

GS247

CONTRADICTIONS

OF

LORD PALMERSTON

IN REFERENCE TO

POLAND AND CIRCASSIA,

ET CÆTERA.

“Russia can be reached only in her instruments.”

The Crisis, Paris, 1840.

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FALSEHOOD AS A METHOD OF GOVERNMENT.

REPORT OF ST. PANCRAS COMMITTEE, APRIL 17, 1863.

AN event took place towards the end of the recent Session of Parliament unprecedented in the history of this country. The First Minister of the Crown was deliberately charged by Mr. COBDEN with three falsehoods.

The three falsehoods had all been told in the House, and one was a wilful perversion, after his death, of a speech delivered by a rival. The purpose in the three cases was to involve the House in expenditure.

On the 30th of July, 1845, Lord PALMERSTON had announced that the invention of steam-ships had destroyed the maritime supremacy of England; Sir ROBERT PEEL had scouted the notion as a ridiculous absurdity. On the 23rd of July, 1860, Lord PALMERSTON attributed to Sir ROBERT PEEL this very statement—namely, that steam had bridged the Channel, and that as regards security from aggression, England had ceased to be an island.

On the 10th July, 1862, Mr. COBDEN, on the authority of quotations from *Hansard*, called on Lord PALMERSTON to admit that his assertion was a mistake, stating that, in order to be Parliamentary, he used the word "inexactness." Lord PALMERSTON refused to enter on the subject. Mr. COBDEN'S constituents and several other bodies have since addressed him on the subject, conveying their approbation of his conduct.

The effect of Mr. COBDEN'S accusation is, therefore, to raise the object of it above all Parliamentary control.

This alarming state of things would be at once reversed if the laws were enforced. The former practice of the expulsion from the House of Commons of those who stated what was not true,

would not only stop the scandal but prevent the malversation which these falsehoods are employed to disguise.

The first Memoir hereto appended is on Falsehood as dealt with by the forms of the House of Commons. The second is on the Falsehoods of Lord PALMERSTON, giving some idea of the extent to which Falsehood is carried on in the management of the Country.

Signed by order of the Committee, and on their behalf.

C. D. COLLET, Chairman.

C. F. JONES, Secretary.

I.

How to deal with Falsehood by the Forms of the House of Commons.

FOR some generations back it has been held as an axiom that Members of the Legislature were incapable of falsehood. Since the year 1847, however, accusations of this offence have not only circulated without the walls of Parliament, but have on several occasions made their way into the House of Commons. These accusations have always been directed against the same person—Lord PALMERSTON. Hitherto they have always been incidental to Motions respecting some foreign State. Such Motions have generally been got rid of by means of a “count-out” or the dropping of an order of the day, so that the issue has been evaded.

The recent charges laid against Lord PALMERSTON, by Mr. COBDEN, having been made under cover of the word “inexactness,” have neither presented to the House a dilemma to be evaded nor to individual members an opportunity to be seized.

The remedy is therefore to reverse the act of Mr. COBDEN, and to bring forward a Motion in the House, dealing with the act by its proper name, and inflicting the ancient Parliamentary punishment for that offence. An inspection of the Journals of the House shows that this punishment consists in expulsion.

In the cases selected, the motive to falsehood appears unimportant; namely, to obtain the privilege of Parliament for some person not entitled to it. The sole point at issue was whether the Member had spoken the truth or not. The first of these two cases is that of Colonel WANKLYN, who was summarily expelled. The second, that of Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN, who was suspended, and afterwards restored on submission, is still more instructive, because it shows the pains taken to examine into and to prevent prevarication, always more difficult to deal with than direct falsehood.

CASE OF COLONEL WANKLYN.

A.D. 1677, 30 CHARLES II. *Friday, February 1.*—A Motion being made against the frequent and irregular granting of Paper Protections by Members of this House; and

A Petition of ANGELA MARGARETTA COTTINGTON being read, complaining of Mr. WANKLYN, a Member of this House, for granting a Protection to CHARLES COTTINGTON, Esq., her husband, as his menial servant, whereby she was hindered in her prosecution at law against him;

And the House being also informed that the said Mr. WANKLYN had granted another Protection to one JONES, whereby to hinder the execution of a writ of restitution awarded by the Court of King's Bench;

And Mr. WANKLYN being present, and standing up in his place, and answering for himself, and to several questions which were propounded to him by Mr. SPEAKER;

And being withdrawn by Order, and the matter debated;

Resolved, &c., *nem. contradicente*, That Colonel WANKLYN in granting Protection to Mr. COTTINGTON and Mr. JONES, *not* being his menial servants, has violated the justice and honour of this House.

The Question being put, That Mr. WANKLYN, for granting such Protections, shall be expelled this House;

The House divide;

The Yeas go forth;

Tellers { Mr. SACHEVERELL } for the Yeas, 140.

Tellers { Mr. WILLIAMS }
{ Mr. PROGERS } for the Noes, 109.
{ Sir WM. WENTWORTH }

And so it was resolved in the Affirmative.

The Question being put, That Mr. WANKLYN shall receive his sentence at the Bar standing;

It was resolved in the Affirmative.

Mr. WANKLYN being brought to the Bar by the Serjeant-at-Arms attending the House, Mr. SPEAKER, in the name of the House, pronounced the said sentence.

Ordered, That Mr. SPEAKER do issue out his warrant to the Clerk of the Crown to make out a new writ for the election of a Member to serve in this present Parliament for the Borough of Westbury in the County of Wilts, in the room of THOMAS WANKLYN, Esq., who was this day expelled the House.*

CASE OF SIR JOHN PRETTIMAN.

A.D. 1669, 21 CHARLES II. *Wednesday, December 1.*—Upon complaint made of a Breach of Privilege committed by one ** in arresting of ROBERT HUMES, a menial servant of Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN, a Member of this House;

Ordered, That it be referred to Mr. SPEAKER to examine the matter complained of, and give such order therein as he shall find just.

Saturday, December 4.—Mr. SPEAKER reports the case of ROBERT HUMES, servant to Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN, arrested and in the prison of the King's Bench: that he was heretofore a merchant, but left off his trade about five years since, and that in August last he was entertained a servant to Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN at twelve pounds per annum wages: and was employed in recovering his rents; and was arrested in four several actions of the case, of a hundred pounds a piece.

* Journals of the House of Commons, vol. ix. pp. 430-31.

The Question being put, That privilege be allowed to ROBERT HUMES, menial servant to Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN ;

The House divided ;

The Yeas went out ;

Tellers { Sir JOHN COVERT } for the Yeas, 29.
 { Sir THOMAS GOWER }

Tellers { Sir FRANCIS GOODRICK } for the Noes, 19.
 { Sir NICO MORICE }

And so it was resolved in the Affirmative.

Ordered, That the Marshal of the King's Bench do discharge ROBERT HUMES, menial servant to Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN (being arrested in breach of privilege) out of prison.

Monday, March 21, 1670 (New Style).—Two Petitions being tendered against Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN, one from Dame THEODOSIA PRETTIMAN, and the other from ELIZABETH HUMES ;

Ordered that the Petitions be read to-morrow morning ; and that Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN have notice to attend then.

Wednesday, March 30.—A Petition of ELIZABETH HUMES, wife of ROBERT HUMES, was read ;

Resolved, &c., That the Petition be committed to [here follow twenty names], or any five of them ; and they are to meet to-morrow morning, at seven of the clock, in the Speaker's Chambers, and to examine the matter of the Petition, and report it, with their opinions therein, to the House ; and to send for persons, papers, and records.

Thursday, April 7.—Sir GILBERT TALBOT reports from the Committee to which the Petition of ELIZABETH HUMES was committed, the whole state of the matter and evidence therein : And that the Committee did leave it to the House, to do what they should think fit therein.

And the Question, upon the whole matter, being, whether the said HUMES ought to be allowed privilege as the menial servant of Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN ;

Resolved, &c., That the matter be recommitted to the former Committee, to examine whether Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN did know of the condition of the said HUMES, and what accusations were against HUMES, when he entertained him for his servant ; and whether he knew he was a prisoner for any criminal matter, or under bail for the good behaviour, when he did entertain him ; and whether he were so when the Motion was made for his privilege ; and whether he were arrested, or in prison, for a real debt, or whether the actions against him were not feigned : And Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN is to attend the Committee, and make it appear that he was arrested and detained prisoner for debt, after he was retained his servant : And the Committee is revived, and to sit this afternoon : And the Keeper of the prison of the King's Bench is to attend the Committee, to give an account of the arresting and detaining of the said HUMES in prison : And all that shall come to the Committee are to have voices : And [here follow eight names] are added to the Committee : And the care of the matter is recommended to Mr. CROUCH.

Friday, April 8.—Mr. CROUCH reports from the Committee to whom the Petition of Mrs. HUMES was committed, That they had, in pursuance of the order of recommitment, examined the whole matter of fact thereby directed, relating to Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN's protection, and moving the House for giving privilege to ROBERT HUMES, as his menial servant.

Upon stating whereof to the House, it appeared that *the House had been ill-dealt with by Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN in his concealing the truth of the case*, and that HUMES was released out of prison, from actions depending against him, by the miscarriage of Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN, as his menial servant, when in truth he was not.

Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN being withdrawn into the Speaker's Chambers ;
Resolved, &c., *nemine contradicente*, That Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN be suspended his sitting in this House, and from all privileges as a Member thereof, until he shall produce ROBERT HUMES.

Resolved, &c., That he be called to the Bar of this House, and receive from Mr. SPEAKER this sentence upon his knees.

The House being informed that the said Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN was not to be found in the Speaker's Chambers, ordered that the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House do bring the said Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN to the Bar of this House to-morrow morning, to receive his sentence as aforesaid.

Resolved, &c., That the back door of the Speaker's Chambers be nailed up, and not opened during any sessions of Parliament.

Saturday, April 9.—Ordered, that it be referred to Colonel BIRD, Sir THOMAS MEERES, Colonel REAMES, Mr. COLEMAN, Colonel TALBOT, to see a true entry made in the Journal, of the matters concerning Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN.

Resolved, &c., That no Member of this House do grant any protection to any but such only as are their menial servants. And that all protections already granted to any other persons besides menial servants be forthwith withdrawn and called in.

Resolved, &c., *That all protections and written certificates of the Members of this House be declared void in Law, and be forthwith withdrawn and called in, and that none be granted for the future ;* and that the privilege of Members for their menial servants be observed according to Law ; and that, if any menial servant shall be arrested and detained contrary to privilege, he shall, upon complaint thereof made, be discharged by order from the Speaker.

Same day, afternoon.—Resolved, &c., That a day be given to Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN to appear and receive the judgment of the House against him.

Resolved, &c. That the day be the second Tuesday at the next meeting after the Recess.

Monday, April 11, 1670.—(The King having made a speech to the Two Houses) Mr. SPEAKER reports the effects of His Majesty's Speech : And that it was His Majesty's pleasure the House should adjourn till the 24th of October next.

And accordingly the House adjourned till the 24th of October next.

Monday, October 31, 1670.—A Petition of Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN being tendered to the House ;

Ordered, That the Petition of Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN be read on Thursday morning, nine of the clock.

Friday, November 11.—The Petition of Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN, Knight, was read. The Petition of Elizabeth HUMES was also read.

Resolved, &c., That the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House do, according to former order, bring Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN to the Bar of this House on Monday next, to receive the judgment of the House against him.

Monday, November 14.—In pursuance of the former order of this House, Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN was, by the Serjeant-at-Arms, brought to the Bar of the House ; who there, upon his knees, received from Mr. SPEAKER the judgment and sentence of the House, for his being suspended sitting in this House, and of all privileges, as a Member thereof, until he shall produce ROBERT HUMES.

Resolved, &c., that Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN be heard at the Bar of this House on Monday next upon his Petition, and the Petition of Mrs. HUMES, both formerly read ; and that the Serjeant do give them notice hereof.

Wednesday, November 23.—The House then, according to former Order, did proceed to the hearing of the matter between Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN and

Mrs. HUMES. And the Petitions on both sides being again read; and the counsel for Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN, and the parties and witnesses on both sides, being heard; it being made appear, on the behalf of Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN, that he had, since the last recess, used his utmost endeavour to apprehend and bring in HUMES, the husband of Mrs. HUMES; and nothing of the suggestions of Mrs. HUMES, her Petition being made out; upon Debate of this matter;

Resolved, &c., That Sir JOHN PRETTIMAN be restored; and have his privilege, to attend the duty of his place, as a Member of this House.*

From the passage in italics it appears that detection was followed not only by the punishment of the offender, but by a provision to ensure the non-recurrence of similar acts. The restoration of the practice of punishing offences would now, as then, be accompanied by provisions to prevent them, or, rather, the provisions already made by the laws would cease to be ineffective the moment it was known that punishment would be the result of their infraction.

II.

The Falsehoods of Lord Palmerston.

FROM the diplomatic history of the last thirty-six years we propose to select such cases of falsehood as are most glaring, and such as may be dealt with without entering into the objects for which they were told.

The cases brought forward by Mr. COBDEN have, of course, to be narrated first, and a careful consideration will show that two of these were, beyond all others, appropriate ones for the House to deal with. The list then extends in the inverse order of time.

REGARDING THE MILITARY FORCES OF FRANCE.

(MR. COBDEN'S FIRST CHARGE.)

On Monday, July 7, Mr. COBDEN laid before the House a comparative statement of the forces of England and France, both naval and military, showing that never had the naval superiority of England been so great, or the military superiority of France so small, as at the present time. He complained of the habitual "inexactness" of Lord PALMERSTON as the cause of the panic, and consequently of the increase in the expenditure. He made special reference to his having added 200,000 men to the real numbers of the French army:—

"But the noble Lord has not confined his statements to the navy. He has also given us some facts and figures respecting the land forces of France; but in his statement there was an inexactness of a very grave kind, for he exceeded the amount of the French force by two hundred thousand men, which called

* Journals of the House of Commons, vol. ix. pp. 114—169.

down a correction from the *Moniteur*. I must complain of the habitual inexactness of the noble Lord as to these matters, and if the China debate should come on to-morrow I should have to recite another grave inaccuracy. On the 24th (23rd) of May the noble Lord, in speaking of the land forces of France, said: 'On the 1st of January, 1862, the French army consisted'—these are the corrected figures which the noble Lord afterwards gave—'of 446,348 men under arms. There was a reserve of 170,000 men, liable to be called out at a fortnight or three weeks' notice, making altogether 616,348,' not 816,000 as the noble Lord really said.

"Lord PALMERSTON.—No. I never said anything of the kind.

"Mr. COBDEN.—I beg the noble Lord's pardon, this was *not a mistake of a figure*. There was addition and subtraction, and the statement was the same all through. The noble Lord proceeded:—'In addition to this force actually under arms, or liable to be called out for service, I stated that there were 268,417 National Guards, making a total available force of 884,765.'—*Times*, July 8.

Lord PALMERSTON replied:—

"The hon. Member accuses me of great exaggeration. Now, I utterly deny that I have been guilty of any exaggeration. Now, with regard to the French army, I stated on a recent occasion that the French army on the 1st January, consisted of 446,000 men under arms, and 170,000 men of the reserve, making a total of 616,000 men. I was reported to have made that total 816,000. It is very seldom that those gentlemen who report our debates in this House commit an error, and an error in one figure is not unnatural."—*Times*, July 8.

This was on the 7th July. Lord PALMERSTON speaks of a recent occasion, but there had been two occasions. The first was on the 19th May, the second was on the 23rd, and purported to be a correction not of the former speech but of the erroneous report of it. On the 19th May Lord PALMERSTON said:—

"On the 1st of January last, France had 646,000 men, I think, at all events upwards of 640,000 men under arms. She had, in addition, 170,000 men of reserve, liable to be called back to the ranks at a fortnight's notice. Besides that she has upwards of 200,000 National Guards. Therefore, her *regular* forces under arms, or liable to be called to the ranks at a fortnight's notice, are about 816,000 to our 100,000. The French Government had since determined that towards the end of the year 31,000 of the 646,000 should be transferred from the active army to the reserve, making no difference in the amount available, but diminishing the expense without diminishing the eventual efficiency. I should say, besides the 646,000, there were 70,000 of the conscription of the present year, which might be called out at any moment if necessary."—*Times*, May 20.

On May 23rd, Lord PALMERSTON said:—

"The hon. Gentleman (Sir R. CLIFTON) read a report of something which I had said here on a former occasion, in which, notwithstanding its general accuracy, there was a mistake of a figure. On the 1st of January, the French army consisted of 446,348 men under arms. There was, besides, a reserve of 170,000 men, liable to be called out at a fortnight or three weeks' notice, making altogether 616,348 men under arms or liable to be called out for service; there were 268,417 National Guards, making a total available force of 884,765. And I stated that besides these there were 70,000 men of the conscription for the present year, liable to be called out if their services should be required. I also stated that of the 446,000 it was intended at the time to transfer *between* 30,000 and 40,000 from the number under arms to the reserve, making no dif-

ference in the really available force, though the change is attended with a certain amount of economy."—*Times*, May 24.

It is thus evident that the reporters had made no mistake. Lord PALMERSTON says only one figure was wrong, meaning it to be believed that an 8 was substituted by the reporters for a 6. After making a variety of minor corrections of a statement in which he professed that only one figure was wrong, he says, "Making a TOTAL AVAILABLE FORCE OF 884,765." What he had said before was, "*Therefore her regular forces under arms or liable to be called to the ranks at a fortnight's notice, are about 816,000, against our 100,000.*" The reporters, therefore, according to him, substituted, not a 6 for an 8, but the words in italics for those in small capitals.

The occasion of this correction has to be taken into consideration. It was made on the night of Friday, the 23rd May. The next morning the following denial appeared at Paris, in the *Moniteur* :—

"In the sitting of the House of Commons of the 19th instant, Lord PALMERSTON estimated the strength of the French army on the 1st of January, 1862, at 816,000 men, of whom 646,000 were under arms, and 170,000 under reserve. This estimate contains an error sufficiently serious to require a rectification. On the 1st of January, 1862, the effective strength of the army was not 646,000, but 447,000 men—a difference of 199,000 men. The reserve counted, at the same date, not 170,000 men, but 165,000—a difference of 5000. The total error is, therefore, 204,000 men, or one quarter of the estimate made in the House of Commons. Since the 1st of January the number of men of the active army who have been allowed to go into the reserve is not 31,000, but exceeds 38,000. This brings the reserve to 203,000 men, and reduces the effective strength of the active army to 409,000 men. Total, 612,000."

If Lord PALMERSTON had been misreported, it was his duty to have corrected the error the next day. It was also open to him to inform the French Government what he had really said. But the *Moniteur* corrects not the reporters, but Lord PALMERSTON. Before taking so serious a step, the French Government must have demanded an explanation, and have failed to obtain it. The *Moniteur* addresses itself to England, for in France it is no crime to have a quarter of a million extra soldiers in arms. Lord PALMERSTON corrects the reporters just in time to nullify the effect in England of the protest in the *Moniteur*. That protest is then a cry of distress. Lord PALMERSTON tyrannises over the French Emperor in this matter, just as M. THOUVENEL domineers over Lord RUSSELL in the affairs of Mexico. This is the one Cabinet, of which "some members live on the banks of the Seine, and others on the banks of the Thames."*

The case, however, is not complete without Lord PALMERSTON'S description of the notice in the *Moniteur*. On the 7th July he said :—

* Lord Palmerston in 1856.

"But my statement was 616,000, and not 816,000. The French *Moniteur* corrected my statement, and what was that correction? It charged me with having made a *little error* both in the force under arms and in reserve, and the aggregate was stated by the *Moniteur* to be 612,000 instead of 616,000. That was the correction of the *Moniteur*, which completely and substantially affirmed the statement that I had made."—*Times*, July 8.

Lord PALMERSTON pretends that the *Moniteur* accuses him of an error of only 4000 men; but the *Moniteur* expressly says: "The total error is 204,000 men." Mr. COBDEN terms this "inexactness." The issue between them was the simplest in the world. Lord PALMERSTON said it was a mistake of a single figure. Mr. COBDEN said it was not a mistake of a single figure. Lord PALMERSTON'S words prove Mr. COBDEN'S case. On this Mr. COBDEN drops the matter.

REGARDING THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF TIEN-TSIN.

(MR. COBDEN'S SECOND CHARGE.)

The next day occurred the China debate, and, according to his promise, Mr. COBDEN brought up another case of "inexactness." He proved that Lord PALMERSTON had first declared that the Emperor of CHINA had ratified the Treaty of Tien-Tsin, and had afterwards declared that the war of 1859 was made to obtain the ratification of that Treaty. Here are the two statements:—

LORD PALMERSTON, MARCH 16, 1860.

"A Treaty has been concluded with China. That Treaty has been approved by the Emperor. We want the ratifications to be exchanged; we want the Treaty to become a formal and acknowledged compact between the two countries."—*Hansard*, vol. 157, p. 807.

LORD PALMERSTON, FEBRUARY 14, 1861.

"It is well known that the *operations* in China arose from the refusal of the Chinese Government to ratify the Treaty of Tien-Tsin, which has been concluded between the two countries. It became necessary to obtain the ratification of that Treaty.—*Hansard*, vol. 161, p. 401.

Lord PALMERSTON said in March, 1860, "That Treaty has been approved by the Emperor." That is, it had been ratified by him at Peking, as it had been by Queen VICTORIA in London. On reference to the Blue-books it will be found that in China this had been publicly done. An edict had appeared respecting the Treaty, and it had actually been put in operation before the arrival of Mr. BRUCE. His visit was to *exchange the ratifications*, which the Treaty had specially provided must be done at Peking, although that exchange could have taken place just as well at London, or at any Chinese port. When Lord PALMERSTON contradicts Mr. COBDEN on this point, on the 8th July, he makes his former assertion still plainer. For he says, "It (the last expedition) was

not undertaken solely because Mr. BRUCE was not allowed to go to Peking (another falsehood); but because the Emperor refused to ratify certain articles of that Treaty, *which he said must be changed before they could be carried out.*"

On the 10th July, when Mr. COBDEN answered what Lord PALMERSTON had said on the 8th, he (Mr. COBDEN) repeated, "I stated that the Treaty had been ratified, and that all that had to be done was to exchange the ratifications."

The truth, as appears in the documents published by the English Government itself, is that not only had the Emperor of CHINA publicly assented to the Treaty, not only were the English actually trading at some of the new ports opened to them by it before Mr. BRUCE'S arrival and the attack on the Peiho forts, but that no objection was ever offered to the formal act of exchanging the ratifications of the two Sovereigns, whether at Peking or elsewhere. Lord PALMERSTON is so sensible of the falsehood he is stating that he carefully mixes up "*ratification*" and "*exchange of ratifications*," and by doing so asserts that what Mr. COBDEN read confirmed his statement. This was on the 10th, as we shall presently see.

No war having been declared, the Treaty of Tien-Tsin was unlawfully obtained, and is not binding upon China. Whether it was obtained by one or by two lawless expeditions is of no importance here. What is of importance is, that, in this as in other matters, Lord PALMERSTON'S statements are diametrically opposed to each other.

REGARDING STEAM HAVING DESTROYED ENGLAND'S NAVAL SUPREMACY.

(MR. COBDEN'S THIRD CHARGE.)

On the 10th of July, Mr. COBDEN brought a third accusation of "inexactness" against Lord PALMERSTON. He had quoted Sir ROBERT PEEL as concurring with him instead of being opposed to him on the subject of steam, the cause of the destruction of England's naval supremacy. Mr. COBDEN said:—

"At an early period of my experience in this House a circumstance happened to which I must refer, because it affords another example—a flagrant example of the *inexactness* and carelessness of the noble Lord in the statements which he makes to us. It occurred in 1845. On that occasion the noble Lord had already mounted this hobby of his, that steam was the great danger of this country. He was fond of saying that the application of steam to navigation had spanned the Channel with a steam bridge. That simile occurs a dozen times in his speeches from 1842 downwards. Let nobody undervalue the force of these repetitions of a phrase, because by dint of them we come at last to believe them ourselves, and we make others believe them also. In 1845 the noble Lord, in a harangue intended to induce Sir R. PEEL

to increase our armaments in some direction, launched this favourite idea of his. Sir R. PEEL controverted it. That led to the noble Lord rising again to explain himself. I will read these passages. On the 30th of July, 1845, Lord PALMERSTON said:—

“In reference to steam navigation, what he (Lord PALMERSTON) said was, that the progress which had been made had converted the ordinary means of transport into a steam bridge.”

“Sir R. PEEL, immediately following in reply, said:—

“The noble Lord (Lord PALMERSTON) appeared to retain the impression that our means of defence were rather abated by the discovery of steam navigation. He (Sir ROBERT PEEL) was not at all prepared to admit that. He thought that the demonstration which we could make of our steam navy was one which would surprise the world; and as the noble Lord (Lord PALMERSTON) had spoken of steam bridges, he would remind him that there were two parties who could play at making them.”

Now comes this flagrant specimen of the noble Lord's *inexactness*. I purposely use that long and rather French word because I wish to be Parliamentary in what I say. (Laughter.) The noble Lord, in speaking of this very Fortifications Bill when he brought it in on the 23rd of July, 1860, said, still reiterating the same argument:—

“And, in fact, as I remember Sir R. PEEL stating, steam had bridged the Channel, and for the purposes of aggression had almost made this country cease to be an island.”

“Now, I happened to hear all that myself, but I am afraid to say so, because I may be contradicted. (“Hear,” and laughter.) But now I will make a suggestion to the noble Lord. Will he send one of his junior Lords of the Treasury to the library to get *Hansard*? I give him the volumes:—*Hansard*, vol. 82, p. 1233, and vol. 160, p. 18. The noble Lord will probably speak again, as we are in committee, and it would be a grateful thing if he would get *Hansard* to satisfy himself of that gross inaccuracy. Moreover, it would only be just to the memory of a great Statesman, and it is also due to this House that he should admit his error and recant it. There would be a novelty about such a proceeding that would be quite charming. (Laughter.) Let him admit that he is wrong. I will forgive him the China business if he will only get *Hansard*, and admit that he was wrong, that it was a fiction—quite a mistake of memory. (“Hear, hear,” and laughter.) But the serious question is what kind of opinion shall we form of the noble Lord's judgment.”—*Times*, July 11, 1862.

Observe, Mr. COBDEN says the serious question is Lord PALMERSTON's judgment, not his integrity, which he had just proved not to exist. Lord PALMERSTON evades the charge:—

“It is very curious that my hon. Friend accuses me of inexactitude, and refers me to *Hansard* to prove my error. I do not feel much disposed to follow his example, because he and I differed the other evening on a matter of historical fact. He contended that the Emperor of CHINA had ratified the Treaty of Tien-Tsin. I said he had not. After two or three days' delay, my hon. Friend brought down a *Blue-book* to confirm his assertion, and proceeded to read a passage which completely substantiates my statement. [Mr. COBDEN intimated dissent.] Let my hon. Friend read it again if he pleases. I did not the other night read the whole of the case; but the fact was just as he read it, and as I stated it. The Emperor of CHINA wrote one of his mandarins to say that he approved of the Treaty; but when he was called upon to ratify it, and exchange ratifications, which process alone could give it international value, he refused, and that which my hon. Friend read confirmed the statement I made.” (Cheers.)—*Times*, July 11, 1862.

Mr. COBDEN had quoted not a Blue-book but *Hansard*. One of his quotations has already been extracted under the head "Lord PALMERSTON, March 16, 1860." The other was from Lord JOHN RUSSELL, February 13, 1860:—

"The Treaty of Tien-Tsin had been signed, and had received the special approval of the Emperor of CHINA. Nothing but the ratification remained to be given, and it would have been impossible for us—because Her Majesty's forces had suffered a loss, because 400 or 500 men had been killed or wounded—to give up a Treaty solemnly agreed to, or to retreat from conditions to which the Emperor of CHINA had given his assent."—*Hansard*, vol. 156, p. 945.

Since this Memoir was published in its original form, Lord PALMERSTON has gone round again. In the Debate of July 9, on Fortifications, he used these words:—

"The hon. Member for Rochdale has referred to something which passed between myself and the late Sir ROBERT PEEL. When I said that steam had bridged the channel, Sir ROBERT replied, in a way suitable to a debate in this House, "Ay, it may have bridged the Channel, but that is a game at which two can play."—*Times*, July 10, 1863.

The Prime Minister is charged by Mr. COBDEN with three falsehoods. Two are proved; the proof being accompanied by fresh falsehoods: the third is admitted. This was a case to be submitted to the judgment of the House. Mr. COBDEN had no option but a duty which he was bound to perform.

In 1670 the House of Commons suspended Sir JOHN PRETTI-MAN, for having only "dealt badly with the House by concealing the truth" about a man for whom he had obtained privilege, by falsely representing him to be his menial servant. The offence was the falsehood. It is no mitigation of Lord PALMERSTON'S offence that it is in weighty, not in trifling matters, that he has "dealt badly with the House by concealing the truth." But this, which is no mitigation of the offence, is an aggravation of the danger. In 1670 the House resented an act of deception. In 1862 it courts such acts, in order to pretend that it is deceived. No such deception exists any longer.

GENERAL PRACTICE OF FALSEHOOD

(CHARGES BROUGHT BY THE QUEEN AND SUBSTANTIATED BY EARL RUSSELL.)

The falsehoods with regard to the French army were told with the view to excite alarm in England, so as to increase the military expenditure as against the aggressive power of France. At the same time the Cabinets of England and France are declared to be so united as to form but one.*

* A little while ago, Louis Napoleon was asked by an ecclesiastic, "Why

Lord Palmerston has, during his whole career, been engaged in increasing the military force of France, and in directing that force to illegal objects.

In 1835 the English navy having been increased, at the instance of William IV., as a precaution against Russia, Lord Palmerston suggested to France to increase hers. When France complied with this advice, he immediately made it a pretence for increased armaments on the part of England as against France. He has since made France a partner in all his schemes of intervention.

So long ago as 1837 the *Times* made the charge which we have here pressed home, namely, that Lord Palmerston makes use of falsehood, not to escape from an attack, but as a method of Government. The *Times* wrote, December 29, 1837:—

“England has been in the habit of receiving as truth the assertions of a Minister. We are now brought into the lamentable predicament of having to guard against deception, and to be armed against design in every phrase which escapes from the lips of the man who at present directs the Foreign Policy of Great Britain. . . . What must be said of the Minister of England who now, after the display of the force which we have described (the Russian fleet in the Baltic), instead of taking steps to counteract her, (Russia) instead of remonstrating, protesting, and preventing, stands forward to justify the measure, and then to repudiate the responsibility, and, not content with this, perverts facts, and falsifies truth?”

Lord Palmerston has now associated France with England in the distant regions of China, and, pursuing the same course as in 1837, has brought her forces into the neighbourhood of disturbed India, all the while arming in England against her. In 1848, on the election of Louis Napoleon to the Presidency of the French Republic, he wrote to Vienna that it was to be inferred from such a choice that France would enter on a course of aggression. To Lord Ponsonby, November 11, 1848:—

“Important changes may take place in France; the election, which is coming on next month, may bring other men into power in that country; with other men another policy may come in. Traditional maxims of policy connected with a busier action in regard to foreign countries may be taken up as the guide of the Government of France. Popular feeling in that country, which at present inclines to peace, might easily be turned in an opposite direction, and the glory, as it would be considered in France, of *freeing the whole of Italy up to the Alps** from the domination of Austria might reconcile the French nation to many sacrifices and to great exertions.”†

do you not give out openly that you will defend the Pope against Garibaldi?” He replied, “If I were to do so, Palmerston would have me upset in a week.” The Committee insert this statement on the written testimony of a gentleman of high standing and character.

* “Italy shall be free from the Alps to the Adriatic.”—*Words of Louis Napoleon in 1859.*

† Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy, 1849, part iii. pp. 566, 567.

Such purposes of aggression were, however, not compatible with the then constituted order of things. Lord Palmerston, however, joined in the measures taken to render Louis Napoleon absolute, and thus overthrow all restraint upon that career whose aggressive tendencies he had prophesied.

Throughout Europe it had been Lord Palmerston's boast to have established "Constitutional Government." To this he had sacrificed the prerogatives of every Crown, the usages of every people, the ancient village government of Greece, the *fueros* of the Basques, the old estates of Spain and Portugal. On the enactment of the *coup d'état* of the 2nd of December, 1851, he hastened to sanction a massacre of unarmed and inoffensive citizens, the arrest of the members of the Assembly, and the restoration, by violence and perjury, of a form of government that had destroyed the liberty of the French people, and indemnified them for the loss by setting Europe in flames. When asked to give reasons, he replied, that the unity of purpose and of authority in the President was his object. He said in Parliament, February 3, 1852:—

"Such was the antagonism arising from time to time between the French Assembly and the President that their long co-existence became impossible, and it was my opinion that if one or the other were to prevail it would be better for France, and, through the interests of France, better for the interests of Europe, that the President should prevail than the Assembly, and my reason was, that the Assembly had nothing to offer for the substitution of the President, unless an alternative obviously ending in civil war or anarchy, whereas the President, on the other hand, had to offer unity of purpose and unity of authority, and *if he were inclined to do so*, might give to France internal tranquillity, with good and permanent government."

The "unity of purpose" of Louis Napoleon had already been shown in his invasion and occupation of a portion of Italy (Rome). It could not be the interest of England to confer "unity of authority" upon such an individual by means of a usurpation.*

The words of Lord Palmerston are unintelligible as those of a British Minister; they are merely the repetition of a passage on the same subject contained in a Russian despatch a quarter of a century before. Count Pozzo di Borgo wrote from Paris, 22nd December, 1826:—

"The ancient fortresses are repaired with a dilatoriness that keeps them still in a state of imperfection, and, consequently, of weakness, particularly as regards the completion of those raised on the opposite frontier; the great roads are falling into decay; the army itself and the marine are in a state that calls for additions and ameliorations; without which it would be impossible to make them act with the unity and the power indispensable to

* "Brunnow is said to have mentioned triumphantly the events of the second and third of December in Paris on the *first* of that month, in his passage through Berlin. He was sure of the success of the plot before it took place."—*Private Letter*, 1852.

their action and their movements. . . . A serious war and the sacrifices it would impose, would give rise, I fear, to all the effects of panic among the capitalists, indifference among a great portion of the nation, and revolutionary sentiments among many others. . . . In proportion as the situation is delicate, it will require increased care and interest to guard it from the evils which menace it. Russia has re-established the French monarchy by her arms, she has continued to protect it by her generosity, she will preserve it, I dare hope, from the embarrassments and even misfortunes which seem to menace it, by her influence and her policy."

This letter was written soon after the invasion of Spain, into which, in spite of Mr. Canning, Russia was able to inveigle France. Within four years afterwards, France had entered on the conquest of Algiers. It is impossible, except on the supposition that the military power of France is at the disposal of Russia, to account for the anxiety which a Russian Ambassador feels that France should be strong. It is impossible, except on the supposition that the British Minister has adhered to this scheme, to account for his efforts to increase that aggressive power of France which he predicted beforehand, and which he persists in holding up to the English people as an object at once for alarm and imitation.

Accordingly, it is on this very point that detection has overtaken Lord Palmerston. On his giving his sanction—in defiance of the Queen and of his colleagues—to the *coup d'état* of the 2nd December, he was removed from office by the Queen. On the opening of Parliament, Lord John Russell announced that this was not the first time he had been detected. He produced a memorandum addressed to himself by the Queen on a former occasion, in which was consigned a description of the frauds and usurpations Lord Palmerston had been in the habit of practising, and a requirement that such practice should cease. Lord Palmerston did not reject the imputation; on the contrary, he accepted the terms on which his continuance in office then and for the future was to depend. He wrote to Lord John Russell:—

"I have taken a copy of this memorandum of the Queen, and will not fail to attend to the *directions* it contains."

Lord John Russell did not produce to Parliament the whole of the Queen's letter, and at a later date, when requested, he refused to give the remaining portion. We are left in ignorance as to the specific occasions in which Lord Palmerston "failed in sincerity." We may, therefore, infer that specific instances were given only as an illustration of a general practice; this is borne out both by the reply of Lord Palmerston and by the terms of the Queen's letter. The latter are as follows:—

"The Queen requires, first, that Lord Palmerston will distinctly state what he proposes to do in a given case, in order that the Queen may know as distinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction.

Secondly, having once given Her sanction to a measure, that it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister. Such an act she must consider as failing in sincerity towards the Crown, and justly to be visited by the exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing that Minister. She expects to be kept informed of what passes between him and the foreign Ministers before important decisions are taken, based upon intercourse; to receive the foreign despatches in good time; and to have the drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself acquainted with their contents before they must be sent off. The Queen thinks it best that Lord John Russell should show this letter to Lord Palmerston."

On the 3rd of February, 1852, Lord JOHN RUSSELL testified to the truth of the charges contained in the QUEEN'S letter, and made the application of them, using the following words:—

"THE NOBLE LORD PASSED BY THE CROWN, AND PUT HIMSELF IN THE PLACE OF THE CROWN."

REGARDING THE ABANDONMENT OF OUR MARI-TIME RIGHTS.

(SELF-CONTRADICTION.)

Mr. COBDEN denounces as ridiculous Lord PALMERSTON'S pretence that steam has injured, or can injure the naval supremacy of England, but Mr. COBDEN has prepared and is still preparing the way for Lord PALMERSTON to destroy the real source of that supremacy—the Right of Search. The subject has been so frequently treated that it is necessary only to recite Lord PALMERSTON'S three speeches on this head:—

LORD PALMERSTON, NOVEMBER 7, 1856.

"I cannot help hoping that these relaxations of former doctrines, which were established in the beginning of the war, practised during its continuance, and which have since been ratified by formal engagements, may perhaps be still further extended, and that, in the course of time, those principles of war which are applied to hostilities by land may be extended without exception to hostilities by sea, so that private property shall no longer be the object of aggression on either side."—*Times*, November 8, 1856.

LORD PALMERSTON, FEBRUARY 3, 1860.

"A naval Power like England ought not to surrender any means of weakening her enemies at sea. If we did not seize their seamen on board their merchant vessels, we should have to fight them on board their ships of war. I deny that private property is spared in war on land any more than in war at sea. On the contrary, armies in an enemy's country take whatever they want or desire, without the slightest regard to the right of property, as we shall find to our cost if a hostile army should ever succeed in landing in this country."—*Morning Star*, Feb. 6, 1860.

LORD PALMERSTON, MARCH 17, 1862.

"The passage quoted as having been part of what I said at Liverpool, related to two matters. First of all to the exemption of private property at sea from capture; and, secondly, to the assimilation of the principles of war at sea to

the practice of war on land. I am perfectly ready to admit that I have entirely altered my opinion on the first point. Further reflection and deeper thinking has satisfied me that what at first sight is plausible—and I admit that it is plausible on the surface—is a most dangerous doctrine, and I hope that the honourable Member (Mr. BRIGHT) will be kind enough to give weight to my thoughts, and also come round to those second thoughts which are proverbially the best." "My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham has very ably and very fully shown that it was a wise and politic measure on the part of the Government to adopt the principle that a neutral flag should cover enemy's goods. There is a principle upon which, as it appears to me, this doctrine must stand. We have lately maintained, at the risk of war, that a *merchant ship at sea is a part of our territory*, that that territory cannot be violated with impunity, that, therefore, individuals cannot be taken out of a merchantman belonging to a neutral country. The same principle may be said to apply to goods as well as men."—*Times*, March 18, 1862.

The transmutation, by a "principle," of a ship, whose function is to move from place to place, and, therefore, to convey help to the enemy, into a territory whose peculiarity is that it remains fixed, and, therefore, cannot convey goods to the enemy, is a climax of absurdity. It covers contraband of war, despatches, everything. It transmutes the neutral into an enemy so much the more dangerous as he is himself exempted from all danger. It is, of course, a flagrant contradiction to the declaration of the 3rd of February, 1860, that "A naval Power like England ought not to surrender any means of weakening her enemies at sea."

REGARDING THE SUEZ CANAL.

(SELF-CONTRADICTION.)

Up to 1857, there was no documentary evidence to show what had been Lord PALMERSTON'S conduct in this matter. Mr. URQUHART, in the "Progress of Russia," published in 1853, had declared that Russia, through Lord PALMERSTON, had actively intrigued against it for twenty-five years. In 1857 this statement was confirmed by Lord PALMERSTON'S admission. In 1858, it received the further confirmation of his denial:—

LORD PALMERSTON, JULY 7, 1857.

"For the last fifteen years her Majesty's Government have used all the influence they possess at *Constantinople* AND *in Egypt* to prevent that scheme from being carried into execution."—*Hansard*, vol. 146, p. 1044.

LORD PALMERSTON, JUNE 1, 1858.

"We are told now that for fifteen years we have been exercising a moral constraint upon the Sultan of Turkey to prevent him giving his sanction to this scheme. Now, I can assure those who hold that opinion that they are entirely mistaken."—*Hansard*, vol. 150, p. 1381.

REGARDING THE DANISH SUCCESSION.

(CHARGE BY LORD ROBERT MONTAGU.)

The succession to the Crown of Denmark is of course a matter in which England has no more right to interfere than in the election of the Governor of New York, or the form of Government in France. This subject has, however, occupied the English Government for at least twelve years. The correspondence had filled, according to Lord PALMERSTON, in 1851, two thousand pages of letterpress, and has given rise to repeated contradictions on his part. The first statement was brought out by a question from Mr. DISRAELI:—

LORD PALMERSTON, FEBRUARY 4, 1850.

“There are grave questions to be determined. There is one relating to the succession to the Danish Crown; another, what should be the Constitution of the Duchy of Schleswig in relation to the other part of what we call the Danish Monarchy. . . . We must not expect that matters of that kind can be arranged so quickly as we could wish; and more especially considering that Her Majesty’s Government is only acting as mediator, and that *we have no power to exercise authority* in regard to these questions.”—*Hansard*, vol. 108, p. 283.

The second was a reply to Mr. URQUHART, who “begged to ask further, whether in this correspondence there had been any negotiation as to the succession to the Crown of Denmark, or in respect to the succession in the Duchies” :—

LORD PALMERSTON, MARCH 20, 1851.

“A good deal had passed in regard to these points, that was to say, in regard to the succession to the Crown of Denmark; and, as connected with that, in regard to the arrangements for the order of succession in Schleswig and Holstein. But Her Majesty’s Government had studiously and systematically held themselves aloof from taking any share in these negotiations. Her Majesty’s Government have *confined themselves strictly to the mediation* which they undertook, which was a mediation for the purpose of bringing about a restoration of peace between Denmark and the German Confederation.”—*Hansard*, vol. 115, p. 221.

In 1850, the Mediation included in its scope the settling of the Danish Succession; in 1851, it had always been confined to the restoration of peace between Denmark and Germany. Two years afterwards, Mr. BLACKETT asked a question which brought forth a third statement. This statement contradicted both the previous ones. According to the first statement, it was only as Mediator that England had anything to do with the Danish Succession; according to the third, it was her “business” to alter that Succession.

LORD PALMERSTON, AUGUST 12, 1853.

“As things stood, the succession to Denmark Proper went in the female line, the succession of Holstein went in the male line, the succession of Schleswig was disputed between two parties (!); and, therefore, on the death

of the King and his Uncle, who was the next heir, Denmark would have gone to the female heir, Holstein to the male, and Schleswig been divided between them. (!) *It was the business of the British Government to prevent such a state of things*, and it was thought an important object to keep together those three States which in common parlance were called the Danish Provinces. He was anxious to get renunciations also from that male branch which had claims on Holstein, and to combine the whole in some party who might equally claim all portions. That was accomplished by the Treaty."—*Hansard*, vol. 129, p. 1680.

On the 5th June, 1851, was signed the Protocol of Warsaw, which established the "principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy." On the 8th May, 1852, this was consigned to a European Treaty. This was *primâ facie* evidence that Lord PALMERSTON'S statement of March, 1851, was false. The documentary proof was not, however, made public till, on the 18th June, 1861, Lord ROBERT MONTAGU produced in the House the Draft of the original document:—

PROTOCOL OF LONDON, AUGUST 2, 1860.

"ART. I.—The unanimous desire of the said Powers is that the state of the possessions actually united under the Crown of Denmark shall be maintained in its integrity."—*Hansard*, vol. 163, p. 1266.

"Thus," to use the words of Lord R. MONTAGU, "the Protocol and the Treaty were conceived in subjection and were executed in duplicity."

This was a charge of falsehood, but it was made as a *primâ facie* case. Lord ROBERT MONTAGU challenged Lord PALMERSTON to rebut the evidence brought against him. Lord PALMERSTON could not disprove, but he did not then dare to avow his falsehood. He answered by a "Count Out."

REGARDING THE FALSIFICATION OF THE AFFGHAN DESPATCHES.

(CHARGE BY MR. DUNLOP.)

The Danish Treaty places the eventual succession of Denmark in the Emperor of RUSSIA, by cutting out nineteen of the intervening heirs. The Affghan Forgeries, first denied by Lord PALMERSTON, are now justified by him on the ground that they were necessary to save the honour of Russia, and to induce her to act in accordance with the interests of England:—

LORD PALMERSTON, MARCH 1, 1848.

"If any man will give himself the trouble of referring to those Debates, as recorded in *Hansard*, respecting the despatches of Sir ALEXANDER BURNES, he will see that it is not true to assert that the papers produced to the House *did not contain a faithful report of the opinions which that Gentleman gave to the Governor-General and the Board of Control*. I do not mean to say that Sir A. BURNES did not himself subsequently alter those opinions, but the passages omitted contained opinions on subjects irrelevant to the question at issue."—*Hansard*, vol. 97, p. 102.

LORD PALMERSTON, MARCH 19, 1861.

"The policy and conduct of the Government were regulated, not by the opinions of their subordinate agent at Caubul, but by the general knowledge which they possessed of the state of affairs in the East, of the aggressive views then entertained by Russia, and of the means by which that State was preparing to carry hostilities to the very frontiers of our Indian possessions. If that be so, the question is not the degree in which Parliament has been misled, or in which Lieutenant BURNES has been injured, by the omission of portions of his despatches in which his personal opinions, evidently arising from confusion of ideas, misconception and overcredulity were stated, at variance with the views justly entertained by the Government under which he was acting. . . ."

"The opinions of Lieutenant BURNES, which are omitted from the despatches form no elements in the policy which was adopted."—*Hansard*, vol. 162, p. 63.

Lord PALMERSTON on this occasion did not hesitate to charge with falsehood a faithful ally of the British Government, DOST MAHOMMED, on the ground not that he had evidence to prove it, but that to tell falsehoods was a very natural thing.

"I am sure nothing can be more easily conceived than that the draught which was submitted to Lieutenant BURNES was one thing, and the letter which was sent off was of a totally different character."—p. 60.

In 1848, Lord PALMERSTON met the charge by asserting that the Papers did contain a faithful report of the opinions of Sir A. BURNES. In 1861, defending himself against the same charge, he says his opinions were omitted because they were not acted upon. When the denial was made, the unutilized Papers had not been published. At that time he could say that Lord FITZGERALD, the President of the Board of Control, "having access to these documents, felt himself bound to state that he could not find any trace on the part of the then Government of concealing or misrepresenting the facts." He could boldly challenge exposure, and say, "Sir, if any such thing had been done, what was to prevent the two adverse Governments who succeeded us in power from proclaiming the fact, and producing the real documents?"

When the real documents are produced, and the omitted words are marked by brackets so as to render all further concealment impossible, he covers the confession by making it in the form of a justification. The omissions and alterations respecting Russia are acknowledged in the same manner. This point is worthy of particular attention, because it is the habitual practice and special art of Lord PALMERSTON.*

* Mr. Dunlop thus addressed his constituents at Greenock on the 21st of October, 1861:—

"The idea of my motion being considered an attack on the present Government never entered my imagination; and the notion that Lord Palmerston would have resigned, had it been carried, must rest entirely on the assumption

"I say it was perfectly right, in the letter which has been referred to, to substitute the words, 'the Russian Government' for the words 'the EMPEROR,' and to omit the words which would have identified the EMPEROR in person with the communication made to DOST MAHOMMED. . . . Nothing could have been more unwise than to pin them (the Russian Government) down to that which you wished them to disavow, and to make it impossible, consistently with their *honour*, to undo that which your remonstrances were especially intended to induce them to retract."—pp. 60-1.

It would have been unworthy of Lord PALMERSTON to have admitted a forgery without justifying it by a falsehood. The Russian Government had already disavowed its agents. The disavowal had been forwarded to Calcutta, and it was after this that VICOVITCH was sent to Caubul with the autograph letter of the Emperor of RUSSIA. Sir ALEXANDER BURNES wrote, December 20, 1837:—

"I shall take an early opportunity of reporting on the proceedings of this Russian agent, if he be so in reality; for, if not an impostor, it is a most uncalled for proceeding, after the disavowal of the Russian Government conveyed through Count NESSELRODE, alluded to in Mr. McNEILL's letter on the 1st of June last."

This passage is one of those suppressed in the papers of 1839.*

REGARDING CIRCASSIA.

(MISQUOTATION OF TREATIES—SELF CONTRADICTION.)

This portion of the world, so long thought of only as the region of fabulous romance, then brought into the light of day to be forgotten for a quarter of a century, is now seen to contain the key to the destinies of the world. Yet in 1837 and 1838, when England was sending an army across the Indus to oppose Russian influence, nobody would take the trouble to see that the real bulwark of India was to be preserved by supporting Circassia, not by destroying Caubul. On the contrary, when the *Vixen* was sacrificed by consent of Parliament, the general feeling was that a great danger—war with Russia—had been escaped at a small sacrifice—the honour of England. This sacrifice, however, could be accomplished only on the condition that somebody should veil it by a falsehood, namely, that the Bay of Soudjouk Kalé was in the possession of Russia at the time the *Vixen* was seized there. This falsehood has not yet been retracted by Lord PALMERSTON, and cannot therefore be set down here, as it would require the statement of the whole case. It has, however, been supported by

that he was undeniably guilty, and that he would not have dared to stand an inquiry. I can truly say that I not only did not believe that he was participant in the falsification—though I *admit* that such belief would not have deterred me—but that till I heard his speech in answer to me, I had never entertained even a suspicion that he had been so."

* See *Affghan Papers*, 1849, p. 81.

subsequent falsehoods, capable of being dealt with on the plan said down for this Memoir, namely, simply as falsehoods, and without reference to the designs with which they are uttered.

The Treaty of Adrianople, September 14, 1829, affected to confer on Russia the east coast of the Black Sea. Had Russia been able to conquer this territory, there would have been little difficulty about the matter. But Russia, not having conquered this coast, that is, Circassia, it remains very important that Turkey never had the right or made the attempt to possess it. Russia's false claim, of thirty-three years standing, has to be backed up by false representations, so as to seclude the Circassians from the commerce of the world till Russia shall have really conquered the country. In two or three places on the coast the Turks had erected small forts, *by permission of the Circassians*. Had these been specified by name in the Treaty of Adrianople, there would have been some colour of a title on the part of Russia to these places, especially if she actually possessed them. But no such places are mentioned in the Treaty of Adrianople.

On Monday, August 24, 1857, in the House of Commons, in reply to Lord RAYNHAM, Lord PALMERSTON said:—"The coast of Circassia—that was to say, the eastern coast of the Black Sea—was ceded to Russia by Turkey at the Treaty of Adrianople—that treaty ceding *certain points by name along the coast round to the Sea of Azoff*. The Russians were engaged in hostilities with the Circassians on the northern part of the eastern coast, and it appeared that some of the cruisers which, by the Treaty of Paris, Russia was entitled to maintain in the Black Sea, had been sent to operate against the Circassians at Ghelendjik and Redout Kalé. He did not apprehend that in so doing, the Russians had at all exceeded their powers under the Treaty of Paris."

The words of the Treaty of Adrianople, Art. IV., are:—

"The whole of the coast of the Black Sea, from the mouth of the Kuban as far as the port of St. Nicholas, inclusively, shall remain in perpetuity under the dominion of the Empire of Russia."

The Treaty, therefore, instead of ceding certain points by name along the coast round to the Sea of Azoff, specifies only the two extremities.*

This falsehood of Lord PALMERSTON did not, however, first appear under the sanction of his name. In the debate of the 21st of June, 1838, on the sacrifice of the *Vixen* in the previous year, Lord JOHN RUSSELL said:—

"What is the case as to the state of the port at which Mr. BELL's vessel is reported to have arrived? This port, apparently, did not belong to Russia

* A copy of the Treaty of Adrianople will be found in the Collection of Treaties between Russia and Turkey published by the Government in 1854.

until the year 1783. Up to that period the fact was acknowledged that it belonged to Turkey in the map put forth by the Russian authorities, and this evening alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman. In that map, it is true, that a great part of Circassia was laid down as belonging to independent tribes. But three of the places at that time so laid down as belonging to Turkey were, *by the subsequent Treaty of Adrianople*, transferred, *by name*, to Russia. These places were Soudjouk Kalé, Poti, Anapa. *They were named specially in the Treaty*, and thence has arisen a claim on the part of Russia that the whole of that territory which had belonged to Turkey belongs, since, to her, and has been confirmed to, and comes under her dominion."—*Mirror of Parliament*, p. 4999.

Neither Anapa, nor Poti, nor Soudjouk Kalé, is mentioned in the Treaty of Adrianople. Lord JOHN RUSSELL must have been whispered to by Lord PALMERSTON. He appears, however, to have read the Treaty *after* the Debate, since the words in italics quoted from the "Mirror of Parliament" are not in Hansard.

In defending himself against the charge of deceiving the owners of the *Vixen*, Lord PALMERSTON had recourse to a process of fraud and falsehood unexampled in parliamentary history. Mr. URQUHART, on returning home from Constantinople, where he had been Secretary of Embassy, consigned in a letter to Lord PALMERSTON (dated September 20, 1837) a history of his conduct in regard to the *Vixen*, which was at once a statement and a charge. Sir STRATFORD CANNING (June 16, 1838) requested Lord PALMERSTON to lay this letter on the table of the House. Lord PALMERSTON refused:—

"With regard to that letter from Mr. URQUHART, it was written after that Gentleman had ceased to hold an official appointment, and is therefore to be regarded as a private communication. The letter contains, too, a number of misstatements and misrepresentations, and is, in fact, an attack upon my conduct. *I have not replied to that letter*; and, considering that it is not official, I doubt whether it ought to be laid before the House."—*Ibid.*, p. 4831.

Sir S. CANNING then requested that that portion of the letter might be produced which referred to the *Vixen*. Lord PALMERSTON replied:—

"I believe that *that part of the letter is connected with a false statement in the Petition, namely, that the voyage of the Vixen was undertaken in consequence of encouragement given to the undertaking by the Under Secretary of State*. I really doubt whether such a document ought to be laid before Parliament."

To this Sir S. CANNING rejoined:—

"I am informed that there are other portions of the letter having reference to the *Vixen*. The circumstance of the document not being official, induces the noble Lord to think that it ought not to be laid upon the table; but I beg to ask the noble Lord whether he himself has any objection to the production of such parts of the communication as have reference to the *Vixen*, Mr. URQUHART having given his consent to its production."

Lord PALMERSTON then said:—

“The fact is, that Mr. URQUHART wrote me a long letter subsequent to his recal, which letter would, I believe, fill one of the volumes on the table, and which letter contains a number of misstatements and misrepresentations connected with transactions in which we had both been concerned. I have not had time to reply to that letter, or to enter into a controversy with Mr. URQUHART, and therefore *the letter has remained wholly unanswered*, but if I were to lay the document on the table of the House I should be obliged to accompany it with an answer from myself, in reference to the misstatements it contains. *I do not know that there is any portion of the letter which has an important bearing on the affair of the Vixen*; but I shall look at it again, and inform the right honourable Gentleman whether such be the case or not, but if any part of it is to be produced, it will be necessary for me to write a reply, and *to lay that reply also on the table of the House.*”

The letter was connected with a false statement in the petition, and therefore could not be published. The letter, nevertheless, had not an important bearing on the affair of the *Vixen*, though the false statement which it supported was the whole case referred to Parliament. Finally, though unimportant, the letter could not be published unless an answer could be written by Lord PALMERSTON, and laid on the table of the House.

This conversation is quoted from the *Mirror of Parliament*. It is also reported in the *Times* of June 18, 1838. Not a trace of it is to be found in *Hansard*.

Lord PALMERSTON did, after this, write a reply, but he never laid it on the table of the House. It was left for Mr. URQUHART to publish in the *Times*. But, on the day of the debate (June 21), Lord PALMERSTON did not hesitate to say that this reply, written after the lapse of six months, was written the day after he received Mr. URQUHART's letter.

“But we now come to another part of these transactions, being that in which the right honourable Gentleman means to impute to me, personally, some considerable blame—I mean as to the matters which form the subject of a letter written by Mr. URQUHART, and published in the *Times* this morning. I beg, in the first place, to say that, during the little leisure which indisposition sometimes gives me, I wrote a letter to Mr. URQUHART, in answer to one I had received from him *the day before*; a fact which I mention to show the course that was taken in answering his communication.”

Mr. URQUHART's letter to Lord PALMERSTON was dated September 30, 1837.*

Lord PALMERSTON's reply is dated June 20, 1838.†

On June 16, 1838, Lord PALMERSTON said:—

“That letter has remained wholly unanswered.”

On June 21, 1838, Lord PALMERSTON said of the same letter:—

* It will be found in the *Times* of June 21, 1838.

† See the *Times* of July 26, 1838, which also contains Mr. Urquhart's rejoinder.

"I wrote a letter to Mr. URQUHART in answer to one I had received from him the day before."

Everybody, surely, can understand a direct falsehood like this. It must be evident that if Lord PALMERSTON could not compass his defence without having recourse to falsehood, he must have been guilty of something far worse than anything the Motion imputed to him.

Such an extraordinary manœuvre must have had a special object; but the mode in which it was intended to operate can be explained only by some one personally cognisant at the time of the whole transaction. Lord PALMERSTON completed his task by repeating, and at the same time contradicting, what he had said about the private nature of Mr. URQUHART'S communication:—

"It would ill become me to criticise the course that Gentleman has thought proper to take, but my objection is not what it has been supposed to be by the noble Lord the Member for North Lancashire (Lord STANLEY)—that his letter was a betrayal of official confidence; my objection is exactly the reverse, namely, that it contains a great number of private and confidential communications between Mr. URQUHART and other people which I did not think fit or proper to be published."—*Ibid.*, p. 4990.

What is a betrayal of official confidence? Is it not the revelation by a public servant of private and confidential communications made to him as such? Does Lord PALMERSTON mean to say that breach of official confidence means publishing that which the public ought to know? If he does not mean this, it is difficult to know what he does mean. But in this last contradiction, if the meaning is obscure the purpose is obvious. The North American Indians, in their warlike marches, leave to the last man the office of concealing the trail which may betray them. This feat seems to a European impossible, but Lord PALMERSTON has learned to perform it with an ease and a perfection which far surpass those of the inhabitants of the forest. He guards against the danger of being detected and contradicted in his falsehoods by detecting and contradicting himself.

REGARDING THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND WITH RUSSIA.

(SELF-CONTRADICTION.)

Lord PALMERSTON lately proposed an assimilation between war and peace. From 1837 to 1840 he effected an assimilation between enmity and friendship. He combined with Russia on all European matters, while he made war upon DOST MAHOMED merely for receiving at his Court a Russian Envoy.

LORD PALMERSTON, DECEMBER 14, 1837.

"I say, therefore—not at all dissembling—that I think Russia does keep a larger force than is required for the defence of her own possessions, and that is consistent with the general well-being of other nations at peace with her . . . that having no reason to believe that the intention of Russia is otherwise than friendly towards this country—having reason, on the contrary, to believe (whatever her policy or ultimate intentions may prompt) that she has no wish or design to embark in a war with England, I feel &c."*

LORD PALMERSTON, MARCH 11, 1839.

"I do not like to touch this part of the subject, lest the possible supposition should be entertained that, in what I say, I am giving any countenance to an opinion that may be anywhere entertained, that we are now in a state in which a rupture with Russia is likely to arise. There is nothing in the relations between this country and Russia to justify such an opinion; on the contrary, I believe that, on both sides, there is a strong and anxious desire to preserve the peaceful relations, and to maintain that friendship which at present exist."†

LORD PALMERSTON, MARCH 19, 1861.

"Russia was then in a state of *active* hostility to England *in regard to our Asiatic affairs*. . . . The policy which the Governor-General had adopted required that DOST MAHOMED should be treated as an enemy, because he was allied with those who were at that time the enemies of England."—*Hansard*, vol. 162, pp. 62—3.

REGARDING THE RUSSIAN FLEET IN THE BALTIC.

(SELF-CONTRADICTION.)

Lord PALMERSTON'S contradiction of himself on this point is one of the most remarkable of his many contradictions. In 1837 there was, according to his statement at the time, a correspondence between England and Russia, respecting the Russian Fleet in the Baltic. In 1848 he denied that any such correspondence had taken place. In making this denial he affected to reply to a demand for papers on the part of Mr. ANSTEY. No such demand was made by Mr. ANSTEY in his speech, nor were the papers in question among those recited in his Motion:—

LORD PALMERSTON, DECEMBER 14, 1837.

"I am asked whether any measures have been adopted by the Government to prevent Russia from proceeding with the naval armament at Cronstadt. Now, with regard to the building and equipping of a fleet, no Government is entitled to prescribe to another Power what fleets it shall build; but unquestionably when a Foreign Power is fitting out a considerable force, either by sea or land which indicates intentions calculated to give reasonable ground of uneasiness to another Power, or its allies, then the Government of such country has a right to demand for what purpose such force is intended; and certainly the presence and equipment of the Russian fleet, as it was collected in the Baltic two or three years ago, did lead to explanations between the Govern-

* Opinions and Policy of the Right Honourable Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B., M.P., &c., as Minister, Diplomatist, and Statesman, during more than Forty Years of Public Life; with a Memoir by George Henry Francis, Esq. Editor of "Maxims and Opinions of the Duke of Wellington," &c. London: Colburn and Co. 1852. P. 361.

† *Ibid.* pp. 406-7.

ments of England and of Russia, but those explanations were satisfactory to the Government of this country; and although, since that time, a large number of vessels have been fitted out for the purpose of review, there has not been any such display of naval force in the Baltic as might be reasonably looked upon as indicating a hostile intention on the part of Russia towards any other Power.”*

LORD PALMERSTON, MARCH 1, 1848.

“The *hon. Member* (Mr. ANSTEY) asks for all the correspondence which may have passed from the year 1835 downwards on the subject of the Russian fleet in commission in the Baltic. I do not recollect that any particular communications took place on this subject between the British Government, on the one hand, and those of Russia or France on the other.”—*Hansard*, vol. 97, p. 120.

REGARDING THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.

(SELF-CONTRADICTION.)

When a Minister avows that he has committed a forgery to save the honour of an enemy, it is natural to suppose that enemy to be strong. Lord PALMERSTON, however, when urged to arm against Russia, declared that she was weaker than England:—

LORD PALMERSTON, DECEMBER 14, 1837.

“Does he suppose that Russia—ay, even that same Russia which he seems so desirous to convert into a general alarm-giver—is in a more warlike position as regards financial matters than Great Britain? I beg to tell him he is quite as much mistaken in thinking that Russia at this moment could find means to commence an offensive war, as he is in asserting that England is in such a state as to render her unable to provide for a defensive one. . . I assert that Russia would find it more difficult to undertake a war, which had not for its object self-defence, than England.”†

England, then, was strong enough to cope with Russia if both stood alone; the only danger was lest England should be encumbered by the assistance of allies—for instance, France and Poland:—

LORD PALMERSTON, JULY 9, 1833.

“I repeat that a general war must have taken place if England had interfered by arms; because, on one side there were Russia, Austria, and Prussia entertaining one opinion, and, on the other, England and France were united in a different interpretation. Austria and Prussia were both in possession of Polish provinces, and both were interested, or believed themselves interested (which is much the same thing), in establishing the interpretation put by Russia on the Treaty. And what was the state of the disposable army of these Powers? Russia had an army in Poland against which the Poles were scarcely able to make head; Austria had an army on the Austrian frontier of Poland; while Prussia had concentrated her forces on the Russian frontier; and if the British Government had wished to make the fate of the Poles certain, and to involve them in a contest with forces so superior as to render resistance on their part for a week impossible, they had nothing to do but to declare that they would, by force of arms, compel Russia to maintain the Constitution of Poland.”‡

Lord PALMERSTON succeeded in persuading the British Parliament that Austria was the enemy of Poland. That the reverse

* Opinions of Lord Palmerston, pp. 356-7.

† Ibid. pp. 362-3.

‡ Ibid. pp. 244-5.

was the truth, has lately been established by the public testimony of a Polish Gentleman whose character and whose knowledge of the subject are alike unimpeachable:—

COUNT ZAMOYSKI, JULY 11, 1861.

“I remember, when the insurrection broke out in Warsaw, the people looked up to the Austrian Consul as their friend. There was no English Consul and no French Consul. No impediment was raised in the way of any man in Galicia passing the frontier and joining the army. We had several regiments formed of Galicians. Austria, at that very time, far from being offended at the Galicians, actually supported the insurrection. The Emperor of AUSTRIA issued a proclamation to the Province in which he announced that six months' taxes would be remitted as a token of gratitude for their conduct during the struggle. Their conduct consisted in collecting money and men, and sending them to the Polish insurrection. The Plenipotentiary of the Austrian Government at the Congress of Vienna was Prince METTERNICH. Now, the Prince, during the Polish insurrection of 1831, concealed himself from the Russian Embassy, but he saw the Polish Envoy every evening, receiving him by the back door of his house. He conferred with him, and expressed the greatest sympathy with Poland, but regretted he could do nothing so long as England and France took no action. He actually ended every conference about Poland by saying to the Polish Envoy:—

“My dear friend, you lose your time here; you should go to the Governments of Paris and London. We cannot move without having the assurance and security that they are determined to do the thing in earnest—to check Russia at once and for ever.”

“The Emperor FRANCIS II., of Austria, sent a message through his Minister to the Polish Envoy, and it was to this effect:—

“The Emperor feels that he is drawing near his end. He is about to appear before the great Judge. The possession of Galicia weighs upon his conscience as a crime, and he would be happy to restore it to Poland, provided that it would not be annexed to Russia.”

“A few years afterwards, the Plenipotentiary of England at Vienna was Lord HOLLAND, who was then Mr. HENRY Fox. He took occasion to observe to Prince METTERNICH that he was surprised Austria did not see the benefit which she would derive from the restoration of Poland. Not knowing what had happened before, he said Austria had remained quiet, not apprehending the immense interest she had in the restoration of Poland. This was in 1835. METTERNICH'S answer was:—

“Do you think we do not know and understand that? Give me the assurance that Poland will be restored in twenty-four hours, and I will subscribe to it at once. But do you think it is an easy matter to accomplish? It wants the assistance of you English and French. Give me the assurance that you are willing to do it, and I am ready. I will ask no compensation for Galicia. The compensation, of course, would be the re-establishment of the barrier between ourselves and Russia.”

“The Polish Envoy at Vienna in 1831 was my own brother, so I have this from a good source.”

REGARDING POLAND.

(EQUIVOCATION.)

It was not enough to persuade the British Parliament that Austria was hostile to Poland, it was necessary to profess a belief that Poland would continue to exist as a State. This was merely a matter of the careful placing of words. In 1832 it was

impossible to exterminate a large *kingdom* morally or *politically*. Nobody dared to say, "Your words are inappropriate, and therefore unmeaning." Four years afterwards it was easy to say that what he meant was, that it was impossible to exterminate a *nation* morally or *physically*, and as these words, by virtue of having a meaning, were the reverse of what he had formerly said, they were taken to mean the same:—

LORD PALMERSTON, JUNE 28, 1832.

"As to the idea which seems to be entertained by several gentlemen of its being intended to exterminate a large *kingdom*, either *morally* or *politically*, if it be seriously entertained anywhere, it is so perfectly impracticable that I think there need be no apprehension of its being attempted."*

LORD PALMERSTON, APRIL 20, 1836.

"What I, on the occasion referred to, said, was this—that it was impossible for Russia to exterminate, *nominally*† or *physically*, a *nation*. I did not say kingdom. A kingdom is a political body, and may be destroyed; but a nation is an aggregate body of men; and what I stated was that if Russia did entertain the project, which many thinking people believe she did, of exterminating the Polish nation, she entertained what it was hopeless to accomplish, because it was impossible to exterminate a nation, especially a nation of so many millions of men as the Polish Kingdom, in its divided state, contained."‡

The conduct of Lord PALMERSTON in respect to Poland cannot be better summed up than in the words of Mr. HENNESSY, July 2, 1861:

"I have said that England has been to blame throughout the whole of this business. When Lord CLARENDON touched the Polish question he did it damage. Lord ABERDEEN and other British statesmen of our day injured it. But the Minister who has from the beginning to this hour done the most against Poland is the present Premier. It may surprise some hon. Members to be told that, when other great Powers were anxious to assist Poland, the noble Lord on behalf of England, stepped in and prevented them. Had I myself heard such a statement some time ago, I should probably have been surprised also. But this session I have seen many things which must lessen the confidence of the country in the noble Lord. I have observed him rise in his place and lose his temper when accused by one of his own supporters of falsifying Sir A. BURNES'S despatches. I have watched influential Members of the Liberal party recording their votes against the noble Lord when that grave charge was denied but not disproved. I have heard another supporter of the Government, when he brought forward the case of the Baron DE BODE, taunted by the noble Lord with bringing forward a case involving fraud, and I have then seen, on that issue, the Minister defeated by a majority of this House, and the charge of fraud flung back upon the noble Lord. And, not the least disgraceful, I have seen the House counted out by the Government when charges equally serious were made against the noble Viscount by the noble Lord near me (Lord ROBERT MONTAGU.)"

In reply to this charge, namely, that of having used the power of England against Poland, and having been guilty of acts which rendered his denial unworthy of belief, Lord PALMERSTON was not able to utter a syllable.

* Opinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 202.

† *Sic.*

‡ Opinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 315.

REGARDING THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE TREATY OF VIENNA.

(MENTAL RESERVATION.)

The only difficulty in the way of Lord PALMERSTON's betrayal of Poland has lain in the Treaty of Vienna, by which we were bound to maintain Poland in the enjoyment of certain rights. Out of this difficulty Lord PALMERSTON easily extricates himself. On August 8, 1831, Mr. HUNT presented a petition praying the House of Commons to address the KING to dismiss Lord PALMERSTON from his councils for not having assisted Poland. Mr. HUME said we were bound by treaty to see justice done to Poland:—

“Lord PALMERSTON could not, consistently with his duty, give the hon. Member those explanations which he desired; but this, at least, he would undertake to say, that *whatever obligations existing Treaties imposed*, would at all times receive the attention of Government.”

On August 16, 1831, on a Motion for papers by Colonel EVANS, after an attack by Mr. HUME:—

“Lord PALMERSTON hoped that nothing he had said, and nothing he had omitted to say, would lead any man to suppose that the British Government had forgotten any *obligations imposed upon it by Treaties*, or that it was not prepared to fulfil those Treaties.”

This was before Warsaw had fallen, and while the cessation of intercourse between England and Russia might have saved Poland. He denied that England was bound to maintain the Treaty of Vienna by force. But then he coupled this doctrine with the hypothesis that England had to stand alone against the other Powers. On June 28, 1832, in reply to Mr. CUTLAR FERGUSSON, he said:—

“England lay under no peculiar obligation, individually and independently of the other contracting parties, to adopt measures of direct interference by force.”

At this time it was supposed in England that Austria and Prussia were ready to make war in concert with Russia, and that all the other Powers would have been neutral. Now, it is known that Austria, France, Turkey, Sweden, and Persia were on the side of Poland, and had to be restrained by Lord PALMERSTON. He, however, is quite equal to the emergency. He shifts his doctrine to the very simple one that a State making a joint Treaty is not bound to enforce it if one of the parties choose to violate it.

On February 27, 1863, Lord PALMERSTON, in reply to Mr. HENNESSY, said:—

“The hon. Member assumes that by the Treaty of Vienna we are under an obligation to interfere with the affairs of Poland. We have a right to interfere, but we are under *no obligation* to do so.”

When, therefore, Lord PALMERSTON told Mr. HUME that the British Government had not forgotten any obligations imposed upon it by Treaties, he made a mental reservation that there were no such obligations. Falsehood here emulates the simplicity of truth, and by that simplicity triumphs.

REGARDING THE RUSSO-DUTCH LOAN.

(FORGERY IN COLLUSION WITH THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS.)

Connected with the Polish Revolution is the payment of the Russo-Dutch Loan, and with that again the separation of Belgium from Holland. The continued payment to Russia of this loan after it had lapsed by this separation, according to the Treaty of 1815, was obtained by a most elaborate falsehood concerted between Lord PALMERSTON and the Russian Ambassadors. This falsehood, told in 1832, is contrary to all the evidence, and especially to Lord PALMERSTON'S own prior statement. The substance of it was that Russia had been willing to ensure a compulsory observance of the Treaty of 1815, and had offered to march 60,000 men into Belgium for that purpose.

The statement first appears in a note from the Russian Ambassadors to Lord PALMERSTON, dated January 25, 1831. They declare, at the same time, that in all their conversations with Lord PALMERSTON they have reserved their right to the continuance of the payments as the condition on which they adhered to the Protocol of the 20th of December 1830. This Protocol they describe as one which "does not yet take away the sovereignty of the King of the NETHERLANDS." Yet the Protocol declares that "the very object of the Union of Belgium with Holland finds itself destroyed, and that thenceforth it becomes indispensable to recur to other arrangements to accomplish the intentions to the execution of which the Union should have served as a means."

LORD PALMERSTON, FEBRUARY 18, 1831.

"They (the Conference) were not to concern themselves with the question whether Belgium, having won her freedom with her arms, should *or should not* be subject again to Holland, and no such interference took place."*

The Protocol of the 20th December, 1830, like every other, was signed by Russia; she was therefore bound to adhere to it. The offer of the 60,000 men must, then, have been made not only before the 25th of January, 1831, but before the 20th of December, 1830—the date of the Protocol.

The offer must also have been known to foreign Powers, since the EMPEROR abstained from following up this determination, "out of respect to the representations of his Allies, and princi-

* Opinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 156.

pally out of deference to the opinions and wishes of the Cabinet of London."

It was not till the 4th November, 1830, that the King of HOLLAND invoked the interference of the Five Powers; it was not till the 10th that he consented to an armistice. The offer must, therefore, have been made between the 10th November and the 20th December, 1830. The offer was not for many months communicated to the public, nor to the Parliament, nor to the Ministers themselves. The letter of the 25th January appears to have lain (unanswered) in Lord PALMERSTON'S desk till the time came round for the December payment.

The payments were made twice in the year, the one per cent. of the principal being paid in July, the interest in December. The Treaty stipulated for the lapse of a year before the payments should cease. The July payment was therefore made without hesitation. But the December one was beyond the stipulated term. The Comptroller of the Exchequer demurred to the payment. So grave was the objection which he raised, that the case was submitted to the Law Officers of the Crown. Then it was that Lord PALMERSTON first produced the letter of the Russian Ambassadors reciting this offer, and it was upon this letter that he obtained an opinion favourable to the Russian claim, and consequently the payment of the usual December instalment.

The legality of this payment was warmly contested in both Houses, and on several occasions. But in spite of this apparent pressure, the offer of the 60,000 men, which, according to the prevalent notions of the day, would have justified the payment to Parliament, was still kept in reserve. Sir THOMAS DENMAN, it is true, referred to a Russian document which had influenced his own legal opinion, and the non-production of which he deplored. But the document was not produced. The motives which induced its suppression appear to have continued for fifteen years, after which period it was laid before Parliament and printed.

The story of a proposed forcible intervention came out here in France, on the opening of the Chambers in 1832, in the shape of a boast by M. CASIMIR PÉRIER that he had threatened with war any Power that should presume to send forces into Belgium. He attributed the "salvation of Belgium" to the promptitude of that declaration. The Duke of WELLINGTON was indignant at this statement, and denounced it in the House of Lords as a falsehood. On the 16th March, 1832, he

"Most distinctly denied the assumption of M. PÉRIER, namely, that other nations had evinced an intention of interfering by force. The British Government had no such intention, nor had any of the other Powers; and he would add that the French Government knew that such was the case."—*Hansard*, vol. 11, p. 307.

Lord GREY confirmed the statement of the Duke of WEL-
LINGTON.

Some months afterwards, on the 12th of July, Lord PAL-
MERSTON brought forward the Russian statement in Parliament
for the first time:—

“In the beginning of October, 1830, the King of the NETHERLANDS applied to his Allies, telling them his authority had been overthrown in Belgium, and he asked for military assistance to enable him to re-establish it. Such an application was made to Great Britain, to Austria, to Russia, and to Prussia. What was the answer—not of the present, but of the late Administration? Why, they declined to afford the military assistance required of them. What, however, was the answer of the Emperor of RUSSIA? He signified to his Allies that he had 60,000 men on his frontiers, ready to march for the purpose of re-establishing the authority of the King of the NETHERLANDS, if the other contracting parties to the Treaty were of opinion that such a proceeding would be consistent with the general interest.”—*Hansard*, vol. 14, p. 326.

The message of the King of HOLLAND was dated the 4th November. By the 29th Russia required every man, whose services she could command, to defend herself in Poland, transferring them from the remotest stations, and leaving naked her most exposed frontiers. Nobody got up to question the reality of the offer, or to state the impossibility of its execution. The Duke of WEL-
LINGTON, who had contradicted the statement before it was put into a definite shape, remained silent.

From that moment the assertion of Lord PALMERSTON has been accepted as truth.

This assertion, so long delayed, has no other evidence than that it is made by the Russian Ambassadors in the letter above mentioned. That letter, marked “confidential,” appears never to have been answered; an answer to it appears, however, to have been imperative, since it invokes the “spirit and the letter of the Treaty.” The new Treaty commences by declaring that complete agreement between the spirit and the letter does not exceed

On the grounds above stated there can be no doubt that the assertion of Lord PALMERSTON was false.

Upon this falsehood was obtained the payment of the instalment, and through it the payments have continued up to the present time. It therefore represented a value for Russia, limiting it to a pecuniary one, of 1,837,500*l.*

It will also appear from the circumstances and context that the Russian note of the 25th January, 1831, never had existence.

The need of something to show having arisen at a posterior date, such a document was forged. It was collusively assumed between the parties to have been presented by the one and accepted by the other at the time of its date.

REGARDING RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

(SELF-CONTRADICTION.)

Nearly all the falsehoods already collected have reference to Russia, and were told for her interest. Secresy and intrigue have not sufficed to keep down Turkey in the interest of Russia. Direct falsehoods have been supplied. Among the most obvious of them is one about the Treaty of Adrianople. By this Treaty Russia obtained possession of the mouth of the Danube. Lord PALMERSTON actually denied that she had obtained by that Treaty any territory in Europe. He gave an argument in support of his assertion, namely, that she was under a Treaty obligation to make no such acquisition. The obligation, of course, had no geographical limits. This additional falsehood is important, because it shows at a glance that Lord PALMERSTON was not unacquainted with the truth, but wilfully perverted it.

LORD PALMERSTON, AUGUST 7, 1832.

"If ever there was just ground for going to war, Russia had it for going to war with Turkey. She did not, however, on that occasion, acquire any increase of territory, at least in Europe. I know that there was a continued occupation of certain points, and some additional acquisitions on the Euxine, in Asia; but she had an agreement with the other European Powers, to the effect that success in that war should not lead to any aggrandisement *in Europe*. I think the official situation I hold in this House renders it my duty to state *facts* like these."*

LORD PALMERSTON, APRIL 20, 1836.

"Undoubtedly, when Russia acquired a portion of the Danube *by the Treaty of Adrianople*, that part of the river fell within the scope of the Treaty of Vienna, as being a part of Russia." †

REGARDING THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840.

(ERASURE OF HANSARD.)

The turning point in the career of Lord PALMERSTON, and in the history of the world, is the Treaty of 1840, for the Pacification of the Levant, by the four Powers to the exclusion of France. By this Treaty Russia was authorised to occupy Constantinople. The meaning of the transaction as regards Russia and Turkey was concealed by the device of the quarrel between the SULTAN and the Pasha of EGYPT. England affected to side with the former, France supported the latter. But though Englishmen were easily mystified as regards Russia and Turkey, they were not disposed to sacrifice the good understanding with France. It became necessary to make it be believed in Parliament that no insult had been offered to France. Mr. HUME demanded the production of the Treaty. Lord PALMERSTON refused to produce it because it had not been ratified, and was therefore not yet valid, but he declared that the Treaty which he refused to the English Parlia-

* Opinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 216.

† Ibid., p. 314.

ment he had already, as a mark of confidence, forwarded to the French Government. This statement was doubly false. No copy of the Treaty was sent to the French Government for two months after its signature. By a Protocol signed on the same day as the Treaty, it was to come into operation without waiting for ratification.

LORD PALMERSTON, AUGUST 6, 1840.

"My honourable Friend (Mr. HUME) asked for a copy of the Convention that had been entered into with the great Powers: that a Convention had been entered into was certain, but *it was not fulfilled* until it was ratified and exchanged by each of the Powers that were parties to it; and until this was done it was impossible that the document could be made public, or that it could be laid before Parliament."—*Hansard*, vol. 55, p. 1371.

EXTRACT FROM PROTOCOL OF JULY 15, 1840.

"The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, have agreed between them that the preliminary measures mentioned in Article II. of the said Convention shall be put in execution immediately, without waiting for the exchange of ratifications; the respective Plenipotentiaries state formally by the present Act the assent of their Courts to the immediate execution of these measures."*

These measures were the employment of the British fleet against MEHEMET ALI, and—if she had assisted him—against France.

LORD PALMERSTON, AUGUST 6, 1840.

"In the case of the Convention between France and England, with respect to Belgium, that Convention was not communicated to the Belgian Government till after it was ratified; whilst, in the present case, *the Treaty was forwarded to France two days after it was signed.*"—*Times*, August 7, 1840.

LORD PALMERSTON TO M. GUIZOT, SEPTEMBER 16, 1840.

"The Undersigned had the honour, on the 17th July, to inform his Excellency M. GUIZOT, that a Convention upon the affairs of Turkey had been signed on the 15th of that month, &c. . . . The ratifications of that Convention having now been exchanged, the Undersigned has the honour of transmitting to M. GUIZOT, for the information of the French Government, a copy of that Convention and of its annexes."†

The falsehood of the 6th August was told for the House of Commons. We quote it from the *Times*' report of the next day. But, though the House of Commons accepted the statement without inquiry, there were others who could not be deceived by it.

M. GUIZOT has just published the History of his Embassy to the Court of St. James in 1840. In it this passage occurs:—

"On the 16th of September, when all the ratifications had arrived and been exchanged in London, Lord PALMERSTON at length made known to us officially and *textually* the Treaty of the 15th of July."

The Appendix to the Correspondence contains the reply of M. THIERS to a Memorandum of Lord PALMERSTON of the 31st August, in which he (M. THIERS) says:—

* Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, presented by command, 1841.

† Correspondence relative to the Affairs of the Levant, Part II., p. 190.

"All at once, on the 17th of July, Lord PALMERSTON calls to the Foreign Office the Ambassador of France, and informs him that a Treaty had been signed the day before yesterday; he tells him this without even communicating to him the text of the Treaty."

In another place, speaking of this Treaty, he says:—

"Which was not communicated to it until two months later."—Pp. 453, 455.

M. GUIZOT says of this Despatch of M. THIERS:—

"I read it to Lord PALMERSTON, who had returned the same day from the country, and gave him a copy of it."—P. 318.

When, therefore, Lord PALMERSTON corrected his speech for *Hansard*, he erased the falsehood which had had such an effect in the House, and substituted the following indistinct and unmeaning form of words:—

"The four Powers then determined, in accordance with the *regulation* already made with France, that they would join in carrying the arrangement into effect, and *notice of the same was given to the French Minister two days after it was completed*. In the case of the Convention made between France and England alone, in reference to Belgium, notice of the same was not communicated to the other Powers till some time after."—*Hansard*, vol 55, p. 1378.

If this falsehood had been detected on the night of its utterance, the career of Lord PALMERSTON might have been closed.

Lord PALMERSTON, ever since he has been Foreign Secretary, has pretended a great regard for the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He said, 11th July, 1833:—

"The integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire are necessary to the maintenance of the tranquillity, the liberty, and the balance of Power in the rest of Europe."*

No change has taken place in Lord PALMERSTON'S conduct to Turkey since he ventured to express a very different opinion. On the 5th of February, 1830, being in opposition, he for once spoke out his intentions:—

"I object to the policy of making the integrity of the Turkish dominions in Europe an object essentially necessary to the interests of Christian and civilised Europe."†

These falsehoods are presented here disconnected from the consideration of the subjects to which they relate. It is sufficient that the designs attempted require the use of falsehood for any honest man to condemn them; they might be arrested in their course by a nation which, though unable to comprehend treason, should at least resolve to punish falsehood. But this process will cease to be effective when, at length, the time shall have arrived in which falsehood shall no longer be necessary for the success of treason.

* Opinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 246.

† Ibid., p. 131.