GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)
Description of contents

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

(1) Box no. 2415

(2) Folder title/number: (6)
Secret Documents

(3) Date: June 1951 - Dec. 1951

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
460	d, e, n

(5) Item description and comment:
Secret

(6) Reproduction: (Yes) No

(7) Film no. Sheet no.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

file
gm

INCOMING MESSAGE

EHD/rbo

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

29 Jul 51

17

FROM : DEPTAR (SAOOA OAEC) WASH DC

TO : SCAP TOKYO JAPAN

NR : DA 38016

REURAD Jul Z 27497 and OURAD Jul DA 34873 subj is Japan CMP Rqmts.

1. As received, rqmts mil do not total 48,202 but 49,602;
Carbon 39,360;
Alloy 9910;
Stainless 332.

2. Mil Distr between claimant programs by percent does not total 100, A-1-3.448, A-4-20.849, A-7-3.630, A-8-6.327, A-9-.405, B-1-58.383, B-3-6.740, C-2-.091.

3. Percentage distr by service does not total 100,
Army 99.065,
Air Forces .035.

4. Have interpreted stated rqmts as being a total for 6 QRS and assume equal distr each qr.

5. Additional info needed concerning forms and shapes of steel rqmts by type of steel, for each claimant program for each service of the mil, forms and shapes by at least types for NPR, forms and shapes by types by ultimate consuming industry by end product for domestic, and forms and shapes by types by ultimate consuming industry by end product for export. Forms and shapes to conform to sed 1 of CMI regulation 1, 3 May 51 as hand carried by Brenn.

NO SIG

ACTION : ECON & SCI

INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4, AG, CIV AFF

94925

PRIORITY
UNCLASSIFIED

TOO : 281720 Z
MCN : AUB 176/28

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

SECURITY INFORMATION

INCOMING MESSAGE

RESTRICTED

TLD/jes

ROUTINE

24 Sep 51

FROM : CG 2D LOG COMD

TO : CG JLCOM (PASS TO ORD OFF) YOKOHAMA JAPAN

INFO : CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN, CG EIGHTH ARMY

NR : OJX 8087-5

Reference your message EX 38017 Shipment Nbr 8-107 SNL group ZI departed Pusan 21 Sep via Olympic Pioneer. Shipping documents being forwarded via courier.

NO SIG

INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, G-4, AG, CIV AFF, SIGNAL

Information on Shipment

NOTE : Answers or references to or acknowledgments of this msg will be classified at least "Restricted".

SECURITY INFORMATION

29

41630

ROUTINE

TOO : 240007 Z
MCN : 74844

RESTRICTED

CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

16623—FEC P&PC—8/51—300M

COPY No.

C O P Y

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Col Cooper
26-6028

Quarters for Advisory Groups to the NPRJ

G-4 CAS 21 Dec 1951

1 1. In reviewing real estate requirements submitted by JLCom for housing and messing CAS Advisory Group personnel stationed with NPRJ units, it appears that great difficulty is encountered in many cases in providing accomodations acceptable by Western standards. If such is the case it is considered desireable to explore the possibilities of developing a program to alleviate this situation particularily in view of the probable extended period of time these facilities will be required.

2. If CAS desires to proceed in this matter it is requested that the following information be furnished G-4:

a. Present accomodations provided each Advisory Group to include the following data:

(1) Name and location of Camp served.

(2) Location of living quarters.

(3) Distance from Camp to quarters and road conditions.

(4) Number of Officers and Enlisted Men in Group.

(5) Classification, i.e., excellent, satisfactory, unsatisfactory.

(6) If unsatisfactory, is alternate facility available? Give location, distance from camp, etc.

b. In addition, a statement as to provision or possibility of future provision of Western-style accomodations by the Japanese Government for Groups by other than procurement demand methods, i.e., construction from budgeted NPRJ funds, rehabilitation of existing buildings, etc.

/s/ G. L. E.
- G. L. E. - - - - - - - - - -

S6783

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Tab "A"

INFORMATION CONCERNING QUARTERS FOR ADVISORY GROUPS TO THE NPRJ

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

NAME OF NPR CAMPS SERVED	LOCATION OF LIVING QUARTERS	DISTANCE FROM CAMP TO QUARTERS AND ROAD CONDITIONS	NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND EM IN GROUP OFF	EM	CLASSIFICATION	IF UNSATISFACTORY ALTERNATE FACILITY LOCATION, DISTANCE
KANTO CAS REGION						
Camp Nerima	Tokyo and Vicinity	Officers 12 Miles EM 2½ Miles - Good	16	27	Excellent	
Camp Kanazawa	Kanazawa	3 Miles	2	3	Excellent	
Camp Utsunomiya	Utsunomiya	6 Miles - Poor	2	7	Satisfactory	
Camp Takada	Takada	5 Blocks	2	4	Satisfactory	
Camp Matsumoto	Matsumoto	4 Miles - Poor	3	7	Unsatisfactory - 1 PD house for officers and EM, poor construction, Japanese style, located in Geisha district, also renting rooms in Japanese hotel. Sanitation unsatisfactory. Only messing facilities are those provided by NPRJ. No satisfactory billets available.	
Camp Toyokawa	Toyokawa	4 Miles - Fair	3	10	Unsatisfactory - No billets available. All personnel on per diem living in Japanese style hotel. Messing facilities and sanitation very unsatisfactory. No satisfactory billets available.	
Camp Shimmachi	Maebashi	10 Miles - Fair	3	3	Excellent	
Camp Katsuda	Mito	5 Miles - Poor	6	14	Satisfactory	
Camp Funaoka	Funaoka Ord Depot	Adjacent to Camp	2	4	Excellent	

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET S6783

Camp Tachikawa	Tachikawa	1½ Miles - Fair	20	18	Unsatisfactory - EM living in transient barracks with R and R personnel. Officers living 3 in one room. No other billets available.
HOKKAIDO CAS REGION					
Camp Engaru	Engaru	2 Miles - Fair	2	4	Satisfactory
Camp Bihoro	Bihoro	4 Miles - Good	6	8	Unsatisfactory - 2 houses on PD for over a year. Renovation disapproved by Northern Command as too costly. Presently living in 14 rooms of Japanese hotel. Sanitation is Japanese standard but considered fair. Food is prepared and served by hotel personnel. No other billets available.
Camp Obihiro	Obihiro	3 Miles - Good	2	8	Satisfactory
Camp Aomori	Aomori	5 Miles - Fair	2	8	Excellent
Camp Eniwa	Chitose	9 Miles - Good	2	4	Excellent
Camp Hakodate	Hakodate	1 Mile - Good	1	5	Excellent
Camp Sapporo	Sapporo	3 Miles - Good	18	25	Satisfactory
KINKI CAS REGION					
Camp Fukuchiyama	Fukuchiyama	1½ Miles - Good	3	5	Satisfactory
Camp Fukuyama	Fukuyama	5 Miles - Fair	3	5	Excellent
Camp Himeji	Himeji	2 Miles - Good	3	9	Satisfactory
Camp Kaidaichi	North Camp Hiro	18 Miles - Good	2	4	Excellent

Camp Maizuru	Camp Maizuru (US)	5½ Miles - Good	3	3	Excellent
Camp Mitsuhama	Matsuyama	6 Miles - Good	2	4	Excellent
Camp Mizushima	Okayama	20 Miles - Fair	2	6	Excellent
Camp Uji	Okubo	4 Miles - Good	3	8	Satisfactory
Camp Yonago	Miho AFB	8 Miles - Good	2	5	Excellent
Camp Zentsuji	Zentsuji	1 Mile - Good	3	7	Excellent
Camp Itami	Itami AFB	4 Miles - Fair	12	35	Excellent
KYUSHU CIVIL AFFAIRS REGION					
Camp Fukuoka	Fukuoka	7 Miles - Poor	15	24	Satisfactory
Camp Kanoya	Camp Kanoya	Quarters in Camp	3	6	Satisfactory
Camp Miyakonojo	Miyakonojo	Quarters in Camp	2	3	Satisfactory
Camp Ozuki	Camp Ozuki	Quarters in Camp	3	5	Satisfactory
Camp Hario	Sasebo	11 Miles - Poor	5	9	Satisfactory
Camp Kumamoto	Kumamoto	3 Miles - Fair	2	4	Satisfactory
Camp Nakatsu	Nakatsu	5 Miles - Fair	1	2	Satisfactory
Camp Sone	Camp Kokura	5 Miles - Fair	3	6	Satisfactory

Camp Kurume Ordinary School Center	Kurume	3/4 Miles - Poor	15	17	Satisfactory
Camp Narashino Mortar Training Center	Camp Palmer	400 Yards Excellent	15	15	Excellent
[illegible]rihama	Camp McGill	7 Miles - Fair	16*	23*	Satisfactory

* Two officers female. One enlisted female. The above three females have to be billeted with civilian personnel. This is found to be unsatisfactory due to difference in time schedules for work.

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12065 SECTION 3-402 / NNDG NO. 775012



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

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JAPAN

Scale 1 : 2,000,000

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NAEBO
SAPPORO
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ENIWA
HAKODATE




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
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DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12065 SECTION 3-402 / NNDG NO. 775025




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Shimizu
Okazaki
Yokkaichi
SHIZUOKA
Himeji
KŌBE
TOYOHASHI
Tsu
Nara
OSAKA
HAMAMATSU
Uji-Yamada
WAKAYAMA
Tokushima
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

LEL
FK Jr

Major R. Y. Sanders
74-1151 Ex

Quarters for Advisory Groups to the NPRJ

CAS G-4 8 MAR 1952

2. 1. Reference: C/N, subject: "Immediate Release of Property Now Used for Administration and Recreational Purposes from PD" (C/N 1 from CAS to G-4), dated 29 Feb 52.

38

2. a. The housing requirements for the current CAS advisory groups are enumerated in the reference quoted above.

b. Attached as tab "A" is the information requested in par 2 a, (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), C/N 1.

c. Attached as tab "B" is a map of Japan showing the location of the NPRJ camps.

3. The NPRJ is providing temporary western-style billets for CAS advisory personnel in NPRJ Camps Miyakonojo and Ozuki. The NPRJ has not made any housing facilities available for dependents of any CAS personnel and does not desire to have any U.S. dependents living within the camp areas.

4. No funds have been included in any current or planned budgets of the NPRJ to provide for any construction or rehabilitation of western-style facilities for use by CAS advisory groups.

5. The current U.S. planning assumption is that the Japanese Government will support CAS advisory groups beginning in 1954. NPRJ officials have no instructions to this effect nor are they planning to provide any additional facilities for CAS advisory groups.

2 Incl
1. Tab "A"
2. Tab "B"

FK
F. K. Jr.

LOGISTICS FILE

S6783

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
Intra-Office Routing Slip

24 DEC 1951

FROM: _____ DATE: _____ 19 _____

SUSPENSE DATE: _____

TO:

CHIEF	2 ✓	ADJ GEN		MEDICAL	
EXECUTIVE	1 OK	COMPTROLLER		ORDNANCE	
ASST EXECUTIVE	2 RCB	ENGINEER		P M	
PERSONNEL		FINANCE		Q M	
INFORMATION		INSP GEN		SIGNAL	
OPERATIONS	4 Rhd	JUDGE ADV		GG SCH CTR	
LOGISTICS	3			MTC	

ADMINISTRATION _____
Mil Personnel _____
Supply _____
Civ Personnel _____

FOR:

Approval		Information	
Action		Return	
Comment		Sign & Dispatch	
Concurrence		File	

Remarks:

G-4

Does this mean that JLC has withdrawn recommendation (phoned to me by Col Donnovin) to release Kusume completely to NPRJ? Investigate x PS

24 DEC 1951
S6790

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

10562

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
AND
FAR EAST COMMAND

Routing of attached papers has been recorded. If change is deemed necessary please call distribution unit 26-6385)

ROUTING SLIP

AG MAIL AND RECORDS UNIT

FROM: _____ DATE: 22 DEC 1951

TO:

Commander-in-Chief _____
Aide-de-Camp _____
Chief of Staff _____
DCofS FEC _____
DCofS SCAP _____
SGS _____
Comptroller _____
G-1 _____
G-2 _____
G-3 _____
G-4 _____
JSPOG _____
AG _____
Antiaircraft _____
Central Purchasing O _____
Chaplain _____
Chemical _____
Civ Personnel _____
Engineer _____
Hq Comdt _____
IG _____
JA _____
Medical _____

Ordnance _____
PM _____
PIO _____
Ryukyus Civ Adm _____
QM _____
Signal _____
Sp Services _____
Trans _____
TI&E _____
Civ Aff _____
Civ Comm _____
Civ Historical _____
CI&E _____
Civ Int _____
Civil Property Custodian _____
Civ Trans _____
Diplomatic _____
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Government _____
Legal _____
NRS _____
PH&W _____

SECRET

FOR:

Approval _____
Comment or Concurrence _____
Information _____
Initials _____
Issuance of Orders _____
Necessary Action ✓

Note and Return _____
Distribution Desired _____
Signature _____
Dispatch _____
Attachment of Reference _____
File _____

24 DEC 1951
S6790

14331—FEC P&PC—6/51—50M

FEC AGO FORM 1 JAN 51 NO. 14

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

GHQ, SCAP-FEC
AG RECORDS
Filed AG 354

JL 354 (19 Nov 51)GD-O 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Temporary Use of Camp Kurume by NPRJ

HEADQUARTERS JAPAN LOGISTICAL COMMAND, APO 343 21 DEC 1951

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East, APO 500

1. By TWX from this headquarters, Commanding General, Southwestern Command has been instructed to take appropriate and expeditious action as outlined in basic letter, above.

2. Further, Commanding General, Southwestern Command, has been authorized to establish direct coordination and liaison with CAS, GHQ, SCAP (Attention: Lieutenant Colonel Pillsbury) to implement and facilitate necessary action.

Recorded
Hq JLC

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Wayne E. Hess

WAYNE E HESS
1st Lt AGC
Asst Adj Gen

24 DEC 1951
S6790

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

1112/6

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

10 December 1951

AG 354 (19 Nov 51)CAS-L

SUBJECT: Temporary Use of Camp Kurume by NPRJ

TO: Commanding General
Japan Logistical Command
APO 343
ATTENTION: Adjutant General

1. It is desired that Camp Kurume and its accompanying training area be made available to the NPRJ on a temporary basis, subject to a 15 - 30 day eviction notice.

2. Direct coordination between CAS, GHQ, SCAP and the Commanding General, JLCOM, is authorized.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

JTC
OMC 100
14 DEC 1951
DATE
B-03
G-8 DOC NO

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col Pillsbury
74-1151 Ext 24

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.: Subject: Release of Camp Kurume to NPRJ

Note No.	From: CAS	To: C/S THRU: G-3	Date:

1. 1. References:

a. C/N CAS to C/S, subject: Release of Camp Kurume for NPRJ Use, dated 19 November 1951.

b. Ltr, AG 354(19 Nov 51)CAS-L, GHQ, FEC, subject: Temporary Use of Camp Kurume by NPRJ, dated 10 December 1951.

2. Reference b above, made Camp Kurume available to the NPRJ on a temporary basis subject to a 15 to 30 day eviction notice.

3. The NPRJ established its Ordinary (Infantry) School Center at Camp Kurume and now plans to use the facilities for an Officers Candidate School in addition. To date approximately 10,000,000 yen have been expended in making limited and necessary repairs. The NPRJ feels that further expenditure of funds to improve facilities cannot be justified unless the camp is released on a permanent basis.

4. As the site appears to be especially desireable as to terrain, climate and accessibility of areas for training and because the selection of a permanent location for an infantry school appears to be so indeterminate, it is requested that Camp Kurume be permanently released to the NPRJ.

- F. K. Jr. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SECRET

FEC AGO FORM NO. 37A SECURITY INFORMATION

11555—FEC P&PC—3/51—30M

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Lt Col Pillsbury
74-1151 Ext 24

Release of Camp Kurume to NPRJ

CAS C/S
THRU: G-3

1. 1. References:

a. C/N CAS to C/S, subject: Release of Camp Kurume for NPRJ Use, dated 19 November 1951.

b. Ltr, AG 354(19 Nov 51)CAS-L, GHQ, FEC, subject: Temporary Use of Camp Kurume by NPRJ, dated 10 December 1951.

2. Reference b above, made Camp Kurume available to the NPRJ on a temporary basis subject to a 15 to 30 day eviction notice.

3. The NPRJ established its Ordinary (Infantry) School Center at Camp Kurume and now plans to use the facilities for an Officers Candidate School in addition. To date approximately 10,000,000 yen have been expended in making limited and necessary repairs. The NPRJ feels that further expenditure of funds to improve facilities cannot be justified unless the camp is released on a permanent basis.

4. As the site appears to be especially desireable as to terrain, climate and accessibility of areas for training and because the selection of a permanent location for an infantry school appears to be so indeterminate, it is requested that Camp Kurume be permanently released to the NPRJ.

- F. K. Jr. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Lt Col Pillsbury
74-1151 Ext 24

Release of Camp Kurume to NPRJ

CAS C/S
THRU: G-3

1. 1. References:

a. C/N CAS to C/S, subject: Release of Camp Kurume for NPRJ Use, dated 19 November 1951.

b. Ltr, AG 354(19 Nov 51)CAS-L, GHQ, FEC, subject: Temporary Use of Camp Kurume by NPRJ, dated 10 December 1951.

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- F. K. Jr. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Lt Col Pillsbury
74-1151 Ext 34

Release of Camp Kurume to NPRJ

CAS C/S
THRU: G-3

1. 1. References:

a. C/N CAS to C/S, subject: Release of Camp Kurume for NPRJ Use, dated 19 November 1951.

b. Ltr, AG 354(19 Nov 51)CAS-L, GNO, FEC, subject: Temporary Use of Camp Kurume by NPRJ, dated 10 December 1951.

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- F. K. Jr. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Lt Col Pillsbury
74-1151 Ext 24

Release of Camp Kurume to NPRJ

CAS C/S
THRU: G-3

1. 1. References:

a. C/N CAS to C/S, subject: Release of Camp Kurume for NPRJ Use, dated 19 November 1951.

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CAS FILE

- F. K. Jr. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

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HP

FK Jr

Lt Col Pillsbury
74-1151 Ext 24

Release of Camp Kurume to NPRJ

CAS C/S
THRU: G-3

1. 1. References:

a. C/N CAS to C/S, subject: Release of Camp Kurume for NPRJ Use, dated 19 November 1951.

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LOGISTICS FILE

- F. K. Jr. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

L-112

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

(Not to Leave the Section)
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
Intra-Office Routing Slip

FROM: Director of Logistics

DATE: 26 December 1951

SUSPENSE DATE:

TO:

CHIEF	ADJ GEN	MEDICAL
EXECUTIVE	COMPTROLLER	ORDNANCE
ASST EXECUTIVE	ENGINEER	P M
PERSONNEL	FINANCE	Q M
INFORMATION	INSP GEN	SIGNAL
OPERATIONS RKW	JUDGE ADV	GG SCH CTR
LOGISTICS		MTC

ADMINISTRATION
Mil Personnel
Supply
Civ Personnel

FOR:

Approval	Information
Action	Return
Comment	Sign & Dispatch
Concurrence	File

Remarks:

1. J.L.C. has not recommended that Kurume be turned over completely to NPR because the accompanying letter arrived after Col. Donnovin's telephone conversation.

2. A new request is being prepared to obtain Kurume on a permanent basis. This request, if considered reasonble by GHQ, will be referred to J.L.C. and will then present an opportunity for J.L.C. to go on record with it's recommendations.

OK

H. B. P.

(Not to Leave the Section)
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
Intra-Office Routing Slip

FROM: **Director of Logistics**

DATE: **26 December** 19**51**

SUSPENSE DATE: ____________

TO:

CHIEF ____	ADJ GEN ____	MEDICAL ____
EXECUTIVE **1**	COMPTROLLER ____	ORDNANCE ____
ASST EXECUTIVE ____	ENGINEER ____	P M ____
PERSONNEL ____	FINANCE ____	Q M ____
INFORMATION ____	INSP GEN ____	SIGNAL ____
OPERATIONS ____	JUDGE ADV ____	GG SCH CTR ____
LOGISTICS ____		MTC ____

ADMINISTRATION ____
Mil Personnel ____
Supply ____
Civ Personnel ____

FOR:

Approval ____	Information ____
Action ____	Return ____
Comment ____	Sign & Dispatch ____
Concurrence ____	File ____

= =

Remarks:

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- H. B. P. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
SECURITY INFORMATION

CHECK SHEET

Lt Col Fargo
26-6443

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.: Subject: Release of Camp Kurume for NPRJ Use.

36

Note No. 4

From: G-4 To: CAS Date: 22 Nov 51

Forwarded. Lt. Col. Webb, CAS, advised 21 Nov 51 by telephone of DCofS, SCAP approval for temporary use of Camp Kurume by NPRJ.

1 Incl
n/c

G.L.E.

Lt Col Beddow
74-1151 Ext 93

From: CAS To: G-4 Date: 1 DEC 1951

5 1. Informal arrangements have been made with JLCOM (G-3 and Engineer) to use Camp Kurume. JLCOM requested, however, that written authorization be furnished.

2. It is, therefore, requested that the attached Draft letter directing JLCOM to permit NPRJ's use of Kurume on a temporary basis be dispatched.

2 Incls:
Map
Draft

L.H.W.

LOGISTICS COPY

S66660
1 DEC 1951

SECURITY INFORMATION
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FEC AGO Form No 37a
(13 Dec 49)

2410—FEC Printing Plant—4/50—50M

DRAFT SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

354 (19 Nov 51) CAS-L

SUBJECT: Temporary Use of Camp Kurume by NPRJ.

TO: Commanding General
Japan Logistical Command
APO 343
ATTENTION: Adjutant General

1. It is desired that Camp Kurume and its accompanying training area be made available to the NPRJ on a temporary basis, subject to a 15 - 30 day eviction notice.

2. Direct coordination between CAS, GHQ, SCAP and the Commanding General, JLCOM, is authorized.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

Copies furnished:
G-3
G-4
CAS

SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT SECRET

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY **CHECK SHEET** COPY

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

Lt Col Webb
74-1151 Ext 23

File No.: 354 Subject: Release of Camp Kurume for NPRJ Use.

Note No.	From: CAS To: CS Thru: G-3 Date: 19 Nov 51
1	1. Reference is made to check sheet, G-3 to CAS, dated 22 October 1951, subject: "Utilization of Camp Palmer".

2. Pursuant to G-3 recommendations contained in reference check sheet, the problem of locating an appropriate camp site for an interim Infantry School and certain other schools for the training of the NPRJ, has been discussed with representatives of JLCOM.

3. As a result of the above mentioned discussion, a survey was conducted which included appropriate ground reconnaissance. Based on conclusions arrived at as a result of the survey, it is recommended that Camp Kurume and its accompanying training area, as indicated on the inclosed map, be released immediately to the Japanese Government for use by the NPRJ.

4. Camp Kurume is considered to be the most feasible selection as a temporary Infantry School for the following reasons:

a. The training areas, although limited, will support the required minimum firing and non-firing problems.

b. The proximity of the training areas to the base camp makes for efficient use of training time, with minimum loss due to movement from classroom to training areas etc.

c. A known distance rifle range is available, and other type firing areas for all Infantry weapons can be constructed.

d. Limited artillery firing for demonstration purposes can be conducted.

e. The buildings would constitute only sub-standard housing for any future use by U. S. troops. They are, however, in sound condition and suitable for NPR use, having been previously rehabilitated for an NPRJ unit at Japanese expense, during former occupancy to December 1950.

5. A list of courses proposed to be conducted at the NPRJ Infantry School appears below. Other courses may be added as the need arises.

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(13 Dec 49)

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Cont'd
1

Basic Infantry Officer
Infantry Light and Heavy Weapons NCO
S-2, S-3 NCO
Officer Candidate School

6. Use of Camp Kurume by NPRJ has received the verbal concurrence of Major General Weible, Commanding General JLC, subject to a 15 - 30 day eviction notice.

7. In the event Camp Kurume cannot be released to the Japanese Government, request authority to utilize it as temporary location subject to 15 - 30 day eviction notice.

1 Incl
Map

- -LHW- - - - - - - - - - -

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

COPY **CHECK SHEET** COPY

SECURITY INFORMATION

Lt Col Reeves/kjm
26-8645

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.: Subject: Release of Camp Kurume for NPRJ Use.

Note No.	From: G3 To: CofS Thru: G4 Date: 19 Nov 51
2	1. Subject to confirmation of para 6, C/N 1, G3 has no objection to the temporary use of Camp Kirume as an iterim location for the NPRJ Infantry School pending redeployment of forces from Korea. 2. Inasmuch as Camp Kurume is currently planned to house 1200 troops in the post-treaty, post-Korea period, G3 does not concur in the release of the camp to the Japanese Government. 3. Recommend that Chief, CAS be authorized to deal directly with CG, JLCOM in implementation of para 1 foregoing. 1 Incl n/c - E. K. W. - - - - - - - - -
	Lt Col Fargo 26-6443 20 Nov 51 From: G-4 To: CofS
3	G-4 concurs in the recommendations of G-3, C/N (2) above. 1 Incl n/c - G.L.E. - - - - - - - - - - - -

SECURITY INFORMATION

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FEC AGO Form No 37a
(13 Dec 49)

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

References: See ANNEX 1.

1. GENERAL: The development of the atomic bomb by a potential enemy and the possibility of Chemical, Biological and Radiological attack introduces a new disaster hazard to both military and civilian personnel, installations and activities in JAPAN. Vital areas, both military and civilian are key targets. Any installation or concentrated troop area in JAPAN is vulnerable to a CBR attack and the resultant effects. The purpose of this plan is to provide a basis for planning for the coordinated action to be taken in the defense of the XVI Corps zone of responsibility against a CBR attack, to minimize the hazards and after effects of such an attack to personnel and material, and to provide relief and rehabilitation of areas attacked. This plan is closely related to the Headquarters XVI Corps Disaster Plan, dated 5 May 1951 and Passive Air Defense Plan (PAD), dated 24 May 1951. Pertinent parts of referenced plans apply.

a. ANNEX 2 (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Commanding General, Far East Air Forces:

(a) Prepares plans to exercise CBR Defense responsibility for 314th and 315th Air Divisions, FEAMCOM and separately assigned units within JAPAN.

(b) Provides active air defense of JAPAN.

(c) Disseminates air raid warnings through the ADCC, 314th Air Division.

(d) Directs Air Force base commanders to coordinate plans with appropriate JLC area commanders, and appropriate Army zone commanders.

(2) Commander, Naval Forces Far East:

(a) Prepares to exercise CBR defense for Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO and separately assigned units within JAPAN.

(b) Supports FEAF in active air defense of JAPAN.

(c) Directs Naval installation commanders to coordinate plans with appropriate JLC area commanders, and appropriate Army zone commanders.

(3) Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command prepares overall plans for CBR defense for all personnel and installations in JAPAN, south of the JLCOM - XVI Corps boundary.

(4) Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command prepares CBR defense plans for the care, hospitalization, housing and evacuation of U. S. Civilian Nationals and dependents in JAPAN.

(5) Commanding General, Northern Command prepares plans for CBR defense of JLCOM installations in support of XVI Corps plan.

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Security Information

DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, Cont'd, 12 Dec 51.

(6) Commanding General, Central Command prepares plans for CBR defense of JLCOM installations and Metropolitan YOKOHAMA area in support of XVI Corps plan.

(7) Commanding General, Headquarters and Service Command, General Headquarters, Far East Command prepares plans for CBR defense of Metropolitan TOKYO area for GHQ, Hq & Svc Comd and JLCOM personnel and installations in support of XVI Corps plan.

(8) Commander Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA prepares plans for CBR defense of Naval installations in support of XVI Corps plan.

(9) Commanding General's 314th, 315th Air Divisions and FEAMCOM prepare plans for CBR defense of bases in support of XVI Corps plan.

c. Assumptions.

(1) General

(a) Potential enemy powers have the requisite means of launching CBR warfare on a large scale within the XVI Corps zone of responsibility at the initiation of hostilities.

(b) JLCOM and adjacent commands will be able to furnish the reciprocal action necessary for the implementation of this plan.

(2) Radiological

Definition: For purposes of this plan radiological defense will be defined to include defense against the blast and heat effect of an atom bomb.

(a) Little or no advance warning may be expected and positive differentation of an atomic bomb attack from a conventional bomb attack is uncertain. The blinding flash of light, many times the intensity of the mid-day sun, is likely to be the first means of detecting that an atomic bomb has been employed.

(b) Targets selected by an enemy force for an atomic bomb attack would be closely populated troop areas, major ports, key installations in the support of the defense or war effort, concentrated industrial areas and densely populated civilian areas.

(c) The atomic bomb relies primarily on its blast and heat effects to destroy the enemy. Thus, it is a highly inefficient means of employing radioactive materials.

(d) Any nation possessing an atomic pile of suitable size has a potential source of RW Agents. These piles will probably be used for production of plutonium for the bomb rather than for the production of radioactive isotopes. Therefore, it is improbable that the enemy is prepared to use radiological warfare as such.

(3) Chemical

(a) The enemy is capable of employing G-Agents (nerve-gases) and nonpersistent casualty agents to produce immediate casualties on troops or civilian concentrations.

(b) Mustard gas and other persistent agents would probably be employed either tactically on personnel, supplies, equipment and terrain, or strategically on industrial areas, to produce casualties or render objects and areas hazardous.

DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, Cont'd, 12 Dec 51.

(4) Biological

Biological organisms could be effectively employed subversively, tactically, or strategically, to produce disease and illness on man, animals, and plants.

2. MISSION OF XVI CORPS:

a. Responsible for the coordination of an overall Army, Navy, AF CBR defense plan for that portion of JAPAN north of the JLCOM - XVI Corps boundary.

b. Coordination of the CBR defense plan with local civil authorities, in zone, as may be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East.

c. To minimize damaging effects to material and personnel from a CBR attack to include: Organizing, equipping and training all armed forces personnel, civilians, dependents, indigenous personnel essential for the logistical support of the armed forces under command of CG, XVI Corps.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

a. Commanding General, 40th Infantry Division:

(1) Prepare CBR defense plans for all divisional organic and attached units on N HONSHU.

(2) Coordinates with CG, Northern Command and CG, Central Command in preparation of mutual assistance CBR defense plans for posts, camps, stations and installations in Division zone.

(3) Organizes, equips and trains all divisional units for CBR defense.

(4) Coordinates with CG, Hq and Svc Comd, GHQ, FEC and Comdr Fleet Activities, YOKOSUKA in preparation of mutual assistance CBR defense plans for installations.

(5) Is responsible for preparation of overall CBR defense plan in Division zone of responsibility on N HONSHU.

(6) Coordinates with CG's 314th and 315th Air Divisions and FEAMCOM in preparation of mutual assistance CBR defense plans for AF bases and Division installations in Division zone.

b. Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry):

(1) Prepares CBR defense plans for all divisional organic and attached units on HOKKAIDO.

(2) Coordinates with CG, Northern Command in preparation of mutual assistance CBR defense plans for posts, camps, stations and installations on HOKKAIDO.

(3) Organizes, equips and trains all divisional units for CBR defense.

(4) Is responsible for preparation of overall CBR defense plan for HOKKAIDO.

(5) Coordinates with CG, 314th Air Division in preparation of mutual assistance CBR defense plans for AF bases and Division installations on HOKKAIDO.

c. Commanding General, 2d Engineer Special Brigade (56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion Attached):

(1) Prepare CBR defense plans for organic and attached units.

(2) Coordinates with CG, 40th Infantry Division and CG, Central Command in preparation of mutual assistance CBR defense plans.

(3) Organizes, equips and trains all brigade units for CBR defense.

d. Commanding General, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team:

(1) Prepares CBR defense plans for RCT units.

(2) Coordinates with CG, Southwestern Command in preparation of mutual assistance CBR defense plans.

(3) Organizes, equips and trains RCT units for CBR defense.

e. Commanding Officer, 34th Infantry (63rd Field Artillery Battalion Attached):

(1) Prepare CBR defense plans for organic and atchd units.

(2) Coordinates with CG, 40th Infantry Division in preparation of mutual assistance CBR defense plans.

(3) Organizes, equips, and trains organic and atchd units for CBR defense.

x. (1) Plans for CBR defense will include:

(a) Provisions for the utilization of existing buildings and facilities presently under military control as protective shelters, decontamination stations, aid stations, hospitals, warehouses and alternate command posts. Facilities not under military control will be used by units of this command only on specific authority from this Headquarters.

(b) Protective measures for and the utilization of indigenous personnel employed in the support of commands in the event of CBR attack.

(c) Provisions for the protection against contamination by CBR agents of food, water, beverage and medical supplies.

(2) Plans will give consideration to:

(a) Maximum dispersion practicable of facilities and supplies (See SR 210-20-30 dated 23 August 1950).

(b) First aid.

(c) Mass evacuation and treatment of casualties.

(d) Control of fires to include dispersed, independent, or self-contained water supplies.

(e) Prevention of panic among military and civilian population.

(f) Detection and survey methods and procedures.

(g) Decontamination of personnel, material and areas.

(h) Training.

(i) Emergency assignments for all personnel of the command in case of CBR attack. Alternates will be assigned to all key positions.

(j) Emergency sanitary measures for the prevention of spreading of disease.

(k) Repair of utilities and emergency provision of facilities for water, heat, light and power.

(l) Traffic control in affected areas.

(m) Security measures for the prevention of sabotage.

(3) In the event of an unexpected attack with CBR Agents or atomic weapons, commanders of affected areas will:

(a) Notify this Headquarters by the most expeditious means available.

(b) Preserve order, alleviate human suffering, and effect emergency rehabilitation of affected installations upon which occupation forces will be dependent to maximum extent consistent with missions assigned under operations plans.

(c) When authroized by this Headquarters, extend such assistance to Japanese government officials as is possible without jeopardizing the relief mission to occupation forces.

(4) All commands are responsible for the preparation of CBR defense plans of own installations.

(5) CBR defense plans for all commands in Corps zone will be furnished this Headquarters, in triplicate.

(6) All commanders maintain current files of CBR technical information, as available.

(7) Each commander disseminate CBR information to personnel authorized and required to receive such information.

4. <u>ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:</u>

a. See current Administrative Order.

b. See Annexes hereto.

5. <u>COMMAND, COORDINATION AND SIGNAL MATTERS:</u>

a. Communications. ANNEX 11 (SIGNAL PLAN).

b. Direct communication is authorized and directed between commanders concerned in coordination of planning details.

Security Information

DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, Cont'd
12 Dec 51.

c. Command Posts.

(1) No change.

(2) Alternate command posts will be provided for in CBR defense planning.

BYERS
MajGen

ANNEXES:

1. References.
2. Intelligence.
3. Organization and Training.
4. Procedures and Monitoring.
5. Medical.
6. Engineer.
7. Transportation (Omitted) (See Current Admin O, XVI Corps).
8. Quartermaster.
9. Provost Marshal.
10. Military Government.
11. Signal.

DISTR: C & S plus:
5 - CINCFE
5 - Chief, CAS, GHQ, SCAP
5 - CG, FEAF
3 - CG, 314th Air Div
3 - CG, FEAMCOM
5 - COMNAVFE
3 - Comdr, Flt Activities, YOKOSUKA
5 - CG, JLCCM
3 - CG, Northern Command
3 - CG, Central Command
3 - CG, Southwestern Command
3 - CG, Hq & Svc Comd, GHQ, FEC
1 - JSPOG

OFL:

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 1 (REFERENCES) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN.

The purpose of this Annex is to provide a list of references to aid and guide personnel concerned in preparation of detailed CBR defense plans.

1. Army Regulations 775-10, subject: Qualification in Arms and Ammunition Training Allowances, 17 Sep 1947, including Changes 1-3, inclusive.

2. Special Regulations 380-5-6 dated 11 Jan 1951 (Secret).

3. Special Regulations 350-80-1, Education and Training, Program for Dissemination of Atomic Energy Information, 18 Aug 1951.

4. Table of Allowances 3-100, Allowances of Chemical Corps Expendable Supplies, 17 Jul 1951.

5. Table of Allowances 20-2, Equipment for Training Purposes, 28 Sep 1950.

6. Field Manual 21-40, Defense Against Chemical Attack, 6 Sep 1946, with Change 1.

7. Technical Manual 23-200 (Secret).

8. Technical Manual 3-305, Use of Chemical Agents and Munitions in Training, 2 June 1944.

9. Department of the Army Training Circular Number 12, Defense Against Biological Warfare, 11 Sep 1950.

10. Department of the Army Training Circular Number 24, Marking of Contaminated Areas, 3 Aug 1951.

11. Department of the Army Training Circular Number 4, Marking of Contaminated Areas, 19 Feb 1951.

12. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 20-110, Atomic Energy Indoctrination, Sep 1950.

13. Department of the Army 20-111, Survival Under Atomic Attack, Feb 1951.

14. Letter, Department of the Army, AGAO-S 353.(9 Mar 50) CSGOT-M, subject, Radiological Defense Organization and Training, 27 Mar 1950.

15. Letter, Department of the Army, AGAO-S 353 (2 Jan 51) G3-M, subject, Integration of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defense Training, 25 Jan 1951.

16. Circular 57, General Headquarters, Far East Command, subject: Safety Regulations for Firing, 3 Nov 1950.

17. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 8-11, Handbook of Atomic Weapons for Medical Officers, June 1951.

18. The Effects of Atomic Weapons, prepared for incorporation with U. S. Department of Defense and the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, June 1950.

19. Special Regulation 350-80-1, Education and Training, Program for Dissemination of Atomic Energy Information, 18 Aug 1949.

20. Department of the Army Circular Number 74, Chemical Agents of the G - Series, 19 Mar 1948.

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ANNEX 1 (REFERENCES) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN, Cont'd 12 Dec 51

21. "What You Should Know About Biological Warfare", Feb 1951. (Federal Civil Defense Administration Publication, PA-2).

22. XVI Corps Passive Air Defense Plan, 24 May 1951.

23. Training Directive Number 7, Hq XVI Corps, Post Cycle Training, 9 Aug 1951.

24. Chemical Annex Training Directive Number 1, Hq XVI Corps, 25 May 1951.

25. Letter, General Headquarters, Far East Command, subject: Individual Protection Against Air Drop of Napalm, 22 Jul 1951.

26. Department of the Army Letter, subject: Military Terms, Abbreviations and Symbols, 10 Sep 1951.

27. Hq, XVI Corps, Disaster Plan, 5 May 1951.

28. Annex 2 (Chemical) Training Memorandum Number 1, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 1 Jul 1951.

29. Training Directive No. 10, Hq XVI Corps, dtd 16 Oct 1951, subject: Decontamination Training.

BYERS
M.JGEN

DISTR: Same as Basic Plan.

OFL:

G3

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12958 MARTIN D. ALT, NARA, DATE

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 2 (INTELLIGENCE) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:

a. See current Intelligence Summaries.

b. There are potential enemy forces which have the capability of launching chemical, biological, or radiological attacks against JAPAN. Such attacks may be launched without warning and may be followed by an amphibious and/or airborne landing in the zone of responsibility of the XVI Corps. The attacks may be directed against key military installations, ports, airfields, and centers of transportation, communications and population.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:

a. Where, when and with what strength was the attack made?

b. What type agent was used?

c. How was the attack made? Air submarine, surface ship, etc.

d. What was the identification of the attacking force?

e. How much damage resulted from the attack and how large an area was affected?

f. Will the enemy follow the attack with an amphibious or airborne landing? If so, where, when and in what strength?

3. INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS:

a. In general, all divisions, corps troops and supporting commands will consider EEI in paragraph 2 above as basic directives for their collection effort.

b. Request to higher commands.

(1) GHQ, FEC.

(a) Request visual and photographic air reconnaissance of the area attacked.

(b) Request visual air reconnaissance of coastal areas in XVI Corps zone of responsibility.

(c) Request aerial photo reconnaissance of any amphibious or airborne landing area.

(d) Request that report of results be disseminated to XVI Corps and divisions subordinate to XVI Corps by fastest available means.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL:

a. Prisoners of War.

(1) Commanders will stress intelligence value of prisoners.

(2) Captured air crews and other enemy personnel will be reported and evacuated without delay to XVI Corps.

(3) Captured enemy agents, saboteurs, agitators, etc., will be reported to CIC for interrogation.

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ANNEX 2 (INTELLIGENCE) TO CBR Defense Plan, [illegible]

b. Captured and/or confiscated documents.

(1) Documents will be delivered to the nearest unit intelligence officer and will be evacuated through intelligence channels without delay other than that required for examination for information of immediate tactical value to the unit concerned. Documents will be enclosed in a wrapper which will show place, date, circumstances and capturing unit.

(2) Documents found on prisoners of war will be evacuated with the prisoner.

(3) Documents found in crashed aircraft and air PW will be evacuated to Corps immediately.

c. Captured Material.

(1) Captured enemy material will be reported through intelligence channels to G2, XVI Corps by type, quantity, location, date of capture, and disposition.

(2) Captured samples of CBR material will be forwarded through technical service channels with report to G2, XVI Corps.

(3) The desirability and use of enemy material for intelligence purposes will be determined by reference to technical service intelligence teams.

5. MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS:

a. Maps. - - See Opn O No. 1, Hq XVI Corps, 1 Apr 51.

b. Photographs. - - Requests for photo coverage will be submitted to G2, XVI Corps.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

See Opn O No. 1, Hq XVI Corps, 1 Apr 51.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION:

a. See Annex 1 to Opn O No. 1, Hq XVI Corps, 1 Apr 51.

b. In the event of implementation of this plan by CBR attack, ISUMs will be forwarded as scheduled without further instruction. Spot Reports will be forwarded as information is received. Periodic Intelligence Reports will be prepared when requested by this Headquarters.

BYERS
MAJ GEN

DISTR: Same as Basic Plan.

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 3 (ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN.

Organization and training for defense against CBR attack is a responsibility of command. This Annex defines organizational and training responsibility of commanders and is prepared to guide and aid commanders and staffs in the preparation of those plans as prescribed in Basic Plan.

SECTION I

1. ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY:

Enemy employment of CBR weapons will present a simultaneous need for many or all of the countermeasures normally applied against other types of enemy action and against conditions created by major disasters. To effect maximum utilization of personnel and facilities, military organization for CBR defense will be included within the existing organization of this command.

2. Echelons of non-medical CBR defense duties within the command structure:

a. CBR defense duties will be performed within the existing chemical defense organization as shown in FM 21-40. Unit CBR defense personnel will perform duties outlined below in addition to their primary duty assignments.

(1) Staff Chemical Officer at all levels will serve as technical advisor to the commander and staff in CBR matters.

(2) Unit CBR Defense Officer below the division and similar level: CBR defense duties within the unit will be supervised by the Unit CBR Defense Officer in accordance with the provisions of FM 21-40. Each Combat or service unit, to include each brigade, regiment, battalion, and company or similar unit will have a minimum of one qualified CBR Defense Officer and at least one qualified alternate. Additional alternates will be appointed wherever practicable and all officers so appointed will be qualified to perform their duties by completion of a prescribed course of training at the Far East Command Chemical School or its equivalent.

(3) Unit CBR Defense Non-commissioned Officer will assist Unit CBR Defense Officer in the performance of duties pertaining to CBR defense as prescribed in FM 21-40. Each combat or service brigade, regiment, battalion, company or similar unit will have appointed unit CBR defense non-commissioned officers on the following basis:

(a) Brigade or similar unit - minimum of one unit CBR defense non-commissioned officer.

(b) Regiment or similar unit - minimum of one unit CBR defense non-commissioned officer.

(c) Battalion or similar unit - minimum of one unit CBR defense non-commissioned officer.

(d) Company or similar unit - minimum of two (2) CBR defense non-commissioned officers.

At least one alternate will be appointed for each unit CBR defense non-commissioned officer required, and all appointees will be qualified to perform their duties by completion of a prescribed course of training. Unit CBR defense non-commissioned officers will be selected from individuals of the Top four grades.

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(4) CBR Defense Monitors. Trained enlisted personnel will be required to assist unit CBR defense officers and non-commissioned officers in performing instrument surveys and obtaining CBR data in areas contaminated, or suspected of being contaminated with CBR materials. CBR defense monitors will perform this duty in addition to their primary duty assignments. Each combat or service regiment, battalion, company, and similar unit, will have CBR defense monitors appointed by the unit commander, on the following basis:

(a) Regiment or similar unit - minimum of one CBR defense monitor.

(b) Battalion or similar unit - minimum of one CBR defense monitor.

(c) Company or similar unit - minimum of two CBR defense monitors. At least one alternate will be appointed for each CBR defense monitor required. CBR defense monitors will be selected from individuals below the top four grades, and will be qualified and unit trained to perform their duties by completion of a prescribed course of training. Insofar as practicable, all unit personnel will be trained in monitoring operations and techniques so as to insure the availability at all times of individuals qualified to operate CBR detection instruments and devices in an emergency.

b. In addition to those CBR defense positions enumerated above, certain Radiological job positions are required and will be filled at a later date. Pending completion of training of individuals and assignment to this command, duties outlined below will be performed by appropriate individuals at the several echelons of command.

(1) Radiological Defense Engineers - These specially trained officers will normally be assigned to duty with the staff Chemical Sections of theatre of operations headquarters, communication zone headquarters and other major headquarters, on the basis of individual requirements, and will serve as advisors and technical experts in all matters pertaining to the non-medical aspects of radiological defense. The position of radiological engineer will be a primary assignment, and will be filled by officers who have completed a prescribed course of post-graduate and field training.

(2) Radiological Defense Medical Officers - These specially trained officers will normally be assigned to duty with Staff Medical Sections of theater of operations headquarters, communication zone headquarters, and other major headquarters. on the basis of individual requirements, and will serve as advisors in all matters pertaining to the medical aspects of radiological defense. The position of radiological defense medical officer will be a primary duty assignment, and will be filled by officers who have completed a prescribed course of post-graduate training.

(3) Radiological Instrument Repairman - Organizational, field, and base maintenance on radiological equipment will be performed by radio repairmen who have received instruction by Signal Corps Personnel in the maintenance and repair of radiological detection instruments. Radiological instrument repairmen who have had this specialized training will be required at all echelons to perform organizational, field, and base maintenance on radiation detection instruments and devices used by the Army. Certain phases of organizational maintenance including calibration of instruments and replacements of defective or worn out batteries can be performed by radiological defense monitors, under the general supervision of unit CBR defense personnel.

(4) Radiological Defense Medical Laboratory Officer - An MSC officer trained at the post-graduate level in radio-chemistry, biology, bio-assay and allied radiation fields; such officers will supervise bio-assay laboratories.

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(5) Radiological Defense Laboratory Technician (Medical) - Enlisted technician of the Medical Department trained in the techniques peculiar to biological, radio-assay laboratories.

(6) Radiological Defense Laboratory Technician (Non-Medical) - Enlisted technician trained in radio-chemistry analysis and radiation measurement.

SECTION II

1. TRAINING FOR CBR DEFENSE:

The integration plan of CBR defense training throughout this command provides for three general training categories.

a. Basic indoctrination in accordance with the privisions of SR 380-80-1, and appropriate training directives for all military personnel, and specialized training with the unit for selected CBR monitors.

b. Military technical training as provided by the Far East Command Chemical School for unit CBR defense officers and non-commissioned officers. Medical and Signal technical training requirements are excepted and are outlined in ANNEX 5 and ANNEX 11, respectively, to this plan.

c. Advanced theoretical education as provided by post graduate training for radiological defense of selected officers within the zone of interior. Upon completion of the training program of individual officers, assignments will be made to fill the position vacancies of radiological defense engineers, radiological defense medical officers, and radiological defense medical laboratory officers at higher staff levels.

2. CBR defense training is a responsibility of command. Commanders will insure that all personnel receive radiological training as prescribed in Chemical Annex Training Directive No. 1, Headquarters, XVI Corps, dated 25 May 1951 and CBR Instruction in ANNEX 2 (Chemical) Training Memorandum No. 1, General Headquarters, Far East Command. 1 July 1951.

3. Practice alerts and other training situation which call for action by commanders and their staffs, as well as by individuals, will be scheduled periodically to include CBR defense situations. When so scheduled, units will notify this Headquarters three (3) weeks in advance of the proposed training situations.

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DISTR: Same as Basic Plan.

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SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 4 (PROCEDURES AND MONITORING) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN

1. General:

a. Definitions:

(1) CBR defense is the defense against any chemical, biological or radiological substance that poisons or destroys body tissues by itself, its products, or its radiations.

(2) Chemical defense consists of protective measures taken against chemical agents - substances which by their chemical action produce death or casualties, an injurious or irritant effect, a smoothing effect, or an incendiary action.

(3) Biological defense is the defense taken against biological agents - agents which include living organisms or their toxic products.

(4) Radiological defense consists of measures taken to minimize personnel and material damage from radioactivity.

(5) CBR Monitoring includes all procedures involved in measuring, collecting, recording, evaluating, and controlling Chemical, Biological, or Radiological contamination for which the essential requirements for effective montioring of intensities are three-fold:

(a) The collection of reliable data on radiological intensities and CB concentrations in an area.

(b) A rapid assimilation of data and its evaluation.

(c) Prompt dissemination of evaluated data and control of all personnel, equipment and areas that are contaminated.

b. Purpose:

(1) The development of modern warfare by a potential enemy has introduced the need for planning for defnse against chemical, biological, and radiological attack. The techniques developed against chemical warfare have proved to be effective against the newer hazards of biological and radiological attack so that the same personnel responsible for chemical defense are now charged with the responsibilities of the defense against radiological and biological attack.

(2) The purpose of this annex is to establish procedures in defense against chemical, biological, and radiological attack.

2. Responsibilities:

a. CBR defense training of units and individuals are basic responsibilities of command.

b. Corps and Division Chemical Officers are responsible for the technical advice to their Commanding General and Staff. The unit CBR Defense Officers will exercise technical supervision within their units as special staff officers.

c. The unit CBR Defense Officer is responsible for the following activities within his unit:

(1) Personnel.

Recommending personnel for assignment to CBR duties and for special CBR training. (See ANNEX 3)

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(2) Intelligence.

(a) Obtain information on enemy CBR activities.

(b) Assist in identification of enemy CBR agents.

(c) Posts the CBR situation on the maps of the unit.

(d) Investigates CBR attacks for unit intelligence officer, reporting directly thereto and to the organization Chemical Officer.

(e) Forwards information on captured enemy CBR supplies to unit intelligence officer and the organization Chemical Officer.

(3) Training and operations.

(a) Instructs and trains unit officers and NCOs in CBR warfare.

(b) Prepares unit SOP for defense against CBR attack.

(c) Advises unit commander on weather conditions as they effect CBR warfare, routes of march, and passage through contaminated terrain.

(d) Recommends collective defense measures, including protection of food and equipment, posting of CBR sentinels, and construction of CBR shelters.

(e) Recommends methods of decontamination of contaminated areas and equipment.

(f) Advises in the care of CBR protective equipment.

(g) Directs use of radiation detection instruments and devices.

(h) Supervises CBR monitors in unit areas.

(i) Advises the commander on the casualty rate to be expected following a radiological attack or from a continuous occupation of an area and aids in preparation of work party schedule to keep within tolerance limits.

(j) Monitoring teams of enlisted men will be organized and trained in all units on a minimum basis of four members per company, or equivalent, to function in addition to their other duties. Extra trained teams are necessary to replace those teams which have exceeded their tolerance dose for the period and must be replaced in order to carry out essential monitoring.

(k) During the training phase of teams, students will learn the use of all monitoring instruments, how to calibrate survey meters, uses of and kinds of protective clothing, specific contamination hazards, emergency first aid, map reading (including plotting of radiation and isodose lines for a contaminated area), radio operation and maintenance of RADIC equipment.

(l) In the event of any CBR disaster all monitoring teams of each Command will be made available for mutual assistance as may be required.

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(4) Supply.

(a) Maintains contact with the unit supply officer and advises unit commander regarding quantity and condition of CBR supplies.

(b) Upon request assists unit supply officer to properly prepare CBR supplies for movement.

(c) Through the unit supply officer, supervises maintenance of all CBR equipment.

(d) Supervises preparation of an adequate quantity of markers for posting of contaminated areas. (See Appendix hereto)

3. Detection:

a. General.

Upon the outbreak of CBR warfare, a CBR attack will be presumed likely in connection with any bombardment by low flying aircraft within 1,000 yards. All personnel will mask and take other individual protective measures immediately without waiting for confirmation of the presence of CBR agents. Personnel with field glasses will observe the bombardment by aircraft for signs of the release of aerosols (fine mists or sprays), or smoke. At night, if available and the tactical situation permits, searchlights may be turned on to reveal the presence of aerosols, which will be immediately apparent in a bright light.

b. Chemical Agents.

(1) The M9A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit will reveal the presence of lethal concentration of most chemical agents. Vesicant Detector Paper and Paint will detect liquid blister gases.

(2) The physiological effects of the G-series gases, as observed in other personnel, may be the first indication of their presence.

(a) G-Agents (nerve gases) are much more toxic by liquid contact than other standard casualty producing chemical agents. Casualties contaminated with persistent liquid gases endanger unprotected personnel. Handlers of such patients should wear protective clothing where there is any chance of skin or clothing contact with the liquid agent.

(b) Self Aid.

Individuals put on the gas mask at once if any of the following effects are noticed:

1 A faint, sweetish, fruity odor, which cannot be accounted for.

2 A feeling of tightness or constriction in the chest.

3 Difficulty in breathing, either on inhaling or exhaling.

4 The light appears to be getting dimmer than usual, for no apparent reason.

5 The eyes of individuals in the vicinity have very small pinpoint-sized pupils.

6 A drawing, slightly painful sensation is felt in the eyes.

(c) If real difficulty in breathing is encountered and the chest feels very tight, remove the atropine ampin from the Protective Ointment Kit, M-5 and inject into the muscle.

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(d) Aviators should not attempt to fly an airplane for the first 12 hours after taking atropine.

(e) Caution: Do not take an injection of atropine until positive that it is needed.

c. Biological agents.

Biological agents are only detectable immediately by the means used for dissemination, as given above for CBR agents. Any sudden outbreak of disease will be reported immediately through intelligence and Medical channels.

d. Radiological agents are readily detected by radiological detection instruments.

4. Alarm and Alarm System:

a. Pending re-issue of gas alarms in the event CBR warfare develops, unit improvised alarm from artillery cartridge cases, pieces of pipe, pans, or similar percussion devices will be used immediately upon detection of CBR attack.

b. CBR defense sentries, on positive detection of a Chemical or Biological attack or upon notification of CBR attack, will give local warning by means of the gas alarm.

5. Procedure in case of attack:

a. On receipt of warning of a possible attack the following action will be taken:

(1) Personnel and equipment will be dispersed to the extent permitted by the tactical situation and the performance of their duties.

(2) Gas-proof shelters will be prepared for use.

(3) Protective clothing will be issued and maintained ready for wear as directed by commander concerned.

b. Action to be taken during attack:

(1) All sentries including military police will assist as CBR sentries.

(2) All activity will be reduced to a minimum.

(3) Personnel will be dispersed to take advantage of all protection and cover.

(4) Individuals remain calm.

(5) All individuals mask rapidly.

c. Action to be taken after attack:

(1) Unit CBR defense personnel will determine the nature of attack.

(2) Immediate first aid will be administered to casualties and those needing further treatment will be evacuated.

(3) In the event of a Radiological attack, monitoring teams will determine the intensity, extent of contamination and inspect personnel for contamination.

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(4) It is the duty of monitoring teams to proceed through its designated portion of the area attacked reporting the extent and type of contamination to the commander concerned. Continuing surveys will be made to determine the decay rate of radiation; posting and the correction of markers indicating contamination extent; monitoring casualties; assisting in rescue and repair operations as directed.

(5) Upon leaving a contaminated area, monitoring personnel will pass through a Personnel Decontamination Station.

(6) Operation of motor vehicles.

If the tactical situation permits, vehicle drivers will move vehicles to cover, upwind, and out of the contaminated area. If practicable, drivers will stop to inspect vehicles for contamination when out of the area. If, on inspection, the vehicle is found to have been contaminated with persistent agents, the agents will be neutralized by first and second echelon decontamination in accordance with the principle of paragraph 60, TM 3-220.

(7) Personnel remove gas masks only on order.

(8) Personnel perform self-aid.

6. Individual Protection:

a. Gas Masks.

(1) All personnel will be instructed in the proper use and care of the gas mask.

(2) While sleeping or when duties prohibit carrying the mask, it will be kept within easy reach at all times.

(3) Upon warning of a possible CBR attack, gas masks will be carried by all personnel as directed.

7. Area Monitoring:

a. Radiological intensity readings should be taken at belt height. While this reading is considerably lower than the actual intensity on the ground, it is a fair indication of the average radiation intensity to which an individual's body is subjected.

b. Only rough average intensities over large radiological contamination areas are obtained. The monitor should average the general readings in his mind and arrive at an overall figure. Local "hot spots" however, should be traced down and marked.

c. Tests for Chemical agents with the detector kit should be made at the same distance as for radiological intensity readings from suspected contamination.

d. Special attention must be given to wood, concrete, fibers and other porous surfaces since these tend to absorb and retain CBR contamination.

e. Items such as rope, canvas, rough or rusted surfaces, greasy and oily surfaces, bituminous coverings, pumps, drains, wood, air intakes and water systems should be closely checked.

f. Care must be exercised to obtain readings of intensities which represent only radiological contamination existing on equipment. In some cases localized "hot spots" on the ground may give distorted values to readings obtained on equipment in that area.

8. Marking of Contaminated Areas:

a. Radiological.

(1) The proper usage for CBR markers is contained in Training Circular 24, Department of the Army, dated 3 Aug 51. The surface of the marker which faces away from the contamination is colored black and white for radiological contamination. In all cases the surface of the marker facing the contamination is painted white. The word "ATOM" will be painted or written in black in three (3) positions as shown in APPENDIX "A".

(2) The triangles will be made of metal, wood, plastic, composition board, or any other similar rigid material.

(3) Holes will be punched in each corner of the triangles to facilitate placement. If material and time permit a short length of wire will be installed through the holes to facilitate rapid placement.

(4) The marker is always placed with the right angle apex downward. The marker will also be placed habitually above the ground on boundary fences, trees, rocks, or stakes. Written on the back of each marker erected should be the following information:

(a) Radioactivity is present.

(b) Intensity reading.

(c) Length of time personnel can stay in area.

(d) Time and date reading was taken.

(e) Unit and team number of monitoring team that took reading.

b. Chemical.

The general procedures and marking of a chemical contaminated area are similar to the marking of radiological contamination with the following exceptions:

(1) The surface of the marker which faces away from the decontamination area will be colored yellow for gas contamination as shown in APPENDIX "B".

(2) The surface of the marker facing the contamination area is painted white. The word "GAS" will be painted or written in black in three (3) positions as shown in APPENDIX "B".

(3) Written on the back of each marker erected should be the following information:

(a) Gas or Chemical agent present.

(b) Length of time personnel can stay in area.

(c) Time and date of contamination.

(d) Unit and team number of monitoring team that made identification.

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c. Biological.

The general procedures and marking of a biological contaminated area is similar to the marking of radiological contamination with the following exceptions:

(1) The surface of the marker which faces away from the decontamination area will be colored yellow and red for biological contamination as shown in APPENDIX "C".

(2) The surface of the marker facing the contamination area is painted white. The word "GERMS" will be painted or written in black in three (3) positions as shown in APPENDIX "C".

(3) Written on the back of each marker erected should be the following information:

(a) BW agent present.

(b) Time and date of contamination.

(c) Unit and team number of monitoring team that took samples.

9. Tactical Protection:

a. Chapter 8, FM 21-40, with the following modifications may be used as a guide in CBR tactical protection.

(1) Substitute "CBR" for "Chemical" and CBR agents for the word "GAS".

(2) Radiological contaminated areas will not be burned.

b. Defensive areas.

(1) Defensive planning will provide for occupation of alternate positions.

(2) In event it becomes necessary to retain a contaminated area, personnel will be given all available protection and relieved within the safe time limit. Provision for personnel decontamination will be made available for the contaminated personnel.

10. Intelligence:

In addition to reporting enemy chemical activities through Command channels, reports will be forwarded immediately through technical channels.

11. Decontamination:

a. General:

(1) After a CBR attack, CBR defense personnel will inspect all personnel, food, clothing and equipment to determine the necessity for decontamination. Contaminated food and water will be destroyed if they cannot be readily decontaminated.

(2) When CBR agents are used, at least eight (8) enlisted men in each company or its equivalent will be made available as a decontamination team. This team will operate under the supervision of the unit CBR defense officer.

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b. Personnel.

(1) Personnel will use protective ointment, M-5 as directed in the kit for elimination of liquid contamination.

(2) General decontamination of personnel will be accomplished wherever possible by bathing and change of clothing.

c. Equipment.

(1) Gun crews, vehicle drivers, and assistants will be responsible for the decontamination of their own equipment. If it is necessary to decontaminate a large number of vehicles, it will be done in a segregated area by units under the supervision of the CBR defense personnel.

(2) The following methods of equipment decontamination will be used:

(a) Chemical agents will be decontaminated by the use of bleach, DANC (Decontamination Agent, Non-Corrosive) (except G-agents), or soap and water.

(b) Radiological agents will be removed with soap and water.

(c) Biological agents will be decontaminated with bleach, DANC and fire.

(d) In large scale operations precautions will be taken to prevent contaminated wash water from draining into an area where it would be dangerous to personnel. Areas will be posted during and after accomplishment of decontamination activities.

12. a. Supply procedures and Salvage:

(1) In the absence of any specific Table of Allowances for protective clothing or R.D.I.C equipment to implement this plan, the following will be the basis upon which units will make their requisitions:

Suit, Protective, permeable	One (1) per monitor
Suit, Protective, impermeable	One (1) per monitor
GM survey meter complete with phones and batteries.	One (1) per monitoring team
Instrument, survey meter, radiation gamma, ionization chamber	One (1) per monitoring team
Instrument, dosimeter, picket 200 mr, full scale reading	Twenty (20) per Co or its equivalent.
Film Badge	Three (3) per individual
Charger, dosimeter	One (1) per Co or its equivalent
BW Sampling Kit	One (1) per monitoring team

(2) Equipment pertaining to CBR defense, but which is not classed as Chemical Corps equipment will be issued by the service concerned.

(3) Chemical Corps protective equipment will be requisitioned through normal supply channels.

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ANNEX 4 (PROCEDURES AND MONITORING) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN, Cont'd 12 Dec 51

b. Maintenance:

(1) Unit commander concerned is reponsible for first and second echelon maintenance of protective equipment.

(2) Unserviceable equipment which cannot be repaired by the using unit will be disposed of through normal channels.

c. Salvage:

(1) Contaminated salvage clothing and equipment will not be mixed with uncontaminated salvage items.

(2) Contaminated salvage will be marked to avoid casualties among handling personnel. When moving contaminated salvage, use will be made of clothing containers, impregnated paper and paulins to avoid contamination of personnel and adjacent equipment.

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APP: Contamination Markers
(3) - "A", "B", "C".

DISTR: Same as Basic Plan

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RADIOLOGICAL-CONTAMINATION MARKER



APPENDIX "A" TO ANNEX 4

Front view of gas-contamination marker.



Rear view of gas-contamination marker.



APPENDIX "B" TO ANNEX 4

Front view of biological-contamination marker.



Rear view of biological-contamination marker.



APPENDIX "C" TO ANNEX 4

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 5 (MEDICAL) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN.

1. GENERAL. This plan provides for special medical measures to be taken in event of CBR attack anywhere in the XVI Corps zone of responsibility.

2. CONCEPTS.

a. For the purpose of manning and operating medical aid stations under this plan, this Headquarters is dependent upon the organic medical facilities of units attached or assigned to XVI Corps.

b. Medical elements of all units assigned or attached to XVI Corps will operate in a normal tactical support role.

c. In the event that personnel from organic medical facilities of XVI Corps are insufficient in number, then support from Japan Logistical Command medical installations and Far East Air Force Medical Installations will be requested through Surgeon, Hq, XVI Corps.

d. Medical Supplies will be procured through established medical supply channels.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. The Surgeon, each major or separate unit, is responsible for the administration and operation of aid stations and evacuation of casualties to the nearest JLC Medical Installation within the zone of action or responsibility of that unit.

b. The Surgeon of each unit is responsible for the training of all medical personnel within his unit in the handling, treatment, and evacuation of CBR casualties.

c. The Surgeon of each unit is further responsible for establishment of an SOP for operation of a medical installation processing CBR casualties (segregation, decontamination, disposal or care of clothing and equipment, etc.) and for the training of the medical units therein.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE.

a. Aid Stations.

Location. Aid Stations will be located at the discretion of the local regimental or separate battalion or similar sized units Surgeon, with the normal command approval.

b. Supplies and equipment. Emergency requisitions for additional medical supplies will be forwarded through established supply channels.

c. Evacuation.

(1) Evacuation of casualties from the disaster area to the aid stations will be based on vehicles of the medical unit operating the station plus vehicles from the parent unit.

(2) Evacuation of casualties from the aid stations to hospitals will be by elements of the division medical service, supported by vehicles made available by the local commanding officer on request.

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(3) Casualties coming from areas suspected of contamination will be monitored, and to minimize contamination of medical supplies and equipment, will be processed through personnel decontamination centers prior to being received for treatment.

(4) Casualties requiring hospitalization will be evacuated from aid station to presently existing hospitals in the area, or in the event that these facilities are no longer tenable to Division clearing stations, or hospitals at redesignated sites.

d. Food and Water.

(1) The Surgeon, in cooperation with the unit CBR Defense Officer and the Local Unit Engineer, will monitor all food and water in affected areas, and will be responsible for pronouncing such food and water safe or unsafe for human consumption.

(2) All food in unopened containers may be considered probably safe for consumption, but ordinarily will not be consumed until specific instructions to this effect have been issued by the proper authorities. However, as an emergency measure, such items of food may be utilized after first washing all outside surfaces.

(3) Water from deep wells, outside or inside the disaster area, may be considered safe for drinking or washing purposes after letting the water flow through the pump system for a period of at least ten (10) minutes. No other water sources will be utilized except upon direction of the proper authorities.

e. Radiation Dosage.

(1) The maximum tolerance dose of radiation under wartime conditions is accepted to be 100 r. (This is construed to mean a one-time dose and/or a cumulative dose during a short period of time.)

(2) The amount of radiation individuals may be necessarily exposed to for military reasons is dependent upon several factors and will be announced by the Commanding General, XVI Corps, at an appropriate time.

f. Records of Radioactivity Exposure.

(1) Unit Commanders will prepare a record of exposure on each individual in their respective unit, using APPENDIX "A", as a guide, and will be responsible that data required is maintained up-to-date.

(2) This record will be initiated and/or continued by medical installations where applicable.

(3) Information relative to exposure dosages will ordinarily be furnished by CBR Monitoring Teams.

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APP: Record of Radioactivity Exposure.

DISTR: Same as Basic Plan.

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RECORD OF RADIOACTIVITY EXPOSURE

NAME: _____ RANK: _____

SERIAL NUMBER: _____ ORGANIZATION: _____

The individual named above has been exposed to radioactivity on the dates and in the amount (roentgens) indicated below:

Date	Amount (Roentgens)	Cumulative Total (Roentgens)

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SEOUL, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 6 (ENGINEER) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN

1. REFERENCES:

a. Supply: See Current XVI Corps Admin O.

b. Construction: See a., above and JLC Cir 39, 10 Oct 51.

c. Repairs and Utilities: See current XVI Corps Admin O and JLC Cir 39, 10 Oct 51.

d. Water Supply: See TM 5-295 and C-1 thereto.

2. MISSION:

The Engineer Section, XVI Corps, will provide technical supervision and advice on all phases of protective construction, reconstruction and rehabilitation of routes of communication, bridges, tunnels, utilities and water supply. It will provide technical supervision and advice for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of all phases of Engineer intelligence data.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Engineer, XVI Corps:

(1) Will assume command of all engineer units within Corps zone not assigned or attached to subordinate commands.

(2) Will recommend the procurement and employment of engineer troops and their allotment to subordinate units for decontamination details for utilities and reservoirs and other larger contaminated areas where earth moving equipment may be required.

(3) Will supervise and advise on priorities to be set on all phases of planning, construction and rehabilitation of roads, tunnels, R.R. and highway bridges, utilities and water supply facilities within the Corps zone of responsibility.

(4) Will co-ordinate with and advise the Chemical Officer, QM Officer and Medical Officer (Corps) on the construction of shelters, decontamination centers, baths and medical facilities.

(5) Will co-ordinate with Corps Medical and Chemical Officers in clearing water supply points and pumping stations for operation and in their decontamination.

(6) Will maintain complete data on water facilities as to location, degree of contamination and keep all units within the Corps zone informed on the location of decontaminated water points.

(7) Will advise on the proper disposal of sewage, refuse and debris which may have a high degree of radiological contamination.

(8) Will supervise the collection, evaluation, and compilation of information on all phases of engineer intelligence and maintain records of all engineer data required for research and future study.

(9) Will cooperate with the Corps Chemical Officer in publishing guides in sketch form for contaminated areas.

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(10) Will co-ordinate with civil authorities in surveying for contaminated electrical power plants, dumps for both solid and liquid fuel, boiler plants and refrigeration plants other than private residences.

(11) Will advise the Provost Marshal on circulation plans for traffic around and thru contaminated areas and setting up of road blocks.

(12) Will cause the preparation and posting of signs for the remarking of routes and recommend traffic regulations and roads and bridges as dictate by their physical condition.

(13) Will advise Military Government Officer and local authorities on the construction of compounds and temporary shelters for refugees.

b. Detachments of the 94th Engineer Maintenance Co located at Camp SCHIMMELPFENNIG, HONSHU, and Camp CHITOSE, HOKKAIDO, will provide field maintenances of Engineer equipment for units within zones of responsibility.

c. Area Commands:

See current XVI Corps Admin O.

d. Post Commanders are responsible for supervision of rehabilitation, temporary construction and utilities within their command, see JLC Cir # 39, dated 10 Oct 1951.

e. Division Engineers:

The Division Engineers are responsible for:

(1) Temporary repairs for emergency use of buildings and structures with priorities as follows: Medical Facilities, water points, storage and housing.

(2) Operations of utilities in conjunction with civilian authorities upon the advice of Corps Engineer.

(3) Minimum road and bridge construction and repair for safe passage of traffic. Priorities will be given to roads required for military operations and those leading to medical facilities, food storage areas and utilities.

(4) Moving Bn and heavy equipment to contaminated areas for assistance to decontamination teams.

(5) Collecting and forwarding Engineer Intelligence to Corps Engineer for record and study.

(6) Training mechanics, heavy equipment operators and water specialists as R.D Control Monitors.

4. <u>SUPPLY</u>:

a. Requisitioning Engineer Supplies:

See current XVI Corps Admin O.

b. Turn-In of Engineer Supplies and Equipment:

(See Section III, JLC Cir # 22 dated 14 July 1951. Highly contaminated supplies and equipment will be segregated but turned in only on the advice of the Corps Engineer.

ANNEX 6 (ENGINEER) TO [illegible]

5. SERVICES:

a. Maintenance:

(1) Engineer maintenance will be in accordance with Sec II, JLC Cir # 28, dated 14 August 1951.

(2) Engineer field maintenance (See current XVI Corps Admin O).

(3) YOKOHAMA Engineer Depot will furnish depot maintenance of Engineer equipment for all units and installations.

b. Construction:

Construction requests other than emergency repairs will be initiated through Post Commanders. See JLC Cir # 39, dated 10 Oct 1951.

c. Real Estate:

See current XVI Corps Admin O.

d. Repairs and Utilities:

See current JLC Cir # 39, 10 Oct 1951 and current Admin O.

e. Destruction of buildings dangerous to life and property will be initiated by the Post Commander within his command. Dangerous buildings on main routes and access roads to military installations and posts will be destroyed only on advice from Corps Engineer who will co-ordinate such matters with local authorities.

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 8 (QUARTERMASTER) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN

1. GENERAL:

a. The Quartermaster, in coordination with staff Chemical Officers will establish decontamination centers using T/O&E bath and laundry equipment. These decontamination centers will be operated by personnel as directed by the division or other unit commanders concerned, in their zones of responsibility.

b. Where T/O&E equipment is not available, the Quartermaster is responsible for procurement of Quartermaster Clothing, Equipment and Supplies required for operation of decontamination centers.

c. The Quartermaster is responsible for procurement and laundering of protective clothing.

2. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT:

a. See Current Administrative Order, Headquarters XVI Corps.

b. Supply officers of all units determine and keep current requirements for protective clothing, and supplies for decontamination centers. Requisitions to be submitted only on order placing CBR Defense Plan in effect.

3. OPERATIONS:

a. Divisions' Quartermasters prepare plans to establish four decontamination centers, See APPENDIX "A", utilizing divisional T/O&E bath equipment and personnel.

b. Division Quartermasters utilize divisional T/O&E equipment, laundry, in support of decontamination centers.

c. Supply Officers of non-divisional units prepare requirements for bath and laundry equipment necessary to establish decontamination centers.

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APP: Layout of Decontamination Center

DISTR: Same as Basic Plan.

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

Schematic Drawing of Decontamination Center
* RW Monitor in case of Radiological contamination

APPENDIX "A" TO ANNEX B

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 9 (PROVOST MARSHAL) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN

1. GENERAL:

The purpose of this plan is to provide a basis for planning and action by Military Police units in the XVI Corps zone of responsibility, in the event of Chemical, Biological or Radiological attack.

2. SCOPE:

To minimize the hazards and after effects of CBR attack to personnel and material. To assist in providing relief and rehabilitation of area or areas attacked, the Military Police Units of XVI Corps will:

a. Train and indoctrinate all Military Police in the hazards resulting from attack with CBR weapons, to include ability to perform simple monitoring operations.

b. Prepare, and maintain current, plans for establishment of stragglor points, traffic control (with alternate routes), refugee evacuation areas and other matters connected with control and discipline of military and civil populace in the event of CBR attack.

c. Be prepared to assist Civil Affairs/Military Government Officers in maintenance of law and order in the XVI Corps area of responsibility.

d. Military Police elements of XVI Corps, Divisions, Regiments and attached troops will be prepared to carry out their CBR mission to meet training and emergency Miliatry Police requirements within the areas of their commands' responsibility.

3. MISSION:

The CG, XVI Corps, is charged with maintaining good order and discipline in the XVI Corps zone of responsibility; enforce laws, regulations and orders pertaining to the control of traffic and to aid in the protection of life and property. Provost Marshal responsibilities are as follows:

a. To advise the Commanding General on Military Police matters.

b. Will exercise operational control of non-divisional Military Police Units attached or assigned to XVI Corps.

c. Will obtain from Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, circulation plans for traffic around and through contaminated areas and establish Traffic Control Points.

d. Coordinate with Corps Engineer in the posting of signs for the marking of routes, roads and bridges in effected areas.

e. Obtain from Civil Affairs/Military Government, XVI Corps, information concerning the locations of shelters for refugees.

f. Obtain from Surgeon, XVI Corps, locations of aid stations established for treatment of casualties from the effected areas.

g. Obtain from Chemical Officer, XVI Corps, location of decontamination centers within the XVI Corps area of responsibility.

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h. Make arrangements with Civil Affairs/Military Government, XVI Corps, for coordination of Military and Civil police between Corps and Division areas.

4. OPERATIONS:

Plans for Military Police Units in XVI Corps zone of responsibility will include the following:

a. Establish traffic control in the effected areas to ensure the orderly and uninterrupted movement of vehicles, troops and supplies.

b. Aid in establishing control in the affected areas to prevent panic among both military and civil populace.

c. Assist in the mass evacuation of casualties.

d. Preserve order among military personnel.

e. Coordinate with Civil Affairs/Military Government and Counter Intelligence Corps in security measures for the prevention of sabotage.

f. Coordinate with Civil Affairs/Military Government to ensure that the civil police forces are enforcing law and order among the civil populace and that controls are established to prevent individuals from entering dangerously contaminated or effected areas.

g. Be prepared to render in an emergency (when ordered by the Commanding General, XVI Corps), within the XVI Corps zone of responsibility, Military Police assistance to military installations.

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 16 (MILITARY GOVERNMENT) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT:

Military Government, in the zone of the XVI Corps, will be established in the event a CBR attack is launched against JAPAN. In the event such an attack is made, the Commanding General, XVI Corps will direct the establishment of Military Government and define the area affected.

2. OBJECTIVES OF DIRECT MILITARY GOVERNMENT:

Military Government will be imposed only in the specific area authorized. All other portions of JAPAN will continue under the Japanese Government acting under the direction of SCAP. The objectives of Military Government will be:

a. To take over any and all phases of civil government where the Japanese Government can no longer function effectively.

b. To return areas to the control of the Japanese Government at the earliest possible opportunity.

3. POLICIES:

The policies under which the Military Government will operate are:

a. In designated areas of attack within the Corps Zone, complete responsibility during the emergency will be assumed by the Commanding General, XVI Corps.

b. The assumption of direct Military Government authority will not be activated by any Divisions of this Command or other attached units unless specifically authorized by the Commanding General, XVI Corps.

c. Military Government will control all phases of government in which the responsible Japanese Government agency has failed because of the attack. This may include, but not be limited to, matters of supervision of polictical subdivisions, maintenance of law and order, supervision of courts, civilian supply, public health and sanitation, censorship, communications, transportation, public works and utilities, money, banking, and public finance, price control and rationing, natural resources, commerce and trade, labor, custody of property, control of population movement, education, public welfare and all other matters which are in the nature of civilian as distinguished from military matters.

d. Where Military Government is initiated it will be the policy to use all agencies of the Japanese Government which are found to be intact and capable of carrying out all or a portion of their functions. The extent of use of these agencies is a matter for local determination by the Commanding General, XVI Corps. JNPR units will not, however, be used except on specific authority of SCAP.

e. Military Government will be guided by the principles of FM 27-5 and 27-10. Where local conditions require any variation from these principles, a report will be prepared and specific authority requested for such variation, the emergency situation permitting.

f. On matters in which the principles of FM 27-5 and FM 27-10 have no particular application, policies and directives of SCAP will apply.

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g. Overall Military Government in any area will be formally terminated by the Commanding General, XVI Corps coincident with the termination of a state of emergency. Responsible commanders, may, however, phase out Military Government activities in the defined areas as pertinent Japanese Government agencies demonstrate their ability to resume their normal functions.

4. REPORTS:

In the event it becomes necessary for any of the organizations or units of this command to assume direct Military Government authority they will make weekly activity reports for the areas which have been affected. These reports will cover the extent of the damage caused by the attack, the functions of government taken over by Military Government, progress in restoring order, estimate of length of time it will be necessary to exercise Military Government control and other significant matters to keep the Commanding General, XVI Corps informed of the situation.

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HEADQUARTERS XVI CORPS
SENDAI, HONSHU, JAPAN
APO 14

12 December 1951

ANNEX 11 (SIGNAL) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN

1. SCOPE:

The purpose of this plan is to provide a basis for planning the defense and the reestablishment of communications in the XVI Corps zone of responsibility in the event of a CBR attack.

2. GENERAL:

In the event of disruption of communications by a CBR attack, affected units will reestablish communications to higher and subordinate headquarters in the following order of priority: Manual CW (Continuous Wave) and voice radio, radio relay (VHF) voice and teletypewriter circuits, radio teletype (if applicable) and messenger where practicable. Signal and communications officers will immediately survey damage to the communication system within their respective areas of responsibility and render reports to this headquarters by the most expeditious means in order to expedite restoration of telephone communications. Units which normally operate and maintain facilities on CW or voice radio, radio relay (VHF) and radio teletype circuits will restore and maintain these facilities as soon as practicable after disruption by a CBR attack.

3. MISSION:

a. In the event of a CBR attack causing the present XVI Corps Headquarters building to become untenable or otherwise necessitating a movement to a new location, this headquarters will establish a new communication center at such location as the Commanding General may designate. (See Alternate Locations, Basic Plan). The following communications will be established:

(1) Seven (7) radio teletype or CW circuits as follows:

(a) XVI Corps - 40th Infantry Division.

(b) XVI Corps - 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry).

(c) XVI Corps - 34th Infantry (63rd Field Artillery Battalion Attached).

(d) XVI Corps - 2d Engineer Special Brigade (56th Amphibious Tank & Tractor Battalion Attached).

(e) XVI Corps - General Headquarters, Far East Command.

(f) XVI Corps - Japan Logistical Command.

(g) XVI Corps - 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team.

(2) Messenger service by:

(a) Motor, to:

1 Northern Command.

2 40th Infantry Division.

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(b) Rail, (if practicable) to:

1 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry).

2 34th Infantry (63rd Field Artillery Battalion Attached).

3 2d Engineer Special Brigade (56th Amphibious Tank & Tractor Battalion Attached).

4 Japan Logistical Command.

5 General Headquarters, Far East Command.

6 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team.

(c) Air, (if practicable) to:

1 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry).

2 34th Infantry (63rd Field Artillery Battalion Attached).

3 2d Engineer Special Brigade (56th Amphibious Tank & Tractor Battalion Attached).

4 Japan Logistical Command.

5 General Headquarters, Far East Command.

6 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team.

(3) The maximum use will be made of existing communication facilities not affected by the CBR attack.

b. 40th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), 34th Infantry (63rd Field Artillery Battalion Attached), 2d Engineer Special Brigade (56th Amphibious Tank & Tractor Battalion Attached) and 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team will be prepared to carry out CBR defense communication plans to meet training and emergency requirements within their areas to include:

(1) Training of Signal personnel to decontaminate equipment, material and areas necessary to reestablish communication facilities.

(2) Training of Signal personnel in the repair and maintenance of RADIAC equipment. Reference DA pamphlet 20-110, dated Sept 1950.

(3) Maintenance and operation of terminal facilities for CW command nets at their respective headquarters.

(4) Maintenance and operation of radio relay (VHF) terminal equipment, including teletypewriter facilities at their respective headquarters.

c. 40th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), 34th Infantry (63rd Field Artillery Battalion Attached), 2d Engineer Special Brigade (56th Amphibious Tank & Tractor Battalion Attached) and 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team will coordinate their CBR Defense Communication Plans with this Headquarters.

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ANNEX 11 (SIGNAL) TO CBR DEFENSE PLAN, Cont'd, 12 Dec 51

d. 50th Signal Battalion will be prepared to carry out the CBR defense plan of this Headquarters.

e. Current copies of this plan with copies of the XVI Corps SOI and SSI will be kept immediately available for use by operating personnel concerned.

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DISTR: Same as Basic Plan.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PLAN FOR RELOCATION OF NPR TACTICAL UNITS

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

1 REGION

CAMP	CAMP CAPACITY	RECOMMENDED LOCATION FOR REGION UNITS	PROPOSED STRENGTH	REMARKS
FUNAOKA	1000	5th Bn, 62d Regt	677	323 Spaces available.
UTSUNOMIYA	3500	1st Regt (- 2d Bn) 1st Bn, 61st Regt	2965	135 Additional spaces available.
McKNIGHT	1100	None	----	For GG Hq personnel.
KURIHAMA	3200	General Group School Center 2d Bn, 1st Regt	838	Additional spaces available for 2352.
TOYOKAWA	5000	3rd Regt 3rd Bn, 61st Regt 5th Bn, 61st Regt (- 16th Co) 1st & 2d Co, 1st Engr Bn	4668	Additional spaces available for 332.
KATSUTA	1000	Engr School 1st Engr Bn (- 1st & 2d Co)	580	420 Spaces available.
TAKADA	3000	None	----	Available for Svc type units, installations, and/or schools.
MATSUMOTO	4000	2d Regt 2d Bn, 61st Regt	3803	197 Spaces available.
KANAZAWA	3000	3d Bn, 6th Regt 1st Bn, 62d Regt	1443	Additional spaces available for 1557.
TACHIKAWA	3000	None	----	3000 spaces available.
MARASHINO	1000	Mortar School 16th Co, 61st Regt	134	Additional spaces available for 866.

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

I REGION - Cont'd

CAMP	CAMP CAPACITY	RECOMMENDED LOCATION FOR REGION UNITS	PROPOSED STRENGTH	REMARKS
SHIMMACHI	1000	61st Regt (- 1, 2, 3, & 5th Bns) 1st Patrol Co	934	Additional spaces available for 66.
NERIMA	2000	Hq & Hq Co, 1st Region 1st Det, 200th Prov Comp Finance Unit 301st Postal Det 1st Weapons Maint Co 1st Medical Bn 305th Postal Det 1st Stores Co 1st Comm Co	1463	Additional spaces available for 537.

II REGION

CAMP	CAMP CAPACITY	RECOMMENDED LOCATION FOR REGION UNITS	PROPOSED STRENGTH	REMARKS
SAPPORO	2100	Hq & Hq Co, 2d Region 2d Stores Co 2d Wpns Maint Co 2d Comm Co 2d Med Bn	1262	838 spaces for non-regional svc units to operate Naebo DP available.
TOMI	1000	62d Regt (- 1st, 3d, & 5th Bns)	1328	Additional billeting space necessary for 328.
OBIHIRO	3500	4th Regt	3210	Additional spaces available for 290.
BIHORO	3000	6th Regt (- 2d, 3d Bns) 3d Bn, 62d Regt 2d Engr Bn	3031	
HAKODATE	1000	3d Bn, 5th Regt 13th Co, 5th Regt	994	Space available for 6.
ENGARU	1000	2d Bn, 6th Regt 2d Patrol Co	972	Additional space available for 28.

II REGION - Cont'd

CAMP	CAMP CAPACITY	RECOMMENDED LOCATION FOR REGION UNITS	PROPOSED STRENGTH	REMARKS
AOMORI	1200	5th Regt (- 2d, 3d Bns, 13th, 14th Co)	1263	
AKITA	1000	2d Bn. 5th Regt 14th Co. 5th Regt	972	1 Feb 52 completion date. Additional spaces available for 28.
NAEBO	400	None	----	300 barracks spaces under construction for Svc units.

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

III REGION

CAMPS	CAMP CAPACITY	RECOMMENDED LOCATION FOR REGION UNITS	PROPOSED STRENGTH	REMARKS
FUKUCHIYAMA	2400	8th Regt (- 3d Bn, 14th Co)	2167	233 Spaces available.
MIZUSHIMA	3000	7th Regt (- 2d Bn, 3d Bn, 14th Co) 1st Bn, 63 Regt	2204	796 Spaces available.
ZENTSUJI	4000	9th Regt 3d Bn, 63d Regt	3803	197 Spaces available.
HIMEJI	3250	63d Regt (- 1st and 3d Bns) 3d Bn, 8th Regt 14th Co, 8th Regt	2756	494 Spaces available
FUKUYAMA	1000	3d Bn, 7th Regt	838	162 Spaces available.
KAIDAICHI	1800	None	----	Available for Svc type units installations and/or schools.
UJI	2000	None	----	Available for Svc type units, installations, and/or schools.
MAIZURU	3000	None	----	do
YONAGO	1000	2d Bn, 7th Regt 13 Co, 7th Regt	994	6 Spaces available.
MITSUHAMA	1000	None	----	Available for Svc type units, installations, and/or schools.

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

III REGION - Cont'd

CAMPS	CAMP CAPACITY	RECOMMENDED LOCATION FOR REGION UNITS	PROPOSED STRENGTH	REMARKS
ITAMI	2200	Hq & Hq Co, 3d Region 3d Med Bn 3d Comm Co 3d Wpns Maint Co 3d Patrol Co 3d Stores Co 3d Det, 200th Prov Comp Finance Unit 303d Postal Det	1580	220 Spaces available.
SUWZO	1200	3d Engr Bn	890	310 Spaces available.

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IV REGION

CAMP	CAMP CAPACITY	RECOMMENDED LOCATION FOR REGION UNITS	PROPOSED STRENGTH	REMARKS
FUKUOKA	3600	Hq & Hq Co, 4th Region 4th Comm Co 4th Det, 200th Prov Comp Finance Unit 304th Postal Det 4th Weapons Maint Co 4th Patrol Co 4th Stores Co 4 med.	1385	Additional spaces available for 2215.
NAKATSU	1300	None	----	Available for Svc type unit, installations, and/or schools.
KUMAMOTO	1400	4th Engr Bn	890	Space available for 510 additional personnel.
KANOYA	4000	12th Regt (- 2d Bn) 3d Bn, 64th Regt	2965	Space available for 1035 additional personnel.
OZUKI	2500	11th Regt (- 2d Bn, 13th Co, 14th Co)	2078	Space available for 422 additional personnel.
HARIO	5700	10th Regt 64th Regt (- 2d & 3d Bns)	5427	Space available for 273 additional personnel.
SONE	2500	None	----	Available for Svc type units, installation, and/or schools.

SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET

IV REGION - Cont'd

CAMP	CAMP CAPACITY	RECOMMENDED LOCATION FOR REGION UNITS	PROPOSED STRENGTH	REMARKS
MIYAKONOJO	1200	2d Bn, 12th Regt	838	Space available for 362 additional personnel.
KURUME	2500	2d Bn, 64th Regt 2d Bn, 11th Regt 13th Co, 11th Regt 14th Co, 11th Regt	1737	Space available for 763 additional personnel.
KURUME SCHOOL	2000	None	----	2000 Spaces available for school,purposes.

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SECURITY INFORMATION
Secret
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AG 400(6 Nov 51)GD/E

6 November 1951

SUBJECT: Logistical and Maintenance Support for United States Equipment for Special FECOM Reserve

TO: Commanding General
Japan Logistical Command
APO 343

1. The equipment being received from the continental United States under special marking "SCJ" is for the "Special FECOM Reserve". The use of this equipment will create replacement and maintenance requirements. Until other arrangements are accomplished, the Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command, will be responsible for the following support:

a. Replacement of end items.

b. Supply of expendable items.

c. Maintenance, to include furnishing parts, and repair of equipment.

2. The replacement factors authorized for the Pacific Command (PAC) in Department of the Army Supply Bulletins 38-4 Ordnance, Engineer, Medical, Signal and Department of the Army Supply Bulletin 3-27, 1 June 1951, will apply for the replenishment of end items for the Special FECOM Reserve.

3. It is therefore requested that action be initiated to provide adequate replacement stocks and necessary maintenance support for all United States items of equipment issued from "Special FECOM Reserve" stocks.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

Aileen M. Webster
AILEEN M. WEBSTER
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant Gen

Copies furnished:
CG SFPE CALIF

Secret
SECURITY INFORMATION

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DISPATCHED

7 NOV 1951
S6620 #12

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Secret

Memo for Record: 4 Nov 51

1. The replacement of end items, the provision of expendable and the repair and maintenance of equip being issued to the Special FECOM Reserve, is a FEC responsiblity. It will remain so, until personnel are adequately trained in the Reserve to repair equip, and other arrangements are accomplished for support.

2. Inst ltr is self-explanatory.

3. Coordination: Ord (Lt Col Baker)
Engr (Lt Col King)
Med (Lt Col Quarton)
Sig (Maj Gunning)
Cml (Maj Fort)

4. G4 action complete on JN 20864.

OBS ____26-6456 MSG ____26-6055 ADS ____26-6043 (Div Chief)

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EMF

LHW

24 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Operations Division

SUBJECT: Modification of Fourth Phase Training Program

1. It is believed that the training outlined in the attached draft and the equipment listed in Tab B should be modified considering the various subjects to be taught, the time allotted to them and the list of equipment required for teaching these subjects and for field operations.

2. Insufficient time is allotted to the use, care and maintenance of equipment, particularly that issued by the Stores (QM) Branch. In operations where men are dependent on their equipment, like men who are trained in winter operations, there can never be too much stress on the proper use, care and maintenance of equipment and clothing. Having the equipment and clothing and not knowing how to use it in winter operations may mean the difference of success or defeat.

3. The following comments are made concerning the equipment shown in Tab B.

a. Bag, sleeping, mountain should be procured. This will keep a man comfortable up to 10 below zero Fahrenheit. Provided colder weather is anticipated, the addition of bag, sleeping, wool to bag, sleeping, mountain will offer comfort in temperatures up to-35 Fahrenheit. Below 35 Fahrenheit bag sleeping Arctic should be issued.

b. Boots, ski, mtn to be issued to only those troops authorized skis.

c. Brush mtn should be issued to each man so that all snow can be removed from their clothing thus helping to keep the man dry.

d. Cap, field, cotton w/visor is almost identical to cap, ski. By issuing one type, it reduces the supply problem.

e. Cap wool knit M1941 is not necessary provided cap, field, pile, OD is issued. It was the cap issued by U.S. Q.M. to wear under the helmet.

f. The issue of container, fuel, 1 qt. and cook set, mtn, camp should be held up until the NPRJ accept the idea of supplying troops with gasoline in the field for cooking. The container, fuel, 1 qt. will carry fuel enough to cook one man's food for two days. It is easily damaged. The use of this type equipment presents a logistic problem that it is believed the NPRJ will not be able to support. The cook set mtn presents the same logistic difficulties as the container, fuel, 1 qt.

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g. Cover, bag, sleeping is a wind resistant, water repellant cover that encompasses the bag, sleeping, mt. It is used to keep the bag, sleeping, mtn clean and prevent it from coming in direct contact with snow or damp ground thus causing it to lose its insulating value and render it useless.

h. Gaiter, ski should be reduced to one pair per individual equipped with skis.

i. Helmet, combat, winter to be deleted. The issue of helmet, steel is satisfactory and can be worn over the cap, pile.

j. Jackets, combat, winter to be deleted. The issue of jackets, pile are sufficient and will serve the same purpose.

k. Add 2 each liner, bag, sleeping, mtn per man. This item acts as a sort of sheet and absorbs the moisture that the body gives off and every other day, it is removed and aired out. When it becomes dirty, it can be removed and washed.

l. Overshoes are not necessary if shoepacs are worn.

m. A man should be issued one of the following:

(1) Packboard

(2) Rucksack

The issue of pack, field is not consistent with the principles of Arctic training. It is too tight and the weight is slung from and supported by the shoulders and back thus restricting circulation and causing areas of the back to become wet or damp with perspiration. This is very undesirable in cold weather operations. Therefore the rucksack should be issued since this type of pack is supported from the hips and the shoulders and back are free. It is also very desirable because of the ease in which the soldier can shed it and put it on while wearing bulky clothing.

n. Pad, insulating, sleeping can be deleted provided the troops operate where evergreen timber is growing. Troops cut the small branches and form a bed thus insulating themselves from the ground, and this bed serves the same purpose as the pad. However if timber is not available for cutting, the pad should be issued.

o. Parka, wet weather should be deleted. This item is for damp, wet weather. If it is worn in weather above zero, it tends to become damp because the moisture the body gives off can't escape.

p. Parka, field, cotton OD should be deleted if parka reversible, ski is issued. All troops should be issued the reversible parka, and the issue of parka, field, cotton OD is basically the same garment without the white side.

q. Pitons should be divided in the two basic types.

r. Shoes Arctic felt should be deleted. They have been found a luxury item in the U.S. Army. In weather over zero, they become damp and soon are useless. They are only worn in dry snow and are not practical to walk in. They soon crack across the toe and back of the heel and are difficult to repair.

s. Socks, heavy, wool or socks, felt, are necessary. If sock, heavy, wool are used two sizes should be issued. One pair the same size as the man's regular socks and the other size, one size larger. The larger pair are worn over the smaller pair. Two pairs of each size are necessary since the men change socks daily.

t. Two types of snowshoes should be issued, the majority of which should be trail type. The trail type are used in marches and cross country movements. They are designed to give maximum mobility and flotation. The bear paw type are shorter and wider. They do not lend themselves to walking for long distances. They are used by men who are mechanics, clerks, supply personnel, etc. who do not walk very much but because of the nature of their work they must stand in one spot for periods of time.

u. Each man should wear suspenders instead of a belt so that no tight fitting clothing will be worn.

v. Tent, mtn, 2 men is not very good. It is too small for movements and the hoarfrost that accumulates on the inside after a nights occupancy is very heavy. When the men try to dress, the frost falls on them or into their sleeping bag getting them wet and making them uncomfortable. Tent, hexagonal, 5 men is more desirable.

w. Toque wool knit, M1941 is not needed if the cap, pile w/flaps is worn.

x. Trousers, field wool, OD can be substituted with trousers, field, cotton OD. The regular issue trousers wool OD can be worn and will provide the protection that trousers, field, wool offer, however, they should be covered with the trousers, field, cotton.

y. Trousers, wet, weather should be deleted in that they are only good in above zero temperature and tend to make the man sweat and do not permit the evaporation of perspiration.

#10

Subject: Modification of Fourth Phase Training Program, 24 October 1951

z. In soles, felt must be added. They are placed in the bottom of the shoepac or ski boots to absorb the moisture that accumulates there.

z-a. Undershirts, wool, and drawers, wool should be added so that a man can change often and have a clean, dry garment to put on while it is washed and is drying.

4. It should be pointed out that the addition of many specialized types of clothing and equipment is desirable from the standpoint of efficiency, comfort and utility of the soldier. However, the soldier will be forced to wear or carry this clothing which will create a problem in field operations. The soldier should carry the least amount of clothing and be able to operate and still be comfortable.

5. The terrain in Northern Japan is very mountainous and the existing roads nets and cross country communications reveals that the country is under developed in means of communication, namely, roads, bridges, etc. Therefore the use of big, heavy snow removal equipment is not practical. It is further believed that the existing bridges would not in many cases support heavy loads without collapsing. The recommended snow removal equipment is good where a good road is present, however the road net in Japan does not lend itself to this type of equipment therefore the snow removal equipment list has been reduced as follows:

<u>Item No.</u>

2. Plow, snow rotary GD, trk mtd, 7½-ton, 4x4.....0

3. Plow, snow straight blade, w/wing, one-way type, trk mtd, 4 or 6 ton, 6 x 6.....0

6. The blankets set, large, should be substituted with an equivalent amount of bag, wool, sleeping. Blankets do not capture the warm air and hold it like the bags, sleeping, wool will do thus reducing the possibility of shock in casualties.

7. A review of the number of sled, cargo, 1-ton, M1 that are required should be made. These sleds are normally towed behind a weasel and if there are no weasels to tow them, they amount to excess equipment. If it is intended to tow them behind a truck, they will not be needed because wherever a truck can go, the 1-ton trailer that is organic to the unit is sufficient.

E. M. FRY
Col CE
Director, Logistics

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LOGISTICS DIVISION
Civil Affairs Section

19 September 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Watson

SUBJECT: Local Procurement of NPRJ Equipment

1. As a result of the conference with General Ford, Chief of Ordnance on 17 September 1951, reconsideration has been given to the list of NPRJ T/E equipment to be provided from U.S. sources.

2. The "Taylor Report" was forwarded to DA on 13 June 1951, stating the requirements for T/E equipment for NPRJ and recommending that certain items (see column 8, Taylor Report) be provided from U.S. sources. These items included all weapons, 1/4 and 3/4 ton trucks, artillery prime movers, and certain other technical equipment. The factors considered in determining which items are recommended for U.S. procurement were as follows:

a. Technical difficulty of manufacture in Japan.

b. Legal bar to manufacture of armament in Japan.

c. Secrecy of plans involving certain items.

d. Necessity of standardization.

e. Inability of Japanese economy to provide all required vehicles.

3. Colonel Everett, of DA G-3, during a visit to FEC in August 1951, stated that DA has accepted the "Taylor Report" and was planning and budgeting on that basis.

4. The Japanese NPRJ budget for FY 52-53 and the supplementary budget for FY 51-52 have been prepared on the assumption that the items in column 8 of the Taylor Report will be provided by the United States.

5. On 16 September 1951 a message from DA in reply to an FEC query on the status of the Taylor Report stated that availability of the equipment requested for NPRJ has not yet been determined.

6. Upon reconsideration, it has been determined that certain items to be provided from U.S. sources can be manufactured in Japan if the following conditions are met:

a. Funds are made available.

b. Procurement is accomplished by U.S. technical agencies in order to insure standardization and concealment of the ultimate use of the equipment.

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SUBJ: Local Procurement of NPRJ Equipment

7. The reasons for requesting the items in column 8 of the Taylor Report to be furnished by the United States are still valid. The decision as to whether these items are to be shipped from the ZI or procured in Japan should be made by U.S. Army supply agencies concerned.

8. Attached as inclosure #1 is a list of items, taken from column 8 of the Taylor Report, which might be provided by purchase with U.S. funds in Japan.

E. M. FRY
Col CE
Director, Logistics

2 Incls
1. List of items suggested for US procurement in Japan
2. Taylor Report

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LIST OF EQUIPMENT SUGGESTED FOR PURCHASE BY U.S. ARMY IN JAPAN

581	Circle Aiming M1
2	Ordnance Maintenance Set "A"
10	" " " "B"
24	" " " "C"
12	" " " "D"
2	" " " "G"
11	" " " "L"
110	Kit Artillery Mechanic Complete
112	Telescope BCM65
240	Telescope Observation M48 or M49
48	Tool Set Armorers F.A. Bn.
29	Tool Set Special Armored Force (all)
3,262	Truck 1/4 ton 4 x 4
1,258	Truck 3/4 ton 4 x 4
20	Truck 2-1/2 ton 6 x 6 cargo SWB
4	Wrench Set Socket 1" sq. drive
444	Truck 2-1/2 ton 6 x 6 cargo w/W
37	Loads for all Shop Trucks with the exception of the installed heaters and generators
3	Tools and Supplies Ord Ammo Co
2	" " " Depot Co
5	" " " Maintenance Co
2	" " " M A M Co
1	Tool Set 3rd Echelon Supply Signal Radar
13	" " Unit Equip 3rd Echelon #1

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Col Fry
74-1155 Ext 24

Provisional Use of Camp Palmer by NPRJ

CAS-L G-3

1. 1. Request that Camp Palmer be released for use by NPRJ for the development of a school center.

2. If released, Camp Palmer will be used as a NPRJ school center for the initial training of NPRJ artillery officers and non-commissioned officers in artillery communications, survey, and fire direction operations. This site may also be used as an Officers Candidate School and as a school for the training of depurged officers upon their integration into the NPRJ.

3. At present the school facilities of the NPRJ are limited to Camp Kurihama, which has a maximum capacity of 600 students. This school facility is used as a Staff Officers School and as a Signal Specialist School. No suitable area is available for tactical field training. Training is limited almost entirely to classroom instructions and small unit problems.

4. In order to develop its artillery units it is essential that the NPRJ begin the early training of certain artillery personnel. Artillery communications, survey, and fire direction and control personnel must complete certain phases of their training prior to the start of general artillery training for all units to progress along balanced lines.

5. Camp Palmer has facilities and areas suitable for the proposed training and schooling and is held on PD by JLCOM. It has not been used by US troops in several months. CG, JLCOM, has no objections to the release of Camp Palmer providing appropriate funding arrangements are made.

6. The NPRJ can be prepared to vacate this camp on two weeks notice.

- L. H. W. - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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20. SEP. 1951

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