

Doc. 4035

Evid

Folder 6

(35)

TELEGRAM FROM RIBBENTROP DATED 26 APRIL 1939

Copy

Top Secret

Berlin, 26 April 1939

Diplogerma

Telegram in Cipher
(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo

No. 136

Most urgent!

Exclusively for the ambassador personally!

Top secret discussions between Berlin, Rome and Tokyo on the conclusion of a defensive alliance have been in progress for some time. They have for special reasons and in accordance with agreements made with the other partners been conducted outside usual diplomatic channels.

In the summer of 1938 General OSHIMA, still military attache at that time, gave the information that the time had come in the opinion of the Japanese army to conclude a general defensive alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan. He gave the contents of the alliance pact as follows:

- 1.) Consultation of the three powers in case one of them should get into political difficulties;
- 2.) Political and economic support in case one of the three powers should be threatened from outside;
- 3.) Granting of help and assistance in case one of the three powers should be attacked without provocation by another power.

At the time of the Munich Conference at the end of September the matter was discussed with MUSSOLINI and Count CIAFO. This discussion was resumed during my visit to Rome at the end of October with the result that the Duce declared his fundamental agreement but still made a reservation with regard to fixing the date for the conclusion of the pact. Then the Italian Foreign Minister made known at the beginning of January that the Duce was now ready for the signing.

The text of the pact was worked out by direct consultation between me, OSHIMA and CIAFO. Besides the above three points it also contained the obligation that in the event of a war waged in common an armistice and a peace would only be concluded jointly, and the duration of the agreement was set at ten years. The treaty draft was further supplemented by the draft of two secret protocols, which provided for immediate consultation on the execution of the obligation of assistance in the various

cases coming into consideration and in addition special measures for mutual treatment of questions on propaganda and press. Drafts were sent by OSHIMA to Tokyo by special courier where they were made the subject of cabinet deliberations.

At the beginning of March, OSHIMA as well as Ambassador SHIRATORI in Rome received instructions, according to which the Japanese Government agreed, it is true, with the idea of the pact in general, but, wished to limit mutual obligations of assistance only to the case of a war with Russia. Both ambassadors informed me and CIANO only confidentially and personally of this, but, on the other hand, immediately refused Tokyo on their own accord to present such a fundamental change of the German-Italian draft in Berlin and Rome. They once more stood up for the acceptance of the original suggestion and declared that they would have to resign from their posts in the event of a different decision of the Japanese cabinet.

Subsequently at the beginning of April a Japanese draft arrived from Tokyo which fundamentally corresponded to the German and Italian draft but, however, reduced the duration of the agreement to five years. The earlier Japanese wish to limit the obligation of assistance only to the case of Russia was, however, still retained in a weakened form, that the Japanese asked for our express approval to be able to give, after the signing and publication of the pact, a declaration to the English, French and American ambassadors with roughly the following contents: The pact had developed from the Anti-Comintern Pact; the partners had looked upon Russia as being the enemy; England, France and America had no need to feel that they were meant by it. The Tokyo cabinet gave as a reason for the necessity of such a limited interpretation of the pact the fact that Japan, for political and in particular, for economic reasons, was at the moment not yet in a position to come forward openly as the opposer of the three democracies. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI have indicated to Tokyo that this wish of the Japanese Government was also impossible and have informed CIANO and myself again purely confidentially regarding the proceedings. CIANO as well as I left no doubt that the conclusion of an agreement with this interpretation, which is in direct contradiction to the text of the agreement, is quite out of question for us. Further I have, in order to hasten a final clarification, informed OSHIMA and SHIRATORI who was in Berlin on the occasion of the Fuehrer's birthday, that I must, before the Fuehrer's speech on 28 April, know the final positive or negative decision of the Japanese cabinet. Both Ambassadors have wired this to Tokyo.

The above information is meant exclusively for your personal information. I ask you to keep it strictly secret, and for your part, not to allude to this topic in your conversations there until later and, in case you are spoken to by another party about it, not to give any recognition whatsoever of the fact of having been informed of the fact. That applies also to the Italian Ambassador there, who according to information given by CIANO has not been informed up to now. On the other hand I ask you to observe carefully developments there and to keep me continuously informed upon the matter by wire.

RIBBENTROP

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

EXHIBIT NO. 502

4035-1

寫シ

FILE COPY

ベルリン RETURN TO ROOM 361 昭和十四年四月廿六日

ドイツ外交 暗號電報 (秘密暗號法)

東京第一三六號

緊急!

大使特別親展!

ベルリン、ローマ、東京間ノ防守同盟締結ニツイテノ極秘會議ハ暫ク前ヨリ進行中デアツタ之等會議ハ特別ノ理由、及び他ノ同盟國トノ協定ニ從ヒ普通ノ外交的経路ヲ外レタ方法ヲ行ハレタ。一九三八年(昭和十三年)ノ夏大島將軍ハ當時マダ大使館附武官デアツタガ、日本陸軍ノ考ヘニ依レバドイツ、イタリ、日本ハ全般的防守同盟ヲ結ブベキ時カ來タトイフ情報ヲ提供シタ。彼ハソノ同盟條約ノ内容ヲ次ノ如ク申シタ。

(1) 三國ノ中ノ一國ガ政治的難局ニ陥ル場合三國協議ヘヲ開ク事。

(2) 三國ノ中ノ一國ガ他カラ脅迫サレル場合、政治的、經濟的援助ヘヲナスコト。

(3) 三國ノ中ノ一國挑發スルコトナクシテ他國カラ

改メラレル場合之ニ援助ト支援ヘヲ具ヘルコトニ

九月末ノミュンヘン會議ノ際、コノ問題ハムツソ
リニトチアノ伯ヲ對手ニ論議サレマシタ。

コノ議論ハ私ガ十月ノ終ニローマ訪問中續ケラレ、
其ノ結果「ヂウチエ」ハ根本的ニ同意スル旨ヲ宜
言シタガコノ條約締結ノ日附ヲキメルコトニ關シ
テハ留保シタ。ソノ後イタリヤノ外相ハ一月ノ初
メニ「ヂウチエ」ハ今ヤ署名スル準備アルコトヲ
知ラセテ來タ。

條約ノ原文ハ余、大島、チアノノ間ノ直接協議ニ
ヨリ作成サレマシタ。

右ノ三點ノ他ニ、戰爭共同遂行ノ場合休戰ヤ和平
ハ共同シテノミ締結サルベキコト、及ビコノ條約
ノ期間ハ十年間トナスベキコトガ確定サレタル議
務ヲ含ンデキタ。條約草案ハナホ二ツノ秘密議定
書草案ニヨツテ更ニ補ハレ、アリト凡ユル場合ノ
援助義務ノ實行ニツイテ迅速ナル協議更ニ宜停ヤ
新聞問題ノ共同對策ニツイテノ特別手段ガ規定サ
レテキル。草案ハ大島ニ依リ特別急使ヲ通ジテ閣
議主題ニスル爲東京ヘ送ラレタ。

三月ノ初メニ大島氏ハローマノ白鳥大使ト同ジク
指令ヲウケマシタ。ソレニヨレバ日本政府ハコノ

條約ノ意旨ニ大体賛成シタガ、シカシロシマトノ
戰等ノ場合タケニ相互援助義務ヲ限リタイトイフ
ノデアツタ。兩大使ハ余トチアノニコノ要ヲ唯内
密ニ個人的ニ通知シ又一方デハ、ドイツ、イタリ
一草案新ル根本的變更ヲローマ・ベルリンニ提出
スルコトヲ自發的ニ東京ヘ直チニ拒絶シマシタ。
彼等ハモトノ提案ヲ受ケ入レルヨウニト今一度進
メ、若日本内閣方他ノ決定ヲナス場合ニハ彼等ノ
地位ヲ速カネバナラヌダラウト宜ベタ。

次イデ四月ノ初メニ東京カラドイツ、イタリーノ
草案ト根本的ニ一致シタ日本ノ草案ガ届イタ。然
シ其ノ期間ハ五年間ニ滿メテアツタ。

日本ノ以前ノ望ミデアツタロシヤノ場合ノミニ援
助義務ヲ制限シタイトイフコトハ弱イ形ナガラ保
留サレテキタ。即チ日本ハソノ條約ノ署名ト公表
後ニ英米佛大使ニ對シ概略次ノ如キ内容ノ宣言ヲ
爲ス事ニ對シ余等ノ明確ナ贊意ヲ要求シタノデア
リマス。即チコノ條約ハ防共協定ヨリ發展シタ。
同盟國ハロシヤヲ敵ト見做シテ居ルモノデアリ、
英米佛ハ此條約ト關係アリト感ズル必要ハナイ、
東京ノ内閣ハ條約ガ斯ル制限サレタ解釋ヲ必要ト
スル理由トシテ公然ト民主三國家ノ對抗者トシテ

政治的條件ニ經濟的理由カラ公然進ンデ出ル立場デ
 ナイ、トイフ事實ヲ擧ゲテキマス。大島氏ト白鳥
 氏ハコノ日本政府ノ希望モヤハリ不可能デアルト
 イフコトヲ東京ニ表明シ、チアノ信ト私ニ再ビソ
 ノ成行ニツイテ内密ニ報告シマシタ。チアノモ私
 モ斯ル解釋ニ依ル條約締結ハ、條約原文ニ直接チ
 肩スルヲ以テ我々ニトツテハ問題外デアルコトヲ
 疑ハナカツタ。

更ニ私ハ決定的解決ヲ急グ爲、大島氏トヒツトラ
 ーノ誕生日ノ爲ニベルリンニキタ白鳥ニ四月廿八
 日ノヒツトラーノ演説前ニ私ハ、日本内閣ノ肯定
 ナリ、否定ナリノ最後ノ決定ヲ知ラネバナラヌト
 云ツタ。

兩大使ハコレヲ東京ヘ打電シタ。

右傳達ハ貴殿個人ノ情報ニ限ル。貴殿ニ置キマシ
 テハ、之ヲ極秘ニ附シ、後程貴地會談ニ於テハ(一
 新ル)テーマヲ貴地方ヨリ届レザル様、又若シ之
 ニ關シ、他ヨリ話シ掛ケラレタル場合ハ、報告ヲ
 受ケテキル様ニ決シテ思ハレナイ様ニサレタシ、
 チアノ氏カラノ報告ニヨレバ、貴地ノイタリヤ大
 使モマダ知ラヌガ、以上ハイタリヤ大使ニモ適用
 スル。他方貴地ノ發展ヲ注意深ク觀察シ、絶エズ
 コレニ就イテ打電下サイ

リツベントロツブ

警報第四〇三五號

證

Ulrich J. Strauss

4035-5

余 *Ulrich Strauss* 余ガ獨逸語及ビ日本語ニ精通
セル者ナルコト並ニ獨逸語原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ
對照ノ上右ハ本警報ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモ
ノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

余、W. P. Carrington
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル國務省獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ國秘取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／＼柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事。

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部管理ヲ命セラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該國務省獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事。

四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、白隠セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

其並ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
諸檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ待サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング
(W.P. Cummings)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エッチ・ガード
CF. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

TELEGRAM FROM RIBBENTROP DATED 26 APRIL 1939

Copy

Top Secret

Berlin, 26 April 1939

Diplogerma

Telegram in Cipher
(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo

No. 136

Most urgent!

Exclusively for the ambassador personally!

Top secret discussions between Berlin, Rome and Tokyo on the conclusion of a defensive alliance have been in progress for some time. They have for special reasons and in accordance with agreements made with the other partners been conducted outside usual diplomatic channels.

In the summer of 1938 General OSHIMA, still military attache at that time, gave the information that the time had come in the opinion of the Japanese army to conclude a general defensive alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan. He gave the contents of the alliance pact as follows:

- 1.) Consultation of the three powers in case one of them should get into political difficulties;
- 2.) Political and economic support in case one of the three powers should be threatened from outside;
- 3.) Granting of help and assistance in case one of the three powers should be attacked without provocation by another power.

At the time of the Munich Conference at the end of September the matter was discussed with MUSSOLINI and Count CIAFO. This discussion was resumed during my visit to Rome at the end of October with the result that the Duce declared his fundamental agreement but still made a reservation with regard to fixing the date for the conclusion of the pact. Then the Italian Foreign Minister made know at the beginning of January that the Duce was now ready for the signing.

The text of the pact was worked out by direct consultation between me, OSHIMA and CIAFO. Besides the above three points it also contained the obligation that in the event of a war waged in common an armistice and a peace would only be concluded jointly, and the duration of the agreement was set at ten years. The treaty draft was further supplemented by the draft of two secret protocols, which provided for immediate consultation on the execution of the obligation of assistance in the various

cases coming into consideration and in addition special measures for mutual treatment of questions on propaganda and press. Drafts were sent by OSHIMA to Tokyo by special courier where they were made the subject of cabinet deliberations.

[At the beginning of March, OSHIMA as well as Ambassador SHIRATORI in Rome received instructions, according to which the Japanese Government agreed, it is true, with the idea of the pact in general, but, wished to limit mutual obligations of assistance only to the case of a war with Russia.) Both ambassadors informed me and CIANO only confidentially and personally of this, but, on the other hand, immediately refused Tokyo on their own accord to present such a fundamental change of the German-Italian draft in Berlin and Rome. They once more stood up for the acceptance of the original suggestion and declared that they would have to resign from their posts in the event of a different decision of the Japanese cabinet.

Subsequently [at the beginning of April a Japanese draft arrived from Tokyo which fundamentally corresponded to the German and Italian draft but, however, reduced the duration of the agreement to five years. The earlier Japanese wish to limit the obligation of assistance only to the case of Russia was, however, still retained in a weakened form, that the Japanese asked for our express approval to be able to give, after the signing and publication of the pact, a declaration to the English, French and American ambassadors with roughly the following contents: The pact had developed from the Anti-Comintern Pact; the partners had looked upon Russia as being the enemy; England, France and America had no need to feel that they were meant by it. The Tokyo cabinet gave as a reason for the necessity of such a limited interpretation of the pact the fact that Japan, for political and in particular, for economic reasons, was at the moment not yet in a position to come forward openly as the opposer of the three democracies.] OSHIMA and SHIRATORI have indicated to Tokyo that this wish of the Japanese Government was also impossible and have informed CIANO and myself again purely confidentially regarding the proceedings. CIANO as well as I left no doubt that the conclusion of an agreement with this interpretation, which is in direct contradiction to the text of the agreement, is quite out of question for us. Further I have, in order to hasten a final clarification, informed OSHIMA and SHIRATORI who was in Berlin on the occasion of the Fuehrer's birthday, that I must, before the Fuehrer's speech on 28 April, know the final positive or negative decision of the Japanese cabinet. Both Ambassadors have wired this to Tokyo.

The above information is meant exclusively for your personal information. I ask you to keep it strictly secret, and for your part, not to allude to this topic in your conversations there until later and, in case you are spoken to by another party about it, not to give any recognition whatsoever of the fact of having been informed of the fact. That applies also to the Italian Ambassador there, who according to information given by CIANO has not been informed up to now. On the other hand I ask you to observe carefully developments there and to keep me continuously informed upon the matter by wire.

RIBBENTROP

4635

(Translator Goto Masabu)

電報

(秘密暗号法)

東京

一九三九年四月二十七日

一三時五四

着

〃 〃 二十七日

八時三五

四月二十七日付中一七二号

至急

極秘

國務大臣宛親展

B. R. A. M

二十六日付電報中一三六号参照

極メラ確實ナル筋ヨリノ情報ニ依レバ、四月二十七日

夕刻閣議ノ決定ニ依リ、大島大使ニ日本ハ

露西亞ニ対スル制限無シニ猶逸及伊太利トノ軍事

同盟ニ賛成スルトノ指令ガ發セラレタ。日本政府ハ

戦軍ノ開始ハ日本ガ現在軍事上及經濟上ノ理

由カラ未ダ効果的ニ援助ヲナシ得ナイ為出來ル丈

逐ラレテ貫ヒ度イト云フ希望ヲ附レテ此ニ替成

シタ。

オット。

Doc 4035

Framer

135905-08

Removed by Hyde

for count on 29 Aug 49

Hyde

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

J. S.

20 Aug, 1946

TO: DUPLICATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 4035 for Javanenko.

Arrange for reproduction of 125 copies in English and 90 copies in Japanese as follows;

WBL

J. S.

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

WBL

4035-1

寫シ

極 秘

Briefing memo

ベルリン 一九三九年（昭和十四年）四月廿六日

ドイツ外交 暗號電報（秘密暗號法）

東京第一三六號

緊急！

大使特別親展！

ベルリン、ローマ、東京間ノ防守同盟締結ニツイテノ極秘會議ハ暫ク前日リ進行中デアツタ。之等會議ハ特別ノ理由、及ビ他ノ同盟國トノ協定ニ從ヒ普通ノ外交的経路ヲ外レタ方法デ行ハレタ。一九三八年（昭和十三年）ノ夏大島將軍ハ當時未ダ大使館附武官デアツタガ、日本陸軍ノ考ヘニ依レバ、ドイツ、イタリー、日本ハ全體的防守同盟ヲ結ブベキ時ガ來タト云フ情報ヲ提供シタ。彼ハ其ノ同盟條約ノ内容ヲ次ノ如ク申シタ。

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(2) 三國ノ中ノ一國ガ他カラ脅迫サレル場合、政治的、經濟的援助ヲナスコト。

(3) 三國ノ中ノ一國ガ挑發スルコトナクシテ他國カラ攻メラレル場合之ニ援助ヲ與ヘルコト。

九月末ノミュンヘン會議ノ際、此ノ問題ハムツソ

リニトチアノ伯ヲ對手ニ贈議サレマシタ。此ノ議
 論ハ私ガ十月ノ終ニローマ訪問中續ケラレ、其ノ
 結果「デウチエ」ハ根本的ニ同意スル旨ヲ宣言シ
 タガ、此ノ條約締結ノ日附ヲ決メル事ニ關シテハ
 留保シタ。其ノ後イタリヤノ外相ハ一月ノ初メニ
 「デウチエ」ハ今ヤ署名スル準備アルコトヲ知ラ
 セテ來タ。

條約ノ原文ハ余、大島、チアノノ間ノ直接協議ニ
 ヨリ作成サレマシタ。右ノ三點ノ他ニ、戦争共同
 遂行ノ場合休戦ヤ和平ハ共同シテノミ締結サルベ
 キコト、及び此ノ條約ノ期間ハ十年間トナスベキ
 コトガ確定サレタ。條約草案ハ尙二ツノ秘密議定
 書草案ニヨツテ補ハレ、アリト凡ユル場合ノ援助
 義務ノ實行ニツイテ迅速ナル協議、更ニ宣傳ヤ新
 聞問題ノ共同對策ニツイテノ特別手段ガ規定サレ
 テアル。此ノ草案ハ大島ニ依リ特別急使ヲ通ジテ
 贈議ノ三點ニスル爲東京へ送ラレタ。

三月ノ初メニ大島氏ハローマノ白鳥大使ト同ジク
 指令ヲ受ケマシタ。ソレニヨレバ日本政府ハ此ノ
 條約ノ趣旨ニ大体賛成シタガ、然シロシヤトノ戰
 争ノ場合ダケニ相互援助義務ヲ限り度イト云フノ
 デアツタ。兩大使ハ余トチアノニ此ノ事ヲ唯内密
 ニ個人的ニ通知シ、又一方チハ、ベルリン、ロー

マニ於ケルドイツ、イタリー草案ヲ斯クノ如ク根本的ニ變更スルコトヲ欲スルニ東京ヘレテニ望ミシマシタ。彼等ノ地位ヲ退カガ遠ツタ決定ヲナス場合ニハ、彼等ノ地位ヲ退カネバナラヌダラウト宣ベタ。

次イデ四月ノ初メニ東京カラドイツ、イタリーノ草案ト根本的ニ一致シタ日本ノ草案ガ届イタ。然シ其ノ期間ハ五年間ニ縮メテアツタ。

日本ノ以前ノ望ミデアツタロシアノ場合ノミニ援助義務ヲ制限シ度イト云フコトハ弱イ形ナガラ保留サレテキタ。即チ日本ハ其ノ條約ノ署名ト公表後ニ英米佛大使ニ對シ概略次ノ如キ宣言ヲ爲ス事ニ對シ余等ノ明確ナ贊意ヲ要求シタノデアリマス。

即チ「此ノ條約ハ防共協定ヨリ發展シタ。同盟國ハロシアヲ敵ト見做シテキルモノデアリ、英米佛ハ此ノ條約ト關係アリト感ズル必要ハナイ。」東京ノ内閣ハ條約ガ斯カル制限サレタ解釋ヲ必要トスル理由トシテ、今ノトコロ日本ハ民主三國家ノ對抗者トシテ政治的特別ニ經濟的ニ公然進ンデ出ル立場デナイ、ト云フ事實ヲ擧ゲテキマス。大島氏ト白鳥氏ハ此ノ日本政府ノ希望モヤハリ不可能デアルト云フコトヲ東京ニ表明シ、チアノ伯ト私ニ再ビソノ成行ニツイテ極ク内密ニ報告シマシタ。

40354

チアノモ私モ斯カル解釋ニ依ル條約締結ハ、條約
原文ニ直接矛盾スルヲ以テ我々ニ取ツテハ問題外
デアアルコトヲ疑ハナカツタ。
更ニ私ハ決定的解決ヲ急グ爲、大島トヒツトラ
ノ誕生日ニベルリンニ居タ白鳥ニ四月廿八日ノヒ
ツトラノ演説前ニ私ハ、日本内閣ノ肯定ナリ、
否定ナリノ最後ノ決定ヲ知ラネバナラヌト云ツタ。
爾大使ハコレヲ東京ヘ打電シタ。

右傳達ハ貴殿個人ノ情報ニ限ル。貴殿ニ於キマシ
テハ、之ヲ極秘ニ附シ、後程貴地會談ニ於テハ斯
ルテーマニ貴殿方ヨリ觸レザル様、又若シ之ニ關
シ、他ヨリ話シ掛ケラレタル場合ハ、之ニ關シ、
報告ヲ受ケテキル様ニ決シテ思ハレナイ様ニサレ
度シ。チアノカラノ報告ニ依レバ、貴地ノイタリ
ヤ大使モ未ダ知ラサレテ居ラヌガ、以上ハイタリ
ヤ大使ニモ適用スル。他方問題ノ進展ヲ注意深ク
觀察シ、余ニ絶エズ事情ヲ打電下サイ。

リツベントロツプ

Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 27. April 1939 13.54 Uhr
Ankunft " 27. " " 8.35 Uhr

Nr. 172 vom 27. 4.

Citissime

Streng geheim

Für Reichsminister persönlich.

+) B.R. A.M.

Auf Telegramm vom 26. Nr. 136 +)

Erfahre aus unbedingt sicherer Quelle:

Am 26. April abends ist auf Grund Kabinettsbeschlusses Weisung an Botschafter Oshima abgegangen, dass Japan Militärbündnis mit Deutschland und Italien zustimmt ohne Beschränkung auf Russland. Die Japanische Regierung verbinde diese Zustimmung mit dem Wunsch, dass der Ausbruch eines Krieges nach Möglichkeit verzögert werden solle, da Japan zur Zeit aus militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Gründen noch nicht zu wirksamer Hilfe fähig sei.

Ott

Streng Geheim!

~~65713~~

135909

巻頭第四〇三五 號

證 *Ulrich J. Staus*

余 *Ulrich Staus* ハ余ガ **獨逸** 語及ビ

日本 語ニ精通セル者ナルコト並ニ

獨逸 語原文及ビ日本 語原文ヲ對照

ノ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セ
ルモノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4035

Date 14 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Photostat - File of telegrams re:
German-Japanese treaty negotiations.

Date: 2 April - 2 May 1939

Original () Copy (X) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes (X) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable):

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nuremberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA; Hiroshi SHIRATORI; Toshio

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Item 1: Telegram sent by RIBBENTROP to OTT in Tokyo, 26 April 1939, (rough translation of 135905 and 135906 attached), dealing with secret negotiations between Berlin, Rome and Tokyo over a Defensive Treaty, which was suggested in summer 1938 by the Japanese army via Military Attache, OSHIMA, who negotiated later with RIBBENTROP and CIANO about the wording of the pact. The Japanese Government wished to limit the obligations to support in case of a war with Russia. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI threatened to resign in this case.

The new Japanese draft agreed basically with the German-Italian draft. However, the Japanese asked German agreement to give a statement after publication of the pact to the British, French and American ambassadors that it is directed against Russia, not against their countries. The reason given was that Japan was "for political and, especially, for economic reasons at present not yet in a position to act openly as adversary of the three democracies."

Doc. No. 4035

Page 1

OSHIMA and SHIRATORI in their communication with Tokyo declared this to be impossible and informed RIBBENTROP and CIANO confidentially of this fact. RIBBENTROP and CIANO refused to sign the pact under this condition.

This information was to be kept strictly secret.

(135905 - 08)

Item 2: "Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo	27 April 1939	13.54 o'clock
Arrived	27 April 1939	8.35 o'clock

<u>No. 172 of 27 April</u>	<u>Citissime</u>	Top Secret
+ D.R.A.M.		for the Reichsminister personally.

In answer of telegram of the 26th, No. 136 + .

Learned from absolutely reliable source:

On the evening of 26 April on account of a Cabinet decision, instructions have been sent to Ambassador OSHIMA, to the effect that Japan agrees to conclude Military Pact with Germany and Italy without limitation to Russia. The Japanese Government combines this consent with the desire that the outbreak of a war be delayed as much as possible, because Japan was not at present able to render active support for military and economical reasons.

OTT "

(135909)

Item 3: Telegram to Tokyo sent by WEISZAECKER, dated 28 April 1939, inquiring whether the restrictions to interpret the pact as not directed against the Western Powers have actually been completely dropped.

(135910)

Item 4: Telegram, dated 30 April 1939, from OTT to the State Secretary. Renewed information showed that instructions were sent by Minister of War through Military Attache to OSHIMA to announce positive attitude of Government before Fuhrer's speech.

Contrasts in the Cabinet re: reservations towards Western Powers increased under insistant pressure of Army, Foreign and Navy Ministers at last consented to drop their proposal of

limiting the obligation of support to the case of Russia. But they still insist on covering this fact in the text by strongly accentuating the Anti-Comintern character of the pact. Foreign and Navy Ministers attacked supposed German demand for obligation to definite military actions (Hongkong, Singapore). The Army also felt this undesirable and would have preferred military negotiations later. In case these contrasts could not be overcome, resignation of the Cabinet threatened, which, according to the opinion of the confidant, would annul the basic agreement for an unlimited Defensive Treaty and would isolate the Army in its pact policy.

Item 5: Telegram, dated 1 May 1939, from RIBBENTROP to OTT. The Anti-Comintern ideas may be detailed in the preamble, but it is impossible to have any Anti-Russian tendencies appear in the articles. The Pact must keep its general character which is not directed against any single power. When the agreement is signed, the only consequence will be the fact that in case of an attack against one of the partners, the other two partners will be ipso facto at war with the aggressor. But the type and extent of the support to be given remain open. All the questions connected herewith will be reserved for the special secret negotiations which are to take place after the conclusion of the Pact. Of course the details cannot be mentioned for all eventualities and so the decisions will always have to be made according to the political situation and military possibilities. This shows that the objection of the Foreign and Navy Ministers viz that Japan would have to obligate herself to military action against Hongkong and Singapore are quite without grounds.

(135912-13)

Item 6: Secret telegram from OTT to the State Secretary personally, dated 2 May 1939. Controversies within the cabinet; pointing out that developments in Europe and Germany were not clear, opponents state that Japan would not be fully prepared for years to come. Army will time and again stress the fact that Japan was tied up in China. They express the hope that the case in which the alliance will be invoked (casus foederis) be postponed as long as possible. Foreign Ministry lukewarm.

(135914)

Item 7: Telegram from RIBBENTROP to OTT, dated 2 May 1946. The wish expressed by Japanese army circles to delay the "casus foederis" as long as possible is quite in accordance with Germany's and Italy's ideas as they too have greatest interest in a period of peace for many years.

(135915)

寫シ

極 秘

ベルリン 一九三九年（昭和十四年）四月廿六日

ドイツ外交 暗號電報 （秘密暗號法）

東京第一三六號

緊急！

大使特別親展！

ベルリン、ローマ、東京間ノ防守同盟締結ニツイ
テノ極秘會議ハ暫ク前ヨリ進行中デアツタ之奉會
議ハ特別ノ理由、及ビ他ノ同盟國トノ協定ニ從ヒ
普通ノ外交的經路ヲ外レタ方法ヲ行ハレタ。一九
三八年（昭和十三年）ノ夏大島將軍ハ當時マダ大
使館附武官デアツタガ、日本陸軍ノ考ヘニ依レバ
ドイツ、イタリ、日本ハ全般的防守同盟ヲ結ブ
ベキ時ガ來タトイフ情報ヲ提供シタ。彼ハソノ同
盟條約ノ内容ヲ次ノ如ク申シタ。

(I) 三國ノ中ノ一國ガ政治的難局ニ陥ル場合三國協
議ヲ開ク事

(2) 三國ノ中ノ一國ガ他カラ脅迫サレル場合、政治
的、經濟的援助ヲナスコト。

(3) 三國ノ中ノ一國挑發スルコトナクシテ他國カラ
攻メラレル場合之ニ援助ヲ與ヘルコト。

九月未ノミュンヘン會議ノ際、コノ問題ハムツソリ

4035-1

トチアノ伯ヲ對手ニ論議サレマシタ。

コノ議論ハ私ガ十月ノ終ニローマ訪問中續ケラレ、其ノ結果「ヂウチエ」ハ根本的ニ同意スル旨ヲ宣言シタカコノ條約締結ノ日附ヲキメル事ニ關シテハ留保シタ。ソノ後イタリヤノ外相ハ一月ノ初メニ「ヂウチエ」ハ今ヤ署名スル準備アルコトヲ知ラセテ來タ。

條約ノ原文ハ余、大島、チアノノ間ノ直接協議ニヨリ作成サレマシタ。

右ノ三點ノ他ニ、戦争共同遂行ノ場合休戦ヤ和平ハ共同シテノミ締結サルベキコト、及ビコノ條約ノ期間ハ十年間トノスベキコトガ確定サレタル。條約草案ハナホ二ツノ秘密議定書草案ニヨツテ補ハレ、アリト凡ユル場合ノ援助義務ノ實行ニツイテ迅速ナル協議更ニ宣傳ヤ新聞問題ノ共同對策ニツイテノ特別手段ガ規定サレテアル。此ノ草案ハ大島ニ依リ特別急使ヲ通ジテ關議主題ニスル爲東京へ送ラレタ。

三月ノ初メニ大島氏ハローマノ白鳥大使ト同ジク指令ヲウケマシタ。ソレニヨレバ日本政府ハコノ條約ノ趣旨ニ大體賛成シタガ、シカシロシヤトノ戦争ノ場合ダケニ相互援助義務ヲ限りタイトイフノデアツタ。兩大使ハ余トチアノニコノ事ヲ唯内密ニ個人的ニ通知シ又一方デハ、ベルリン、ローマニ於ルドイツ、イタリー草案ヲ

斯ク根本的ニ變更スルコトヲ自發的ニ東京へ直
 チニ拒絕シマシム。 彼等ハモトノ提案
 ヲ受け入レルヨウニト今一度進メ、若日本内閣
 ガ違ツタ決定ヲナス場合ニハ彼等ノ地位ヲ退カ
 ネバナラヌダラウト宣ベタ。

次イテ四月ノ初メニ東京カラドイツ、イタリ
 ノ草案ト根本的ニ一致シタ日本ノ草案ガ届イタ
 然シ其ノ期間ハ五年間ニ縮メテアツタ。
 日本ノ以前ノ望ミデアツタロシヤノ場合ノミニ
 援助義務ヲ制限シタイトイフコトハ弱イ形ナガ
 ラ保留サレテキタ。即チ日本ハソノ條約ノ署名
 ト公表後ニ英米佛大使ニ對シ概略次ノ如キ宣言
 ヲ爲ス事ニ對シ余等ノ明確ナ贊意ヲ要求シタノ
 デアリマス。即チ「コノ條約ハ防共協定ヨリ發
 展シタ。同盟國ハロシヤヲ敵ト見做シテ居ルモ
 ノデアリ、英米佛ハ此條約ト關係アリト感ズル
 必要ハナイ」東京ノ内閣ハ條約ガ斯ル制限サレ
 タ解釋ヲ必要トスル理由トシテ政治的トコロ在
 納民主三國家ノ對抗者トシテ政治的特ニ經濟的
 ニ公然進ンデ出ル立場デナイ、トイフ事實ヲ暴
 ゲテキマス。大島氏ト白鳥氏ハコノ日本政府ノ
 希望モヤハリ不可能デアルトイフコトヲ東京ニ
 表明シ、チアノ伯ト私ニ再ビソノ成行ニツイテ
 極ク内密ニ報告シマシム。 チアノモ私モ斯ル

4035-4

解釋ニ依ル條約締結ハ、條約原文ニ直接矛盾スルヲ以テ我々ニ取ツテハ問題外デアルコトヲ疑ハナカツタ。

更ニ私ハ決定的解決ヲ急グ爲、大島氏トヒットラーノ誕生日ニベルリンニキタ白鳥ニ四月廿八日ノヒットラーノ演説前ニ私ハ、日本内閣ノ定ナリ、否定ナリノ最後ノ決定ヲ知ラネバナラヌト云ツタ。

兩大使ハコレヲ東京ヘ打電シタ。

右傳達ハ貴殿個人ノ情報ニ限ル。貴殿ニ置キマシテハ、之ヲ極秘ニ附シ、後程貴地會談ニ於テハ斯ルテーマ貴殿方ヨリニ觸レザル様、又若シ之ニ關シ、他ヨリ話シ掛ケラレタル場合ハ、之ニ關シ、報告ヲ受ケテキル様ニ決シテ思ハレナイ様ニサレタシ、チアノ氏カラノ報告ニヨレバ、貴地ノイタリヤ大使モマダ知ラヌガ、以上ハイタリヤ大使ニモ通知スル。貴方同僚ノ進展ヲ注意深ク觀察シ、余ニ絶エズ事情ヲ打電下サイ。

リッベントロツプ

4035-5

書類第四〇三五號

證

Merid A Straus

余 *Merid Straus* 余ガ引逸語及ビ日本語ニ精通セル
者ナルコト並ニ引逸語原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ對
照ノ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモ
ノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Abschrift.

Berlin, den 28. April 1939.

Streng geheim!

Diplogerma

T o k i o
= = = = =

Nr. 139

Citissime!

Telegramm in Ziffern (Geh.Ch.Verf.)

Ausschließlich für Botschafter persönlich!

Auf Drahtbericht vom 27. Nr. 172

Hier bestehen Zweifel, ob Vorbehalt dortiger Regierung Westmächten gegenüber Vertrag als nicht gegen sie gerichtet zu interpretieren

(siehe vorletzter Absatz Drahterlaß Nr. 136 vom 26.4.)

eindeutig fallen gelassen worden ist.

Wäre dankbar, falls möglich, unauffällig an informierter Stelle Lage festzustellen.

gez/ Weizsäcker.

~~65711~~

135910

Abschrift

1. Mai 1939

Büro RAM

Ha

#

Telegramm i. Ziffern

(Geh.Chiffr.Verf.)

Diplogerma

T o k i o

Nr. 143 vom

Für Botschafter persönlich

Auf Telegramm Nr. 177

1) In Paktentwurf, wie ihn Japaner uns zuletzt Anfang April vorgelegt haben, kommt Antikomintern-Gedanke lediglich in der Präambel, nicht dagegen in den einzelnen Artikeln selbst zum Ausdruck. Weitere Vertiefung Antikominterngedankens in Präambel erscheint uns möglich. Dagegen ist es ausgeschlossen, antirusische Tendenz in irgend einer Weise in den Paktartikeln selbst in die Erscheinung treten zu lassen. In diesen Artikeln selbst muß es vielmehr dabei bleiben, daß allgemeiner, nicht auf einzelne Mächte abgestellter Charakter des Bündnisses stipuliert wird.

2) Bei dieser allgemeinen Fassung der Paktartikel selbst ist selbstverständlich irgendeine einschränkende Interpretation in dem einen oder anderen Sinne nicht möglich und kann von uns unter keinen Umständen akzeptiert werden.

3) Falls Pakt unterzeichnet ist, ist damit als Auswirkung lediglich das eine festgestellt, daß in Falle eines Angriffs gegen einen der Partner auch die beiden anderen Partner sich ipso facto im Kriegszustand mit dem Angreifer befinden. Dagegen bleibt Art und Maß des von den Bundesgenossen zu leistenden Beistandes in jeder Beziehung zunächst offen. Alle hiermit zusammenhängenden Fragen bleiben den in Aussicht genommenen geheimen Sonderbesprechungen vorbehalten, die erst nach Paktabschluß stattfinden sollen.

Auch

~~65716~~

135912

Auch diese können naturgemäß nicht sofort alle Einzelheiten und alle Eventualitäten für alle Zukunft festlegen, vielmehr müssen sich Verabredungen über Art und Umfang Beistandes fortlaufend der jeweils gegebenen politischen Lage und den jeweiligen militärischen Möglichkeiten anpassen.

4) Hieraus ergibt sich ohne weiteres, daß der von Außen- und Marineminister erhobene Einwand, daß Japan sich sofort auf militärische Aktionen wie z.B. Hongkong und Singapur festlegen müsse, vollkommen unbegründet ist.

5) Sie sind ermächtigt, die vorstehenden Gesichtspunkte auf dem gleichen Wege wie Ihnen Ihre Informationen zugegangen sind, zur Geltung zu bringen. Im übrigen bitte ich aber, nach wie vor von jeder Initiative in der Angelegenheit abzusehen. Besondere Vorsicht ist gegenüber Angehörigen dortigen Außenministeriums geboten.

R i b b e n t r o p

~~65717~~

135913

Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 2. Mai 1939 13.30 Uhr
Ankunft " " " " 12.00 "

Ganz Geheim!

Nr. 178 vom 2. 5.

Citissime Streng geheim.

Für Staatssekretär persönlich.

Im Anschluss an Telegramm vom 30.Nr.177.

Hartnäckige Kämpfe innerhalb Kabinetts andauern. Unter Hinweis auf Unübersichtlichkeit Europaentwicklung und nächste deutsche Ziele operieren Gegner hauptsächlich mit Argument, dass Japan auf Jahre hinaus nicht voll einsatzfähig. Auch Armeekreise unterstreichen in Gesprächen immer wieder starke Festlegung Japans in China und aussprechen Hoffnung auf gegebenenfalls möglichst lange Hinauszögerung Bündnisfall-
les.

Für laue Haltung Aussenministeriums bezeichnend, dass gestrige Sprechererklärung (vgl.DNB Nr. 127) als bisher einzige amtliche Verlautbarung zu Führerrede Fragen Antikomintern Front völlig übergeht.

Ott

~~65748~~

135914

Abschrift.

Berlin, den 2. Mai 1939.

Büro des R.A.M.

Ganz geheim!

Diplogerma

T o k i o .
= = = = =

Nr. 144

Telegramm in Ziffern

(Geh.Ch.Verf.)

Auf Telegramm Nr. 178

Ausschließlich für Botschafter persönlich.

Zur Regelung Ihrer Sprache.

Die von dortigen Armeekreisen ausgesprochene Hoffnung auf möglichst lange Hinauszögerung Bündnisfalles entspricht völlig unserer eigenen Auffassung, da sowohl Deutschland als auch Italien das größte Interesse an einer langjährigen Friedensperiode haben.

gez: Ribbentrop.

~~65719~~

135915