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INTERROGATION NO. 330
(Jap Intell #16)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 10 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2 USSBS.

Subject: Japanese Naval Intelligence Organization.

Person Interviewed and Background:

Captain SHIBA, Katsuo graduated from the Naval Academy in 1922. He attended the Naval War College for 2 years from 1932-1934. From 1935-1937 he was assistant Naval Attache in GERMANY. Upon return to the Empire Capt SHIBA was commanding officer of DD HIBIKI for three months from August to November 1937 following which he taught naval history at the War College for 6 months until April 1938. In April Capt. SHIBA was transferred to the Navy Ministry. In February 1944 he took command of the OI and in August 1944 he came to the Naval General Staff where he served until the end of the War.

Where Interviewed: Room 554, Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS, USNR
Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

Summary:

Captain SHIBA's duties as the "A" member and "B" member of the Staff Department and Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Naval General Staff included, broadly, liaison with the Supreme War Direction Council and the Navy Department, determining policies of propoganda, and operations planning.

Propoganda aimed at America (as opposed to internal propoganda and that aimed at neutral countries) was intended to create a belief that American Capitalists had brought on the war, and, to instil in American troops (1) a conviction that Japan would fight to the last man and (2) a fear of the Special Attack Corps. A similar program was carried out by the Army and liaison was, in this respect, fairly close. Internal propoganda under SHIBA's cognizance was restricted to military requirements.

Foreign office information consisted mainly of newspapers from Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and Spain, and magazines from America. The German office provided some good information on German technical developments, her internal situation and some concerning Allied aircraft and equipment. Some information about B-29 production was derived from a study of our (U.S.) radio broadcasts. A monthly courier service from Moscow was maintained, but no regular service from Berlin.

Captain SHIBA will furnish, at a later date, a T.O. of Naval diplomatic representatives from 1937 through the War period.

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Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K.

Q.1. What were your duties as head of the "A" Section of the Staff Department?

A. Operations and political liaison were my responsibilities; to explain the problems of and conditions in the Navy to the Supreme War Council, in terms of ships and equipment required, and plans of the General Staff. Largely it was explanation to the Navy Department and to the Supreme War Council of Naval General Staff plans.

Q.2. Did you have additional duties?

A. No additional duties.

Q.3. Did you have duties connected with determining intelligence and propaganda policies?

A. Yes. I am involved in principles of propaganda, but not with regard to intelligence.

Q.4. What do you consider the guiding principles of propaganda?

A. The general policy was laid down before I came in and these principles were not changed.

Q.5. What was this policy?

A. It can be divided into three categories:

1. Internal propaganda.
2. That aimed at America.
3. That aimed at neutral countries.

The general line up was left up to the information board.

Q.6. Along what general lines was propaganda aimed at America directed? What was it expected to accomplish?

A. There were two main approaches:

1. Toward Americans in general, that capitalists had begun the War for their own gain and America had nothing to gain by it.
2. Towards American Troops, that the Japanese would fight to the last man and that the ability and accomplishments of the Special Attack Corps were such as to make their efforts extremely costly if not futile.

Q.7. What channels were used for disseminating this propaganda?

A. This was handled by the Naval Board of Information, generally by radio and by leaflets. I was responsible for determining policy. It was up to the Naval Information Board, headed by Captain Goro TAKASE who is at the Navy Department now, to execute the policy.

Q.8. What was the effectiveness of these policies?

A. It was difficult to tell. I believe it was not great. I believe the general policies were good however.

Q.9. Who was your predecessor prior to August of 1944 when you came into your present position?

A. Rear Admiral ONO War Chief of "A" section before the war, then Captain ONODA, then Captain FUJII, and then Captain SUEZANA.

Q.10. Did the Army have a similar propaganda function?

A. Col. TANEMURA, S. had this function. He was captured in KOREA by the Russians. Col TANEMURA left for KOREA on 4 August 1945. I do not know who succeeded him.

Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K., IJN, (contd).

Q.11. Was there any liaison between the Army and Navy in propaganda policy?

A. There were two liaison officers under TANEMURA who called often. I met once a week with TANEMURA without fail in connection with our liaison duties with the Supreme War Council as representatives of the Navy General Staff and the Army General Staff.

Q.12. What was the relationship between your work and that of Adm. ONO head of the 3rd Department (Naval Intelligence) and the 5th Section (U.S. Intelligence) of the Navy General Staff under Rear Adm. TAKEUCHI?

A. We passed to the 3rd Department all information which we thought would be helpful, and made requests for information we required. With regard to the 5th Section, we maintained liaison with the Army through Col. TANEMURA and with the foreign office through Mr. E. SOME. He is now in TOKYO, head of the Central Liaison office.

Q.13. What type of information did you request of the 5th Section?

A. Since I came in, primarily air operations information, particularly regarding special attack forces.

Q.14. What type of information was requested from the Foreign Office under Mr. SOME?

A. None was requested.

Q.15. What, then, was the nature of the information received from your various legations, consulates and embassies?

A. Newspaper information from Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and Spain, also American magazines.

Q.16. For what purpose was this information used?

A. For future operations, in planning.

Q.17. What were your duties in connection with "direction of international situation?"

A. Direction internally (Japan) of the international situation.
a. Analyze American public opinion.
b. Situation between America and Russia.
c. Situation between America and China.
d. Strength of Army (Japanese).
e. Strength of Navy (Japanese).
f. Strength of Homeland.

Q.18. Did you have responsibility for propaganda aimed at the Japanese People?

A. Adm. MAKASE (Chief of 3rd Department) had that responsibility. The Army and Navy pooled information toward the end of the War.

Q.19. Were your responsibilities confined to Army and Navy military requirements or in addition did they extend to the Japanese people?

A. Mainly for military operations.

Q.20. Who was the man who was Minister of propaganda?

A. Head of Board of Information. (Changes with each Cabinet)

Q.21. Which Consulate provided you the most useful information?

A. Swedish.

Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K., IJN, (contd).

Q.22. In the Swedish Consulate what was the number of Army and Navy personnel?

A. Only 1 Naval member. I don't know the Army and civilian component.

Q.23. Lisbon - Naval representative?

A. A Naval Captain. (1 only)

Q.24. Argentina - Naval representatives?

A. A Commander (1 only)

Q.25. What other South American countries had Naval members in your delegation of representatives?

A. None. Brazil did prior to the War.

Q.26. Mexico?

A. Two before the war. (Captain and Commander)

Q.27. German Naval representation?

A. One Rear Admiral, three captains, two commanders and about ten Naval Engineers.

Q.28. Was German information good? What type?

A. Information on technical subjects and German internal conditions was good. There was no operational information of value.

Q.29. Any on Allied aircraft and equipment?

A. Some.

Q.30. How was all the above information used in planning future operations?

A. I suggest you ask MIYAZAKI (Intelligence and information officer in First Section). We carefully studied U.S. methods in the larger campaigns (e.g. Philippines operation) in an effort to predict future moves. Small lessons were gained from a study of our own tactics and an effort made to correct mistakes.

Q.31. How was Consular information specifically used?

A. Very little except figures on B-29 production, which, I believe were picked up from U.S. broadcasts. We found from study that U.S. figures as to future production announced over the radio were usually reliable.

Q.33. Who was the Navy's chief planning officer while you had your present job?

A. Captain OHMAE. I worked closely with him. (Same class at Academy.)

Q.33. Specifically, what did you do with Consular information?

A. Turned it directly to MIYAZAKI. He (MIYAZAKI) keeps files and works with Captain OHMAE who then uses it in planning. My liaison work occupied me most of the time.

Q.34. How did information from Japanese Consulates get back to TOKYO?

Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K., IJN, (contd)

A. Most of it came by dispatch. Some material came by air from Moscow. We had monthly courier service from Moscow.

Q.35. Did you have a courier service from Berlin?

A. No. We had no courier service to Berlin.

Q.36. What was the Consular organization at HONOLULU prior to attack?

A. The normal functions of a Consul, I think. I don't remember the Consul's name.

Q.37. When did you first learn of the plans for the PEARL HARBOR attack?

A. The 5th of December, I heard about it only that there would be a three pronged attack on PEARL HARBOR, MANILA, and SINGAPORE. Plans were very secret, only a few knew.

Q.38. What was your job at that time?

A. I had a liaison post in Navy Ministry.

Q.39. What information did the HONOLULU Consul send 24 hours prior to the attack?

A. the TATSUTA MARU was turned around. I heard talk from people aboard her, but know of nothing received direct from the Consul.

Q.40. To this day, you don't know what information was received from HONOLULU prior to the attack?

A. No.

Q.41. Who held Mr. SOME's position at that time?

A. I don't know.

Q.42. What is TOKUNU KIKAN?

A. It is completely an Army organization and has no connection with Navy or liaison, so far as I know, there is no corresponding Naval organization.

Q.43. Do you know the names of any of the Army Officers connected with it?

A. No, but General ARISUE would know.

Q.44. To what extent were Naval attaches interchanged during the war?

A. Two were traded off at Berlin; Russian Naval representatives were changed and possibly the Swiss attache.

Q.45. Will you please provide us with a T.O. of the diplomatic representatives (Naval) from 1937 through war period?

Q.46. What special training did Naval representatives have before going to Consulates?

A. They were required to read the back intelligence files before departing for a foreign post.

Q.47. What was the name of the Japanese organization working in Argentina as an information gathering agency for the Japanese Embassy?

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Interrogation of Captain SHIBA, K., IJN, (contd)

A. I don't know.

Q.48. Were there such organizations in Spain and Mexico?

A. I don't know.

Q.49. What arrangements were made to continue securing information from the U.S. after the outbreak of war?

A. I don't know. Spain supplied some poor information for which she was paid:

Example: one half of U.S. Fleet sunk in 2nd Battle of Philippines Sea. (In reply to the three last questions, the Captain offered to try to find additional information).