive in the trans-Mississippi countries. State policy determined otherwise. On the 8th of January, 1864, Halleck, in a letter to Grant, says: "Banks's campaign against Texas was undertaken less for military reasons than as a matter of state policy. As a military movement simply, it perhaps presented less

advantage than a movement on Mobile and the Alabama River, so as to threaten the enemy's interior lines. But, however this may have been, it was deemed necessary, as a matter of political or state policy connected with our foreign relations, and especially with France and Mexico, that our troops should occupy and hold at least a portion of Texas. It is therefore unnecessary for us to inquire whether or not the troops could have been employed elsewhere with greater military advantage."

*In the Department of the Tennessee*, after the capture of

Incidents in the  
Department of  
the Tennessee.

Vicksburg, Grant reported that his troops were so much fatigued and worn out with forced marches and the labors of the siege as absolutely to require several weeks of repose before undertaking another campaign. Nevertheless, as the exigencies of the service seemed to need it, he sent out those who were least fatigued on several expeditions, while the others remained at Vicksburg to put that place in a condition for defense by a small garrison. Among these expeditions was one to Yazoo City; others against Canton, Pontotoc, Granada, and Natchez. As soon as his army was supplied and rested, Grant sent a force under General Steele to Helena to co-operate with Schofield's against Little Rock, and another under Generals Ord and Herron to New Orleans to re-enforce Banks. Small expeditions were also sent to the Red River, and to Harrisburg and Monroe, on the Washita, to break up and destroy guerrilla bands.

After Grant left Vicksburg to assume the general command east of the Mississippi River, General McPherson moved with a part of his force to Canton, Mississippi, scattering the enemy's cavalry, and destroying his material and the roads in the centre of that state.

*In the Department of the Missouri*, the withdrawal to

Incidents in the De-  
partment of the  
Missouri.

Missouri of a large part of the national forces in Arkansas left the frontier of the former exposed to raids. Early in January, 1863, a

Confederate force, estimated at from 4000 to 6000, under Marmaduke, moved upon Lawrence Mills, and proceeded by way of Ozark to the attack of Springfield, Missouri, to which place a small national force of about 1000 men was compelled to fall back. They obstinately defended it during most of the day (the 8th of January), losing 164 men. Under cover of night the enemy withdrew.

On the 9th of March General Curtis was relieved of the command of the Department of the Missouri, and on May 13th General Schofield succeeded him.

A steam-boat, the *Sam Gaty*, was captured by Confederate guerrillas near Independence, March 28th, 1863. Several of her white passengers were murdered. Of 80 negroes on board, 60 escaped; but the remainder, being seized, were drawn up in a line on shore, one man holding a lantern by the side of their faces in succession, while others shot them through the head.

On the 15th of July General Blunt crossed the Arkansas River near Honey Springs, Indian Territory, and next day attacked a superior force of Confederates, completely routing it. His loss was 77; that of the enemy about 600, 1 piece of artillery, and 200 stand of arms. After several skirmishes, Blunt descended the Arkansas River, and on the 1st of September occupied Fort Smith, Arkansas.


A band of 300 Confederate guerrillas, under Quantrell, attacked the town of Lawrence, in Kansas, on the night of the 21st of August. The people were surprised in their beds. Those who came out into the streets to ascertain the cause of the uproar were shot without ceremony. The place was sacked; every negro and German who could be found was murdered. The court-house and many of the buildings were set on fire; 140 men were killed, and 185 buildings burnt.

As soon as Vicksburg had capitulated, General Steele was sent with a force to Helena, July 21st, to form a junction with General Davidson, who

The sack of  
Lawrence.

Steele's operations  
in Arkansas.

was moving south from Missouri, and to drive the enemy south of the Arkansas River. This junction being effected, Steele established his *dépôt* and hospitals at Duvall's Bluff, and then advanced against the enemy, who fell back toward Little Rock. After several skirmishes, he reached the Arkansas River, and threw a part of his force upon the south side, to threaten the enemy's communications with



EXPEDITIONS IN ARKANSAS.

Arkadelphia, and take his defenses in reverse. The Confederates fled in disorder, and on the 10th of September the national troops took possession of the capital of Arkansas, their loss in killed, wounded, and missing not exceeding 100. On the 28th of October the national troops occupied Arkadelphia, the enemy retreating to Red River.



Rosecrans, who, after the battle of Chickamauga, was superseded by Thomas, was assigned to the command of the Department of the Missouri. He reached St. Louis in the beginning of January, 1864, and found Missouri in a very disturbed condition, an expectation prevailing that the Confederate General Price would shortly invade it, and that he would be joined by the members of a secret society, 23,000 in number, known as "The Order of American Knights," or "The Sons of Liberty." Respecting this society Rosecrans sent information to Washington, but the government was reluctant to sustain the rigorous measures which he was disposed to take with some of its members.

About the last of August, it being reported that Price, with a force of 10,000 men, had reached Jacksonport on his way to invade Missouri, General Smith's command, then *en route* from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri; a cavalry force also, at the same time, was sent from Memphis under command of Colonel Winslow. This made Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained that he would be able to check Price and drive him back, while the forces under Steele in Arkansas would cut off his retreat.

On the 26th of September Price attacked Pilot Knob, and forced the garrison to retreat. Thence he moved north to the Missouri River, and continued up that river toward Kansas. General Curtis, commanding the Department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General Rosecrans's cavalry, under Pleasonton, was operating in his rear.

At the crossing of the Big Blue the Confederates were overtaken by Pleasonton, who routed and pursued them beyond Little Santa Fé. With his cavalry he followed them until the Little Osage was reached; there (October 25th), charging their rear-guard, he

Rosecrans in command of the Department of the Missouri.

Price invades Missouri.

He attacks Pilot Knob.

He is driven back into Arkansas.

routed it, capturing 8 guns and 1000 prisoners, among them the Confederate Generals Marmaduke and Cabell. The roads were covered with the burnt wrecks of wagons and other abandoned material, but Price made good his escape into Arkansas.

In his report of these operations, General Grant says that "the impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob."

*In the Department of the Ohio*, in March, 1863, General Gillmore defeated a Confederate force under General Pegram, near Somerset, Kentucky.

Incidents in the  
Department of  
the Ohio.

In June the Confederates attempted a raid into Harrison County, Indiana, but were driven back, with the loss of 50 prisoners. About the same time a small national force, with two pieces of artillery, destroyed the railroad near Knoxville, and the bridges at Slate Creek, Strawberry Plains, and Mossy Creek, capturing 10 pieces of artillery, 1000 stand of arms, and 500 prisoners. Morgan's raid into Indiana and Ohio, which took place about the time of Lee's sortie into Pennsylvania, has already been alluded to (vol. iii., p. 63).

On the 21st of September Colonel Foster had a skirmish with the Confederates near Bristol, on the Virginia line, and on the 10th and 11th of October another sharp engagement took place at Blue Springs. The national loss was about 100, the Confederate heavier. After the battle of Chickamauga, Bragg, as we have seen, pushed forward a column into East Tennessee to threaten Burnside, who had occupied several points with small garrisons. The Confederates surprised some of these forces, capturing 6 guns, and 600 or 700 prisoners. They also moved down the north side of the Holston River to Rogersville, and

surprised the garrison at that place, capturing 4 guns and 650 men.

*In the Department of the Cumberland,* Wheeler, who commanded Bragg's cavalry, rode round Rosecrans's right, moving toward Fort Donelson. The fort had never been reoccupied since it was taken by Grant. It had been dismantled. It had no advantages except that of commanding the river below. The town of Dover, however, had been fortified. The Confederates (February 3d, 1863) demanded its surrender. It was held by Colonel Harding with about 600 men. He made a firm resistance to the Confederate attack, and sent to Fort Henry for aid. He had only one 30-pounder and four small brass guns, but he held out until some gun-boats came to his assistance. After an obstinate attack, which lasted all day, the Confederates retired with the loss of 900. The loss in the fort was 13 killed, 51 wounded. The straits to which the Confederates were beginning to be reduced was shown by their dead, many of whom were mere boys—some not more than 14 years of age.

On the 4th of March, Colonel Coburn, with 1845 men, attempted a reconnoissance from Franklin toward Springfield, encountering on his way Van Dorn's Confederate column, estimated at 7500. The enemy retreated, drawing Coburn into a gorge, where he was surrounded and nearly all his force captured. The loss was 1406, that of the enemy 150 killed and 450 wounded.

On the 25th of March the Confederate General Forrest made a cavalry raid on the Nashville and Columbia Railroad, burning the bridge and capturing a command at Brentwood. A cavalry force of 600 happening to arrive, attacked the Confederates in the rear, and put them to flight.

On the 10th of April a guerrilla force attacked a train near Lavergne, guarded by 40 men. The cars were de-

stroyed, and nearly half the guard killed or wounded. At the same time, Van Dorn, with a large mounted force, attacked Franklin, but was repulsed by General Granger, losing 19 killed, 35 wounded, and 48 prisoners.

On the 29th of April Colonel Streight was ordered by Rosecrans to operate in the rear of Bragg's Streight's disastrous expedition. army and destroy the railroads in North-western Georgia. He went in steam-boats from Fort Henry to Eastport, and, aided by an infantry force, captured Tuscumbia. Thence he moved into Georgia, intending to destroy Rome and Atlanta. He was pursued by the Confederate cavalry under Forrest and Roddy, and compelled to surrender when near Rome. His men were treated as other prisoners of war, but he was closely confined. The authorities of Georgia insisted on applying against him the laws of that state respecting the exciting of slaves to rebellion. After nearly a year's confinement he escaped out of the Libby Prison at Richmond.

On the 4th of June the Confederate General Forrest made a raid upon Franklin, and on the 11th attacked Triune. His losses in these unsuccessful skirmishes were estimated at over 100; the national, only 17 killed and wounded.



## SECTION XVIII.

### PIERCING OF THE COTTON STATES BY THE ARMY OF THE WEST.

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#### CHAPTER LXXVIII.

##### THE CONSULTATION.

General Grant was promoted to be Lieutenant General of the Army of the United States.

He changed the plan of the war by giving unity to its operations, and conducting them without intermission.

He gave orders to cease all minor movements, and to act in the Atlantic region against the two great armies of the Confederacy, he himself undertaking the campaign in Virginia, and committing that in Georgia to General Sherman.

WHILE Grant occupied a subordinate position, his duty restricted to the reopening and securing of the Mississippi River, operations in the trans-Mississippi regions possessed considerable interest for him and his officers. But when the government had detected his singular military abilities, manifested by the siege of Vicksburg, the relief of Rosecrans's army, the victory of Chattanooga, and had raised him to the chief command of all the armies by reviving in his favor the grade of Lieutenant General, which had been accorded to no one since Washington, General Scott being such only by brevet, all minor movements fell into neglect in presence of the gigantic operations which were now to be conducted on the grander domain of the whole republic.

Not without reluctance did Grant contemplate taking command of the Army of the Potomac. He could not but call to mind Pope's experience with it. In the previous summer, soon after the fall of Vicksburg, it had been proposed to give him

Elevation of Grant  
to be Lieutenant  
General.

His reluctance to  
command the Army  
of the Potomac.

that command; but in a letter written to Mr. Washburne, August 30th, he said: "My going there could do no possible good. They have able officers who have been brought up in that army, and to import a commander to place over them certainly would not be well." Accordingly, with a deep insight into the motives of human action, he abstained from any thing that might wound the self-love of that army, and the consequence was, as might have been expected, that never was a commander served with greater zeal and devotion.

On the 9th of March, 1864, Grant received his commission at Washington from the hands of the President, in presence of the Cabinet. The President said:

The commission  
conferred upon  
him.

"GENERAL GRANT: The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission constituting you Lieutenant General of the armies of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you also a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I need scarcely add that with what I here speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

To this the general replied:

"MR. PRESIDENT: I accept the commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me, and I know that if they are met, it will be due to these armies, and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

When Grant first heard that this honor was intended, and before it was conferred, he hastened to write to Sherman:

"While I have been eminently successful in the war in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy

His letter to  
Sherman.

and skill of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me.

“There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable in a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given to you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you can not know as well as I. I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction.”

Upon the receipt of the order formally placing him in command of the armies, Grant at once summoned Sherman to meet him at Nashville for the purpose of consultation.

Consultation between Grant and Sherman.

Sherman accompanied the Lieutenant General on his return to Washington as far as Cincinnati. In these interviews the plan of operations was matured. It was to abandon every thing unimportant and outlying, and strike at the centres of power of the enemy. These were two—the army of Lee in Virginia, and that of Johnston in Georgia. They were to be assailed simultaneously, so that they could take no advantage of their interior lines in aiding each other; they were also to be assailed incessantly, regardless of the seasons. In his official report Grant says:

The future plan of the war.

“From an early period of the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of the season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but, as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

“The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east

Imperfection of the former plans.

to west, re-enforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furnish large numbers during seasons of inactivity on our part to go to their homes and do the work of producing supplies for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

"From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken.

The military power of the Confederacy must be broken.

I therefore determined first to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing the necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land."

No man ever more thoroughly appreciated the military maxim that it is not the mass *present*, but the mass *acting* that wins battles.

At Nashville, early in April, Sherman received from Grant an outline statement of the proposed operations. A map was sent him by General Comstock. It was one of Colton's railroad maps, with pencil lines in red indicating the existing front, which coincided nearly with the valley of the Tennessee River, and a blue line following the upper Chattahoochee down to West Point, across to Montgomery, and down the Alabama, including Mobile. It showed the general advance of front proposed. Of this Sherman remarked: "That map to me, with its red and blue lines, contains more information and ideas than a volume of printed matter. From it I see *all*, and glad am I that there are minds now in Washington able to devise."

Details of operations sent to Sherman.

Grant's letter, dated Washington, April 4th, 1864, is in abstract as follows:

"It is my design, if the enemy keeps quiet, and allows me to take



the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat toward a common centre. For your information, I now write you my programme as at present determined upon.

“I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defense of Red River to General Steele and the navy, and return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; to abandon all Texas except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with a force not exceeding 4000 men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest necessary to hold it; and to collect from his command not less than 25,000 men. To this I will add 5000 from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can; it will be impossible for him to commence too early.

“Gillmore joins Butler with 10,000 men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of James’s River. This will give Butler 33,000 men, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside’s corps of not less than 25,000 effective men, and operate directly against Lee’s army wherever it may be found. Sigel collects all his available force in two columns—one, under Ord and Averill, to start from Beverley, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha—to move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. Crook will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from 10,000 to 12,000 men of all arms. You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up and get into the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

“I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to indicate the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as soon as you can, your plan of operation.

“As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can; Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th, or as soon thereafter as practicable; Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th instant, if possible; but all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as you can. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.”

Orders respecting  
trans-Mississippi  
operations.

Orders for the  
Southern De-  
partment.

Orders for West  
Virginia.

Orders to  
Sherman.

Date of the simul-  
taneous move-  
ments.

In a letter, ten days later (April 14th), to Sherman, among other things Grant says :

“What I now want more particularly to say is that, if the two main attacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success, the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their line of defense and throw their whole strength upon a single army, believing a defeat with one victory to sustain them better than a defeat all along their whole line, and hoping, too, at the same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest perfectly satisfied with its laurels, having penetrated to a given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their force first upon one and then on the other.

“With the majority of military commanders they might do this; but you have had too much experience in traveling light, and subsisting upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse. I hope my experience has not been thrown away. My directions, then, would be, if the enemy in your front shows signs of joining Lee, follow him up to the extent of your ability. I will prevent the concentration of Lee upon your front if it is in the power of this army to do it.”

The appointment of Grant to be lieutenant general produced several changes in the army: General Halleck, with the thanks and approbation of the President for the manner in which his arduous and responsible duties had been performed, was relieved as general-in-chief, and assigned to duty as chief of staff of the army; Sherman succeeded Grant in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing four departments and their armies, the Ohio, Tennessee, Cumberland, Arkansas.

Henceforth the chief interest of the war centres on the campaigns of Grant and Sherman.

## CHAPTER LXXIX.

### THE CAMPAIGN ACROSS THE ALLEGHANY MOUNTAINS. CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. ABANDONMENT OF GEORGIA BY THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

General Sherman, conducting that portion of the campaign in the Atlantic region which had been committed to him, forced a passage across the Alleghany Mountains.

He compelled the opposing Confederate army, under General Johnston, to retreat from one strong position after another, defeating it in many battles, and in face of it accomplishing the passage of the Chattahoochee River.

On this the Confederate government relieved General Johnston from command, replacing him by General Hood, who at once assumed the offensive, and fought several fierce battles in defense of Atlanta.

The Confederate army was at length compelled to evacuate that city, General Sherman thus bringing his campaign to a triumphant close.

Under the orders of President Davis, disastrous for the Southern cause, the Confederate armies abandoned Georgia.

“It is hardly necessary for me to tell you,” said Grant in a letter to Sherman, “that I feel you have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any general in this war, and with a skill that will be acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled.” “I do not hesitate to say,” wrote Halleck, “that your campaign has been the most brilliant of this war.” The campaign which thus extorted their admiration was Sherman’s forced passage across the Alleghany Mountains, and his descent into the plains of Georgia.

Sherman’s campaign across the Alleghany Mountains.

This range of mountains, commencing near the Canadian frontier, follows in a general manner the course of the Atlantic coast-line for more than 1200 miles, being nearest to it in the Northern States, and gradually receding until, in the cotton regions, its distance is 200 miles. The Indians of the North gave to it the name of the Alleghanies, those of the South the Appalachians. Among Americans it passes indifferently

Topography of those mountains.

under both titles. It consists of a series of parallel folds or flexures of the earth's crust, on the eastern side of which is a gently inclining plane descending to the sea.

To that plane great historical significance belongs. It was the seat of the English colonial settlements—the scene of the Revolutionary War.

A traveler from Chattanooga to Atlanta passes for forty miles a succession of mountain ranges; then there is a broad valley intersected by two rivers; then another succession of mountains to the Chattahoochee, beyond which is Atlanta, a focus of railroads and manufactures. The plane, thence extending to the sea, was the chief seat of the machine-shops and factories of the Confederacy.

Winding through the dark glens and frowning passes of this rugged region is the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta. It was along this road, or rather in lines parallel to it, that the march now to be described was made.

In the opinion of the best-informed military officers of the Confederacy, "the most injurious blow which could be struck against the Confederacy would be the capture of Atlanta." Such was the view of Beauregard, who not only proposed to withdraw from all distant and diverging lines of operations, so as to concentrate at that point an army of 100,000 men, but to "thoroughly emancipate its commander from the least subordination to the views and control of the heads of bureaus at Richmond" (letter to Soulé, December 8th, 1863). That these views were correct we shall now see. The military power of the Confederacy was broken, and what, perhaps, in the end was of higher importance, its political spirit was destroyed by the capture of Atlanta.

The military operations which had been conducted in the Mississippi Valley had forever wrested that vast country from the Confederacy. It might be troubled by the transitory dashes of marauding

Importance of the  
city of Atlanta,  
and of the Atlantic  
region.



cavalry or infantry sorties, but in a political sense it was completely conquered. Mobile, on the Gulf coast, was the only remaining strong-hold, and that was held by the Confederates merely on sufferance. Unless the requirements of the proposed Georgia campaign should otherwise indicate, it was concluded expedient for the present to leave it untouched. Its possession implied the neutralization of a considerable Confederate force which was idly occupying it. The region beyond the Mississippi was of no strategic importance, and could not in any manner influence the issue of the war.

Very different was it with the region interposed between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic Ocean. This was the seat of whatever power remained in the Confederacy. The government at Richmond had stripped all other parts of their vast domain to insure the security of this. The people of Georgia and the Carolinas viewed unmoved the disasters they had done so much to bring upon the states of the great valley, believing themselves protected on the west by the impassable rampart of the Alleghanies, and on the north and south by the powerful armies of Lee and Johnston—living walls which, not without reason, they considered as immovable as the mountains themselves.

Sherman, having been assigned to the duty of dealing with the Confederate army in Georgia, repaired to Chattanooga, the portal through which he must pass to assail his antagonist among the mountains, and there destroy him, or force him down into the open country below.

On the 1st of May, 1864, Sherman's force was as follows :

	Men.	Guns.	Commander.
The Army of the Ohio . . . . .	13,559	28	Schofield.
"    "    Tennessee . . . . .	24,465	96	McPherson.
"    "    Cumberland . . . . .	60,773	130	Thomas.
Total . . . . .	98,797	254	

It consisted of 88,188 infantry, 4460 artillery, and 6149 cavalry.

The Department of Arkansas was commanded by Steele, but he took no part in the Atlanta campaign. During the month of May his department was added to the military division of West Mississippi under Canby.

Sherman's army, though maintained by re-enforcements to its original strength, was practically diminished by large detachments necessary for keeping up communications. It was to move as lightly as possible, taking no tents and no baggage.

The Confederate army under Johnston, who had succeeded Bragg, and assumed command of the army at Dalton, December 27th, 1863, consisted of three corps, under Hardee, Hood, and Polk respectively. The following are its official returns:

	Present for Duty.	Aggregate Present.	Aggregate Present and Absent.
December 31, 1863 . . . . .	42,439	57,428	98,215
January 31, 1864 . . . . .	41,553	55,059	88,457
February " . . . . .	37,789	48,010	79,071
March 31, " . . . . .	42,125	55,113	85,953
April 30, " . . . . .	43,887	63,807	95,863
May " . . . . .	—	—	—
June 30, " . . . . .	54,085	77,441	137,192

At the commencement of the Atlanta campaign the Confederate army therefore numbered about 48,000, of which one tenth was cavalry. Johnston had occupied the winter in equipping his troops and bringing back absentees. While Sherman was busy procuring supplies, he was engaged in making roads in his rear, and preparing strong positions—an expedient on which, as we shall see, the course of the ensuing campaign turned.

When Sherman was engaged in his Meridian expedition, Thomas, who was in command at Chattanooga, hearing that Johnston had been or-

Thomas's expedition against Dalton.

dered, on the 17th of February, to send detachments to Polk in Mississippi, moved against Dalton, and occupied Ringgold on the 22d. On the 25th he made an attempt against Buzzard Roost Pass, but found the enemy in strength. He then withdrew. His loss in this reconnoissance was 17 killed and 255 wounded.

This portion of Georgia, naturally poor, had already suffered much from the ravages of the preceding year. It is related by one who followed Thomas's expedition: "The march from Chattanooga to Ringgold was through a dreary pine forest, broken by small patches of cleared but unfenced land. Most of the houses were deserted. Here and there were some dirty-looking women and children peeping out." Speaking of the dilapidated aspect of the country, he says: "Before sundown we must have met at least a dozen wagons, drawn by blind and bony horses, broken-down mules, fleshless oxen. At 10 P.M. we descried our camp-fires shining red in the distance through the smoke and fog. A mass of ruins in the centre, a hundred uninhabited houses scattered around—such is now the town of Ringgold."

It was at Ringgold that the pursuit of Bragg after the battle of Chattanooga was stopped. Bragg's army then retired to a strong position near Dalton, behind Rocky Face Ridge, and remained there all winter. There Johnston relieved Bragg of his command. Ringgold was then held as an advanced position of the national army.

There were very serious misunderstandings between Johnston and the chiefs of the Confederate government. He was personally obnoxious to Davis and to the Secretary Benjamin Bragg, on being relieved from the command of the army in Georgia—it being found impossible to withstand the public clamor against him—had been appointed to a position analogous to that held by Halleck at Washington. His influence was exerted very strongly against Johnston.

The dissensions between the Confederate government and General Johnston.

With Davis, Seddon, and Benjamin, he insisted that Johnston should institute an offensive campaign into Tennessee. Johnston reported to them that it was impracticable. But, after Thomas's reconnoissance (February 27th), he suggested to Davis, through Bragg, that preparations for it might be made. Bragg, in reply, directed him to make such preparations, and on the 18th of March sent him a plan of operations. On his suggesting modifications, Bragg telegraphed him that troops could be drawn from other points only for the purpose of an advance. Johnston, on the 22d, in view of the probability of Sherman's advancing first, urged that troops should be sent him for defensive as well as offensive movements. No notice was taken of his communication. He renewed it, and on the 2d of May received 1400 men. Then he asked (May 4th) for a portion of Polk's command, and it was granted. He had asked for 1000 negro teamsters: none were received. It is no wonder that to such a beginning there should have been a fatal end.

On the 4th of May the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, and Grant, sitting on a felled tree, telegraphed to Sherman at Chattanooga to advance. Sherman's armies were thus grouped: that of the Cumberland at or near Ringgold; that of the Tennessee at Gordon's Mills, on the Chickamauga; that of the Ohio near Red Clay, on the Georgia line, north of Dalton. The Confederates lay in and about Dalton.

The great campaign now to be considered presents ten stages: (1), the turning of Dalton; (2), the turning of Resaca; (3), the passage of the Etowah; (4), the turning of Allatoona Pass; (5), the turning of Kenesaw; (6), the passage of the Chattahoochee; (7), the battles round Atlanta; (8), the turning of Atlanta; (9), the capture of Atlanta; (10), the abandonment of Georgia by the Confederate army.

Sherman's campaign commences.

Its division into stages.




I shall therefore relate the details of it under those divisions. In anticipation, it may be said that the object of the campaign was accomplished: the army that had defended Georgia spontaneously abandoned that state, leaving it at the mercy of the invader, and the Carolinas and Virginia were uncovered.

(1.) *The turning of Dalton.*

To strike Dalton in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge, Rocky-Face, through which was a pass between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, known as the Buzzard Roost. This pass is a deep glen cleft in the overshadowing mountains, into which, throughout its length, projects spur after spur from its sides, and on its farther end a ridge like a traverse crosses it. On the left side of the glen is the railroad, on the right the common road, and separating them a rugged crag covered with pines. On the spurs, and indeed on every available point, batteries had been placed. To detain the assailants under fire, Johnston obstructed the glen with abatis, and flooded it by dams on Mill Creek. He might rest securely as to his right; if turned at all, it must be on his left: that was not only settled by the character of the region, but also by the direction of Sherman's advance.

In the shady forests at the foot of the mountains the national army lay waiting for orders. Its general carefully reconnoitred the pass. The ridges of the Roost looked dim and gloomy through the cold, cloudy atmosphere, for the air was damp and chilly. Concluding that it was impossible to force the pass, Sherman resolved to turn it by moving through Snake Creek Gap toward Resaca, 18 miles below Dalton, on the railroad. McPherson was accordingly ordered to move rapidly through Ship's Gap, Villanow, and Snake Creek Gap directly on Resaca, or the railroad at any point below Dalton; to break the railroad, and fall back to Snake Creek,

Operations for the turning of Dalton.



THE CAMPAIGN OF SHERMAN.

and be ready to attack the enemy's flank when he retreated. During this movement Thomas was to make a strong feint in front, while Schofield pressed down from the north.

The plan, therefore, was to compel Johnston to recede from his strong-hold at Dalton, and, while he was moving, to bring on a general battle.

On the 7th Thomas marched from Ringgold, occupied Tunnel Hill, and pushed the enemy's cavalry through Buzzard Roost Gap; on the 8th McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap; and on the 9th Schofield pushed down nearly to Dalton from the north, Thomas renewing his demonstrations against the Gap and Rocky-Face Ridge nearly to a battle. The weather was very unpropitious; heavy showers were falling, but the troops were in the highest spirits; they made the valley ring with their huzzas, for news had come that Grant was compelling Lee to retreat to Richmond, and Rocky Face, remembering that she was an American mountain, joined with her glad echoes in the shouts of the men.

McPherson was now enabled to march to within a mile of Resaca almost unopposed. He found that Johnston had prepared for this event, and made the place too strong to be carried by assault, and, there being no road by which he could rapidly reach the railroad, he fell back and took position near the east end of Snake Creek Gap. With his failure the general intention of the movement was frustrated. Strong re-enforcements were now sent him, and Howard, with the 4th Corps, being left to threaten Dalton in front, the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek Gap. The movement against Resaca was resumed, McPherson on the direct road, Thomas on his left, and Schofield on Thomas's left. McPherson drove the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca within their fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of bald hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, his left abreast the town. Thomas

McPherson fails to carry out his part of the plan.

came up on his left, and Schofield broke his way through the dense forest at Thomas's left. The country was very hilly, rough, and covered with pine jungles and brush, through which it was almost impossible to penetrate on horseback. These movements compelled Johnston to abandon Dalton on the night of the 12th. Howard entered it, and pressed his rear. Nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of troops across the valley extremely difficult. On the other hand, he had with foresight constructed good roads in his rear from Dalton to Resaca: upon these he retreated, and on the 14th of May was found posted in a strong position behind Camp Creek, occupying the forts at Resaca, his right on some high chestnut hills to the north of the town. On the 13th, just as the sun was going down, Sherman and Thomas came to the summit of the opposite heights, and through their glasses reconnoitred Johnston's strong works.

Johnston is forced out of Dalton.

(2.) *The turning of Resaca.*

To force Johnston out of Resaca, Sherman determined to send light columns to threaten his communications in the rear, and to press upon him in front with his whole force. Polk was on Johnston's left, resting on the Oostanaula, Hardee in the centre, Hood on the right, extending northeastwardly round Resaca toward the Connasauga.

Operations for the turning of Resaca.

Sherman therefore ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's Ferry, and a division of the 16th Corps to cross and threaten Calhoun; also the cavalry division of Garrard to move from its position at Villanow down toward Rome, cross the Oostanaula, and break the railroad below Calhoun and above Kingston, while with the main army he pressed against Resaca at all points.

At 1 P.M. of the 14th an attempt was made from Sherman's left centre to break the enemy's line and force him



The battle of Resaca. from an elevated position in the immediate front. To effect this, it was necessary to descend a hill in range of the enemy's artillery, ford a stream bordered with interlacing vines, and mount the opposite eminence. The attempt was bravely made, but the assailants were compelled to fall back with the loss of 1000 men. Farther to the left, Judah's and Newton's divisions, after a severe struggle, forced a point on the enemy's outer line, but were unable to retain it.

At 3 P.M. Johnston attempted to turn Sherman's left flank, making an impetuous attack, which was at first successful; but, Hooker's corps coming up, the Confederates, about dusk, were driven back with very great loss. McPherson, taking the opportunity while Johnston was occupied in this movement, gained a position which would enable him to pour an enfilading fire on Johnston's works. As it also commanded the bridges across the Oostanaula, a determined effort was made to retake it. Heavy columns, with fixed bayonets, advanced up to the very crest of the hill, but were forced back. The fighting did not end till 10 P.M.

Johnston is forced out of Resaca. The night was spent in strengthening positions. On the morning of the 15th there was heavy skirmishing along the national centre. About 1 P.M., after several unsuccessful attacks, the Confederates were driven from a portion of their lines, and a lodgment was secured under the projecting works of a lunette; but so severe was the fire from the rifle-pits that farther advance was checked. Hood's corps made a resolute but unsuccessful attempt to dislodge the assailants. Subsequently, under cover of the darkness, the national soldiers dug out the ends of the works, and hauled the guns away, by means of ropes, under a very destructive fire. As soon as a breach was made the men rushed in, and, after a desperate struggle, captured the lunette. Sherman's losses, during these two days, were between 4000 and 5000; those of

Johnston—his men fighting, for the most part, behind earth-works—were about 2500. During the night Johnston was again compelled to retreat. He moved southward across the Oostanaula, pursued so closely that, though the railway bridge was burnt, the road bridge was saved. Thomas followed the retreating columns directly, McPherson by Lay's Ferry, and Schofield by obscure roads to the left.

(3.) *The passage of the Etowah.*

On the 17th all the national armies moved by as many different roads as they could find. The im-  
Approach to the Etowah. palpable dust, which lay a foot deep, whirled and eddied about in suffocating clouds, overtopping the men, and floating upward in the air, forming long gray lines. As day advanced the heat became overpowering. The troops threw aside every thing that might weary or impede them. One division—that of Jefferson C. Davis—was sent along the western bank of the Oostanaula to Rome. About sunset of that day, Newton, whose division was in advance, had a sharp encounter with the retreating rear-guard—Polk's cavalry—at Adairsville. The enemy disappeared during the night, Polk and Hood taking the road from Adairsville to Cassville—a strong intrenched position—Hardee that to Kingston, where, however, they did not remain, and Sherman therefore pushed on through Kingston, and four miles beyond, when he found Johnston in force on ground comparatively open and well adapted for a battle. The proper dispositions were made. That evening, Johnston, weary and hungry, happened to go to Hood's head-quarters, and, while at supper, that general and Polk remarked that they thought their position untenable, and that the Etowah ought to be crossed. Hood said that the enemy could en-

filade his lines. "What does this mean?"  
Johnston's generals insist on abandoning that line. said Johnston. "I am not going to give battle here unless you all have your hearts in it." The Etowah was crossed that night—"a step,"

said Johnston, "which I have regretted ever since." The road and railroad bridges near Cartersville were burnt, and a most valuable country abandoned to Sherman.

(4.) *The turning of the Allatoona Pass.*

Operations for the turning of the Allatoona Pass.

Holding Thomas's army about Cassville, McPherson's about Kingston, and Schofield's at Cassville Station and toward the Etowah Bridge, Sherman gave his army a few days' rest, using the time to bring forward supplies for the next stage of the campaign. Meantime Jeff. C. Davis had obtained possession of Rome and its forts, several heavy guns, and valuable mills and founderies. Possession had also been secured of two bridges over the Etowah, near Kingston. Satisfied that the enemy could and would hold him in check at the Allatoona Pass, Sherman resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right; and, having supplied his wagons for 20 days from the railroad, and left garrisons for Rome and Kingston, he marched, on the 23d, toward Dallas.

Thomas's head of column, skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry near Burnt Hickory, captured a courier with a letter of Johnston's showing that he had detected the movement, and was preparing to meet it at Dallas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded. It had few and obscure roads.

On the 25th of May Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory toward Dallas, Hooker having the advance. When he approached Pumpkin Vine Creek he found a force of the enemy's cavalry at a bridge on his left. He pushed them across the creek and saved the bridge, though it was on fire. About two miles to the eastward he encountered infantry. It was near 4 P.M. before he could get his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed two divisions, and, by Sherman's order, made a bold push to secure possession of the point New Hope Church; for Johnston did not stop at Allatoona on his retreat, but made for the hills



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north of Dallas and Marietta, concentrating his army near New Hope Church, where the roads from the north, east, and southwest converge. Hood's corps was at the church, and Polk and Hardee lay eastward across the Atlanta Road.

Here a severe battle took place, and the Confederates were driven back; but, they having hastily thrown up some parapets, and a stormy, dark night having set in, Hooker was unable to expel them from the roads. All day it had been lowering. At dark it rained heavily, but the troops kept working until a breastwork was secured. There were neither tents nor food. If fires were kindled the rain put them out. The general and his staff spent the night wrapped in their coats and saddle blankets. Next morning the enemy was found entrenched in front of the road from Dallas to Marietta, and dispositions on a larger scale had to be made.

Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and the dense forests, it took several days to deploy close to the enemy, Sherman resolving to work gradually toward his own left, and, when all things were ready, to push for the railroad east of Allatoona. In making the development about New Hope many sharp encounters occurred. On the 28th, McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on Thomas in front of New Hope Church, to enable the rest of the army to extend still more to the left and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly a bold assault was made by the Confederates on him at Dallas. His men had, however, erected good breastworks, and gave their antagonists a terrible repulse.

On the 27th Howard's corps attacked Cleburne, and was repulsed. Johnston estimates his loss in this action and that at New Hope Church at 900.

The order was renewed for McPherson to move to his left about five miles, Thomas and Schofield also correspondingly moving to their left, the

The Allatoona Pass is turned.

movement being completed in safety on the 1st of June. By pushing the left well round, all the roads leading from Allatoona and Ackworth were occupied. Stoneman's cavalry was then moved to the east end of the pass, and Garrard's cavalry round by the rear to the west end, and the real purpose of all these movements was accomplished. Allatoona Pass was turned.

Sherman now ordered the railroad bridge across the Etowah to be rebuilt, and continued working by his left. Plans of the bridge had been in the hands of the Construction Corps long enough to enable them to furnish a duplicate. A train from Chattanooga, with the bridge on board, soon came up, and, though it was 620 feet long, it was rebuilt by the Railroad Construction Corps with 600 men in six days. The engineering operations of the Georgia campaign compare advantageously with similar works executed by former soldiers. Cæsar built a bridge across the Rhine, a few miles below Coblenz, in ten days: it was regarded as a very extraordinary feat. Bertrand threw one across the Danube for Napoleon, near Vienna, in 1809. It took ten times the amount of labor of that of Cæsar; it was finished, however, in twenty days. But railroad bridges, over which heavy and fast-going trains must pass, require to be more strongly constructed than those which formerly sufficed for armies. Commonly, also, they require to be much higher to reach the level of the road; thus the bridge over the Tennessee at Falling Waters, constructed during the winter of 1863, consisted of not less than five stories of round timber cut from the adjacent forests.

On the 4th of June Sherman had resolved to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and move to the railroad about Ackworth, when the latter suddenly abandoned his intrenchments, and retreated to his strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost Mountains. Sherman readily

Rebuilding of  
the Etowah  
Bridge.

The Allatoona made  
a secondary base.

reached the railroad at Ackworth on the 6th. He now examined in person the Allatoona Pass, and, finding it adapted to use as a secondary base, gave orders for its defense and garrison; and, as soon as the bridge across the Etowah was finished, stores came forward to his camps by rail.

The results of the campaign to this date are thus summed up: "We have, in a month's time, with a force not very superior to his, compelled the enemy to fall back nearly one hundred miles, obliging him to abandon four different positions of unusual strength and proportions; have fought him six times; have captured 12 guns, 3 colors, over 2000 prisoners, with considerable forage, provisions, and means of transportation; have placed at least 15,000 of his men hors de combat, and have destroyed several important founderies, rolling-mills, iron-works, etc., at Rome, and in the Allatoona Mountains."

(5.) *The turning of Kenesaw.*

On the 9th of June, his communications to the rear being secure, and supplies ample, Sherman moved forward to Big Shanty. In front of him were Lost and Pine Mountains, almost perfect cones, and Kenesaw, divided by a deep notch at the summit, its entire length at the base being nearly two miles.

He says: "Kenesaw, the bold and striking twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills trending off to the northeast, terminating to our view in another peak called Brushy Mountain. To our right was the smaller hill called Pine Mountain, and beyond it, in the distance, Lost Mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that offers itself from any of the hills abounding in that region. Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain form a triangle; Pine Mountain at the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain at the base, cover-

The Kenesaw Mountain and its consorts.

Results thus far obtained.

ing perfectly the town of Marietta, and the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal station. The summits were covered with batteries, and the spurs alive with men busy felling trees, digging pits, and preparing for the grand struggle impending."

On approaching close to the enemy, Sherman found him occupying a line full twelve miles long, more than he could hold with his force. On the 11th of June dispositions were made to break that line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. During a sharp cannonading on the afternoon of June 14th, Johnston, Hardee, and Polk were reconnoitring Sherman's position. They dismounted and walked to the front. A cannon shot struck General Polk, passed through his body, and carried off his right arm. He died instantly. On the next morning the Confederates abandoned Pine Mountain. A paper was found affixed to a stake, stating, "Here General Polk was killed by a Yankee shell." Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found the enemy again strongly intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. At the same time McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. An assault on the centre had been ordered, but not carried out, when, on the 17th, the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain and the long line of admirable breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw. Sherman continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber, and across most difficult ravines, until he found the enemy again strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw as the salient, his right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, his left behind Nose Creek, covering his railroad back to the Chattahoochee. This enabled him to contract his lines and strengthen them.

After this contraction of Johnston's lines on the 19th, Hood's right rested on the Marietta Road; Loring, who



had succeeded to Polk, was in the centre, at Kenesaw, and Hardee was on the left, across the Lost Mountain and Marietta Road. A division of Georgia militia guarded the crossings of the Chattahoochee. The whole country, says Sherman, has become one vast fort; Johnston must have fully fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished batteries. With truth it was remarked, "We crowd them day and night; push them from tree to tree, from ridge to ridge, from earth-work to earth-work, from their first position to their last. A vast skirmish blazes from morning to night along ten or twelve miles of infantry lines."

From Kenesaw, "the everlasting hill," Johnston could look down upon the national camps and observe every movement. His batteries thundered away, but did little injury on account of their extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly overhead, as the troops lay close up against his mountain tower.

During these operations about Kenesaw the rain fell al-  
The dreadful state  
of the weather. most continuously for three weeks, rendering  
 the narrow wooded roads mere mud gullies, so that a general movement would have been impossible; but the men daily worked closer and closer to the intrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket-firing galling to him. Every opportunity was taken to advance the general lines.

In spite of this trying weather, the army was in the highest spirits. The Western soldiers seemed to take delight in characteristically exaggerating their troubles. "The water comes down as it only can do in the South. The June rains, that nearly drowned Rosecrans's army, are duplicated; old campaigners speak of them with decreasing respect. The roads are impassable. The trees are dropping the intercepted moisture in tears as big as walnuts. Skirmishing is not brisk; a man must be vindictive indeed if he would shoot an enemy who is as clammy

as a codfish, and has a crawling rivulet going down his back." "The whole country is full of the most remorseless wood-ticks. They bite hard. We have to divide our attention between them and the rebel sharpshooters, whose aim, however, is just as good; you can't go safely within three quarters of a mile of their rifles."

McPherson was watching the enemy on Kenesaw, and working his left forward, Thomas swinging, as The affair of Kulp's House. it were, on a grand left-wheel, his left on Kenesaw connecting with McPherson, and Schofield moving to the south and east along the old Sandtown Road. On the 22d, as Hooker had advanced his line, with Schofield on his right, the enemy, Hood's corps, with detachments from the others, suddenly sallied and attacked at 4 P.M. The blow fell mostly on Williams's division of Hooker's corps, and a brigade of Hascall's division of Schofield's army. The ground was comparatively open, and, although the enemy drove in the skirmish line, yet, persisting in his assault till sundown, when he reached the line of battle he received a severe repulse, leaving his dead, wounded, and many prisoners. This is known as the affair of "Kulp's House."

Though inviting Johnston to commit such mistakes, Sherman resolves to assault Kenesaw. Sherman could not hope that the affairs of Dallas and Kulp's House would be repeated. He saw that there was no alternative but to assault the lines or turn the position. He resolved on the former, selecting the enemy's left centre. On the 27th of June two assaults were made, one near Little Kenesaw by McPherson, and the other a mile farther south by Thomas. They Failure of the assault. were made simultaneously. Both failed, with the loss of many valuable lives. The killed, wounded, and missing were nearly 3000, and but comparatively little loss was inflicted on the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed breastworks.

On the 28th of June, writing to a friend, Sherman says,

Difficulties attend-  
ing the campaign. “My campaign has been one grand skirmish, mountains and forests so obscuring the ground that I have not seen 10,000 of the enemy at any one view, though by advancing my lines at any time 100 yards in the past month I could draw the fire of 100 guns and 50,000 or 60,000 muskets at point-blank range. I have been compelled to move laterally for miles to turn a line or succession of lines of parapets, which, though made in two or three days, have all the essentials of a permanent work, ditch, parapet, and embrasure, and the very best kind of abatis and palisade. Each party has made many dashes at the other, but invariably the assailant gets the worst of it. I have already passed over 100 miles, including the only nitre-producing country, the great iron and coal beds of Georgia, and its best meat-producing country.”


After the failure of the assault, nothing remained but to resort to the old measure and turn the position. On the 1st of July McPherson was relieved by Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, and his whole army was put in motion toward Turner's Ferry, which is across the Chattahoochee at the mouth of Nickajack Creek.

The effect was instantaneous. McPherson's movement was commenced on the night of July 2d, and the next morning Kenesaw was abandoned.

Johnston at last  
forced from Ken-  
esaw.

With the first dawn of day the national skirmishers appeared on the mountain-top.

“The fatigue of this campaign, since the first day's march from Ringgold, has been very great. The cautious approaches on Dalton, the sleepless, laborious nights and bloody days at Resaca, the fortnight of carnage and vigilant toil near Dallas, and the many even more wearisome and sanguinary days consumed in investing the position of Kenesaw, are without parallel (unless it be Grant's present campaign) during the war. The losses in both these armies, in killed and wounded, during this period of grand activity, fully equal those of one of our great encounters,



THE CAMPAIGN OF SHERMAN.



without the decisiveness that sometimes pertains to a pitched battle of the first class."

(6.) *The passage of the Chattahoochee.*

Thomas's whole line was now moved forward to the rail-  
The occupation of Marietta. road, and turned south in pursuit toward the  
 Chattahoochee. Sherman, in person, entered Marietta at 8.30 A.M., just as the enemy's cavalry were leaving. Marietta is prettily situated in a valley in the rear of Kenesaw, to which there is a pleasant drive through the most enchanting groves. Near the hotel, which had been used as a hospital, was a carpenter's shop, at the door of which was a pile of unplanned coffins. In the cemetery, close at hand, there were more than 800 new-made graves.

It was hoped that Johnston might be assailed in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee, but he had skillfully provided against this, and covered his movement well. He had constructed a strong tête-du-pont at the Chattahoochee, with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna Camp-meeting Ground, five miles from Marietta.

Here Thomas found him, his front covered by a parapet,  
Sherman approaches the Chattahoochee. his flanks behind the Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks. On the 4th of July his entire line of pits was captured, and strong demonstrations made along Nickajack Creek and Turner's Ferry. Next morning Johnston had abandoned his position, and Sherman moved to the Chattahoochee. Thomas's left flank rested near Paice's Ferry, McPherson's right at the mouth of Nickajack, and Schofield in reserve. The Confederate cavalry crossed the Chattahoochee, Wheeler observing it above, and Jackson below. Johnston followed his cavalry across on the night of the 5th, and took up a position on Peach Tree Creek and the river. He lay behind a line of great strength, covering the railroad and pontoon bridges. To turn it the river must be crossed—a deep and rapid stream, passable only by means of bridges, except at one or two difficult fords.

To Sherman was now afforded an opportunity for a display of the highest military talent: he had to cross this deep river in face of an army of 50,000 men.

To accomplish this, "he so manœuvred as to give Johnston the impression that it was his left flank that was about to be turned, amusing him by demonstrations south of the railroad bridge, as if he intended crossing there. His real object was, by rapidly shifting masses of troops from extreme right to extreme left, to turn Johnston's right flank, and hold the vital strategic points in that direction."

Schofield was therefore ordered across from his position on the Sandtown Road to Smyrna Camp Ground, and next to the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Soap Creek, to effect a lodgment on the east bank. This was done; a good pontoon and trestle bridge was laid, and a strong lodgment on high and commanding ground was effected. Meantime Garrard moved rapidly north to Roswell, and destroyed the factories which had for years supplied the Confederate armies with cloth. Over one of these—the woolen factory—its owner displayed the French flag: it was not respected; the factory was destroyed.

Garrard secured the shallow ford at Roswell, and McPherson's whole army was transferred from Sherman's extreme right to his left. At the same time, Howard had built a bridge at Powers's Ferry, two miles below Schofield; had crossed over, and taken position on his right. Thus, on the 9th, Sherman had three points of passage over the Chattahoochee above the enemy, with good roads leading to Atlanta. Hereupon Johnston abandoned his tête-du-pont, burned his bridges, and left Sherman undisputed master north and west of the river.

The sudden abandonment of so strong a position caused the utmost consternation not only in Georgia, but throughout the Confederacy. The works

His plan for passing the river.

Johnston is forced across the Chattahoochee.

Alarm of the inhabitants of Atlanta.

were of the most formidable kind; they extended for more than five miles, and were almost impenetrable in front. The inhabitants of Atlanta were terror-stricken; they had never thought until now that the national forces could reach them.

Atlanta, with its magazines, stores, arsenals, workshops, founderies, was only eight miles distant. Rousseau's cavalry expedition. Railroads converge to it from the four cardinal points. But, before advancing, Sherman's army took a short rest, during which a cavalry force, 2000 strong, under General Rousseau, was telegraphed to move from Decatur, Alabama. He had orders to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa at the railroad bridge or the Ten Islands, and thence advance to Opelika. There was but one stem of finished railroad connecting the channels of travel between Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, which runs from Montgomery to Opelika. If this were broken up effectually, Johnston's army would be cut off from that source of supply and re-enforcement. Rousseau accomplished this object, thoroughly breaking up the road, and reached Marietta safely, with the loss of not more than 30 men.

At the same time Sherman was collecting stores at Alatoona, Marietta, and Vining's Station. Trains were constantly on the road from Chattanooga to the front. The Construction Corps were frequently under fire. The Field Telegraph Corps kept up unbroken communication between the head-quarters of the army commanders and those of Sherman, and between Sherman and the War Office in Washington. The soldiers, after their fatigues, were resting, and preparing for the great exertions they had soon to make.

All things being ready for an advance (17th), Thomas crossed at Powers's and Paice's Bridges, and Sherman's passage of the Chattahoochee River. marched by Buckhead. Schofield, already across at the mouth of Soap Creek, marched by Cross Keys. McPherson directed his course from Ros-

well straight against the Augusta Road, at a point east of Decatur, near Stone Mountain. Continuing on a general right-wheel, McPherson reached the Augusta Railroad on the 18th, seven miles east of Decatur, and broke up a section of about four miles. Schofield reached the town of Decatur the same day. It is a pretty village, beautifully shaded with trees. On the 19th McPherson turned along the railroad into Decatur; Schofield followed a road toward Atlanta by Howard's and the distillery; and Thomas crossed Peach Tree Creek in force, by numerous bridges, in face of the enemy's intrenched lines. All found the enemy, and skirmished heavily.

At 10 P.M. on the 17th Johnston received a telegram from Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, to the effect that, as he had failed to arrest Sherman's approach to Atlanta, and had expressed no confidence in his ability to defeat that general, he must immediately turn over the army to General Hood.

Hood succeeds  
Johnston in com-  
mand of the Con-  
federate army.

The misunderstanding between President Davis and Benjamin on one side, and General Johnston on the other, had, it was said, been aggravated by the latter formally expressing his opinion at a dinner-party in Richmond that the Confederate cause could never succeed while Benjamin was War Minister. This opinion had been cited in the Confederate Congress, and eventually occasioned Benjamin's removal from the War Department. He was succeeded by Seddon.

(7.) *The battles around Atlanta.*

Peach Tree Creek is a narrow, sluggish stream, with abrupt banks, fringed with a jungle of brier patches, and an almost impassable undergrowth. It empties into the Chattahoochee at the crossing of the railroad. Johnston had abandoned the river because the creek would have separated the two wings of his army. He had prepared two positions for assaulting his enemy. First, he intended to attack him

Johnston's plans  
for the defense of  
Atlanta.



while crossing the creek, and drive him back over the Chatahoochee. Second, if that failed, he proposed to draw his army on one side, and uncover the other position—a strong line between the Decatur and Marietta Roads. This was to be held by the Georgia State troops, and when Sherman attacked them Johnston would fall upon his flank with his main army.

As we have seen, Thomas was on the right, Schofield in the centre, McPherson on the left; the army had swung round Thomas as on a pivot, and was advancing on Atlanta from the north and east, Thomas coming on from the north, Schofield from the northeast, McPherson from the east along the Augusta Railroad. But before the armies could be brought in line of battle close to Atlanta, Hood attacked them.

On the 19th Hood had disposed his troops so that Cheatham's (formerly Hood's) corps on the right would cut off Thomas from Schofield and McPherson. Hardee held the centre, and Stewart, commanding Polk's corps, the left.

On the 20th Sherman's forces closed, converging toward Atlanta; but, as a gap existed between Schofield and Thomas, two divisions of Howard's corps of Thomas's army were moved to the left to connect with Schofield, leaving Newton's division of the same corps on the Buckhead Road. About 4 P.M. the enemy sallied from his works in force, Stewart's corps falling in line of battle against Sherman's right centre, composed of Newton's division of Howard's corps, Hooker's corps, and Johnston's division of Palmer's corps. The blow was unexpected; but Newton had hastily covered his front by a line of rail-piles, which enabled him to repulse the attack on him. Hooker's whole corps was uncovered, and had to fight on comparatively open ground; however, after a very severe battle, it drove the enemy back to his intrenchments; the action in front of Johnston was light, he being well intrenched. The enemy left on the field 500 dead,

Hood's attack of  
the 20th of July.

1000 wounded, 7 stand of colors, and many prisoners. Sherman's loss in killed, wounded, and missing was about 1500; he supposed that the Confederate loss could not have been less than 5000.

The first of Johnston's plans, as carried out by Hood, that of attacking Sherman on the passage of Peach Tree Creek, thus failed. Hood now tried the second. He withdrew the main army from the outer Peach Tree Creek intrenchments, left Atlanta under the protection of the state troops, and concentrated far out to the right, in readiness to fall on Sherman's left flank when it came up to form the general line in front of Atlanta. On the night of the 21st Hood marched beyond Decatur and lay in wait. Sherman came up, and found the works on Peach Tree Creek abandoned; he thought the city was abandoned too. His troops swept across the well-finished parapet of the enemy, and closed in upon Atlanta in the form of an arc of a circle of about two miles radius.

But on the 22d, at 11 A.M., the sounds of musketry on the left and rear revealed the whole danger. Hood's attack of the 22d of July. While Stewart and Cheatham were engaging Thomas and Schofield, Hood was attempting to turn Sherman's left by Hardee.

In the movements which had taken place, McPherson Death of McPherson. had gained a high hill to the south and east of the railroad. It gave him a most commanding position, within view of the very heart of the city. The 16th Corps, General Dodge, was ordered from right to left to occupy the position and make it a strong general left flank. A consultation took place between Sherman and McPherson at the Howard House, in the course of the morning, respecting the movements necessary to be made. They separated about midday. Soon after the sounds of musketry were heard to the left rear; at first mere pattering shots, but soon they grew in volume, and were accompanied by artillery. The 16th Corps had been occupied, as just

mentioned, with orders to move, as soon as their work was complete, down a country road, and form on the left of the 17th Corps, refusing the line to a point nearer the railroad. The corps was in the act of moving down the road when they were attacked, and forced from it to a position in a field on the right. Battery F, 2d United States, was lost here, and some of the cannoneers captured while endeavoring to unlimber the guns. McPherson, unattended except by a single orderly, rode rapidly down the line toward the point of attack. He supposed that the 16th Corps had connected with the 17th, and followed the continuation of the line of the latter, and, by so doing, went through the space left between the left of the 17th and right of the 16th, directly into the Confederate line. He was instantly killed by the rebel skirmishers. Logan was directed to assume command of his army—the Army of the Tennessee.

The whole line was now engaged in battle, the conflict continuing for nearly four hours. At 4 P.M. Hood again plunged into McPherson's army, broke through its lines, captured two or more guns, driving a division 400 yards, and, in face of a terrific fire, carried two batteries, one of them of Parrott guns. Two divisions of the 15th Corps that were on the right and left of the railroad were separated. Sherman, being upon the spot, and appreciating the vast importance of the connection at that point, ordered some of Schofield's batteries to be placed in a commanding position, to give an incessant fire of shells, and the 15th Corps to regain its lost ground at any cost. This was executed, the enemy at length giving way, the 15th Corps regaining its position, and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which had been removed by the enemy into his main work. With this terminated the battle of the 22d, the national loss being 3722 killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Confederates left on the field their dead, wounded, and about 1000 prisoners. Their dead alone were computed to be 3240, of

The Confederates at length repulsed.

which number 2200 were from actual count. They probably lost not less than 8000 men.

Garrard had been detached with his cavalry on the 21st to Covington, 42 miles east of Atlanta. From that point he was to send detachments to break the two important bridges across the Yellow and Ulfouhatchee Rivers, tributaries of the Ocmulgee. He returned, that work thoroughly accomplished. The Augusta Road was rendered useless. Sherman now addressed himself to the task of reaching the Macon Road, over which of necessity came the stores and ammunition which alone maintained the Confederate army in Atlanta.

Schofield and Thomas were holding the enemy behind his inner intrenchments. The Army of the Tennessee was ordered to prepare to vacate its line and shift by the right below Proctor's Creek, and Schofield to extend his lines up to the Augusta Road. About this time Rousseau arrived from his Opelika expedition, bringing 2000 cavalry. He had found every thing under military control. "The conscription law was rigorously enforced. Scarcely an able-bodied man was to be met with. Even the infirm and crippled, who were capable of doing light duty, were enrolled and detailed for such service as they were able to perform. Tanners, millers, and others, following occupations of necessity to the army, were also enrolled, and then detailed to pursue their business for the benefit of the government. Conscription officers were in every neighborhood, hunting down any one who might have escaped or in any way evaded service. An iron-heeled despotism prevailed, and individual rights and freedom were utterly trampled under foot. No 'subjugation' could be more thorough than that under which the people of the South were placed by the rebel government."

The whole cavalry was now prepared for a blow at the Macon Road. Stoneman, with 5000 men, was to move



by the left round Atlanta to McDonough; McCook, with 4000 men, by the right on Fayetteville; and on the night of July 28th they were to meet near Lovejoy's, on the Macon Road, and destroy it in the most effectual manner. Stoneman, when on the point of starting, asked permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the road, to proceed to Macon and Andersonville, and release the prisoners there confined. With certain restrictions, Sherman consented. The expedition, however, was not successful. Stoneman was taken prisoner. McCook, after some successes, with difficulty extricated himself. The damage done to the road was so limited that it was obvious it would soon be repaired.

Stoneman's expedition against the Macon Railroad.

It fails; Stoneman is taken prisoner.

Pursuant to the general plan, the Army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines on the left, near the Decatur Road, during the night of July 26th, and on the 27th moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor's Creek and south, to prolong the national line due south, facing east. On that day General Howard, by order of the President of the United States, assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, and had the general supervision of the movement, which was made en echelon. Dodge was in line on the evening of the 27th. Blair came into line on his right on the morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting-house called Ezra Church, near some large open fields by the poor-house, on a road known as Bell's Ferry or Lick-skillet Road. Here the 15th Corps, Logan's, joined on and refused along a ridge well wooded, which partially commanded a view over the same fields. About 10 A.M. all the army was in position, and the men were busy throwing up the accustomed piles of rails and logs, which soon assumed the form of a parapet.

About midday the enemy came out of Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry Road, and formed his masses in the open fields, behind a swell of ground, and

Battle of Ezra Church.

advanced in parallel lines against the 15th Corps, expecting to catch that flank in air. It was evident that Hood was attempting to repeat his movements of the 22d. The advance was magnificent, but founded on an error which cost him heavily; for so coolly and deliberately were his men cut down that, in spite of the efforts of their officers, the ranks broke and fled. They were rallied again and again, as often as six times at some points. A few, both officers and men, reached the line of rail-piles only to be killed or dragged over as prisoners.

These assaults lasted from noon until about 4 P.M., when the Confederates disappeared, leaving their dead and wounded. Their loss was not less than 5000; Sherman's not reaching 600.

This battle terminated all efforts to check Sherman's extensions by the flank, which now proceeded with comparative ease; but extensions to the south were met by well-constructed forts and rifle-pits, built between Sherman's lines and the railroad to and below East Point.

General Hooker, considering himself disparaged by the assignment of Howard to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, was relieved, at his own request, from the command of his corps, which was given to General Slocum. General Palmer was also relieved from the command of the 14th Corps by General Jeff. C. Davis. General Stanley succeeded General Howard in the 4th Corps.

But if there were these changes in the national army, there were changes of a far more serious kind in the Confederate. It has been already mentioned that Johnston had been removed by the authorities at Richmond; and here, perhaps, we may conveniently pause from the military movements to consider the statements made respectively by Hood and Johnston, and their dissensions, as they throw much light upon the conduct of the whole campaign.

Defeat of the Confederates.

Changes in the national army.

Dissensions in the Confederate army.

Hood states that Johnston's force on May 6th was 70,000 men. He says the South had been denuded of troops to fill that army. Mississippi and Alabama were without military support, and looked for protection to a decisive battle in the mountains of Georgia. He criticises Johnston's conduct of the campaign with severity. He says:

Accusations brought  
by Hood against  
Johnston.

"In such condition was that splendid army when the campaign fairly opened. The enemy, but little superior in numbers, none in organization and discipline, inferior in spirit and confidence, commenced his advance; the Confederate forces, whose faces and hopes were to the North, almost simultaneously began to retreat. They soon reached positions favorable for resistance. Great ranges of mountains running across the line of march, and deep rivers, are stands from which a well-directed army is not easily driven or turned. At each advance of the enemy, the Confederate army, without serious resistance, fell back to the next range or river in the rear. The habit to retreat soon became a routine of the army, and was substituted for the hope and confidence with which the campaign opened. The enemy soon perceived this. With perfect security he divided his forces, using one column to menace in front, and one to threaten in rear. The usual order to retreat, not strike in detail, was issued and obeyed. Those retreats were always at night; the day was consumed in hard labor. Daily temporary works were thrown up, behind which it was never intended to fight. The men became travelers by night and laborers by day. They were ceasing to be soldiers by the disuse of military duty. Thus for seventy-four days and nights that noble army, which, if ordered to resist, no force that the enemy could assemble could dislodge from a battle-field, continued to abandon their country, to see their strength departing, and their flag waving only in retreat or in partial engagements. At the end of that time, after descending from the mountains, where the last advantage of position was abandoned, and camping without fortifications in the open plains of Georgia, the army had lost 22,750 of its best soldiers. Nearly one third was gone, no general battle fought, much of one state abandoned, two others uncovered, and the organization and efficiency of every command, by loss of officers, men, and tone, seriously diminished."

Johnston, on his part, says that at the time of his removal the troops were well equipped, and abundantly

Johnston's reply  
and counter-ac-  
cusations.

supplied with draught animals; were in a better condition than when the campaign began; that he lost no material in the retreat except four field-pieces. Respecting the campaign, he affirms that the enemy's great numerical superiority made the chances of battle much against the Confederates; for, if Sherman were beaten, he had a safe refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga; but their refuge was a hundred miles off, at Atlanta, with three rivers intervening. Victory for them could not have been decisive; defeat would have been utterly disastrous. Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee they could have given battle only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that the only result of their success would have been his falling back into them; but, he adds:

“Defeat would have been our ruin. Our troops, always fighting under cover, had trifling losses when compared with the enemy, whose numerical superiority was thus reduced daily and rapidly. We could, therefore, reasonably expect to cope with him on equal terms by the time that the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on our side of that river would have been his destruction. We, if beaten, had a refuge in Atlanta too strong to be assaulted, too extensive to be invested. I also hoped, by breaking the railroad in his rear, that he might be compelled to attack us in a position of our own choosing, or to a retreat easily converted into a rout. After we crossed the Etowah, five detachments of cavalry were successively sent with instructions to destroy as much as they could of the railroad between Dalton and the Etowah; all failed, because too weak. We could never spare a sufficient body of cavalry for this service, as its assistance was absolutely necessary in the defense of every position we occupied. Early in the campaign the statements of the strength of cavalry in the Departments of Mississippi and East Louisiana given me by Lieutenant General Polk, just from that command, and my telegraphic correspondence with his successor, led me to hope that a competent force could be sent from Mississippi and Alabama to prevent the use of the railroad by the United States army.”

He states that he suggested this to President Davis twice, and indirectly through Bragg five times, and to Lee,



in addition, four times. He adds: "I did this in the belief that this cavalry would serve the Confederacy better by insuring the defeat of Sherman's army than by repelling a raid in Mississippi." He declares that he never received from Davis any instructions in relation to the campaign; that the conduct of his predecessor, in retreating before odds less than those confronting him, had been apparently approved; that Lee's retreating before Grant, under similar circumstances, was increasing his great fame, both in the estimation of the administration and the people. "I supposed," he concludes, "that my course could not be censured. I believed then, as I do now, that it was the only one at my command which promised success."

Sherman and the officers of the national army spoke of Johnston's retreat from Resaca to the vicinity of Atlanta with professional admiration.

His retreat had been skillfully conducted.

"Not a straggler was left behind to give us information. A broken-down horse or mule was a curiosity. Never was there such a fine retreat." It will be found that, though the army under Johnston escaped uninjured across the Chattahoochee, under Hood it was destined to receive, through his imprudence, mortal blows.

Both parties usually fortified their lines when held for two or more days. Some of these works, as at Resaca, Kenesaw, Chattahoochee Bridge, and Atlanta, though termed field-works, became quite formidable—quite as strong as the general lines which, at Sebastopol, forced the English and French to open regular trenches.

The dense woods and broken ground all the way from Chattanooga to Atlanta afforded opportunity to either party on the defense to cover itself by works which made an assault cost dearly.

General character of the operations of the campaign.

Thus, cutting trees and bushes for two or three hundred yards in front made a strong abatis; then a ditch and parapet, with head-logs, covered the assailant perfectly. The head-log was the trunk of a tree from 12 to 18 inches

thick, laid along the interior crest, with billets of wood of about 4 inches, which would leave a space between the earth and log of 3 or 4 inches to fire through. This covered the head. The Confederates prepared many of these field-works in advance by negroes or militia in their rear; but in some cases, as at Cassville, Dallas, Kenesaw, the troops threw them up first hastily, and at their leisure finished them under cover.

Johnston supposed that Sherman would attack these works, thereby losing men all the time. This diminution of strength, with that arising from necessary guards to the rear, he expected would, as he fell back and Sherman advanced, so weaken the national army that a time must come when he could turn and be assailant.

But Sherman was cautious. He usually closed up and fortified against a sally, and, with his excess of troops, worked round Johnston's flank, and reached his line of supply, when, of necessity, that general retreated. In all the principal battles the losses were not far from balancing, and the disparity of the two armies remained unchanged.

(8.) *The turning of Atlanta.*

From the 2d of August to the 5th, Sherman continued subtracting from his left to piece out his right, in the hope of being able to reach round to the Macon Road. Hood kept gliding alongside him. On the latter day an attempt was made by Schofield to break through the enemy's line about a mile below Utoy Creek. It failed, however, and there was a loss of 400 men, who were caught in the entanglements and abatis. The position was nevertheless turned the next day, but still a foothold was not gained either on the West Point or Macon Railroads. The Confederate line was at this time almost 15 miles long, extending from near Decatur to below East Point. Hood was enabled to hold it by the use of a large force of state militia, and such was

Operations for the  
turning of Atlanta.

the shape of the ground that it was impossible to discover the weak point.

It had become plain that Hood's lines could only be carried by direct assault at a great sacrifice; and that, to reach the Macon Road, and thereby control the supplies for Atlanta, the

Cavalry attempt to break the supplying railroads.

whole army must be moved; but, before doing this, Sherman, with a view of impressing the enemy with the belief that regular siege operations were in progress, ordered from Chattanooga four 4½-inch rifled guns. These arrived on the 10th, and were put to work night and day, causing frequent fires and creating confusion in Atlanta; yet the enemy seemed determined to hold his forts, even if the city were destroyed. On the 16th of August preparations were made for a grand movement by the right flank; but at that time intelligence was received that a Confederate cavalry force, variously estimated at from 6000 to 10,000 men, had passed around by the east and north, capturing a large quantity of supplies, and breaking the railroad near Calhoun. Sherman at once took advantage of the superiority in cavalry which this gave him, suspended his general flank movement, and sent Kilpatrick, with 5000 cavalry, to break the West Point and Macon Railroads. Kilpatrick accordingly did this; but Sherman, being satisfied that the

Sherman raises the siege of Atlanta,

damage was not sufficiently thorough, determined to raise the siege of Atlanta, take the field with his whole force, and use it against the communications instead of against the intrenchments of the city. Accordingly, he loaded his wagons with 15 days' provisions, and on the night of the 25th the 4th Corps drew out of its lines on the extreme left, and marched to a position below Proctor's Creek; the 20th Corps moved back to the Chattahoochee. Hood, when he first saw these operations, fell into the delusion that Sherman had given up the campaign, and had commenced his retreat. On the next night the movement continued, the Army of the Tennessee march-

ing by a circuit toward Sandtown and across Camp Creek ; the Army of the Cumberland below Utoy Creek ; and Schofield remaining in position. The third move, on the 27th, brought the Army of the Tennessee on the West Point Railroad above Fairborn, the Army of the Cumberland about Red Oak, while Schofield closed in near Diggs and Mims. One day's work, the 28th, was now expended in destroying the roads. It was thoroughly done through 12½ miles ; the ties were burned, the rails twisted. Several cuts were filled up with trunks of trees, logs, rocks, and earth, intermingled with loaded shells prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Next day the army moved eastward by several roads, Howard on the right toward Jonesborough, Thomas in the centre to Couch's, and Schofield on the left, about Morrow's Mills. An inspection of the map shows the strategic advantages of this position. The railroad from Atlanta to Macon makes a wide bend to the east from East Point to Jonesborough. The position attained, as described, was Sherman's first objective ; it gave him interior lines.

In making this movement, which commenced on the morning of the 29th, Thomas reached Couch's without difficulty. Schofield moved cautiously on a smaller circle around East Point, still occupied by the enemy, and came into position toward Rough and Ready. Howard, having the outer circle, had the greater distance to move. He met with resistance, but forced the enemy before him, passed Renfrew, and, moving toward Jonesborough, saved the bridge across Flint River, and at night halted within half a mile of Jonesborough. On the next morning, August 31st, he found himself in presence of a heavy force of the enemy.

Hood at length comprehended the nature of Sherman's movement, but, not supposing that the whole army was engaged in it, he sent Lee's and

and throws his whole army on the railroads.

Hood dispatches troops to Jonesborough.



Hardee's corps alone to Jonesborough, he himself remaining with Stewart's in Atlanta.

When Sherman learned that Howard had passed Renfrew, he directed Thomas to send to that place a division, to move Stanley's corps, in connection with Schofield, toward Rough and Ready, and to send forward, due east, a strong detachment of Davis's corps to feel for the railroad. These movements were going on on the 31st, when the enemy came out of Jonesborough, attacked Howard in his position, and was thoroughly repulsed. The attack lasted more than two hours. The Confederate loss could not have been less than 2500; there were left on the ground 400 dead. Sherman, hearing the sounds of this engagement about noon, ordered the movements on the left and centre to be pressed, and at 4 P.M. received reports that Howard had repulsed the enemy at Jonesborough, as just related; that Schofield had reached the railroad a mile below Rough and Ready, was moving along it, and breaking it as he went; that Stanley, of Thomas's army, had also reached the road below Schofield, and was destroying it, working south; and that Baird, of Davis's corps, had struck it still lower down, within four miles of Jonesborough.

Orders were at once given for all the army to turn on Jonesborough. Howard was directed to keep the enemy occupied while Thomas should move down from the north, with Schofield on his left. The troops were ordered, as they moved down, to continue the thorough destruction of the road. Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch the roads to the rear—the north; Kilpatrick's was sent south to attack the railroad below Jonesborough. It was intended that the whole army should close down on Jonesborough by noon of the 1st of September. Night came, and, owing to the difficult nature of the country, the movement was not completed. In the morning it was found that the enemy had retreated.

(9.) *The capture of Atlanta.*

At last it could be no longer concealed in Atlanta that the whole national army lay between the city and Hardee. Hood recognized that he had lost the campaign.

Hood is compelled to evacuate Atlanta.

About 2 A.M., September 2d, sounds of heavy explosions were heard by Sherman's army in the direction of Atlanta, distant about 20 miles, with a succession of minor explosions, and what seemed like the rapid firing of cannon and musketry. These continued for about an hour, and again, about 4 A.M., occurred another series of similar discharges, apparently nearer.

Atlanta had been abandoned during the night (September 1-2). Hood had blown up his ammunition trains; 6 locomotives, 100 cars, machine-shops, store-houses, and dépôts had been destroyed.

Sherman, before the news from Atlanta reached him, had ordered a pursuit of the enemy from Jonesborough, but he now countermanded those orders, and drew back his troops. He grouped the Army of the Cumberland around Atlanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and that of the Ohio about Decatur, in clean and healthy camps.

The losses in the national army from Chattanooga to Atlanta were about 30,000; in the Confederate about 42,000. The latter lost more than 20 general officers killed and wounded, between 40 and 50 cannon, and 25,000 small-arms.

The losses of the campaign.

"I must bear," says Sherman, "full and liberal testimony to the energetic and successful management of our railroads during the campaign. No matter when or where a breach has been made, the repair-train seemed on the spot, and the damage was repaired generally before I knew of the break. Bridges have been built with surprising rapidity, and the locomotive-whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost before the echoes of the skirmish-fire had ceased. Some of

The skill with which the campaign had been conducted.

these bridges, those of the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and Chattahoochee, are fine, substantial structures, and were built in an inconceivably short time, almost out of material improvised on the spot."

"Atlanta is ours, and fairly won," telegraphed Sherman to Washington on September 2d. Lincoln's letter of thanks to Sherman. Lincoln wrote him a letter of thanks: "The marches, battles, sieges, and other military operations that have signaled this campaign must render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the applause and thanks of the nation." Grant, before Petersburg, on the 4th, ordered a salute to be fired in honor of the victory, "with shotted guns, from every battery bearing upon the enemy." Sherman had already received from the President a commission making him a major general in the regular army.

In this campaign Sherman was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. It passed the whole distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected with troops.

Twice, had Sherman's orders been executed, Hood's army would have been destroyed—at Resaca and Jonesborough.

Atlanta, it is true, was a magnificent prize, but it was not the entire objective of Sherman's campaign. Though the Confederates had lost full 40,000 men, Hood's army was still in front, and 40,000 strong. Sherman therefore resolved to make the city a military post.

It had not infrequently happened that the Confederate officers had left their women and children, in places their armies had been constrained to evacuate, a burden on the national resources. So it was at Atlanta. But Sherman's supplies were derived from Nashville, or, indeed, from Louisville, and were brought over a single-track railroad nearly 300 miles. It was obviously out of the question for

him to support his own army and the residents of Atlanta also. "I am not willing," he said, "to have Atlanta encumbered with the families of our enemies." He therefore delivered over to General Hood 446 families, and then burnt every thing in the place except the churches and dwelling-houses.

The municipal authorities of Atlanta had presented a memorial to Sherman earnestly requesting him to reconsider his determination, and depicting the suffering that would ensue. To this the general, in an equally respectful but firm tone, replied, acknowledging and regretting the distress that must be occasioned:

Sherman's reply  
to the memorial  
of the authorities  
of Atlanta.

"I can not revoke my order. I have to prepare for a future struggle in which millions, yea, hundreds of millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only in Atlanta, but in all America. To have peace, the rebel armies must be defeated. To defeat them, we must reach them in their recesses. My military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible.

"War is cruelty, and you can not refine it. Those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I had no hand in making this war, and I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you can not have peace and a division of our country. We don't want your negroes, or your houses, or your land, or any thing that you have, but we do want, and will have, a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements we can not help it.

"You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers. They live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters the better for you. You began this war without one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your own armies and desperadoes hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very differently—you depre-



cate its horrors. But you did not feel them when you were sending car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and were moulding shells and shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people who only asked to live in peace at their old homes under the government of their inheritance.

“But, when peace does come, you may call upon me for any thing. Then I will share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to guard your homes and families against danger from every quarter. Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and Peace once more to settle on your old homes in Atlanta.”

(10.) *Abandonment of Georgia by the Confederate Army.*

Great as were the physical consequences of the capture of Atlanta, the moral consequences were indescribably greater. The people of the Confederacy were appalled. The government at Richmond lost all control of itself. It stood on the brink of despair. In seasons of peril and disaster, the mental qualities of a man are more clearly displayed than in the sunshine of prosperity. Lucretius makes the remark that “it is more satisfactory to contemplate a person in doubtful dangers, and to learn what he is in adverse circumstances, since words of truth are then at last elicited from the bottom of the heart, and the mask is taken away, while the reality of the man remains.” Tried by that test, the misfortunes now besetting President Davis showed only too clearly how unequal he was to the exigencies of his elevated post. Three weeks after the fall of Atlanta he left Richmond for the purpose of seeking an interview with Hood, on his journey making public addresses at various places; among others, on the 23d of September, at Macon, in Georgia. It would have been difficult to compose any thing more undignified, more impolitic. Even the muzzled and profligate newspapers of Richmond denounced it, and, bitter as they were, the president’s political enemies declared that it must be a forgery.

Consequences of the fall of Atlanta.

He spoke of the deep disgrace of the Confederate army falling back from Dalton to the interior of Georgia. He denounced the governor of that state as a scoundrel who had been uttering falsehoods; and, if thus he did not spare those who had been his co-laborers, he assailed with vulgarity his antagonists, informing his audience that Butler the Beast had been engaged in an effort to get himself whitewashed by holding intercourse with gentlemen. With inconceivable indiscretion he announced that two thirds of the soldiers were absent from the army, and that, though some were sick and some were wounded, most of them were absent without leave; he added that the disparity of numbers in Virginia was as great as it was in Georgia. He depicted the exhaustion of the country: "You have not many men between eighteen and forty-five." He called upon the matrons of the South to come forward to the public help, and told them of some who had given all their children to the cause. To the young women he frantically appealed to reject the addresses of the suitor who did not join the army.

At Augusta he declared that the enemy must be driven from the soil of Georgia; that "we must march into Tennessee and push the enemy back to the Ohio." To Hood's soldiers he said, "Be of good cheer, for within a short time your faces will be turned homeward, and your feet pressing Tennessee soil."

On the 4th of October he made a speech at Columbia, South Carolina, the object of which was to incite every one in the South capable of bearing arms to join the army. "Does any one," said the Confederate President, "does any one imagine that we can conquer the Yankees by retreating before them? Do you not all know that the only way to make spaniels civil is to whip them? And you can whip them, if all the men capable of bearing arms will do their duty by taking their places under the standard of their country." He denounced all attempts for obtaining

peace by the separate negotiations of the seceding states with the national government.

Johnston had been removed from command because he had retreated from Dalton to the Chattahoochee; it was politically impossible to permit Hood to follow the same course and continue his retreat from Atlanta. The Richmond government had ever been clamorous for an invasion of the North. It was so even in its dying hours. A dream of blood and fire in Northern cities was flitting before its eyes. A sortie into Tennessee would not only destroy Sherman's communications, it might, perhaps, cross the Ohio, and, in the sack of Louisville, compensate for the capture of Atlanta.

The abandonment of Georgia, an invasion of Tennessee—such was the result of Davis's consultations with Hood. When Sherman heard of it he with difficulty could cause himself to credit the intelligence. He knew well that if he could once bring Hood's army fairly to battle, it would be destroyed; he expected that that destruction would place the Atlantic States at his mercy.

Hood crossed the Chattahoochee on the 29th of September on his perilous, and, as it was to prove, fatal expedition to the North; and Sherman's campaign, justly spoken of by great military authorities as the most brilliant of the war, reached, both in a military and in a political sense, a successful issue. There was nothing now to prevent him sweeping through the Atlantic States.

Another Confederate sortie to the North is resolved on.

The Confederate army abandons Georgia.

## CHAPTER LXXX.

### THE MARCH OF THE ARMY OF THE WEST FROM THE ALLEGHANY MOUNTAINS TO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

The Confederate government attempted to compel the Army of the West to retreat from Georgia by threatening its communications.

That army, under General Sherman, followed the Confederate army, under General Hood, to the confines of Alabama; then, swiftly retracing his steps, Sherman, having dispatched General Thomas to Nashville to resist the Confederate sortie, destroyed his own supplying railroads, burnt the city of Atlanta, and pursued his march to the sea.

Notwithstanding the great difficulties encountered, the march was successfully completed. Milledgeville, the capital of Georgia, was taken, Fort McAllister carried by assault, and Savannah compelled to surrender, damage to an amount estimated at one hundred millions of dollars having been inflicted on the state.

Sherman thus came in connection with the national fleet, and established a new base of supply on the Atlantic Ocean for the Army of the West.

SHERMAN, after the fall of Atlanta, camped his army in the vicinity of that place, refitting and supplying his men. He strengthened the garrisons in his rear, and, among other movements, sent Corse's division of the 15th Corps to Rome. He also remodeled the works of Atlanta, so that a smaller garrison would suffice to defend them.

Position of the national and Confederate armies after the fall of Atlanta.

Hood had collected his forces about half a dozen miles south of Jonesborough, at Lovejoy's Station, from which he moved westward toward the Chattahoochee, and took a position at Palmetto, covering the West Point Railroad. The three corps of his army were commanded by Cheatham, S. D. Lee, and Stewart, his cavalry by Wheeler. Lee had succeeded Hardee, the latter going to Charleston to relieve Beauregard, who was placed at the head of all the armies operating in the central region.

Sherman had already experienced the facility with which his railroad communications might be broken. Two cavalry attempts had been made by the Confederates to destroy the roads in his rear.

Attempt to break the railroads in Sherman's rear.



The first was during the latter part of August, when Sherman's movements were culminating in the capture of Atlanta. Wheeler, who was in command, was repulsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee. He moved westward through McMinnville, Murfreesborough, and Franklin, and was finally expelled south of the Tennessee. The damage he did was repaired in a few days.

The second was at the close of September. It was under Forrest, who crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d of September attacked the garrison at Athens, consisting of 600 men. It capitulated on the next day; soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and were likewise compelled to surrender. Forrest now began destroying the railroad, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch Trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Decherd. On the morning of the 30th one column of Forrest's command, under Buford, summoned the garrison at Huntsville to surrender. This was refused. Hereupon he withdrew to Athens, which had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of October 1st, without success. Renewing the attack, he was repulsed.

Another of his columns appeared before Columbia on the 1st. On the 3d Forrest moved toward Mount Pleasant. General Thomas made every exertion to destroy these forces before they could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent their escape to Corinth in Mississippi.

Not without reason did Johnston bitterly complain, as we have seen in the last chapter, of the manner in which the Confederate cavalry was employed. Had Forrest's been united with Wheeler's, it would have given a force 15,000 strong—a force which Johnston or Hood might have successfully thrown on Sherman's long line of railroad at any point.

Very different was Grant's action. He sent Wilson from Virginia to report to Sherman, with powers to reorganize and bring into the field the scattered cavalry forces of the three armies of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Wilson reported at Gaylesville early in October, and was assigned to duty as chief of cavalry, having command of 72 regiments. These were withdrawn from the control of the army commanders, and organized into a corps of 7 divisions and 15 brigades.

The Richmond authorities saw that it was absolutely necessary that Sherman should be either forced or drawn out of Georgia. They expected to accomplish their object by thoroughly breaking the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, and by destroying the great bridge over the Tennessee at Bridgeport. By these operations Atlanta would be isolated from Chattanooga, and Chattanooga from Nashville. Sherman would not only be compelled to retreat, but perhaps he would be placed at their mercy.

They might have succeeded had their antagonist been an ordinary routine general, but he was a soldier at all times full of resources; and more than that—of all American officers, he was distinguished by the highest attribute of military skill—the ability to produce a maximum result with a minimum waste of force. He helped them to do the very thing they wanted. He cut his own supplying railroads, and then, turning round, delivered a death-blow at their Confederacy.

Vainly, but in the hope of blinding Sherman to the movement about to be executed, the Governor of Georgia, with great publicity, withdrew his state militia from Hood, who then moved toward the Chattahoochee to carry out the purpose of breaking Sherman's communications.

As soon as Sherman became satisfied of the character of

Organization of the national cavalry.

Necessity for the Confederates to remove Sherman from Georgia.

Hood marches toward the Chattahoochee.

Hereupon Thomas  
goes to Nashville.

Hood's movement (September 28th), he sent General Thomas to Nashville.

The Confederates  
attack Allatoona,

About October 1st, the Confederate army, numbering 36,000, one fourth of which was cavalry, crossed the Chattahoochee, marched to Dallas, and thence sent cavalry to Big Shanty, where they broke the railroad and telegraph, capturing the garrison both of that place and Ackworth, 400 men. A division of their infantry (French's) appeared before Allatoona (October 5th), where were stored about one million rations. The post was under charge of Colonel Tourtelotte.

and are repulsed.

Sherman had anticipated this movement, and had, by signal and telegraph, ordered Corse to re-enforce the post from Rome. Corse reached the place just before the attack, increasing the garrison to 1944 men. Sherman, in person, reached Kenesaw Mountain about 10 A.M., and could see the smoke, and hear the sound of artillery. The distance, 18 miles, was too great for him to march in time to join in the battle, but he ordered the 23d Corps, Cox's, to move rapidly from Kenesaw west, and threaten the rear of the forces attacking Allatoona. He succeeded in getting a signal message to Corse during the battle notifying him of his presence. The day was cloudy. From the height of the sunless Kenesaw the flags waved the necessary orders. The conflict lasted from 8.30 A.M. until night. It ended in the withdrawal of the Confederates. They left 231 dead and 411 prisoners. Corse's loss was 707, more than one third of his men. He himself had been wounded in the face. Tourtelotte had also been wounded. On this occasion, as on many others, the signal corps proved of great utility. By the waving of its little flags on the hill-tops it carried intelligence of vital importance to and from the fort.

Hood is repulsed  
from Resaca.

Hood crossed the Coosa on a pontoon bridge, and Sherman followed him to Rome, October 11th, sending thence the 23d Corps and some cav-

ally to threaten his flank. Hood now made his appearance before Resaca, October 12th, and in person demanded its surrender, threatening to take no prisoners if refused. He was, however, repulsed. Thence he moved up the railroad, destroying it as far as the Tunnel, and capturing the garrison at Dalton. On reaching Resaca, Sherman determined to try to force the Confederates to a battle. He therefore sent the Army of the Tennessee to Snake Creek Gap, while the 4th and 14th Corps were to march to their rear. Hood, however, moved away rapidly, followed by Sherman, who attempted to cut off his retreat; but the Confederates, little encumbered with trains, succeeded in reaching the narrow gorge formed by the Lookout range abutting against the Coosa River in the neighborhood of Gadsden. Hood had no intention of fighting; his object was to lure Sherman out of Georgia. On the 19th Sherman reached Gaylesville.

At Gaylesville he remained some days. The troops were instructed to draw supplies from the surrounding country. Communications were opened with Rome, and a large force set at work to repair the damages done to the railroads.

To pursue Hood would merely amount to being decoyed, with little prospect of overtaking him. Sherman therefore submitted to Grant a plan to the following effect—to destroy Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and, sallying forth from Atlanta through the heart of Georgia, to capture one or more of the Atlantic sea-ports. He had hitherto been drawing his supplies over a single-track railroad from Nashville, or, more correctly, from Louisville, a distance of 500 miles. He saw that it was impossible to preserve that line with a Confederate army of 40,000 men upon it. But to march through Georgia was to destroy that state, so far as it contributed to the military resources of the Confederacy; it was to sever communications between the

Sherman halts at  
Gaylesville,

and determines to  
return and march  
through Georgia.



Atlantic States and the Gulf States, and the West; it was to exchange an untenable base, far off in the interior, for one inaccessible to the enemy, close at hand, and upon the sea; it was to insure the capture of all the Confederate Atlantic cities.

Two conditions were involved in this movement: 1st, Two conditions necessary to his march. to have a force sufficient to execute the proposed march; 2d, to place under Thomas at Nashville an army strong enough to resist Hood's northward progress, or even to destroy him. At first Sherman was doubtful whether he could meet both conditions, as he could not tell what re-enforcements he should have. That was, however, settled by Grant's letter to him on September 27th: "I have directed all the new troops from the West, and from the East too, if necessary (if none are ready in the West), to be sent to you." Sherman now determined to carry his intention into effect.

Not without some difficulty, however, was that accomplished. He asks Grant's permission to make it. Grant inclined to the belief that it was safer to destroy Hood's army first, and then march through Georgia. Thomas thought it would be best to send Wilson's cavalry through Georgia, and fight Hood with the whole army. On maturely considering the arguments which had had so much weight with Sherman, they both, however, eventually acquiesced in the correctness of his conclusion. As the march executed had much to do with the downfall of the Confederacy, the facts relating to its inception present historical interest. The following abstract of the correspondence will place them in a clear point of view.

On the 1st of October, four days after the above-mentioned offer of troops, Sherman wrote to Correspondence on the subject. Grant: "Why would it not do for me to leave Tennessee to the force which Thomas has, and the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and to destroy Atlanta, and then march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston,

breaking roads, and doing irreparable damage?" On the same day he wrote to Howard: "The march I propose is less by 200 miles than that I made last fall, and less than I accomplished in February; and we could make a break in the Confederacy by ruining, both east and west, roads, and not running against a single fort till we reached the sea-shore in communication with our ships." And still again, on the same day, he wrote nearly in the same words to Thomas.

On the 10th of October he renewed his suggestion to Grant: "Hood is crossing the Coosa 12 miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio Road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the state? He will have ample force when the re-enforcements ordered reach Nashville." Not content with this, in a cipher dispatch, on the following day (October 11th), he pressed the matter on Grant: "I would infinitely prefer to send back all my wounded, make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee. Answer quickly, as I know we shall not have the telegraph long."

In a cipher dispatch to Halleck: "I shall pursue him (Hood) as far as Gaylesville. I propose to send the 4th Corps back to General Thomas, and leave him, with that corps, the garrisons, and new troops, to defend the line of the Tennessee, and with the rest push into the heart of Georgia, and come out at Savannah, destroying all the roads of the state." On the 19th of October, in a letter to Halleck, he stated that he now considers himself authorized to execute his plan; that Grant preferred the march to be directed upon Savannah rather than to Charleston or the mouth of the Apalachicola. It is in this letter that

he justifies the course about to be pursued of taking supplies from the country. "My answer (to the people here) is, Your friends have broken our railroads, which supplied us bountifully, and you can not suppose our soldiers will suffer when there is abundance within reach." He presented the same defense to Slocum (October 23): "If Georgia can afford to break our railroads, she can afford to feed us." As late as the 2d of November he was still reasoning with Grant: "If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated movement through Georgia."

At last, on November 2d, Grant's permission reached him: "With the force you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. I really do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose." On the 8th came Grant's adieu, nobly expressed. "Great good fortune attend you! I believe you will be eminently successful, and, at worst, can only make a march less fruitful of results than hoped for."

Subsequently, on reaching the vicinity of Savannah, in a dispatch to Grant, Sherman made a statement which has become historically important (December 16): "I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas assured me that he was all ready; and my last dispatch from him (November 12th) was full of confidence; in it he promised me that he would 'ruin Hood' if he dared to advance from Florence, urging me to go ahead, and give myself no concern about Hood's army in Tennessee."

At Gadsden, Beauregard, commanding the Confederate Military Division of the West, joined Hood. With his assent the sortie was made, and, on the 26th of October, Sherman, being satisfied

Grant gives his permission.

Sherman delays till Thomas is ready.

He dispatches reinforcements to Thomas,

that Hood had moved westward across Sand Mountain, detached Stanley, with the 4th Corps, to Chattanooga, ordering him to report to Thomas at Nashville. On the 30th he detached Schofield, with the 23d Corps, to the same destination. These two bodies were 23,000 strong. To General Thomas he delegated full power over all the troops subject to his command, except the four corps with which he designed to move into Georgia. Of cavalry, Sherman kept only one division, under Kilpatrick, sending the rest, under Wilson, to Thomas. A. J. Smith was also ordered from Missouri to join him. These forces were considered sufficient to enable him to cope with Hood, whose army, estimated at 35,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, had moved to Tusculumbia. A pontoon bridge had been laid opposite Florence.

Sherman now began preparations for his great march, having communicated full details of it to Thomas and to all the corps commanders. Arrived at Kingston, he directed all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed, the sick, the wounded, the refugees, to be sent back to Chattanooga. He ordered Corse, who was still at Rome, to burn the bridges, founderies, mills, etc., at that place. The railroad in and about Atlanta, and that between the Etowah and Chattahoochee, he ordered to be utterly destroyed. The garrisons from Kingston northward were directed to withdraw to Chattanooga, taking with them all public property and railroad stock, and the rails from Resaca back, saving them to be replaced should future interests demand.

On the 9th of November, at Kingston, Sherman issued the following orders for the march :

“I. For the purpose of military operations, this army is divided into two wings, viz., the right wing, Major General O. O. Howard commanding, composed of the 15th and 17th Corps ; the left wing, Major General H. W. Slocum commanding, composed of the 14th and 20th Corps.

and makes preparations for marching to the sea.

Orders issued for the march.



“II. The habitual order of march will be, whenever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special orders from the commander-in-chief.

“III. There will be no general trains of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition and provision trains distributed habitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition wagons, provision wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each army corps commander should change this order of march by having his advance and rear brigade unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 A.M., and make about 15 miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

“IV. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather near the route traveled corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagon trains at least ten days' provisions for the command, and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during the halt, or at camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and drive in stock which is in sight of their camp. To regular foraging parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the road traveled.

“V. To army commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc., and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army corps commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.

“VI. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit, discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor or industrious, who are usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack-mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will

refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, when the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts, and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.

“VII. Negroes who are able-bodied, and can be of service to the several columns, may be taken along, but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

“VIII. The organization at once of a good pioneer battalion for each corps, composed, if possible, of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance guard, should repair roads, and double them if possible, so that the columns may not be delayed on reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should study the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, and marching their troops on one side, and also instruct their troops to assist wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.

“IX. Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, will assign to each wing of the army a pontoon train fully equipped and organized, and the commanders thereof will see to its being properly protected at all times.”

From Cartersville the last communication was sent to  
Communication with the North severed. the North. It was a message to Thomas:  
 “All is well.”

On the 12th of November Sherman's army stood detached and cut off from all communication  
Composition of Sherman's marching army. with the rear. It was composed of four  
 corps, of an aggregate strength of 60,000 infantry, one cavalry division of 5500, and the artillery reduced to a minimum—one gun per thousand men.

The columns marched rapidly, leaving a wasted track in  
The army reaches Atlanta. their rear. Half Marietta was burned by stragglers acting against orders. The whole force was grouped about Atlanta on the 14th of November. That city, with the exception of its churches and dwelling-houses, was thoroughly destroyed. Major Nichols, who was present, speaking of this incident, says:

“Atlanta is entirely deserted by human beings, except a few soldiers here and there. The houses are vacant. There is no trade or

traffic of any kind ; the streets are empty. Beautiful roses are blooming in the gardens of fine houses, but a terrible stillness and solitude cover all. In the peaceful homes of the North there can be no conception how these people have suffered for their crimes.

“A grand and awful spectacle is presented to the beholders in this beautiful city. By order, the chief engineer has destroyed by powder and fire all the store-houses, *dépôt* buildings, and machine-shops. The heaven is one expanse of lurid fire ; the air is filled with flying burning cinders ; buildings covering two hundred acres are in ruins or in flames. Every instant there is the sharp detonation, or the smothered booming sound of exploding shells or powder concealed in the buildings, and then the sparks and flames shoot away up into the black and red sky, scattering cinders far and wide.

“These are the machine-shops, in which have been forged and cast the rebel cannon, shot, and shell that have caused death to many a brave defender of our nation’s honor. These warehouses have been the receptacle of munitions of war stored to be used for our destruction. This city which, next to Richmond, has furnished more material for prosecuting the war than any other in the South, exists no more as a means of injury to be used by the enemies of the Union.

“A brigade of Massachusetts soldiers are the only troops now left in the town ; they will be the last to leave it. To-night I heard the fine band of the 33d Massachusetts playing ‘John Brown’s soul goes marching on’ by the light of the burning buildings. I have never heard that noble air when it was so grand, so solemn, so inspiring.”

The organization of Sherman’s army as it marched from Atlanta to Savannah, and subsequently from Savannah to Raleigh, was, as has been said, in two wings—the right wing, or Army of the Tennessee ; the left wing, or Army of Georgia.

The right wing consisted of the 15th and 17th Army Corps.

“THE 15TH ARMY CORPS was commanded by Major General P. J. Osterhaus from Atlanta to Savannah, and from Savannah to Raleigh by Major General John A. Logan. Its first division was commanded by Brevet Major General C. R. Woods, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of that division by Colonel Milo Smith, Brigadier General C. C. Walcott, and Colonel J. A. Williamson respectively. Its second division was commanded by Brigadier General W. B. Hazen, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of that di-

vision by Colonel Theodore Jones, Colonel Wells S. Jones, and Colonel J. M. Olliver respectively. Its third division was commanded by Brigadier General John E. Smith, and the 1st and 2d brigades of that division by Colonel J. B. McConn, and Brevet Brigadier General G. B. Raum respectively. Its fourth division was commanded by Brigadier General J. M. Corse, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of that division by Brigadier General E. W. Rice, Colonel R. M. Adams, and Lieutenant Colonel F. J. Hurlburt respectively. The artillery brigade was commanded by Major C. J. Stolbrand.

“THE 17TH ARMY CORPS was commanded by Major General F. P. Blair, Jr. Its first division was commanded by The 17th Army Corps. Major General James A. Mower, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of that division by Brigadier General J. W. Fuller, Brigadier General J. W. Sprague, and Colonel John Tillson respectively. Its third division was commanded by Brigadier General M. D. Leggett, and the 1st and 2d brigades of that division by Brigadier General M. F. Force, and Colonel R. K. Scott respectively. Its fourth division was commanded by Brigadier General Giles A. Smith, and the 1st and 3d brigades of that division by Colonel B. F. Potts and Brigadier General W. W. Belknap respectively. The artillery brigade was commanded by Major A. C. Waterhous.

The left wing consisted of the 14th and 20th Corps.

“THE 14TH ARMY CORPS was commanded by Brevet Major General The 14th Army Corps. Jeff. C. Davis. Its first division was commanded by Brigadier General W. P. Carlin, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of that division by Colonel H. C. Hobert, Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Brigham, and Colonel H. A. Hambright respectively. Its second division was commanded by Brigadier General James D. Morgan, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of that division by Colonel C. F. Smith, Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Pearce, and Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Loughley respectively. Its third division was commanded by Brigadier General A. Baird, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of that division by Colonel M. C. Hunter, Colonel N. Gleason, and Colonel G. S. Este respectively. The artillery was commanded by Major C. Houghtaling.

“THE 20TH ARMY CORPS was commanded by Brigadier General A. The 20th Army Corps. S. Williams. Its first division by Brigadier General N. J. Jackson, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of that division by Colonel J. L. Selfridge, Colonel E. A. Carman, and Colonel J. S. Robinson respectively. Its second division was commanded by Brigadier General John W. Geary, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades of that division by Colonel A. Pardee, Colonel P. H. Jones, and Colonel H. A. Barnum respectively. Its third division was commanded by



Brigadier General W. T. Ward, and the 1st and 3d brigades of that division by Colonel F. C. Smith, and Colonel S. Ross respectively. The artillery brigade was commanded by Major J. A. Reynolds.

All the troops were provided with wagon-trains loaded with ammunition, and supplies of about 20 days' bread, 40 days' sugar and coffee, a double allowance of salt for 40 days, and beef cattle equal to 40 days. The wagons also carried about 3 days' forage in grain. The troops were instructed, by a judicious system of foraging, to maintain this state of things as long as possible, living upon the country, which abounds in corn, sweet potatoes, and meats. In a continuous line the army would have stretched over fifty miles, the wagon-train would have reached over thirty miles. At every halt the adjacent fields were covered with the horses, mules, and cattle. Not much was left in the rear.

The march lay through majestic pine forests, slippery with fallen and faded needle-leaves covering the ground—the spoils of many preceding years. Nothing could be more picturesque than the bivouac in these woods. Groups of soldiers flitting past the red, glaring watch-fires; some busy preparing supper; some card-playing, dancing, singing, talking; and there was the low murmur of the vast host; the moaning of the wind as it swept through the tops of the pine-trees; the neighing of horses, and the rustling step of the picket-guard pacing his round, and outwatching the clear, cold night.

The events of a day are thus described, in his "Story of the Great March," by the officer, Major Nichols, from whom I have previously quoted:

"The order of march is issued by the army commanders the preceding night, from them to the corps commanders, and then passed along until every soldier, teamster, and camp-follower knows that an early start is to be made. 'The second division will be on the Milledgeville Road promptly at four o'clock' reads an order, by way of instance.

Supplies to be taken from the country.

The march through the forests.

Manner of conducting the march.

“At three o’clock the watch-fires are burning dimly, and, but for the occasional neighing of horses, all is so silent that it is difficult to imagine that twenty thousand men are within a radius of a few miles. The ripple of the brook can be distinctly heard as it breaks over the pebbles, or winds petulantly about the gnarled roots. The wind, sweeping gently through the tall pines overhead, only serves to lull to deeper repose the slumbering soldier, who in his tent is dreaming of his far-off Northern home.

The start in the morning.  
 “But in an instant all is changed. From some commanding elevation the clear-toned bugle sounds out the *reveill e*, and another and another responds, until the startled echoes double and treble the clarion calls. Intermingled with this comes the beating of drums, often rattling and jarring on unwilling ears. In a few moments the peaceful quiet is replaced by noise and tumult, arising from hill and dale, from field and forest. Camp-fires, hitherto extinct, or smoldering in dull, gray ashes, awaken to new life and brilliancy, and send forth their sparks high into the morning air. Although no gleam of sunshine blushes in the east, the harmless flames on every side light up the scene, so that there is no disorder or confusion.

“The æsthetic aspects of this sudden change do not, however, occupy much of the soldier’s time. He is more practically engaged in getting his breakfast ready. The potatoes are frying nicely in the well-larded pan, the chicken is roasting delicately on the red-hot coals, and grateful fumes from steaming coffee-pots delight the nostrils. The animals are not less busy. An ample supply of corn and huge piles of fodder are greedily devoured by these faithful friends of the boys in blue, and any neglect is quickly made known by the pawing of neighing horses and the braying of the mules. Amid all this is the busy clatter of tongues and tools—a Babel of sounds, forming a contrast to the quiet of the previous hour as marked as that between peace and war.

“Then the animals are hitched into the traces, and the droves of cattle relieved from the night’s confinement in the corral. Knapsacks are strapped, men seize their trusty weapons, and, as again the bugles sound the note of command, the soldiers fall into line, and file out upon the road to make another stage of their journey.

“A day’s march varies according to the country to be traversed or the opposition encountered. If the map indicates a stream crossing the path, probably the strong party of mounted infantry or of cavalry which has been sent forward the day before has found the bridges burned, and then the pontoons are pushed on to the front. If a battle is anticipated, the trains are shifted to the rear of the centre. Under any circumstances, the divisions having the lead move

unencumbered by wagons, and in close fighting trim. The ambulances following in the rear of the division are in such close proximity as to be available if needed. In the rear of each regiment follow the pack-mules, laden with every kind of camp-baggage, including blankets, pots, pans, kettles, and all the kitchen-ware needed for cooking. Here will be found the led horses, and with them the negro servants, who form an important feature of the *ménage*.

“Having placed the column upon the road, let us now follow that long line of muskets gleaming in the rays of the morning sunlight, and ride, heedless of the crack of the rifles, to the head of the column. The advance are driving a squad of rebel cavalry before them so fast that the march is not in the least impeded. The flankers spread out on a line parallel to the leading troops for several hundred yards, more or less, as the occasion may require. They search through the swamps and forests ready for any concealed foe, and anxiously looking out for any line of works which may have been thrown up by the enemy to check our progress. A large plantation appears by the roadside. If the ‘bummers’ have been ahead, the chances are that it has been visited, in which event the interior is apt to show evidences of confusion; but the barns are full of corn and fodder, and parties are at once detailed to secure and convey the prize to the roadside. As the wagons pass along they are not allowed to halt, but the grain or fodder is stuffed into the front or rear of the vehicles as they pass, the unhandy operation affording much amusement to the soldiers, and not infrequently giving them a poor excuse for swearing as well as laughing.

“When the treasure-trove of grain, and poultry, and vegetables has been secured, one man is detailed to guard it until the proper wagon comes along. Numbers of these details will be met, who, with proper authority, have started off early in the morning, and have struck out miles away from the flank of the column. They sit at some cross-road surrounded with their spoils—chickens, turkeys, geese, ducks, pigs, hogs, sheep, calves nicely dressed, hams, baskets full of honey, and pots of fresh white lard.

“There is a halt in the column. The officer in charge of the pioneer corps, which follows the advance guard, has discovered an ugly place in the road, which must be corduroyed at once before the wagons can pass. The pioneer corps quickly tear down the fence near by, and bridge over the treacherous place, perhaps at the rate of a quarter of a mile in fifteen minutes. If rails are not near, pine saplings and split logs supply their place. Meanwhile the bugles have sounded, and the column has halted. The

The columns upon the road.

Collection of supplies.

Corduroying of the roads.

soldiers drop out of the line on the roadside, lying upon their backs, supported by their still unstrapped knapsacks. If the halt is a long one, the different regiments march by file right, one behind the other, into the fields, stacking their muskets, and taking their rest at ease, released from their knapsacks.

“These short halts are of great benefit to the soldier: he gains a breathing-spell; has a chance to wipe the perspiration from his brow and the dust out of his eyes, or pulls off his shoes and stockings to cool his swollen, heated feet, though old campaigners do not feel the need of this; he munches his bit of hard bread, or pulls out a book from his pocket, or oftener a pipe, to indulge in that greatest of luxuries to a soldier, a soothing, refreshing smoke. Here may be seen one group at a brook-side, bathing their heads and drinking; and another, crowded round an old song-book, are making very fair music; one venturesome fellow has kindled a fire, and is brewing a cup of coffee.\* All are happy and jolly; but when the bugle sounds ‘fall in,’ ‘attention,’ and ‘forward,’ in an instant every temporary occupation is dropped, and they are on the road again.

“But the sun has long since passed the zenith; the droves of cattle, which have been driven through the swamps and fields, are lowing and wandering in search of a corral; the soldiers are beginning to lag a little; the teamsters are obliged to apply the whip oftener; 10 or 15 miles have been traversed, and the designated halting-place for the night is near. The column must now be got into camp.

“Officers ride on in advance to select the point for each brigade, giving the preference to slopes in the vicinity of wood and water. Soon the troops file out into the woods and fields, the leading division pitching tents first, those in the rear marching on yet farther, ready to take their turn in the advance next day.

“As soon as the arms are stacked, the boys attack the fences and rail-piles, and with incredible swiftness their little shelter-tents spring up all over the ground. The fires are kindled with equal celerity, and the luxurious repast is prepared. After this is heard the music of dancing or singing, the pleasant buzz of conversation, and the measured sound of reading. The wagons, meanwhile, are parked, and the animals fed.

“By-and-by the tattoo rings out on the night air. Its familiar sound is understood. ‘Go to rest, go to rest,’ it says as plainly as organs of human speech.

“Shortly after follows the peremptory command of ‘taps’—‘out lights, out lights.’ The soldier gradually disappears from the camp-fire; rolled snugly in his blanket, he dreams again of home. The

Preparations for halting at night.

Evening amusements—the bivouac.



animals, with dull instinct, lie down to rest. The fires, neglected by the sleeping men, go out, gradually flickering and smouldering, as if unwilling to die. All is quiet—the army is asleep. Perhaps there is a brief interruption to the silence, as some trooper goes clattering down the road on an errand of speed, or some uneasy sleeper turns over to find an easier position. And around the slumbering host the picket-guards keep quiet watch.”

There are two lines of railroad connecting Atlanta with the sea; one terminates at Charleston, 308 miles distant; the other at Savannah, 293 miles distant. The former consists of the Georgia Railroad, 171 miles, connecting Atlanta and Augusta; and of the South Carolina Railroad, connecting Augusta and Charleston, 137 miles. The latter consists of the Western and Macon Road, connecting Atlanta and Macon, 103 miles; and the Central Georgia Road, connecting Macon and Savannah, 190 miles. The two main lines are connected by a cross-road from Augusta to Millen, 53 miles.

These roads constituted essential links in the chain of communication between the Atlantic and Gulf States. To destroy them was again to bisect the remnant of the Confederacy, damaging it even more than had been done when it was first bisected by the seizure of the Mississippi River.

We have now to follow the marches of the two wings of the army. We shall see how perfectly the destruction of these railroads was accomplished, and the tract of country between and in the vicinity of them, one of the most fertile and wealthy portions of the South, completely devastated.


On the 16th of November the march began. The left wing, under Slocum, marched along the railroad toward Augusta; the right, under Howard, along the Macon Road. Each had cavalry on its flank.

Howard, having the 15th Corps on his right, and the 17th on his left, moved along the railroad to Jonesbor-

Railroads of Georgia.

Their destruction a chief object of the march.

Itinerary of the march.



SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA.

March of the right wing of the army. ough, where he met with Confederate cavalry, but Kilpatrick dispersed it. Thence he moved eastward through McDonough and Jackson to the Ocmulgee, crossing at Planter's Factory, thence through Monticello and Hillsborough, and between Milledgeville and Clinton. On the 22d his left struck the Georgia Central Railroad at Gordon, his right extending west to Griswold. Kilpatrick, who was with him, made a feint with the cavalry through Griffin and Forsyth toward Macon, deceiving the Confederates into the belief that that was Sherman's objective. That accomplished, the cavalry returned toward Griswold, after destroying several miles of the railroad east of Walnut Creek.

Howard's two corps, as soon as they struck the Georgia Central on the 22d, commenced destroying it. While they were occupied with this, the extreme right of the 15th Corps was attacked by a Confederate force about 5000 strong, coming from the direction of Macon. The attack, though delivered in not less than six successive assaults, was at length repelled, the Confederates leaving 300 dead upon the field.

Slocum, with the left wing of the army, was meantime marching along the Augusta Road in two parallel columns, the 20th Corps being the left, the 14th the right. The latter destroyed the road to Covington, and turned thence on the 19th to Milledgeville, the other corps continuing the destruction to Madison, 69 miles east of Atlanta. This northward movement was intended as a feint on Augusta, the deception being increased by the cavalry moving out many miles in advance toward that city. From Madison the 20th Corps marched through Eatonton to Milledgeville, where it arrived on the 21st; the 14th Corps, having passed through Shady Dale and Eatonton, joined it the next day.

The Legislature of Georgia, which was in session at Milledgeville, supposing that Augusta or Macon was Sher-

Capture of Milledgeville. man's objective, took suddenly to flight when they found that the two great columns of Slocum and Howard were converging toward Milledgeville. On the 20th Milledgeville was surrendered by its mayor. A panic had fallen on the citizens. Every one who could escape had fled; the most extravagant prices were given for vehicles. Those who remained found, however, that no pillage, no insult occurred. Private dwellings were respected, but the arsenals, magazines, dépôts, etc., belonging to the Confederate government were destroyed. Both soldiers and citizens were infinitely amused at the fright and flight of the legislators, which were declared to have been "comical in the extreme."

Destruction of the Georgia Central Railroad. Meantime Howard, with the right wing, was steadily advancing along the Georgia Central, destroying it to the Oconee. On reaching the bridge across that river, he found his passage disputed, but the 15th Corps crossed at a ford eight miles below, whereupon the Confederates at the bridge retreated, and now the whole wing passed the river, destroying the railroad as it advanced.

Slocum, with the left wing, crossed the Oconee near Milledgeville on the 24th, moving toward Sandersville. The 14th Corps now took position on the left of this column, which position it held during the remainder of the march. On the 26th, Slocum's two corps, marching on parallel roads, entered Sandersville simultaneously, and on the 27th and 28th both wings were temporarily encamped between Sandersville and Irwin's Cross Roads, a few miles south of the railroad.

After the demonstration toward Macon, ending with the action at Griswold, Kilpatrick shifted his cavalry to the left wing. On the 25th he left Milledgeville, taking the direction of Waynesborough, partly for the purpose of covering the passage of the main body of the army across the Ogeechee, and partly for conducting a feint toward Au-



gusta. A detachment of his force burned the railroad bridge over Brier Creek, and then fell back to the main body in the neighborhood of Louisville. One of his main objects was to release the prisoners at Millen, but they had been already removed.

Slocum, with the 14th Corps, reached the Ogeechee at  
Passage of the  
Ogeechee. Fenn's Bridge, crossed on pontoons, marching on the left bank of the river, and reached Louisville on the 29th. His 20th Corps moved at the same time along the railroad, which, from Davisborough for about 20 miles, is parallel to the Ogeechee. The 17th and 15th Corps moved south of the railroad, the latter covering the right flank of the army. On Kilpatrick's movement to the left flank of the whole army and the occupation of Louisville by the 14th Corps, the Confederates concluded that Augusta was the point aimed at, and their cavalry, under Wheeler, at once moved north to obstruct the supposed advance. Hereupon Sherman was able to cross the Ogeechee with his main body, the 20th Corps near the railroad bridge, the 17th near Barton's Station. They had been engaged in destroying the railroad between Tenille Station and the river. The 15th Corps marched in a parallel line with the other columns, but on the right bank of the river. This passage of the Ogeechee without loss is regarded by military critics as "one of the most brilliant pieces of strategy witnessed during the campaign."

Demonstrations against Augusta were again renewed for the purpose of expediting Wheeler's movement to the north. During the 1st, 2d, and 3d of December skirmishing took place with his cavalry, which was gradually forced beyond Waynesborough. Baird's division of the 14th Corps formed the infantry support. The remaining divisions of that corps, on reaching Buckhead Creek, turned east to Lumpkin's Station, on the Augusta and Millen Railroad, 10 miles south of Waynesborough, where, on the 3d and 4th, they destroyed a considerable portion of the track.

They then marched for Jacksonborough, where Kilpatrick and Baird rejoined them.

The 20th and 17th Corps meanwhile advanced along the railroad, and on December 2d the latter reached Millen. The 20th Corps had marched to the north of Millen through Bairdsville, and thence southeast, the 15th Corps moving in two columns to the west of the Ogeechee River, a day's march in advance of the main body. The whole army, now pivoting on Millen, deflected from its eastern to a southward course, all, with the exception of the 15th, marching down the peninsula between the Ogeechee and the Savannah Rivers. The 17th Corps followed the railroad, destroying it from Millen downward. So complete a success was the feint on Augusta, that Sherman could now pursue an unobstructed march to the sea.

As Sherman came down the peninsula, between the Savannah and the Ogeechee, Hardee, who held Savannah with 15,000 men, recognized that that city was the true objective. A line of works from river to river had been constructed to delay the advance, and to prevent an attack on the Savannah and Gulf Railroad, which was employed to its utmost capacity in bringing supplies and re-enforcements to the city. A force was sent across the Ogeechee to check the progress of the 15th Corps. The greater part of that corps had, however, crossed to the east bank, near Eden, on the 7th; and on the succeeding day Corse's division was pushed forward between the Little and Great Ogeechee, thirteen miles in advance of the main column, to the canal connecting the Ogeechee with the Savannah. The canal was quickly bridged, and the Confederates retired into the fortifications of Savannah. On the 9th the Savannah and Gulf Railroad was destroyed for several miles around Miller's Station, a train of cars and many prisoners captured, and communication between Savannah and the South cut off.

Destruction of the  
railroads continued.

Hardee discovers  
that Sherman is  
marching on Sa-  
vannah.

While the right was thus closing in upon the rear of Savannah, the main body was moving on the peninsula between the two rivers. The weather was very rainy, and the march very difficult. As the coast was neared the surface of the country became flat and swampy. Large ponds or pools were continually met, and the creeks spread out into many miry branches.

The roads between the creeks and ponds, though apparently of sand and of a substantial character, proved to be upon a thin crust, which was soon cut through by the long trains into the deep quicksand below, thus requiring miles of corduroy.

In his report Sherman says, "As we approached Savannah, the country became more marshy and difficult, and more obstructions were met, in the shape of felled trees, where the roads crossed the creeks, swamps, or narrow causeways; but our pioneer companies were well organized, and removed the obstructions in an incredibly short time. No opposition from the enemy worth speaking of was encountered until the heads of columns were within 15 miles of Savannah, when all the roads leading to the city were obstructed, more or less, by felled timber, with earth-works and artillery; but these were easily turned, and the enemy driven away."

On the evening of the 10th the advances of the several columns were within from three to eight miles distant from Savannah. The left wing struck the Savannah and Charleston Railroad where it crosses the Savannah River, and destroyed it thoroughly from that point southward. Some resistance was experienced as the army approached the city, and, as several men were wounded by the explosion of shells and torpedoes buried in the ground, the Confederate prisoners were compelled to remove them. On the 12th the army was so concentrated as to form a semicircle from the Savannah River to the Savannah and Gulf Railroad, the line being about ten miles

The army closes in upon that city.

Difficulties of the march near Savannah.

The city is invested,





THE VICINITY OF SAVANNAH.



long. The extreme left, held by the 20th Corps, was three miles from the city; the extreme right, held by the 15th Corps, was eleven miles distant.

Already, on the 9th, Captain Duncan and two scouts had been sent from the 15th Corps to penetrate through the enemy's lines and communicate with the fleet. This hazardous enterprise they had accomplished, hiding themselves in the rice-swamps by day, and paddling down the river by night. They stole past Fort McAllister unobserved, and were picked up by the national gun-boat Flag. They had brought a dispatch from Howard: "We have had perfect success, and the army is in fine spirits." This was the first direct intelligence which had been received from Sherman since his departure from Atlanta.

and communi-  
cation opened with  
the fleet.

Sherman now determined to open communication with the fleet through Ossabaw Sound, which forms the mouth of the Ogeechee. This implied the reduction of Fort McAllister.

On the evening of the 12th, Hazen's division of the 15th Corps marched toward the road-bridge over the Great Ogeechee. This had been destroyed by the Confederates; but, though it was 1800 feet in length, a new one was constructed during the night by a battalion of engineer troops under the supervision of Captain Reese. At daybreak on the 13th Hazen was able to march forward toward McAllister.

The Great Ogee-  
chee bridged.

Fort McAllister was a strong inclosed redoubt, garrisoned by 200 men, and mounting 23 guns en barbette, and 1 mortar. At Cheeves's rice-mill a section of a battery was firing at the fort, partly as a diversion, and partly to attract the notice of the fleet. About noon Fort McAllister opened fire inland from three or four guns. From the top of this mill Sherman, by signal, ordered Hazen to carry the fort. He had reached its vicinity at 1 P.M., and deployed his division about the

Fort McAllister  
to be reduced.

place, with both flanks resting upon the river, posting his skirmishers judiciously behind the trunks of trees, the branches of which had been used as abatis. Sherman knew that Hazen would carry the fort at a rush if the thing were possible: the crisis of the battle of Murfreesborough, the midnight passage down the Tennessee River to Wauhatchie, the storming of Missionary Ridge, declared what manner of man he was. He was now about to adorn, with a final victory, the great March to the Sea.

The sun was descending behind a grove of water-oaks when Hazen was ready for the assault. It is assaulted and carried by Hazen. Out of the encircling woods came forth a blue line fringed with steel, advancing steadily to the work. Nine regiments were about to make the attack at three points. They entered the battle-smoke and disappeared. Sherman, who, with Howard, was posted at the rice-mill on the opposite bank of the river, watched with anxiety. Soon, however—for the conflict did not last very long—they could see the men discharge their pieces in the air, and hear them shout as they took possession and raised the national flag. Fort McAllister, which had resisted many attacks from the sea, was carried in a few minutes from the land. Hazen reports that, in fifteen minutes after the bugle sounded the forward, the fort was taken. The troops were deployed as thinly as possible, the result being that no man in the assault was struck until they came to close quarters. Then the fighting became desperate and deadly. Just outside the works a line of torpedoes had been placed, many of which were exploded by the tread of the men, who, however, moved on without check, over, under, and through abatis, ditches, palisading, and parapet, driving the Confederates through the fort to their bomb-proofs, at which they still fought, and only succumbed as each man was individually overpowered.

From the signal station at the mill Sherman had looked for two days over the rice-fields and salt marsh in the di-

rection of Ossabaw Sound for signs of the fleet. But, while watching the preparations for the assault on the fort, there was discovered in the distance what seemed to be the smoke-stack of a steamer. At the very moment of the assault she was plainly visible below the fort. Her officer signaled, "Have you taken McAllister?" At that moment Hazen was sounding the charge. As soon as the national colors were planted on the fort, Sherman and Howard went in a small boat to meet Hazen. Determined to communicate with the fleet that night, Sherman pulled down the river and went on board the steamer.

Communications were now established with Admiral Dahlgren, and arrangements made for siege ordnance to be sent from Hilton Head. On the arrival of these guns a demand was made for the surrender of Savannah. This, Hardee, who was in command of it, refused.

Sherman is in communication with Dahlgren.

In his summons to Hardee, Sherman told him that if he was compelled to assault, or depend upon the slower process of starvation, he should feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and should make little effort to restrain his army, which was burning to avenge the great national wrong they imputed to Savannah and other large cities that had been so prominent in dragging the country into civil war. He added: "I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the surrender of the town of Resaca, to be used by you for what it is worth." In his reply Hardee pointed out that the investment was incomplete.

He demands the surrender of Savannah,

In the mean time reconnoissances from the left flank had shown that it was impracticable to push any considerable force across Savannah River, since the enemy held it opposite the city with iron-clad gun-boats, and could destroy any pontoons laid down between Hutchinson's Island and the South Carolina shore, and isolate any force sent over from that flank.

which being refused, he prepares to carry it by assault.

Sherman therefore ordered Slocum to put in position the siege guns, and make all the preparations necessary to assault.

After firing heavily from his iron-clads and the batteries along the lines all the afternoon and late into the evening of the 20th, Hardee evacuated the city during that night on a pontoon bridge, and marched toward Charleston on the Causeway Road. The night being dark, and a strong westerly wind blowing, although the sounds of movement were heard in Geary's front, it was impossible to make out its direction or object; but when the pickets of that division advanced early on the morning of the 21st, the evacuation had been completed, and nothing remained but to occupy Savannah.

Savannah is evacuated by night, and Sherman occupies it.

In concluding his report, Sherman says:

"I was left with a well-appointed army to sever the enemy's only remaining railroad communications eastward and westward, for over one hundred miles, namely, the Georgia State Railroad, which is broken up from Fairborn Station to Madison and the Oconee, and the Central Railroad from Gordon clear to Savannah, with numerous breaks on the latter road from Gordon to Eatonton, and from Millen to Augusta, and the Savannah and Gulf Railroad. We have consumed the corn and fodder in a region of country thirty miles on each side of a line from Atlanta to Savannah, as also the sweet potatoes, cattle, hogs, sheep, and poultry. We have carried away more than ten thousand horses and mules, as well as a countless number of slaves. I estimate the damage done to the State of Georgia at a hundred millions of dollars, at least twenty millions of which has inured to our advantage, and the remainder is simply waste and destruction. This may seem a hard species of warfare, but it brings the sad realities of war home to those who have been directly or indirectly instrumental in involving us in its attendant calamities.

Sherman's report of his march.

"The behavior of our troops in Savannah has been so manly, so quiet, so perfect, that I take it as the best evidence of discipline and true courage. Never was a hostile city filled with women and children occupied by a large army with less disorder, or more system, order, and good government."



Sherman announced his triumph to the President: "I beg to present you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with 150 guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about 25,000 bales of cotton."

To this Lincoln returned his heartfelt thanks, and Halleck, in a letter to Sherman (December 18th), said, "Your march will stand out prominently as the great one of this great war;" and Grant, rejoicing in the glory of his friend, wrote (December 18th) to Sherman: "I have just received and read with I need not tell you how much gratification your letter to General Halleck. I congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him that with the army you had, and with you in command of it, there was no danger but you would reach salt water in some place. But I should not have felt the same security—in fact, I would not have intrusted the expedition to any other living commander."

In the entire command 5 officers and 58 men were killed, 13 officers and 232 men were wounded, and 1 officer and 258 men were missing. There were 27 days of marching. The distance passed over was more than 300 miles.

A track of desolation marked the course that the army had taken, though the soldiers were not permitted to enter the dwellings of the inhabitants or to commit any trespass. With less justification, the Confederate cavalry had not abstained from destruction. Houses were passed which had been rifled by them, the furniture wantonly broken and scattered about. Both parties, however, had respected the habitations of the "poor whites," often constructed of a few rough boards scantily nailed on a tumble-down frame, windowless, or, if it had a

Lincoln and Grant address letters of thanks and congratulation to him.

Losses during the march.

Conduct of the soldiers on the march.

sash, the broken panes replaced with flakes of bark or wads of old rags, the door often hanging by a single hinge. Sometimes a passing soldier would pick up a stone and hammer up tightly a board hanging by one corner, to keep, as he said, "the wind from the poor devils' young uns."

Their amusements  
and retaliations.

The good-nature of the troops was constantly manifested. Many of the regiments were accompanied by goats, dogs, cats, and other animals they had adopted. Game-cocks might be seen riding on a cannon, or on the pack-saddle of a mule. Considering the matter from their professional point of view, a passion for cock-fighting may perhaps be excused in soldiers. The birds which had come forth victorious from repeated battles were honored with such names as "Bill Sherman," "Johnny Logan;" while those that had suffered defeats received ignominious titles, such as "Jeff. Davis," "Beauregard," "Bragg," and were doomed to a speedy expiation of their want of valor. The spit or the camp-kettle awaited them.

To the animals of the army the Western soldier is singularly attached. He can never speak of them in terms of sufficiently affectionate exaggeration. From the horse, and even from the mule, he can not withhold his caresses. "Fine fellow! what should we do without him? He will tug on, though his hip-bones do stick up as high as his ears."

But sometimes the passions of these soldiers were aroused. Near Millen a house was passed which, with its outbuildings, and every thing that could be set on fire, was in flames—stables, cotton-gin, fodder-stacks, all were burning. The dead bodies of several bloodhounds which lay in the yard explained the cause of this severity. Their owner had used them for tracking national prisoners who had attempted to escape. After that, every dog that was seen was shot.

About 7000 slaves followed the march to the coast, and

Many slaves accompany the columns.

Slocum estimates that about as many more joined the column, but were unable to hold out. They had a simple but unbounded faith in their deliverers. They had been told that Sherman would put them in the front of the battle; that he had thrown women and children into the Chattahoochee; and that, before he burnt the buildings in Atlanta, he stuffed them full of negroes—"but, massa," said an old whiteheaded slave, "we all know'd better nor dat."

About 20,000 bales of cotton were burnt during the march. Of provisions there were captured ten million pounds of corn, and an equal amount of fodder; 1,217,527 rations of meat, 919,000 of bread, 483,000 of coffee, 581,534 of sugar, 1,146,500 of soap, and 137,000 of salt. Three hundred and twenty miles of railroad were destroyed, and the last links of communication between the Confederate armies in Virginia and the West finally severed by burning every tie, twisting every rail while heated red-hot over the flaming piles of ties, and laying in ruin every dépôt, engine-house, repair-shop, water-tank, and turn-table. Georgia, as the foundery, machine-shop, granary, and corral of the Confederacy, was destroyed. Since the Mississippi had been seized, the supplies for the armies in Virginia had been largely drawn from this quarter. The cultivation of cotton had, at the earnest solicitation of the Richmond government, been suspended, and in all directions there were corn-fields of from 100 to 1000 acres.

From the time the army left Atlanta until its arrival before Savannah, not one word of intelligence was received in the North from it except through Confederate newspapers. Nothing was known of its whereabouts or its fate. Marching in four columns with a front of thirty miles, each column masked in all directions by clouds of skirmishers, Sherman was able to continue to the last to menace so many points that it was impossible for the ene-

The devastation occasioned by the march.

my to decide whether Augusta, Macon, or Savannah was his objective, the Gulf or the Atlantic his destination.

Soon after Sherman began his march, an expedition from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and another from Minor contemporaneous expeditions. Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by Canby to cut the enemy's line of communication with Mobile, and detain troops in that field. The expedition from Vicksburg, under General Osband, destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad Bridge over the Big Black, thirty miles of the road, two locomotives, and many stores. The Baton Rouge expedition had not a favorable result. At the same time, General Foster, commanding the Department of the South, sent an expedition by the way of Broad River to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. It was repulsed, with a loss of 746 killed, wounded, and missing; but on December 6th Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah Railroad between the Coosawatchie and Tullifinny Rivers.



## CHAPTER LXXXI.

### CONFEDERATE SORTIE TO NASHVILLE. BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. DESTRUCTION OF THE SALLYING CONFEDERATE ARMY.

After the departure of General Sherman on his march to the sea, General Hood, under orders from the Confederate government, continued his sortie toward Nashville. The national troops fell back, as he advanced, from the Tennessee River.

He overtook General Schofield at the passage of the Harpeth River at Franklin. THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN ensued. He was unable to prevent Schofield joining Thomas at Nashville.

General Hood then moved forward to Nashville. For some days the armies were paralyzed by severe weather. THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE was fought; General Thomas totally defeated the Confederate army, driving it from the field with great loss, and in the pursuit annihilating it.

General Hood escaped across the Tennessee River, and was relieved by the Confederate government from command.

“THOMAS has done magnificently,” wrote Grant to Sherman, December 18th, 1864.

We have seen that Sherman halted at Gaylesville, unable to bring Hood to battle, unwilling to follow him any farther, and that, preparing every thing to accomplish his double object—the protection of Nashville and the march to the sea—he had divided his army, sending one part under Thomas to Nashville, and putting the other in motion through Georgia.

In its consternation, the cabinet at Richmond had become demented. Not satisfied with the removal of Johnston, the ablest general of the South, Davis insisted that Hood should attempt a sortie, removing, for that purpose, the only army that stood between Sherman and the Atlantic Confederate States. Such were the circumstances under which Hood had assumed command that, even had he disapproved of these measures, he must have yielded his consent. To exchange the military advantage of interior lines for the gratification of a delusive invasion was the device of a politician, not of a soldier—a bid for temporary public applause.

Hood marches northward, while Sherman marches to the sea.

He had been ordered to make a sortie.

The distance from Atlanta to Louisville is 474 miles; from Atlanta to Nashville, 289. Every foot of his railroad to these bases Sherman had to protect. Davis had expected that the moment it was seriously threatened Sherman would abandon Georgia; he never supposed that that general would, without hesitation, break it himself, and boldly march to the sea.

In his report of these movements Grant says: "Hood, Grant's opinion of his movements. instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting." On the 26th of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison of Decatur, Alabama, but, failing to carry the place, withdrew toward Courtland, and succeeded, in face of the national cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th Forrest reached the Tennessee at Fort Heiman, and captured a gun-boat and three transports. On the 2d of November Forrest's successful attack on Johnsonville. he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gun-boats and eight transports.

On the 4th he opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to by the gun-boats and the garrison. The gun-boats, becoming disabled, were set on fire, as were also the transports, to prevent their falling into his hands; about a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and property was consumed. On the 5th Forrest disappeared, and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville, moving toward Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d Corps, reached Johnsonville, but, the enemy being gone, he was ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of Hood, and retard his advance, but not

to risk a general engagement until the arrival of A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until Wilson could remount his cavalry.

Hood's army did not arrive at Florence until nearly a month after its departure from Sherman's front, a delay that gave Thomas time for the gathering and concentration of his forces.

Hood at Florence, and Schofield confronting him.

At Florence Hood was confronted by Schofield, who lay at Pulaski. The Mobile and Ohio Railroad was repaired; trains ran over it up to Corinth (see Map, vol. iii., p. 206), and thence east to Cherokee Station. Through this route Hood obtained supplies, and also large re-enforcements, from Mississippi and Alabama. At Corinth, Beauregard, who abstained from taking any active part in the campaign, established his head-quarters. Though, under the stress of public opinion, Davis had recalled him to service, notwithstanding his declaration that he would never consent to it though the whole world should demand it (vol. ii., page 307), the quarrel between them had not been appeased. Beauregard appears to have lost all faith in the success of the Confederacy under the leadership of Davis.

Sherman's instructions were that Thomas should exercise command over all the troops and garrisons not absolutely in presence of the general-in-chief. He lingered at Kingston until he felt sure that Thomas was strong enough. On the 6th of November Hood's force was about 40,000; the infantry was 30,600, the cavalry about 10,000. He had lost about 10,000—one fourth of his army, probably by desertion, in his march from Jonesborough to Gadsden.

From the 1st to the 10th of November Hood was at Florence. He had laid a pontoon bridge by mooring it to the piers of the old railroad bridge at that place, and had crossed over a corps of infantry and two divisions of cavalry. The remainder of his force was still on the south side of the river, but on the 17th of November he brought it over.

Thomas estimated his own force at 29,700. To this was to be added Washburn's command, 4500. He soon received 21 regiments of new recruits; most of these, however, were absorbed in replacing old regiments whose terms of service had expired. Two divisions, under A. J. Smith, were on their way from Missouri. He was also re-enforced by Wilson's cavalry 12,000, and by 7000 convalescents from Chattanooga, who were suitable for garrison duty, but not for marching.

Thomas's plan was simply to act on the defensive, impeding Hood's movements as much as possible, and gradually withdrawing Schofield and Stanley until the expected re-enforcements joined him. Forrest's cavalry joined Hood November 21st, and the northward movement then commenced (see Maps, vol. iii., p. 59 and 82). Had that advance been delayed a week or ten days longer, Thomas would have been ready to resist it at some point south of Duck River. Hood moved on parallel roads from Florence to Waynesborough, with Forrest on his right flank. His march was, however, slow. He shelled Hatch's cavalry out of Lawrenceburg on the 22d.

On the 23d Granger commenced withdrawing the garrisons from Athens, Decatur, and Huntsville, Alabama, and moved toward Stevenson. The movement was made rapidly and without opposition. That night Schofield evacuated Pulaski and marched toward Columbia. During the 24th and 25th the enemy skirmished with Schofield's troops at Columbia, pressing them still more strongly on the two following days. As Schofield perceived that Hood intended to cross above or below the town, he withdrew to the north bank of Duck River on the night of the 27th. Two divisions of the 23d Corps were placed in line in front of the town, holding all the crossings in its vicinity, while Stanley's Corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin Pike, was held in readiness to repel any vigorous attempt the enemy should

Strength of Thomas's army.

Hood begins his northward march.

Schofield and Stanley withdraw before him.



make to force a crossing. The cavalry, under Wilson, held the crossings above those held by the infantry. But the Confederates succeeded in forcing Wilson back, and effected a passage. Hereupon, his line of retreat being threatened, Schofield prepared to withdraw to Franklin. Stanley, with one division of infantry, was sent to Spring Hill, about fifteen miles north of Columbia, to cover the trains and hold the road open for the passage of the main force. He reached Spring Hill just in time to drive off the enemy's cavalry and save the trains; but later he was attacked by infantry and cavalry combined, and they nearly succeeded in dislodging him from his position. Schofield was busily occupied all day at Columbia, resisting the enemy's attempt to cross Duck River, in which he succeeded, repulsing them with heavy loss. Giving directions for the withdrawal of the troops as soon as darkness came on, at a late hour in the afternoon he started with Ruger's division to the relief of Stanley at Spring Hill, and, when near that place, came upon the enemy's cavalry, but they were easily driven off. At Spring Hill the enemy was found bivouacking within eight hundred yards of the road. The withdrawal of the main force from in front of Columbia was safely effected after dark on the 29th. Spring Hill was passed without molestation about midnight; and, making a night march of 25 miles, the whole command got into position at Franklin at an early hour on the morning of the 30th. Cheatham's corps, supported by Stewart's, ought to have defeated Stanley at Spring Hill, and cut off Schofield's retreat. As it was, they nearly accomplished it. Hood, not without reason, affirms that this attack was feeble and partial, and that, had his instructions been carried out, the Confederates could have gained the road. He says:

“Stewart's corps and Johnston's division were arriving upon the field to support the attack. Though the golden opportunity passed with daylight, I did not at dark abandon the hope of dealing the en-

Hood's dissatisfaction with his officers. enemy a heavy blow. Accordingly, Stewart was furnished with a guide, and ordered to move his corps beyond Cheatham's, and place it across the road beyond Spring Hill. Shortly after this, General Cheatham came to my head-quarters, and, when I informed him of Stewart's movements, he said that Stewart ought to form on his right. I asked if that would throw Stewart across the pike. He replied that it would, and a mile beyond. Accordingly, one of Cheatham's staff officers was sent to show Stewart where Cheatham's right rested. In the darkness and confusion, Stewart did not succeed in getting the position desired, but about 11 P.M. went into bivouac. About 12, ascertaining that the enemy was moving in great confusion—artillery, wagons, and troops intermixed—I sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers against him, and still farther impede and confuse his march. This was not accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and confusion, within hearing, all the night. Thus was lost a great opportunity of striking the enemy, for which we had labored so long—the greatest the campaign had offered, and one of the greatest during the war."

The national troops reach Franklin. At Franklin Schofield formed line of battle on the southern edge of the town to await the coming of the enemy, and in the mean time hastened the crossing of the trains to the north side of Harpeth River.

Hood brings Schofield to a stand at Franklin. The Confederates followed closely after Schofield's rear-guard in this retreat to Franklin. Stewart was in the advance, followed by Cheatham; Lee, with the trains, bringing up the rear. Hood had captured at Spring Hill some dispatches from Thomas to Schofield, and they determined him to attack without delay. He therefore resolved to use Stewart's and Cheatham's corps without waiting for Lee. Stewart was on his right, Cheatham on the left, with cavalry on each flank; the main body of the cavalry, under Forrest, however, being on the right. When Johnston's division of Lee's corps arrived, it went to the left.

The position at Franklin. Franklin is on the south bank of the Harpeth River, a tributary of the Cumberland, 18 miles south of Nashville. The river here assumes a horse-

shoe shape, leaving only the south and west of the town exposed. Schofield had one of his corps above the town. The line was interspersed with artillery, and guns commanding the plain in front were on the north side of the river. The square around Franklin was completed by Schofield's lines. He had about 17,000 men; many of them, however, had gone across the river, reducing his strength so much that he had hardly 10,000 on hand. His position was of the utmost peril—a river in his rear, and the roads beyond it covered with wagons. On reaching Franklin he rapidly repaired the railroad bridge, and constructed a foot bridge available for wagons. He would have crossed his troops, but Hood was too close upon him. He placed on the south side of the river the 23d Corps (Cox) on the left and centre, covering the approaches from Columbia and Lewisburg; Kimball's division of Stanley's corps was on the right, both flanks resting on the river. Wood's division of Stanley's corps was sent to the north side, to cover the flanks in case Hood should cross above or below. Two brigades of Wagner's division were posted in front to retard the advance of the enemy.

Hood could not get ready for the attack until 4 P.M.

Hood attacks Schofield and breaks his line.

The blow first fell on Wagner's brigades, who maintained the contest too long, and were driven back in confusion, carrying with them a portion of the first line in the works. They lost a thousand men. Schofield's line was broken in the centre, and eight guns captured.

Sometimes in battles there is a well-marked moment in which the spontaneous act of a single man determines the issue. It was so at the battle of Franklin. When the centre was pierced, and irretrievable ruin seemed impending, Emerson Opdycke, who commanded the brigade of Wagner's division which was posted within the works, seeing what had happened, without

Opdycke's charge restores the battle.

directions from any one, gave the order to his command, "First brigade forward to the works," and himself led the way. He forced back the enemy, and closed the gap.

General Wood says: "It is not saying too much to declare that, but for the skillful dispositions made by General Opdycke (all of which were done entirely on his own judgment), the promptness and readiness with which he brought his command into action at the critical and decisive moment, and the signal personal gallantry he displayed in the counter assault on the enemy when he had broken our lines, disaster instead of victory would have fallen on us at Franklin." This language was indorsed by General Thomas.

On the day after the battle General Stanley wrote to Thomas stating that the charge of Opdycke, which occurred immediately in his presence, saved the army from a destructive defeat.

Opdycke, who accomplished this critical exploit, had seen many of the great battles of the war. At Shiloh he had been twice wounded; he was at Chickamauga, and was one of the first to reach the crest of Missionary Ridge. He was in the assault on Rocky Face, and was wounded again at Resaca. At Peach Tree Creek he rendered important services, and was spared from the carnage at Franklin to perform others at Nashville.

The Confederates made four distinct attacks, each being repulsed with dreadful loss. They continued their attempts until near midnight. The desperate character of these assaults is shown by the losses. Among their generals, Cleburne, Gist, Adams, Strahl, and Granbury were killed; Brown, Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockerell, and Scott were wounded; and Gordon was captured. They lost about 6000 men. Hood's generals had done their utmost to drive Schofield into the river. At midnight Schofield withdrew. His loss in this battle was 189 killed, 1033 wounded, 1104 missing. Total,

The Confederates  
repulsed with  
dreadful loss.



2326. Thomas states that the important result of this engagement can not be too highly appreciated, for it not only seriously checked the enemy's advance, and gave Schofield time to remove his troops and all his property to Nashville, but it also caused a deep depression in Hood's army. The Confederates had flattered themselves that if they could get between Schofield and Nashville that general would be destroyed, the city taken, and Thomas driven beyond the Ohio.

During the ensuing night, Schofield, by Thomas's orders, fell back to Nashville, in front of which city a line of battle was formed by noon on the 1st of December. Thomas had been making every exertion to fortify the place and construct additional defenses. The

Schofield falls back to Nashville.

The defenses of Nashville. southern approaches were covered by Forts Negley, Morton, Confiscation, Houston, and Gillem; they were on commanding hills, and Thomas's army lay just north of them. Re-enforcements were rapidly reaching him. Steedman, with a command of 5000, composed of detachments belonging to Sherman's column left behind at Chattanooga and a brigade of colored troops, was at hand. A. J. Smith's command, from Missouri, had arrived on the morning of the 30th. Thomas's army was now more than 56,000 strong.


Hood approached the south side of Nashville on the 2d of December, and next day succeeded in establishing his line, with his salient resting on the summit of Montgomery Hill, an irregularly cone-shaped eminence rising 450 feet above the general level of the country. The ascent to its summit, throughout most of its circumference, is quite abrupt; its sides are covered with forest trees. This was Hood's advanced position, and not more than 600 yards distant from Thomas's centre. Cheatham formed Hood's right, Lee the centre, Stewart the left. His main line occupied the high ground on the southeast side of Brown's Creek, and extended from

Hood approaches that city, and establishes his line.

the Nolensville Pike—his extreme right—across the Franklin and Granny White Pikes in a westerly direction to the hills south and southwest of Richland Creek, and down that creek to the Hillsborough Pike, with cavalry extending from each flank to the river. His left flank was his weak point; it could be turned.

The position of Hood's army around Nashville remained unchanged, and, with the exception of occasional picket-firing, nothing of importance occurred from the 3d to the 15th of December. On the morning

Freezing weather sets in.



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

of the 9th a sleet-storm covered the ground with a sheet of ice. It was impossible to move. Both armies were thus imprisoned for a week; the weather then moderated. Thomas, however, did not lose the time; he was remounting his cavalry as fast as possible; and, on his part, Hood was busy furnishing his army with supplies and shoes.

Thomas's plan was to make a feigned attack against

Hood's right, and to follow it by an energetic and real one against his left.

The morning of the 15th was gloomy; a cloak of fog and smoke enveloped every thing. At 6 A.M. the movement of the troops was entirely impracticable, but between 7 and 8 the fog lifted so much that the men could see their way to their assigned positions. Their formation was partially concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground. Hood was apparently unaware of any intention on Thomas's part to attack, and more especially he did not seem to expect any movement against his left flank. To divert his attention still farther, Steedman received orders, on the evening of the 14th, to make a heavy demonstration against his right, east of the Nolensville Pike. He succeeded in attracting the enemy's attention to that part of his line, and inducing him to draw re-enforcements to it from his centre and left. As soon as Steedman had completed this, the commands of Generals Smith and Wilson moved out along the Harding Pike, and commenced the main movement of the day by wheeling to the left, and advancing against the enemy's position across the Harding and Hillsborough Pikes. A division of cavalry was sent, at the same time, to look after a battery of the enemy's on the Cumberland River, at Bell's Landing. The remainder of Wilson's command, Hatch's division leading, and Knipe in reserve, moving on the right of A. J. Smith's troops, first struck the enemy along Richland Creek, and drove him back rapidly, capturing a number of prisoners, and, continuing to advance, while slightly swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was carried by assault, at 1 P.M., by a portion of Hatch's division dismounted, and the captured guns turned on the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next carried by the same troops; they took four more guns and 300 prisoners. A division of Smith's

The battle of Nashville—first day.

It went against the Confederates.

command participated in these assaults, and claimed its share of the success.

Finding that Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as was desirable, Thomas directed Schofield to move his command (the 23d Corps) from the position in reserve to which it had been assigned over to the right of General Smith, enabling the cavalry thereby to operate more freely on the enemy's rear.

The 4th Corps, Brigadier General T. J. Wood, formed on the left of Smith's command, and, as soon as the latter had struck the enemy's flank, assaulted Montgomery Hill, Hood's most advanced position, at 1 P.M. The assault was gallantly executed by the third brigade, second division, and a number of prisoners were captured. Connecting with the left of Smith's troops, the 4th Corps continued to advance, and carried the enemy's entire line in its front, captured several pieces of artillery, about 500 prisoners, and some stands of colors. The enemy was driven out of his original line of works, and forced back to a new position along the base of Harpeth Hills, still holding his line of retreat to Franklin by the main pike through Brentwood and by the Granny White Pike. Thomas's line was readjusted at nightfall. It ran parallel to, and east of the Hillsborough Pike. Schofield was on the right, Smith in the centre, Wood on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield. Steedman held the position he had gained early in the morning.

The result of the day's operations was the capture of 16 guns, 1200 prisoners, several hundred stand of small-arms, and about 40 wagons. The Confederates had been forced back at all points with heavy loss; on the other hand, Thomas's loss was very light. His army bivouacked in line of battle, during this black December night, on the ground occupied at dark, and preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the morrow.

During the night Hood transferred Cheatham's corps



from right to left, leaving Stewart in the centre and Lee on the right. When Wood advanced in the morning he found only skirmishers in his front.

At daylight the next morning Wood's corps pressed the Confederate skirmishers across the Franklin Pike to the eastward, and then, swinging slightly to the right, advanced due south from Nashville, driving the enemy before them until they came upon his new main line of works constructed during the night on Overton's Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the Franklin Pike. Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville Pike, and formed his command on the left of Wood, effectually securing the latter's flank. Smith's command moved on the right of the 4th Corps (Wood's), and, establishing connection with Wood's right, completed the new line of battle. Schofield's troops remained facing eastward and toward the enemy's left flank, the line of the corps running perpendicular to Smith's troops. Wilson's cavalry was dismounted, and formed on the right of Schofield's command, and, by noon of the 16th, had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear, and stretched across the Granny White Pike, one of his two outlets toward Franklin.

These dispositions completed, Thomas gave directions to continue the movement against the enemy's left flank. The national line approached to within 600 yards of the Confederate at all points. The Confederate centre was weak as compared with either their right at Overton's Hill, or the left on the hills bordering the Granny White Pike. Thomas still had hopes of gaining the enemy's rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin.

About 3 P.M., Post's brigade of Wood's corps, supported by Streight's brigade of the same command, was ordered by General Wood to assault Overton's Hill. Steedman directed a brigade of colored troops (Morgan's) to co-operate. The ground on which the two assaulting columns

formed being open and exposed to the enemy's view, he drew re-enforcements from the left and centre to the threatened point.

The assault was made, and received by the Confederates with a tremendous fire of grape, canister, and musketry, the assailants moving steadily up the hill until near the crest, when the reserves of the enemy rose up and gave a most destructive fire, causing the men first to waver and then fall back, leaving their dead and wounded—black and white indiscriminately mingled—lying amid the abatis, the gallant Colonel Post being among the wounded. Wood reformed his command in the position it had previously occupied preparatory to a renewal of the assault.

Immediately after the attack, Smith and Schofield moved against the enemy's works in their respective fronts, carrying all before them, irreparably breaking his lines in a dozen places, capturing all his artillery, and thousands of prisoners, among whom were four general officers. The national loss was so small as hardly to be worthy of mention.

All of the enemy who escaped were pursued over the Brentwood or Harpeth Hills.

Wilson's cavalry, dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and, gaining firm possession of Granny White Pike, they cut off his retreat by that route.

Wood and Steedman's troops, hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, renewed the assault on Overton's Hill, and, though meeting with a very heavy fire, their onset was irresistible, artillery and many prisoners falling into their hands. The Confederates, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion through Brentwood Pass, the 4th Corps in a close pursuit, which was continued for several miles, when darkness closed the scene.

As the 4th Corps pursued the Confederates on the Franklin Pike, Wilson hastily mounted Knipe's and

Hood's lines irreparably broken.

Flight of the Confederates from the field.

Hatch's divisions of his command, and directed them to pursue along the Granny White Pike, and endeavor to reach Franklin in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came upon his cavalry under Chalmers, posted across the road and behind barricades. The position was charged, the enemy's lines broken, scattering him in all directions, and capturing a large number of prisoners.

During the two days' operations there were 4462 prisoners captured, including 287 officers of all grades, from that of major general, 53 pieces of artillery, and thousands of small-arms. The Confederates abandoned on the field all their dead and wounded.

The pursuit was continued as soon as day broke. The 4th Corps moved on Franklin by the direct pike, the cavalry by the Granny White Pike to its intersection with the preceding, when it took the advance.

Losses of the Confederate army.

Thomas's army in pursuit.

Johnson's division of cavalry was sent direct to Harpeth River, on the Hillsborough Pike, with orders to cross, and move rapidly toward Franklin. The main cavalry column came up with the enemy's rear-guard four miles north of Franklin, and captured 413 prisoners and 3 colors. The Confederates then fell back rapidly to Franklin, endeavoring to defend the crossing of Harpeth River at that place, but Johnson's division coming up from below on the south side of the stream, they were forced to retire. The town was captured, and in the hospitals were found more than 2000 wounded.

The pursuit was still pressed toward Columbia, the Confederate rear-guard slowly retiring to a distance of about five miles south of Franklin, north of West Harpeth River. Here the national cavalry again attacked it, scattering it, and compelling it to abandon its artillery. Darkness coming on during the engagement enabled many of the fugitives to escape.

The 4th Corps (Wood's) followed in the rear of the cavalry as far as Harpeth River, where it found the bridges destroyed, and too much water on the fords for infantry to cross. A trestle bridge was hastily constructed from such materials as lay at hand, but could not be made available before nightfall. In the morning the cavalry pushed on as far as Rutherford's Creek, three miles from Columbia, the 4th Corps following, and closing up with them. The enemy made no stand. Rutherford's Creek was found to be impassable on account of high water; it was a perfect torrent. A pontoon bridge, hastily constructed at Nashville during the presence of the army at that place, was on its way to the front, but the bad condition of the roads, and the incompleteness of the train itself, retarded its arrival. The pontoon train belonging to Thomas's command, with its trained corps of pontoniers, was absent with Sherman.

Difficulties arising  
from the heavy  
rains.

On the 19th several unsuccessful attempts were made to cross Rutherford's Creek. The heavy rain had inundated the whole country, and rendered the roads almost impassable. On the morning of the 20th Hatch constructed a floating bridge over the creek, and, crossing his entire division, pushed forward for Columbia; but, on reaching Duck River, he found that the Confederates had succeeded the night before in getting every thing across, and had already removed their pontoon bridge. During the day Wood improvised a foot bridge over Rutherford's Creek, at the old road-bridge, and by nightfall had succeeded in crossing his infantry entire, as well as one or two of his batteries, and moved forward to Duck River.

The pursuit con-  
tinued over  
Duck River.

The pontoon train came up to Rutherford's Creek about noon on the 21st; a bridge was laid during the afternoon, and Smith's troops crossed. The weather had changed from a dismal rain to bitter cold, and had materially retarded the work of laying the bridge; the regiment of colored



troops, to whom that duty was intrusted, seemed to become unmanned by the cold, and totally unequal to the occasion. On the completion of the bridge at Rutherford's Creek, sufficient material for a bridge over Duck River was hastily pushed forward to that point, and the bridge constructed in time to enable Wood to cross late in the afternoon of the 22d, and get into position on the Pulaski Road, two miles south of Columbia. The water in the river fell rapidly during the construction of the bridge, necessitating frequent alterations, and causing much delay. The Confederates, in their hasty retreat, had thrown into the stream several fine pieces of artillery, which were rapidly becoming uncovered, and were subsequently removed.

Thomas, though the weather was so dreadfully inclement, determined still to continue the pursuit with Wilson's cavalry and Wood's (4th) Corps, directing the infantry to move on the pike, while the cavalry marched on either flank across the fields. Smith's and Schofield's corps were to move more leisurely, and to be used as occasion demanded.

Day and night, wet to the skin with the incessant rains, foodless and shoeless, the Confederates kept on their desperate flight to the distant Tennessee, their remorseless enemy not permitting them a moment's rest. A national soldier, who was among the foremost in the pursuit, subsequently writing to his friends, said: "These people plunged us into war in the hopes of perpetuating slavery—their infernal institution. Theirs is a crime not only against America, but against Heaven, and against the whole human race. I see them crouching in abject terror, and can not help asking myself, Are these the people whose wretched newspapers made them believe that one of them is equal to ten of us? And as I ride along, and witness the horrible wreck they are leaving behind—their sick abandoned on the roadside, their deserters coming in crowds begging for mercy, half

Awful sufferings in  
the Confederate re-  
treat.

blinded by the pitiless sleet, half frozen to death, I know that the Avenger has come at last. It is indeed a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

Forrest and his cavalry, and such other detachments as had been sent off from his main army while besieging Nashville, had rejoined Hood at Columbia. He had formed a powerful rear-guard, made up of detachments from all his organized force, numbering about 4000 infantry, under Walthall, and all his available cavalry, under Forrest. With the exception of this rear-guard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and barefooted men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their cause to put an end to their sufferings. The rear-guard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the last. I am quoting Thomas's own words; it is thus that he speaks of the soldierly conduct of his antagonist. The prediction of Jefferson Davis had indeed come to pass. There was a Moscow retreat. But it was of the Confederate, not of the national army.

On the 24th the Confederates were again overtaken just south of Lynnville, and also at Buford's Station. At both places they made a short stand, but were speedily dislodged. The next day they evacuated Pulaski, and were pursued towards Lamb's Ferry, over an almost impracticable road, and through a country devoid of sustenance for man or beast. During the afternoon Harrison's brigade found them intrenched at the head of a heavily-wooded and deep ravine, through which ran the road, and into which Colonel Harrison drove their skirmishers, and then waited for the remainder of the cavalry to close up previous to attacking; but, before this could be accomplished, the enemy, with something of his former boldness, sallied from his breastworks and drove back Harrison's skirmishers, capturing and carry-

Undaunted conduct  
of the Confederate  
rear-guard.

The wreck of the  
Confederate army  
crosses the Ten-  
nessee.

ing off one gun, which was not recovered; notwithstanding this, the ground lost was immediately regained. By night-fall the enemy was driven from his position. The cavalry had moved so rapidly as to outdistance its trains, and both men and animals were suffering greatly in consequence, although they continued the pursuit uncomplainingly. Wood's corps kept well closed up on the cavalry, camping on the night of December 25th six miles beyond Pulaski, and, pursuing the same route as the cavalry, though the mud in the roads was almost bottomless, reached Lexington, Alabama, thirty miles from Pulaski, on the 28th, on which day, having definitely ascertained that the Confederates had escaped across the Tennessee at Bainbridge, Thomas directed the pursuit to cease.

Hood crossed the Tennessee on the 27th, and fell back to Tupelo, Mississippi. Here, finding great dissatisfaction throughout the Confederacy at his conduct, he asked to be relieved, and accordingly Davis relieved him on January 23d.

Hood resigns his command.

But, though the pursuit by Thomas's main army had ended, a force of cavalry, numbering 600 men, under Colonel Palmer, started from Decatur, Alabama, in the direction of Hood's line of retreat in Mississippi. He overtook the enemy's pontoon train, consisting of 200 wagons and 78 pontoon boats, when 10 miles out from Russellville, and destroyed it. Having learned that a large supply train was on its way to Tuscaloosa, Palmer succeeded in surprising it at 10 P.M. on January 1st, just over the line in Mississippi. It consisted of 110 wagons and 500 mules; the former he burnt, the latter sabred or shot. He then forced his way to Decatur, overcoming the resistance that he met, and reached that place on the 6th of January. Palmer thus gave the last blow of the campaign, at a distance of over 200 miles from the point at which Hood was first struck on the 15th of December, near Nashville.

Palmer strikes a final blow at the wreck of the Confederates.

The whole line of Hood's retreat was strewn with abandoned wagons, limbers, small-arms, blankets, showing conclusively how great the disaster had been. There were captured from the Confederates during this campaign 13,189 prisoners of war, including 7 general officers, and nearly 1000 other officers of all grades, 72 pieces of serviceable artillery, and many battle-flags; during the same period over 2000 deserters were received; many also went to their homes. Thomas's losses did not exceed 10,000 in killed, wounded, and missing.

The feeble manner in which Hood's campaign was conducted shows how inadequately he was sustained by his officers. In many respects his position was not unlike that of Pope in the post-peninsular campaign. Not without reason did he complain of their remissness in the affair at Spring Hill. When, however, the hour of battle came, they forgot his supplanting of Johnston and their mutual recriminations, doing their utmost to secure victory. As we have seen, not less than five general officers were killed in the battle of Franklin, and six wounded, which shows how necessary it had become for them to expose themselves in order to infuse vigor among their men; it also shows how nearly the military spirit had become extinct in the ranks. The enthusiasm which distinguished the earlier days of the war had altogether died out; the retreats and misfortunes which had been unceasingly occurring since the battle of Chattanooga had brought Hood's army into a condition of despair.

In concluding his admirable report of the campaign, General Thomas justly says that too much praise can not be accorded to the army which, hastily made up from the fragments of three separate commands, had successfully contended against a force numerically greater than itself, and of more thoroughly solid organization, inflicting on it a crushing defeat—almost an annihilation.

Hood's sortie was not only repulsed, the Confederate



That army was not merely defeated, but annihilated.

army under him was so totally destroyed that neither recruiting nor re-enforcement could restore it. For the first time in the war, a great Confederate army had been annihilated. Of the imperturbable soldier who had achieved this result, Grant might well say, "He has done magnificently." Yet Thomas had done no more than was his wont. He saved the Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga. He never lost a battle. In Washington he was said to be very slow; in Hood's army it was felt that he was fearfully sure.

The conduct of Thomas in this decisive campaign.

Grant took alarm at the narrow escape of Schofield; he was dissatisfied at the falling back to Nashville; again and again he urged Thomas to strike. Though threatened with removal, nothing could induce the cool, resolute soldier to give a premature battle. Grant himself lost patience while Thomas was biding his opportunity, and actually set out from City Point to take charge of affairs at Nashville. When he reached Washington, on his way, the telegraph brought him news that Thomas had delivered the fatal blow—not the skin-wound of a dexterous rapier, but the death-shock of an iron mace.

## SECTION XIX.

### FORCING OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA INTO THE FORTIFICATIONS OF RICHMOND BY THE ARMY OF THE EAST.

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#### CHAPTER LXXXII.

##### THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA FROM THE RAPIDAN TO THE JAMES RIVER.

General Grant, assuming command as lieutenant general, made changes in the Army of the Potomac, but continued General Meade in its immediate command.

He then commenced operations for the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Lee, moving against that army in the beginning of May, 1864, simultaneously with the movement of General Sherman in Georgia.

Successively, in **THE WILDERNESS**, at **SPOTTSYLVANIA**, at the **NORTH ANNA**, and at **COLD HARBOR**, very severe battles were fought, with heavy losses on both sides.

After the battle of Cold Harbor, since operations for turning the Confederate right could be no longer continued on the north of the James, General Grant, with the Army of the Potomac, crossed that river.

Meanwhile, co-operative movements, under Generals Butler, Sigel, Hunter, had been in progress, including several minor cavalry expeditions. Among these, more particularly, were attempts to capture Petersburg; being conducted feebly, they failed.

At the close of this period the campaign assumed the form of a siege of Petersburg and Richmond.

GRANT'S campaign in Virginia, which resulted in the total overthrow of the Confederacy, may be conveniently divided into four stages:

The stages of Grant's Virginia campaign.

I. The campaign from the Rapidan to the James.

II. The investment of Petersburg, and repulse of the Confederate sortie under Early.

Digression. The capture of Fort Fisher, and the reduction of Mobile.

III. The fall of Richmond.

IV. The surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia.

In this order I shall therefore treat of it.

But, as these events occupy a period of almost a year, I

shall group them in two sections, separating those which occurred in 1864 from those of the following year, and taking the opportunity of the pause which occurred in military operations during the intervening winter for giving the history of the current civil transactions. Under this arrangement, the first and second of the above-mentioned stages will fall in the present section.

In this chapter, then, I have to relate the events of the campaign from the Rapidan to the James. It presents five steps: (1), the battles in the Wilderness; (2), the attacks at Spottsylvania; (3), the operations on the North Anna; (4), the assault at Cold Harbor; (5), the passage of the James River.

The primary conception of the campaign was the advance of a great central army, that of the Potomac, with two co-operating and converging forces, the army on the Shenandoah and that of the James.

Before entering on the history of these grand operations, it is necessary to relate briefly some minor incidents of interest which preceded them in point of time.

Public feeling throughout the North had been greatly excited by the deplorable condition of the prisoners of war held at Richmond. Early in the year, before the opening of the great campaign, some expeditions had been undertaken both from the Army of the Potomac and from Fortress Monroe with the intention of relieving them. On February 27th, Custer, with 1500 horse, had crossed the Rapidan on a feint to the west of the Confederate army, while Kilpatrick, starting on the following day, moved down on its opposite flank, by Spottsylvania Court-house, to within  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles of Richmond, passing its first and second lines of defenses, but being obliged to fall back from its third. Pursued by a force of the enemy, he was compelled to cross the White House Railroad and move down the peninsula.

Steps in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James.

General plan of the campaign.

Preliminary cavalry movements.

A detachment of Kilpatrick's force, 400 strong, under Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, leaving the main body at Spottsylvania, had gone to the right through Louisa and Goochland Counties, intending to cross the James River and enter Richmond from the south, while Kilpatrick attacked it on the north. But the river was found to be too deep to be forded. Dahlgren passed down the north bank to the fortifications of Richmond, forcing his way through the outer works, but being repulsed from the inner. Finding that Kilpatrick's attempt had miscarried, he moved toward King and Queen Court-house; but, after crossing the Mattapony at Dabney's Ferry, he fell into an ambuscade, his command being scattered, and himself killed. Under a false pretense that papers were found upon him showing an intention to set fire to Richmond, and take the lives of Davis and his cabinet, his corpse was insulted, and the place of its interment concealed. At the time of his death he was but 21 years of age, yet he had rendered important services to his country during the war. Though he had been wounded in the foot, and suffered severely from its amputation, he did not permit this loss to keep him from joining Kilpatrick's expedition—a shining example of patriotism to the young men of the land.

Kilpatrick's expedition thus failed of its object, as also had an attempt, having the same end in view—the release of the prisoners—made by Butler from Fortress Monroe (February 6th). To carry Richmond by surprise, he marched his infantry 80 miles in 56 hours; his cavalry 156 miles in 50 hours. But a deserter gave the alarm to the Confederates, and they rendered the roads beyond Bottom's Bridge impassable.

The Army of the Potomac lay on the north of the Rappahannock during the winter of 1863-4, confronting the Army of Northern Virginia, which, under Lee, lay on the south of that river.

The death of Ulric  
Dahlgren.

Object and failure  
of these preliminary  
movements.

Position and  
strength of the Ar-  
my of the Potomac.



Grant, having selected Meade as second in command, intrusted to him the supervision and execution of the proposed movements—a discreet concession to an army to which the Lieutenant General was a comparative stranger.

The Army of the Potomac was consolidated into three corps, the former 1st and 3d Corps being distributed. Hancock commanded the 2d; Warren the 5th; Sedgwick the 6th. In addition to these, the 9th, commanded by Burnside, acted for a time independently of Meade, on account of Burnside's older commission. Sheridan commanded the cavalry, consolidated into a corps.

The entire national force available and present for duty for the campaigns of 1864 was, on the 1st of May, 662,345. The Army of the Potomac numbered 140,000, including the 9th Corps.

The strength of the Confederate army of Northern Virginia had been for the time much reduced by furloughs. In May it had reached 60,000.

Position and strength of the Army of Northern Virginia.

It consisted of three corps, under the command of Ewell, Hill, and Longstreet respectively. They lay en echelon. Ewell was upon the river, a stream with steep banks and difficult fords; Hill at Orange Courthouse; Longstreet at Gordonsville.

At this period the military strength of the Confederacy centred in two armies—that in Virginia, under Lee; and that in Georgia, under Johnston. The course of events during the preceding year had constrained both these armies to act now on the defensive.

The essential feature of Grant's plan for the ensuing campaign was, by taking advantage of his preponderating numbers, to assail both these armies simultaneously, thereby depriving them of the possibility, by the use of their interior lines, of giving assistance to each other. Thus far in the course of the war there had been no unity in the military move-

Grant's method of action against the two great Confederate armies.

ments. One of the chief objects in creating Grant Lieutenant General had been to remedy that disadvantage.

Meade was informed that Lee's army would be his objective point. It was decided to cross the Rapidan below Lee, and operate on his right.

Instructions for the  
advance against  
Lee.

Butler, who was at Fort Monroe, was instructed (April 2d) to collect all the forces of his command that could be spared from garrison duty, estimated at not less than 20,000, and operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being his objective. To his force 10,000 men from South Carolina, under Gillmore, were to be added. He was ordered to take City Point as soon as notification of movement was given, and fortify it. By this common advance from the Rapidan and Fortress Monroe the two armies would be brought into co-operation.

Shortly afterward these instructions were reiterated, and Butler was directed to move from Fort Monroe on the same day that Meade moved from Culpepper; of the exact time he was to be notified by telegraph. He was informed that Grant intended to give battle to Lee between Culpepper and Richmond, if he would stand; should he fall back, Grant would follow him, and make a junction with Butler's army on James River; that, should Butler be able to invest Richmond on the south side, and have his left resting on James River above the city, Grant would form the junction there. He was directed to use every exertion to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could.

In co-operation with these movements, Sigel was directed to organize his available force in West Virginia in two columns, one to operate on the Kanawha, the other on the Shenandoah.

Orders were given for a general movement on the 4th of May.


On the 4th of May the Army of the Potomac left Cul-

Commencement of the campaign. pepper; on the same day Butler moved up James River; on the 6th Sherman advanced from Chattanooga.

Grant had paid a visit to Butler at Fort Monroe, and had pointed out to him the importance of obtaining possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. As the Army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with Butler's, Lee could not with safety detach troops from his army for the relief of Richmond.

On the morning of the 4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out by starlight toward the Rapidan. The sun rose fiery and red; the day proved to be very hot and oppressive. Before night Meade had crossed the river. The 5th and 6th Corps had made the passage at Germanna Ford, the 2d at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under Sheridan, being in advance. The army had with it about 4000 wagons. The average distance marched that day was 12 miles.

In the evening Meade was in the midst of that tangled forest to which the battle of Chancellorsville had given celebrity—the Wilderness. It is a region of worn-out tobacco-fields, covered with scraggy oaks, sassafras, hazel, pine, intersected with narrow roads and deep ravines. The two columns were about five miles apart. Grant had expected that, as soon as Lee discovered this movement on his right, he would fall back toward Richmond; Lee, however, perhaps inspired by the reminiscence of Chancellorsville, and considering that the effect of preponderating numbers would be much diminished by the embarrassments of the forest, in which artillery could not be used, and large bodies of troops be almost in presence of each other without being seen, determined to attempt to strike Grant on the flank as he passed through the woods. Scarcely had the national army begun its march when Lee's signal-fires were calling up his distant



THE CAMPAIGN OF GRANT.



Advance of Lee's army. troops. By dark on the 4th, Ewell, who had moved on the Orange Turnpike, and Hill, on the Orange Plank Road, had approached near to the Old Wilderness Tavern, where Warren lay. Longstreet was to follow Hill.

The battle in the Wilderness—first day. Early on the next morning the advance corps, the 5th (Warren), was struck by Ewell's column, and the battle began. At first Meade supposed that this was merely a division left to mask Lee's retreat; but toward the middle of the day Grant perceived what Lee's intentions were. Thus far the contest had been between Warren and Ewell, the former having been pressed back. As Ewell's forces came up, there was danger that Warren's right would be turned: two of Sedgwick's divisions were therefore sent to that point. The conflict raged without decisive result until 4 o'clock, when both parties fell back and began fortifying their positions. "They were but a hundred or two yards apart, and, though the ring of axes felling trees to form breastworks and abatis filled the air, not a man on either side could be discerned on the other."

When it was discovered that the Confederates, instead of retreating, were making a determined attack, Hancock, who had been directed to march by Shady Grove Church, was recalled, and ordered to come up the Brock Road to its intersection with the Orange Plank Road. As he was already ten miles on his march, Getty's division of the 6th Corps was sent to hold that intersection. Getty, who was desperately assailed by Hill's corps, maintained himself successfully until Hancock came up at 3 P.M. As soon as Hancock arrived he had breastworks thrown up, and, orders coming from Meade that Getty should take the offensive, he accordingly commenced an attack, supported by Hancock. The battle continued until 8 P.M., without advantage to either side.

Late in the afternoon Wadsworth was sent southward

through the forest to fall on Hill's flank, but he could not reach the position until the contest was over. He remained, therefore, in readiness until the next morning.

Burnside, with the 9th Corps, had been left at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run. He was not to move until he was notified that the crossing of the Rapidan was secured. The notification was given on the afternoon of the 4th, and by 6 o'clock on the morning of the 6th Burnside had marched more than 30 miles, crossed both the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and was bringing his troops into action.

As the result of the first day's operations, Lee had failed to defeat Grant by striking him on his flank. Grant was now presenting his front to him. Lee did not know that Burnside was fast coming up with 20,000 men; but he expected that Longstreet's corps and Anderson's division would increase the Confederate force before morning with an addition of 20,000. His plan was that Longstreet and Hill should attack Grant's left, while Ewell made a demonstration on his right.

Grant's line of battle was five miles long, facing westward; Sedgwick on the right, Warren in the centre, Hancock on the left. Burnside, on coming up, was to fill a space between Hancock and Warren.

Hancock had a division from the 6th Corps (Getty's) and one from the 5th (Wadsworth's). They were posted near the left flank of Hill's force, which was confronting Hancock.

Grant had ordered an attack to be made along the whole line at 5 o'clock in the morning, but he was anticipated by Ewell, who began his demonstration against Sedgwick fifteen minutes earlier. This attack was feebly made, it being mainly intended as a feint. The real conflict was on Grant's left. There Hancock made a vigorous assault on Hill in front, while Wadsworth, who

Results of the first day's operations.

The battle of the second day.

had been lying in wait all night, struck him on the flank. After a desperate contest, Hill's divisions broke and fled, overrunning every thing in their way, even Lee's headquarters. They had been driven back a mile and a half; their artillery and trains were almost in the grasp of the national soldiers, when they were stayed by the head of Longstreet's column just then coming up. Could Hancock have pressed on, he would have cut Lee's army asunder, and ended the campaign then and there.

But in this advance through the woods his troops had fallen into confusion, and not until two hours—from 7 to 9—hours of unspeakable value—could the line be restored. During this pause Lee's re-enforcements arrived, the remaining divisions of Hill and the corps of Longstreet, and the Confederate line was consolidated. Upon this line Hancock, advancing when he was ready, found that he could make no impression.

At this time Hancock's left was on the Brock Road, his centre and right a mile in front. On this advanced line the Confederates made a furious attack about noon, driving it in confusion back to the Brock Road. On Hancock's right, Wadsworth was killed in attempting to check the enemy's attack. His body remained in their hands. On the Confederate side Longstreet was severely wounded. He was shot through the neck, the ball passing out through the shoulder. It was thought that the wound was mortal. In all directions wounded men were staggering along, or borne through the thickets on stretchers. The air was excessively close, and made stifling by the smoke of gunpowder slowly pervading the woods.

While such was the progress of affairs on the left, Warren at the centre and Sedgwick on the right had been vigorously engaged, but found that the Confederate position in front of them was too strong to be carried. At 4 P.M. the battle had apparently ceased along the whole line.

The death of  
Wadsworth.

Grant had, however, ordered Hancock to renew his attack at 6 P.M. He was anticipated by Lee, who recommenced the assault on Hancock soon after 4 P.M. But, though the forest in front of the breastworks caught fire, and, under cover of the flames, the Confederates reached those works, they were driven back with very heavy loss.

At nightfall, on Grant's right, some brigades of Sedgwick's corps were withdrawing from the front of breastworks which they had for more than a day been guarding unmolested. The Confederates, watching their movement, made a rush upon them, and threw them into the utmost confusion. Seymour and Shaler, the commanders of two of these brigades, together with more than three thousand men, were taken prisoners. The whole right wing, and, indeed, the whole army, was in peril. It seemed as if Chancellorsville was to be renewed. But Sedgwick lost no time in throwing back his right, re-establishing his corps against the impetuous onset, and averting what might have proved a great disaster. It was now dark. Night put an end to the battle.

In these battles, fought in the heart of the Wilderness—  
Results of the second day. fought in a mass of tangled underwood, a jungle of confusion, where cannon could not be used, and, except along its half-forsaken roads, cavalry could not act—where manœuvring was impossible—where only glimpses of the enemy could be had through the thickets, and officers were commanding troops that were not their own, Grant's losses had been more than 20,000, of whom 5000 were prisoners. The Confederate loss was 10,000, of whom but few were captured—an appalling aggregate of destruction, illustrated by no brilliancy of manœuvres. The battle was a bloody bush-fight. Night came, hot and stifling; not a breath of air could penetrate the recesses of these woods. In the belt between the opposing lines there were places that had been fought over four



or five times. The dead lay thickly strewn among the trees—the Wilderness was throbbing with the wounded.

But, surrounded by these awful scenes, Grant lost none of his determination. He only sought to press forward. He and his staff slept till daylight on the bar-room floor of Todd's Tavern, a dilapidated cross-road public house in the Wilderness.

On the morning of the 7th reconnoissances showed that the Confederates had fallen behind their intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this Grant inferred that Lee was satisfied of his inability to maintain the contest in the open field, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. Grant therefore determined to put his whole force between Lee and Richmond, and gave orders for a movement by Lee's right flank. On the night of the 7th the march for Spottsylvania Court-house commenced. Warren and Hancock marched by the Brock Road; Sedgwick and Burnside, with the trains, by a detour eastward by Chancellorsville, and then southward.

Lee discovered the movement, and, it so happened, reached Spottsylvania first. Anderson, who commanded Longstreet's corps after the disabling of that officer, had received orders to march next morning, but was driven by the flames out of the burning woods, and kept on all night, moving by a road parallel to that on which Warren was marching to Spottsylvania. Not meeting with the obstructions that Warren encountered, he reached Spottsylvania first. Now, learning of Warren's approach, he drew up his men across the road on which Warren was coming. The country was undulating, and dotted here and there with thick groves of pine for the distance of a mile from the point where the Wilderness terminates.

As Grant's rear-guard was firing its last gun in the Wilderness, its advance had thus reached Lee's troops three miles in front of Spottsylvania.

Grant moves toward Spottsylvania Court-house.

The Confederates reach Spottsylvania first.

It was not until four hours after the expected time that Warren's column emerged into the open clearing, and saw the court-house on its wooded ridge. He had been delayed by barricades. At once he endeavored to force his way, and succeeded for the time, after a desperate struggle, in driving back the Confederates, with severe loss on both sides. The First Michigan, 200 strong, came out of the conflict with only 23 men. The day was intensely hot, and many suffered from sun-stroke.

On the 9th, Sheridan, with his cavalry, started on a movement against Lee's lines of communication with Richmond.

Preparatory measures against the Confederates.

The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting. The sharpshooters up in the trees were busy picking off officers. It was on the first of these days that Sedgwick, commanding the 6th Corps, was killed. He was superintending the placing of a battery where the men were exposed to a pretty sharp fire. "Pooh!" said he, "they could not hit an elephant at that distance." At that

moment he was struck by a rifle-shot in the face, and instantly fell dead. The command of the 6th Corps devolved upon Wright.

The death of Sedgwick.

On Tuesday morning, the 10th, Grant occupied substantially the same position as on the previous day. His line stretched about six miles on the north bank of the Po, in the form of a crescent, the wings being thrown forward. The 2d Corps, across the Po, held a line on the right nearly parallel to the road from Shady Grove Church to the Court-house; the 5th held the centre, on the east side of the Po; the 6th held the left, facing toward the Court-house; farther on the left was the 9th; in front was a dense forest. Lee held Spottsylvania and the region north of the Court-house. His left rested on Gladly Run, bending northward, and sheltered by strong works made previously in anticipation; his right curved in a similar direction, and

The attacks at Spottsylvania Court-house on May 10th.

rested on the Ny River; his centre, thrown forward a little from the right and left centres, was posted on commanding ground. His position was well supported by breastworks; along the centre was the forest and underbrush lining a marsh partially drained by the Run. The conflict opened in the morning by a terrific fire of artillery, which lasted all the forenoon. An attack was then made by the 5th Corps, and by Gibbon's and Birney's divisions of the 2d, on Lee's centre. Grant's losses were very severe in the repeated charges by which the enemy was driven from his rifle-pits. In the mean time the enemy had attacked and turned Barlow's division of the 2d Corps on the right, but it was finally extricated without great loss. Although the woods took fire and added to the difficulties, the withdrawal was effected in good order, but many of the wounded had to be left behind to perish in the flames.

So far the operations of the day had resulted in no substantial advantage to the national arms. A Results of these attacks. weak point had, however, been discovered in front of the 6th Corps, and a column of 12 picked regiments, under Colonel Upton, was formed for the purpose of assaulting it. So suddenly and well was the attack made, at 5 o'clock, that Upton, who led it himself, broke the Confederate line, captured several guns and nearly 1000 prisoners. The works gained, he turned at once right and left along the intrenchments, driving back the troops holding them. It was, however, found impossible to support him effectively, and he was compelled to fall back with the prisoners he had taken. Grant's losses during the day were supposed to exceed 10,000; Lee's were believed to be equally severe. At 8 o'clock on the following morning Grant sent to the War Department the following dispatch:

“ We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The Grant's dispatch to the government. result to this time is much in our favor. Our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I

think the loss of the enemy must be greater. We have taken over 5000 prisoners in battle, while he has taken from us but few except stragglers.

"I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

On Wednesday (11th) the position of the two armies remained nearly the same. There was some skirmishing, but toward noon it lulled away. Rain began to fall, for the first time since the army had moved, in the afternoon. It was determined that on the next morning an attack should be directed toward Lee's right, where his lines made a salient. Soon after midnight, in the darkness and storm, Hancock's corps drew out from its intrenchments, and, passing in rear of the 6th, went into position 1200 yards in front of the works it was to storm.

At dawn of the 12th, covered by a dense fog, Hancock's columns emerged from the woods, and, without firing a shot, marched in quick time against the enemy. When nearly half way toward the hostile line, they gave a cheer, and, taking the double-quick, pushed forward to the abatis, tore it away, and got across the intrenchments. They surrounded an entire division of the enemy, capturing three thousand prisoners, among them two generals. So complete was the surprise that the officers were taken at their breakfast, and Hancock sent a dispatch, in pencil, to Grant: "I have captured from 30 to 40 guns. I finished up Johnston, and am now going into Early." It was Johnston's division of Ewell's corps that had been struck. Hancock now pushed forward in the hope of cutting Lee's army in two. But he was checked by a fire from an interior line of works half a mile beyond the line he had carried. To this Ewell retreated, Hill re-enforcing him from the right, Anderson from the left, and Hancock was forced back to the position he had first carried. Wright's corps was hurried up to Hancock's help, and Burnside and Warren were directed to attack along their fronts. The bat-

Renewal of the battle on the 12th.

Successes obtained by Hancock.



tle now became general all along the line. Lee made five furious assaults in quick succession, with the intention of dislodging Hancock and Wright; but, though his men succeeded in planting their flags, in some instances, in the very midst of the national troops, they were repulsed each time. Ultimately Hancock got off twenty of the captured guns, and kept firm possession of the salient; but Lee held a line only a few paces beyond, so that his position was as secure as ever.


“The fighting of this day was as severe as any during the war. It is to be doubted if musketry-firing was ever kept up so incessantly as it was by the contending troops near the captured salient. The whole forest within range was blighted by it. One tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was actually cut in two by the leaden bullets which struck it. The loss on each side was not less than 10,000 men.

Results of the  
battle.

“From dawn to dusk the roar of the guns was ceaseless; a tempest of shell shrieked through the forest and plowed the field. When night came, the angle of those works where the fire had been hottest, and from which the enemy had been finally driven, had a spectacle for whoever cared to look that would never have enticed his gaze again. Men in hundreds, killed and wounded together, were piled in hideous heaps—some bodies, that had lain for hours under the concentric fire of the battle, being perforated with wounds. The writhing of wounded beneath the dead moved these masses at times; at times a lifted arm or a quivering limb told of an agony not quenched by the Lethe of death around. Bitter fruit this; a dear price it seemed to pay for the capture of a salient angle of an enemy’s entrenched work, even though that enemy’s loss was terrible.”

The rain which had set in on the 11th continued falling, and the roads became very heavy; on the 15th, 16th, and 17th they were in such a condition that offensive operations had to be sus-

Grant moves  
toward the  
North Anna.



THE CAMPAIGN OF GRANT.

pended. Grant waited until the 19th for re-enforcements from Washington; the number he received made up for all his losses. Deeming it impracticable to make any farther attack on the position at Spottsylvania, he gave orders for a movement to the North Anna, to commence at midnight on the 19th. Late in the afternoon of that day Ewell's corps came out of the works against Grant's extreme right flank, but was repulsed with heavy loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st. Again Lee, having the shorter line and the best roads, reached the North Anna first, and took position behind it.

When Grant arrived at the railroad crossing over the stream on the 23d, he ordered Warren, whose corps was on the right, to cross at Jericho. This was done, and the enemy driven back nearly to the Virginia Central Railroad. Lee now attacked Warren very violently, and for a short time with success; eventually, however, he was repulsed, leaving 1000 prisoners in Warren's hands.

Hancock reached the river at the county bridge, a mile west of the railroad crossing, and found it covered by a strong line of intrenchments. He, however, succeeded in forcing a passage. On the next morning his corps had moved over the bridge and made good its position on the south side of the river.

The 6th Corps crossed at Jericho. Grant's forces had, therefore, thus passed the river at two points, Lee there successfully checks him. about four miles apart. It was soon found, however, that they could not communicate with each other, on account of a strong salient in Lee's lines resting on the bank of the river between the two points of passage. Lee had so posted his troops that his right wing was thrown back at an obtuse angle to his left; he was intervening between the two points at which the passage had been made. In spite of Grant's attempts, Lee succeeded in maintaining his centre in its salient position, and in

keeping the Army of the Potomac divided so as to render it incapable of advancing without imminent risk. Burnside had vainly tried to make a crossing at a middle point, but was repulsed with heavy loss, and a division which attempted a demonstration from Warren's front toward this middle point was forced back upon the river, and narrowly escaped a disaster. Finding his antagonist's position impregnable, Grant gave orders to withdraw the army over the river to the north side, and commenced another turning movement.

Grant resorts to another turning movement.

Grant's losses at the North Anna, and from the 21st to the 31st, were 1607; the Confederate loss was much greater. Lee here received a re-enforcement of 15,000, but it was not sufficient to make up for his entire losses.

On the 25th Sheridan rejoined the army. He had destroyed the dépôts of Beaver Dam and Ashland Stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad track, recaptured about 400 men on their way to Richmond as prisoners of war, and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Stone Tavern. In this combat General Stuart, the ablest of the Confederate cavalry generals, was mortally wounded. Sheridan had carried the first line of works around Richmond, but found the second too strong for assault; had recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadows Bridge; moved to Haxall's Landing on James's River, where he communicated with Butler; had drawn off the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and made it easy for Grant to guard his trains.

Sheridan's successful cavalry expedition.

General Stuart mortally wounded.

As arranged, Butler moved from Fortress Monroe on May 4th, Gillmore having joined him with the 10th Corps. The next day he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the Richmond and

Movements of the Army of the James.



Petersburg Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the night of the 9th he received dispatches from Washington informing him that Lee was retreating to Richmond, and Grant in pursuit. He had, therefore, to act with caution, fearing that he might have Lee's whole army on his hands. On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defenses at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling. The time thus consumed from the 6th left no possibility of surprising and capturing Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the defense of these places. On the 16th the Confederates attacked Butler in his position in front of Drury's Bluff, forced him back into his intrenchments between the forks of James and Appomattox Rivers, and, intrenching strongly in his front, not only covered the railroads and city, but completely neutralized his forces.


It is held in check in Bermuda Hundred.

On the 12th, Kautz, with his cavalry, started on an expedition against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula Stations, destroying them and the tracks, with large quantities of rolling stock. Thence he crossed to the Southside Road at Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black and White's, treating it in like manner, and reaching City Point on the 18th.

Butler's army being confined at Bermuda Hundred, most of the re-enforcements from the South were now brought against the Potomac Army. In addition to this, probably not less than 15,000 men, under Breckinridge, arrived from the western part of Virginia.

The Confederate army re-enforced.

The position of Bermuda Hundred being easy to defend, Grant, leaving only enough to secure what had been gained, took from it all available forces under W. F. Smith, and joined them to the Army of the Potomac.



THE CAMPAIGN OF GRANT.

Grant retires from the North Anna, Finding, as we have seen, that Lee's position on the North Anna was very strong, Grant, by skillfully and rapidly handling his cavalry, masked his plans, and, on the night of the 26th, the 2d, 5th, and 6th Corps retired silently to the north side of the river, moving by Hanovertown, to turn Lee's position by his right.

Two divisions of cavalry under Sheridan, with the 6th Corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River at Hanovertown after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the cavalry had a severe but successful engagement at Hawe's Shop. On the 29th and 30th Grant advanced to the Hanover Court-house and Cold Harbor Road. On the evening of the latter day the enemy attacked his left, but was repulsed. Meade immediately ordered an attack along the whole line, which resulted in driving the Confederates from a part of their intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st Sheridan reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th Corps and Smith's command, which had just arrived from Butler's army.

The vicinity of Richmond on the northeast had been thoroughly surveyed by the Confederates, and defenses had been partly constructed. The lines formed a curve, convex on the side upon which Grant was advancing. The south end at Cold Harbor was as yet only slightly held.

It was Grant's last chance to attack Lee in the open field. He might overthrow him. He resolved to take the chance.

On the 1st of June an attack was made at 5 P.M. by the 6th Corps and Smith's troops, and resulted in carrying and holding the first line of works in front of the right of the 6th and in front of Smith. A determined effort was put forth to carry the second line, and only desisted from after 2000 men had been lost, and the task found to be impracticable. The enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not en-

Preliminary conflicts at Cold Harbor.

gaged in the main attack, but were repulsed with heavy loss. That night he made several ineffectual attempts to regain what he had lost in the day. The 2d was spent in getting the troops into position. Their order from left to right was Hancock, Wright, Smith, Warren, Burnside. The first three were to make a simultaneous assault at day-break. Lee's position, naturally strong, had been immensely strengthened by slashings and rifle-trenches. Sheridan, with two divisions of horse, was watching the lower crossing of the Chickahominy, and covering the base of supplies at the White House. Wilson was watching the right.

The morning of the 3d came in with a drizzling rain.

The battle of Cold Harbor. As soon as it was light enough, the national troops silently but swiftly moved upon the Confederate intrenchments. The corps commanders had been authorized to direct their attacks as circumstances might seem to require, for it could not be determined, except during the assault itself, where the lines of the enemy were weakest. The country was only slightly undulating, and nothing could be perceived through the fields but faint lines of trenches bristling with bayonets, and tipped with the gray of Confederate uniforms.

Barlow and Gibbon, of Hancock's corps, forced the enemy in their front from a sunken road, and drove them out of their works, capturing several hundred prisoners and three guns. Barlow held his position for about a quarter of an hour; he was then forced out of the works, but succeeded in holding on and intrenching himself just outside of them. Gibbon's attack was broken by a swamp, which cut his division into unequal portions, neither of which was strong enough to produce a decided impression; several of his regiments, however, reached the parapets and planted their colors upon them. Many of his best officers were killed. Wright and Smith made assaults with equal energy, but not with better fortune. They lost very heavily. Warren, holding a long, thin line, did not feel himself strong



enough to make a concentrated attack, and maintained a silent defensive with every thing except his artillery. Burnside did not advance at the designated hour, but toward noon threw forward his right flank, and succeeded in reaching a position from which the enemy's left could be advantageously assailed; but Meade, in view of the fact that the attack on the right had failed, countermanded Burnside's movement.

The attack lasted little more than half an hour. So awful was the fire encountered that Grant lost not less than 7000 men. Lee's loss was not more than 3000.


Later in the day orders were issued to renew the assault; but the whole army, correctly appreciating what the inevitable issue must be, silently disobeyed.

For ten days the two armies lay confronting each other in the trenches, their riflemen picking off many men. Lee, expecting that Grant would cross the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, kept extending his right, and intrenching as he went.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defenses around Richmond, it was impossible by any flank movement to interpose between him and the city. It had been Grant's hope to beat Lee's army north of Richmond; then, after destroying his lines of communication north of James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. Grant was still in a condition either to move by Lee's left flank and invest Richmond from the north, or continue to move by his right flank to the south side of the James. Though the former might be better as a covering for Washington, yet he was satisfied that it would be impracticable to protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long and vulnerable line, which would consume much strength to guard, and which must be protected to supply the army; moreover,

The defeat attended with great losses.

Grant now determines to cross James River.



THE CAMPAIGN OF GRANT.

it would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that Lee would take no farther risks; he acted purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them. In view of all these facts, Grant determined to hold substantially the ground he occupied until his cavalry could break the railroad connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg, and then to move the army by Lee's right flank to the south side of the James, where all his sources of supply, except by the canal, could be cut off.

On the 7th, Sheridan, with the cavalry divisions of Torbert and Gregg, departed on an expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad (see Map, p. 388). They expected to meet, at Charlottesville, the forces of Hunter, and return with them to the Army of the Potomac. It was also supposed that this movement would cause Lee to detach his cavalry, and thereby reduce his power to prevent the passage of the Chickahominy and James. This expectation was realized; for, when Torbert arrived at Trevillian's Station on the 11th, he met Hampton's division of cavalry, and Gregg encountered Fitzhugh Lee's division on the Louisa Court-house Road. After some manœuvring and fighting, in which Sheridan captured 500 prisoners, he heard that Hunter had passed on toward Lynchburg without turning toward Charlottesville, that Ewell was marching to the same place, and that Breckinridge had gone to Gordonsville with a considerable force; he therefore gave up the attempt to join the national force in the Valley, and decided to return. On the 12th, while Gregg was tearing up railroads, Torbert was attacked, and hotly engaged all day. Sheridan was encumbered with wounded and prisoners, and most of his ammunition was expended.

On the 10th of June Butler sent a force, under Gillmore

and Kautz, to capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry penetrated into the town, but were forced to retire; the infantry, finding the works strong, returned without making any attempt.

Grant, attaching much importance to the possession of Petersburg, sent back Smith's command by water, for the express purpose of securing that place before the enemy, becoming aware of his intentions, could re-enforce it.

After the battle of Cold Harbor, movements were made having in view the passage of the James River. By successive extensions of the different corps toward the left, the army was brought into position near the lower crossings of the Chickahominy. The columns moved rapidly over the sandy roads. On the morning of the 15th the entire army had reached the banks of the James. In two days the men had marched 55 miles.

Cavalry feints and dashes veiled the real movements of the army, permitting it to lay bridges and make arrangements for the passage to the south side of the James before Lee discovered its intentions. One hundred and thirty thousand men were about to cross the river. A pontoon bridge, constructed by Major Duane, was laid at Windmill Point; it was 3580 feet long, and wide enough for twelve men or five horses to pass abreast. Hawsers were run out to schooners, anchored above and below, to keep it steady.

In a cloud of dust the head of the columns came down to the bridge at daylight on the 15th. The morning was cool and very pleasant. Burnside's corps had the advance. The regimental wagons came first, then the commissary wagons, the ambulances, the artillery, and the long columns of troops in successive order; among the last were black regiments. Then came

Butler attempts to capture Petersburg, and fails.

Grant's preparations for crossing the James River.

Passage of the James River.



a vast drove of cattle. Burnside's corps was followed by Hancock's. And so, for not less than three days, the countless procession continued.

Thus, mainly over the bridge and partly by ferry-boats, the army crossed James River. Grant himself did not wait for the passage to be completed, but proceeded to Bermuda Hundred to take measures for the capture of Petersburg.

Lee did not dare to extend his line any more. He made no resistance to Grant's movement, but fell back to Richmond.

Lee falls back to Richmond, and prepares for a siege.

It was now clear that the contest between Lee and Grant had resolved itself into a siege of Richmond.

The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were to Grant, were relatively even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive.

During the campaign of forty-three days from the Rapidan to James River, Grant had to supply his army—more than 100,000 soldiers—from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over roads so narrow that often one wagon could not pass another, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to discharge vessels conveniently. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, his men never suffered once for food.

From the 5th of May to the 13th of June, Grant had lost 54,551 men, of whom 7289 were killed, 37,406 wounded, 9856 missing. This is exclusive of Butler's losses. Excluding those of Beauregard, Lee's losses had been about 32,000, of whom 8500 were prisoners. The military determination indicated (vol. ii, p. 144) was taking fearful effect.

Losses on both sides during the campaign.

When Lee entered Richmond he had about 70,000 men. Grant's army, including Butler's, was about 150,000.

It was a part of Grant's plan that there should be a conjoint movement up the Shenandoah under Sigel, and up the Kanawha under Crook, their objectives being Staunton and Lynchburg.

Accordingly, on the 1st of May, Sigel, with 10,000 men, moved up the Valley. He was met at New-market by the Confederate General Breckinridge on the 15th, and routed, with the loss of 700 men, 6 guns, and 1000 small-arms. Breckinridge, however, made no pursuit.

Failure of Sigel's  
co-operative move-  
ment.

At the same time that Sigel advanced from Winchester, Crook moved from Charlestown, on the Kanawha. He divided his force, sending Averill with 2000 cavalry to destroy the lead mines at Wytheville, while he advanced farther to the left. Averill was met by a cavalry force under Morgan, May 10th, and defeated. Crook himself, with about 6000 men, moved toward Dublin Station, on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. Near that place he repelled a Confederate force, suffering, however, a loss of more than 700 killed and wounded. He destroyed the railroad for a short distance, but, re-enforcements sent by Morgan coming up, Crook had to retreat; so that, when Averill reached Dublin Station, Crook was gone, and he was obliged to follow. These operations on Lee's flank and rear proved, therefore, failures.

Grant now relieved Sigel. Hunter succeeded him; and Breckinridge having been withdrawn to aid in the defense of Richmond, Hunter assumed the offensive. He met the Confederate army at Piedmont, June 5th, and completely routed it, taking 1500 prisoners, 3 guns, and 3000 small-arms. Hunter now advanced to Staunton, where he was joined by Crook and Averill. He moved to Lexington, disappointing Grant, who had expected him at Gordonsville, whither he had sent Sheridan to meet him. Hunter's force was now about 20,000 men. He moved through Lexington toward Lynchburg. Lee,

Sigel is relieved  
by Hunter,

foreseeing the difficulties that would ensue should Lynchburg be taken, sent a strong force to its relief. Hereupon Hunter found that he must retreat (June 18). Sharply pursued, he followed the railroad westward to Salem, and thence through Newcastle (June 22) toward Meadows Bluff. The country was so exhausted that the sufferings of the men and loss of horses were very great. No rations could be obtained until the 27th. This retreat into Western Virginia was a great disappointment to Grant. It opened the way, as we shall see, for Early's movement toward Washington.

who is compelled to  
retreat to Western  
Virginia.

## CHAPTER LXXXIII.

### INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG, AND REPULSE OF THE CONFEDERATE SORTIE UNDER EARLY.

Grant, having crossed the James River, moved against Richmond from the south side. His operations are divisible into seven periods.

- 1st. He attempted the capture of Petersburg by a coup de main before Lee could defend it in force. In this he did not succeed.
- 2d. Lee having also crossed the river, and garrisoned Petersburg as well as Richmond, Grant made attempts to break in between those cities. In this, again, he did not succeed.
- 3d. He now began to intrench; his general intention being to extend his left as far as possible, so as to reach the Weldon Railroad.
- 4th. Finding that it would be a work of time and difficulty to reach the Southside and the Danville Roads, he attempted once more to break through Lee's lines by the aid of a mine. This attempt did not succeed.
- 5th. With a view of compelling Grant to relax his grasp on Petersburg, Lee caused a sortie to be made under General Early, who advanced nearly to Washington, and threatened the Free States. After it had obtained some signal successes, Early's army was destroyed by Sheridan.
- 6th. Taking advantage of his preponderating numbers, Grant resorted to the plan of demonstrating with one wing of his army, and, on the Confederates moving their forces to resist the threatened attack, to strike their weakened point energetically with the other. In this manner he at length seized the Weldon Railroad.
- 7th. The envelopment of Petersburg continued unceasingly to the close of the year 1864.

While Grant was thus steadily acting against the political focus of the Confederacy by developing his intrenched line to his left, he was relentlessly executing his design of destroying its armies. Into the defenses of Richmond troops from all parts were drawn, and there they disappeared.

THE blow which Lee received in the Wilderness, followed as it was by the advance of the national army, admonished that general to abstain from the adventurous offensive operations which not unfrequently he had engaged in previously. He fell back over ground which had already been carefully surveyed and prepared—ground with which he was thoroughly familiar. He had discovered that the object at which his antagonist was aiming was not merely the possession of the capital of the Confederacy—it was the life of the Army of Northern Virginia.

The Army of Northern Virginia is forced into the defenses of Richmond.

A fearful issue! Now for the first time were fairly pit-



ted the military resources and endurance of the North against the military resources and enthusiasm of the South. For every life he destroyed Grant could afford to lose two. At a dreadful cost to himself, he had sent the Confederate army reeling and dripping with blood from the banks of the Rapidan to Richmond.

The retreat of Lee into the fortifications of Richmond implied the siege of that city—or fortress, for such it might now with propriety be termed.

Grant prepares to force it out of those works.

Grant had no intention of making any attempt to carry the place by direct assault, knowing well that that would be impracticable against such veteran troops as were then defending it; his object was to force Lee out of his strong works into the open country by cutting his supplying railroads, and, in so doing, to weaken his army as much as possible by making feints and attacks alternately on its right and left.


After the passage of the James, Grant's base of supply was established at City Point, where were accumulated the munitions and stores necessary for an army of more than a hundred thousand men. The occupation of Petersburg—a town of 18,000 inhabitants—22 miles south of Richmond, and 9 southwest of City Point, and to which two of the supplying railroads converged, was therefore the first step in the new campaign. We are now to see that, after the crossing of the river, Grant, without the loss of a moment, attempted to seize Petersburg, but, disappointed in that, his operations necessarily assumed the form of a siege of the place, the fall of Petersburg implying the fall of Richmond.

He besieges Petersburg.

For a clear comprehension of the operations now to be described, it is necessary to allude to the topography of the region, and the defenses of Richmond and Petersburg respectively.

The defenses of Richmond.

The Appomattox is a branch of the James River, coming in from the west, the James, previously to their confluence,



THE CAMPAIGN OF GRANT.

flowing, with many curves, in a southerly direction—these streams inclosing between them Bermuda Hundred, a peninsula on which Butler's army lay. Richmond is on the north bank of the James, Petersburg on the south bank of the Appomattox (see Map, vol. iii., p. 384).

There were two lines of defense covering Richmond, an exterior and an interior. The first, or exterior, encircled it on the north and east, at a distance of from four to ten miles; it terminated on the south at Chapin's Bluff; over the river, at this point, was Fort Darling; this line then ran westwardly across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. The second, or interior line, environed the city from the northwest to the southeast, at a distance of about two miles, both extremities resting on the river, which completed the line.

Petersburg is the focus of convergence of many roads; the more important of them may be enumerated as follows: the Richmond Railroad enters it on the north, the City Point Railroad on the northeast, the Norfolk Railroad on the southeast; then comes the Jerusalem Plank Road, followed by the Weldon or Roanoke Railroad, which enters from the south; beyond this, in order, are the Vaughan Road, the Boydton Plank Road, the Lynchburg or Southside Railroad, coming from the west; this intersects, at Burkesville Junction, the Danville Railroad on its way to Richmond. Hatcher's Run is a creek flowing eastwardly from near the Southside Railroad across the Boydton Plank Road, and then flowing southward.

The distance from Fort Darling to Petersburg is about 15 miles. Across this front—such are the curvatures of the rivers—the only open space is at the neck of the peninsula. So strong were the Confederate defenses at this part that they were considered impregnable. On the east and south the Confederate lines encircled Petersburg until they reached the Boydton Plank

The railroads of Petersburg.

The defenses of Petersburg.

Road; they followed that road to Hatcher's Run, crossed that stream, and were then continued along its south bank. Lee's army was posted in two divisions: the left, under Longstreet, at Chapin's Bluff; the right, under himself, at Petersburg. It will be seen that Grant's general method of attack was to threaten simultaneously both flanks, and convert that which seemed to be most promising into the real attack, Lee's forces being already so diminished that he could not strengthen one flank without weakening the other. Perceiving, however, that Grant's aim was to cut the railroads which brought him supplies from the south and southwest, he kept a preponderating force on that flank, and held that point under his own immediate supervision.

Grant's method of attack, and Lee's of defense.

The Weldon, the Southside, and the Danville Railroads were thus Grant's first objective points. To reach them, he must cross in succession the various roads radiating from Petersburg, and expose himself to flank attacks.

In August the Confederate lines had reached only the Weldon Railroad; Grant's had extended only to the Jerusalem Plank Road. Soon afterward, however, the defensive works were carried westward to Hatcher's Run, and at length, through the labors of thousands of slaves, they reached a development of more than 40 miles.

Development of Lee's works.

The change of base to the south side of the James River implied a complete change in the conditions of the campaign. Especially it implied the abandonment of the principle of covering Washington by the main army.

First period of the Petersburg campaign.

Grant's intention was to seize Petersburg instantly, and thereby secure some of the railroad lines of supply to Richmond.

While his army was crossing the James River, Grant hastened in a steamer to Bermuda Hundred, and gave



orders for the capture of Petersburg. Lee, Attempts to capture Petersburg. quickly divining his intention, threw a strong force over the river at Drury's Bluff.

It has already been stated that, on June 10th, Butler Gillmore's attempt. had sent a force of infantry, under Gillmore, and cavalry, under Kautz, to destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox, and, if possible, to capture Petersburg. The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated into the town, but were forced to retire. Gillmore, finding the defenses very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one.

Grant now instructed Butler to send Smith forthwith, with all the troops he could give him without imperilling the position he then held, and told him that the Army of the Potomac would be forwarded by divisions as rapidly as it could be done.

Smith marched, as directed, June 14th, and confronted Smith's attempt. the enemy's pickets before Petersburg by daylight next morning, but did not get ready to assault the main lines until near sundown; then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines northeast of Petersburg from the Appomattox River for a distance of over  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles, capturing 15 guns and 300 prisoners. This was about 7 P.M. Between the lines thus captured and Petersburg there appeared to be no other works. There was no evidence that Petersburg had been re-enforced with a single brigade. The night was clear, the moon shining brightly, and favorable to farther operations. Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d Corps, reached Smith just after dark, his march having been prolonged by an incorrect map. Waiving his rank, he offered to Smith the service of his troops; but, instead of taking them and pushing at once into Petersburg, Smith only requested Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works.

The next morning the enemy had come up in force. A

Confederate re-enforcements arrive, and the attack fails.

general attack was made upon him at 6 that evening, it requiring that length of time to get ready. The advance and some of the main works to the left of those previously captured were carried. As re-enforcements arrived, the attacks were renewed on the two following days, but they resulted only in forcing the enemy to an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. Grant's losses in four days were nearly 9000 men.

Grant's losses up to the siege of Petersburg.

This failure to capture Petersburg may be considered as closing the first period of the campaign on the south side of the James River. From the 5th of May, when Grant first moved against Lee, to the 18th of June, the time now under consideration, Grant had lost 64,000 men, and had inflicted on Lee a loss of about 38,000.

Second period of the Petersburg campaign.

Lee having thus garrisoned Petersburg as well as Richmond, and holding a continuous line between those cities, Grant made attempts to break it by assaults.

Butler gains a temporary advantage on his front.

On the 16th the enemy, to re-enforce Petersburg, had withdrawn from a part of his intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred. Butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. Apprized of this advantage, Grant sent re-enforcements, under Wright, and urged upon Butler the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line. Instead, however, of putting these re-enforcements into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. In the afternoon of the 17th the enemy attacked him, drove in his pickets, and recovered the lost ground.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st Butler effected a lodgment, with one brigade of infantry, on the

north bank of the James at Deep Bottom, 10 miles below Richmond, and connected the pontoon bridge with Bermuda Hundred.

The siege of Petersburg, and indeed of Richmond, began on the repulse of the assault of the 18th of June. On the 21st Grant attempted to capture the Weldon Road and push the investment west. The region was swampy and woody, intersected with many small streams. The 2d and 6th Corps, Hancock's and Wright's, moved out of their intrenchments. The corps of the former, who had been incapacitated by a wound, was commanded by Birney, who, having the advance, encountered the enemy three miles south of Petersburg. Night coming, a position was taken with the intention of continuing the operation on the next day. In the movements which then took place a gap occurred between the two corps, and into that opening Hill threw a strong column. Both corps were struck upon the flank, and thrown into confusion. When the attack was finally repelled, Hill's column carried off many prisoners and seven guns. The next morning, the 23d, Wright sent a small force to the railroad; it cut the telegraph wires, but was driven back. This first attempt to seize the Weldon Road cost Grant nearly 4000 men. Not only was the road not gained, but he was compelled to contract his left, and placed on the defensive for several weeks.

It is worth remarking what a change had taken place in the national estimate of military operations. In the beginning of the war, such affairs as those at Big Bethel and Drainsville occupied a prominent place. Now, toward its close, a battle, involving by no means insignificant results, and the loss of many thousand men, attracts little notice. Grant does not even so much as mention it in his Report.

III.—C c

Third period of the Petersburg campaign.

The first attempt to seize the Weldon Railroad.

On the 19th, Sheridan, returning from his expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and forced them to retire. Sheridan had, as we have seen, p. 389, in his expedition, met the enemy's cavalry near Trevillian's Station on the 11th of June, and completely routed it. On the 12th he had destroyed the railroad from that station to Louisa Court-house. He then advanced in the direction of Gordonsville, but found the enemy re-enforced by infantry behind well-constructed rifle-pits, too strong to be successfully assaulted. Being in want of forage and ammunition, he withdrew to the north side of the North Anna, and thence returned to White House, as above stated. He broke up the dépôt at that place, moved to James River, which he crossed on the 25th, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.


Sheridan returns from the Virginia Central Railroad.

On the 22d, Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and Kautz's division of that of the James, moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. He struck the Weldon Railroad at Ream's Station (see Map, vol. iii, p. 396), destroyed the dépôt and several miles of the road, and the Southside Road to near Nottaway Station, where he defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Station on the 23d, and from that point destroyed the Danville Railroad for 25 miles to Roanoke Bridge, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left, with a view of reaching Ream's Station, which he supposed was in Grant's possession. At that place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported

The cavalry expedition of Wilson and Kautz.

They destroy the railroads, but are defeated.





THE CAMPAIGN OF GRANT.

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10

by infantry which had been sent from Petersburg, and was forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. In this encounter, Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, but found his way back to the national lines. Wilson, with the remainder of the force, succeeded in crossing the Nottaway River and reaching Grant's left. The loss of the two divisions was nearly 1000 men. But so completely had they destroyed the railroads that it required more than three weeks to repair them. In Richmond the market price of wheat rose from twenty to forty dollars per bushel.

Two weeks had now passed. The result had not answered Grant's expectations. Although the enemy's loss had been very great, his was still greater. It could hardly be estimated at less than 15,000 men. An attempt was now made to break Lee's lines by the aid of a mine.

Fourth period of the Petersburg campaign.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the Anna Rivers, and making him wary of the situation of Early's army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the 9th Corps, and assault the enemy's lines at that place—on the night of the 26th of July the 2d Corps, two divisions of the cavalry corps, and Kautz's cavalry, were crossed to the north bank of the James, and joined the force which Butler had there. Next day they drove the enemy from his intrenched position and took 4 guns. But eventually, the object of the move having failed by reason of the large force thrown there by Lee, Grant determined to take advantage of this diversion of their force by springing the mine and assaulting Petersburg before the Confederate troops could be brought back to it.

Another cavalry expedition on the north side fails.

This mine was not devised, but only approved of by Meade. It originated with the men of one of The Petersburg mine. Burnside's regiments who had been Pennsylvania miners. It consisted of a main shaft 4 or 5 feet across, 520 feet long, with lateral terminations 40 feet in either direction. It was begun on the 25th of June, and finished on the 23d of July. Several of the officers seem to have entertained a prejudice against it. Nothing better than cracker-boxes was furnished for carrying out the earth. The charge placed in it was 8000 pounds of powder.

It was to be exploded on the 30th, at 3½ A.M. Burnside was to rush through the breach and seize a crest in the rear—Cemetery Hill—which commanded Petersburg. Warren was to support him on the right, Ord on the left. The assault was to be made by 50,000 men.

At the appointed time the fuse was lighted, but the explosion did not follow. Lieutenant Douty and Sergeant Rees crept into the mine, and found the fuse broken within 50 feet of the magazine. They rearranged it, and barely had time to escape before the explosion occurred. A crater 200 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 30 feet deep was formed. A Confederate battery and most of a regiment were blown up. It was impossible for there to have been greater mismanagement than that which occurred in conducting the assault. The crater, for eight hours, was filled with troops, but there was a failure in advancing promptly to the ridge beyond. Had such an advance been made, there was every reason to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. The Confederates, recovering from their surprise, poured on the troops delayed in the crater a most murderous fire. Four thousand men were lost, 1900 of them being made prisoners. And thus, says Grant, terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

After the failure of the mine, Burnside, at his own re-

quest, received leave of absence. The command of the 9th Corps was given to Parke.

While Grant lay on the Chickahominy, after the battle of Cold Harbor, Hunter was successfully operating in the Valley of Virginia. On the 16th of June he appeared before Lynchburg, where he found the small Confederate force of Breckinridge. Early was sent by Lee to re-enforce Breckinridge, and hereupon Hunter retreated across the mountains, leaving Washington exposed.

Fifth period of the Petersburg campaign.

Lee, seeing his opportunity, determined now to make an attempt on that capital, believing that such a demonstration might lead to the raising of the siege of Petersburg. Early was accordingly ordered on that expedition with about 20,000 men. He marched, in spite of the hot weather, about 20 miles a day.

Lee prepares a sortie under Early.

As soon as Early's movements were discovered, Hunter was directed to transport his troops forthwith, by river and railroad, to Harper's Ferry. Much delay was, however, experienced by him in getting to that place. It became necessary to use other troops. The 6th Corps was therefore taken from the armies operating against Richmond, and the 19th Corps, then happening to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, was added. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg. Sigel, who was in command of the national forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shepardstown, and Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the river and occupied Maryland Heights. On the 6th the enemy reached Hagerstown, moving a strong column toward Frederick. Hereupon General Wallace

Powerful re-enforcements sent to Washington.

The national troops defeated on the Monocacy.

advanced from Baltimore, and met him on the Monocacy. Though the action resulted in a defeat to the national arms, the loss being 1959, of whom 1282 were missing, it detained the Confed-



erates so much that Wright was enabled to reach Washington with two divisions of the 6th Corps and the advance of the 19th. Had Early hastened to Washington, it is not improbable that he might have captured it. On the evening of the 10th he was within six miles of the city, no substantial opposition intervening; but he paused for a day, and then advanced to Fort Stevens.

Early approaches near to Washington.

The arrival of the 6th and 19th Corps did not take place too soon. As the soldiers stepped ashore they were met by Lincoln, who was anxiously expecting them on the wharf.

On the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens to ascertain Early's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued. In the night Early retreated, carrying with him 5000 horses and 2000 cattle. Wright, who, at Grant's urgent request, was assigned to the command of all the troops that could be made available, commenced a pursuit on the 13th, and overtook the enemy at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, on the 18th, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th Averill encountered and defeated a portion of the Confederate army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners.

He is defeated and pursued by Wright.

Supposing that Early was now retreating south, Grant directed that the 6th and 19th Corps should be brought back to the armies operating at Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the Valley, and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah, keeping between any force of the enemy and Washington, and acting on the defensive as much as possible. He supposed that, if Early intended to renew his expedition, the fact would be detected before the two corps could leave Washington. Subsequently the 19th Corps was excepted from this order. At this time Crook, who was in command at Harper's Ferry, moved up the Valley, which he supposed had been

abandoned by Early; but at Kernstown, near Winchester, he encountered the enemy, and was driven back to Martinsburg with a loss of 1200 men.

About the 25th it became evident that Early was again advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th Corps, then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The Confederates moved down the Valley, and sent a party into Pennsylvania, which on the 30th burned Chambersburg, having demanded \$200,000 in gold as a ransom. They then retreated toward Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelly, and escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.

As the telegraph wires between Washington and City Point were repeatedly broken, it became evident that some officer should have supreme control of all the forces in the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle Department, and that the confusion arising from so many subordinate commands should be brought to an end.

At this time Early was at Winchester, and Hunter concentrated on the Monocacy. With a view of determining what was best to be done, Grant visited Hunter, and, after consultation with him, gave him suitable orders, among other things instructing him that in his movement up the Shenandoah Valley he should leave nothing to invite the enemy to return; to destroy whatever could not be consumed. "The people must be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards."

Hunter having expressed a willingness to be relieved from the command, Sheridan was assigned to it (August 7th), and Grant returned to City Point. The Army of the Shenandoah, at this time, consisted of the 6th Corps, two divisions of the 19th

He advances again toward Pennsylvania.

His troops burn Chambersburg.

Grant orders the Shenandoah Valley to be devastated.

Sheridan appointed to command against Early.

Corps, two divisions composing the 8th Corps, and two divisions of cavalry commanded by Torbert and Wilson, sent from the Army of the Potomac.

For some weeks during August and the fore part of September, Sheridan's operations were both of a defensive and offensive character, resulting in skirmishes. Early had been re-enforced by the infantry division of Kershaw, under Anderson, and by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. Constrained by the necessity of recovering the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, although defeat would lay open the states of Maryland and Pennsylvania, Grant determined that an attack should be made. But, before authorizing it, he again left City Point (September 15th), and visited Sheridan. Satisfied by this conference that the result would be successful, he gave the order. It appeared that the re-enforcements of Kershaw had been recalled to Culpepper Court-house, as Lee intended to use them in some operations he proposed at Petersburg.

Sheridan was about to throw himself upon the Confederate rear. But on the 18th of September he learned that Early had sent two divisions to Martinsburg. He determined, therefore, to fall upon Early's two divisions at Winchester, and then upon the two sent to Martinsburg. But it happened that Early's troops had marched only half way to that place, and he was able to bring his whole force into the field.

Early was on the west bank of Opequan Creek, covering Winchester. Sheridan was in his front, to his right, at Berryville. To approach the Confederate position, it was necessary, after crossing the creek, to advance through a narrow ravine. Sheridan's intention was to threaten the Confederate right, to turn its left, and assail its centre.

At about 10 A.M. (September 19th) the 6th Corps made its way through the ravine, and took post on Sheri-

Sheridan assumes  
the offensive.

The battle of Ope-  
quan. Early is de-  
feated.

dan's left; the 19th was on the right of the 6th; the 8th Corps debouched behind them from the pass, and moved toward the enemy's left.

The advance of the 6th and part of the 19th Corps, though strongly resisted, broke Early's first line, but re-enforcements drove back the assailants in disorder and with heavy loss. These in their turn being rallied, the Confederates were repelled to their original position, and the battle on the front was maintained until nearly 3 P.M., without decisive advantage on either side.

At that hour the 8th Corps had executed its turning movement, and had struck the Confederate left flank, and now, the attack in the front being renewed with great energy, the enemy gave ground. The national cavalry, under Merritt and Torbert, charged the disorganized mass. It broke and fled in confusion to Winchester; but here it did not stay; all night long it kept on its flight, not stopping until it reached Fisher's Hill.

Sheridan captured 2500 prisoners on the field and in the pursuit; in the hospitals at Winchester he found 2000 wounded. He took five guns. His loss was 4990, of whom 653 were killed, 3719 wounded, and 618 missing; the Confederate loss could scarcely have been less than 6000.

Fisher's Hill, where Early rallied, was about 12 miles from the battle-field. It is one of the strongest positions in the Valley, which is here bisected by the Masanutten Mountains interposing between the Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah Mountains (see Map, vol. ii., p. 392). To expel him from this position, Sheridan ordered the 8th Corps to gain the left rear of the Confederates, the march for that purpose being made in the night. The 8th Corps then lay hidden in a wood. It was nearly dark on the 21st when every thing was ready. The 6th and the 19th then made an attack in front, and, while Early was engaged with them, the concealed corps burst forth upon his rear. The effect was instantaneous; the Confed-

He is defeated again  
at Fisher's Hill.



erates fled. Sheridan pursued them through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. In a week he had destroyed or captured half of Early's army, and driven the rest southward.

He now proceeded to carry out Grant's instructions respecting the devastation of the Valley. His cavalry spread across its entire breadth; and so thorough was the destruction, that it was said, "If a crow wants to fly down the Valley he must carry his provisions with him." Sheridan himself reported that

"The whole country, from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain, has been rendered untenable for a rebel army. I have destroyed over 2000 barns filled with wheat, and hay, and farming implements; over 70 mills filled with flour and wheat. I have driven in front of the army over 4000 head of stock; have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3000 sheep. A large number of horses has also been obtained."

The devastation of the Valley was a severe measure, but its inhabitants were bitterly hostile to the government. They had promoted, as much as they could, every Confederate expedition against Washington; indeed, without their assistance it was scarcely possible that such expeditions could be made. It had plainly come to this: Was the capital of the nation to be insulted and endangered, or was this road to it to be made impassable?

Sheridan now returned toward Strasburg, and posted his army on the north side of Cedar Creek. He then went to Washington to consult with the Secretary of War respecting the return of the 6th Corps to Washington.

Early, having received back Kershaw's division, which restored his original strength, returned to the Valley again. On the night of the 18th he crossed Cedar Creek, and the next morning surprised the national army.

That army had been posted by Sheridan as follows:

Commencing on the left was Crook's corps, the 8th, composed of two divisions; his first

The devastation  
of the Valley.

Lee re-enforces  
Early.

Posting of the  
national army.

line was on the high ground bordering Cedar Creek, and entirely on the left of the turnpike leading to Strasburg; his second line was thrown back at a considerable angle toward the left. On the right of Crook's command, and to the right of the turnpike, was the 19th Corps, commanded by Emory; this corps was also composed of two divisions, one of which was small, but excellent. It may be remarked that the names given to these two commands are calculated to convey a false impression as to their numbers; both together would hardly have made one strong corps. To the right of the 19th Corps, and nearly at right angles to the general line, was the 6th Corps, composed of three divisions, which, though much reduced in numbers by battle, were wholly reliable. In addition to the foregoing was a small provisional brigade occupying a position along the pike in rear. The cavalry, under the command of Torbert, was on each flank, the whole being as first posted by Sheridan.

As day was breaking the Confederates fell on the unsuspecting 8th Corps. Its first line was instantly routed. Wright, hearing the rattle of musketry both on his right and left, rode forward toward the left, which he regarded as the real point of attack. He found, on reaching the pike, Crook's second line in much confusion; nevertheless, it took up a position which he indicated. He connected the line thus formed with a brigade of Emory's command to that of the 19th Corps, at the same time dispatching orders to General Ricketts to send at once two divisions of the 6th, which he intended to place in position, and to hold the remaining one ready to follow as soon as the attack on the right should prove, as was expected, a feint. He had no doubt that he should repulse and drive back the enemy across the creek, and recover the little that had then been lost; but, before the two divisions had time to reach the position, the second line of Crook broke and fled. Two regiments of this line

The battle of  
Cedar Creek.

were all that did not go to the rear. The 8th Corps had no part in the final conflict which decided the fate of the day. A portion of the 19th Corps, connected with the 8th, followed the movements of the latter, and was lost to the subsequent operations.

The 6th Corps moved as it was ordered, as also did that part of the 19th which had not retreated. It is to be borne in mind that the 6th, on the right of the army, lay nearly at a right angle to the rest, and that, when the left of the line was attacked and scattered, the rear of this corps was exposed. A change of front and a retrograde movement were therefore necessary to bring it to face the enemy and to place it between him and its own base. To accomplish this, it retired in good order to a suitable position, and Emory was directed to fall back and take post on its right when it halted. About this time Wright was wounded, but he still continued to act.

Hastening to the rear, Wright came up with the 6th Corps, and, with a part of its first division and some artillery, contested the advance of the enemy, as also did Getty with the second division. This gave time for the formation of the rest of the troops. In this attempt, which was successful, Wright lost heavily in men, and several guns, the horses of which had been shot, had to be abandoned.

During this the movement was going on steadily, the troops taking the positions indicated. Wright then directed the withdrawal of the force with which he was at the moment, and went to the rear to superintend the formation. The second division was already established, the third moving in, and the first was being brought up, as also was the 19th Corps.

At this juncture, about 11 A.M., Sheridan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced, arrived. Wright informed him of the dispositions he had made, and Sheridan gave his approval. The

A stand made by the 6th Corps.

Wright reposts the army, and is ready to renew the battle.

Sheridan comes on the field.

Confederates had ceased their pursuit, and were occupied in plundering the captured camps of the 8th and 19th Corps.

Sheridan, at about 3 P.M., attacked them, defeating them with great slaughter, and with the loss of most of their artillery and trains, and the trophies they had captured in the morning. The wreck of Early's army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. Thus ended the last Confederate attempt to invade the North by the Shenandoah Valley.

Sheridan's loss was 5990. His campaign was ended in little more than a month. It was characterized by rapidity and energy, and was unquestionably one of the most brilliant of the war. He had captured 13,000 prisoners, and killed and wounded 10,000 of the enemy. His total loss during the campaign was 16,952. As to Early's losses, it may be said that his army was virtually destroyed.

It was plain that the Confederate troops were no longer what they had formerly been. In an address to them, Early said: "I have the mortification of announcing to you that, by your subsequent misconduct, all the benefits of that victory were lost, and a serious disaster occurred." He accused his officers of a disgraceful propensity to plunder, of desertion of their colors for that object, and of a feeble defense.

On the 30th of June, at the close of two months' fighting, Grant, after detaching the 6th Corps, and two divisions of Sheridan's cavalry to meet Early, had present for duty, equipped, 85,295 men.

Lee, having sent away Early, had present for duty 54,751, exclusive of Dearing's brigade of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry omitted from the return.

During the operations in the Valley, in consequence of



Grant remains on the defensive, and constructs a military railroad.

the detachment of the 6th Corps and much of the cavalry, Grant was on the defensive. He spent most of July and August in strengthening his intrenchments from the Appomattox east of Petersburg, to his left flank on the Jerusalem Plank Road. Batteries and redoubts were made on available points, and a military railroad for the more effectual supply of the army was commenced.

Taking advantage of his preponderating numbers, Grant's plan was to demonstrate with one wing of his army, and, on the Confederates moving their forces to resist the threatened attack, to strike their weakened point energetically with the other.

He was now able to return the 6th Corps to the Army of the Potomac, to send one division of Sheridan's army to that of the James, and reserve another for Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's acquisitions on the sea-coast. Having reason to believe that Lee had detached three divisions from Petersburg to re-enforce Early, he sent (August 12) a force to threaten Richmond on the north side. In this movement Hancock's corps was publicly embarked on the James as though for Fortress Monroe, but after dark it returned, and was landed at Deep Bottom, whence it advanced toward Richmond. Six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners were captured, and troops that were under marching orders for the assistance of Early were detained. It was ascertained that but one division of the three intended had gone.

This threatening of Richmond on the north side led to a very important result—the capture of the Weldon Railroad. Lee had drawn heavily from Petersburg toward Richmond. The opportunity was seized, and on the 18th the 5th Corps (Warren) moved from its position on the extreme left, and struck the railroad four miles below Petersburg. In doing this a gap was left between Warren and the troops on his right.

and captures the Weldon Railroad on the south side.

Into this gap, on the 19th, Lee thrust Mahone's division, taking 2000 prisoners, but being eventually driven back into his lines. Warren spent the 20th in fortifying his position, and on the next day Lee, having massed thirty guns, made a most determined attempt to dislodge him, but was repulsed with heavy loss. The conflicts of these three days for the Weldon Road cost Grant 4543 men. The destruction of the road at once commenced. By the 24th seven miles of it were effectually ruined.

On the night of the 20th the troops sent to the north side of the James were withdrawn, and returned to the front of Petersburg. On the 25th the 2d Corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Ream's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and, after desperate fighting, a part of their line gave way, and 5 guns fell into the hands of the enemy. In these engagements, Hancock, out of 8000 men, lost 2400, of whom three fourths were missing.

No time was lost in completing the branch railroad from the City Point and Petersburg to the Weldon. It was finished by the 12th of September. The army in front of Petersburg could now be supplied in all weathers.

Grant had once more an opportunity for a repetition of his method of operation. The extension of his lines across the Weldon Railroad had compelled Lee so to extend his that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the James for the defense of Richmond; and therefore, on the night of the 28th, a force was crossed to the north side of the James.

It advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments known as Fort Harrison, below Chapin's Farm, capturing 15 guns, and the Newmarket Road and intrenchments. This success was followed up

Gregg's cavalry division defeated.

The military railroad continued to the Weldon.

Seventh period of the Petersburg campaign.

Grant again successfully assails Richmond on the north.

by an assault on Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of the Chapin Farm fortifications, in which the national troops were repulsed with heavy loss. The position that had been captured was so threatening to Richmond that Grant determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge him, all of which were unsuccessful. On the morning of the 30th Meade sent out a reconnoissance, with the view of attacking the enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by the withdrawal of troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance the Confederate works near Poplar Spring Church were captured and held.

The loss in the operations following the 30th was 2685, of whom 1756 were missing. The line was extended three miles westward.

On the 7th of October the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss, capturing all its artillery—8 or 9 pieces. He followed this up by an attack on the intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed. On the 13th a reconnoissance sent out by Butler, with the view of driving the enemy from some works he was constructing, was repulsed with heavy loss.

The Confederates defeat Kautz's cavalry.

Though the capture of the Weldon Railroad was a severe loss to Lee, crippling his ability to supply his army, he might consider himself secure as long as the Southside and the Danville remained in his possession. The Southside Road, at its nearest point, was from ten to fifteen miles distant from Grant; the Danville nearly forty. These, therefore, could not be reached by any extension of his intrenched line to the left without weakening that line and endangering the dépôt at City Point. They could only be reached by a powerful detached column.

Grant attempts to reach the Southside Railroad,

Military critics will examine with curiosity the movement that now ensued, comparing it with Sherman's move-

ments when he raised the siege of Atlanta and attacked the Confederate supplying railroads. However, it should not be forgotten that the morale of the army defending Richmond was very different from that of the army defending Atlanta.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank, Grant and Meade personally accompanying it. It was Grant's expectation to reach and hold the Southside Railroad. The passage of Hatcher's Run was forced, part of the cavalry reaching the Boydton Plank Road where it crosses Hatcher's Run. But, finding that he had not passed the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault, Grant withdrew to his fortified line. In doing this, a gap happened to occur between Hancock and Warren. Grant, having received an erroneous report that Warren had connected with Hancock, returned to City Point. The Confederates, taking advantage of the gap, made a desperate attack on Hancock's right and rear. Hancock, however, drove them into their works, and withdrew to his old position during the night.

but his troops are forced to withdraw.

It was well that Hancock thus withdrew, for Hill had massed 18,000 infantry and cavalry to fall upon him in the morning. In this operation Grant's loss was 1900, of whom one third were missing.

In support of this movement, Butler made a demonstration on the north side of the James.

Butler, moreover, for some time past had been digging the Dutch Gap Canal. It was excavated where the James River makes a bend to the westward about Bermuda Hundred, the neck of land being only about half a mile across. It was begun in the summer and completed at the end of the year, a narrow bulkhead being left at the upper end. On blowing this up the earth fell back into the channel, admitting but an

The Dutch Gap Canal excavated.



insignificant stream of water. The Confederates established a battery opposite the mouth of the canal, so as to enfilade and neutralize it completely.

The Weldon Railroad was still used in bringing supplies from Wilmington within a few miles of Grant's lines; they were then wagoned to Richmond; but, on the 7th of December, Warren destroyed the road for 20 miles farther down.

Farther destruction of the Weldon Railroad.

From this time until the spring campaign of 1865 the operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond were confined by Grant to the defense and extension of his lines, and to movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and preventing his detaching any considerable force southward.

Active siege operations cease for the winter.

I did not think it advisable to break the narrative of Early's sortie by any detailed statement respecting the fortifications of Washington. Although his advance to them and his subsequent retreat suggested a description of those works, I preferred postponing it to this opportunity.

The defenses of Washington.

The problem of surrounding Washington with fortifications came up at the outbreak of the war. Such officers of the Corps of Engineers as could be most readily withdrawn from other duties were summoned to that city and placed under the orders of General J. G. Barnard, chief engineer on the staff of General Mansfield, and subsequently of Generals McDowell and McClellan.

Commencing with the few works thrown up when the national troops crossed the Potomac and seized Alexandria and the Heights of Arlington, the system of defenses now to be described was constructed mainly under the direction of the engineer officer named. Associated with him during a portion of the time, and taking an important part in the work, were Generals Woodbury and Alexander.





THE DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON.

Of the four works thrown up prior to the battle of Bull Run, Forts Corcoran, Albany, Runyon, and Ellsworth, three were mere *têtes-de-pont*, the fourth an isolated strong point by which to overawe the inimical population of Alexandria, and to offer some resistance to external attacks. That they should have served to deter General Johnston from advancing to seize the Heights of Arlington must be attributed rather to exaggerated notions of their extent, and to the confessed demoralization of his own forces by the severe treatment he had received, than to the real capabilities of the works themselves. The issue of that battle made it apparent that the war was not only to be of considerable duration, but one in which the strength and resources of the contending parties must be tested to the utmost.

Their condition at the time of the battle of Bull Run.

Necessity of increasing their strength. The necessity of a thorough fortification of Washington was no longer doubtful; indeed, its urgency was such at that period as to admit of no elaborate plans, nor of such a thorough study of the ground as the judicious location of lines so extensive should require. The nearness of Alexandria to Washington, its situation on the Potomac and its importance as the terminus of a great system of Southern railroads, imposed the necessity of its inclosure within the national lines, which, at first formed by the hasty erection of a series of detached works in front of Arlington Heights connecting Fort Corcoran with Fort Albany, were finally extended across Four-mile Run, and thence, along the heights on which stands the Theological Seminary, to the margin of Hunting Creek, where Fort Worth overlooked a deep valley and imperfectly linked the chain with Fort Ellsworth. It was ultimately found necessary to occupy the heights south of Hunting Creek by the large bastioned work Fort Lyon and dependencies, and to establish at the Chain Bridge, as an auxiliary to the defense of Washington and a means of throwing the troops into Virginia, an extensive *tête-de-pont*,

Progress of their development.



of which Forts Marcy and Ethan Allen were the principal features. On the north of the Potomac the first points fortified were such as commanded the roads, they, in general, occupying the most practicable approaches to the city. Thus the sites of Forts Reno, Stevens, Slocum, and Lincoln (the latter forming the right of the line on the Eastern Branch) were chosen, and works thereon simultaneously commenced in August, and, in as rapid succession as possible, the intermediate forts were thrown up. Somewhat later, the left of the line was established on the Potomac by a group of three small works, subsequently united into Fort Sumner, the left being thus thrown forward to cover the reservoir of the Washington Aqueduct. South of the Eastern Branch were heights which, for an extent of five or six miles, overlooked the Navy Yard, the Washington Arsenal, and, even at long rifle range, the Capitol itself. To hold them, and to protect the bridges crossing the Eastern Branch, eleven inclosed works, several of which—Forts Mahan, Baker, Carroll, and Greble—were of considerable size, were constructed.

The system, as it existed at the end of 1861 (when Congress forbade the commencement of any new work), consisted of fifty-two earth-works built in the usual style of temporary field forts, varying in perimeter from 150 to 950 yards. They contained 480 pieces of artillery, mostly 32 and 24 pounder guns on barbette carriages, few others being then obtainable. After the retreat of Pope upon Washington in August, 1862, it was clear that, though valuable as affording points d'appui to an inferior army, the system was far from adequate to its great object. Congress no longer laying an interdict upon its continuance, the work was resumed, and the required development given by the interpolation of additional forts where needed—by the construction of batteries to sweep ravines or approaches not seen from the forts—and by connecting the whole with

It is checked by  
Congress,

but subsequently  
resumed.

infantry trenches. At the same time, the earlier works, originally hastily planned and built, were remodeled, and in many cases rebuilt, after more durable systems of construction. Most of the 24 and 32 pounders were withdrawn, and their places filled by smooth-bore or rifled guns, on field or siege carriages. For the first rude magazines were substituted new ones on plans suggested by experience, thoroughly ventilated and dry, and, though framed of timber, calculated to endure several years. To render the forts tenable under the severest artillery or mortar fire, bomb-proofs of timber, covered with earth, were constructed in all the principal works, and embrasures and traverses provided for the guns. The slight profiles and gentle slopes of the earth-works rendering them easy of escale, they were invariably surrounded by abatis, by which also the valley of Four-mile Run was obstructed; that of Hunting Creek being defended against cavalry raids by block-houses and batteries.

As finally completed, the defenses of Washington consisted of 68 inclosed forts and batteries, having an aggregate perimeter of about 14 miles, and emplacements for 1120 guns, of which 807, besides 98 mortars, were mounted; of 93 unarmed batteries, having 401 emplacements, and of 20 miles of infantry trenches. The entire circuit of the line was, exclusive of the Chain Bridge works, and of the stretch across the Potomac from Fort Greble to Lyon, 33 miles. Thirty-two miles of military roads, besides the existing roads and avenues of the district, afforded the means of communication from the interior to the periphery, or from point to point. The labor of troops was employed in the construction whenever it could be obtained, but the greater portion was accomplished by hired labor, the disbursements for which, and other connected objects, amounted to \$1,436,000, no part of which was paid for damages or occupation of land, or for timber cut. The aggregate

• Their eventual extent,

and their cost.

calculated garrisons of the forts was about 35,000 men, but under no circumstances would it be necessary to fill all of them up to this complement.

Lines of such extent necessarily require a large force to defend them if assailed by an army. The Strength of the garrison required. actual garrison fluctuated with the relative situation of the contending forces. During the winter and spring of 1864 it was about 20,000 men, made up of instructed heavy artillery regiments (volunteers). During the month of May all these had been withdrawn to re-enforce the armies operating against Richmond, and the garrison, made up of newly-raised "Ohio National Guards" (100 days' men) and some independent artillery companies, amounted to about 13,000 men. About 4000 of them manned the Northern lines; and although this weak and uninstructed force was largely augmented by veteran reserves, convalescents, and a miscellaneous organization of quarter-masters' men, department clerks, etc., it seemed scarcely competent to oppose successfully Early's veterans, flushed with success. The timely arrival of two divisions Services they actually rendered. of the 6th Corps (under General Wright), and of a division of the 19th Corps, averted the danger. Yet this combined force thus made up was scarcely a match in the open field for Early's, and the aid of the fortifications before and after Wright's arrival was a vital element in producing the result.

Napoleon's dictum concerning the necessity of fortifying national capitals was fully sustained by these works. They exerted no small influence in saving Washington after the Bull Run defeat. They afforded a temporary shelter to the shattered national forces in Virginia after the disasters of the campaign of 1862, and they were again instrumental to the same result when Early marched on Washington—a third time saving the capital.

A comparison is naturally made with the most promi-

Illustration from  
the lines of Torres  
Vedras.

gent example of analogous works in foreign warfare, the lines of Torres Vedras. Designed to meet a foreseen contingency, they differed materially in their objects from the works we have just described. Those objects were to enable a given army to stand at bay before a superior foe, and thereby to hold, permanently if possible, the city and port of Lisbon, and the contiguous Portuguese soil, until succor could be received, or the invader should withdraw; or, if this were not possible, to secure a safe embarkation to the English forces. Latitude of choice in the location was in this case allowed, and, in a region of naturally strong defensive features, the most favorable were chosen. Two lines, one of 29 and one of 22 miles in length, were constructed, besides the works at St. Julian for covering an embarkation, and those over the Tagus at Almada. They consisted of detached inclosed works, the intervals being generally made impracticable by natural or artificial obstacles, or by trenches defended by musketry. There were 152 small and rudely-built earth-works, armed with 534 guns, and having about the same total perimeter as the forts at Washington. Commenced in the fall of 1809, they were mostly completed by October, 1810 (in which month the retreating army of Wellington occupied them). Their cost was nearly \$1,000,000, much of which was for land, damages, etc.

Illustration from  
the defenses of  
Sebastopol.

Interesting, in this connection, are the works thrown up in the defense of Sebastopol. Although, simultaneously with the great harbor works, land defenses had been planned in 1834, little had been done upon them, and at the outbreak of the war they consisted mainly of the Fort du Nord, of the casernes of several of the proposed bastions, and of some portions of connecting loop-holed wall. In the spring of 1854 efforts were made to render the place defensible against a mere descent of a small hostile force, nothing more seri-



ous being anticipated. The well-known bastions were thrown up with something of their ultimate development, the most practicable approaches barred by barricades or continuous infantry trenches, and the Malakoff tower built. Earth being scarce, building-stone, of which there was much on hand, was largely used for these hastily-formed works, which were armed with 145 guns. Such were the land defenses on the south when, in September, 1854, the Allies invested them, the still more incomplete defenses on the north having served much the same purpose in preventing the immediate seizure of that side as did the insignificant works of Washington at the date of Bull Run. "Neither the exaltation of the troops nor their resolution to conquer would have saved Sebastopol if the enemy had attacked immediately after the passage of the Tschernaïa." An enceinte of nearly five miles, thus weakly fortified, was held by only 16,000 men, Prince Menschikoff's army not being then in communication with the place. Every effort was made to increase its strength, and the process continued *pari passu* with the progress of the siege. The imminence of an assault compelled a resort to the readiest means of attaining the desired results, which were, taking a line of minimum development, to arm its principal points with a formidable artillery; to connect these points by trenches defended by musketry; to establish detached batteries, each armed with an adequate number of guns; and thus to concentrate a powerful front and flank fire of artillery and musketry, sweeping, as completely as practicable, all the sinuosities of the site, which might serve the enemy for his approaches. The pressure under which the work was performed, combined with the exceptional character and topography, gave to it a highly peculiar character. The scarcity of earth and of materials for gabions caused external ditches, except for the principal works, to be dispensed with, and a resort to all possible expedients for making access difficult, and to a profuse use of sand-bags

for traverses, embrasures, and other interior structures. To delay to the utmost the near approach of the besieger's trenches, and thus to postpone the period of an assault, which the weak profiles of the work invited, the use of "logemens" (rifle-pits), which played so important a part in the siege, and subsequently in the American War, was resorted to. For the better protection of the defenders (who, to guard works so weak, must be always in force along the lines) from the storm of gun and mortar projectiles, bomb-proofs became a necessity, and were improvised by the usual expedients, and by the novel one of excavations in the rocky soil. In these, and in devices to protect the men, and especially the gunners, against the searching fire of the new rifled weapons in the hands of sharpshooters, great ingenuity and invention were displayed.

Considered as a whole, these defenses, based upon a matured plan of permanent fortification, and having some of its features, combined therewith the characteristics of lines of field-works and those of the siege-works always resorted to by a besieged garrison, but yet differed from all these and from all others previously employed, owing to the indicated peculiarities of site and circumstance, to the skill of the engineer, and to the indomitable resolution of the defenders. Though compressed into comparatively small linear space, their real magnitude was enormous, five or six thousand men being at some periods daily engaged on them, and the labor being unintermitted during the eleven months of the siege. The garrison, during this period (always in free communication with the external forces by which it was replenished), was usually about 30,000 men; the number of guns mounted at the final assault is said to have been 800, several times that number having been put hors de service in the course of the siege.

## SECTION XX.

### INTERIOR AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE CONFEDERACY.

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#### CHAPTER LXXXIV.

##### INTERIOR AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE CONFEDERACY IN 1863.

The elections following the Proclamation of Emancipation showed that that measure was not thoroughly sustained by the people until it became clear that nothing but separation would satisfy the Southern leaders.

The 37th Congress commenced its second regular session on the 1st of December, 1862. The topics with which it was mainly occupied were compensated emancipation, political arrests, suspension of the habeas corpus, conscription, the national currency, the relation of insurgent states to the Union, the admission of West Virginia, and foreign mediation. An abstract is given of its chief acts.

A portion of the Irish laboring population in New York was excited to riot on account of the draft. It overpowered the municipal authorities and committed many excesses. Troops brought in from the army quelled the disturbance.

The Autumn elections proved favorable to the administration.

The Confederate Congress conducted its sessions chiefly in secret. The people whom it represented held it in so little esteem that the domestic and foreign policy of the Confederacy is best illustrated by the presidential speeches and acts. They considered it as simply registering the presidential decrees.

An abstract is given of some of the more important addresses of Mr. Davis.

IN the lull of military operations occasioned by the winter of 1864-5, while Grant is crouching and watching before Petersburg, making ready for a death-spring on the main army of the Confederacy; while Sherman is at Savannah, preparing for his destructive march through the Carolinas, and Thomas is resting at Nashville after exterminating the army of Hood, we may profitably take the opportunity of turning our attention from the affairs of war to the civil condition and transactions of the Republic and the Confederacy respectively.

In the preceding volumes I have treated of this portion of the subject up to the period of issuing "the Proclamation of Emancipation of the Slaves." Considering that proclamation in a political light as the great central event of the war, I propose in this section to collect together the more prominent transactions occurring between it and the overthrow of the Confederacy—a period reaching from the commencement of 1863 to the close of the spring of 1865.

It was not alone in the Army of the Potomac that the emancipation of the slaves gave dissatisfaction; the spring elections of 1863 showed that it met the disapproval of a large portion of the people who had until that time sustained the Republican party. In New Hampshire (March 10) that party was nearly defeated; in Rhode Island (April 1) it exhibited a very considerable decline. The same thing occurred in Connecticut. Mr. Seymour, a leader of the Peace section of the Democratic party, was made governor of New York. That section still indulged the belief that, even after all that had taken place, the Southern politicians could be induced to unite with it for the recovery of place and power in the Union. It opposed emancipation, declared the war a failure, and by its clamor against taxation and conscription brought many persons over to its views.

"The war is a failure!" exclaimed the Peace section—Copperheads as their antagonists termed them. "Is not Grant checked before Vicksburg, and Banks before Port Hudson? Bragg is holding Rosecrans fast at Nashville; Morgan has invaded Ohio; your fleet has been driven from Charleston; the Confederate cruisers have swept the ocean of your shipping; the Army of the Potomac has been twice disastrously beaten on the Rappahannock; General Lee is invading Pennsylvania. The summer of 1863 is at hand—are these the victories that Lincoln promised us?"

Effect of the Emancipation Proclamation on the elections.

Conduct of the Peace party.



Not without alarm did Lincoln witness this diminishing support. He had not yet cast away the cramped ideas he had gathered in a merely political life, nor did he yet perceive the grandeur of his position, or rise to a sense of the responsibilities imposed upon him. Forgetting that it is the nature of mankind to be unreasoning and inconstant, he was disposed to accept a manifestation of popular will as an expression of intrinsic wisdom, and to doubt the correctness of his own judgment when rebuked by the votes of an election.

Lincoln fears that the country will not sustain him.

Considering the variety of interests touched, it was not possible that so great a measure as the emancipation of the slaves should be carried without difficulty or without opposition. In American as in other communities, there are multitudes who have an aversion to any great organic change—who would have things go on in the future as in the past. Disliking any political disturbance, they are prone to transfer their dissatisfaction at an event to the instrument which may seem to be connected with it. Lincoln certainly had nothing to do with determining the course of affairs which for many years had been inevitably leading to the destruction of the slave system in America, though he was the instrument for bringing it to an end. The abhorrence of a measure which would give to a slave, and that slave a negro, social equality, was transposed into detestation of a man who had only been the proclaimer of an unavoidable fact.

Political opinions prevailing at the time.

Some—among the worthiest members of society—indulged in a pensive retrospect of the old Republic. They were reluctant to believe that the Constitution under which a nation lives must necessarily undergo change. They remembered with intense affection the institutions established by their forefathers when the Republic was a thin line of colonies along the Atlantic coast, and could not

bring themselves to understand that great changes had become necessary to adapt those institutions to a continent.

There were also many who believed that the war might have been avoided, and that a mere election squabble had been transmuted into a dismal tragedy. Though the Southern oligarchy—  
Conduct of the Southern oligarchy.  
 a most atrocious tyranny—was bent on separation, cost what it might, and loudly declared that it would have nothing more to do with the Union except to destroy it, these persons affected to believe that its insatiate ambition could be cajoled, its anger appeased by fair words. For more than thirty years that oligarchy had been training itself to hate the beneficent Republic, and in a frenzy had resolved to establish in its stead a slave empire—a vast and fantastic conception, a dark nocturnal dream. Accustomed to dictate, it had yet to learn that man can not defy mankind with impunity; that a people can not obtain, in the congregation of civilized nations, reception and recognition if it insists on carrying with it habits or institutions which the human race abhors.

Two years of civil war had not in the smallest degree changed the inflexible determination of that oligarchy. To gain its ends, it had appealed to the sword and fire. Its efforts knew no intermission. No matter what ruin was inflicted either upon its antagonist or itself, separation it was determined to have.  
It will have no peace except with separation.

If fair words fail, and fail they will to conciliate or cajole a hatred so intense, what will you then do? Such was the question pressed by the supporters of the national government on the Peace party. Mr. Pierce, who had been President of the United States—he was the immediate predecessor of Mr. Buchanan—in a speech delivered before a great meeting at Concord, in New Hampshire, undertook to furnish an answer to this question. From the eminent position he had occupied, and  
Speech of ex-President Pierce.

from his familiarity with all the points in dispute, his views may command attention.

He denounced Lincoln's Proclamation of Emancipation, and declared that the war must be fruitless in every thing except a harvest of woe; and, addressing himself to the question, What should be done in this fearful extremity? he said:

“From the beginning of this struggle to the present moment my hope has been in moral power. There it reposes still. . . . Through peaceful agencies, and through such agencies alone, can we hope to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity—the great objects for which, and for which alone, the Constitution was formed. If you turn round and ask me, What if these agencies fail? what if the passionate anger of both sections forbids? what if the ballot-box is sealed? Then, all efforts, whether of war or peace, having failed, my reply is, You will take care of yourselves, with or without arms, with or without leaders. We will, at least, in the effort to defend our rights as a free people, build up a great mausoleum of hearts, to which men who yearn for liberty will in after years, with bowed heads and reverently, resort as Christian pilgrims to the sacred shrines of the Holy Land.”

To those who earnestly desired peace, but were not swayed by the frenzy of partisanship, the ex-President's speech was a deep disappointment. It was only too plain that his figurative language was without precise meaning, and that, in fact, he had nothing adequate to recommend. The scornful language of the Confederates, from their President downward, proved unmistakably that they were no longer to be lured by the hope of political spoils. They had higher expectations, and more magnificent plans of their own. “The Yankees ought to know by this time what we mean. Democrats or Lincolnites, we hate them all alike. We are not going to submit to a lecherous union with either. We despise equally the Black Republican Abolitionist and the Copperhead political trickster. We hold at an equal value the threats of

the one and the fawning humbuggery of the other. Sharp at a trade, let them understand unmistakably that we have nothing to swap, least of all have we any intention of swapping ourselves. They must carry their vile wares to some other market."

Notwithstanding the hopelessness of reconciliation, the Peace party were determined so to embarrass the government as to compel it to stop the war. They clamored against the emancipation of the slaves, protested against the conscription and the enlistment of negroes, inveighed against military arrests and war appropriations, and raised an outcry at the invaded liberty of the press. The newspapers of both parties were filled with discussions on these different points, and, as might be anticipated, they were the prominent topics of Congressional debates.

The 37th Congress opened its second regular session on the 1st of December, 1862. Compared with the preceding session, its political character was unchanged. In his message the President spoke of the treaty with Great Britain respecting the slave-trade, of African colonization, the condition of the Territories, the financial state of the country, the Atlantic Telegraph, the Pacific Railroad. He recommended the passage of a constitutional amendment providing for the compensated emancipation of slaves.

On the first day of the session, Mr. Cox, of Ohio, offered a resolution in the House declaring that all arrests previously made by the United States authorities of citizens in states where there was no insurrection were unwarranted by the Constitution, and a usurpation of power. A similar resolution was offered in the Senate. It was asserted that the right to suspend the habeas corpus does not include the right to make arrests.

The Constitution of the United States had prescribed that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not

Action of the Peace party against the government.

The assembling of Congress.

Movements respecting the suspension of the habeas corpus.



be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion and invasion, the public safety may demand." The suspension was thus authorized, but it was not expressly determined by whom it should be made. We have seen that Lincoln, on the 27th of April, 1861, had ordered Scott to suspend the writ on the military line between Philadelphia and Washington, and on the 10th of the following month had given similar orders to the commander on the Florida coast (vol. ii., p. 31).

A bill passed the House, by a vote of 90 to 45, indemnifying the President and his subordinate officers for suspending the habeas corpus, and for all acts done in pursuance thereof. It was amended in the Senate. It authorized the President to suspend the habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States. It made provision for the protection of persons arrested, and provided that an order of the President should be a sufficient defense in prosecutions for arrests made under that order. It also prescribed the means by which the defendant might have his case adjudicated in the courts.

This subject of arrests was the source of much trouble.

The case of Vallandigham. On the 13th of April General Burnside issued an order at Cincinnati for the punishment of spies and traitors. Mr. Vallandigham, a leading Democrat in Ohio, who had made himself conspicuous by his opposition to the government, was arrested by Burnside, and charged with publicly expressing sympathy for those in arms against the government of the United States, and declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion. He was tried by a military commission, found guilty, and condemned to close confinement in some fortress of the United States, there to be kept until the close of the war. Accordingly, Burnside ordered him to be sent to Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor. The President, however, com-

muted the punishment, and ordered the prisoner "to be sent beyond our military lines, and, in case of his return within our lines, he be arrested and kept in close custody for the term specified in his sentence." He passed into the hands of Bragg, who sent him to Richmond, and thence he went to Canada. He returned home toward the close of the war, but was not molested.

On the 15th of the following September the President The habeas corpus suspended. proclaimed a general suspension of the habeas corpus, to continue throughout the duration of the Rebellion.

Debates on the Conscription Act. The Confederate Congress, in April, 1862, passed a Conscription Act, forcing into their army all white males between 18 and 35, not even excluding those who had already enlisted for shorter terms. The national government was compelled to take similar measures, though with much reluctance. The drain of men to the army had raised the price of labor, which was still farther enhanced by the depreciation of the currency. Enthusiasm, which had once supplied volunteers, had died out, and thousands who claimed the privilege of voting refused military service. The Conscription Bill was resisted in the Senate as "despotic, and as conferring more power on the President than belongs to any despot in Europe or any where else." An attempt was made to postpone it, but was unsuccessful; 11 Democrats voted for postponement; there were 35 votes, including that of every Republican present, against it. The bill passed the Senate, the yeas and nays not having been called. In a very able speech, Mr. Wilson presented to that body the true issue. He said:

"The issue is now clearly presented to the country for the acceptance or rejection of the American people—an inglorious peace with a dismembered Union and a broken nation on the one hand, or war fought out until the rebellion is crushed beneath its iron heel. Patriotism, as well as freedom, humanity, and religion, accepts the bloody issues of war rather than peace purchased with the dismemberment

of the Republic and the death of the nation. If we accept peace, disunion, death, then we may speedily summon home again our armies; if we accept war until the flag of the Republic waves over every foot of our united country, then we must see to it that the ranks of our armies, broken by toil, disease, death, are filled again with the health and vigor of life. To fill the thinned ranks of our battalions we must again call upon the people. The immense numbers already summoned to the field, the scarcity and high rewards of labor, press upon all of us the conviction that the ranks of our wasted regiments can not be filled again by the old system of volunteering. If volunteers will not respond to the call of the country, then we must resort to the involuntary system."

An act was accordingly passed for the enrolling and calling out the national forces. The vote in the House, on the 25th of February, was 115 to 49. It became a law on the 3d of March. It provided for the enrollment by national officers of all able-bodied male citizens, irrespective of color, including aliens who had declared their intention to become naturalized, between the ages of 18 and 45; those between 20 and 35 to constitute the 1st class, all others the 2d. The President was authorized, on and after July 1st, to make drafts at his discretion of persons to serve in the national armies for not more than three years, any one drafted and not reporting to be considered as a deserter. Persons drafted might furnish an acceptable substitute, or pay \$300, and be discharged from farther liability under that draft. The bill authorized special exemptions in certain cases, such as certain heads of executive departments, governors of states, the only son of a widow depending on his labor for support, the father of dependent motherless children under twelve years of age, etc.

In accordance with this act, the enrollment was soon made, and in May a draft of 300,000 men ordered.

In the House a bill was passed, by a vote of 83 to 54, authorizing the President "to enroll, arm, and equip, and receive into the land or naval service of the United States, such numbers of volunteers of Af-

Act for enrolling  
and calling out the  
national forces.

Enlistment of col-  
ored volunteers.

rican descent as he may deem useful to suppress the present rebellion, for such term as he may prescribe, not exceeding four years." In the Senate it was considered that the authority thus granted had been already given by the act of July 17th, 1862, and therefore this bill did not pass.

Members of the Republican party by no means agreed in their views of the relation of the insurgent states to the government. Mr. Stevens, in the House, looked upon them as being in the position of an alien enemy with regard to duties and obligations—that they were to be treated simply in accordance with the laws of war. These views were altogether rejected by other influential members.

On the 31st of December an Act for the Admission of the State of "West Virginia" into the Union, which had been passed by both houses, was approved by the President. This seemed to sanction the correctness of Mr. Stevens's view that the Constitution had no application to the insurgent states. On the other hand, however, the House passed resolutions admitting members from the 1st and 2d Congressional Districts of Louisiana, which seemed to carry an opposite interpretation.

A very important measure was the passage of resolutions by both houses declining emphatically foreign mediation in the war by very large majorities—in the Senate, 31 to 5; in the House, 103 to 28. The occasion of this was an offer of mediation by the French Emperor on the 9th of January, 1863, and which the American government had declined.

On the opening of the session of the Senate and Corps Legislatif of France (January 12th), the Emperor said in his speech: "I have made the attempt to send beyond the Atlantic advices inspired by a sincere sympathy; but the great maritime powers not having thought advisable as yet to act in concert with me, I have been obliged to postpone till a more suitable opportunity the offer of media-

Debates on the relation of the insurgent states to the Union.

Action of both houses on foreign intervention.



tion, the object of which was to stop the effusion of blood, and prevent the exhaustion of a country the future of which can not be looked upon with indifference."

The Emperor's wish was to accomplish the separation of the Republic. He made very earnest exertions to draw the English government over to his views; in fact, as we have seen (vol. ii., p. 518), his expedition to Mexico was based on the hope of that partition, and the consequent neutralization of both sections. France and England had both come to the conclusion that the last hours of the American Republic were at hand. They only differed in opinion as to what might subserve their individual interests best. They sat by the bed of agony—the death-bed, as they supposed, of the Union. France was thinking of Louisiana and the Valley of the Mississippi, which she had discovered and settled, where her language is not yet forgotten, but which unwisely she had sold. The eyes of the Republic closed, the mournful event over, there needs must be heirs to her rich estate. They mimicked sorrow with a heart not sad.

Very different was the conduct of the Russian government. On the 8th of November, 1862, Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had sent to Paris, in reply to the foregoing proposal, this dispatch:

"We are inclined to believe that a combined step by France, England, and Russia, no matter how conciliatory and how cautiously made, if it were taken with an official and collective character, would run the risk of causing the very opposite of the object of pacification, which is the aim of the wishes of the three courts."

The American Congress and people correctly appreciated the attitude of these foreign powers. They considered that the unfriendly disposition of the French government was the result of the political intentions of the French Emperor, and that the French people were in no wise responsible for it; that,

The French Emperor wishes to divide the Republic.

Russia declines to join in the French proposal.

Sentiments in America toward these foreign powers.

under a different dynasty and a different system, there would be a cordial friendship between the two countries, as there had always been. But since, in Great Britain, there were free institutions, a free press, and an administration accountable to popular judgment, the unkindness and injustice which were now so signally manifested were imputed to the deliberate intentions of the English people. By Russia a just, and, therefore, a better course was taken. At the very time that the news of the battle of Bull Run reached Europe, and England, filled with mockery and derision, was clapping her hands at the downfall of "the Dis-united States," Prince Gortschakoff, in a letter to Baron de Stoeckl, the minister from St. Petersburg to Washington (July 10th, 1861), made known "the deep interest of

Conduct of the Russian government.

the Emperor of Russia in the state of affairs in America." He desired the Baron to use his influence in promoting reconciliation, telling him that "the Union is not simply, in the eyes of the Russian government, an element essential to the universal political equilibrium, but also a nation to which the emperor and all Russia have pledged the most friendly interests." He directed him "to express himself, as well to the members of the general government as to the influential persons whom he may meet, in earnest friendship, giving them the assurance that in every event the American nation may count upon the most cordial sympathy on the part of the emperor during the important crisis through which it is passing."

This letter produced an ineffaceable impression in America. Hereafter historians may perhaps be able to trace its influence on the course of events in Europe.

Among other measures passed by Congress in 1863 may be mentioned bills to provide a national currency, to improve the organization of the cavalry, to authorize the raising of a volunteer force for the defense of Kentucky, to promote the efficiency of the commissary department, to facilitate the payment of

Various other measures passed by Congress.

sick and wounded soldiers in the hospitals and convalescent camps, to provide for the organization of the Signal Corps, and to promote the efficiency of the Corps of Engineers and of the Ordnance Department.

The 37th Congress was dissolved on the 4th of March, 1863. It had originally convened, at the special call of the President, on the 4th of July, 1861. It had passed through the period when the government could rely on the enthusiasm of the people, and had inaugurated that during which it was necessary to resort to force.

In the beginning of June a convention of editors of newspapers was held in New York, and a series of resolutions passed affirming the duty of fidelity to the Constitution, the government, and the laws; that, while journalists have no right to incite or aid rebellion or treason, they have a right to criticise freely and fearlessly the acts of public officers, and that any limitation of this right, created by the necessities of war, should be confined to localities wherein hostilities actually exist or are imminently threatened. The meeting denied the right of any military officer to suppress the issue or forbid the general circulation of journals printed far away from the seat of war. A few days previously General Burnside had issued an order prohibiting the circulation of certain newspapers on account of their "repeated expressions of disloyal and incendiary sentiments."

On the same day that ex-President Pierce made his speech at Concord, Governor Seymour, who, as we have seen, was a distinguished leader of the Peace party, addressed a large audience in the city of New York. In this he dwelt upon the calamities that had befallen the nation. "Remember," he said, "that the bloody, treasonable, and revolutionary doctrine of public necessity can be proclaimed by a mob as well as by a government."

The President's conscription proclamation, carrying the

Resolutions of  
a convention of  
editors.

Governor Seymour's  
address.

law of the 3d of March into operation, was issued on the 8th of May. The newspapers in the interest of the Peace party spared no pains to incite the populace to violence, especially taking advantage of the impending draft, which was to occur in New York on Saturday, July 11th. Every exertion was used to arouse the laboring people and dangerous classes of the city. The acts of the government were denounced as outrages and usurpations, the war as a quarrel provoked by Abolitionists, in which white men were to be killed for the sake of "niggers," and for diminishing the Democratic vote at the next election; the draft was declared to be unconstitutional, and an infraction of the rights of the states; the privilege of finding a substitute for three hundred dollars an advantage for the rich and not for the poor. At the very moment that Lee was ordering Pickett's column to assault the national position at Gettysburg, handbills were being circulated in New York calling on the people to rise and vindicate their liberties. Pathetic appeals were made about republican equality—there did not seem, however, to be any intention to extend it to the blacks.

At the appointed time the draft began in New York.

The draft in  
New York.

A crowd attended at the place of drawing. That day every thing passed off peaceably. Among those who had been drafted were some Irishmen. On Monday morning, when the drawing recommenced, an immense crowd, chiefly of that nationality, had assembled.

The populace in-  
cited to riot.

They broke the windows with paving-stones, burst into the house where the officers were, and attacked them with so much fury that one was taken home for dead; they then set fire to the place, resisted the attempts of the firemen to extinguish the flames, and nearly killed the police superintendent. Spreading over the city, they raised a cry against "the niggers;" forced their way into hotels and restaurants where colored servants were employed; sacked an asylum for colored orphan chil-



dren (it had several hundreds of those little helpless inmates), the women in the mob carrying off beds, furniture, and such other property as could be removed—they then set the building on fire; an armory not far distant shared the same fate. In the lower part of the city an attack was made on the office of a newspaper—the *Tribune*—specially obnoxious to the rioters on account of its supporting the government; the omnibuses and street-cars were stopped; the railroads and telegraphs cut; factories, machine-shops, ship-yards, etc., were forcibly closed; business was paralyzed. In all directions the unoffending negroes were pursued in the streets; some were murdered; their old men and infirm women were beaten without mercy; their houses were burnt; one negro was tied to a tree, a fire kindled under him, and he was roasted to death.

The governor of the state, Mr. Seymour, was absent in New Jersey. On Tuesday he returned, and addressed the mob from the steps of the City Hall. He informed them that he had sent his adjutant general to Washington to confer with the authorities there, and to have the draft stopped. Doubtless his fair speeches were well intended, but they were wholly without effect; the dangerous classes, in the flush of a successful riot, are not to be controlled by flattery.

The Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York, by birth an Irishman, but full of patriotism and loyalty, used every exertion to check the excesses of his misguided countrymen, imploring them publicly, and remonstrating with them personally. In these efforts he was warmly sustained by his clergy. In other places the authorities of that Church followed the example. The Catholic Bishop of Buffalo solemnly implored his flock to have nothing to do with such riots. He required that his letter should be read in every church under his charge on the Sunday after its reception. At Cleveland, Ohio, the bishop, in a sermon, warned his hearers against joining in

The governor promises to attempt to stop the draft.

Conduct of the Catholic clergy.

draft-riots; he had pledged his word, he said, to the citizens that there should be no disturbance on the part of the Catholic Irish, and he looked to them that this pledge should not be broken.

In New York the rioters had completely got the upper hand. There was nothing to prevent them plundering the banks, maltreating all who were obnoxious to them, or even sacking the city. It was now plain what dreadful consequences would have ensued had Lee in the preceding weeks won the battle of Gettysburg, and been marching to the help of these his allies.

The police had done their duty, but had been utterly unable to put down the riot. The militia were absent in Pennsylvania, resisting Lee's sortie. A detachment of 50 marines, and a small force of the Invalid Corps, had appeared at the beginning of the outbreak; they encountered a body, consisting principally of infuriated women, and attempted to disperse it by firing blank cartridges; the soldiers were quickly overpowered, several of them killed, many maltreated. Whatever force there was in the city made the best resistance it could, but without avail. The riot continued through four days. On Thursday evening (16th) a determined stand was made by the mob against a small body of regulars, who quelled their antagonists by firing at those who were hurling missiles at them from the house-tops, while a body of artillerymen entered the houses and made prisoners of the male inmates; 13 of the rioters were killed, 18 wounded, and many taken prisoners. The emergency had become so pressing that the Secretary of War was obliged to order regiments from the seat of war and elsewhere. They made short work of the matter. It is said that about 1000 of the rioters were killed—perhaps many more.

Troops from the  
army in the field  
quell the riot,

and the draft  
is completed.

The government ordered the draft to be continued. It was completed with firmness.

The destruction of property in this riot was estimated at about two millions of dollars. The governor of the state, in accordance with his promise, urged President Lincoln to postpone the draft until its constitutionality could be determined by the courts. The President replied that he would abide by such a decision, but that he would not consent to lose the time while it was being obtained. The city authorities of New York, in order to ingratiate themselves with those who had a vote in future elections, passed a bill to pay \$300 commutation or substitute money to every drafted man unable to pay that sum himself, thus thwarting the measures of the general government to keep up the strength of the army. It was men, not money, that the government wanted.

The New York draft-riot is correctly considered as an outbreak of the Irish laboring classes in that city. But, in the condemnation with which they must be visited for thus lifting their hands against the government which had ever done so much to befriend them—a government then in a moment of the utmost peril—it must be borne in mind that there were many, very many persons of Irish birth, and of different political parties, who set their faces against these proceedings. Throughout the war, among Irishmen who held positions of social distinction, the government found many of its noblest and ablest defenders; and among those who were less favored by fortune, there were thousands who gave their lives.

Similar riots occurred in Boston and other places. They did not, however, assume the proportions of that of New York. The draft, in the twelve states in which it was enforced, added only about 50,000 men to the army. It produced, however, a fund of more than ten and a half millions of dollars commutation money. On October 17th an additional draft of 300,000 men was made. It was accomplished without difficulty.

The elections which took place in the autumn of the year (1863) proved that, in all its great measures of policy, the administration was now sustained by the people. The Republican vote, as compared with the Democratic, greatly exceeded that of the preceding year. California and Maine gave large Republican majorities; in Pennsylvania that party gained the ascendancy in every branch of the state government. In Ohio, which had been the scene of the Vallandigham controversy, there was, on the vote for governor, a Union majority of more than one hundred thousand. The same decision was given in the Western States, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, etc. In New York the effect of the riots no doubt aided in producing the surprising result—the Democratic majority of 10,000 in the preceding year was replaced by a Republican majority of nearly 30,000.

It was evident that the great victories on the Mississippi and at Gettysburg were producing a powerful political effect; it was also evident that the people had now arrived at the belief that the Proclamation of Emancipation must be sustained as the true means of the salvation of the nation.

As the year wore on the prospect became still brighter.

On the 1st of November the subscription agent of the government reported the sales of more than thirty-six millions of the five-twenty bonds during the previous week. The proclamation of October 17th, calling for 300,000 additional men to serve for three years or the war, excited no dismay. The President had proclaimed a Thanksgiving for the victories of July on the 15th of that month, and another on the last Thursday in November. He closed the year appropriately by publishing, on the 8th of December, an amnesty proclamation.

From the civil affairs of the National, we may now turn to those of the Confederate government.

The autumn elections of 1863 are favorable to the administration.

Prospect at the close of the year.



I have already indicated (vol. ii., p. 149) that the proceedings of the Confederate Congress were almost entirely secret, and that they mainly consisted in carrying out the intentions of the President, Davis.

Affairs in the  
Confederacy.

In this abnormal condition of things—abnormal in a republic—we are therefore more interested in examining the President's views of public affairs than in studying what may be accessible of the records of the Congress. This body never commanded the respect of the Southern people. Their want of confidence in it appears to have arisen from the mediocre character of its members. All the best men were in the army. They valued military more than civil distinction.

The opinions held in the Confederacy on this subject are perhaps best gathered from Southern historians. One of them, Mr. Pollard, who had closely studied the subject, informs us that the Confederate Congress was characterized by "utter inanity;" "it was the most unimportant, incompetent, and barren of public assemblies." He makes the following statements:

Character of its  
Congress.

There were two of these bodies; the first was the Provisional, the second the Permanent Congress. The former was composed of delegates sent by State Conventions under the supposition that the war would be very short. It was intended to devise a permanent system for the South only after the war was over, but other affairs were so pressing in February, 1862, that there was no time to attend to such matters. So "Davis ascended from being the provisional chief of a rebellion to the office of President of the Confederacy without question," and a tawdry ceremony in Capitol Square—his inauguration—notified the South of its choice. Up to this time there had been but one house; now two, the Senate and the Representatives, were organized. The Provisional Congress was, in fact, a revolutionary council; Cobb, of Georgia, was its president. All the heads of executive departments had seats in it, and participated in its

debates. Among its members were naturally those politicians who had formerly distinguished themselves at Washington in leading the first movements of secession, such as Toombs, Wigfall, Pryor, and Keitt.

The decision excluding military men was fatal to the Exclusion of military men from it. Legislature. It became a collection of new and unknown persons and broken-down politicians. The government was literally abandoned to Davis and his creatures. The best men in the country were wild after military honors.

During the first year of the war Davis was the legislator of the Confederacy. Laws framed in his office were sent to the dingy room in which the Congress met, to be passed.

Public respect for this body totally disappeared after its Estimate in which it was held by the public. flight on the approach of McClellan in 1862. It was caricatured and lampooned even by the women without mercy. Its return was almost unnoticed. It repudiated one third of the debt, and ruined public credit. Corrupt senators trafficked in the small currency. The Legislature was nicknamed by the citizens "the Debating Society on Capitol Hill." The government had become a mere despotism.

The Congress was composed of men of ordinary appearance. Conduct of its meetings. Its surroundings were dingy, dirty, without luxuries or even conveniences. The Senate Chamber was in the third story; there were no seats for the audience. In the House of Representatives that deficiency appears to have been rectified, for members might be seen sprawling on two or three chairs, with their heels in the air, or sitting whittling their desks. There were not half a dozen known men. Some were representing places in possession of the enemy. Even old members who had been in Washington had lost by such associations what dignity they once had. Nobody pretended to eloquence; speeches embodied in bad grammar were uttered

with a colicky delivery. Among these uncultivated men occurred many breaches of decorum, reports of which, for the credit of the Confederacy, were suppressed by the newspapers. A member who was distinguished by scratching his arms and crying out "Mr. Cheerman" when he designed to make an address, on one occasion enforced his argument by rushing upon his opponent with a bowie-knife. Even in the Senate a hand-to-hand fight took place between Mr. Yancey, who had been one of the earliest promoters of secession, and another member. It was thought that this encounter hastened Mr. Yancey's death, as his antagonist dragged him across a desk, pummeled his face, and injured his spine. One of the senators was cowhided by another in his seat. Messages were sent to the newspapers to suppress the reports of these scenes, and not to give information to the enemy.

This Congress became more animated toward the close of the war, from opposition to Davis. It was spurred on to this by the press. Wigfall, who had formerly been in Washington, and who had figured in the firing on Fort Sumter, had now quarreled with the President, and described him as a compound of mediocrity and malice. There was, adds Pollard, a determined thought in the minds of the Southern people to get up a counter revolution, but this degenerated into an indecent controversy with Davis.

The President's relation to the Congress declined at last into a back-door conversation with a few members. Even on them he had spies.

The statements in the foregoing paragraphs are in substance the words of Mr. Pollard. If, from their severity, it be thought that they must be tinctured with personal resentment, it would not be difficult to show that such opinions prevailed in many other quarters. In the very offices of the

Decline of the President's influence in it.

Its character as drawn by Confederate authorities.

government it was said that "the Confederate States' Congress will not live in history; it never existed at all except as a body of subservient men registering the decrees of the executive." When Grant was ready to assault Petersburg, it was actually wasting its time in discussions about adopting a national flag. The author of the *Diary of a War Clerk*, from whom I am quoting, says: "Mr. Davis was at St. Paul's to-day with a knit woolen cap on his head; he is not equal to the rôle he has to play. I fear that this government, in future times, will be denounced as a cabal of bandits and outlaws, making and executing the most despotic decrees. In future revolutions, never let a permanent government be established until independence is achieved."

For the reasons just indicated, we may perhaps correctly conclude that the clearest views of the policy of the Confederacy may be gathered from the messages and other public addresses of Mr. Davis. So far from having the art of concealing his opinions and intentions—an art said to be essential in the successful practice of statesmanship—he never refrained from revealing his passing thoughts, sometimes with singular indiscretion. Thus, as we have seen, during the journey he made to Bragg in Georgia, so unwisely did he unbosom himself that even his political opponents were disposed to believe that the speeches imputed to him were forgeries. Nothing could exceed the mortification of his friends when it was found that they were authentic. They were of the highest value to Grant and Sherman in determining the movements of the ensuing campaign.

These speeches have the merit—perhaps some persons may say the demerit—of frankness. Too often there runs through them a vein of discourtesy, an unpleasing coarseness of language. Political antagonists are visited with unsparing vituperation, unacceptable opinions with vulgarity.

The public speeches  
of the President.



In a speech before the Legislature of Mississippi, December 26th, 1862, Mr. Davis said that though Speech before the Legislature of Mississippi. from the beginning he had predicted war, the contest had assumed more gigantic proportions than he had anticipated.

“After what has happened during the last two years, my only wonder is that we consented to live for so long a time with such miscreants, and have loved so much a government rotten to the core. Were it ever proposed again to enter into a union with such a people, I could no more consent to do it than to trust myself in a den of thieves.”

With great bitterness the President denounced the His description of Northern people, Northern enemy as a traditionless and homeless race. They had been gathered by Cromwell from the bogs and glens of the north of Ireland and of England. They commenced by disturbing the peace of their own country; they disturbed Holland, to which they fled, and disturbed England again on their return. The fact that he had not carried out the policy of fighting battles on their fields instead of suffering them to invade the South, was not the result of his will, but of their power. They had grown rich from taxes wrung from the South. The wonder was not that the Confederates had done so little, but that they had done so much. At the end of twelve months of the war it was necessary to adopt some expedient

“to enable us to maintain our ground. The only expedient remaining to us was to call on those brave men who had entered the service of the country at the beginning of the war, supposing that the conflict was to last but a short time, and that they would not be long absent from their homes. And nobly did they respond to the call. They answered that they were willing to stay; that they were willing to maintain their position, and to breast the tide of invasion. But it was not just that they should stand alone. They asked that the men who had staid at home, who had thus far been sluggards in the cause, should be forced likewise to meet the enemy.

“From this resulted the law of Congress which is known as the Conscription Act, which declared all men from the age of 18 to the

He advocates the age of 35 to be liable to enrollment in the Confederate service. I regret that there has been some prejudice excited against the act, and that it has been subjected to harsher criticism than it deserves.

“When this act was found inadequate, and enough men were not drawn into the ranks of the army, it became necessary to pass another Conscription Act. This exempted alone those whose labor, employed in other avocations, was more profitable to the country and the government than in the ranks of the army.”

Mr. Davis said that this act also had provoked censure, it being affirmed that it exempted the rich from military service, and forced the poor to fight the battles of the country. This assertion he controverted in detail, but added that the Exemption Act passed by the last Congress would probably be made the subject of revision and amendment.

As to the manner in which the war had been conducted, the President remarked that “it had been impossible to meet the enemy in equal numbers—nor have we required it. We have often whipped them three to one. In the eventful battle of Antietam, Lee whipped them four to one;” but this could not be expected to continue as the enemy became more disciplined. “We want public opinion to frown down those who come from the army with sad tales of disaster and prophecies of evil, and who skulk from the duties they owe their country. We rely on the women of the land to turn back these deserters from the ranks.”

On January 12th, 1863, Mr. Davis sent his message to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate States, congratulating them that, notwithstanding the vast preparations of the enemy, victory had crowned the Confederate arms. Burnside had been overthrown at Fredericksburg, the attempts on Vicksburg had been repulsed, on the Atlantic coast the enemy had been unable to gain a footing beyond the protecting shel-

He advocates the  
Conscription Act,

and invokes the  
support of public  
opinion.

Message to the Con-  
federate Congress,  
January, 1863.

The victories that  
had been gained by  
the Confederates.

ter of his fleets, Galveston had been recovered, in all directions the Confederate fortified positions strengthened, and there was every reason to expect that this would be the closing year of the war.

The war had first been waged by the enemy for the purpose of forcing the Confederate States back into the Union. Then it reached a second stage, an attempt to subjugate them. This defeated, another design was entered on, having for its object revenge—a thirst for blood and plunder of private property.

He then referred to the relations between the Confederacy and foreign powers, declaring that their avowed neutrality was in reality in favor of the groundless pretensions of the United States, and imputing to them the continuance of the calamities of the war; and especially in relation to the blockade had their policy been so shaped as to cause the greatest injury to the Confederacy, and to confer signal advantages on the United States; and that the exercise of the neutral right of refusing entry into their ports to prizes taken by both the belligerents had been eminently hurtful to the Confederacy.

Adverting to the fact of the correspondence between the cabinets of France, Great Britain, and Russia, the President said:

“It is to the enlightened ruler of the French nation that the public feeling of Europe is indebted for the first exhibition of its sympathy for the sufferings endured by this people with so much heroism, of its horror at the awful carnage with which the progress of the war has been marked, and of its desire for a speedy peace.”

Mr. Davis then drew attention to the atrocities committed by the forces of the United States, and said that he had been constrained to brand General Butler as an outlaw, and direct his execution, if he should fall into the hands of the Confederate forces.

The foreign relations.

Sympathy of the Emperor Napoleon.

Atrocities committed by the United States forces.

Referring to the Proclamation of Emancipation of the Slaves, he says :

“ We may well leave it to the instincts of that common humanity which a beneficent Creator has implanted in the breasts of our fellow-men of all countries to pass judgment on a measure by which several millions of human beings of an inferior race—peaceful and contented laborers in their sphere—are doomed to extermination, while at the same time they are encouraged to a general assassination of their masters by the insidious recommendation ‘to abstain from violence unless in necessary self-defense.’ Our own detestation of those who have attempted the most execrable measure recorded in the history of guilty man is tempered by profound contempt for the impotent rage it discloses. So far as regards the action of this government on such criminals as may attempt its execution, I confine myself to informing you that I shall—unless in your wisdom you deem some other course more expedient—deliver to the several state authorities all commissioned officers of the United States that may hereafter be captured by our forces in any of the states embraced in the proclamation, that they may be dealt with in accordance with the laws of those states providing for the punishment of criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection; the enlisted soldiers I shall continue to treat as unwilling instruments in the commission of these crimes, and shall direct their discharge and return to their homes on the proper and usual parole.”

The President then drew attention to the condition of the Confederate finances, the operations of the War Department, the embarrassments resulting from the limited capacity of the railroads to afford military and other transportation, the necessity of a revision of the Exemption Law, the condition of the Post-office, and other topics of minor interest.

In the message delivered to the Confederate Congress December 7, 1863, Mr. Davis stated that grave reverses had befallen the Confederate arms at Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Helena. At Gettysburg, however, Lee had inflicted such severity of punishment on the enemy as to disable them from the early renewal of the campaign, as orig-

Denunciation of  
the Proclamation  
of Emancipation.

Message to the Con-  
federate Congress,  
December, 1863.

The reverses that  
had befallen the  
Confederacy,



inally projected. Unfortunately, the communications on which he had relied for receiving his supplies of munitions were interrupted by extraordinary floods, which so swelled the Potomac as to render impassable the fords by which his advance had been made, and he was thus forced to a withdrawal.

“The effective check thus opposed to the advance of the invaders at all points was such as to afford hope of their early expulsion from portions of the territory previously occupied by them, when the country was painfully surprised by the intelligence that the officer in command of Cumberland Gap had surrendered that important and easily defended pass without firing a shot. This easy success of the enemy was followed by an advance of General Rosecrans into Georgia, and our army evacuated Chattanooga, and availed itself of the opportunity thus afforded of winning, on the field of Chickamauga, one of the most brilliant and decisive victories of the war. This signal defeat of General Rosecrans was followed by his retreat into Chattanooga, where his imperiled position had the effect of relieving the pressure of the invasion at other points, forcing the concentration for his relief of large bodies of troops withdrawn from the armies in the Mississippi Valley and in Northern Virginia. The combined forces thus accumulated against us in Tennessee so greatly outnumbered our army as to encourage the enemy to attack. After a long and severe battle, in which great carnage was inflicted on him, some of our troops inexplicably abandoned positions of great strength, and by a disorderly retreat compelled the commander to withdraw the forces elsewhere successful, and finally to retire his whole army to a position some 20 or 30 miles in the rear.”

but a great victory had been obtained at Chickamauga,

and a defeat had occurred at Chattanooga.

In regard to the foreign relations of the Confederacy, the President regretted that there had been no improvement since his message in the preceding January. In details of considerable length he examined the conduct of Great Britain, and announced that he had felt it his duty to recall the commissioners formerly accredited to that court.

The foreign relations of the Confederacy.

With respect to the French expedition to Mexico, Mr. Davis remarked that

“the Emperor of the French had solemnly disclaimed any purpose

The French expedition to Mexico. to impose on Mexico a form of government not acceptable to that nation; and the eminent person to whom the throne had been tendered declined its acceptance unless the offer was sanctioned by the suffrages of the people. In either event of a monarchy or a republic, a continuance of peaceful relations might be expected."

To the condition of the Confederate finances Mr. Davis asked the attention of the Congress. He remarked that,

The condition of the finances. "at the commencement of the war, we were far from anticipating the magnitude and duration of the struggle in which we were engaged. A long exemption from direct taxation by the general government had created an aversion to its raising revenue by any other means than by duties on imports; and it was supposed that these duties would be ample for current peace expenditures, while the means for conducting the war could be raised almost exclusively by the use of the public credit.

Earlier finance measures. "The first action of the Provisional Congress was therefore confined to raising a sum of fifteen millions of dollars by loan, with a pledge of a small export duty on cotton to provide for the redemption of the debt.

"At its second session war was declared to exist between the Confederacy and the United States, and provision was made for the issue of twenty millions of dollars in treasury notes; and for borrowing thirty millions of dollars on bonds.

"Prior to the assembling of the Congress in Richmond at their third session, near the end of July, 1861, the President of the United States had developed in his message the purpose 'to make the contest a short and decisive one,' and had called on Congress for four hundred thousand men, and for four hundred millions of dollars. The Congress exceeded his recommendation. The necessity thus first became urgent that a financial scheme should be devised for the Confederacy on a basis sufficiently large for the vast proportions of the contest with which we were threatened.

Effects of the blockade on the finance system. "The plan devised by Congress at that time was based on the theory of issuing treasury notes, convertible at the pleasure of the holder into eight per cent. bonds, the interest of which was to be payable in coin. This system depended for success on the continued ability of government to pay the interest in specie. An internal tax, termed a war-tax, was levied, the proceeds of which, together with the revenue from imports, were deemed sufficient for the object designed. This scheme required for its operation that Confederate commerce with foreign nations should

not be suspended. It was not to be anticipated that such a suspension would be permitted otherwise than by an effective blockade.

“The Confederacy had the means, therefore (if neutral nations had not combined to aid its enemies by the sanction of an illegal prohibition on their commerce), to secure the receipt into the Treasury of coin sufficient to pay the interest on the bonds, and thus maintain the Treasury notes at rates nearly equal to par in specie. So long as the interest continued to be thus paid with the reserve of coin pre-existing in the country, experience sustained the expectations of those who devised the system. Thus, on the first of the following December, coin had only reached a premium of about 20 per cent., although it had already become apparent that the commerce of the country was threatened with a permanent suspension by reason of the conduct of neutral nations, and that the necessary result must be the exhaustion of our specie reserve.

“In the mean time, the popular aversion to internal taxation by the general government had influenced the legislation of the several states, and in only three of them—South Carolina, Mississippi, and Texas—were the taxes actually collected from the people. The quota devolving upon the remaining states had been raised by the issue of bonds and State Treasury notes, and the public debt of the country was thus actually increased instead of being diminished by the taxation imposed by Congress.

“Neither at the first nor second session of the existing Congress were means provided by taxation for maintaining the government, legislation being confined to authorizing farther sales of bonds and issues of Treasury notes.

Although repeated efforts were made to frame a proper system of taxation, they were confronted by an obstacle which created grave embarrassment. About two thirds of the entire taxable property of the Confederate States consists of lands and slaves. The general power of taxation vested in Congress by the Provisional Constitution (which was to be only temporary in its operation) was not restricted by any other condition than that ‘all duties, imports, and excises should be uniform throughout the states of the Confederacy.’ But the permanent Constitution, sanctioning the principle that taxation and representation ought to rest on the same basis, specially provided that ‘representation and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons—including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed—three fifths of all the slaves.’

Exhaustion of the specie reserve.

Aversion of the public to direct taxation.

Difficulties arising in the case of lands and slaves.

“It was further ordered that a census should be made within three years after the first meeting of Congress, and ‘that no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.’

“It is plain that, under these provisions, capitation and direct taxes must be levied in proportion to the census when made. It is also plain that the duty is imposed on Congress to provide for making a census prior to the 22d of February, 1865. It may farther be stated that, according to the received construction of the Constitution of the United States (a construction acquiesced in for upward of sixty years), taxes on lands and slaves are direct taxes; and the conclusion seems necessarily to be that, in repeating without modification in the Confederate Constitution the language of the Constitution of 1787, our Convention intended to attach to it the meaning which had been sanctioned by long and uninterrupted acquiescence.

“So long as there seemed to be a probability of being able to carry out these provisions of the Constitution in their entirety, and in conformity with the intentions of its authors, there was an obvious difficulty in framing any system of taxation. A law which should exempt from the burden two thirds of the property of the country would be as unfair to the owners of the remaining third, as it would be inadequate to meet the requirements of the public service.

“The urgency of the need was such, however, that, after great embarrassment, Congress succeeded in framing the law of the 24th of April, 1863, by which it sought to reach, as far as practicable, every resource of the country except the capital invested in real estate and slaves, and by means of an income tax, and a tax in kind on the products of the soil, as well as by license on business occupations and professions, to command resources sufficient for the wants of the country. But a very large portion of these resources could only be made available at the close of the current and the commencement of the ensuing year, while the intervening exigencies permitted no delay. In this state of affairs, superinduced almost unavoidably by the fortunes of the war, the issues of Treasury notes were increased until the currency in circulation amounted to more than six hundred millions of dollars, or more than threefold the amount required by the business of the country.

“The evil effects of this condition of things were unfortunately but too apparent. In addition to the difficulty presented to the necessary operations of the government and the efficient conduct of the war, the most deplorable of all its results was undoubtedly its corrupting influence on the morals of the people. A spirit of speculation

Course that had  
been taken by  
Congress.

Necessity of in-  
creased issue of  
Treasury notes.



had been fostered, debasing in its influence and ruinous in its consequences.

“Reverting to the constitutional provisions, the question arises whether it be possible to execute the duty of apportioning in accordance with the census ordered to be made as a basis. So long as this appeared to be practicable, no one could deny the propriety of abstaining from the imposition of direct taxes until the power could be executed in the precise mode pointed out by the terms of the fundamental law. But the terms of the Constitution can not be carried out so long as states or portions of states are held by the enemy; and any attempt to apportion taxes among states, some of which are wholly or partially in the occupation of hostile forces, would be productive of the most revolting injustice. What justice would there be in imposing on the remainder the whole amount of taxation of the entire state in proportion to its representation? What else would this be in effect than to increase the burden of those who are the heaviest sufferers by the war, and to make our own inability to protect them from invasion, as we are required to do by the Constitution, the ground for adding to their losses by an attempted adherence to the letter in violation of the spirit of that instrument?

Guided by these considerations, the President therefore declared that he should deem it his duty to approve any law levying the taxation which Congress was bound to impose for the defense of the country in any other practicable mode which should distribute the burden uniformly and impartially on the whole property of the people.

“The Congress by former legislation had sought to avoid the increase in the volume of notes in circulation by offering inducements to voluntary funding. The measures adopted for that purpose had been but partially successful, and the evil had now attained such a magnitude as to permit no other remedy than the compulsory reduction of the currency to the amount required by the business of the country. This reduction should be accompanied by a pledge that under no stress of circumstances will that amount be exceeded. No possible mode of using the credit of the government can be so disastrous as one which disturbs the basis of all exchanges, renders impossible all calculations of future values, augments in constantly increasing proportions the price of all commodities, and so depreciates all fixed wages, salaries, and incomes as to render them inadequate to bare subsistence.

Difficulties arising from occupation of places by the enemy.

A compulsory reduction of the currency necessary.

“The holders of the currency now outstanding can only be protected in the recovery of their just claims by substituting for their notes some other security. If the currency is not greatly and promptly reduced, the present scale of inflated prices will not only continue to exist, but, by the very fact of the large amounts thus made requisite in the conduct of the war, those prices will reach rates still more extravagant, and the whole system will fall under its own weight, thus rendering the redemption of the debt impossible, and destroying its whole value in the hands of the holder. If, on the contrary, a funded debt, with interest secured by adequate taxation, can be substituted for the outstanding currency, its entire amount will be made available to the holder, and the government will be in a condition enabling it, beyond the reach of any probable contingency, to prosecute the war to a successful issue. It is therefore demanded, as well by the interest of the creditor as of the country at large, that the evidences of the public debt now outstanding in the shape of Treasury notes be converted into bonds bearing adequate interest, with a provision for taxation sufficient to insure punctual payment, and final redemption of the whole debt.”

Calling attention to the army, the President affirmed that for character, valor, efficiency, and patriotic devotion it had not been equaled in the history of the war. As respects the exchange of prisoners, he laid the blame of the difficulties that had been encountered on the United States, characterizing their conduct toward the Southern prisoners as the most revolting inhumanity.

With some remarks respecting the obstruction of communication with the trans-Mississippi Department, the condition of the Navy, the Post-office, and the conduct of the United States, the President thus concluded his message :

“The hope last year entertained of an early termination of the war has not been realized. Could carnage have satisfied the appetite of our enemy for the destruction of human life, or grief have appeased their wanton desire to inflict human suffering, there has been bloodshed enough on both sides, and two lands have been sufficiently darkened by the weeds of mourning to induce a disposition for peace.

“If unanimity in a people could dispel delusion, it has been dis-

A funded debt to be substituted.

Conduct of the United States in the exchange of prisoners.

Denunciation of the United States.

played too unmistakably not to have silenced the pretense that the Southern States were merely disturbed by a factious insurrection; and it must long since have been admitted that they were but exercising their reserved rights to modify their own government in such manner as would best secure their own happiness. But these considerations have been powerless to allay the unchristian hate of those who, accustomed to draw large profits from a union with us, can not control the rage excited by the conviction that they have by their own folly destroyed the richest source of their prosperity. They refuse to listen to proposals for the only peace possible between us—a peace which, recognizing the impassable abyss which divides us, may leave the two people separately to recover from the injuries inflicted on both by the causeless war now waged against us. Having begun the war in direct violation of their Constitution, which forbade the attempt to coerce a state, they have been hardened by crime until they no longer attempt to veil their purpose to destroy the institutions, and subvert the sovereignty and independence of these states. We now know that the only hope for peace is in the vigor of our resistance, as the cessation of their hostility is only to be expected from the pressure of their necessities.”

## CHAPTER LXXXV.

### INTERIOR AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE CONFEDERACY DURING 1864 AND TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR.

An abstract is given of the debates and acts of the 38th Congress respecting slavery, military affairs, and the relation of the seceding states to the Union, together with other minor matters.

At their respective conventions for nominating the next President, the Radicals nominated General Fremont, the Republicans Mr. Lincoln, the Democrats General McClellan. Mr. Lincoln was elected.

Attempts were made by several persons for the restoration of peace.

A statement is given of the civil affairs of the Confederacy, and of the military, financial, and other measures of its Congress.

So complete was the military exhaustion of the Confederacy that it became necessary to resort to the employment of slaves as soldiers.

In the decline of its affairs, alienations occurred between the Confederacy and foreign powers.

The 38th Congress  
—first session. THE 38th Congress assembled in its first session on the 7th of December, 1863. In the Senate the opposition numbered 13 out of 40 members; in the House it counted 82 out of 183. Schuyler Colfax was elected Speaker of the House on the first ballot.

The President's  
message. The President's message was received on the following day. It stated that the foreign relations of the country were undisturbed; the condition of the Treasury satisfactory; the great burden of taxation cheerfully borne; the naval force, particularly in the iron-clad portion, much developed; the blockade successfully maintained, more than 1000 contraband vessels having been captured.

Respecting military operations, the President contrasted their condition with that of the previous year, showing how favorable had been the change. The policy of emancipation had been adopted; black soldiers had been employed. There had followed the forcing back of the insurgent armies, the complete opening of the Mississippi, the bisection



of the country dominated over by the rebellion, the stoppage of communication between its parts, the deliverance of Tennessee and Arkansas from insurgent control. Of those who were slaves at the beginning of the rebellion, fully 100,000 were now in the United States military service, half of them bearing arms in the ranks, and doing the duty of soldiers. The arming of the blacks had not been followed by violence or cruelty on their part. The country, as shown by the elections, had not withheld its approval of these measures, and among foreign nations they had produced a good effect. Such was the improved aspect of public affairs that the President had felt encouraged to issue an amnesty proclamation.

The debates and acts of Congress during this session were chiefly directed to three topics: 1st, slavery; 2d, military affairs; 3d, the relations of the seceding states to the Union.

(1.) As respects legislation in relation to slavery—

A bill was passed to “repeal the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, and all acts and parts of acts for the rendition of fugitive slaves,” approved on June 28th. In the Senate a bill was reported proposing to repeal the law prohibiting negroes from being employed as carriers of the mail, with an amendment providing that in the courts of the United States there should be no exclusion of any witnesses on account of color. This amendment was subsequently attached to the Civil Appropriation Bill. In a bill incorporating the Metropolitan Railroad Company of the District of Columbia, which passed both houses, provision was made that there should be no regulation excluding any person from any car on account of color. A section was attached to the Civil Appropriation Bill prohibiting the coastwise slave-trade.

(2.) As respects legislation in relation to military affairs—

A joint resolution was passed directing that the thanks

Legislation on military affairs.

of Congress be presented to General Grant, and to the officers and soldiers under him. A gold medal was voted to the general, and on February 29th, 1864, the grade of Lieutenant General was revived in his favor.

The commutation clause of the Conscription Act was repealed.

An act was passed declaring negroes employed as soldiers free, and provision made for their receiving the same pay as white soldiers.

An act passed July 4th, 1864, provided that the governor of a state might send recruiting agents into any of the states declared to be in rebellion, except the States of Arkansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana, to recruit volunteers, who should be duly credited to the states procuring them. The Governor of Massachusetts was one of the first to appoint recruiting agents for the purpose, and the governors of other states followed his example. This enabled such states as had large manufacturing interests to keep their skilled operatives at home; but it was soon found by the military commanders within the lines of military operations to be so fruitful of abuses that it had to be abandoned.

In 1864 the number of men called for by the President of the United States amounted to 1,500,000. The military calls. The calls were—

On February 1st . . . . .	500,000
“ March 14th . . . . .	200,000
“ July 18th . . . . .	500,000
“ December 20th . . . . .	300,000
	<u>1,500,000</u>

From this, however, should be deducted 300,000 of the February call, who had really been included in the October call of the preceding year. Three hundred thousand of the July call were canceled by credits, and the December call may be considered as belonging to the year 1865. With these deductions the number becomes 600,000 men.

Besides these, however, there were added to the army in the summer 100,000 men, known as "Hundred days' men." They were voluntarily furnished by the Governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin. They were to serve one hundred days, unless sooner discharged. Congress appropriated twenty-five millions of dollars for equipping them. They performed garrison duty, and otherwise relieved disciplined troops, who were sent to the front.

The pay of soldiers was increased to \$16 per month, and a Bureau of Military Justice established.

(3.) As respects the relations of the seceding states to the Union—

By the Amnesty Proclamation, property confiscated and not already sold was restored to persons taking the oath of allegiance.

Relations of the seceding states to the Union.

In the discussions which ensued upon the Confiscation Act, the opposing views which would be taken respecting the position of the seceding states when measures of reconstruction were under consideration were brought into clear relief. Some thought that "those states were still in the Union, and entitled to the protection of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that, notwithstanding all they had done, they might at any time, without any legislation, come back, send senators and representatives to Congress, and enjoy all the privileges and immunities of loyal members of the United States." Others held that, "since they have committed treason, renounced their allegiance to the Union, discarded its Constitution and laws, organized a distinct and hostile government, and, by force of arms, risen from the condition of insurgents to the position of an independent power *de facto*, and been acknowledged as a belligerent both by foreign nations and our own government, the Constitution and the laws of the Union are abrogated so far as they are concerned; and that in their relation to the other bel-

ligerent they are under the laws of war and the laws of nations alone; and that whichever power conquers may treat the vanquished as conquered provinces, and may impose upon them such conditions and laws as it may deem best." The latter was the view of Thaddeus Stevens, from whom the foregoing quotation is made, and who defended that view with ability in the House of Representatives. "To my mind," he said, "there can be no doubt of what we have a right to do. What it will be policy to do may be more difficult to determine."

On the 15th of February, Mr. Henry Winter Davis, from Bill for reconstruction of the states. the select committee, reported to the House a bill to guarantee to certain states a republican form of government. It authorized the President to appoint a provisional governor in each of the states in rebellion, to be charged with its civil administration until a state government therein should be recognized. It directed the steps of re-establishment of such state government by means of a convention, in which no one should vote or be eligible as a delegate who had exercised any civil, military, state, or Confederate office under the rebel occupation, or who had voluntarily borne arms against the United States; it required that convention to insert in the Constitution three provisions: (1), disfranchising, in elections for governor and Legislature, all who had held military or civil office under the Confederacy (except offices merely ministerial, and military offices below that of a colonel); (2), abolishing slavery, and guaranteeing the freedom of all persons; (3), prohibiting the recognition or payment of any Confederate debt. Before the President could issue a proclamation recognizing the government thus established, the assent of Congress must be had. Then senators, representatives, and presidential electors might be elected. It affixed a penalty to any attempt to re-enslave slaves. It declared that every person who should thereafter exercise any office, civil or military, in the rebel service—state or



Confederate—except such as were merely ministerial, or military officers below the grade of colonel, should not be a citizen of the United States. As respects negro suffrage, it was silent.

This bill passed the House on the 4th of May, and the Senate on the 2d of July. The President does not sign it. The President did not sign it, but on the 9th of July issued a proclamation concerning it, saying that it had been presented to him less than one hour previous to the close of the session, and that he was unprepared, by its formal approval, to be committed to any single plan of restoration, to set aside the state constitutions and governments already instituted in Arkansas and Louisiana, thereby discouraging loyal citizens from farther effort, or to declare the constitutional competency of Congress to abolish slavery in the states; he was, however, fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill, as one very proper for the loyal people of any state choosing to adopt it, and in that case would give it executive aid.

This proclamation induced a protest from Mr. Wade, who Protest against his action. was chairman of the Senate committee, and Mr. Davis, chairman of that of the House, severely censuring the President; and subsequently the Senate declared that certain persons from Arkansas claiming seats in that body were not entitled to them, the House of Representatives taking similar action in the case of others from Arkansas and Louisiana claiming seats in it, both bodies expressing thus their dissent from Lincoln's plan of restoration.

On the 8th of April, the House being in Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, The cases of Long and Harris. Alexander Long, a representative from Ohio, in a speech, prophesied the failure of the war, and declared himself in favor of the recognition of the Confederacy. The next day the Speaker of the House, Schuyler Colfax, moved for Long's expulsion. "Can the United States," he said,

“declare war against any foreign nation for recognizing the Confederacy while from the halls of Congress an opinion was permitted to go forth in favor of such recognition unaccompanied by the highest expression of congressional censure?” Another member from Ohio opposed that resolution, insisting on the right of freedom of discussion, but absolutely repudiating, for himself and his Democratic colleagues, the sentiments expressed by Long. Hereupon Harris, a representative from Maryland, rose and said, “I am for peace by the recognition of the Confederacy. I am for acquiescence in the doctrine of secession. I hope that you may never subjugate the South. God Almighty grant that it may never be.” He was called to order, and his expulsion moved. The resolution of expulsion was, however, not carried, but one of censure was passed.

Measures were taken for the formation of state governments in Colorado, Nevada, and Nebraska.

Such was the legislation of Congress as respects domestic affairs. The foreign relations of the nation were in a very delicate condition. The French, as we have seen (vol. ii., Chap. LXI.), had established an empire in Mexico, and set up Maximilian as its head. In reference to this, resolutions were introduced in the Senate, on January 11th, declaring that the French attempt to subvert the Mexican Republic was an act hostile to the United States, and that it was the duty of the government to require France to withdraw her armed forces from Mexico. The Senate, doubtless considering the time inauspicious, stifled the resolutions by referring them to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

But in the House of Representatives, April 4th, a very different spirit was manifested. Henry Winter Davis offered a joint resolution, which was passed without dissent:

“The Congress of the United States are unwilling, by silence, to leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are

Action in relation to  
the French Mexican  
expedition.

indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico, and they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge a monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republican government in America, under the auspices of any European power."

This joint resolution was, however, extinguished in the Senate.

When this resolution reached Paris, the French minister, Course of the French government. M. Drouyn de L'Huys, insolently accosted the American minister, Mr. Dayton, at their first interview, "Do you bring us peace or war?" Meantime, however, instructions had been forwarded by Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton to the effect that, though this resolution expressed the unanimous opinion of the people of the United States, it had not passed the Senate, nor did it necessarily represent the form of opinion which the President might think fit to adopt. The French government was informed that the President "does not at present contemplate any departure from the policy hitherto pursued by him in regard to the war which exists between France and Mexico."

On this, announcement was made through the *Moniteur* that satisfactory explanations had been received from the United States government. But on the part of America the real object had been accomplished. The French Emperor had been given clearly to understand that his operations in Mexico were inadmissible.

So great had become the military reputation of Grant in the estimation of his countrymen, that, when he commenced his march from the Rapidan in May, it was universally expected that the war would be brought to a close before midsummer. Disappointment ensued at the result of the battles of the Wilderness. Taking advantage of the public anxiety, some unscrupulous stock-jobbers in New York put forth a forgery, May 18th, 1864, purporting to be a proclamation by the President, stating that Grant's campaign had ended, appointing a day

A stock-jobbing forgery.

of fasting, and calling forth a fresh levy of 400,000 men. It occasioned a great deal of mischief before it could be exposed.

A far more serious shock occurred by the resignation  
Resignation of  
Mr. Chase. (June 30th) of Mr. Chase, who with such signal ability had discharged the duties of Secretary of the Treasury. The premium at which gold could be purchased with paper had been steadily advancing. In January, 1862, the average price of gold was about 104—that is, 104 dollars in paper would purchase 100 of gold. The failure of McClellan's campaign that year carried it up to 120. After Burnside's defeat at Fredericksburg it went up to 160. After the battle of Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, in August, 1863, it went down below 123. From that point it rose during the following autumn and winter, until, in May, 1864, after the battles of the Wilderness, it had reached 195. In June, at the time of Mr. Chase's resignation, it had reached 252; and in the following month after that event it gained the highest point during the war—this was 290. In the following December it had declined to 211.

Now, though there was reason to suppose that the resignation of Mr. Chase was in some manner connected with the political movements incident to the Presidential election, yet, in the public estimation, it could not altogether be separated from the discouraging condition of the finances. Many persons thought that even he had begun to despair.

The season now approached for preparation for the Presidential election. On the last day of May, a  
The Cleveland  
Convention. small body, gathered together under a call addressed "to the Radical men of the Nation," met at Cleveland, Ohio, and nominated General Fremont for President, and General John Cochrane for Vice-President. Their platform declared that the President should hold his



office only for a single term, and that his election ought to be by a direct vote of the people; that the subject of reconstruction belonged to Congress and not to the executive; that rebel property ought to be confiscated, and distributed among soldiers and settlers.

On the 7th of June the Republican Convention assembled at Baltimore. It nominated Lincoln for President. On the first ballot, however, the vote of Missouri was given for General Grant.

The Republican  
Convention at  
Baltimore.

That vote was then changed, and the nomination made unanimous. Andrew Johnson was nominated for Vice-President.

The platform adopted maintained the restoration of the Union; the paramount authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States; the suppression of the rebellion; the repudiation of compromise with the insurgents—they must abandon their hostility unconditionally; the abolition of slavery by constitutional amendment; the Emancipation Proclamation, and the employment of negro soldiers; provision for all soldiers and sailors disabled by wounds; redress for the treatment of prisoners of war, both colored and white; the encouragement of immigration; the inviolability of the public debt; and the application of the Monroe doctrine.

Its nominations  
and platform.

Lincoln accepted the nomination with the understanding that the position of the government in relation to the French in Mexico as assumed by the state department would be maintained "as long as it was pertinent and applicable."

The Democratic Convention did not assemble until August, and in the mean time events had occurred which were considered by that party as not unfavorable to its policy. Grant's campaign from the Rapidan had not yet brought the war to a close. The debt was increasing; it was nearly two thousand millions. Gold had risen to 290. Chase had resigned. Two attempts had been made to

bring about peace. They were, however, of an unofficial kind.

The first of these originated in a letter sent by certain Southern refugees in Canada to Horace Greeley, the editor of the *Tribune* newspaper in New York, to the effect that they were willing to go to Washington, if protection were accorded them; and it was understood that their errand was to treat on terms of peace. Mr. Greeley forwarded their application to the President, who, to his surprise, at once deputed him to go to Canada and have an interview with them.

Peace propositions  
of the Canadian ref-  
ugees.

When Mr. Greeley came into communication with them, it appeared, however, that they were not accredited from Richmond as the bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace. Hereupon he telegraphed to the President for farther instructions. The President then sent Major Hay, his private secretary, to Niagara, who, on being brought into communication with the Confederate agents, handed them the following letter:

“To whom it may concern. Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war with the United States, will be received and considered by the executive government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points; and the bearer or bearers shall have safe-conduct both ways.”

In their reply, the Confederate agents reiterate that they are acting without direct authority from the Confederate government, and declare that, instead of the safe-conduct they had asked, they had received a paper that precluded negotiation. They charge the President with rudeness, decline to fathom the caprices of his imperial will, and have no use whatever for the paper that has been placed in their hands.

The reader who clearly bears in mind the real position of the question of peace, that the government at Washing-

Insincerity of these  
peace proposals.

ton was determined never to accord it except on the condition of a restoration of the Union, and the government at Richmond was determined never to accept it except on the condition of disunion and the acknowledgment of Southern independence, will recognize that in these and other analogous movements there was insincerity. The Richmond government desired to impress on the Southern people, fast becoming weary of the war, that reiterated attempts had been made to obtain peace, and that Lincoln had insultingly repelled them; it supposed that in doing this it was also strengthening the opposition, or, as it was called, the Copperhead party at the North. The Washington government, in view of the impending draft, financial embarrassment, increasing taxation, and the coming elections, was disposed to have it understood that it left nothing untried to secure an honorable peace. Neither of the two governments was for an instant deceived. They knew that the only possible settlement of the controversy was by force.

In the parting letter of the Confederate agents to Mr. Greeley, these principles are amusingly apparent, if such an expression may with propriety be used. In writing to him, they are writing at their own people and at the Democratic party of the North. They say:

“If there is any citizen of the Confederate States who has clung to a hope that peace was possible with this administration of the Federal government, it will strip from his eyes the last film of such delusion; or if there be any whose hearts have grown faint under the suffering and agony of this bloody struggle, it will inspire them with fresh energy to endure and brave whatever may yet be requisite to preserve to themselves and their children all that gives dignity and value to life, and hope and consolation to death. And if there be any patriots or Christians in your land who shrink, appalled, from the illimitable vista of private misery and public calamity which stretches before them, we pray that in their bosoms a resolution may be quickened to recall the abused authority and vindicate the outraged civilization of their country.”

Having thus secured the main object of these fictitious

negotiations, and delivered their address to the fainting Confederates in the South and to the Democratic opposition in the North, the agents return their sincere thanks to Mr. Greeley, and the negotiation closes.

The second attempt was made by two persons, Colonel Jaques and Mr. J. R. Gilmore, who were permitted, but not authorized by the government to go to Richmond. To pave the way for a treaty of peace was their ostensible errand; to extract from Mr. Davis an unmistakable declaration that no treaty could be had except on the basis of an acknowledgment of Southern independence was their real object. It was supposed that this could be used with fatal effect against the Democratic party. Their mission was completely successful.

An interview with Mr. Davis was accorded them. Without any hesitation, he told them that "the war must go on till the last of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight his battle, unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. We are not fighting for slavery; we are fighting for independence, and that or extermination we will have."

Mr. Gilmore had suggested that there should be taken a general vote of the people of both federations in mass, and the majority of the vote thus taken should determine the dispute. On this Mr. Davis remarked, "The majority shall decide it, you mean! We seceded to rid ourselves of the rule of the majority, and this would subject us to it again." On the remark being made that the majority must rule finally, either with bullets or ballots, Mr. Davis replied, "I am not so sure of that. Neither current events nor history shows that the majority rules, or ever did rule. The contrary, I think, is true. Why, sir, the man who should go before the Southern people with such a proposition—with any proposition which implied that the North was to have a voice in determining the domestic relations of the South,

Interview of Jaques  
and Gilmore with  
Davis,

who will accept  
nothing short of  
independence.



could not live here a day; he would be hanged to the first tree, without judge or jury."

As they left the room, Davis said, "Say to Mr. Lincoln, from me, that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other."

That section of the Democratic party who were so loudly and incessantly declaring that there was no difficulty in making peace on the basis of the preservation of the Union might now be confronted with an authentic and positive denial. This incident had undoubtedly very great influence on the elections.

Effect of these movements on the elections.

The Democratic Convention met on the 29th of August, at Chicago. The chair was taken by Governor Seymour, the same to whom reference has been made in speaking of the New York riots.

The Democratic Convention at Chicago.

There were present Vallandigham, now returned from exile, and Long, who had recently received the censure of the House of Representatives. These persons took a leading part in the deliberations.

The platform declared unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution; that the war had proved a failure; that public liberty and private right had been trodden down; that immediate efforts should be made for peace on the basis of the federal union of the states; that the Constitution had been shamefully violated by military interference in Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Delaware, and that such interference ought to be resisted; that the existing administration had been guilty of many acts of usurpation and tyranny, which were enumerated in detail; that it was responsible for the sufferings endured by the prisoners of war; that the sympathy of the Democratic party is extended to the soldiers who are and have been under the flag of the country, and that, in the event of the Democratic party attaining power, they will receive all the care and protection, regard and

Its nominations and platform.

kindness that the brave soldiers of the republic have so nobly earned.

The Convention then nominated General McClellan for President. The vote was at first not unanimous, but was made so on the motion of Vallandigham. George H. Pendleton was nominated for Vice-President.

From his letter accepting the nomination, it appeared that General McClellan's opinions were not altogether in unison with those of the Convention. The Union, he said, "must be preserved at all hazards." He could not conceal from himself that efforts for peace based on that ultimatum would fail, and that then the war would have to be renewed. With reference to the declaration that the war had been a failure, he said, "I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors, and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren, had been in vain; that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our lives." This letter cost him the votes of many of the ultra Peace Democrats.

Fremont withdrew from the contest—not for the purpose of aiding the triumph of Lincoln, whose administration he regarded as a failure, but to do his part in preventing the election of McClellan.

The Presidential election took place on the 8th of November. McClellan carried three states—Lincoln is re-elected President. Delaware, New Jersey, and Kentucky, 21 votes; Lincoln carried all the rest, 212 votes. His popular majority was near half a million (411,428) over McClellan.

The 38th Congress assembled in its second session on the 6th of December, 1864. In his message His message to Congress. Mr. Lincoln dwelt on the fact that the recent canvass had shown that the people were determined to maintain the integrity of the Union. No candidate for

office, high or low, had ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the Union. He discouraged farther attempts at negotiation with the insurgent leader who had manifested his determination to insist on disunion—a point that would never be conceded. “I shall not retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation. If the people should make it an executive duty to re-enslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument to perform it. In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say that the war will cease on the part of the government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.”

The most important event of the session was the passage, by the required two thirds vote, of the Constitutional Amendment abolishing slavery, and forever prohibiting it throughout the United States. This measure had been originally submitted to the Senate and adopted, but it failed in the House. Subsequently it was reconsidered by the House, and the action of the Senate concurred in. The resolution is as follows:

Passage of the Constitutional Amendment abolishing slavery.

“*Be it resolved*, etc., That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several states as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three fourths of said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the said Constitution, namely:

“ARTICLE XIII., *Section 1.* Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or in any place subject to their jurisdiction.

“*Section 2.* Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”

Subsequently, by the ratification of more than two thirds of the states, this amendment became a part of the Constitution.

Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated a second time as President

Second inaugura- of the United States on the 4th of March, 1865. The address which he then delivered will be read with the deepest interest. In spirit it contrasts very strikingly with Mr. Davis's speeches. Had he known of his approaching end, then, alas! close at hand, he could not have expressed himself in sentiments more appropriate, more true, more noble; in words better calculated to elicit the cordial approval of just men all over the world.

“FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN,—At this, my second appearing to take the oath of the Presidential office, there is less occasion that I should give an extended address than there was at the first. Then a statement, somewhat in detail, of the course I proposed to pursue seemed proper; now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been repeatedly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented.

“The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to you as to myself, and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to us all. While I have the highest hopes for the future, I shall here venture on no predictions.

“On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago the thoughts of all of us were anxiously directed to the impending civil war. All dreaded it; all sought to avoid it. While the inaugural address, devoted altogether to the saving of the Union without war, was being delivered from this place, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy the Union without war, seeking to dissolve it and divide its effects by negotiations. Both parties deprecated war, but one of them would *make* war rather than let the nation survive; the other would *accept* war rather than let it perish—and war came. One eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the Southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and lucrative interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; the government claimed no right to do more than restrict the enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before the conflict itself should end. Each looked for an easier triumph—a result less fundamental and astounding. Both



read the same Bible, and prayed to the same God ; each invoked his aid against the other. To us it may seem strange that any man should dare to ask the assistance of a just God to help him to gain his bread by the sweat of another man's brow—but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayer of both could not be answered ; that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. 'Woe unto the world because of offenses, for it must needs be that offenses come ; but woe unto that man by whom the offense cometh.' If we suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which in the providence of God must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a loving God always ascribe to him ? Fervently do we hope, fervently do we pray that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass from us ; yet, if it be his will that it shall continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsmen's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk—until every drop of blood drawn by the lash shall be paid for by another drawn by the sword—as it was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true, and righteous altogether.'

“With malice toward none, with charity for all—with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive to finish the work we are engaged in ; to bind up the wounds of our nation ; to care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphan ; and to do all which may achieve a just and a lasting peace among ourselves, and between us and all other nations.”

From the National civil affairs we may now turn to the civil affairs of the Confederacy.

The imperfect conception of the sentiments of modern civilization which prevailed in the Confederacy is strikingly indicated by “an address to the Christians throughout the world,” which was issued at

Civil affairs of the Confederacy. Richmond on the 23d of April, 1863, signed by ninety-six clergymen of all denominations.

Address of the clergy at Richmond. Among other things, they say that “the recent proclamation of the President of the United States seeking the emancipation of the slaves of the South is, in our judgment, a suitable occasion for solemn protest on the part

of the people of God throughout the world." They charge President Lincoln with intending to produce a general insurrection of the slaves, which "would make it absolutely necessary for the public safety that the slaves be slaughtered, and he who should write the history of that event would record the darkest chapter of human woe yet written." It is of the massacre of four millions of human beings that the clergy are here speaking. Modern history does not furnish a more impressive fact than this in support of the views of those statesmen and philosophers who are averse to the secularization of the Church, and regard "the voluntary system" with misgivings, as tending to give to the people the guidance of the clergy, and to take from the clergy the guidance of the people.

The capital of the South consisted not of money, but of land and slaves—both, owing to the circumstances of the times, inconvertible into money. Articles of food and clothing had, in 1863, risen from five to one hundred times their former value. The enthusiasm which had distinguished the opening of the war had completely ended. Agriculturists refused to sell their produce for government notes, or would sell only at the highest prices. There was danger that the army could not be held together for want of supplies. The government was therefore constrained to seize whatever was needed for that object, and establish boards of commissioners to determine values. They who had expected that secession would not lead to war, or that the war would not amount to much, had been bitterly disappointed. The owners of slaves refused to hire them to the government; men of property remonstrated against taxation. Secession had been consented to in order to support slavery; now it was found that slavery must be sacrificed in order to support secession. The finances were falling into hopeless confusion.

Until November, 1861, the Confederate currency had

Declining condition  
of Confederate af-  
fairs.

Decline of the Confederate finances. remained at par; afterward it steadily depreciated. The amounts required to buy one hundred dollars in gold were—

December, 1861 . . . . .	\$120
“ 1862 . . . . .	300
“ 1863 . . . . .	1900
“ 1864 . . . . .	5000
March, 1865 . . . . .	6000

A month later the currency was valueless.

But not only was there thus a great difficulty in obtaining supplies, there was also serious embarrassment as to transportation. The railroads were fast wearing out: there were no adequate means for their repair. It was found necessary to reduce the rate of speed upon them to ten miles an hour. So stringent was the blockade that iron for rails could not be imported. There was danger that from many points the Confederate armies would have to fall back because of the difficulty of conveying to them supplies.

Nevertheless, two important road-links were made by the Confederate government. One was from Selma in Alabama to Meridian in Mississippi: it gave a line parallel to the Memphis and Charleston Road. The other was between Danville in Virginia and Greensboro in North Carolina, completing the line running in a general manner parallel to the Weldon Railroad, and furnishing a new complete line north and south.

The acts of the Confederate Congress in 1862 had authorized Mr. Davis to call into the military service all white male residents of the Confederacy between the ages of 18 and 45, except exempts. In that year all between 18 and 35 were called out, and a portion of those between 35 and 45. At the close of that year the Confederate armies reached their maximum of strength. After this they were greatly weakened by the expiration of the terms of some of the soldiers, and by the desertion

Military measures of the Congress.

of many others. The disasters of Gettysburg and Vicksburg occasioned an imperative demand for more troops; and accordingly, on July 15th, 1863, Davis issued a proclamation calling for all between 18 and 45 not exempt, directing them to repair to the conscript camps, under pain of being dealt with as deserters. Making due allowance, it was supposed that this would bring out about 75,000 men.

Desertion, straggling, and absenteeism prevailed to an alarming extent. Davis was constrained, on the 1st of August, to make an appeal not only to the absentees themselves, but also to the women, whom he implored to use their influence in aid of his call.

At the close of 1863 the conscription was extended to every man between 18 and 55. Failure to report for duty incurred the penalties of desertion. Through the depreciation of the currency, the pay of the soldiers had become worthless. At this time, according to the report of the Secretary of War, from one third to one half of the men whose names were on the muster-rolls were absent.

Extent to which  
were carried con-  
scription

On December 28th, 1863, the Confederate Congress enacted that no person liable to military service should be permitted or allowed to furnish a substitute for such service. A few days subsequently it was enacted that no person liable to military service should be exempted by reason of his having furnished a substitute. In February, 1864, a general military act was passed, under which almost the whole male population could be employed either in the army or in the raising of supplies. Subsequently, from time to time, measures still more stringent were taken; details, furloughs, and temporary exemptions were revoked.

It was found impossible to execute these acts strictly. Under all kinds of pretenses exemptions were obtained. More than 30,000 persons were exempted by the Conscription Bureau as state officers, more than 100,000 from



physical disability. Thousands escaped as physicians, and more than 100,000 as farmers. It was becoming evident that nothing would save the Confederate cause but the arming of the slaves.

In the beginning of 1865 conscription had been carried to its last limit. Every man between 17 and 55 was made liable. No one was exempt except on considerations of public interest. The government was a despotism in the hands of one man. Direct taxes were laid in defiance of the Constitution. The currency was fast becoming valueless. Persons holding it were compelled to fund it or lose one third. The railroads were seized by the government; some were destroyed, others built. A universal system of impressment of property was established at government prices in government money. The government had seized the monopoly of the exportation of cotton. Citizens permitted to remain at home were required to execute a bond to furnish their products to the government at its prices. The habeas corpus was suspended, and a passport system established. The conscription became an engine of vengeance and cupidity.

“To-day,” says the author of the *Diary of a War Clerk* in Richmond, “I saw two conscripts from Western Virginia conducted to the cars going to Lee’s army *in chains*. It made a chill shoot through my breast.” The same person, an unwilling witness, says:

“Lee writes that the Bureau of Conscription fails to replenish the army. The rich men and slave-owners get out and keep out of the service. Nearly every landed proprietor has given bonds to furnish meal to obtain exemption. Over 100,000 landed proprietors, and most of the slave-owners, are now out of the ranks, and soon, I fear, we shall have an army that will not fight, having nothing to fight for. The higher class is staying at home making money, the lower is thrust into the trenches. Lee complains that the rich young men are elected magistrates to avoid service in the field. Guards every where in the city are arresting pedestrians, and forcing them into the army. The militia are all out except those hidden in the back rooms of their shops.”

Hardships of the  
military system.

Was it to be wondered at that, under such circumstances, the military spirit in the armies declined? We are not surprised to read, in the author from whom I have been quoting: "Colonel Gardner reports that of the citizens taken from the streets to the front last week a majority have deserted—that despotic order is the theme of universal execration." A little later he says, "Brigadier General Preston, of the Bureau of Conscription, says there are now 100,000 deserters." "The books of the Conscript Office show a frightful list of deserters—60,000 Virginians." It was no sentiment of cowardice that led these men to desert; there were no braver men in the world. This author unintentionally gives us their excuse: "The poor men in the army can get nothing for their families, and there is a prospect of their starving." "I saw a captain commissary give his dog a piece of beef for which I would have paid a dollar. Many little children of soldiers were standing by with empty baskets." "A poor woman yesterday applied to a merchant in Carey Street to purchase a barrel of flour. The price he demanded was seventy dollars. 'My God!' exclaimed she, 'how can I pay such prices? I have seven children. What shall I do?' 'I don't know, madam,' said he, coolly, 'unless you eat your children!'"

Such was the condition of things; and yet, incredible to be said, there are persons who cherish a remembrance of "the Lost Cause."

In vain were changes made in the personnel of the administration. As the war drew toward a close, Changes in the administration. General Breckinridge was brought into the cabinet as Secretary of War. Trenholm, of South Carolina, displaced Memminger as Secretary of the Treasury. Lee was appointed general-in-chief. But the desperate condition of affairs was not to be remedied by change of men.

During the course of 1864 it was becoming clear that the military strength of the South was undergoing rapid exhaustion. Davis, in his message in November, had drawn

attention to the question of the employment of slaves as soldiers, as also had the Secretary of War, Mr. Seddon, in his report. On the 10th of that month the subject was brought before the Confederate Congress. It met with a stormy opposition. It was declared that now, since President Davis proposed to put 40,000 negroes into the field, the question could no longer be postponed. "Are we," said the member whose motion was under consideration, "are we approximating exhaustion?" He denied that they were. The President had said, in his Macon speech, that two thirds of the army were absent. This was a subject that should demand the attention of Congress rather than be made a plea for employing negroes in the armies. "All nature cries out against making the negro into a soldier. That race was ordained for slavery by the Almighty. Emancipation would be the destruction of the social and political system of the South."

The discussion spread from Congress to the newspapers, some of the more prominent urging the adoption of the measure. A remonstrance made to one of these, the *Richmond Enquirer*, sets forth the views of the opposition:

"Can it be possible that you are serious and earnest in proposing such a step to be taken by our government? or were you merely discussing the matter as a something which might be done, an element of power which might be used; meaning thereby to intimidate or threaten our enemy with it as a weapon of offense which they may drive us to use? Can it be possible that a Southern man—editor of a Southern journal—recognizing the right of property in slaves, admitting their inferiority in the scale of being, and also their social inferiority, would recommend the passage of a law which, at one blow, levels all distinctions, deprives a master of a right of property, and elevates the negro to an equality with the white man? What was it that embittered the feelings of the two sections of the old Union? What has gradually driven them to a final separation? What is it that has made two nationalities of them if it is not slavery? It was slavery that caused them to denounce us as inferiors; it was slavery that made the difference in our Congressional representation; it was slavery that made the difference in our pursuits, in our interests, in our feelings, in our social and

Proposition to employ slaves as soldiers.

Public opposition to it.

political life; it is slavery that now makes us two people as widely antagonistic as any two people can be; and it only needs a difference of language to make the Northerner and Southerner as opposite as the Frenchman and Englishman. You say the liberty and freedom of ourselves and children, the nationality of our country, are involved in this struggle. Yes, and of this nationality you would deprive us; instead of being, as we now are, a nation of freemen holding slaves as our property, you would make us a nation of white men, with free negroes for our equals."

Notwithstanding this, at the urgent request of General Lee, in the spring of 1865, measures were taken for the organization of negro troops. A bill to employ slaves as soldiers had passed the Lower House, but it was lost in the Senate by one vote. Hereupon the Legislature of Virginia instructed her senators to vote for it. It was then amended to the effect "that not more than twenty-five per cent. of the male slaves between the ages of 18 and 45 in any state should be called for under the provisions of the act." With that amendment it passed the House.

In the discussions which arose in the Confederate Senate on this measure, Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, said that not for all the gold of California would he have put his name to such a measure, unless obliged by instructions.

"It is regarded as an abandonment of the ground on which we seceded from the old Union. We had insisted that Congress had no right to interfere with slavery; and upon the coming into power of the party who, it was known, would assume and exercise that power, we seceded. We had also then contended that, whenever the two races were thrown together, one must be master and the other slave; and we vindicated ourselves against the accusations of Abolitionists by asserting that slavery was the best and happiest condition of the negro. Now, what does this proposition admit? The right of the central government to put slaves into the militia, and to emancipate at least so many as shall be placed in the military service. It is the clear claim of the central government to emancipate the slaves.

"If we are right in passing this measure, we were wrong in denying to the old government the right to interfere with the institution of slavery and to emancipate slaves. Besides, if we offer slaves their

Virginia instructs her senators to vote for it.

Mr. Hunter's speech against it.



freedom as a boon, we confess that we were insincere, were hypocritical in asserting that slavery was the best state for the negroes themselves."

Mr. Hunter declared that arming and emancipating the slaves was an abandonment of the struggle, an abandonment of the grounds on which it had been undertaken. He added, "If this be so, who is to answer for the hundreds of thousands of men who have been slain during the war? Who is to answer for them before the bar of Heaven? Not those who had entered into the contest upon principle, but those who had abandoned the principle."

To reflecting men throughout the South it was plain that the contest was drawing to an end. The war had been commenced for the protection and vindication of slavery, and the very men who had brought it on were now ready to emancipate the slaves. Their objects and principles, however, had never changed. It was for the perpetuation of their own political power that they had called to their assistance the slave interest, and for the perpetuation of their political power they were now ready to destroy it. The slave-owner had been their dupe; he now found that he was to be their victim.

One course was still open—it was to renew attempts for peace. Accordingly, in February, 1865, an interview took place at Hampton Roads between Mr. Stephens, the Confederate Vice-President, Mr. Hunter, and Mr. Campbell on one side, and President Lincoln and Mr. Seward on the other. The Confederates suggested that the difficulties of the position might in some way be avoided by postponing the question of separation, and entering conjointly on some scheme of extrinsic policy, such as an expedition against the French in Mexico, during which present animosities might subside, and a condition of things arise propitious to peace. But Mr. Lincoln instinctively recoiled from such indirect projects. On the return of the Confederate commissioners to Richmond, a

Renewed peace attempts—operations against the French suggested.

public meeting was summoned, at which it was resolved that the terms offered by President Lincoln were an insult to the Southern people. A few days afterward another meeting was held, in which it was resolved that the Confederates would never lay down their arms until they had achieved their independence.

Public policy is too often guided by considerations of interest. So long as there was a hope that the United States could be divided and neutralized by the fragments being set in antagonism, the Confederacy had warm foreign friends. Its President was declared to be the founder of a new nation. That change of sentiment which the United States had vainly tried to bring about by an appeal to the principles of national morality at length occurred, but not until it was clear that the military affairs of the Confederacy were in a hopeless condition. When Mr. Davis plaintively exclaimed, "We have now no friends in Europe," he recognized the truth.

An incident had occurred well calculated to close the friendly relations between the British government and the Confederacy. We have already had repeated occasion to remark how indiscreet and unfortunate President Davis was in many of his public communications. In this case he spoke with more than his accustomed bitterness.

On the 1st of April, 1864, Lord Lyons addressed to Mr. Davis a formal protest and remonstrance of her majesty's government against the efforts of the authorities of the "so-called Confederate States" to build war vessels within her majesty's dominions to be employed against the government of the United States.

Mr. Harrison, replying to this by direction of President Davis, said

"that it would be inconsistent with the dignity of the position which Mr. Davis fills as chief magistrate of a nation comprising a population of more than twelve millions, occu-

Alienation of foreign governments from the Confederacy.

Protest of the British government.

Reply of Mr. Davis to that protest.

pying a territory many times larger than the United Kingdom, and possessing resources unsurpassed by those of any other country on the face of the globe, to allow the attempt of Earl Russell to ignore the actual existence of the Confederate States, and to contumeliously style them 'so-called,' to pass without a protest and a remonstrance. The President, therefore, does protest and remonstrate against this studied insult; and he instructs me to say that, in future, any document in which it may be repeated will be returned unanswered and unnoticed.

“With respect to the subject of the extract from Earl Russell’s dispatch, the President desires me to state that the plea of neutrality, which is used to sustain the sinister course of her majesty’s present government against the government of the Confederate States, is so clearly contradicted by their actions, that it is regarded by the world, not even excepting the United States, as a mere cover for actual hostility, and the President can not but feel that this is a just view of it. Were, indeed, her majesty’s government sincere in a desire and determination to maintain neutrality, the President could not but feel that they would neither be just nor gallant to allow the subjugation of a nation like the Confederate States by such a barbarous, despotic race as is now attempting it. He can not but feel, with the history and traditions of the Anglo-Saxon race before him, that, under a government faithfully representing the people of Great Britain, the whole weight and power of that nation would be unhesitatingly thrown into the scale in favor of the principles of free government, on which these states were originally formed, and for which alone the Confederate States are now struggling. He can not but feel that, with such a government, and with the plea of neutrality urged upon the people as it now is, no such pitiful spectacle could be witnessed as is now manifested by her majesty’s present government in the persistent persecution of the Confederate States at the beck and bidding of officers of the United States, while a prime minister mocks and insults the intelligence of a House of Commons and of the world by excusing the permission to allow British subjects to go to the United States to fight against us by the paltry subterfuge that it was the great demand for labor and the high rate of wages that were taking them thither. He can not but feel that a neutrality most cunningly, audaciously, fawningly, and insolently sought and urged, begged and demanded by one belligerent and repudiated by the other, must be seen by all impartial men to be a mere pretext for aiding the cause of one at the expense of the other, while pretending to be impartial; to be, in short, but a cover for treacherous, malignant hostility.

He complains of  
the course of that  
government

as being unjust to  
the Confederacy.

“As for the specious arguments on the subject of the rams advanced by Earl Russell, the President desires me to state that he is content to leave the world and history to pronounce judgment upon this attempt to heap injury upon insult by declaring that her majesty’s government and law officers are satisfied of the questions involved, while those questions are still before the highest legal tribunal of the kingdom, composed of members of the government and the highest law officers of the crown, for their decision. The President himself will not condescend to notice them.”



## CHAPTER LXXXVI.

### THE FINANCES OF THE REPUBLIC FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1863 TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR.

The financial condition of the Republic up to the resignation of Mr. Chase.

The financial condition up to the resignation of Mr. Fessenden.

Mr. McCulloch's report for 1865.

The national debt at the end of the war was nearly twenty-seven hundred millions of dollars.

At the beginning of the fiscal year 1863 all demands on the Treasury had been discharged, and there remained a balance to the credit of the treasurer of thirteen millions (\$13,043,546 81), as already mentioned, vol. ii., p. 570. The military reverses of the summer of 1862, and other causes, gave rise to a pressure on the Treasury, so that on the first day of the meeting of Congress there were unpaid requisitions to the amount of more than forty-six millions.

Condition of the Treasury at the beginning of the fiscal year 1863.

To provide for these requisitions and for current demands, Congress, on the 17th of January, 1863, authorized an additional issue of United States notes to the amount of one hundred millions.

Provision for unpaid requisitions.

On the last day of the session (March 3, 1863), the act to provide ways and means became law. In addition to various provisions for loans, it contained clauses repealing the restrictions affecting the negotiation of the five-twenties, and thus disengaged that loan from the embarrassments which had previously rendered it almost unavailable.

Repeal of restrictions on the five-twenties.

A week earlier, on the 25th of February, an act even more important to the credit of the government—the act to provide a national currency through a national banking system, had

The national banking system established.

received the sanction of Congress and of the President. The salutary effect of these two great acts was soon conspicuous. They were followed by an immediate revival of public credit. Success altogether beyond anticipation crowned the efforts to distribute the five-twenty loan in all parts of the country, and every other measure adopted for replenishing the Treasury succeeded equally well. The consequence was, that within two months after the adjournment of Congress the whole mass of suspended requisitions had been satisfied, all current demands promptly met, and full provision made for the payment of the army and navy. During the remainder of the fiscal year no embarrassments attended the administration of the finances except those inseparable from vast expenditures.

The receipts during the year from all sources, including loans and the balance in the Treasury at its commencement, were about nine hundred and one millions (\$901,125,674 86), and the aggregate disbursements about eight hundred and ninety-six millions (\$895,796,630 65), leaving a balance on the 1st of July of \$5,329,044 21. Of the receipts, there were, derived from customs, \$69,059,642 40; from internal revenue, \$37,640,787 95; from direct tax, \$1,485,103 61; from lands, \$167,617 17; from miscellaneous sources, \$3,046,615 35; and from loans, \$776,682,361 57; making, with the balance of last year, the aggregate \$901,125,674 86.

Of the disbursements, there were, for the civil service, \$23,253,922 08; for pensions and Indians, \$4,216,520 79; for interest on public debt, \$24,729,846 51; for the War Department, \$599,298,600 83; for the Navy Department, \$63,211,105 27; for payment of funded and temporary debt, \$181,086,635 07; making the aggregate \$895,796,630 65, and leaving a balance of \$5,329,044 21.

But sums borrowed during the year, and applied during the same time in payment of debts, affect only nominally

the total of receipts and disbursements. The sums thus borrowed and applied during the fiscal year amounted to \$181,086,635 07. This aggregate should therefore be deducted from both sides of the statement, making the true amount of receipts \$720,039,039 79, and that of disbursements \$714,709,995 58. The balance, of course, remains the same.

The true amount of the public debt on the 1st of July, 1863, was about eleven hundred millions  
Amount of the public debt. (\$1,098,793,181 37).

At the close of the fiscal year 1863, on June 30, Mr. Chase resigned his office as Secretary of the Treasury, and was succeeded by Mr. Fessenden, who reported the receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1864, as follows:

Receipts from all sources, including loans, and the balance in the Treasury on the 1st of July, 1863, were about fourteen hundred millions  
Receipts for the fiscal year 1864. (\$1,394,796,007 62), and the aggregate disbursements were about thirteen hundred millions (\$1,298,056,101 89), leaving a balance in the Treasury of \$96,746,905 73, as shown by warrants.

From these amounts are to be deducted the amount of the principal of the public debt redeemed, and the amount of issues in substitution therefor; hence the actual cash operations of the Treasury were: Receipts, \$884,076,646 57; disbursements, \$865,234,087 86; leaving a cash balance in the Treasury of \$18,842,558 71.

Of the receipts, there were, derived from customs, \$102,316,152 99; from lands, \$588,333 29; from direct taxes, \$475,648 96; from internal revenue, \$109,741,134 10; from miscellaneous sources, \$47,511,448 10; and from loans applied to actual expenditures, including former balance, \$623,443,929 13.

Of the disbursements, there were, for the civil service, \$27,505,599 46; for pensions and Indians, \$7,517,930 97;

Disbursements during that year.

for the War Department, \$690,791,842 97 ;  
for the Navy Department, \$85,733,292 77 ;  
for interest on the public debt, \$53,685,421 69 ; making  
an aggregate of \$865,234,087 86 ; leaving a balance as  
before stated.

The amount of the public debt on the 1st of July, 1864,  
was more than seventeen hundred millions  
(\$1,740,690,489 49).

Mr. Fessenden resigned his position as Secretary of the  
Treasury on the 4th of March, 1865, to take  
the position of senator from Maine, and Mr.

McCulloch was appointed in his stead.

In an exhaustive report on the financial condition of the  
nation, Mr. McCulloch says that, "since the  
commencement of the special session of 1861,  
the most important subject which has demanded and re-  
ceived the attention of Congress has been that of provid-  
ing the means for the prosecution of the war, and the suc-  
cess of the government in raising money is evidence of the  
wisdom of the measures devised for this purpose, as well  
as of the loyalty of the people and the resources of the  
country. No nation within the same period ever borrow-  
ed so largely or with so much facility. It is now demon-  
strated that a republican government can not only carry  
on a war on the most gigantic scale, and create a debt of  
immense magnitude, but can place this debt on a satisfac-  
tory basis, and meet every engagement with fidelity." He  
gives the following statement of the receipts and expendi-  
tures of the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1865 :

Receipts from all sources, including loans, and the bal-  
ance in the Treasury on the 1st of July, 1864,  
were about nineteen hundred millions of dol-  
lars (\$1,898,532,533 24), and the aggregate disbursements  
were nearly the same (\$1,897,674,224 09). There was a  
balance in the Treasury on the 1st of July, 1865, of  
\$858,309 15.



Of the receipts, there were, from balance of last year, \$96,739,905 73; from receipts from loans applicable to expenditures, \$864,863,499 17; from receipts from loans applied to payment of public debt, \$607,361,241 68; from customs, \$84,928,260 60; from lands, \$996,553 31; from direct tax, \$1,200,573 03; from internal revenue, \$209,464,215 25; from miscellaneous sources, \$32,978,284 47.

Of the expenditures, there were, for redemption of public debt, \$607,361,241 68; for civil service, Expenditures during that year. \$44,765,558 12; for pensions and Indians, \$14,258,575 38; for War Department, \$1,031,323,360 79; for Navy Department, \$122,567,776 12; for interest on public debt, \$77,397,712 00.

The amount of public debt on June 30th, 1865, was nearly twenty-seven hundred millions of dollars (\$2,682,593,026 53). Amount of the public debt at the close of the war.

The heavy expenditures of this year were the result of the gigantic scale on which the war was prosecuted, and the payment of officers and men mustered out of service. The large estimates of the War Department for the rest of the year were for the payment of troops to remain in the service, of those to be discharged, and for closing up existing balances. Cause of its rapid increase.

The secretary remarks that "the establishment of the national banking system is one of the great compensations of this war—one of the great achievements of this remarkable period. In about two years and a half from the organization of the first national bank, the whole system of banking under state laws has been superseded, and the people of the United States have been furnished with a circulation bearing upon it the seal of the Treasury Department as a guaranty of its solvency. It only remains that this circulation shall be a redeemable circulation—redeemable not only at the counters of the banks, but at the commercial cities, to Advantages of the national banking system.

make the national banking system of almost inconceivable benefit to the country."

Additional issue  
of bonds or notes  
authorized.

The act of March 3d, 1865, authorized the secretary to borrow any sums not exceeding six hundred millions of dollars, and to issue therefor bonds or Treasury notes of the United States, in such form as he might see fit to prescribe.

Under this act there were issued, during the month of March, seventy millions of notes, payable three years after date, and bearing an interest, payable semi-annually in currency, at the rate of seven and three tenths per cent. per annum, and convertible at maturity, at the pleasure of the holders, into five-twenty gold-bearing bonds.

Upon the capture of Richmond and the surrender of the Confederate armies, it became apparent that there would be an early disbanding of the forces of the United States, and, consequently, heavy requisitions from the War Department for transportation and payment of the army, including bounties. As it was important that these requisitions should be promptly met, and especially important that not a soldier should remain in the service a single day for want of means to pay him, the secretary perceived the necessity of realizing, as speedily as possible, the amount, five hundred and thirty millions, still authorized to be borrowed under this act. The seven and three tenths notes had proved to be a popular loan, and, although a security on a longer time and lower interest would have been more advantageous to the government, the secretary considered it advisable, under the circumstances, to continue to offer these notes to the public. The result was in the highest degree satisfactory.

The six hundred million loan promptly taken by the people.

No loan ever offered in the United States, notwithstanding the large amount of government securities previously taken by the people, was so promptly subscribed for as this. Before the 1st of August the entire amount of \$530,000,000 had

been taken, and the secretary had the unexpected satisfaction of being able, with the receipts from customs and internal revenue, and a small increase of the temporary loan, to meet all the requisitions upon the Treasury.

So stood the credit of the government and the confidence of the people at the close of the Civil War.

III.—I 1

## CHAPTER LXXXVII.

### THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS AND TREATMENT OF SOLDIERS.

The national government was at first disposed to deal with privateersmen as with pirates, but was forced to abandon that determination.

A cartel was agreed upon, but the exchange of prisoners was stopped by the refusal of the Confederate government to give up colored soldiers.

#### THE CONFEDERATE PRISON AT ANDERSONVILLE.

The United States Sanitary and Christian Commissions, and other organizations of mercy.

At the outbreak of the war, the government, not recognizing the strength and determination of the conspiracy, believed that it could, by a display of authority and a resort to the ordinary processes of law, do much to curb the insurgents. Under this impression, it ordered that the crew of the privateer Savannah, which was taken early in June, 1861, should be tried as pirates; but it was compelled to recede from its determination to punish them as such by the threat of the Confederates that they would retaliate on the prisoners captured by them soon afterward at Bull Run. Reluctant to do any thing that might seem to imply a recognition of the belligerent rights of the South, the government for a time took no steps in the matter of exchanges. But in December, 1861, a joint resolution was adopted by Congress requesting the President to take immediate measures to effect a general exchange. Two commissioners were designated by Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, to visit prisoners belonging to the army of the United States in captivity in the Confederacy, and relieve their necessities. The Confederate government refused these commissioners admission, but declared its readiness to negotiate for a general exchange. An equal ex-

Government orders privateersmen to be tried as pirates.

It is forced to recede from that determination.

Intervention of Congress to procure a general exchange.



change was consequently agreed on; and as the Confederates had 300 in excess, these they proposed to release on parole on the understanding that the United States would release the same number of those who might be subsequently captured by them. This took place in February, 1862.

The following letter indicates the condition of the subject in the summer of 1862:

“War Department, Washington City, July 12, 1862.

“The President directs me to say that he authorizes you to negotiate a general exchange of prisoners with the enemy.  
The Dix-Hill cartel.

“You will take immediate measures for that purpose, observing proper precaution against any recognition of the rebel government, and confining the negotiation to the subject of exchange. The cartel between the United States and Great Britain has been considered a proper regulation as to the relative exchange value of prisoners.

“EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

“Major General John A. Dix, Fortress Monroe.”

Accordingly, on the 22d of July, a cartel was agreed upon by Generals Dix and Hill, representing the two governments. It was substantially based on that between the United States and Great Britain in 1812. It provided for an equal exchange, and for the release of prisoners on each side in ten days after their capture: those for whom no exchange could be provided were to be paroled.

The first practical violation of the cartel was by the Confederate authorities in relation to the United States troops in Texas. In the early part of 1861 these troops had been seized, disarmed, and imprisoned, and, by the direct order of Davis, were held as hostages to secure the good treatment of such Confederates as might thereafter be captured by the United States. They were in this condition when the cartel was executed, and were entitled to immediate delivery, if not to exchange; but they were not delivered until the 23d of April, 1863—nine months instead of ten days.

Case of the Texas troops.

The incidents of the war occasioned misunderstandings ; the exchanges, however, went on, for the most part, with regularity until the issue of the Emancipation Proclamation. Davis, in his message of January 12th, 1863, announced that he should deliver over to the state authorities all commissioned officers of the United States thereafter captured in any of the states embraced in the Emancipation Proclamation, to be punished as criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection. The two houses of the Confederate Congress jointly resolved that such captives ought to be dealt with and disposed of, not by "the states," but by the Confederate government ; and, among other severe penalties, resolved that every white prisoner who had commanded negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate States should "be put to death, or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court ;" and that all negroes and mulattoes taken in arms should "be delivered over to the authorities of the state in which they were captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such state." This drew from President Lincoln a proclamation, July 30th, 1863, declaring that the United States government would protect its soldiers, no matter of what color or condition they might be ; that to sell or enslave any captured person on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism, and a crime against the civilization of the age ; and that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed ; and for every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works."

Davis's proclamation respecting officers of colored troops.

Lincoln's retaliatory proclamation.

Major General Hitchcock, the commissioner for the exchange of prisoners on the part of the United States, in his report to Mr. Stanton, says :

"Coincident with the proceedings with regard to the exchange of prisoners, the rebels inaugurated a system of seizing unoffending cit-

The seizure of citizens of the United States, and subjecting them to maltreatment in various ways, in order to effect a particular object, which became apparent when a demand was made for their release. For this purpose quite a number of citizens of Pennsylvania were carried into captivity by General Lee when he penetrated into that state in 1863.

“When a demand was made for the release of this class of prisoners, it was met by a most positive declaration that no citizen prisoner in rebel hands should be released unless the government would enter into an agreement with the rebel authorities not to arrest any one on account of his opinions, or on account of his sympathy with the rebel cause; and this declaration was repeated again and again by the rebel authorities whenever the government demanded the release or exchange of said citizen prisoners.

“It will require but the slightest glance at this subject to convince any one of the utter impossibility of acquiescing in the demand of the rebel authorities as a prerequisite to the release of the citizens thus held in bondage. Such an agreement on the part of the United States authorities would have been a virtual acknowledgment of the independence of the rebel government, and would have foreclosed all proceedings of the United States against all persons whomsoever engaged in the crimes of treason and rebellion. It was absolutely impossible to acquiesce in the demand of the South on that point, and this is the reason why this class of prisoners was beyond the reach of the government, except through the power of its armies, which finally settled the entire question by putting an end to the rebellion itself.”

The Confederate government recognized at once the serious consequences that would ensue from the Emancipation Proclamation and the employment of negro troops; it perceived that by these acts it was touched on a vital point, and it resolved to refuse to exchange negro prisoners. The United States could assent to no such determination. This, therefore, at once embarrassed the execution of the cartel, and eventually led to its suspension.

Lincoln’s retaliatory proclamation checked the proposed excesses of the Confederate authorities, but it did not prevent them attempting to carry their point by indirect measures of cruelty. Their position was one of difficulty: the

conscription had failed to replenish their armies—they must have back their prisoners of war for that purpose; but, considering the social ideas of the South, and the objects for which the war had been undertaken, they could never face their people with the admission that a black man and a white man are equal.

They therefore resolved to put such a pressure on the prisoners in their hands that the United States government might be compelled to yield its point, and submit to the exchange of white prisoners alone.

and attempt to compel the government to exchange white prisoners only.

The Confederate authorities say that they adhered to their position until the 10th of August, 1864, when, moved by the sufferings of the men in the prisons of each belligerent, they determined to abate their just demand. On that day their agent notified the United States agent of exchange that he would accept the proposal which had been several times made to him to exchange the prisoners of war respectively held by the two belligerents, officer for officer, and man for man.

But the correspondence captured at the fall of Richmond, now in possession of the United States, shows that the Confederate authorities were moved to this action by other influences.

Reasons for their eventually abandoning that determination.

The first of these was the fear that the prisoners at Andersonville and other points in the South would be recaptured by Sherman's army, and lost to the Confederates in exchange. This is shown by the correspondence of General Johnston and other Confederate generals, and Governor Brown and Howell Cobb with the authorities at Richmond. The proposition was not made until to resist Sherman's progress had become hopeless, nor until after Johnston himself had telegraphed to Richmond, "I strongly recommend the distribution of the United States prisoners at Andersonville immediately."

The second was the political effect to be produced on



the coming Presidential election by an offer of exchange. The details of this are exhibited in the correspondence between Howell Cobb and the Confederate Secretary of War. Mr. Cobb suggested that all the Democrats who were imprisoned at the South should be found out, and released on the condition of their voting the Democratic ticket, and exciting opposition to the government of the United States on the ground that it was indifferent to the lives and sufferings of its soldiers who fell into the hands of the enemy.

On the 30th of November, 1862, the Confederate Secretary of War had ordered the summary execution of all negro slaves who might be found bearing arms against the Confederacy. In his report of May 2d, 1864, to the Confederate Secretary of War, Mr. Ould, their Commissioner of Exchange, says: "As yet the Federals do not appear to have found any well-authenticated case of the retention of a negro prisoner. They have made several specific inquiries, but in each case there was no record of any such party, and I so responded. Having no especial desire to find any such case, it is more than probable that the same answer will be returned to every such inquiry."

On the 22d of September, 1862, the chairman of a committee of the Confederate Congress transmitted to the Confederate Secretary of War a copy of a resolution passed by his committee on the morning of that day, and invoked the attention of the Secretary to the wretched condition of "the hospitals of the sick and wounded of our enemies now in our custody." In this communication he said, "The honor of our country will not permit us to bring this matter to the attention of Congress, thereby making the matter public."

On the 17th of March, 1863, Mr. Ould addressed a communication to his associate, Brigadier General John H. Winder, in which he said, "The arrangement works largely in our favor. We get rid of a

Orders respecting  
the execution of  
negro soldiers.

Resolution of the  
Confederate Con-  
gress respecting  
hospitals.

Letter of Mr.  
Ould.

set of miserable wretches, and receive some of the best material I ever saw."

It is officially stated, but without giving the numbers, in documents submitted to the Confederate War Department, that the death-rate among the Union prisoners in the hospitals at Richmond in the months of September and October, 1863, was as great as at a later period, when the actual rate and numbers are given. Thus, in the report made by Colonel Brent and Surgeon Richardson on the 12th of March, 1864, of their inspection of the prison hospitals at Richmond, it is stated that the

Death-rate of national prisoners.

Ratio of deaths per 1000 in January, 1864, was .	188 ;
"    "    "    "    "    February, 1864, was .	240 ;
Number of deaths in March to date (11 days) .	244 ;

that is, the average number of deaths per day during the month of January was 10; in February, 18; in March, to date, 22; on the day previous to the inspection it was 26. The ratio per 1000 in the Confederate hospitals at Richmond during the same period ranged between 10 and 20.

This report was referred by General Bragg, then on the staff of Mr. Davis, to the Confederate War Department, with the following indorsement: "A copy will be furnished General Winder, and his attention called to the condition of his command. The Medical Department is compromised by this state of affairs, which can but justly and seriously compromise us in the treatment of our prisoners."

Action of the Confederate authorities in the matter.

General Winder and his subordinate officers submitted explanations and excuses, and, on the 13th of April, General Bragg returned all the papers to the adjutant and inspector general with the following indorsement: "The explanations are not satisfactory; but, as the condition of affairs is entirely changed by the removal of the sick prisoners, no farther action seems necessary."

Surgeon Carrington, General Winder's medical director,

endeavored to excuse himself by the statement that he had, in a personal interview with the Confederate surgeon general, called his attention to the subject "without effect, and understood, from his remarks, that the matter was one of international policy and military control." And again: "At this time I adopted the conviction that the existing state of things was known and approved by the department for the purpose of diplomatic policy, or forced upon them by the stern necessities of the occasion."

Surgeon Harrington directed the attention of General Bragg to the statement made by the medical director, "that he was led to believe that the refusal of proper accommodations to the sick Federal prisoners was one of state policy," and he infers that General Winder "was to some extent influenced by the same impression."

The policy was not disavowed. Its agents were not punished or even rebuked, and the principal was transferred to a larger command and a more extended theatre of operations.

On the 18th of August, 1864, a report of the condition of this new command was submitted to the Confederate Secretary of War (Seddon) by the adjutant and inspector general (Chilton), with the following indorsement: "Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War. The condition of affairs at Andersonville is a reproach to us as a nation."

Confederate protest  
against the state of  
things at Anderson-  
ville.

With the papers accompanying this report there was also submitted a supplemental report from the Inspector, Chandler, from which is extracted the following:

"My duty requires me respectfully to recommend a change in the officer in command of the post, Brigadier General H. Winder, and the substitution in his place of some one who unites both energy and good judgment with some feelings of humanity and consideration for the welfare and comfort (so far as is consistent with their safe keeping) of the vast number of unfortunates placed under his control—some one who at least will not advocate deliberately and in cold blood the propriety of leaving them in their present condition

until their number has been sufficiently reduced by death to make the present arrangements suffice for their accommodation; who will not consider it a matter of self-laudation, boasting that he has never been inside the stockade, the horrors of which it is difficult to describe, and which is a disgrace to civilization."

It is not necessary to refer to any of the Confederate reports in relation to the prisoners at Salisbury, Florence, or other points in the South; but the whole record shows that the condition of national prisoners was improved almost in precise ratio to their remoteness from the central influences at Richmond. If the distance or the circumstances of the command made the Confederate commanders comparatively independent of those influences, the treatment of prisoners was reasonably humane and considerate, and negotiations for exchange were uniformly successful up to the point at which the Confederate commanders were restrained "by orders from Richmond." Until this point was reached there was generally no difficulty in arranging for the comfort of prisoners who could not be exchanged. General Banks had no difficulty in making arrangements with General Taylor, General Sherman none with General Hood, General Canby none with General Kirby Smith. The greatest suffering and greatest mortality among the national prisoners were at Richmond, Salisbury, Florence, and Andersonville. These four places were directly under the influence and control of the Richmond authorities, and the number of the unknown dead at these four places was greater by more than five thousand than the whole number of Confederate prisoners who died in the hands of the United States during the entire period of the war.

It does not appear that any steps were taken by the Confederate government to bring General Winder or any of his associates in these transactions to justice; for in November, 1864, we find him busily engaged in preparing other prisons for

The Richmond government responsible for these enormities.

It did not bring the malefactors to justice.



United States soldiers; and as late as the 3d of December following, the Confederate Secretary of War was invoked by the Adjutant and Inspector General's Department "to rebuke an officer who seems to be as careless and indifferent to another's reputation as he is reputed to be to the dictates of humanity."

The number of Confederates captured during the war and sent to dépôts at the North was 222,847.

The number of United States troops captured during the same time and sent to dépôts at the South was 126,950.

This does not include on either part the numbers paroled upon agreement by the commanders of armies in the field, or exchanged and delivered immediately after capture, nor does it include the numbers captured and paroled at the final surrender of the Confederate armies.

The number of Confederate prisoners who died from all causes (including wounds received in battle) while in the custody of the United States was in the ratio of one in eight and twenty-seven hundredths (1:8.27).

The number of United States prisoners who died in the dépôts at the South was in the ratio of one in three and forty-four hundredths (1:3.44).

The figures here presented, and, indeed, many of the statements made in this chapter, I have derived from an investigation of the subject which was made in consequence of a letter addressed to the *National Intelligencer*, dated August 17th, 1868, by Robert Ould, who had been the Confederate Commissioner of Exchange. It is proper, therefore, to add, that the last ratio given (1:3.44) refers only to those United States soldiers who had up to that time been actually interred at the Confederate prisons at the South; and as this work was still going on, and additions were constantly being made to this number, the true ratio will probably be not less than three United States soldiers to one Confederate soldier.

When, on the 12th of December, 1863, the Confederate authorities refused to permit the government of the United States to send food and clothing to its prisoners at Richmond, and when, on the 27th of the same month, the proposition to exchange prisoners man for man, "leaving all other questions in abeyance," was, after discussion in the Confederate cabinet, refused, the starvation of United States soldiers was openly justified in the public journals of the Confederacy on the ground that they had not food enough for their own soldiers. The Confederate commissary general justified the failures of his department on the same grounds: "It is just that the men who have caused the scarcity should be the first to suffer from it." It was at the same time charged that the action taken by the Confederate authorities was the result of a deliberate policy to force, by the importunities of the relatives and friends of the prisoners, and by the pressure of public opinion at the North, from the government of the United States, the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy.

A charge has been made that when the United States held an excess of prisoners, the cartel was openly and notoriously violated by them. Such a statement was made by Howell Cobb in his report to the Confederate Secretary of War, March 4th, 1862, and repeated by Davis in his message of December 7th, 1863. The actual facts connected with Mr. Cobb's failure are, however, these. On the 21st of May, 1861, the Indian Territory west of Missouri was annexed to the Confederacy; on the 21st of November, the State of Missouri; on the 10th of December, the State of Kentucky; and on the 18th of January, 1862, the Territory of Arizona was in like manner annexed. In his negotiations for a cartel, in February, 1862, Howell Cobb endeavored to secure, by the insertion of an article stipulating for the delivery of prisoners at the *frontier* of their respective countries, not only a covert rec-

Public justification  
of the starvation of  
prisoners.

The scheme of  
Howell Cobb.

ognition of the validity of these annexations, but also of the territorial independence of the Confederacy. This scheme was detected, and it was at once rejected by the President and his cabinet as involving in effect, if not in terms, a direct recognition of the territorial independence of the Confederacy. Foiled in this, the Southern leaders resorted to other means. First among these were outcries against the barbarities of the North; the proclamation of December 23, 1862; Presidential messages and Congressional manifestoes denouncing the war as a war against civilization, and invoking foreign intervention to put an end to it. Next followed attempts to create a "Northern pressure" by the treatment of prisoners of war, and other Unionists who fell into Confederate hands. The recognition of the independence of the Confederacy was the cardinal issue between the two parties, and to secure this recognition, by direct or indirect means, every effort on the part of the Confederates was directed. Their purpose was to entrap the agents of the United States into admissions of the independence of the Confederacy, and into defining its territorial boundaries.

The authority from whom I have just been quoting was in such a position as to make him familiar with the feelings of the President (Mr. Lincoln) upon this subject, and the motives that controlled his action. He declares that there was no subject nearer Mr. Lincoln's heart than the relief of the prisoners at the South; that there was no concession which he was not prepared to make, and did not make when the opportunity was offered, if it stopped short of an acknowledgment of the success of the rebellion, and of endangering the national safety and national honor. In this spirit his subordinates were instructed to act, and did act; and the moment that these conditions were satisfied, all measures of relief in the power of the government were at once applied.

Lincoln's feelings  
and actions in re-  
gard to exchanges.

Under the above-mentioned circumstances, the Confederate government, failing to carry its point by negotiations, resorted to systematic cruelty in its hospitals at Richmond, Salisbury, Florence, Andersonville.

The prison at Andersonville.

Andersonville! what is it that has given to that place its frightful celebrity? Why is it that the Confederate inspectors themselves have denounced it as "a place the horrors of which it is difficult to describe?"

The Confederate States prison at Andersonville, in Georgia, was situated on the Southwestern Railroad, about 62 miles south of Macon. The climate there is such that the thermometer sometimes rises in summer as high as 110° Fahrenheit, its mean degree for that season being 88° in the shade. In the winter it descends below 20°, and ice two inches thick occasionally forms.

On the side of a red-clay hill facing the south, and near by the railroad, a clearing was made in the woods, the site of the prison. At the base of the hill there ran a little brook, about five feet in breadth and six inches deep; it issued from an adjacent swamp, a matted morass of a tangled growth of swamp-myrtle, with tussocks of grass and decaying logs of wood. The borders of the stream were miry, the flow sluggish; the water, impregnated with decaying vegetable matter, had a taste of the mould through which it filtered. The prison was extended a certain distance up an opposite hill, so that the brook flowed through its bounds, entering on the east side, and running out on the west.

The prison was thus an open field, on which the pines and oaks had been cut down. It was in the form of a parallelogram 1540 feet long, 750 feet wide; its walls were composed of logs, the trunks of trees, cut so as to be 24 feet in length; one end was firmly bedded in the ground, the other being roughly pointed with the axe; these logs were fitted as closely as possible side by side. Outside of this, as



an additional security, was another lower stockade. At the angles of the prison, artillery was placed so as to cover all the area, and on the top of the inner stockade were 35 sentry-boxes, from which a full view was obtained. Within the stockade, and parallel to it, at a distance of 30 feet, posts 3 feet high and 10 feet apart were ranged; along their tops was tacked a rail, known as "the dead line." The sentinels, in their boxes on the platforms above, were ordered to shoot without notice any one who transgressed this line. It was not necessary that the entire person should be exposed—an arm or a hand extended beyond it was enough. This rule was rigidly enforced. For the apprehension of fugitives a pack of bloodhounds was kept.

From the interior of the prison every thing was cleared; not a tree or bush was left. There was no protection from the intolerable heat of the sun or from the rain.

On the 15th of February, 1864, the first gang of prisoners of war, 860 in number, were turned into the stockade. The locomotives incessantly brought additions. By the end of May there were more than 12,000; in August there were confined in this narrow space not less than 31,693 prisoners of war.

The rations for one day were 2 ounces of bacon, or 2 ounces of boiled beef, with the water in which it had been boiled; one sweet potato; a piece of bread  $2\frac{1}{2}$  inches square and thick, composed of corn and peas ground into meal, but not sifted. If one of a squad of prisoners were missing, the rest were deprived of rations for that day.

The continuous stir and ceaseless movement, the constant crossing and mixing together of the thousands passing to and fro, sent forth a monotonous sough, intermingled with the dull hum of countless confused voices rising from that overcrowded space.

Some of the men dug holes in the slope of the hill large enough to allow them to crawl into. The earth taken from

these excavations was used by others to plaster up low shanties they made of sticks and brush. Some made temporary coverings of ragged blankets and portions of their clothing, under which they sought refuge from the sun and the rain. Others, reduced to despair, sat sullenly all day long, and lay down at night wherever exhaustion overtook them.

When the rains set in, the tread of so many thousands covered the ground with slush a foot deep; the whole surface was like a cesspool. Into the brook there flowed the filth and excrements of more than thirty thousand men. The banks of the stream were covered with ordure, and appeared to be alive with working maggots. Through this reeking mass wandered about, elbowing and pushing one another, the shoeless, hatless, famished captives, many of them with scarcely a tatter to cover them.

When the hot weather came, the pestiferous surface baked in the sun. A surgeon reports that in August and September there were more than 3000 sick lying on the ground, partially naked; some had broken limbs, some were gangrened, some suffering with scurvy, some with chronic diarrhœa. There were some—such is the expression of an eye-witness—“coated with lice.” “The lice on that man’s body were as thick as a garment—a living mass.” Lice, fleas, and incredible clouds of mosquitoes deprived them of sleep, and drove them mad. The death-rate had reached, at this awful period,  $8\frac{1}{2}$  each hour of the day.

As they died, they were dragged to the outlet of the prison and hauled away by wagon-loads. They were buried without coffins, thrown into a ditch with quicklime. In many instances (I am quoting the words of a Confederate officer) their hands were mutilated with an axe to remove any finger-ring they might have. Raw rations were issued to a very large proportion, who were entirely unprovided with proper cooking utensils, and fur-

Atrocities inflicted upon them.

Their deaths and burials.

nished with so limited a supply of fuel that they were compelled to dig with their hands in the marsh for roots. The condition of things became so dreadful that, on passing up and down the railroad, if the wind was favorable, the smell of the stockade could be perceived for two miles. Starvation drove the prisoners to such fearful straits that "men were frequently seen picking up particles of food that had passed undigested through the bodies of others, and wiping and eating them." It was observed that men afflicted with scurvy, and who were crawling on the ground, did this.

Horrible condition  
of the prison and  
captives.

Well might Colonel Chandler, the inspector general of the Confederate army, who was ordered to examine into the condition of things, report, "It is a place the horrors of which it is difficult to describe—it is a disgrace to civilization."

But it was not alone physical suffering; there was a still more awful spectacle. In hundreds of the captives reason was entirely overthrown. Soldiers of the United States were converted into wild beasts. They who had hitherto been orderly became riotous; many, who had entered religious men, became reckless of conscience and conduct; their blasphemies were intermingled with hideous laughter and maniacal imprecations. Often they tried, with fiendish cunning, to get possession of the food and clothing of their comrades; they even did not scruple to murder them. Some, with outstretched arms and clenched fists, cursed the sky; some, idiotic, wandered about in listless apathy; some shouted insane defiance to imaginary foes; some might be seen, with animal cunning, hiding in a hole in the ground, or in their tatters, a clutched and often gnawed bone. All ideas of personal decency were gone.

The jailer, Wirz, no longer dared to go into the stockade. To such a state of desperation had the inmates been brought that life was of no value to them. Many voluntarily crossed the dead line in order to be shot.

III.—K K

Attracted by the smell of this mass of living carrion, flocks of vultures—the “turkey-buzzard” of the South—soared in the air over this den of human putridity, or, gorged with human flesh, sat nodding on the dead pines of the adjacent forest.

It appears from the records of this prison that the total number of prisoners received in it during the 13 months of its use was 44,882; of these there died 12,462. The jailer boasted, not without truth, that he was killing more Yankees at Andersonville than Lee was killing at Richmond.

If my reader be shocked, as well he may be, at the above recital, let me assure him that I have not told him half the reality. I have said nothing of the punishments inflicted—the stocks, the chain-gang; nothing of the hospitals; nothing of the capture of fugitives and their rending by blood-hounds; nothing of the three hundred wretches shot for passing beyond the dead-line; nothing of the murders committed by the jailer with his own hand, and for which he was subsequently tried by the United States government and hanged.

Let us read what was recorded by a soldier of the Forty-seventh New York. A pious man, he had secreted in his tatters, as his chief consolation, a Testament, and on its margin, here and there, had written with a bit of pencil:

“March 26. No rations to-day. March 27. Rations not served till 3 o’clock. April 1. No rations issued. April 2. Rations issued at 5 P.M.; meal and mule-flesh. April 10. No meat. April 27. Man shot for getting over the line. May 2. Our friend the cavalry-man shot. May 15. The singular cripple Chickamauga shot dead. July 3. No rations. July 4. Rations full of maggots; had to be thrown away. July 13. Man shot at dead-line. August 6. Man went to the brook, reached over the line with a pole and cup, and was shot; water colored with his blood. September 10. My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?”

It is the office of history to pass a verdict on the transactions which it relates; but so atrocious is the crime perpe-



The Confederate government is responsible for these crimes. trated at Andersonville that it is not for man to deal with it. None but God can justly measure its enormity; none but God can adequately punish it.

It was time that a government which had need to resort to such abominations should be put out of the sight of men.

I gladly turn from the awful scenes at Andersonville to the acts of the "United States Sanitary Commission," "the Christian Commission," and other organizations of mercy.

The United States Sanitary and Christian Commissions. Soon after Mr. Lincoln issued his proclamation, at the outbreak of the war, calling for 75,000 soldiers, many good men and women instituted what they termed "Soldiers' Aid Societies."

At first the government did not look upon these with approval, under an apprehension that they might interfere with the discipline and efficiency of the armies. Certain physicians and clergymen who had interested themselves in these charitable undertakings perceived how much good could be accomplished by a more extensive and thorough organization. Seeking no remuneration, they applied to the government to give them recognition and moral support, and, after some difficulty, this being secured, they organized themselves and were recognized as "the United States Sanitary Commission." The Rev. Henry W. Bellows, D.D., was its president.

Origin of these commissions. Their intention was to aid by their professional advice the medical department of the government service; but soon, the field opening out before them, their operations were greatly enlarged. From being simply an advisory, they became more and more an executive body. They published and circulated among the surgeons of the army many valuable tracts, such as those entitled "Advice as to Camping," "Rules for preserving the Health of a Soldier." To these were soon added many purely medical reports—"Reports on Amputations,"

Their field of usefulness increases.

“Report on Dysentery,” “Directions to Army Surgeons on the Battle-field.” With no uncertain skill they prepared the germ of their eventually vast organization, instituting three committees—one to communicate with the government, a second with army officers, a third with the public.

The Sanitary Commission now entered on an extraordinary career of usefulness. It ranged itself in affiliation with the government medical bureau. It gathered supporters from all classes of the people—physicians, clergymen, lawyers, merchants, tradesmen, laborers, and—how was it possible that it should be otherwise?—conspicuous among all, very many women. The wealthy man gave lavishly of his means; the poor man a portion, often not an inconsiderable portion, of his earnings; the widow brought her mite. Soon the commission had an independent transportation of its own. It had hospital transports, wagons, ambulances, railroad ambulances, cars. Ingenious men devised for it inventions of better litters, better stretchers, better ambulances. It secured comfortable transportation for the wounded soldier from the battle-field to the hospital. On the railroad it soon had its hospital cars, with kitchen, dispensary, and a surgeon’s car in the midst. As its work increased, so did its energies and the singular efficiency of its organization. It divided its services into several departments of duty.

(1.) Its preventive service, or sanitary inspection department, had a corps of medical inspectors, who examined thoroughly troops in the field, and reported their condition and needs to its own officers and to the government. It had also a corps of special hospital inspectors, who visited the general hospitals of the army, nearly 300 in number, their reports being confidential, and sent to the surgeon general of the army.

(2.) Its department of general relief. This consisted of twelve branches of the general commission, having dépôts

Wonderful development of the Sanitary Commission.

Its preventive service department.

Its department of general relief. in the large towns, each branch having from 150 to 1200 auxiliaries engaged in obtaining supplies. These were sent to the main dépôt, and there assorted, repacked, and dispatched. One of these branches, the "Women's Central Association," collected stores to the value of over a million of dollars; another, the Northwestern, at Chicago, furnished more than a quarter of a million. Care was taken to have no waste in the distribution. Soldiers of all the states were equally supplied; and even wounded enemies left on the field, or sick and abandoned in the hospitals, were tenderly cared for.

(3.) Its department of special relief. This took under Its department of special relief. its charge soldiers not yet under, or just out of the care of the government; men on sick leave, or found in the streets, or left by their regiments. For such it furnished "homes." About 7500 men were, on an average, thus daily or nightly accommodated. It also had "lodges" wherein a sick soldier might stay while awaiting his pay from the paymaster general, or, if unable to reach a hospital, might stop for a time. Still more, it had "Homes for the Wives, Mothers, and Children of Soldiers," where those visiting the wounded or sick man to minister to his necessities might find protection, defense, food, shelter. It had its "Feeding Stations," where a tired and hungry soldier passing by could have a gratuitous meal. On the great military lines these stations were permanently established. On the chief rivers, the Mississippi, the Cumberland, the Potomac, it had "sanitary steamers" for transmitting supplies and transporting the sick and wounded. It established "agencies" to see that no injustice was done to any soldier; that the soldier, his widow, his orphan, obtained pensions, back pay, bounties, or whatever money was due; that any errors in their papers were properly corrected, and especially that no sharper took advantage of them. It instituted hospital directories by which the friends of a soldier could obtain information with-

out cost as to his place and condition, if within a year he had been an inmate of any hospital. It had such a record of not less than 900,000 names. Whenever permitted to do so, it sent supplies to the United States prisoners of war in confinement at Andersonville, Salisbury, Richmond. On every flag of truce boat it placed clothing, medicines, cordials, to meet prisoners who had been exchanged. Often they came in rags insufficient to cover them; often devoured by vermin; often in the delirium of fever; sometimes at the point of death. With boundless mercy, it comforted and cared for all. Its sleepless eyes examined with jealous care the government prison camps, extending to the Confederate prisoners of war its charitable supervision. Not for a moment would it have tolerated the beginning of the abominations of Andersonville or Richmond.

(4.) Its department of field relief. The duty of this Its department of field relief. was to minister to the wounded on the field of battle; to furnish bandages, cordials, nourishment; to give assistance to the surgeons, and to supply any deficiencies it could detect in the field hospitals. It had a chief inspector for the armies of the East; another for the Military Department of the Mississippi, with a competent staff for each.

(5.) Its auxiliary relief corps. This supplied deficiencies in personal attendance and work in the Its auxiliary relief corps. hospitals, or among the wounded on the field. Between May, 1864, when it was first organized, and January, 1865, it gave its services to more than 75,000 patients. It waited on the sick and wounded; wrote letters for them, gave them stationery, postage stamps, newspapers, and whiled away the heavy hours of suffering by reading magazines and books to them.

To the Sanitary Commission the government gave a most How it was sustained. earnest support; the people gave it their hearts. They furnished it with more than



three millions of dollars in money, of which one million came from the Pacific States; they sent it nine millions' worth of supplies. From fairs held in its interest very large sums were derived. One in New York yielded a million and a quarter of dollars; one in Philadelphia more than a million. In towns comparatively small, there were often collected at such fairs more than twenty thousand dollars.

What country, what age of the world can show such a splendid example of "organized mercy?" And yet this is not all. Besides the United States Sanitary Commission, there was the "Western Sanitary Commission," with similar duties, though on a smaller scale. It disbursed about one million in money and two millions in supplies. There were also "State Sanitary Commissions," which took charge of matters more directly local, for the special benefit of soldiers of their particular states.

The Christian Commission emulated the noble conduct of the United States Sanitary Commission. It, too, received the recognition and countenance of the government. Its object was to promote the physical and spiritual welfare of soldiers and sailors. Its central office was in Philadelphia, but it had agencies in all the large towns. "It aided the surgeon, helped the chaplain, followed the armies in their marches, went into the trenches and along the picket-line. Wherever there was a sick, a wounded, a dying man, an agent of the Christian Commission was near by." It gave Christian burial whenever possible; it marked the graves of the dead. It had its religious services, its little extemporized chapels, its prayer-meetings. The American Bible Society gave it Bibles and Testaments; the Tract Society its publications. The government furnished its agents and supplies free transportation; it had the use of the telegraph for its purposes. Steam-boat and railroad companies furthered its

objects with all their ability. It distributed nearly five millions of dollars in money and supplies.

Faithful to the last, these noble commissions did not forsake the soldier when he had fought through the war and conquered a peace. They threw open their "Homes" to welcome him returning to his home. Their agents met him at railroad stations and steam-boat landings; protected him from impositions, and carried him to their lodges; looked after his arrears of pay, saw that full justice was rendered to him, and that no man took advantage of him. They set up "bureaus of information and employment," to find for each, desirous of obtaining it, a situation such as he was capable of filling.

They extend their  
care to the dis-  
charged soldier.

## SECTION XXI.

### THE DOWNFALL OF THE CONFEDERACY.

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#### CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS. THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER. THE CAPTURE OF MOBILE. THE EXPEDITIONS OF SCHOFIELD, STONEMAN, WILSON, AND SHERIDAN.

Grant caused preparations to be made in North Carolina for the approach of Sherman, who was advancing from Savannah through the Carolinas.

Fort Fisher was reduced, and Wilmington and Goldsboro captured.

From General Thomas's army, which, since the battle of Nashville, had no enemy before it, detachments were sent to North Carolina, to Virginia, to Alabama.

Sheridan, with his cavalry, moved against the communications of Richmond north of James River.


WILMINGTON, in North Carolina, was, in the spring of 1865, the only sea-port remaining to the Confederacy through which foreign supplies could be obtained. The navy had used every exertion to blockade it, but such are the peculiarities of the harbor that this could not be accomplished effectually without the capture of Fort Fisher, one of its defensive works. In view of Sherman's contemplated march from Savannah northward, it became necessary to reduce those forts and to capture Wilmington.

Fort Fisher is situated on the peninsula between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic Ocean. For five miles north of Federal Point this peninsula is sandy and low, not rising more than 15 feet above high tide. The interior abounds in fresh-water swamps, often wooded, and almost impassable. Much of the dry land to within half a mile of the fort is covered with a low undergrowth. There is a bare strip of about 300 yards in width along the sea-shore.

Necessity of obtaining possession of Wilmington.

Description of Fort Fisher.

The fort presents two fronts: the first, or land front, running across the peninsula, at this point 700 yards wide, is 486 yards in length; the second, or sea front, runs from the right of the first parallel to the beach to the Mound Battery, a distance of 1300 yards. The land front is intended to resist any attack from the north; the sea front to prevent any vessels from running through New Inlet, or landing troops on Federal Point.



FORT FISHER.

To secure possession of this fort, a formidable armada, under Admiral Porter, was assembled in Hampton Roads. In the latter part of November, 1864, a conference was held between Grant, Butler, and Porter, and suitable arrangements made. General Weitzel was designated to command the land forces. Advantage was taken of the circumstance that a large part of the Confederate force at Wilmington had gone to resist Sherman in Georgia.

Arrangements for its capture.



General Butler had formed great expectations of the effect that would be produced on Fort Fisher by the explosion of a boat loaded with a very large quantity of powder. Some delay occurred in properly preparing the contrivance. The boat was stored with 215 tons of gunpowder, and fuses were so arranged as to secure the instantaneous ignition of the whole mass. There was a clock-work mechanism to fire it at the proper moment.

Butler's powder-boat a failure.

On the 13th of December the expedition started, and arrived near Fort Fisher on the evening of the 15th; but, through a storm—one of those storms which have given its name to Cape Fear—and other causes, delays occurred until the 24th, when the powder-boat was exploded, producing, however, no effect.

At daylight on that day, the ships, led by the Ironsides, got under way. Nothing could long endure their shot and shells. The fire was declared to be “magnificent for its power and its accuracy.” Earth-banks, guns, and men alike went down before it. Clouds of dust arose from the fort as the crest of the parapet was shot away, or when shells buried themselves in the earth, and there exploded. Gun-carriages were struck and destroyed. In one hour and a quarter the fort was silenced. Two magazines were blown up.

Bombardment by Porter's fleet.

General Butler had accompanied the expedition, and, indeed, had taken command of it, though Grant had intended that Weitzel should have had that responsibility. A reconnoissance of the fort was made on the 25th, and then Butler ordered the re-embarkation of the troops, and the return of the expedition. Several of the officers voluntarily reported to Grant that when recalled they had nearly reached the fort, and, in their opinion, could have taken it without much loss.

Butler orders the attacking force to withdraw.

The fleet, under Porter, still lay off the place, and that officer, writing to Grant, expressed his conviction that, un-

Grant sends the troops back under Terry.

der a proper leader, the fort could be taken. Grant sent back the troops, with the addition of a brigade of 1500 men and a small siege train. He selected General Terry to command.

The plan of attack.

The plan of attack was to lead the troops some distance above the fort, and intrench across the point to Cape Fear River, so as to prevent re-enforcements being sent from Wilmington, and then to assault by land and water. Fort Fisher and its connected works mounted about 75 guns. The armament of the works guarding the approaches to Wilmington was about 160 guns; among them were some 150-pounder Armstrong guns. Admiral Porter, who was at Sebastopol during the siege of that place, reported that "Fort Fisher was much stronger than the famous Malakoff." The attacking squadron carried 500 guns, some of them the largest in the world. No such formidable armament as this had ever before been arrayed against a fort. It was not, however, a mass of masonry that had to be battered down, but immense earth-banks, in which shot and shell would bury themselves.

The fort again cannonaded by the fleet.

On the 13th of January, the troops, under cover of the fleet, were landed, Porter's fire being so severe that it kept the artillerymen in the fort from their guns. The iron-clads alone, with thirty guns, fired, in the course of the day, upward of 2000 shells. It was computed that, during the bombardment, four shots were fired from the fleet every second. The Confederates were forced into their bomb-proofs while this continued. An hour after the landing the wooden ships were withdrawn, but the iron-clads kept up their fire all night. On the 14th the general fire was resumed; that of the iron-clads was concentrated on the northeastern face of the fort, which it was intended should be assaulted by the soldiers; the wooden ships directed their fire against the southeastern or sea face, which was to be assaulted by 2000 sailors and marines.

The fort was divided by traverses into spaces, each being about 60 feet long and 50 feet wide. The spaces were open in the rear and in front sufficiently for the working of the guns. Each constituted, as it were, a separate fort, with a gun or two and a garrison of its own, and each, in an assault, would have to be separately taken.

Interior structure of the fort.

On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of, and turned into part of a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. The reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the fort had been seriously injured by the fire of the ships.

On the morning of the 15th the ships reopened fire at 11 o'clock, the soldiers and sailors respectively having made their arrangements for attack. They worked their way onward by a series of trenches until within 200 yards, and there awaited the order to assault.

The fire was kept up with the utmost severity until 3 P.M., when the signal was given. The steam-whistles were blown. The ships changed their fire to the upper batteries. The sailors on one side, and the soldiers on the other, rushed forward. The former, under Captain Breese, made an energetic assault, but were brought to a check at the stockade by a fire from the garrison, who had issued forth from their bomb-proofs. The sailors were driven back to the beach. While they were thus being repulsed, the assaulting column of soldiers, under the command of Ames—a youth who was a cadet at West Point when the war broke out—rushed toward the fort, the brigade of Curtis taking the lead. The palisades had been so much injured by the fire of the fleet that a few vigorous strokes by the axemen sufficed to clear gaps for the passage of the troops, and, in the face of a severe enfilading fire, a lodgment was soon effected on the

The sailors are repulsed.

A column of soldiers and one of sailors assault it.

west end of the land front. For five hours there was a terrible hand-to-hand death-struggle at the traverses, which were used as breastworks, over the tops of which the contending parties fired into each other's faces. The garrison, with the most resolute determination, defended them. They were taken in succession. All the time signals between the land and sea forces were exchanged with the utmost exactness. Such of the ships as lay in the proper position fired through the traverses in advance of the troops, changing the direction as, one after another, they were carried. The others, with grape and canister, swept the ground over which re-enforcements might come.

Not until midnight was the resistance ended, and the Confederates forced beyond the last traverse at the Mound Battery. Hemmed in between the water and their antagonists, there was nothing for them but to surrender. Never had there been a more gallant, nor, for the conquered, a more glorious defense.

In foreign countries it was often said that the reunion of the states after the war was over was a political impossibility. In America there was a very different opinion. In defeats such as this there was no disgrace. Conquered and conquerors looked upon each other with pride.

The garrison originally numbered more than 2300 men, of whom 1971, with 112 officers, were captured. The Confederate commanders, General Whiting and Colonel Lamb, were among the prisoners, both of them severely wounded. The loss of the assailants was 110 killed, 530 wounded. Of the three brigade commanders of Ames's division, Curtis and Pennybacker were severely, and Bell mortally wounded.

Next morning the chief magazine of the fort accidentally exploded — a dreadful catastrophe — by which 200 men were killed and 100 wounded.

On that and the following day the Confederates aban-



The smaller forts abandoned by the Confederates. doned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's Island, which were immediately occupied by Terry. Entire control of the mouth of Cape Fear River was thus obtained.

At Grant's request General Butler was relieved, and General Ord assigned to the command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina.

Operations against Mobile. We have already seen that the capture of Mobile had been contemplated in the spring of 1864, but that, for various reasons, the execution of that intention had been postponed, and that the reduction of the forts at the entrance to the harbor by Farragut had been considered sufficient for the time.

It was now (March, 1865) determined to carry the original intention into effect. A force of about 45,000 men was therefore collected by Canby for operating against the place. It consisted of Granger's corps, the 13th, 13,200 strong; A. J. Smith's corps, the 16th, 16,000; Steele's column, 13,200; and 3000 engineers, artillery, and cavalry. The Confederate General Taylor was at Meridian, and General D. H. Maury in command at Mobile with 9000 men.

The attack on Mobile was made on the east side. The 13th Corps marched from Fort Morgan along the peninsula, and on the 24th of March reached Danley's, on Fish River. The 16th was conveyed there by transports from Fort Gaines. The landing of the troops on Fish River was covered by the fleet, now under command of Admiral Thatcher.

Capture of Spanish Fort. On the 27th of March, Spanish Fort—a system of defenses rather than a single fort—was invested by Smith's Corps on the right, and Granger's on the left. It was seven miles east of Mobile, and held by 3000 men. Its works extended two miles in length. On the 4th of April a bombardment was opened on it from 75 guns, but without doing much injury. It was

Canby's intention to assault it on the 9th. But General Carr, who was on Canby's extreme right, found it possible, on the 8th, to secure a commanding crest well covered with pines, where a battery might be erected which would take the enemy in reverse. On the evening of that day he gained the crest, captured 300 yards of the Confederate works, and half of one of their brigades. Hereupon the Confederates determined to evacuate Spanish Fort. Five hundred prisoners and fifty guns were taken by Canby.

About the close of March, Steele's column, which had reached Pensacola on the 10th, joined the force in front of Mobile, and commenced operations against Fort Blakely. This fort was five miles north of Spanish Fort, on the east bank of the Appalachee. The garrison of the fort was 3500 strong, under the command of General Lidell. The works constituting the fort were three miles long, and much stronger than Spanish Fort. On the 2d of April they were invested by Steele.

On the 11th Forts Huger and Tracy were evacuated, and the fleet came into the Tensas River. In crossing Blakely Bar, however, the Metacomet and Osage were sunk. But after the evacuation of the two forts, the admiral, with his iron-clads, anchored off Mobile.

On the evening of the 9th, the force that had taken Spanish Fort having joined that before Blakely, an assault was made and the works carried. There were captured 40 guns and 3423 men. The loss in the assault was 654 killed and wounded.

Two days subsequently Mobile was evacuated. It could offer no farther resistance. General Maury, with the remnant of his force, retreated to Meridian. On the 12th the Mayor of Mobile surrendered the city.

The battle of Nashville having so completely disposed of the Confederate army under Hood, Thomas's powerful

force was left without any adequate antagonist in its front. It therefore became necessary to use detachments from it on collateral services.

On the 26th of January Thomas was directed to send A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General Canby. They were used against Mobile, as we have seen. Previously to that he had been directed to send Schofield with his corps east. Accordingly, the advance of that corps reached Washington on the 23d of January, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and Newbern. The State of North Carolina was constituted a military department, and Schofield, being assigned to its command, was placed under the orders of Sherman, with whose expedition it was intended that he should co-operate.

On the 21st of January Grant informed Sherman that Schofield, with the 23d Corps, numbering 21,000 men, had thus been ordered east; that there were at Fort Fisher 8000, at Newbern about 4000 men; that, if Wilmington was captured, Schofield would go there, if not, to Newbern. In either event, all the surplus force would move toward Goldsboro, in cooperation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be extended, and that all these troops would be under his orders as he came in communication with them.

Under these instructions Schofield reduced Wilmington, co-operating for that purpose with the navy, and moving his forces up both sides of Cape Fear River. Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defense on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it. Wilmington was entered on the 22d—a serious loss to the Confederacy. A telegram from Lee was found in Fort Fisher when that work was captured, in which he informed the officer com-

manding that he could not hold Richmond if Wilmington should be taken.

Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro in two columns, one from Wilmington, the other from Newbern; and to repair the railroads leading from Goldsboro to each place, as well as to supply Sherman by Cape Fear River toward Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column from Newbern was attacked on the 8th of March, and driven back. On the 11th, however, the enemy was repulsed with severe loss. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed, and Kinston occupied. On the 21st Goldsboro was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro, on the 22d.

General Thomas was also directed, on the 31st of January, to send a cavalry expedition under Stoneman from East Tennessee in aid of Sherman's proposed march, to penetrate South Carolina toward Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and to return, if possible, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing the prisoners of war at that place. Stoneman was, however, so late in starting, and Sherman so rapid in his movements, that on the 27th of February he was ordered to change his course, and, repeating his former raid, to destroy the railroad toward Lynchburg as far as he could, and prevent the apprehended escape of Lee.

The raid here alluded to occurred about the close of the preceding year (1864), when a Confederate force under Breckinridge entered East Tennessee, and on the 13th of November attacked General Gillem near Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions of Thomas, Stone-

and Goldsboro  
is taken.

Thomas detaches  
Stoneman toward  
Virginia.

Stoneman's first  
expedition.



man concentrated the commands of Burbridge and Gillem near Bear's Station, to operate against Breckinridge, to destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia. On the 12th of December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces. On the 16th he struck them, under Vaughan, at Marion, routing and pursuing them to Wytheville, capturing all their artillery, trains, and 198 prisoners; he destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and extensive lead-works. Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to attack it next morning, but morning found Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, destroyed there the salt-works and a large amount of stores, and captured 8 guns. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned Burbridge to Lexington and Gillem to Knoxville.

Stoneman's column did not leave Knoxville on his second expedition until the 20th of March. Detachments from it captured Christiansburg, Wytheville, and Salem, and destroyed the railroad from near Lynchburg to Wytheville. Stoneman then moved into North Carolina, destroying a large amount of cotton, cotton factories, and the bridges on the railroad between Greensboro and the Yadkin River. At Salisbury he defeated a Confederate force, capturing 13 guns and 1364 prisoners, destroying immense dépôts of supplies, and the bridges on all the railroads for many miles from that place. He then returned to Greenville, East Tennessee.

Thomas was, moreover, directed to organize an expedition of 12,000 cavalry, under Wilson, to destroy the military resources of Alabama, and aid in the movements that Canby was then making against Mobile.

Thomas detaches  
Wilson into Ala-  
bama.

The Confederate forces between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi were about 21,000, of whom 9000 were at Mobile, and the remainder, under General Taylor, at Meridian. The latter consisted of one infantry corps and 7000 cavalry under Forrest.

Wilson's cavalry, after the expulsion of Hood from East Tennessee, was at Eastport, Mississippi, at the head of steam-boat navigation on the Lower Tennessee. On the 23d of February, 1865, Thomas went there to give Wilson his final instructions.

Each trooper was to take five days' rations and 24 pounds of grain, a pair of extra horse-shoes, and 100 rounds of ammunition. Additional supplies were in the wagons, of which there were 250. There was also a pontoon train. The troops were armed with the Spencer carbine. The expedition was to last 60 days, and to live as much as possible off the country. Its general course was to be to the southeast.

Wilson left Chickasaw on the 22d of March, and with much difficulty, such was the condition of the roads, reached Elyton on the 30th. At that place he detached a brigade to Tuscaloosa to burn the public stores, military school, bridges, and founderies; it was then to rejoin the main body near Selma. On the 31st, near Montevallo, with the remainder of his force he destroyed a large number of iron-works, rolling-mills, and collieries. He routed the Confederate cavalry, and pursued it through Plantersville, taking three guns and several hundred prisoners. He then continued his march to Selma.

Selma, which is situated on the north bank of the Alabama River, had been strongly fortified, and garrisoned with about 7000 men. Taylor had left it under command of Forrest. It was carried by assault on the 2d of April: 32 guns, 2700 prisoners, of whom 150 were officers, were taken, and the Confederates, before evacuating, burnt 25,000 bales of cotton; Wilson found and burnt 10,000 more.

Capture of Selma.

On the 10th, Wilson, having constructed a bridge 870 feet long across the Alabama, burnt the arsenal, founderies, and stores of Selma. He marched upon Montgomery, the original seat of the Confederate government. It was surrendered to him on the 12th, the Confederates having burnt 85,000 bales of cotton. Here Wilson destroyed five steam-boats, several locomotives, one armory, and several founderies. He now entered Georgia, and on the 16th captured Columbus, taking 52 guns and 1200 prisoners; a Confederate ram, ready for sea, carrying six 7-inch guns, was destroyed, with the navy yard, arsenal, factories, 15 locomotives, 200 cars, and 115,000 bales of cotton.

On the 20th Wilson arrived at Macon, which was surrendered to him under protest, the municipal authorities claiming immunity under the armistice between Sherman and Johnston; of this armistice Wilson now, for the first time, heard. Here he was joined by one of his brigades (Croxtton's), which had captured Tuscaloosa on the 3d of April, had come through Jasper, Talladega, and Newman, having marched 650 miles in 30 days.

Grant considered it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond took place, that all communications with the city north of the James River should be cut off. He therefore instructed Sheridan, February 20th, to reach Lynchburg with a cavalry force as soon as it was possible to travel, and destroy the railroad and canal thence in every direction. From Lynchburg he might strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the west of Danville, and join Sherman.

Sheridan therefore moved from Winchester on the 27th of February with two divisions of cavalry numbering about 5000 each. On the 1st of March he secured the bridge across the middle fork

Capture of Montgomery.

Wilson marches into Georgia.

Sheridan's cavalry expedition.

He cuts the northern communications of Richmond.

of the Shenandoah, and entered Staunton on the 2d. Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro, and there found the enemy, under Early, intrenched. Without stopping for a reconnaissance, an immediate attack was made, the position carried, 1600 prisoners, 11 pieces of artillery, 200 wagons, and 17 battle-flags captured. Thence Sheridan marched on Charlottesville, breaking the railroad as he went. He remained at that place two days, destroying the railroad toward Richmond and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna, and awaiting the arrival of his trains. That delay obliged him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg. On the 6th he divided his force into two columns. One of these marched up the James River from Scottsville to New Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. The other column moved down the railroad toward Lynchburg, breaking it as far as Amherst Court-house; thence it marched across the country, and united with the former at New Market. The river being very high, Sheridan's pontoons could not reach across; he therefore returned toward the White House, on his way destroying every lock on the canal, and cutting its banks wherever practicable. He concentrated his whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, he crossed the Annas, burning all the bridges and many miles of railroad, and proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunkey to White House, which he reached on the 19th. He made a junction with the Army of the Potomac, in front of Petersburg, on the 27th.



## CHAPTER LXXXIX.

### MARCH OF THE ARMY OF THE WEST FROM GEORGIA NORTHWARD THROUGH THE CAROLINAS.

There were two modes by which the Army of the West, under General Sherman, could be brought into connection with the Army of the East, under General Grant: (1), by a sea voyage; (2), by an overland march.

Of these, at Sherman's request, both for military and political reasons, the overland march was selected. It was accomplished in the depth of winter, and in spite of the most formidable difficulties.

The railroads and military resources of South Carolina were destroyed; its capital, Columbia, was captured; the Confederate forces were compelled to evacuate Charleston, which was occupied by national troops, and the national flag was raised on Fort Sumter.

Sherman entered Goldsboro, in North Carolina, his proposed objective point.

The resumption of hostilities was arrested by a communication sent to Sherman by the Confederate General Johnston.

THE Army of the West had accomplished the objects to which it had been assigned. It had forced its way through the mountains to Atlanta; then, dividing, one portion of it, under Thomas, in the battle of Nashville had totally destroyed the Confederate army which, under Hood, had been defending Georgia; the other, under Sherman, had marched irresistibly across that state, devastating it throughout its length, capturing Milledgeville, its capital, and Savannah, its sea-port, and had established an unassailable military basis on the coast. There could not have been a more triumphant or more complete success.

The point next to be accomplished was to bring the powerful army which now, under Sherman, lay at Savannah, to a junction with the army of Grant, confronting Lee at Richmond.

There were two modes by which this junction might be effected: 1st, by a sea voyage; 2d, by a land march through the Carolinas.

Acts of the Army  
of the West.

Modes proposed for  
its junction with the  
Army of the East.

The first of these modes presented no unusual practical difficulty, the national government having the undisputed control of the sea, and being able to bring rapidly to Savannah the requisite amount of shipping. The considerations against its adoption had reference mainly to the chances which must be encountered on a stormy coast, the partial disorganization which an army always suffers while cooped up on board of transports, and the loss of time and effect which must be submitted to while so powerful a force was idly making its voyage.

The second mode presented at once very formidable difficulties and very conspicuous advantages. The difficulties lay chiefly in the state of the country through which the long march must be made. It was the depth of winter; there had been unusual rains; the low lands were all overflowed; the roads in many places were quagmires; streams commonly insignificant had become formidable rivers. For many weeks the weather could not be expected to improve.

But Sherman felt that, great as these difficulties were, his army was able to overcome them; that, in spite of the season, the condition of the roads, and the military opposition it might meet, it could make good its way to Wilmington, Goldsboro, or any other selected point at the North. In doing this there were advantages of a very conspicuous kind. The army, instead of being injured as in a sea-voyage, would even be improved; it would reach its objective point in a higher condition of discipline and efficiency. And while such were the military advantages, the political results would be equally important. The State of South Carolina had taken the lead in bringing on the war. At Charleston the first gun had been fired, and the national flag first insulted. Thus far South Carolina had enjoyed immunity from those inflictions which her conduct had brought on so many other states. Her vainglory would be enhanced

Transportation  
by sea.

A march through  
the Carolinas.

Military and polit-  
ical results of such  
a march.

if she should altogether escape. A knowledge of what the march through Georgia might have been, indicated in no ambiguous manner what a march through South Carolina would be. The Army of the West would leave no cause of boasting in its track. Afar off, the towns upon the coast, and among them Charleston, must fall, as the towns on the Mississippi had fallen when an army marched past their rear.

It was the painful but profound conviction of many persons who were versed in the political affairs of the nation that no durable peace could be hoped for, no security against future assaults on the government provided, no guarantee against the disturbance of the tranquillity of the country obtained, unless this march were made.

The conclusion that it should be made was, however, not arrived at hastily. There entered into it no feeling of revenge. It was deliberately viewed and reviewed as a matter of military expediency and state policy. We are now to see how, when once resolved upon, it was inexorably carried into effect.

To General Sherman must be accorded the merit of the conception, as well as the execution of the marches through Georgia, and from Georgia through the Carolinas.

Sherman prefers the overland march,

While he was at Chattanooga, it was intended by the government that his objective should be, not upon the Atlantic coast, but upon the Gulf. After the fall of Atlanta, it was not without some difficulty that he obtained permission to turn from the pursuit of Hood, and make his way to the coast. He first perceived the great political and military results which must follow an overland movement northward, and, though thoroughly appreciating its difficulties, had the courage to recommend strenuously its execution.

It was Grant's purpose to bring Sherman's army to the

vicinity of Richmond. It was his intention at first that it should be transported by sea.

Not without exertion did Sherman carry his point, and obtain permission to make the overland movement. He had written to General Foster on the 18th of December: "You are aware that I am ordered to carry this army to Virginia by sea;" and to Grant on the same day: "I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark for James River." In a few days, however (December 23d), we find him earnestly suggesting to Grant: "I have now completed my first step, and should like to go to you by way of Columbia and Raleigh, but will prepare to embark as soon as vessels come. You know well how much better troops arrive by a land march than when carried by transports." After the movement had actually commenced, he again addressed Grant from Pocotaligo: "I know that this march is necessary to the war. It must be made sooner or later, and I am in the proper position for it. I ask no re-enforcement, but simply wish the utmost activity at all other points, so that the enemy may not concentrate too powerfully against me. I expect Davis will move heaven and earth to resist me, for the success of my army is fatal to his dream of empire. Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia."

Grant gave his consent, and Sherman answered him:

"I am gratified that you have modified your former orders, as I feared the transportation by sea would very much disturb the unity and morale of my army, now so perfect." To Halleck he expresses his delight that he is not to embark, but to march through the Carolinas, preferring to go to Wilmington rather than to Charleston, the former being a live place, the latter dead and unimportant when its railroad communications are broken. To Admiral Porter he expresses a fear that the President's anxiety to take Charleston may induce Grant to order him to operate against that city rather

The march to be to  
Wilmington, not to  
Charleston.



than against Wilmington, though he greatly prefers the latter, Charleston being, as he says, "a dead cock in the pit."

The marches from Chattanooga to Atlanta, from Atlanta to Savannah, and from Savannah to Goldsboro, were of his conception and execution. He foresaw that these movements must be conclusive of the war. He deliberately put himself and his army in such a position that, if not absolutely destroyed, the existence of the Confederacy was an impossibility. From the moment he passed the capital of South Carolina the Confederacy was ended. All after that was simply the necessary consequence of what had already been done.

After consent had been given for the proposed march through the Carolinas, Sherman remained nearly a month at Savannah, refitting his army, constructing new lines of fortifications, making a proper disposition of captured property, and directing local matters. During this interval the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, visited him, and, with his approval, devoted the abandoned sea islands, with river-bank lands for thirty miles back, to the freedmen.

By the 15th of January, 1865, the army was ready to begin its march. During the campaign from Atlanta to Savannah, the line of its movement was parallel to the water-courses; on this, it would be at right angles to them all, and the difficulties to be encountered much greater. The course now to be followed was therefore chosen near the junction of the clay of the uplands with the sand of the lower country. It cut the streams at the head of navigation in each. The engineers expected that along this track the best roads and the minimum amount of swamps and mud would be found. Colonel Poe, the chief engineer, in his report of these operations, states that this supposition proved to be entirely correct, as was found whenever it was necessary to depart much from this line.

Preparations at Savannah for the march.

The engineers determine its track.

Previously to the beginning of the march, General Howard, with the right wing, had been ordered to make a lodgment at or near Pocotaligo, on the Charleston Railroad. After a sharp engagement, he established a *dépôt* for supplies at the mouth of Pocotaligo Creek, with easy water communication back to Hilton Head.

Howard makes a lodgment near Pocotaligo.

The railroad bridge across the Pocotaligo was the object of this movement. With the trestlework in the swamp, it was a mile in length, and many attempts had been made to destroy it. It was nearly midway between Savannah and Charleston.

The left wing under Slocum, and the cavalry under Kilpatrick, had been ordered to rendezvous, about January 15th, near Robertsville and Coosawatchie, South Carolina, with a *dépôt* of supplies at Purysburg or Sister's Ferry.

In the mean time, Grant, in aid of the movement, had sent troops to garrison Savannah, and had directed operations to be conducted on the coast of North Carolina, in preparation for Sherman's coming.

Sherman's army was about 60,000 strong. It was intended that it should carry supplies for thirty days, and live upon the country. It was stripped for the march. Wall-tents, chairs, camp-cots, trunks, and all unnecessary personal baggage, were forbidden. Scarcely was it in motion when it was embarrassed by very heavy rains. Some of the columns were almost submerged in the rice-fields of the Savannah; a causeway which had been carefully constructed was swept away; the swamps became lakes of slimy mud. The march lay through morasses, at the best penetrable with difficulty, and rice-fields crossed by raised causeways.

The flooded condition of the country.

Sister's Ferry had the advantage of a high ridge extending far into South Carolina; but even at that point Slocum found the overflowed river nearly three miles wide, and it was not until the first week of February that he could get his whole wing across.



THE CAMPAIGN OF SHERMAN.

On the 18th of January Sherman transferred Savannah to General Foster, and imparted to him information respecting the proposed movements. Grant's operations on the coast of North Carolina had been completed; for, though Butler had failed in the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, Terry and Porter, as we have seen, had succeeded (January 15). It was in reference to this that Grant subsequently wrote: "To secure your certain success, I deemed the capture of Wilmington of the greatest importance. Butler came near losing that

Grant makes preparations for Sherman in North Carolina.

prize to us, but Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunder;" and he added: "I do not know but the first failure has been as valuable a success for the country as the capture of Fort Fisher, though Butler may not see it in that light."

A point of security had thus been obtained on the sea-coast. Sherman resolved to advance directly to Goldsboro, in North Carolina, proposing to arrive there about the 15th of March, and open communications with the sea by the Newbern Railroad. He took measures to have suitable preparations at Newbern.

Having made some feigned demonstrations, as though it was his intention to march upon Charleston, he succeeded in detaining a considerable force of the enemy to contest that movement; and, the floods having at length somewhat subsided, the march of the right wing, under Howard, began on the 1st of February. All the roads northward had been held for weeks by Wheeler's cavalry, who had, by details of negro laborers, felled trees, burned bridges, and made obstructions to impede the march. But so well organized were the pioneer battalions, that felled trees were removed and bridges rebuilt by the heads of columns before the rear could close up. On the 2d of February the 15th Corps (Logan's) reached Loper's Cross Roads, and the 17th (Blair's) was at Rivers's Bridge. Slocum, with the left wing, was still struggling with the floods at Sister's Ferry. He was ordered to hasten the crossing as much as possible, and overtake the right wing on the South Carolina Railroad. Howard, with that wing, was directed to cross the Salkehatchie, and push rapidly for the South Carolina Railroad at or near Midway. The enemy held the line of the Salkehatchie in force, having infantry and artillery at Rivers's and Beaufort's Bridges. The former position was, however, promptly carried on February 3d, though the troops had to

March of the right wing begins.

The left wing detained by the floods.

Crossing of the Salkehatchie.



cross a swamp three miles wide, with water varying from knee to shoulder in depth. The weather was bitter cold, the rain falling in torrents, and the wind coming in boisterous gusts. The line of the Salkehatchie being thus broken, the Edisto was the next line, and thither the enemy retreated, taking post at Branchville. Sherman's whole army was pushed rapidly to the South Carolina Railroad at Midway, Bamberg, and Graham's Station. The 17th Corps, by threatening Branchville, forced the enemy to burn the railroad bridge and Walker's Bridge below, across the Edisto. All hands were at once set to work to destroy the railroad track: it was thoroughly done from the Edisto to Blackville. In the mean time, Kilpatrick had brought his cavalry by Barnwell to Blackville, and had turned toward Aiken, with orders to threaten Augusta. He had skirmished with Wheeler's cavalry.

On the 7th of February Wheeler addressed a letter to General Howard in these words: "If the troops of your army be required to discontinue burning the houses of our citizens, I will discontinue burning cotton." To this, on the next day, Sherman himself replied:

"I hope you will burn all the cotton, and save us the trouble. We don't want it. It has been a curse to our country. All you don't burn I will. As to private houses occupied by peaceful families, my orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to any body, I care little about, as the owners have thought them of little use to themselves; I don't wish to have them destroyed, but do not take much care to preserve them."

Williams, with two divisions of the 20th Corps, reached the railroad at Graham's Station on the 8th, and Slocum reached Blackville on the 10th. So swollen was the river that the forests of water-oaks which line both its banks were submerged. The rain fell in such torrents as to blind both horses and riders. "We must all turn amphibious," wrote

Sherman to Slocum, "for the country is half under water. Mower had to fight at the Salkehatchie with his men up to their armpits, he himself setting the example." The destruction of the railroad was now continued by the left wing from Blackville up to Windsor. By the 11th of February all the army was on the railroad from Midway to Johnston's Station, thereby dividing the enemy's forces, which still remained at Branchville and Charleston on the one hand, and at Aiken and Augusta on the other.

Destruction of the South Carolina Railroad.

Sherman was personally familiar with the country through which he was now marching. He had formerly hunted over it frequently. The aspect of Nature still remained the same, but great were the social changes. The South Carolinians had never imagined that war would approach their firesides. They thought that they were encircled by a rampart of other states. None were more clamorous in upholding the war so long as its devastations were at a distance—on the banks of the James, the Tennessee, the Mississippi; but, now that the tide of blood had reached the Edisto, they were urgent that there should be peace. Already, through this country of solemn woods and sandy plains, columns of black smoke rising to the sky indicated that an avenging army was approaching.

Alarm of the inhabitants.

Of the Confederate commanders, Hardee was in Charleston, with about 14,000 men, expecting Sherman coming from Branchville; D. H. Hill and G. W. Smith were at Augusta, also looking for his approach; Beauregard was near the North Carolina line, collecting troops.

Sherman was at this time operating west of Branchville, on the railroad from that place to Augusta. He now struck north to Orangeburg, the first important station from Branchville to Columbia. The next important station is Kingsville, where the road from Wilmington to Charleston intersects the Columbia and

Position of the Confederate generals.

Sherman's army crosses the Edisto.

Charleston Road. The 17th Corps crossed the south fork of the Edisto at Binnaker's Bridge, and moved directly for Orangeburg; the 15th crossed at Holman's Bridge, and moved to Poplar Springs, to act as a support; the left wing, which was still at work on the railroad, was ordered to cross the South Edisto at New and Guignard's Bridges, to move to the Orangeburg and Edgefield Road, and there await the result of the attack on Orangeburg. On the 12th the 17th Corps found the enemy intrenched in front of the Orangeburg Bridge, but swept him away by a dash, and followed him, forcing him across the bridge, which was partially burned. Behind the bridge was a battery in position, covered by a cotton and earth parapet with wings. Blair held one division (Smith's) close up to the Edisto, and moved the other two to a point about two miles below, where he crossed Force's division by a pontoon bridge, holding Mower's in support. As soon as Force emerged from the swamp the enemy gave ground, and Smith's division gained the bridge, crossed over, and occupied the enemy's parapet. The bridge was soon repaired, and by 4 P.M. the whole corps was in Orangeburg. Orders were given to destroy the railroad effectually up to Lewisville, to push the enemy across the Congaree, and force him to burn the bridges, which he did on the 14th. Sherman, without wasting time on Charleston, which he knew could be no longer held, turned all his columns on Columbia.

The 17th Corps followed the State Road, and the 15th crossed the North Edisto at Schilling's Bridge, above the mouth of Cawcaw Swamp Creek. On the 15th it found the enemy in a strong position at Little Congaree Bridge (across Congaree Creek), with a tête-de-pont on the south side, and a well constructed fort on the north side, commanding the bridge with artillery. The ground in front was very bad, level and clear, with a fresh deposit of mud from a recent overflow. The leading divi-

Destruction of the  
Columbia and  
Charleston Railroad.

Advance to  
Columbia.

sion, however, succeeded in turning the flank of the tête-de-pont by sending a brigade through a cypress swamp to the left; and, following up the retreating enemy promptly, got possession of the bridge and the fort beyond. The bridge had been somewhat damaged by fire, and had to be repaired for the passage of artillery, so that night closed in before the head of the column reached the bridge across Congaree River in front of Columbia. Early the next morning the head of the column was opposite Columbia, but too late to save the fine bridge which spanned the river at that point: it was burned by the enemy. While waiting for the pontoons to come to the front, the troops could see people running about the streets of Columbia, and occasionally small masses of cavalry. A few shots were fired at the unfinished state-house walls, and a few shells at the railroad dépôt, to scatter the people, who were carrying away sacks of corn and meal that Sherman's troops would need. There was no flag or manifestation of surrender. Howard was ordered not to cross the river in front of Columbia, but to move over the Saluda at a factory three miles above, and then over Broad River, so as to approach the city from the north. Within an hour after the arrival of Howard's head of column opposite Columbia, the head of column of the left wing also appeared, and Slocum was directed to cross the Saluda at Zion Church, and thence take roads direct for Winnsboro, breaking up the railroads and bridges about Alston.

To South Carolina the Day of Retribution had at last come. For more than thirty years she had been conspiring against the unity of the nation. Forgetting that pretensions to sovereignty are only respected in proportion as they can be made good by physical power, she gave herself no concern with the reflection that she was one of the weakest of the states. There were single towns in the North surpassing her in population and resources. The domineering spirit

The capital of South Carolina in presence of the national army.



engendered by her despotism over slaves in the cotton plantation, she had carried into the public councils. Slavery had produced in her the same result that it has done on a grander scale in Asia—the sympathy of the Orientals centres in men, never in governments. She thought more of the dicta of Calhoun than of the Constitution. Her political leaders had found—such was the condition of public sentiment—that they could array their own private ambition against the general good.

Civil War, with all its tremendous evils, she had provoked, not because of any injustice, any tyranny inflicted on her, but only because she foresaw that, through the irresistible development of other portions of the nation, her relative influence must decline, her politicians lose their importance. She had drawn over to her views all the other slave states by teaching them that their domestic institution was in peril. It was in peril, not because of the North alone, but because of the civilized world. Human slavery in the nineteenth century was a political anachronism, and had no rightful claim to exist.

South Carolina believed that she was assailable only on her Atlantic front, and there she made a gallant defense—a defense on which, in her ruin, she may reflect with pride. But never did she expect that a great army, making real warfare, would pass like a tornado through her midst. The army that was coming was not like those which in the earlier days of the war waited for the roads to dry, for the weather to become cooler and then to become warmer, for the leaves to fall—armies spell-bound through dread of masked batteries. This was one which had forced the passage of the Alleghanies with many tremendous pitched battles; which had corduroyed its way for hundreds of miles through quagmires and morasses; which had crossed broad rivers, and built great bridges sometimes in a single night. When the 1st Division of the 17th Corps, its general, Mower, leading, forded and fought

its way through the wintry Salkehatchie, the water up to the shoulders of the men, South Carolina might well tremble.

From beyond the Edisto the four great columns of the national army were coming. It presented a front of more than fifty miles. Clouds of cavalry, foragers, and bummers were hovering on its flanks. A black smoke, rising to the skies, marked the track on which the avenger was approaching. For many miles the pine woods were on fire. Devastation stalked in front of the invading host. It was surrounded by flames. Ashes were in its rear.

Devastation already caused by the march.

In this her hour of dire extremity South Carolina expected the dread consequences of her willful acts. Of the inexorable conqueror she did not ask the terms of peace—she only wanted peace. The phantom president at Richmond was too much engrossed with cares for his own safety; he did—he could do nothing for her. The neighboring Confederate States, who through her act had felt the mailed hand of war, with joy unconcealed saw that now for South Carolina there was no escape.

Howard had crossed the Saluda, and made a flying bridge, and then laid a pontoon across Broad River. At 10 A.M. of the 17th, the mayor of Columbia came out and surrendered the city. About the same time a party of the 17th Corps crossed the Congaree in a skiff, and entered Columbia from a point immediately west. Sherman had given Howard written orders touching the conduct of the troops. These were to destroy absolutely all arsenals and public property not needed for the use of the national army, as well as all railroads, dépôts, and machinery useful in war to the enemy, but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and harmless private property. Sherman was the first to cross the pontoon bridge, and, with Howard, rode into the city. The day was clear, but the wind, which was from S.W. and W.,

Capture of Columbia.

was very high. A brigade was already properly posted on duty. Citizens and soldiers were together in the streets, and general good order prevailed. But Wade Hampton, who commanded the Confederate rear-guard of cavalry, had, in anticipation of the capture of the place, ordered that all cotton, public and private, should be moved into the streets and fired, to prevent Sherman's using it. Bales were piled every where, the ropes and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were blown about by the wind, and lodged on trees and against houses. It resembled a snow-storm. Some of these piles of cotton were burning, especially one in the very heart of the city, near the Court-house; but the fire was partially subdued by the labor of Sherman's soldiers.

Before one single public building had been fired by order, these smouldering fires, set by Wade Hampton, were rekindled by the wind and communicated to the buildings around. About dark they began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The houses were mostly wooden. The whole of Wood's division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the flames, which by midnight had become unmanageable, and raged until 4 A.M., when, the wind subsiding, they were brought under control. Sherman disclaims, on the part of his army, any agency in this destruction, and declares that it saved of Columbia whatever remained unconsumed. He charges Wade Hampton with having burned the city, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a Roman stoicism, but from folly in filling it with cotton and tinder. He says that his officers and men on duty worked hard to extinguish the flames, but others not on duty, including some officers who had long been imprisoned here, and now were rescued, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have gratified their feelings of resentment in the ruin of the capital of South Carolina. These prisoners of war,

who had been secreted by the negroes, now came forth from their concealment. They had great wrongs to avenge. By the light of the blazing houses, the overjoyed slaves ran through the streets welcoming one another. "Mister Sherman has come, wid his company." To Sherman himself they said, "We prayed dis long time for ye. De blessing ob de Lord is on ye. Bress de Lord, ye will have a place in heaben; ye will go dar, sure." The desolate whites could only say, "We never thought that you Yankees could get here." In all directions there were curses on Jefferson Davis, and on the politicians who had occasioned these calamities. After daybreak the flames were dying out, and the wind brought the distant sounds of the regimental bands. They were playing the war-chant, "Old John Brown."

So fell Columbia, the political capital of South Carolina. On the next day, February 18th, fell Charleston, the commercial capital.

When Sherman reached Branchville and destroyed the railroad there, Hardee, who, under Beauregard, was commanding in Charleston with a force of 14,000 men, saw that the fate of Pemberton awaited him unless he moved quickly. There remained but one line of railroad open to him—it was that to Florence and Cheraw. Without delay he evacuated Charleston, retreating so rapidly that he joined the main Confederate army on the border of North Carolina before Sherman could intercept him.

But he did not abandon Charleston without inflicting on it fearful injury. Under pretense of leaving as little as possible for the enemy's rapacity, he set fire to every building, warehouse, or shed stored with cotton. In vain did the citizens bring out their fire-engines and attempt to check the conflagration; it was soon uncontrollable.

It happened that a quantity of gunpowder had been

The Confederates evacuate Charleston,

and set it on fire.



placed at the dépôt of the Northwestern Railroad, and some boys, discovering it, amused themselves by throwing handfuls of it on the cotton that was burning in the street. It was not long before the powder running from their hands formed a train upon the ground leading from the cotton to the powder in the dépôt. An explosion took place which shook the whole city. About 200 people were instantly killed; the flaming ruins shot forth in every direction, and carried destruction to all that part of the town.

The devastation of public property was as complete as Hardee could make it. He burned the cotton warehouses, arsenals, quartermasters' stores, railroad bridges, two iron-clads, and some vessels in the ship-yard; but in addition to this a vast amount of private property was destroyed.

The officer in command on Morris's Island, having received information that Charleston had been evacuated, dispatched a boat to reconnoitre. Finding the rumor true, he sent a party to hoist the national flag on Fort Sumter, which was done at 9 A.M. He then passed up toward the city, on his way hoisting the flag on Fort Ripley and Castle Pinckney. He landed at Mills's Wharf, Charleston, at 10 A.M., where he learned that a part of the Confederate troops still remained, and that mounted patrols were applying the torch and driving the inhabitants before them. The national troops, General Gillmore being in command on the coast, moved into the city, aided in putting out the fires, and preserving the arsenal and railroad dépôts. They captured 450 guns.

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I have already alluded to the destruction of the two cities Columbia and Charleston (vol. i., page 565), a destruction inflicted, for the most part, by the hands of the Confederates themselves.

Responsibility of  
the Confederate  
generals for those  
conflagrations.

The conflagration of Columbia may not have been intentional. Hampton's object may have been limited to the burning of the cotton in the streets; but, though Charles-

ton had suffered much from the fire of Gillmore's guns, its ruin was deliberately ordered by the Confederate general, as was subsequently that of Richmond. In each of these instances the national generals used their utmost exertions to check the fires. In judging of the conduct of Hardee, Hampton, and Ewell, it must be borne in mind that they had already, in the case of Savannah, an example of what would ensue on the occupation of one of the great cities of the Confederacy by a national army; all parties bear witness to the fact that nothing could have been more orderly and less open to blame.

It should also be borne in mind that the burning of what is termed public property may not always be justifiable. If such property adds little or nothing to the advantage of the party into whose hands it is about to fall—if to the party about to relinquish it its destruction does not yield some conspicuous material advantage over its mere loss—if that destruction can not be carried into effect without involving much private property in a common ruin—if these be the conditions or results, then the destruction is unjustifiable.

Due weight being given to such considerations, we are constrained to infer that these acts of the Confederate generals were not justifiable, and that they who suffered from such proceedings had just cause for their loud and bitter complaints.

So insignificant in a military point of view was Charleston, that Sherman actually gives no account of its fall in his report of the campaign. The news of that event was first brought to the army by negroes.

During the 18th and 19th, the arsenal, railroad dépôts, machine shops, etc., of Columbia were destroyed by detailed working parties, and the railroad track broken down to Kingsville and the Wateree Bridge, and up in the direction of Winnsboro.

The march continued toward Winnsboro and Cheraw.

At the same time the left wing and the cavalry crossed the Saluda and Broad Rivers, breaking the railroad as they moved. For several of the following days marching was exceedingly difficult, on account of the heavy rains. The difficulties were, however, at length overcome, and this wing was put in motion for Cheraw.

On the 22d of February Kilpatrick reported that 18 of his men had been murdered by Wade Hampton's cavalry and left on the road, with labels attached to their bodies, threatening a like fate to all foragers. Sherman ordered Kilpatrick to retaliate man for man. He insisted on his right to forage on the country. "It is a war-right as old as history; but, if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions, I will forbid all foraging. I assert my war-right to forage, and I will protect my foragers to the extent of life for life."

The right wing had crossed over the Catawba before the heavy rains set in. It then moved straight on Cheraw. Detachments were sent to Camden to burn the bridge over the Wateree, with the railroad *dépôt*, stores, etc.

On the 2d of March the leading division of the 20th Corps entered Chesterfield, and the next day the 17th Corps entered Cheraw, the enemy retreating across the river and burning the bridge. At Cheraw much ammunition and many guns were found. They had been brought from Charleston when that city was evacuated.

On the 8th the army crossed the line which divides South from North Carolina. The day before —the day of departure from the former state —was one of the few fair ones of the campaign. It was sunny and bright. For the first time since leaving Savannah dust rose into the air from the tread of the columns. When evening came, the troops went into camp under a beautiful sky, the night-wind murmuring in the tops of the lofty pines. North Carolina, it was well known, had been

Capture of Chesterfield and Cheraw.

Sherman's army enters North Carolina.

dragged into the secession movement by her thoughtless and impetuous neighbor. The invading soldiery bore her conduct in mind. They spontaneously kept their ranks; there was no plundering, no violence, no column of smoke following their track. The march was now directed on Fayetteville, over roads that had to be corduroyed for miles. But the army was in the highest spirits. The forests were re-echoing to the woodcutter's axes, and the pioneers cheerily shouting as they brought the pine-poles along. Fayetteville was reached on March 11th. There, as elsewhere, the people were loud in their denunciations of Davis and his despotism. They considered that he had abandoned them to their fate.

On the march from the Pedee Kilpatrick was surprised by Wade Hampton, who captured the camp of one of his brigades, and the house in which he had his quarters. Kilpatrick surprised by Wade Hampton. Kilpatrick, however, succeeded in rallying his men, on foot, in a swamp near by, and recovered his artillery, horses, camp, and every thing save some prisoners whom the enemy carried off.

After the capture of Columbia, Sherman could choose between Charlotte and Wilmington, feigning on the one and marching on the other. But the Confederate commander must choose between Charlotte and Goldsboro. They were too far distant to be both defended. If he chose Goldsboro, Sherman could march unopposed through Charlotte to the James; if he chose Charlotte, Goldsboro and the sea-board were open; the army, too weak to hold Columbia, must lose everything south of the Roanoke. Sherman pushed his advantage to the utmost.

From the Salkehatchie the form of the army front was always concave. On arriving at rivers, the passage was forced by first one and then the other of the cusps, or by both at once. The centre never met any serious opposition; the right was fighting every day. After March 6th the concave was changed into a convex form. At any



moment Sherman could put more than half his force in line of battle if attacked on his left flank.

The 12th, 13th, and 14th were passed at Fayetteville. Capture of Fayetteville. The arsenal, and a vast amount of machinery which had been brought here from Harper's Ferry, was destroyed. At this time Sherman had with him 65,000 fighting men, 40,000 animals, and 3000 wagons. Twenty-five thousand non-combatants had joined the army since leaving Savannah. They were chiefly negro women and children. The droves of cattle increased at every step. From the rear of the vast procession arose the multitudinous discordant sounds of the captured animals.

Until this period Sherman had succeeded in interposing The Confederate forces concentrate, his superior army between the scattered parts of the enemy. Now, however, the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been re-enforced by Cheatham's corps from the West, and the garrison of Augusta. They had had time to move to his front and flank about Raleigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear River ahead of Sherman, and could therefore complete a junction with the armies in North Carolina. Davis had taken no steps to defend South Carolina until the destruction of Columbia. Then it was too late. He relieved Beauregard from the chief command of the Confederate forces operating against Sherman, and un-

and Johnston again placed in command. willingly reappointed Johnston. That skillful and experienced general took up a position at Charlotte, concentrating the forces collected from the Carolinas, and waiting the arrival of some remnants of Hood's troops from the West. In Johnston's presence it was necessary for Sherman to move with great caution;

Sherman in communication with Terry and Schofield. but he had now come into communication with Terry and Schofield, at Wilmington, by way of Cape Fear River. He had already sent messengers to Wilmington. The news they bore, "We are all well," on reaching the government at Wash-

ington, was published in a bulletin by the Secretary of War. It was the first received since the army left Savannah. On the 12th a tug-boat reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, bringing intelligence from "the outer world." By her Sherman sent back dispatches to Terry and to Schofield at Newbern, informing them that he should feign on Raleigh, but would march on Goldsboro, which place he expected to reach about the 20th, and ordered them to the same point.

The weather continued very bad; the land was undulating, and covered with pine forests. Rain-drops were unceasingly dripping from the needle-shaped leaves. The woods gave no shelter. The roads had become quagmires. Almost every foot had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of wheels. Nevertheless, so important was punctuality, that the columns moved out from Cape Fear River on the 15th of March. Near Averysboro the enemy was encountered by Slocum. Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and South Rivers, hoping to hold Sherman, and save time for the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point in his rear—Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro. Though the ground was so soft that horses sank every where, and the men could hardly make their way over it, the Confederates, after a severe conflict, amid showers of rain and gusts of wind, were dislodged. The whole line advanced late in the afternoon, drove the enemy within his intrenched line, and pressed him so hard that the next morning he was gone, having retreated in a stormy night over dreadful roads, not on Raleigh, but on Smithfield. In this affair Sherman's loss was 12 officers and 65 men killed, and 477 wounded. The Confederates left on the field 108 dead.

Leaving a division to keep up a show of pursuit, Slocum's column turned to the right, moving toward Goldsboro. The wagon trains and guards, and also Howard's

column, were wallowing along the miry roads toward Bentonville and Goldsboro. Nature was beginning to present a more pleasing aspect. The peach and apple trees were in full bloom, covered with their pink and white blossoms. The odors of the pines and cedars pervaded the air.

On the 18th of March, when near Bentonville, Slocum again encountered the Confederate army, receiving and repulsing six distinct assaults.

The battle of  
Bentonville.

The forces here met were Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, 10,000 strong; Hardee's force, from Charleston, 9000; and Hampton's cavalry, 5000—in all, 24,000. Hoke, with 9000, had not yet joined. Johnston was in command, and had moved by night from Smithfield with great rapidity, intending to surprise and overwhelm Sherman's left wing. During the following night Slocum brought up his wagon train, with its guard of two divisions, and Hazen's division of the 15th Corps, which re-enforcement enabled him to make his position impregnable. The right wing encountered a considerable body of cavalry behind a barricade, at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the battle-field of the day before. Its resistance was, however, quickly overcome, and the intersection of the roads secured. Such movements were now made by Sherman that by 4 P.M. a strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his intrenched position, and Johnston was thrown on the defensive, with Mill Creek and a single bridge in his rear. On the 21st a steady rain prevailed, during which Mower's division of the 17th Corps, on the extreme right, worked round the enemy's flank, and nearly reached the bridge across Mill Creek, the only line of Confederate retreat. There was now danger that the enemy would turn on Mower all his reserves, and abandon the parapets to overwhelm him. Sherman therefore ordered a general attack by his skirmish line from left to right. Quite a noisy battle ensued, during which Mower was enabled to recover his connection with his own corps. Alarmed by what had

taken place, Johnston that night retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets and many dead and wounded to fall into Sherman's hands. In these engagements the Confederate loss was probably 3000. Sherman lost at Bentonville 1646.

The main army, under Sherman in person, being at Bentonville, Schofield, on the 21st, occupied Goldsboro. Terry, holding the Neuse ten miles above, connected with Blair's corps at Cox's Bridge. The three armies were in actual connection, holding both banks of the river, and having free communication with the sea both by the river and the double line of railroad to Newbern and Wilmington.

In undertaking this march two military objects had been contemplated: (1), to cut off Lee's resources, and confine him to Virginia; (2), to mass an overwhelming force against him. Both had been thoroughly accomplished. Sherman had now, between Goldsboro and Bentonville, 100,000 men. Something not less important than these military objects had been accomplished—the spirit of the insurgent people had been completely broken.

The chief engineer, Colonel Poe, in his Report of the march, states:

“It involved an immense amount of bridging of every kind known in active campaigning, and some four hundred miles of corduroying. The latter was a very simple affair where there were plenty of fence rails, but, in their absence, involved the severest labor. It was found that a fence on each side of the road furnished enough rails for corduroying it so as to make it passable. I estimate the amount of corduroying at fully one hundred miles for each army corps. This is a moderate estimate, and would make for the four corps some four hundred miles of corduroying. The cavalry did very little of this kind of work, as their trains moved with the infantry columns.

“The right wing built fifteen pontoon bridges, having an aggregate length of 3720 feet; the left wing built about 4000 feet, being a total of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles. There were no measurements of the amount of trestle bridge built, but it was not so great.”

Occupation of  
Goldsboro, and  
successful end  
of the march.

Engineering difficulties that had been overcome.



The railroads back to the sea-ports of Wilmington and Beaufort were quickly repaired. The army is re-fitted. The army moved into camp to rest and receive the supplies and clothing it needed. The men had been working in rain and in water during a march of four hundred miles, and required clothing throughout.

Sherman, now leaving Schofield in command, went to City Point, and reached Grant's head-quarters on the evening of the 27th of March.

On the 10th of April the men were all reloaded, the wagons reloaded, and forage accumulated ahead. Stoneman, who, as previously mentioned, had been in command of a division of cavalry operating in East Tennessee in connection with Thomas, now, under Sherman's orders, reached the railroad about Greensboro, North Carolina, pushed along it to Salisbury, destroying bridges, culverts, and dépôts. He extended the break on this railroad down to the Catawba Bridge—a severe blow to the armies of Lee and Johnston, who depended on it for supplies, and as their ultimate line of retreat.

Johnston was at this time at Smithfield, intervening between Sherman and Raleigh. It is ready to resume hostilities, At daybreak on the 10th, all the heads of Sherman's columns were in motion against the enemy. Thereupon Johnston rapidly retreated across the Neuse River, and, having the railroad to lighten his trains, could retreat faster than Sherman could pursue. The rains had set in, making it necessary to corduroy the roads to pass even ambulances. Inspired by the news which reached them of Grant's success, the soldiers, in spite of the tempestuous weather and dreadful roads, pushed on, the Confederate army retreating rapidly from Hillsboro to Greensboro, intending to make

its way by Salisbury and Charlotte, when, when a letter from Johnston is received. on the 14th of April, Sherman received a letter from Johnston, which was followed, as we shall find on a subsequent page, by very important events.

## CHAPTER XC.

### THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND BY THE ARMY OF THE EAST.

In the spring of 1865 the condition of the Confederacy was evidently becoming desperate. Extraordinary measures were therefore taken to meet the crisis. General Lee was promoted to the command of all the Confederate forces, and, though it had denounced that policy when adopted by the national government, the Confederacy now determined to arm the slaves.

On the 29th of March General Grant resumed offensive operations, acting by his left. THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS was fought and won by Sheridan. The lines of Petersburg were assaulted and carried.

Richmond was instantly evacuated by the Confederate army. That city and Petersburg were entered by the national troops. The President of the Confederacy and his Cabinet escaped. The city was set on fire by a Confederate general, and sacked by its own populace.

The flag of the United States was raised on the Capitol of the Confederacy.

WINTER in those states that were the seat of war was now passing away; the season for reopening the campaign was at hand. Though Richmond was beleaguered on all sides, and, under Grant's remorseless strategy, the Confederate armies were disappearing, the inhabitants of that capital, from whom a knowledge of the true state of affairs was sedulously concealed, still trusted in the valor of their troops and the strength of their fortifications. To them the danger did not seem more imminent than after the battle of Malvern Hill, and from that they had come forth with glory. Their journals supplied them with acceptable but fictitious news of the exhaustion and defeats of their enemies, and of resplendent Southern victories. A light was shining over the Confederacy, but it was the corruption-gleam of death.

Some minor affairs had taken place. On the night of the 23d of January the three Confederate iron-clads Virginia, Richmond, and Fredericksburg attempted to destroy Grant's shipping in the

Grant's spring campaign, 1865.

Minor antecedent affairs.

James, induced to this by the withdrawal of troops and ships for the attack on Wilmington; they were accompanied by five steamers and three torpedo-boats. Two of the iron-clads ran aground, one of the steamers had to be blown up, and the expedition failed.

On the 5th of February Grant made an abortive attempt to turn the Confederate lines at Hatcher's Run. It cost him 2000 men, the Confederates losing about 1000. The only success gained was an extension of his line westward a short distance. At this time his lines reached Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon Railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.

On February 9th, 1865, Lee was promoted from the command of the Army of Northern Virginia to that of all the military forces of the Confederacy. Things were obviously drawing to a close. On the 3d of March Grant addressed Stanton:

“General Ord met General Longstreet a few days ago, at the request of the latter, to arrange for the exchange of citizen prisoners and prisoners of war improperly captured. He had my authority to do so, and to arrange it definitely for such as were confined in his department. A general conversation ensued on the subject of the war. It has induced the [following] letter. I have not returned any reply, but promised to do so at 12 M. to-morrow. I respectfully request instructions.”

Letter of Grant  
to Stanton.

The letter here referred to is from General Lee. It is dated March 2d:

“GENERAL,—Lieutenant General Longstreet has informed me that, in a recent conversation between himself and Major General Ord as to the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the present unhappy difficulties by means of a military convention, General Ord stated that if I desired to have an interview with you you would not decline, provided I had authority to act. Sincerely desiring to leave nothing untried which may put an end to the calamities of war, I propose to meet you at such time and place as you may designate, with the hope that, upon an interchange of views, it may be found practicable to submit the subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a convention of the kind mentioned.

III.—N N

—N N

"In such event, I am authorized to do whatever the result of the proposed interview may render necessary or advisable.

"Should you accede to this proposition, I would suggest that, if agreeable to you, we meet at the place selected by Generals Ord and Longstreet for their interview at 11 A.M. on Monday next."

To Grant's letter the Secretary of War replied :

"The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of Lee's army, or on solely minor and purely military matters.

"He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political question. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages."

Grant therefore replied courteously to Lee, declining the interview, on the ground that authority to act in the matter was vested in the President of the United States alone. He also addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, which it is proper here to quote, as it throws light on his subsequent action in the negotiations between Sherman and Johnston. It is dated March 4th :

"I can assure you that no act of the enemy will prevent me from pressing all the advantages gained to the utmost of my ability ; neither will I, under any circumstances, exceed my authority, or in any way embarrass the government.

"It was *because* I had no right to meet General Lee on the subject proposed by him that I referred the matter for instruction.

"I have written a letter to General Lee, a copy of which will be sent you by to-morrow's mail."

In the beginning of March Lee had determined to evacuate Petersburg and Richmond, and to join Johnston's army. From all directions troops were converging upon him. His strength was daily diminishing, and it was not possible for him to conceal from himself that the last hour of the Confederacy was approaching. The territory controlled by Davis had shrunk into small dimensions—a part of Virginia and a part of North Caro-



lina; there was not meat enough in that territory to sustain the army. The capture of Wilmington had closed the avenue from Nassau, and cut off all foreign sources of supply. Should Grant succeed, as now appeared to be inevitable, in breaking the Danville Railroad, it would bring affairs instantly to a crisis. Davis made convulsive efforts to escape the impending doom. A tax bill provided that agriculturists must pay in kind one tenth of their produce. All property, real and personal, must pay 8 per cent.; specie, bullion, and bills of exchange, 20 per cent. A tax of 25 per cent. was imposed on all coin held by banks or individuals in excess of two hundred dollars. It was also determined to arm the slaves. We have seen (vol. iii., p. 485) the circumstances under which this policy had been adopted. Again and again we have remarked how bitterly such a course in the national government had been denounced by the Confederate. It was this that had led to the massacre of Fort Pillow, and to the barbarities of Andersonville; it was this that had stopped the exchange of prisoners. Now, notwithstanding all that had been said, the Confederates resolved to make soldiers of their slaves. But every one felt that the object for which the war had ostensibly been entered upon—the interests of slavery—was sacrificed. As it was, the arming of the slaves was conceded too late. Before it could be carried into effect the Confederacy had ceased to exist. Yet it was well that the measure was adopted; it showed the Southern people the insincerity, the duplicity of their political guides.

If Lee remained in Petersburg, his destruction became unavoidable as soon as Sherman crossed the Roanoke, a movement which Johnston could not prevent. If Lee, joined by Johnston while Sherman's army was refitting, should make an attack on Grant behind his intrenchments, there was no hope that they could be successful. Grant could hold them at bay until Sherman came up, when there

would be no possibility of their escape; starvation, if nothing else, would compel their surrender.

These considerations drew Lee to the conclusion that there was no other course for him than to evacuate Richmond and Petersburg, and attempt to join Johnston in North Carolina. Grant saw this equally clearly, and for many days was filled with anxiety lest Lee should prematurely escape. It was for him to strike the retreating army the moment it attempted its movement. He accordingly, as we are now to see, did so strike, breaking Lee's army to pieces, and putting the Confederate government to an ignominious flight.

Grant's forces for the campaign.

On the 20th of March, 1865, Grant had the following strength:

Army of the James . . . . .	35,411
“ “ “ Potomac . . . . .	84,778
	<u>120,189</u>

Meade was, as before, second in command. The posting of the troops was: Ord on the right, north of the James; then Parke, Wright, Humphreys, in succession; and on the left, Warren.

Though we have no official returns, there is reason to believe that Lee's effective force on that day was at least 70,000 men.

On the 24th of March, Grant issued instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond on the 29th.

When Lee found that he must prepare to evacuate his position, he planned an assault on Grant's right, in order to facilitate his escape. The attack was to be on Fort Steedman, near the site of Burnside's mine. Lee thought that there was a possibility that he might reach Grant's railroad, and perhaps burn his stores at City Point. In the confusion, Longstreet and Hill might march southward, and the assaulting column follow

His attack on Fort Steedman.

them, as it was hoped that Grant would weaken his left to succor the threatened point.

Before morning broke on March 25, squads of Confederates, with arms in their hands, stole into the national lines in front of Fort Steedman, the opposing works being at that point scarcely a hundred yards apart. They were received, without any suspicion, as deserters, such affairs being quite a common occurrence. Suddenly, about half past five, they rose on the pickets and overpowered them; the abatis in front was opened, and three columns emerged from the Confederate works, under the command of Gordon. The central column rushed upon Fort Steedman, and instantly carried it; the other two took some small batteries to the right and left. They captured 500 prisoners. Powerful supporting columns of 20,000 men had been prepared to follow up Gordon's assault, but they failed to move forward.

Parke, who held the line at the point where the assault had been made, telegraphed thrice within half an hour to head-quarters, but received no reply. At length came a dispatch, "General Meade is not here; the command devolves upon you." Couriers were at once sent to City Point, but before Meade could arrive the affair was over. The batteries on the hill in the rear had checked the central column. The right had been stopped by Hartranft's division. The assailants were huddled together in the works they had taken, and, afraid to pass through the fire sweeping the track of their retreat, 2000 of them surrendered. Of the 5000 who made the attack, 3000 were killed, wounded, or captured.

Blame has been attached to those who failed to push forward the supporting force. The enterprise was, however, too desperate; and perhaps blame attaches rather to the conception than to the execution of the scheme.

The assault repulsed, Meade, who had now reached the ground from City Point, at once ordered the 2d and 6th

Corps to advance. They captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in their front, and took 834 prisoners. The Confederates made energetic attempts to retake the line, but failed. What was still worse, Grant did not weaken his left, and hence the object of the whole operation of Lee was abortive. Grant's movements were neither hastened nor retarded.

Sherman, his march through the Carolinas completed, had an interview with Grant at City Point on the 27th of March, and arrangements were made between them for conjoint action.

At this time Grant was full of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. He was firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave Richmond, and, should his junction with Johnston occur, an expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might be the result. Grant therefore determined not to delay his proposed attack.

Apprehensions of Grant that Lee will escape.

Instructions were given to Sheridan, who had been absent eight months when he rejoined Grant, to reach the right and rear of the enemy, and attack him if he should come out of his intrenched position; if he did not, to push for the Danville Road, and destroy it; then to pass on to the Southside Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that.


Instructions to Sheridan.

Though Sheridan's horses had suffered greatly in his recent operations, he had now been re-enforced, so that his strength was 9000 men. The Confederate cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee was scarcely one third of that number.

On the morning of Wednesday, the 29th of March, the movement began. Grant and his staff left City Point for the front, 18 miles distant. Lincoln accompanied them to the train. As they stepped on board, he stood grasping the iron rod at the rear of the

The final movement.





THE CAMPAIGN OF GRANT.

car, and saying, "I wish I could go with you." The cavalry moved down the Jerusalem Plank Road in two columns, of which Crook commanded the right, and Merritt the left; at night they had reached Dinwiddie Court-house. Warren marched by the Quaker Road, with Griffin in advance. Humphreys crossed Hatcher's Run, moving through the woods on Warren's right. The left of the infantry line extended to the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road. The position of the troops, from left to right, was: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke. The national line extended, without a break, from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie Court-house.

The plan was originally for the two infantry corps to appear on the Confederate right flank, while Sheridan made a wide detour through Dinwiddie to reach and break up the railroad; but, during the day, so satisfactory did things appear, that Grant was induced to change his mind. When he reached Gravelly Run he wrote to Sheridan countermanding the previous order:

"I feel now like ending this matter, if it be possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning, push round the enemy if you can, and get in his right rear."

Lee could extend his lines no farther for want of men. His last effort had been to continue his intrenchments two miles westward, terminating in a crotchet northward. His right was a mile west of Five Forks, a point where several roads intersected. It was three miles from the Southside Railroad. His army was posted as follows: Ewell commanded the garrison in Richmond; Longstreet, below that city north of the James, and across the river nearly to Petersburg; Gordon was at Petersburg, and Hill south and west of that place.

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to

Sheridan advances toward Five Forks. move wheeled vehicles except as corduroyed roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court-house toward Five Forks, where he found the enemy in force. Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of getting across the latter. He was directed to hold on where he was and fortify. Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into their main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's mills. Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault. The two latter reported favorably. As the enemy confronted the national army at every point from Richmond to its extreme left, Grant conceived that their lines must be weakly held, and might be penetrated. He determined, therefore, to extend his own line no farther, but to re-enforce Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and enable him to turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault their lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when they assaulted Fort Steedman, particularly favored this. It had brought the belligerent lines so close that in some places it was but a moment's run from one to the other.

Lee, at this moment, mistook Grant's intention. He thought it was only to cut the railroads; he therefore stripped the Petersburg intrenchments as much as he could with safety, and obtained, on the 31st, a force of about 20,000, chiefly the divisions of Pickett and Johnson, to meet the threatened attempt. Time would have failed had it not been for the opportune fall of rain. That delayed Warren and Sheridan more than them; and on the morning of the 31st they had managed to pass beyond the extremity of the intrenched line, and were on the White Oak Road approaching Five Forks.

Lee's left. It was on the discovery of this  
and thereby weakens his left. This extension toward Five Forks weakened

that Wright and Parke reported that they could assault successfully.

Warren's corps (5th), consisting of the divisions of Crawford, Griffin, and Ayres, was nearly at the White Oak Road. On its right was Humphreys, but its left was unprotected, as Sheridan was at Dinwiddie. Ayres's division was in advance, Crawford's next, and Griffin's in the rear, the three being en echelon. Winthrop's brigade, of Ayres's division, was reconnoitring the White Oak Road west of the Confederate works. Lee's column came up, overthrew Winthrop, and then the remainder of Ayres's division; that disorganized Crawford's; but Griffin, aid being sent to him, repulsed the assault, and the White Oak Road was gained.

Lee's column now turned on Sheridan, who had taken possession of Five Forks. The Confederate Sheridan forced back temporarily. infantry fell upon his advance and drove it back in confusion toward Dinwiddie; the Confederates, however, were checked at the crossing of Chamberlain's Creek. Grant, in his report, speaking of Sheridan's conduct at this moment, says:

"Here General Sheridan displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of woods and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie Court-house."

McKenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th Corps were ordered to his assistance. Grant now, finding that Humphreys could hold the position on the Boydton Road, ordered the two other divisions of the 5th Corps to go to Sheridan. Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren instead of Humphreys, as was intended. The night was intensely dark as Warren hastened to Dinwiddie; and now the Confederates, fearing that the 5th Corps would march on the White Oak Road, seize Five



Forks and cut off their retreat, about midnight abandoned their position in Sheridan's front, and fell back to the Forks.

On the morning of April 1st Sheridan moved against Five Forks. He had 9000 cavalry, and the 5th Corps, about 12,000 strong. The rest of the army Grant had in the intrenched lines.

He advances again toward Five Forks.

Sheridan's plan was to drive the enemy back to Five Forks with the cavalry, and with it make a feint of turning their right; then, under its screen, secretly to move the 5th Corps on the enemy's left, and throw it against that flank. He expected thus to cut the whole force off from Petersburg and capture it.

There was no difficulty in executing the first part of the plan. By 2 P.M. Sheridan had forced the Confederates into their main works at the Forks, and was masking the movement of his infantry. He dispatched McKenzie's cavalry along the White Oak Road to guard against any attack in the direction of Petersburg on what would become his right and rear. McKenzie met such a force, attacked it, and drove it back toward Petersburg.

Battle of Five Forks.

The 5th Corps was now advancing, Crawford on the right, Ayres on the left, Griffin behind Crawford. On reaching the White Oak Road, Warren brought his line at right angles to it, facing westward. The corps now overlapped the Confederate flank. Before Crawford and Griffin had completed their change of front, Ayres had become engaged, and came under a fire which reached to the left of Crawford. The latter therefore moved somewhat to the right to draw his left out of the fire. This uncovered Ayres's right; his men broke, unable to stand the fire. Warren now restored the line by throwing Griffin into the interval, and Crawford could thus extend toward the Confederate rear.

The charge was now made. Ayres carried every thing in

his front, capturing the works and more than a thousand prisoners; Griffin, on Ayres's right, captured the works in his front and 1500 prisoners; Crawford seized the Ford Road in the enemy's rear. The heavy firing upon his right was the signal for Merritt to sound the charge for his cavalry, who, rushing straight from the southward at the works in their front, carried every thing before them, but not without severe loss. A most desperate resistance was made. Riderless horses were galloping over the plain, snuffing the air with terror, and screaming with fright. The Confederates, assailed in front, on their right, and their rear, were totally overwhelmed.

Sheridan had ordered that, as soon as the position was forced, there should be no halt to reform broken lines, but the pursuit should be pushed.

Pursuit of the Confederates.

Lee's army was dripping with blood. It had lost dreadfully at Fort Steedman, and now again at Five Forks. Its right wing was remorselessly pursued for six miles along the White Oak Road. More than 5000 prisoners were taken, with 4 guns and many colors. Sheridan's loss was not more than 1000. Of that number, 634 were of Warren's corps.

There were few battles in the Civil War more brilliant than this of Five Forks—none more decisive. Sheridan's firmness had been proved at Murfreesborough, his energy at Missionary Ridge, his generalship in the sortie of Early. The battle of Five Forks displayed all those qualities at once.

The news of Pickett's disaster quickly reached Lee. For once his feelings overcame him—he uttered a word of reproach—the next time his troops went into the field he would lead them himself. He saw the ominous position of affairs. His right flank was turned, the enemy was in his rear. To-morrow his lines would be assaulted. All that he now could do was to hold back the enemy until a retreat could be secured.

Grant at once communicated the news of Sheridan's success to the army; it was received with deafening cheers; but he feared that Lee might abandon his lines during the night, and, falling upon Sheridan before assistance could be given, expel him from his position, and open the way for a retreat. He therefore sent to him a division of Humphreys's corps, and kept up a terrific cannonade along the whole line all night.

At 4 o'clock on Sunday morning, April 2d, Grant delivered the mortal blow. The cannonade suddenly stopped, and the troops advanced toward the enemy's lines in one overwhelming assault from the Appomattox to Hatcher's Run, Wright in the centre, Ord on the left, Parke on the right.

In Parke's assault, Wilcox's division was to make a feint in front of Fort Steedman, those of Potter and Hartranft on the left, on the site of the mine explosion. Wilcox's feint succeeded. He carried the outer line in his front. The other two divisions rushed forward. Hartranft captured 12 guns and 800 prisoners. Potter forced the enemy back into their interior line of works. He made a determined effort to break that line, and was wounded in so doing. The success elsewhere had been so complete that he was ordered not to continue the attempt, but simply to strengthen his position.

Wright's corps, the 6th, stood next to the 9th. It had been formed into a wedge. It advanced at the signal of a single gun. It found that the point at its front had been weakened by the withdrawal of troops. It swept off all resistance; it cut through three lines of abatis, capturing thousands of prisoners, and dividing the Confederate army in two. Then, followed by portions of Ord's and Humphreys's commands, who had carried every thing in their fronts, it swung to the right, and moved straight toward Petersburg, leaving that part of the Confederate force which had been severed from the

Grant's measures  
to detain Lee.

Assault on Lee's  
lines.

It is successful: the  
lines are broken.

main army to be disposed of by Sheridan. That portion fled northward, crossing Hatcher's Run, and taking up a position at Sutherland's Station. Here it was overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement ensued until the approach of Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station toward Petersburg, when the enemy broke in the utmost confusion, leaving their guns and hundreds of prisoners. The remnant fled to the Appomattox, over which it escaped by fording, and joined Lee in his retreat.

On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, Gibbon's division came upon two strong inclosed works, the most salient and commanding south of Petersburg, Fort Alexander and Fort Gregg. These were all that stood in the way of his direct advance on the city. The former was instantly carried, but the resistance at Fort Gregg was so severe that Gibbon's troops were forced back. Again and again they returned to the assault, and thrice recoiled. At length they gained the crest, and a hand-to-hand struggle ensued. They held their ground, carried the fort, and found that, of 250—its garrison—only 30 survived. Their own loss was not less than 500.

Lee, Hill, and Mahone were in Petersburg listening to the roar of the battle, and consulting together on their movements. The sounds were evidently coming nearer. "How is this, general?" said Lee to Hill. "Your men are giving way." Hill put over his uniform a rough coat, and rode forward at once with a single orderly to reconnoitre. In a wooded ravine he came upon half a dozen soldiers in blue. They fired their rifles, and Hill fell dead on the spot.

Before midday the entire exterior defenses had been captured, Lee's lines broken, his army irretrievably ruined; he had lost thousands of men, and many guns; there was imminent danger that his retreat would be blocked. In Richmond, for it was Sunday (April 2, 1865), the people had assembled in

Death of General Hill.

Davis notified that Richmond must be evacuated.



the churches, knowing little of what was going on twenty miles distant at the front. Davis had repaired to his customary place of worship, and was engaged in his devotions. There came up the aisle a messenger, who handed him a dispatch from Lee, briefly informing him that Richmond must be instantly evacuated.

A livid pallor passed over the face of the ruined president. With unsteady steps he silently retired.

Every one present perceived that something dreadful had happened. The news quickly passed Alarm in the city. from lip to lip, from church to church. From the pulpits, which had so often proclaimed that God was fighting for the Confederacy, it was now announced that great disasters had befallen, and that the congregations would probably never assemble again.

All winter Richmond had been fed with rumors of the most gratifying kind. The newspapers published nothing except what was acceptable to, or furnished by the War Department. To the last—to this beautiful Sunday morning, for the day was bright and balmy—it gave itself up to welcome delusions. There were rumors in the streets that Johnston had destroyed Sherman, that Lee had overthrown the Yankee army. It was said that the Emperor of the French and the Queen of England had recognized the Confederacy. Richmond was soon to learn the grim reality that Grant had ended it.

Davis, on withdrawing from the church, gave orders for removing the coin in the banks to Danville, and for sending away or burning all the Confederate archives. As the day wore on the tokens of evacuation became unmistakable. The population began to converge to the Danville Railroad Station. From the height of exultation they fell into the depth of despair—it was but a step from that to abject terror. They felt that the hour of reckoning had come, in which they were to stand before the power they had so arrogantly defied. Some betook themselves to

flight, some sought concealment. Among the former, many members of the Legislature embarked on a canal-boat for Lynchburg. Vehicles commanded from eighty to one hundred dollars in gold an hour.

As night approached the tumult increased. The criminals in the State Penitentiary made their escape, their guards having fled. Orders were given that no one should be permitted to enter the Danville train without a pass from the Secretary of War—no one could find that functionary. A mob, consisting of the rabble of the town and straggling soldiers, was fast gathering in the streets. Fearing the worst, the City Council ordered all liquors to be emptied into the gutters; those sent to execute the order found that they could not prevent large quantities from being seized. The uproar now became tenfold greater. A crowd was shut up in a Pandemonium. No one in Richmond was asleep. The windows of stores were smashed, the doors broken open; goods that had run the blockade were scrambled for; on the sidewalks were scattered costly articles of dress, luxuries, broken glass; men and women, black and white, were rolling away barrels filled with spoils, and carrying off loads of plunder. Confederate paper money was thrown away in the streets; it was flying about or trampled under foot in all directions.

At some of the government offices they were attempting to pack up the archives; in front of others immense bonfires of them were burning. The negroes were standing about, wondering what was to be their fate. In the more respectable houses terror-stricken ladies were busy preparing comforts for friends departing with the army or the government, collecting valuables, or secreting correspondence. It was not until after dark that Davis could get away.

Departure of Davis  
from Richmond.

Ewell, who was in command in the city, now blew up the iron-clads, and set fire to the bridges and store-houses.

Ewell sets the city on fire.

In vain the mayor and a committee of citizens remonstrated with him, telling him that the whole city would be burnt. The conflagration was soon beyond control. A thousand houses, covering thirty squares—one third of the city—were on fire. The War Department, the Treasury, many churches and public buildings were consumed. There was a hideous mingling of the discordant sounds of human voices—the crying of children, the lamentations of women, the yells of drunken men—with the roar of the tempest of flame, the explosion of magazines, the bursting of shells. On the verge of the fire plunderers were flitting about with their booty. When the government officers had removed all that they could from the Commissary Dépôt, they abandoned the vast stores remaining; a crowd, with bags, buckets, tin pans, aprons, pushing and cursing, got entrance, and it seemed as if the building would be carried off its foundations by their press.

In the early morning Ewell rode away upon an iron-gray horse. He wore a faded cloak and a slouched hat.

About two o'clock that Monday morning (April 3d), General Weitzel, who was holding the national lines north of the James, saw a bright light in the sky in the direction of Richmond, and heard the explosions. Soon after a negro came with the news that Richmond was being evacuated.

As soon as it was light Weitzel crossed the abandoned defenses, the outer line continuous, the inner one consisting of a series of strong redoubts and bastioned forts. In these works were upward of 300 guns, many of them captured at Norfolk in the beginning of the war.

The national troops enter it.

A cry passed up the bewildered crowd in Main Street, "The Yankees are coming!" Fifty cavalrymen forced their way to the Capitol, and Lieutenant Johnston de Peyster raised the flag of

The United States flag hoisted on the Capitol.

the United States on that building. A regiment of colored cavalry was in the advance of the coming column of troops.

Capitol Square was full of furniture and valuables, a wreck rescued from the flames. Women and children, sitting upon their goods, were trying to screen themselves from the stifling heat. On the north side of the square a regiment of black cavalry was posted. At this moment it seemed as if the whole city would be consumed.

The first thing for the United States troops to do was to control the fire. The fire-engines had been disabled; it was long before they could be brought into action. Providentially, however, the direction of the wind changed, and the flames were arrested.

General Shepley, who had been put in command of New Orleans when it was captured, was put in command of Richmond. He at once issued orders forbidding officers and soldiers entering or searching any private dwelling, or removing any kind of property therefrom, under pain of immediate and summary punishment; the soldiers were to abstain from any offensive or insulting words or gestures toward the citizens, and the citizens were ordered not to use treasonable or offensive expressions insulting to the flag, the cause, or the armies of the Union. Subsequently it was declared by citizens, "Very agreeable was the disappointment at the conduct of the victorious army. The fact was that, with few exceptions, the troops behaved astonishingly well, and were remarkably courteous and respectful."

Richmond was burnt by the order, not of national, but of Confederate generals; it was sacked, not by its conquerors, but by its own rabble. For a time one third of its population were fed from the United States stores. The United States Sanitary Commission and the Christian Commission, bearing in mind their noble duty, dispensed in the hospitals whatever was wanted by the sick and wounded Confederates.

Commendable conduct of the national troops.



With Richmond were taken 1000 prisoners, 5000 sick and wounded in the hospitals, 500 cannon, 30 locomotives, 300 cars.

Petersburg was evacuated, simultaneously with Richmond. Its municipal authorities came out and surrendered it. It was taken possession of quietly, and the United States flag hoisted on the courthouse at 4.30 A.M.

Evacuation of  
Petersburg.

## CHAPTER XCI.

### THE SURRENDER OF LEE.

After the evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg, General Lee attempted so to conduct his retreat as to join the army of Johnston in North Carolina. His march was intercepted by Sheridan. He then endeavored to escape to Lynchburg. His army endured the most dreadful privations. Its retreat was finally cut off near Appomattox Court-house.


An interview took place between Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox Court-house, and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia surrendered to the national army.

THE night was moonless and dark as Lee withdrew the wreck of his army from Petersburg and Richmond. He had given orders for the shattered troops to unite at Chesterfield Court-house, a point about midway between the two cities. Ostensibly it was his intention to march toward Danville, and join the army of Johnston; but doubtless he realized, in the horrible confusion and disorder of the fleeing host, that the power of the Confederacy was not only broken, but forever gone. No order was published against straggling. The soldiers deserted almost at will, particularly the Virginia troops, who dropped off to their homes at almost every step of the route. The 40,000 men with whom the retreat commenced had dwindled greatly in numbers when it closed.

Nevertheless, for him there was but one honorable course, whatever his private conviction of the issue might be: he must energetically attempt to make good his retreat, and not surrender his army until its surrender became an undeniable military necessity.

It was Lee's intention to make as quickly as he could for It is toward Burkesville Junction. Burkesville, the junction of the Southside and Danville Railroads, 52 miles west of Petersburg. If he could reach that point and destroy the

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bridges behind him, there was a hope that his pursuers might be so delayed that he could make good his escape, and, uniting with Johnston, exact favorable terms. Twice, under like circumstances, he had been fortunate: he had made his way across the Potomac after Antietam, and again after Gettysburg.

Of Grant's army, the 5th Corps was at Sutherland's, nine miles west of Petersburg. Sheridan, with his cavalry, was ten miles still farther west. All the rest of his forces, except Weitzel, were south or southwest of Petersburg. Grant's object was to reach Burkessville in advance of Lee, so as to intercept him there. The lines of march of the two armies, the pursued and the pursuing, converged to that point. The troops of the Army of the James, under Ord, moved by the Southside Railroad; Sheridan and the 5th, 2d, and 6th Corps of the Army of the Potomac more to the north.

The roads, which are here of a stiff red clay, were very much broken, and rendered almost impassable by the recent rains. The bridges over the creeks had to be renewed, and much corduroying done. But the roads over which Lee had to pass were in a better condition than those of his antagonist's line of march.

Lee, with all speed, made his way due west, crossing the Appomattox River, and reaching Amelia Court-house on Tuesday, the 4th. But there was no lingering on the part of his ever-watchful antagonist.

At Amelia Court-house Lee struck the Danville Railroad. He had ordered supplies for his army to meet him at that point—a quarter of a million of rations. His men had started on the march provided only for a single day. With dismay he learned that the train which had duly brought these supplies had been ordered on to Richmond by the authorities there the previous Sunday to carry away the fugitive officials. It had gone without unloading the supplies. In

Lee is constrained to halt at Amelia Court-house.




this supreme moment the army had been sacrificed for the safety of the politicians. The men were famishing. It was absolutely necessary to halt, during the 4th and the 5th, to obtain subsistence from the surrounding country. All the advantages of the start and the forced march were lost.

This delay enabled Sheridan, with his cavalry, to overpass Lee, and reach the Danville Railroad at Jetersville, seven miles southwest of Amelia, the advance sweeping down to Burkesville.

Sheridan intervenes between him and Burkesville. The 5th Corps was rapidly following. At Jetersville Sheridan heard that Lee was still at Amelia Court-house. He saw with delight that he had intercepted the Confederates. He sent an urgent request to Meade, who was sixteen miles in the rear, sick, and his troops encamped for the night, to hurry up. "Do I understand that General Sheridan believes that Lee's army will be destroyed or captured if my troops reach the Danville Railroad by morning?" "Yes, sir," was the reply. Orders were at once issued, and the wayworn men were put in motion.

To Grant Sheridan sent word: "I wish you were here yourself. I feel confident of capturing the Army of Northern Virginia. I see no escape for General Lee." Just before midnight Grant reached Sheridan's head-quarters, a little frame building near Jetersville. Sheridan was up stairs asleep, but, soon coming down, he drew on the back of a letter the positions of Lee's columns and his own troops. "Lee is caught," said Grant; "it will be hard for him to get away."

Accordingly, Meade came up with the 2d and 6th Corps. On the ensuing morning three fourths of the Army of the Potomac were at Jetersville. Lee's farther retreat in that direction was cut off. He had ordered supplies to meet him from Danville and Lynchburg at Burkesville. Even had not his dispatch been intercepted, it was impossible for him now to reach them.



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A body of Sheridan's cavalry, under Davies, making a reconnoissance, struck at Paine's Cross Roads Lee's train, which was in advance of his infantry, destroying 180 wagons, and capturing 5 guns and many prisoners.

Sheridan now advanced upon Amelia Court-house, but, Lee escapes round the national left. on nearing that place, found that Lee had escaped at nightfall on the previous evening (5th); that he had moved round the left of the national forces at Jetersville, and was trying to make his way to Farmville, where he expected to cross the Appomattox River.

It had been hoped that the Army of the Potomac would be able to force him to battle at Amelia; but that failing, the direction of the pursuing corps was changed, so that one column followed close on his rear, a second moved parallel to him on the south, a third parallel to him on the north. The Army of the James, which had reached Burkesville, was directed upon Farmville.

The famished Confederates were, however, so utterly exhausted that they could hardly move half a The cavalry overtake him at Sailor's Creek. mile an hour. At Deatonsville, Crook, who had been holding Sheridan's left, came in view of the whole retreating army struggling westward. For the purpose of detaining it, he charged it at once, not caring for the inferiority of his force. Though repulsed, he obtained time for Custer, with his division of horse, to strike it again a little farther on, and thus a weak point was found. At Sailor's Creek, Custer, joined by Crook and Devin, who promptly came up, succeeded in piercing the Confederate column; they destroyed 400 wagons, took 16 guns and many prisoners. Ewell's corps and the remnant of Pickett's division were thus cut off. They were 6000 or 8000 strong. The cavalry, by incessant charges, detained this force until Wright, with the 6th Corps, could get up. Ewell at first resisted, but, enveloped by the cavalry and the 6th Corps, his men threw down their arms

and surrendered. Five generals, more than 7000 prisoners, several hundred wagons, and many guns were taken.

That night Sheridan wrote to Grant, informing him of the success that had been achieved, and the captures that had been made. "If the thing is pressed," he added, "I think that Lee will surrender." Then he flung himself upon his back on the ground, with his feet to the fire, and was asleep in a moment. He and his staff had shared supper and blankets with the captured Confederate generals, who reclined about the fire weary and sad.

The wreck of Lee's army was now reduced to the most direful extremity. The men had nothing to eat except the young shoots of the forest trees; the horses and mules were so worn out that the roads were blocked with wagons. The soldiers were throwing away their arms and straggling off by hundreds. There was no rest for them either by night or by day. If they attempted to snatch a few moment's sleep, they were roused by the hoof-clatter of Sheridan's cavalry. A remnant, brave and unyielding as ever, kept on its weary way toward Farmville, where it hoped to cross the Appomattox, to burn the bridges in its rear, and thereby stop its pursuers.

Such, thus far, were the incidents which befell the Army of the Potomac. Meantime Ord, with his command of the Army of the James, had, on the evening of the 5th, reached Burkesville, and next morning pushed forward to Farmville, to burn the bridges and intercept Lee at that point. Ord's advance consisted of two regiments of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry under Read. It struck the head of Lee's fleeing column as it was preparing to cross the Appomattox. Read, disregarding the odds against him, and the desperation with which the enemy would fight, threw his little force upon them, in hopes of arresting their march and burning the

Ewell's corps compelled to surrender.

Deplorable condition of the retreating army.

Lee forces his way across the Appomattox.



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THE CAMPAIGN OF GRANT.



bridges in their faces. With the energy of despair they cleared their way to the bridges, hurling Read's men aside, killing him, and making good their passage over the river.

On the night of the 6th several of the Confederate generals met round a bivouac fire, and, in view of the state of affairs, decided on taking upon themselves the responsibility of advising Lee to surrender. They accordingly sent Pendleton to him to state this. But Grant spared Lee the pain of making the proposition. He had dispatched to him the following letter:

“April 7th, 1865.

“GENERAL,—The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of farther resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any farther effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States Army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

Grant asks the surrender of the Confederate army.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

“General R. E. Lee.”

Lee's way-worn column was in such a disjointed state that, though its van, which had forced its passage over the Appomattox, had advanced several miles, its rear had not crossed the river until dawn on the 7th. So close were the pursuers upon the fugitives that, though they had time to burn the railroad bridge, that on the wagon road was secured by Humphreys, who was in the lead with the 2d Corps. At once he threw a division across; the Confederate rear-guard receded, abandoning 18 guns. He kept up the pursuit four or five miles north of Farmville, when he overtook all that was left of Lee's forces, intrenched in a strong position, commanding a slope half a mile in extent, over

Lee, hoping to escape, refuses it.

which the direct advance must be made. Humphreys therefore attempted to turn the position, but was repulsed, with a loss of 600 killed and wounded. At nightfall Lee slipped off again, and, encouraged by the ephemeral gleam of success, answered Grant's letter:

“April 7th, 1865.

“GENERAL,—I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express of the hopelessness of farther resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

“R. E. LEE, General.

“Lieutenant General U. S. Grant.”

To this Grant replied:

“April 8th, 1865.

“GENERAL,—Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of the same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say that, *peace* being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon—namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

“General R. E. Lee.”

Sheridan, finding that the Confederates had passed the Appomattox, and fearing that Lee would move southwestwardly and join Johnston, dispatched, on the morning of the 7th, Merritt, with two cavalry divisions, by the left to Prince Edward Court-house. Crook, with the remaining division, forded the Appomattox near Farmville, and encountered, and was defeated by, some Confederate infantry defending a train.

At midnight came Lee's answer to Grant's letter:

“April 8th, 1865.

“GENERAL,—I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think that the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but, as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would

He inquires what terms will be offered.

Grant's reply.

Lee declines to surrender, but will treat on the general subject of peace.

lead to that end. I can not, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia; but, as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 A.M. to-morrow on the Old Stage Road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

R. E. LEE, General.

“Lieutenant General U. S. Grant.”

Early in the morning Grant dispatched the following reply:

“April 9th, 1865.

“GENERAL,—Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace. The meeting proposed for 10 A.M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

“General R. E. Lee.”

News now reaching Sheridan that there were four supply trains awaiting Lee at Appomattox Station, 28 miles distant, he at once inferred that Lee was moving to that point, and thence to Lynchburg, not to Danville. Accordingly, he pushed his cavalry forward to seize those trains. Custer, who was in the advance, reached Appomattox Station at midnight, and there found the Confederate advance just arrived. He at once got into the rear of the trains to prevent their return to Lynchburg, captured them, attacked without delay the Confederates, routing them, and taking 25 guns and a park of wagons. Sheridan was now fast coming up. He sent word to Ord and Griffin that if they would hasten there was no escape for the Confederates. They accordingly made a forced march, and reached Appomattox Station at daylight on April 9th.

Sheridan reaches Appomattox Station.

Lee, supposing that there was only a cavalry force in



his front, prepared to burst through it. He was scarcely 20 miles from Lynchburg, the goal of his march. Gordon was accordingly brought through the remnant of the wagon train, and made a reconnoissance in front. He also thought that there was nothing but cavalry in the way, and ordered his line to advance. At once, to his amazement, Sheridan withdrew his horsemen on one side, revealing the gleaming bayonets of Ord's and Griffin's lines of infantry in battle array. To attack was hopeless. Gordon dispatched a message to Lee, and sent forward a white flag to Sheridan, asking a suspension of hostilities for a little while.

The morning of the 9th was damp and foggy, but, long before it broke, Lee, clad in a new uniform, was at a camp-fire with Mahone and Longstreet; the latter, with one arm in a sling, from his old wound, sat on the trunk of a felled tree smoking a cigar. They agreed that unless Gordon succeeded there was no hope of escape. News soon came that Gordon's attempt had failed. Lee mounted his horse, saying, "General Longstreet, I leave you in charge; I am going to hold a conference with General Grant." He rode toward the national line, and on his way received Grant's letter. At once he answered:

"April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL,—I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General."

The interview requested was accorded. The following particulars are given by an eye-witness:

"Appomattox Court-house boasted of five dwellings. The largest, a square building of brick, with a yard smiling with roses, violets, and daffodils, belonged to one Wilmer McLean.

Lee orders Gordon to break through his lines.

Gordon finds it impossible.

The interview between Grant and Lee.

“Grant, accompanied by Ord, Sheridan, and their staffs, walked up to the house. Lee’s blooded iron-gray horse, wearing a one-line bridle and a plain saddle, with the owner’s initials upon a corner, was nibbling at the grass in charge of a Confederate orderly. Grant and two aids, entering the house while the rest sat down on the porch, found Lee and Colonel Marshall, his chief of staff. Lee stood beside a table, wearing a bright bluish-gray uniform, a military hat with a gold cord, buckskin gauntlets, high riding-boots, and a beautiful sword. His hair and beard were long and gray. He was tall and soldierly.

“Grant—with his slouched hat, dark blue frock-coat unbuttoned and covered with mud, gray pantaloons tucked in his soiled boots, and a dark waistcoat—wore no sword, and no indication of his rank except the double row of buttons on the breast of his coat and the three silver stars. They shook hands, sat down, and talked of business. Lee asked no modification of Grant’s terms.”

Grant, referring to these incidents, says: “When I reached Appomattox Court-house, I had ridden that morning thirty-seven miles. I was in my campaign clothes, covered with dust and mud. I had no sword. I was not even well mounted. . . . I found General Lee in a fresh suit of Confederate gray, with all the insignia of his rank, and at his side the splendid dress-sword which had been given to him by the State of Virginia.”

Grant wrote the terms he required—Lee accepted them. They were as follows:

“Appomattox Court-house, Virginia, April 9th, 1865.

“GENERAL,—In accordance with the substance of my letter to you on the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged, and

Terms of the sur-  
render.

each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of his command. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by the United States authority so long as they observe their paroles, and the laws in force where they may reside.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

“General R. E. Lee.”

“Head-quarters Army of Northern Virginia, April 9th, 1865.

“GENERAL,—I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officer to carry the stipulations into effect.

“R. E. LEE, General.

“Lieutenant General U. S. Grant.”

After the signatures were attached, Lee said that he had forgotten one thing. Many cavalry and artillery horses in his army belonged to the men in charge of them, but of course it was too late to speak of that now. Grant replied, “I will instruct my paroling officers that all the enlisted men of your cavalry and artillery who own horses are to retain them, just as the officers do theirs. They will need them for their spring plowing and other farm work.” “General,” replied Lee, with earnestness, “there is nothing that you could have done to accomplish more good either for them or the government.”

The following is the form of personal parole given by all the officers of General Lee’s army :

“We, the undersigned, prisoners of war, belonging to the Army of Northern Virginia, having been this day surrendered by General R. E. Lee, commanding said army, to Lieutenant General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, do hereby give our solemn parole of honor that we will not hereafter serve in the armies of the Confederate States, or in any military capacity whatever against the United States of America, or render aid to the enemies of the latter, until properly exchanged in such manner as shall be mutually approved by the respective authorities.

III.—P P

“Done at Appomattox Court-house, Virginia, this 9th day of April, 1865.”

An equivalent obligation was also given by officers for the subdivisions under their command.

To retain their influence in the councils of the nation, the politicians of the South had plunged a continent into agony; more than half a million of men had been sacrificed to their lust of power, many thousands of millions of dollars had been wasted. Of the men who perpetrated this great crime, not one was present in the little parlor at Appomattox Court-house.

General Lee rejoined his army to bid it farewell. Ad-  
The parting of Lee  
and his army. dressing his troops, he said: “Men! we have fought through this war together. I have done the best I could for you.” From the Rapidan to Appomattox Court-house he had indeed made a grand defense; he had shed over Virginia a mournful glory. In the Wilderness, at Spottsylvania, at the Anna, at Cold Harbor, during the siege of Richmond, and again in the final retreat, he had struggled against preponderating power. For a whole year he had tried to stay the hand of Fate. No one can read his gallant acts without lamenting that they had not been in the cause of human freedom and national unity, the ideas and purposes of the present age.

On the 12th of April, 1865, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia marched by divisions to an appointed place near Appomattox Court-house. The troops stacked their arms and deposited their accoutrements. Not more than 8000 had muskets in their hands, but there were paroled 27,805 men; 30 cannon and 350 wagons were yielded—all that were left.

The War Department at Washington issued the following order on receiving the news of the surrender:



“War Department, Washington, D. C., April 9th—10 o'clock P. M.

“*Ordered*, That a salute of two hundred guns be fired at the headquarters of every army and department, and at every post and arsenal in the United States, and at the Military Academy at West Point, on the day of the receipt of this order, in commemoration of the surrender of General R. E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia to Lieutenant General Grant and the army under his command—report of the receipt and execution of this order to be made to the Adjutant General, Washington. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.”

When General Grant assumed command of the armies of the United States (March 17th, 1864), he saw distinctly that the strength of the Confederacy lay, not in the phantom government at Richmond, nor in the enthusiasm of the insurgent people, but in the army that was operating in Georgia, and in that in Virginia. He committed the overthrow of the former to Sherman, and we have narrated how that general accomplished his task. With the destruction of the latter he charged himself. His advance toward Richmond was marked not only by the signal ability with which he subsisted and manœuvred his great army, but also by the undaunted resolution with which he kept his chief object—the annihilation of the opposing force—in view. Obligated to be the assailant in every encounter, to attack Lee's veteran troops in positions they had previously selected and fortified, to operate in a country with which he was not familiar, but which his enemy had carefully surveyed and thoroughly knew, it was not possible but that his losses should be very great. Unappalled by the battles in the Wilderness, he assaulted his antagonist at Spottsylvania; thwarted there, he repeated the attempt at the North Anna; thwarted there again, with inflexible determination he delivered an assault at Cold Harbor. “I will fight it out on this line if it takes all summer,” he wrote to the Secretary of War.

Unable to bring Lee to a decisive battle north of Richmond, he without hesitation crossed the James River and

Review of Grant's  
campaign.

uncovered Washington. The highest military authorities, some of whom had distinguished themselves by the accuracy of their conceptions of the plan of the war, thought that in doing this he had made a mistake; but, with the inspiration of military genius, Grant trusted to himself. Disappointed by the inefficiency of his subordinates in the seizure of Petersburg, with unflinching resolution he laid siege to that place. With an unrelaxing grasp he held it fast in one hand, with the other he defended Washington from Early's sortie. Even when he seemed to be inactive in his lines, the system he was pursuing was operating against the Confederates with frightful effect. Their armies were steadily wasting away. Exhaustion and debility were fast coming on. With truth he said, "They have now in their ranks their last reserves. A man lost to them can never be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and the grave to obtain their present force. They are losing at least one regiment a day. With this drain upon them, the end is not far off, if we be but true to ourselves."

When spring returned it was plain to all eyes that the days of the Confederacy were numbered. It only remained for Grant to set the time.

At a given signal, his army, in one tremendous assault from the Appomattox to Hatcher's Run, burst through the lines of Petersburg, and, in a pursuit of unparalleled energy, compelled his antagonist to surrender.

Thus was attained the object for which, during more than a year, he had struggled day and night. His losses in the campaign from the Rapidan to Appomattox Courthouse, in killed, wounded, and missing, were one hundred thousand men (99,772)—a fearful price, yet not a price too great for the perpetuity of the Republic.

In the bloodstained thickets of the Wilderness, in the awful repulse at Cold Harbor, in the weary siege of Petersburg—a summer and a winter—in the final triumph, he was equally calm. Undaunted in peril, in success he was

unmoved. He steadfastly kept in mind the duty to which he had been assigned, nor did he relax his exertions until he had accomplished it. Inexorable in warfare, he was generous to the defeated, and in the hour of completed victory imposed on his overthrown antagonist no humiliation.

His correspondence with Lee in relation to the surrender will be read every where with admiration. It exhibits no mark of vainglory, no tone of triumph. The conqueror, whose pathway had been soaked in blood, pleads with the vanquished, in the name of their common humanity, to end the conflict without the loss of another life.

## CHAPTER XCII.

### THE SURRENDER OF JOHNSTON.

A consultation took place at City Point between the President of the United States and certain officers of the army and navy.

Shortly afterward, in interviews held between Generals Sherman and Johnston, terms were suggested for the surrender of all the Confederate armies. They were referred by the former to the government.

The government refused to accede to them. General Grant repaired to Sherman's head-quarters. In another interview between Sherman and Johnston, acceptable terms for the surrender of Johnston's army were agreed upon.

The Secretary of War caused to be published in newspapers statements to General Sherman's disadvantage, and the subordinates of that officer were directed to disregard his orders. An examination of the controversy which ensued sustains that general, both as respects his opinions and his acts.

General Johnston surrendered his army, and that event was soon followed by the surrender of all the other Confederate armies.

Four persons met in the upper saloon of the steamer "River Queen," at City Point, on the 27th of March, 1865. They were: the President, General Grant, General Sherman, and Admiral Porter. No one else was present.

Lincoln looked care-worn and anxious, as though he had fled from the annoyances and importunities of the politicians at Washington, to seek for mental rest in the army of Grant. His countenance brightened, however, when the conversation turned on the promising aspect of military affairs.

The interview lasted about an hour and a half. The President was evidently persuaded that the military movements about to ensue would be successful, and was desirous that the capitulation of the Confederates should be accepted on the most favorable conditions, and as soon as possible.

His heart was full of tenderness. "As long as the rebels lay down their arms, I don't care how it is done." "Stop this bloodshed; stop this

The consultation at City Point.

The intentions of Lincoln.



horrible war; I know I can manage all the rest." Though sure that his armies were about to conquer, and that the Confederacy was a mere wreck, he wanted peace on any terms. "What signify *the terms* so long as we get peace? These people only want a good opportunity to give up gracefully."

After hearing Sherman's account of his own position and that of Johnston, Lincoln expressed fears that the latter might escape southward by the railroad, and that Sherman would have to chase him anew. But Sherman said, "He can not move southward without breaking up his army, which, once disbanded, can never again be reunited; and I have destroyed the railroads, so that they can not be used for a long time."

Grant was sitting smoking a cigar a short distance from the President. "What," said he, "is to prevent them laying the rails again?" It was the only remark he made during the interview.

"Why," replied Sherman, "my bummers haven't done things by halves. All the rails have been twisted, and are as crooked as rams' horns. They can never be used again."

The conversation then turned on the terms of surrender which should be allowed to Johnston. Sherman said, "I can command my own terms; Johnston will have to yield." Lincoln said, "Get his surrender on any terms."

It might be inferred that Grant thought the same; for, though he did not make any suggestions, he made no objections.

The interview closed, and Sherman returned to Newbern, North Carolina, in the steamer "Bat."

On the 14th of April, Sherman, whose army was then advancing upon Johnston's, received a letter requesting an armistice, and inquiring the terms on which he might surrender. With-

Sherman receives  
a letter from  
Johnston.

out delay, Sherman sent an answer to the effect that he was willing to hold a conference, and would offer the conditions entered into by Grant and Lee at Appomattox Court-house.

Sherman had heard of Lee's surrender the day before he entered Raleigh. His apprehension was that Johnston would retreat into the mountain country of South Carolina and Georgia, break up his army into small bands, and prolong the war indefinitely. He therefore turned the heads of his columns westward, in hope of intercepting Johnston's army before such a plan could be carried into effect. When the letter asking for an interview arrived, he was more than pleased.

All his officers, Howard, Slocum, Logan, Blair, etc., dreaded the consequences of chasing Johnston's army around by the West and back to the South. They urged that the surrender of that army should be procured on any terms. They had "been fighting and marching for four long years, and had had enough of it."

Sherman was at this moment at Raleigh, Johnston at Hillsboro. The lines of the former extended up to Durham's Station, twenty-seven miles. To that point the rails and wires had been repaired.

Just as he was on the point of leaving Raleigh, a telegraph operator came into the cars, and asked him to hold the train a few moments, as a cipher dispatch of very great importance was coming over the wires from Morehead City. The train was accordingly held. The dispatch was from the Secretary of War, bringing tidings of Mr. Lincoln's assassination. Sherman had been familiar with death in so many forms that no one, from his words or bearing, suspected what he had learned. The operator, who, however, understood the intelligence, was ordered, on his peril, to keep silence.

The slaveholders' rebellion was ending in the baseness

He hears of the  
assassination of  
Lincoln.

of assassination. For Lincoln, who had just triumphed over a conspiracy against the nation more audacious than that of Catiline, and which had a deeper policy than the Sicilian Vespers, there had been reserved that euthanasia described and experienced by the greatest of the Romans, who said, "The best death is that which is least expected."

It was in reference to this murder of Cæsar that Cicero advised the Roman Senate, "Let the past be forgotten; let every man go free and unquestioned for his share in it. Let there be, not pardon, nor mercy, nor even toleration, but simply oblivion;" and the Senate consented "for the sake of peace."

So, too, the American people consented, "for the sake of peace," that the crimes of those who had brought upon the nation the calamities of the four last fearful years should pass into oblivion—that retribution should not be inflicted; and, anticipating that spirit, their general was going forth to receive Johnston's surrender.

It was not possible for him to repair to such an interview without reflecting on the position of things. The proud defiance of an overbearing oligarchy had subsided into the murmurs of a ruined faction. The South had learned by bitter experience that, though people may go to war when they will, they can not withdraw from it when they like. The real cause of the end of the conflict had been, not a brilliant battle, covering even the vanquished with glory, but the more dismal process of an utter exhaustion of the war-power of the Confederacy. There was no need to seek the punishment of individuals; a more than ample retribution had been inflicted in putting the arch-traitor Slavery to death. So interwoven had human bondage been with the South that its abolishment was felt at every fireside, and disorganized every family—nay, more, the emancipation of the slave was equivalent to the confiscation of the

Change in the condition and sentiments of the South.

land, for of what value is the largest and most fertile estate when the labor necessary for working it is taken away? In the civil commotions which other nations have experienced, there had very commonly been an inherent vitality in the cause, which sustained its abettors after defeat, and lured them into renewals of their attempt. But Slavery, once crushed, had no future; there was left not even an expectation—no, not so much as a hope. The slave-owner could no longer rule Southern society—it must find its leaders in new men. The Roman oligarchy was prostrated by bringing to bear against it the will of the middle classes at the epoch when the government was transformed; and in the South new men were coming on the stage, bringing with them new ideas. The slave-lord, despotic and imperious, who suffered no restraint to be put on his will, was about to be displaced by those who had learned subordination in camps. A clamor for state-rights, which it had suited the fallen rulers to raise, was now to be replaced by something very different. The war had taught the Confederate soldier that he must abandon his petty loyalties, and substitute for his state—the political and physical insignificance of which had become unmistakably apparent—the conception of a great nation, in the grandeur and power of which he might take a just pride. It had been so in former times in Rome. Local prejudices died away in the vastness of the empire, and men—even soldiers—recognized, with profound satisfaction, that the sentiment of unity is necessarily connected with the sentiment of universal peace—a grand and noble idea.

But not alone had the new men—the soldiery—changed. The Southern people were no longer what they had been. They had lost that enthusiastic courage which arose from the preposterous belief that God was defending their cause. Weary of the struggle they had provoked, crushed down by the disasters they had experienced, they earnestly hoped for peace. The confidence they had reposed in their polit-



ical leaders was entirely gone. They had entered on the conflict in the expectation that they should rid themselves of the mild restraints of the Union, and found that they had passed into the power of a ferocious despotism which, caring nothing for the fiction of state-rights, or the realities of individual rights, remorselessly conscripted their persons and confiscated their goods. A time comes in all civil wars when a desire for the tranquil possession of property outweighs all care for liberty. Men then prefer that government, regardless what its name or form may be, which intermeddles with them individually the least.

Changed men and changed ideas—these were the facts which the South presented. In settling the basis for a new departure, was it better to go back to the old, the ruined, or to coalesce with the vigorous, the new?

It was a very beautiful morning when Sherman set out for his interview with the Confederate commander. The air was full of the fragrance of fruit-trees just bursting into blossom. Durham's Station was reached about 10 o'clock. After riding half a dozen miles farther, Johnston was met. The two generals greeted each other very cordially. They repaired to a small farm-house on the brow of a hill a little distance back, and, asking permission of the owner, obtained the use of a room. An orderly brought pens, ink, and paper, and, closing the door, left them alone.

It was remarked that Wade Hampton, the South Carolina cavalry officer, lay stretched all the time upon a broken-down carpenter's bench by the side of the house. South Carolina had brought on the civil war. Was this all the influence she could excite in its closing scenes?

Johnston was ten or twelve years older than Sherman; his hair and beard were quite gray. In person he was short, stout, compact. He wore his gray uniform, which harmonized well with his appearance, buttoned to the neck.

Interview between  
Sherman and John-  
ston.

After some unimportant preliminary conversation, Sherman said, "I have just received bad news; the worst news, general, in my judgment, that we have had for a long time. It is especially damaging to your cause." He then handed Johnston the dispatch reporting the President's assassination.

Johnston's exclamations showed how profoundly he was affected. The perspiration came in heavy drops on his high forehead as he was reading. Sherman remarked that this assassination would forever stand as a part of the rebellion, though he did not believe that Lee or any of the higher Confederate officers would sanction such a deed. Johnston declaimed against it bitterly. Sherman told him that he had purposely withheld the information from his own army for a few hours, as he feared that when the knowledge of it spread among his men, vengeance would so seize on them that dreadful scenes would ensue. Johnston then frankly acknowledged that the cause was lost, that for himself he asked nothing. His anxiety was about his men.

They then considered what would be the best and speediest method to put the men back in their respective homes. Then said Johnston, "Why can not we make this surrender universal?" He added, "I know I can get an order from Mr. Davis that all the Confederate armies shall disband." It was agreed that if this could be done quickly, in time to raise a crop for the year, it would avert starvation, with all its disorders and crimes, from the South.

Sherman repeatedly offered to accept Johnston's surrender, and that of all the troops subject to his orders, on the identical terms that had been given to Lee's army by Grant.

Johnston as often admitted that the terms were liberal, magnanimous, and better than he could ask for, only he pleaded that things were opportune for closing the war

Johnston desires to include all the armies in the surrender.

by the surrender, on common terms, not inconsistent with those of Lee's surrender, of all the Confederate troops, embracing his own in North Carolina and Georgia, Taylor's in Louisiana, Bankhead's in Texas, and other forces scattered all over the South. He asked for some days' delay, perhaps for the purpose of finding Davis, and receiving his orders for all the Confederate armies to surrender. Sherman would consent to yield one day only; and, after three hours, the interview closed, with an appointment to meet at the same place the next day at noon.

At the second interview there was grouped round the little farm-house, with its grass-plot and blossoming cherry-trees, a brilliantly costumed crowd of officers in full uniform.

A second interview takes place.

A Confederate officer galloped down the road, and soon returned with a tall gentleman, John C. Breckinridge, who hurried into the house where the two generals were.

Johnston had not been able to confer with Davis in person, but had brought Breckinridge, the Confederate Secretary of War, whose orders to the Confederate armies, he said, would be obeyed as implicitly as if issued by Davis.

Before going to the interview Sherman had again conversed with his generals—Howard, Slocum, Blair, Logan, all of whom were anxious that Johnston's propositions should be acceded to. It was expected that he might ask for some facilities to enable Davis and his cabinet, with the more offensive politicians, to escape.

Johnston manifested great feeling at the downfall of his cause. He seemed oppressed by the clamors and demands of his own troops and people. He appealed to Sherman to help him and help them in their terrible strait.

All the men of influence and note in the South had become compromised. Its best men were in the Confederate army; but—such had been the course of events—it was

plain that these very persons could be used to maintain peace and order among their own people.

Sherman told Breckinridge that he, and Davis, and the Southern politicians were exceedingly obnoxious, and that they should at once flee the country. Breckinridge replied that he should never be seen again, and intimated that Davis was already far on his way to Europe to escape his doom.

The territory in the immediate command of Johnston comprised the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. But he was now offering to disband the armies in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Sherman, in reply to his inquiry what terms would be granted for this, expressed his inability to do any thing except with belligerents; that he would make terms for the Confederate soldiers in accordance with President Lincoln's amnesty proclamation, viz., that all of the rank of colonel and under should have pardon on condition of taking the oath of allegiance to the United States. He stated his willingness to go farther, and agree that every officer and soldier who would return home, observe his parole, and obey the laws, should not be disturbed by United States authority.

Johnston expressed his fears that the Southern States would be dismembered, that their separate political existence would be destroyed, and representation in Congress denied them. Sherman listened respectfully to his statements, and, declaring that to deal with these things was beyond his power, simply offered his personal conviction that if the Southern people submitted in good faith to the Constitution and authority of the United States, they would regain their position.

In these conversations Breckinridge joined. Sherman had at first objected to his being present, reminding Johnston that the understanding between them had been that

Sherman can alone  
treat with respect  
to the armies,

but Johnston desires  
to make terms for  
the Southern States.



negotiations should be confined to belligerents. "Have you any objection to his being present, not as Confederate Secretary of War, but as a major general?" To that Sherman could not object. Soon after a courier brought in a package of papers, over which the two Confederates conversed. One they handed to Sherman. It was a memorandum by the Confederate Postmaster General Reagan. Sherman read it and rejected it.

Several hours had now been spent; the time was drawing near when the interview must close. Sherman concluded that he had better refer the whole subject discussed to Washington, and stated his determination. He sat down at the table and drew up a paper embodying the terms of the conversation. Each then signed it, and agreed to hold his own army *in statu quo* until an answer could be received from Washington.

The subject is referred to the government at Washington.

Sherman returned to Raleigh, and without delay dispatched an aid-de-camp, Major Hitchcock, to Washington. That officer traveled with all speed, and on reaching his destination found every thing in confusion. Mr. Lincoln was dead; Mr. Johnson freshly installed; the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, so severely wounded that his recovery was regarded as impossible.

Men of all parties had been shocked at the atrocity perpetrated. In the first burst of indignation, there was a universal regret that such liberal terms had been granted even to Lee. In Washington there seemed to be no one capable of dealing calmly with the crisis.

A condition of things more inopportune for the reception of Johnston's peace propositions could hardly be imagined. If, a short time previously, when Grant transmitted Lee's application for an interview, he had been so sharply rebuked as to be compelled to write to the government almost in a tone of remonstrance, what might be expected now!

The views held by the cabinet in Washington and those held at Sherman's headquarters could not possibly be reconciled.

The following are the terms thus referred to the consideration of the government:

*“Memorandum or basis of Agreement, made this the 18th day of April, A. D. 1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army, and Major General W. T. Sherman, commanding the Army of the United States, both present.*

“I. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the status quo until notice is given by the commanding general of either to his opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed.

“II. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded, and conducted to their several state capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the state arsenal, and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of both state and federal authorities. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the mean time to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the states respectively.

“III. The recognition by the Executive of the United States of the several state governments on their officers and Legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and where conflicting state governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

“IV. The re-establishment of all federal courts in the several states, with powers as defined by the Constitution and laws of Congress.

“V. The people and inhabitants of all states to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchise, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States, and of the states respectively.

“VI. The executive authority or government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, and abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

“VII. In general terms, it is announced that the war is to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by officers and men hitherto composing said armies.

“Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfil these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain authority, and will endeavor to carry out the above programme.”

Letter from Sherman to Grant.

With the foregoing document was sent the following letter:

“Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, in the Field, }  
Raleigh, North Carolina, April 18th, 1865. }

“To Lieutenant General Grant, or Major General Halleck, }  
Washington, District of Columbia. }

“GENERAL,—I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved by the President of the United States, will produce peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. Mr. Breckinridge was present at the interview, in the capacity of a major general, and satisfied me of the ability of General Johnston to carry out to the full extent the terms of this agreement; and, if you will get the President to simply indorse the copy, and commission me to carry out the terms, I will follow them to the conclusion. You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to the lawful authorities of the United States, and disperses his armies absolutely; and the point to which I attach most importance is, that the disposition and dispersement of the armies is done in such a manner as to prevent their breaking up into guerrilla bands. On the other hand, we can retain just as much of an army as we please. I agree to the mode and manner of the surrender of the armies set forth, as it gives the states the means of suppressing guerrillas, which we could not expect them to do if we strip them of all arms.

“Both Generals Johnston and Breckinridge admitted that slavery was dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the states in detail. I know that all the men of substance South sincerely want peace, and I do not believe they will resort to war again during this century. I have no doubt but that they will, in the future, be perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United States. The moment my action in this matter is approved, I can spare five corps, and will ask for orders to leave General Schofield here with the 10th Corps, and go myself with the 14th, 15th, 17th, 20th, and 23d Corps *via* Burkesville and Gordonsville to Frederick or Hagerstown, there to be paid and mustered out.

“The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and officer not needed ought to go home at once. I would like to be able to begin the march North by May 1st.

“I urge, on the part of the President, speedy action, as it is impor-

tant to get the Confederate armies home, as well as our own. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

“W. T. SHERMAN, Major General commanding.”

To this letter Grant, bearing in mind the unpleasant correspondence he had so lately had with the government, promptly replied :

Grant's reply to Sherman.

“Washington, April 21st, 1865.

“GENERAL,—The basis of agreement entered into between yourself and General J. E. Johnston for the disbandment of the Southern army and the extension of the authority of the general government over all the territory belonging to it, sent for approval of the President, is received.

“I read it carefully myself before submitting it to the President and Secretary of War, and felt satisfied that it could not possibly be approved. My reasons for these views I will give you at another time in a more extended letter.

“Your agreement touches upon questions of such vital importance that, as I read, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War notifying him of its receipt, and the importance of immediate action by the President; and suggested, in view of its importance, that the entire cabinet be called together, that all might give an expression of their opinions upon the matter. The result was a disapproval by the President of the basis laid down; a disapproval of the negotiations altogether, except for the surrender of the army commanded by Johnston; and directions to me to notify you of the decision. I can not do so better than by sending you the inclosed copy of a dispatch penned by the late President, though signed by the Secretary of War, in answer to me on sending a letter received from General Lee proposing to meet me for the purpose of submitting the question of peace to a convention of officers.

“Please notify General Johnston, immediately on receipt of this, of the termination of the truce, and resume hostilities against his army at the earliest moment you can, acting in good faith. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.”

The letter referred to as inclosed is that from the Secretary of War to General Grant inserted in this volume, p. 562.

At the cabinet meeting Grant was present. He offered at once to go to North Carolina and see Sherman.

Grant repairs to Sherman's headquarters.



The written answer from the Secretary of War which Grant carried with him was courteous, and the fact that he had been sent to direct matters—not to supersede Sherman—gave to that officer no offense. He received the news as he would have done any other official matter.

As soon as Grant reached Raleigh, and had conversed with Sherman, he declined to intervene personally in the negotiation, saying that all that was wanted was the surrender of Johnston on the same terms that Lee had accepted. Without delay, Sherman notified Johnston by messenger, and they met again, when Johnston, being powerless to resist, signed without question the following articles of surrender:

A third interview between Sherman and Johnston takes place.

*“Terms of a military Convention, entered into this twenty-sixth (26th) day of April, 1865, at Bennett’s House, near Durham Station, North Carolina, between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army, and Major General W. T. Sherman, commanding the United States Army in North Carolina.*

“All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston’s command to cease from this date. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro, and delivered to an ordnance officer of the United States army. Rolls of all officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation, in writing, not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly released from this obligation. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage, to be retained by them.

“This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their obligations, and the laws in force where they may reside.

“W. T. SHERMAN, Major General commanding the Army of the United States in North Carolina.

“J. E. JOHNSTON, General commanding the Confederate States Army in North Carolina.

“Approved. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.

“Raleigh, North Carolina, April 26th, 1865.”

Johnston did not know that Grant was present until he saw the indorsement afterward in print.

Grant hereupon returned to Washington, and Sherman, the surrender of the Confederate army having been carried into effect, supposed the matter ended. But a painful event now occurred.

There were published, by official authority, in the New York newspapers of April 22d, reflections on the terms of Sherman's first agreement with Johnston, the memorandum of those terms being withheld.

Allegations against Sherman's conduct.

These reflections were to the effect that the memorandum was an exercise of authority not vested in General Sherman, and on its face showed that both he and Johnston knew that the former had no authority to enter into any such arrangement; that it was an acknowledgment of the rebel government; that it was understood to re-establish rebel state governments, and placed in the hands of rebels arms and munitions of war which might be used to conquer and subdue loyal states; that it enabled rebel authority to re-establish slavery; that its stipulations made the national government responsible for the payment of the rebel debt; and subjected loyal citizens of the rebel states to debts contracted by rebels in the name of the states; that it put in dispute the existence of loyal state governments, and the new State of Western Virginia; that it abolished the confiscation laws, and gave indemnity to rebels of every degree from pains and penalties for their crimes; that it gave terms deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly rejected by Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous condition; that it formed no basis of a true and lasting peace, but left the rebels free from pressure, and in a condition to renew their effort to overthrow the United States government and subdue the loyal states whenever opportunity should offer.

Not without amazement did loyal men in the Northern

States read these accusations against a soldier who had so repeatedly periled his life in the national cause, who had delivered against the Confederacy mortal blows.

The action of the government in not permitting its generals to control its policy was both correct and consistent—consistent, for on several occasions, as far back as the times of Hunter and Fremont, it had been guided by that principle. In this case, however, we must observe that it was committed to nothing. If it were its pleasure so to do, it was perfectly at liberty to reject the terms suggested, as it actually did.

The propriety of his course.

It was the duty of any general who received propositions for the simultaneous surrender of several armies, to make known forthwith to the government those propositions, no matter what the conditions asked might be. It was also proper for him, being on the ground, and therefore, it might be presumed, well informed of existing facts, to convey to the government his own impressions. It was his duty, on receiving the determination of the government, to carry it thoroughly into effect, no matter whether it coincided with his own views or not. In the case before us all this had been done.

What was it that Johnston proposed to surrender? Not his own army alone, but all the Confederate armies. He exhibited the authority by which he could make his engagement good. He offered submission from the Roanoke to the Rio Grande. Was not that something worth an equivalent? There was imminent danger that the Southern armies would break up into guerrilla bands: no one in America knew better than Sherman what that meant. No man knew better how many years of struggling, and what a fearful cost it would take to put them down. The proposition made was not made *to* him, but *through* him to the government. If it was accompanied by stipulations which he was not at liberty to accept, it was very clear that

he was not at liberty to reject them. His plain duty was to refer the subject to the government, and that he did.

If we compare the accusations against him side by side with the memorandum, are not these the conclusions to which impartiality must bring us? So far from usurping authority, he referred the whole matter to the government, and waited its order. He neither acknowledged the Confederacy, nor did any thing to recognize the Confederate state governments more than the President of the United States had done in the case of the state government of Virginia: in that respect he had guided his conduct strictly by Mr. Lincoln's example. He had not delivered the arms of the Confederate States armies into rebel custody, but had proposed to place them under the control of the United States. He had stipulated nothing about the rebel debt; he did not put into dispute the existence of West Virginia, nor in any manner affect the Confiscation Bill; he did relieve the penalty of crime, but not more than Grant had done in the case of Lee. So far from being in opposition to Lincoln's policy, Sherman had every reason to believe that, had Lincoln lived, he would have given a cordial approval to the terms; and as to the last allegation against this agreement, it may be replied that, if it left the rebels able to renew the war, it only left them where it found them.

With respect to the instrumentality which Sherman proposed to employ in the restoration of the overthrown states, his opinion has been signally justified by events that have since taken place—perhaps it may be still more so hereafter. The sentiment expressed in reference to this matter by Grant in a letter (May 6th, 1865) suggests the true criterion: "I know very well it is a difference of opinion, and time will decide who is right."

On the same day that these allegations were published,

Mr. Stanton telegraphed to General Dix, in New York, for publication in the newspapers:

Newspaper publications respecting these transactions.



“Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived here from General Sherman. An agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum of what is called ‘a basis of peace,’ had been entered into, on the 10th instant, by General Sherman with the rebel General Johnston, the rebel General Breckinridge being present at the conference.

“A cabinet meeting was held at 8 o’clock in the evening, at which the action of General Sherman was disapproved by the President, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant, and by every member of the cabinet. General Sherman was ordered to resume hostilities immediately, and he was informed that the instructions given by the late President in the following telegram, which was penned by Mr. Lincoln himself, at the Capitol, on the night of the 3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were reiterated to govern the action of military commanders.

“On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and his cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant was brought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee had asked for a conference to make arrangements for terms of peace. The letter of General Lee was published in a message to the rebel Congress. General Grant’s telegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a few minutes, took up his pen and wrote with his own hand the following reply, which he submitted to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War; it was then dated, addressed, and signed by the Secretary of War, and telegraphed to General Grant.”

(Here follows the letter already inserted in this volume, page 562.)

“The orders from General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw from Salisbury and join him will probably open the way for Davis to escape to Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to be very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says: ‘It is stated by respectable parties that the amount of specie taken South by Jefferson Davis and his partisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. They hope, it is said, to make terms with Sherman, or some other Southern commander, by which they will be permitted, with their effects, including the gold plunder, to go to Mexico or Europe. Johnston’s negotiations look to that end.’

“After the cabinet meeting last night General Grant started for North Carolina to direct future operations against Johnston’s army.”

No one can read this publication, and recall Sherman's honorable and brilliant conduct during the whole war, without being drawn to the painful conclusion that herein he was deeply wronged.

But this was not all. General Halleck, then at Richmond in command of the military division of the James, ordered Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright to move into Sherman's department, and pay no regard either to his orders or his truce. Halleck also advised the Secretary of War to order Generals Thomas and Wilson, Sherman's own subordinates, not to obey Sherman's orders.

Sherman's subordinates are instructed to disobey him.

This dispatch was also sent to New York for publication. The Secretary of War instructed General Thomas, and, through him, his subordinates, to disregard Sherman's orders.

Had Sherman been a traitor, nothing more could have been done except to put him under arrest.

Unconscious of the allegations against him, he proceeded to issue all the orders necessary to carry into effect the surrender, and then went down the coast to Charleston and Savannah, to make similar provisions for that portion of his command. It was during this journey that he learned from the newspapers of the publications that had been made to his detriment.

But where there is a free press there is a quick correction of public mistakes. The public soon found that it had misunderstood, and had done injustice to its great soldier.

Before leaving this painful topic there is one point to which allusion may profitably be made again —the instrumentality which Sherman intended to use in accomplishing the reconstruction of the South.

The instrumentality which Sherman proposed to use in the South.

He knew that, by a friendly confidence and consultation

with their *new* men made by the war, a powerful influence could be exercised on the side of the national government, and even in favor of the Republican party.

From the old political partisans—the men who had once dominated over the South and precipitated it into the war, he had little hope. He believed that their day was over; that the social ruin they had provoked would overwhelm them. No cause can long survive a crushing military defeat. Want and a loss of power, Time and Death, would soon eliminate them from the political question. Already they were unpopular, because, by the operation of the Confederate government, they had been specially privileged, exempted from conscription, and often appointed to execute acts, such as forced contributions, odious to their own people. They had reveled in secure offices, and enjoyed places without risk.

But Sherman very well knew, at the time he was dealing with Johnston, that a very different state of feeling existed in the army. He has told us: “I perceived that we had the unbounded respect of our armed enemies, and that, by some simple measures, we could enlist them in our cause. By their instrumentality we could not only restore our whole government according to its written fabric, but could have in every vicinage men used to subordination and government, who would employ their influence to create civil order. I am sure that my own army, now disbanded, makes the best of citizens; and I am also sure that, at the close of the Civil War, the Confederate army embraced the best governed, the best disposed, the most reliable men in the South; and I would have used them in reconstruction, instead of driving them into a hopeless opposition.”

The old politicians of the South, the men who had kept aloof from the perils of the war, were held in contemptuous estimation. Their recommendations had been tried, and the people had been ruined. Why, then, restore them to credit?

But the new men, who owed their reputation to the war, whose brilliant courage and soldierly qualities had illustrated many a battle-field, justly and worthily occupied all the public regard. Whatever they might recommend was certain to be done.

Measures for the reconstruction or restoration of the overthrown states must be adopted. To carry them into effect there must be instrumentality, and for that instrumentality there was but a narrow choice. Was it to be intrusive Northern men?—who were certain to be powerless, because they were certain to be hated. Was it to be the Southern clergy?—the Union had had no bitterer enemies than they. Was it to be the old politicians?—conspirators once, and ready to be so again. If not these, then there remained only the new men. Who among them was most likely to guide into the right path the women of the South, whose influence had been so powerfully felt throughout the war? The fanatic beauty who turned with disdain from the braggart “bomb-proof” would follow with unquestioning enthusiasm the armless sleeve.

The course that was taken in Washington was the device of the Politician; that which was taken by Sherman was the forethought of a Statesman.

The surrender of Johnston to Sherman was followed, on the 14th of May, by that of General Taylor, with all the remaining Confederate forces east of the Mississippi, to General Canby. On the 26th of the same month General Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command west of the Mississippi to General Canby. With this, all military opposition to the government ended.

The flag of the United States was lowered at Fort Sumter on the 16th of April, 1861, by Anderson, who was compelled by Beauregard to evacuate that work. On the anniversary of that day, four years later, Charleston having

Surrender of the  
Confederate ar-  
mies.



been captured and South Carolina devastated and overwhelmed, that flag was again raised on Fort Sumter, under orders of the President of the United States, by the hands of the same Anderson, with appropriate military and naval ceremonies, and a commemorative address delivered by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher.

The last conflict of the Civil War occurred May 13th, on the Rio Grande, near Brazos Santiago. A small expedition had set out to surprise a Confederate camp, which it succeeded in doing, but was overtaken on its return by a large force, and defeated, with the loss of 80 men.

The last conflict of  
the Civil War.

## CHAPTER XCIII.

### THE FLIGHT AND CAPTURE OF DAVIS.

On the fall of Richmond Davis escaped to Danville, expecting that a junction would take place between the armies of Lee and Johnston. At Danville an attempt was made to re-establish the Confederate government.

Events soon showed that the Confederacy was at an end, and that its President must seek safety by flight.

His cabinet ministers abandoned him, and he was taken prisoner by national cavalry at Irwinville, Georgia.

He was confined for some time at Fortress Monroe, but was eventually set at liberty.

AFTER withdrawing from the church on that fatal Sunday—fatal to the Confederacy—Davis spent the remainder of the day in preparations for flight. Such valuables as could, in the haste of the moment, be collected, were made ready for transportation, and orders were given that those which could not be removed should be burnt.

The flight of Davis from Richmond.

Fires were beginning to be seen in the city; the populace were already sacking the stores when Davis and his cabinet, some military officers and clergymen, entered a train for Danville. They had with them a guard of about 200 picked men, and saddled horses and carriages to insure their escape if Sheridan's cavalry should threaten them. It was some time after dark—10 P.M.—before the train started.

Gloomy as was the prospect, Davis had yet no just conception of the magnitude of the reverses that had befallen him. He still supposed that the armies of Lee and Johnston could effect a junction, and the war be indefinitely prolonged if advantageous terms could not be exacted. At about 20 miles from Richmond, the Secretary of War, Breckinridge, left the train to make his way to the headquarters of the two generals.

Late on the following morning the fugitives reached

Danville safely, and there, expecting that Lee would fall back toward them, Davis prepared to re-establish his government. The Secretary of the Treasury reopened his department in a bank building of the town, and, for the sake of prestige, began exchanging silver for Confederate notes—one dollar of the former for seventy of the latter. He ventured so far as to waste in this manner about \$40,000 of coin. Preparations were made for fortifying the place; and on the 5th, Davis issued a proclamation informing the people that they had entered on a new phase of the struggle; that, relieved from the necessity of guarding particular points, their army would be free to move, and strike the enemy in detail far from his base. "Let us," said he, "but will it, and we are free. Let us not despond, my countrymen; but, relying on God, meet the foe with fresh defiance, and with unconquered and unconquerable hearts."

Day after day passed. No tidings came of Lee's approach; nothing could be heard of him. At length, on the 10th, Davis's worst suspicions were realized: news came that Lee had surrendered.

It was now impossible to remain at Danville. There was nothing to do but to flee to Greensboro, and find shadow under the wing of Johnston's army. The President and his officers had a narrow escape from capture, but on the 11th reached Greensboro safely. There he held a consultation with Johnston and Beauregard, both of whom, in former days, he had deeply wronged. He was anxious that they should attack Sherman; but Johnston, a far better judge of the military position, and, indeed, of the state of affairs, not only declined, but did not conceal the fact that there was obviously no other course than to follow the example of Lee.

Perhaps Davis might have borne with equanimity this abandonment of his cause by the armies which had so long and so ably sustained it, but here he found that the people

He re-establishes  
his government at  
Danville.

Thence he flees  
to Greensboro.

themselves had surrendered it. No one in Greensboro offered hospitality. Houseless and without a friend, the Confederate government for three days remained in a railroad car. The veil had fallen from his eyes, and Davis now saw the magnitude of the Confederate calamity.

From Greensboro the fugitives took their way to Charlotte, journeying partly in the humble conveyance of wagons. At that place Breckinridge joined them, bringing news of his interview with Sherman. It was clear that the Confederacy had come to an end, and here Davis spontaneously ceased to exercise authority. Trenholm and Benjamin, Mallory and Breckinridge, in succession, as he fled southward, abandoned him.

It was Davis's intention to reach the Gulf coast, or, if possible, to make his way into Texas, but the national cavalry was busy in all directions cutting off his flight. He soon found that it would be impossible to flee westward. Even to the Gulf was a long and arduous journey. His escort mutinied, and demanded to be paid in coin. He was destined to experience how bitter is the lot of those who have fallen from power. Yet, though the white people among whom he passed might treat him with neglect, he knew that none of them would betray him, notwithstanding that a reward of \$100,000 had been offered for his apprehension as an accomplice in the assassination of President Lincoln. He had already made his way far into Georgia without being discovered, when, about midnight (May 7th), a negro came into the camp of Colonel Harnden, at Dublin, in that state, and gave information that the fugitive, with his wife and family, had passed by that town during the day. They had eight wagons with them. He had heard the lady called Mrs. Davis, and one of the gentlemen spoken of as President Davis. He said that Mr. Davis had not crossed the river at the regular ferry with the rest of the party, but had gone about three miles lower down, and passed over on a small flat-boat, re-



joining those with the wagons near the outskirts of the town. Thence they had all gone toward the south together. Mr. Davis was mounted on a fine bay horse.

Colonel Harnden, with a detachment of cavalry, had been for some time on the watch for the fugitives; he therefore at once pressed the pursuit, and soon fell on the track of the party. The trail led southward through a region of pine forests and cypress swamps almost uninhabited, affording no food for men or horses. Rain began to fall, and, as there was no road, the tracks of the wagon-wheels upon the sandy soil were soon obliterated. A citizen was pressed, and compelled to act as guide till the track was again discovered. The pursuit was continued with renewed vigor; but, as the wagon-tracks were once more lost in the waters bordering on Alligator Creek, the pursuing party was again delayed. That day was one of great toil, both to men and horses; they had marched 40 miles through an almost trackless forest, much of the way under the rain and in water up to their saddle-girths. They bivouacked after dark on the borders of Gum Swamp, heavy rain still falling, and before daylight on the 9th resumed their march. In the afternoon they met with another pursuing cavalry detachment, under Colonel Pritchard, to whom they gave the information they had gained. The two detachments now marched to Irwinville by different roads. Pritchard reached it first, at 2 A.M. on the 10th, and, guided by a negro whom he compelled to act, came within half a mile of the camp of the fugitives.

At daybreak the order was passed in a whisper to make ready to enter the camp, which was found pitched on both sides of the road. On the left hand were wagons, horses, tents, and men; on the right were two wall tents, fronting from the road. No guards were encountered.

While they were thus in the act of surprising the camp, a sharp firing was heard. It turned out to be an acci-

Pursuit by the national cavalry.

His camp at Irwinville discovered.

dental collision with the other cavalry party, in which, unfortunately, two men were killed and several wounded.

Three persons in female attire, who had apparently just left one of the large tents, were seen moving toward the thick woods. A corporal who confronted them cried "Halt, or I'll fire." They halted, and were found to be Jefferson Davis, his wife, and sister. Mr. Davis had a black mantle wrapped about his head; over his suit of Confederate gray he had a lady's water-proof cloak gathered at the waist; a shawl was thrown over his head; in his hand he carried a tin pail. As they walked back to the tent, it was observed that Davis's high top-boots were not covered by his disguise.

He assumes disguise, but is captured.

Lieutenant Stuart, one of Mr. Davis's staff, thus relates the incident of the capture: "When the musketry firing was heard at dim gray dawn, it was supposed to be between (some) marauders and Mrs. Davis's few camp defenders. Under this impression, Mr. Davis hurriedly put on his boots, and prepared to go out for the purpose of interposing, saying,

"They will, at least as yet, respect me."

"As he got to the door, thus hastily equipped, and with this good intention of preventing an effusion of blood by an appeal, in the name of a fading but not wholly faded authority, he saw a few cavalry ride up the road and deploy in front.

"Ha, Federals!" was his exclamation.

"Then you are captured," cried Mrs. Davis, with emotion.

"In a moment she caught an idea—a woman's idea—and as quickly as women execute their designs it was done. He slept in a wrapper—a loose one. It was yet around him. This she fastened ere he was aware of it, and then, bidding him adieu, urged him to go to the spring, a

short distance off, where his horses and arms were. Strange as it may appear, there was not even a pistol in the tent. Davis felt that his only course was to reach his horse and arms, and complied. As he was leaving the door, followed by a servant with a water-bucket, Miss Howell flung a shawl over his head. There was no time to remove it without exposure and embarrassment, and, as he had not far to go, he ran the chance exactly as it was devised for him."

The empty water-pail—an emblem of the Confederacy—had dropped from the captive president's hand. He was sent to Fortress Monroe, where he was for a long time confined, not, however, with a vindictive, but with a merciful intent. Had he been brought to trial before time had somewhat softened the remembrance of all the bloodshed and devastation which the rebellion had caused, his life would hardly have been spared. When resentment had subsided he was set at liberty, a monument of the clemency of the Republic.

III.—R R

His imprisonment  
and subsequent  
release.

## CHAPTER XCIV.

### THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN, AND THE DISBANDING OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

As the affairs of the Confederacy declined, conspiracies were entered into by certain desperadoes for the abduction or murder of President Lincoln.

He was assassinated in a theatre in Washington.

Immediately after the surrender of the Confederate armies, measures were taken for the disbanding of the national army and the reduction of the navy.

An abstract of the report of the Secretary of War is given, showing the manner in which this was done.

IMMEDIATELY after the re-election of Lincoln in 1864, a conspiracy was set on foot to seize him and carry him to the South. It was expected that the success of the plot would throw affairs in Washington into irretrievable confusion. The leading spirit in this undertaking was a play-actor whose name was John Wilkes Booth, and who looked upon slavery, so he said, as one of the greatest blessings that God had ever bestowed upon a favored nation. He had aided in the capture and execution of John Brown, and declared, "I was proud of my little share in the transaction, for I deemed it my duty, and that I was helping our common country to perform an act of justice."

"For six months," says Booth, "we had worked to capture, but, our cause being almost lost, something decisive and great must be done." It was therefore determined to assassinate the President, the Vice-President, the members of the cabinet, and General Grant.

Lincoln, full of charity for all, and with malice to none, seems never to have comprehended how bitter may be the revenge of passionate and desperate men. A stranger to personal fear, and forgetful how important his life was to



the nation, he sometimes exposed himself needlessly, and therefore unjustifiably. Thus, on the day after the capture of Richmond, he made an objectless public entrance into that city, though it abounded with persons familiar with scenes of violence, wild with excitement, and looking upon him as the author of their humiliation.

On his return to Washington his conversation with his official and personal friends showed that his mind was filled with ideas of forgiveness, amnesties, reconciliation, reunion. Looking at a photograph of General Lee, he could not refrain from expressing his delight at its urbane and benevolent lineaments.

On the evening of the 14th of April, at 9 o'clock, he repaired to Ford's Theatre. In the box with him were his wife, another lady, and Major Rathbun. He had been there about an hour when Booth, who was well acquainted with the building, made his way stealthily to the box, and, putting a pistol at the back of the President's head, fired. Major Rathbun attempted to seize the assassin, but was stabbed by him. For a moment Booth stood at the front of the box, and, brandishing his knife, exclaimed, "Sic semper tyrannis!" the motto of Virginia; then, placing his hand on the railing of the box, he leaped on the stage, but in so doing his spur caught in a national flag that was hung in front of the box; he was thrown down, and his leg injured severely by the fall. Recovering himself, he again stood erect, and, once more flourishing his knife before the audience, shouted out, "The South is avenged!" So saying, he escaped.

The ball had entered the President's head behind the left ear, and, passing through the brain, lodged at the back of the right eye. He uttered no word, and was so instantly insensible that probably he never knew what had happened. He was removed to a house in the neighborhood, and breathed his last soon aft-

He is shot in  
the theatre.

The death of  
Lincoln.

er 7 o'clock the next morning. The stern Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, closed Mr. Lincoln's eyes, and, leaning over him, mournfully said, "No one will ever know the anxious hours that you and I have spent together. You were my only witness. Now you are gone, and I am left here alone." Then, rousing himself from the intensity of his grief, he gave the necessary orders to secure the government to the Vice-President, Johnson, and surrounded Washington with troops.

Attempts to assassinate the cabinet ministers.

While Booth was committing this assassination in the theatre, another of the conspirators, Lewis Payne Powell, the son of a Florida clergyman, forced his way into the bedchamber of the Secretary of State. Mr. Seward had been recently thrown from his carriage, and, having had his right arm broken and his jaw fractured, was confined to his room. The assassin, having severely wounded Mr. Seward's son, who attempted to stop him, seized the invalid minister in his bed, and endeavored to cut his throat. He stabbed him three times with a bowie-knife, and then, fighting his way down the stairs, succeeded in making his escape.

The conspirators who had undertaken to assassinate the other cabinet ministers failed of accomplishing their object. Booth was soon afterward captured in a tobacco-house, near Port Royal, and killed by his pursuers. Harold, Atzerott, Powell, and a woman, Mrs. Surratt, were hanged. Three others were condemned to imprisonment for life, one for a term of six years.

The death of Lincoln was felt throughout the North as a great calamity. Never was a public man more sincerely lamented. His body was taken to Springfield, Illinois, the home from which he had come to the Presidency, for interment; and it may be said that the funeral cortége, gathering all along the way, extended for many hundred miles. It was a procession of mourners bewailing him who had successfully guided the people

The memory of Lincoln.

through the agony of the Civil War, and who had been thus prematurely lost. Yet, perhaps, not prematurely—for it can not be said that he has come to an untimely end who has given freedom to four millions of slaves, and has removed forever from a great nation its only cause of shame.

While in America the murder of the President excited the most poignant emotion, the intelligence of it was received by foreign nations with horror. There was not a government in the civilized world which did not hasten to convey to the United States its sympathy, and testify its abhorrence of the crime. The Confederates were plainly given to understand, even by those who had been their warmest supporters, that they must forthwith clear themselves from every vestige of suspicion of a participation in this assassination.

The assassination was not without an instant and a permanent effect on the South. Instant, for it led to the emphatic and peremptory rejection of the terms that Johnston had submitted to Sherman; permanent, because it gave another and a final direction to the policy of reconstruction. For once, and it was the only time during the war, the outraged North was angry. A rebellion, which had commenced in treason, had ended in murder. Had Grant's terms with Lee happened to come for approval on the 16th instead of the 10th of April, they would have been summarily rejected. But when the facts were more fully known, it was clear that no one connected with the Confederate government had been implicated in this transaction, but that it was the work of a band of desperadoes. Soon afterward the Confederate President fell a prisoner into the hands of the government, and, as we have related, was kept in confinement until resentment had passed away, and then he was suffered to go free.

Though Lincoln was permitted to see the dawn of peace, he was not allowed to witness that which he had

so earnestly desired, the disbanding of the army. The day before his assassination, four days after Lee's surrender, notice was given that orders would be speedily issued to stop all drafting and recruiting, to curtail purchases of army supplies, to reduce the number of general and staff officers, and to remove military restrictions on trade and commerce. A grand review of the united armies of Grant and Sherman took place in Washington on the 22d and 23d of May. More than 200,000 men, veterans, the victors of many a field, marched before the President and his cabinet. What a contrast to that feeble body of militia which, in April, 1861, had rushed into Washington to save it from the clutch of the conspirators. On the walls of the Capitol was suspended a banner, bearing the inscription, "The only national debt that we can never pay is the debt we owe to the victorious Union soldiers."

Meantime Stanton was actively engaged in the great work of disbanding the army. In foreign countries it had often been said, "It is true that the United States have easily raised great armies, but they never will be able to return to a peace footing. The soldiers are masters of the situation; they can never be disbanded." In his annual report (1866), Stanton thus relates how it was actually done:

"The entire number of volunteer troops to be mustered out was, on May 1, 1865, 1,034,064; and my last annual report recounted the operation of disbanding this force until November 15, 1865, when 800,963 troops had been transported, mustered out, and paid. The work was continued actively after that date, and on Jan. 1, 1866, 918,722 volunteers had been mustered out. February 15, 952,452; March 10, 967,887; May 1, 986,782; June 30, 1,010,670; Nov. 1, 1,023,021; leaving in service 11,043 volunteers, white and colored. Commenced in May, 1865, the work of discharging and returning to their homes 1,034,064 volunteers would have been completed within three months but for the necessity of retaining in service a part of that force. Past

The disbanding of the army.

The final review.

Stanton's report of the disbanding.

Mustering out of the soldiers.



experience shows that, should any national emergency require a larger force than is provided by the peace establishment, armies could be swiftly organized to at least the full strength of a million of men.

“The reduction of the army has been attended by a corresponding reduction of material and retrenchment of expenditures. The advanced dépôts of the quartermaster’s department, which had been established as bases of operations, have been broken up, the greater part of the material sold at advantageous rates, or concentrated in five principal dépôts and arsenals, and all unnecessary employés discharged. From May 1, 1865, to August 2, 1866, over 207,000 horses and mules were sold for \$15,269,075 54. About 4400 barracks, hospitals, and other buildings have been sold during the year for \$447,873 14. The sale of irregular and damaged clothing in store produced, during the fiscal year, the sum of \$902,770 45. The fleet of 590 ocean transports in service on July 1, 1865, at a

Reduction of the navy.

daily expense of \$82,400, was reduced, before June 30, 1866, to 53 vessels, costing \$3000 per diem, and most

of these have since been discharged, ocean transportation being now almost entirely conducted by established commercial lines of steamers. Of 262 vessels which had been employed on inland transportation at an expense of \$3,193,533 28, none were remaining in service on June 30, 1866; sales of river transports, steamers, and barges during the year are reported as amounting to \$1,152,895 92. The military

Disposal of the military railroads and equipments.

railroads which were operated during the war, at a total expenditure of \$45,422,719 15, and which are officially reported to have reached an extent of 2630½

miles, and to have possessed 433 locomotives and 6605 cars, have all been transferred to companies or boards of public works, upon condition of the adoption of loyal organizations of directors. Cash sales of railroad equipment to the amount of \$3,466,739 33 are reported, and credit sales of \$7,444,073 22; upon the latter there have been paid, principal and interest, \$1,200,085 18. The military telegraph,

Disposal of the telegraphs.

which attained an extent of 15,389 miles of lines, constructed during the period of hostilities, with a total

expenditure of \$3,219,400 during the war, and \$567,637 during the last fiscal year, has been discontinued, the material sold and disposed of, and the employés discharged, only a few confidential operators being still retained for cipher correspondence with commanders of important districts.

“Such subsistence stores as could not be retained for supplying the reduced army have, for the most part, been sold at satisfactory prices.

“The sale of unserviceable and surplus stores pertaining to the signal corps has been effected, most of the officers have been mustered out, and the employés discharged.

“All the temporary ordnance dépôts established during the war, with the exception of that at Hilton Head, where the work is in progress, but not completed, have been discontinued. Disposal of hospital supplies. General hospitals, hospital transports and railroad trains, ambulance corps, and a number of medical purveying dépôts, have been dispensed with, and all perishable articles of medicines and hospital supplies in excess of the requirements of a peace establishment have been disposed of by public sale at advantageous prices. The proceeds of old or surplus medical and hospital property amount to \$4,044,269 59.

“But the sale and disposition of these large amounts of unserviceable and perishable stores still leave on hand an adequate supply of war material to meet any emergency that can possibly arise. The stock of clothing, equipage, quartermaster’s, subsistence, hospital, and ordnance stores, arms, ammunition, and field artillery, is sufficient for the immediate equipment of large armies. The disbanded troops stand ready to respond to the national call; and, with our vast means of transportation and rapid organization developed during the war, they can be organized, armed, equipped, and concentrated at whatever points military emergency may require.

“The troops in service were regularly paid, and the demands of those discharged and mustered out promptly met. Payment of the troops. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1866, \$10,431,004 42 were disbursed to the army and the Military Academy; \$248,943,313 36 to volunteers; and in the disbursement of millions of dollars in small sums, and amid great difficulties and hazards, the total cost to the government in expenses of every character is but a fractional part of one per cent.

“The duty of the government to the soldiers who have been maimed or fallen in its defense has not been neglected. Supply of artificial limbs. Much care has been taken, by precautions and practical tests, to secure for the former the most durable, useful, and comfortable artificial limbs. From July 16, 1862, to July 1, 1866, there have been supplied to disabled soldiers 3981 legs, 2240 arms, 9 feet, 55 hands, 125 surgical apparatus, and it is supposed that not more than 1000 limbs remain still to be supplied.

“Forty-one national military cemeteries have been established, and into these there had already been gathered the remains of 104,526 Union soldiers. Establishment of national cemeteries. It is estimated that our national cemeteries will be required to receive

and protect the remains of 249,397 patriotic soldiers, whose lives were sacrificed in defense of our national existence. It is proposed, instead of the wooden head-boards heretofore used, to erect on the graves small monuments of cast iron, suitably protected by zinc coating against rust."

In this report Stanton states that, from January 1, 1861, to June 30, 1866, the Ordnance Department provided 7892 cannon, 11,787 artillery carriages, more than four millions of small-arms, more than two and a quarter millions of complete sets of accoutrements for infantry and cavalry, more than half a million complete sets of cavalry horse equipments, more than twenty-eight thousand sets of horse artillery harness, more than one thousand millions cartridges for small-arms, more than twelve hundred millions of percussion caps, nearly three millions rounds of fixed artillery ammunition, more than fourteen millions of cannon primers and fuses, nearly thirteen millions of pounds of artillery projectiles, more than twenty-six millions of pounds of gunpowder, and ninety millions of pounds of lead. He gives the particular numbers in each case, and remarks that, in addition to these, there were immense quantities of parts provided for repairing and making good articles damaged, lost, or destroyed in the service.

Such was the scale on which the American Civil War was carried on. What can more strikingly evince the responsibilities of the War Department, and the extraordinary ability with which Stanton discharged his duty?

I may close this interesting topic with an extract from the report of General Meigs, the quartermaster general:

"During the forty days between the 27th of May and 6th of July, 233,200 men, 12,823 horses, and 4,300,850 pounds of baggage were moved from Washington by the Washington Branch Railroad to the Relay House, where a large portion of them turned westward. The remainder passed through Baltimore, dividing at that city into two streams, one of which moved north through Harrisburg, the other northeast through Philadelphia.

Scale on which munitions of war had been furnished.

Return of the soldiers to their homes.

“Of the above number, 96,000 men and 10,000 horses were, in the short space of forty days, between May 27 and July 6, moved from Washington on the Potomac, across the Alleghanies, and, descending the Ohio and ascending the Mississippi, were placed in the several positions to which they had been ordered.

“Thus nearly a quarter of a million of men, and more than twelve thousand horses, with more than four millions of pounds of baggage, were moved from Washington to the posts ordered, or distributed to every hamlet and village of the states north of the Potomac and the Ohio Rivers, and restored to their homes, the labor of war over, to return to the pursuits of peaceful industry, which they had left at the call of their country in her hour of need.

“Such movements are unexampled. They illustrate the resources of the country for the operations of war, and the great advantages it possesses in its system of navigable rivers, and its forty thousand miles of railroads.”

In the same rapid and satisfactory manner were carried to their homes all the soldiers of the national army—more than a million of men.



## SECTION XXII.

### THE CONCLUSION.

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#### CHAPTER XCV.

##### RETROSPECT OF THE WAR.

The primary object of the Southern politicians who originated the Civil War was the retention of political influence.

Finding that they could no longer secure their purposes in the Union, they resolved on seceding from it, making use of the Slave question to unite their people, and the doctrine of State Rights to vindicate their course.

The object of the supporters of the Union was at first simply to maintain things as they were.

The intentions of neither party were realized. The use of the Slave question by the South provoked Emancipation; the use of the doctrine of State Rights gave strength to the principle of Nationality.

Emancipation and Nationality were the great and abiding results of the war.

A brief survey is taken of the details of the military operations, coast movements, the blockade, the strength, the losses, the acts of the armies, and of the political incompetency of the administration to which the Southern people had intrusted their cause.

The American Civil War shows how insignificant are the intentions of men in controlling the destiny of nations, and that the progress of humanity is not the result of political devices, but is determined by immutable law.

IN the narrative I have now completed of the American Civil War, I have endeavored to convert its annals into a history; to bring into prominence facts which ought to be conspicuous from their importance, and to place in the background such as had but little influence on the result; to connect together isolated incidents by furnishing the reason or cause of their occurrence.

But the duty of the historian does not end with a mere grouping of events, a merely perspicuous statement of the facts he has had to narrate. It is for him to mark the influences that have originated the drama he has presented, that have placed before its scenery the actors and their acts. In a great social movement, such as the American

Retrospect of the  
Civil War.

Civil War, the objects of the instigators are soon altogether lost sight of in the stirring events and unexpected results that ensue. It is proper, therefore, to bring those objects once more into view, and examine how far they have been attained—to discover whether the expectations of those who provoked a dismal tragedy have been fulfilled, whether the purposes of those who resisted them have been accomplished.

The interests of Humanity are thus subserved. They who seek to trouble society may learn from the lessons of the past to what degree they may expect a gratification of their hopes.

What was it that they who provoked this Civil War proposed? What have been its actual results?

Object of the originators of the war

Almost from the foundation of the Republic its places of profit and power had been chiefly in the possession of Southern politicians; but when it became clear that the rapid development of the North and West

the retention of political influence.

would end this state of things, such persons resolved on attempting a partition of the Union, expecting that in a new government their influence and emoluments would be perpetuated.

It was not to be supposed that their constituents would wantonly encounter the perils of secession to secure such an object; but by working on their apprehensions for the safety of the slave system, and exciting their imagination with dreams of a great and prosperous slave empire, their leaders at length drew them into the movement. The real intention of the conspiracy—the preservation of political influence—thus passed aside, and what was at the time a fictitious issue, but destined soon to be a real one—the Slave question—stood in its place.

Use of the Slave question for that purpose.

As to other points in dispute, they were merely insin-  
cerities. With what countenance could the South complain of the protective policy enjoyed by the North? If

discriminations were made in behalf of Northern iron, coal, manufactures, how was it with the grand industrial interest of the South—the production and employment of slaves? Not only was the slave system protected in every conceivable way, but the influence of the nation was too often prostituted in its support.

Pro-slavery was thus introduced by the South as her war-weapon. By a logical consequence, anti-slavery, and abolition, which is its highest expression, came to be the war-weapon of the North. This was not resorted to without the utmost reluctance. Again and again Lincoln himself put it away from him. But an unseen Necessity forced it back into his hand, and clasped his fingers upon it. The Slave at last became what neither party had ever really intended, the stake to be won or lost in this war.

Continuance of power and profit was thus the primary object of those who ventured on the war. It was politically impossible that they should have it in the Union, and hence they resolved on secession.

Their vindication of the movement was based on the doctrine of State rights. The inevitable consequence of this was, that the idea of nationality rapidly gained strength among their antagonists. Emancipation thus became the necessary issue of Pro-slavery, Nationality the necessary issue of State rights.

Vindication of secession by State rights.

That an oligarchy should rule the republic, or found a government of its own; that a caste of politicians should still hold places of profit and power; that slavery should not only be protected, but extended; that each state should work its own will, uncontrolled by any higher power; that South Carolina, with her 200,000 people, but with a paraphernalia of governors, cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and grand military officers, should stand on a footing of equality in the congregation of nations with the military monarchies of the world—these were the dreams of those who projected and provoked the war.

The military plot of the conspirators embraced three principal objects: (1.) The seizure of the forts or coast defenses; (2.) The possession of the Mississippi River; (3.) The capture of Washington.

Primary objects of the conspirators.

Their first movements were made under very favorable circumstances. They held possession of many of the chief places of the government; their colaborers swarmed in all the public offices, and, what was of the utmost importance, very largely controlled the army and navy.

For a certain length of time they were thus in a position to paralyze completely the government; and, in this respect, the relative power of the conspiracy was at a maximum at its inception.

Notwithstanding the favorable circumstances under which the plot was thus commenced, its early success was only partial. Though nearly all the coast forts were seized, the most important of them all—one destined to exert a decisive influence on the fortunes of the war, Fortress Monroe, in Virginia—escaped. As respects the Mississippi River, the conspirators succeeded in temporarily closing it; but as respects the seizure of Washington, they failed.

Such were the successes, and such the failures of the initial movements of the war. If we turn abruptly to its close, and inquire how far the objects proposed were secured, what were the realities? State rights! what became of that dogma? The seceders themselves were constrained to abandon it. They found that such a system is absolutely incompatible with the vigorous prosecution of a war—inconsistent with the necessary existence of a central power. Slavery! could that institution be more completely surrendered than it was when the Confederates themselves resorted to the arming of their slaves? As to the separation of the Union—the success of secession—it was with the states as with bars of iron—they were forged into one mass by fire and blows. As to the retention of political power, not only has that

Those objects were never attained.



forever passed from the hands of those who tried to keep it, but its very sources have been changed. It is the attribute of civil wars that, though they may agitate a state to its foundations, they do not destroy it. One family is beggared, but another takes its riches. The alleged value of the slaves, four thousand millions of dollars, was not lost. Emancipation only transferred the vast capital which labor represented to a new capitalist, the slave himself. The politicians who inaugurated this civil war seem not to have reflected that such must be its inevitable issue; and now all among the plantations may be seen silver-haired men sitting in their shady piazzas ruminating with unavailing regret on the past. The wealth and influence that once were theirs have gone into other hands. The dislocation of property has dislocated the social gradation; there is not a class whose destiny has not been completely changed. All have verified the truth taught by civil wars in other countries and other ages, that, no matter what the cause of the quarrel, in insurrectionary movements it is invariably the families which have property who suffer most.

From the South let us turn to the North; let us see what its intentions were, and ascertain what was the result.

When first the Republic was assailed, its laws defied, its property seized, the North had no other object than the perpetuation of the Federal Union, the preservation of the Constitution, the maintenance of the accustomed political order. Afterward, in the most disastrous moments, its faith in the Republic was unshaken. It never ceased to believe that the Constitution, like a diamond, would irradiate the darkness with light that it had gathered in former days.

But the result of the war was the emancipation of the slaves, the concentration of a band of jealous and jarring states into a nation, and the unanticipated demonstration of the prodigious military power of that nation.

Primary objects of  
the supporters of  
the government.

Only a few of the more observant and thoughtful persons at the North had foreseen the impending change. Few had perceived what the effect of foreign immigration and of foreign thought had been, and that the way had been silently preparing for the acceptance of the Idea of Nationality. To no small degree through foreign immigration, though also partly on account of the peculiar condition into which its native societies were passing, in the North the states were no longer looked upon with patriotic fervor; they were regarded merely as convenient political fictions. While in the South no one could be found who remembered that he was an American, in the North men had ceased to recollect to what state they belonged. In the South they clamored for state rights; in the North men had become ready to accept the nobler idea of a great and indivisible nation.

So, introduced by no man, pushed forward by no party, the Idea of Nationality stood forth. It found on the ground another idea, already grown to gigantic dimensions—Emancipation. A common object was before them, a common enemy; and as they had each, in the course of events, spontaneously come into existence, so now, through necessity, they allied.

Let us consider the relative strength of these contestant ideas as they stand before us on the stage of action. Nationality and Emancipation are intrinsically strong, especially as war ideas. State rights and Slavery are intrinsically weak. Scarcely was the Confederate government established when it found itself in irreconcilable opposition to the very principle it had been called into existence to maintain. It was compelled to assert its paramount rights over the states. It did this, not as a matter of choice, but as a matter of necessity; it had to compel the states to conform to its bidding. As to the principle of secession, to which it owed its birth, it had to repudiate that at once. Had that prin-

Nationality and  
Emancipation the  
actual result.

Contrast between  
Nationality and  
State rights.

ciple been permitted to pass to its logical issue, there would soon have been as many belligerent powers as there were separate communities, and the Confederacy, if it had continued to exist at all, must have existed as a mob of towns.

If we compare Emancipation and Slavery as war ideas, we see at once how different is their value. The former is allied to modern civilization, and carries with it the best wishes of the human race. The strength of the latter is delusive. For a long time the Southern people deceived themselves as to its real quality, believing that it re-enforced their cause. But before the war was over the error was detected. It was found that the slave must be turned into a soldier; he must be made a free man. In this, Necessity asserted her power. Emancipation forced its way in the South as it had previously forced its way in the North.

Emancipation and Nationality — portentous ideas — strode thus to victory through the war.

To one who is disposed to contemplate the rise and progress of nations, who is impressed with the great truth that it is, as Guizot declares, “a process accomplished, without human premeditation or design, by the natural course of events,” no study can be more instructive than that of the American Civil War.

I have endeavored, in my work on “the Intellectual Development of Europe,” to show that the progress of that continent has been determined by law, and not by the volition of man. America forms no exception to what may thus be established in the case of the older continent.

This war was brought on by those who provoked it for the accomplishment of ends not one of which was attained. Its real and grand issues, easily enough discerned by us after the events are passed, came forth, as it may truly be said, in the necessity of the case. They were not what was intended; they were what could not be prevented.

III.—S s

Contrast between  
Emancipation and  
Slavery.

Reflections on the  
control of man over  
political events.

I have quoted, on a former page, a declaration made by  
Statement of  
Lincoln. Lincoln, embodying a profound philosophical  
 truth, the result of his meditations on this  
 war: "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess  
 plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end  
 of three years' struggle, the nation's condition is not what  
 either party or any man expected or devised. God alone  
 can claim it." The French statesman to whom I have re-  
 ferred, and who had not only seen the movements of a  
 great nation—France—from a very elevated point of view,  
 but who had also studied them with profoundly religious  
 and philosophical attention, thus adds his testimony: "It  
Views of Guizot. is thus that man advances in the execution  
 of a plan which he has not conceived, and of  
 which he is even not aware. He is the free and intelli-  
 gent artificer of a work which is not his own. He does  
 not perceive or comprehend it till it manifests itself by  
 external appearances and real results, and even then he  
 comprehends it very incompletely. It is through his means,  
 however, and by the development of his intelligence and  
 freedom that it is accomplished. Conceive a great ma-  
 chine, the design of which is centred in a single mind,  
 though its various parts are intrusted to various workmen  
 separated from and strangers to each other. No one of  
 them understands the work as a whole, nor the general re-  
 sult which he concurs in producing, but every one executes  
 with intelligence and freedom, by rational and voluntary  
 acts, the particular task assigned to him. It is thus that,  
 by the hand of man, the designs of Providence are wrought  
 out in the government of the world. It is thus that the  
 two great facts, which are apparent in the history of civili-  
 zation, come to coexist; on the one hand, those portions  
 of it which may be considered as fated, or which happen  
 without the control of human knowledge or will; on the  
 other hand, the part played in it by the freedom and in-  
 telligence of man, and what he contributes to it by means  
 of his own judgment and will."



Such were the proposed objects, such the actual results of the war; let us now, continuing our retrospective review, examine the manner in which it was conducted.

Details of the conduct of the war.

So far as the revolting states were concerned, the Civil War never lost the characteristic which, from the first, it had assumed—those states were in a beleaguered condition—the military operations against them were in the nature of a siege. Their sea line was girdled by fleets, their land frontier was invested by armies. The movement of those armies presents a steady advance—an advance in which there is no going back from the day when Lincoln ordered Virginia to be invaded, to that on which Grant burst through the lines at Petersburg. One point after another is steadily gained; town after town, state after state, is entered and won. Repulses and retreats there may be, but they are quickly followed by victories and advances. The waves of conflict surge forward and back, but the tide of conquest flows irresistibly and steadily on.

The insurgent states in a condition of siege.

On the part of the Confederates, their strictly offensive operations were never any thing more than transient sallies or sorties. This is the true character of the Shiloh campaign in the West, and of the minor movement of Van Dorn; this also is the character of the Antietam and Gettysburg campaigns, as it is of Morgan's raid into the Free States, of Early's movement upon Washington, of Hood's desperate march to Nashville.

The offensive movements of the Confederates were sorties.

In all this we recognize convulsive struggles, illustrated by brilliant courage; but—and this is a fact of the highest moment—there is no steady, no far-reaching military plan.

Turning from the Confederate to the National government, and considering its military operations, we must assign a very high importance to

Great influence of the blockade.

the blockade. Resorted to as one of the first acts of the war, it was remorselessly persisted in to the end. With wonderful resolution and industry a great steam navy was created—no insignificant portion of it iron-clad—and the entire Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the Confederacy absolutely sealed. The effect was a thorough destruction of the financial basis of the Confederacy, a paralysis of its industry. Cotton could not go out; and, instead of there being an immense influx of gold, what coin there was in the country passed into the hands of the blockade runner. Nor was the effect of the naval power thus put forth restricted to these great physical results; the capture of New Orleans by Farragut produced a deep moral impression. From that moment the self-reliance of the Confederacy was lost.

If we examine the national army operations, these are the conclusions to which we shall come. The attempts upon the coast were inconsequential. At the best they only gave a foothold here and there; they did not contribute essentially to the solution of the military problem. The same may be affirmed of the military movements in the states beyond the Mississippi.

The forces which really decided the controversy may be regarded as grouped in two separate areas of action; and, for the sake of clearness, may be designated the Army of the West and the Army of the East. The Army of the East, of which the Potomac Army was the essential element, had its area of action in the region between the two capitals—Washington and Richmond—a region, geographically, of insignificant dimensions. Considered from this point of view, it might be regarded as a stationary force. It discharged a double function, political and military.

The Army of the West, consisting of several associated armies having different designations, had for its first area

Insignificance of  
army operations on  
the coast.

The forces which  
decided the war.

The Army of the West a movable force.

of action the region between the Mississippi River and the Alleghany Mountains; it crossed those mountains, and then assumed for its second area of action the Confederate Atlantic States. In contradistinction to the Army of the East, this was a movable army; its track of march extended through much more than a thousand miles. If figurative language may be used to convey an impressive idea, the effect of the march of this army was as if a gigantic mower, standing at Nashville, had put forth his scythe toward the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, and, with a steady sweep, had carried its point over Memphis, Vicksburg, through the States of Mississippi, Alabama, and then northward through Georgia and the Carolinas—a stroke before which cities and men went down—a deadly stroke; for, with but little exaggeration, it may be said that it left nothing behind it but the bare earth.

I have remarked that the function of the Army of the East was partly political, a statement which requires explanation.

Function of the Army of the East.

Two considerations led the conspirators to establish their seat of government at Richmond: (1), they expected to Mexicanize the Republic by the seizure of Washington; and Richmond was the most convenient point from which to carry on their operations; (2d), in order to draw Virginia into the enterprise of secession, it was necessary to concede ostensibly to her the leading position, and guarantee to her effective military protection. The metropolis of the Confederacy being placed within her limits, insured the continual presence of a powerful army. Accordingly, from the time that the Confederates transferred their seat of government to Richmond, they maintained such a force in its front; and to all foreign nations whose recognition and alliance were sought, this "Army of Northern Virginia" was the outward and visible sign of the strength and independence of the Confederacy.

The function of the national Army of the East was to protect Washington—to antagonize the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, which was slowly but steadily consuming the military strength of the insurgent states. There can be no doubt that, though in a military point of view the capture of Washington would have been an insignificant event, in a political point of view it was very different: it would have entailed consequences of the most serious kind in the foreign relations of the nation.

The entire force called into the national service during the war was 2,688,523 men. Of these there were enlisted,

Military force of the government.

For three months . . . . .	191,985
“ six months . . . . .	19,076
“ nine months . . . . .	87,558
“ one year . . . . .	394,959
“ two years . . . . .	43,113
“ three years . . . . .	1,950,792
“ four years . . . . .	1,040
	<u>2,688,523</u>

Many of these, however, were mustered in more than once. Making suitable allowance for this, and other necessary deductions, it may be concluded that about 1,500,000 soldiers were employed. Of these it is believed that more than 75 per cent. were native Americans, about 7 per cent. were Irish, and 9 per cent. were Germans; the remainder were English, British-American, and other foreigners.

Of the one and a half million of soldiers employed, 56,000 were killed in battle, 35,000 died in the hospitals of wounds, 184,000 died in the hospitals of disease, many more died subsequently, the health of still more was irreparably ruined.

Though the Confederate armies were not equal in strength to the national, there is reason to suppose that the number of their killed, and of their wounded and sick who died in hospital, was not far short of 300,000.

It may interest us to recall that the entire armies of the



Roman Empire under Augustus Cæsar numbered 340,000 men, exclusive of the battalions maintained in Rome itself; the cost was from fifty to seventy millions of dollars annually. In the French Empire under Napoleon the entire military charge averaged about \$200 per man per annum.

The cost of supporting the great armies and fleets used in the Civil War is shown by the rapid increase of the national debt. It was, in

Cost of the war.

1860, June 30 . . . . .	\$64,769,703
1861, " " . . . . .	90,867,828
1862, " " . . . . .	514,211,371
1863, " " . . . . .	1,097,274,360
1864, " " . . . . .	1,740,036,689
1865, March 31 . . . . .	2,423,437,001
1866, Jan. 1 . . . . .	2,749,491,745

The great increase indicated by the last item, apparently after the war was over, was due to the paying off of the troops and the settlement of outstanding bills.

Such was the debt; but to it should be added the sums expended by the individual states and local bodies in raising and fitting out their several contingents. The total rises above four thousand millions of dollars. Bounties were paid to the amount of about two hundred millions of dollars, and about one hundred millions more to the families of absent and deceased soldiers.

It is often said that the American people entered on this conflict unacquainted with the art of war, and hence many mistakes were made by them in its management in the earlier stages. Without contesting the force of this remark, it may be observed that of no nation whatever could the opposite be affirmed. Within comparatively few years the means and the character of warfare had greatly changed. The steam-ship, the locomotive, the electric telegraph, rifled arms, cannon of great calibre, iron-clad ships, turreted monitors had been introduced. No one could tell beforehand how, on the great

The government at first unacquainted with the art of war.

scale, these might be best used, nor what their effect would be. For the first time in history, a steam navy was employed for a blockade. The question had to be settled whether, in such a service, a steam-ship could be kept at sea for months. It had to be provisioned, supplied with coal, its boilers and machinery kept in repair, its armament and crew maintained in efficiency. Yet so perfectly was this done that the greatest blockade ever undertaken was effectually enforced. In England, among those who were competent judges of the difficulties, it was declared that this was the most wonderful fact of the war. An unbroken succession of ships kept guard winter and summer; and so well were they provisioned, that during the four years scurvy in their crews was almost unknown. The English blockade-runners, long, low in the water, narrow, and painted of a dull neutral color, found how difficult it was to escape their vigilance.

The military reports show how quickly the use of the new appliances of war was learned, and how effectively they were employed. We have seen (vol. iii., p. 77) that Stanton caused to be transported Hooker's command, 23,000 strong, with its artillery and trains, baggage and animals, from the Rappahannock in Virginia to Stevenson in Alabama, a distance of 1192 miles, in seven days. The reports of Major General Meigs, the quartermaster general, contain other similar illustrations. Thus, in the summer of 1864, more than 14,000 mechanics and laborers were employed at Nashville in providing material for Sherman's campaign. There were in store at that post twenty-four millions of rations, and forage to the amount of one hundred and sixty-eight millions of pounds of oats, corn, hay. These stores, and vast numbers of troops, and all the sick and wounded, were transported over a single-track railroad, consisting of two slender rods of iron three hundred miles long, crossing wide rivers, winding through mountain gorges, plunging

But it quickly learned the use of the new appliances.

under hills, and every where exposed to an enterprising enemy bent on destroying them. An army of 90,000 men, with more than 40,000 animals, was supported on the end of this tremulous line, and that not only while advancing, but, what is more difficult, while laying siege for many weeks to a strongly fortified town. Well may that able engineer say, in no other country have railroads been brought to perform so important a part in the operations of war; and with just pride may he speak of those bridges which, though they had to bear the heaviest military trains, "rose like an exhalation from the ground." The Etowah Bridge, 625 feet long and 75 feet high, was built in six days; the Chattahoochee Bridge, 740 feet long and 90 feet high, was built in four and a half days.

If this was done in one portion of the vast theatre of war, how astonishing are the facts presented when we consider the whole. More than once I have alluded to the extraordinary ability of the Secretary of War, and certainly not without reason, when we remember what were his duties, and how well they were discharged. A million of men were clothed, fed, armed; transportation secured for them over a surface many hundreds of thousands of square miles; telegraphs were established and kept in order; immense wagon trains supplied. If the trains of the Army of the Potomac alone had been put on a single road toward Richmond, the head of the column would have reached that city before the rear was out of sight of Washington.

As the war went on, inventive genius, sustained by the national wealth, effected singular improvements. The wretched muskets with which the troops at first had been armed were replaced by rifles of the most admirable construction. The manufacture of artillery, both for the land and sea service, developed very rapidly. It is a great step from the cannon used at the outset of the war to the 15-inch guns with

Improvements in  
those appliances  
during the war.

which the monitors were eventually armed, and the Parrotts, which threw shells from Morris Island into Charleston—which demolished Forts Pulaski and Sumter. It is a great step from the wooden ship of war to the sea-going monitor with iron turrets fifteen inches thick. The means of offense kept pace with the means of defense. There never was a more energetic bombardment than that of Fort Fisher under Porter.

We may appreciate the advances that had been made in a knowledge of the art of war if we recall the experience of the Army of the Potomac before the Peninsular campaign. How, in that magnificent autumn, it waited for the weather to improve, for the dust to settle, for the roads to dry, for the leaves to fall, for the frost to come, and, when it did come, for the ground to thaw, and for fine weather again. Let us contrast this with what Stanton tells us in one of his Reports, and we shall no longer wonder at the disasters of the outset of the conflict, or the victories of its close: "The 23d Army Corps (Schofield), after fighting at Nashville in the midst of ice and snow, in December, 1864, was, on the conclusion of the campaign in the West, transferred, 15,000 strong, from the Valley of the Tennessee to the banks of the Potomac, moving by river and rail down the Tennessee, up the Ohio, across the snow-covered Alleghanies, a distance of 1400 miles, and in the short space of eleven days was encamped on the banks of the Potomac, then blocked up with the ice of a most severe winter. Vessels were collected to meet this corps; the obstacles interposed by the ice were overcome; and early in February the troops composing it were fighting before Wilmington, on the coast of North Carolina."

In the opinion of the Adjutant General of the Confederate Army, published since the close of hostilities, and corroborating the statement of the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society,

Strength and losses  
of the Confederate  
forces.



the available Confederate force capable of active service in the field did not, during the entire war, exceed 600,000 men. Of this number not more than 400,000 were enrolled at any one time, and the Confederate States never had in the field more than 200,000 men capable of bearing arms.

He believes that one third of all the men actively engaged on the Confederate side were either killed outright upon the field, or died of disease and wounds; another third were captured, and held for an indefinite period in Northern prisons; and of the remaining third, at least one half were lost to the service by discharges and desertion. At the close of the war the available force of the Confederate States numbered scarcely 100,000 effective men, and this number he declares was all that was opposed to one million of Federal troops. Such are the Confederate estimates.

If these statements are to be accepted, the conduct of those who directed the war in behalf of the Confederacy is without justification. So long as it was believed that the secession movement might be ventured upon without provoking hostilities, its promoters may present an excuse, but not so after the great disparity of the contending forces became a demonstrated fact. There is a point beyond which no commander has a right to risk his men—the point at which it has become clear that it is physically impossible for them to attain his object. Already the South is justly asking, Who is it that shall bear the responsibility for what has happened? who is it that has ruined us? It is no answer to this question to say that “the resolution, unsurpassed bravery, and skill with which the Confederate leaders conducted this contest is shown by the fact that, out of 600,000 men in the field, about 500,000 were lost to the service;” it is of no use to boast that the South maintained her ground for a time against a force ten times as strong as her own. She can not accept a compliment to her animal courage at the expense of her common sense.

Responsibility of  
the Confederate  
leaders,

Who was it that ruined the South? Incompetent political leaders, an unfaithful clergy, a profligate press.

What but ruin could be the result when the political leaders were deceiving their constituents as to the intentions, the temper, the power of the adversary they were provoking; when the clergy were justifying, as an ordinance of God, the darkest crime of the age; when the press was goading the people to the perpetration of civil war, and, that accomplished, persistently misrepresenting its events from the beginning to the end.

Incompetent political leaders! No one can study the acts of the Richmond administration without being struck with the shortcomings of Davis as a ruler. It was impossible that, under such guidance, there could be success. The people gave him whatever he asked for without deduction or delay—their men, their wealth, all that they had were his. Yet, no matter in what direction we look, whether in the military, the diplomatic, the legislative, the financial, we recognize nothing but failure. Not a trace of genius in any of these departments is to be seen. The war was alternately carried on with brute energy and vacillation, with explosions of passion and tricks of intrigue, but never with deliberate skill. The best officers in the army were put down to make way for favorites; the deep-seated convictions and earnest entreaties of an agonized people were set at naught. The means lavishly given to secure independence were squandered, not used. There is scarcely one of the public addresses of Davis which does not surprise us with its indiscretion, its intemperance, or shock us with its ferocious vulgarity. Long before the close of the war it became obvious to the ablest men in the Confederacy, to those who were in a position to judge correctly of the state of affairs, that success, under such leadership, was impossible. How could it be otherwise? History, as yet, offers no exception to the declaration of Tac-

the clergy, and  
the press.

Incompetence of the  
Confederate admin-  
istration.

tus: "No man ever administered well an empire won by crime."

In the movement undertaken by the South there was The difficulties of its position. an incompatibility between the political and the military conditions. The highest statesmanship was necessary to reconcile them, yet reconciled they must be if success was to be obtained. The military condition required heavy taxation, the political opposed it; the political required Northern invasion, the military forbade it; the military required the use of the slave as a soldier, the political dared not yield him; the military required foreign aid, French armies and English fleets, the political would not give the purchase-consideration that was needful to secure them—Emancipation. State rights must be reconciled with the wrongs of Confederate conscription; the abandonment of important regions to the ravages of the enemy, with the constitutional obligation to defend them. In face of the imbecility with which public affairs were transacted—an imbecility unconcealable even from the men in the ranks—the conscript, taken by force, perhaps carried in chains, unpaid for his services, his family left in starvation at home, was to be transmuted into an enthusiastic soldier. Need it be wondered at that before the close of the war two thirds of the Confederate army had deserted? How could there be enthusiasm when there was no faith? faith in the head of the Confederacy was gone.

Iron quickly receives the excitement of magnetism, and Decline of military spirit at the South. as quickly loses it. Steel receives it reluctantly, but retains it permanently. In its military enthusiasm the South exhibited a rapid decline. They who clamored for war in the beginning were on the roll of deserters in the end. The South had the magnetism of soft iron, the North that of tempered steel. The energies of the latter, excited by the outrage on Sumter and the defeat at Bull Run, went on increasing, and were very far

from having reached their maximum at the close of the war.

The decline of the military spirit of the South, it is often affirmed, was due to the depression that followed the fall of Vicksburg and the defeat at Gettysburg. But it needs little examination to prove that it dates much farther back. The Southern people entered into the war in the firm conviction that their antagonists would not fight. The battle of Shiloh rudely dispelled that delusion. Again and again Davis declared that the conflict, in its magnitude, had altogether outrun his expectations.

To this must be added the severity of the conscription, the tyranny of the Richmond authorities, and the discovery made on all hands of the impossibility of maintaining the cherished dogma of state rights in presence of an arbitrary, a centralized military government. It had become very clear that secession, as it actually was, was very different from what it had promised to be. As early as the taking of New Orleans, we find fortresses surrendered because of the mutinous temper of their garrisons. In Grant's advance upon Vicksburg many of the Confederate soldiers threw away their arms and deserted. Pemberton himself was loud in his complaints of the demoralization of his army. He could not induce it to stand. The men made no concealment of the cause of their dissatisfaction, imputing their misfortunes to the misconduct of the Richmond authorities. The capture of Vicksburg fell heavily on the whole Confederacy. Contemporaneously with this, when Rosecrans advanced with the Army of the Cumberland, Bragg unceasingly fell back. From one strong point after another he retreated, until he had retreated beyond Chattanooga. No army, no matter of what material it may have been composed, can undergo such an experience without demoralization; the chief officers of that army came into open feud with their commander, and the discontent spread all through the ranks. Bragg could not control



his officers before the battle of Chickamauga, and they could not make him pursue his enemy after it. After the battle of Chattanooga he imputed their misfortunes to their misconduct, and in that condemnation Jefferson Davis loudly joined. When Sherman commenced his campaign, it was another commencement of Confederate retreat; one strong-hold after another was abandoned, and the end of it was that Sherman reached the sea. Hood's subsequent sortie to Nashville exhibited another spectacle of mismanagement and disorganization.

To the incompetency of the Richmond authorities the misrepresentations of the Southern newspapers signally added. According to them, the whole war was a procession of Confederate victories. It could not be but that such purposed deception would occasion a reaction at last.

Profligate journalism may demoralize a people, but it can not continue deceiving them forever. In the Confederacy there was not a newspaper strong enough and courageous enough to tell the truth. Fictitious victories were blazoned forth as realities—romantic triumphs won in the face of unheard-of odds. And what was the consequence when the truth came to be known? Dissatisfaction with the government, distrust of the press, decline of the military spirit.

If from the Confederate we turn to the National government, how fortunate was the Republic in the presidency of Lincoln, whose conduct secured not merely the confidence, but the unfaltering affection of the people. How fortunate in those whom he gathered round him as advisers: Stanton, his Secretary of War, an iron man, never surpassed in administrative ability—a man who knew how to wield, and, what is even more, how to disband armies of a million of men; Seward, who, with an ability to which his countrymen will yet render homage, guided the foreign affairs of the Republic through periods of the utmost peril. "I entered your serv-

Contrast exhibited  
by the National ad-  
ministration.

ice," he has told us, "when the hollowness of national friendship was expressed in the melancholy fact that the United States had not an assured or sympathizing friend in the world except the Republic of Switzerland;" he left it when, to no small degree through his wisdom, it had risen to be one of the great powers of the earth, and had need of the friendship of none; Welles, the creator of a navy on which the most powerful maritime nations looked with respect; Chase, who with consummate ability mastered the financial capacity and managed the financial affairs of the Republic.

At length, from the wintry heights of the White Mountains to the sun-seared sands of the Gulf, there was peace—a peace secured, not by a single battle, not by one crushing victory, but by a total exhaustion of the war-power of the South.

The war has not created a great slave empire encircling the Mexican Gulf; it has not divided the continent into rival states; it has not produced the results anticipated by those who occasioned it or by those who accepted it. It has left an undivided NATION, living under a common government, clement, just, powerful—a nation in which every man is free.

To thoughtful men it furnishes another proof that the progress of nations is not the result of the devices of individuals, but is determined by immutable law.

## CHAPTER XCVI.

### THE PROSPECT.

The domain of the Republic. Its rapidly increasing population presents great differences in character, in interests, in intentions. The result of the war has shown that to these diverse people equal civil rights will be accorded.

As the Civil War occurred between two sections of the Republic which had been made separate by climate, it is plain that the chief problem for American statesmen to solve is that of the harmonizing of such discordant elements, and causing them to submit to a common rule.

Examples are given of the modes of solution of this problem by other nations—by the Romans, under their imperial and ecclesiastical forms of government; by the Chinese, and by the Turks.

It may be foreseen that, in America, the solution will depend on the development of principles already existing—universal education, and an unfettered career for talent, the result of which must be an organization of the national intellect.

Some reflections are offered on the inevitable centralization of power; the conditions on which the manifestation of the physical energy of the Republic depends; the necessity of promoting the intellectual development of the now dominant race; the importance of locomotion and of a common speech; the difficulties that will arise from changes in the distribution of power; the removal of the capital of the nation to the West.

The future power and grandeur of the Republic.

THE Republic has been left by the war with a continent The domain of the United States. for its stage of action. It has passed from the condition of a coast power. It differs from older nations in this, that while they could develop only by warfare, the true condition of its growth is peace.

Its territory is divided by the meridian of  $100^{\circ}$  into two sections, the Atlantic and the Pacific. It contains regions nowhere excelled in agricultural fertility, and, for the production of some of the most important staples, nowhere equaled. It has vast mineral deposits—coal, iron, gold, silver, copper, lead, oil. It has a surface of inconceivable variety, rich savannas and sandy plains, sultry valleys and mountains covered with perpetual snow, great navigable rivers. The student of geography can never sufficiently express his admiration of its adaptability to all the various wants of civilized man.

The physical structure of this territory has settled that the Republic shall be one and indivisible from ocean to ocean; the Civil War has determined that it shall be neither Mexicanized nor Europeanized; that it shall not be the prey of trading politicians or military aspirants; nor a collection of rival and quarrelsome states, mutually thwarting each other's progress, and each paralyzing its own industry by the maintenance of standing armies. It is to continue to be a vast community, yielding a willing obedience to the dictates of reason issuing from a central power, which it has voluntarily established for its own benefit.

In his message to Congress (Dec., 1862), Lincoln gives the following table of the past and future population of the Republic:

Population of the Republic.

Year.	Population.	Year.	Population.
1800 . . .	5,305,937	1860 . . .	31,433,790
1810 . . .	7,239,814	1870 . . .	42,323,341
1820 . . .	9,638,131	1880 . . .	56,967,216
1830 . . .	12,866,020	1890 . . .	76,677,872
1840 . . .	17,069,453	1900 . . .	103,208,415
1850 . . .	23,191,876	1910 . . .	138,918,526

He anticipated that, before the close of the present century, the population would exceed one hundred millions.

But there is an element overlooked in the computations for the years after 1860 which will probably greatly change the result. The estimates here presented do not include Asiatic immigration.

The strength of the Republic turns on the prosperity and harmony of this multitudinous people, which not only thus differs in its origin, but will be made more heterogeneous by the influences to which it is exposed.

I may here refer the reader to what has been stated in the 1st Section of this work (Chapters from I. to VI. inclusive) for a view of the physical geography and climate of the territory which these vast populations have to inhabit, and the influences

Effect of climate and immigration upon it.



which those agencies will exert upon them. So diversified are the aspects of Nature in North America, that here necessarily will be produced all kinds of modified men—men differing from each other in their physical appearance and in their mental qualities.

Some persons have been disposed to deny to climate the influence on which I am insisting. But if they believe that the human race has descended from one original pair, since some nations are white, some olive, some yellow, some red, some black, if it be not climate that has wrought these changes, it is for those persons to tell us to what else they have been due. Let them consider well whether the causes they may be disposed to suggest are not themselves the consequences of climate.

Here, living together under a common rule, will be found men who, though of American birth, approximate in bodily conformation and in mental attributes to Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Italians, Germans, Arabs, Persians, Russians, and with these a vast body of immigrants of European and Asiatic origin.

The present populations on the American Atlantic coast are more or less Europeanized. They are either descendants of Europeans or of European birth. Those who live on the verge of that coast are a reflex of the people who confront them on the other side of the ocean. Boston is, to all intents and purposes, an English town. Massachusetts has never ceased to be intellectually a British colonial possession. Its style of thinking is altogether English.

Passing along the coast southwardly, ethnological types are encountered, the counterparts of the French, the Spanish, the North African, their distribution being determined by the isothermal lines. Considered in the aggregate, it may therefore be said that the Atlantic verge is truly European. The men think like Europeans, and the women mimic the modes of Europeans; but passing westwardly,

Europeanized character of the Atlantic region.

that resemblance, stage by stage, declines. Along the line of the Mississippi, respect for European opinion is lost.

Such being the Europeanized condition of the Atlantic region of the United States, the Pacific region will, through the operation of similar causes, inevitably be Orientalized. In it the ideas of Asia will find a favoring habitation.

Orientalized character of the Pacific region.

In Europe men think that political liberty is every thing. In Asia they have concluded that the form of government is of no moment provided that it has stability, and that security for the individual in person and property is the one thing to be desired. None in Asia ever think of improving their government; they restrict their changes to those who administer it. In Europe, the motto is principles, not men; in Asia, men, not principles.

The American statesman has to harmonize these discordant political elements. He has to enact for the Janus-faced republic common laws; he has to harmonize the man who limits his cares to this life, who pensively says that he expects at last to reach that place whither the flame of a lamp has gone when it has been blown out, with the man who is full of ideas of liberty and progress now, and who looks forward to immortality hereafter.

The problem of harmonizing such diverse populations.

Is it to be supposed that the rules of life which suit the inhabitants of Maine will suit the inhabitants of Florida? that laws adapted to men living in the rich alluvial valleys of the Mississippi will answer for those of the great sandy plains? Must not any general political system, suitable to such different cases, though it may rest on principles that are uniform, be yet capable of varied adaptation in its applications?

The influences we are here speaking of gave to the Northern and Southern States their distinct and opposing ideas, interests, wants. They were the predisposing causes that brought on the Civil War—a war one of the chief re-

sults of which was the concession of civil rights to the African.

If in that extreme case—for there can not arise a greater disparity than that between the white man and the black—such proved to be the unavoidable issue of the American system asserted in the shock of arms, we may rest assured that such also will be its issue in other cases that in the course of time will arise; such will be the result with the Asiatics; such, too, with the mixed population of Mexico.

The greatest of all problems with which the American statesman has to deal is that of the co-ordination of states peopled by modified men.

The concession of equal political rights to all men who own allegiance to the Republic is the basis on which American institutions rest; but the experience of many great people shows that this “comprehension” or “absorption” of discordant populations can not happen without risk to the well-being of a nation.

Dangers arising from the absorption of discordant populations.

Rome perished because the original Roman race was lost in an intermixture of foreign blood. Greece perished because of the Macedonian conquest of Persia. No Greek remained in his sterile home who fancied that the wealth and luxuries of Asia were within his reach. In the swarming myriads of Oriental people the sparsely-scattered Greek immigrants disappeared?

In view of this state of things, may we not earnestly inquire if history furnishes any example of governments which have been placed in similar circumstances, from whose experience we may gather instruction?

I have elsewhere pointed out the correspondence of geographical position presented by the Roman and American republics. If this continent has on either hand an ocean, Italy, on a smaller scale, had on either hand a sea: it lay between the two Mediterranean basins. On its east and west were

Analogy between the Roman and American republics.

communities altogether alien to each other, as completely differing in thoughts, and habits, and interests as was possible.

The essential principle of Roman polity was expansion and absorption. At a very early period in their history that people discovered the important fact that in a democracy absorption is essential to permanent dominion. Though they hated foreigners, they found themselves compelled by the force of circumstances to admit aliens to citizenship.

The dealings of  
Rome with foreign  
populations.

From the beginning, in the legendary times of their kings, they resorted to this principle. They transplanted to the city the people they conquered. They persisted in this policy throughout the period of the Republic. Marius would actually have transferred the seat of government to the Samnites. Sulla, though the champion of exclusion, was compelled by the difficulties of his position to associate with himself a host of foreign-born clients; Cæsar had to go farther, and admit such into the Senate. In the height of its power, the imperial system was compelled to follow the same maxims. It was the difficulty connected with this necessity, and not so much the personal ambition of leading men, that caused a change in the government. "Cæsar, foreseeing that the genuine Roman race would be overwhelmed by such crowds of aliens, conceived the idea, far beyond the ordi-

Her difficulty solved  
by resorting to im-  
perialism.

inary comprehension of his times, of reducing this mighty mass to that obedience to the rule of a single chieftain which it scorned to render to an exhausted nation: he fused the chaotic mass into one people. At first a veil was cast over the old republican forms, but it was gradually dropped, and there came into view a single ruler and a homogeneous state." This transition from Republicanism to Imperialism was not, as is often said, the voluntary work of men; it arose from the pressing necessities of the times. "The increasing extent of Roman dominion seemed to require a firmer



rule and a more definite system of government, and these could not be obtained except by imparting permanence and independence to the central authority. It was felt that the prolonged exercise of power could alone avail to effect the requisite reforms and superintend their development. The ministers of Augustus had to continue the policy of Julius. The Roman mind, constantly displaying its constructive attribute, was never satisfied with the contemplation of confusion: it sought to bring this to order." Mæcenas, one of the ministers of Augustus, transformed the ancient system of co-ordinate municipalities into a government whose authority emanated from the centre and passed to the extremities. It was a maxim often repeated by Agrippa, the personal friend of that emperor, "By union small things become great; by division the greatest become dust."

At the time of this transition to Imperialism the true Roman people had become passive. They found themselves overwhelmed by a countless multitude of Spaniards and Gauls, Greeks and Asiatics, and helpless under the sway of factions and political intriguers.

The ability with which the transmutation was accomplished merits our attention. The Roman imperial system was developed from the republican, not forcibly fastened upon it. All the early emperors feigned to be guided by the traditions and precedents of the Republic. They recognized, in their most solemn formulas, the popular will, delivering their mandates in the name of the Senate and the Roman people. Their uniform practice was not to fasten on the old system things that were strange and new, but to unfold the new from parts already existing. They did not add to their political structure as men add new apartments to a house, by bringing materials and fashioning them for the purpose, but they developed things as the oak grows—its leaf coming from the bud, its bud from the branch, its branch from the trunk.

The Empire was developed out of the Republic.

In the particulars now under consideration, the state of affairs in Rome offers a striking parallel to the state of affairs in America. As in Rome, so here, there is an irresistible progress of geographical expansion, a necessary absorption of many different people. We see how the Romans solved this political problem by a resort to Imperialism; and, perhaps, considering the great ability of the statesmen of those times, we may concede that such was the only proper solution in their case.

In America the same problem of dealing with discordant populations occurs.

It has been stated that the principles which have been in operation during the war will continue their action, and that the absorption of discordant populations will inevitably occur. If we have not been able to avoid the concession of civil rights to the negro in the Atlantic region—a more extreme case than Rome ever had to deal with—we may be certain that we shall have to concede them to the Asiatics and Mexicans in the Pacific region.

The concession of civil rights to all people inevitable.

While we are thus demanding from history examples for our guidance, and find one so significant offered to us by Rome, not without interest may we recall the progress and consider the present position of Turkey. The Turks have rejected the policy of absorption; they present a pure instance of the policy of exclusion; their political decline and present weakness illustrate the political wisdom of the founders of Roman dominion, who took the opposite course. Their history is a monition to us. They had the same contempt for the European that the white American has for the Mongol or the African. Let us, however, not fall into the arrogance of these Mohammedans, or into the superciliousness of the Chinese, who look upon other people with disdain. Let us frankly recognize the fact that among Asiatics there are men experienced in the management of great affairs, and in intellectual power equal to any of us. Let

Treatment by the Turkish government of its foreign populations.

us remember that to the people of that continent the world owes all its religious ideas, and modern society much of its physical well-being.

We have adopted the principle that in political systems it is the same as in mechanics—the broader the base and the lower the centre of gravity, the greater the stability.

The policy of absorbing diverse peoples, whether their diversities originate in other lands, or are engendered by climate-influences on this continent—still more, the policy of giving to all a voice in the government, brings us face to face with the same problem that the Romans encountered in the days when it was feared that the true Roman would be obliterated by the alien—the same problem that the Turks encountered in dealing with the victims of their conquests.

Twice did Rome solve the problem—on both occasions with consummate ability. First, as we have just seen, she solved it by resorting to Imperialism; and when, after a time, that failed, by Ecclesiasticism. Twice has she ruled Europe—once by her emperors, and once by her popes.

The study of the pontifical government—I speak of it not in its religious, but in its political aspect—is full of interest to the American statesman, rich in examples for his guidance.

The two solutions of this problem offered to us in the history of Rome—Imperialism and Ecclesiasticism—are inadmissible here, the American system rejecting both. Another solution, in accordance with its fundamental principles, will have to be found.

Even to one who considers superficially the habits and tendencies of society in the Republic, it may be plain that preparation has long been in progress for a third solution of the problem in accordance with American principles. This consists in the enforcement of universal education, and the opening

A second solution of the problem by Rome.

Incompatibility of those solutions with the American system.

In America the solution will be by universal education, and a free career to talent.

of an unfettered career to talent. We may safely admit unlimited territorial extension, and the unrestricted absorption of populations, no matter of what origin or type they may be, if we shape our institutions so as to make it sure that political influence and the guidance of affairs shall be in the hands of established ability.

No one who has devoted attention to the relative capacity of races of men would ever hesitate to commit the pure American to such a competition.

The education of every child, irrespective of nationality or color, by a general public school system—a career fairly open to each, that he may attain a position according to the talent that God has given him, neither possible in Rome, are both possible in America.

It will be understood that, in the remarks I am now making, I am not considering what ought to be, but endeavoring to ascertain, from the course of past events, what the future is about to be, taking for granted that the principles which have regulated American life thus far will not suddenly lose their efficacy, but will continue in operation.

To open the career for capacity or talent, irrespective of the condition of life, implies, in reality, the organization of the intelligence of the nation.

Necessity of an organization of the National Intellect.

Already we see that, perhaps without a very far-reaching conception either of the plan or of its consequences, preparatory measures of the kind have been contemplated in Congress. Schemes of competitive examination for the civil service have been proposed, partly to put an end to the disgraceful place-hunting that marks the accession of every new president, and fills the public offices with discreditable incompetence and ignorance, and partly to gain for that service the skill arising from experience in the special pursuit, whatever it may be. Not only in America, but in Europe, do we perceive a tendency to the adoption of this course. In England the system of competitive



examination has made a much more marked advance than in the United States.

But it is to China that we must look if we desire to see, Example offered by China, on the grand political scale, the organization of National Intellect carried into practical effect in the public administration of a vast empire. Four hundred millions of people—one third of the human race—have there, through many centuries, been carrying these ideas into effect. In a remote antiquity they based their system on the two principles we are here considering—universal education, and a free career for ascertained ability. The special mode by which they gave to these principles a practical working has been by competitive examination, which seems to have answered their purposes singularly well. Whether it would prove as suitable in America, or whether some other mode might be more advantageously resorted to, I will not here inquire. Many methods of reaching the effect might be suggested. With and of papal Rome. extraordinary ability, ecclesiastical Rome solved the problem by her monastic institutions. It was often remarked that the way to preferment and to offices of the highest state influence—nay, even that the high road to the papacy itself lay through the monastery porch.

From these considerations of the modes by which the The physical energy of the Republic. guidance of the policy of the Republic may be delivered over to its intelligence, we may pass to reflections on the modes by which it may carry out its resolves.

The energy with which the force of a nation may be brought into play, and therefore the manifestation of its physical power, turns altogether Conditions on which its exertion depends. on the rapidity with which information can be conveyed, resolves transmitted, and material transported. The greater the speed with which this can be done,

the more compact or concentrated the nation. From this point of view, the United States are far more compact at the present time, when they extend over the continent, than they were at the epoch of the Revolution, when they spread over only a few hundred miles along the Atlantic coast. The telegraph and the locomotive have accomplished this result.

I have already (vol. i., p. 302) referred to the change which has taken place in the rapidity of locomotion, and the effect it has had on the history of nations. This effect was never more thoroughly appreciated than by the Romans, whose empire, at its maximum development, was, in reality, a fringe round the Mediterranean. That sea offered an ever-open pathway in all directions to them. Rome was thus geographically the centre of the empire, with easy water-transportation to all the provinces. As regards internal communications, the first thing the legions did, when they found themselves in a new country, was to construct substantial roads and solid bridges to insure a rapid communication with Rome. No pains were spared to keep these avenues in thorough repair. It may be of interest to us to compare the rate of travel now with what it was in those days. Historians who have paid attention to the subject tell us that the average rate of sailing before the wind was seven miles an hour. It took two days to go from the mouth of the Tiber to the African coast, seven days to the Straits of Gibraltar. Caesar's customary rate of land travel was 100 miles in 24 hours, but Tiberius actually made 200 in one day, when hastening to Drusus in Germany. Cicero says that 56 miles made a good day's journey; the ordinary rate was about 30. It was the roads all pointing toward Rome, and, above all, the Mediterranean, which gave unity and strength to the empire. "Ever and anon the subject nations lifted up their heads from the dust, and beheld with amazement, and even with indignation, by how mere a

The parallel case  
in Rome.

shadow of military force they were actually controlled, and again lay quietly down and resigned themselves to their humiliation. Spain and Egypt were kept in obedience by only two legions each, Africa by one, Gaul by two cohorts of only 1200 men, Greece by six lictors. The sway of Rome throughout the provinces was a government of opinion. The repose of the empire was calm, passive, and almost deathlike."—*Merivale*. The populace well knew that, if the lictor was not enough, a few hours would bring a cohort; if the cohort was overpowered, there would soon be a legion; if the legion was insufficient, it would be backed by a Roman army.

Rome developed from a centre by successive additions and absorptions; the empire was a fringe of civilization on the edge of barbarism; the city was a focus of light and power. In America the development has been, not from a point, but from a line; the movement being not in all directions, but in one direction westward. Roman dominion carried with it the acknowledgment of a centre of power as its primary, its stern, its indisputable fact; here we have had voluntarily to acquire the conception of political unity, and to create artificially such a centre of power.

Centralization is an inevitable issue in the life of nations. Power ever tends to concentration. Inanimate nature exhibits to us innumerable illustrative instances. All animated nature displays, as we examine grades of life that are successively higher, a progress to the domination of a central intelligence. In democratic communities the political application of these doctrines is received with disfavor; in America, even with condemnation. But let thoughtful men ask themselves whether it be in truth a democracy in which we are living, or whether we are only deluding ourselves with a name; whether, under our existing institutions,

Development of Roman power from a centre.

Development of American power from a line.

The centralization of power is inevitable.

power is really in the hands of the people or in those of political sharpers; let them inquire what is the true character of that which we call a majority; whether or not, in the actual working of things, it is a tyranny that disfranchises the minority—a minority perhaps not far from half the people—cutting them off from all share in the government in which they are supposed to participate, all share in its influence and profits; let them consider whether our public policy is controlled by men who are acting with a single eye to the prosperity of the nation, or by men acting with a view to the distribution of the spoils of office; whether, in our Legislatures, it is the public good or individual interest that compels attention and secures its ends; whether it be the intellect of the country or audacious ignorance which is leading the people. There is no tyranny so dreadful as that of Ignorance armed with power. While unquestionably they will admit that Individualism is converting the continent from a wilderness into a garden, filling it with prodigies of art and skill, producing untold wealth, giving to all a competence, to some colossal fortunes, let them reflect whether Individualism is not overweighing Patriotism; whether society, instead of being guided by prudence, is not simply intent on gains, and delivering itself up to extravagance, dissipation, immorality. We have seen how Individualism (Chapter III.) originated in the race from which we have descended; we have seen to what wonderful results it has given rise; but let us not forget that it was Individualism that brought on this Civil War—the individual setting up his interests in opposition to the public good; let us consider whether Individualism may not prove to be the ruin of the nation if it continue to have free play, uncorrected and unchecked by some higher, some better motive. A nation inevitably becomes weak when it delivers itself up to the mere acquisition of wealth, the glory of which, as Sallust truly tells us, is fleeting and

The present distribution of power in the Republic.



perishable, while that of the intellect is illustrious and immortal. Why, then, should we view with despair or condemnation the retreat of power from the Individual or from the Party. Why lament the loss of that which, if we will only open our eyes, we may see that we never possessed? Why not prepare to accept that which has been, and will ever be the lot of all nations—centralization? guiding ourselves in such a manner that it may be a centralization resting on Intelligence, and not on brute force.

The centralization of power on Intelligence to be desired.

While in America there is nothing to prevent the influx of foreign populations—European, Asiatic, African—bringing with them their various religious and social ideas—while thus it appears from the past history of the Republic that these populations will be inevitably absorbed, sound policy indicates that nothing should be left undone to maintain the physical vigor and the intellectual activity of the native American race. A community which for many generations has lived in one locality becomes, as it were, specialized; it is moulded by climate; it may even fall into a stagnant state. Physical immobility engenders intellectual immobility, and improvement seems almost to be hopeless. What a contrast between the Asiatic, who is fixed to one spot like a plant, who has lost all ideas of progress, of liberty, of manhood, and the restless American, who is ever shifting his place—who itches to have a hand in the legislation and administration of affairs, small or great, in the village, the township, the nation—who would revise the laws of nature if he could, and amend the Constitution of the universe.

In another work I have pointed out that it should be a settled principle of American polity to encourage, as far as possible, personal and family locomotion. In this way much may be done to neutralize the pernicious influences of climate, and prevent special-

Political importance of locomotion.

ization. The self-conceit that fills an unmoving people is destroyed if that people be brought into the presence of the stranger. The Civil War would not have occurred if the Southern people had known better the character, the intelligence, the resources, the power of those whom they voluntarily made their antagonists.

The experience of America confirms the experience of Europe, that control over the means of transmission of intelligence and over the means of internal locomotion, the telegraph and the railroad, should be possessed by the government. Individuals and companies are not to be trusted with the power that arises from these inventions.

Individual and family locomotion in the United States is both prompted and facilitated by the important fact that, with exceptions too insignificant to merit notice, the entire population speaks one tongue. This is a powerful bond of unity, giving wonderful activity, and inducing multitudes who would otherwise be stationary to undertake journeys and change their place of abode, thereby antagonizing to no small degree the baleful effects of climate. But the advantages of a common language are not limited to these physical results: there are intellectual ones of not less, perhaps, indeed, of higher value. One language implies one literature, a tendency to uniformity in the processes of thought, and to identity in fundamental ideas. What England has produced by centuries of intellectual labor has come to us a free gift—a gift of priceless value. Ours are her ideas of liberty and law; to her literature as to a fountain of light we repair; the torch of science that is shining here was kindled at her midnight lamp; the fires of religion that purify our land were lighted at her altar.

In this chapter I have been contemplating the difficulties that are before the Republic arising from its necessary expansion and policy of absorption. There are other formidable difficulties, which

Political importance  
of a common tongue.

Difficulties arising  
in the Republic from  
changes in the Dis-  
tribution of Power.

must inevitably be encountered, arising from the Distribution of Power. The Civil War itself has been a most momentous example of this. As we have seen, the real cause of that war was the apprehension that the political influence so long enjoyed by the South was about to be lost by her. The slave interest was merely the instrument with which she tried to secure by separation what she must inevitably lose by union. As the centres of population and of wealth move steadily westward, there will be continually witnessed changes in the Distribution of Power—changes that will necessarily imply conflicts of a serious kind. Thus it is not to be supposed that the smaller states, such as Delaware and Rhode Island, will be permitted long to possess an equal voice in the United States Senate with the great and powerful states of the West. New England and the Atlantic region must make ready to surrender a part of their power. It may be said that these are rights founded upon the original compact, and consecrated by the Constitution; but the Civil War has its logic too. In imposing once and forever the principle of Nationality, it has inexorably determined that the little rights of a particular state shall never stand in the way of the rights and the progress of the great united whole.

In the American system the Distribution of Power is regulated by the distribution of population, and therefore it is liable to great and rapid changes. Some communities are growing, some have passed into a stationary condition, some are declining. Hence there arise many facts of interest, not only in a local, but a national point of view. Among such may be mentioned the migratory movements of the white inhabitants of the Southern into other states, the result of the change in social condition brought about by the war. The hope of restoring ruined fortunes, the escape from civil disabilities, perhaps, too, the souvenirs of a regretted past, will dislocate large portions of those populations—how large remains to be seen. But not only will

the white race exhibit these movements, the negroes, free from the restraints that for centuries past have been imposed upon them, will follow their animal instincts. Their physical constitution, in harmony with a hot climate, will prompt them to migrate from the cooler states to the warm climate of the Gulf. The experience of Europe has shown that the production-rate and death-rate of man are largely controlled by political conditions; frequently has the population of that continent exhibited a rapid increase; frequently has it exhibited a great diminution. In America the negro is an exotic: throughout a large portion of the continent he is not in harmony with the climate; and though, since the foundation of the Republic, his numbers have exhibited an increase, that increase has been due to the mercenary causes which stimulated his production; he was profitable to his owner, and was an article of sale. Thrown on his own resources, having to take care of himself, it remains to be seen whether he will live as long as he did when his master took care of him; whether he will submit to bear the burden of supporting such large families as he produced when the cost of raising them was not his, but his master's. It is very clear that great changes await this portion of the population; its individual death-rate will probably increase; its reproductiveness will diminish; it will tend to migrate to the hotter regions of the continent.

Similar inquiries present themselves as respects European immigrants. The extinction of slavery has thrown open the whole country to them; it remains to be seen how they will voluntarily distribute themselves. Of this immigration the greater portion comes not from the warmer, but from the cooler parts of Europe; its natural instinct is to seek a similar abode on this continent; but from this it will be diverted by the inducements that are offered in other localities, and especially by more profitable recompenses for labor.



The outward and visible sign of this change in the distribution of power; the transition of the Republic from a coast to a continental nation, will be found in the removal of the seat of government to a more central, a more convenient, a more secure position. To the necessity of this change I endeavored to draw attention years ago. No one can study the events of the Civil War without perceiving how important it is that this should be brought to pass. I know that the very stones of the Capitol, defended at the cost of so many precious lives and untold millions of money, are hallowed in American eyes; but, though that Capitol will never be abandoned, it may yet be transferred to a site more appropriate to the grandeur and power of the country.

The mind of our nation is expanding to a conception of the imperial future that is before it; it realizes the necessity of political unity and the establishment of a centre of power. It recognizes that it is the destined successor of Rome, but with influences far grander than Rome ever possessed. With many points of resemblance between them, the American differs from the Roman in this, that he is full of anticipations of the future. The Roman had no idea of the progressive improvement of mankind; he lived in reminiscences of the past and enjoyment of the present; the American forgets the past, is dissatisfied with the present, and lives for the future.

And now we may contemplate the Republic whose existence has been vindicated by this Civil War—the Republic of the future, whose seat is a continent, with the Atlantic and enlightened Europe on one side, the Pacific and the wealth of Asia on the other—the Pacific, with its hundreds of isles, beautiful as the Garden of Eden, and awaiting the welcome approach of civilized man. It is a republic with a net-work of railroads and telegraphs from sea to sea; its capital in the heart of its power; its population

harmonized by wise institutions, speaking one language, obeying one Constitution, disciplined by a uniform education, equal before the law; its national intellect organized, freedom of thought secured, a career of advancement fairly open to all, place given to talent. It is a military power, strong in the vast armies it can raise, swift in intercommunication, abounding in resources; a commercial power, having geographical advantages never yet allotted even to states most illustrious in the annals of the world. Tyre, Athens, England, have each lain in an eccentric position, with their dépôts, colonies, dependencies at a distance. If they, in spite of such disadvantages, could, from the corners of the world, put forth their influences and rise to so great a pitch of prosperity, what may not be expected of a Power whose seat is in the midst of the nations, whose dominions are round her feet, whose rulers are Lords of the East and the West?

In that day of greatness and glory Americans will desire to put aside the remembrance of this war. The very descendants of those who lifted their hands against the Republic will be ashamed of what their ancestors did, and seek to hide in forgetfulness the memory of their acts. They who fought for the perpetuation of human slavery will find in the future no friends. Their posterity will look back on the accomplishment of Emancipation and the establishment of Nationality with pride; regarding the issue of the war, not as the victory of the North, but as the fiat of God.

All history tells us that Lost Causes do not live long. The Social War lasted three years, half a million of men were destroyed, yet Rome very quickly forgot it. In our ancestral country the remembrance of its civil wars has long ago passed away; yet in the American Conflict there was no battle as bloody as the battle of Towton. For a little while they who have been disappointed clamor; it is the privilege of the vanquished to exaggerate every thing;

then objurgation subsides into murmurs, and murmurs sink into souvenirs, and souvenirs end in oblivion.

In these volumes I have related, as correctly as I could, the story of the Civil War. To find the truth and deliver it to others, I have spared neither time, nor labor, nor expense. Knowing, personally, many of the chief actors in these events, I have tried to guard myself equally from partiality and prejudice. Though I write in the North, no Northern view has biased me; some of the happiest years of my youth were spent in the South. I have had friends on both sides who have risen to distinction in this war, and friends on both sides who have fallen. The roads over which some of the greatest marches here described have been made, the fields in which some of the most decisive of these battles have been fought, were long ago familiar to me. Unswayed by friendships, undeterred by the apprehension of offending, I have, in the composition of this book, endeavored to keep steadfastly in view the strict injunction—

“Be just, and fear not;  
Let all the ends thou aim'st at be thy Country's,  
Thy God's, and Truth's.”





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