The Ramakrishna Mission
Institute of Culture Library

Presented by

Dr. Baridbaran Mukerji

RMICL—8

2379

ELEMENTS

OF

PSYCHOLOGY:

INCLUDED IN

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LOCKE'S ESSAY ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, AND IN
ADDITIONAL PIECES.

BY VICTOR COUSIN.

Translated from the French,

WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES,

BY CALEB S. HENRY, D.D.

FOURTH IMPROVED EDITION, REVISED ACCORDING TO THE AUTHOR'S
LAST CORRECTIONS.

NEW-YORK:
IVISON & PHINNEY, 321 BROADWAY,
(SUCCESSORS OF MARK H. NEWMAN & CO.)
CHICAGO: S. C. GRIGGS & Co., 111 LAKE STREET.
BUFFALO: PHINNEY & CO.
1856.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1855, by
CALEB S. HENRY,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New York

R.M.I.C. LIBRARY
Acc. No. 2379
Class No. 150
Date
St. Card
Class ✓
Cat ✓
Bk. C. ✓
Checked

STEREOTYPED BY
THOMAS B. SMITH,
82 & 84 Beekman Street.

PRINTED BY
DANIEL ADEE,
112 Center St.

TO

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.,

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH;
MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE,
ETC., ETC.,

THIS VOLUME OF THE WRITINGS

OF

ONE WHOM, THOUGH OPPOSING, HE HAS PRONOUNCED

THE FIRST PHILOSOPHER OF FRANCE,

IS INSCRIBED,

LESS AS A TRIBUTE OF ADMIRATION

TO THE

FIRST OF BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS

THAN AS

A HOMAGE OF REVERENCE TO THE MAN,

WHOSE SPIRIT PROMPTED AND INDITED HIS DEDICATION TO COUSIN
OF HIS EDITION OF THE WORKS OF REID,

AND AS

A GRATEFUL RECOGNITION

FROM THIS SIDE THE ATLANTIC,

OF THE

NOBLE AND NEEDFUL LESSON

EXEMPLIFIED IN THE MUTUAL BEARING OF THESE TWO GREATEST
THINKERS OF THE AGE,

THAT

THE TRUE MUSE OF PHILOSOPHY

IS

NOT HATRED BUT LOVE.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Preface to the Fourth Edition, ... ix

Extract from the Preface to the Third Edition—Remarks on an Article in the Princeton Review, ... xiii

Additional Remarks, ... xxiii

Introduction by the Translator, ... 65

EXAMINATION OF LOCKE'S ESSAY ON THE UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER I.

General spirit of the Essay on the Human Understanding.—Its Method. Study of the Human Understanding itself, as the necessary introduction to all true philosophy.—Study of the Human Understanding in its action, in its phenomena, or *ideas*.—Division of the inquiries relating to ideas, and determination of the order in which those investigations should be made. To postpone the logical and ontological question concerning the truth or falsity of ideas, and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of their application to their respective objects; and to concentrate our investigations upon the study of ideas in themselves—and in that, to begin by describing ideas as they actually are, and then to proceed to the investigation of their origin.—Examination of the Method of Locke. Its merit: he postpones and places last the question of the truth or falsity of ideas. Its fault: he entirely neglects the question concerning the actual character of ideas, and begins with that of their origin. First mistake of Method; chances of error which it involves.—General tendency of the School of Locke. Recapitulation. 93

CHAPTER II.

First Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding. Of Innate Ideas.—Second Book. Experience, the source of all ideas. Sensation and Reflection.—Locke places the development of the sensibility before that of the operations of the mind. Operations of the Mind. According to Locke, they are exercised only upon sensible data.

PAGE

Basis of Sensualism.—Examination of the doctrine of Locke concerning the idea of Space.—That the idea of Space, in the system of Locke, should and does resolve itself into the idea of Body.—This confusion contradicted by facts, and by Locke himself.—Distinction of the actual characters of the ideas of Body and of Space: 1, the one contingent, the other necessary; 2, the one limited, the other illimitable; 3, the one a sensible representation, the other a rational conception. This distinction ruins the system of Locke. Examination of the origin of the idea of Space. Distinction between the logical order and the chronological order of ideas.—Logical order. The idea of space is the logical condition of the idea of body, its foundation, its reason, its origin, taken logically.—The idea of body is the chronological condition of the idea of space, its origin, taken chronologically.—Of the Reason and Experience, considered as in turn the reciprocal condition of their mutual development.—Merit of the system of Locke.—Its vices: 1, confounds the measure of space, with space; 2, the condition of the idea of space, with the idea itself. . . 116

CHAPTER III.

Recapitulation of the preceding chapter.—Continuation of the examination of the Second Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding. Of the idea of Time.—Of the idea of the Infinite.—Of the idea of Personal Identity.—Of the idea of Substance. 141

CHAPTER IV.

General remarks on the foregoing results.—Continuation of the examination of the Second Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding. Of the idea of Cause.—Origin in sensation. Refutation.—Origin in reflection and the sentiment of the Will. Distinction between the idea of Cause, and the Principle of Causality.—That the principle of causality is inexplicable by the sentiment of will.—Of the true formation of the principle of Causality. 16

CHAPTER V.

Examination of the second Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding continued. Of the idea of Good and Evil. Refutation. Conclusions of the Second Book. Of the formation and of the mechanism of ideas in the understanding. Of simple and complex ideas. —Of the activity and passivity of the mind in the acquisition of ideas. —The most general attributes of ideas.—Of the Association of ideas. —Examination of the third Book of the Essay on the Understanding, concerning words. Credit due to Locke.—Examination of the following questions: 1. Do words derive their first origin from other words

PAGE
significant of sensible ideas? 2. Is the signification of words purely arbitrary? 3. Are general ideas nothing but words? Of Nominalism and realism. 4. Are words the sole cause of error, and is all science only a well-constructed language?—Examination of the third Book concluded. 200

CHAPTER VI.

Examination of the fourth Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding, on Knowledge.—That knowledge, according to Locke, depends: 1, upon Ideas; 2, upon Ideas, in so far as they are conformed to their objects.—That the conformity or non-conformity of ideas with their objects, as the foundation of truth or falsehood in regard to knowledge, is not with Locke merely a metaphor, but a real theory.—Examination of this theory of ideas, 1, in relation to the external world, to secondary qualities, to primary qualities, to the *substratum* of these qualities, to space, to time, etc.; 2, in relation to the spiritual world.—Appeal to Revelation. Paralogism of Locke. . . 238

CHAPTER VII.

Resumption and continuation of the preceding chapter.—Of the idea, not now considered in relation to the object which it should represent, but in relation to the mind which perceives it, and in which it is found.—The idea-image, idea taken materially, implies material subject; from hence materialism.—Taken spiritually, it can give neither bodies, nor spirit.—That the representative-idea, laid down as the sole primitive *datum* of the mind, in the inquiry after reality, condemns us to a paralogism; since no representative idea can be decided to represent correctly or incorrectly, except by comparing it with its original, with the reality itself, to which, however, by the hypothesis, we can not arrive but by the idea.—That knowledge is direct, and without an intermediate.—Of judgments, of propositions and ideas.—Return to the question of innate ideas. 264

CHAPTER VIII.

Examination of the fourth book of the Essay on the Understanding continued. Of Knowledge. Its modes. Omission of inductive knowledge.—Its degrees. False distinction of Locke between knowing and judging.—That the theory of knowledge and of judgment in Locke resolves itself into that of a perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas. Detailed examination of this theory.—That it applies to judgments abstract and not primitive, but by no means to primitive judgments which imply existence.—Analysis of the judgment; *I exist*. Three objections: 1, the impossibility of arriving at real ex-

PAGE

istence by the abstraction of existence; 2, that to begin by abstraction is contrary to the true process of the human mind; 3, that the theory of Locke involves a paralogism.—Analysis of the judgments: *I think, this body exists, this body is colored, God exists, etc.*—Analysis of the judgments upon which Arithmetic and Geometry rest 288

CHAPTER IX:

Continuation of the preceding chapter. That the theory of judgment, as the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement between ideas, supposes that every judgment is founded upon a comparison. Refutation of the theory of comparative judgment.—Of axioms.—Of identical propositions.—Of Reason and of Faith.—Of Syllogism.—Of Enthusiasm.—Of the cause of error.—Division of the Sciences.—Conclusion of the examination of the Fourth Book of Locke's Essay. . 314

CHAPTER X.

Examination of three important Theories found in the Essay on the Human Understanding: 1. Theory of Freedom; which inclines to Fatalism. 2. Theory of the Nature of the Soul; which inclines to Materialism. 3. Theory of the Existence of God which rests itself almost exclusively upon external proofs, drawn from the sensible world.—Recapitulation of the whole Examination of the Essay of Locke; the merits and the faults which have been pointed out.—Of the spirit which has governed this Examination.—Conclusion. . . 347

ADDITIONAL PIECES.

I.—Classification of Philosophical Questions and Schools . 395
II.—Psychological Method and its application 406
III.—Passage from Psychology to Ontology 440
IV.—Reply to the charge of Pantheism 445
V.—Theory of Reason.—Further explications 450
VI.—Berkely and Hume. Idealism and Skepticism 454
VII.—Outline of a System of Metaphysics 469
VIII.—Programme of a Course of Lectures on Absolute Truths . 495
IX.—Absolute Truths.—Their Origin and Validity 512
X.—God the Principle of Absolute Truth 532
XI.—Mysticism 538
XII.—Of the Beautiful and of the Arts 543
XIII.—The Comprehensibility of God and the Necessity of Creation 559

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

THE call of the publishers upon me to prepare another edition of this work has given me the opportunity, and imposed upon me the duty, of improving it as much as possible. I have, therefore, carefully revised the translation according to the author's last edition, which contains numerous corrections and retrenchments, rendering the expression more exact and more compact. I have also added a considerable number of new pieces to the selections before made from the author's other writings, making the work more fully conformed to the title I have thought fit to give it. Although it has not the form of a regular systematic treatise, and by its title does not pretend to have, yet it comprises the elements, and all the elements, of a complete system of psychology, and of philosophy as contained in psychology. It embraces the fundamental principles and most important questions in ontology, in logic, in morals, and in æsthetics.

In regard to the use of this work in instruction : the method of instruction by merely formal lectures is unsuited to the undergraduate course in our colleges. Books are therefore put into the hands of the student to read, which are called text-books—a term which

specially implies that they are to be made the basis of instruction by the professor. Many years' experience has established me in the conviction that no text-book in the hands of our young students is good for much, if for any thing, without thorough instruction—earnest familiar exposition on the part of a competent professor, who is master of the whole subject, as well as acquainted with what this or that particular text-book says; and, with such instruction, almost any text-book is good enough.

The student who attends on a philosophical course, attends to very little purpose if that instruction amounts to nothing but a catechetical examination, and a dry repetition of what he remembers of a text-book. It is a dead mechanical affair, with little clear insight and comprehension of the subject, and consequently little of that peculiar culture of the faculties, for the sake of which philosophical studies are made a part of his course of education. Contrary to all this, the interest of the students should be aroused, their attention directed, their perceptions quickened, by the living voice of the competent, earnest teacher, who knows and feels his subject himself in a living way, and knows how to tell what he knows and feels, and to make them know and feel with him; to make them grasp truth in its principles, to see into the nature, force and reach, the logical connection and systematic consequences of principles; to make them not only understand his thought, but think for themselves, exert their own critical faculties, form opinions, not merely adopt them. There is in such a course a high and noble culture of the faculties and of the soul, of infinitely more value than the amount of knowledge gained.

It makes philosophers, not merely knowers of a philosophy, of this or that set of opinions, adopting or rejecting the one or the other set, just according as they happen to be in good or bad odor among this or that particular set of men or—women. It is a consoling reward to any one whose life has been devoted to such labors to be humbly able to hope he has, in this way, done some good in his day, has helped to form right men.

But though no text-books are worth much without such instruction, there are still reasons for choosing among them. I will briefly express my preference, and the reasons for it. I recommend Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, this work of Cousin, and Reid's works, in Sir William Hamilton's edition. This is the smallest course of reading for the student, under the guidance and instruction of the professor, that can well be named; yet, with competent instruction, it is sufficient for the purposes of our academical culture. I recommend this course because students in our colleges have no time to study the ancient and middle age philosophy any further than as they are resumed in these works; and modern philosophy may well enough be said to date from Locke. Locke should therefore be read, and compared with Reid and Cousin, and commented on. Reid is the first great opponent of Locke in England, and a genuine thinker. Thus, the student in our colleges is put upon a course at what is for him a fitting beginning. He may go afterward as far as he pleases. I recommend this work of Cousin, because in it the fundamental principles of Locke are subjected to a criticism more clear, complete, and thorough, than they ever before received.

His examination of the Essay on the Understanding is acknowledged by the greatest authorities to be the most admirable specimen of philosophical analysis extant; and it is admirably adapted to cultivate the power of analysis in the student; while the other portion of this volume contains discussions and suggestions of great importance and interest in reference to comprehensive views of philosophy, and the solution of its great problems, and will furnish opportunity for the professor to give what historical and critical notices of modern German speculation he may think needful.

In reference to our colleges, to the age of the students generally, and to the time allowed, I do not know a better course to recommend than the one I have ventured to point out: it being always borne in mind that the great object is not to secure an accomplished philosophical erudition—a thing impossible under the circumstances—but to secure philosophical training and mastery of great principles.

It remains only to say that I have thought fit to retain in this edition that portion of the Preface to the Third Edition which related to the attack of the *Princeton Review;* and that I have added some new remarks at the end of it.

C. S. H.

NEW YORK, November, 1855.

EXTRACT

FROM THE

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

REMARKS ON THE PRINCETON REVIEW.

It may perhaps be expected that I should say something respecting an article which appeared in a certain religious journal shortly after the publication of the second edition of this work.* I have never taken any public notice of it, because for those who thoroughly understand the subject of which it treats, the article itself is its own best refutation; while to candid and sensible persons less familiar with philosophical studies, though its numerous untruths and calculated appeals to the prejudices of the ignorant may not be equally apparent, yet its flippancies, personalities, and bad temper (at variance alike with the true philosophical and with the Christian spirit) are sufficiently obvious to produce the reverse of the intended impression (and I may add that from both these classes of persons and from various quarters I have received numerous testimonies to this effect); and, as to the remaining portion of the public coming within the limited sphere of the journal in question—persons, namely, with whom ignorance of the subject and religious associations

* Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, for January, 1839.

would make that journal an *authority*—I certainly felt no call to argue philosophical questions before such a tribunal.

A few words will suffice for all that it is necessary to say to the reader of this volume.

The article represents Cousin as a Pantheist, denying the Personality of God; as denying also the Essential Difference of Right and Wrong; and as maintaining a scheme of Fatalism. I should do wrong to content myself with simply saying that these representations are totally false. Not only are they entirely destitute of just foundation, and contradictory also to the *system* of Cousin; but, on each and every one of those points, Cousin STRENUOUSLY MAINTAINS DOCTRINES PRECISELY THE REVERSE OF THOSE IMPUTED TO HIM! The statements of the article are as laughably untrue as it would be to call Athanasius an Arian, Bishop Berkeley a Materialist, or Jonathan Edwards a believer in the Self-determining power of the Will! It seems to me, therefore, incredible that any person of ordinary good sense, assuming to pass a public judgment upon such subjects, should fall into an honest misconception of Cousin's doctrines on these points. I confess I can scarcely in my own mind acquit the writer of the article of deliberately imposing upon his readers representations which he knew to be not only unjustifiable as toward Cousin personally, because contradictory to his express and repeated official declarations, but also unjust in themselves, because not involved in his fundamental principles, but contrary to his principles, to his system, and to the whole strain of his systematic teaching. This impression is rendered the more difficult to resist by the mode in which the writer has endeav-

ored to support his representations—his logic being of that pleasant and effectual sort sometimes called the method of proving *aliquid ex aliquo*. The only supposition upon which the writer can be freed from the imputation of deliberate bad faith is, that his predetermination to make out a case destroyed for the time his capacity to perceive any thing that made against his purpose. Why he should have wished to make out a case is not hard to be conceived in this community, and is apparent enough upon the face of the article.

For proof of the utter falsehood of the charge of Fatalism brought against Cousin, the reader need only turn to the tenth chapter of the present volume, and to the notes connected with the fifth chapter. Elsewhere, also, in various parts of his other writings, and particularly in his lectures on the foundation of the absolute idea of moral good (occupying a considerable portion of a volume which I presume the writer of the article had not seen), the freedom of man, the absolute free will and sovereign Providence of God, are established with great force against every form of the opposite doctrine. The writer of the article is forced indeed to admit that "Cousin does not teach what is commonly meant by fatalism; that he is a strenuous advocate for the freedom of the will, and talks much about our free personality." Now, Cousin not only does not teach what is commonly meant by fatalism, but he teaches nothing to which the term can be applied in any sense. He not only talks much about the freedom of the will, but he makes it a fundamental principle of his system, absolutely essential to any possible conception of moral obligation, of accountability, and of the supreme free moral government of God,

which latter truth he likewise teaches as expressly, an in as good faith, as any writer that ever wrote. Thi is his systematic teaching: and he has advanced noth ing in other connections which is subversive of it nothing that is not compatible with it. The passage adduced by his critic in proof that Cousin's "freedom is itself but one of the products of a deeper fatalism which pervades the universe" are merely some rapic and general expressions, in an animated rhetorica style, respecting the development of humanity unde the laws of Divine Providence—a development which is spoken of as necessary not in relation to God, nor in relation to the human will, but only in relation to an order of moral causes established by God, which we generalize in our conceptions as laws, and which we apply to explain the events of human history; expressions the like of which are continually occurring in animated public discourses upon such subjects without exciting a thought of fatalism; expressions which can be represented as fatalism only when stupidly misconceived or willfully perverted.

The same course of remarks applies to the charge of confounding moral distinctions. Abundant evidence of the falsehood of the charge is contained in the fifth chapter of this volume, and in the programme of a course of lectures in the appendix. Any person in the least degree conversant with such studies will instantly perceive that if ever there was a doctrine clearly and undeniably taught in the world, Cousin teaches the absolute and essential difference of right and wrong, the eternal and immutable nature of moral distinctions; and if ever there was a doctrine expressly and earnestly

opposed, Cousin opposes every form of the doctrine which confounds moral distinctions. The absolute idea of right and wrong is made the indispensable basis of any idea of obligation or duty, of merit and demerit, and of reward and punishment; no motive of virtuous action is allowed except the simple idea of absolute obligation grounded upon and springing necessarily and immediately from the absolute conception of right and wrong; and every form of the selfish system, from the grossest to the most refined, is repudiated; every motive of self-love (from that which makes the gratification of the senses the rule of action up to that which obeys in form the will of God for the sake of the consequent advantage) is excluded from the essence of virtue. Do right for the sake of right, without regard to consequences, is made the fundamental maxim of ethics. All this may be seen in the present volume, and the same views are expounded systematically and thoroughly in the extended discussion of this subject already referred to—the lectures on the absolute idea of moral good. Cousin is one of the most decided advocates of the principles of essential and immutable morality that ever wrote: Cudworth, Butler, and Price, have written nothing stronger, nothing clearer. It would not be a grosser falsehood, nor a more laughable blunder, to assert that the systems of Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham recognize disinterested virtue and the essential difference of right and wrong, than has been committed by this person in asserting that Cousin denies them. Yet carefully withholding from his readers all these abundant, unambiguous, systematic statements of Cousin, and presuming (one would suppose) that they had never read, and would never read,

the writings which he was perverting; violating, also, every rule of interpretation which renders it possible ever to ascertain from language a writer's opinions or system; in his predetermination to make out a case, he has culled a few scattered expressions occurring in the course of some rapid reflections upon historical and political topics, on the ground of which he represents Cousin as confounding moral distinctions by exalting fact into right: expressions which no more justify the charge than would the familiar political maxim that a probability of success is indispensable to justify an attempt to revolutionize a government. . . . . . .

So likewise with respect to the charge of Pantheism. Apparently the writer of the article in question had no precise conception of the meaning of the term. Certain it is that Cousin is no Pantheist in any of the senses in which the word is ever used by persons entitled to speak upon the subject.

Pantheism, in the strict sense of the term, is the confounding of God with the universe—denying His distinct substantial existence, and making him merely the collective ALL of things. It may be of two sorts: *material*, when the substantial existence of spiritual being is denied, and matter is made the only substance of which the collective all of the universe is composed; or *ideal*, when the substantial existence of matter is denied, and spiritual being made the only substance.

Pantheism, in the less proper meaning of the word, is the confounding of the universe with God—making God the sole substantial existence, and the universe of mind and matter merely phenomena; thereby destroying human personality, freedom, etc.

Now, Cousin not only does not teach Pantheism in either of these forms, but, on the contrary, clearly and abundantly exposes and confutes them all. He maintains the substantial existence of God and the substantial existence of the universe of mind and matter; of God as distinct from the universe; of God as the cause and the universe the effect; of God as superior to the universe by all the superiority of an infinite uncreated substance and cause over all finite and created substances and causes. Yet all that Cousin says expressly and directly on this subject is kept out of view by the writer of the article, and some speculations respecting the relation of the creation to God, and some expressions concerning the all-pervading presence and energy of God, are paraded as proof of Pantheism.

As to the speculations about the creation considered as the necessary product of the divine activity: I should suppose it would be readily admitted by any thinker that if God had never created any thing, he would never have exerted his power out of himself, never have manifested himself. I should suppose it would be equally admitted to be natural to the human mind to conceive that God, as an infinite personal cause, a free potential activity, would put forth or actualize his power in some determinate, and therefore finite production, that is to say, would create. I do not understand Cousin as asserting that creation is necessary in any other sense than this, relative, namely, to our conception of an infinite cause personal and free. If he intended the assertion as absolute, I should not adopt it: but certainly I should never dream of considering it Pantheism; it has no more to do with Pan-

theism than with Polytheism; and as to the rest is perfectly harmless.*

And as to the expressions relating to the all-pervading presence and energy of God in the universe: they are the same sort of expressions as those in which all elevated meditation on the Divine Being naturally

* In saying that I should not adopt it, I do not mean that it may not be so, or that there is not some ground for it in the idea on which it rests. For our conception of the human will as an active power, a power of volition, involves naturally the conception that it is a power which, when the *conditions* of its activity are supplied, must pass into action in the production of volitions—yet without destroying the free personality of man. Even the necessarians, who make these conditions to be *causes* ab extrâ, do, still, many of them, maintain the free personality of man.

With respect to the human will, we all admit that there must be conditions of its activity, that these conditions are external to the will, and primarily external even to the mind. But, prior to the first creative act of the Divine will, there existed nothing but God, and consequently the conditions of the passing into activity of the Divine will (if such there were) must have been entirely within the nature itself of the Divine Being

Now, with respect to Cousin's speculation about creation, it certainly is true that the Divine will has passed into activity and created the universe; and it *may* be true that there was in the very nature of the Divine will a necessity of its passing into activity, an activity which must also be creative—a necessity equally eternal, groundless, and unfathomable to our comprehension as the necessity of the Divine existence itself. I certainly would not venture either to assert or deny that it is absolutely so, for I am reverently averse to all speculations which go back of the attributes of God and seek to penetrate his nature, or which proceed upon ideas with respect to his nature not given or warranted by revelation. "*Who by searching can find out the Almighty to perfection?*"—But I should like to know what there is in such a speculation that has the remotest connection with Pantheism.

At the same time, I consider the necessity of creation spoken of by Cousin to be a purely hypothetical necessity, not absolute but relative to our limited conceptions; necessary, that is, unless we would conceive God to remain eternally solitary and inactive.

utters itself; and the charge of Pantheism would lie equally against nine tenths of the most accredited devotional poetry, and against the Holy Scriptures themselves, which speak of God as "all in all," and of creatures as "living, moving, and having their BEING IN HIM," etc., etc.

I repeat, then, summarily, that the person who wrote the article in question has imputed to Cousin doctrines directly the opposite of those which he explicitly and positively teaches, doctrines which he distinctly and strenuously opposes: and the mode in which he endeavors to justify his imputations involves a perversion of thought and language scarcely less incredible. A parallel argument equally valid might be constructed to prove Cudworth an Atheist, Bishop Butler an Infidel, and Mr. Thomas Paine a Christian believer!

The article also attempts to confound Cousin with certain German philosophers. As to this I have only to say that the system of Cousin is distinguished from each and all those German systems by fundamental differences of principle. A professed exposition of modern German philosophy is also given in this article, putting it in as odious a light as possible, for the sake of casting accumulated odium upon Cousin and (perhaps chiefly) upon myself. Not adopting any of those German systems, nor sympathizing with their theological spirit and tendency, I do not here feel concerned to correct the mistakes of this exposition. Besides, no thinker tolerably well informed on the subject needs be told what a superficial and insufficient account it is. It has every appearance of being an assemblage of scraps gathered at second and third hand from ency-

2, 379

clopedias, reviews, and incidental notices. A moment's glance is sufficient to satisfy any competent judge that it was never formed by a discriminating philosophical mind from a careful examination of the original sources.

These are the leading and only material points in the article. Almost every page of it, however, abounds with particular instances of bad spirit and deficient capacity. Its arrogance and flippant personalities, its numerous perversions and blunders, both in logic and fact, taken in connection with the falsehood of its leading positions, form a combination equally pitiable and ludicrous. But I have said enough, and perhaps more than enough, respecting an article so little entitled, either for its matter or its spirit, to the respect of any true philosopher; and whose only value to the genuine Christian, who is, at the same time, thoroughly acquainted with its subject, is in the example it furnishes how far from truth and propriety one may be led who attempts, under the banner of religion, to excite the *odium theologicum* against another by presuming on the ignorance and appealing to the prejudices of those whom he addresses.

As to myself, I may be permitted to observe that my own philosophical and religious opinions, and the character of my instructions are well known, by my friends, colleagues, and pupils, to be diametrically opposite to any of the false and dangerous principles with which my humble name is attempted to be connected: and I might add that they may be gathered distinctly enough by the public even from the few things which I have printed on these subjects.* I take leave to say

* In an article published in the *Literary and Theological Review*, in 1834, which was devoted to showing the impossibility of any absolute

that, in my opinion, I have done no such wicked or foolish thing as willfully or ignorantly to promote the subversion of my own fundamental principles on points of such vital importance; and I can not but add that, so far as a mere opinion on such subjects is worth any thing, fifteen years devoted to philosophical studies, and for a considerable portion of the time in the way of professional duty, may, perhaps, entitle my opinion to as much provisional force as that of the individual who has seen fit to become my assailant. It is not pleasant thus to speak of one's own opinions and writings; and I should not presume to refer to my slight productions, but for the attempt made in the article to connect my name with opinions so diametrically opposite to those I hold. I am not apprehensive, indeed, that the attempt to represent me as introducing, either knowingly or ignorantly into public instruction, a work calculated to subvert the proper belief in God, in the essential difference of right and wrong, and in the moral accountability of men, will have its intended effect with competent judges. Attempts like that of my assailant, as they never in the long run do harm to the party as-

system of philosophy, of any speculative solution of the great problems of the human mind, and the necessity of leaping by faith alone, the chasm which separates the infinite from the finite—and expressly condemning the great modern German systems. Also, in an article in the same journal for 1835, defending the essential and immutable difference of right and wrong, on the grounds of Cudworth and Butler, against the principles of the selfish system. Just before the appearance of the article in the *Princeton Review*, I had also printed, in connection with Whewell's Sermons on the Foundations of Morals (a work written in the spirit of Butler), several pieces containing views respecting the Divine existence and the nature of moral distinctions, directly in contradiction with those which I am represented as promoting by the publication of Cousin's examination of Locke.

sailed, so neither do they do the assailant any goo
and (which is of much greater importance) they wi
never in the long run promote the sacred cause of trut
and of God.

Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis.

I published this examination of Locke because, in
dependently of any systematic peculiarities of th
author, and independently of my own personal opinio
of his system, I believed it calculated to establish th
very foundations of morality and religion against th
subversive principles of Locke and Paley. In regard
to these great truths, as against the principles and systematic results of the Sensual philosophy, this work is
in perfect harmony with Cudworth, Price, Butler, Reid,
and Stewart. C. S. HENRY.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, October, 1841

ADDITITIONAL REMARKS.

So I wrote fourteen years ago. I should scarce be able to believe it so long but for the date—so quickly do the years pass. What I then wrote I have not read in nearly as many years until now; and it is a satisfaction to me to find at this distance that in repelling the false and odious charges brought against Cousin and myself in the article in the *Princeton Review*, and in characterizing its manner and spirit, I kept so far within the allowable limits of self-defense against such an arrogant and insulting attack. I have nothing now to retract or regret in the positions I took, or in the language I employed. There are, however, a few things which I think it fit at this time to add.

As to the charges of Fatalism, Pantheism, and the

confounding of moral distinctions, the readers of this volume will find within its pages the clearest proof of their untruth, and that not one particle of abatement need be made from the utmost force and literal strictness of the terms of contradiction and counter-assertion which I employed. Thus much those who have never seen the article in question will be able to judge: but they can not, of course, have any conception of the multitude of minor positions and collateral utterances it contains, equally open, in the view of every well-informed thinker, to contradiction, and even, in many cases, to counter-assertion; nor can they have any adequate impression of the exceedingly bad tone and spirit which pervades it throughout: and so they may not unnaturally be liable to do less than justice to the exact fitness of the general terms in which I characterized it in these respects. Something, therefore, I think it right to add in my own justification, as well as in the more important interests of truth and fairness.

Had the article in question been, like that of Sir William Hamilton, the production of a learned and profound thinker, thoroughly comprehending, accurately expounding, and honorably combating the system of Cousin, in the true philosophical spirit of candor and respect, I should have readily yielded to it the same homage of cordial admiration as I expressed for Sir William Hamilton's article, whether, as to the rest, I acceded to its conclusions or not. Had it even been the serious and candid utterance of an incompetent thinker, disturbed by unaccustomed expressions and seeming contradictions to the great religious convictions which are so dear to the religious heart, and expressing his fears without dogmatism or contempt, it would have

been entitled to the sincerest respect. But it was throughout a calculated appeal to religious prejudices and the spirit of theological hatred, calculated to the purpose of exciting the pious alarm of the sincere and serious, and of provoking the "fool's laugh" of the shallow and conceited.

I can not, perhaps, better make good what I say than by putting in contrast the spirit of these two articles.

Sir William Hamilton's criticism of the system of Cousin first appeared in the *Edinburg Review* in 1829; and has since been reprinted in his volume of "Discussions in Philosophy, etc.," London, 1852, and published in this country by the Harpers. It is no less remarkable for its admirable spirit than for its great philosophical learning and profound speculative and critical ability. The author does not attempt to expound a system which he at the same time professes not to understand. He does not attempt to confute it by imputing to Cousin opinions which he knows to be repudiated by him; nor by forcing upon his words a meaning in which they are not used by him; nor by forcing upon his system consequences which it does not contain; nor by detached sentences torn alive asunder from the living whole, where only they can be rightly comprehended, and, perhaps, thus torn asunder, presenting—or if not presenting of themselves, made by further distortion to present—to the pious horror of the unlearned the ghastly semblance of some impious error; nor, by taking advantage of the popular pious fear and hatred in which he knows the modern German metaphysics are held, does he get up an exhibition of grotesque absurdities and solemn horror-shows from

that source, making his readers (who may know no better) believe, by insinuation or assertion, that these absurdities and horrors are part and parcel of Cousin's system too; nor does he take every opportunity which a malicious ingenuity can find or make, by derogatory charges, insinuations, and sneers, to pour contempt on the personal character of Cousin, and of those whom he takes to be his followers; nor, finally, does he at the last leave his reader without any clew out of the tangled labyrinth he had involved them in, that is, without giving them any positive philosophical solution of the great problems he had raised, or informing them whether, in his opinion, a philosophical solution is or is not possible.

Contrary to all this, Sir William Hamilton takes upon himself to expound the system of Cousin, because he professes to understand it; and he expounds it accurately and adequately. He then fixes upon a prominent and distinguishing peculiarity of Cousin's system, from which he dissents, and which he attempts to confute—a point which constitutes nearly every thing that is at all peculiar in Cousin's system, namely, the assertion for man of the power of attaining the infinite as a positive in knowledge, grounded in the fundamental distinction Cousin makes between spontaneous and reflective reason. On the question whether a philosophy of the unconditioned be possible for man, or, in other words, whether and how far a positive cognition of the infinite is possible, he lays it down that *four* answers may be given. "1. The Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived. 2. It is not an object of knowledge; but

its notion, as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is something more than a mere negation of the conditioned. 3. It is cognizable, but not conceivable; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the absolute, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the different. 4. It is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality.—The first of these opinions we regard as true; the second is held by Kant; the third by Schelling; and the last by our author [Cousin.]"

Of these four opinions, it will be seen, the two first deny, and the two last assert, the possibility of a positive cognition of the absolute and infinite. Hamilton proceeds to expound and enforce his own view, in itself, and with a profound criticism of the other opinions; and he as accurately and carefully discriminates Cousin's system in its contradiction to Kant's and Schelling's, as to his own.

Now, see the spirit which animates him as a philosophical controversialist.

In 1829, he thus speaks: "Condemned to silence during the reign of Jesuit ascendancy, M. Cousin, after eight years of honorable retirement, not exempt from persecution, had again ascended the Chair of Philosophy, and the splendor with which he recommenced his academical career more than justified the expectation which his recent celebrity as a writer, and the memory of his earlier productions had inspired. Two thousand auditors listened, all with admiration, many with enthusiasm, to the eloquent exposition of doctrine intelligible only to the few; and the oral discussion of philosophy awakened in Paris, and in France, an in-

terest unexampled since the days of Abelard. The daily journals found it necessary to gratify, by their earlier summaries, the impatient curiosity of the public; and the lectures themselves, taken in short-hand and corrected by the professor, propagated weekly the influence of his instruction to the remotest provinces of the kingdom. . . . . M. Cousin is the apostle of Rationalism in France, and we are willing to admit that the doctrine could not have obtained a more eloquent or devoted advocate. For philosophy he has suffered; to her ministry he has consecrated himself—devoted, without reserve, his life and labors. Nor has he approached the sanctuary with unwashed hands. The editor of Proclus and Descartes, the translator and interpreter of Plato, and the promised expositor of Kant, will not be accused of partiality in the choice of his pursuits; while his two works, under the title of "Philosophical Fragments," bear ample evidence to the learning, elegance, and distinguished ability of their author. *Taking him all in all, in France M. Cousin stands alone; nor can we contemplate his character and accomplishments without the sincerest admiration, even while we dissent from the most prominent principle of his philosophy.** "The development of his system, in all its points, betrays the influence of German speculations on his opinions. His theory is not, however, a scheme of exclusive Rationalism; on the contrary, the peculiarity of his doctrine consists in the attempt to combine the philosophy of experience and the philosophy

* "*From the most prominent* principle of his philosophy." So it now stands in the volume of his Discussions, 1852; originally in the *Edinburg Review* it stood, "*from almost every principle.*" The alteration expresses what I thought it necessary to indicate as the extent of his meaning in the introduction to the first edition of this work in 1834.

of pure reason into one." So wrote Sir William Hamilton in 1829. Let us see how he speaks after an interval of twenty-three years.

In a note to the reprint of this article, in the volume of "Philosophical Discussions," etc., in 1852, speaking of the reluctance with which he undertook the article, at the request of Professor Napier, then editor of the *Edinburg Review*, he goes on to say: 2,579

"Moreover, I was still further disinclined to the undertaking, because it would behoove me to come forward in overt opposition to a certain theory, which, however powerfully advocated, I felt altogether unable to admit; while its author, M. Cousin, was *a philosopher for whose genius and character I already had the warmest admiration—an admiration which every succeeding year has only augmented, justified, and confirmed.* Nor, in saying this, need I make any reservation. For I admire even where I dissent; and *were M. Cousin's speculations on the absolute utterly abolished, to him would still remain the honor of doing more himself, and of contributing more to what has been done by others, in the furtherance of an enlightened philosophy than any other living individual in France —I might say in Europe.* Mr. Napier, however, was resolute; it was the first number of the *Review* under his direction, and the criticism was hastily written. . . . . The illustrious thinker, against one of whose doctrines its argument is directed, was the first to speak of it in terms which, though I feel their generosity, I am ashamed to quote. I may, however, state that, maintaining always his opinion, M. Cousin (what is rare, especially in metaphysical discussions) declared that it was neither unfairly combated nor imperfectly

understood."—This is noble! And it is a noble spectacle to see two such men, pre-eminent above all other men of the age for philosophical learning and ability, thus illustrating the beautiful utterance with which Cousin concludes his criticism of Locke: "The true Muse of History"—the critical history of philosophy—"is not Hatred but Love."

Add to this the dedication prefixed by Sir William Hamilton to his great edition of Reid's Works:

"To Victor Cousin,

"Peer of France, late Minister of Public Instruction, Professor of Philosophy, etc., etc., this Edition of the Works of Reid is dedicated, not only in token of the editor's admiration of the first Philosopher of France, but as a tribute, due appropriately and pre-eminently to the Statesman, through whom Scotland has been again united intellectually to her old political ally, and the Author's Writings (the best result of Scottish speculation) made the basis of Academical Instruction in Philosophy throughout the central nation of Europe."

The reader may thus see in what estimation Cousin is held by Sir William Hamilton, the follower and great expositor of Reid, occupant of the philosophical chair in the University of Edinburg, once filled by Reid, speaking, too, at the intellectual center of Presbyterian Scotland, himself (as I gather) a Calvinist.

Now, let us contrast the language of respect and admiration held by Cousin's great Scottish compeer with the arrogant and contemptuous terms employed by the writer of the article in the *Princeton Review.*

There is a tone of arrogance and contempt pervading the whole article which can not be adequately exhibited; but specimens of the sneering insinuations, odious imputations, and unbecoming personalities with which it abounds, and of its numerous blunders in logic and in fact, may be given.

After an introduction, which is somewhat largely occupied with giving his views about utilitarianism, Edwardsism, Emmonsism, and Taylorism, the writer enters upon the task of overwhelming Cousin with the odium of being a pantheist, a fatalist, a denier of moral distinctions, a rejecter of the sacred Scriptures, and a subverter of Christianity, etc., etc. But, as preliminary to this, well knowing that German metaphysics was a thing already in extremely bad odor in this country, he gives a professed exposition of the systems of Kant and the later German philosophers, the manner and object of which I have characterized in the preface to which these remarks are added. It is a grand horror-show, a set of mosaic pictures wrought up mainly out of detached sentences from the judgments of certain theologians, and of absurd utterances of certain alleged disciples of those systems, designed to awaken the contempt and hatred of pious souls; and, all along, the reader is expected, and at intervals admonished, to bear in mind that between these German systems and Cousin's system there is little difference, and nothing to choose. Then comes the more extended and formal criticism of Cousin's doctrines, although at every convenient point the box of German horror-shows is turned round again, in order that the identity of the ghastly lineaments of Teutonic and of French impiety may be disclosed. Such is the plan and purpose of the

article. Now more particularly for the manner and spirit of its procedure:

Since it is undeniable that Cousin expressly claims to hold the Personality of God, the personal Freedom both of God and man, the absolute and eternal Distinction of Right and Wrong, and the Divine origin of Holy Scripture and Christianity, the only open question for a fair-minded critic is, whether he holds them by a happy inconsistency, while his system does not allow him to hold them; and the only fair way of settling this question is by a rigorous deduction of the consequences which flow by logical necessity from his grounding principles. But the writer of the article in question has not so proceeded. In fixing upon Cousin the odious charges he brings, his method is mainly that of forcing upon passages, detached from the connections where they sufficiently explain themselves, a sense not intended by the author; or, in cases where it is just possible to put a bad interpretation upon them, assuming it to be the true interpretation—construing collateral and unsystematic utterances, not by the system or by the systematic utterances of the author, as fairness requires, but the system by them, forcing from words and sentences inferences not contained in them, and contrary to the author's express assertions; and finally, culling and picking with special pains every expression that could be distorted into some odious or ridiculous point of view. There is no thinker in the world who might not in this way be made odious or contemptible in the eyes of the superficial and ignorant.

And here I may refer to one of those numerous notes in which all along the reviewer strives to throw personal odium upon those he opposes: "Dr. Henry, who seems

anxious to give his readers an exalted idea of the philosophic temperament of M. Cousin, says that 'he rarely speaks in the Chamber of Peers, that he takes part in the discussions of that body only when some question relating to public instruction is before the Chamber, or on extremely rare occasions, etc.' Dr. Henry calculates rather largely upon the ignorance of his readers as to the transactions and debates of the French Chamber of Peers. We need only refer, in illustration of the philosophic elevation of M. Cousin, to one of the most disgraceful scenes that ever occurred in any legislative body, in which this gentleman, in a debate upon the question of Spanish intervention, gave the *lie direct* to Count Molé, one of the ministry."

A man must be anxious to find occasion for sneering insinuations who could write such a comment upon such a statement as mine. I do not think it evinces any anxiety of any sort. But a person disposed to think evil, and say evil can always find something evil to think and to say; and so the reviewer contrives to make out of this little sentence several derogatory charges against Cousin and myself. And his logic in the case is as admirable as his spirit is amiable. Cousin, it would seem, once lost his temper. Suppose it to be so. Can this be fairly called an "illustration" of his character? Does it justify the sweeping charge of habitual want of self-control, and even of moderation? But suppose it does. What has that to do with what I said? If the reviewer had quoted the whole of my sentence—of which, however, he chose to quote only half—his readers would have seen that I was speaking of Cousin as "destitute of political ambition." What then if Cousin did on one occasion lose his temper;

what if he be moreover the generally infirm-tempered man his critic insinuates? That does not prove me in the wrong in speaking of his want of political ambition. Still less does it justify the insinuation that I am anxious to gain him credit for moderation of temper. And least of all does it justify the charge that I have attempted to do so knowing it to be undeserved, and with a calculated reliance upon the ignorance of my readers. What a complication of unfairness of spirit and of logical blundering! A particular incident first made the basis of a sweeping judgment against Cousin, and then, by an irrelevant application—an unconscious or a willful *ignoratio elenchi*—made the basis of a twofold odious charge against me! The article abounds with such things.

The reviewer speaks of Cousin's philosophy as "to the last degree superficial and conceited. . . . . making pretensions to extraordinary profoundness, but skimming the surface of things." . . . employing "a witch jargon, which, when penetrated with infinite pains, contains only some old truth then 'made use of to pass off a thousand nothings with;'" yet he pronounces it a "system of abominations," although he finds it "difficult to define precisely how far" it "agrees with the misshapen phantasies" of German philosophy he had produced to view, because, "when language ceases to be the representative of ideas, it is not easy to tell what are intended to be equivalent forms of speech."

"We are further embarrassed," he goes on to say, in the interpretation of this system, by the material consideration that no full exposition of it has yet been given to the world. . . . . It is too early to pro-

nounce of it, as Dr. Henry has done, 'that it is a distinct scientific theory, having its method, its principle, and its consequences.' . . . . Nor are we willing to defer to the judgment of Dr. Henry, unless some of the letters of M. Cousin 'to the present translator,' contain a more full and systematic exposition of the principles of eclecticism than is to be found in his published writings."*

In the same tone, by way of justifying, perhaps, his want of deference to my judgment, he proceeds to point out a contradiction, as he supposes, between my statement of the distinguishing peculiarity of Cousin's system, contained in the first edition of this work, and that in the second—namely, that I had represented it in the first edition to consist in Cousin's "distinction between the spontaneous and reflective reason," and in the second, in his "attempt to fix the infinite as a positive in knowledge." This criticism shows not only his want of deference for my judgment, but some other things besides. The intelligent and candid reader will see, however, that the two things thus put in contradiction are only two points of view of one and the same thing; it is in the "distinction between the spontaneous and reflective reason," that Cousin's assertion of

* In this connection he has a note sneering at Cousin and myself for our vanity: "Dr. Henry," he says, "may have sources of information that are not open to the public. He has taken care not to leave his readers ignorant that he is in correspondence with M. Cousin. It was hardly necessary to inform the public that he was 'indebted to M. Cousin himself for a copy of the highly eulogistic memoir from which he has compiled his biographical notices of this philosopher." The fact of my correspondence with Cousin is also sneeringly referred to in several other places. I hope candid and kindly-disposed persons will not on this account impute to me a vain-gloriousness of which I certainly was not conscious.

"the infinite as a positive in knowledge" is grounded—the former is the principle of which the latter is the consequence; moreover, the reviewer might have enabled his readers to see this in the very sentence he quotes from in the first edition, if he had quoted the whole of it; for it is there said: "in this distinction between the spontaneous and reflective intelligence; in the recognition of the former as anterior, ... and *immediately and positively cognizant of the infinite*, no less than of the finite; it is here that we find the principle which with its consequences constitutes and determines the peculiar system of M. Cousin."

In a similar spirit, and with like justice, he characterizes "the affectation and charlatanry" of the title of eclecticism, as applied to M. Cousin's philosophy, denying its fitness (after misconceiving its import), laughing at the reasons assigned for it by the author, and finally signalizing his humble editor as guilty of a "strange confusion of ideas" because I had said that the eclectic character of Cousin's philosophy "consists precisely in the pretension of applying its own distinctive principles to the criticism of all other systems, discriminating in each its part of truth and its part of error—and combining the part of truth found in every partial, exclusive, and therefore erroneous system, into a higher comprehensive system." And the contradiction he finds here is, in his view, "that the test to be applied implies the existence of a philosophical creed, and yet this creed is still to be formed from the parts of truth extracted, by the application of itself to all others!" If this were a right representation of my meaning, his point would certainly be well taken; but I said nothing which indicates that the object of the

eclectic process is to "form a creed." It is a critical method of applying to the history of philosophy a system already formed by psychological observation, the result of which will be a comprehensive system that will be found to be the counterpart of the system previously derived from the analysis of consciousness. This ought to have been clear enough; for Cousin (notwithstanding the declaration of the reviewer to the contrary) gives a complete exposition of his system, and of all that is peculiar in it, as found in the analysis of consciousness, before he applies it to the criticism of other systems as a method of eclecticism. But on this point enough is elsewhere said. I will only add that Sir William Hamilton found no difficulty in making the proper discrimination, and saw no absurdity to signalize. In fine, as to his alleged inability to "put his readers in possession of M. Cousin's complete system," I have merely to say that ample materials for doing so were before him in the two works from which he quotes. Hamilton, writing ten years earlier, found no trouble on this score.

But notwithstanding the difficulty, embarrassment, and inability he professes, the reviewer does at length proceed to an exposition of Cousin's system; but, oddly enough, he adds at the end: "it is perhaps a work of supererogation to say that it is given in the author's own phraseology, though abridged, since we are sure our readers will acquit us of the ability to construct it ourselves"! It might be asked what he means by this? That he does not understand the system he thus sets forth in the author's phraseology? By what right, then, assume to criticise it? But to the work of criticism he proceeds; and a marvelous criticism it is.

"We can now," he says, "show the reader the ground which M. Cousin's philosophy affords him for a belief in the objective existence of the world and of God," namely, in the pure affirmation or spontaneous, unreflective perception of reason.

Passing over a number of misconceptions or perversions, which it would take up too much room to signalize and expose, we come to the consequence he deduces from Cousin's doctrine: "We must, therefore," says the critic, "find this 'pure affirmation' in our consciousness, or admit, in deference to M. Cousin's logic, that it exists there, though so brightly that we can not see it, *before we can believe in any objective existence*"! This logic is to me most wonderful, going, as it does, upon an assumption contradicted in the experience of the great mass of men every day and hour—the assumption that men can not exercise faculties whose operations they do not analyze! Just as if men can not accept the truth imposed upon them by the necessary convictions of reason, even though they may not be able to state those convictions in the shape of formulated principles, and may perhaps be still less able to see at once into the fact (so very obvious, however, to the thinker) that the operations of the mind which reflection now recognizes and formulates as necessary laws of thought, or fundamental principles of belief, must have taken place in the mind anterior to reflection (else they never could have become matter for reflection), and must, therefore, primitively have been precisely of the nature Cousin assigns to them, namely, spontaneous, unreflective; and finally, just as though the necessary laws of the human mind can not be for men a ground of belief in God, even though they

should be as unable, as the critic supposes, ever to see into or be satisfied of the truth of Cousin's further speculation, by which he attempts to show that the Divine existence is not only a belief, but a cognition! It is precisely this speculation about the immediate and positive cognition of the infinite as primitively given in the spontaneous reason, that Hamilton combats; but he does not dream of deducing from it any such consequence as this reviewer's. He never imagines that it removes any of the old grounds of human faith in God; if it adds nothing, it takes nothing away. As to the rest, this is a point on which, as I have elsewhere said, there will perhaps always be a difference of opinion. Truly great men and truly profound thinkers will, however, I hope, follow the example of Hamilton and Cousin, and differ with a clear intelligence and fair treatment of each other's doctrines and arguments, and with mutual respect and admiration for each other's persons; while those who are neither truly great men, nor profound thinkers, such of them as enter into the controversy at all, will probably continue to take sides as the prejudices of education incline them, or the imagined interests of religion impel them, and will continue to display their incapacity to comprehend the great men who differ from each other, or to respect the persons of those who differ from themselves—making up too often for the want of the true philosophical spirit by the abundance of their Christian zeal in plying the *argumentum ad invidiam*, by calculated appeals to the prejudices of the unreflecting multitude. But the reviewer goes on to point out "other results of the non-subjectivity of the spontaneous reason which are more startling." Here we have the charge of panthe-

ism—a startling charge, but more startling as a grotesque perversion of the principle than as a legitimate result of it. At the same time it may be readily admitted, that in the passages quoted in this connection, there are some expressions which a person, predetermined to make out a point, might plausibly put forward as pantheistic, and which a reader predisposed to believe the charge, and not thoroughly acquainted with the author's writings, might naturally receive as such. And the same may be said of numerous passages of Holy Scripture. But to any candid and competent thinker, who proceeds upon the only fair rule of interpretation in the case of ambiguous or unguarded expressions—namely, that of explaining what an author says by its special purpose, and by what he says more officially and expressly in other places, it will be evident that these expressions, occurring where they do, are directed against the Scholastic way of considering God, which tends to make him but an abstraction instead of the Living God; and so in the unguarded fervor with which he repudiates the "dead God" of the Schoolmen, he may seem to set forth "the grosser God of pantheism."

Now, the principal passage which the reviewer quotes in proof of Cousin's pantheism, is only the latter part of a sentence, of which the first part—not quoted—expressly shows the special purport, and limits the sense of the expressions he does quote. His object is precisely to repudiate the idea of "an abstract God, a solitary king, exiled away from the creation upon the solitary throne of a silent eternity, and of an absolute existence which resembles the annihilation of existence." Then follow the expressions quoted by the reviewer:

"He is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only so far as he is cause, and cause only so far as he is substance; that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end, and center, at the summit of being and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple in word; that is to say, at the same time God and nature and humanity. In fact, if God be not every thing, he is nothing."

Now, no matter how startling these expressions may seem (and they are any thing but agreeable to me), yet thus torn from the preamble which should govern their interpretation and presented alone—the juridical mind will appreciate the remark—it is a violation of the simplest rule of just criticism to insist that they mean pantheism, and can mean nothing else, especially since Cousin elsewhere in the strongest terms combats and confutes every form of the pantheistic conception of God. The reader will find the proof of this in the additional pieces in this volume. Many others might be cited where he speaks directly on this point. I will adduce but two:

Combating pantheism (Works, 1st series, vol. ii. Course of 1818, p. 383), he says:

"God is infinite, absolutely infinite in his essence, and it is a contradiction to say that an indefinite series equals the infinite; for, after all, the indefinite is only the finite multiplied by itself. The world is a whole which has its harmony, for God could have produced only a work complete and harmonious. The harmony of the world reflects the unity of God, just as its indefinite

quantity is the defective sign of the infinitude of God. To say that the world is God, is to admit nothing but the world; it is to deny God. Give it any name you please, it is at bottom atheism."

So in his Introduction to *Pascal's Thoughts*, p. xiii., he says: "Let us speak without circumlocution. What is pantheism? It is not a disguised atheism, as it has been called. No: it is avowed atheism. To say, in the presence of this universe, vast, beautiful, magnificent as it is: God is there entire, behold God, there is no other—this is to say, as clearly as possible, that there is no God, for it is to say that the universe has not a cause essentially different from its effects." Many similar citations, as I have said, might be made.

Cousin, then, is no Pantheist. We have his explicit condemnation of it. He does not confound God with the universe. And to say that he is a pantheist in the improper sense in which the word is sometimes used, to say, that is, that he confounds the universe with God, is equally at variance with hundreds of explicit utterances of his. It would be suicidal to his system; it would be in palpable contradiction with the numerous critical confutations he has constructed against every form of resolving the universe of mind and matter into mere phenomena. It is the very scope of his philosophy to establish the objective reality and the substantial existence of the universe of mind and matter, as distinct from God.

The candid thinker will, therefore, see that the expressions quoted by the reviewer, whatever they may mean, must not be taken to mean pantheism, in the intention of their author. The attempt to harmonize them with his manifold explicit declarations, is re-

quired by the simplest rule of justice. And the candid thinker will, I apprehend, find no more difficulty in considering them as fervid, exaggerated expressions of the all-pervading presence and energy of the living God in the universe, than he does in putting the like interprétation upon many similar passages of holy Scripture. Yet it is in keeping with the characteristic spirit of the article under consideration, that the writer should speak of Cousin as "not permitting the shadow of a doubt to rest upon the pantheistical tendency of his philosophy," and of his "attempting to forestall the charge of pantheism," by the "not very creditable artifice of pronouncing it the bugbear of feeble imaginations"—thereby intimating to his readers that Cousin speaks as one having taken pantheism under his protection, and so wishing to discredit the intelligence of those who dislike it; whereas, the very reverse (as may be seen above) is the case, and Cousin, disliking it as much as they, only wishes to guard his readers from the folly of seeing pantheism in every thing, and not knowing when it is uttered or when it is combated.

Then follows a representation of Cousin's views on the question of the relative comprehensibility of the Divine being—made up partly of quotations quite unobjectionable, I apprehend, to most thinkers, but which the reviewer appears to have made because he thought they would be considered otherwise, and partly of gross perversions of Cousin's views, effected by leaving out some material part of his expression of them. But on this point the reader is referred to the last piece in this volume. In this connection the reviewer talks of the "admirable contrast between the pert self-sufficiency of M. Cousin and the humble truth-loving spirit of the

illustrious Descartes, who is honored and lauded [by Cousin] as the author of the psychological method, and the founder of the ideal school of philosophy. Cousin calls himself one of the sons of Descartes. Degenerate son of a noble sire! Compare the modest caution of the one with the all-embracing arrogance of the other." Then he gives a quotation from Descartes, containing a very sound remark, almost a philosophical commonplace, which Cousin would be the last man in the world to deny. "We could quote much," he goes on to add, "to the same effect from Leibnitz, to whom M. Cousin does homage 'as the greatest of modern philosophers.' These were men who were seeking, with passionate earnestness after truth; they were not founding new schools in philosophy. They were men of large powers and large attainments, and could afford to confess ignorance where it is folly to be wise." This of course is intended to imply that Cousin is wanting in earnestness after truth, in large powers, etc., and can not afford to confess ignorance where it is folly to be wise. It will, perhaps, be news to the learned reader that Descartes and Leibnitz were "not founding schools in philosophy;" and it may puzzle him to see why Cousin should be jeered at even if he were, as is insinuated, engaged in that business.

We are told by the reviewer "that with this for his point of departure"—his view on the relative comprehensibility and incomprehensibility of God—"it is not surprising that M. Cousin should be led to reject entirely the God of the Scriptures, and substitute in his place a shadowy abstraction"! But such a point-blank slander as this is surprising to me, even from the writer of this article. Cousin's God a shadowy abstraction!

This is the last charge in the world I should ever imagine would be made. God turned into an abstraction! It is the very thing of all others he combats. I confess myself totally unable to comprehend how any man should have any notion of what he is talking about who makes such a charge.

Next we have a long jeering comment upon Cousin's assertions about the impossibility of atheism, which, however, he takes as amounting to nothing, and in spite of which he declares Cousin to be quite as much an atheist as Leucippus, Spinoza, and La Place, only the latter were more "candid!" This is connected with some curious criticisms on the ideas of Spinoza and others about creation out of nothing, and their demonstration of its impossibility, as compared with Cousin's demonstration of its possibility and necessity, going to show that there is not a pin to choose between his ground and theirs. This will be edifying to the learned reader. On this point, of the idea of creation as necessary, enough is elsewhere said.

Again: while Cousin is charged with atheism, it is admitted that "he never fails in polite respect to religion;" but his expressions of respect and veneration are jeeringly characterized as the "deferential and smirking politeness of a French *petit maître*." So, too, it is said, "he is studiously polite to Christianity;" but his politeness is represented, in one place, as a "condescending patronage," and in another, as a *hypocritical guise*, like that of the old French Encyclopedists, assumed in order the more easily to overthrow it; "but," continues the reviewer, "unless it be to blind the eyes and evade the arm of the ecclesiastical power, which in Catholic countries holds watch over the press,

we do not see what good purpose can be effected by so thin a disguise as that assumed by M. Cousin. He surely can not imagine that the most ordinary intelligence could fail to penetrate the *flimsy hypocrisy*"! I wonder if the writer was unconscious of the enormity of this charge. I wonder if he was unaware that it was a violation of the proprieties of philosophical controversy. I wonder whether he did not know that it was an outrage upon the decencies of any kind of public debate, such as upright and honorable men every where look upon with reprobation, such as they expect to see only in the lowest organs of political party rancor. In my judgment, it will take a long time for any intelligence, ordinary or extraordinary, to see from Cousin's writings, that this atrocious charge of "hypocrisy," is one to which Cousin is justly obnoxious—his very temperament makes it incredible; on the contrary, it may readily be believed he speaks with his whole heart when he speaks (as in the preface to the last edition of his work on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good) to the young men of France on this wise: "Far be from you that sad philosophy which preaches to you materialism and atheism as doctrines to regenerate the world; they kill, it is true, but they do not regenerate. Nor listen you to those superficial spirits who give themselves out as profound thinkers, because, after Voltaire, they have discovered difficulties in Christianity; measure your progress in philosophy by your progress in tender veneration for the Gospel." They will readily believe him sincere in that noble passage (too long to quote here) in which he explains himself concerning true religion and true philosophy, as naturally and necessarily allied, differing in form, in language,

But to take a more direct instance of the way in which Cousin's hostility to divine revelation in Holy Scripture is made out. Speaking of those truths which are disclosed to us absolutely, universally, and necessarily, in the spontaneous convictions of the human mind, Cousin has these expressions, which are quoted by the reviewer: "When man refers to God the truth which he can not refer either to this world or to his own personality, he refers it to him to whom he ought to refer it; and this affirmation of truth without reflection—this inspiration—this enthusiasm—is veritable revelation. . . . . Every where, in its instinctive and spontaneous form, reason is equal to itself, in all the generations of humanity, and in all the individuals of which those different generations are composed."* Now, these sentences, I apprehend, taken in their connection, and with reference to the point on which they bear, contain nothing either strange or untrue—nothing that is not quite in harmony with what St. Paul (Rom. i. 19; ii. 14-16) is directed by special inspiration to call our attention to as a fact lying in the constitution of the human mind, and also with what St. John says, John i. 9.

But see how they strike the reviewer: "It is too plain for argument," says he, "that these principles destroy all that is peculiar or valuable in the Sacred Scriptures. The distinctive claim which they put forth of containing a revelation from God, is set aside by a similar claim in behalf of all men." Admirable logic this! Because God has revealed himself in one way, therefore he can not reveal himself in any

* All the quotations made by the reviewer from Cousin's Introduction are from Linberg's translation, Boston, 1832.

other way! Because he has made a special revelation in the Holy Scriptures, therefore he can not have made a general one in nature or in the mind of man; and so to say, as Cousin says, that he has revealed himself to all men in the constitution of their minds, and is thereby, as St. Paul says, "manifest in them," is in effect to deny that he has revealed himself in the Holy Scriptures! I do not think that this criticism of the reviewer will gain general acceptance among good thinkers, or be admitted as proving Cousin to be a subverter of the Bible. I do not think that the notion of a revelation—call it even a Divine revelation—of certain things in the spontaneous convictions of the reason which God has put into the universal heart of humanity, will be considered by our best minds as incompatible with the notion that God has also made a special revelation of certain other things in Holy Scripture. If I did, I should be sadly troubled to know on what grounds this special revelation can be authenticated to us.

But the reviewer is apparently satisfied with his logic; and so he goes on to draw out a long train of the frightful consequences of calling the spontaneous intuition of truth an inspiration, a revelation; that it makes it impossible for the truths declared by Christ and his apostles to be a revelation in any more special sense; makes the Koran and all other pretended special revelations of equal authority with the Bible; makes Strauss's Life of Jesus; makes "Marheineke and Röhr, like Herod and Pilate, agree when the Son of God is to be crucified;"—until at last, overcome with profound emotion, he cries out: "Would to God that our fellow Christians in America, before abandoning as shallow

the philosophy of the great English fathers, would take the trouble to examine the issues of the paths on which they are entering! Let us have any philosophy, however shallow, that leaves us in quiet possession of the Gospel, rather than the dark and hopeless bewilderment into which we are thrown by the deep metaphysics of Cousin." If the whole article had been written in the same strain as this; if it had been a statement, calm or pathetic, of the points wherein the writer found *his faith disturbed* by the metaphysics of Cousin (which he here pronounces deep, but which he elsewhere calls "shallow and superficial to the last degree"); if it had been made without dogmatism, invidious arguing and set effort to make the worst of every thing, and free from arrogance and contempt, odious personal charges and insinuations; I should have felt only sincere sympathy—pity mingled with respect; and I would have tried to put his disturbed mind at rest, in a provisional way at least, by showing him that as he can not mean to stand on all the "great English fathers;" seeing they are divided into two great schools mutually destructive of each other—and must make an election between them; so if he should be willing to take the truly great Reid for his guide, he may free himself from alarm, since Cousin and Reid are in entire harmony, save on the question whether our conviction of the objective existence of God be a faith or a knowledge; and, moreover, that so well persuaded is Cousin himself of this, that, as Minister of Public Instruction, he caused the writings of Reid to be made the basis of academical instruction in philosophy throughout all the colleges and schools in France.

But the respectable spirit evinced in the paragraph

just quoted, is but a transient mood. In the very next sentence, he brings down a remorseless blow on Cousin's head and on mine too, with a heavy club borrowed from the hands of Edmund Burke, wherewith he cudgeled the heads of the French infidels of his day, to the effect that we are "infidel" expounders whose expoundings he does not want, dealers in "unhallowed fire," which he will not have to light his temple withal, "smugglers of adulterated metaphysics," whose "infectious stuff" he will not have to perfume it withal. No; he "has a wide charity" he tells us, "for what seems" to him "nonsense, and can extend even an amiable and silent tolerance to the pretensions of those who utter it to be the depositaries of all wisdom. But when this nonsense begins to ape the German impiety, when it openly professes to cast off all subordination to religion, and prates in dogmatic superiority to revelation," he "can not but lift up his solemn protest against it."

Now when a man talks in this arrogant way, and brings such charges as these, and others such as we have already seen and shall see, affecting not only the opinions but the moral characters of men who have, perhaps, studied philosophy and theology as much as he, it is very important that he should be in the right in his charges; for it is not very likely nor justly to be required, that those who are thus assailed, while preserving their own self-respect, should be studious to manifest much respect for their assailant in defending themselves.

We now come to what, on the whole, I consider the worst part of the article—that which relates to Cousin's ethical principles, and contains the reviewer's mode of

making good the charge, summarily expressed in another place, that his "system erects a false standard in morals, and confounds the distinction between right and wrong." When I say the worst, I do not mean that the misconceptions or perversions of Cousin's language and meaning are greater, or the charge more monstrous, for in this respect scarcely any thing can be worse than what we have already seen; but that the misconceptions or perversions are so palpable, and the odious charge so palpably wanting in truth. Language does not contain terms more exact and clear, nor is it possible to frame terms into statements more precise, more full, more unambiguous or impossible to be mistaken in their meaning, than those in which Cousin, in almost innumerable ways and places, propounds a doctrine the very reverse of that imputed to him. I can conceive no excuse for the reviewer. He subjects himself, in my opinion, to the reprobation of every honorable man. Supposing it to be conceivable that a man, with limited acquaintance with philosophical systems, and limited ability for the critical appreciation of them, coming to the criticism of Cousin's system, under the bias of strong predetermined religious prejudices, might be able, without deliberate bad faith, to get up such a representation of Cousin's pantheism, atheism, denial of revelation and of Christianity, as we have seen; yet that any man of ordinary capacity and ordinary intelligence of the subject, with merely that before his eyes which the volume I put forth contained, should be able, from detached and garbled passages out of the volume translated by Mr. Linberg, to pronounce such a judgment on Cousin's views on moral distinctions; that he should be able to

do it in good faith, or at least without perceiving such a contradiction between his representation and the official systematic utterances of Cousin on the point, as ought to make an honest man pause—this is to me inconceivable, and I frankly say I do not believe it. I think the man guilty of slander; and I think that in the clear-sighted judgment of our Lord God, there are many inmates of the state prison less morally guilty than the slanderer. I am not one of those dainty religionists who have a greater horror of sins of infirmity of the flesh than of sins of the spirit; and I would sooner withhold my hand from the deliberate maligner, than from many a less reputable sinner in the scale of social estimation. I think our Lord feels as I do; when on earth, it was precisely upon the heads of the high religious professors of the age, the holiest separatists from publicans and sinners, that He lanched his severest denunciations: "Woe unto you scribes and pharisees;" and to those who now-a-days seek to advocate his cause by unrighteous imputations, I fancy the Lord God still, as of old, putting the stern interrogation:

> "What hast thou to do to declare my statutes?
> Thou sittest and speakest against thy brother;
> Thou slanderest thine own mother's son."

If what I have said on this point be strongly said, let it be remembered that I speak in defense of Cousin and of myself too, against a charge which, if not true, and if not undeniably made out to be true, must be held to be a slander, affecting a man's character in that which most dearly concerns a public teacher, his

moral and religious convictions. The justification of my language depends on the issue I make, that the charge is untrue and not at all justifiably made out—an issue I am ready to submit to any body of competent and impartial thinkers.

But to proceed: in many cases where the spirit of petty sneering is evident enough, it would take whole pages to expose fully the strange mixture either of misconception or of perversion by which Cousin's views are distorted into something at once odious and ridiculous. An instance may be seen in the mode by which the charge of fatalism is made out. There is not room here for the whole grotesque representation. The reviewer finds something monstrous, and at the same time laughable, in Cousin's idea that the development of the human mind in history and in philosophy should have its necessary laws, and particularly that the movement of the spirit of independence in philosophy, represented by Descartes, and carried forward by Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, should come at length to need "a great professor," because, forsooth, according to his representation of Cousin's reasoning, "Descartes was a gentleman and a soldier, Malebranche a monk, Spinoza a recluse, and Liebnitz a statesman"! But he takes care not to give Cousin's reason for saying so, which was, that these great thinkers, being what they respectively were—soldier, monk, recluse, and statesman—naturally failed to give, and did not aim to give to Cartesianism the full and regular exposition, which would "imbue new generations with its spirit by introducing it into instruction." "There was needed for Cartesianism," Cousin concludes, "a great professor: such is the place and

destiny of Wolff." It seems to me there is nothing here that smacks either of "fatalism" or of any thing ridiculous. But perhaps, after all, it was the sting in the tail of the critic's representation that pleased him most; for, to Cousin's statement of the need of a great professor, such as Wolff, the reviewer adds: "the inference is obvious. There still remained a necessity in the philosophy of the age for a 'Peer of France;' quere: does the same principle of necessary emanation from the age and circumstances hold in the case of translators? Or could M. Cousin, by an inverse method, declare the horoscope of his admirers?" This is nice! I make no defense of Cousin; but I must say, I really do not think it right to jeer at me for having translated some of his writings. But still unsatisfied, the critic goes on to get another cut at Cousin, by showing that he constructed his scheme of fatalism with all its expositions, in order to prove not only the necessity of his elevation to the peerage, but also that he is a "great man," because he is a "great philosopher," because he has "succeeded," and finally, because he is "a fatalist, as all great men are," and the critic thinks "he has given sufficient proof that he labors under no lack of this qualification." This again is nice and amiable.

But at this stage of his progress the reviewer gets wrought up to too much emotion to find vent in jeers and covert sneers; and so he declares in good round dogmatic terms, that "except the philosophy of the absolute, few things can be imagined more ludicrously and disgustingly absurd than the revelations of Jacob Behmen." And then we have a long rigmarole of scraps of second-hand learning, to prove the identity

of Behmenism with Schellingism, and of both with the ancient Gnosticism, Oriental Soofeism, Buddhism, and all other pantheistic mysticisms—all for the purpose of conveying the imputation (yet not attempting to establish it) that Cousin's philosophy is of the same sort; although the contrary may be seen in the fact, that one of the clearest expositions of the Oriental philosophy, in all its systems, and of the errors in each, is to be found in Cousin's History of Philosophy. The critic confesses, with much complacency, his utter inability to comprehend all the stuff that he expounds, but thinks that "it is, however, the happy faculty of the absolute philosophers, the Behmenites, the Gnostics, the Soofies, the Buddhists, and—a few Americans!" Among the latter I suppose I am to consider myself intended. In reply I have only to say, I hope I shall never undertake to expound what I do not at least think I understand; perhaps I may be pardoned in so far retorting the sneer as to say, after Coleridge's fashion, that while there are some great writers of whose understanding I am ignorant, there are others whose ignorance I understand.

After all this, it is not surprising that he comes out severely upon the public institutions that have introduced this book into instruction. He would like to have their "names made known to the public." He would like it, in the first place, because he "would like to know which of our public seminaries of education has so far distinguished itself in point of science as to take, for its text-book on mental philosophy, an unmethodized set of criticisms on Locke;" with more of the like stuff, to which no answer is here needful for those who will look at what I have said in the

preface that stands first in order in this volume, and in the introduction that follows; only I may here point out the untruth of the assertion about "an immethodized set of criticisms." The Examination of Locke is one of the most perfectly methodized criticisms in the world.

But, in the next place, he wants the "names of these colleges made known to the public," that it may be known "what college or university *dares* assume the responsibility of instilling the principles of this book into the young men committed to its care." "Every parent and guardian in the land has an interest in knowing," in order, I suppose, that they may beware where they send their sons and wards, if they do not send them to Princeton.

There is something decidedly impressive and potential in this. Those colleges which have not been shamed by the jeers, nor overawed by the threats emanating from this American Vatican, have reason perhaps to rejoice that there is not, in this country, an "arm of ecclesiastical power" like that "which" according to the reviewer's peculiar figurative, but delicate and cordial-seeming euphuism—"in [Roman] Catholic countries, keeps watch over the press," and especially that its heavy hand is not at the will of this Princeton reviewer.

Finally, to crown the summit of this vast pile of odium he has built up, we have a quantity of transcendental cloud and moonshine out of Ralph Waldo Emerson, which is represented to be nothing but Cousinism, and which frightened the propriety of the old school Unitarians; and in the clear obscure of which I am adroitly made to loom forth as the guilty introducer

of doctrines banned alike by all reputable persons, heterodox as well as orthodox, and so one necessarily doomed to Coventry by all; and the only excuse for me is found in the fact, that I "did not know what" I "was doing"—that "fascinated by the first charms of this new philosophy, and dazzled by the brilliancy of a correspondence with a peer of France," I was "not able to see the end from the beginning."

Presuming, however, that my vanity, in being "consecrated by no less a personage than M. Cousin to the duty of reanimating our philosophy," would impel me to go on in the pernicious work of spreading error, the reviewer declares he "will watch" my "labors." His watching has given him little to see. Indolently averse to the labor of writing, without ambition for the honors of authorship, and absorbed in the twofold duty of a professor and a clergyman, I have published under my own name but little of any sort, during this long interval, and nothing in philosophy, save a manual of its history for the use of my classes, translated from the French, to which I added a continuation, including the history of philosophy in the nineteenth century, laborious indeed in preparation, but unpretending in form, a work for which I am naturally gratified to know that I have been kindly and respectfully spoken of by Sir William Hamilton, but which has not, so far as I am aware, attracted the attention of the Princeton reviewer. The scene of my philosophical labors during this long period has been my lecture-room. There, until failing health broke me off from all public work, I have labored with all my mind and heart to form right-minded and right-hearted young men, to imbue them not only with the principles of a sound specu-

lative and ethical philosophy, but with the true philosophical spirit. The fruits of my labors are in the minds and hearts of the hundreds of young men who have gone out from my teaching; and the rich reward of my labors is in the conviction I have that they know I tried to do them good and did do them good, and in the grateful affection in which I know they hold me.

The reader has thus seen that the writer of the article in the *Princeton Review*, charges Cousin directly with being a pantheist, a fatalist, a denier of moral distinctions, an atheist, "openly professing to cast off all subordination to religion," a rejecter of revelation and of Christianity—charges made in the very teeth of Cousin's express assertions to the contrary—charges, the utter and monstrous falsehood of which may be seen in this volume.

The reader has seen, also, that by jeering insinuations or direct imputations, he is accused of the most odious and contemptible vanity, of pert self-sufficiency and conceit, of bad temper, of want of earnestness in search of truth, of discreditable artifice, of not being above slippery and deceptive evasion, and finally of hypocrisy, and that too of a sort which every honorable man must pronounce to be the most abominable.

And in all this accumulated odium, I am made to share—held up to public reprobation—as the guilty introducer of the monstrous writings of this wretched man into the country, and thus, in conjunction with the guilty colleges that have adopted them, poisoning the sources from whence the young men of the country draw the nurture of their minds; as being, besides, a

contemptibly vain-glorious meddler with matters beyond my reach; for whose guilt, indeed, the only excuse is to be found in the vanity that blinded me and the stupidity that incapacitated me from knowing what I was doing.

My main purpose has been to signalize the spirit and temper of the article in its contrast with that of Sir William Hamilton's; and bad as the impression I have conveyed may be, I assure the reader it is not one half as bad as the reading of the whole article itself will produce. Something also of the character of the article, as a philosophical discussion, and of the writer's competency to engage in the criticism of such questions, I have incidentally shown; but *how* bad, how very bad the article is, as a whole, in these respects, I have not attempted to show. Nothing can adequately show it but the whole article itself—nor that except to a true thinker, accurately acquainted with Cousin's system, and with the history of philosophy in all its great systems. Such a person, and only such a person, can perfectly see how thoroughly wanting in any respectable quality, as a philosophical criticism, this article is. Enough however has, I trust, been made evident to the intelligent reader to justify the terms in which I characterized the article in the preface to the third edition.

I have prolonged these remarks far beyond the limits I proposed. I hope indulgence will be granted to their length and to the personal feelings I have just expressed, if it is kindly considered what recollections and reflections the reading again, after the lapse of so many years, of such a virulent attack, not only upon Cousin, but upon myself, would naturally awaken. I was then

a young man just entering upon the career of public instruction, in the University of New York. The article was calculated, if I ought not to say designed, to overwhelm me with odium. It was fitted, too, to compromise the interests of the institution in which I held the Chair of Philosophy. It did not injure me in the estimation of my colleagues; they knew me. That it did not render my position untenable; that I kept it for thirteen years; as long as I was able to discharge its duties, is due to the intelligence and candor, the kindness and firmness which prevailed in the body of my constituents.

I have only to add that there are other considerations bearing upon the interests of truth, which may serve as a justification for these remarks. It is the misfortune of philosophy, especially among us, that such an immense proportion of the eminent ability of the country is drawn away and absorbed by the more stirring activities of practical life. Comparatively few, except among the clergy, either know or care for the philosophical discussions that arise; while of the clergy, a large proportion, destitute, perhaps, of any interest in philosophical questions, except as they bear upon religious doctrines, and with very little of that interest, with no time to study them thoroughly, either in themselves or in their relations to theology; just adopt implicitly the opinions of those who set up as authorities and guides; and so it comes to pass, that under the nightmare-pressure of an ignorant but tyrannical ecclesiastical opinion, those who can think dare not let themselves think, or if they think, dare not give free utterance to their thought, for fear of encountering in their professional, social, and material relations, a martyrdom quite as appalling to

the sensitive soul as the old stake and faggot. Let us hope for the prevalence of a better spirit. To promote it, in the limited sphere of my labors, has been the great object of my life.

C. S. Henry.

New York, December 1, 1855.

INTRODUCTION.

In France, in the eighteenth century, the principles of the philosophy of Locke were the most completely developed and most boldly carried out to their final consequences. From France, too, has come, in the nineteenth century, the most regular, complete, and thorough examination and refutation of them—contained in the following lectures of M. Cousin. This circumstance may render it proper to connect, with the brief notices of the life and philosophical labors of M. Cousin here intended to be given, a few remarks upon the history of philosophy in France from the time of Locke.

At the time when the influence of the Cartesian philosophy in France was giving way to the new spirit of the eighteenth century, nothing was more natural than the ready reception of the system of Locke, claiming as it did—and to a certain extent, justly—to be a fruit of the movement of independence and of the experimental method. Thus put upon the road of Empiricism, the activity of the French mind continued to develop its principles, and carry out its consequences to their last results.* Condillac, ex-

* The term *Empiricism*, as applied to the system of Locke, may require, for younger students, some explanation; because it is possibly liable to be confounded with the more familiar popular use of the word. As a philosophical term it is not used in any invidious sense; but merely to designate a system which makes *Experience* (ἐμπειρία) the exclusive

aggerating the already partial and defective, and therefore erroneous principles of the Empiricism of Locke, rejected reflection, or natural consciousness, as one of the sources of knowledge; and analyzed all the phenomena of the mind, into forms of sensation. By the admirable logical precision, the clearness and perfect system which he gave to his analysis, he became the metaphysician and acknowledged chief of this new school; while Helvetius, d'Holbach, and others, carried it boldly out to the Materialism, Fatalism, and Atheism, which are its legitimate moral consequences. From that period, Sensualism, as a philosophical theory, maintained an almost exclusive predominance. Exceptions to this remark are scarcely to be met with; and those that may be regarded as such, were merely the fragmentary outbreakings of a higher inspiration than Sensualism could supply, not the regular and scientific exposition of a better system.

Sensualism was the reigning doctrine. All knowledge and truth were held to be derived from Experience; and the domain of Experience was limited exclusively to Sensation. The influence of this doctrine extended throughout every department of intellectual activity—art, morals, politics, and religion, no less than the physical and economical sciences. It became, according to Damiron, "a new faith, which was preached by the *philosophes*, as its priests and doctors; and, among all ranks, and first, among the higher orders, including the clergy, it superseded the for-

source of knowledge. The fundamental principle of the system of Locke is that all human knowledge is derived from Experience. With Locke, Experience was twofold—consisting of Sensation and Reflection.

In like manner, *Sensualism*, in philosophical language, is taken in no bad signification. The French philosophers rejected Reflection as a source of knowledge, and analysed all human ideas into *sensation* as their sole principle. Hence the terms Sensualism, and the Sensual School, to distinguish it from the Empiricism of Locke.

gotten or ill-taught doctrines of Christianity. It was in all books, in all conversations; and, as a decisive proof of its conquest and credit, passed into instruction, and for many years before the Revolution, it had taken every where, in the provinces as well as in Paris, the place of the old routine of education."*

Subsequently, the exciting and terrific scenes of the Revolution occupied all minds; the speculations which had, in no small degree, prepared the way for those scenes, gave place to the absorbing interest of that period. Philosophy, in its more extended sense, was abandoned; all speculation was directed toward political theories, to the neglect of science, and even of public instruction; and nothing was done in the cultivation of philosophy, until 1795.

At that time, the reign of violence began to give way to something like order and repose. With this return to comparative quiet, the philosophical spirit began to reawaken. It was natural, however, that this movement should recommence where it had been arrested—namely, with Sensualism.

The organization of the *Institute* by the Directory, contributed to renew and extend the philosophy of Condillac, and to make it in some sort the doctrine of government, the philosophy of the state. During this period, we have several works produced in the spirit of the Sensual system —among the most important of which may be named the *Rapports du Physique et du Moral* of Cabanis, and the *Ideology* of M. Destutt de Tracy; and by a strange fortune, the word Ideology became in France the distinctive appellation of the doctrine of exclusive Sensualism. From this time to the Consulate, we may trace a lively philosophical activity, though always in the direction of Sensualism. Hitherto, if any opposition to it had appeared, it was indirect and literary, rather than scientific. It may be found

* Damiron, *Histoire de la Philosophie en France au 19me siècle.*

in writers of sentiment, such as St. Pierre, rather than in works of reflection.

Thus, up to the time of the Empire, there was in strictness no philosophy opposed to the Sensual system. But from this period the tokens of a reaction become more distinct. Still, as is entirely natural, it manifested itself at first and most clearly in works of imagination and sentiment, in poetry and eloquence, rather than by scientific exposition.

This reaction was favored by Napoleon, though not from any sympathy with the direction which the movement against Sensualism afterward displayed. From the cast of his mind and habits of education, and partly also from motives of policy, the Emperor had a strong dislike to all metaphysical and moral speculations, and did all in his power to discredit Ideology, which was then the exclusive form of speculation. When he reorganized the Institute, he excluded that class of studies; and in every way endeavored to repress their pursuit, and to excite the cultivation of the mathematical and physical sciences. Thus, under the Empire, the philosophy of Condillac sensibly declined. It no longer produced important works; its former authorities lost in credit; and there was no longer the brilliant propagation of its doctrines which distinguished the preceding periods.

There was still another cause of the decline of Sensualism. It was in the character of several works written about this period, by writers avowedly belonging to the school of Condillac; but who, by the distinctions and modifications which they introduced, actually favored a contrary doctrine. Among the most important of these works, may be named the Lectures of *M. Laromiguière.* By distinguishing between the *idea* and the *sensation*, he makes the latter the *matter*, and the first the *form received;* and, this form is given by the intellectual activity. This activity is therefore admitted as an original attribute of the mind, and a coordinate source of knowledge; which

is certainly contrary to the exclusive origin in sensation. Laromiguière, therefore, comes much nearer in this respect, to Reid, and particularly to Kant, than to his master Condillac.

A little subsequently to this time, we come to *Royer-Collard.* Distinguished by eminent ability in every department, this celebrated man appeared in open and systematic opposition to Sensualism. From 1811 to 1814, as the disciple and expounder of Reid, he advocated the doctrines of the Scottish philosopher, and annihilated the exclusive pretensions of the Sensual school to be the last word and the highest result of philosophy. The able translation of Reid's works, and of Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, by *Jouffroy*, contributed still further to extend the reaction against the system of Condillac. From the time when Royer-Collard commenced his lectures to the present day, and through the impulse which he imparted, philosophy has been cultivated with the most lively activity, by many of the finest spirits in France. Of these, some carrying the zeal they had imbibed from their master into a still more extended sphere, pursued their investigations into the modern German speculations, which had already attracted some attention, and exerted some influence, through the writings of Madam de Stäel, the expositions of Villiers, and others.

The reign of Sensualism was thus at an end. It came to be looked upon with as great a degree of aversion and contempt, as it formerly enjoyed of credit and authority. Its few partisans were almost exclusively to be found among the naturalists and physicians. In the only important work which we have seen and the only one, we believe, recently written, in the interest of Materialism—*Sur l'Irritation et la Folie*, by Broussais—the author complains of the injustice and prejudice with which the once predominant doctrines of Sensualism were regarded. In truth, nearly all the names of eminence and celebrity

in every department of intellectual activity, are ranged on the side of a spiritual philosophy. Its influence pervades almost all the celebrated works that have appeared for forty years, in Art, in History, and in Literature generally.

Among those who imbibed and have contributed to extend the spirit of this new activity in philosophy, there is no one who occupies so brilliant a position, or has exerted so great an influence as VICTOR COUSIN. This celebrated philosopher was born at Paris, November 28, 1792. He was educated at the *Lycée Charlemagne*, where he distinguished himself by his talents and by his industry. At this period, under the Empire, it was the policy of the government to attach to itself every sort of youthful talent by opening different careers in the service of the state to those who distinguished themselves in the colleges of Paris. Cousin having taken the highest prizes, entitled himself to exemption from the conscription and to the place of auditor to the Council of State, with a handsome salary. But an ardent love of study prevailed over every other consideration, and led him to decline this opening to civil employments and honors. Through the influence of M. Gueroult, the translator of Pliny, and honorary counselor of the University, who had known him, and watched his course with friendly interest, he was decided to devote himself to the profession of public instruction. His name was accordingly inscribed the first on the list of the pupils admitted at the Normal School, then organized under the direction of M. Gueroult. It was in 1810, at the age of eighteen, that Cousin entered the Normal School, which he never afterward quitted, and at the head of which he was placed, after the revolution of 1830. After passing two years there as a pupil, he was appointed Instructor in Literature, at the close of the year 1812; and was made Master of the Conferences in 1814, in the place of M. Villemain.

He had not yet however found his true sphere, the proper

theater for his activity. He has himself described, in the preface to the second edition of his *Philosophical Fragments*, the impressions made upon his mind, upon first entering the Normal School, by the lectures of M. Laromiguière, and shortly afterward, by those of M. Royer-Collard. From that moment he gave up his whole heart to philosophy. But his patron, M. Gueroult, the principal of the Normal School, entertained very different views for him, and after some fruitless struggles, M. Cousin found that his success as a teacher of literature, condemned him to that department of instruction. He remained, however, none the less warmly attached to his favorite science; and at length all his wishes were crowned; for when at the close of the year 1815, M. Royer-Collard was placed by the new government at the head of the University, he appointed Cousin to succeed himself as Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Literature.

Henceforth M. Cousin devoted himself entirely to philosophy—giving instruction both at the University and at the Normal School. For five years he bore the weight of this double duty. His lectures at the University gave a strong impulse to the public mind, and excited a more general taste for philosophical studies; while his instructions at the Normal School formed that body of young men who have since so well and ably seconded his labors.

In 1817 and 1818, he passed his vacations in traveling in Germany, for the purpose of studying the philosophy of that country. In 1820 he made a journey to the north of Italy, in order to collate the manuscripts of the Ambrosian Library and the Library of St. Mark, with reference to his projected edition of the unpublished works of Proclus. But on his return he found a great change in the condition of affairs in France. Royer-Collard was no longer at the head of the University; he had been dismissed from the council of state, along with M. Guizot; and an adverse influence had gained possession of the government and of

public instruction. Our young professor fell under the suspicion of liberalism in politics; his course of lectures was suspended, and this suspension continued for seven years. In 1822 the Normal School was suppressed. During this long disgrace, M. Cousin, though deprived of all public employment, and without any private fortune, did not abandon his vocation as a philosopher. He had hitherto served the cause of philosophy by his teachings; he now continued to serve it by his writings, which at the same time maintained and increased his reputation.

In 1824, he traveled in Germany with the son of Marshall Lannes, the Duke of Montobello. Silenced in his own country by the ultra-royalists, his brilliant reputation, and his well-known liberal principles alarmed the Prussian government, which sent police officers into Saxony, and arrested him at Dresden. He was carried to Berlin where he was kept in prison for several months. By the interposition of the celebrated Hegel, at that time Professor of Philosophy and his personal friend, Cousin obtained his release. This kindness Cousin acknowledges with great warmth in his beautiful and elegant dedication to Hegel of the translation of the Gorgias. It turned out that his arrest was due to the intrigues of the French Jesuits.

Upon his return to France, in 1825, he continued still out of favor with the government, and was not permitted to resume his lectures. But with the elections of 1827 came the overthrow of the Villèle administration; and under the presidency of Royer-Collard and the ministry of M. de Martignac, Cousin, together with M. Guizot, was re-established in his Chair in the Faculty of Literature. He re-appeared there and continued to lecture down to 1830 with a brilliant success which has perhaps never been equaled at any period in the history of philosophical teaching. We must go back to the days of Abelard to find any thing like the numerous and enthusiastic body of

auditors that attended the courses of M. Cousin. "The instruction, though so remarkable for splendor and brilliancy, was equally remarkable for moderation, in religion, in politics, in every thing. The lectures of Cousin, as well as those of his colleages Guizot and Villemain, were taken down by stenographers, printed, and circulated, almost as soon as they were delivered; and in a few days after the two thousand auditors had heard them at the Sorbonne, the friends of philosophy from one end of France to the other received them, and might thus be said to have been present at the lectures of this illustrious triumvirate."

At the Revolution of 1830, M.Cousin, with his high reputation, his great talents as an orator, his character for energy, and the popularity he had gained in the *Quartier Latin* during the celebrated Three Days, might easily have secured a seat in the Chamber of Deputies, and entered upon a political career, as did his two colleagues M. Guizot and M. Villemain, and his friend M. Thiers. But Cousin declared his resolution to remain faithful to philosophy. "Politics," said he at that time, "are but an episode in my life; the great current of my existence belongs to philosophy." Accordingly the only change he was willing to yield to, was to pass, according to the strictest forms of University promotion, from the Faculty of Literature to the Royal Council of Public Instruction, and to the principal direction of the Normal School, which he re-established and organized. In order to provide a place for M. Jouffroy, one of his most able pupils, he exchanged the Chair of the History of Modern Philosophy, for that of the History of Ancient Philosophy, of which he continued the titular incumbent. He refused to accept any political office; and although he had preserved the intimate confidence of his old friends, who were now become powerful ministers, he adhered closely to the University, and devoted his active mind to the continuation of his philosophical publications which his lectures had suspended.

But there is another career in which, after 1830, he acquired nearly as much reputation, and a still more undisputed popularity. We refer to his services in behalf of Education.

The whole system of public instruction in France is under the direction of the government, and all the different schools, from the lowest to the highest, compose, with the Ministry of Public Instruction, what is called the *University of France*. To enlarge the framework of the University, without deforming it, and to perfect the system in all its details, became the object of Cousin's earnest endeavors from the time when he became a member of the Council of Instruction. But he particularly occupied himself with two principal objects that were specially intrusted to him, the organization and direction of the Normal Schools, and the arrangement of the philosophical studies in the Faculties, and in the Royal, and Communal Colleges. Of the Normal School, he is the author of the present Constitution, as well as of its admirable plan of studies—remarkable for extreme simplicity, and at the same time uniting the twofold excellence of being both systematic and practical. This plan of study, which may serve as a model for all Normal Schools, consists in dividing the course into three years. The first year, the pupils are treated as young men just come from the colleges; and the object is to go over, systematize, and perfect the instruction already received, without rising much above it. The second year, they are regarded as scholars, whose knowledge is to be enlarged and cultivated in every direction, as if they were future candidates for the different academies of the Institute. The third year, the pupils are no longer treated as students come from the colleges whose course of study is to be reviewed, nor as men of letters in the general sense of the word, but as professors, who are to be instructed, not in the sciences, but in the art of teaching them. We have not space to explain the system

by which, in the course of three years, the peculiar talents and aptitudes of the pupils are brought out, by which their particular destination for the different departments of public instruction may be indicated.

For the improvement of philosophical instruction, M. Cousin arranged a system no less perfect, the details of which could not here be easily explained. The result, however, has been that the methods of teaching philosophy in the colleges have been greatly improved, and a new zeal in the study of it every where awakened.

There is another department of public instruction, even more important perhaps, in which M. Cousin has rendered important public service, and acquired a still stronger claim to the gratitude of the country. We mean popular education.

After organizing the Normal School, and the plan of instruction in philosophy, his attention was seriously taken up with primary instruction. In 1831, he solicited and received from the French government and from M. de Montalivet, then minister of Public Instruction, a special mission for examining the institutions for public instruction in Germany. He visited and inspected all the public establishments of Frankfort; of the Grand Duchy of Weimar; of Saxony, particularly of Leipsic; of Prussia, of Berlin especially. His report to the government made two quarto volumes. This report has excited the admiration of accomplished teachers; has been translated into several languages; and attracted general attention throughout Europe. It was moreover the basis of the law passed in 1833, under the ministry of M. Guizot, and which M. Cousin brought forward in the Chamber of Peers. He then devoted himself to perfecting all the regulations and details which the passage of that law rendered requisite. Besides his Report on Primary Instruction in Germany, he gave, subsequently, a memior on the Secondary Instruction of Prussia, which became the basis of a project for a law presented to the Chamber of Peers.

The eminent services of Cousin in the cause of truth and letters, had long pointed him out as a candidate for the French Academy; of which he was elected a member, after the death of M. Fourier. Subsequently he was chosen a member of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences; and here, in the philosophical section, he displayed his characteristic activity and zeal, in a variety of memoirs and reports.

When the new law was passed, by which members of the Institute became eligible to the peerage, Cousin was among the first persons promoted by the king to that dignity. He was made a peer of France, Oct. 1832, along with De Sacy, Thenard, and Villemain. But he rarely took any part in the discussions of that body except on some question relating to public instruction.

In 1840 he was made Minister of Public Instruction. Being now at the head of this important department of the government, he was in a position to exert himself still more beneficially for the great interests to which his whole life had been devoted; but, of the details of his labors I am not able to speak. From the time when he went out of office, he has, I believe, lived retired from public life, occupied in his favorite studies and in completing, revising, and perfecting his numerous works.

The following is a list of Cousin's works according to the last revised and corrected edition of them:

First Series.—History of Modern Philosophy, Lectures from 1815 to 1821. 5 vols.

Second Series.—History of Modern Philosophy, Lectures from 1828 to 1830. 3 vols.

Third Series.—Philosophical Fragments, as a sequel to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. 4 vols. To this third series is attached the Fragments on the Cartesian Philosophy. 1 vol.

Fourth Series.—Literature. 3 vols. 1st. vol., Blaise

Pascal; 2d. vol., Jacqueline Pascal; 3d. vol., Literary Fragments.

Fifth Series.—Public Instruction. On Public Instruction in Germany. 2 vols. On Public Instruction in Holland. 1 vol. On Public Instruction in France under the Government of July. 3 vols.

Sixth Series.—Political Discourses, with an Introduction on the Principles of the French Revolution, and of Representative Government. 1 vol.

Editions and Translations.—Manual of the History of Philosophy, translated from the German of Tennemann. 2 vols. 8vo. Complete Works of Plato. 13 vols. 8vo. Procli Opera inedita. 6 vols. 8vo. Abelardi Opera. 2 vols. 4to. The Unpublished Works of Abelard. 1 vol. 4to. Complete Works of Descartes. 11 vols. 8vo. Philosophical Works of P. André. 1 vol. 12mo. Philosophical Works of M. de Biran. 4 vols. 8vo.

Of the philosophical system of M. Cousin a brief exposition was given in the introduction to the first edition of this work, which is rendered unnecessary by the plan of the present edition. In place of it, I have preferred to let the author speak in his own words in the additional pieces which follow the critical examination of Locke, and which, besides elucidating his general system, contain also a fuller explanation of some points treated in the examination, and give his systematic determination of several of the most important questions in philosophy. Every thing therefore, that is necessary to an accurate comprehension of his system, especially in all that is peculiar to it, may be easily gathered from this volume. If it is not unfolded precisely in the order and with the duly proportioned development of a regular treatise, yet all its leading ideas, its constituent principles and their connection and coordination into a systematic whole, may be seen with suf-

ficient clearness to render an extended exposition needless. I shall therefore confine myself here to a few general observations which I think important to be borne in mind.

In the first place, there is a misconception of the nature of Cousin's philosophy to be guarded against, which might at first thought connect itself with the term eclecticism commonly applied to it. On the one hand it should not be confounded in advance with the Alexandrian school which, though professing the principle of eclecticism, belongs to the class of systems denominated by Cousin, the mystical; nor, on the other hand, should it be conceived as the absence of system, or the gross mixture of all systems, the impossible project of bringing together all doctrines, all opinions, which can only result in the confusion of inconsistent principles without scientific unity and connection. Nor, again, is it the arbitrary selecting and combining of doctrines and notions on the grounds of taste and preference.

On the contrary, eclecticism, as Cousin holds it, supposes a system, sets out with a system, and applies a system. It takes a system as the criterion of the truth or falsehood of all actual systems which it subjects to historical and critical analysis.

This system is properly called Rational Psychology: psychology, because although psychology is not the whole of philosophy, it is its foundation, the point from which it sets out, and the principle which contains in itself the whole of philosophy; rational, because in the psychological analysis of the facts of consciousness, not only is the sensibility found with its sensations individual, contingent, variable, but also reason, and, in the psychological analysis of reason, rational principles which to the view of reflection are marked with the character of universal and necessary convictions of the human mind, and which impose themselves upon the intelligence not merely as necessary forms of thought, but also as absolute truths, truths in themselves

independent of our intelligence, and so legitimately conduct us to a sphere of reality lying beyond ourselves. Rational Psychology, therefore, contains not only psychology proper, but also ontology, and logic which explains and justifies the passage from psychology to ontology; it contains in short, the whole of philosophy.

Now it is in relation to the application of Rational Psychology to the history of philosophy, that Cousin denominates his system eclecticism. Eclecticism is a method rather than a system: it is the method by which a system is applied to the criticism of all other systems. It goes upon the ground that a truly complete and correct system of philosophy will explain the whole history of philosophy, and will be itself justified by the history of philosophy. For, all the great systems that have appeared in history, however subversive of each other, contain each some portion of truth, and consequently something in common with the comprehensive system by which they are judged. Eclecticism is therefore a method both philosophical and historical. Rational Psychology at once explains and is verified by the history of philosophy. Three things are accordingly to be distinguished in electicism: its starting-point, its processes, and its end; or, in other words, its principle, its instruments, and its results. It supposes a system as its starting-point and clew through the labyrinth of history, its instrument is a rigid criticism sustained on solid and extensive erudition; its primary result is the decomposition of all systems; and its final result the reconstruction from their materials of a new system which shall be a complete representation of human consciousness as unfolded in history, and, at the same time correspond to the results of rational psychology.*

* If Dr. Hickok (in his *Rational Psychology*, p. 71), means to characterize Cousin's eclecticism as an "arbitrary patchwork" and an "arrogant plundering" of other systems without any "law of constructing," he has totally misconceived Cousin's views, and that, for such a man as

A few remarks in the next place may be made in regard to the distinguishing peculiarity of Cousin's system: for in a general view it presents but one point by which it is specially distinguished from all other systems.

In adopting the method of internal observation and in making psychology the basis of all philosophy Cousin agrees with Locke, and the Sensualistic School, with Reid and the Scottish School and with Kant, and differs from Schelling and the later Germans; but in refusing to limit philosophy within the sphere of psychology and in contending for a philosophy of the absolute and infinite, he differs from Locke, Reid and Kant, and agrees with Schelling. But while he agrees with Schelling in making the absolute and infinite a positive in knowledge, he differs fundamentally from him in the mode of attaining it. Cousin finds it in consciousness; Schelling in a faculty transcending consciousness; Cousin in spontaneous reason; Schelling in intellectual intuition, which being, according to his determination, a faculty out of consciousness, is a pure hypothesis.

The fundamental peculiarity therefore of the system of Cousin consists not merely in making the absolute and infinite a matter of positive cognition, but in holding the twofold distinction of reason into spontaneous and reflective, and making the former, as impersonal and therefore not

Dr. Hickok, is explicable only by supposing he did not give himself time to ascertain them. He may be well assured that Cousin would agree with him as to every one of the conditions demanded for a legitimate eclecticism. It is not absolutely clear from his way of expressing himself, whether Dr. Hickok thought otherwise, whether he intended by his remarks to characterize Cousin's eclecticism, or such a process of arbitrary picking and choosing as the word might naturally seem to imply.

As to the other point on which he expresses a decided opinion, namely Cousin's view of the necessity of creation and the consequences it involves, I have need here only to observe that Dr. Hickok entirely mistakes the sense in which the word necessity is used by Cousin, and that it entails neither fatalism nor pantheism.

subjective, this faculty of immediately knowing the absolute and infinite. The spontaneous reason apprehends the absolute and infinite by an act of positive cognition; it reveals them in consciousness without thereby making them merely subjective.

Now this is undoubtedly the great problem of speculative inquiry, the problem of problems in philosophy, namely: whether there can be any objective knowledge of the unconditioned; or, in other words: whether philosophy is possible considered as any thing more than the observation and analysis of the phenomena of consciousness. The objective reality of the infinite and absolute may, however, be admitted on either ground. Reid and Kant admit the existence of God on the ground of the necessary convictions of the reason (we need not here advert to the differences in their modes of arriving at their result); Cousin admits the Divine existence on the ground of positive knowledge. The former attain to God by Faith; Cousin by Cognition. Reid says: I believe in God because the necessary laws of thought oblige me to believe in what I can not know; Cousin says: I believe in God, as I do in my own soul, because I know the former as well as the latter in that primitive, unreflective synthesis of thought—that natural realism—in which quality and substance, the finite and the infinite are both at once given as cognizable objects, cognizable under conditions which subsequent reflection indeed recognizes as necessary laws of thought.

Now, all this in a practical point of view, may be considered as amounting to the unimportant verbal question, whether our conviction of the Divine existence be a belief or a knowledge. But in a speculative point of view, with reference to a theoretical system and to the question how far philosophy can go, the difference is very material. On this question great men and profound thinkers have differed, and will probably continue to differ—perhaps to the end of time; perhaps not. Meantime, whatever may be

thought of Cousin's doctrine on this question, a high interest attaches to his labors as an expounder of the history of philosophy. His profound and accurate acquaintance with the whole range of philosophical learning, his exact and just comprehension of philosophical doctrines and systems, and his lucid and faithful exposition of them, will certainly be appreciated by all competent judges. In general critical ability and particularly in the talent for analysis, he has few equals and no superior.*

We now give some account of the course of lectures on the *History of Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century*, of which this volume contains a part. It must, however, be limited to the briefest indications.

Having, in his *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, explained the scope and method, the system and general spirit of his instruction, M. Cousin proceeds, in the lectures on the philosophy of the eighteenth century, to elucidate, extend, and confirm the historical principles before developed, by applying them to the eighteenth century. It is his principle, that the philosophy of an age proceeds from all the elements of which the age is composed; hence the necessity of studying the philosophy of the eighteenth century, first in the *general history* of that period.

The general character of the eighteenth century resembles that of the two preceding centuries, inasmuch as it

* On this question concerning the absolute, I am bound to refer the reader to an extended refutation of the doctrine of Cousin attempted by Sir William Hamilton, originally published in the *Edinburg Review*, 1829, and contained in his *Discussions on Philosophy*, etc., Lond. 1852, p. 1; and also to be found in the American reprint, edited by Mr. Wight, under the title of "*Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton*," New York, 1855, p. 441. A noble production by a worthy antagonist of Cousin—worthy to be his antagonist by his wonderful learning, his prodigious speculative power, and above all, by his ability to respect and admire an opponent equal to that which distinguishes Cousin himself.

continues the characteristic movement of that period; it differs from it, only as it develops that movement on a larger scale. The middle ages was the reign of authority—every thing was fixed and controlled; the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries commenced a new movement, in the spirit of independence; it was the age of conflict and revolution. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries undermined and shook the middle ages. The mission of the eighteenth century was to continue and complete that movement—to overthrow and put an end to the middle ages.

This mission determines the general spirit of the eighteenth century. This spirit is displayed in all the great manifestations of the age—political—moral—religious—literary—and scientific. In all these respects, there is a diminution of the powers and influences which predominated in the middle ages, and, finally, the extension and predominance of new and unknown powers and influences. The spirit of the eighteenth century is a spirit of independence, of scrutiny, of analysis, in regard to all things. This movement began obscurely, and proceeded with a comparatively slow and latent progress at first, but with a constantly accelerating march toward the close of the period.

The general character of the *philosophy* of the eighteenth century is determined by the general character of the period. The philosophy of this epoch likewise continues, develops, and completes the philosophical movement of the former period. This movement was in the reaction against the spirit of authority in philosophy which predominated in the middle ages. This reaction—which began in the sixteenth century, by the springing up of the spirit of independence: and which continued with increasing strength during the seventeenth—gains the victory in the eighteenth; completes and puts an end to the middle ages in the matter of philosophy. The sixteenth century was, to

this philosophical revolution, what the fifteenth was to the religious reformation—a period of necessary preparation, filled with struggles, and often with unsuccessful struggles, against the predominant spirit of authority; and, like that, it had its martyrs. Bruno and Vanini were the Huss and Jerome of this philosophical revolution. The sixteenth century was a blind attack upon the principle of authority, as it existed in the Scholastic philosophy. The seventeenth century renewed the conflict, established the revolution, and destroyed Scholasticism. The mission of the eighteenth century was to continue and consummate this revolution, by overthrowing the general spirit of authority in philosophy, and establishing the general spirit of independence. In fact it generalized the conflict of the preceding period; propagated the spirit of independence in every direction of thinking; and, finally, established philosophy as a distinct and independent power.

Thus the general mission of the eighteenth century was to continue and complete the movement of independence, begun in the two preceding centuries; and to put a final end to the middle ages in every thing—politics, life, art, and science.

And analogous to this, the special mission of philosophy in the same century, was to complete the movement before begun therein, to put an end to the middle ages in regard to philosophy, by destroying, in this respect, the principle of authority, and circumscribing it within its proper limits, those of theology.

Now this was a complex and laborious task, mixed with results of good and of evil. The reaction against authority might go too far; freedom is liable to be pushed to licentiousness; and while the object is to reduce religious authority within its legitimate sphere, namely, theology, theology itself may be attacked. Instances of this occur in the philosophy of the eighteenth century; still, a large share of the most illustrious names are no less distinguished

for a profound submission and respect to religion, than by the spirit of independence in regard to philosophy.

Next comes the consideration of the *Method* of philosophy in the eighteenth century. The middle ages was the reign of Hypothesis. The sixteenth century was a sort of insurrection of the new spirit against the old, and could not organize itself and take the form and consistence of an established Method. But in the seventeenth century, the true Method began to be formed under Bacon and Descartes; though in the latter it ran out at last into hypothesis. In the eighteenth century, the question concerning Method became the fundamental question. In this century was completed the triumph of the method of experiment over hypothesis; its triumph, that is, in regard to its principle, namely, analysis. Analysis was generalized, extended every where, and established as an exclusive power in philosophy. The triumph of analysis has likewise its part of good and its part of evil. Its good is found in the destruction of hypothesis, and of false synthesis, and in a vast collection of accurate experiments and observations. Its evil is found in the neglect of synthesis, which is, equally with analysis, an element of the true experimental method.

Then follows a view of the different systems of philosophy embraced in the eighteenth century. These systems are the same as those of the two preceding centuries; neither more nor less. The only difference is, that the philosophy of the eighteenth century develops these systems in grander proportions, and on a larger scale. They are the same systems, moreover, which are to be found in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—in the middle ages—in Greece—in the East. The reason is, that all these systems have their root in human nature, independent of particular times and places. The human mind is the original, of which philosophy is the representation, more or less exact and complete. We are therefore to seek from the human mind the explanation of the different sys-

2,379

tems, which born of philosophy, share all its changes, its progress, and its perfectionment;—which starting up in the East, in the cradle of humanity, after traversing the globe, and successively appearing in Greece, in the middle ages, in the modern philosophy commencing with the sixteenth century—have met together in Europe in the eighteenth century.

The result of this examination gives as a matter of fact in the history of philosophy, four great schools or systems of philosophy, which comprehend all the attempts of the philosophical spirit, and which are found in every epoch of the world. These systems are Sensualism, Idealism, Skepticism, and Mysticism.

Sensualism takes sensation as the sole principle of knowledge. Its pretension is that there is not a single element in the consciousness which is not explicable by sensation. This exclusive pretension is its error. A part of our knowledge can be explained by sensation; but another part, and that a very important part, can not. Its necessary consequences are fatalism, materialism, and atheism.

On the other hand, Idealism, as an exclusive system, takes its point of departure from the reason or intelligence, from the ideas or laws which govern its activity; but instead of contenting itself with denying the exclusive pretension of Sensualism, and assertaining the origin of an important part of our knowledge in the reason, and thus vindicating the truths destroyed by Sensualism—it finds all reality in the mind alone; denies matter; absorbs all things, God and the universe, into individual consciousness, and that into thought; just as, by a contrary error, Sensualism absorbs consciousness and all things into sensation. Sensualism and Idealism are two dogmatisms equally true in one view, equally false in another; and both result in nearly equal extravagances.

Skepticism, in its first form, is the appearance of common sense on the scene of philosophy. Disgusted with the

extravagances of the two exclusive systems, which mutually conflict and destroy each other, reflection proceeds to examine the bases, the processes and results of those systems; and it easily and undeniedly demonstrates that in all these respects, there is much error in both the systems. But in its weakness, it falls likewise into exclusiveness and exaggeration; and finally declares that every system is false, and that there is no such thing as truth and certainty within the grasp of the mind. Thus skepticism results in equal extravagance. Its distinctive position, that there is no truth, no certainty, is the absurd and suicidal dogmatism: It is certain that there is no certainty.

The fourth system is Mysticism. The word is not used vaguely, but in a precise sense; and designates the principle of a distinct philosophical system. The human mind, indeed, when tossed about amid conflicting systems, and distressed by the sense of inability to decide for itself, yet feeling the inward want of faith—a spirit the reverse of the dogmatic and scornful skepticism, may despair of philosophy, renounce reflection, and take refuge within the circle of theology. This is doubtless often the fact, though there is, in the opinion of Cousin, an obvious inconsistency in it; for it takes for granted that the objections which Skepticism brings against every system, and which the mind cannot refute, are not as valid against a religious as a philosophical system. The renunciation of reflection is not, however, what Cousin means by Mysticism. It is reflection itself building its system on an element of consciousness overlooked by Sensualism, and by Idealism, and by Skepticism. This element is spontaneity, which is the basis of reflection. Spontaneity is the element of faith, of religion. Reflection effects a sort of philosophical compromise between religion and philosophy, by falling back and grounding itself upon that fact, anterior to itself, which is the point where religion and philosophy meet—the fact of spontaneity. This fact is primitive, unreflective, accom-

panied by a lively faith, and is exalting in its influence. It is reason, referred to its eternal principle, and speaking with his authority in the human intelligence. It is on this element of truth that Mysticism reposes. But this system, like the others in the exaggeration of its principles and in its neglect of the other elements of human nature, engenders multiplied extravagances; the delusions of the imagination, and nervous sensibility, taken for revelations, neglect of outward reality, visions, theurgy, etc.

These systems all have their utility; positively, in developing respectively some element of intelligence; and in cultivating some part of human nature and of science;—negatively, in limiting each other; in combatting each other's errors; and in repressing each other's extravagances.

As to the intrinsic merit, it is a favorite position with Cousin: They exist; therefore there is a reason for their existence; therefore they are true, in whole or in part. Error is the law of our nature; but not absolute error. Absolute error is unintelligible, inadmissible, impossible. It is not the error that the human mind believes; it is only in virtue of the truths blended with it that error is admitted. These four systems are, respectively, partly true, and partly false. The eclectic spirit is not absolutely to reject any one of them, nor to become the dupe of any one of them; but by a discriminating criticism, to discern and accept the truth in each. This is the scope and attempt of M. Cousin's historical and critical labors.

These four systems are the fundamental elements of all philosophy, and consequently of the history of philosophy. They are not only found in the eighteenth century, but they exist and re-appear successively in every great epoch of the history of man. Previously, therefore, to entering upon the examinations of these systems as they exist in the eighteenth century Cousin reviews their respective antecedents in the East, in Greece, in the middle age and in

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He traces and develops the Sensual, the Ideal, the Skeptical and the Mystical Schools, in each of those periods. The principal portion of his first volume is occupied with this review. Our limits forbid us to follow him. It can only be remarked, that along with the other schools, he finds also the Sensual school. He finds it with all its distinctive traits in the philosophy of India; traces it through the twelve centuries filled by Grecian philosophy, from its commencement in the Ionian School, to Aristotle and the Peripatetics; thence to its re-appearance in the middle age, involved in the scholastic Nominalism of Occam; thence to its more decided announcement in Pomponatius, Telesio, and Campanella, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; and finally in modern philosophy, in Hobbes, Gassendi, and others, the immediate predecessors of Locke. He then comes to a detailed examination of Locke as the true father of the Sensual school in the eighteenth century and of the various Sensual systems included in it. In this examination of the Essay on the Understanding, he signalizes the general spirit and the method of that work; he exhibits its systematic principle, its applications, and all its consequences, explict or involved. He carefully discriminates its part of truth from its part of error; and if his conclusions result in the overthrow of the exclusive and systematic principles and principal positions of Locke's work, it is because his analysis led him to this. Of the truth and exactness of this analysis, the reader will judge.

C. S. H.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION

OF

LOCKE'S ESSAY ON THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL SPIRIT AND METHOD OF LOCKE'S ESSAY.

General spirit of the *Essay on the Human Understanding.*—Its Method.—Study of the Human Understanding itself, as the necessary introduction to all true philosophy.—Study of the Human Understanding in its action, in its phenomena, or *ideas.*—Division of the inquiries relating to ideas, and determination of the order in which those investigations should be made. To postpone the logical and ontological question concerning the truth or falsity of ideas, and the legitimacy of their application to their respective objects; and to concentrate our investigations upon the study of ideas in themselves, and in that, to begin by describing ideas as they actually are, and then to proceed to the investigation of their origin.—Examination of the Method of Locke. Its merit: he postpones and places last the question of the truth or falsity of ideas. Its fault: he entirely neglects the question concerning the actual character of ideas, and begins with that of their origin.—First mistake of Method; chances of error which it involves.—General tendency of the School of Locke.—Recapitulation.

The first question which arises in examining the *Essay on the Human Understanding* respects the authority upon which it relies in the last analysis. Does the author seek for truth at his own risk, by the force of reason alone; or does he recognize a foreign and superior authority to which he submits, and from which he borrows the ground of his judgments? This is indeed, as you know, the question which it is necessary to put at the outset to every philosophical work, in order to determine its most general character, and its place in the history of philosophy, and even of civilization. A single glance is enough to show

that Locke is a free seeker of truth. Every where he appeals to the reason. He starts from this authority, and from this alone; and if he subsequently admits another, it is because he arrived at it by reason; so that it is the reason which governs him, and, as it were, holds the reins of his mind. Locke belongs then to the great family of independent philosophers. The *Essay on the Human Understanding* is a fruit of the movement of independence in the eighteenth century, and it has sustained and redoubled that movement. This character passed from the master to his whole school, and was thus recommended to all the friends of human reason. I should add that in Locke, independence is always united with a sincere and profound respect for every thing worthy of respect. Locke is a philosopher, and he is at the same a Christian. Such is the chief. As to his school, you know what it has been. Its independence passed rapidly into indifference, and from indifference to hostility. I mention all this, because it is important you should always hold in your hand the thread of the movement and progress of the sensual school.

I now pass to the question which comes next after that concerning the general spirit of every philosophical work, namely, the question of Method. You know the importance of this question. It ought by this time to be very obvious to you, that as is the method of a philosophy, so will be its system, and that the adoption of a method decides the destinies of a philosophy. Hence our strict obligation to insist on the method of Locke with all the care of which we are capable. What then is that method which, in its germ, contains the whole system of Locke —the system that has produced the great Sensual school of the eighteenth century? We will let Locke speak for himself. In his preface he expresses himself thus:

"Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends, meeting

in my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that arose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by entreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humor or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement, where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it."

He returns to the same thought in the Introduction which follows the preface:

B. I. Ch. I. § 2.—"I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensations by our organs, or any *ideas* in our understandings; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or no. These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way, in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with."

Locke is persuaded that this is the only way to repress the rashness of philosophy, and at the same time to encourage useful investigations:

2,379.

B. I. Ch. I. § 4.—"If, by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; and to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others about things to which our understandings are not suited, and of which we can not form in our minds any clear and distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state."

§ 6. "When we know our own *strength*, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success: and when we have well surveyed the *powers* of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing any thing; or, on the other side, question every thing, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood."

And again in the same section:

"It is of great use to the sailor, to know the length of

his line, though he can not with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him."

I will add but one more quotation:

§ 7. "This was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step toward satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end . . . ."

I have brought together all these citations on purpose to convince you that they contain not merely a fugitive view, but a fixed rule—a Method. Now this method, in my judgment, is the true method, the same which at this day constitutes the power and the hope of science. Let me present it in somewhat more modern language.

Whatever be the object of knowledge or of inquiry, God or the world, things the most remote or near, you neither know nor can know them but under one condition, namely, that you have the faculty of knowledge in general; and you neither possess nor can attain a knowledge of them except in proportion to your general faculty of knowledge. Whatever you attain a knowledge of, the highest or lowest thing, your knowledge in the last result rests upon the reach and the validity of that faculty, by whatever name you call it—Spirit, Reason, Mind, Intelligence, Understanding. Locke calls it Understanding. A sound philosophy, instead of beginning with a blind and random application of the understanding, ought first to examine that faculty, to investigate its nature and its capacity; otherwise there will be a lia-

bility to endless aberrations and mistakes. The study of the understanding is then pre-eminently the philosophical study. There is no part of philosophy which does not presuppose it, and borrow its light from it. Take, for example, Logic, or the science of the rules which ought to direct the human mind—what would it be without a knowledge of that which it is the object to direct, the human mind itself? So also of Morals, the science of the principles and rules of action—what could that be without a knowledge of the *subject* of morality, the moral agent, man himself? Politics, the science or the art of the government of social man, rests equally on a knowledge of man whom, in his social nature, society may develop, but can not constitute. Æsthetics, the science of the Beautiful, and the theory of the Arts, has its root in the nature of a being made capable to recognize and reproduce the beautiful, to feel the particular emotions which attest its presence, and to awaken those emotions in other minds. So also if man were not a religious being, if none of his faculties reached beyond the finite and bounded sphere of this world, there would be for him no God. God exists *for man*, only in proportion to his faculties; and the examination of those faculties and of their capacity, is the indispensable condition of every sound Theodicy. In a word, the nature of man is implied in every science, however apparently foreign. The study of man is then the necessary introduction to every science; and this study, call it Psychology, or by any other name, though it certainly is not the whole of philosophy, must be allowed to be its foundation and its starting-point.

But is a knowledge of human nature, is psychology possible? Without doubt it is; for consciousness is a witness which gives us information of every thing that takes place in the interior of our minds. It is not the principle of any of our faculties, but is a light to them all. It is not because we have the consciousness of it, that any thing goes on within us; but that which does go on within us,

would be to us as though it did not take place, if it were not attested by consciousness. It is not by consciousness that we feel, or will, or think; but it is by it we know that we do all this. The authority of consciousness is the ultimate authority into which that of all the other faculties is resolvable, in this sense, namely, that if the former be overthrown, as it is thereby that the action of all the others, even that of the faculty of knowing itself, comes to be known, their authority, without being in itself destroyed, would yet be nothing for us. Thus it is impossible for any person not to rely fully upon his own consciousness. At this point, skepticism itself expires; for, as Descartes says, let a man doubt of every thing else, he can not doubt that he doubts. Consciousness, then, is an unquestionable authority; its testimony is infallible, and no individual is destitute of it. Consciousness is indeed more or less distinct, more or less vivid, but it is in all men. No one is unknown to himself, although very few know themselves perfectly, because all or nearly all make use of consciousness without applying themselves to perfect, unfold, and enlarge it, by voluntary effort and attention. In all men, consciousness is a natural process; some elevate this natural process to the degree of an art, of a method, by reflection, which is a sort of second consciousness, a free reproduction of the first; and as consciousness gives to all men a knowledge of what passes within them, so reflection gives the philosopher a certain knowledge of every thing which falls under the eye of consciousness. It is to be observed that the question here is not concerning hypotheses or conjectures; for it is not even a question concerning a process of reasoning. It is solely a question of facts, and of facts that are equally capable of being observed as those which come to pass on the scene of the outward world. The only difference is, the one are exterior, the other interior; and as the natural action of our faculties carries us outward, it is more easy to observe the

one than the other. But with a little attention, voluntary exertion, and practice, one may succeed in internal observation as well as in external. And finally, even if psychology were really more difficult than physics, yet in its nature, the former is, equally with the latter, a science of observation, and consequently it has the same title and the same right to the rank of a positive science.*

* [*Consciousness.*—This is a brief but sufficient demonstration of the possibility and validity of psychology. Before proceeding, however, to the next topic—the *objects* of psychology—it may be well for the student to reflect a little further upon the nature of consciousness.

The fact of consciousness is the condition of all knowledge and all philosophy. It is "the light of all our seeing." The various definitions which have been given of this word by different writers, and the vagueness with which it has been used, appear to result from the difficulty of distinguishing the different elements which, in their inseparable and blended action, make up the complex whole of intellectual reality and life; or rather, in which variety the unity of intellectual life manifests itself. It is difficult to see the distinct in the inseparable; to see a part in a whole, without confounding it with the whole. It is difficult, on the other hand, to distinguish without separating and destroying. And again, where any one element is present, and inseparably connected with each and all the other elements of a complex whole, there is great danger of confounding it with some one or other of those elements, apart from which it is never found, while yet it is distinct from each and all of them. This is the case with regard to consciousness. It is not the mind itself, but the light in which all the phenomena of the mind are reflected to itself. We know ourselves and every thing that we know, only in the light of consciousness. We find ourselves and all things in consciousness. It is the light in which we see all things, yet it is not the *seeing* itself. It reveals to the mind its various modifications, its feelings, sensations, thoughts and volitions; yet, though connected with them, it is distinct from them all. It is neither a pure passivity nor a voluntary activity, though it may appear on both hands to partake of the nature of the modifications of which it informs us. It is a spontaneity, a fact. It is neither a machine nor an agent. It is not a product of the mind, nor an effect of the will. Thought and volition are produced; but consciousness is a *witness* of our thoughts and volitions; though the most eminent fact of consciousness—self-affirmation—may indeed be *conditioned* by an act of the will; yet this reflective

But we must recognize the proper objects of psychology. They are those of reflection, which again are those of consciousness. Now it is evident the objects of consciousness are neither the outward world, nor God, nor even the soul itself as to its substance, for if we had a consciousness of the substance of the soul, there would be no more dispute concerning its nature, whether it be material or

act is ulterior to the primitive, spontaneous fact of consciousness, in which self is first revealed in opposition to not-self.

Consciousness, considered as the condition of perceiving immediately whatever passes within us, has, by some, been confounded with the internal sensibility. Reid, on the contrary, appears to regard it as a distinct and special faculty of the mind, whose office is in general to observe the operations of the other faculties. This view is rejected by Brown, who seems to consider consciousness as nothing more than a general word to express the aggregate of the phenomena or states of the mind. Many nice questions have been made by other writers, in regard to the discrimination of the words *consciousness*, *self*, and the *me*; and the distinctions that have been laid down in respect to these words may seem to many more subtle than valid. Passing by them therefore, it is probably enough here to observe that consciousness is not to be confounded neither with the sensibility (external or internal), nor with the understanding, nor with the will; neither is it a distinct and special faculty of the mind; nor is it the principle of any of the faculties; nor is it, on the other hand, the product of them. Still less is it a mere generalization to express the total series of representations, a merely verbal or logical bond to bring into a collective unity the various phenomena of the mind. It is the condition of all knowledge: it is that in which all the representations of the mind are revealed to the *self*, in opposition to the *not-self*. It is not the result of experience (though conditioned by it), since it is pre-supposed in experience, and renders experience possible. For there is no experience without knowledge; and in order to knowledge it is not only necessary that the *sensibility* should be affected, but that the *mind*, re-acting upon the sensibility and connecting itself with it, *representations*, or mental phenomena, as the joint effect, should be produced; and these representations, as *objects*, when perceived through the light of consciousness, by the intelligence as the *subject*, constitute knowledge direct and immediate, which, in its most general term, is *feeling*; or, if the conscious representation is referred exclusively to the subject, *sensation*; if to the object, *perception*. Con-

spiritual. The essence, the being in itself, whatever it be, whether of bodies, or of God, or of the soul, falls not under consciousness. True philosophy does not exclude ontology, but it adjourns it. Psychology does not dethrone metaphysics, but precedes and clears it up. It does not employ itself in constructing a romance concerning the nature of the soul, but it studies the soul in the

sciousness has been defined in the Critical Philosophy as the act of referring that *in a phenomenon* which belongs to the subject to the subject; and that which belongs to the object to the object; as the power of distinguishing ourselves from external objects, and from our own thoughts. Perhaps the most correct description of the mind in consciousness, *i. e.*, of the *conscious states* of the mind, is the being aware of the phenomena of the mind—of that which is *present to the mind;* and if self consciousness be distinguished, not *in genere*, but as a special determination of consciousness, it is the being aware of ourselves, as of the *me* in opposition to the *not-me*, or as the permanent *subject*, distinct from the phenomena of the mind and from all the outward causes of them.

In regard to the distinction between the natural or spontaneous, and the philosophical or reflected consciousness, it may be remarked, that while Locke uses the word reflection to signify the *natural* consciousness common to all reflecting beings, Cousin uses it above to imply a particular determination of consciousness by the will. It is a voluntary falling back upon the natural and spontaneous consciousness; it is an act of self-reduplication. It is in this sense that he regards reflection as the special attribute of the philosophic mind. All men are endowed with the natural consciousness; while in many the faculty of higher speculation is never developed. The one is like the scales in common use, and answers the ends of ordinary life; the other is like the golden scales of the chemist, to appreciate the slightest weight;—or, the one is the vision of the unaided eye; the other the vision aided by the microscope. COLERIDGE makes the same distinction with Cousin; but he does not consider the power of philosophical insight to be as common as Cousin would make it: "it is neither possible," says he, "nor necessary for all men, or for many, to be philosophers. There is a *philosophic* (and, inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an *artificial*) consciousness which lies beneath, or, as it were *behind* the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings."—TR.]

action of its faculties, in the phenomena which consciousness may attain, and does directly attain.

This may put in clear light the true character of the Essay on the Human Understanding. It is a work of psychology and not of ontology. Locke does not investigate the nature and principle of the understanding, but the action itself of this faculty, the phenomena by which it is developed and manifested. Now the phenomena of the understanding Locke calls *ideas*. This is the technical word which he every where employs to designate that by which the understanding manifests itself, and that to which it immediately applies itself:

Introduction, § 8. "I have used it," says he, "to express whatever is meant by *phantasm*, *notion*, *species*,* or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking. I presume it will be easily granted me that there are such ideas in men's minds; every one is conscious of them in himself; and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others."

It is very obvious that by ideas are here meant the phenomena of the understanding, of thought, which the consciousness of every one can perceive in himself when he thinks, and which are equally in the consciousness of other men, if we judge by their words and actions. Ideas are to the understanding what effects are to their causes. The understanding reveals itself by ideas, just as causes by their effects, which at once manifest and represent them. Hereafter we shall examine the advantages and disadvantages of this term, and the theory also which it involves. For the present it is enough to state it and to signalize it as the watchword of the philosophy of Locke. The study of the understanding is with Locke and with all his school, the study of ideas; and hence the celebrated word Ideology, recently formed to designate the science

* [These are the terms employed in the Scholastic philosophy.—Tr.]

of the human understanding. The source of this expression already lay in the Essay on the Human Understanding, and the Ideological school is the natural daughter of Locke.*

* [*Ideology.*—This word came into use in France about the beginning of the present century, and became the general designation of philosophy in the Sensual School. One of the most distinguished writers of the Ideological school is the Count Destutt de Tracy, to whom perhaps the word owes its origin. He was the metaphysician of the Sensual School at the period when Cabanis may be considered as its physiologist, and Volney its moralist. From the strictness of his thinking, and the clearness of his style, Cousin considers him the most faithful and complete representative of his school. His writings are characterized by the attempt at logical simplicity, and by a great talent for it. He excels in abstraction and generalization; he reasons with strictness from the data he starts from, but without much scrutiny of the grounds on which those data rest, or the processes by which they were furnished. His theory of the mind is very simple. The mind, according to him, is nothing but sensation, or more properly the sensibility, of which sensation is the exercise. The sensibility is susceptible of different sorts of impression: 1, those which arise from the *present* action of objects upon its organs; 2, those which result from their *past* action, by means of a certain disposition which that action left upon the organs; 3, those of things which have *relations*, and may be compared; 4, those which spring from our wants and lead us to satisfy them. Every thing thus comes from the exercise of the sensibility through *impressions* made upon the organs of sense. When the sensibility is affected by the *first* sort of impression, it *feels* simply; when by the *second* it repeats or *recollects*; when by the *third*, it feels the relations or *judges*; when by the *fourth*, it desires or *wills*. Thus *Sensation*, according to the nature of its objects, manifests itself respectively as pure perception, or memory, or judgment, or will. It is therefore the sole principle of all our faculties and of all operations of the mind; since there is none of them which may not be reduced to one or the other of these forms of sensibility.

It is obvious that *Materialism* is one of the consequences of this theory; resolving *all* the phenomena of the mind into forms of sensation, it goes to make the supposition of a spiritual subject unnecessary. *Fatalism* is another systematic consequence; willing is but a form of the sensibility impressed from without; actions are therefore necessary; and responsibility and moral distinctions are destroyed. The theory results also in *Atheism*, or, which comes to the

Here, then, you perceive the study of the human understanding reduced to the study of ideas; now this study embraces several orders of researches which it is important definitely to determine.* According to what has been said, ideas may be considered under two points of view: we may inquire if, in relation to their respective objects, whatever these objects may be, they are true or false; or neglecting the question of their truth and falsity, their legitimate or illegitimate application to their objects, we may investigate solely what they are in themselves as they are manifested by consciousness. Such are the two most general questions which may be proposed respecting ideas. And the order in which they are to be treated can not be doubtful. It is obvious enough, that to begin by considering ideas in relation to their objects, without having ascertained what they are in themselves, is to begin at the end; it is to begin by investigating the legitimacy or illegitimacy of consequences, while remaining in ignorance of their principles. The correct procedure, then, is to begin by the investigation of ideas, *not* as true or false, properly or improperly applicable to such or such objects, and consequently as being or not being sufficient grounds for such or such opinion or belief, *but* as simple phenomena of the understanding, marked by their respective characteristics. In this way unquestionably should the true method of observation proceed.

This is not all. Within these limits there is ground likewise for two distinct orders of investigation.

same thing, in a certain form of *Pantheism*; for, according to it, no idea can be formed of a God existing independently of the material universe.

Count de Tracy was born in 1754. His *Elemens d'Idéologie* were published at Paris in 1801–1804. 2 vols. 8vo —TR.]

* All the distinctions which follow have been before made in the opening discourse of the year 1817, on the Classification of Philosophical Questions and Schools. See Appendix. I.

We may study the ideas which are in the human understanding as it is now developed in the present state of things. The object, in this case, is to collect the phenomena of the understanding as they are given in consciousness, and to state accurately their differences and resemblances, so as to arrive at length at a good classification of all those phenomena. Hence the first maxim of the method of observation: to omit none of the phenomena attested by consciousness. Indeed you have no option; they exist, and they must for that sole reason be recognized. They are in reality, in the consciousness; and they must find a place in the frame-work of your science, or your science is nothing but an illusion. The second rule is: to imagine none, or to take none upon mere supposition. As you are not to deny any thing which is, so you are not to presume any thing which is not. You are to invent nothing and you are to suppress nothing. To omit nothing, to take nothing upon supposition; these are the two maxims of observation, the two essential laws of the experimental method applied to the phenomena of the understanding, as to every other order of phenomena. And what I say of the phenomena of the understanding, I say also of their characteristics; none must be omitted, none taken upon supposition. Thus having omitted nothing and taken nothing upon supposition, having embraced all the actual phenomena and those only, with all their actual characteristics and those only; you will have the best chance of arriving at a legitimate classification, which will comprehend the whole reality and nothing but the reality, the statistics of the phenomena of the understanding, that is of ideas, complete and exact.

This done, you will know the understanding as it is at present. But has it always been what it is at present? Since the day when its operations began, has it not undergone many changes? These phenomena, whose characters you have with so much penetration and fidelity analyzed

and reproduced, have they always been what they are and what they now appear to you? May they not have had at their birth certain characters which have disappeared, or have wanted at the outset certain characters which they have since acquired? Hence the important question of the *origin* of ideas, or the primitive characters of the phenomena of the understanding. When this second question shall be resolved; when you shall know what in their birth-place have been these same phenomena which you have studied and learned in their present actual form: when you shall know what they were, and what they have become; it will be easy for you to trace the route by which they have arrived from their primitive to their present state. You will easily trace their genesis, after having determined their actual present state, and penetrated their origin. It is then only that you will know perfectly what you are; for you will know both what you were, and what you now are, and how from what you were you have come to be what you are. Thus will be completely known to you, both in its actual and in its primitive state, and also in its transformations, that faculty of knowing, that intelligence, that reason, that spirit, that mind, that understanding, which is for you the foundation of all knowledge.

The question of the present state of our ideas, and that of their origin, are then two distinct questions, and both of them are necessary to constitute a complete psychology. In as far as psychology has not surveyed and exhausted these two orders of researches, it is unacquainted with the phenomena of the understanding; for it has not apprehended them under all their aspects. But where should we commence? Should we begin by recognizing the actual character of our ideas, or by investigating their origin?

Shall we begin with the question of the origin of ideas? It is without doubt a point extremely curious and extremely important. Man aspires to penetrate the origin

of every thing, and particularly of the phenomena that pass within him. He can not rest satisfied without having gained this. The question concerning the origin of ideas is undeniably in the human mind; it has then its place and its claim in science. It must come up in its time, but should it come up first? In the first place it is full of obscurity. The mind is a river which we can not easily ascend. Its source, like that of the Nile, is a mystery. How, indeed, shall we catch the fugitive phenomena, which mark the first springing up of thought? Is it by memory? But you have forgotten what passed within you then; you did not even remark it. Life and thought then go on without our heeding the manner in which we think and live; and the memory yields not up the deposit that was never intrusted to it. Will you consult others? They are in the same perplexity with yourself. Will you make the infant mind your study? But who will unfold what passes beneath the vail of infant thought? The decyphering of these hieroglyphics easily leads to conjectures, to hypotheses. But is it thus you would begin an experimental science? It is evident, then, that if you start with this question concerning the origin of ideas, you start with precisely the most difficult question. Now if a sound method ought to proceed from the better known to the less known, from the more easy to the less easy, I ask whether it ought to commence with the origin of ideas.

This is the first objection. Look at another. You begin by investigating the origin of ideas; you begin then by investigating the origin of that of which you are ignorant, of phenomena which you have not studied. What origin could you then find but a hypothetical origin? And this hypothesis will be either true or false. Is it true? Very well then: you have happened to divine correctly; but as divination, even the divination of genius, is not a scientific process, so the truth itself thus discovered, can not claim the rank of science: it is still but hypothesis. Is it false?

Then instead of truth under the vicious form of an hypothesis, you have merely an hypothesis without truth. Accordingly you may see what will be the result. As this hypothesis, that is to say in this case this error, will have acquired a hold in your mind; when you come in accordance with it to explain the phenomena of the intelligence as it is at present, if they are not what they ought to be in order to establish your hypothesis, you will not on that account give up your hypothesis. You will sacrifice reality to it. You will do one of two things: you will boldly deny all ideas which are not explicable by your hypothetical origin; or you will arrange them arbitrarily and for the support of your hypothesis. Certainly it was not worth while to have made choice, with so much parade, of the experimental method, to falsify it afterward by putting it upon a direction so perilous. Wisdom, then, good sense and logic demand, that omitting provisionally the question of the origin of ideas, we should be content first to observe the ideas as they now are, the characters which the phenomena of intelligence actually have at present in the consciousness.

This done, in order to complete our investigations, in order to go to the extent of our capacity and of the wants of the human mind, and of the demands of the experimental problems, we may then interrogate ourselves as to what have been, in their origin, the ideas which we at present possess. Either we shall discover the truth, and experimental science, the science of observation and induction, will be completely achieved; or we shall not discover it, and in that case nothing will be either lost or compromised. We shall not have attained all possible truth, but we shall have attained a great part of the truth. We shall know what *is*, if we do not know what *was;* and we shall always be prepared to try again the delicate question of the origin of ideas, instead of having all our ulterior investigations impaired, and observation perverted beforehand,

by the primary vice of our method in getting bewildered in a premature inquiry.

The regular order then of psychological problems may be settled in the following manner:

1. To investigate without any systematic prejudice, by observation solely, in simplicity and good faith, the phenomena of the understanding in their *actual* state as they are at present given in consciousness, dividing and classifying them according to the known laws of scientific division and classification.

2. To investigate the *origin* of these same phenomena or ideas by all the means in our power, but with the firm resolution not to suffer what observation has given, to be wrested by any hypothesis, and with our eyes constantly fixed on the present reality and its unquestionable characters. To this question of the origin of ideas is joined that of their formation and genesis, which evidently depends upon and is involved in it.

Such in their methodical order are the different problems included in psychology. The slightest inversion of this order is full of danger and may lead to the gravest mistakes. Indeed you can easily conceive, that if you treat the question of the legitimacy of the application of our ideas to their external objects, before learning what these ideas exactly are—what are their present actual characters, and what their primitive characters—what they are and from whence they spring—you must wander at hazard and without a torch in the unknown world of ontology. Again: you can conceive, that even within the limits of psychology, if you begin by wishing to carry by main force the question of the origin of ideas, before knowing what these ideas are, and before you have recognized them by observation, you seek for light in the darkness which will not yield it.

Now, how has Locke proceeded, and in what order has he taken up these problems of philosophy?

Introduction, § 3. "I shall pursue," says he, "this following method:

"*First*, I shall inquire into the *original* of those *ideas*, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

"*Secondly*, I shall endeavor to show what *knowledge* the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

"*Thirdly*, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of *faith* or *opinion;* whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge: and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent."

It is evident that the two latter points here indicated, refer to one and the same question, that is, the general question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the application of our ideas to their external objects; and the question is here given as the last question of philosophy. It is nothing less than the adjournment of the whole logical and ontological inquiry until after psychology. Here is the fundamental characteristic of the method of Locke, and in this the originality of his Essay. We agree entirely with Locke in this respect, with this provision however, that the adjournment of ontology shall not be the destruction of it.

Now remains the first point, which is purely psychological, and which occupies the greatest part of Locke's work. He here declares that his first inquiry will be into the *origin* of ideas. Now here are two radical errors in point of method:—1. Locke treats of the origin of ideas before studying sufficiently what the ideas are. 2. He does still more: he not only puts the question of the origin of ideas before that of the inventory of the ideas; but he entirely neglects the latter question. It was already running a

great hazard to put the one question before the other; for it was seeking an hypothesis at the very outset, even though afterward the hypothesis should be confronted with the actual reality of consciousness. But how will it be when even this possibility of return to truth is interdicted, when the fundamental question, of the inventory of our ideas and their actual characters, is absolutely omitted?

Such is the first error of Locke. He recognizes and proclaims the experimental method; he proposes to apply it to the phenomena of the understanding, to ideas; but not being profoundly enough acquainted with this method, which indeed was then in its infancy, he has not apprehended all the questions to which it gives rise; he has not disposed these questions in their true relation to each other; has misconceived and omitted the question, which is eminently the experimental problem, namely, the observation of the actual characters of our ideas; and he has fallen at the outset upon a question which he ought to have postponed, the obscure and difficult question of the origin of our ideas. What then must the result be? One or the other of these two things.

1. Either Locke will hit upon the true origin of ideas by a sort of good luck in guessing, at which I should rejoice; but however true it may really be it will never be demonstrated to be true, will never be legitimately established, except upon this condition, that Locke subsequently demonstrates that the characters of our ideas are all in fact explicable and explained in all their extent by the origin which he supposes.

2. Or, Locke will deceive himself: now, if he deceives himself, the error will not be a particular error, confined to a single point, and without influence upon the rest. It will be a general error, an immense error, which will corrupt all psychology at its source, and thereby all metaphysics. For in faithfully adhering to his hypothesis, to the origin which he had beforehand assigned to all ideas without

knowing precisely what they were, he will sacrifice all ideas which can not be reduced to this false origin. The falsehood of the origin will spread out over the actual present state of the intelligence, and will hide even from the eyes of consciousness the actual characters of our ideas. Hence it will result that from application to application of this hypothesis, that is from error to error, the human understanding and human nature will be more and more misconceived, reality destroyed, and science perverted.

You see the rock; it was necessary to signalize it. We do not know whether Locke has made shipwreck upon it; for as yet we are ignorant what he has done, whether he has been so fortunate as to divine correctly, or whether he has had the fate of most diviners, and of those who take at venture a road they have never measured. We suppose ourselves to be at present ignorant, and we shall hereafter examine. But here is a proper place to remark that it is in great part from Locke, is derived in the eighteenth century, and in all his school, the habit and system of placing the question of the origin and genesis of ideas at the head of all philosophical inquiries. In metaphysics, this school is pre-occupied with inquiring what are the first ideas which enter into the mind of man. In morals, neglecting the actual facts of man's moral nature, it searches for the first ideas of good and evil which rise in the mind of man considered in the savage state, or in infancy, two states in which experience is not very sure, and may be very arbitrary. In politics, it seeks for the origin of society, of government, of laws. In general, it takes fact as the equivalent of right; and all philosophy, for this school, is resolved into history, and history the most dim and shadowy, that of the first age of humanity. Hence the political theories of this school so frequently opposite in their results while at the same time so identical in their general spirit and character. Some, burying themselves in ante-historical or anti-historical conjectures, find as the

origin of society force and conquerors; the first government which history presents to them is despotic; hence the idea of government is the idea of despotism. Others, on the contrary, in the convenient obscurities of the primitive state, perceive a contract, reciprocal stipulations, and titles of liberty, which subsequently were made to give way to despotism, and which the present times ought to restore. In both cases alike the legitimate state of human society is always drawn from its supposed primitive form, from that form which it is almost impossible to trace; and the rights of humanity are left at the mercy of a doubtful and perilous erudition, at the mercy of hypotheses. In fine, from origin to origin, they have gone on even to investigate and settle the true nature of humanity, its end and all its destiny, by the absurdest geological hypotheses; and the last expression of this tendency is the celebrated *Telliamed* of Maillet.*

To recapitulate: most general character of the philosophy of Locke is independence; and here I openly range myself under his banner, though with the necessary reservations, if not side by side with the chief, at least side by side with his school. In respect to method, that of Locke is psychological, or ideological (the name is of little consequence); and here again I declare myself of his school. But from not sufficiently comprehending the psychological

* [*Maillet's Telliamed.*—Benedict de Maillet, born in Lorraine in 1659; French Consul in Egypt, and afterward at Leghorn; died at Marseilles in the year 1738. He was an ardent student of natural history, and a man of fanciful turn of mind. He produced a system which for some time excited considerable interest. He maintained that all the land of the earth, and its vegetable and animal inhabitants rose from the bosom of the sea, by successive contractions of the waters; that men had originally been Tritons with tails; and that they, as well as other animals, had lost their marine, and acquired terrestrial forms by their agitations when left upon dry ground. The work was published after the death of its author by La Mascrier, who also published in 1743 a "Description of Egypt drawn up from the papers of De Maillet."—TR.]

method, I accuse him of having commenced by an order of investigations which in the eye of strict reason is not the first; I accuse him of having commenced by an order of inquiries which necessarily puts psychology upon the road of hypothesis, and which more or less destroys its experimental character; and it is here that I withdraw myself from him.*

Let us recollect where we are. We have seen Locke entering upon a hazardous route. But has he had the good fortune in spite of his bad choice, to arrive at the truth, that is to say, at the true explanation of the origin of ideas? What is, according to him, this origin? This is the very basis of the Essay on the Human Understanding, the system to which Locke has attached his name. This will be the subject of our future discussions.

* On all these questions respecting Method, and the order in which they should be treated, see in the *Fragmens Philosophiques*, the "*Essay on a Classification of Philosophical Questions and Schools*," and also the "*Programme of a Course* of Lectures delivered in 1817."

[These two pieces will be found translated among the ADDITIONAL PIECES at the end of this volume.—TR.]

CHAPTER II.

INNATE IDEAS—IDEA OF SPACE.

1st Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding—Of Innate Ideas.—Second Book. Experience, the source of all ideas. Sensation and Reflection.—Locke places the development of the sensibility before that of the operations of the mind. Operations of the Mind. According to Locke they are exercised only upon sensible data. Basis of Sensualism.—Examination of the doctrine of Locke concerning the idea of Space.—That the idea of Space, in the system of Locke, should and does resolve itself into the idea of Body.—This confusion contradicted by facts, and by Locke himself.—Distinction of the actual characters of the ideas of Body and of Space: 1, the one contingent, the other necessary; 2, the one limited, the other illimitable; 3, the one a sensible representation, the other a rational conception.—This distinction ruines the system of Locke. Examination of the origin of the idea of Space.—Distinction between the logical order and the chronological order of Ideas.—Logical order.—The idea of space is the logical condition of the idea of body, its foundation, its reason, its origin, taken logically.—The idea of body is the chronological condition of the idea of space, its origin, taken chronologically.—Of the Reason and Experience, considered as in turn the reciprocal condition of their mutual development.—Merit of the system of Locke.—Its vices: 1, confounds the measure of space with space; 2, the condition of the idea of space with the idea itself.

Locke, it is true, is not the first who started the question concerning the origin of ideas; but it is Locke who first made it the grand problem of philosophy; and since the time of Locke, it has maintained this rank in his school. For the rest, although this question is not the first which in strict method should be agitated, yet certainly,

taken in its place it is of the highest importance. Let us see how Locke resolves it.

In entering upon the investigation of the origin of ideas, Locke encounters an opinion, which if it be well founded, would cut short the question: I refer to the doctrine of *innate ideas.* In truth, if ideas are innate, that is to say, as the word seems to indicate, if ideas are already in the mind at the moment when its action begins, then it does not acquire them; it possesses them from the first day just as they will be at the last; and properly speaking, they have no progress, no generation and no origin. This doctrine, then, which Locke rightly or wrongly imputes to his adversaries, is opposed to his design in beginning with the question of the origin of ideas. It is opposed also to the solution which he wished to give of this question, and to the system with which he was pre-occupied. It behooved him, then, first of all, to remove this obstacle, to refute the doctrine of innate ideas. Hence the polemic discussion which fills the first book of the Essay on the Understanding. It is my duty to give you some account of this controversy.

According to Locke there are philosophers who consider certain principles, certain maxims and propositions, pertaining to metaphysics and morals, as innate. Now on what grounds can they be called innate? Two reasons may be and have been given; 1, that these propositions are universally admitted; 2, that they are primitive, that they are known from the moment the reason is exercised.

Locke examines these two reasons successively.

In metaphysics, he takes the two following propositions, namely: "*what is, is,*" and "*it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;*"—and he examines whether in fact, all men admit these two propositions. Passing by civilized men who have read the philosophers, he has recourse to savage nations, and he inquires whether a savage knows that "what is, is," and "that it is impossible for

the same thing to be, and not to be." He replies for the savage, that he knows nothing about these propositions, and cares nothing. He interrogates the infant, and finds that the infant is in the same case as the savage. Finally, supposing that savages and infants, as well as civilized people, admit that what is, is, and that the same is the same; Locke has in reserve an objection which he believes unanswerable, namely, that idiots do not admit those propositions; and this single exception suffices, according to Locke, to demonstrate that they are not *universally admitted*, and consequently that they are not innate, for certainly the soul of the idiot is a human soul.

Examining next whether these propositions are *primitive*, whether they are possessed at the first, and as soon as men come to the use of reason, Locke still takes a child for the subject of his experiment, and maintains that there are a crowd of ideas which precede them, the ideas of colors, of bodies, the idea of his own existence; and thus the propositions in question are not the first which preside over the development of intelligence.

So much for speculative propositions. It is the same with practical: Locke subjects moral propositions or maxims to the same test as metaphysical. Here he relies even more strongly on the manners of savages, on the recitals of travelers, and on the observation of infants. His conclusion is that there is no moral maxim, universally and primitively admitted, and consequently, innate.

Such are the first two chapters of the first book of the Essay on the Human Understanding. The last goes still further. If the propositions and maxims, metaphysical and moral, before examined, are neither universally or primitively admitted, what must we think of the ideas which are contained in these propositions, and which are the elements of them? Locke selects two of them, upon which he founds an extended discussion, namely, the idea of God, and the idea of substance. He has recourse to his ordinary

arguments to prove that the idea of God, and that of substance, are neither universal nor primitive. He appeals to the testimony of savage nations, who, according to him, have no idea of God; he appeals also to infants, to know if they have the idea of substance; and he concludes that these ideas are not innate, and that no particular idea, nor any general proposition, speculative or moral, exists anterior to experience.

As, ever since Locke, the question concerning the origin of ideas has become the fundamental question in the Sensual School, so also it is to be remarked that ever since Locke, the controversy against innate ideas has become the necessary introduction of this school. And not only the subject, but the manner of treating it, came from Locke. Ever since his time, the habit has prevailed of appealing to savages and to children, concerning whom observation is so difficult; for in regard to the former, it is necessary to recur to travelers who are often prejudiced, who are ignorant of the languages of the people they visit; and as to children, we are reduced to the observation of very equivocal signs. The controversy of Locke, both in its substance and its form, has become the basis of every subsequent controversy in his school against innate ideas.

Now what is the real value of this controversy? Permit me to adjourn this question. For if we should give it merely a general discussion, it would be insufficient, and if we should discuss it more profoundly, it would anticipate some particular discussions which the examination of the Essay on the Understanding will successively bring up. Reserving, then, for the present, my judgment on the conclusions of the first book, I enter now upon the second, which contains the special theory of Locke, on the question of the origin of ideas.

"Let us then suppose, says Locke (B. II. Chap. I. § 2), the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all charac-

ters, without any *ideas*; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience;* in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself."

Let us see what Locke understands by experience. I leave him to speak for himself:

B. II. Ch. I. § 2. "Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring."

§ 3. "*The objects of sensation one source of ideas.*

"First, Our *senses*, conversant about particular sensible objects, do *convey into the mind* several distinct *perceptions* of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them; and thus we come by those *ideas* we have of *yellow*, *white*, *heat*, *cold*, *soft*, *hard*, *bitter*, *sweet*, and all those things which we call sensible qualities; which, when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the *ideas* we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call *Sensation*."

§ 4. "*The operations of our minds the other sources of ideas.*

"Secondly, The other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with *ideas* is the *perception of the operations of our own mind* within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the

understanding with another set of *ideas*, which could not be had from things without; and such are *perception*, *thinking*, *doubting*, *believing*, *reasoning*, *knowing*, *willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct *ideas*, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense*. But as I call the other *Sensation*, so I call this *Reflection*, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By *Reflection*, then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, namely, external material things, as the objects of *sensation*, and the operations of our minds within, as the objects of *reflection*, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term *operations*, here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them; such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought."

§ 5. "*All our ideas are of the one or the other of these.*—The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities*, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us: *and the mind furnishes the understanding with the ideas of its own operations.*

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, combinations and relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we

have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways."

Locke here evidently confounds reflection with consciousness. Reflection, in strict language, is undoubtedly a faculty analogous to consciousness,* but distinct from it, and pertains more particularly to the philosopher, while consciousness pertains to every man as an intellectual being. Still more, Locke arbitrarily reduces the sphere of reflection or consciousness by limiting it to the "operations" of the soul. It is evident that consciousness or reflection has for its objects all the phenomena which pass within us, sensations or operations. Consciousness or reflection is a witness, and not an actor in the intellectual life. The true powers, the special sources of ideas, are sensations on the one hand, and the operations of the mind on the other, only under this general condition, that we have a consciousness of the one as well as the other, and that we can fall back upon ourselves and reflect upon them and their products. To these two sources of ideas, in strictness, the theory of Locke is reduced.

Now, is it the sensibility; or is it the operations of our soul, which enters first into exercise? Locke does not hesitate to pronounce that our first ideas are furnished by the sensibility; and that those which we owe to reflection come later. He declares this in B. II. ch. I. § 8, and still more explicitly in § 20: "I see no reason to believe that *the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas* to think on." And again, § 23: "If it shall be demanded, then, *when a man begins to have any ideas*, I think the true answer is, when he first has any *sensation* . . . ."

Thus Locke places the acquisitions of the senses before those of thought. Now we might pause here, and demand if this order is real; if it is possible to conceive, not perhaps a sensation, but the idea of a sensation, without the

* See the preceding chapter.

intervention and concurrence of some of the operations of the soul. But without entering into this objection, let it suffice to state the fact that Locke does not admit the operations of the mind to have place until after the sensations. It remains to see what these operations do, and what are their proper functions; upon what, and in what sphere, they are carried on, and whether, supposing them not to enter into exercise till after the sensibility, they are, or are not, condemned to operate solely upon the primitive data furnished to them by the senses. In order to this, it is necessary to examine with care the nature and object of the operations of the mind, according to Locke.

Locke is the first who has given an analysis, or rather an attempt at an analysis of the sensibility and of the different senses which compose it, of the ideas which we owe to each of them, and to the simultaneous action of several (B. II. Ch. II. § 2: Ch. III. IV. and V.) He likewise is the first who gave the example of what subsequently in the hands of his successors became the theory of the faculties of the mind. That of Locke, curious, and precious even, for the times, is in itself extremely feeble, vague and confused. Faithful, however, to the general spirit of his philosophy, Locke attempts to present the faculties in the order of their probable development.

The first of which he treats is *perception:* (B. II. Ch. IX. § 2.) "What *perception* is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, what he sees, hears, feels, etc., or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind, can not miss it: and if he does not reflect, all the words in the world can not make him have any notion of it." § 3. "This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within; there is no perception." § 4. "Wherever there is sense, or perception, there is some *idea* actually pro-

duced, and present to the understanding." And, § 15. "Perception is the first degree toward knowledge."—The perception of Locke is undeniably consciousness, the faculty of perceiving what actually passes within us.

After perception comes *retention* (Chap. X. § 1.), or the power of retaining actual perceptions, or ideas, and of *contemplating* them when present, or of *recalling* them when they have vanished. In this latter case, retention is *memory*, the aids to which are *attention* and *repetition*.

Then comes the faculty of *distinguishing* ideas (Ch. XI.) and that of *comparing* them; from whence spring all the ideas of relation, not to omit the faculty of *composition*, from whence spring all the complex ideas which come from the combination of several simple ideas. And finally, at a later period, the faculty of *abstraction* and *generalization* is developed. Locke reckons no other faculties. Thus in the last analysis, perception, retention or contemplation and memory, discernment and comparison, composition, abstraction; these are the faculties of the human understanding; for the will, together with pleasure and pain, and the passions, which Locke gives as "operations of the mind," form another order of the phenomena.

Now what is the character and what is the offiice of these faculties? About what, for example, is perception exercised; to what is it applied? To sensation. And what does it? It does nothing but perceive the sensation, nothing but have a consciousness of it. Add, according to Locke (ch. IX. § 1.), that the perception is passive, forced, inevitable, it is still scarcely any thing but the effect of sensation. The first faculty of the mind, then, adds nothing to the sensation; it merely takes knowledge of it. In retention, contemplation continues this perception; when faded, the memory recalls it. Discernment separates, composition re-unites these perceptions; abstraction seizes their most general characters: but still, the materials are always, in the last analysis, ideas of sensation due to per-

ception. Our faculties add nothing to the knowledge which they draw from them, but that of their own existence and of their action.

Thus, on the one hand, sensation precedes; on the other, the understanding is, for Locke, only an instrument, whose whole power is exhausted upon sensation. Locke, to be sure, has not confounded sensation and the faculties of the mind; he most explicitly distinguishes them; but he makes our faculties sustain a secondary part, by concentrating their action upon the data of the senses. From this, to the point of confounding them with the sensibility itself, it is but a step, and here already planted in philosophy is the germ, as yet feeble, of that subsequent theory of *sensation transformed*, of sensation as the sole and single principle of all operations of the mind.* It is Locke who, without knowing it, or wishing it, has opened the route to this exclusive doctrine, by adding to sensation only faculties whose sole office is to operate upon it without any original power of their own. The Sensual School will be completely formed only when it has arrived at that point. In the mean time, while waiting for the future to urge the system of Locke onward to this point, let us take up this system for what it is, or rather for what it holds itself out to be, namely, the pretension of explaining all the ideas that are or can be in the human understanding, by sensation, and by reflection, that is, the feeling of our own operations.

"If we trace the progress of our minds," says Locke (Ch. XII. § 8), "and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us further than at first perhaps we should have imagined. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even the *most abstruse* ideas, how remote soever they may

* [As maintained by Condillac and other successors of Locke, of the French Sensual School.]—Tr.

seem from sense, or from any operations of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas, that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them: so that those even large and *abstract* ideas are *derived from sensation or reflection*, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does attain unto. This I shall endeavor to show in the ideas we have of *space*, *time*, and *infinity*, and some few others, that seem the most remote from those originals."

Well and good, then. This has a little the air of a challenge. Let us accept it, and let us see, for example, how Locke will deduce the idea of *space* from sensation and from reflection.

I am a little embarrassed, in attempting to expound to you the opinion of Locke concerning space, and I have need here to recall to your minds an observation I have already made. Locke is the chief of a school. You are not to expect, then, that Locke has drawn from his principles all the consequences which these principles contain; nor even are you to expect that the inventor of a principle should establish it with perfect clearness and precision. This remark, which is true of the whole Essay on the Human Understanding, is particularly true of the chapters where Locke treats of the idea of space. There reigns, under a clearness sometimes real, but oftener apparent and superficial, an extreme confusion; and contradictions, direct and express, are to be met with not only in different chapters, but even in different paragraphs of the same chapter. Unquestionably it is the duty of the critical historian to bring out these contradictions, in order to characterize the era and the man; but history is not merely a monograph; it is not concerned solely with an individual, however great he may be; it seeks in the past the germ

of the future. I shall devote myself, then, after having pointed out once for all, the innumerable inconsistencies of Locke, to the task of disengaging from the midst of these barren inconsistencies, whatever there is that is fruitful—whatever has borne its fruits—that which constitutes a system, and the true system of Locke. This system, you know, consists in deducing all ideas from two sources, sensation and reflection. The idea of space, then, must necessarily be derived from one or the other of these two origins. The idea of space is certainly not acquired by reflection, by consciousness of the operations of the understanding. It comes then from sensation. Here you have the systematic principle. We shall allow Locke to start from this principle, and arrive at the idea of space. But Locke does not set up to reform the human understanding; he wishes only to explain it, to show the origin of that which is, not of that which might be or ought to be.

The problem, then, for him, as for every other philosopher, is this: the principle of his system being admitted, to deduce from it that which now is, the idea of space, such as it is in the minds of all men. We shall therefore allow him to proceed according to his system; then we shall take from the hands of this system, the idea of space as given by it, and we shall confront it with the idea of space as we have it, such as all men have it, independently of any system whatever.

According to Locke, the idea of space comes from sensation. Now from what sense is it derived? It is not from the sense of smelling, nor of taste, nor of hearing. It must then be from sight and touch. So Locke says, B. II. Ch. XIII. § 2. "We get the idea of space both by our sight and touch, which I think is so evident," etc. If the idea of space is an acquisition of the sight and touch, in order to know what it should be under this condition, we must recur to previous chapters, where Locke treats of

the ideas we gain by the sight, and especially by the touch? Let us see what the touch can give according to Locke, and according to all the world.

The touch, aided or not aided by sight, suggests the idea of something which resists; and to resist is to be solid. "The idea of solidity, says Locke (Ch. IV. § 1), we receive by our touch, and it arises from the resistance which we find." And what are the qualities of a solid, of that something which resists? Greater or less degree of solidity. The greater solidity is hardness; the less is softness; from hence, also, perhaps, figure with its dimensions. Put, then, upon your solid, your something which resists, its different qualities, and you have every thing which the touch, whether aided or not aided by sight can give you. This something which resists, which is solid, which is more or less so, which has such or such a figure, the three dimensions is, in a single word, body.

Is it true, then, that the touch, with the sight, suffices to give us that which resists, the solid with its qualities, body? I do not wish to push the inquiry too far. Analysis would perhaps force me to admit here a necessary intervention of something, altogether different, besides the sense of touch. But I now choose rather to suppose that, in reality, the touch, sensation, gives the idea of body. That sensation may go thus far, I am willing to grant; that it goes further Locke does not pretend. In that chapter, in which, almost without any thing of the spirit of system, he investigates the products of sight and touch, Locke produces nothing from them but the idea of solid, that is to say, of body. If afterward, and in the spirit of his system, he pretends, as we have seen he does, that the idea of space comes from sensation, that is from the sight and touch, it follows that he reduces the idea of space to that of body, and that, for him, space can be nothing else but body itself—body enlarged, indefinitely multiplied, the world, the universe, and not only the actual, but the pos-

sible universe. In fact (Ch. XIII. § 10), Locke says: "the idea of *place* we have by the same means that we get the idea of space (whereof this is but a particular and limited consideration), namely by our sight and touch . . . . ." Same chapter, same section: "to say that the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist. . . . ." This is clear: the space of the universe is equivalent to neither more nor less than to the universe itself, and as the idea of the universe is, after all, nothing but the idea of body, it is to this idea, that the idea of space is reduced. Such is the necessary genesis of the idea of space in the system of Locke.

That there are, in these chapters, many contradictory paragraphs, and that the contradictions are sometimes of the most gross and obvious kind is true; but it is no less true, that the system of Locke being given, that is to say here, sensation being given as the sole principle of the idea of space, such an idea of space as Locke has just made out is the necessary result. But is this systematic result the reality? The idea of space, the offspring of sensation, of touch and of sight, is it the idea of space such as it exists in your minds, and in the minds of all men? Let us see, if such as we now are, we confound the idea of body and the idea of space—if they are for us but one and the same idea.

But in bringing ourselves to the test of such an experiment, let us beware of two things which corrupt every experiment. Let us beware of having in view any particular systematic conclusion, and let us beware of thinking of any origin whatever: for, the pre-occupation of the mind by such or such an origin, would, unconsciously even to ourselves, make us attribute to ideas, such as they now are in our consciousness, some special character, more in harmony with the origin which we internally prefer. We shall see hereafter the systematic conclusions which may be drawn from the experiment we wish to institute; hereafter

we will follow up the origin of the idea; but what we have now to do, and it is enough for us, is first to state the idea without any prejudice and without any foreign view.

Is the idea of space, then, reduced in the understanding to the idea of body? This is the question. And it is a question of fact. Let us take whatever body you please: take this book which is before our eyes and in our hands. It resists, it is solid, it is more or less hard, it has a certain figure, etc. Do you think of nothing more in regard to it? Do you not believe, for instance, that this body is somewhere, in a certain place? Be not surprised at the simplicity of my question; we must not be afraid of recalling philosophers to the simplest questions; for precisely because they are the simplest, philosophers often neglect them, and for want of interrogating evident facts, fall into absurd systems.

Is this body then any where? is it in some place? Yes, undoubtedly, all men will reply. Very well, then, let us take a larger body, let us take the world. Is the world somewhere also? is it in some place? Nobody doubts it. Let us take thousands, and thousands of millions of worlds, and can we not, concerning these myriads of worlds, put the same question which I have just put concerning this book? Are they somewhere—are they in a place—are they in space? We may ask the question concerning a world and millions of worlds, as well as this book; and to all these questions, you reply equally: the book, the world, the millions of worlds, are somewhere, are in a place, are in space. There is not a human being, unless it may be a philosopher pre-occupied with his system, who can for a moment call in question what I have just said. Take the savage, to whom Locke so often appeals, take the child, and the idiot also, if he be not entirely one, take any human being who has an idea of any body whatever, a book, a world, a million of worlds; and he will believe naturally that the book, the world, the

millions of worlds, are somewhere, are in a place, are in space. And what is it to acknowledge this? It is to recognize, more or less implicitly, that the idea of a book, a world, millions of worlds, solid, resisting, situated in space, is *one thing;* and that the idea of space, in which the book, the world, the millions of worlds, are situated, is *another thing.*

This is so evident that Locke himself, when not under the yoke of his system, distinguishes perfectly the idea of body, of solid, from that of space, and establishes very clearly the difference. Thus, for instance, B. II. Chap. XIII. § 11:

"There are some that would persuade us that body and extension are the same thing: who either change the signification of words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant terms. If therefore they mean by body and extension the same that other people do, viz., by *body*, something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and movable different ways; and by extension, only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid coherent parts, and which is possessed by them: they confound very different ideas one with another. For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity as it is from the idea of scarlet color? It is true, solidity can not exist without extension, neither can scarlet color exist without extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct ideas." This is followed by various considerations on the difference between body and space; considerations which occupy more than ten sections, and to which I must refer you, lest I multiply citations too much. I can not however forbear adding here a decisive and curious passage: Chap. XIV. § 5:

"Of pure space then, and solidity, there are several (among which I confess myself one) who persuade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas; and that they can think on space without any thing in it that resists or is protruded by body. This is the idea of pure space which they think they have as clear as any idea they can have of the extension of body; the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies being equally as clear without as with the idea of any solid parts between: and on the other side they persuade themselves that they have, distinct from that of pure space, the idea of something that fills space, that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies or resist their motion. If there be others that have not these two ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not how men who have the same idea under different names, or different ideas under the same name, can in that case talk with one another, any more than a man who, not being blind or deaf, has distinct ideas of the color of scarlet, and the sound of a trumpet, could discourse concerning scarlet color with the blind man I mentioned in another place, who fancied that the idea of scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet."

Thus, according to Locke himself, the idea of space and the idea of body are totally distinct. To put this distinction in a clearer light, let us notice the different characters which those two ideas present.

You have an idea of a body. You believe that it exists. But could you suppose that such a body did not exist? I ask you, can you not suppose this book to be destroyed? Undoubtedly. Can you not also suppose the whole world to be destroyed, and no body to be actually existing? Unquestionably you can. For you, constituted as you are, the supposition of the non-existence of bodies involves no contradiction. And what do we term the idea of a thing which we conceive as possibly non existent? It is termed *a contingent and relative idea.* But if you should suppose

the book destroyed, the world destroyed, all matter destroyed, could you suppose *space* destroyed? Can you suppose that if there were no body existent, there would then no longer remain any space for the bodies which might come into existence? You are not able to make the supposition. Though it is in the power of the human mind to suppose the non-existence of body, it is not in its power to suppose the non-existence of space. The idea of space is then a *necessary and absolute idea.* You have then two characteristics perfectly distinct, by which the ideas of body and of space are separated.

Moreover, every body is evidently limited. You embrace its limits in every part. Magnify, extend, multiply the body by thousands of similar bodies, you have removed, enlarged the limits of the body, but you have not destroyed its limits; you conceive them still. But in regard to space, it is not so. The idea of space is given to you as a continuous whole, in which you can very readily form useful and convenient divisions, but at the same time artificial divisions, under which subsists the idea of space without limit. For, beyond any determinate portion of space, there is space still; and beyond that space, there is still space forever and forevermore. Thus while body has in all its dimensions something else which bounds it, namely the space which contains it; there are no limits to space.

The idea of body, moreover, is not complete without the idea of form and figure, which implies that you can always represent it under a determinate form: it is always an image. Far otherwise with space, which is a *conception,* and not an image; and as soon as you conceive of space by *imagining* it, as soon, that is, as you represent it under any determinate form whatever, it is no longer space, of which you form a conception, but something *in* space, a body. The idea of space is a conception of the reason distinct from all sensible representation.

I might pursue this opposition of the ideas of body and of space. But it is sufficient to have established these three fundamental characteristics: 1, the idea of body is contingent and relative, while the idea of space is necessary and absolute; 2, the idea of body implies the idea of limitation, the idea of space implies the absence of all limitation; 3, and lastly, the idea of body is a sensible representation, while the idea of space is a pure and wholly rational conception.

If these characteristics are truly those of the idea of space, and of the idea of body, these two ideas are profoundly distinct, and no philosophy which pretends to rest on observation should ever confound them. Nevertheless, the confusion of these ideas necessarily results from the system of Locke. The idea of space—condemned to come from sensation, and not being deducible from the smell, the hearing, or the taste—was behooved to be derived from sight and from touch; and coming from sight and touch, it could be nothing else than the idea of body, more or less generalized. Now it has been demonstrated that the idea of space is not that of body; it does not, then, come from sight and touch; it does not, then, come from sensation; and as it can still less be deduced from reflection, from the sentiment of our own operations; and as it nevertheless exists; it follows that *all ideas are not derived solely from sensation and reflection*, and that the system of Locke concerning the origin of ideas is defective and vicious, at least in regard to the idea of space.

But in order the better to penetrate this system, we must ourselves take stand upon the ground of Locke, and investigate the question which is, with him, the great philosophical problem. After having determined the characteristics of the idea of space and of the idea of body, as they now actually exist in the intelligence of all men, and shown that these characteristics establish a profound difference between these two ideas; we must now inquire what

their origin really is; we must investigate the origin of the idea of space relatively to the idea of body. Every thing thus far, I trust, has been simple and clear; for we have not set foot out of the human intelligence as it now manifests itself. Let us go onward; but let us endeavor that the light which we have already gained from impartial observation be not quenched in the darkness of any hypothesis.

There are two sorts of origin. There are in human cognitions, two orders of relations which it is important clearly to distinguish.

Two ideas being given, we may inquire whether the one does not *suppose* the other; whether the one being admitted, we must not admit the other likewise, or incur the reproach of inconsistency. This is the *logical* order of ideas.

If we regard the question of the origin of the ideas of body and of space under this point of view, let us see what will be the result.

The idea of body and the idea of space being given, which supposes the other? Which is the logical condition of the admission of the other? Evidently the idea of space is the logical condition of the admission of the idea of body. In fact, take any body you please, and you can not admit the idea of it but under the condition of admitting, at the same time, the idea of space; otherwise you would admit a body which was nowhere, which was in no place, and such a body is inconceivable. Take an aggregate of bodies; or take a single body, since every body is also an aggregate of particles; these particles are more or less distant from each other, and at the same time they co-exist together: these are the conditions of every body, even the smallest. But do you not perceive what is the condition of the idea of co-existence and of distance? Again the idea of space. For how could there be distance between bodies or the particles of a body, without space, and what possible co-

existence is there without a continuity? It is the same with contiguity. Destroy, in thought, continuity of space, and distance is no longer appreciable; neither co-existence nor contiguity are possible. Moreover, continuity is extension. We are not to believe (and Locke has very clearly established it, B. II. Ch. XIII. § 11), that the idea of extension is adequate to the idea of body. The fundamental attribute of body is resistance; from hence solidity; but solidity does not imply in itself that this solidity is extended.* There is no extension but under the condition of a continuity, that is, of space. The extension of a body, then, already supposes space; space is not the body or the resistance; but that which resists does not resist except upon some real point. Now every real point is extended—is in space. Take away, therefore, the idea of space and of extension, and no real body is supposable. Therefore as the last conclusion, in the *logical* order of human knowledge, the idea of body is not the logical condition of the admission of the idea of space; but on the contrary, it is the idea of space, the idea of a continuity, of extension, which is the logical condition of the admission of the slightest idea of body.

This is beyond doubt; and when we regard the question of the origin of ideas under the logical point of view, this solution, which is incontestable, overwhelms the system of Locke. Now it is at this point that the Ideal school has in general taken up the question of the origin of ideas. By the origin of ideas, they commonly understand the logical filiation of ideas. Hence they could say, with their last and most illustrious interpreter, that so far is the idea of body from being the foundation of the idea of space, it is the idea of space which is the foundation [the logical condition] of the idea of body. The idea of body is given to us by the touch and the sight, that is, by experience of

* First Series, Vol. I. § xi. p. 297. See also the Essay of Dugald Stewart, on the Idealism of Berkeley in his Phil. Essays.

the senses. On the contrary, the idea of space is given to us, on *occasion* of the idea of body, *by* the understanding, the mind, the reason; in fine, by a faculty other than sensation. Hence the formula of Kant: the pure rational idea of space comes so little from experience that it is the condition of all experience. This bold formula holds true with perfect strictness, when taken in a certain reference, in reference to the logical order of human cognitions.

But this is not the sole order of cognition; and the logical relation does not comprise all the relations which ideas mutually sustain. There is still another, that of anterior, or posterior, the order of the relative development of ideas in time—their *chronological* order. And the question of the origin of ideas may be regarded under this point of view. Now the idea of space, we have just seen, is clearly the *logical* condition of all sensible experience. Is it also the *chronological* condition of experience, and of the idea of body? I believe no such thing. If we take ideas in the order in which they actually evolve themselves in the intelligence, if we investigate only their history and successive appearance, it is not true that the idea of space is the antecedent of the idea of body. Indeed it is so little true that the idea of space supposes chronologically the idea of body, that, in fact, if you had not the idea of body, you would never have the idea of space. Take away all sensation, take away the sight and the touch, and you have no longer any idea of body, and consequently none of space. Space is the place of bodies; he who has no idea of a body will never have the idea of space which contains it. Rationally, logically, if you had not the idea of space, you could not have the idea of a body; but the converse is true chronologically, and in fact, the idea of space comes up only along with the idea of body: and as you have not the idea of body without immediately having the idea of space, it follows that these two ideas are cotemporaneous. I will go

further. Not only may we say that the idea of body is cotemporaneous with the idea of space, but we may say, and ought to say that it is anterior to it. In fact the idea of space is cotemporaneous with the idea of body in this sense, that as soon as the idea of body is given you, you can not but have that of space; but yet it was necessary that you should have first that of a body, in order that the idea of the space which contains it, should appear to you.* It is then by the idea of body,† that you go to that of space. Take away the idea of body, and you would never have the idea of space which incloses it. The former, then, may be called the historical and chronological condition of the latter.

Undoubtedly—I can not repeat it too much, for it is the knot of the difficulty, the secret of the problem—undoubtedly as soon as the idea of *body* is given, that instant the idea of *space* is evolved; but if this condition were not fulfilled, the idea of space would never enter the human understanding. When it is awakened there, it remains fixed, independently of the idea of body which introduced it there;‡ for we may suppose space without body, while we can not suppose body without space. The idea of body was the chronological condition of the idea of space, as the latter is the logical condition of the former.§ These two orders are reciprocal, and, so to say, in a certain sense all the world are right, and all the world are wrong. *Logically*, idealism and Kant are right, in maintaining that the pure idea of space is the condition of the idea of body, and of experience; and *chronologically*, empiricism and Locke are right in their turn, in holding up experience, that is, on this point, sensation, the sensa-

* [Or be evolved in your consciousness.—TR.]

† [By the idea of body as the occasion.—TR.]

‡ [Was the occasion of its evolution.—TR.]

§ [*Fragmens Philosophiques, Programme of a Course of Lectures delivered* in 1817. See ADDITIONAL PIECES.—TR.]

tion of sight and touch, as the condition of the idea of space, and of any exercise of the understanding.

In general, idealism more or less neglects the question of the origin of ideas, and scarcely regards them but in their actual character. Taking its position, at the outset, in the understanding as at present developed, it does not investigate its successive acquisitions; it does not trouble itself about the chronological order of ideas. It confines itself to their logical connection; it starts from reason, not from experience. Locke, on the contrary, pre-occupied with the question of the origin of ideas, neglects their actual characters, confounds their chronological condition with their logical ground, and the power of reason with that of experience which indeed precedes and guides the former, but which does not constitute it. Experience, when put in its just place, is the condition, but not the principle of knowledge. Does it go further, and pretend to constitute all knowledge? It then becomes nothing but a system, a system incomplete, exclusive, and vicious. It becomes empiricism or the opposite of idealism, which latter is, in its turn, the exaggeration of the proper power of reason, the usurpation of reason over experience, the destruction, or the forgetfulness of the chronological and experimental condition of knowledge, and which arises from its exclusive pre-occupation with its logical and rational principles. Locke introduced and accredited empiricism in the philosophy of the eighteenth century. He saw very clearly that we could have no idea of space if we had not some idea of body. Body is not space; but it is body which fills or which measures space. If then space is not body, we never know any thing of space, except what body teaches us. Locke saw this: that is his merit. His fault is, 1, in having confounded that which fills and measures space and reveals it to us, with the proper idea of space itself; 2, and this second fault is far more general and comprehensive than the first, in having confounded the

chronological condition of ideas with their logical condition, the experimental data, external or internal, upon condition of which the understanding conceives certain ideas, with the ideas themselves.

This is the most general critical point of view which is to be taken of all the metaphysics of Locke. I have drawn it from the examination I have just made of his theory of the idea of space. It may be applied, and I shall apply it in the succeeding discussions, to his theory of the idea of the infinite, of time, and of other ideas, which Locke has made boast, as you know, of deducing easily from experience, from sensation or from reflection.

CHAPTER III.

TIME.—THE INFINITE.—SUBSTANCE.—IDENTITY.

Recapitulation of the preceding chapter.—Continuation of the examination of the Second Book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.—Of the idea of Time.—Of the idea of the Infinite.—Of the idea of Personal Identity.—Of the idea of Substance.

I SHALL begin at this time, by placing before you the results at which we arrived in the last lecture. The question was concerning Space.

A sound philosophy unquestionably ought not to suppress and destroy the ontological questions concerning the nature of space considered in itself; whether it is material, or spiritual—whether it is a substance, or an attribute—whether it is independent of God, or is to be referred to God himself; for all these questions are undeniably in the human mind. But they should be postponed until psychological observations correctly made and skillfully combined, shall put us in a condition to resolve them. Our first occupation, then, is with the purely psychological question concerning the idea of space.

If we interrogate the human understanding, as it is developed in all men, we shall recognize the idea of space with these three eminent characteristics: 1. Space is given us as necessary, while body is given as that which may or may not exist. 2. Space is given us as without limits, while body is given as limited on every side. 3. The idea of space is altogether rational, while that of body is accompanied by a sensible representation.

The preliminary question concerning the actual characteristics of the idea of space being thus resolved, we may, without danger, advance to the far more obscure and difficult question concerning the origin of the idea. Now here we have carefully distinguished two points of view, which are intimately connected together, but which analysis should separate, namely, the logical order of ideas, and their chronological order. In the logical view, body presupposes space; for what is body? The juxtaposition, the co-existence of resisting points, that is, of solids. But how could this juxtaposition, this co-existence, happen but in a continuity, in space? But while, in the order of reason and of nature, body presupposes space; it must be admitted, on the other hand, that in the chronological order, there is a cotemporaneousness of the idea of body and that of space; we can not have the idea of body without that of space, nor of space without that of body. And if, in this cotemporaneous process, one of these ideas may be distinguished as the antecedent, it is not the idea of space which is anterior to that of body; it is the idea of body which is anterior to that of space. It is not from the idea of space that we start; and if the sensibility, if the touch, did not take the initiative, and give us the idea of resistance, of solid, of body, we should never have the idea of space. Without doubt the idea of body could never be formed and completed in the mind, if we had not already there the idea of space; but still, the former idea springs up first in time; it precedes in some degree the idea of space, which immediately follows it.

Here then are two orders perfectly distinct from each other. In the order of nature and of reason, body presupposes space. In the order of the acquisition of knowledge, on the contrary, it is the idea of solid, of body, which is the condition of the idea of space. Now the idea of body is acquired in the perception of touch, aided by the sight; it is then an acquisition of experience. It is

then correct to say that, in the chronological order of knowledge, experience and a certain development of the senses, are the condition of the acquisition of the idea of space; and at the same time, as body presupposes space, and as the idea of space is given us by the reason, and not by the senses or experience, it is right also to say that, logically, it is the idea of space and a certain exertion of the reason which render experience possible.

At this point of view, the true character, the merit and the defects, of the system of Locke, are discovered. What has Locke done? Instead of being contented to postpone, he has, I apprehend, destroyed the ontological questions concerning the nature of space. True, indeed, he had the sagacity to give the first rank to the psychological question concerning the idea of space. But he ought to have tarried much longer in the inquiry into the actual characteristics of this idea; and it was a great fault in him to throw himself at the outset upon the question of its origin. Now his general system of the origin of ideas being that all our ideas are derived from two sources, reflection, that is consciousness, and sensation; as the idea of space could not come from consciousness, it was clearly necessary it should come from sensation; and in order to deduce the idea of space from sensation, it was necessary to resolve it into the idea of body. This Locke has done in the systematic parts of his work, though at the same time, contradicting himself more than once; for sometimes he speaks of space as altogether distinct from solidity. But when his system comes up, when he puts upon himself the necessity of deducing the idea of space from sensation, then he affirms that the idea of space is acquired by the sight and by the touch; and as the touch, aided by the sight, gives us only body, and not space, Locke by his mere process implicitly reduces space to body. He does the same thing expressly when he says that to ask if the world exists in any place, is simply to ask if the world exists. This confusion of the

existence of space with the existence of the world, is the confusion of the idea of space with that of body. This confusion was necessary to render his system strict, at least in appearance. But the universal belief of the human race declares that body is one thing, and space, which incloses it, another thing; the world and all possible worlds, one thing; the infinite and illimitable space which incloses them, another thing. Bodies measure space, but do not constitute it. The idea of body is indeed the antecedent of the idea of space; but it is not the idea itself.

So much for the idea of space. Let us now proceed further to interrogate the second book of the Essay on the Human Understanding concerning the most important ideas; and we shall see that Locke constantly confounds the order of the acquisition of knowledge with the logical order, the necessary antecedent of an idea with the idea itself. I propose now to examine the system of Locke in relation to the idea of time, the idea of the infinite, of personal identity, and of substance. I begin, as does Locke, with the idea of TIME.

Here the first rule, you know, is to neglect the question concerning the nature of time, and to inquire solely what is the idea of time in the human understanding; whether it is there, and with what characteristics it is there. It is undeniably there. There is no one, who, as soon as he has before his eyes, or represents to his imagination, any event whatever, does not conceive that it has passed, or is passing, in a certain time. I ask whether it is possible to suppose an event, which you are not compelled to conceive as taking place some hour, some day, some week some year, some century? You can suppose the abolition, the non-existence of every event; but you can not suppose this of time. Standing before a time-piece, you may very easily make the supposition, that from one hour to another, no event has taken place; you are, however, none the less convinced that time has passed away, even when no event

has marked its course. The idea of time, then, like the idea of space, is a necessary idea. I add, that, like space, it is also illimitable. The divisions of time, like those of space, are purely artificial, and involve the supposition of a unity, an absolute continuity of time. Take thousands of events, and do with them as you did with bodies, multiply them indefinitely, and they will never equal the time which precedes and which succeeds them. Before all finite time, and beyond all finite time, there is still time unlimited, infinite, inexhaustible. Finally, as with the idea of space necessary and illimitable, so is it with the idea of time necessary and illimitable; it is a pure idea of the reason, which escapes all sensible representation, all grasp of the imagination and of the sensibility.

Now it is with respect to the origin of the idea of time as with the origin of the idea of space. Here again we are to distinguish the order of the acquisition of our ideas from their logical order. In the logical order of ideas, the idea of any succession of events pre-supposes that of time. There could not be any succession, but upon condition of a continuous duration, to the different points of which the several members of the succession may be attached. Take away the continuity of time, and you take away the possibility of the succession of the events; just as the continuity of space being taken away, the possibility of the juxtaposition and co-existence of bodies is destroyed. But in the chronological order, on the contrary, it is the idea of a succession of events, which precedes the idea of the time that includes them. I do not mean to say in regard to time, any more than in regard to space, that we have a clear and complete idea of a succession, and that then the idea of time, as including this series of succession, springs up. I merely say, it is clearly necessary that we should have a perception of some events, in order to conceive that these events are in time. Time is the place of events, just as space is the place of bodies; whoever had no idea

of any event, would have no idea of time. If, then, the logical condition of the idea of succession, lies in the idea of time, the chronological condition of the idea of time is the idea of succession.

To this result, then, we are come: the idea of succession is the occasion, the chronological antecedent of the necessary conception of time. Now every idea of succession is undeniably an acquisition of experience. It remains to ascertain of what experience. Is it that of the senses, or that of the operations of the mind? The first idea of succession: is it given in the spectacle of outward events, or in the consciousness of the events that pass within us?

Take a succession of outward events. In order that these events may be successive, it is necessary that there should be a first event, a second, a third, etc. But if, when you see the second event you do not remember the first, it would not be the second; there could be for you no succession. You would always remain fixed at the first event, which would not even have the character of first to you, because there would be no second. The intervention of memory is necessary, then, in order to conceive of any succession whatever. Now memory has for its objects nothing external; it relates not immediately to things, but to ourselves; we have no memory but of ourselves. When we say, we remember such a person, we remember such a place—it means nothing more than that we remember to have been seeing such a place, or we remember to have been hearing or seeing such a person. There is no memory but of ourselves, because there is no memory but upon the condition that there has been a consciousness. If consciousness then is the condition of memory, and memory the condition of the idea of succession, it follows that the first succession is given us in ourselves, in consciousness, in the proper objects and phenomena of consciousness, in our thoughts, in our ideas. But if the first succession given us is that of our ideas, as to all suc-

cession is necessarily attached the conception of time, it follows again, that the first idea we have of time, is that of the time in which we are; and so the first succession for us is the succession of our own ideas, the first duration for us is our own duration; the succession of outward events, and the duration in which these events are accomplished, is not known to us till afterward. I do not say that the succession of outward events is nothing but an induction from the succession of our own ideas; neither do I say that outward duration is nothing but an induction from our own personal duration: but I say that we can not have an idea either of external succession or of duration, till after we have had the consciousness and the memory of some internal phenomena, and consequently the conception of our own duration. Thus then, summarily, the first duration given us, is our own; because the first succession which is given, is the succession of our own ideas.

A profound analysis might carry us further still. There is a crowd of ideas, of phenomena, under the eye of consciousness. To inquire what is the first succession given us, is to inquire what are the first ideas, the first phenomena, which fall under consciousness, and form the first succession. Now it is evident in respect to our sensations, that they are not phenomena of consciousness except upon this condition: that we pay attention to them. Thousands and thousands of impressions may affect my sensibility; but if I do not give them my attention, I have no consciousness of them. It is the same with respect to many of my thoughts, which, if the attention is directed elsewhere, do not come to my consciousness, but vanish in reveries. The essential condition of consciousness is attention; the internal phenomenon, most intimately allied to consciousness then, is attention; and a series of acts of attention is, necessarily, the first succession which is given us. Now what is attention? It is nothing less than the *will* itself; for nobody is attentive without willing to be so.

The first succession, then, is that of our voluntary acts. Now succession measures time, as body measures space; from whence it follows that the first succession being that of voluntary acts, the will is the primitive measure of time; and as a measure, it has this excellence, that it is equal to itself; for every thing differs in the consciousness, sensations and thoughts, while acts of attention, being eminently simple, are essentially similar.

Such is the theory of the primitive and equal measure of time which we owe to M. de Biran; and you may see it expressed with perfect originality of analysis and of style, in the lectures of M. Royer-Collard.* M. de Biran con-

* *Œuvres complètes de* Thomas Reid *publiées par* M. Th. Jouffroy *avec des Fragmens de* M. Royer-Collard. Paris, 1829. [To the third and fourth volume of this edition of Reid's works the editor has attached copious extracts and reports of Royer-Collard's lectures, delivered in 1811–1814. An extended discussion concerning duration may be found in Vol. IV. pp. 347–426. It is too long to be introduced in this place; a brief view of its results is all that can be given.

The first duration we conceive is, according to Royer-Collard, *our own.* It is not in the succession of our feelings that our duration consists; for succession pre-supposes a duration in which it takes place. Our duration results from the sentiment of our continued identity which results from the continuity of our activity, attested by consciousness and memory. To act, with consciousness and memory of acting, is to endure. Whenever, in the consciousness of our own activity and the succession of its acts, we acquire the conception of the duration (our own) in which that succession takes place, it becomes independent of the sentiment of our own identical and continuous existence, which contained it. By occasion of our own duration, we conceive a necessary and illimitable duration, the eternal theater of all existences and all contingent successions; and not only do we conceive it, but we are invincibly persuaded of its reality. This passage from the conception of time within us to time without us, is made, in the opinion of Royer-Collard, by what he calls a *natural induction.* His view of this point seems unnecessary and burdened with difficulties, the nature of which the reader will apprehend from the criticism of it, by Cousin, as applied to the conception of causality, in the next chapter. To explain the origin of the conception of Time, it is quite sufficient to say that when by occasion of

tinually repeated that the element of duration is the will; and in order to pass from our own duration to outward duration, from the succession of our own acts, to the succession of events, from the primitive and equal measure of time for us, to the ulterior and more or less uniform measure of time without us, M. de Biran had recourse to a twofold phenomenon of the will, which has reference at once to the external and to the internal world. According to De Biran, the type of the sentiment of the will is the sentiment of effort. I make an effort to raise my arm, and I raise it. I make an effort to walk, and I walk. The effort is a relation with two terms; the one is internal, namely, the will, the act of the will; the other is external, namely, the movement of the arm, or the step that I take, which has its cause and its measure in the internal movement of the will. Now a moment, an instant, is nothing else in itself but a most simple act of the will. It is at first altogether internal; then it passes outward, in the external movement produced by the *nisus* or effort, a movement which reflects that of the will, and becomes the measure of all the subsequent external movements, as the will itself is the primitive and undecomposable measure of the first movement which it produces.

Without taking upon myself either the honor or the responsibility of all parts of this theory, I hasten to notice that of Locke. The merit of Locke consists in having proved that the idea of time, of duration, of eternity, is suggested to us by the idea of some succession of events;

experience any particular succession is given, the mind, in virtue of its own activity and by its own laws, forms the necessary and universal conception of time. The primitive succession given in consciousness and memory (that is, according to Royer-Collard, the acts of our own will), furnishing us the notion of time concrete, particular and determinate (our own duration) suffices to supply the condition under which the mind in virtue of its own laws, without resorting to the process of *induction*, but *immediately* forms the conception of duration without us, of time absolute, unlimited.—TR.]

and that this succession is taken, not from the external world, but from the world of consciousness. See B. II. Ch. XIV. XV. XVI. For example, Ch. XIV. § 4: "men derive their ideas of duration from their reflection on the trains of the ideas they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings." And, § 6: "the idea of succession is not from motion." Also, § 12: "the constant and regular succession of ideas is the measure and standard of all other successions." The analysis of Locke does not go far enough; it does not determine in what particular succession of ideas, the first succession, the first duration, is given to us. Should it be said that Locke, in making the idea of duration to come from reflection, makes it to come from the sentiment of the operations of the mind, yet as according to Locke the operations of the mind are not all active and voluntary, his theory is very far from being the same with that which I have just now stated. But it must be acknowledged that the one has opened the road for the other; and that it was doing much to have deduced the idea of time from the interior, from the phenomena of reflection. This is the merit of Locke's theory. The vice of it is more considerable; but still it is closely allied to the merit. Locke saw that the idea of time is given in succession, and that the first succession for us is necessarily the succession of our own ideas. Thus far Locke deserves only praise, for he gives the succession of our ideas merely as the condition of the acquisition of the idea of time; but the condition of a thing is easily taken for the thing itself, and Locke, after having taken the idea of body, the mere condition of the idea of space, for the idea of space itself, here also takes the condition of the idea of time, for the idea itself. He confounds succession with time. He says not merely that the succession of our ideas is the condition of the conception of time; but he says that time is nothing else than the succession of our ideas. B. II. Ch. XIV. § 4: "That we have our notion of succession

and duration from this original, namely, from reflection on the train of ideas which we find to appear one after another in our minds, seems plain to me in that we have no perception of duration, but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself, while he sleeps soundly, whether an hour, or a day, or a month, or a year; of which duration of things, while he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance. And so, I doubt not, it would be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep only one idea in his mind, without variation and the succession of others."

In this whole passage there is:

1. A confusion of two ideas very distinct—duration and succession.

2. An obvious paralogism; for duration is explained by succession, which, in its turn, is inexplicable only by duration. In truth, where do the elements of any succession follow each other, if not in some duration? Or how could succession—the distance, so to say, between ideas—take place, unless in the space proper to ideas and to minds, that is, in time?

3. Moreover, see to what results the theory of Locke leads. If succession is no longer merely the measure of time, but time itself; if the succession of ideas is no longer the mere condition of the conception of time, but the conception itself; time is nothing else than what the succession of our ideas makes it. The succession of our ideas is more or less rapid; time therefore is more or less short, not in appearance, but in reality. In absolute sleep, in lethargy, all succession of ideas, all thought ceases; therefore we have no duration, and not only have we no duration,

but there is no duration for any thing; for not only our time, but time in itself, is nothing but the succession of our ideas. Ideas exist but under the eye of consciousness; but there is no consciousness in lethargy, in total sleep; consequently there is no time. The time-piece vainly moved on; the time-piece was wrong; and the sun, like the time-piece, should have stopped.

These are the results, very extravagant indeed, and yet the necessary results of confounding the idea of succession with that of time; and the confusion itself is necessary in the general system of Locke, which deduces all our ideas from sensation and reflection. Sensation had given space; reflection gives time; but reflection, that is, consciousness with memory, attains only to the succession of our ideas, of our voluntary acts, a succession finite and contingent, and not time necessary and unlimited, in which this succession takes place. Experience, whether external or internal, gives us only the measure of time, and not time itself. Now Locke was forbidden any source of knowledge but sensation and reflection. It was necessary of course to make time explicable by the one or the other. He saw very clearly that it was not explicable by sensation, and it could not be by reflection, except upon reducing it to the measure of time, that is to say, to succession.* Locke has thus, it is true, destroyed time; but he has saved his system. It is at the same price he will save it again in respect to the idea of the infinite.

Time and Space have for their characteristics, that they are illimitable and infinite. Without doubt the idea of the infinite is applicable to something else besides time and space; but since we have hitherto treated only of time and space, we will now refer the idea of the infinite merely to time and space, as Locke has set the example.

Space and time are infinite. Now the idea of the infinite

* [For we are conscious of succession (the succession of our own ideas), but not of time.—TR.]

may be detached from the ideas of time and space, and considered in itself, provided we always keep in mind the subject from which it is abstracted. The idea of the infinite unquestionably exists in the human understanding, since there is undeniably in it the idea of time, and the idea of space, which are infinite. The infinite is distinct from the finite, and consequently from the multiplication of the finite by itself, that is, from the indefinite. That which is not infinite added as many times as you please to itself will never make up the infinite. You can no more deduce the infinite from the finite than you could deduce space from body, or time from succession.

In respect to the origin of the idea of the infinite, recollect that if you had not had the idea of any body, nor of any succession, you would never have had the idea of space, nor of time; but at the same time, you can not have the idea of a body and of succession, without having [necessarily awakened along with it] the idea of space and of time. Now body and succession are the finite; space and time are the infinite. Therefore without the finite, there is for you no infinite; but at the same time, immediately that you have the idea of the finite, you can not help having the idea of the infinite. Here recollect again the distinction between the order of the acquisition of our cognitions and their logical order. In the logical order, the finite supposes the infinite as its necessary ground; but in the chronological order, the idea of the finite is the necessary condition of the acquisition of the idea of the infinite.

These facts are evident; but Locke had a system, and this system consists in admitting no other origin of all our ideas but sensation and reflection. The idea of the finite, which resolves itself into that of body and of succession, comes easily from sensation or from reflection; but the idea of the infinite, which resolves itself neither into the idea of body nor into that of succession, since time and space

are neither one or the other of these two—*the idea of the infinite can come neither from sensation nor from reflection.* If the idea of the infinite subsist, the system of Locke must then be false. It is necessary therefore that the idea of the infinite should not subsist; and Locke has accordingly repulsed and eluded it as much as possible. He begins by declaring that the idea of the infinite is very obscure, while that of the finite is very clear and comes easily into the mind (B. II. Ch. XVII. § 2.) But obscure, or not obscure, is it in the intelligence? That is the question, and whether obscure or not obscure, if it is real, it is your duty as a philosopher to admit it, whether you can render it clear or not. And then as to the obscurity, let us understand ourselves. The senses attain only body; consciousness or reflection attain only succession. The objects of sense and of consciousness are then body and succession, that is to say, the finite. Thus nothing is clearer, for sense or for consciousness than the finite; while the infinite is and ought to be very obscure for sense and consciousness, for this very simple reason, that the infinite is the object neither of sense nor of consciousness, but of the reason alone. If, then, you go about to apprehend the infinite by sense and consciousness, it is necessarily obscure and even inaccessible; but if by reason, nothing is clearer, even to the degree that it is then precisely the finite which becomes obscure to your eyes and escapes you. Thus you perceive how empiricism, grounding itself exclusively upon experience, internal or external, is naturally led to the denial of the infinite; while idealism, grounding itself exclusively upon the reason, forms a very clear idea of the infinite, but scarcely admits the finite, which is not the appropriate object of the reason.

After having sported awhile with the idea of the infinite as obscure, Locke objects again that it is purely negative, that it has nothing positive in it. B. II. Ch. XVII. § 13. "We have no positive idea of infinity."

§ 16: "*We have no positive idea of infinite duration.*" § 18: "*We have no positive idea of infinite space.*" Here we have the accusation, so often since repeated, against the conceptions of reason that they are not positive. But first, observe that there can no more be an idea of succession without the idea of time, than of time without the previous idea of succession; and no more idea of body without the idea of space, than of space without the previous idea of body; that is to say, there can no more be the idea of the finite without the idea of infinite, than of the infinite without the previous idea of the finite. From whence it follows in strictness, that these ideas suppose each other, and if any one pleases to say, reciprocally limit each other; and consequently, the idea of the infinite is no more the negative of that of the finite, than the idea of finite is the negative of that of the infinite. They are both negatives on the same ground, or they are both positives; for they are two simultaneous affirmations, and every affirmation contains a positive idea. Or does one understand by positive, that which falls under experience external or internal, and by negative, that which does not fall under experience? Then I grant that the idea of body and of succession, that is of the finite, does fall solely under experience, under sensation and consciousness; and that it alone is positive; while the idea of time and of space, that is, of the infinite, falling only under reason, is purely negative. But with this explanation, we should be driven to maintain that all rational conceptions, for example those of geometry and morals, are also purely negative, and have nothing positive in them. But if by positive be understood every thing which is not abstract, every thing that is real, every thing that falls within the immediate and direct grasp of some one of our faculties, it must be admitted that the idea of the infinite, of time and of space, is as positive as that of the finite, of succession and of body, since it falls under the reason, a faculty altogether

as real and as positive as the senses and consciousness, although its proper objects are not objects of experience.*

At last being obliged to explain himself categorically, after many contradictions, for Locke often speaks elsewhere, and here also, of the infinity of God (B. II. Ch. XVII. § 1, and even of the infinity of time and space, *ib.* § 4, 5), he ends by resolving the infinite into number (*ib.* § 9): "*Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity.*"— "But of all other ideas, it is number, as I have said, which I think furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity we are capable of. For even in space and duration, when the mind pursues the idea of infinity, it

* [*The idea of the infinite.*—This criticism is unquestionably valid *as against Locke's reduction* of the infinite to number, his confusion of the idea of the infinite with that of the finite, and consequent destruction of the former idea. But there still remains a higher question concerning the positive science of the infinite, which involves the possibility of philosophy itself, considered as the positive knowledge of the absolute and infinite, or viewed as any thing more than the observation and analysis of the *phenomena* of consciousness. The possibility of philosophy, in this sense of the word, is indeed the grand problem of speculative inquiry, the resolution of it, explicit or implied, determines the most general character of the great systems of philosophy. It is a question, however, which we do not intend here to discuss. We will only remark that the position taken by Cousin on this subject in his other works, constitutes the chief pretension and systematic peculiarity of his philosophy. It is a position certainly not without great difficulties. Cousin's theory on this subject has been very ably combated in an article in the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1829. The foregoing discussion in this chapter may remind those who have read the article alluded to, of the objection raised by the reviewer against Cousin's doctrine, namely, that the idea of the infinite is purely negative, and the above remarks will perhaps be thought a sufficient answer to the objection. But in the preface to the second edition of the *Philosophical Fragments*, and in the preface to Cousin's edition of M. De Biran's *Rapports du Physique et du Moral*, extracts from which are printed in the appendix to this volume, will be found what the author himself (in a letter to the present translator) speaks of as a sufficient "complete reply to the article of the Edinburgh Review."—Tr.]

there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers, as of millions of millions of miles, or years, which are so many distinct ideas, kept best by number from running into a confused heap, wherein the mind loses itself."

But what is number? It is in the last analysis, such or such a number; for every number is a determinate number. It is then a finite number, whatever it may be, and as high as you please. Number is the parent of succession, not of duration; number and succession measure time, but do not adequate and exhaust it. The reduction of the infinite to number is, then, the reduction of time infinite, to its measure indefinite or finite; just as in regard to space, the reduction of space to body is the reduction of the infinite to the finite. Now to reduce the infinite to the finite is to destroy it; it is to destroy the belief of the human race; but, as before observed, it saves the system of Locke. In fact the infinite can enter into the understanding neither through sense, nor through consciousness, but the finite can enter there wonderfully well through these two doors. It alone does so. There is, then (for Locke), nothing else, neither in the mind nor in nature: and the idea of the infinite is nothing but a vague and obscure idea, altogether negative, which at last, when reduced to its just value, resolves itself into number and succession.

Let us now examine the theory of Personal Identity in Locke, as we have that of Infinity, of Time, and of Space.

Is the idea of personal identity found, or not found, in the human understanding? Let every one answer for himself. Is there any one of you who doubts his personal identity, who doubts that he is the same to-day he was yesterday, and will be to-morrow? If no one doubts his personal identity, it remains solely to determine the origin of this idea.

I suppose if you did not think and were not conscious of thinking, you would not know that you existed. Re-

flect whether in the absence of all thought, all consciousness, you could have any idea of your own existence, and consequently of your existence as one and the same? On the other hand, can you have the consciousness of a single operation of your mind, without instantly having an irresistible conviction of your existence? You can not. In every act of consciousness there is the consciousness of some operation, some phenomenon, some thought, volition, or sensation; and at the same time the conception of our existence. And when memory, following consciousness, comes into exercise, we conceive that the same being, the same *I myself*, who was before the subject of the phenomena of which I was conscious, still exists, and is the same whom my memory recalls to me. So that consciousness and memory can never be in exercise without the reason suggesting to me the irresistible conviction of my personal existence as one and identical.

Now if you distinguish again here the two orders I have repeatedly mentioned, the logical order and the chronological order of knowledge, it is evident that in the order of reason and nature, it is not the consciousness and memory which are the foundation of personal identity; on the contrary, personal identity, the continued existence of our being, is the foundation of consciousness and of memory. Take away being, and there are no longer any phenomena; the phenomena no longer come to consciousness and memory. Thus in the order of nature and of reason, consciousness and memory involve the supposition of personal identity. But it is not so in the chronological order. In this order, though we can not be conscious and remember without instantly having a rational conviction of our identical existence; nevertheless it is necessary in order to have this conviction of our identity, that there should have been some act of consciousness and of memory. Undoubtedly the act of memory and of consciousness is not consummated, until the conception of our per-

sonal identity is awakened; but some act of memory and of consciousness must have taken place, in order that the conception of our identity should take place in its turn. It is in this sense I say, that an operation, an acquisition of memory and of consciousness, of some sort, is the necessary chronological condition of the conception of our personal identity.

Analysis might bring up concerning the phenomena of consciousness and of memory, which suggest to us the idea of our personal identity, the same problem that has already been brought up concerning those phenomena of consciousness which suggest the idea of time: it may examine what, among the numerous phenomena which we are conscious of and remember, are those by occasion of which we first acquire the conviction of our existence. This, in fact, is to inquire what are the conditions of memory and of consciousness. We have already seen that the condition of memory is consciousness. We have already seen also, that the condition of consciousness is attention—and the principle of attention is the will. It is the will, then, attested by consciousness, which suggests to us the conviction of our own existence; and it is the continuity of the will attested by the memory, which suggests to us the conviction of our personal identity. It is M. de Biran to whom again I refer the honor and the responsibility of this theory.

Let us now notice the theory of Locke. It was very clearly seen by Locke (B. II. Ch. XXVII. § 9), that where there is no consciousness (and, as has been well said, Locke should have added memory); where there is neither consciousness nor memory, there can be for us no idea of our personal identity; so that the sign, the characteristic, and the measure of personality, is consciousness. I can not attribute too much praise to this part of the theory of Locke. It apprehends and puts in clear light the true sign, the true characteristic, the true measure of personality. But the sign is one thing, and the thing signified is another

thing; the measure is one thing, the thing measured is another thing; the eminent and fundamental characteristic of *self*, and of personal identity, is one thing, the identity itself is another thing. Here, as in regard to the infinite, to time, and to space, Locke has confounded the condition of an idea with the idea itself. He has confounded identity with consciousness and memory, which represent it and which suggest the idea of it. B. II. Ch. XXVII. § 9. "Since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking beings; in this alone consists personal identity, that is, the sameness of a rational being; and so far as this consciousness can be extended backward to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same *self* now that it was then, and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects upon it, that that action was done." *Ib.* § 10, "Consciousness makes personal identity;" and § 16, "Consciousness makes the same person;" § 17, "Self depends on consciousness;" § 23, "Consciousness alone makes self."

Now the confusion of consciousness and personal identity destroys personal identity, just as the confusion of number and infinity destroys infinity, as the confusion of succession and time destroys time, as the confusion of body and space destroys space. In truth, if personal identity consists wholly in consciousness, then when consciousness is impaired or lost, there must be a diminution or loss of personal identity. Deep sleep, lethargy, which is a species of sleep; revery, intoxication, or passion, which frequently destroys the consciousness, and of course the memory, must not only destroy the sense or feeling of existence, but existence itself. It is not necessary to follow all the consequences of this theory. It is evident that if memory and consciousness not merely measure existence for us, but constitute it, any one who has forgotten that he

did an act, did not in reality do it; any one who has badly measured by memory the time of his existence, has really had less of existence. A man no longer recollects to have done a particular act; he can not be put upon trial for it, for he has ceased to be the same person. The murderer must no longer suffer the punishment of his act, if by a fortunate chance he has lost the recollection of it.

To resume: no doubt personality has, for its distinguishing sign, the will and the operations of consciousness and memory; and if we never had either consciousness or memory of any operation and of any voluntary act, we should never have the idea of our personal identity. But this idea once introduced by [occasion of] consciousness and memory into the intelligence, subsists there independently of the memory of the acts which occasioned it. No doubt that which attests and measures personality and the moral accountability of our actions, is the consciousness of the free will which produced them; but when these actions are once performed by us with consciousness and free will, though the recollection of them may have faded or vanished quite away, yet the responsibility of them, as well as our personality, remains complete. It is not, then, consciousness and memory which constitute our personal identity. Still more; not only do they not constitute it, but personal identity itself is not even an object of consciousness and of memory. None of us has a consciousness of his own nature; otherwise, the depths of existence would be easy to sound, and the mysteries of the soul would be perfectly known. We should perceive the soul as we perceive any phenomena of the consciousness, which we apprehend directly, sensation, volition, thinking. But such is not the fact. The personal existence, the self which we are, does not fall under the eyes of consciousness and memory; and nothing does, but the operations by which this self is manifested. These operations are the proper objects of consciousness and memory; personal identity is

a conviction of the reason. But none of these distinctions could find a place in the theory of Locke. The pretension of this theory is to deduce all ideas from sensation and reflection. But the idea of personal identity could not be made to come from sensation; it was necessary, therefore, to make it come from reflection, that is, to make it an object of memory and of consciousness, that is, again, to destroy the idea of personal existence, by confounding it with the phenomena which reveal it, and which, too, without it would be impossible.

It only remains now to examine the theory of substance. Do not be disturbed by the idea of substance any more than by that of the infinite. Infinity is an attribute of time and space: so the idea and the word substance is a generalization from the fact which I have just been discussing. Consciousness, with memory, attests to you an operation, or many successive operations, and at the same time reason suggests the belief of your own personal existence. Now your personal existence, the self which you are, and which reason reveals to you—what is it, relatively to the operations which consciousness and memory attest to you? It is the *subject* of these operations, of which the operations themselves are the characteristics, the signs, the attributes. These operations are perpetually changing and renewing; they are accidents. On the contrary, your personal existence subsists always the same; amid the perpetual diversity of your acts, you are to-day the same that you were yesterday, and that you will be to-morrow. Personal identity is the unity of your being, your self, as contradistinguished from the plurality of consciousness and memory. Now being, one and identical, contradistinguished from variable accidents, from transitory phenomena, is substance.

Here you have personal substance. And it is the same in relation to external substance, which I do not yet care to call material substance. The touch gives you the idea

of resistance, of solid; the other senses give you the idea of other qualities, primary or secondary. But what! Is there nothing but these qualities? While the senses give you solidity, color, figure, softness, hardness, etc., do you believe that these qualities are merely in the air; or do you not believe that they are the qualities of something really existing, and which because it really exists, is solid, hard, soft, of a certain color, figure, etc.? You would not have had the idea of this something, if the senses had not first given you the idea of these qualities; but you can not have the idea of these qualities without the idea of this something existent. This is the universal belief, which implies the distinction between qualities and the subject of these qualities, between accidents and substance.

Attributes, accidents, phenomena;—being, substance, subject;—these are the generalizations drawn from the two incontestable facts of my belief in my own personal existence, and my belief in the existence of an external world.

Now every thing which has been said of body and space, of succession and time, of the finite and the infinite, of consciousness and personal identity, all this may be said of attribute and subject, of qualities and substance, of phenomena and being. When we inquire concerning the origin of the idea of phenomena, of quality, of attribute; if the question be concerning an attribute of an external substance, the idea is given by the senses; if concerning an attribute of the mind, the idea is given by consciousness. But as to the substance itself, whether material or spiritual, it is not given either by sense or consciousness; it is a revelation of the reason in the exercise of sense and consciousness; just as space and time, infinity and personal identity, are revealed to us by the reason in the exercise of the sensibility, the consciousness and the memory. In fine, as body, succession, the finite, variety, logically involve the supposition of space, time, infinity, and unity; so

in order of reason and nature it is evident, that attribute and accident involve the supposition of subject and substance. But it is not less evident that in the order of the acquisition of our ideas, [the chronological order], the idea of attribute and accident is the necessary condition of arriving at that of substance and subject; just as in this same order, the idea of body, of succession, of number, of variety, is the condition of the idea of space, of time, of infinity, of identity.—This being established, it remains to see what place the idea of substance occupies in the system of Locke.

"I confess," says he, B. I. Ch. IV. § 18, "there is one idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it: and this is the idea of substance, which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection." Locke, then, systematically denies the idea of substance. Unquestionably many passages might be cited, in which he unconsciously admits it; but he openly repels it, in one place as of "little use in philosophy," B. II. Ch. XIII. § 19;—in another as obscure: "we have no clear idea of substance *in general*," B. II. Ch. XXIII. § 4. But take away from substance this characteristic of abstraction and generality; restore it to reality; and then substance is self, or is body. What then? can we say that the idea is of little use in philosophy; that is, does the belief of my personal identity, and the belief of an external world, play but an insignificant part in my understanding and in human life? Unquestionably to the senses, as well as to consciousness, all substance is obscure; for no substance, material or spiritual, is in itself a proper object of sense or of consciousness. But to reason, we say again as before, it is not obscure. The idea of substance is the proper object of reason, which has its own objects, and reveals them to us with as much evidence as consciousness and the senses attest their objects.

Locke, however, every where repels the idea of substance, and when he officially explains it, he resolves it into a collection of simple ideas of sensation or of reflection. B. II. Ch. XXIII. § 3, 4, 6: ". . . no other idea of substances than what is framed by a collection of simple ideas." ". . . It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves." § 37. "*Recapitulation.* All our ideas of the several sorts of substances, are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with a supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all." And he declares that we know nothing of matter but the aggregate of its qualities, and nothing of mind but the aggregate of its operations. Nothing can be more true than this in a certain respect. It is indubitable that we know nothing of mind but what its operations teach us concerning it, and nothing of matter but what its qualities teach us of it; just as we have already granted that we know nothing of time, save that which succession teaches us of it; nor of space, save that which body teaches; nor of the infinite, save that which the finite teaches; nor of self, save that which consciousness teaches. Body is the sole measure of space, succession of time, the finite of the infinite, the operations of consciousness of our identity; and just so, attributes and qualities are the only signs and the sole measures of substances, whether material or spiritual. But because we do not know any thing of one thing except what another thing teaches us concerning it, it does not follow that the former thing *is* the latter; because it is only by the aggregate of its qualities that substance manifests itself, it does not follow that substance itself is nothing but an aggregate of those qualities. To argue that it does, involves a thousand extravagances and paralogisms which have been put forth every where. It is evident that the aggregate of qualities into which Locke resolves sub-

stance, is altogether impossible without the supposition of substance. Royer-Collard has perfectly exposed the various aspects of this impossibility.* I shall bring forward but a single one. Among all conditions which are requisite to the possibility of this aggregate, look at one which is clearly unquestionable: it is that there should be some person, some mind, to make this collection. Numbers placed under each other do not make addition; arithmetic does not make itself alone, it demands an arithmetician. Now Locke, by denying substance, has destroyed the arithmetician necessary in order to make this addition. The human mind no longer exists, you are no longer a mind one and identical, capable of finding the sum of the different quantities of which the collection is to be composed; and there remains nothing but different quantities compelled to add themselves up, and to perceive themselves the relations which connect them together. But pass over this radical difficulty, and suppose that a collection is possible without some person, some mind, to make it. Suppose it made, and made by itself. What will it be? All that a mere collection can be: a class, a genus, an abstraction, that is to say, a word. See, then, to what you ultimately arrive. Without speaking of God —who is, however, the substance of substances, the being of beings—behold mind, behold matter, reduced to words. The scholastic philosophy had converted many collections into substances, many general words into entities; but by a contrary extravagance, Locke has converted substance into a collection, and made all things to be words, and this, note it well, necessarily, and by the compulsion of his system. Admitting none but ideas explicable by sensation or reflection, and being unable to explain the idea of substance either by the one or the other, he was necessarily led to deny it, to resolve it into *qualities*, which are

* *Fragments of the Lectures of* M. Royer-Collard, published in Jouffroy's edition of the Works of Reid, Vol. IV. p. 305.

easily attained by sensation or reflection. Hence the systematic identification of substance and qualities, of being and phenomena, that is to say, the destruction of being, and consequently of beings. Nothing therefore exists as substance, neither God, nor the world, neither you, nor myself. Every thing resolves itself into phenomena, into abstractions, into words: and singular enough, it is the very fear of abstraction and of verbal entities, the ill-understood taste for reality, that carries Locke into an absolute nominalism which ends in absolute nihilism.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE IDEA OF CAUSE.

General remarks on the foregoing results.—Continuation of the examination of the Second Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding. Of the idea of Cause.—Origin in sensation.—Refutation.—Origin in reflection and the sentiment of the Will.—Distinction between the idea of Cause and the Principle of Causality.—That the principle of causality is inexplicable by the sentiment of will.—Of the true formation of the principle of Causality.

THE first fault of Locke in respect to the ideas of Space, of Time, of the Infinite, of Personal Identity, and of Substance, is a fault of method. Instead of investigating and ascertaining, at the outset, by impartial observation, the characteristics which these ideas actually display in the human understanding, Locke begins with the exceedingly obscure and difficult question concerning the origin of those ideas. Then he resolves this question in respect to those ideas, by his general system concerning the origin of ideas, which consists in admitting no idea that is not formed by sensation, or by reflection. Now the ideas of Space, of Time, of the Infinite, of Personal Identity, and of Substance, with the characteristics by which they are now undeniably marked, are inexplicable by sensation and reflection, and by consequence, incompatible with the system of Locke. There remained, then, but one resource to mutilate those ideas with their attributes, so as to reduce them to the measure of other ideas which really do come from sensation or reflection; for example, the ideas

of body, of succession, of number, of the direct phenomena of consciousness and memory, of the attributes of outward objects and of our own attributes.

But we believe we have shown that these latter ideas, while they are indeed the condition [the necessary occasion] of the acquisition of the former ideas, are nevertheless not the same as the former; they are the chronological antecedent, but not the logical reason of them; they precede, but do not explain them. Thus facts distorted and confused, save the system of Locke; re-established and distinguished with clearness, they overthrow it.

These observations are equally and specially applicable to the theory of one of the most important ideas in the human understanding, the idea which figures most largely in human life, and in the books of philosophers; I mean the idea of cause. It would have been wise in Locke to have begun by recognizing and describing this idea exactly as it now is, and as it is manifested by our actions and speech. But far from this, Locke begins by investigating the origin of the idea of cause, and without hesitation refers it to sensation; this will be seen by the following passage:

B. II. Ch. XXVI. § 1.—" *Of cause and effect. Whence their ideas got.*" "In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we can not but observe that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of *cause* and *effect*. That which produces any simple or complex ideas, we denote by the general name, *cause;* and that which is produced, *effect*. Thus finding that in that substance which we call wax, fluidity, which is a simple idea that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat; we call the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity, the effect. So also, finding that the substance wood, which is

a certain collection of simple ideas so called, by the appli cation of fire is turned into another substance called ashes, that is, another complex idea, consisting of a collection of simple ideas quite different from that complex idea which we call wood; we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as the cause, and ashes as the effect." § 2: "Having thus, from what our senses are able to discover in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cause and effect. . . ."

This is positive. The idea of cause has its origin in sensation. Whether it is so, is the question for us to examine. And first of all, since the question is, whether sensation gives us the idea of cause, we must guard against taking for granted the thing in question. We must abstract sensation from every foreign element and interrogate that alone, in order to discern what it can give relative to the idea of cause.

I suppose myself then limited exclusively to sensation, and, I take the example of Locke, that of a piece of wax which melts and passes into a liquid state by contact with fire. Now what is there here, for the senses? There are two phenomena, the wax and the fire, in contact with each other. Of this my senses inform me; they inform, moreover, of a modification in the wax which was not there before. A moment before, they showed me the wax in one state; now they show me it in a different state; and this different state they show me at the same time that they show me, or immediately after they have shown me, the presence of another phenomena, namely, the fire; or in other words, my senses show me the succession of one phenomenon to another. Do my senses show me any thing more? I do not see that they do, and Locke does not pretend that they do; for according to him, the senses give us the idea of cause in the observation of the constant vicissitude of things. Now the vicissitude of things is clearly the succession of phenomena to each other. Let

this succession re-appear sometimes, or frequently, or even constantly; you will have a constant succession; but whether constant and perpetual, or limited to a very few cases, the nature of the succession is clearly not altered by the number. Succession is never any thing but succession. Thus the constant vicissitude of things at the bottom resolves itself into their vicissitude, which is nothing but their succession. I agree with Locke that the senses give me this succession; and Locke does not pretend that they give me any thing more. The only question between us, therefore, is to ascertain whether the succession, rare or constant, of two phenomena, explains, exhausts the idea which we have of cause.

Because a phenomenon succeeds another, and succeeds it constantly, is the latter for that sole reason the cause? Is that all the idea you form of cause? When you say, when you think, that the fire is the cause of the fluidity of the wax, I put it to you, whether you merely understand that the phenomenon of fluidity succeeds the phenomenon of the contact of fire? I put it to you whether you do not believe, whether the whole human race do not believe, that there is in the fire an unknown something, a property which is not our concern here to determine, but to which you refer the production of the phenomenon of the fluidity in the wax. I put it to you, whether the conception of a phenomenon appearing after another phenomenon, is not one thing; and the conception of a certain property in a phenomenon which produces the modification attested by the senses in the phenomenon that follows, another thing.

I will take an example often employed, and which expresses perfectly well the difference between the relation of succession, and the relation of cause and effect. I will suppose that I wish at this moment to hear a melody, a succession of musical sounds, and scarcely is my desire expressed when that succession of sounds is heard from a neighboring apartment and strikes my ear. There is here

evidently nothing but a relation of succession. But suppose that I will to produce those sounds, and that I do produce them myself: do I in this case predicate nothing, between my volition and the sounds, but the relation of succession, which I predicated in the former case between my desire and the accidental sounds? Besides the relation of succession, do I not in this case assume, between my will to produce the sounds and the sounds heard, another relation still, and one altogether different? Is it not evident that in the last case, I believe not only that the first phenomenon, to wit, the will, preceded the second, to wit, the sounds; but moreover, that the first phenomenon produced the second; in short, that my will is the cause, and the sounds the effect? This is undeniable: it is undeniable, that, in certain cases, we perceive between two phenomena only the relation of succession, and that in certain other cases, we predicate of them the relation of cause to the effect; and that these two relations are not identical. The conviction of every one, and the universal belief of the human race, leave no doubt on this subject. Our acts are not only phenomena which appear in a sequence to the operation of the will; they are judged by us, and recognized by others, as the direct effects of our will. From hence, moral imputation, judicial imputation, and three quarters of human life and conduct. If there is nothing but a relation of succession, between the action of the murderer and the death of his victim, then the universal belief and all civil life are without ground. For every civil action is founded upon the hypothesis, universally admitted, that man is a cause; just as the science of nature is also founded upon the hypothesis that external bodies are causes, that is, have properties which can and do produce effects. From the fact, then, that the senses give us the succession of phenomena, their succession more or less constant, it does not follow that they explain that connection of phenomena, far more intimate

and profound, which we call the relation of cause and effect; and consequently they do not explain the origin of the idea of cause. As to the rest, I refer you on this point to Hume, who has perfectly distinguished vicissitude, that is, succession, from causation, and completely demonstrated that the latter can not come from sensation.*

* See Hume's *Essays on the Human Understanding*, Essay 7th.—[Hume's philosophical genius was of a very superior order. Justice was never done to it by his cotemporaries, nor has it since been done in the general estimation of the English. In logical force, acuteness, and at the same time clearness and elegance of mind, he had few equals. His philosophical skepticism was the consistent result of principles at that time almost universally adopted. The difference between himself and his cotemporaries and opposers was only that he was more acute and consequent than they. In the first place, he clearly and fully established the essential difference of the notions of succession and causation, notions which Locke had confounded for the sake of his system, and which every body continued to confound.—1. Hume showed that the conception of cause, and of the relation of cause and effect, could not be resolved into, or explained by, the notion of succession: they were two distinct and different conceptions. 2. He proved, beyond contradiction, that the idea of cause and effect is not derived from experience, either external or internal, from sensation or from reflection; but 3. He still continued to hold, and seems not to have suspected the questionableness of, the grounding principle of Locke's system, that all our real knowledge must be derived from experience. Hence, 4. He was consistently led to deny the truth, the objective reality of the relation of cause and effect. He therefore explained it as a delusion of the imagination, the result of association, and habit; as a very useful idea, having a *subjective* necessity and reality (being held, that is by us, as true), but having no *objective* reality, no reality beyond our mind.

Thus, Hume, for want of elucidation on the third point, remained a skeptic. His opponents, Beattie, Oswald, and Priestley, were entirely unable to shed any light upon the subject; for they equally failed in perceiving the point to which criticism should have been directed.

But KANT, struck with the truth and profoundness of Hume's analysis and discrimination of the idea of succession and cause, and the impossibility of deriving the latter from experience, was led directly to question the grounding principle of Locke's system, and thus to discern a way of avoiding the skeptical conclusion of Hume. Upon investigation, he

Enough has been shown to ruin the theory of Locke concerning the origin of the idea of cause from sensation.

But this is not all. Not only is there in the human mind the idea of cause; not only do we believe ourselves to be the causes of our own acts, and that certain bodies are often the cause of the movement of certain other bodies; but we judge in a general manner that no phenomenon whatever can begin to exist, whether in space or in time, without the phenomenon which begins to exist having its cause. There is here something more than an idea; there is a principle; and the principle is as incontrovertible as the idea. Imagine a movement, any change whatever, and the moment you conceive of this change, this movement, you can not help supposing that it was made in virtue of some cause. It is not our concern now to inquire what this cause is, what its nature, or how it produced such a change; the only question is, whether the human mind can conceive of a change, a movement, without conceiving that it is produced by virtue of a cause. Here is the foundation of human curiosity, which seeks for a cause for every phenomenon, and of the judicial action of society, which intervenes as soon as any phenomenon appears in which society is concerned. An assassination, a murder, a theft, any phenomenon which falls within the scope of the law, being given, an author of it is instantly presumed, a thief, a murderer, or an assassin, is presumed, and an inquisition is made; nothing of which would be done, if it was not a decided impossibility for the human mind not to conceive of a cause wherever there is a phenomenon which begins to

perceived that the idea of cause and effect was not the only one that is *applied to* experience, with the consciousness of its necessity, yet without being derived *from* experience. Hence, the very first position of his Critique of Pure Reason is, that we are in possession of knowledge, *à priori;* and the first sentence of his work contains the annunciation of the important distinction, that although all our knowledge *begins with* experience, yet it is not therefore all derived *from* experience.—Tr.]

exist. Observe, I do not say there is no effect without a cause, for evidently this is a frivolous proposition, of which one term involves the other, and expresses the same idea in a different manner. The word effect being relative to the word cause, to say that the effect supposes the cause is to say nothing but that the effect is an effect. But we do not make an identical and frivolous proposition, when we say that every phenomenon which begins to exist necessarily has a cause. The two terms of this proposition; commencing phenomenon, and cause, do not reciprocally contain each other; they are not identical; and yet the human mind puts a necessary connection between them. This is what we call the principle of causality.

This principle is real, certain, undeniable. What now are its attributes? First, then, it is universal. Is there, I put it to you, a savage, a child, an old man, a well man, a sick man, an idiot even, provided he is not entirely one, who, in the case of a phenomenon beginning to exist, does not instantly suppose a cause of it? True, indeed, if no phenomenon is given, if we have not the idea of some change, we do not suppose, we can not suppose, a cause; for where neither term is known, what relation can be apprehended? But it is a fact that in this case, a single term being given, the supposition of the other and of their relation is involved, and that universally. There is not a single case in which we do not thus judge.

Still more: not only do we thus decide in all cases, naturally and in the instinctive exercise of our understanding; but to decide otherwise is impossible; a phenomenon being given, endeavor to suppose there is no cause of it. You can not. The principle, then, is not only universal; it is also necessary. From whence I conclude it is not derived from the senses. For even if it should be granted that the senses might give the universal, it is evident that they can not give the necessary; for the senses give that which appears, or even that which is, just as it is or appears,

this or that phenomenon, with this or that incidental characteristic: but it is repugnant to suppose that they can give that which *ought* to be, the reason of a phenomenon, still less its necessary reason.

It is so far from being true that the senses and the external world give us the principle of causality, that were it not for the intervention of this principle, the external world from which Locke derives it, would have for us no existence. Suppose that a phenomenon could begin to appear in time or in space without your being necessarily led to suppose a cause; when a phenomenon of sensation appeared under the eye of consciousness, not conceiving or supposing a cause for this phenomenon, you would not seek for any thing to which to refer it; you would stop at the phenomenon itself, that is, at a simple phenomenon of consciousness, that is again, at a modification of yourselves; you would not go out of yourselves; you would never attain the external world. For what is it that is necessary in order for you to attain the external world and suspect its existence? It is necessary that, a sensation being given, you should be forced to ask yourselves, what is the cause of this new phenomenon, and also that under the twofold impossibility of referring it to yourself, that ME which you are, and of not referring it to some cause, you should be forced to refer it to a cause other than yourself, to a foreign cause, to an external cause. The idea of an external cause of our sensations, such is then the fundamental idea of a without, of outward objects, of bodies, and of the world. I do not say that the world, bodies, external objects, are nothing more than causes of certain sensations; but I say that they are first given us as causes of our sensations, under this condition, and by this title. Afterward, or, if you please, at the same time, we add to this property of objects other properties still. But it is upon this that all the others, which we subsequently learn, are founded. Take away the principle of causality, sensation reveals to us only

its relation to the *me* which experiences it, without revealing to us that which produced it, the *not-me*, external objects, the world. It is commonly said, and philosophers even join with the mass in saying, that the senses discover the world to us. This is right, if it is meant merely to say, that without the senses, without some previous sensation, the principle of causality would lack the basis [the condition, the occasion] for attaining external causes, so that we should never conceive the world. But we completely deceive ourselves, if we understand that it is the senses themselves, directly and by their own force, without the intervention of the reason, or any foreign principle, which make us acquainted with the external world. To know in general, to know without regard to any particular object, is beyond the reach of the senses. It is the reason, and the reason alone, which knows, and which knows the world; and it does not know the world at first but in the character of a cause. It is for us, primarily, nothing but the cause of the sensitive phenomena which we can not refer to ourselves; and we should not search for this cause, and consequently should not find it, if our reason were not provided with the principle of causality, if we could suppose that a phenomena might begin to appear on the theater of consciousness, of time or of space, without having a cause. The principle of causality, then, I am not afraid to declare it, is the father of the external world; while it is far from being possible to deduce it from the world and make it come from sensation. When we speak of external objects and of the world, without previously admitting the principle of causality, either we know not what we affirm, or we are guilty of a paralogism.

The result of all this is: that if the question be about the idea of cause, we can not find it in the succession of outward and sensible phenomena; that succession is the condition of the conception of cause, its chronological antecedent, but not its principle and its logical reason: and

if the question be, not merely about the idea of cause, but concerning the principle of causality, this principle still more escapes from every attempt to explain it by succession and sensation. In the first case, in regard to the idea of cause, Locke confounds the antecedent of an idea with the idea itself; and in the second case, in regard to the principle of causality, he derives from the phenomena of the outward world precisely the principle without which there would be for us no outward, no world. He takes for granted the very thing in question. He no longer confounds the antecedent with the consequent, but the consequent with the antecedent, the consequence with its principle; for the principle of causality is the necessary foundation of even the slightest knowledge of the outward world, of the feeblest suspicion of its existence; and to explain the principle of causality by the spectacle of the world, which can be given only by the principle of causality, is, as we have said, to explain the principle by the consequence. Now the idea of cause and the principle of causality, are undeniable facts in the human mind; consequently the system of Locke, which obliges him to receive, in their stead, merely the idea of succession, of constant succession, does not account for facts, nor explain the human mind.

But is there nothing more in Locke on the great question of cause? Has Locke never assigned to the idea of cause another origin than sensation?—You are not to expect from our philosopher perfect self-consistency. I have already told you, and I shall have frequent occasion to repeat it, nothing is less consistent than Locke. Contradictions occur not only from book to book, in his Essay; but from chapter to chapter, and almost from paragraph to paragraph. I have already cited the positive passage (B. II. Ch. XXVI), in which Locke derives the idea of cause from sensation. Well now, let us turn over a few pages, and we shall find him forgetting both his funda-

mental assertion, and the particular examples, all physical, produced to justify it; and concluding, to the great astonishment of the attentive reader, that the idea of cause no longer comes from sensation solely, but from sensation, *or from reflection.* Ch. XXVI. § 2. . . . "In which and all other cases, we may observe that the notion of cause and effect has its rise from sensation or reflection; and that this relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them." This "*or*" is nothing less than a new theory. Hitherto Locke had not said a word about reflection. It is an evident contradiction to the passage I have before cited. But is this contradiction thrown in here at hazard, and afterward abandoned and lost? Yes, in regard to the twenty-sixth chapter; in regard to the entire work, no. Read another chapter of the same second Book, Ch. XXI. *On Power.* At the bottom, a chapter on power is a chapter on cause. For what is power, but the power to produce something, that is, a cause?* To treat of power, then, is to treat of cause. Now what is the origin of the idea of power, according to Locke, in the chapter expressly devoted to this inquiry? It is, as in chapter twenty-sixth, at once sensation and reflection.

B. II. Ch. XXI. "*Of Power.* § 1. *This idea how got.*" "The mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding, from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by like agents, and by like ways; considers in one

* The famous Essay of Hume on cause is entitled, *Of the Idea of Power.*

thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that idea which we call power."

Of these two origins, I have demonstrated that the first, namely *sensation, is not sufficient to account for the idea of cause*, that is to say, of power. It remains, then, to examine the second origin. But this second origin, does it precede, or follow the first? We derive, according to Locke, the idea of cause, both from sensation, and from reflection. But from which of these do we derive it first? It is one of the eminent merits of Locke, as I have before noted, that he has shown on the question concerning time, that the first succession which reveals to us the idea of time, is not the succession of external events, but the succession of our own thoughts. Here Locke equally says that it is from the internal and not from the external, in reflection and not in sensation, that the idea of power is first given. It is a manifest contradiction, I grant, with his official chapter on cause; but it is to the honor of Locke to have seen and established, even in contradiction to himself, that it is in reflection, in the consciousness of our own operations, the first and clearest idea of cause is given. I wish to cite this passage entire; for it evinces a true talent for observation, and a rare psychological sagacity.

B. II. Ch. XXI. § 4. "*The clearest idea of active power had from spirit*" . . . "If we will consider it attentively, bodies by our senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our own minds. For all power relating to action, and there being but two sorts of action whereof we have any idea, namely, thinking and motion, let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all, it is only from reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from body any idea of the be-

ginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion, than an action in it. For when the ball obeys the stroke of a billiard stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion; also when by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and loses in itself so much as the other received; which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power moving in a body, while we observe it only to transfer, but not to produce any motion. For it is but a very obscure idea of power which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the passion. For so is motion, in a body impelled by another: the continuation of the alteration made in it from rest to motion, being little more an action, than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the same blow, is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion, we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest. So that it seems to me, we have from the observation of the operation of bodies by our senses, but a very imperfect, obscure idea of active power, since they afford us not any idea of power in themselves to begin any action, either motion or thought."

Locke seems to have felt indeed that he contradicted himself; so he adds "But if, from the impulse, bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it serves as well to my purpose, sensation being one of these ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas: only I thought it worth while to consider here by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external sensation."

Now this power of action, of which we have from reflec-

tion that distinct idea which sensation alone could not give us, what is it? It is that of the will.

B. II. Ch. XXI. § 5. "This at least, I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versâ* in any particular instance, is that which we call the *will*. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call willing, or *volition*. The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the mind, is called *voluntary;* and whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind is called *involuntary*."

We have here, then, the will considered as an active power, as a productive energy, and consequently as a cause. This is the germ of the beautiful theory of M. de Biran, concerning the origin of the idea of cause. According to M. de Biran, as according to Locke, the idea of cause is not given us in the observation of external phenomena, which regarded solely by the senses, do not manifest to us any causative energy, and appear only as successive; but it is given from within, in reflection, in the consciousness of our operations, and of the power which produces them, namely the will. I make an effort to move my arm; and I move it. When we analyze attentively this phenomenon of effort, which M. de Biran considers as the type of the phenomenon of the will, we have the following elements: 1, the consciousness of a voluntary act; 2, the consciousness of a motion produced: 3, a relation of the motion to the voluntary act. And what is this relation? Evidently it is not a simple relation of succes-

sion. Repeat in yourselves the phenomena of effort, and you will find that you all with perfect conviction attribute the production of the motion of which you are conscious to a previous voluntary operation of which you are also conscious. For you; the will is not merely a pure act, without efficiency; it is a productive energy, it is a cause.

Still more. This motion, of which you are conscious, which you all refer, as an effect, to the previous operation of the will, as the producing operation, the cause—do you, I ask, refer this motion to any other will than your own? Do you, or could you, consider it as the will of another, as the will of your neighbor, of Alexander, or of Cæsar, or of any superior or foreign power? Or, for you, is it not your own? Do you not always impute every voluntary act to yourselves? It is not, in a word, from the consciousness of your will, as your own, that you derive the idea of your personality, the idea of yourselves. The distinguishing merit of M. de Biran is in having established that the will is the constituent characteristic of our personality. He has gone further—too far perhaps. As Locke confounded consciousness and memory with personality and identity of self, M. de Biran has gone even so far as to confound the will with personality itself. It is certainly the eminent characteristic of it; so that the idea of cause, which is given in the consciousness of the producing will, is for that reason given in the consciousness of our own personality, and that we ourselves are the first cause of which we have any knowledge.

In short, this cause, which is ourselves, is implied in every fact of consciousness. The necessary condition of every phenomenon perceived by the consciousness, is that we pay attention to it. If we do not bestow our attention, the phenomenon may perhaps still exist, but the consciousness not connecting itself with it, and not taking knowledge of it, it is for us a non-existence. Attention then is

the condition of every apperception of consciousness. Now attention, as I have more than once shown, is the will. The condition, then, of every phenomenon of consciousness, and of course of the first phenomenon, as of all others, is the will; and as the will is a causative power, it follows that in the first fact of consciousness, and in order that this fact may take place, there must necessarily be the apperception of our personal causality in the will; from whence it follows again that the idea of cause is the primary idea; that the apperception of the voluntary cause which we ourselves are, is the first of all apperceptions; and the condition of all the others.

Such is the theory to which M. de Biran has raised that of Locke.* I adopt it. I believe that it perfectly accounts for the origin of the idea of cause. But it remains to inquire whether the idea of cause springing from this origin and from the sentiment of voluntary and personal activity, suffices to explain the idea which all men have of external causes, and to explain the principle of causality. For Locke, who treats of the idea of cause, but never of the principle of causality, the problem did not even exist. M. de Biran, who scarcely proposes it, resolves it by far too rapidly, and arrives at once at a result, the only one permitted by Locke's theory and by his own, but which sound psychology and sound logic can not accept.

According to M. de Biran, after we have derived the idea of cause from the sentiment of our own personal activity, in the phenomenon of effort, of which we are conscious, we transfer this idea outwardly; we project it into the external world, by virtue of an operation which, with Royer-Collard, he has called *natural induction*.† Let us

* See Laromiguière's *Leçons de Philosophie*, and also M. de Biran's *Examen des Leçons de M. Laromiguière*, Ch. 8. pp. 140–152.

† M. de Biran's *Examen*, pp. 109–151; also M. de Biran's Article, entitled *Leibnitz*, in the *Biographie Universelle*; also the *Fragments* of M. Royer-Collard in *Jouffroy's* Reid, Vols. III. IV.

understand. If by this, M. de Biran means merely that before knowing external causes of any kind, we first derive the idea of cause from ourselves, I grant it. But I deny that the knowledge which we have of external causes, and the idea which we form of them, is a transfer, a projection, an induction of ours. In fact this induction could not take place but under conditions which are in manifest contradiction with facts and with reason. I request here all your attention.

According to Locke and to M. de Biran, it is reflection, consciousness, which gives us the first idea of cause. But what idea of cause does it give us? Note well that it gives us, not the idea of cause in the abstract, in general, but the idea of the *me* which wills, and which, by willing, produces, and thereby is a cause. The idea of cause which consciousness gives us is, then, an idea altogether particular, individual and determinate, since it is to us altogether personal. Every thing which we know of cause by consciousness, is concentrated in personality. It is this personality, and in this personality the will, and the will alone, and nothing more, which is the power, the cause, revealed in consciousness. This being laid down, let us next see what are the conditions of the induction of this cause. Induction is the supposition that in certain circumstances a certain phenomenon, a certain law, having been given us, the same phenomenon, the same law, will take place in analogous cases. Induction then implies: 1, analogous cases; 2, a phenomenon which is to continue the same. Induction is the process of the mind which having hitherto observed a phenomenon only in certain cases, transfers this phenomenon—this phenomenon, observe, and not another—to different cases, cases necessarily different, since they are only analogous and similar, and can not be absolutely identical. The peculiar character of induction then is precisely in the contrast of the identity of the phenomenon or of the law, and of the diversity of the circumstances from

which it is first derived and then transferred. If, then, the knowledge of external causes is only an induction from our own personal cause, it is in strictness our causality, the voluntary and free cause which ourselves constitute, that should be transferred by induction into the external world; that is to say, whenever any motion or change begins to appear in time or in space, there we must suppose, what? a cause in general? No; for bear in mind that we are not possessed yet of the general idea of cause, we have only the idea of our own personal casuality. We can only suppose what we already have, otherwise it would no longer be a proper and legitimate process of induction. We must suppose, then, not the abstract and general idea of cause, but the particular and determinate idea of the particular and determinate cause which we ourselves are. From whence it follows that it is our own casuality we should be obliged to suppose wherever a phenomenon begins to appear: that is to say, all the causes which we subsequently conceive are and can be nothing but our own personality, the sole and only cause of all the effects, accidents or events which begin to appear. And bear in mind, that the belief in the external world and in external causes, is universal and necessary. All men have it; all men can not but have it. If, then, induction explains our whole idea of external causes, this induction must be universal and necessary; it must be a universal and necessary fact that we believe ourselves to be the cause of all the events, movements and changes which take place or can take place.

Thus in strictness, the induction, the transfer of our own casuality without ourselves, is nothing less than the substitution of our own personal causality for all the causes of the world, the substitution of human liberty for destiny and nature.

M. de Biran would undoubtedly resist this consequence as forced; but there is one which he almost accepts. If external causes are nothing but an induction from our own

causal power, and if, nevertheless, we are unwilling to allow that they are our own, it must at least be conceded that they are like our own, conscious, free, animated, living. In fact, without pretending that this is our whole conception of external causes, M. de Biran maintains that such is the conception which we form of them at first. And he gives in proof of it that children, and savages, who are but grown children, conceive of all external causes after the model of their own; that hence the child is angry at the stone which hurt him, as if it had the intention of hurting him; and the savage personifies and deifies the causes of natural phenomena.

To this I reply: we are not to forget that the belief in the external world and in external causes is universal and necessary; and that the fact which explains it ought itself to be universal and necessary; if, therefore, our belief in the world and in external causes resolves itself into the assimilation of these causes to ours, this assimilation ought likewise to be universal and necessary. Now at this point I have recourse to psychology; I look to it to prove that all intellectual and moral beings conceive of external causes after the fashion of their own as animated and conscious. I look to it to prove that this opinion of children and of savages, is not only a frequent fact, but an universal fact; that there is not a child nor a savage who does not at first form this conception. And when it has proved that this fact is universal, it must go further still; it must prove also that the fact is not only universal, but that it is necessary. But the character of a necessary fact is, that it is not possible it should not exist; the necessity of an idea, of a law, implies the supremacy of that idea, that law, throughout the whole extent of duration, as long as the human mind subsists. Now, even if I should grant that all children and all savages believe at first that external causes are animated, living, free, and personal; this would not be enough to establish it as a necessary fact; it would be requisite that

all men, without any distinction, should have this belief, just as they all, without distinction, believe the principle of causality. But far from that, we now-a-days do not the least in the world admit such an opinion, and it is to our credit that we do not. That which [by the theory in question] should be a necessary truth, reproduced from age to age without exception or alteration, is for us just simply an extravagance which exists for a short period, and then passes away never to return. From the fact that this supposed induction has languished for a single day, from this alone, we are forced to conclude that it is not an universal and necessary law of the human mind; and of course it does not explain the universal and necessary belief in the existence of the world and of external causes.

We all have a perfect conviction that the world exists, that there are external causes. These causes we believe to be neither personal, nor intentional and voluntary. This is the belief of the human race. It is the province of the philosopher to explain it, with destroying or impairing it. But if this belief is universal and necessary, the judgment which includes it and which gives it, ought to have a principle which is itself universal and necessary; and this principle is nothing else than the principle of causality, a principle now-a-days expressed by logic and grammar under this form: every phenomenon, every change, which begins to appear, has a cause. Take away this principle, and leave the mere consciousness of our personal causality, and never should we have the least idea of external causes and of the world. In fact, take away the principle of causality, and whenever a phenomenon appeared upon the theater of consciousness, of which we were not the cause, there would no longer be a ground for our demanding a cause for the phenomenon. We should not seek for a cause. It would be for us without cause. For observe; that even in order to the induction we have been speaking of; even in order for us to fall into the absurdity of assign-

ing to the sensation as its cause either ourselves, or something like ourselves, it is necessary to feel the need of assigning causes for every phenomenon; and in order to make this induction universal and necessary, this feeling of need must be universal and necessary; in short, we must have the principle of causality. Thus, without the principle of causality, every phenomenon is for us as though it had no cause, so that we can not even attribute it to an extravagant cause. But on the contrary, assume the principle of causality [as potentially existing in the mind,] and as soon as a phenomenon of sensation begins to appear on the theater of consciousness, at the same instant, the principle of causality [actually unfolded and put in exercise by the occasion of the phenomenon,] marks it with this character: that it can not but have a cause. Now, as consciousness attests that this cause is not ourselves, and yet it remains not less certain that it must have a cause, it follows that there is a cause *other* than ourselves, and which is neither personal nor voluntary, and yet is a cause, that is to say, a cause simply efficient. Now this is precisely the idea which all men form of external causes. They consider them as capable of producing the motions which they refer to them, but not as intentional and personal causes.* The universal and necessary principle of causality is the only principle which can give us such causes; it is, then, the true and legitimate process of the human mind in the acquisition of the idea of the world and of external causes.

Having now demonstrated that our belief in external causes is not an induction from the consciousness of our own personal cause, but a legitimate application of the principle of causality, it remains to learn how we pass from the consciousness of our own particular causality to the conception of the general principle of causality.

* On the reality of natural causes as efficient and not voluntary, see *Examination of Reid's Essay on Active Power. Course of the History of Philosophy*, 1st Series, Vol. iv., pp. 542–564.

I admit, I am decidedly of the opinion, that the consciousness of our own proper causality precedes any conception of the principle of causality, and of course precedes any application of this principle, any knowledge of external causality. In my judgment, the process by which, in the depths of the mind, the passage is made from the primary fact of consciousness to the ulterior fact of the conception of the principle, is this. I wish to move my arm, and I move it. We have seen that this fact when analyzed, gives three elements: 1, consciousness of a volition which is my own, which is personal; 2, a motion produced; 3, and finally, a reference of this motion to my will, a relation which, as we have seen, is a relation of production, of causation; a relation, too, which I no more call in question, than I do either of the two other terms; a relation which is given me with the two terms, which is not given me without these two terms, and without which the two terms are not given; so that the three terms are given in one single and even indivisible fact, which fact is the consciousness of my personal causality.

Now what is the character of this fact? It is characterized by being particular, individual, determinate, and for this very simple reason, that the fact is altogether personal. This producing will is my own, and of course it is a will particular and determinate. Again, it is characteristic of every thing particular and determinate, to be susceptible of the degrees of more or less. I myself, a voluntary cause, have at such a moment more or less energy, which makes the motion produced by me have more or less force. But does the feeblest motion pertain any less to me than the most energetic? Is there between the cause, myself, and the effect, motion, a less relation in the one case than in the other? Not at all; the two terms may vary, and do vary perpetually in intensity, but the relation does not vary. Still further: the two terms may not only vary, but they may be altogether others; they may even not exist

at all. They are purely accidental; but the relation between these two determinate, variable, and contingent terms, is itself neither variable nor contingent. It is universal and necessary. The moment the consciousness seizes these two terms, the reason seizes their relation, and by an immediate abstraction which needs not the support of a great number of similar facts, it disengages the invariable and necessary element of the fact, from its variable and contingent elements. Make the attempt to call the truth of this relation in question. You can not; no human intelligence can succeed in the attempt. Whence it follows, that this truth is an universal and necessary truth. Reason, then, is subjected to this truth; it is under an impossibility of not supposing a cause, whenever the senses or the consciousness reveal any motion, any phenomenon. Now this impossibility, to which reason is subjected, of not supposing a cause for every phenomenon revealed in sense and consciousness, is what we call the principle of causality; not, indeed, in its actual logical formula, but in its internal primitive energy. If it be asked, how the universal and the necessary are found in the relative and the contingent, and may be perceived in them, I reply that along with the will and the senses, there is also in us the faculty of the reason, and that it is developed simultaneously with the former.*

What has just been said of the principle of causality, may be said of all the other principles. It is a fact which should not be forgotten, though it very often is, that our judgments are all at first particular and determinate, and that under this form of a particular and determinate judg-

* On this delicate point, the formation of our actual conception of the universal and necessary relation of cause and effect, and in general on the formation of rational principles, see first series, Vol. I. Course of 1817, *Program*; and Vol. II., Course of 1818, *Program*; and Lectures II.-IV. pp. 47-58, and Lecture XI. p. 134. [The matter here referred to will be found in the Appendix to this volume.—Tr.]

ment, all universal and necessary truths, all universal and necessary principles, make their first appearance. Thus the senses attest to me the existence of a body, and at the instant I judge that this body is in space, not in space in general, not in pure space, but in a certain space; it is a certain body which my senses attest, and it is in a certain space that reason locates it. Then, when we reflect upon the relation between this particular body and this particular space, we find that the relation itself is not particular, but universal and necessary; and when we attempt to conceive of a body without any space whatever, we find that we can not. So also it is in regard to time. When our consciousness or our senses give us any succession of events or of thoughts, we instantly judge that this succession passes in a determinate time. Every thing in time and succession such as they are primitively given us, is determinate; it is such or such a particular succession, an hour, a day, a year, etc. But that which is not determinate and special, is the relation between this succession and this time. We may vary the two terms; we may vary the succession, and the time which embraces the succession; but the relation of succession to time does not vary.* Again it is in the same way that the principle of substance is given us. When a phenomenon takes place in my consciousness, it is a particular and determinate phenomenon; and accordingly I judge, that under this particular phenomenon, there is a being, an entity, which is the subject of it—not a being in

* [For illustration: suppose a hundred revolutions of a wheel in a hundred minutes. You can then *vary the two terms* (one hundred revolutions, and one hundred minutes) in any way you please; for example, varying the *second* term, you can suppose the hundred revolutions to take place in *five* or *ten* or a *thousand* minutes; or, varying the *first* term, you can suppose five revolutions, or ten, or a thousand, made in the hundred minutes; or, varying *both* terms, you can suppose sixty revolutions in sixty seconds, etc.; but the *relation* of this succession to *time*, to some time, is not variable.—TR.]

the abstract and general, but actual and determinate, to wit, myself. All our primitive judgments are personal and determinate, and yet under the depths of these personal and determinate judgments, there are already relations, truths, principles, which are not personal and determinate, although they do determine and individualize themselves in the determination and individuality of their terms.

Such is the first form of the truths of geometry and arithmetic. Take, for example, two objects, and two more objects. Here all is determinate; the quantities to be added are concrete, not discrete. You judge that these two, and these two objects, make four objects. Now, what is to be noted in this judgment? Here again, as before, every thing is contingent and variable, except the relation. You can vary the objects; you can put pebbles in the place of these books, or hats in the place of the pebbles; and the relation will remain unchanged and invariable. Still further: why do you judge that these two determinate objects added to these two other determinate objects make four determinate objects? Reflect. It is in virtue of this truth, namely, that two and two make four. Now, this truth of relation is altogether abstract and independent of the nature of the two concrete terms, whatever they may be. It is then the abstract truth which leads you to pronounce that two concrete objects added to two concrete objects, whether alike or dissimilar, make four concrete objects. The abstract is given in the concrete; the invariable and the necessary in the variable and contingent; the reason in sensation and consciousness. The senses attest the existence of concrete quantities and of bodies; consciousness attests the presence of a succession of thoughts and of all the phenomena which pertain to personal identity. But at the same time, reason intervenes and pronounces that the relations of quantities in question are abstract, universal, and necessary. Reason pronounces that the relation of body to space is necessary; that the

relation between succession and time is a necessary relation; that the relation between the phenomenal plurality formed by the thoughts in consciousness, and that substance, one and identical which is the subject of them, is a necessary relation. Thus in the birth-place of intelligence, the action of the senses and of consciousness is blended with that of reason. The senses and consciousness give the phenomena external and internal, the variable, the contingent; reason discovers the universal and necessary truths blended with the accidental and contingent truths which result directly from the apperception of the internal or external phenomena; and these universal and necessary truths constitute universal and necessary principles.—Now it is with the principle of causality as with other principles; never would the human mind have conceived it in its universality and its necessity, if first there had not been given us a particular fact of causation; and this primitive particular fact is that of our own proper and personal causality, manifested to the consciousness in an effort, in a voluntary act. But this does not suffice of itself wholly to explain the knowledge of external causes, because then we should have to regard external causes as only an induction from our own causality, that is to say, we should have to resolve the faith of the human race, its necessary and universal faith, into an absurdity, and that a transient absurdity, which experience exposes, and which is now-a-days abandoned. This explanation, then, is inadmissible. It is necessary, then, to conceive that in the contingent and particular fact—I will to move my arm, and I move it—there is a relation of the motion as an effect to the volition as a cause, which relation, disengaged from the two terms, is seized immediately by the reason as a universal and necessary truth. From hence the principle of causality; by which we can attain to external causes; because the principle is broader than the sphere of consciousness, and with it we can judge universally and necessarily that every

phenomenon, whatever it be, has a cause. Thus armed, so to say, let a new phenomenon present itself, and we refer it universally and necessarily to a cause; and that cause not being ourselves, our consciousness bearing witness, we do not any the less necessarily and universally judge that a cause exists; we only judge that it is other than ourselves, that it is foreign, external; and here, once more, is the idea of *exteriority*, and the basis of our conviction of the existence of external causes and of the world; a conviction universal and necessary, because the principle of the judgment which gives us it, is itself universal and necessary.

Unquestionably, at the same time that we conceive of external causes foreign to ourselves, other than ourselves, not intentional, not voluntary, but pure causes, such as the application of the general principle of causality affords—unquestionably it is true, that the child, the savage, the human race in its infancy, sometimes, or even frequently, adds to this idea of exteriority and of cause purely efficient, the idea of a will, of a personality analogous to our own. But because this second fact sometimes accompanies the first, it does not follow that we are to confound it with the first. In order to apprehend the first as a universal and necessary fact, this other fact need not be held universal and necessary. This I have demonstrated. To do so, results in errors and temporary superstitions in place of the permanent and inviolable truth engendered by the principle of causality. But yet the fact of this confusion is real; the errors which it involves, though local and temporary, are undeniable; they must therefore be explained. And the explanation of them is very simple. As the principle of causality, though universal and necessary, is given us at first in the sequel of the consciousness of our own causality, it retains in its first applications, the marks of its origin, and the belief in the external world may, for a while, be accompanied with some assimilation, more or less

vague, of external causes to ourselves. Add here, as in all cases, that it is the truth which serves as the basis of the error; for this arbitrary and superstitious personification of external causes takes for granted the existence of external causes, that is to say, an application of the principle of causality. Induction, then, misleads the principle of causality: but it does not constitute it.

Thus it is that a sound psychology, determined never to abandon the natural conceptions of the human mind, gradually ascends to their true origin; while the systematic psychology of Locke, plunging into the question of the origin of our ideas and principles, before having determined with precision the characters with which they are actually marked; and not admitting any other origin than sensation or reflection, thinks to find the origin of the idea of cause in sensation, in the simple spectacle of the external world; then forced to abandon this insufficient origin, it goes from sensation to reflection. But this new origin, which can indeed give us the idea of a voluntary and personal cause, can give us nothing but that idea, and not the principle of causality; and of course it can not explain the origin of external purely efficient causes. If, however, we determine to rest in this narrow and insufficient origin, to what consequences are we driven? We are obliged to confound two things: the necessary and universal result—that we conceive of causes external to ourselves, with another fact purely accidental and transitory—that it happens to us sometimes to conceive of these causes as personal; and thus we are, indeed, enabled to explain the knowledge of external causes by a simple induction from our own proper causality, and of course to explain the principle of causality by reflection or consciousness, that is, by one of the two assumed origins of all knowledge. But as has been already shown, the conception of external causes as personal and endowed with consciousness, is nothing but an error found in the in-

fancy of the human reason, and not a law of the reason, and by no means affords an explanation of the legitimate belief, the universal and necessary belief of the human race.

In concluding I should perhaps ask pardon for the length of this discussion; but I owed it, imperfect as it still is, both to the importance of the subject, and to the memory of the great metaphysician whose very sagacity and profoundness led him astray in the path of Locke. Gifted with extraordinary psychological insight, M. de Biran penetrated so far into the intimacy of the fact of consciousness by which the first idea of cause is given, that he scarcely disengaged himself from that fact and that idea, and neglected too much the principle of causality; thus confounding, as Locke had done, the antecedent of a principle with the principle itself; or when he attempted to explain the principle of causality, he explained it by a *natural induction* which transfers to the external world consciousness, the will, and all the peculiar attributes of his model; confounding in this way a particular, transient, and erroneous application of the principle of causality, with the principle in itself, the true, universal and necessary principle—that is to say, in fine, confounding by a single error, not only the antecedent with the consequent, but also the consequent with the antecedent. The theory of M. de Biran is the development of the theory of Locke. It reproduces that theory with more extent and profoundness, and exhausts at once both its merits and its defects.

[NOTE. *Brown's Theory of Cause and Effect.*—It will be perceived that the discussion contained in the foregoing chapter, is a substantial refutation of the doctrine of Brown as exhibited in his Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect. Brown defines the relation to be one of "immediate and invariable antecedence and consequence." A cause with him is nothing more than "an immediate and invariable anteced-

ent." This is only another form of resolving causation into succession. In critically examining Brown's theory, the epithets "immediate and invariable" may and should be thrown off. For Brown has no right to pre-assume that the only difference between causation and antecedence is a difference merely of degree, and not of kind. If the ideas of antecedence and causation can be shown to be *essentially* different; then no addition of the epithets "immediate and invariable" can change or elevate the idea of an antecedent into that of a cause.—The only proper question therefore is, whether antecedence and causation are at the bottom the same idea.

But this is a position contradicted by consciousness, by the usage of all languages, and by every thing to which the decision of the question can be referred. The necessity and universality of the idea of cause prove the contrary of Brown's position. They announce in the notion of cause a higher than a merely empirical character; they prove that the mind connects with the phenomena of experience something not given by experience. It must therefore be regarded as a law of the mind that we should refer things, so far as they are successive phenomena of perception, to one another in such a manner as that the one determines the other in respect to its essence and existence. A cause not merely precedes; it produces the effect. Consequently we must suppose an objective connection—a real connection out of our minds—answering to the subjective connection, or to the concatenation of phenomena in our minds.

If now the question be asked, how Brown came to confound antecedence and causation, the answer is not difficult. It is undoubtedly true that the perception of some "antecedence" (some change or succession) is the occasion and the necessary condition of the mind forming the notion of cause, or of the evolution in the mind of the principle of causality; to wit, that every phenomenon has a cause. Still it is to be noted that the perception of one single change is sufficient for the development of this universal and necessary conviction. The moment a change is perceived the principle is developed and put in action, and with it the general notion of cause. Consequently Brown's epithets "immediately and invariable" have no validity and no relevancy in explaining the origin or nature of the simple idea of cause; but apply only to the *use* of the principle of causality in experience—to the determination of *the* cause of a phenomenon for which the mind necessarily supposes *a* cause, even upon the first perception of it, and without any successive observations of "immediate and invariable antecedence." A single experience is sufficient to awaken the principle of causality; which is thenceforward of universal and necessary application, by the

mind, to all phenomena. But in the application of this principle to particular phenomena, the mind may err. Several or many experiences may be necessary, in order to determine *what is the precise cause* of a given phenomenon. And here it is that the consideration of the immediateness and invariableness of a particular sequence comes in as the result of experience, as that which is phenomenal, and which determines us to the application of the idea of cause to the particular antecedent in question.

This distinction Brown has failed to perceive; indeed, he seems to have had no distinct idea of the principle of causality; and every thing plausible and true in his analysis of the notion of cause into that of "immediate and invariable antecedence," applies merely to the ulterior question, namely, what is *the* particular cause in a given phenomenon, or to the application of the necessary idea of cause and the principle of causality to particular phenomena. It seems, however, not once to have occurred to Brown, that without the previous principle of causality, potentially existing in the mind, ready to develop and apply itself to experience, there would be no ground or reason why the mind should be curious to observe and seek this "immediate and invariable antecedence;" consequently it would never be led to decide upon the particular cause in a given sequence; for merely to see successive phenomena, is not the same thing as experimentally observing and deciding upon the immediate and invariable connection of particular phenomena.

It should be remembered, too, that the "immediate and invariable" antecedence into which Brown resolves the idea of Cause, is not an absolute immediateness and invariableness—but relative merely to human observation; so that the decisions which experience leads us to make in regard to the particular causes of particular phenomena, however satisfactory they may be to the mind, and however safe they may be for practical guidance of life, can never have the absolute character which belongs to the general idea of cause, or rather to the principle of causality. We perceive a particular instance of change, or of antecedence and consequence. The change, the antecedence and consequence, is all that is phenomenal, all that appears; but it is not all that we believe. Besides the antecedence which we see, there is something else which we do not see but which we believe, namely a cause. That there is a cause of that change, is for us, a necessary and absolute truth. Whether that particular antecedent is the cause of that particular consequence, may or may not be believed, according as observation shall lead us to decide; but this belief does not express a necessary and absolute truth as in the first case.—TR.]

CHAPTER V.

OF THE IDEA OF GOOD AND EVIL.—OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX IDEAS.—OF WORDS.

Examination of the Second Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding continued.—Of the idea of Good and Evil.—Refutation.—Conclusions of the Second Book.—Of the formation and of the mechanism of ideas in the understanding.—Of simple and complex ideas. —Of the activity and passivity of the mind in the acquisition of ideas. —The most general attributes of ideas.—Of the Association of ideas. —Examination of the Third Book of the Essay on the Understanding, concerning words.—Credit due to Locke.—Examination of the following questions: 1. Do words derive their first origin from other words significant of sensible ideas?—2. Is the signification of words purely arbitrary?—3. Are general ideas nothing but words?—Of Nominalism and Realism.—4. Are words the sole cause of error, and is all science only a well-constructed language?—Examination of the Third Book concluded.

It is an undeniable fact, that when we have done right or wrong, when we have obeyed the law of justice, or have broken it, we judge that we merit either reward or punishment. It is moreover a fact that we do indeed receive reward or punishment; 1, in the approbation of conscience or in the bitterness of remorse; 2, in the esteem or blame of our fellow-men, who, themselves also moral beings, judge also of right and wrong; and who punish and reward according to the nature of our actions, sometimes by the moral sentence of their esteem or blame, sometimes by physical rewards and punishments, which positive laws, the legitimate interpreters of the law of nature, hold ready for actions which are noble, or for faults and crimes; 3, and

finally, if we raise our thoughts beyond this world, if we conceive of God as we ought, not only as the author of the physical world, but as the Father of the moral world, as the very substance of good and the moral law, we can not but conceive that God ought also to hold ready rewards and punishments for those who have fulfilled or broken the law. But suppose that there is neither good nor evil, neither justice nor injustice in itself; suppose there is no law: there can then be no such thing as merit or demerit in having broken or obeyed it; there is no place for reward or punishment; there is no ground for peace of conscience, nor for the pains of remorse; there is no ground for the approbation or the disapprobation of our fellow-men, for their esteem or their contempt; there is no ground for the punishments inflicted by society in this life, nor in the other, for those appointed by the Supreme Legislator. The idea of reward and punishment rests, then, upon that of merit or demerit, which rests upon that of law. Now what course does Locke take? He deduces the idea of right and wrong, of the moral law, and all the rules of duty, from the fear and the hope of rewards and punishments, human or divine; that is to say (laying aside every other consideration, and going on the ground of scientific method), he grounds the principle upon consequence; he confounds, not as before the antecedent with the consequent, but the consequent with the antecedent. And from whence comes this confusion? From that same source of all the confusion we have so many times signalized, the premature inquiry after causes, before a sufficient study of effects, the inquiry after the origin of the idea of right and wrong, before carefully collecting the attributes and all the attributes of this idea. Permit me to dwell a moment upon this important topic.

First, then, the most superficial observation, provided it be impartial, easily demonstrates, that in the human mind, in its present actual development, there is the idea of right

and of wrong, altogether distinct the one from the other. It is a fact, that in the presence of certain actions, reason qualifies them as good or bad, just or unjust, honest or dishonest. And it is not merely in the select circle of the enlightened, that reason puts forth this judgment: there is not a man, ignorant or instructed, civilized or savage, provided he be a rational and moral being, who does not pass the same judgment. As the principle of causality errs and rectifies itself in its application without ceasing to exist, so the distinction between right and wrong may be incorrectly applied, may vary in regard to particular objects, and may become clearer and more correct with time, without ceasing to be with all men the same thing at the bottom. It is an universal conception of reason, and hence it is found in all languages, those products and faithful images of the mind.—Not only is this distinction universal, but it is a necessary conception. In vain does the reason, after having once conceived it, attempt to deny it, or to call in question its truth. It can not. One can not at will regard the same action as just and unjust; these two ideas baffle every attempt to commute them, the one for the other; their objects may change, but never their nature.—Still further: reason can not conceive the distinction between right and wrong, just and unjust, without instantly conceiving that the one ought to be done, and the other ought not to be done. This conception of right and wrong instantly gives that of duty, of law; and as the one is universal and necessary, the other is equally so. Now a law necessary for the reason in respect to action, is, for a rational but free agent, a simple obligation, but it is an absolute obligation. Duty obliges us, though without forcing us; if we can violate it, we can not deny it; and accordingly, even when the feebleness of the liberty and the ascendency of passion, make the action, as it were, falsify the law, yet reason, independent, asserts the violated law as an inviolable law, and imposes it still with supreme authority

upon the wayward conduct as its imprescriptible rule. The sentiment of reason, and of moral obligation which reason reveals and imposes, is moral consciousness, or conscience properly so called.

Observe distinctly, however, with what it is that obligation has to do. It refers to right doing; it bears upon no other point, but there it is absolute. It is, then, independent of every foreign consideration; it has nothing to do with the facilities or difficulties which its fulfillment may encounter, nor with the consequences it may entail, with pleasure or pain, that is, with happiness or misery, that is again, with any motive of utility whatever. For pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, are nothing but objects of sensibility; while moral good, and moral obligation, are conceptions of the reason. Utility is but an accident, which may, or may not be; duty is a principle.

Now is not right doing always useful to the agent and to others? That is another question, to answer which, we no longer appeal to reason, but to experience. And does experience always answer in the affirmative? Even if it does, and if the useful be always inseparable from the good, yet the good and the useful are none the less distinct in themselves; and it is not on the ground of utility that virtue becomes obligatory, and that it obtains universal veneration and admiration. It is admired; therefore it is not taken solely as useful; for admiration is not the expression of interest.*

* *On the Moral Phenomenon of Admiration*, see Series I., Vol. II., Lect. XVII., p. 214. [The passage referred to is as follows:

"Admiration is a sentiment essentially disinterested. Consider whether there is any interest in the world that has the power of awakening your admiration for any thing, or for any person. If your interest prompts it, you can feign admiration; but you can not feel it. A tyrant impending death may constrain you to seem to admire, but not in reality to admire. Affection even does not determine admiration; while a trait of heroism, even in an enemy, commands it, and forces it from us in spite of ourselves."]

If the good were nothing but the useful, the admiration which virtue excites would always be in proportion to its utility. But such is not the fact. The most useful virtuous act can never be so much so as many natural phenomena, which every where diffuse and maintain life. But who ever experiences for the sun, with its influence so beneficent, the sentiment of admiration and respect which the most unproductive act of virtue inspires? It is because the sun is nothing but useful; while the virtuous act, whether useful or not, is the fulfillment of a law to which the agent, whom we denominate virtuous and whom we admire, is voluntarily conformed. We may derive advantage from an action without admiring it, as we may admire it without deriving advantage from it. The foundation of admiration, then, is not the utility which the admired object procures to others; still less is it the utility of the action to him who performs it. The virtuous action would otherwise be nothing but a lucky calculation; we might indeed congratulate the author, but we should not be tempted to admire him. Mankind demands of its heroes some other merit than that of a sagacious merchant; and far from the utility of the agent and his personal interest being the ground and the measure of admiration, it is a fact that other things being equal, the phenomenon of admiration diminishes or in[illegible]es in proportion to the sacrifices which the virtuo[illegible] costs.* But if you want a

* *On Sacrifice, as the Grou[illegible]d Measure of Approbation*, see Series I., Vol. IV., Lecture XV., p. [illegible]

[The passage here referred to is in Cousin's *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century*, and in the volume devoted to the critical account of the Scottish School. Lecture XV. is taken up with the moral and political theory of Hutcheson, whom Cousin rightly calls the true founder of the Scottish School. The theory of Hutcheson on virtue is: 1, that the principle of virtue is benevolence; 2, that the constituent quality of a virtuous action is, that it serves the public good. In regard to the first point, Cousin shows that this theory rests indeed on a real fact, benevolence as a natural and disinterested sentiment; but

manifest proof that virtue is not founded upon the personal interest of him who practices it, take the example I have given on another occasion, of a generous man whose virtue

that it corrupts this fact by exaggerating it, and by recognizing no other virtue than benevolence. Whereas, there are many other virtues which can not by any analysis be resolved into benevolence; and consequently benevolence is not the sole principle of virtue. Next, as to the constituent quality of a virtuous action, Cousin shows that the theory of Hutcheson on this point falls to the ground along with his theory on the first point; as benevolence is not the sole object of moral approbation, and the sole foundation of virtue, so the essence of a virtuous action can not consist in its property of subserving the general welfare.

But the particular passage to which reference is made above is a criticism on a statement of Hutcheson as to what the perfection of virtue consists in, to the effect that a virtuous action is the product of two factors, the benevolence and the ability of the agent; and consequently that the moral importance of an action is in a ratio compounded of the two factors:

"On which," continues Cousin, "I propound for Hutcheson the following problem:

"Two men have given to an unfortunate person the same sum of money; they have the same fortune and the same benevolence: What is the comparative valuation of the moral importance of these two actions?

It is evident by the terms of the calculation before laid down, that the moral importance of the two actions is mathematically the same.

Nothing more certain, it seems, yet nothing more false.

In fact the calculation has forgot[illegible] one small item, to wit, the greater or less sacrifice made by one o[illegible]gent. Both were equally rich and equally benevolent; but th[illegible], young and handsome, had intended to use that sum of mone[illegible] gratifying certain refined and charming tastes which he has not renounced without regret; the other man, while equally benevolent and equally generous, had not at that time the least use for the sum; he has given it with the same heart, but with far less sacrifice, while the former, without feeling a more lively sentiment of benevolence, has had to put a much greater force upon himself. This greater or less self-denial, this sacrifice more or less painful, does it go for nothing, O ye mathematicians, in the moral character of the action? You consider nothing but the product, and you say: for society and the human race, the action is on both sides the same. You are also good enough to make account of the internal sen-

proves his ruin instead of being an advantage to him; and to prevent all idea of calculation, suppose a man who sacrifices his life for the truth, who dies upon the scaffold, in the flower of his age, for the cause of justice. Here there is no future, no chance of advantage, at least in this world; and of course no calculation, no possible self-interest. This

timent of benevolence; that now is something; but it is not enough; and the voice of the human race, the cry of conscience, proclaim, in spite of your calculus, that one of these two actions is better than the other, because it has cost more. It has not cost more money, it is true, but it has cost more effort. This effort, see there a new datum, which you have neglected, and which, introduced into your equation, deranges it a little!

Thus, two actions precisely alike [in form], performed with the same ability and the same benevolence, have a different moral value, according to the greater or less sacrifice or effort which they have cost: the fact is certain; here is another which is not less so, and which disturbs the arithmetic of Hutcheson still more.

A man with a certain ability and a certain benevolence does a certain amount of good; another, with the same ability and a little less benevolence, does a less amount of good, but with incomparably more effort, whether because he is naturally less generous, much as he may wish to be equally so, or whether because he had been planning an altogether different employment of his money, more agreeable to his heart: what is the relative value of the two actions? To the eyes of Hutcheson's arithmetic that has the most which contains the greater amount of good done to others. To the eyes of God and of conscience, the contrary is evident: the most virtuous person is not he who has given the most, but he who has given with the most devotion, the most sacrifice.

Suppose that a man does to other men immense good, from the overflowing of a generous disposition, without any sacrifice, without having to struggle against any temptation, against any desire less noble and less pure: this wonderful being is an angel upon earth, but he is not a virtuous man. He has received from heaven magnificent endowments; but he has not added to them this special possession which is not an endowment, but which must be acquired by the sweat of his face, to wit, virtue.

Sacrifice, struggle with one's self, is therefore not only a new element which ought to be introduced among the legitimate data of the problem respecting the moral importance of actions; it is the first of all these

man, if virtue is nothing but utility, is a fool, and mankind who admire him are delirious. This delirium is nevertheless a fact, an undeniable fact. It demonstrates, then, unanswerably, that in the human mind, such as it has pleased its author to make it, the idea of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, is one thing, and the idea of utility, of pleasure, and pain, of happiness and misery, is another thing.*

data, it is the fundamental and essential element which measures, and almost by itself alone constitutes moral importance. This moral importance is not therefore, as Hutcheson pretends, in the amount of good done, and in a ratio compounded of the agent's benevolence and ability. In fact, the ability of an agent, his talents, his fortune even, do not belong to him: they are almost never his own achievement; they confer therefore no merit which is properly his own. His benevolence is still less his own: it is instinctive and involuntary; its liveliness is a grace of nature, and its feebleness is a defect rather than a vice. From whence it follows that if there were no other factors in goodness, then goodness is a result in which the will has no part, and consequently the act which produces it is without merit, that is to say, at bottom there is no virtue, but a certain amount of advantage, which the public receives with great pleasure, but without owing to their author any sentiment which resembles moral approbation, esteem and admiration."—TR.]

* *History of Modern Philosophy*, Lecture VIII., p. 197, and First Series, Vol. I. Course of 1817, Lecture XVIII., p. 313, and Vol. II., Lecture XXIII., p. 355.—[The first reference is to a discussion of the doctrine of Epicurus concerning virtue. The argument there given goes, however, upon the supposition that there is no future life. To the argument as here given, it might be objected that on the hypothesis of a future life, the man who sacrifices his life on the scaffold for the cause of truth may make a very prudent calculation for his best interest. Cousin's answer to this objection may be found in the passage included in the second reference; where he says that, if the hopes of another life be admitted as the motive for the self-sacrifice in the case supposed, that involves the admission also of the idea of merit and demerit as the foundation of those hopes, and consequently of the idea of right and wrong, of obligation, in short, of virtue as something different in essence from utility, as something absolute, that is to say, in fine, involves the subversion of the utilitarian theory. This is sufficient answer, if the rewards and punishments of a future life necessarily imply a moral government.

I have now shown the essential and metaphysical difference of these ideas. It remains to show their relation. It is certain that the idea of virtue is distinct from that of happiness; but I ask, if when you meet a virtuous man, a moral agent who, free to obey or not to obey a severe law, obeys it at the sacrifice of his dearest affections—I ask if this man, this moral agent, besides the admiration which attaches to the act, does not inspire you with a sentiment of good-will which attaches to his person? Is it not true that you are disposed, if happiness were in your hands, to dispense it to this virtuous man? Is it not true that he appears to you worthy to be happy, and that in respect to him, happiness does not appear to you solely as an arbitrary idea, but a right? At the same time, when the guilty man is rendered wretched, as the effect of his vices, do we not judge that he deserves it? Do we not judge, in general, that it would be unjust for vice to be happy and virtue miserable? This is evidently the common opinion of all men; and this opinion is not only universal, it is also a necessary conception. In vain does reason endeavor to conceive vice as worthy of happiness; it can not succeed in the attempt. It can not help demanding an intimate harmony between happiness and virtue.

But if future rewards and punishments are attached to obeying or disobeying in this life the commands of an arbitrary omnipotent Ruler, the force of the objection is not removed; and Paley's definition of virtue as consisting "in obedience to God for the sake of everlasting happiness," might hold good. But such a monstrous supposition can not be made. Human reason can not conceive of happiness as the supreme end either for God or for his rational creatures; it can not conceive of an arbitrary God, or a non-moral administration of the universe. As to the rest it is undeniable that though virtue is doubtless in the long run prudent, yet prudence is not the essence of virtue. He who obeys the law of duty merely for the advantage he expects, does not obey it at all, except in mere form, and can never gain reward of true virtue, that virtue which obeys the law of right because it is right, and therein gets, as only therein it is possible to get, its just reward.—Tr.]

And in this, we are not sensitive beings who aspire after happiness, nor sympathetic beings who desire it for our fellow-creatures; we are rational and moral beings, who pass such a judgment in respect to others, as well as in respect to ourselves; and when facts do not accord with our judgments, we do not, on that account, reverse our judgments; we maintain them invincibly, in spite of all facts at variance with them. In a word, the idea of merit and demerit is for the reason inseparable from that of the moral law fulfilled or violated.*

Wherever virtue and vice receive their reward and punishment, there, in our conceptions, is a state of moral order; and where vice and virtue are without punishment and reward, or where they are equally treated, there, on the other hand, is a state of disorder. Rewards and punishments are different, according to the cases which it is not necessary here to determine and classify with perfect precision. When vicious actions do not pass beyond the sphere of the person who commits them, we do not impose upon them any other punishment than blame or disesteem. We punish them by opinion. When they exceed that sphere, and affect the rights of others, then they fall under positive laws, and those laws penal. These two sorts of

* ["Not only do we unceasingly aspire after happiness, as sensitive beings, but when we have done right, we judge, as intelligent and moral beings, that we are worthy of happiness. This is the necessary principle of merit and demerit—the origin and foundation of all our ideas of reward and punishment—a principle perpetually confounded either with the desire of happiness, or with the moral law.

"Hence the question of the sovereign good—*summum bonum*—never yet solved. A single solution has been sought for a complex question, from not comprehending the two principles capable of solving it. The Epicurean solution: satisfaction of the desire for happiness. The Stoic solution: fulfillment of the moral law.

"The true solution is in the connection and harmony of virtue, and happiness as merited by it; for the two principles are not equivalent; virtue is the antecedent. It is not alone the sole and sovereign good; but it is the chief good." *Fragmens Philosophiques.*—TR.]

punishment, moral and material, have through all time and every where been inflicted upon vicious agents. Without any doubt it is useful to society to inflict disgrace upon the violator of moral order; without doubt it is useful to society to punish effectually the individual who attacks the foundations of social order. This consideration of utility is real; it is weighty; but I say that it is not the only one, it is not the first, it is only accessory, and that the immediate basis of all penalty is the idea of the essential merit and demerit of actions, the general idea of order, which imperiously demands that the merit and demerit of actions, which is a law of reason and of order, should be realized in a society that pretends to be rational and well ordered. On this ground, and on this ground alone, of realizing this law of reason and of order, the two powers of society, opinion and government, appear faithful to their primary law. Then comes up utility, the immediate utility of repressing evil, and the indirect utility of preventing it, by example, that is, by fear. But this consideration of the utility of punishment is not a sufficient basis for it. Suppose, in fact, that there is nothing good or evil in itself, and consequently neither essential merit or demerit; by what right, then, I ask, do you disgrace a man, or make him ascend the scaffold, or put him in irons for life, for the mere advantage of others, when the action of the man is neither good nor bad, and merits itself neither blame nor punishment? Suppose that it is not absolutely right, just in itself, to blame this man or to punish him, then the justice of infamy and of glory, and of every species of reward and punishment are at an end. Still further, I maintain that if punishment has no other ground than utility, then even its utility is destroyed; for in order that a punishment may be useful, it is requisite: 1, that he upon whom it is inflicted, endowed as he is with the principle of merit and demerit, should regard himself as justly punished, and accept his punishment with a suitable disposition; 2, that

the spectators, equally endowed with the principle of merit and demerit, should regard the culprit as justly punished according to the measure of his crime, and should apply to themselves by anticipation the same justice in case of crime, and should be kept in harmony with the social order by the view of its legitimate penalties. Hence arises the util ity of examples of punishment whether moral or physical.—But take away its foundation in justice, and you destroy the utility of punishment; you excite indignation and abhorrence, instead of awakening penitence in the victim, or teaching a salutary lesson to the public. You array courage, sympathy, every thing noble and elevated in human nature, on the side of the victim; you excite all energetic spirits against society and its artificial laws. Thus the utility of punishment is itself grounded in its justice, instead of its justice being grounded in its utility. Punishment is the sanction of the law, and not its foundation. The idea of right and wrong is grounded only on itself, on reason which reveals it. It is the condition of the idea of merit and demerit, which is the condition of the idea of reward and punishment; and this latter idea is to the two former, but especially to the idea of right and wrong, in the relation of the consequence to its principle.*

* See First Series, particularly Vol. II.; Part III., Lect. XVII., p. 218; Lect. XXI. and XXII., p. 341. See also translation of Plato, Vol. III. argument of the Gorgias. [We translate the passage which relates most directly to this subject; it will be read with interest:

"Publicists still seek for the foundation of penalty. Some, who regard themselves as enlightened politicians, find in it the utility of punishment for those who witness it, who are deterred from crime by its threatenings, and its preventive efficacy. This is indeed one of the effects of punishment, but not its foundation.—Others, through affectation of greater humanity, wish to consider the legitimacy of punishment as grounded wholly on its utility to him who endures it, by its corrective efficacy. This, again, is certainly one of the possible effects of punishment, but not its foundation; for in order that the punishment be corrective, it is necessary that it should be submitted to as just. We are therefore always compelled to return to the idea of justice. Justice is the true

This relation which embraces all moral order, subsists inviolably, even when we pass beyond the sphere of this life and of human society, to that of religion and of a world where God reigns supreme, where destiny gives place to the pure action of Providence, where fact and right are the same thing. The idea of merit and demerit, transferred as it were beyond this world, is the basis of the conception of punishments and rewards in the future life. It is not in the caprice of a being superior to us in power, that we rest the legitimacy of the retributions of another life. Take away the justice of God, and his power, absolute as it is, would no longer appear to us a sufficient foundation for rewards and punishments. Take away his justice, and what remains? A government, but no law; and instead of the sublime realization of the idea of merit and demerit, the future life is nothing but the threat of a superior force against a feeble being, fated to sustain the part of a sufferer and a victim.—In heaven, then, as upon

foundation of punishment; personal and social utility is only a consequence. It is an undeniable fact, that after every wrong act, the unjust man thinks, and can not but think, that he is ill-deserving, that is, is worthy of punishment. In the intelligence, the idea of punishment corresponds to that of injustice: and when the injustice has been committed in the social sphere, the punishment ought to be inflicted by society. Society can do it only because it ought. The right here has no other source than the duty to inflict—duty the most strict, the most evident and the most sacred—without which this pretended right would be nothing but that of force, that is to say an atrocious injustice, even though it be to the moral advantage of him who received it, and a salutary spectacle for the people; which in fact could not then be the case, for the punishment would then find no sympathy, no echo, neither in the public conscience, nor in that of the individual punished. Punishment is not just because it is useful, as a preventive or a corrective; but it is useful in either or both these ways, because it is just. This theory of punishment, by demonstrating the falseness, the incomplete and exclusive character of the two theories which divide publicists, completes and explains them, and gives to both a center and legitimate basis." Cousin's *Plato*, Vol. III., p. 167-169.—Tr.]

the earth, in heaven much more than upon the earth, the sanction of law is not the foundation of it; reward and punishment are deduced from merit and demerit, from right and wrong; the former do not constitute the latter.

Let us now apply to this subject the distinctions we have before established. We have distinguished the logical order of ideas from the order of their acquisition. In the first case, one idea is the logical condition of another when it explains the other; in the second case, one idea is the chronological condition of another, when it arises in the human mind before the other. Now I say in respect to the question before us, that the idea of justice, the idea of the moral law obeyed or broken, is: 1, the logical condition of the idea of merit or demerit, which without it is incomprehensible and inadmissible; 2, the antecedent, the chronological condition of the acquisition of the idea of merit and demerit, which certainly never would have arisen in the mind, if previously it had not received the idea of justice and injustice, right and wrong, good and evil. Now, Locke, after having frequently confounded, as we have seen, the logical condition of an idea with its chronological condition, confounds at once in regard to this subject, both the logical and chronological condition of an idea with the idea itself, and even with a consequence of that idea; for the idea of reward and punishment is only a consequence of the idea of merit and demerit, which in its turn is only a consequence of the idea of right and wrong, which is the supreme principle, beyond which it is impossible to ascend. Locke reverses this order. Thus, instead of laying down first the idea of right and wrong, then that of merit and demerit, and then that of reward and punishment, it is the reward and punishment, that is to say, the pleasure and the pain that result from right and wrong, which, according to Locke, is the foundation of moral good and evil, and of the moral rectitude of actions.

B. II. Ch. XXVIII. § 5: "Good and evil, as hath been shown, B. II. Ch. XX. § 2, and Ch. XXI. § 42, are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions, or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is what we call reward and punishment."

Locke then distinguishes three laws or rules, namely, the divine law, the civil law, and the law of opinion, or reputation.

Ibid. § 7: "By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices."

Ibid. § 8: "*Divine law the measure of sin and duty.* First, the divine law, whereby I mean that law which God has set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves, I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny. He has a right to do it; we are his creatures: he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best; and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments, of infinite weight and duration in another life; for nobody can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude, and by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether as sins or duties, they are like to procure them happiness or misery, from the hands of the Almighty."

Here, then, the punishments and rewards of a future life are declared the sole touchstone, the sole measure of the rectitude of our actions. But suppose that the law which

God has given us were not just in itself, independently of the rewards and punishments attached to it: the act which obeys or violates it would then be neither good nor bad in itself; and the divine will would then be seen in the strange aspect of attaching to a law indifferent in itself, and in its fulfillment or violation, rewards the most alluring, and punishments the most dreadful. These promises and these threatenings, moreover, being addressed merely to the sensibility, which is the subject of pleasure and pain, and not to the reason or conscience, might excite in us fear or hope, but never the emotion of reverence, nor the sentiment of duty. And it is of no avail to say, as Locke has, that God has the right to do so, to establish, namely, such a law, though it is in itself indifferent, because we are his creatures; for that is without meaning, unless it be that he is the most powerful and we the weakest, and that would be to appeal to the right of the strongest. In general, this theory tends to make God an arbitrary king, to substitute the Divine Will and Power in place of Divine Reason and Wisdom. It is a doctrine concerning God for the senses, and not for the reason; made for slaves and brutes, not for intelligent and free beings.*

* [In his Introduction to Plato's *Euthyphron*, Cousin has the following remarks upon the Divine Government:

"God being goodness, or rectitude itself, the very substance of moral order, it follows that all moral truths refer to him, as radii to a center, as modifications to the subject which is the ground of their existence and which they manifest. So far therefore from being in contradiction, morality and religion are intimately connected with each other, both in the unity of their real principle and in that of the human mind which simultaneously forms the conception of them. But when Anthropomorphism, degrading theology to the drama, makes of the Eternal a God for the theater, tyrannical and passionate, who from the height of his omnipotence arbitrarily decides what is right and what is wrong, it is then that philosophical criticism may and ought, in the interest of moral truths, to take authority from the immediate obligation which characterizes them, to establish them upon their own basis, independently of every foreign circumstance, independently even of their relation to their

Ibid. § 9. "*Civil law the measure of crimes and innocence.* *Secondly*, the civil law, the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it, is another rule to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be criminal or no. This law nobody overlooks; the rewards and punishments which enforce it being ready at hand, and suitable to the power that makes it; which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions of those who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods, from him who disobeys, which is the punishment of offenses committed against this law."

Unquestionably society has this right; this right is even a duty for it; but it is so only upon one condition, the

primitive source. Such is the particular point of view in which the Euthyphron is to be regarded. Socrates eagerly acknowledges that there is an essential harmony between morality and religion, that every thing which is right is pleasing to him whom we are behooved to conceive as the type and substance of eternal reason. But he inquires *why* right, the morally good, is pleasing to God; and if it might not be otherwise; if it is not possible that wrong, the morally evil, might be pleasing to him? No. Why is it then that the good can not but be pleasing to God? It is, in the last analysis, solely because it is good; all other reasons that can be given always presuppose and return to this. It must therefore be admitted that good is not such because it pleases God, but it pleases God because it is good; and consequently it is not in religious doctrines that we are to look for the primitive title of the legitimacy of moral truths. These truths, like all others, legitimate themselves, and need no other authority than that of Reason which perceives and proclaims them. Reason is for itself its own sanction. This conception of the morally good, or to speak in the language of the time of Socrates, this conception of the *holy* in itself, disengaged from the external forms in which it may be clothed, from the circumstances which accompany it, and even from the necessary consequences which are derived from it—and considered in regard to what is peculiar and absolute in it, in its immediate grandeur and beauty, is an example of an IDEA in the system of Plato." Cousin's *Plato*, *Argument of the Euthyphron*, Vol. I.—TR.]

condition namely, that the laws which it passes should be just; for suppose that the law established by society be unjust, the violation of this law ceases to be unjust, and then the punishment of an act not unjust which transgresses an unjust law, is itself injustice. Take away, I repeat, the previous fitness and justness of the law, and you destroy the fitness and justice of the punishment. Punishment loses all its character of morality, and retains only that of mere physical force, which can not, as Hobbes very well perceived, be too absolute or too formidable; since it can not subsist nor make itself regarded, except from the fear it inspires.*

Ibid. § 10: "*Philosophical law the measure of virtue and vice.* Thirdly, the law of opinion or reputation. Virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed every where to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong; and so far as they really are so applied, they are coincident with the divine law above mentioned. But yet whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these names, virtue and vice, in the particular instance of their application, through the several nations and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed only to such actions, as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange that men every where should give the name of *virtue* to those actions, which among them are judged praiseworthy; and call that *vice*, which they account blamable; since otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think any thing right, to which they allowed not commendation, and any thing wrong, which they let pass without blame. Thus the measure of what is every where called and esteemed virtue and vice, is the approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies, tribes and clubs of men in the

* Series I., Vol. III., Lecture IX.—[Cousin's *Examination of the Political Principles of Hobbes.*—Tr.]

world; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace among them according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions, of that place. For though men uniting to politic societies, have resigned up to the public, the disposing of all their force, so that they can not employ it against any fellow-citizen, any further than the law of the country directs, yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving the actions of those whom they live among and converse with; and by this approbation and dislike, they establish among themselves what they call virtue and vice."

Ibid. § 11: "That this is the common measure of virtue and vice, will appear to any one who considers, that though that passes for *vice* in one country which is counted *virtue*, or at least *not* vice in another, yet every where virtue and praise, vice and blame go together."

Upon which point Locke refers to all pagan antiquity, which incited to virtue by the allurement of glory. He even cites a passage of St. Paul, which he forces aside from its natural sense, to get at the conclusion, that there is no other measure of virtue than good or bad fame. Read also his twelfth section, in which the "enforcements" of this law are stated to be "commendation and discredit."

But you perceive that the same is true in regard to opinion, the pretended philosophical law, as in regard to public punishments under the civil law, and in regard to the punishments of another life under the divine law. Suppose that virtue is not virtue in itself, and that it is praise and approbation which make it such, it is clear that morality is no longer any thing; there is no longer a law; there is nothing but arbitrary customs local and changing; there is no longer any thing but fashion and opinion. Now, either opinion is nothing but a lying sound, or it is the echo of the public conscience; and then it is an effect, and not a cause; its legitimacy and its power reside in the strength of the sentiment of right and wrong. But to

elevate the effect to the rank of a cause, to establish right and wrong upon opinion,* is to destroy right and wrong; it is to confound and vitiate virtue, by making fear its only sanction; it is to make courtiers and not virtuous men. Popular applause is one of the sweetest things in the world, but only when it is the reflection of one's own conscience, and not the price of complaisance; when it is acquired by a series of actions truly virtuous, by constancy to one's character, fidelity to one's principles and to one's friends in the common service of one's country. Glory is the crown, not the foundation of virtue. Duty does not measure itself by reward. Without doubt it is easier to perform it on a conspicuous theater, and with the applause of the crowd; but it is not at all lessened in the shade; it does not perish in ignominy; there, as every where, it is one and the same, inviolable and obligatory.

The conclusion to which we perpetually recur, is, that here likewise, Locke obviously takes the consequence for the principle, the effect for the cause. And you will observe that this confusion is a necessity of his system. This system admits no idea that is not derived from reflection or from sensation. Reflection being here out of the question, it is to sensation that Locke has recourse; and as sensation can not explain the idea which mankind have of good and evil, the object is to find an idea more or less resembling it, which can come from sensation, and take the place of the former. Now this idea is that of punishment and reward, which resolves itself into that of pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, or in general, into the idea of utility. This confusion, to repeat once more, was necessary to the system of Locke; and it saves it; but dispel the confusion, re-establish the facts in their real value and true order, and the system of Locke is overthrown.

* This is the fundamental error of Smith's *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*.

Let us see where we are. Locke has tried his system upon a number of particular ideas, to wit: the idea of space, the idea of time, the idea of the infinite, of personal identity, of substance, of cause, of good and evil; imposing upon himself the task of explaining all these ideas by sensation and by reflection. We have followed Locke upon all these points chosen by himself; and upon all these points, an attentive examination has demonstrated that not one of these ideas can be explained by sensation or reflection, except under the condition of entirely misconceiving the real characteristics with which these ideas are now marked in the understanding of all mankind, and of confounding, through the help of this misconception, these ideas with other ideas which are indeed more or less intimately united with them, but which are not the same; which precede them, or which succeed them, but do not constitute them, as the ideas of body, of number, of the phenomena of consciousness and memory, of collection and totality, of reward and punishment, pleasure and pain. Now, without doubt sensation and reflection explain these latter ideas; but these are not the ideas which it is the problem to explain; and the system of Locke is therefore convicted of being unable to explain all the ideas that are in the human mind.

The theories which we have brought forward and discussed, occupy three fourths of the second book of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. Locke had then only to gather his generalizations; he had nothing more to do but to show how, the ideas which we have gone over and all similar ideas being furnished by sensation or by reflection, the complete edifice of the human understanding may be erected on this basis. On our part, the most important portion of our task is accomplished. It was necessary to accompany the exposition of the principles of Locke's system with a profound and thorough discussion. Now that

these principles are overthrown, we can proceed faster; it will be enough to give a rapid view of the last part of the second book, stating the principal positions, and elucidating them by a few reflections.

All those ideas which are derived immediately from these two sources, sensation and reflection, are by Locke denominated *simple ideas.* Simple ideas are the elements out of which we compose all other ideas. Compound or *complex* ideas are those which we form subsequently by the combination of simple and primitive ideas; so that the whole development and action of the human mind is resolved into the acquisition, immediately from the senses, or from reflection, of a certain number of simple ideas, which Locke believes he has determined; then the formation from these materials of complex ideas by combination and association; then again, the formation from these complex ideas of ideas still more complex than the former; and thus on continually, till we have exhausted all the ideas in the human mind.*

There is one error which it is here necessary to expose—an error of idea, or a verbal error, whichever you please. It is not true that we begin by simple ideas, and then proceed to complex ideas. On the contrary, we begin with complex ideas, and from them proceed to more simple; and the process of the mind in the acquisition of ideas is precisely the inverse of that which Locke assigns. All our primary ideas are complex, and for the evident reason that all our faculties, or at least a great number of our faculties, enter into exercise at the same time; and their simultaneous action gives us at the same time a number of ideas bound and blended together, which form a whole. For example: the idea of the external world which is given so early, is a very complex idea, containing a multitude of ideas. There is the idea of the secondary qualities of external objects; the idea of their primary qualities; the idea of the permanent reality of something to which you refer

* Book II. Chap. II. and Chap. XII.

these qualities, that is of body, of matter; there is also the idea of space containing body; the idea of time in which its different motions and changes are accomplished, etc. And do you believe that you have at first, and by itself, the idea of primary qualities, and of the secondary qualities; and then the idea of the subject of these qualities; then the idea of time; and then the idea of space? By no means. It is simultaneously, or almost simultaneously, that you acquire all these ideas. Moreover you do not have them without knowing that you have them. Now consciousness implies a certain degree of attention, that is, of will; it implies also a belief in your own existence, in the real or substantial *me* or *self*, which you are. In a word, you have at once an assemblage of ideas which are given you the one with the other; and all your primitive ideas are complex. They are complex besides for another reason: because they are particular and concrete; as I have shown in the preceding lecture. Then comes abstraction, which, employing itself upon those primitive data, complex, concrete, and particular, separates what nature had given you united and simultaneous, and considers by itself each of these parts of the whole. That part which is separated from the whole, that idea detached from the total picture of the primitive ideas, becomes an abstract and simple idea, until a more sagacious abstraction decomposes that supposed simple idea, and evolves from it many other ideas which it considers apart, abstracting one from the other; until at last, from decomposition to decomposition, abstraction and analysis arrive at ideas so simple that they are, or appear to be, no longer capable of being decomposed. The more simple an idea is, the more general it is; the more abstract, the greater the extension it has. We begin with the concrete, and we go to the abstract; we begin with the definite and particular, in order to arrive at the simple and the general. The process of the mind, then, as I have said, is altogether the reverse of that assigned

by Locke. I should, however, render this justice to the school of Locke, that it has not permitted so important an error to remain in the analysis of the mind; and that Condillac subsequently restored the true process.

This has not been done, however, in regard to another opinion of Locke, blended with the former, namely, that the mind is passive in the acquisition of simple ideas, and active in that of complex ideas.* Without doubt the mind is more active, its activity is more easily apprehended, in forming general ideas by abstraction (for this is what we must understand by the complex ideas of Locke); but it is also active in the acquisition of particular ideas (the simple ideas of Locke), for in this there is still consciousness, and consciousness supposes attention, activity. The mind is always active when it thinks. It does not always think, as Locke has well remarked;† but whenever it does think, and it certainly thinks in the acquisition of particular ideas, it is active. Locke has too much diminished the activity of the mind; and the school of Locke, far from extending it, has limited it still more.

All our ideas are now obtained, or supposed to be obtained; their mechanism has been described. It remains only to investigate their most general characters. Locke has divided them into clear and distinct ideas, and ideas obscure and confused,‡ real and chimerical,§ complete and incomplete,‖ true and false.¶ In the last chapter we find the remark since then so often reiterated, that in strictness all our ideas are true, and that error does not respect the idea considered in itself; for even when you have an idea of a thing which does not exist, as the idea of a centaur, of a chimera, it is not the less true that you have the idea which you have; it is only that the idea which you really have, lacks a corresponding object, really existing in

* B. II. Ch. I. § 25; Ch. XII. § 2.

† B. II. Ch. I. § 18, 19.

‡ B. II. Ch. XXIX.

§ *Ibid.* Ch. XXX.

‖ *Ibid.* Ch. XXXI.

¶ *Ibid.* Ch. XXXII.

nature; but the idea in itself is not the less true. The error, then, respects not the idea, but the affirmation sometimes added to it, namely, that this idea has an object really existing in nature. You are not in an error, because you have the idea of a centaur; but you are in an error when to this idea of a centaur you join the affirmation, that the object of such an idea exists. It is not the idea taken by itself, it is the judgment connected with it, which contains the error. The school of Locke has developed and put in clear light this judicious observation.

The Second Book closes with an excellent chapter on the association of ideas.* Not only are ideas clear or obscure, distinct or confused, real or chimerical, complete or incomplete, true or false; they have besides this undeniable peculiarity, that by occasion of one we conceive another; that they recall and bring up each other. There are associations natural, necessary, and rational; there are also false, arbitrary, and vicious associations of ideas. Locke has clearly discerned and forcibly signalized the danger of the latter sort. He has shown by a multitude of examples how it frequently happens, that simply because we have seen two things by chance united, this purely accidental association subsists in the imagination and perverts the understanding. This is the source of a multitude of errors; not only of false ideas, but of false sentiments, of arbitrary antipathies and sympathies, which not unfrequently degenerate into folly. We find here in Locke the wisest counsels for the education of the soul and of the mind, on the art of breaking up in good season the false connections of ideas, and of restoring to their place those rational connections which are derived from the nature of ideas and of the human mind. I regret but one thing; it is that Locke did not push this analysis still further, that he left still so much vagueness and indecision upon this important subject. It should not have been enough for him to lay it down

* B. II. Ch. XXXIII.

that there are associations true, natural, and rational; and associations false, accidental, and irrational; he should have shown in what consisted the true connections; determined the most important and the most ordinary of these legitimate connections; and attempted to ascend to the laws which govern them. A precise theory of these laws would have been an immense service done to philosophy; for the laws of the association of ideas rest upon the laws of the understanding itself. In fine, when Locke passed to perverted associations, he should have shown what is the root of these associations, and what is the relation of false connections to the true. We see the human mind only in its extravagance, until we ascend to its source, the reason of that extravagance. Thus, for example, Locke incessantly recommends, and very justly, to break up in the minds of children, the ordinary association of specters with darkness. A more thorough analysis would have investigated the ground of this association of mysterious beings with night, darkness, or obscurity. The idea of phantoms or specters is never connected in the mind or in the imagination with the idea of the sun or a brilliant light. Here is certainly an extravagance of the mind, but it is an extravagance which has its ground, and it would be curious and useful to investigate it. Here is a false connection of ideas which analysis can completely explain only by referring it to another connection of ideas, natural and legitimate, but perverted in a particular case. As to the rest, I repeat, this whole chapter shows the ingenious observer, and the true philosopher; and we shall see hereafter that the association of ideas became, in the hands of Locke's school, a rich subject of experiment and of instructive results, a fruitful topic of favorite study, and in respect to which the followers of Locke have rendered unquestionable service to the human reason.

Such is the exact and faithful analysis of the Second Book. Locke has made all our ideas to be derived from

sensation or from reflection; he has exhibited the different general attributes by which they may be classed, and that most remarkable quality of them, which is at once the most useful or the most dangerous. Ideology, psychology, at least that of Locke, is achieved.

It would now remain to pass to the applications of Ideology, to the knowledge of objects and beings by the aid of ideas. This is the subject of the Fourth Book. But Locke, having clearly perceived what is the relation of words to ideas, and that words are a fruitful source of errors for the understanding, has previously devoted an entire book, his third, to the discussion of the great question concerning signs and language.

You know that this is again one of the favorite subjects of the school of Locke, and I cordially acknowledge that in regard to this question, together with that concerning the association of ideas, it has deserved best of philosophy. I acknowledge with great respect a multitude of sound, ingenious, and even original ideas, scattered through the whole of Locke's Third Book. Locke has admirably perceived the necessary intervention of signs, of words, in the formation of abstract and general ideas; the influence of signs and words in definitions, and consequently in a considerable part of logic. He has noticed and signalized the advantages of a good system of signs, the utility of a well constructed language; the verbal disputes to which a defective language too frequently reduces philosophy. Upon all these points he has opened the route which his school have entered and pursued. If he has not gone very far, he still has the credit of opening the way; if he has suffered many profound observations to escape him which have been made by his successors, he has in requital avoided very many systematic errors into which they have fallen. Faithful still, however, to his method of inquiring more after the origin of things than their actual characters, Locke has not failed to investigate, though briefly, the

origin of words, of signs, of language. He has recognized that the materials of language pre-exist in nature, in sounds, and in that of our organs which is fitted to form them; but he perfectly comprehended that if there were nothing else but sounds, even articulate sounds, there would indeed be the materials of signs, but there would yet be no signs. It is necessary that the understanding attach a sense, a particular signification to the sound, in order that the sound should become a sign, the sign of an internal conception of the mind. "Parrots, and several other birds," says Locke, B. III. Ch. I. § 1 and 2, "will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet by no means are capable of language. Besides articulate sounds, therefore, it was further necessary that man should be able *to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions;* and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind." From whence it follows, 1, that the intelligence is not the product of language, but on the contrary, language is the product of intelligence; 2, that the greater part of words having, as Locke well remarked, an arbitrary signification, not only are languages the product of the intelligence, but they are even in great part the product of the will; while, in the system which has prevailed, both in the school of Locke and in a school altogether opposed to his, intelligence is made to come from language, in the latter, without much inquiring whence language comes, in the former, by making it come from the sensation and the sound, without suspecting that there is a gulf between the sound considered as a sound, and the sound considered as a sign, and that what makes it a sign is the power to comprehend it, that is, the mind, the intelligence. Sounds, and the organs which perceive and produce them, are the conditions of language; but its principle is intelligence. Here at least, we can give Locke the credit of not confounding the condition of a principle

with the principle itself. His successors have not been as wise.*

I will now proceed to take up several important points of the Third Book, which appear to me doubtful or false. You will judge.

1. Locke maintains (B. III. Ch. I. § 5), that "words ultimately derive their origin from such [other words] as signify sensible things," that is to say, in the last analysis all words have for their roots elementary words, which are the signs of sensible ideas. In the first place, the absolute truth of this proposition may be denied. I will give you two words, and will ask you to reduce them to their primitive words expressive of sensible ideas. Take the word *I* or *me*. This word, at least in all languages with which I am acquainted, is not susceptible of any reduction. It is undecomposable and primitive. It expresses no sensible idea; it represents nothing but the meaning which the intelligence attaches to it; it is a pure sign, without relation to any sensible sign. The word *being* is in precisely the same case; it is primitive and altogether intellectual. I know no language where the word *being* is expressed by a corresponding word representing a sensible idea. It is not then true, that all the roots of language are in the last analysis signs of sensible ideas. Further: even if it were true, and absolutely so, which is not the fact, let us see the only conclusion which could be justly drawn from it. Man is led at first by the action of all his faculties out of himself and toward the external world. The phenomena of the external world first strike his notice; these phenomena of course receive the first names; the first signs are drawn from sensible objects; and they are tinged in some sort with their colors. Then when man, subsequently, in falling back upon himself, apprehends more or less distinctly those intellectual phenomena, of which he had only confused

* First Series, Vol. III. Lect. II., *On Condillac*, p. 94. and Lect. III. p. 140.

glimpses; and when he wishes to express these new phenomena of the mind and of thought, analogy leads him to connect the signs he is seeking for, with those he already possesses; for analogy is the law of all language forming or developed. Hence the metaphors into which analysis resolves the greater part of the signs of the most abstract moral ideas. But it does not follow at all, that the mind of man has hereby intended to mark the genesis of its ideas. Because the signs of certain ideas are analogous to the signs of certain other ideas, the conclusion does indeed follow that the former were formed after the others, and upon the others; but not that the ideas of all these signs are in themselves identical or analogous. It is, however, by these analogies, purely verbal, and which, I repeat it, do not explain all the phenomena of language, that the school of Locke, taking advantage of the relations of words to each other, and of the sensible characteristics of the chief parts of their roots, has pretended, that all signs in the last analysis are derived from sensible signs; and what is more, that all ideas are equally derived from sensible ideas. Here is the foundation of the great work of Horne Took, who, in respect to grammar, has developed with a hardy fidelity the system already clearly indicated in the Essay on the Human Understanding (B. III. Ch. I. § 5), a system more or less in accordance with the necessary intervention of intelligence in the formation of language which Locke has himself set forth, and with the power of reflection as distinct from sensation in the acquisition of knowledge: "It may also," says Locke, "lead us a little toward the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for things that come not under the cognizance of our

senses; *e. g.*, to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, instill, disgust, disturbance, tranquillity, etc., are all words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. *Spirit*, in its primary signification, is breath; *angel*, a messenger; I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names which stand for things that fall not under the senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas. By which we may give some kind of a guess, what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the first beginners of languages; and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge . . . ."

II. Another proposition of Locke: (B. III. Ch. III. § 8), "that the signification of words is perfectly arbitrary."—I have already acknowledged that the greater part of words are arbitrary, and come not only from the intelligence, but from the will. I am thoroughly persuaded that the greater part of words are conventional; but the question is, whether they are all so; the point to be investigated is, whether there be absolutely not one root in language which carries of itself its own signification, which has a natural meaning, which is the foundation of subsequent convention, instead of coming from that convention. This is a great question which Locke has cut short with a single word, and which all his school have regarded as definitively settled; not even agitating it. And certainly even if I should grant, what I can not grant without qualification, that all words are arbitrary, I should except the laws of the relation of words to each other. Language is not a simple collection of words; it is a system of manifold relations of words to each other. These various relations are all referable to invariable relations, which constitute the foundation of every language, its grammar, the common and identical part of all languages, that is to say, universal

grammar, which has its necessary laws derived from the very nature of the human mind. Now it is remarkable, that in the book on words, Locke has never touched upon the relations of words, never upon syntax, nor the true foundation of language. There are a multitude of special reflections, and ingenious too, but no theory, no true grammar. It is by the school of Locke that the isolated remarks of their master have been formed into a grammatical system, true or false, which we shall take up hereafter.

III. We come now to another proposition of great importance. Locke declares expressly, that what is called general and universal, is the work of the understanding, and that the real essence is nothing else than the nominal essence. B. III. Ch. III. § 11: "*general* and *universal* belong not to the real existence of things; but are the *inventions and creatures of the understanding*, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas." You see here the very foundation of nominalism. It is important to examine, though briefly, this proposition, which has become in the school of Locke an unquestionable principle, a prejudice placed above all discussion.

I perceive a book, and another book, and another book still; I neglect, by abstraction, their differences of position, of form, of size, of color; I attend solely to their relations of resemblance which it is needless to enumerate, and I arrive by well-known processes, to the general idea of book; and that general idea is expressed for me by the word, book. Now what is there under this word? Neither more nor less than this: 1, the supposition that, between these different books placed under my eyes, besides the differences which distinguish them, there are also in them resemblances, common qualities, without which no generalization would be possible; 2, the supposition that there is a mind capable of recognizing these common qualities; and 3, the supposition that there are objects

really existing, real books, subjects of the common qualities. The word book represents all this: different books existing in nature, qualities common to those different books, and a mind capable of uniting those common qualities and of raising them to their general idea. But independently of these different and real books, of their common qualities, and of the mind which conceives them, does the word book express, does it represent, any thing existing, which is neither such or such a book, but book in itself? No, certainly not. The word book is, then, nothing but a word, a pure word, which has no special type, no real object existing in nature; it is certain, then, that the general essence of book confounds itself with its nominal essence, that the essence of book is nothing but a word; and here I am altogether on the side of Locke and of Nominalism.

But are there not other general ideas? Let us examine. I perceive a body, and at the same instant my mind can not but take for granted that the body is in a certain particular space, which is the place of this particular body. I perceive another body, and my mind can not but believe that this other particular body is also in a particular space: and thus I arrive, and I arrive very soon, as you have before seen, without need of passing through a long series of experiments, at the general idea of space. It remains to ascertain if this general idea of space is exactly the same as the general idea of book, that is, if the word space in itself signifies nothing more than the word book. Let us consult the human mind and the truth of internal facts. It is an unquestionable fact, that when you speak of book in general, you do not connect with the idea of book that of real existence. On the contrary, I ask if, when you speak of space in general, you do not add to this idea a belief in the reality of space? I ask if it is with space as with book; if you believe, for instance, that there are, without you, nothing but particular spaces, that there is not an universal space, capable of embracing all possible bodies, a

space one and continuous, of which different particular spaces are nothing but arbitrary portions and measures? It is certain, that when you speak of space, you have the conviction that out of yourself there is something which is space; as also when you speak of time, you have the conviction that there is out of yourself something which is time, although you know neither the nature of time nor of space. Different times and different spaces, are not the constituent elements of space and time; time and space are not solely for you the collection of different times and different spaces; but you believe that time and space are in themselves, that it is not two or three spaces, two or three ages, which constitute space and time; for, every thing derived from experience, whether in respect to space or to time, is finite, and the characteristic of space and of time for you is to be infinite, without beginning and without end: time resolves itself into eternity, and space into immensity. In a word, an invincible belief in the reality of time and of space, is attached by you to the general idea of time and space. This is what the human mind believes; this is what consciousness attests. Here the phenomenon is precisely the reverse of that which I just before signalized; and while the general idea of a book does not suppose in the mind the conviction of the existence of any thing which is book in itself; here on the contrary, to the general idea of time and of space, is united the invincible conviction of the reality of something which is space and time. Without doubt, the word space is a pure word, as well as that of book; but the former word carries with it the supposition of something real in itself. Here is the root and ground of Realism.

Nominalism thinks that general ideas are nothing but words; realism, that general ideas suppose something real. On both sides there is equal truth, and equal error. Without doubt, there are a great number of general ideas, which are purely collective, which represent nothing else than the

common qualities of objects, without implying any existence [any general existence, any essence separate from those common qualities, and the particular objects in which they reside]; and in this sense nominalism is in the right. But it is certain, also, that there are general ideas, which imply the supposition of the real existence of their object: realism rests upon this basis, which is undeniable. Now, observe the error of nominalism and of realism. The force of realism lies in general ideas which invincibly imply the external existence of their objects; these are, as you know, universal and necessary general ideas. It starts from thence; but into the circle of these superior ideas, it attracts and envelops ideas which are purely collective and relative, born of abstraction and language. What it had the right to affirm of the former, it affirms also of the latter. It was right on one point; it would extend it to an absolute and exclusive right: that is its error. Nominalism, on its part, because it had demonstrated clearly that there are many general ideas which are only collective ideas, relative and of mere words, concluded from this that all general ideas are nothing but general ideas, collective and relative, mere signs. The one converted things into words, the other converted words into things. Both are right in their starting-point; both go astray in their conclusion, through their excessive and absolute pretensions. In general, the Sensual School is nominalist, and the Ideal School is realist; and both sides, as is always the case with the incomplete and exclusive, half right and half wrong.*

IV. I conclude with pointing out another proposition or rather pretension of Locke, which it is important to reduce within just limits. Every where Locke attributes to

* On the difference of general collective ideas and general necessary ideas, see First Series, Vol. II. Lecture II.–IV. p. 45. *On Nominalism, Realism, and Conceptualism*, see First Series, Vol. IV. Lecture XXI. pp. 257–263; and Introduction to the unpublished works of Abelard.

words the greatest part of our errors; and if you expound the master by his disciples, you will find in all the writers of the school of Locke, that all disputes are disputes about words; that science is nothing but a language, and of course, a language well formed, is a science well constructed. I undertake to show the untruth of these exaggerated assertions.* No doubt words have a great influence; no doubt they have a very large share in our errors, and we should endeavor to make language as perfect as possible. Who denies it? But the question is, whether all error is derived from language, and whether science is merely a well formed language? No. The causes of error are very diverse; they are both more extended and more profound. Levity, presumption, indolence, precipitation, pride, thousands of moral causes, influence our judgments. The vices of language may connect themselves with these moral causes and aggravate them, but do not constitute them. If you look more closely, you will see that the greater part of the disputes, which seem at first to be disputes about words, are at the bottom, disputes about things. Humanity is too serious to be excited and often to shed its best blood for words. Wars do not turn on disputes about words; and I say the same of other conflicts, theological and scientific controversies, whose depth and importance is altogether misconceived, when they are resolved into pure logomachies. Certainly every science should seek for a well-constructed language; but it were to take the effect for the cause, to

* "In order for this to be true it would be necessary that not one thought could take place without the aid of language, which is not the case. I will take but one example among a thousand. Is it by help of the word *me*, or of the word *existence* that I feel that I exist? Have I come from the word to the thing? The very supposition is absurd. Conciousness perceives its phenomena by its own power, and not by words; words are a powerful help to it, but do not constitute it." First Series, Vol. III. Lecture I. p. 63.

suppose that there are well established sciences, because there are well formed languages. The contrary is true: sciences have well formed languages, when they themselves are well formed. Mathematics has a very well constructed language. Why? Because in mathematics the ideas have been perfectly determined; the simplicity, strictness and precision of the ideas have produced strictness, precision and simplicity of signs. It is contradictory to suppose that precise ideas express themselves in confused language; and even if it were so for a while, in the infancy of a language, yet soon, the precision, strictness, and fixedness of the ideas would dispel the vagueness and obscurity of language. The excellence of the chemical and physical sciences comes obviously from well made experiments. Facts having been observed and described with fidelity, reasoning could apply itself to these facts with certainty, and deduce from them legitimate consequences and applications. From hence arose, and from hence should arise, a good system of signs. Make the contrary supposition; suppose the experiments badly made: then the more strict the reasoning founded upon these false data, the more errors it would deduce, and the more length and breadth it would give to the errors. Suppose that the theories resulting from these imperfect and vicious experiments should be represented by signs the most simple, the most analogous, the best determined; of what importance would the goodness of the signs be, while under this excellent language was concealed a chimera or an error? Take medicine. It is a complaint that it has made so little advancement. What do you think should be done to bring it up from the regions of hypothesis, and elevate it to the rank of a science? Do you believe that at the outset you could, by a language well constructed, reform physiology and medicine? Or do you not believe that the true remedy is experiment, and along with experiment the strict employment of reason? A good system of signs will then

come of itself; it could not come before, or it would come to no good purpose. It is the same with respect to philosophy. It has been incessantly repeated, that the structure of the human mind is entire in that of language, and that philosophy would be completed the day that a philosophical language should be achieved. And starting from this point, some have endeavored to arrange a certain philosophical language more or less clear, easy and elegant; and they have believed that philosophy was completed. But it was not: it was very far from being so. This prejudice has even retarded its progress, by taking off the mind from experiment. Philosophical science, like every science of observation and of reasoning, lives by observations accurately made and deductions rigorously strict. It is there, and not elsewhere, we are to look for all the future progress of philosophy.

CHAPTER VI.

OF KNOWLEDGE: THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE IDEAS.

Examination of the Fourth Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding, on Knowledge.—That knowledge, according to Locke, depends: 1, upon Ideas; 2, upon Ideas, in so far as they are conformed to their objects.—That the conformity or non-conformity of ideas with their objects, as the foundation of truth or falsehood in regard to knowledge, is not with Locke merely a metaphor, but a real theory.—Examination of this theory of ideas: 1, in relation to the external world, to secondary qualities, to primary qualities, to the *substratum* of these qualities, to space, to time, etc.; 2, in relation to the spiritual world.—Appeal to Revelation.—Paralogism of Locke.

Having found all the ideas which are in the human understanding, their origin, their genesis, their mechanism and characters; the signs also by which we express, exhibit and unfold them;—the next thing is to inquire what man does with these ideas, what knowledge he derives from them, what is the extent of this knowledge, and what its limits. This is the subject of the Fourth Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding: it treats of Knowledge, that is, not merely of ideas taken in themselves, but in relation to their objects, in relation to essences; for knowledge reaches to that; it attains to God, to bodies, and to ourselves. Now here at the outset a previous question comes up. Knowledge extends to beings: the fact is unquestionable; but how does this take place? Starting from ideas which are within it, how does the understanding arrive at beings which are without it? What bridge is there, between the faculty of knowing, which is within us,

and the objects of knowledge which are without us? When we shall have arrived on the other side, we will take counsel what course we ought to follow, and where we can go; but first it is necessary to know how to make the passage. Before entering upon ontology, we must know how to pass from psychology to ontology, what is the foundation, and the legitimate foundation of knowledge. It is this preliminary question which we shall first impose upon Locke.

The fourth book of the Essay on the Human Understanding begins by recognizing that all knowledge depends upon ideas:

B. IV. *Of Knowledge;* Ch. I. *Of Knowledge in general.* § 1: "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them."

But you have seen that Locke recognizes, and rightly, that ideas in themselves considered are always true. It is always true that we have the idea which we have, which is actually under the eye of consciousness. Be this idea a chimera, a centaur, yet we always have it, and in this respect the idea can not be false, it can not but be true; or rather, in strictness, it is neither false nor true. Where, then, can error begin, and where does truth reside? Both the one and the other evidently reside, and can reside, only in the supposition of the mind that the idea does, or does not refer to an object, to such or such an object really existing in nature. It is in this reference or relation, that truth or error lies for the human mind. If this relation can be found and fastened upon, human knowledge is possible; if this relation can not be apprehended, human knowledge is impossible. Now supposing that this relation is possible, what is it, and in what does it consist? On this point it is our task to interrogate Locke with precision and severity; for here should be the foundation of the

theory of the true and of the false in regard to human knowledge, that is, the foundation of the Fourth Book which we have to examine.

Throughout the whole of the Fourth Book, as at the close of the Second, Locke expressly declares that the true or false in ideas, about which all knowledge is conversant, consists in the supposition of a relation between these ideas and their object; and every where also he expressly declares that this relation is and can be nothing but a relation of agreement or disagreement. The idea, to which, properly speaking, neither truth nor error pertain, is conformed to its object, or it is not conformed. If conformed, knowledge is not only possible, but it is true; for it rests upon a true idea, an idea conformed to its object; if the idea is not conformed to its object, the idea is false, and the knowledge derived from it is equally false. This in substance is what we find from one end to the other of the Fourth Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding, concerning knowledge. The same also we find at every step in the six last chapters of the Second Book, where Locke treats of true and false ideas.

B. II. Ch. XXXII. § 4: "Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the mind in such a reference makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing."

B. IV. Ch. IV. § 3: "It is evident, the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our *knowledge* therefore is *real*, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things."

These two passages are positive; they clearly reduce the question of truth or falsehood in respect to knowledge to that of the conformity or non-conformity of ideas with their objects.

But this necessity of the conformity of an idea with its

object in order to its truth, is it in Locke a real philosophical theory, or is it merely a mode of speaking, simply a metaphor, more or less happy? If it is a metaphor, I would ask what then is the theory couched under this metaphor, and in what place in Locke we are to find that theory once expressly declared? Nowhere do I find any thing but the metaphor itself. If in the entire absence of any other theory, the two passages which I have just cited do not suffice to prove that the necessity of the conformity of an idea with its object in order to constitute its truth, is not a metaphor, but an express theory, I could adduce here a multitude of other passages which leave no doubt in this respect. Thus when near the end of the Second Book, Locke treats of ideas as real or chimerical, as complete or incomplete, he rests upon his theory of the conformity or non-conformity of ideas with their objects.

B. II. Ch. XXX. § 1: "*Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.* First, *real* ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. *Fantastical* or *chimerical*, I call such as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity to that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as their archetypes."

Now what is an adequate or inadequate idea? An adequate idea should, according to Locke, be that which is completely conformed to its archetype; an inadequate idea, that which is conformed only in part.

Ibid. Ch. XXXI. § 1: "Those I call *adequate*, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from, which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. *Inadequate* ideas are such, which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred."

Thus the theory of complete or incomplete ideas rests upon the theory of real and chimerical ideas, which also

rests upon that of true or false ideas, and that consists altogether in the theory of the conformity of the idea to the object. This is a point of so much importance, that to take away all uncertainty, I wish to adduce a passage where Locke lays down the problem by itself, and the precise form in which he lays it down, excludes all ambiguity in the solution which he gives:

B. IV. Ch. IV. § 3: "But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? This, though it seems not to want difficulty, yet I think there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree with things."

§ 4: "Simple ideas carry with them all the conformity which is intended, or which our state requires; for they represent things to us under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us." And further on: "this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things, is sufficient for real knowledge."

It is impossible to explain himself more expressly. It is not, then, a mere way of speaking, a metaphor thrown off in passing; it is altogether a theory, a system. Let us examine it seriously.

See, then, by it, truth and error, reality and chimera, resolved into the representation or non-representation of the object by the idea, into conformity or non-conformity of the idea to its object. There is knowledge upon this condition, and upon this alone, that the idea represents its object, is conformed to it. But upon what condition does an idea represent its object, and be conformed to it? Upon this condition, that the idea resemble its object, that the idea have to its object the relation of a copy to its original. Weigh the force of the words: the conformity of an idea to its object can signify nothing else but the resemblance of that idea, taken as a copy, to its object, taken as the original. This is exactly what Locke expresses by

the word *archetypes*, which he uses to designate the objects of ideas. Now if the conformity of the idea to its object is nothing but the resemblance of the copy to its original, to its archetype, I say that in such a case, the idea is taken solely as an image. The idea must evidently be an image in order to resemble any thing, in order to represent any thing. See then the representative idea reduced to an image. Now look closely, and you will see that every image implies something material. Can an image of any thing immaterial be conceived? Every image is necessarily sensible and material, or it is nothing but a metaphor, a supposition which we have put aside. Thus in the last analysis, to say that there is knowledge where the idea is conformed to its object, and that no knowledge is possible but upon this condition, is to pretend that there is no knowledge but upon the condition that the idea of a thing is the image of that thing, that is to say, its material image. All knowledge, then, is involved in the following question: Have we in respect to beings ideas which represent them, which resemble them, which are the images, and the material images of them; or have we not such images? If we have, knowledge is possible; if not, it is impossible. Now in point of fact, human knowledge embraces both the external world, and the soul, and God. If, then, knowledge of these objects is possible and real, it is only upon the condition just laid down, namely, that we have of these beings, ideas which are conformed to them, which represent them, which resemble them, which are images of them, and once again, material images. Have we, then, or have we not idea-images, material images, of God, of the soul, and of the external world? This is the question. Let us first apply it to the external world. It is there, above all, that the theory of Locke would appear most admissible. Let us see what is the soundness and value of it even upon this ground.

The idea of the external world is the idea of body.

Bodies are known to us only by their qualities. These qualities are primary or secondary. By the secondary qualities of bodies is understood, you know, those which might not exist, and yet the body itself not cease to exist; for instance, the qualities of which we acquire the idea by the sense of smelling, of hearing, and of taste, by all the senses, in short, except unquestionably that of touch, and perhaps also that of sight. The primary qualities of bodies are those which are given to us as the fundamental attributes of bodies, without which bodies could not for us exist. The eminently primary quality is solidity, which implies more or less extension, which directly implies form. We have the conviction that every body is solid, extended, has form. We are moreover convinced that bodies have the property of causing in us those particular modifications which are called savor, sound, odor, perhaps also the modification called color. Locke agrees to all this: it is he who chiefly contributed to extend the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies, which it is not our object to go any deeper into. Let us see how he explains the acquisition of ideas of the primary and of the secondary qualities:

B. II. Ch. VIII. § 11: "*How primary qualities produce their ideas.*" The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in."

§ 12. "If, then, external objects be not united to our minds, when they produce ideas therein, and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies to the brain or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived

at a distance by the sight, it is evident that some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion, which produces these ideas which we have of them in us."

§ 13. "*How secondary qualities produce their ideas.*" "After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, namely, by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. For it being manifest that there are bodies, and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small, that we can not by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as is evident in the particles of the air and water, and others extremely smaller than those, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air and water as the particles of air and water are smaller than peas or hailstones: let us suppose at present that the different motions and figures, bulk and number of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations, which we have from the colors and smells of bodies; *e. g.*, that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue color and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds; it being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance."

§ 14. "What I have said concerning colors and smells, may be understood also of tastes, and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities . . . ."

If you follow up this whole theory to its principle, so imperfectly discerned and unfolded by Locke, you will find that it rests in the last analysis upon the supposition that,

as bodies act upon each other only by contact, and consequently by impulsion, so in like manner the mind can not be brought into connection with corporeal things but upon the same condition, that there should be contact between the mind and body, and of course impulse of the one upon the other. Now in sensible ideas, which are involuntary, and in which, according to Locke, the mind is passive, the impulse ought to come from the body upon the mind, and not from the mind upon the body; and the contact can not take place directly, but indirectly by means of particles. Thus the necessity of contact involves that of particles, which, emitted by bodies, obtain admittance by the organs into the brain, and there introduce into the mind what are called sensible ideas. The whole theory starts from the necessity of contact, and in its result it comes out to intermediate particles and their action. These particles are, in other terms, the sensible species of the Peripatetic Scholasticism, to which modern physics has done justice. There is at the present day no more talk about sonorous, visible, tangible species; nor can there of course be any more question about their emission; nor consequently about the principle by which they were engendered, namely, the necessity of contact and impulse as the condition of acquiring sensible ideas. All this at the present day is only an obsolete hypothesis, which it would be superfluous to stop to refute. Supposing sensible ideas, however, to be thus formed, once obtained under this condition, which is yet a chimera, let us see in what these ideas differ from each other.

According to Locke, the ideas which we have of the primary qualities of matter have this peculiarity, that they resemble their object; while the ideas we have of secondary qualities have this as their peculiarity, that they do not resemble their objects:

B. II. Ch. VIII. § 15: "The ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do

really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by those secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all."

The ideas of secondary qualities do not then resemble those qualities. Very well; I am, therefore, according to the theory of Locke, to conclude at once that the ideas of secondary qualities are mere chimeras, and that we have no knowledge of these qualities. Recollect that according to Locke all knowledge depends upon ideas, and that there is no knowledge except as far as the idea resembles its object. Now by the acknowledgment of Locke himself, the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble these qualities; therefore these ideas do not contain any knowledge. It can not be said that we have indeed a knowledge, though incomplete, of the secondary qualities of bodies. If Locke had intended to say only this, he should have said, according to his general theory, that the ideas of secondary qualities do represent, though incompletely, their objects. But he says they do not represent them at all. They do not therefore involve even the most imperfect knowledge; they contain no knowledge; they are pure chimeras, like the ideas of fairies, of centaurs, etc. This consequence is necessitated by the theory of Locke. But is it in accordance with the facts which it is our business to explain and not to destroy? Is it in fact true, that we have no knowledge of the secondary qualities of bodies? Far otherwise. The secondary qualities of bodies, smell, sound, taste and color, are for us decidedly real properties in bodies, to which we attribute the power of exciting in us certain modifications or sensations. We are not only conscious of these sensations, but we believe that they have causes, and that these causes are in the bodies. As we could however conceive of the bodies independently of these causes or powers, properties or qualities, we call these qualities *secondary*. We know them, I grant, only as causes of our sensations; but still we know them in this character, and it is a real knowl-

edge undeniably found in all mankind. But according to Locke, knowledge is always subject to this condition, that the idea upon which knowledge depends shall represent its object. You have undeniably the idea of the secondary qualities of bodies, so far forth as causes of many of your sensations. Very good! this idea, which you all have, and upon which is founded almost all your conduct, and human life at large—this idea can not be true, can not be the foundation of any legitimate knowledge, except upon condition that it shall be conformed to its object, to the causes of your sensations, to the secondary qualities of bodies. And when I say conformed to them, bear in mind that the condition of conformity is nothing less than that of resemblance, and that the condition of resemblance is nothing less than that of being an image, and that the condition of every image is nothing less than that of being a sensible and material image; for there is no immaterial image. The question, then, resolves itself to this: whether you have, or have not a material image of the secondary qualities of bodies, that is to say, of those properties of bodies which cause in you the sensations of color, sound, taste and smell. Let us see, then, what the material image of a cause can be. A cause, so far forth as cause (and the secondary properties or qualities of bodies are nothing else), has no form, no color; what material image then can be made of it? A cause, whatever it be, whether you place it in the mind, or in what we call matter, is always a cause, it is never any thing but a cause; and so far forth as it is a cause, it falls neither under the hand, nor the eye; it falls under none of our senses. It is therefore something of which in strictness you can have no sensible idea, no idea-image, no material image. Then, since you have not, and can not have the image of a cause, and since secondary qualities of bodies are given you only as causes, it follows that you can not have any true idea, any legitimate knowl edge of the secondary qualities of bodies; it follows even

in strictness that you can not have any knowledge of them, legitimate or illegitimate, and that these qualities ought to be to you as though they were not; since you could not have attained them except by images more or less faithful which you had formed of them, images which in this case are absolutely lacking to you.

The denial of the secondary qualities of bodies is then the inevitable result of the theory that every idea, to be true, must represent its object. This result is unavoidable; experience however gives the lie to it, and in so doing, refutes its principle. The ideas of the secondary qualities do not resemble their objects in any way, and nevertheless they contain a certain knowledge; it is not therefore true that all knowledge supposes the resemblance of the idea to its object.

The theory of Locke breaks to pieces upon the secondary qualities of bodies; let us see if it will be more fortunate in respect to primary qualities.

Solidity is by eminence the primary quality. Solidity with its degrees, hardness or softness, penetrability or impenetrability, envelops extension, which contains size and form; these are chiefly the primary qualities of bodies. Locke declares expressly that the ideas of primary qualities resemble those qualities; this is their title of legitimacy in his view. This theory, at first sight, might seem to be true in regard to one point, that which respects form. In fact, the form of objects which appertains to extension, which also appertains to solidity, paints itself upon the retina. Experience attests this, and the conformity of these images to their objects, seems indeed the foundation of the truth of the ideas which we have of the form of objects. But it is only a false semblance.

If the resemblance of the image on the retina to the form of the external object, is the foundation of our knowledge of the form of that object, it follows that this

knowledge could never have been acquired, but upon the following conditions:

1. That we should know there is some image upon the retina.

2. That, by some process, comparing the image upon the retina to the external object, we should find the image upon the retina, in fact, similar to the object, as to form.

Both these conditions are necessary; but are they fulfilled in the fact of our knowledge of the forms of external objects? By no means. In the first place, the knowledge of the image upon the retina is a subsequent acquisition of experience and of physiology. The first men who believed that they had before their eyes figured bodies knew nothing in the world about the images upon the retina. Still further were they from inquiring whether these images, of which they knew nothing, were conformed to the forms of the bodies which they knew; and consequently the condition imposed upon the human mind of knowing first the image upon the retina, and then of verifying the conformity of that image with its object, is not the process which the mind, left to itself and without any system, naturally employs in order to know the forms of bodies. Again, observe that that if the accurate painting of the form of the object upon the retina explains the secret of the perception of that form, it is necessary that this picture, this image, should pass from the retina to the optic nerve, and from the optic nerve to the brain, which Locke calls the audience chamber of the soul; and from this audience chamber it must gain admittance to the mind itself. But this process is arrested at every step. From the retina, the image must pass to the brain by the optic nerve. Now, who does not know that the optic nerve is situated in an obscure region impenetrable to the light? The optic nerve is dark, no image can be painted on it, and our image is already lost to us. Further, the brain, that audience chamber of the soul, is also in the dark; the soul

which, according to the theory of Locke, must observe the retina in order there to meet with the image of the form of a body, which must discern this image and its conformity to the original, can make this observation neither upon the optic nerve nor the brain.

We have, so to say, shut up all the avenues of the soul against the hypothesis of the idea-image; in the perception of the form of objects there are not the three things: figured objects; a mind capable of perceiving the figures of these objects; and an intermediate image between the real form of the objects and the mind. There are nothing but figured objects, and a mind endowed with the faculty of perceiving them with their forms. The existence of the image of the figure of objects upon the retina is a real fact, which is indeed the previous condition of the perception of visible appearances, but not the foundation of this perception; which precedes, but does not in any way constitute nor explain it. The existence of the figure of objects upon the retina, which is simply an external condition of the phenomena of vision, being transformed into a complete explanation of these phenomena, is the source of the hypothesis of the idea-image, so far as respects the perception of the forms of objects. It has also still another source. Not only is the mind endowed with the faculty of perceiving the forms of present objects, whenever certain organic conditions are fulfilled; but also when these objects are absent, it is endowed with the faculty of recalling them, not only of knowing what they were, but of representing them to itself as they were, and with the forms which they had been perceived to have while they were present. The memory actually has this imaginative power; we may imagine objects altogether as we perceived them; the fact is unquestionable. But in the imagination of the forms of absent objects, as in the perception of the forms of present objects, there are only two terms, the absent objects, and the mind which is able to represent them

though absent; or rather in this case, there is really nothing but the mind which, in the absence of the objects, recalls them with their forms, as if they were present before it. Now in the mind which represents past objects to itself, poetry can indeed detach the representation from the objects, and consider it apart as a proper element subsisting by itself. This is a right of poetry, but not of philosophical analysis, which can never lawfully convert abstractions into realities. Abstraction taken for reality, the participle or adjective converted into a substantive, is, then, the second source of the hypothesis of the idea-image; not to refer again to the vicious analogies, of the conditions of communication between bodies, applied to the mind.

But to go further. Our discussion has thus far respected only phenomena of vision, the form of external objects; but how will it be if we come to the other primary qualities of bodies; for instance, the primary quality *par excellence*, namely solidity? Would you dare revive the scholastic hypothesis of the *tangible species*, in order to provide a companion to the visual image upon the retina? Would you put this tangible species upon the mysterious paths of the nerves and brain which the image of forms could not traverse? Be it so. Suppose a tangible species; suppose this idea-image of solidity arrived at the mind, and there let us see if it satisfies the fundamental condition of the theory of Locke, if it is conformed, or not conformed to its model, to solidity itself. What is solidity? We have seen that it is resistance. Where there is no resistance, there is to us nothing but ourselves. Where resistance begins, there begins for us something besides ourselves, the outward, the external, nature, the world. Now if solidity is something which resists, it is a resisting cause; and we are here again, in respect to the primary quality of bodies, as before in respect to their secondary qualities, led back to the idea of cause. Here, then again, in order that we may have a legitimate knowledge of the resisting

cause, of solidity, it is necessary that we should have an idea of it, which is conformed to it, which is similar to it, an image, a material image of the resisting cause. Such according to Locke is the systematic condition of the primary quality of body. But I have shown that there can not be a material image of any cause, and of course not of a resisting cause, of solidity, the fundamental quality of body.

Thus we have no longer a legitimate idea of the primary qualities of bodies, any more than of their secondary qualities, if we are to have it only upon the condition of the idea being a material image of its object. But we are not yet done; we are yet only at the threshold of the external world. Not only has body primary and secondary qualities, which I have just shown to be incompatible with the theory of Locke; but moreover, we believe that under these qualities, there is something which is the subject of them, something which has not only a real, but a permanent existence, while these qualities are in perpetual motion and alteration; we all believe in the existence of a subject, of a substance for these qualities. Now in the theory of Locke, the idea of this substance is not legitimate, unless it be conformed to its object, that is, to the substance of bodies; and the idea, to be conformed to its object, to resemble it, must be an image, and every image must be material. But I ask if it is possible to have a material image of substance? It is obviously impossible. Then you have no idea of substance and of the reality of bodies.

Not only are you convinced of the real and substantial existence of bodies, but you all believe that these bodies, of which the fundamental attribute is solidity, resistance, are somewhere, in place, in space. You all have the idea of space. But you can not have it except on the condition, that the idea you have of it represents it, is its material image. But it is, we have seen, one of the characteristics

of space, that it can not be confounded with bodies which fill and measure it, but do not constitute it. It is, then, *à fortiori*, impossible that you should have a material image of that which has no material existence, when you can not have one of the bodies, and of their fundamental or accessory attributes.

It is the same in regard to time. You believe that the motions of bodies, and the succession of these different motions, take place in time, and you do not confound the succession of the motions of bodies with time itself, which is indeed measured but not constituted by this succession, any more than the aggregate of bodies constitute space. You have the idea of time as distinct from all succession. If you have it, by the theory of Locke, it is under the condition of having an idea conformed to it, an idea-image. But you can not have an idea-image of time, since time is distinct from the motion of bodies and does not fall under any of the senses;—you can not therefore have a legitimate idea of time.

I might pursue this criticism still further, but I believe I have gone sufficiently far to demonstrate that, if relatively to the external world our ideas are not true except upon condition that they are representative ideas conformed to their objects, material images of their objects, we should have no legitimate idea of the external world, neither of the secondary nor primary qualities of matter, nor of their subject, nor of space, nor of time. The theory of a material image results therefore in nothing less than the destruction of all legitimate knowledge of matter and of the external word.

The objections which I have just presented are so natural and so simple, that Locke could not even lay down the problem as he has done, without partially suspecting them, and they sufficiently pressed upon him to shake his conviction of the existence of the external world. He does not precisely call it in question, but he acknowledges that upon

the sole foundation of the representative idea, the knowledge of bodies has not perfect certainty; he thinks however that it goes beyond simple probability. "But yet, if after all," says Locke, "any one will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing, I must desire him to consider that we have such an assurance of the existence of things without us as is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good, and avoiding the evil, which is caused by them; which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them." B. IV. Ch. 10, § 8. This is almost the language of skepticism.

Locke, however, is not skeptical in regard to the existence of bodies; in spite of his theory of ideas, he is very far from being idealistic. On the contrary, he belongs to the great family of peripatetics and sensualists, in which the theory of *sensible species* had the authority of a dogma, and the office of giving and explaining the external world. Out of sensible species, the seventeenth century in general and Locke in particular have made sensible ideas, provided with all the qualities of those species, representatives of their objects, and emanating from them. There is then no idealistic design in the theory of Locke. On the contrary, Locke is persuaded that these ideas, so far forth as they are representative, are the only solid foundation on which the knowledge of external objects can be had; only he half acknowledges, that contrary to his wish, the peripatetic hypothesis of species transformed into the modern theory of sensible ideas, turns out aginst his design; and that although this hypothesis has evidently a material character, since his ideas are necessarily material images, yet it is incapable of legitimately giving us matter. Judge, then, how it must be in regard to the spiritual world, the soul, and God. I shall be brief.

Recollect the general principle of Locke. We have no legitimate knowledge of any thing, but upon condition that the ideas we have of it be conformed to their object.

Now all the world believe in the existence of the soul, that is to say, in the existence of something in us which feels, which wills, which thinks. Even those who do not believe in the spiritual existence of this subject, have never called in question the existence of its faculties, the existence of the sensibility, for example, or that of will, or of thought. Reflect, then: you have no legitimate knowledge of thought, of volition, of sensibility, but upon the condition that the ideas you have of them are representative, and these ideas must be images, and of course material images. See then into what an abyss of absurdities we are thrown. In order to know thought and volition, which are immaterial, it is necessary that we should have a material image which resembles them. But what is a material image of thought, and of volition? It is an absurdity even in regard to the sensibility. But the absurdity is, if possible, still greater, in regard to the substance of these faculties, in regard to the soul, and then in regard to the unity and identity of this soul, and then in regard to the time in which the operations of these mental faculties take place, sensations, volitions, and thoughts.

See, then, the spiritual world fallen away as well as the material. Simply from the condition that we have no legitimate ideas of our faculties and of their subject, unless these ideas be material images of them, it evidently results that we have no legitimate knowledge of our soul, and of its faculties, of our whole internal being, intellectual and moral. Here the difficulty seems even much greater than in regard to the material world, or at least the successor of Bacon and of Hobbes is more startled by it. In respect to the material world, he had acknowledged that his theory was liable to some objections, but these objections did not seem to him insurmountable, nor to go far enough to deprive us of a certain knowledge of the material world, sufficient for our wants. Hereby he pretended to open the door only to a semi-skepticism. It was without doubt a

weakness; for the idea of Locke, a material image, not in any manner representing bodies, neither complete nor incomplete, he ought not to have admitted any idea of bodies; he ought to have gone on to absolute skepticism. Locke, however, stops short, both from good sense and from the evidence which, in his school, surrounds the senses and the objects of the physical world. But when he comes to the spiritual world, to which the Sensual School is much less attached, the arguments which naturally rise up against him from this theory, strike him more forcibly, and he declares (B. IV. Ch. XI. § 12), that "we can no more know, that there are finite spirits really existing, by the idea we have of such beings in our minds, than by the ideas any one has of fairies, or centaurs, he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist." Here it would seem is absolute skepticism; you may think, perhaps, that the final conclusion of Locke will be, that there is no knowledge of finite spirits, nor consequently of our soul, nor of any of its faculties; for the objection is as valid against the phenomena of the soul as against its substance. This is, indeed, the result to which he should have gone on; but he did not dare to do it, for there is no philosopher at once wiser and more inconsistent than Locke. What then does he do?

In the peril into which his philosophy has driven him, he abandons his philosophy, and all philosophy; and appeals to Christianity, to revelation, to faith. By faith, however, and by revelation, he does not understand a philosophical faith and revelation. He understands faith and revelation in the proper theological sense. His conclusion is this: "Therefore, concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as several other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence of faith." Locke himself, then, meets and accepts the inevitable consequences of his theory, to which I wished to conduct him. Speaking as a philosopher, and not as a theologian, I said that if we had no

other reason to believe in the existence of spirit than the hypothesis of the representative idea, we had no good reason to believe at all. Locke admits it; he proclaims it himself: and he throws himself into the arms of faith. I shall not allow him to rest there. The world of faith is as much shut up against him, as the world of mind and of matter. He could never have penetrated into it, but by the grossest paralogism. Locke has no more right, nay, he has even less right, to believe in faith, in revelation, in Christianity, than in finite spirits such as we are, and in matter which is before us.

Revelation supposes two things: 1, doctrines emanating from God; 2, a book in which these doctrines are deposited and preserved. This book, though its contents may be divine and sacred, is itself necessarily material, it is a body; and here I refer Locke to the objections already brought forward against the legitimate knowledge of bodies, if we have no other ground for believing in them than the idea-image which represents them. Thus there is no legitimate knowledge of the book, in which are contained the sacred doctrines revealed by God. But the book gone, what becomes of the doctrines it contained? Besides, these doctrines come from God.

And what is God? A spirit, an infinite spirit, as we judge. Now, Locke was not able, a little back, by his theory, to admit the legitimate existence of finite spirits; and incredible to tell, in order to make me admit the existence of finite spirits, he proposes that I should begin by admitting the existence of an infinite spirit. But is this not to exaplain *obscurum per obscurius*, [to solve the lesser difficulty by presenting a greater]? See the human mind a little while ago deprived of the knowledge of finite spirits, because, it can have no idea conformed to them; and now because of its greater facility, having an idea of the infinite spirit, an idea perfectly representing its object! But if a finite spirit can not be represented by an idea,

much less can the infinite spirit be so represented; evidently it can not be, under the condition of Locke, that is, under the condition of the mind forming an image, and a material image of it. There is then, no infinite spirit, no God, therefore, no revelation possible. Every where at every step, in the theory of Locke, we are plunged from depth to depth in the abyss of paralogism.

If it is true that we have no legitimate knowledge, no true idea, but under the condition that this idea represents its object, that it is conformed to it, that it is an image of it, and (as I have proved to be in strictness the necessary result of the hypothesis) a *material* image of it—it follows, that we have no legitimate idea of the external world, nor of the world of spirits, of souls, of ourselves, and still less of God, to whom Locke appeals. Consequently it follows, in the last analysis, that we have no true idea of beings, and that we have no other legitimate knowledge than that of our own ideas; none of their object, whatever it be, even of our own personal being itself. Such a consequence overwhelms the theory of ideas, and it is a consequence which invincibly follows from this theory.*

* [*Theory of Perception.*—On the subject of this chapter the reader is referred to a very able article on the "Philosophy of Perception," in the Edinburgh Review, No. 103, for Oct. 1830, in which the doctrines of Reid and Brown are examined. We regard this article as one of the best specimens of philosophical criticism that has recently appeared in the English language. It shows great power of thinking—great comprehension and great acuteness, united with an extent, a depth and accuracy of erudition, seldom met together. The writer shows that our knowledge of the external world—the qualities of matter—is direct and immediate. "*Consciousness, declares our knowledge of material qualities to be intuitive.* Nor is the fact, *as given*, denied even by those who disallow its truth." "According" says he, "as the *truth* of the fact of consciousness in perception is *entirely* accepted, accepted *in part*, or *wholly* rejected, *six* possible and actual systems of philosophy result:

"1. If the veracity of consciousness be unconditionally admitted—if the intuitive knowledge of mind and matter, and the consequent reality

of their antithesis be taken as truths, to be explained if possible, but in themselves are held as paramount to all doubt, the doctrine is established which we would call the scheme of *Natural Realism* or *Natural Dualism*.—2. If the veracity of consciousness be allowed to the equipoise of the object and subject in the act, but rejected as to the reality of their antithesis, the system of *Absolute Identity* emerges, which reduces both mind and matter to phenomenal modifications of the same common substance.—3 and 4. If the testimony of consciousness be refused to the co-originality and reciprocal independence of the subject and object, two schemes are determined, according as the one or the other of the terms is placed as the original and genetic. Is the object educed from the subject, *Idealism*, is the subject educed from the object, *Materialism* is the result.—5. Again, is the consciousness itself recognized only as a phenomenon, and the substantial reality of both subject and object denied, the issue is *Nihilism*.

"6. These systems are all conclusions from an original interpretation of consciousness in perception, carried intrepidly forth to its legitimate issue. But there is one scheme which, violating the integrity of this fact, and, with the idealist, regarding the object of consciousness in perception as only a modification of the percipient subject, endeavors, however, to stop short of the negation of an external world, the reality of which, and the knowledge of whose reality, it seeks to establish and explain by various hypotheses. This scheme, which we would term *Hypothetical Realism* or *Hypothetical Dualism*, although the most inconsequent of all systems, has been embraced, under various forms, by the immense majority of philosophers." All the possible forms of Hypothetical Realism, or the representative theory, are reducible, in the opinion of the writer, to three, and these have all been actually maintained:

1. *The representative object not a modification of mind.*

2. *The representative object a modification of mind, dependent for its knowledge, but not for its existence, on the act of consciousness.*

3. *The representative object a modification of mind, non-existent out of consciousness; the idea and its perception only different relations of an act (state) really identical.*

Of the six possible systems above given, it is then shown that Reid held the first, that of *natural* realism; while Dr. Brown held the last, that of *hypothetical* realism; and of its three forms, adopted the *third*. The writer fully makes out his case, "that Brown's interpretation of the fundamental tenet of Reid's philosophy, is not a simple misconception, but an absolute reversal of its real and even unambiguous import, and is without a parallel in the whole history of philosophy."

The writer goes on to demonstrate Brown's inadequate conception of

the problem in question, his ignorance of the history of opinions on the subject, and his remarkable misconception of the very writers whom he criticises. In regard to the latter point, among other philosophers Locke is mentioned; and it is principally for the sake of adducing the passage in regard to Locke's theory of perception, that I have introduced this note.

"Supposing always that ideas were held to be something distinct from their cognition, Reid states it as that philosopher's opinion, [Locke's,] that images of external objects were conveyed to the brain; but whether he thought with Descartes" [*lego omnino* Dr. Clarke,] "and Newton, that the images in the brain are perceived by the mind there present, or that they are imprinted on the mind itself, is not so evident." This, Dr. Brown, nor is he original in the assertion, pronounces a flagrant misrepresentation. Not only does he maintain that Locke never conceived the idea to be substantially different from the mind, as a material image in the brain, but that he never supposed it to have an existence apart from the mental energy of which it is the object. Locke, he asserts, like Arnauld, considered the idea perceived, and that the percipient act, to constitute the same indivisible modification of the conscious mind. We shall see.

"In his *language*, Locke is, of all philosophers, the most figurative, ambiguous, vacillating, various, and even contradictory, as has been noticed by Reid, and Stewart, and Brown himself; indeed, we believe by every author who has had occasion to comment on this philosopher. The opinions of such a writer are not therefore to be assumed from isolated and casual expressions which themselves require to be interpreted on the general analogy of his system; and yet this is the only ground on which Dr. Brown attempts to establish his conclusions. Thus, on the matter under discussion, though *really* distinguishing, Locke *verbally* confounds the objects of sense and of intellect—the operation and its object—the object immediate and mediate—the object and its relations—the images of fancy and the notions of understanding. Consciousness is converted with perception—perception with idea—idea with the object of perception, and with notion, conception, phantasm, representation, sense, meaning, etc. Now, his language, identifying ideas and perceptions, appears conformable to a disciple of Arnauld; and now, it proclaims him a follower of Digby—explaining ideas by mechanical impulse, and the propagation of material particles from the external reality to the brain. In one passage, the idea would seem an organic affection—the mere occasion of a spiritual representation; in another, a representative image in the brain itself. In employing thus indifferently the language of every hypothesis, may we not suspect that

he was anxious to be made responsible for none? One, however, he has formally rejected, and that is the very opinion attributed to him by Dr. Brown—that the idea or object of consciousness in perception, is only a modification of the mind itself."

A passage is then quoted from Locke's *Examination of Mallebranche's Opinion*, published subsequently to his Essay, expressly establishing this assertion. It is too long to give here. The reviewer concludes: "If it be thus evident that Locke held neither the *third* form of representation—that lent to him by Brown—nor even the *second*; it follows that Reid did him any thing but injustice in supposing him to maintain that ideas are objects *either* in the *brain*, *or* in the *mind* itself. Even the *more material* of these alternatives has been the one generally attributed to him by his critics, and the one adopted from him by his disciples. Nor is this to be deemed an opinion too monstrous to be entertained by so enlightened a philosopher. It was, as we shall see, the common opinion of the age—the opinion, in particular, held by the most illustrious of his countrymen and cotemporaries—by Newton, Clarke, Willis, Hook, etc."

The foregoing note stands as inserted in the first edition of this work. It is proper to mention (what was omitted in the first edition because not then known, and has been inadvertently omitted in the subsequent editions), that the writer of the article in the *Edinburgh Review* is Sir William Hamilton, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, whose reputation for metaphysical ability and profound philosophical learning is now too well and widely known to need any remark. —This article, together with various other pieces, has been published in a volume entitled: "*Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform.* By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. London and Edinburgh, 1852."

He has also published: "*The works of Thomas Reid, D.D., now fully collected with selections from his unpublished letters. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations.* By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Third edition. London and Edinburgh, 1852."

A volume has been put out in this country by Mr. O. W. Wight. Third edition. New York, 1855, under the title: "*Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, etc.*"

The article of the *Edinburgh Review* from which the foregoing citations are made, may be found in the *Discussions*, pp. 38–98; and in Mr. Wight's volume, p. 165. Part II. *Philosophy of Perception*, Chap. I. "*Elucidation of Reid's Doctrine of Perception, and its Defense against Sir Thomas*

Brown." Mr. Wight by the way gives Dr. Brown a title to which I am not aware that he had any claim—inadvertently no doubt; for it is not to be imagined that he could confound the successor and critic of Reid with old Sir Thomas Browne, author of the *Religio Medici*, who died near thirty years before Reid was born.—TR.]

CHAPTER VII.

THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE IDEAS CONTINUED.

Resumption and continuation of the preceding chapter.—Of the idea, not now considered in relation to the object which it should represent, but in relation to the mind which perceives it, and in which it is found.—The idea-image, idea taken materially, implies a material subject; from hence materialism.—Taken spiritually, it can give neither bodies nor spirit.—That the representative idea, laid down as the sole primitive *datum* of the mind, in the inquiry after reality, condemns us to a paralogism; since no representative idea can be decided to represent correctly or incorrectly, except by comparing it with its original, with the reality itself, to which, however, by the hypothesis, we can not arrive but by the idea.—That knowledge is direct, and without an intermediate.—Of judgments, of propositions and ideas.—Return to the question of innate ideas.

I NOW resume and complete the last lecture. According to Locke, knowledge consists entirely in the relation of the idea to its object; and this knowledge is true or false, according as the relation of the idea to the object is a relation of conformity or of non-conformity. An idea, to be true, to be the foundation of real knowledge, must be similar to its object, must represent it, must be an image of it. Now what is the condition of an idea-image? There is no image without figure, without something of extension, without something sensible and material. The idea-image then implies something material; and if the truth of knowledge resolves itself into the conformity of the idea to its object, it resolves itself into the conformity of an image, taken materially, to its object, of whatever sort the object be.

Observe that the representative idea, as the basis of knowledge, is in Locke a universal theory, without limit, without exception. It should then explain all knowledge; it should go as far as human knowledge can go; it should embrace God, spirits, and bodies, for all this falls more or less under knowledge. If then we can know nothing, neither God, nor spirits, nor bodies, except by the ideas which represent them, and which represent them by being material images of them, the question is: whether we have ideas of these objects, these beings, which are faithful images of them, taken materially.

The problem thus reduced to its most simple expression, has been easily solved. I think it has been clearly demonstrated that the external world itself, which the idea-image would seem most easily to give us, entirely escapes us, if it can be got at only by the idea-image; for there is no sensible idea which can be an image of the world, of external objects, of bodies.

In regard to bodies, we have considered first their secondary qualities so called, which you know are properties in their nature out of our reach, and appreciable only by their effects, that is to say, are pure causes, the causes of our sensations. Now it is evident there is, and can be no material image of a cause. In respect to the primary qualities of bodies, there is one among them, namely-figure, which would seem proper to be represented by the idea-image; and in fact it is certain that the visible appearance, the figure of external bodies placed before the organ of vision, is painted upon the retina. But, 1, the person who first knew the visible figure of a body was entirely ignorant that this visible figure was painted upon his retina; it is not, then, to the knowledge of this picture upon the retina and of the conformity of this picture to its object, that the knowledge of the reality of the external figure is owing: then 2, this picture stops at the retina; in order to go to the brain, which, as Locke says, is the

audience-chamber of the mind, it is necessary that it should traverse the optic nerve, which is in an obscure region; and even if the optic nerve were in a luminous position, the image, after having traversed it, and arrived at the brain which is undeniably obscure, would perish in the darkness of that organ, before arriving at the mind. Thus it is indeed the condition of the phenomena of vision that there should be an image of the object upon the retina, but only its external condition, unknown to the soul itself, and not its foundation and explanation. Besides, if the idea-image plays a certain part in the phenomena of vision, it does not apply at all to other phenomena, to those of touch, for example, from which we derive the knowledge of the primary quality of body, namely of solidity, resistance. We have demonstrated that there can be no idea-image of resistance, of solidity; for the idea of solidity resolves itself into the idea of a cause, a resisting cause, and it has been demonstrated that there can be no idea-image of cause.

So much for the qualities of bodies, the primary as well as the secondary. If the idea-image represents no quality of bodies, still less can it represent the subject of these qualities, that *substratum* which escapes the grasp of the senses, and which of course can fall under no image borrowed from the senses. Space also, which must not be confounded with bodies inclosed by it, can not be given by an idea-image. It is the same in respect to time; it is the same in respect to all the cognitions involved in the general knowledge of the external world. Since, then, the idea-image can represent only forms, and plays no part except in the phenomena of vision, and even there is only the condition of those phenomena, it follows that if the external world has no other way of arriving at the intelligence than that of the representative idea, it does not and can not arrive there at all.

The difficulties of the hypothesis of a representative

idea are greatly increased when we come to consider the spiritual world. Locke acknowledges these difficulties. He allows that, since in fact the idea-image can not represent the qualities of spirits, because there is no image of that which has no figure, either we must renounce the knowledge of spirit, or to obtain it we must have recourse to faith, to revelation. But revelation is for us a book which contains doctrines revealed by God. Here there are, then, two things, a book, and God. As to the book, we refer it to the external world: no representative idea being able to give certain knowledge of a sensible object, consequently giving none of a book, this book, sacred or not, can never be certainly known, nor be the foundation of certain knowledge of spiritual existence. God remains; but to have recourse to God in order to legitimate the knowledge of spirit, is to have recourse to spirit, in order to legitimate the knowledge of spirit; it is to take for granted the thing in question. The only difference there is between the spirit of God, and our own, is that the spirit of God is infinite, while our spirit is finite, which, far from diminishing the difficulty, increases it. Thus the representative idea, turned every way, can give no real knowledge, neither of bodies, nor of spirits, and still less the knowledge of the infinite spirit to whom Locke gratuitously appeals.

Absolute skepticism, then, is the inevitable consequence of the theory of the representative idea; and absolute skepticism is here nothing less than absolute nihilism. In fact you have legitimately by this theory, neither the secondary qualities of bodies, nor their primary qualities, nor the subject of these qualities, nor space in which the bodies are located, nor time in which their motions are accomplished. Still less have you legitimately the qualities of your mind, or your mind itself, or that of your fellow-beings —the finite mind; and still less God—the infinite mind. You have then nothing, absolutely nothing, but the idea

itself, that idea which ought to represent every thing, and which represents nothing, and suffers no real knowledge to come to you.

You see then where we are; but our difficulties are far from being exhausted. We have hitherto considered the idea-image in its relation to external objects which it should represent, namely, to bodies, to our spirits, and to God. Let us now consider it in another view, in its relation to the mind which must perceive it, and in which it must be found.

The idea represents neither body, nor spirit, nor God; it can then give no object. This we have demonstrated. But it necessarily is in a subject. How is it there? What is the relation of the idea, not now to its object, but to its subject?

Recollect the condition to which we have condemned the representative idea. If it represents, it must have in itself something of figure, something material; it is, then, something material. Look, then, at the representative idea which is something material in the subject where it is found. But it is clear that the subject of the idea, the subject which perceives and contains and possesses the idea, can be of no other nature than the idea itself. The representative idea is something figured, like the shadows which paint themselves in a magic lantern; it can then exist only in something of an analogous kind, in a subject of the same nature, figured as the idea is, having parts, being extended and material, as that is. Hence, the destruction of the simplicity and spirituality of the subject of the idea, that is to say, of the soul; or in a word, materialism is the inevitable consequence of the theory of the representative idea, considered in relation to its subject.

This result was already in the principle; this consequence does nothing but expose the vice of the origin of the representative idea. In fact, the origin of theory, as you

know, is in the hypothesis that the mind does not know bodies, does not communicate with bodies, except in the same way that bodies communicate with one another. Now bodies communicate either by immediate impulse one upon the other, or indirectly by the intermediation of one or more bodies receiving and communicating the impulse, so that it is always impulse, mediate or immediate, which forms the communication between bodies. If mind, then, may know bodies, it can know them only in the way in which bodies communicate with each other, by impulse. But we see no immediate and direct impulse of bodies upon the mind, nor of the mind upon bodies; the impulse must then be from a distance, that is, by something intermediate. This intermediate is the idea. The idea emanates from the body, and through the senses arrives at the mind. The idea emanates from bodies—that is its first characteristic; the second is, that it represents them. Representation is here founded upon the emission. Now emission, which is the first root of the representative idea, necessarily makes it material. This shows already a strong inclination toward materialism; look now at something which makes this tendency much stronger. Not only does the mind gain no knowledge of bodies, except as bodies communicate with one another; but the mind knows minds only as it knows bodies, by the intermediation of the representative idea. A theory material in its origin, is first applied to the knowledge of bodies, then transferred to the knowledge of spirit. It is then altogether natural that the last expression of this theory should be materialism. And I do not impose upon this theory consequences logically necessary, but which have not been deduced from it. It is a matter of fact that upon this theory of the representative idea, the school of Locke in part grounds its positive denial of the spirituality of the soul. According to that school many ideas in the mind, taken materially, suppose something extended in the mind; and even a single idea being an image, is already

something figured, which supposes a corresponding subject. The common expression that ideas make an impression on the mind is not in this school, a metaphor; it is the actual reality. I refer you to Hartley, to Darwin, to Priestley, and to their English and other successors. We shall take them up in due time and order.

But does any one wish to save the spirituality of the soul, and still preserve the theory of the representative idea? Then on the one side, there are material ideas, material images, and on the other, a simple soul, and consequently between the modification and its subject an abyss. How to bridge over this abyss? What relation is there between the material image and the subject of this image, if this subject is held to be simple, unextended, spiritual? It is clearly necessary to find some intermediates between the idea-images and their subject, the soul. The images were before regarded as the media between bodies and the soul; but now media are necessary between those first media or the idea-images and the soul. New media must be found, that is to say, new ideas. But these new ideas, in order to serve as media between the first ideas and the soul, must represent those ideas; and in order to represent images they must themselves be images, and if images, then material. The difficulty therefore perpetually returns; either the idea-images do not enter the soul, or they make the soul material. The attempt is in vain made to subtilize these ideas, to refine the intermediate; either these refinements still leave it material, and of course the materiality of the image involves the materiality of its subject; or the idea-image, as material, must be absolutely given up, and retaining the theory of the representative idea, the idea must be considered as spiritual.

This has been done. The idea, as a material image, has been abandoned for a spiritual idea. But what is the result of this modification of the theory under examination? I grant that if the idea is spiritual, it permits a spiritual sub-

ject; it gives room for believing in the simplicity and spirituality of the soul. But then the hypothesis of emission is evidently destroyed, and along with it, the theory of representation. Indeed, I ask what is this spiritual idea as the image of a material object? The mind has none of these fundamental properties which constitute what we call matter; it has then neither solidity nor extension nor figure. But how can that which is neither solid, nor extended, nor figured, represent that which is solid, extended, figured? What can the spiritual idea of a solid be? What the spiritual idea of extension, of form? It is evident that the spiritual idea can not represent body. And can it any better represent spirit; still less; for once again, there is no representation where there is no resemblance, and there is no resemblance except between figures or forms. That which is figured can resemble that which is figured; but where there is no figure, there is no possible matter for resemblance, nor consequently for representation. Spirit can not represent spirit. A spiritual idea can not in any way represent any spiritual quality nor any spiritual subject; and the spiritual idea which destroys the possible knowledge of body, destroys no less, nay even more decidedly destroys the possible knowledge of spirit, of finite spirits such as we are, and of the infinite spirit, God. Thus from the bosom of Sensualism there proceeds a kind of idealism, which along with matter does away also with mind and with God himself. And I beg you not to think, that it is merely reasoning which derives these new consequences from the theory of ideas. As Hartley and Priestley prove that I have not gratuitously derived materialism from the the theory of ideas, taken as material images; so the history of another branch of the school of Locke proves that it is not I who condemn the theory of the spiritual idea to the necessity of destroying both body and spirit. That it destroys body, seek in Berkeley,* who armed himself with

* First Series, Vol. I. Lect. VIII. p. 43, and Vol. IV. Lect. XX. p. 359.

this theory, in order to deny all material existence. That it destroys spirit, seek in Hume,* who taking from the hands of Berkeley the arms he had used for the destruction of the material world, and turning them against the spiritual world, has destroyed both the finite spirit which we are, and the infinite spirit, both the human soul and God.

We must go the extent of these principles. The representative idea considered relatively to its subject and as a material image, conducts directly to materialism; taken spiritually, it leads to the destruction of body and of spirit, to absolute skepticism and absolute nihilism.—Now it is an unquestionable fact that we have the knowledge of bodies, that we have the knowledge of our mind. We have this twofold knowledge; and yet we could not have obtained it by the theory of the representative idea. This theory therefore does not exhibit the true process of the human mind. According to Locke, the representative idea is the only way of legitimate knowledge; then this way failing us, we are in the absolute impossibility of ever arriving at knowledge. We do arrive at it, however; consequently we arrive at it in some other way than by the representative idea, and consequently, again, the theory of the representative idea is a chimera.

I now go further. I take entirely different ground. I will admit that the idea has a representative office; I will admit the reality of this representation; I will believe with Locke and all his partisans, that we know only through representative ideas, and that in fact ideas have the wonderful property of representing their objects. Let all this be so. But on what condition do ideas represent things? On the condition, you know, of being conformed to them. I take for granted that if we did not know that the idea was conformed to its object, we should not know that it

* First Series, Vol I Lect. X, and Vol IV Lect XX, 360-369. [See in the Appendix the passages referred to in this and the preceding note. —Tr]

represented it; we should have no true knowledge of this object. And again, upon what condition can we know that an idea is conformed to its object, is a faithful copy of the original which it represents? Nothing more simple. The condition is that we should know the original. It is necessary that we should have before our eyes both the original and the copy, in order to compare the copy with the original, and to pronounce that the copy is in fact a faithful copy of the original. But suppose we have not the original, what could we say of the copy? Could you say, in the absence of the original, that the copy which alone is before your eyes, is a faithful copy of the original which you do not see, which you have never seen? Certainly not. You could not be sure that the copy is a faithful copy, nor an unfaithful copy; you could not even affirm that it is a copy. If we know things only through ideas, and if we know them only on the condition that the ideas faithfully represent them, we can know that the ideas do faithfully represent them only by seeing on the one hand the things themselves, and on the other the ideas of them. Then only could we pronounce that the ideas are conformed to their objects. Thus, to know if you have a true idea of God, of the soul, of bodies, you must have, on the one hand, God, the soul, and bodies, and on the other, the idea of God, the idea of the soul, and the idea of bodies, in order that by comparing the idea with its object, you may be able to decide whether it is or is not conformed to its object. Let us choose an example.

I wish to know, if the idea which I have of body is true. It is necessary that I should have both the idea which I form of body, and the body itself; then that I should compare them, confront them, and decide.

I take then from the hands of Locke the idea of body, just as Locke has himself furnished me with it. To know if it is true, I must compare it, I must confront it with body itself. This supposes that I know body; for if I do

not know it, with what shall I compare the idea of body in order to know if it is true or false? We must then suppose that I know body. But how could I come to know it? By the theory of Locke, you know and you can know nothing but by ideas which represent things to you. Now I know this body; then by the theory of Locke, I know it only by the ideas which represent it to me; therefore I do not know this body itself, the body which it is necessary for me to know in order to compare it with the idea that I have of it; I know only its idea, and it is its idea alone that I can compare with its idea, that is to say, I shall compare an idea with an idea, a copy with a copy. Here is still no original. The comparison, then, the verification, is impossible. That the verification may conduct me to a result, it is necessary that this second idea which I have of body, in the knowledge which I am supposed to have of body, should be a true idea, should be conformed to its object. But I can not know that this second idea is true, except on the condition that I compare it; and with what? With the body, with the original. It is therefore necessary that I should know the body in some other way, in order to decide whether this second idea is conformed to it. Let us see then. I know the body; but how do I know it. By the theory of Locke I never know it except by the idea I can have of it; there is here, again, nothing but an idea with which I can compare the second idea I had of body. I can not pass beyond the idea; go on in this way, as long as you please, you go round in a circle of ideas from which you can not break forth, and which never allow you to get at the real object, nor lay the foundation of a legitimate comparison; since a comparison supposes that you have on the one hand the copy, and on the other the original; while in fact you have nothing but an idea, and then a second idea, and thus on, and of course can compare nothing but the ideas, the copies. And again, even to decide that they are copies,

it is necessary that you should have had the original itself, which yet escapes, and forever will escape your grasp, in every theory of knowledge which subjects the mind to the necessity of knowing only through the intermediation of representative ideas.

Thus in the last analysis, the object, the original, forever escapes the *immediate* grasp of the human mind, can never be brought under its regard, nor consequently be the basis of a comparison with the copy, the idea. You can never know therefore that the idea which you have of body is conformed or not conformed, faithful or unfaithful, true or false. You will have it without knowing even whether it has any object or not.

It is impossible to remain in this predicament; and to assist Locke, I will now make a supposition. I will now suppose, that in fact we have before our eyes not only the idea of the original, but the original itself. I will suppose, that we know the original *directly;* the comparison is then possible. Let us go on to make it. Previously, however, I will remark, that the supposition I have made—of an original directly known, which is the necessary basis of all comparison, but which comparison is the necessary basis of the theory of Locke—this supposition just destroys entirely the theory. For if we suppose that we have an original which we know directly, we suppose that we can know in some other way than by representative ideas.

But I will proceed with the supposition; and I ask whether this original, which we know *directly*, and without the medium of representative ideas, is a chimera? No; if it were, to compare an idea with a chimerical object would lead you to nothing. You suppose, then, that it is indeed the original, the true original, the object, the body; and you suppose that the knowledge you have of it is certain knowledge, knowledge which leaves nothing to be desired. See then what is your position. You have, on the one hand, the certain knowledge of body, on the other you

have an idea of this body, and you wish to know whether it is faithful or not. On these terms, the comparison is very easy; it is made of itself; having the copy and the original, you can easily tell if the one represents the other. But this comparison, necessary by the theory, and now [by supposition] possible and easy, is also perfectly useless. What indeed was the object of this comparison? It was to obtain a certain knowledge of body. That is what you were seeking after. In order to get at it, you place the original beside the copy. But if you take for granted that you have the original, that is to say, certain knowledge of the body, the whole thing is done; there is nothing more to do. Let alone your comparison, your verification. Do not give yourself the trouble to investigate whether the idea is conformed or not to the original. You possess the original; that is enough; you possess the very knowledge you were seeking to gain. Thus without having the certain knowledge of the original, you could never know whether the idea you have is faithful or not, and all comparison would be impossible; and as soon as you have the original, it is undoubtedly very easy to compare the idea with the reality; but since you have the reality, it is altogether useless to compare the idea with it; you have what you were in search of, and the very condition of the theory, the comparison namely which it requires, is precisely the taking for granted the knowledge which you are seeking from the theory: that is a paralogism, [here a begging the question.]

Such is the criticism, a little subtle, but exact, which pursuing in all its turnings the theory of the representative idea, destroys and confounds it on every hand. Either the representative idea does not represent, and can not represent, and in this case, if we have no other means of knowing things, we are condemned never to know them; we are condemned to skepticism, more or less extensive, according as we are more or less consistent, and if we will be perfectly consistent, to absolute skepticism both in

respect to matter and mind, that is to say, to absolute nihilism. Or else the idea does represent its object; and in this case we can know that it faithfully represents its object only so far as we have the original, that is, so far only as we know matter and mind, things themselves, in some other way; and then the intervention of the representative idea is possible, but it is useless. Its truth, the conformity of the idea to its object, can be demonstrated only by a supposition, which overthrows the very theory it was designed to sustain.

Let us now deduce from this criticism the consequences it gives.

First consequence: we know matter and mind, the world, the soul, and God, otherwise than by representative ideas. Second and more general consequence: in order to know beings we have no need of an intermediate. We know things directly and without the medium of ideas, or of any other medium. The mind is subject to certain conditions, but when these conditions are once supplied, it enters into exercise, and knows, for the sole reason that it is endowed with the ability of knowing.

The true history of the understanding confirms this important result, and completely puts the theory of ideas in full light.

Primitively nothing is abstract, nothing is general; every thing is particular, every thing is concrete. The understanding, as I have proved, does not begin with these formulas: there is no modification without its subject: there is no body without space, etc.; but a modification being given, it conceives a particular subject of this modification; a body being given, it conceives that this body is in a space; a particular succession being given, it conceives that this particular succession is in a determinate time, etc. It is so with all our primitive conceptions; they are all particular, determinate, concrete. Moreover, as I have also shown, they are blended together, all our faculties

entering into exercise simultaneously, or nearly so. There is no consciousness of the slightest sensation without an act of attention, that is to say, without some putting forth of the will; there is no volition without the sentiment of an internal causative power; no sensation perceived without reference to an external cause and to the world, which we immediately conceive as in a space and in a time, etc. In fine, our primitive conceptions present moreover two distinct characteristics; some are contingent, others are necessary. Under the eye of consciousness there may be a sensation of pleasure or of pain, which I perceive as really existing; but this sensation may vary, change, disappear. From hence very soon arises the conviction that this sensible phenomenon which I notice, is indeed real, but that it might exist or might not exist, and therefore I might feel it or not feel it. This is a characteristic which philosophy will afterward designate as contingent. But when I conceive that a body is in space; if I endeavor to conceive the contrary—that a body may be without space, I can not succeed. This conception of space is one which philosophy will designate by the term necessary. But from whence do all our conceptions, contingent or necessary, come? From the faculty of conceiving, which is within us, by whatever name you call this faculty of which we are all conscious—mind, reason, thought, understanding, or intelligence. The operations of this faculty, our conceptions, are essentially affirmative, if not orally, yet mentally. To deny, even, is to affirm; for it is to affirm the contrary of what had been first affirmed. To doubt also, is to affirm; for it is to affirm uncertainty. Besides, we evidently do not begin by doubt or negation, but by affirmation. Now, to affirm in any way, is to judge. If, then, every intellectual operation resolves itself into an operation of judgment, all our conceptions, whether contingent or necessary, resolve themselves into judgments contingent or necessary; and all our primitive operations being concrete and syn-

thetic, it follows that all the primitive judgments, supposed by these operations, are also exercised under this form.

Such is the primitive scene of the intelligence. Gradually the intelligence unfolds itself. In the progress of this development language supervenes, which reflects the understanding, and brings it, so to say, out of itself. If you open the grammars, you will see that they all begin with the elements and go to propositions, that is, they begin by analysis and end by synthesis. But in reality the process is not so. When the mind translates itself into language, the primary expressions of its judgments are, like the judgments themselves, concrete and synthetic. Its first products are not words, but phrases, propositions, and very complex propositions. A primitive proposition is a whole, which corresponds to the natural synthesis by which the mind begins. These primitive propositions are by no means abstract propositions such as these: There is no quality without a subject; there is no body without space containing it; and the like; but they are all particular, such as: I exist; this body exists; such a body is in that space; God exists, etc. These are propositions which refer to a particular and determinate object, which is either self, or body, or God. But after having expressed its primitive, concrete and synthetic judgments by concrete and synthetic propositions, the mind operates upon these judgments by abstraction; it neglects that which is concrete in them to consider only the form of them, for example, the character of necessity with which many of them are invested, and which, when disengaged and developed, instead of the concrete propositions: I exist; these bodies are in such a space, etc.; gives the abstract propositions: There can be no body without space; there can be no modification without a subject; there can be no succession without time, etc. The general was at first enveloped in the particular; then you disengage the general from the particular, and you express it by itself. But I have else-

where sufficiently explained the formation of general propositions.*

Language is the sign of the mind, of its operations and of their development. It expresses primitive, concrete and synthetic judgments, by primitive propositions themselves concrete and synthetic. The judgments are gradually generalized by abstraction, and in their turn the propositions become general and abstract; upon these abstractions abstraction operates new abstractions. Abstract propositions, the signs of abstract judgments, are themselves complex, and contain several elements. We abstract these elements in order to consider them separately. These elements are called ideas. It is a great error to suppose that we have first these elements, without having the whole of which they are a part. We do not begin by propositions, but by judgments; the judgments do not come from the propositions, but the propositions come from the judgments, which themselves come from the faculty of judging, which is grounded in the original capacity of the mind. *A fortiori*, we do not begin by ideas; for ideas are given us in the propositions. Take, for example, the idea of space. It is not given us by itself, but in this complete proposition: there is no body without space, which proposition is only the form of a judgment. Take away the proposition, which would not be made without the judgment, and you have not the ideas; but as soon as language permits you to translate your judgments into propositions, then you can consider separately the different elements of these propositions, that is to say, ideas separately from each other. To speak strictly, there are in nature no propositions, neither concrete nor abstract, particular nor general, and still less are there ideas in nature. If by ideas be understood something real, which exists independently of language, and which is an intermediate between beings and the mind, I

* Chap. IV.

say that there are absolutely no ideas. There is nothing real except things, and the mind with its operations, that is, its judgments. Then come languages, which in some sort create a new world, at once spiritual and material, those symbolic beings which are called signs, by the help of which they give a kind of external and independent existence to the results of mental operations. Thus, in expressing judgments or propositions, they have the appearance of giving reality to those propositions. The same is the case in respect to ideas. Ideas are no more real than propositions; they have the same reality, the reality of abstractions, to which language attaches a nominal and conventional existence. Every language is at once an analyst and a poet; it makes abstractions and it realizes them. This is the condition of every language: we must be resigned to it, and speak in figures, provided we know what we are doing. Thus all the world talk of having an idea of a thing, of having a clear or obscure idea, etc.; but by this nobody intends to say that he has no knowledge of things, except by means of certain intermediate things called ideas; it is merely intended to mark thereby the operation of the mind in reference to such a thing, the operation by which the mind knows the thing, knows it more or less, etc.

We talk also of representing a thing, and frequently a thing which falls not under the senses; this is merely saying that we know it, comprehend it; saying it, that is, by using a metaphor borrowed from the phenomena of the senses, and from the sense whose use is the most frequent, that of sight. Taste is ordinarily the sole judge of the employment of these figures. This metaphorical style may be carried, and is frequently carried, very far without obscurity or error. I absolve, then, the ordinary language of the bulk of mankind; and I believe that we may also absolve that of most philosophers, who commonly have spoken as the people, without being more absurd than the

people. It is impossible, in fact, to forbid the philosopher all metaphors; the only law which it is necessary to impose upon him is, not to insist upon metaphors, not to convert them into theories. Perhaps the Scotch school, which has taken up in the eighteenth century the old controversy aginst the representative idea, in the name of the common sense of the human race, has not always been sufficiently aware that philosophers also make a part of the human race; perhaps it has imputed too much to the schools, and been too willing to see every where the theory which it had undertaken to combat.* But it has certainly rendered an eminent service to philosophy, in demonstrating that the idea-image is at the bottom nothing but a metaphor, and in doing justice to this metaphor if seriously taken as endowed with a representative power. This latter is the vice into which Locke has fallen, and I have thought it needful to signalize it to you as one of the most perilous rocks of the Sensual school.

From the point at which we now have arrived, we can easily judge of the doctrine of *innate ideas*, the refutation of which occupies the whole of the First Book of the Essay on the Understanding.† The time has now come to explain ourselves concerning this doctrine, and concerning Locke's refutation of it. Locke divides the general doctrine of innate ideas into two points, general propositions or maxims, and ideas. Now, we likewise reject the doctrine of innate propositions and ideas, and for this very simple reason: because there are in nature neither propo-

* See the development and confirmation of this doubt, First Series Vol. IV, Lecture XXII. p. 508, etc., [where Cousin vindicates Descartes against the misjudgment of Reid. He says: "Reid passed his life so much in the midst of the representative idea theory of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume, that he saw it every where; I say every where strictly and literally; there is not a single philosopher, ancient or modern, in whom he did not find it."—Tr.]

† See Chap. II.

sitions nor ideas. What is there in nature? Besides bodies there is nothing except minds, and among these, that which we are, which conceives and knows directly things, minds and bodies. And in the order of mind what is there innate? Nothing but the mind itself, the understanding, the faculty of knowing. The understanding, as Leibnitz has profoundly said, is innate to itself; the development of the understanding is equally innate, in this sense, that it can not but take place, when the understanding is once given, with the power which is proper to it, [and the conditions of its development supplied.] And, as you have seen the development of the understanding are the judgments which it passes and the knowledge implied in those judgments. Undoubtedly these judgments have conditions, which belong to the domain of experience. Take away experience, and there is nothing in the senses, nothing in the consciousness, and consequently nothing in the understanding. But is this condition the absolute law of the understanding? Might it not still judge and develop itself, without the aid of experience, without an organic impression, without a sensation? I neither affirm nor deny it; *hypotheses non fingo*, as Newton said, I am not framing hypotheses; I state what is, without inquiring what might be. I say, that in the limits of the present state, it is an undeniable fact, that unless certain experimental conditions are supplied, the mind does not enter into operation, does not judge; but I say at the same time, that as soon as these conditions are fulfilled, the mind, in virtue of its own energy, develops itself, thinks, conceives, judges, and knows a multitude of things, which fall neither under consciousness, nor under the senses, as time, space, external causes, existences, and its own existence. There are no innate ideas, any more than innate propositions; but there is an energy innate in the understanding, which projects itself in primitive judgments, which judgments, when language comes in, express themselves in

propositions, which propositions, decomposed by abstraction and analysis, engender distinct ideas. As the mind is equal to itself in all men, the primitive judgments which it passes are the same in all men; and consequently, the propositions in which language expresses these judgments, and the fundamental ideas of which they are composed, are at once and universally admitted. One condition is, however, necessary, namely, that they should be apprehended. When Locke pretends that these propositions: "*whatsoever is, is*," and "*it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*," are propositions which are not universally nor primitively admitted, he is both right and wrong. Certainly, the first comer, the peasant to whom you should say: whatever is, is, and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, would not admit these propositions; for he would not comprehend them, because you speak a language which is not his own, the language of abstraction and of analysis. But that which the peasant does not admit and does not comprehend under its abstract form, he admits immediately and necessarily under the concrete and synthetic form. Ask this same man who does not comprehend your metaphysical language, ask him whether under the different actions or sensations of which he is conscious there is not something real and subsistent, which is himself; whether he is not himself the same to-day that he was yesterday; in a word, instead of abstract formulas, propose to him particular, determinate and concrete questions; and then human nature will give you an answer, because human nature, the human understanding, is in the peasant just as really as in Leibnitz. What I have just said concerning abstract and general propositions, I say concerning the simple ideas which analysis finds in these propositions. For example, ask a savage if he has the idea of God; you ask him what he can not reply to, for he does not understand it. But if you know how to interrogate this poor savage, you will see proceed from his intelligence

a synthetic and confused judgment, which, if you know how to read it, contains already every thing which the most refined analysis could ever give you; you will see that under the confusion of their natural judgments, which they neither know how to separate nor to express, the savage, the child, the idiot even, if he is not entirely one, admit originally and universally all the ideas which subsequent analysis develops without producing, or of which it produces only the scientific form.

There are, then, indeed, no innate ideas, nor innate propositions, because there are no ideas, nor propositions really existing, and again, there are no general ideas and propositions universally and primitively admitted under the form of general ideas and propositions. But it is certain that the understanding of all men teems, so to say, with natural judgments, which may be called innate in this sense, that they are the primitive, universal and necessary development of the human mind, which finally is innate to itself, and equal to itself, in all men.*

* This is the recognized and now uncontroverted sense of the Cartesian theory of innate ideas.

[It seems incredible that Locke should ever have instituted such a controversy as that contained in his First Book, or that it should ever have gained such celebrity. "The First Book of Locke's Essay," says Coleridge ("if the supposed error which it labors to subvert, be not a mere thing of straw, an absurdity which no man ever did or could believe), is formed on a σόφισμα ἑτεροζητήσεως, and involves the old mistake of *cum hoc, ergo propter hoc.* We learn all things indeed by *occasion* of experience; but the very facts so learned, force us inward upon antecedents which must be presupposed in order to render experience itself possible." "The position of the Aristotelians: *Nihil in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu,* on which Locke's Essay is grounded, is irrefragable; Locke erred only in taking half the truth for a whole truth." If the dependence of the mind upon experience as the *condition* of all knowledge were all that Locke meant to maintain by his attempt at refuting *innate ideas,* he would maintain what nobody denies, while he has in fact undertaken to refute what nobody ever in reality believed.

Origin of Ideas.—On the question of the origin of ideas, a few state-

ments may properly here be made. It needs now but few words to put the whole matter in a summary view clearly before the mind.

The theory of Locke is built upon a gross confusion of distinct things. Its comprehending sophism is the mistaking of the conditions of a thing for its principle.

All our knowledge begins *with* experience; no knowledge precedes experience, but it does not therefore follow, as Kant well observes, that all our knowledge springs *from* experience. It may still be the fact, that even our empirical knowledge is compounded partly of that which we *receive* through impressions, and partly of that which the understanding *produces of itself*, barely through *occasion* of sensible impressions. This is the true explanation. The understanding, when called into exercise by and upon the data of experience, in virtue of certain previous laws of its activity, *is itself the source* of much of our knowlege, knowledge which we could never derive from experience. Now these laws and original conceptions of the understanding (known in our modern English philosophy as first principles, necessary truths, etc.) are sometimes called *constituent forms* of the understanding, and knowledge *à priori*. "They are called *constituent*," says Coleridge, "because they are not *acquired* by the understanding, but they are implied in its constitution. As rationally might a circle be said to acquire a center and circumference, as the understanding to acquire these, its inherent *forms*, or ways of conceiving. This is what Leibnitz meant, when to the old adage of the Peripatetics: *nihil in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu*, he replied: *præter intellectum ipsum*." They are also, we have said, called knowledge *à priori*.—"This phrase," as Coleridge remarks, "is in common most grossly misunderstood. By knowledge *à priori*, we do not mean that we can know any thing previously to experience, which would be a contradiction in terms; but that, having once known by occasion of experience (*i. e.* something acting upon us from without), we then know that it must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible. By experience only, I know that I have eyes; but then my reason convinces me that I must have had eyes, in order to the experience."

The psychological question in regard to the origin of ideas is simply whether the ideas, and all the ideas which in point of fact are in the human mind, *are there because the objects of those ideas—the things, the qualities, the matters to which they relate—are, or have been themselves objects of experience*, either external or internal, that is in sensation or in reflection? To this the answer in one word is: no. But the positive solution of the problem gives a threefold origin:

1. Some of our ideas are in our minds, because, we have *by sensation*

experienced the objects of them: as for instance, the ideas of hard and soft, hot and cold, sweet and bitter, white and black, etc. These have there origin in sensation;

2. Some of our ideas are in our minds, because we have by reflection, that is, *in consciousness, experienced the objects* of them: as for instance, the ideas of thinking, willing, joy, grief, hope, fear, etc. These have their origin in reflection;

3. Some of our ideas are in our minds, because, although we never have experienced the objects of them, the realities to which they apply, yet the faculty of reason, the proper conditions of its activity being supplied, does in its own function necessarily apprehend them: as for instance, the ideas of space, time, infinite, right and wrong, etc.—The objects of these ideas are not objects of sensation; they can not be touched, nor seen, nor heard, nor tasted, nor smelled; neither are they any more objects of reflection, *i. e.*, we have no inward experience or consciousness of the objects of the ideas, but only of the ideas themselves. The ideas are in our minds, because, reason in its proper activity has apprehended and unfolded them in our consciousness. They are rational ideas; they have their origin in reason.

Sensation, reflection, reason; such is the threefold origin of ideas and of knowledge; or rather, since sensation and reflection may be generalized under a single term, experience, we may say the origin of ideas and of knowledge is twofold. All our knowledge is either empirical or rational; the latter conditioned by the former, but not originated by it.—TR.]

CHAPTER VIII.

OF JUDGMENT.

Examination of the Fourth Book of the Essay on the Understanding continued.—Of knowledge.—Its modes.—Omission of inductive knowledge.—Its degrees.—False distinction of Locke between knowing and judging.—That the theory of knowledge and of judgment in Locke resolves itself into that of a perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas.—Detailed examination of this theory.—That it applies to judgments abstract and not primitive, but by no means to primitive judgments which imply existence.—Analysis of the judgment; *I exist*.—Three objections: 1, the impossiblity of arriving at real existence by the abstraction of existence; 2, that to begin by abstraction is contrary to the true process of the human mind; 3, that the theory of Locke involves a paralogism.—Analysis of the judgments: *I think, this body exists, this body is colored, God exists, etc.*—Analysis of the judgments upon which Arithmetic and Geometry rest.

We have stopped some time at the entrance of the Fourth Book of the Essay on the Understanding: let us now pass within.

The Fourth Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding treats of knowledge in general; of its different modes; of its different degrees; of its extent and limits; with some applications. It is, therefore, properly speaking, Logic with something of Ontology. The principle of this logic rests upon the theory we have examined, that of the representative idea. We have seen that, with Locke, the condition of all legitimate knowledge is the conformity of the idea to the object; and we have every way proved

that this conformity is nothing but a chimera. We have therefore already overthrown the general theory of knowledge, but we have overthrown it only in its principle by raising a provisional question, by taking an exception against it. It is necessary now to examine it in itself, independently of the principle of the representative idea, and to follow it in its appropriate development and consequences.

Whether the idea is representative or not, it is a settled point in the system of Locke that the understanding does not commence by things, but by ideas; that ideas are the sole objects of the understanding, and consequently the sole foundations of knowledge. Now if all knowledge necessarily depends upon ideas, then where there is no idea there can be no knowledge; and wherever there is knowledge, there has necessarily been an idea. But the converse is not true, there is not necessarily knowledge, wherever there is an idea. For instance, in order that you may be able to have a well-grounded knowledge of God, it is necessary that you should first have some idea of God; but from your having some idea of God, it does not follow that you have a true or sufficient knowledge of him. Thus knowledge is limited by ideas; but it does not necessarily go as far as ideas go.

B. IV. Ch. III. § 1. "*We can have knowledge no further than we have ideas.*" *Ibid.* § 6. "*Our knowledge is narrower than our ideas.*" If knowledge never surpasses the ideas and sometimes falls short of them, and if all knowledge depends only upon ideas, it is clear that knowledge can never be any thing but the relation of one idea to another; and that the process of the human mind in knowledge is nothing else than the perception of a relation of some sort between ideas.

B. IV. Ch. I. § 1. "Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object *but its own ideas*, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident

that our knowledge is only conversant about them." § 2. "Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge.

Thence follow the different modes and degrees of knowledge in the system of Locke. We *know* only when we perceive a relation of agreement or disagreement between two ideas. Now we may perceive this relation in two ways: either we perceive it immediately, and then the knowledge is intuitive; or we are not able to perceive it immediately, and must have recourse to another idea, or to several other ideas, which we put between the two ideas whose relation can not be directly perceived, so that thereby we may apprehend the relation which escapes us. Knowledge is then called demonstrative. (B. IV. Ch. II. § 1, 2.) Locke here makes an excellent remark which ought not to be omitted, and for which it is just to give him the credit. No doubt we are often compelled to resort to demonstration, to the interposition of one or more ideas, in order to perceive the latent relation of two ideas; but this new idea which we interpose in some way between the two others, it is necessary that we should perceive its relation to each of the others. Now if the perception of this relation between that idea and the two others, is not intuitive, if it is demonstrative, it would be necessary to have recourse to the intermediation of a new idea. But if between this idea and the anterior ideas the perception of relation were not intuitive, but demonstrative, it would be necessary to have recouse again to a new idea, and so on *ad infinitum*. The perception of the relation between the middle term and the extremes must therefore be intuitive; and it must be so in all the steps of the deduction; so that

demonstrative evidence is grounded upon intuitive, and always presupposes it.

B. IV. Ch. II. § 7. "*Each step must have intuitive evidence.*" "Now in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge, there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea, which it uses as a proof; for if it were not so, that yet would need a proof; since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced. If it be perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge; if it can not be perceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea, as a common measure to show their agreement or disagreement. By which it is plain that every step in reasoning that produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty; which when the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, concerning which we inquire, visible and certain. So that to make any thing a demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last in the account), is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas, in each step and progression of the demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the mind, and a man must be sure that no part is left out."

Thus intuition and demonstration are the different modes of knowledge according to Locke. But are there no others? Have we not knowledge which we acquired neither by intuition nor demonstration? How do we acquire a knowledge of the laws of external nature? Take which you please, gravitation for instance. Certainly there is no simple intuition and immediate evidence here; for experiments multiplied and combined, are necessary to give the slightest law; and even these will not suffice, since

the slightest law surpasses the number, whatever it be, of these experiments from which it is drawn. There is therefore need of an intervention of some other operation of the mind besides intuition. Is it demonstration? Impossible. What in fact is demonstration? It is the perception of a relation between two ideas by means of a third, but it is upon this condition that the latter should be more general than the two others, in order to embrace and connect them. To demonstrate is, in the last analysis, to deduce the particular from the general. Now what is the more general physical law from which gravitation can be deduced? We have not deduced the knowledge of gravitation from any other knowledge anterior to it, and which involves it in the germ. How, then, have we acquired this knowledge, which we certainly have; and in general, how have we acquired the knowledge of physical laws? A phenomenon having been presented a number of times, with a particular character and in particular circumstances, we have judged that if this same phenomena should appear again in similar circumstances, it would have the same character; that is to say, we have generalized the particular character of this phenomenon: instead of descending from the general to the particular, we have ascended from the particular to the general. This general character is what we call a law; this law we have not deduced from a more general law or character; we have derived it from particular experiments in order to transfer it beyond them. There is here neither simple intuition nor demonstration: it is what we call *induction*. It is to induction that we owe all our conquests over nature, all our discoveries of the laws of the world. For a long time natural philosophers contented themselves either with immediate observations which furnished no great result, or with speculations which resulted in nothing but hypotheses. Induction for a long time was only a natural process of the human mind, of which men make use for

acquiring the knowledge they need in respect to the external world, without explaining it, and without its passing from practice into science. It is to Bacon, chiefly, we owe, not the invention, but the discovery and largest propagation of this process. It is strange that Locke, a countryman of Bacon, and who belongs to his school, should in his classification of the modes of knowledge, have permitted precisely that one to escape him to which the school of Bacon has given the greatest celebrity, and placed in the clearest light. It is strange that the whole Sensual School, which pretends to be the legitimate offspring of Bacon, should, after the example of Locke, have almost forgotten the evidence of induction among the different species of evidence, and that contrary to what an experimental school should have done, it has neglected induction to bury itself in demonstration. This is the reason of the singular but undeniable phenomenon, that in the eighteenth century, the logic of the Sensual school was scarcely any thing but a reflection of the peripatetic scholasticism of the middle age, of that scholasticism which admitted no other processes in knowledge than intuition and demonstration.

Let us now see what, according to Locke, are the different degrees of knowledge.

Sometimes we know with certainty, without the least blending of doubt with our knowledge. Sometimes also, instead of absolute knowledge, we have only probable knowledge. Probability also has its degrees, and its particular grounds. Locke treats them at large. I advise you to read with care the chapters, not indeed very profound, but sufficiently exact, in which he discusses the different degrees of knowledge. I can not go into all these details, but will content myself with pointing out to you the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of the Fourth Book. I shall particularly notice only one distinction to which Locke attaches great importance, and which, in my opinion is without foundation.

We either know in a certain and absolute manner, or we know merely in a manner more or less probable. Locke chooses to employ the term knowledge exclusively to signify absolute knowledge, that which is raised above all probability. The knowledge which is wanting in certainty —simple conjecture, or presumption more or less probable—he calls judgment. B. IV. Ch. XIV. § 4: "The mind has two faculties, conversant about truth and falsehood. *First*, *knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement, or disagreement of any ideas. *Secondly*, *judgment*, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is as the word imports, taken to be so, before it certainly appears."

But the general usage of all languages is contrary to so limited a sense of the word knowledge; a certain knowledge, or a probable or even a conjectural knowledge is always spoken of as knowledge in its different degrees. It is so in regard to judgment. As languages have not confined the term knowledge to absolute knowledge, so they have not limited the term judgment to knowledge merely probable. In some cases we pass certain and decisive judgments; in others we pass judgments which are only probable, or even purely conjectural. In a word, judgments are infallible, or doubtful in various degrees; but doubtful or infallible, they are always judgments, and this distinction between knowledge as being exclusively infallible, and judgment as being exclusively probable, doubtful or conjectural, is a verbal distinction altogether arbitrary and barren. Time accordingly has done justice to it; but it seems to have spared the theory on which the distinction is founded, the theory which makes both knowledge and judgment consist in the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement between two ideas.

All verbal distinction laid aside, to judge or to know, to know or to judge, is with Locke nothing but to perceive, intuitively or demonstratively, a relation of agreement or disagreement, certain or probable, between two ideas. This is the theory of knowledge and of judgment according to Locke, reduced to its simplest expression. From Locke it passed into the Sensual school, where it enjoys undisputed authority, and forms the acknowledged theory of judgment. It requires, then, and it deserves a scrupulous examination.

In the first place, let us note the extent of this theory. It pretends not merely that there are judgments which are nothing else than perceptions of the relation of agreement or disagreement of ideas; but it pretends that every judgment is subject to this condition. This is the point to be verified.

Let us take any knowledge, any judgment. I propose the following judgment: two and three make five. This is not a chimera; it is a knowledge, a judgment; and it is certain. How do we acquire this knowledge, what are the conditions of this judgment?

The theory of Locke supposes three: 1, that there are two ideas present to the understanding, known anterior to the perception of relation; 2, that there is a comparison made between these two ideas; 3, that at the end of this comparison there is a perception of some relation between the two ideas. Two ideas, a comparison of them, a perception of a relation derived from the comparison: such are the conditions of the theory of Locke.

Let us go on: two and three make five. What are the two ideas? Two and three, and five. Suppose I had not these two ideas, these two terms, on the one hand, two and three, and on the other, five. Could I ever perceive that there was a relation between them of equality or inequality, identity or diversity? No. And having these two terms, if I did not compare them, should I ever perceive their re-

lation? Certainly not. And if in comparing them, their relation, spite of all my exertions, should escape my understanding, should I ever arrive at the result, that two and three make five? By no means. On the contrary, suppose these three conditions to be supplied, is the result infallibly obtained? I see nothing wanting to it. Thus far, then, the theory of Locke seems to work well. Shall I take another arithmetical example? But arithmetical examples have this peculiarity, that they are all alike. What in fact are arithmetical truths but relations of numbers? They are nothing else. Arithmetical knowledge then falls under the theory of Locke concerning knowledge; and an arithmetical judgment, if the expression may be used, is nothing else than the perception of a relation of numbers. Thus far, then, the theory of Locke is perfectly sound.

Shall we take geometry? But if geometrical truths are nothing but relations of magnitude, it is clear that no geometrical truth can be obtained, except under the condition of having previously two ideas of magnitude, then of comparing them, and then of deducing a relation of agreement or disagreement. And as all mathematics, as Newton has said, is only a universal arithmetic, it seems true that mathematical judgment in general is nothing but a perception of relations.

Let us take other examples a little at random. I wish to know if Alexander is a truly great man: it is a question frequently agitated. It is evident that unless I have on the one hand the idea of Alexander, and on the other an idea of a truly great man, and unless I compare these two ideas, and perceive between them a relation of agreement or disagreement, I can not decide whether Alexander is a great man or not. Here again we must necessarily have two ideas, a particular idea, that of Alexander, and a general idea, that of a great man, and we compare these two ideas to know if they agree or disagree with each

other, if the predicate can be affirmed of the subject, if the subject falls under the predicate, etc.

I wish to know if God is good. At first it is necessary that I should have the idea of the existence of God, of God so far forth as existing; then it is necessary that I should have the idea of goodness, an idea more or less extensive, more or less complete of it, so as to be able after a comparison of the one with the other, to affirm that these two ideas have a relation of agreement.

Such are, indeed, the conditions of knowledge, of judgment in these different cases. But let us explain the nature of these different cases. Let us examine the mathematical truths which lend themselves so readily to the theory of Locke. Arithmetical truths, for example, do they exist in nature? No. And why not? Because these relations which are called arithmetical truths, have for their terms not concrete quantities, that is to say, real quantities, but discrete, that is, abstract quantities. One, two, three, four, five—all this has no existence in nature; consequently, the relations between abstract and not real quantities no more have a real existence than their terms: arithmetical truths are pure abstractions. And moreover the human mind operates at first upon concrete quantities, and it is only subsequently that it rises from the concrete to the conception of those general relations which constitute arithmetical truths properly so called. They have then, two characteristics: 1, they are abstract; 2, they are not primitive; they suppose previous concrete judgments, in the bosom of which they reside until deduced by abstraction and raised to the height of universal truths. The same may be said of the truths of geometry. The magnitudes with which geometry has to do, are not concrete magnitudes; they are abstract, having no existence in nature. For there are in nature only imperfect figures, and the operations of geometry are conditioned by perfect figures, the perfect triangle, the perfect circle, etc., that is to say, by figures which have no real

existence, but are pure conceptions of the mind. The relations of abstractions can then be nothing but abstractions. Still further, the human mind no more begins by conceiving perfect figures, than it begins by conceiving the abstract relations of numbers. It first conceives the concrete, the imperfect triangle, the imperfect circle, from which it subsequently deduces by abstraction, rapid indeed, the perfect triangle, and circle of geometry. The truths of geometry are not then primitive truths in the human understanding. The other examples which we have taken, namely, that Alexander is a great man, and that God is good, have the same character of being problems instituted by later reflection and intelligent curiosity. In a word, hitherto we have verified the theory of Locke only in respect to abstract judgments and those which are not primitive. Let us take judgments marked with other characteristics.

Look at another knowledge, another judgment, which I propose for your examination, namely, the judgment: I exist. You no more doubt the certainty of this knowledge than of the first knowledge I referred to: two and three make five. You would sooner doubt the first than the second. Well, then, let us submit this certain knowledge, this certain judgment: I exist, to the conditions of Locke's general theory concerning knowledge and judgment.

I remind you of the conditions of this theory: 1, two ideas; 2, a comparison of the two ideas; 3, perception of some relation of agreement or disagreement.

Now, what are the two ideas which should be the two terms of this relation and the basis of the comparison? It is the idea of I, or me, and the idea of existence, between which it is the object to find the relation of agreement or disagreement.

Let us take good heed what we do. It is not the idea of our existence that is to be one of the two ideas which are to be objects of comparison. For what are we seeking after? Our own existence. If we have it, we should not

seek after it. We must not take the thing in question, our own existence, for granted. The idea of existence which is to be here one of the terms of comparison, is therefore the idea of existence in general, and not the particular idea of our own existence. Such is the rigorous condition of the problem. And what is the other idea, the second term of the comparison? It is the idea of the me. But what are we seeking after? The me *as existing*. We are not, then, to take it for granted; for that would be to take for granted the thing in question. It is not, then, the existing me which should be the second term of the comparison; but a me, a self, which must necessarily be conceived as distinct from the idea with which it is intended to compare it, in order to know if it agrees or not, namely, the idea of existence. It is a self, then, a me, which must be conceived as not possessing existence, that is to say, an abstract me, a general me.

The idea of an abstract me, and the idea of existence—these are the two ideas of which a comparison is to be made, which ought to bring out the judgment in question! Reflect, I pray you; what are you in search of? Your own personal existence. Do not, then, take it for granted, since it is what you are seeking to find. Do not put it into either of the two terms, from the comparison of which you are to get it. Since it should be only the product of the relation of these two terms, it should not be taken for granted in either of them, for then the comparison would be useless, and the truth would then be anterior to the perception of their relation, and not [as the theory demands] the result of it. Such are the imperious conditions of the theory of Locke: two abstract ideas, the abstract idea of the me, and abstract idea of existence. We are now to compare these two ideas, to see if they agree or disagree with each other, to perceive the relation of agreement or disagreement which binds or separates them. I might first remark, in passing, upon this expression of

agreement or disagreement, and show how much it is wanting in precision and distinctness; but I will not do so. I take the words as Locke gives them. I let his theory unfold itself freely; I shall not repress it; I merely wish to see where it will arrive. It starts from two abstract terms; it compares them, and seeks a relation of agreement or disagreement between them, between the idea of existence and the idea of the me. It compares them, then; so be it. And what is the result? a relation, a relation of agreement. So be it again. I wish to make here but one remark, it is, that this relation, whatever it be, must necessarily be of the same nature as the two terms, which are its foundation. The two terms are abstract; the relation must therefore necessarily be abstract. What then will be the result of the perception of the relation, which I am very willing to suppose one of agreement between the general and abstract idea of existence, and the general and abstract idea of the me? A truth of relation of the same nature as the two terms on which it is founded, namely, an abstract knowledge, a logical knowledge of the non-contradiction found between the idea of existence and the idea of the me, that is to say, the knowledge of the pure possibility of the existence of a me, a self. But when you believe that you exist, do you, I ask, merely pass the judgment that there is no contradiction between the general idea of the me, and that of existence? Not at all. The qnestion is not about a possible you, a possible me, but a real me, that quite determinate me which nobody confounds with a logical abstraction. The question is not about existence in general, but about your own, your own altogether personal and individual existence. On the contrary, the result of the judgment derived from the perception of a relation of agreement between the general and abstract idea of existence and the general and abstract idea of the me does not imply real existence. It gives, if you please, possible existence, but it gives nothing more.

This is the first vice of Locke's theory. Look now at another.

The judgment: I exist, is eminently a primitive judgment. It is the starting-point of knowledge. Obviously you can know nothing before yourselves. Now in the theory of Locke, the two ideas upon which the judgment acts, and between which is to be discerned the relation of agreement, are necessarily two abstract ideas. The radical supposition then of the theory of Locke is that the human mind, in regard to knowledge, begins by abstraction, a supposition gratuitous and falsified by facts. In fact we set out with the concrete and not with the abstract, and even if it were possible (which I deny, and which I have demonstrated to be impossible), to derive reality from abstraction, it would remain not less true that the process which Locke imputes to the human mind, even if it were legitimate, is not that which the mind employs.

The theory of Locke can give only an abstract judgment and not a judgment which reaches to real existence; and his theory, moreover, is not the true process of the human mind, since the process it employs is altogether abstract, and by no means primitive; further, this theory involves a paralogism.

In fact Locke proposes to arrive at the knowledge of real and personal existence by the comparison of the idea of existence and the idea of self, by bringing them together in order to discern their relation. But in general, and to dispatch the question at a single stroke, the abstract being given us only in the concrete, to derive the concrete from the abstract is to take as a principle what could have been had only as a consequence; it is to ask what we are in search of, from precisely that which we could never have known but by means of that which we are in search of. And in regard to this particular case, under what condition have you the general and abstract idea of existence, and the general and abstract idea of self, which you

compare in order to derive from them the knowledge of your own existence? Under this condition; that you have already had the idea of your own existence. It is impossible that you should have ascended to the generalization of existence without having passed from the knowledge of some particular existence; and as neither the knowledge of the existence of God, nor that of the existence of the external world precedes or can precede that of your own, it follows that the knowledge of your own existence can not but have been one of the bases of the abstract and general idea of existence; consequently to derive the knowledge of your own existence from the general idea of existence, is to fall into an evident paralogism. If Locke had not known that he existed, if he had not already acquired the knowledge of his own me real and existent, he could never have had the general and abstract idea either of a me, nor of existence, those very ideas from which he seeks to obtain the knowledge of his personal me and existence.*

* [The reader will recollect the criticism of Reid upon Descartes's celebrated *cogito, ergo sum*; and also Stewart's vindication of it against Reid. Cousin has the following remarks upon this topic:

"Before Spinoza and Reid, Gassendi had attacked the enthymeme of Descartes. 'The proposition, *I think, therefore I am*, supposes,' says Gassendi, 'this major: *that which thinks, exists*; and consequently involves a begging of the question.' To this Descartes replies: 'I do not beg the question, for I do not suppose any major. I maintain that the proposition: I think, therefore I exist, is a particular truth which is introduced into the mind without recourse to any more general truth, and independently of any logical deduction. It is not a prejudice, but a natural judgment which at once and irresistibly strikes the intelligence.' 'The notion of existence,' says he, in his reply to other objections, 'is a primitive notion, not obtained by any syllogism, but evident in itself; and the mind discovers it by intuition.' Reasoning does not logically deduce existence from thought; but the mind can not think without knowing itself, because being is given in and under thought: *cogito, ergo sum*. The certainty of thinking does not go before the certainty of existence; it contains and envelops it; they are two cotemporaneous

Thus we have three radical objections against the theory of Locke:

1. It starts from abstractions; consequently, it gives only an abstract result, and not the one you are seeking.

2. It starts from abstractions, and, consequently, it does not start from the true starting-point of the human intelligence.

3. It starts from abstractions, which it could never have obtained but by the help of the self-same, concrete knowledge that it pretends to derive from the abstractions which suppose it; consequently, it takes for granted the thing in question.

The theory of Locke breaks down under these three objections; and the judgment, I exist, escapes in every way from the theory of Locke.

This judgment has two characteristics:

1. It is not abstract: it implies existence:

2. It is a primitive judgment: all others involve the supposition of it, while it supposes no others.

It was in regard to abstract judgments, judgments slowly formed in the human mind, that the theory of Locke was before seen to hold true. But here the judgment implies existence, and is primitive; and the theory can no longer be verified. We must therefore choose between the theory and the certainty of personal knowledge.

So much for personal existence. It is the same in regard to all the modes of this existence, to our faculties, our operations, whether sensation, or will, or thought

Take whatever phenomenon you please: *I feel; I will; I think.* Take for instance: *I think.* This is commonly called a fact of consciousness; but consciousness is still to know (*conscire sibi*), it is to know, since it is to know one's

verities blended in one fundamental verity. This fundamental complex verity is the sole principle of the Cartesian philosophy."—*Fragmens Philosophiques.* 314–321.—TR.]

self; it is to believe, to affirm, to judge. When you say, I think, it is a judgment which you exercise and express: when you are conscious of thinking, and do not say so, it is still a judgment which you exercise without expressing it. Now this judgment, whether expressed or not, implies existence; it implies that you, a real being, actually exercise the real operation of thinking. Moreover, it is a primitive judgment, at least cotemporaneous with the judgment that you exist.

Let us test the theory of Locke in regard to this judgment, as we have tested it in regard to that other primitive and concrete judgment: I exist.

Three conditions are necessary by the theory of Locke, in order to explain and legitimate the judgment: I think; namely, two ideas, their comparison, a perception of relation between them. What in this case are the two ideas? Obviously the idea of thinking on the one hand, and of I or myself, on the other. But if it is the idea of thinking distinct from myself, if it is thinking considered apart from the subject, the me, from that subject me which is, you will not forget, the primary basis of all existence; it is thinking abstracted from all existence, it is abstract thought, that is to say, the simple power of thinking, and nothing else. On the other hand, the me, which is the other necessary term of the comparison, can not be a me which thinks, for you have just separated it from thought; it is, therefore, a me, which you are to consider abstracted from thinking. For if, in fact, you suppose it thinking, you would have what you are in search of, and there would be no need of your making a laborious comparison; you might stop at one of the terms, which would give you the other, the me as thinking, or I think. But to avoid paralogism, you must suppose it as not thinking; and as your first legitimate term is thought separated from the me, your second legitimate term must be me separated from thought, a me not thinking. And you wish to know if this me, taken

independently of thinking, and this thinking taken independently of the me, have a relation to each other of agreement or disagreement. Such is the question. It is then two abstractions you are going to compare. But once again, two abstract terms can engender only an abstract relation, and an abstract relation can engender only an abstract judgment, namely, the abstract judgment that thinking and the me are two ideas which imply no contradiction. Thus the theory of Locke applied to this judgment: I think, as to the other judgment: I exist, gives nothing but an abstract result [the possibility of the truth: I think, but not its actual truth, its reality], an abstract truth which in no respect represents what passes in your mind when you judge that you think, and when you say, I think.

Then, too, the theory of Locke makes the human mind begin by abstraction: but it does not thus begin.

Finally, it makes the mind begin by abstraction, and seeks to derive the concrete from the abstract, while in point of fact you could never have had the abstract if you had not previously had the concrete. You passed first, and naturally, this determinate, concrete, and synthetic judgment: I think; and then afterward as you began to exercise the faculty of abstraction, you made a division in the primitive synthesis; you considered separately, on the one hand, the thinking, that is to say, thought without the subject, without the me, the self, that is, possible thinking—and then, on the other hand, the me, I, without the real attributes of thinking, that is to say, the simple possibility of being; and now you are pleased artificially and too late, to reunite, by a pretended relation of agreement, two terms which originally you did not have given you separate and disjoined, but united and confused in the synthesis of reality and of life.

Thus the three preceding objections return here with the same force; and the theory of Locke can legitimately

give you neither the knowledge of your own existence, nor the knowledge of any of your faculties, or operations; for what I have said concerning the judgment: *I think*, may be said likewise of the judgment: *I will*, *I feel*, and of all the attributes and all the modes of personal existence.

Nor is it any more possible for the theory of Locke to give external existence. Take for instance the judgment: *this body exists*. The theory decides that you can not have this knowledge but upon the condition of having perceived a relation of agreement between two ideas compared with each other. What are these two ideas? Certainly not the idea of a body really existing; for you would then have what you are seeking; nor is it any more the idea of actual existence. It is then the idea of a possible body, and the idea of a possible existence, or two abstractions. But you can deduce from them only this other abstraction: there is no logical incompatibility between the idea of existence and the idea of body. Then you commence by abstraction, which is contrary to the natural order. Finally, you begin by an abstraction which you would never have had, if you had not previously obtained the concrete knowledge, the very knowledge which you wish to derive from the comparison of your abstractions.

What has been said concerning the existence of body, holds equally good concerning the attributes by which body is known to us, solidity, form, color, etc. Take for example, the quality of color, commonly classed among the secondary qualities, but which is perhaps more inherent in body than is commonly believed. Be this, however, as it may, whether color be a simple secondary quality or a primary quality of matter, let us see on what conditions, by the theory of Locke, we acquire the knowledge of it. In order to pass this judgment: *this body is colored*, white, or black, etc., is it true that we must have two ideas, com

pare them, and perceive their relation? The two ideas should be that of body and that of color. But the idea of body must not here be the idea of a colored body, for then the single term would imply the other, would render the comparison useless, and would take for granted the thing in question. It must then be the idea of a body as not being colored. The idea of color also must not be the idea of a color really existing; for a color is not real, does not exist, except in a body, and the very condition of the operation which we wish to make, is the separation of color from body. The question here, then, is not concerning a real color, having such or such a determinate shade, but of color abstracted from all that determines it, all that makes it special and real. The question is only concerning the abstract and general idea of color. From whence it results that the two ideas you have, are general and abstract ideas; and from abstractions you can derive only abstractions. And again, you commence by abstraction; you go contrary to the true natural process. Finally, which is the most crushing objection, it is obvious that you could never have gained the general idea of color except in the idea of some particular and positive color, which you could not have gained except in that of a body figured and colored. It is not by the help of the general idea of color, and the general idea of body, that you learn that bodies are colored; but on the contrary, it is because you have previously known that such a body was colored, that afterward separating what was united in the primitive synthesis, you were able to consider on the one hand, the idea of body, and on the other the idea of color, abstracting one from the other; and it is then only that you could have instituted a comparison in order to explain to yourselves what you already knew.

In general, judgments are of two sorts: either those in which we acquire what we were before ignorant of, or those reflex judgments in which we only explain to our-

selves what we already knew. The theory of Locke can to a certain extent, explain the second, but the first entirely escape it.

For instance, if we wish now to give account to ourselves of the existence of God, whom we already know, we take or we can take, on the one hand, the idea of God, and on the other, the idea of existence, and inquire if these two ideas agree or disagree. But to give account of the knowledge we have already acquired, is one thing; to acquire that knowledge, is another thing. Now certainly we did not at first acquire the idea of the existence of God, by placing the idea of God on one side and the idea of existence on the other, and then seeking their relation; for (to spare you superfluous repetitions, and not go over the whole circle of the three foregoing objections, but to fasten only upon the last of them) that would be to take for granted the thing in question. It is very evident that when we consider on the one hand the idea of God, and on the other the idea of existence, and when we seek the knowledge of the existence of God by comparing the two ideas, we do nothing but turn over and over what we already had, and what too we never could have had, if we had been reduced to gain it by the theory of Locke. It is perfectly easy to see that it is the same in regard to the attributes of God as in regard to his existence. Every where, then, and continually, we encounter the same objections, the same paralogism.

The theory of Locke then can give neither God, nor body, nor self, nor their attributes: it gives every thing else except these, I allow, if any body wishes the concession.

It gives mathematics, you say. True, I have myself said so, and I repeat it; it gives mathematics, geometry, and arithmetic, in so far as they are sciences of the relations of magnitude and numbers. It gives them, however, on one condition: that you are to consider these numbers and these magnitudes, as abstract, not implying existence.

Now without doubt the science of geometry is an abstract science; but it has its bases in concrete ideas, and real existences. One of these bases is the idea of space, which, as you know,* is given in this judgment: every body is in a space. This is the proposition, the judgment, which gives us space, a judgment accompanied with perfect certainty of the reality of its object. We have but one single idea as the starting-point, namely, the idea of body; then the mind by its own power, as soon as the idea of body is given it, conceives the idea of space and its necessary connection with body. A body being known, we can not but judge that is in a space which contains it. From this judgment abstract the idea of space, and you have the abstract idea of space. But this idea was not anterior to the conception of the necessary relation of space to body, any more than the relation was anterior to it; nor was it posterior to the relation, nor the relation posterior to it; they both reciprocally imply each other, and are given us in the same judgment as soon as body is known. To lay down first the idea of space, and the idea of body, and then to seek by comparing them to deduce the relation which connects them, is to overthrow the order of intellectual development; for the idea of space alone, supposes already this judgment, that every body is necessarily in space. The judgment therefore can not come from the idea; on the contrary, the idea comes from the judgment. It is not difficult to deduce the idea from the judgment which supposes it, but it would require to be explained from whence comes the idea anterior to the judgment. There is no difficulty in finding a relation between body and space, when we know body and space; but we should have to ask Locke how he obtained that idea of space, just as we have a little back asked him how he obtained the idea of body, of God, of color, of existence, etc. To suppose that the necessary idea is given us by the comparison of two ideas, one of

* See Chapter II.

which is already the idea of space, is a vicious circle, and a ridiculous paralogism. This is the rock on which the theory of Locke perpetually breaks.

The other idea upon which geometry rests is the idea of magnitude, which contains the idea of point, the idea of line, etc. Magnitude, point, line, are ulterior and abstract conceptions, which suppose the idea of some real body, of a solid existing in nature. Now the idea of solidity, like every idea, is given us in a judgment: and it is necessary that we should judge that such a solid exists in order to conceive the idea of solidity by itself. How, then, do we judge that such a solid exists? According to the theory of Locke, there must be two ideas, a comparison of those two ideas, and a perception of their agreement. And what are the two ideas which are to serve as the terms of the judgment: *this solid exists?* I acknowledge I do not see. Compelled by the hypothesis to find them, I can discover no others than the idea of solidity and that of existence, which we are to compare in order to see if they agree or disagree. The theory requires all this scaffolding. But is there any need of destroying it piece by piece, in order to overthrow it? Is it not enough to recollect that the solid in question, being deprived of existence, since it is separated from the idea of existence, is nothing but the abstraction of solidity, and that this abstraction, to which it is the object to give reality, in order to deduce the existence of the solid, could never have been formed without the previous conception of a solid really existing? The abstraction, line, point, etc., supposes such or such a real solid, a primitive and concrete knowledge which can never be made to come from ulterior abstractions without falling into a vicious circle, and taking away from all geometrical conceptions their natural basis.

Thus, then, the two fundamental ideas of geometry, the idea of space, and the idea of solidity, elude Locke's theory of knowledge and judgment.

The same is true in regard to the fundamental idea of arithmetic. This idea is evidently that of unity, not a collective unity, for example: *four* representing *two* and *two*, *five* representing *two* and *three*, but a unity which is found in all collective unities, measures them and values them. This unity arithmetic conceives in an abstract manner; but abstraction not being the starting-point of the human mind, the abstract unity must have been given to us at first in some concrete unity, really existing. What is then this concrete, really existing unity, the source of the abstract idea of unity? It is not body; that is indefinitely divisible. It is the me, the me identical and consequently one under all the variety of its acts, its thoughts, its sensations. And how, by the theory of Locke, could the knowledge of the unity of the me be acquired? It is necessary that we should have had, on the one hand, the idea of the me, not as being one, that is, without reality (the identity and unity of the me being implied in its existence from the very first moment of memory), and on the other hand, the idea of a unity distinct from the me, without subject, and consequently without reality; and then comparing these, that we should have perceived their relation of agreement. Now here all my objections come up again, and in concluding I beg permission to recapitulate them.

1. It is abstract unity and an abstract me, from which you start; but the abstract unity and the abstract me, brought together and compared, will give you nothing but an abstract relation, and not a real relation, an abstract unity, and not the real unity of the me. You will not therefore have that concrete idea of unity which is the necessary basis of the abstract idea of unity, which again is the basis of arithmetic, the general measure of all numbers;

2. You start from abstraction without having passed through the concrete; which is contrary to the natural order of the understanding;

3. Finally, you commit a paralogism, since you wish to obtain the integrant unity of the me from the comparison of two abstractions which involve the supposition of precisely what you are seeking, namely, the real unity of the me.

The theory of Locke therefore can not give the basis of geometry and arithmetic, that is, of the two most abstract sciences. It works well in the field of geometry and arithmetic in as far as they are abstract sciences; but these abstract sciences, and all mathematics, depend in the last analysis upon primitive cognitions which imply existence; and those primitive cognitions which imply existence elude the theory of Locke on every hand. Now, we have seen that the theory fails equally and on the same grounds, in respect to the knowledge of personal existence, that of bodies, and that of God. It follows, then, in the last result, that the theory of Locke is valid only in respect to pure abstraction; and that it falls away as soon as it is brought face to face with any reality to be known, of any sort whatever. The general and unlimited pretension of Locke, therefore, that all knowledge, all judgment, is nothing but the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement between two ideas—this pretension is convicted in every way of error and even of absurdity.

I am afraid this discussion of Locke's theory of knowledge may appear somewhat subtile; but when one wishes to follow error in all its windings, and to untie, methodically, by analysis and dialectics, the knot of sophistical theories instead of cutting it at once by simple good sense, one is obliged to engage in apparent subtilities in following the track of those we wish to combat; at this price alone we can seize and confound them.

I am afraid, too, that this discussion may seem to you very prolonged; and yet it is not finished, for has it not yet penetrated to the true root of the theory of Locke. In fact this theory—that every judgment, every knowledge

is nothing but the perception of a relation between two ideas—supposes and contains another theory, which is the principle of the former. The examination of the one is indispensable to complete that of the other, and to determine the judgment we ought to pass definitively upon it.

CHAPTER IX.

THEORY OF JUDGMENT CONTINUED.

Continuation of the preceding chapter.—That the theory of judgment, as the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement between ideas, supposes that every judgment is founded upon a comparison.—Refutation of the theory of comparative judgment.—Of axioms.—Of identical propositions.—Of Reason and of Faith.—Of Syllogism.—Of Enthusiasm.—Of the cause of Error.—Division of the Sciences.—Conclusion of the examination of the Fourth Book of Locke's Essay.

I believe I have sufficiently refuted, by its results, the theory of Locke which makes knowledge or judgment to consist in a perception of the relation of agreement or disagreement between ideas. I have demonstrated, I believe, that this theory can not give reality, existences; that it is condemned to start from abstraction and to result in abstraction. I now come to examine this same theory under another aspect, not any longer in its results, but in its principles, in its essential principle, in its very condition.*

It is evident that judgment can be the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement of ideas, only on condition that a comparison be made between the ideas. Every judgment of relation is necessarily comparative.

* [Locke's theory of Knowledge is that knowledge is derived solely by comparing ideas, considered as representative images, and discerning a relation of agreement or disagreement between them. It therefore involves *three* distinct positions: 1, ideas as *representative images*; 2, a relation of *agreement* or *disagreement* between them; 3, a *comparison* made between them. The theory has been refuted in regard to the first two positions. It remains to examine the *third;* which is done in this chapter.—Tr.]

Here, if we look closely, is the first and the last principle of the theory of Locke; a principle which the infallible analysis of time has successively disengaged and placed at the head of the logic of the Sensual school. In its germ, at least, it is found in the Fourth Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding, and there we must take it up and examine it.

We observe then, once more, that the theory of comparative judgment,* like that of which it is the foundation, is an unlimited and absolute theory. It pretends to explain all our knowledge, all our judgments; so that if the theory is correct, that is, if it be complete, there ought not to be a single judgment which is not a comparative judgment. I might then, I ought even, in this, as in the preceding lecture, to go from judgment to judgment, examining if they are or are not in fact the fruit of a comparison. But this would lead me too far, and the space I have yet to go over admonishes me to hasten my progress. I will say then all at once, that if there are many judgments which are undeniably comparative, there are also very many which are not, and that here again every judgment which implies reality and existence, excludes all comparison. Let us begin by accurately recognizing the conditions of a comparative judgment, then we will test these conditions in regard to judgments which imply existence. We shall without doubt get again somewhat into our former reasonings; but it will be requisite, in order to pursue and force the theory of Locke into its last hold.

In order to make a comparison, there must be two terms to be compared. Whether these terms are abstractions or realities, is a point not any longer to our purpose to examine; there must always be two terms, or the comparison is impossible. And it is necessary that these terms should be known, that they should be present to the mind,

* On the theory of comparative judgment, see First Series, Vol. IV., Lecture XX., p. 370.

before the mind can compare them and judge. All this is very simple; yet it is sufficient to overthrow the theory of comparative judgment, in respect to reality and existence. For there, in fact, I maintain that judgment does not depend and can not depend upon two terms.

Let us take, for example, personal existence, and see what are the two terms which are to be compared in order to derive from them this judgment: *I exist.* We will, for this time, have nothing to say about the abstraction of self, and the abstraction of existence, which as we have seen can give only an abstract judgment. Let us take an hypothesis more favorable; let us come nearer to reality. It is indubitable, that if we had never thought, if we had never acted, never felt, we should never have known that we exist. Sensation, action, thinking, some phenomenon appearing on the theater of consciousness, is absolutely necessary, in order that the understanding may be able to refer this phenomenon to the subject which experiences it, to that subject which is ourselves. If, then, knowledge is here the fruit of a comparative judgment, the two terms of this judgment must be, on the one hand, action, sensation, thought, and in general every phenomenon of consciousness; and on the other hand, the subject me. I do not see any other possible terms of comparison.

Now what is the nature of these two terms? And first, what is that of the phenomenon of consciousness. The phenomenon of consciousness is given by an immediate apperception which attains it and knows it directly. See, then, already a knowledge; I say a knowledge, for it is either a mere dispute about words, or else an apperception of consciousness is knowledge or it is nothing. But if there is knowledge, there has been judgment; for apparently there has been a belief of knowledge, an affirmation of the truth of this knowledge, tacit or express; whether the affirmation has taken place solely in the depths of the intelligence, or has been pronounced on the

lips in words, at all events it has taken place: and to affirm is to judge. There has then been a judgment. Now there is here again only a single term, namely, the sensation, or action, or thought, in a word, a phenomenon of consciousness. There can not then have been a comparison; therefore again, according to Locke, there can not have been a judgment, if every judgment is comparative. Our cognitions are all resolvable in the last analysis into affirmations of true or false, into jugdments; and it is a contradiction to say that the judgment which gives the first knowledge we have, the knowledge of consciousness, is a comparative judgment, since this knowledge has but a single term, and there must be two terms for every comparison. This single term is nevertheless a knowledge, and consequently it supposes a judgment, but a judgment which eludes the conditions which the theory of Locke imposes upon every judgment.

Thus of the two necessary terms of the comparison from which should result the judgment: *I exist*, the first by itself alone already comprehends a knowledge, a judgment, which is not and can not be comparative. It is just so in regard to the second term. If every phenomenon of consciousness, in so far as known, implies already a judgment, it is evident that the me, which ought also to be known in order to be the second term of the comparison, implies likewise from the very fact of its being known, a judgment and that a judgment which can not have been comparative. In fact, if the comparison of a sensation, a volition, or a thought, with the me, is the foundation of the judgment: *I exist*, it follows that neither the phenomenon, of consciousness, nor the being, me, which are to be the terms of the comparison, should or can, either of them taken by itself, come from the comparison which has not yet taken place. Both of these two terms nevertheless constitute cognitions; the second particularly is an important and fundamental knowledge, which evidently im-

plies a judgment. The theory of comparative judgment falls to pieces, then, in respect to the second term as well as the first; and the two terms necessary, according to Locke, in order that a judgment may take place, contain each a judgment, and a judgment without any comparison.

But there is a second and still greater difficulty. The special characteristic of every knowledge gained in consciousness, is its directness and immediateness. There is an immediate and direct apperception of a sensation or a volition or a thought; hence it is that you can observe and describe them in all their modes and shades, in all their characteristics, relative or particular, fugitive or permanent. Here the judgment has no other principle than the faculty of judging, and the consciousness itself. There is no principle, general or particular, on which consciousness is obliged to depend in order to perceive its own objects. Undoubtedly any phenomenon may take place to no purpose; without an act of attention we shall not perceive it; an act of attention is the condition of every cognition of consciousness; but when this condition is fulfilled, the phenomena of consciousness are perceived and known directly. But it is not with being, with essence, as with a phenomenon; it is not with the me, as with the sensation, volition, or thought. Suppose, when any phenomenon of consciousness is directly perceived, that the understanding was not provided with the principle: that every phenomenon implies a being, every quality implies a subject—the understanding in that case would never be able to form the judgment, that under the sensation, thought or volition, there is the subject me. And bear in mind I do not mean to say that the understanding must know this principle in its general and abstract form; I have shown in another place that such is not the primitive form of principles.* I merely say that the understanding [by the

* See Chap. IV.

ultimate law of its action] must, *consciously or unconsciously, be directed by this principle*, in order to affirm and judge, or even to suspect (which is still judging) that there is some being under the phenomena which consciousness perceives. This principle, properly speaking, is the principle of being; the principle by which self or personality is revealed; I say *revealed*, for the me does not fall under the immediate apperception of consciousness; the understanding conceives and believes it, without the consciousness attaining and seeing it. Sensation, volition, thought, are believed because they are, so to say, seen by the internal intuition of consciousness; the subject of the sensation, of the volition, of the thought, is believed without being seen neither by the external senses (not by them very evidently), nor by the consciousness itself; it is believed [by a law of the mind] because it is conceived. The phenomenon alone is visible to the consciousness, the being is invisible; but the one is a sign of the other, and the visible phenomenon reveals the invisible being, on the faith of the principle in question, without which the understanding would never come forth from the consciousness, from the visible, from the phenomenal, would never attain the invisible, the substance, the me.

Moreover, there is this striking difference between the character of the knowledge of the me, and that of the knowledge of the phenomena of consciousness: the one is a judgment of fact which gives a truth, but a contingent truth, the truth, namely, that at some particular moment there is some particular phenomenon under the eye of consciousness: while the other, when once its condition is supplied, is a necessary judgment; for as soon as an apperception of consciousness is given, we can not help judging that the subject of it, the me, exists. Thus in regard to the second term, the subject, the me, there is not only knowledge and consequently judgment, as is the case in regard to the first term; but there is also a knowledge and

judgment marked with characteristics altogether peculiar. It is, then, absurd to derive the judgment of personal existence from the comparison of two terms, of which the second, in order to be known, supposes already a judgment of a character so remarkable. And it is very evident that this judgment is not comparative; for from what comparison could the me proceed? Invisible, it can not be brought under the eye of consciousness along with the visible phenomenon, in order that they may be compared together. It is not then from a comparison of the two terms that the certainty of the existence of the second is derived; for this second term is given us all at once, with a certainty which neither increases or decreases, which has no degrees. Far from the knowledge of the me and of personal existence coming from a comparison between a phenomenon and the me taken as correlative terms, it is enough to have one single term, namely, a phenomenon of consciousness; and then, on the instant, and without the second term, me, being already otherwise known, the understanding, by its own innate energy and by that of the principle which in such a case directs it, conceives and, as it were, divines, but divines infalliby, this second term, so far forth as the necessary subject of the first. After having thus conceived the second term, the understanding can, if it pleases, place it beside the first, and compare the subject me, with the phenomena of sensation, volition, thought; but this comparison teaches it only what it already knew; and comparison can do this only because the understanding already had the two terms which contain all the knowledge sought from a comparison, and which were acquired anterior to all comparison, by two different judgments, whose only point of resemblance is that they are not comparative.

The judgment of personal existence does not therefore depend upon the comparison of the two terms, but upon a single term, the phenomenon of consciousness. The latter

is given immediately, and having it, the understanding conceives the other, that is, the me and personal existence —hitherto unknown and consequently incapable of serving as the second term of a comparison. Now what is true of personal existence is true of all other existences and of the judgments which reveal them; these judgments rest primitively upon a single datum.

How do we know the external world, bodies and their qualities, according to the theory of Locke? To begin with the qualities of bodies. If we know them, it must be only by a judgment founded upon a comparison, that is upon two terms previously known. Such is the theory: but it is utterly falsified by facts.

I experience a sensation, painful or agreeable, which is perceived by consciousness; this is all that is directly given me, and nothing more; for we must not take for granted the thing in question, the qualities of bodies; the problem is to arrive at the knowledge of them, it will not do to take for granted that they are already known. And you understand in what way we come to the knowledge of them, in what way we pass from the sensation, the apperception of a phenomenon of consciousness to the knowledge of the qualities of external objects.* It is in virtue of the principle of causality, which, the instant any phenomenon begins to appear, leads us irresistibly to seek for a cause of it: and in our inability to refer to ourselves the cause of the involuntary sensation actually under the eye of consciousness, we refer it to a cause other than ourselves, foreign to us, that is external. We make as many causes as there are distinct classes of sensations, and these different classes are the powers, the properties, the qualities of bodies. It is not therefore by a comparison that we come to know the qualities of bodies; for the involuntary sensation alone is given us at first, and it is after this sensation alone, that the mind passes the judgment, that it is impos-

* See Chap. IV

sible this sensation should be self-produced, that it therefore refers to a cause, to an external cause, which is some particular quality of bodies.

The theory of comparison can not then give the qualities of body: still less does it give the *substratum*, the subject of these qualities. You do not believe that there is merely extension, resistance, solidity, hardness, softness, savor, color, etc., before you; but you believe that there is something which is colored, extended, resistant, solid, hard, etc. But it will not do to begin by presupposing this something at the same time with its qualities, so as to have these two terms: solidity, resistance, hardness, etc., *and* something really solid, resisting, hard, etc.—two terms which you are then to compare in order to decide whether they agree or disagree. This is not the actual process; at first you have solely the qualities, which are given you by the application of the principle of causality to your sensations; then, and from this datum alone, you judge that these qualities can not but belong to some subject of the same nature; and this subject is body.* It is not therefore to the comparison of two terms of which the one, namely, the subject of sensible qualities, was at first entirely unknown, that you owe the knowledge of body.

It is just so in regard to space. There again, you have but a single term, a single datum, namely, bodies; and upon that alone, without having any other term, you judge and can not help judging that bodies are in space. The knowledge of space is the fruit of this judgment which has nothing to do with any comparison; for you knew nothing of space anterior to the judgment; but a body being given, you judge that space exists, and it is then only, that the idea of space comes up, that is to say, the second term.†

The same thing holds in regard to time. In order to judge that the succession of events is in time, you do not have, on the one hand, the idea of succession, and on the

* See Chap III. † Ibid

other, the idea of time: you have but one term, namely, the succession of events, whether external events, or internal events—our sensations, thoughts, or acts; and this single term being given, you judge, without comparing it with time which is as yet profoundly unknown to you, that the succession of events is in time: from hence the idea, the knowledge of time. Thus this knowledge, so far from being the fruit of a comparison, becomes the possible basis of an ulterior comparison only on the condition that it has first been given you in a judgment not dependent upon two terms, but upon a single term, namely, the succession of events.*

This is still more evident in regard to the infinite. If we know the infinite, we must by the theory of Locke, know it through a judgment, and that a comparative judgment. Now the two terms of this judgment can not be two finite terms; for the finite could never give the infinite; it must be the finite and the infinite between which the mind discovers the relation of agreement or disagreement. But I have, I think, demonstrated, and I need here only refer to it,* that it is enough for us to have the idea of the finite given us, and we are instantly led to the judgment that the infinite exists; or, to keep within the limits of the topics there discussed, the infinite is an attribute of time and of space, which we necessarily conceive, by occasion of the finite and contingent attributes of body and of the succession of events. The mind is so constituted, that, on occasion of the finite, it can not help conceiving the infinite. The finite is previously known; but it is known entirely alone: it is known directly, by the senses or by consciousness; the infinite is invisible and escapes our grasp; it is only conceivable and comprehensible; it eludes the senses or the consciousness, and falls only under the reason; it is neither one of the two terms of a comparison, nor the fruit of it; it is given us in a judgment passed on a single term, the idea

* See Chapter III.

of the finite. So much for judgments pertaining to existence in general.

There are also many other judgments, not relating to existence, which present the same character. I shall content myself with referring to the judgments of good and evil, of the beautiful and the ugly. In both cases the judgment depends upon a single term; and it is the judgment itself which attains and reveals the other term, instead of resulting from the comparison of the two terms.

According to the theory of Locke, in order to judge whether an action is right or wrong, good or bad, it would be requisite to have, first, the idea of the action, and then the idea of right and wrong, and then, to compare the one with the other. But in order to compare an action with the idea of right and wrong, it is necessary to have that idea, that knowledge: and that knowledge supposes a judgment. The question then is: whence comes this judgment, and how is it formed. Now we have seen,* that in view of particular actions, which to the eyes of the senses are destitute of any moral character, the understanding is so constituted that it takes the initiative, and attributes to these actions, indifferent to the sensibility, the quality of right or wrong, good or bad. From this primitive judgment, which undoubtedly has its law, analysis at a later period derives the idea of right and wrong, which thenceforward serves as the rule of our subsequent judgments.

The forms of objects are to the sense, whether external or internal, neither beautiful nor ugly. Take away the intelligence, and there is for us no longer any beauty in external forms and things. What in fact do the senses teach you concerning forms? Nothing, except that they are round or square, colored, etc. What does consciousness teach you? Nothing, but that they give you agreeable or disagreeable sensations. But between the agreeable or

* Chapter V

disagreeable, the square or round, the green or yellow, etc., and the beautiful or the ugly, there is an immense chasm. While the senses and the consciousness perceive such or such a form, such or such a feeling more or less agreeable; the understanding on the other hand, conceives the beautiful, as it does the good and the true, by a primitive and spontaneous judgment, the whole validity of which resides in that of the understanding and its laws, and of which the sole datum is an external perception.

I have then demonstrated, I believe, and perhaps too much at length, that the theory of Locke, which makes knowledge to rest upon comparison, that is upon two terms previously known, does not explain the true process of the mind in the acquisition of a great many of its cognitions; and in general, I here bring forward again the criticism I have so many times made upon Locke, that he always confounds either, the antecedents of a knowledge with the knowledge itself, as when he confounded body with space, succession with time, the finite with the infinite, effect with cause, qualities and their aggregate with substance; or, which is a mistake not less grave, the consequences of a knowledge with the knowledge itself. Here, for example, the comparative judgments which pertain to existence (and the same holds in other cases) require two terms, which again suppose a previous judgment founded on a single term, and consequently not comparative. Comparative judgments presuppose judgments not comparative. Comparative judgments are abstract, and suppose real judgments; they teach us scarcely any thing but what the others had already taught: they mark explicitly what the others had taught implicitly, but yet decisively; they are arbitrary, at least in the form: the others are universal and necessary; they need the aid of language; the others are strictly speaking, above language, above all conventional signs, and suppose necessarily nothing but the understanding and its laws. Comparative judgments pertain

to reflection and to artificial logic; primitive and not comparative judgments constitute the natural and spontaneous logic of the human race. To confound these two classes of judgments, is to vitiate at once all psychology and all logic; and yet such a confusion fills a large portion of the Fourth Book of the Essay on the Understanding.

I shall now pass rapidly over the different fundamental points with which this book is taken up, and you will see that, for the most part, we shall find continually the same error, the results of judgments confounded with the judgments themselves: this criticism applies directly to the seventh chapter concerning *axioms*.

If I made myself fully understood in my last lecture, it must be very evident to you that axioms, principles, general truths, are the product and expression of propositions, which are the expressions of primitive judgments. There are no axioms in the primary development of the understanding. There is an understanding which, when certain external or internal conditions are fulfilled, by virtue of its own laws, passes certain judgments, sometimes local and contingent, sometimes universal and necessary. These latter judgments, when we operate upon them by analysis and language, resolve themselves, like the others, into propositions; and these propositions being universal and necessary, like the judgments which they express, are what we call axioms. But it is clear that the form of the primitive judgments is one thing, and the form of these same judgments when reduced to propositions and axioms, is another thing. At first, concrete, particular, and determinate, at the same time that they are universal and necessary, language and analysis raise them to the abstract form which is the actual form of axioms. Thus in the primitive action of the mind, a particular phenomenon being under the eye of consciousness, you instinctively referred it to a subject which is yourself. But at present, instead

of abandoning the mind to its laws, you recall them to it, you submit it to the axiom: Every phenomenon implies a subject to which it is referred; and so of the other axioms: All succession supposes time; every body supposes space; the finite supposes the infinite, etc. Do not fail to notice that these axioms have no force but what they borrow from the primitive judgments from which they are deduced. It is to primitive judgments we owe all real and fundamental knowledge, the knowledge of ourselves, of the world, of time, of space, and even, as I have shown in the last lecture, the knowledge of magnitude and of unity. But in respect to axioms it is not so. You acquire no real knowledge, for instance, by the application of the axiom; every effect supposes a cause. It is the philosopher, and not the man, that makes use of this axiom. The savage, the peasant, the uneducated, know nothing of it; but they all, as well as the philosopher, are provided with an understanding which makes them pass certain judgments, concrete, positive and determinate, and at the same time, necessary, the result of which is the knowledge of such or such a particular cause. The judgments and their laws, I repeat, are what produce all knowledge; axioms are only the analytic expression of those judgments and laws, the ultimate elements of which they express under their most abstract form. Locke, however, instead of stopping within these limits, pretends that axioms are of no use; that they are not the principles of the sciences; and he demands somewhat contemptuously, to be shown a science founded upon axioms: "it has been my ill luck," says he (§ 11), "never to meet with any such sciences; much less any one built upon these two maxims, *what is, is:* and, *it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.* And I would be glad to be shown where any such science, erected upon these or any other general axioms, is to be found; and should be obliged to any one who would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built

on these or any such like maxims, that could not be shown to stand as firm without any consideration of them."—Now, it is indeed true beyond all doubt, that axioms, in their actual form of axioms, never engendered any science: but it is no less true that, in their source and under their primitive form, that is, in the laws of the natural judgments from which they are deduced, they have served as the basis of all the sciences. Moreover, although in their actual form, they never have made and can not make any science, and although they give no particular truth; yet it must be recognized that without them, no science, no truth general or particular, subsists. Endeavor to deny the axioms; to suppose, for instance, that there can be a quality without a subject, a body without space, succession without time, etc.; set yourselves to turning into abstractions the axioms with which Locke has chosen to amuse himself, namely, *what is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;* that is to say, turn into an abstraction the idea of being, and of identity; and there is an end of all science; it can neither advance nor sustain itself.

Locke pretends also (Ch. VII. § 9), that the axioms are not the truths which we know first. True, again, without doubt, the axioms, under their actual form, are not primitive cognitions; but, under their real form, as laws governing the exercise of the understanding, and implied in our judgments, they are so truly primitive that without them no knowledge could be acquired. They are not indeed primitive as being the first truths which we know, but as those without which no others would be known. Here returns again the perpetual confusion in Locke of the historical and of the logical order of human knowledge. In the chronological order, we did not begin by knowing the axiom, the laws of our understanding; but, logically, without the axioms, no truth is admissible; without the operation, unnoticed, indeed, but real operation, of the laws of

thought, no thought, no judgment is either legitimate or possible.

At last, Locke combats the axioms by a celebrated argument, since his time frequently renewed, namely, that the axioms are nothing but frivolous propositions, because they are identical propositions (Ch. VII. § 11). It is Locke, I believe, who introduced, or at least gave vogue to the expression, identical proposition, in the language of philosophy. It signifies a judgment, a proposition, wherein an idea is affirmed of itself; wherein we affirm of a thing what was already known concerning it. Elsewhere (Ch. VIII., *of trifling propositions;* § 3, *of identical propositions*), Locke shows that identical propositions are merely verbal propositions. "Let any one repeat as often as he pleases, that *the will is the will; . . . . a law is a law;* and *obligation is obligation; right is right; wrong is wrong;* . . . . what is this more than trifling with words?" "It is," says he, "but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other; and had he words, might, no doubt, have said; oyster in right hand is subject, and oyster in left hand is predicate; and so might have made a self-evident proposition of oyster, that is: *oyster is oyster.*" Hence the condemnation of the axiom: *that which is, is,* etc. But it is not exact, it is not fair, to concentrate all axioms, all principles, all primitive and necessary truths into the axiom: *what is, is; the same is the same;* and to the trifling and ridiculous examples of Locke, I oppose, as examples, the following axioms, which have already been brought forward: *quality supposes a subject; succession supposes time; body supposes space; the finite supposes the infinite; variety supposes unity; phenomenon supposes substance and being;*—in short, all the necessary truths which our foregoing discussion must have fixed in your minds. The question is, whether these are identical propositions. In order to show that they are, Locke maintains that time is reducible to succession, or succession to

time; space to body, or body to space; the infinite to the finite, or the finite to the infinite; phenomenon to being, or being to phenomenon, etc. Locke by his system should thus maintain. But it ought by this time to be sufficiently evident to you that this pretension, and the system on which it rests, do not stand the test of reason.

This proscription of axioms as identical, Locke extends to propositions which are not axioms; and in general, he perceives very many more identical propositions than there are. For instance, gold is heavy, gold is fusible, are to Locke (Ch. VIII. § 5 and 13) identical. Nothing is further from the truth, however; we do not in these propositions affirm the same thing of the same. A proposition is called identical, whenever the attribute is contained in the subject in such sort that the subject can not be conceived as not containing it. Thus, when you say that body is solid, I say that you make an identical proposition, because it is impossible to have the idea of body without having that of solidity.

The idea of body is perhaps more extended than that of solidity, but it is primarily and essentially the same. The idea of solidity being, then, for you the essential quality of body, to say that body is solid, is to say nothing else than that body is body. But when you say that gold is fusible, you affirm, of gold, a quality which might, or might not belong to it. It involves a contradiction to say a body is not solid; but it involves no contradiction to suppose that gold might not be fusible. Gold might for a long time be known solely as a solid, as hard, yellow, etc.; if the experiment had not been made, if it had not been put in the fire, it would not be known that it is fusible. When, then, you affirm of gold that it is fusible, you recognize in it a quality which you may not have known before: certainly you do not affirm the same of the same, at least when you first make the assertion. At the present day, it is true, in the laboratory of modern chemistry, where the

fusibility of gold is a quality universally reçognized, to say that gold is fusible, is to repeat what is already known; it is to affirm of the word gold what is already comprised in the received signification; but, originally, the first one who affirmed that gold is fusible, far from making a tautology, on the contrary, expressed the result of discovery, and a discovery not made without difficulty and not without importance. I may ask whether Locke in his time would have mocked at the proposition, that the atmosphere has weight, as an identical and frivolous proposition? Certainly not; and why? Because at that time, weight was a quality of the air which had hardly come to be demonstrated by the experiments of Toricelli and of Pascal. Those which established the fusibility and weight of gold were earlier by some thousands of years; but if the assertion of the gravity of the atmosphere is not an identical proposition, neither, on the same ground, is that of the fusibility of gold; since the first who announced these qualities did not affirm in one term what had already been affirmed in the other.

As to the rest, it is worth while to note the fate of identical truths. Locke saw a great many more than there are, and ridiculed them. The school of Locke has perceived still more of them; but far from condemning them on that score, it treats them with respect; it even goes so far as to lay down as the condition of every true proposition that it must be identical. Thus, by a strange progress, what Locke had branded with ridicule, as frivolous, became in the hands of his successors a mark of legitimacy and truth. The identity ridiculed by Locke was nothing but a fictitious identity; and now, see this pretended identity, so much scouted by him, and so unreasonably, because it is not real, see it celebrated and vaunted in his school, with still less reason, as the triumph of truth and the last conquest of science and analysis. Now, if all true propositions are identical, as every identical proposition, whether

according to Locke, it be frivolous, or according to his disciples not so, is, according to both, only a verbal proposition, it follows that the knowledge of all possible truths is only a verbal knowledge; and thus, when we think that we have learned science or systems of truth, we have really done nothing but translate one word into another; we only learn words, and a language. Hence the famous principle, that all science is only a language, dictionaries well or ill formed. Hence the reduction of the human mind to grammar.

I pass now to other theories which remain to be examined in the Fourth Book of the Essay.

Ch. XVII. *Of Reason.*—I have scarcely any thing but praise to bestow upon this chapter. Locke there shows (§ 4), that the syllogism is not the sole nor the principal instrument of reasoning. The evidence of demonstration is not the only evidence; there is, besides, the evidence of intuition, upon which Locke himself rests the evidence of demonstration; and, also, a third kind of evidence which Locke misconceived, namely, the evidence of induction.

Now, the syllogism is of no service in regard to the evidence of induction; for the syllogism proceeds from the general to the particular, while induction proceeds from the particular to the general. The syllogism, too, serves no purpose in regard to intuition, which is knowledge direct and without an intermediate. It is of use, then, only in respect to demonstrative evidence. But Locke does not stop here; he goes even so far (§ 6) as to pretend that the syllogism adds nothing to our knowledge, and that it is only a means of disputing. I here recognize the language of a man who wrote near the end of the seventeenth century, still absorbed in the movement of reaction against the Scholastic philosophy. The Scholastic philosophy admitted, as Locke did, the evidence of intuition and demonstration; it forgot, like Locke, the evidence of

induction; even more, being forbidden to choose for itself and to examine its principle, it scarcely employed any other evidence than demonstrative; and consequently it made the syllogism its favorite weapon. A reaction therefore against the Scholastic philosophy was necessary and legitimate. But every reaction goes too far. Hence the proscription of the syllogism; a blind and unjust proscription, for deductive knowledge is still real knowledge. There are two things in the syllogism, the form and the substance. The substance is the real and special process by which the human mind goes from the general to the particular; and certainly it is a process of which account should be made in a faithful and complete description of the human mind. It is not the work of a school, it is common to the ignorant and the learned; it is an original and fruitful principle of cognitions and of truths, since it is that which gives all consequences. As to the form, so well described and so well developed by Aristotle, it is undoubtedly liable to abuse; but still it has a very useful office. In general, all reasoning which can not be put into this form, is vague reasoning, which should be mistrusted; while every true demonstration naturally submits itself to this form. The syllogistic form, it is true, is often nothing but a test applied to explain a deduction already made, but as a test, it is not without great value, a sort of guaranty of strictness and exactitude of which we should do unwisely to deprive ourselves. It is not right to say that the syllogism lends itself as readily to the demonstration of the false as of the true; for let any error whatever be taken in the order of deduction, and I defy it to be put into a regular syllogism. The only remark which holds true, is that the human mind is not to be found entire in the syllogism, neither in the process which constitutes it, nor in the form which expresses it; because reason is not entire in reasoning, nor is all evidence reducible to that of demonstration. On the contrary, as Locke himself very clearly saw, the evidence

of demonstration would not exist if there were not previously the evidence of intuition. Within these limits Locke's criticism of the syllogism must be confined.

This same chapter XVII., contains several passages (at § 7, and seq.) on the necessity of seeking for discoveries by some other instrument than the syllogism. But, unfortunately with more of promise than performance, these passages give no definite indication. In order to find this new instrument, Locke had nothing to do but to open Bacon's *Novum Organum*, and he would have there found perfectly described both sensible intuition and rational intuition, and above all, induction. We are compelled to suspect that he had very little acquaintance with Bacon, when we see him darkly groping after, and unable to find, the new route opened a half century before, and already put in such clear light by his immortal countryman.

One of the best chapters of Locke is that on *Faith and Reason* (Ch. XVIII). Locke assigns the exact province of reason and of faith He indicates their relative office and their distinct limits. He had already said (Ch. XVII. § 24) that faith in general is so little contrary to reason, that it is nothing else than the assent of reason to itself: "I think it may not be amiss to take notice that however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind; which if it be regulated, as is our duty, can not be afforded to any thing but upon good reason, and so can not be opposite to it."

And when he comes to treat of positive faith, that is, of revelation, in spite of his respect, or rather by reason of his profound respect for Christianity, even while admitting (Ch. XVIII. § 7) the celebrated distinction between things according to reason, contrary to reason, and above reason, he declares that no revelation, whether immediate or traditional, can be admitted contrary to reason. Here are the words of Locke, § 5:

"*No proposition can be received for divine revelation,*

or obtain the assent due to all such, *if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge.* Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence and assent whatsoever; and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In propositions, therefore, contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of *faith.* They can not move our assent under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts our knowledge. Because though faith be founded on the testimony of God (who can not lie), revealing any proposition to us, yet we can not have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge; since the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our own knowledge that God revealed it; which, in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our own knowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, namely, that we can not tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful author of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of knowledge he has given us, render all our faculties useless, wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship, our understandings."*

* I can not forbear giving, on this important subject, the passage from *Nouveaux Essais* of Leibnitz corresponding to that of Locke, a passage entirely in accordance with what I have elsewhere more than once expressed. Leibnitz had even begun to question the celebrated distinction according to reason and above reason. It is curious and interesting. "I find something to remark on your [Locke's] definition of that which is above reason, at least if you take the received usage of this word; for it seems to me that, from the manner in which that definition is framed, it goes too far on one side.—I approve very strongly of your disposition

I wish I were equally satisfied with Chapter XIX., *On Enthusiasm.* But it seems to me that Locke has not profoundly apprehended his subject; he has made a satire rather than a philosophical description.

to found faith in reason; for without this, why should we prefer the Bible to the Koran, or to the sacred books of the Bramins? This is recognized by theologians and other learned men; and hence it is that we have such excellent treatises on the truth of the Christian religion, and so many fine arguments put out against the pagans and other infidels, ancient and modern. Hence, also, enlightened men have always held as suspicious, those persons who have pretended that it is not necessary to put one's self to the trouble of reasons and proofs when the question is about believing; a thing impossible, in fact, unless believing signify reciting or repeating and then letting pass away, without troubling ourselves to understand, which many persons do, and which is also characteristic of some nations more than of others. This is why some Aristotelian philosophers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, wishing to maintain two contrary truths, the one philosophical, the other theological, were rightly opposed by the last Lateran council, under Leo X.

A similar dispute formerly arose at Helmstadt, between Hoffman, the theologian, and Martin, the philosopher; but with this difference, that the philosopher would conciliate philosophy with religion, while the theologian wished to reject the use of it. But the founder of the university, the Duke Julius, decided in favor of philosophy. It is a fact, indeed, that in our times, a person of the highest eminence has declared, in respect to articles of faith, that it was necessary to shut the eyes in order to see clearly; and Tertullian says somewhere, this is impossible, therefore it is true; it is to be believed, for it is an absurdity. But if the intention of those who express themselves in this way, is good, the expressions themselves are extravagant, and may do hurt.—Faith is grounded on the motives to belief, and on the internal grace which determines the mind immediately, [this theological distinction of Leibnitz is a bottom to our philosophical distinction between spontaneous reason and reflective reason]. It must be allowed that there are many judgments more evident than those which depend on these grounds or motives of credibility. Some are further advanced in a knowledge of them than others, and there are many persons even, who have never known, and still less weighed, and consequently have not any thing that can be called the [external] ground, or evidence of their faith. But the internal grace of the Holy Spirit supplies it immediately. It is true that God never gives it, but where the faith which it produces is in something

What, in fact, is enthusiasm according to Locke? It is: 1, the pretension of referring to a positive, privileged, and personal revelation, to a divine illumination made in our particular favor, our own peculiar sentiments, which often are nothing but extravagances; 2, the pretension, still more absurd, of imposing upon others these imaginations, as superior orders clothed with divine authority. (See § 5. and 6.) These are indeed the follies of enthusiasm. But is enthusiasm nothing but this?

that is really grounded in reason, otherwise he would destroy the means of knowledge; but it is not necessary that all those who have this divine faith should know those reasons or evidences, and still less that they should have them always before their eyes; for in such a case, feeble minded persons and idiots could never have true faith, and the most enlightened would not have it when they might stand most in need of it, for they could not always recollect the reasons for believing.—The question of the use of reason in theology has been greatly agitated as much between the Socinians and the Catholics as between the Reformed and the Lutherans.—We may say that the Socinians go too far in rejecting every thing that is not conformed to the order of nature, even when they can not prove its impossibility; but their adversaries go too far in sometimes urging mysteries to the borders of contradiction, by which they injure the truth they wish to defend.—How can faith establish any thing that overthrows a principle, without which all belief, affirmation, or denial, would be vain? But it seems to me there still remains a question, which the authors of whom I speak have not sufficiently examined. It is this: Suppose that on the one hand we have the literal sense of a passage of Scripture, and on the other a great appearance of logical impossibility, or, at least, of acknowledged physical impossibility; is it more reasonable to hold to the literal sense, or to the philosophical principle? It is certain that there are passages in which we have no hesitation in departing from the literal sense, as when, etc.—It is here that the rules of interpretation come in. The two authors of whom I speak (Musaeus and Videlius), still dispute concerning the attempt of Kekerman to demonstrate the Trinity by reason, as Raymond Lully had attempted before. But Musaeus acknowledges with great fairness, that if the demonstration of the reformed author had been good and sound, he should have had nothing to say, and that the author would have been right in maintaining that the light of the Holy Spirit could be increased by philosophy."

Locke has elsewhere perfectly seen that the evidence of demonstration is founded upon that of intuition. He has even said that of these two kinds of evidence, the evidence of intuition is not only anterior to the other, but is superior to it, and is the highest degree of knowledge (Ch. XVII. § 14). "Intuitive knowledge is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any, this being the highest of all human certainty. In this consists the evidence of all those maxims which nobody has any doubt about, but every man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be true as soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the discovery of and assent to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence; and such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think that angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect shall have in a future state, of thousands of things, which now either wholly escape our apprehensions, or which, our short-sighted reason having got some faint glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after. . . ." I accept this statement, let it be consistent or not as the case may be, with the general system of Locke. I add that intuitive knowledge, in many cases, for example, in regard to time, space, personal identity, the infinite, all substantial existences, as also, the good and the beautiful, has, you know, this peculiarity, that it is not grounded upon the senses nor upon the consciousness, but upon the reason, which, without the intervention of any reasoning, attains its objects and conceives them with certainty. Now, it is an attribute inherent in the reason, to believe in itself; and from hence comes faith. If, then, intuitive reason is above inductive and demonstrative reason, the faith of reason in itself in intuition, is purer and more elevated than the faith of reason in itself in induction and demonstration. Recollect likewise that the truths intuitively discovered by reason are not arbitrary,

but necessary; that they are not relative, but absolute. The authority of reason is absolute; it is then a characteristic of the faith attached to reason to be like reason absolute. These are the admirable characteristics of reason, and of the faith of reason in itself.

This is not all. When we interrogate reason as to the source of that absolute authority which characterizes it, we are forced to recognize that this reason is not ours, nor, consequently is the authority which belongs to it ours. It is not in our power to make reason give us such or such a truth, or not to give it to us. Independently of our will, reason intervenes, and, when certain conditions are fulfilled, suggests to us, I might say, imposes upon us, these truths. Reason makes its appearance in us, though it is not ourselves, and can in no way be confounded with our personality. Reason is impersonal. Whence then comes this wonderful guest within us, and what is the principle of this reason which enlightens us, without belonging to us? This principle is God, the first and the last principle of every thing. When reason knows that it comes from God, the faith it had in itself increases not merely in degree, but in nature, by as much, so to say, as the eternal substance is superior to the finite substance. Thus comes a redoubled faith in the truths revealed by the supreme reason in the shadows of time and in the limits of our weakness.*

See, then, reason become to its own eyes divine in its principle. Now this state of reason which hears itself and takes itself as the echo of God on the earth, with the particular and extraordinary characteristics connected with it, is what is called enthusiasm. The word sufficiently explains the thing; enthusiasm [Θεος εν ἡμιν] is the breath of God within us; it is immediate intuition, opposed to induction and demonstration; it is the primitive spontaneity opposed to the ulterior development of reflection; it is the apperception of the highest truths by reason in its

* See Introduction to the History of Philosophy, Lect. VI.

greatest independence both of the senses and of our personality. Enthusiasm in its highest degree, in its crisis, so to say, belongs only to particular individuals, and to them only in particular circumstances; but in its lowest degree, enthusiasm pertains not to any particular individual, or epoch, but to human nature, in all men, in all conditions, and almost at every hour. It is enthusiasm which produces spontaneous convictions and resolutions, in little as in great, in the hero as in the feeblest woman. Enthusiasm is the poetic spirit in every thing; and the poetic spirit, thanks to God, does not belong exclusively to poets; it has been given to all men in some degree, more or less pure, more or less elevated; it appears most in particular men, and in particular moments of the life of such men, who are the poets by eminence. It is enthusiasm likewise which produces religions, for every religion supposes two things: that the truths which it proclaims are absolute truths; and that it proclaims them in the name of God himself who reveals them to it.

Thus far all is well: we are still within the conditions of reason; for it is reason which is the foundation of faith and of enthusiasm, of heroism, of poetry and of religion. And when the poet, when the priest, repudiate reason in the name and behalf of enthusiasm and faith, they do nothing else, whether they are aware or ignorant of it (and it is the affair neither of poets, nor of priests, to give account of what they do), they do nothing else, I say, than put one mode of reason above other modes of the same reason; for, if immediate intuition is above ratiocination, yet it none the less pertains to reason. But it is in vain to try to repudiate reason; we always make use of it. Enthusiasm is a rational fact, which has its place in the order of natural facts, and in the history of the human mind; only this fact is extremely delicate, and enthusiasm may easily turn into folly. We are here upon the doubtful border between reason and extravagance. See the legitimate principle, the universal

and necessary principle of religions, a principle which must not be confounded with the aberrations by which it may be corrupted. Thus disengaged and set in a clear light by analysis, philosophy ought to recognize it, if it wishes to recognize all the essential facts, all the elements of reason and of humanity.

See now how error begins. Enthusiasm is, I repeat, that spontaneous intuition of truth by reason, as independent as possible of the personality and of the senses. But it often happens that the senses and the personality introduce themselves into the inspiration itself and mingle with it material, arbitrary, false and ridiculous details. It happens likewise, that those who share, in a superior degree, this revelation of God which is made in some measure to all men, imagine it to be peculiar to themselves, and denied to others, not only in this degree, but totally and absolutely. They set up in their minds, in their own behalf, a sort of privilege of inspiration; and as in inspiration we feel the duty of submitting ourselves to the truths which inspiration reveals, and the sacred mission of proclaiming and spreading them, we frequently go to the extent of supposing that it is also a duty for us, while submitting ourselves to these truths, to subject others likewise to them, and to impose them upon others, not in virtue of our own power and personal illumination, but in virtue of the superior power from which all inspiration emanates. On our knees ourselves, before the principle of our enthusiasm and our faith, we wish also to make others bend their knees to the same principle, to make them adore and serve it, for the same reason that we adore and serve it. From hence religious authority; from hence also tyranny. Men begin by believing in special revelations made in their favor; they end by regarding themselves as delegates of God and Providence, commissioned not only to enlighten and save teachable souls, but to enlighten and save, spite of themselves, those who resist the truth and God.

But the folly and the tyranny, which, I grant, sometimes spring from the principle of inspiration, because we are feeble, and consequently exclusive, and therefore intolerant, are essentially distinct from the principle. We can and we ought to do honor to the principle, while at the same time we condemn the errors connected with it. But instead of this, Locke confounds the abuse of the principle, that is to say, extravagant enthusiasm, peculiar to some men, with the principle itself, the true enthusiasm which has been given in some degree to all men. In enthusiasm throughout he sees nothing but a disordered movement of the imagination; and every where he sets himself to putting up barriers to all passing beyond the circle of authentic and properly interpreted passages of the Holy Scriptures. I approve this prudence; I allow it at all times; and I think still better of it when I recollect the extravagances of Puritan enthusiasm which Locke had the spectacle of before his eyes. But prudence should never degenerate into injustice. What would the Sensual school say, if, from prudence likewise, idealism should wish to suppress the senses on account of the excesses to which the senses may and very often do conduct, or reasoning, on account of the sophisms which it engenders? We must be wise within bounds, *sobrie sapere;* we must be wise within the limits of humanity and of nature; and Locke was wrong in looking at enthusiasm so much less in itself, than in its consequences, and even in its foolish and pernicious consequences.

Next follows Ch. XX. *On the causes of Error.* Nearly all those signalized by Locke had been recognized before him. They are: 1, want of proofs; 2, want of ability to use them; 3, want of will to use them; 4, wrong measures of probability which are reduced by Locke to the four following: 1, propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles; 2, received hypotheses; 3, predominant passions or

inclinations; 4, authority. This whole chapter may be read with profit; but I shall dwell only upon the last section (18th), entitled; "*Men not in so many errors as is imagined.*" I avow that I was singularly pleased, from the optimism which you know I cherish, with the title of this paragraph. I hoped to find in the good and wise Locke these two propositions which are so dear to me; first that men do not so much believe in error as in truth; and secondly, that there is no error in which there is not some share, however small, of truth. So far from this, however, I perceived that Locke, in this matter of error, makes an apology for human nature that is but little creditable to it. If men are not the fools which they appear to be, it is, according to Locke, because they really have but little faith in the foolish opinions with which they have the air of being so persuaded; but follow them merely from habit, excitement or interest. "They are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has engaged them in; and there, like the common soldiers of an army, show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without even so much as examining or knowing the cause they contend for. . . . It is enough for a man to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit, preferment, or protection in that society."

Here, again, Locke suffered himself to be disturbed by the spectacles presented by his own times; when, amid so many follies, there might very likely be some of them dissembled; but all were not so, and could not be. I allow that in times of revolution, ambition frequently takes the standard of extravagances which it does not believe in, in order to lead the crowd; but it is not right to calumniate even ambition. Every thing is entire in humanity; and a man may be at the same time both very ambitious and very sincere. Cromwell, for instance, was, in my opinion,

a sincere Puritan even to fanaticism; and likewise greedy of power to a degree that made him a hypocrite in order to gain it; yet still his hypocrisy is more secure and more doubtful than his fanaticism. Probably it only led him to exaggerate the opinions which were really in his heart, and to caress the passions, which he himself shared. His tyranny is not a proof that his republican ardor was assumed. There are times when the popular cause needs a master; and when the good sense which perceives this necessity, and the genius which feels its own strength, easily impel an ardent mind to arbitray power, without implying excessive egotism. Pericles, Cæsar, Cromwell, and another still, might very sincerely have loved equality in the midst of a dictatorship. There is perhaps now in the world a man, whose ambition is the last hope of the country which he has twice saved, and which alone he can save again by applying a firm hand.* But let us leave great men, who, to expiate their superiority and their glory, are often condemed not to be comprehended; let us leave the chiefs, and come to the multitude. Here the explanation of Locke fails. We can, indeed, explain to a certain extent the foolish opinions of some men by the interest they have in simulating those of the masses upon whom they wish to support themselves; but the masses can not hold false opinions by imposture; for apparently they have no wish to deceive themselves. No; this is not the way to justify error and humanity. Their true apology is that which I have so many times given, and which I shall never cease to repeat: that there is no total error in an intelligent and rational being. Men, individuals and nations, men of genius and ordinary men, unquestionably give in to many errors, and attach themselves to them; but not to that which makes them errors, but to the part of truth which is in them. Examine to the bottom all the celebrated

* The allusion is to Bolivar.

errors, political, religious, philosophical; there is not one which has not a considerable portion of truth in it; and it is to this it owes its reception in the minds of the great men, who introduced it upon the scene of the world, and in the minds of the multitude, who have followed the great men. It is the truth joined to the error, which gives to the error its force, which gives it birth, sustains it, spreads it, explains and excuses it. Errors gain success in the world, no otherwise than by carrying along with them, and offering, as it were, for their ransom, so much of truth, as, piercing through the mists which envelop it, enlighten and carry forward the human race. I approve entirely, then, the title of Locke's paragraph; but I reject his development of it.*

The *twenty-first* Chapter contains a division of the sciences into physics, practics, and logic or grammar. By physics, Locke understands the nature of things, not only of bodies, but of spirits, God and the soul; it is the ancient physics and the modern ontology. I have nothing to say of this division but that it is very ancient, obviously arbitrary and superficial, and very much inferior to the celebrated division of Bacon, reproduced by D'Alembert. I find it indeed very difficult to believe that the author of this division could have known this division of Bacon. I

* I am happy to confirm an opinion so dear to me by the greatest authority that I can recognize among the moderns, that of Leibnitz. The following is his reply on this point to Locke: "the justice you would do to the human race does not turn to its credit; for men would be much more excusable in following their opinions sincerely, than in counterfeiting them from motives of interest. Perhaps, however, there is more sincerity in point of fact than you seem to accord; for without any knowledge of the cause, they may come to exercise an implicit faith by submitting themselves generally and sometimes blindly, but always in good faith, to the judgment of others whose authority they have once recognized. It is true that the advantage they may find in it may contribute something to producing this submission; but this may not prevent their opinions being heartily entertained."

see rather, in this, as also in the Third Book concerning signs and language, marks of the reading and recollection of Hobbes.

We have at length come to the end of this long analysis of the *Fourth Book* of the Essay of Locke. I have followed, step by step, all the important propositions contained in it, as I have done in regard to the preceding books. I should not, however, give a complete view of the Essay on the Human Understanding, if I should stop without exhibiting some theories of great importance, which are not thrown in episodically in the work of Locke, but pertain closely to the general spirit of his system, and have acquired in the Sensual school an immense authority. It has appeared to me proper to reserve these theories for a special examination.

CHAPTER X.

OF LIBERTY.—OF THE SOUL.—OF GOD.—CONCLUSION.

Examination of three important Theories found in the Essay on the Human Understanding: 1. Theory of Freedom; which inclines to Fatalism. 2. Theory of the Nature of the Soul; which inclines to Materialism. 3. Theory of the Existence of God which rests itself almost exclusively upon external proofs, drawn from the sensible world. —Recapitulation of the whole Examination of the Essay of Locke; the Merits and the Faults which have been pointed out.—Of the spirit which has governed this Examination.—Conclusion.

The theories which I wish to now discuss, are those concerning Liberty, the Soul, and God. I wish to explain these three theories in the order in which they occur in the Essay on the Human Understanding.

In order to enable you to comprehend clearly the true character of Locke's theory of Liberty, some preliminary explanations are indispensable.

All the facts which can fall under the consciousness of man, and under the reflection of the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental facts, which comprise all the rest; three facts which without doubt are never in reality solitary; but which are not the less distinct; and which a careful analysis ought to distinguish, without dividing, in the complex phenomenon of intellectual life. These three facts are expressed in the words: *to feel, to think, to act.*

I open a book and read; let us decompose this fact, and we shall find in it three elements.

Suppose I do not see the letters of which each page is composed, nor the form and order of the letters; it is quite obvious I shall not comprehend the meaning which usage has attached to those letters, and so I shall not read. To see, then, is here the condition of reading. But, on the other hand, to see is still not to read; for, the letters being seen, nothing would be done if the intelligence were not superadded to the sense of sight, in order to comprehend the signification of the letters placed before my eyes.

Here, then, are two facts, which the most superficial analysis immediately discerns in the fact of reading. Let us recognize the characteristics of these two facts.

Am I the cause of the vision, and in general of sensation? Am I conscious of being the cause of this phenomenon; of commencing, continuing, interrupting, increasing, diminishing, maintaining and terminating it, at my pleasure? I will refer to other examples more striking. Suppose I press upon a sharp instrument; a painful sensation ensues. I put a rose to my nose; and an agreeable sensation is the result. Is it I who produce these two phenomena? Can I make them cease? Does the pain or pleasure come or go at my wish? No: I am subject to the pleasure as well as to the pain; both come, continue, and depart, without regard to my will. In a word, sensation is a phenomenon, marked in the eye of my consciousness, with the undeniable characteristic of necessity.

Let us now examine the character of the other fact, which sensation indeed precedes, but does not constitute. When the sensation is accomplished, the intelligence connects itself with the sensation; and first it pronounces that the sensation has a cause, the cutting instrument, the rose, and, to return to our first example, the letters placed before the eyes; this is the first judgment passed by the intellect. Further: as soon as the sensation is referred by the intellect to an external cause namely, to the letters and

the words which they form, this same intellect conceives the meaning of these letters and words, and judges of the truth or falseness of the propositions formed by them. The intellect, then, judges that the sensation has a cause; but I ask could it judge the contrary? No: the intellect can no more judge that this sensation is without a cause than it was possible for the sensation to be or not to be when the cutting instrument was in the wound, the rose at the organ of smelling, or the book before the eyes. And not only does the intellect of necessity judge that the sensation has a cause, but it also of necessity judges that the propositions contained in the lines perceived by the eye are true or false; for instance, that two and two make four, and not five, etc. I ask again if it is in the power of the intellect to judge at pleasure concerning any particular action of which the book speaks, that it is good or bad; or concerning any particular form which the book describes, that it is beautiful or ugly? By no means. Undoubtedly different intellects, or the same intellect at different periods of its exercise, will often pass very different judgments in regard to the same thing; it will often even be deceived; it will judge that which is true to be false, the good to be bad, the beautiful to be ugly, and the reverse; but, at the moment when it judges that a proposition is true or false, an action good or bad, a form beautiful or ugly, at that moment, it is not in the power of the intellect to pass any other judgment than that it passes. It obeys laws which it did not make. It yields to motives which determine it independently of the will. In a word, the phenomenon of intelligence, comprehending, judging, knowing, thinking, whatever name be given to it, is marked with the same characteristic of necessity as the phenomenon of sensibility. If then the sensibility and the intellect are under the dominion of necessity, it is not in them, assuredly, that we are to seek for liberty.

Where, then, are we to seek for it? It must be found

in the third fact blended with the two others, and which we have not yet analyzed, or it is to be found nowhere, and liberty is only a chimera.

To see and to feel, to judge and to comprehend do not exhaust the complex fact submitted to our analysis. If I do not look at the letters of this book, shall I see them, or at least shall I see them distinctly? If, seeing the letters, I do not give my attention to them, shall I comprehend them? Certainly not. Now what is it to look, to give attention? It is neither to feel nor to comprehend; for to look is not to perceive, if the organ of vision is wanting, or is untrue; to give attention is still not to comprehend; it is an indispensable condition of comprehending, but not always a sufficient reason; it is not enough to be attentive to the statement of a problem, in order to solve it; and attention no more includes the understanding, than it is included in the sensibility. To be attentive is a new phenomenon, which it is impossible to confound with the first two, although it is perpetually blended with them, and along with them makes up the total fact which we were to explain.

Let us examine the character of this third fact, the phenomenon of activity. Let us first distinguish the different sorts of action. There are actions which a man does not refer to himself, although he may be the theater on which they are displayed. Others may tell us that we performed these actions; but we ourselves know nothing of them; they are done in us, but we do them not. In lethargy, in sleep, real or artificial, in delirium, we execute a multitude of motions which resemble actions, which are actions even, if you please, but which present the following characteristics:

We have no consciousness of them at the time when we appear to be performing them;

We have no recollection of having performed them;

Consequently we do not refer them to ourselves, neither while we were performing them, nor afterward;

Consequently, again, they do not belong to us, and we do not impute them to ourselves, any more than to our neighbor, or to an inhabitant of another world.

But are there not other actions besides such? I open this book; I look at the letters; I give my attention to them; these are certainly actions too; do they resemble the preceding?

I open this book; am I conscious of doing it? Yes.

This action being done, do I remember it? Yes.

Do I refer this action to myself as having done it? Yes.

Am I convinced that it belongs to me? Could I impute it to such or such another person, as well as to myself, or am I myself solely and exclusively responsible in my own eyes? Here likewise I answer yes to myself.

And in fine, at the moment when I do this action, along with the consciousness of doing it, am I not conscious likewise of power not to do it? When I open this book, am I not conscious of opening it, and conscious also of power not to open it? When I look, do I not know at once that I look, and that I am able not to look? When I give my attention, do I not know that I give it, and that I am able also not to give it? Is not this a fact which each of us can repeat as many times as he pleases, and on a thousand occasions? Is not this the universal belief of the human race?—Let us, then, generalize, and say that there are motions and actions which we perform with the twofold consciousness of doing them, and of being able not to do them.

Now, an action performed with the consciousness of power not to do it, is what men have called a free action; for there is no longer in it the characteristic of necessity. In the phenomenon of sensation, I could not help enjoying when an agreeable sensation fell under my consciousness; I could not help suffering when the pain was present; I was conscious of feeling with the consciousness of not being able not to feel. In the phenomenon of intelligence, I

could not help judging that two and two make four; I was conscious of thinking this or that, with the consciousness of not being able not to think it. In certain motions, likewise, I was so little conscious of power not to make them, that I made them without any consciousness even of doing so at the very moment I was making them. But in a great number of cases, I perform certain actions with the consciousness of doing them, and of being able not to do them, of ability to suspend or to continue them, to complete or to cut them short. This is a class of facts of undoubted reality; they are very numerous; but if there were but a single one, it would be enough to establish in man a special power, that of liberty. Liberty, then, is the attribute, neither of the sensibility nor of the intelligence; it belongs to the activity, and solely to acts which we perform with the consciousness of doing them, and of being able not to do them.

After having stated a free act, it is necessary to analyze it more attentively.

A free act is a phenomenon which includes many different elements blended together. To act freely, is to do an act with the consciousness of being able not to do it: now, to do an act with the consciousness of being able not to do it, supposes that one prefers doing it to not doing it; to commence an action, with ability not to have commenced it, is to have preferred to commence it; to continue it, when able to suspend it, is to have preferred continuing it; to carry it out to the end, when able to abandon it, is to have preferred completing it. But to prefer supposes that we have motives of preference, motives to perform the action, and motives not to perform it; that we know these different motives; and that we prefer the one to the other. What these motives are, whether passions or ideas, errors or truths, this or that, is of little moment; what is important, is to know what is the faculty here in operation, that is to say, what the faculty is which knows these mo

tives, which prefers one to the other, which judges that the one is preferable to the other, for that is to prefer. Now, what is it that knows, and judges, but the intellect? The intellect, then, is the faculty which prefers. But to prefer one motive to another, to judge that the one is preferable to the other, it is not enough to know the different motives, it is necessary likewise to have compared and weighed them; it is necessary to have deliberated and concluded. And what is it to deliberate? It is nothing else than to examine with doubt, to appreciate the relative value of those different motives, not yet perceiving it with that evidence which decides the judgment, the conviction, the preference. But what is that which examines, which doubts, which judges that it ought not yet to judge, in order that it may judge the better? Evidently the intellect, which, subsequently, after having passed several provisional judgments, will abrogate them all, will judge that they are less true, less reasonable than some other one, will to pass a final judgment, that is to say, will conclude, that is to say again, will prefer after having deliberated. It is in the intellect, that the phenomenon of preference, and the other phenomena implied in it, take place. Thus far then we are still within the sphere of the intelligence, and not in that of action. The intellect, to be sure, has its conditions; no one examines who does not wish to examine, and the will intervenes in deliberation; but it is simply as a condition; and not as the ground of the phenomenon; for, although it is true, that without the faculty of willing, all examination and deliberation would be impossible, it is also true that the faculty which examines and deliberates, the faculty whose proper office is examination, deliberation, and all judgment, whether preliminary or decisive, is the intellect. Deliberation and conclusion or preference, are, then, facts purely intellectual. Let us pursue our analysis.

We have conceived the different motives for doing or not doing an action; we have deliberated on these motives,

and we have preferred some to the others; we have concluded to do it, rather than not to do it; but to conclude to do, and to do, are not the same thing. When the intellect has judged that this or that is to be done, from such or such motives, it remains to pass on to action, and at once to resolve, to take sides, to say no longer: I ought to do, but: I will to do. Now the faculty, which says: I ought to do, is not and can not be the faculty which says: I will to do, I take the resolution to do. Here the action of the intelligence ceases. I ought to do, is a judgment; I will to do, is not a judgment. See, then, a new element, which must not be confounded with the former; this element is the will. A moment before we were in a state of judging and knowing; now we are in a state of willing. I say willing, and not doing; for, as to judge that a thing should be done, is not to will to do it, so likewise to will to do it, is yet not to do it. To will is an act, and not a judgment; but it is an act altogether internal. It is evident that this act is not an action properly so called; in order to arrive at action, it is necessary to pass from the internal sphere of the will, to the sphere of the external world, wherein the action is definitively accomplished which you first conceived, deliberated on and preferred, and then willed that it should be executed. If there were no external world, there would be no completed action; and not only is it necessary that there should be an external world, but also that the power of willing should be connected with another power, a physical power, which serves as an instrument and by which it can attain the external world. Suppose that the will was not united with an organization, there would no longer be any bridge between the will and the external world; and no external action would be possible. The physical power, necessary to action, is the organization; it is admitted that the muscular system is the special instrument of the will. Take away the muscular system, and there is no more effort possible, consequently

no more locomotion and movement possible, and therefore no more external action possible. Thus, to resume what has been said, the total action, which we were to analyze, resolves itself into three elements perfectly distinct: 1, the intellectual element, which is composed of the knowledge of the motives for and against, of deliberation, of preference, of choice; 2, the voluntary element, which consists solely in the resolution to do; 3, the physical element, or external action.

The question now to be decided is, precisely in which of these three elements liberty is to be found, that is, the power of doing with the consciousness of being able not to do. Does this power of doing, while conscious of the power not to do, belong to the first element, the intellectual element of the free action? It does not; for we are not master of our preferences; we prefer this or that motive for or against according to our intellectual nature, which has its necessary laws, without having the consciousness of being able to prefer or judge otherwise, and even with the consciousness of not being able to prefer or judge otherwise than we do. It is not therefore in this element that we are to look for liberty. Still less is it in the third element, in the physical action; for this action supposes an external world, an organization corresponding to it, and, in this organization, a muscular system, sound and suitable, without which the physical action is impossible. When we accomplish it, we are conscious of acting, but under the condition of a theater of which we have not the disposal, and of instruments, of which we have but an imperfect disposal, which we can neither retake, if they escape us, and they may do so every moment, nor repair, if they are out of order and unfaithful, as is often the case, and which are subject to laws peculiar to themselves over which we have no power and which we scarcely even know; whence it follows, that we do not act here with the consciousness of being able to do the contrary of what we do Liberty is

therefore no more to be found in the third, than in the first element. It can then only be in the second; and there in fact we find it.

Neglect the first and the third element, the judgment and the physical action, and turn to the second element, the willing: analysis discovers in this single element two terms, namely, a special act of willing, and the power of willing, which is within us, and to which we refer the special act. This act is an effect in relation to the power of willing which is its cause; and this cause, in order to produce its effect, has need of no other theater, and no other instrument, than itself. It produces it directly, without intermediate and without condition; continues it and consummates it; or suspends it and modifies it; creates it entirely, or annihilates it entirely; and at the moment it exerts itself in any special act, we are conscious that it might exert itself in a special act totally contrary, without being thereby exhausted; so that after having changed its acts a hundred times, the faculty would remain integrally the same, inexhaustible and identical, amid the perpetual variety of its applications, being always able to do what it does not do, and able not to do what it does. Here, then, in all its plenitude, is the characteristic of liberty.*

* On this essential point, see *Course of History of Modern Philosophy*, First Series, Vol. IV. p. 545, *et seq.* [The passage referred to by Cousin, occurs in his critical examination of Reid's philosophy. I think it best to introduce it here; it is as follows:

"Volitions are acts distinct from the power which produces them: they are effects of which the will is the cause. Between this cause and its effects there is no foreign intermediate: there is no paralysis to be feared. In order for the will to produce a muscular effort, there must needs be the concurrence of the muscular power; but in order for the will to produce a volition, a resolution, a determination, the concurrence of no foreign power is needful. In the production of effort and of muscular motion, I learn how the forces of nature, physical causes destitute of thought and will, operate in the service of an intelligent and voluntary cause; in the production of volition, I have the consciousness of the action of that cause, operating by its own energy and without over-

If the whole outward world were wanting to the will, yet if the organization and the muscular system existed, the

passing its sphere. As the muscular effort is the type of the action of the will in the sensible world, so the willing is the type of the pure act, of the spiritual operation of the will upon itself. Between a volition and the power of willing, the sole intermediate, the sole causal bond, is the willing itself, which is the will passed into act, and, as Aristotle says, the voluntary power realized or rather realizing itself. It is evidently in this operation of the will that liberty is found.

The will is mine, and I dispose absolutely of it within the limits of the spiritual world. There, the cause which I myself am, borrows no foreign instruments, and its action pertains wholly to itself. When the will takes any resolution, not only has it the consciousness of not being constrained by any foreign power, but it has the consciousness of being able to take the contrary resolution: it determines itself in one way, knowing that it could determine itself another way, knowing even that it was able not to determine itself, but to suspend or to adjourn any resolution, just as it knows that it can act and manifest itself when it does not act nor manifest itself. It is this special characteristic of the voluntary action which is liberty.

Liberty is not to be defined, nor demonstrated; it is to be felt: it is not a power, but the inherent quality of a power, the power which is the will. Nor any more is the will to be defined and demonstrated, it is to be felt; it is to be felt in its operation and by its operation. Consciousness does not attain the will as an abstract power, a pure power. If the will never came to be a willing, if it never determined itself by some particular act, the consciousness would never attain it, nor consequently know it, or even conjecture it. But as soon as the will wills, puts forth a volition, consciousness attains both the volition and the power which put forth the volition: it attains it not by application of the principle of causality, but by an immediate apperception. The volition is not an effect separated from its cause; it is its cause itself operating, passing into act. The cause and its effect fall both together under the eye of consciousness. To pretend that from the volition we infer the cause and do not attain it directly, is to pretend that we know the cause which we ourselves are, and the power of our will only as we know natural causes and external forces; from whence it would follow that the first cause of our volitions might be one not appertaining to ourselves; for the general principle of causality can give in its applications only a general cause. If the principle of causality, applied to the internal change called a volition, teaches me only that this volition has a cause, I know very

will could still produce the muscular effort, and consequently a sensible fact, even though this fact would not pass beyond the limits of the organization. This M. de Biran has perfectly established.* He regarded the phenomenon of muscular effort as the type of causality, of the will and of freedom. But while I readily agree with him, in regarding the muscular effort and the consciousness of this effort and the sensation which accompanies it, as the most eminent and most easily appreciable type of our causative power, voluntary and free, I say still, that it is only an external and derivative type, and not the primitive and essential type; otherwise, M. de Biran would be obliged to carry his theory to the extreme of asserting that where there is absence or paralysis of the muscles, there can be no causation, volition, or active and free phenomenon. Now, I maintain the contrary; I maintain that if the external world be removed, and the muscular and locomotive system taken away; yet, if there remained to man, along with an organization purely nervous, an intelligence capable of conceiving motives, of deliberating, of preferring, and choosing, there would remain to him the power of willing, which might still exert itself in special acts, in volitions, in which the proper causality and the liberty of the will would still manifest itself, although these effects, these free volitions, would never pass beyond the internal world of the will, and would have no reaction on the organization through a muscular system, and would produce no phenomena of muscular effort—phenomena, which without doubt, are internal in reference to the external world, but which are themselves external in reference to the will.

well thereby that my volition has a cause, but I do not know thereby what that cause is, it may be neither mine nor yours, it may be a force of nature as the materialists hold; it may be God, as mysticism dreams: so many hypotheses that my consciousness breaks down. My consciousness tells me, with the most certain knowledge, that my willing appertains to myself, that I am the cause of it, and the free cause."—Tr.]

* See Chapter IV.

Thus, suppose I will to move my arm, without being able to do it through defect of the muscles; there is still in this fact: 1, the act of willing to move my arm, a special volition; 2, the general power of willing, which is the direct cause of this volition; there would, then, in such a case, be an effect and a cause; there would be consciousness of this effect and cause, of a causal act, of an internal causative force, supreme in its own world, in the world of willing; even though it might be absolutely unable to pass to the external action, because the muscular and locomotive system was wanting.

The theory of M. de Biran, then, takes the free act only in its external manifestation, in a remarkable fact undoubtedly, but which itself implies besides the profound and intimate fact of willing with its immediate and proper effect. Here in my judgment, is the primitive type of freedom;—and this is the conclusion to which this analysis brings us—an analysis too long perhaps for its place, and too brief in itself not to be still very gross.* When, in an

* *Fragmens Philosophiques*, preface to the first edition. "It is a fact that in the midst of the movements which external agents determine in us in spite of ourselves, we have the power of taking the initiative of a different movement, first of conceiving of it, then of deliberating whether we will peform it, finally, of resolving and going on to the performing of it, of continuing it or suspending it, of finishing it or breaking off, and always of having the mastery over it. The fact is certain, and it is not less certain that the movement executed under these conditions takes in our eyes a new character: we impute it to ourselves, we refer it as an effect to ourselves whom we then consider as the cause of it. Here for us is the origin of the notion of cause, not of a cause in the abstract, but of a personal cause, to wit, of ourselves. The proper characteristic of the me is causality or the will, since we do not refer to ourselves and impute to ourselves any thing except that which we ourselves cause, and we do not cause any thing except that which we will. . . . . . It will not do to confound the will or the internal causality, which produces at first effects which are internal as their cause is, with the external instruments of this causality, which as instruments seem also to produce effects, but without being the true cause of them. When I drive one ball against another, it is not the ball which in truth causes

action, we are seeking for that which constitutes its freedom, we may be deceived in two ways:

Either it may be sought in what I have called the intellectual element of the action, the knowledge of motives, deliberation, preference, choice—and then it can not be found; for it is evident that the different motives for or against govern the intellect, which is not free to judge this or that, and to prefer the one to the other; men do not find liberty in the intellectual part of action; they decide therefore that there is no liberty: undoubtedly it is not there, but it may be elsewhere.

Or liberty may be sought in the physical element of the action; and men do not find it there, at least not con-

the motion it impresses, for this motion has been itself impressed upon it by the muscles which in our organization are at the service of the will. Properly speaking these actions are only effects linked one to the other, appearing alternately as causes without being truly such, and all referable as effects more or less remote to the will as the primary cause. Does one look for the primitive notion of cause in the action of the ball upon the ball, as was the way of doing before the time of Hume, or of the hand upon the ball, or of the primary muscles upon their extremities, or even in the action of the will upon the muscles, as M. de Biran has done? It can not be found in any of these cases, not even in the last; for it is possible there may be a paralysis of the muscles, rendering the will powerless over them, inefficacious, incapable of being the cause [of muscular motion,] and consequently of suggesting the notion of a cause. But that which no paralysis can hinder is the action of the will upon itself, the producing of a resolution, that is to say, a causation altogether spiritual, the primitive type of causality, of which all the outward actions—beginning with the muscular effort and ending with the movement of the ball upon the ball—are nothing but symbols more or less imperfect. The primitive cause for us then is the will, whose first effect is a volition. There is the source, at once the highest and the purest, of the notion of cause, which is there confounded with that of personality. . . . . The phenomenon of the will presents the following momenta: 1. Predetermining to do an act; 2, deliberating; 3, resolving. If we look closely we shall see that it is the reason which constitutes the first entire, and even the second, for it is the reason which deliberates; but it is not the reason which resolves and determines."

stantly, and they are tempted to conclude that liberty is but an accident, which sometimes exists, but three quarters of the time has no existence, and which is dependent on physical conditions, either external or internal: they see there no token of the proper and fundamental power of human nature.

Now if we wish to refer to their most general causes these two sorts of errors, that is, if we wish to consider them in reference to scientific method, we may say that they consist, the first, in looking for the phenomenon of liberty in the antecedent of it, namely, in the intellectual fact which always precedes the free act of the will, but which does not engender and contain it as the cause engenders and contains the effect; the second, in looking for the phenomenon of liberty, not in the antecedent, but in the consequent, so to say, of the phenomenon, in the sensible fact which sometimes (but not always) follows willing, but which does not include it, except as borrowed from another source. This brings us back to the general source of all the errors of Locke: the confusion of an idea with that which precedes or that which follows it. You have seen this in regard to space, to time, the infinite, substance, cause, good and evil; and you may now see it in regard to the theory of liberty.

Locke begins (Book II. Ch. XXI. *Of Power*, § 5) by dividing all the phenomena of consciousness, not into three classes, but into two, the understanding and the will, a division radically false and contrary to facts. Then follows a classification of actions:

"All the actions that we have any idea of, reduce themselves to two, namely, thinking and motion." *Ibid.* § 8. Sometimes in Locke, the will includes both these actions, sometimes it applies only to motion.

"This power which the mind has to order the consideration of any idea or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice*

versâ in any particular instance, is that which we call the will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing." *Ibid.* § 5.

Here, you perceive, the will is made to apply to acts of the understanding as well as the motions of the body. In the following passage, on the contrary, it is applied only to the latter:

"Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action." *Ibid.* § 15.

The theory of the will, in Locke, appears, then, as fluctuating and inconsistent as the other theories which have been exhibited. As to the rest on both hands there is equal error. Does Locke seek for the will in the understanding? It is clear he can not find liberty there; for the intelligence is not free, and we do think just as we please. Locke is then deceived by confounding a phenomenon with that which precedes it, and does not include it. Again: does Locke wish to understand, by will, merely the faculty of moving his body? It is clear likewise that he will not find freedom in that faculty; for, as you know, our physical power is limited on all hands, and we have not always the control of it with the consciousness of power to do the contrary of what we actually do; and here Locke is deceived by confounding the internal phenomenon of volition with the external phenomenon of motion which sometimes follows the volition, but which is not the volition itself. This, however, mixed up with many inconsistencies, is the predominant theory of Locke, a theory, which, like that of M. de Biran, but with less profoundness, concentrates the will into one of its applications, visible external action. Now if the will is only the power of motion, it is not always and essentially free. This is the positive conclusion of Locke:

Ibid. § 14. "*Liberty belongs not to the will.*—If this be so (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and I think unreasonable, because unintelligible question, namely: *whether man's will be free or no.* . . . The question itself is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask whether man's *will* be free, as to ask, whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square. . . ."

§ 10. "Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power [of doing and forbearing to do,] and no further. For wherever restraint comes in to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting; there, liberty, and our notion of it, presently cease."

Now, as it is unquestionable that a thousand obstacles oppose, or may perpetually oppose, our power of acting, evidently here by him meant physical, it follows that there is sometimes liberty and sometimes not; and even when it exists, it exists only by the concurrence of external circumstances which might have prevented it. To explain liberty in this way, is to destroy it. Liberty is not and can not be, neither in the faculty of thinking, nor in that of [outward] action, since they are subject to necessary laws, but in the pure power of willing, which is always accompanied by the consciousness of the power to will (I do not say power to think, or power to act, but power to will) the contrary of what it wills. Locke has then destroyed liberty by denying it to the will, and seeking for it either in the thinking faculty, or in the power of outward motion. He destroys it, and he thinks he has even destroyed the question concerning liberty. But the belief of the human race protests against the annihilation of liberty, and the whole history of philosophy protests against the annihilation of the question concerning it.*

* [*Doctrine concerning the Will and Freedom.* In the discussion of the subject of liberty in the foregoing chapter, Cousin *presumes* the free-

I now pass to another point, the theory of the nature of the soul.

You have seen (Ch. III.) that it is impossible to know

dom of the will, in opposition to the doctrine of philosophical necessity, as maintained by many English and American philosophers and theologians. This is obvious throughout, and particularly from his definition of liberty, as referring to "those acts which we perform with the consciousnes of doing them, and of being able not to do them," at the same time. By this, he obviously does not mean to assert—and he does not think it necessary to say that he does not—that this consciousness always and necessarily accompanies the act of the will at the moment of its performance; because we may sometimes not reflect at all about it. But that such a conviction is inseparable from every free act, is apparent to every one who will reflect, that is, observe his consciousness.

It may be doubted whether Cousin has rightly taken up Locke on one part of this subject. Though the system of Locke involves the necessarian scheme of the will, and in strict logical consistency results in the destruction of freedom; yet Locke's denial of freedom to the will, can in propriety be made only a verbal question: for what he denies to the *will*, he expressly attributes to *man*. Nothing, therefore, in regard to the question concerning liberty and necessity, in the ordinary sense of the terms as employed in controversial discussion in this country, can be argued from the distinction made by Locke. The proper question is, whether that kind of liberty which Locke attributes to man—and not to his will—is necessarianism or self-determination.

It may be doubted, also, whether the process of voluntary action, as described by Cousin, be sufficiently general to include all cases—whether, in *every instance*, there is such a process of deliberation, preference, and choice, as he describes to be the condition and antecedent of the pure act of willing. It may likewise finally be very much doubted whether Cousin's analysis on one point is strictly correct—whether, namely, in his phenomenon of "preference," which he attributes solely to the intelligence, there may not be in many cases an element truly referable to the will, to say nothing here of another possible element referable neither to the intelligence nor to the will, but to the sensibility, to an internal sentiment accompanying and blending itself with the action of the intelligence. Be all this however as it may, it will invalidate neither the general conclusion that liberty is to be sought for in the will, and not in the sense nor in the intellect, nor his subsequent reasoning; because the act of *willing*, to which liberty will not be denied, if it is allowed or pretended any where, is a necessary element in the complex process

any phenomenon of consciousness, the phenomenon of sensation, or of volition, or of intelligence, without instantly referring these phenomena to a subject one and identical,

of action; whether the limits where necessity ceases and liberty begins, be made a little too broad or too narrow; and of course those who make the *whole* complex process necessary, can not quarrel with the concession that a *part* is so.

The great question on this subject doubtless is, whether the will, in all its particular volitions, is necessarily determined by causes from without:—whether the will, in its acts, is subjected to the law of necessity, equally with the phenomena of the outward world. This is the only question of material importance. If this be not the question, then there is nothing in question worth contending about. Those who hold the freedom of the will, in opposition to the necessarian scheme, maintain that the will is itself the efficient cause of its own volitions; that it is not determined by any necessity *ab extra;* that is not subjected to the mechanism of cause and effect. They hold an essential difference between Nature and Spirit—and that the eminent and most distinguishing characteristic of this difference consists precisely in this that the former *is*, and the latter is *not*, subjected to the law of necessity. They hold Freedom and Necessarianism to be incompatible—exclusive of each other; that the necessarian doctrine destroys the difference in kind, between nature and spirit, between freedom and mechanism. They regard freedom as the essential attribute and characteristic of the will, and hold that the very idea of freedom, both in itself, and as the principle of personality and the foundation of moral responsibility, excludes any such necessary determination as is maintained by the necessarians. They hold that the will is a Law to itself, and not subjected to a law out of itself. Like other powers, however, conditions of its action are requisite. These conditions are what is commonly included in the word *motives*. Motives are the occasion, the *condition* of volitions, but not the *cause* of them.

The whole necessarian scheme is grounded upon the assumption that the will is not a law to itself, but is subjected, equally with external nature, to a law out of itself. The whole necessarian argument proceeds upon the confusion of the *conditions* of volitions with its *cause*—upon the *assumption* that motives stand to volition in the relation of cause to effect; and it involves the old sophism: *quod hoc, ergo, propter hoc.* Now motives may be allowed to be the universal and necessary condition of all special determinations of the will, that is, of all particular volitions; and yet it would by no means therefore follow that those volitions are

which is myself, me; and likewise that we can not know the external phenomena of resistance, solidity, figure, color, smell, taste, etc., without judging that they are not

necessarily determined, produced, caused by the motives. Though man never acts without motives, it would not necessarily follow that his actions are caused by motives; for the motives may be simply the occasion and condition of his volitions; and it would remain to be proved that they are any thing more. Unless they do this, necessarians beg the very thing in question, which is, not whether there is a constant and necessary co-presence of motives whenever a particular volition is so and not otherwise, but whether these motives stand in a relation of a *cause* to the volition being so and not otherwise, or only in the relation of a *condition* to the acting of the will, while the will of itself, as an efficient power and the principle and cause of its own volitions, determines the particular volition so and not otherwise. In an exhausted receiver, a guinea and a feather will fall through an equal space in the same time; but it would be absurd, in strict language, to call the exhaustion of the air the *cause* of the phenomenon: it is only the occasion, and condition, while the cause is gravitation.

In this view, the celebrated axiom of Edwards, "that the will is as the greatest apparent good," if it be taken to mean any thing more (as he unquestionably did take it) than that motives are the condition of volition, is reduced to the flat truism, that the will is as the will is.

In regard to the objections brought against the doctrine of liberty, a few words may be offered.

The doctrine is said to involve the position, that *men act without motives*. This objection is already sufficiently disposed of. It is no more a part of the doctrine of liberty than of necessity. To pretend that man acts or wills without motive or reason, would be a contradiction: it would be to confound the human will with the animal instinct, where, reason being wanting, the will is merged in nature, subjected to a necessary law, of which it is an organ, instrument, or manifestation; or rather, where there is no will, in any proper sense of the word. That men act from reasons, with a motive, is fully asserted. It may be indeed, that there are cases in which the maxim, *stat voluntas pro ratione*, holds good; that is, in the absence of other motives, the will may decide for the sake of deciding. If a purse is filled with pieces of gold, and it is offered to me upon condition of saying correctly whether the number of pieces be equal or unequal, and I say equal, it may be solely because I *will* to say so; that is all the reason I can give. It is very much my interest to say

phenomena in the air, but phenomena which pertain to something real, which is solid, impenetrable, figured, colored, etc. On the other hand, if you did not know any

something; but no interest may determine me to say equal, rather than unequal; and this very consideration of the absence of motives, may be sufficient to constitute the condition, or previous deliberation, required in order to the exercise of the free will. The presence of motives is fully admitted, as the general condition of volition: it is only denied that they are the causes of it.

It is also objected, that *as every event must have a cause, if motives are not the cause of volitions, we have phenomena without a cause.*—Not to advert here to any higher considerations which might vacate the objection, it is sufficient to reply that the consequence by no means follows. For it may be said the will itself is the cause. The will is a faculty or power of willing, limited indeed, and conditioned; but within its limits, and when its conditions are supplied, capable of acting, of determining itself in a special direction, that is, of originating particular volitions: and therefore as truly a cause as God or a physical efficient. The will is a general power or faculty of acting, that is, of willing. Volitions are special actual exertions of this power, particular actual determinations of it. The latter are the effect, the former is their sole principle and cause. In this view, Edwards' famous *reductio ad absurdum* falls to pieces. His argument is, that if a given volition be not determined by motives as its cause, it must be without a cause; or else it must be determined by a *previous volition*, and that by another, and so on *ad infinitum*. But deny his inference; lay your finger upon the given volition, or upon any one in the series, and call upon him to prove that the general faculty of willing is not a power adequate to the direct production of the given volition—and his reduction is at an end, at all events, stopped, till he fulfill the demand. His whole reduction is nothing but a sheer begging of the very thing in question.

But what, after all, is this pretended denial of causation charged upon the doctrine of free will? So entirely the reverse of the fact, is the assumption made in the objection, that without the very freedom which necessarians deny, there would be for us no such conception as that of causation. It is in the exertion of this free will that the idea of a cause is given us. It is precisely because the free agent determines himself, and is not determined, that he really produces an effect; and in the consciousness of this, he finds the primitive idea of cause, as has been so largely and clearly shown by Cousin in this volume.

There is another objection made in the interest of theology, and which

of the phenomena of consciousness, you would never have the least idea of the subject of these phenomenon; and if you did not know the external phenomena of resistance, figure, color, etc., you would never have any idea of a subject of these phenomena. These characteristics or attributes, are therefore for you the only signs or tokens of the nature of the subjects of these phenomena, whether they are phenomena of consciousness, or external phenomena. In examining the phenomena which fall under the senses, we find important differences between them, which it is useless to insist upon here, and which establish the distinc-

at the present day, attaches many to the doctrine of necessity *that the doctrine of liberty contradicts divine prescience and certainty in the moral government of the world.*

This objection is as old as Cicero, to go no further back, and may be well enough presented in his words: "If the will is free, then Fate does not rule every thing; if Fate does not rule every thing, then the order of all causes is not certain, and the order of things is no longer certain in the prescience of God; if the order of things is not certain in the prescience of God, then things may not take place as he foresees them; and if things do not take place as he foresees them, there is in God no foreknowledge." St. AUGUSTINE may supply the answer: "Although the order of causes be certain to God, it does not follow that nothing depends upon our will; for our wills themselves are in the order of causes which are certain to God, and which he foresees, because men's wills are also the causes of their actions; so that he who has foreseen all causes, has also foreseen our wills which are the causes of our actions" (*De Civitate Dei*, V. 9). "If God foresees our will," says the same writer in another place (*De libero arbitrio*, lib. iii. c. 3), "as it is certain that he foresees it, there will therefore be the will; and there can not be a will if it is not free; therefore this liberty is foreseen by God. Hence, his prescience does not destroy my liberty." The answer is certainly as good as the objection.

In short, as the knowledge which we have of present things, so far forth as knowledge, imposes no necessity upon them, although it is certain that they are taking place as we see them; so the prescience of God, which sees the *future* as the *present*, imposes no necessity upon future events or actions, although they will certainly take place as he foresaw them.—TR.]

tion of primary and secondary qualities. Among the primary qualities, and first in rank, is solidity, which is given in the sensation of resistance, and inevitably accompanied by that of form, etc. On the contrary, when you examine the phenomena of consciousness, you do not find in them this characteristic of resistance, of solidity, form, etc.; you do not find that the phenomena of your consciousness have figure, solidity, impenetrability, resistance, etc., to say nothing of secondary qualities equally foreign to them, color, taste, sound, smell. Now, as the subject is for us nothing but the aggregate of the phenomena which reveal it to us, together with its own existence so far forth as the subject of the inherence of these qualities; it follows that, under phenomena marked with dissimilar characteristics, and altogether foreign to each other, the human mind conceives their subjects dissimilar and of different kind. Thus, as solidity and figure have nothing in common with the phenomena of sensation, of thought, and of will; as every solid is for us extended and necessarily located by us in space, while our thoughts, our volitions, and our sensations, are for us unextended and can not be conceived and located in space, but only in time; the human mind concludes with perfect strictness that the subject of the external phenomena has the character of the former, and that the subject of the phenomena of consciousness has the same character with the latter, that the one is solid and extended, the other neither solid nor extended. In fine, as that which is solid and extended is divisible, and as that which is not solid nor extended, is indivisible, divisibility is therefore attributed to the solid and extended subject, and indivisibility is attributed to the subject which is not solid, nor extended. Who of us, in fact, does not believe himself a being indivisible and simple, one and identical, the same yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow? Very good now! the word BODY, the word MATTER, signifies nothing else than the subject of those external phenomena, of which the most

remarkable are form, impenetrability, extension, solidity, divisibility.

The word SPIRIT, the word SOUL, signifies nothing else than the subject of those phenomena of consciousness, thought, volition, sensation, phenomena simple, unextended, not solid, etc. See the whole idea of spirit, and the whole idea of matter. You see, then, the whole of what is requisite in order to identify matter with mind, or mind with matter; it is necessary to pretend that sensation, thought, volition, are reducible, in the last analysis, to solidity, extension, figure, divisibility, etc.; or that solidity, extension, figure, etc., are reducible to sensation, thought, will.* In the view of Spiritualism, there will be but one substance, namely, spirit, because there is but one single general phenomenon, namely, consciousness. In the view of Materialism, there will be but one substance, namely, matter, because there is but one single fundamental phenomenon, namely, solidity or extension. These are the two great systems; they have each their part of truth and their part of error, which it is not my purpose now to determine. I wish only to state the fact, that Locke inclines more to the one than the other, and that he is almost led to derive thought from extension, and consequently to make the mind a modification of matter. It is true, Locke is far from explaining himself clearly on this point; but he advances the notion that it might not be impossible that matter, besides the phenomenon of extension, by a certain disposition and arrangement of its particles, might produce also the phenomenon of thought. He does not say that the soul is material, but that it might very well be so.

See this important passage, B. IV. Ch. III. § 6: "We have the ideas of *matter* and of *thinking*, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material being

* [And according to the starting-point of the reduction and its direction are the two contrary systematic results of Spiritualism and Idealism.—TR.]

thinks, or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas without revelation, to discover, whether omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fitted to matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance. . . . What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such as pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves after a certain manner modified, as well as that they should be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of the parts of the body?"

Locke therefore declares, that apart from revelation, and within the limits of reason alone, he is not certain that the soul may not be material. Now you conceive that if the soul is not immaterial, it runs some risk of not being immortal; for, if the phenomenon of thought and consciousness are nothing but the result of the combination of material particles, extended and divisible, the dissolution of this organization may well involve that of thought and the soul. Locke replies that this consequence is not to be feared; for, material or not, revelation guarantees the immortality of the soul. "And therefore," says he (*Ibid*), "it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as some over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul, have been forward to make the world believe." And when his adversaries insist, when Bishop Stillingfleet objects, that "it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality, to make it depend wholly upon God's giving that of which it is not capable in its own nature," Locke is ready to cry out upon him as a blasphemer; "that is to say," says he, "it is not as credible upon divine revelation, that a material substance should be immortal, as an immaterial; or which is all one, God is not equally to be believed when he declared it, because the immortality of a material substance can not be demonstrated from natural reason." Again: "Any one's not being able to demon-

strate the soul to be immortal, takes not off from the evidence of its immortality, if God has revealed it; because the veracity of God is a demonstration of the truth of what he has revealed, and the want of another demonstration of a proposition, that is demonstratively true, takes not off from the evidence of it." And he goes so far as to say that his system is the only Christian system. Certainly I believe no such thing: but without descending to this ground, which is not ours, notice the consequence involved in such a system. If the immateriality of the soul is very doubtful and indifferent, and if the immortality of the soul, in itself equally doubtful as its immateriality, is grounded solely upon the promise of God, who is to be believed upon his word, that is, the Christian revelation; it follows that whoever has not the happiness to be enlightened, as Locke was, by the rays of Christian revelation, and who has no other resource than that of his own reason, can legitimately believe neither in the immateriality nor the immortality of the soul; and this is to condemn the entire human race to materialism, previous to Christianity, and more than half of humanity, since then. But facts repel this sad consequence; facts attest that reason, so feeble according to Locke, has sufficed to establish, and still suffices to establish among mankind, the twofold conviction of the immateriality and immortality of the soul. The universal and perpetual revelation of Reason (*the light of the* WORD *which lighteth every man that cometh into the world*), more or less vivid, more or less pure, has every where preceded, prepared for, or supplied the place of that [special revelation] which in the designs of Providence, and in the progress of humanity, has come to establish, extend, and complete the former. Finally, I wish you to notice that it is the father of the Sensual school of the eighteenth century, who here announces himself in opposition to reason, and substitutes theology in place of philosophy, and, as to the rest, with perfect loyalty, for he firmly believed in revela-

tion and in Christianity. Hereafter* we shall see what became of these two great truths in the hands of the successors of Locke, who, after his example, declare reason in respect to these subjects feeble and incompetent, and like him refer them to faith, to revelation, to theology, some believing and some disbelieving the authority they invoke.

I have proved, I believe, that Locke, in seeking for liberty where it could not be found, in the power of motion, has, in the midst of many contradictions, put philosophy upon the route to fatalism. I have shown likewise that, without affirming the soul to be material and perishable, he at least says that revelation alone can give us any certainty of it; and he has put philosophy upon the road to materialism. Now I am happy to declare that Locke has not the least in the world put philosophy upon the road to atheism. Locke, not only as a Christian, but as a philosopher, admits and proclaims the existence of God, and has given excellent natural proofs of it; but it is important to put you fully in possession of the particular character of these proofs, which are likewise in keeping with the general system of Locke.

There are various proofs of the existence of God. The gratifying result of my studies in this respect, is, that these various proofs have different degrees of strictness in their form, but that they all have a foundation of truth, which needs simply to be disengaged and put in clear light in order to give them an incontrovertible authority. Every thing leads us to God; there is no bad way of arriving thither; we may go in different ways. In general, all the proofs of every sort of the existence of God, are compre-

* [Alluding to future lectures which it was the intention of Cousin to give, designed to exhibit the history and progress of the Sensual school, with a critical examination of the principal successors of Locke, and which are now contained in the First Series of the lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy.—Tr.]

hended under two great classes, namely: proofs *à posteriori*, and proofs *à priori*. Either I give myself, aided by my senses and consciousness, to the observation and study of the external world and of my own existence; and simply by a knowledge, more or less profound and extended, of nature and myself, after sufficient observations, and inductions founded upon them, I arrive at the knowledge of God, who made man and nature. This is called the demonstration *à posteriori*, of the existence of God.—Or, I may neglect the external world, and fall back upon myself, in the entirely interior world of consciousness; and even there, without engaging in the study of its numerous phenomena, I may derive at once from reason an idea, a single idea, which, without the aid of experience, in the hands of that same reason, becomes the basis of a demonstration of the existence of God. This is called the demonstration *à priori*.

Look for example, at the most celebrated proof *à priori*, and which includes nearly all the others of this kind. When we fall back upon ourselves, the first glance which we bestow upon the phenomena of consciousness discovers to us this striking characteristic, that they begin, and intermit, renew themselves, and cease, have their different degrees of intensity and energy; in a word they attest in us something imperfect, limited, finite. Now this characteristic of finite can not, as we have seen (Ch. III.) be given us, without the reason entering into exercise, and passing instantly this judgment: that there is something infinite, if there is any thing finite. If you did not know the external world, yet consciousness would suffice to give you the idea of the finite, and consequently the reason would have a sufficient basis for suggesting to you the idea of the infinite. The idea of the infinite opposed to the idea of the finite, is nothing less than the idea of perfection opposed to the idea of imperfection. What in fact is consciousness for us, but the sentiment of our imperfection and

our weakness? I do not dispose of my sensations; they come and go at their will; they appear and disappear, often without my being able to retain or repel them. Nor do I control my judgments; they are subject to laws I have never made. I have the direction of my will, it is true, but frequently it results only in internal acts, without being able to pass into external and visible actions; and sleep, and lethargy, and delirium, suspend it. On every hand, the finite and imperfect appear in me. But I can not have the idea of the finite and imperfect without having the idea of the perfect and infinite. These two ideas are logical correlatives; and in the order of their acquisition, that of finite and imperfect precedes the other, but it scarcely precedes it. It is not possible for the reason, as soon as consciousness furnishes the mind with the idea of the finite and imperfect, not to conceive the idea of the infinite and perfect.

Now, the infinite and the perfect, is God himself. It is enough therefore for you to have the idea of the imperfect and finite, in order to have the idea of the perfect and the infinite, that is to say, of God, whether you do or do not call him by that name, whether you know how to express in words the spontaneous convictions of your intelligence, or whether, through defect of language and analysis, they remain obscure and indistinct in the depths of your soul. Once more, then, I say: do not go to consult the savage, the child, or the idiot, to know whether they have the idea of God; ask them, or rather, without asking them any thing, ascertain if they have the idea of the imperfect and the finite; and if they have it (and they can not but have it if they have the least perception) be sure that they have an obscure and confused idea of something infinite and perfect; be sure that what they discern of themselves and of the world, does not suffice them, and that they at once humble and exalt themselves in a deep felt faith in the existence of something infinite and perfect, that is to say, of

God. The word may be wanting among them, because the idea is not yet clear and distinct; but no less does it exist within the folds of the opening intelligence, and the philosophic observer easily discovers it there.

The infinite and the perfect are given you along with the imperfect and the finite; and the finite and the imperfect are given you immediately by your consciousness, as soon as there are under the eye of consciousness any phenomena. The idea of the finite and imperfect, being, then, primitive, the correlative idea of the infinite and perfect, and consequently, of God, is also primitive.

The idea of God is a primitive idea; but from whence comes this idea? Is it a creature of your imagination, an illusion, a chimera? You can imagine a gorgon, a centaur, and you can imagine them not to exist; but is it in your power, when the finite and the imperfect are given, to conceive or not to conceive, the infinite and perfect? No: the one being given, the other is also necessarily given. It is not then a chimera; it is the necessary product of reason; therefore it is a legitimate product. Either, you must renounce your reason; and then we will talk no more neither of reason, nor of truth, nor of knowledge, nor of philosophy; or, you must admit the authority of reason, and admit it in regard to this subject, as well as in regard to other subjects.*

Such, nearly, is the celebrated demonstration *à priori*,

* [This argument is not unfolded with the usual fullness of Cousin. The point of the argument is, that as in the human consciousness, there is, for the understanding, the notion of finite and imperfect existence, accompanied by an invincible conviction of a reality corresponding; so likewise, there is in human consciousness, for the reason, the idea of an infinite and perfect being, of God, accompanied likewise with an invincible conviction of a reality corresponding to the idea; and that the human mind is as necessarily determined to a belief in the latter as in the former—that is to say, if we determine that the necessary action of our faculties is a trustworthy ground of belief in one case, we must admit it to be so in the other.—Tr.]

of the existence of God, that is, independently of experience. Now look at the proof *à posteriori;* a few words will be enough to put you in possession of it; it explains itself.

This proof consists in arriving at God solely by an induction founded on observation more or less extended. Instead of closing your senses, and opening only your consciousness, you open your senses, and close up more or less your consciousness, in order to survey every where nature and the vast world which surrounds you; and by a contemplation, more or less profound, by studies, more or less intelligent, you become penetrated with the beauty, the order, the intelligence, the skill, the perfection diffused through the universe: and as the cause must, at least, be equal to the effect, you reason from Nature to its Author; from the existence and perfection of the one, you conclude the existence and perfection of the other.

These two proofs, I repeat, are good; and instead of choosing between them, we ought to do as the human mind does, employ them both. In fact, they are so little exclusive of each other, that they each contain something of the other. The argument *à priori*, for example, supposes an element *à posteriori*, a datum of observation and experience, for, although the idea of the infinite, of the perfect, of unity, of the absolute, conducts directly to God, and although this idea is given by reason and not by experience, yet it is not given independently of all experience, [is not given without experience as its occasion and condition,] since reason would never give us this idea without the simultaneous or anterior idea of the finite, the imperfect, which is derived from experience; only in this case, the experimental datum is borrowed from the consciousness, and not from the senses; though it is still true, that every phenomenon of consciousness supposes a sensitive phenomenon, simultaneous or anterior. An element *à posteriori* intervenes, then, as the condition of the demonstration *à priori.*

So likewise, a little reflection shows that the proof from experience *à posteriori* implies an element purely rational and *à priori*. In fact, on what condition do you conclude from nature to God? On condition that you admit, or at least, that you employ the principle of causality; for if you are destitute of this principle, you might contemplate and study the world forever, you might forever admire the order and wisdom which reign there, without ever rising to the supposition that all this is only an effect, that it all must have a cause. Take away the principle of causality, and there are for us no longer any causes, there would no longer be neither the need nor the possibility of seeking for them, nor of finding them, and induction would no longer go from the world to God. Now, the principle of causality has indeed an experimental condition; but it is not itself derived from experience; it supposes experience, and it is applied to experience, but it governs it and decides upon it. It properly belongs to the reason. (See Ch. IV.)— See then in turn an element *à priori*, in the proof *à posteriori*. Further: this world is full of harmony; I believe it; and the more we look at it, especially if we place ourselves in a certain point of view which observation may indeed confirm, but which it does not give, the more we are struck with the order of the world; but we can also, by consulting only the senses, find appearances of disorder; we can not comprehend the reason of volcanoes which overwhelm flourishing cities, of earthquakes and tempests, and the like; in a word, observation employed alone, and not directed by a superior principle, may easily find disorder and evil in the world. Now, if to this deceptive experience, you connect the rational principle, that every thing which is true of the effect is true of the cause, you will be forced to admit in the cause what there is in the effect, that is to say, not only intelligence, wisdom, and power, but also degrading imperfections, as has indeed been done by more than one distinguished mind, when

under the exclusive direction of experience, and by more than one people in the infancy of humanity. In fine, so many diverse effects, of which experience does not always show the connection, might easily conduct not to God as one sole cause, but to divers causes, and to a plurality of gods; and history is at hand to justify this apprehension. You see then clearly, that the proof *à posteriori*, which, in the first place, essentially requires the rational principle of causality, has need also of other principles still to direct the application of causality to experience—principles, which, in order to govern experience, should not come from it, but must come from reason. The argument *a posteriori*, supposes, then, more than one element *à priori*. Thus completed, it has its use and excellence, as well as the argument *a priori*, when well regulated and recalled to its true principles.

These two arguments are not in themselves exclusive of each other; but one or the other is more striking, according to the turn of mind and moral and religious condition of individuals and nations. The Christian religion, rational and idealistic, which takes its grounds in the mind, and not in the senses, employs chiefly proofs *à priori*. Neglecting Nature, or regarding it under an idealistic point of view, it is in the depths of the soul, by Reason and the WORD, that it rises to God. The argument *à priori* is eminently the Christian argument. It belongs particularly to the reign of Christianity, to the middle age, to the Scholastic philosophy which represents it; from thence it passed into the great modern Spiritualistic school, that of Descartes,*

* DESCARTES believed that he had invented it: but he undoubtedly owed it to the Scholastic philosophy and to St. Anselm.—[St. Anselm was born in 1034 and died in 1109. One of his most important works is his *Monologium, seu Exemplum meditandi de Rationi Fidei.* His method in this work consists in deducing all theological truths from a single point—the being of God. The diversity and plurality of the Beautiful, the Sublime, the Good, the True, involve the supposition of an ideal

where it was brilliantly unfolded for half a century by Malebranche, Fénelon, Bossuet, Leibnitz. On the contrary, the religions of the first age of humanity, which are not yet religious "in spirit and in truth," and which are almost solely founded upon the senses and appearance, employ the proof *à posteriori;* and while spiritualistic religions tend a little too much to the separation of God from nature, because the proof upon which it rests separates reason and consciousness too much from the senses and from experience; so, in their turn, the religions of na-

ONE, a UNITY which is the ESSENCE of all Beauty, Goodness, and Truth. It must exist, for it is this which is the necessary form of every thing which exists. This unity is anterior to the plurality, and is its root. *Est ergo, aliquid unum, quod sive essentia, sive natura sive substantia, dicitur, optimum et maximum est et summum omnium quæ sunt.* This unity is God; from hence St. Anselm deduces the whole system of theology.

Another work of his is entitled *Prosologium seu Fides quærens intellectum.*—The name of St. Anselm is attached to an argument which deduces the demonstration of the existence of God, solely from the idea of God—an argument which has experienced many changes of fortune. It was greatly derided in the eighteenth century, but in the seventeenth it was regarded as invincible. The *Prosologium* consists of twenty-six short chapters, and has for its motto the passage of Scripture: *the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.* The argument is this: the most hardened atheist has in his mind the idea of a Highest Good, beyond which he can conceive no other. Now this supreme good can not exist merely in the mind, for a still greater would be conceivable; it therefore must exist out of the human mind: therefore God exists. Without quoting St. Anselm, or the *Prosologium,* with which he was perhaps unacquainted, Descartes has produced this argument in his *Méditations.* Leibnitz has also brought forward the same argument under a form at once the most simple and precise. He refers the honor of it to St. Anselm. See Cousin's *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie,* tome I.

It is needless to remark here upon the value of the argument in the form in which it is expressed by St. Anselm. It obviously *assumes* the point in question; it *proves* nothing except hypothetically, that is to say, *if* there exist a REALITY corresponding to the IDEA in the human mind, that reality must exist *out* of the human mind.—TR.]

ture make God in the image of nature, and reflect all the imperfections of the argument *à posteriori;* they are apt to put into the cause whatever is in the effect; and as nature presents very diverse phenomena, whose harmony is often scarcely seen, the religions of nature are polytheistic, physical, astronomical, anthropomorphic. As the Christian religion produces chiefly an idealistic philosophy, so the philosophy which proceeds from the religions of nature is a sensualistic philosophy whose theodicy most affects the proofs *à posteriori;* and accordingly one of two things results: either the sensualistic theology accepts the rational *à priori* principle of causality, contrary to the spirit of the philosophical school to which that theology pertains, and thus arrives at God by an inconsistency: or, it rejects the principle of causality, and then it does not and can not arrive at God at all; and moreover, as Sensualism confounds substance with the aggregate of qualities (see Ch. III.), so here it recognizes no other God than the aggregate of the phenomena of Nature, the assemblage of things in the universe. From hence, pantheism, the necessary theology of paganism, and of the Sensual philosophy. Let us apply all this to Locke.

Locke believes in the existence of God, and he has given an excellent demonstration of it. But he comes from the Sensual school, he therefore repels arguments *à priori* and admits scarcely any thing but arguments *à posteriori.* He does not wish to employ the argument of Descartes, which proves the existence of God from the idea of him, from the idea of infinity and perfection. B. IV. Ch. X. § 7: "This I think, I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and silencing Atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this, upon that sole foundation; and take some men's having that idea of God in their minds (for it is evident that some men have none, and some men worse than none, and the most very different) for the only proof of a Deity; and out of an over-

fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at least endeavor to invalidate all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken to these proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer so cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can any where be delivered that 'the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.'" He then goes on more particularly to develop this kind of proofs. If Locke had wished simply to establish that the argument *à priori* is not the only valid argument, and that the proof *à posteriori* is not to be slighted, I would very willingly join with him; but he goes much further, and strays into assertions which I can not too strongly repel. I deny that there are persons who have no idea of God; and here the Cartesian philosophy and all ideal philosophy comes well in, and proves beyond reply, that the idea of God, being at the bottom, that of the infinite, of perfection, of unity, of absolute existence, can not but be found in every man whose reason is at all developed. I deny also the sentiment which Locke unfortunately but naturally has lent to Bayle—sensualism to skepticism—that some men have such an idea of God that they had better have none at all. I deny that it is better to have no idea of God than to have an imperfect idea; as if we were not imperfect beings, subjected to blend the false with the true. If we will have nothing but unmixed truth, very little belief would be left to humanity, and very few theories to science. The man must be a stranger to the history of philosophy, who would reject the truth because it should be blended with some errors, or even with many errors. I remark, finally, that even in developing his preference for the argument *à posteriori*, Locke employs frequently, and without hesitation, arguments *à priori*, ideal, and even somewhat

scholastic: § 8. "Something must be from eternity." § 3. "Nothing can produce a being, therefore something eternal." Although he especially seeks God in the external world, he also (§ 2 and 3), with Descartes, goes from man to God. He nowhere accepts and unfolds, but every where employs the principle of causality, without which, indeed, he could never take a single step beyond nature and man. As to the rest, the sole conclusion, which I wish to deduce from these observations, is that the theology of Locke, in repelling the argument *à priori*, and in employing in preference the argument *à posteriori* still retains and manifests the fundamental characteristic of the philosophy of Locke, which grounds itself specially, and often even exclusively, upon sensible and external experience.

Here ends this long analysis of the Essay on the Human Understanding. It only remains to generalize and recapitulate the partial results we have obtained.

1. Considered in the most important point of view, that of Method, the Essay on the Human Understanding has this excellence, that psychology is given as the basis of all sound philosophy. Locke commences by the study of man, of his faculties, and of the phenomena observable in consciousness. Thereby he attaches himself to the great Cartesian movement and to the genius of modern philosophy. This is the good side of the method of Locke. The bad side is, that instead of observing man, his faculties and the phenomena which result from the development of his faculties, in their present state, and with the characteristics which these phenomena actually present, he buries himself at once in the obscure and perilous question concerning the primitive state of these phenomena, the first developments of the faculties, the *origin* of ideas.

2. This vice of method—the question concerning the *origin* of ideas, which ought to come after that of their *actual* characteristics, being prematurely taken up, without

a sufficient knowledge of the facts to be explained—throws Locke into a system which sees no other origin to all knowledge and all ideas, than sensation and reflection.

3. And again, it is to be recollected that Locke does not hold the balance true between these two origins, and that he lets it incline in favor of sensation.

4. This position being taken, to derive all ideas from sensation and from reflection, and prticularly from sensation, imposes upon Locke the necessity of confounding certain ideas with certain others, for example, the seven following ideas: the idea of space, of time, of the infinite, of personal identity, of substance, of cause, of good and evil—ideas which, as we have demonstrated, can not come into the human mind from sensation, nor from reflection. Locke is therefore forced to confound them with the ideas of body, of succession, of the finite or number, of consciousness, of the aggregate of qualities, the succession of phenomena, of reward and punishment, or pleasure and pain; which are in fact explicable by sensation or by reflection; that is to say, he is forced to confound either the antecedents or the consequents of the ideas of space, time, infinity, substance, cause, good and evil, with the ideas themselves.

5. This is the most general vice which governs the philosophy of Locke; and this vice fully displays itself in the theory of knowledge and judgment. Locke founds knowledge and judgment upon the perception of a relation between two ideas, that is to say, upon comparison; while in many cases these relations and the ideas of relation, so far from being the foundation of our judgments and of our cognitions, are, on the contrary, the results of primitive cognitions and judgments referable to the natural power of the mind, which judges and knows in its own proper virtue, basing itself frequently upon a single term, and consequently without comparing two together in order to deduce the ideas of relation.

6. The same is true in regard to the theory of language. Locke attributes very much to language; and with reason. But we are not to believe that every dispute is a dispute about words, every error an error purely verbal, every general idea the sole product of language, and that a science is nothing but a language well framed;—we are not, I say, to believe all this merely because that words really play a great part in our disputes and errors, because there are no general ideas without language, and because a language well framed is the condition, or the consequence rather, of a true science.

7. In fine, in regard to the great theories, by which all philosophies in their last result, are judged, the theories of God, of the soul, and of liberty; you see Locke confounding the will with the power of moving, as he expresses it, with the power of producing external action, and seeking for freedom in the will thus extended, and consequently seeking it where it is not. You see him, yielding to the prejudices of empiricism, expressing a doubt whether thought may not be only a mode of matter, just as extension is. You see him, finally, in theology, always faithful to the spirit of his system, depending more upon the senses than upon consciousness, interrogating nature rather than reason, repelling the proof *à priori* of Descartes, and admitting only the proof *à posteriori.*

Such is my definitive judgment on the work of Locke. If I have devoted the greatest part of the lectures of this season to the examination of this single work, I trust it will meet your approbation, when the importance of the work and of every thing of which it is a summary and a preparation, is considered. The Essay on the Human Understanding sums up for the eighteenth century nearly all the sensualistic tradition in which it had an interest, that is to say, that of the seventeenth century. In general modern philosophy, and I except no school, is, to say the least, care-

less of the past. It thinks only of the future; it is acquainted only with its own most immediate history. As the spiritualistic school of the eighteenth century ascends no further than Descartes, so the sensual school scarcely goes back further than Locke. It boasts much of Bacon; but its official point of departure is Locke. It is Locke who is always cited and imitated and developed. And in fact, now that you are thoroughly acquainted with the Essay on the Human Understanding, as a whole, and in its details, you must see that it really contains the most marked traits of all the great anterior sensual theories, whether of modern philosophy, or of Greece, or of the East.*

The essential characteristic of sensualism, as we have seen, is the denial of all the great truths which escape the senses, and which reason alone discovers, the denial of infinite time and space, of good and evil, of human liberty, of the immateriality of the soul, and of Divine Providence; and according to the times, or the greater or less zeal of its partisans, it openly announces these results, or vails them by the distinction, often sincere, and oftentimes pretended, between philosophy and religion. This is the sole difference which, in the seventeenth century, separates Gassendi, the Catholic priest, from Hobbes, the enemy of the Church. At the bottom their system is the same; they give an almost exclusive share to sensation in knowledge; they nearly maintain that all being is material (*substantia nobis datur sub ratione materiæ*); in spiritual beliefs they see nothing but metaphors; and, beyond the senses, they attribute every thing to signs and to language: after all this, Gassendi invokes revelation, and Hobbes invokes it not. In the sixteenth century, the appeal to revelation was indis-

* [Reference is here had to a rapid view of the history of philosophy down to the time of Locke, exhibited in the preceding portion of the course of Lectures, of which this work is a part. Some account of them has been given in the Introduction.—TR.]

pensable; it characterizes, and it hardly save the Peripatetic sensualism of Pomponatius and his school. Previous to that time, during the absolute reign of Christianity, this precaution was still more necessary; it hardly protected the involved Sensualism and the avowed Nominalism of Occam, the denial of all absolute truth in itself, of right and wrong, the beautiful and ugly, the true and false, in so far as founded in the nature of things, and their explanation by the sole will and arbitrary power of God. Now, all these traits of sensualism, manifest or concealed, of the middle age, and of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are reproduced in Locke. Who can not see, likewise, in the bosom of paganism, the precursors of Gassendi and Hobbes, and consequently of Locke, in Epicurus, in Strato, in Democritus and in the Ionian school? In fine, in certain Oriental systems, and particularly the *Sankhyra* of Kapila,* in the midst of inconsistencies apparent or real, and of mysticism true or false, similar, perhaps, to much of the modern invocation of revelation, who does not trace the lineaments of that theory which, advancing from age to age, and sharing in all the progress of humanity, came, toward the commencement of the eighteenth century, to

* [See Cousin's *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, Vol. I. § 5. The sources from which Cousin principally drew, are the Memoirs of Colebrooke, published in the Transactions of the London Asiatic Society, from 1824 to 1827. The *Sankhyra* is an oriental system, embracing physics, psychology, dialectics and metaphysics—in short, a complete philosophy. The meaning of *Sankhyra* is λόγος, reason. Its author is Kapila. It is a system of Sensualism; starting from Sensation as the principle of knowledge, and applying induction only to its phenomena, it results in materialism. Denying also the idea of cause, it comes out to fatalism and to atheism. Nor is this latter consequence disguised. Kapila denies the existence of a personal God and of Providence, on the ground, that not being perceivable by the senses, nor deducible from sensation by induction, there is no legitimate ground for these truths. Intelligence is admitted; but only as an attribute of matter, and the God of Kapila is a sort of *anima mundi*, or soul of the world.—Tr.]

receive its expression, not indeed full and decisive, but already elevated and truly scientific expression, in the *Essay on the Human Understanding?*

And not only does the Essay on the Human Understanding include and sum up the past, but it also contained the future. All those theories, the discussion of which has so long occupied us, and which, as they appear in Locke, may have perplexed you by their equivocal character, will be seen, as we proceed,* in less than half a century, to become enlarged, extended, and regularly unfolded by the hardy successors of Locke, into firm and precise theories, which will obtain, in more than one great country of Europe, an almost absolute authority, and be there regarded as the last expression of the human mind. Thus the theory of Locke concerning freedom tended to fatalism; this theory will come forth fully developed. Locke seems not to have had much dread of materialism; his disciples will admit and proclaim it. Soon, the principle of causality, being no longer merely overlooked and neglected, but repelled and destroyed, the argument *à posteriori* for the existence of God, will lose its basis, and the sincere theism of Locke's indecisive sensualism, will end in avowed pantheism, that is to say, in atheism. The two sources of knowledge, sensation and reflection, will be resolved into one; reflection will be merged in sensation; there will remain only sensation to explain the whole human mind.—Signs, whose influence Locke had already exaggerated, will become next after sensation, the source of all ideas. In a word, you may expect hereafter to see, how important it was for us to throw at the outset a strong and abundant light upon all those questions and theories, which gradually rising up, will become the battle-ground of our future discussions. It

* In default of the lectures here promised, consult Vol. III. of the First Series, where the school of sensation is presented in all its great metaphysical, moral and political aspects, in the persons of Locke, Condillac, Helvetius, St. Lambert and Hobbes.

was necessary to reconnoiter beforehand, and familiarize you with the field, on which we shall have so often to engage.

I have [in former discussions] divided the schools of the eighteenth century into four fundamental schools, which have appeared to me to contain them all. I have loved to tell you, that each of these schools has existed; therefore there was some ground for its existence. If these schools had been entirely absurd and extravagant they could not have existed. For total absurdity alone could not have found either place or credit in the human mind, could not have gained so much luster, nor have acquired so much authority, in any age, still less in an age so much enlightened as the eighteenth century. Thus, from the simple fact, that the Sensual school has existed, it follows that it had reason for its existence, that it possesses some element of truth. But there are four schools, and not merely one. Now, absolute truth is one; if one of these schools contained absolute truth, there would be but one school and not four. But they are; therefore there is reason for their being, and they contain truth; but at the same time there are four; therefore neither the one nor the other contains the whole truth entire, and each of them, with an element of truth which has caused it to exist, contains some element of error which reduces it, after all, to exist only as a particular school. And bear in mind that error, in the hands of systematic genius, easily becomes extravagance. It was my duty, then, to absolve and at the same time to combat all the schools; and consequently that great school which is called the sensual school, the school of sensation, from the name of the principle on which it solely rests. I was to absolve the school of sensation, as having had its part of truth; and I was to combat it, as having blended with the part of truth, which recommends it, many errors and extravagances. And in what way, was I to combat the school of

sensation? I promised you to combat the errors of one school, by all the truth there was in the opposite school. I was, then, to combat the exaggerations of sensualism, with what there is of sound and reasonable in idealism. This I have done. Perhaps there is something of my own, if I may be permitted to say it, in the development of these arguments, and in the conduct of the discussion, and above all in its general spirit, and in some sort, its moral spirit; but the arguments in themselves pertain for the most part to the spiritualistic school in its most reasonable, that is to say its negative side, which is always the soundest part of every school. At a future day, I shall take up the spiritualistic school; I shall examine it in its *positive* elements, and there I shall turn against it, against its sublime errors and its mystical tendencies, the solid arms which the good sense of empiricism and of skepticism will frequently furnish. In the mean time, it is with the dialectics of spiritualism that I have combated the extravagances of the empirical school, as they appear in Locke, the representative of that school in the eighteenth century. It is not, however, ancient idealism which I have invoked against modern empiricism; for the one does not answer to the other; ancient philosophy, and modern philosophy do not serve each other and enlighten each other, except on the highest summits of science, and for a very small number of the elect thinkers. It is therefore modern spiritualism which I have used against modern empiricism; I have employed against it in the eighteenth century, the arms which the eighteenth century itself furnished. Thus I have opposed to Locke the great men who followed him, and who were to modify and combat, in order to pass beyond him, and lead onward the march of science. It is not therefore even from Leibnitz, already too far back, but from Reid and Kant, that I have borrowed arguments. But I have had almost always to change the form of them; for their form savors a little of the country of those two great

men. Both express themselves, as men talk at Edinburgh and at Königsburg; which is not the way in which men express themselves in France. I have therefore neglected the phraseology of Reid, and particularly of Kant; but I have preserved the substance of their arguments. You are not acquainted with Kant; one day I shall endeavor to make you acquainted with that mind, so firm and so elevated—the Descartes of the age.* But the works of the judicious Reid are accessible to you, with the admirable commentary of Royer-Collard.† The Scotch philosophy [of Reid and Stewart] will prepare you for the German philosophy. It is to Reid and Kant I refer in great part the controversy I have carried on against empiricism as represented in the person of Locke.

I was bound to be just also toward the empirical school, even while combatting it; I was bound to take up its part of truth as well as of error, for the one was there as well as the other. Have I not also done this? Have I not recognized and signalized every thing good in different parts of the Essay on the Understanding? Have I not carefully brought out the happy commencement of Locke's method, and of his theories, before attacking the errors into which the spirit of system threw him? Finally, have I not rendered full homage to Locke as a man and a philosopher? I have done this, and with all my heart; and on this point at least, I am sure I am undeserving of reproach either from Locke, or from myself, or from philoso-

* The First Series of my Course was not then published. [So says Cousin in the last edition of this work. The series referred to is now published; and contains one entire volume, the fifth, devoted to Kant. —Tr.]

† I have incessantly referred to the translation of M. Jouffroy and the admirable lectures of M. Royer-Collard, in Vol. IV. of the First Series; and I take pleasure in rendering on every occasion my homage to him who was and will always be to me a revered master, and to him whom I may now name as the first of the independent pupils who have gone from my lecture-room.

phy. In fact, philosophy is not such or such a particular school, but it is the common foundation, and so to say, the soul of all schools. It is distinct from all systems, but it is blended with all; for it manifests, develops, and advances itself only by them. Its unity is even their variety, so discordant in appearance, and in reality so profoundly harmonious. Its progress and its glory is their mutual perfectionment by their pacific conflicts. When we attack, without qualification, any considerable system, we proscribe unawares some real element of the human mind and of things, and philosophy itself is in some part wounded. When we outrage an illustrious philosopher, to whatever school he may belong, we outrage philosophy and human reason in the person of one of its choicest representatives. I trust that nothing of this kind will ever come from me; for what before all things I profess, what I teach, is not such or such a philosophy, but philosophy itself; not attachment to such or such a system, however grand it may be; not admiration of such or such a man, whatever his genius; but the philosophic spirit, superior to all systems and all philosophers, that is, the boundless love of truth, the knowledge of all systems which, pretending to possess all the truth, at least possess something of the truth, and respect for all men who seek for it with talent and loyalty. The true muse of history is not Hatred, but Love; and the mission of true criticism is, not merely to signalize the extravagances, too real and too numerous, of philosophical systems, but also, to disengage from the folds of error, the truths which may and must be involved in them, and thereby to absolve philosophy in the past, to embolden and enlighten it for the future.

APPENDIX.

ADDITIONAL PIECES,

FROM

COUSIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS, ETC.

ADDITIONAL PIECES.

I.

CLASSIFICATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS AND SCHOOLS.

THE preliminary question of all philosophy is that of the classification of philosophical questions.

The first law of a classification is, that it should be complete, embracing all questions, general and particular, both those which present themselves immediately, and those which must be sought for in the depths of science—in short all questions that are known and all that are possible.

The second law of a classification is, that it should establish the relation of all the questions which it enumerates, and describe with precision the order in which each question should be treated.

Now, when I reflect upon all the questions that have occupied my own mind; when I compare them with those that have occupied all philosophers; when I interrogate both books and myself; and above all, when I consult the nature of the human mind—reason as well as experience seems to me to reduce all the problems of philosophy to a very small number of general problems, whose character is determined by the general aspect under which philosophy, or more particularly metaphysics, presents itself to my mind.

Philosophy, it appears to me, is only the science of hu-

man nature considered in the facts which it offers to our observation. Among these facts, there are those which refer more especially to the intelligence, and are therefore commonly called metaphysical. Metaphysical facts—the phenomena by which the intelligence displays itself—when reduced in general formulas, constitute intellectual principles. Metaphysics is therefore the study of the intelligence in that of our intellectual principles.

Intellectual principles present themselves under two aspects; either as relative to the intelligence in which they exist, to the *subject* that possesses them, to the consciousness and reflection which exercises and contemplates them —or as relative to their *objects*, that is, no longer as in themselves and in ourselves, but in their consequences and external applications. Every intellectual principle indeed has reference to the human mind; and at the same time that it refers itself to the human mind as the subject of all knowledge and all consciousness, it likewise has respect to objects as existing out of the mind that conceives them; or to adopt those celebrated expressions, so convenient from their conciseness, precision, and force, every intellectual principle is either *subjective* or *objective*, or *subjective* and *objective* at the same time. There is no principle, no knowledge, no idea, no perception, no sensation, which does not come under the general division—a division which includes and divides at the outset all the problems of philosophy into two great classes; problems relative to *subject*, and problems relative to *object*; or, to speak more briefly, *subjective* problems, and *objective* problems.

Let us unfold this general division, and deduce from it the particular questions which it contains. Let us examine first the intellectual principles, independently of the external consequences that may be derived from them. Let us develop the science of the *subjective*.

This science is that of the internal world. It is the sci-

ence of the *me*, a science entirely distinct from that of the *objective*, which is, properly speaking, the science of the *not-me*. And this science of the *me* is not a romance concerning the nature of the soul, its origin, and its end; it is the true history of the soul, written by reflection, at the dictation of consciousness and memory. It is the mind falling back upon itself, and contemplating the spectacle presented by itself. It is occupied entirely with internal facts, phenomena perceptible and appreciable by consciousness. I call it *psychology*, or, again, *phenomenology*, in order to mark the nature of its objects. Now, in spite of the difficulties which a being thrown at first beyond himself—and constantly drawn to the outward world by the wants of his sensibility and his reason—has to encounter in the process of reflection, yet this science, entirely subjective as it is, is not above man, not beyond the reach of human nature. It is certain, for it is immediate. The *me*, and that with which it is occupied, are both contained in the same sphere, in the unity of consciousness. There the object of science is entirely internal; it is perceived intuitively by the subject. The subject and the object are given, intimately connected the one with the other. All the facts of consciousness are evident of themselves, as soon as consciousness attains them; but they frequently escape its grasp, by their extreme delicacy, or from being developed in others foreign to themselves. Psychology gives the most perfect certainty: but this certainty is found only at a depth which it belongs not to all eyes to penetrate. To arrive there it is necessary to abstract one's self from the world of extension and of form in which we have lived so long, and whose colors now tinge all our thoughts and language. It is necessary also to abstract one's self from the external world of being and of the absolute, which is even more difficult to remove than the former; that is to say, abstract one's self from an integral part of thought itself, for in all thought there is being and the absolute;

and, again, it is necessary to separate and distinguish thought without mutilating it, to disengage the phenomena of consciousness, both from the ontological notions which naturally envelop them, and from the logical forms which, in the developed intelligence, express and restrain them; and to do this without falling into mere abstractions. In fine, after having established our position in this world of consciousness, so delicate and shifting, it is necessary to make a wide and profound review of all the phenomena comprehended in it; for, here, phenomena are the elements of science. We must be sure of having omitted no element, otherwise the science will be incomplete. We must be sure of having taken none upon supposition. We must be careful that we omit no real element, that we admit no foreign element, and, finally, that we view all the real elements in their true aspect, and in all the aspects which they present. When this preliminary labor has put us in possession of all the elements of science, it remains to construct the science by bringing those elements together, by combining them, so as to exhibit them all in the different classes to which they would fall, and which result from their different characteristics, just as the naturalist arranges the varieties of the vegetable and mineral world, under a certain number of divisions which comprehend them all.

This done, all is not yet done; the science of the subjective is not yet exhausted; the greatest difficulties remain to be overcome. We have recognized the internal world, the phenomena of consciousness, as consciousness at the present time displays them. We know the actual man, but we are still ignorant of primitive man. It is not enough for the human mind to contemplate the analytical inventory of its cognitions, arranged under their respective titles. The unwearied curiosity of man can not rest in these careful classifications; it goes on after higher problems, which at once daunt and attract it, which charm

and defy it. We seem not lawfully to possess present reality, until we have obtained the primitive truth; and we ascend continually to the origin of our cognitions, as to the source of all light. With the question of the origin of knowledge a new question springs up, as difficult, perhaps more difficult. It is the question concerning the relation of the primitive to the actual. It is not enough to know where we now are, and from whence we started; we must know all the road by which we arrived at the point where we now find ourselves. This third question is the complement of the two others. Here the whole problem is solved, the science of the *subjective* is truly exhausted; for when we have the two extreme points and the intermediate space, nothing more remains to be asked.

Let us now consider the intellectual principles as relative to their external objects.

A strange thing this! A being perceives and knows, out of his own sphere; he is nothing but himself, and yet he knows something that is not himself. His own existence is, for himself, nothing but his own individuality and yet from the bosom of this individual world which he inhabits and which he constitutes, he attains to a world foreign to his own, and that, by powers which, altogether internal and personal as they are in reference to the subject in which they inhere, extend beyond its boundary, and discover to him things lying beyond his reflection and his consciousness. That the mind of man is provided with these wonderful powers, no one can doubt; but is their reach and application legitimate? and does that which they reveal really exist? The intellectual principles have an incontestable authority in the internal world of the *subject;* but are they equally valid in reference to their external *objects?*

This is eminently the *objective* problem. Now, as every thing which lies out of the consciousness is objective, and as all real and substantial existences are external to the

consciousness, which is exercised only upon internal phenomena, it follows, that every problem relating to any particular being, or in general implying the question of existence, is an objective problem. Finally, as the problem of the legitimacy of the means we have of knowing any thing objective, whatever it be, is the problem concerning the legitimacy of the means we have of knowing in an *absolute* manner (since the *absolute* is that which is not relative to the *me*, which refers to being in general), it follows that the problem concerning the legitimacy, and the validity, of all external, objective, and ontological knowledge, is the problem concerning absolute knowledge. The problem concerning the ABSOLUTE, constitutes the HIGHER LOGIC.

When we are assured of the validity of our means of knowing in an absolute manner, we apply these means to some object, that is, to some particular being; and we raise the question concerning the reality of the substantial *me* of the soul which conceives, but does not perceive itself, and of that extended and figured substance which we call *matter*, and of that Supreme Being, the last ground of all beings, of all external objects, and of the subject itself, likewise, who rises to him—GOD.

At length, after these problems relative to the existence of different particular objects, come up those which pertain to the modes and characteristics of this existence, problems superior to all others; since, if it is strange that the individual intelligence should know that there are existences out of its own sphere, it is still more strange that it should know what passes in spheres beyond its own existence and consciousness.

These special researches constitute the HIGHER METAPHYSICS, the science of the objective, of essence, of the invisible; for all essence, every thing that is objective, is invisible to consciousness.

Let us recapitulate. The objective problems divide

themselves into two great problems, the one logical, the other metaphysical; namely, the problem of the absolute, the question concerning the reality of the existence of any thing objective; and the question concerning the reality of the existence of different particular objects. Add to these two *objective* questions the three questions involved in the general question concerning the *subjective*, and you have all the questions of metaphysics. There is none which will not fall within the general frame-work. We have therefore satisfied the first law of classification. Let us endeavor to satisfy the second, and to ascertain the order in which it is proper to examine each question.

Let us first consider the two problems which contain all the others, that of the subject, and that of the object.

Whether the object exists or not, it is obvious that it exists for us only as it is manifested to us by the subject; and if it is maintained that the subject and the object are actually and primitively given us, the one with the other, it must always be admitted that, in this natural relation, the term which knows, should be considered, as in truth it is, the fundamental element of the relation. It is, therefore, with the subject that we are to commence. It is ourselves we are first to know; for we know nothing but in ourselves, and by ourselves. It is not ourselves who move around the external world, it is rather the external world which moves around us; or if these two spheres have each their proper motions, and are merely correlative, we know not the fact, except as one of them teaches it to us. It is thereby, always, that we are to gain the knowledge of every thing, even the existence, and the independent existence of the other.

We are, then, to commence with the subject, with the *me*, with consciousness.

But the question concerning the subjective, involves in itself three others. With which of these are we to commence? In the first place, one of these questions consists

in determining the relation of the other two, the relation of the primitive to the actual. It is clear that this can not be treated, until after the other two. It remains to determine the order of the other two. Now a strict method will not hesitate to place the actual before the primitive; for, by commencing with the primitive, we might obtain only a false primitive, which, in deduction, would give only an hypothetical actual, whose relation to the primitive would be only the relation of two hypotheses, more or less consistent. In commencing with the primitive, if a mistake is made, all is lost; the science of the *subjective* is falsified, and what then will become of the *objective?* Besides, commencing with the primitive is to start with one of the most obscure and embarrassing problems, without guide and without light; whereas, to begin with the actual, is to begin with the easiest question, with the one which serves as the introduction to all the others. On every hand, experience and the experimental method have been celebrated as the triumph of the age and the genius of our epoch. The experimental method, in Psychology, is to begin with the actual, to exhaust it, if possible; to take a strict account of all the principles which now actually govern the intelligence; to admit only those which actually present themselves, but of those to reject none; to ask none of them from whence they come, or where they go—it is enough that they are actually present in nature, they must have a place in science. No arbitrary judgment is to be passed upon facts, no systematic control. We are to be contented to register them, one with another; nor are we to be in any haste to torture them, in order to force from them some premature theory. We are to wait patiently until their number is complete, their relations unfolded, and the theory comes forth of itself.

If we pass now from the subjective to the objective, and if we investigate the order of the two questions of which the objective is composed, it is easy to see that the logical

question is to be treated before the metaphysical, the problem of the absolute and of existence in general before that of particular existences; for the solution, whatever it be, of the first problem, is the principle of the second.

Here then are the laws of classification satisfied; the frame-work of philosophy divided and arranged: now who will build and fill it up?

In the first place, has there hitherto been a philosopher who has done this? If there were, there would be a metaphysical science, just as there is a geometry and a chemistry.—But have not philosophers at least distinguished these different parts, if they have not filled them up? Have they not sketched the outlines and proportions of the edifice, if they have not yet been able to realize it? If this were the case, there would be a science commenced, a route opened, a method fixed.—But if philosophers have done neither of these, what have they done? A few words will explain.

The first philosophers have treated every thing and resolved every thing, but it is confusedly; they have treated every thing, but without method, or with arbitrary and artificial methods. There is not a metaphysical problem which has not been agitated in every form and analyzed in a thousand ways by the philosophers of Greece, and by the Italian metaphysicians of the sixteenth century; nevertheless, neither the former, with their wonderful genius, nor the latter, with all their sagacity, could discover or settle the true limits of each problem, its relations, and its extent. No philosopher previous to Descartes has laid down precisely and distinctly the very first problem of philosophy, the distinction between the subject and the object; this distinction was scarcely any thing but a scholastic and grammatical distinction, which the successors of Aristotle vainly agitated without being able to deduce any thing from it but consequences of the same kind as their principle, grammatical consequences which, passing from gram-

mar into logic and from thence into metaphysics, corrupted intellectual science and filled it with empty verbal arguments. Descartes himself, notwithstanding the strength and acuteness of his mind, did not penetrate the whole extent of this distinction; his glory consists in having made it and having placed the true starting-point of philosophical investigations in the consciousness, in the *me;* but he was not so much aware as he should have been of the abyss that separates the subject from the object; and after having laid down the problem, this great man resolved it far too hastily.—It was reserved for the eighteenth century to apply and extend the spirit of the Cartesian philosophy, and to produce three schools which, instead of losing themselves in external and objective investigations, began by an examination, more or less strict, more or less profound, of the human mind itself and its faculties. It belonged to the greatest philosopher of the last age, by the very title of his own philosophy to mark the characteristic of modern philosophy. The system of Kant is called the Critical Philosophy (*Kritik*). The other two European schools, the one anterior, the other cotemporaneous, the school of Locke and the school of Reid, are both far below the school of Kant, by the inferiority of the genius of their masters, and by the inferiority of their doctrines, and both very different from each other in their principles and in their consequences, yet both belong to the school of Kant, and are intimately connected with each other by the spirit of criticism and analysis by which they are recommended. If the analysis of Reid is stricter and more extended than that of Locke, we must not forget that he had the advantage of all the light which the works written in the system of Locke shed upon that system; and we should beware of injustice toward Locke, and particularly we should guard against being unjust to Descartes the founder of the modern philosophy.

But much as the three great schools of Europe are allied in the general spirit that animates them, they differ as

much in their positive principles; and the reason of this difference is the particular point of view under which each of these schools has considered philosophy. All philosophical questions being reducible to three great questions, in regard to the objective, to the question concerning the absolute and the reality of existences, in regard to the subjective, to that of the actual, and that of the primitive, the weakness of the human mind, which is seen in the strongest intellects, did not permit Locke, and Reid, and Kant to bestow their attention equally upon these three questions. It was directed respectively to one. Locke, Reid, and Kant took each a different question; so that by a fortune sufficiently remarkable, each of the three great questions which make up metaphysics became the special object and the exclusive possession of one of the three great schools of the eighteenth century. The school of Locke seeks after the *origin* of knowledge [the *subjective primitive;*] the Scotch school of Reid seeks rather after the *actual* characteristics which human knowledge presents in the developed intelligence [*the subjective actual;*] and the school of Kant is occupied with the legitimacy of the passage from the subjective to the objective [*the objective logical—transcendental logic*]. Let me explain: I do not mean to say that each of these three schools has taken up but a single problem; I mean that each of them is more especially occupied with a particular problem, and is eminently characterized by the mode in which that problem is resolved. All the world is agreed that Locke has misconceived many of the actual characteristics of human knowledge; Reid does not conceal that the question of their origin is of little importance in his view; and Kant contents himself with indicating in general the source of human knowledge without investigating the special origin of each of those intellectual principles, those celebrated categories which he established. Now it seems to me that in following this parallel division of the questions and schools of

philosophy, the history of philosophy might be viewed under a new aspect. In the three great modern schools we might study the three great philosophical questions; each of these three schools, partial and incomplete in itself, might be extended and enlarged by the vicinity of the others; opposed, they would reveal their relative imperfections; brought together, they would mutually supply what each one is deficient in. It would be an interesting and instructive spectacle to show the vices of the modern schools by engaging them one against the other, and to bring together their several merits into one vast central ECLECTICISM which should combine and complete all three. The Scottish philosophy would demonstrate the vices of the philosophy of Locke; Locke would serve to question Reid on the subjects which he has too much neglected; and the examination of the system of Kant would introduce us into the depths of a problem which has escaped both the other schools.

II.

PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD.—ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. —ITS ONTOLOGICAL RESULTS.

[Preface to the First Edition of the Philosophical Fragments.]

A SYSTEM is scarcely any thing but the development of a method applied to certain objects. Nothing therefore is more important than to ascertain and determine, in the first place, the method which we wish to pursue; to give an account to ourselves of our good and our bad impulses and of the direction in which they impel us, and to which we must know whether or not we mean to consent; for our philosophy, like our destiny, must necessarily be our own. Undoubtedly, we should borrow it from truth and the ne-

cessity of things; but we ought also to receive it freely, with a perfect comprehension of what we borrow and what we receive. Philosophy, whether speculative or practical, is the alliance of necessity and liberty in the mind of the man, who spontaneously places himself in harmony with the laws of universal existence. The end is in the Infinite, but the point of departure is in ourselves. Open the books of history; every philosopher who has respected his fellow-men, and who has not wished to offer them merely the indefinite results of certain dreams, has begun with the consideration of method. Every doctrine which has exercised any influence, has done so and could do so, only by the new direction which it has given to the mind, by the new point of view in which it has presented the subjects of inquiry, that is to say, by its method. Every philosophical reform has its avowed or secret principle in a change or in an advancement of method. . . . .

It is an incontestable fact that in England and France in the eighteenth century, Locke and Condillac supplanted the great schools of a previous date, and have reigned without contradiction to the present date. Instead of being irritated at this fact, we should endeavor to comprehend it; for after all, facts do not create themselves; they have their laws, which are connected with the general laws of the human race. If the philosophy of sensation actually gained credit in England and France, there must have been some reason for this fact. Now this reason, when we come to reflect upon it, does honor and not discredit to the human mind. It was not its fault, if it could not remain in the shackles of Cartesianism; for it belonged to Cartesianism to protect it, to satisfy all the conditions which can perpetuate a system. In the general movement of affairs and the progress of time, the spirit of analysis and observation was also to have its place; and this place it found in the eighteenth century. The spirit of the eighteenth

century needs no apology. The apology for a century is the fact of its existence; for its existence is a decree and a judgment of God himself; or else history is nothing but an insignificant phantasmagoria. The modern spirit is often accused of incredulity and skepticism, but it is skeptical only with regard to what it does not understand, incredulous only concerning what it can not believe, that is to say, the condition of understanding and of believing, at that epoch, as at many former epochs, having been changed for the human race, it was indispensable, on pain of surrendering its independence, that it should impose new conditions on every thing which aspired to govern its intelligence and its faith. Faith is neither exhausted nor diminished. The human race, like the individual, lives only by faith; but the conditions of faith, however, are constantly renewed. In the eighteenth century, the general condition of comprehending and of believing was that of having observed the object; from that time, all philosophy which aspired to authority must needs be founded on observation. Now, Cartesianism, especially with the modifications which it had received from Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Wolf—Cartesianism, which in the second stage of its progress, abandons observation and loses itself in ontological hpyotheses and scholastic formulas, could not pretend to the character of experimental philosophy. Another system was presented in this character, and in this character, it was accepted. Such is the explantion of the fall of Cartesianism, and the success of the philosophy of Locke and Condillac. If we reflect for a moment on the subject, the success of this meager philosophy still testifies to the dignity and independence of the human mind, which forsakes in its turn the systems which forsake it, and pursues its path even through the most deplorable errors, rather than not advance at all. It did not adopt the philosophy of sensation on account of its Materialism; but on account of its experimental character, which to a certain degree it

actually possessed. The favor with which this philosophy was received did not come from its dogmas, but from its method; and this method was not its own, but that of the age. And it is true that the experimental method was the necessary fruit of time, and not the transient work of a sect in England and France; and if we calmly examine the cotemporary schools, the most opposed to that of sensation, we shall find the same pretensions to observation and experience. Reid and Kant, in Scotland and in Germany, engaged in conflict against, and utterly overthrew, the doctrine of Locke; but with what weapons? With those of Locke himself; with the experimental method differently applied. Reid starts from the human mind and its faculties, which he analyzes in their actual operation, and the laws of which he determines. Kant, separating reason from all its objects, and considering, if I may so speak, only its interior, gives a profound and exquisite statistical account of it; his philosophy is a Critique; it is always that of observation and experience. Make the tour of Europe and of the world, you will every where find the same spirit, the same method; and this in fact constitutes the unity of the age, since this unity presents itself in the midst of the most striking diversities. . . . .

To be limited to observation and experience is to be limited to human nature; for we observe only with ourselves, in proportion to our faculties and their laws. We are then limited to human nature. But what else would we have? If the observation which goes as far as human nature can go, does not suffice for the attainment of all truths and all convictions, and for the completion of the whole circle of science, the evil is certainly not in the method which limits us to our natural means of knowledge, but in the weakness of those means and of our nature from which we can not escape. In fact, whatever method we may adopt, it is always ourselves who have made it or who employ it; it is always with ourselves that we act; it is

always human nature which, appearing to forget itself, is always present, which does every thing that is done or attempted, even apparently beyond its power. Either we must despair of science, or human nature is competent to attain it. Observation, that is, human nature accepted as the sole instrument of discovery, is competent, when properly employed, or nothing is competent; for we have nothing else, and our predecessors had no more. Let us study the systems on which time has passed sentence; what has it destroyed? What could it destroy? The hypothetical part of those systems. But what gave life and coherence to those hypotheses? Merely certain truths which had been discovered by observation, which observation now discovers, and which still possess, for that reason, the same certainty and the same novelty as heretofore. What has raised so high and yet sustains the *numbers* of Pythagoras, the *ideas* of Plato, the *categories* of Aristotle? A fact no less real at this moment than it was in antiquity, namely, that there are real elements in intelligence which the acquisitions of the senses alone can not explain. What has produced the *vision in God* of Malebranche, and the *pre-established harmony* of Leibnitz? Facts again;—the fact that there is not a single cognition which does not suggest to our minds the notion of existence, that is to say, of God, the fact that our intelligence and our sensibility, though inseparable, are distinct, that each has its independent laws by which it is governed, but that these laws have their secret relations and harmony. If we thus examine the most celebrated hypotheses we shall perceive that even when they are lost in the clouds, their root is here below in some fact, real in itself; and that it is by this fact, that they have been established and brought into credit among men. Every unmingled error is incomprehensible and inadmissible. It is only by its relation with the truth that it is sustained. It is impossible for the most extravagant systems not to have some reasonable aspects; and it is always

the unperceived common sense which gives success to the hypothesis with which it is combined. At the bottom, every thing true and permanent in the systems that are scattered through the course of ages is the fruit of observation which often labors for philosophy without the knowledge of the philosopher; and, what is remarkable, there is nothing permanent in the changing forms of human opinion but that which comes precisely from this experimental method, which at first appears competent to attain only that which is transitory.

The method of observation is good in itself. It is given to us by the spirit of the age, which itself is the product of the general spirit of the world. We have faith only in that method, we can do nothing except with that, and yet in England and in France, it has hitherto done nothing but destroy without building up. With us, its single work in philosophy is the system of *transformed sensation.* And whose is the fault? Not of the method, but of men. The method is irreproachable; but it should be applied according to its true spirit. We must do nothing but observe; but we must observe every thing. Human nature is not impotent; but we must deprive it of no portion of its strength. We may arrive at a permanent system; but it is possible only on condition that we are not stopped at the entrance of our course by a systematic prejudice. The philosophy of the eighteenth century did not proceed and could not proceed in this manner. The offspring of a struggle against the past, and wishing to gain by this struggle, it was experimental against the past, but systematic in relation to experience; fearful of going astray in the ancient darkness, finding evident facts under its hand in sensations, it was led to rest with them: at first through weakness, for every new method is weak; then by the dazzling influence, at that time, almost irresistible, of the success of the physical sciences, which seduced the attention from every other order of phenomena; and finally, by

the blindness of the spirit of revolution which could be enlightened only by its excesses, and which was destined to go on until it had obtained an absolute triumph. Its cradle had been England; it was necessary that its battle-field should be France. Bacon has been often celebrated as the father of the experimental method; but the truth is that Bacon marked out the rules and processes of the experimental method within the sphere of the physical sciences, but not beyond; and that he was the first to lead that method astray in a systematic path, by limiting it to the external world and to sensibility. The language of Bacon is: "Mens humana si agat in materiam, naturam rerum et opera Dei contemplando, pro modo materiæ operatur atque ab eadem determinatur: si ipsa in se vertatur, tanquam aranea texens telam, tunc demum indeterminata est; et parit telas quasdam doctrinæ tenuitate fili operisque mirabiles, sed quoad usum frivolas et inanes." As a general rule, observation with Bacon is applicable only to the phenomena of sense; but induction supported on this basis alone will carry us but a little way. The philosophy which must needs proceed from such an imperfect application of method could not but be miserably imperfect itself. The system of *transformed sensation* was at the end of a procedure like this; and Bacon necessarily produced Condillac. Of so much consequence are the aberrations of method. Even the most trifling bring in their train the gravest errors which can not be destroyed but by going back to their principle. The first aberration from the philosophical method comes from Bacon, its consequences stop only with Condillac, beyond whom there is no room for any further aberration, whether in point of method or of system. Is the imperfect method of Bacon admitted? Then all the defects of the system of Condillac must be adopted. It is only feebleness and inconsistency which can stop short of them. Does the system of Condillac, in its rigor, shock the least attentive observation and human

nature itself? We must go back to Bacon and endeavor to put a stop to the evil at its source; we must borrow the experimental method from Bacon, but avoid corrupting observation at the outset by imposing on it a system. We must employ only the method of observation, but apply it to all facts, whatever they may be, provided they exist; its accuracy depends on its impartiality, and impartiality is found only in universality. In this way, perhaps, may be established the long-sought alliance between the metaphysical and the physical sciences, not by the systematic sacrifice of the one to the other, but by the unity of their method applied to different phenomena. It might be possible, in this way, to satisfy the conditions of the spirit of the age, and of all that was legitimate and necessary in the revolution of the eighteenth century; and also perhaps to satisfy the most elevated wants of human nature, which are facts in themselves, facts no less incontestable and imperious than any others. . . . .

Facts, therefore, are the point of departure, if not the limit of philosophy. Now facts, whatever they may be, exist for us only as they come to our consciousness. It is there alone that observation seizes them and describes them, before committing them to induction, which forces them to reveal the consequences which they contain in their bosom. The field of philosophical observation is consciousness; there is no other; but in this nothing is to be neglected; every thing is important, for every thing is linked together; and if one part be wanting, complete unity is unattainable. To return within our consciousness, and scrupulously to study all the phenomena, their differences and their relations; this is the primary study of philosophy. Its scientific name is psychology. Psychology is then the condition and as it were the vestibule of philosophy. The psychological method consists in completely retiring within the world of consciousness, in order to become familiar in that sphere where all is reality, but where

the reality is so various and so delicate; and the psychological talent consists in placing ourselves at will within this interior world, in presenting the spectacle there displayed to ourselves; and reproducing freely and distinctly all the facts which are accidentally and confusedly brought to our notice by the circumstances of life. . . . .

As soon as we return within our consciousness, and, free from every systematic view, observe the diversified phenomena which are there exhibited, with the actual characteristics which distinguish them, we are at first struck with the presence of a multitude of phenomena which it is impossible to confound with those of sensibility. Sensation and the notions which it furnishes, or with which it is combined, indeed constitute an actual order of phenomena in our consciousness; but it also presents other facts no less incontestable, which we may reduce to two great classes, voluntary facts and rational facts. The will is not sensation; for the will often combats sensation; and it is even in this opposition that it is most signally manifested. Neither is the reason identical with sensation; for among the notions which reason furnishes, there are some, the characteristics of which are irreconcilable with those of the sensible phenomena; for example, the notions of cause, of substance, of time, of space, of unity, and the like. Let sensation be tortured, as much as you please, you will never draw from it the characteristics of universality and necessity by which these notions and many others are incontestably distinguished. The case is the same with regard to the notion of the Good and that of the Beautiful: and, consequently, art and morality are enfranchised from the origin and the limits that have been imposed upon them by the exclusive philosophy of sensation, and placed, together with metaphysics, in a superior and independent sphere. But this sphere itself, in all its sublimity, composes a portion of our consciousness, and hence falls within the

reach of observation. Observation disengages it from the clouds in which it is usually enveloped, and gives to the phenomena which it comprises the same authority with the other phenomena of which consciousness is the theater. The method of observation, accordingly, in the limits within which it is at first held by a wise circumspection, presents to us already many attractive prospects. These we must follow and enlarge.

The first duty of the psychological method is to retire within the field of consciousness, where there is nothing but phenomena that are all capable of being perceived and judged by observation. Now as no substantial existence falls under the eye of consciousness, it follows that the first effect of a rigid application of method is to postpone the subject of ontology. It postpones it, I say, but does not destroy it. It is a fact, indeed, attested by observation, that in this same consciousness, in which there is nothing but phenomena, there are found notions, whose regular development passes the limits of consciousness and attains the knowledge of actual existences. Would you stop the development of these notions? You would then arbitrarily limit the compass of a fact, you would attack this fact itself, and thus shake the authority of all other facts. We must either call in question the authority of consciousness in itself; or admit the authority without reserve for all the facts attested by consciousness. The reason is no less certain and real than the will or the sensibility; its certainty once admitted, we must follow it wherever it rigorously conducts, though it be even into the depths of ontology. For example, it is a rational fact attested by consciousness, that in the view of intelligence, every phenomenon which is presented supposes a cause. It is a fact, moreover, that this principle of causality is marked with the characteristics of universality and necessity. If it be universal and necessary, to limit it would be to destroy it. Now in the phenomenon of sensation, the

principle of causality intervenes universally and necessarily, and refers this phenomenon to a cause; and our consciousness testifying that this cause is not the personal cause which the will represents, it follows that the principle of causality in its irresistible application conducts to an impersonal cause, that is to say, to an external cause, which subsequently, and always irresistibly, the principle of causality enriches with the characteristics and laws, of which the aggregate is the Universe. Here then is an existence; but an existence revealed by a principle which is itself attested by consciousness. Here is a primary step in ontology, but by the path of psychology, that is to say, of observation. We are led by similar processes to the Cause of all causes, to the substantial Cause; to God, and not only to a God of Power, but to a God of Justice, a God of Holiness; so that this experimental method, which, applied to a single order of phenomena, incomplete and exclusive, destroyed ontology and the higher elements of consciousness, applied with fidelity, firmness, and completeness, to all the phenomena, builds up all that which it had overthrown, and by itself furnishes ontology with a sure and legitimate instrument. Thus, having commenced with modesty, we can end with results whose certainty is equaled by their importance. . . . .

Sensible facts are necessary. We do not impute them to ourselves. Rational facts are also necessary; and reason is no less independent of the will than sensibility. Voluntary facts alone are marked in the view of consciousness with the characteristics of personality and responsibility. The will alone is the person, or the me. The me is the center of the intellectual sphere. So long as the me does not exist, the conditions of the existence of all the other phenomena might be in force, but, without relation to the me, they would not be reflected in the consciousness, and would be for it as though they were not. On the other hand, the will creates none of the rational and sensible phenom-

ena; it even supposes them, since it does not apprehend itself, except in distinction from them. We do not find ourselves, except in a foreign world, between two orders of phenomena which do not pertain to us, which we do not even perceive, except on condition of separating ourselves from them. Still further, we do not perceive at all, except by a light which does not come from ourselves, for our personality is the will and nothing more; all light comes from reason, and it is reason which perceives both itself, and the sensibility which envelops it, and the will which it obliges, without constraining. The element of knowledge is rational by its essence; and consciousness, although composed of three integrant and inseparable elements, borrows its most immediate foundation from reason, without which no knowledge would be possible, and consequently no consciousness. Sensibility is the external condition of consciousness; the will is its center; and reason its light. A profound and thorough analysis of reason is one of the most delicate undertakings of psychology.

Reason is impersonal in its nature. It is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual that its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of individuality, namely, universality and necessity: since it is to reason, that we owe the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of principles which we all obey, and which we can not but obey. The existence of these principles is then a preliminary fact which it was essential to establish in the first place upon the most complete evidence. It is a triumph of the method of observation, to which it must have been indebted for an incontestable basis. Then comes the question with regard to the precise number of these regulating principles of reason, which, as far as we are concerned, are reason itself. After having established the existence of such principles, it is the business of method to

attempt a complete enumeration and a rigorous classification of them.

Plato, who following Pythagoras, built his philosophy on these principles, neglected to count them; it seems as if he shrunk from permitting a profane analysis to touch those divine wings on which he soared into the world of ideas. The methodical Aristotle, faithful to his master, but still more faithful to analysis, after having changed ideas into categories, submitted them to a severe examination, and did not hesitate to give a list of them. This list, so much despised by frivolous minds as an arid nomenclature, is the boldest and the most hazardous effort of method. Is the list of Aristotle complete? I believe that it is. It exhausts the subject. Let this be its immortal glory. But if the enumeration is complete, is there nothing to be desired in the classification and the arrangement of the categories? Here commences the defect of the list of Aristotle. In my opinion, its order is arbitrary and does not correspond to the progressive development of intelligence. Besides, does not this list contain repetitions? Would it not be possible to reduce it? I have no doubt of it. Among modern systems, Cartesianism recognizes necessary truths; but it makes no attempt at completeness and precision with regard to them. In the eighteenth century, in France, necessary truths were set aside as by the previous question; they did not even receive the honor of being submitted to examination; they were guilty of being found in the old system; they must be sacrificed to sensation, the only basis and standard of all possible truth. The Scottish school which restored them to honor, enumerated a part of them, but did not think of making a complete account. It was reserved for Kant to renew the undertaking of Aristotle, and the first among the moderns to attempt to form a complete list of the laws of thought. Of these, Kant made an exact and profound review, and his labor, in this respect, is superior even to that of Aristotle; but,

in my opinion, similar charges can be brought against him; and a long and detailed examination may have demonstrated to those who attended my Course of 1818, that if the list of Kant is complete, it is arbitrary in its classification, and is susceptible of a legitimate reduction. If I have accomplished any thing useful in my teaching, it is perhaps on this point. I have at least renewed an important question: I have debated the two most celebrated solutions; and I have ventured to propose another which time and discussion have not yet shaken. In my opinion, all the laws of thought may be reduced to two, namely, the law of causality and that of substance. These are the two essential and fundamental laws, of which all others are only derivatives, developed in an order by no means arbitrary. I have demonstrated, as I think, that if we examine these two laws in the order of the nature of things, the first is that of substance and the second that of causality; while in the order of the acquisition of our ideas, the law of causality precedes that of substance, or rather both are given to us together, and are cotemporary in our consciousness.

It is not sufficient to have enumerated, classed, and reduced to a system the laws of reason; we must prove that they are absolute, in order to prove that their consequences, whatever they may be, are also absolute. Here is the defect of the celebrated discussion of Kant respecting the Objective and Subjective in human knowledge. That great man, after seeing so clearly all the laws which preside over thought, struck with the character of necessity which they bear, that is to say, our inability not to recognize and follow them, supposed that he saw in this very fact a bond of dependence and relativeness with respect to the me, the peculiar and distinctive characteristic of which he was far from having completely fathomed. Now as soon as the laws of reason are degraded to being nothing but laws relative to the human condition, their

whole compass is circumscribed by the sphere of our personal nature; and their widest consequences, always marked with an indelible character of subjectivity, engender only irresistible persuasions, if you please, but no independent truths. This is the procedure by which that incomparable analyst, after having so well described all the laws of thought, reduces them to impotence; and with all the conditions of certainty, arrives at an ontological Skepticism, from which he finds no other asylum than the sublime inconsequence of allowing more objectivity to the laws of practical reason than those of speculative reason. The whole endeavor of my Lectures of 1818, after a systematic catalogue of the laws of reason, was to free them from the character of subjectivity which seemed to be imposed upon them by that of necessity; to reinstate them in their independence; and to save philosophy from the rock on which it had been thrown the moment of reaching the port. Our public discussions, for several months, were devoted to showing that the laws of human reason are nothing less than the laws of reason in itself. More faithful than ever to the psychological method, instead of departing from observation, I plunged into it more deeply: and it is by observation that in the recesses of consciousness, and at a depth to which Kant did not penetrate, under the apparent relativeness and subjectivity of the necessary principles of thought, I detected and unfolded the fact, instantaneous but real, of the spontaneous perception of truth—a perception, which not reflecting itself immediately, passes without notice in the interior consciousness, but is the actual basis of that which, at a subsequent period, in a logical form and in the hands of reflection, becomes a necessary conception. All subjectivity, with all that is of a reflective character, expires in the spontaneity of perception. But the spontaneous perception is so pure that it escapes our notice; it is the reflected light which strikes us, but often obscuring, by its false brightness, the purity

of the primitive light. Reason it is true, becomes subjective by its relation to the free and voluntary me, the seat and type of all subjectivity; but in itself it is impersonal; it belongs to no one individual rather than another within the compass of humanity; it belongs not even to humanity itself; and its laws consequently depend only on themselves. They preside over and govern humanity which perceives them, as well as nature which represents them; but they belong neither to the one or the other. It might even be said with greater truth that nature and humanity belonged to them; since they have no beauty or truth but by their relation to intelligence, and since nature without the laws by which it is governed, and humanity without the principles which guide it, would soon be lost in the abyss of nothingness, from which they could never escape. The laws of intelligence therefore constitute a separate world, which governs the visible world, presides over its movements, sustains and preserves it, but does not depend upon it. This is the intelligible world, the sphere of *ideas*, distinct from and independent of their subjects, internal and external, which Plato had glimpses of, and which modern analysis and psychology still discover at the present day in the depths of consciousness.

The laws of thought having been demonstrated to be absolute, induction can make use of them without hesitation; and from absolute principles obtained by observation can legitimately conduct us to a point beyond the immediate sphere of observation itself. Now among the laws of thought given by psychology, the two fundamental laws which contain all the others, the law of causality and the law of substance, irresistibly applied to themselves, elevate us immediately to their cause and their substance, and as they are absolute, they elevate us to an absolute cause and an absolute substance. But an absolute cause and an absolute substance are identical in essence; since every ab-

solute cause must be substance in so far as it is absolute, and every absolute substance must be cause in order to be able to manifest itself. Besides, an absolute substance must be One in order to be absolute; two absolutes are a contradiction; and the absolute substance must be One, or not at all. We may even say that all substance is absolute in so far as it is substance, and consequently One; for relative substances destroy the very idea of substance, and finite substances which suppose beyond them another substance still to which they belong, bear a strong resemblance to phenomena. The Unity of substance, therefore, is involved in the very idea of substance, which is derived from the law of substance, an incontestable result of psychological observation; so that experience applied to consciousness, at a certain degree of profoundness, gives that which appears at first view to be the most opposed to it, namely, ontology. In fact, substantial causality is Being in itself; the rational laws, therefore, are laws of Being, and reason is the true existence. Thus, as analysis applied to consciousness at first separated reason from personality, so now on the elevated point to which we have been conducted by analysis, we perceive that reason and its laws, referred to substance, can be neither a modification nor an effect of the me, since they are the immediate effect of the manifestation of absolute substance. Ontology, therefore, returns to psychology the lights which it borrows from it; and we thus arrive at the identity of the two extremities of science.

Such is the analysis of reason. That of activity is not less important. Of all the active phenomena, the most striking undoubtedly is that of will. It is a fact, that in the midst of the movements which are carried on within us by external agents in spite of ourselves, we have the power of commencing a different movement, in the first place of conceiving it, then of deliberating whether we shall execute it, finally of resolving and proceeding to execution, of begin-

ning it, of pursuing or suspending it, of accomplishing or retarding it, and at all times of controlling it. The fact is certain; and it is no less certain, that the movement accomplished on these conditions assumes a new character in our eyes; we impute it to ourselves, we refer it as an effect to ourselves, and in that case we consider ourselves as its cause. This is the origin of our notion of cause, not of an abstract cause, but of a personal cause, of ourselves. The peculiar characteristic of the me is causality, or will, since we refer to ourselves, we impute to ourselves, only what we cause, and we cause only what we will. To will, to cause, to exist for ourselves—these are synonymous expressions of the same fact, which comprises at once will, causality, and personality. The relation of the will and the person is not a simple relation of co-existence; it is a true relation of identity. To exist for ourselves is not one thing, and to will another, for in that case, there could be impersonal volitions, which is contrary to facts, or a personality, or self-conscious me without will, which is impossible; for to know myself as the me, is to distinguish myself from a not me; now, we can not distinguish ourselves from that but by separating ourselves from it, by leaving the impersonal movement and producing one which we impute to ourselves, that is to say, by exercising an act of volition. Will therefore is the essence of the person. The movements of sensibility, the desires, the passions, so far from constituting personality, destroy it. Personality and passion are essentially in an inverse relation, in an opposition to each other, which constitutes life. As we can find the element of personality only in the will, so also we can find the element of causality only in the same place. We must not confound the will or the internal causality which immediately produces effects internal at first like their cause, with the external and actually passive instruments of this causality, which as instruments, appear at first sight also to produce effects, but without being their primary cause,

that is to say, their true cause. When I throw a ball against another, it is not the ball which actually causes the motion that it communicates, for this motion was communicated to it by the hand, by the muscles which in our wonderful organization are at the service of the will. Properly speaking, these actions are only effects connected with one another, alternately resembling causes, without containing a single real cause, and all traceable as effects, more or less distinctly, to the will as their primary cause. If we seek the notion of cause in the action of one ball upon another, as was done previously to Hume; or in the action of the hand on the ball, and of the primary muscles of motion on their extremities, or even in the action of the will on the muscle, as was done by M. Maine de Biran; we shall find it in none of these cases, not even in the last, for it is possible that there should be a paralysis of the muscles which deprives the will of power over them, makes it unproductive, incapable of being a cause, and consequently of suggesting the notion of it. But what no paralysis can prevent, is the action of the will on itself, the production of a resolution, that is to say, an act of causation entirely mental, the primitive type of all causality, of which all external movements, commencing with the muscular effort and ending with the action of one ball on another, are only symbols more or less imperfect. The first cause for us therefore is the will; of which the first effect is a volition. This is at once the highest and the purest source of the notion of cause, which thus becomes identical with that of personality. And it is the taking possession, so to speak, of the cause in the will and the personality which is the condition for us of the ulterior or simultaneous conception of the external impersonal causes.

The phenomenon of will presents the following elements; 1, to decide upon an act to be performed; 2, to deliberate; 3, to resolve. Now if we look at it, it is reason which composes the first element entirely, and even the second;

for it is reason also which deliberates, but it is not reason which resolves and determines. Now reason, which is thus combined with will, is combined in a reflective form; to conceive an end, to deliberate, involves the idea of reflection. Reflection is therefore the condition of every voluntary act, if every voluntary act supposes a predetermination of its object and a process of deliberation. Now to act voluntarily, is, as we have seen, to act in this manner; and it is because the will is in fact reflective, that it presents such a striking phenomenon. But can a reflective operation be a primitive operation? To will is—with the consciousness that we can resolve and act—to deliberate whether we shall resolve, whether we shall act in such or such a manner, and to decide in favor of one or the other. The result of this choice, of this decision preceded by deliberation and predetermination, is volition, the immediate effect of personal activity; but in order to resolve and to act in this manner, it was necessary to know that we could resolve and act, it was necessary that we should have previously resolved and acted in a different manner, without deliberation or predetermination, that is to say, without reflection. The operation previous to reflection is spontaneity. It is a fact that even now we often act without having deliberated, and that rational perception spontaneously making known to us the act to be performed, the personal activity also spontaneously enters into operation and resolves at once, not by a foreign impulse, but by a kind of immediate inspiration, prior to reflection and often superior to it.* The *Qu'il mourût!* of the old Horatius, the *à moi, Auvergne!* of the brave d'Assas, are not blind impulses and in consequence destitute of morality; but neither is it from reasoning or reflection that they are borrowed by heroism. The phenomenon of spontaneous activity, therefore, is no less real than that of voluntary activity. Only, as every thing which is reflective is completely determined, and for that reason distinct, the phenomenon of voluntary and re-

flective activity is more clear than that of spontaneous activity, which is less determined and more obscure. Moreover, the characteristic of every voluntary act is the power of repeating itself at will, the power of being summoned, so to speak, before the tribunal of consciousness, which examines and describes it at leisure; while on the other hand, as it is the characteristic of a spontaneous act that it is not voluntary, the spontaneous act is not repeated at will, and when it takes place is either unperceived or irrevocable, and can not be afterward summoned back but on condition of being reflective, that is to say, of being destroyed, as a spontaneous fact. Spontaneity is therefore necessarily subjected to that obscurity which surrounds every thing which is primitive and instantaneous.

With all our seeking, we can discover no other modes of action. Reflection and spontaneity comprise all the real forms of activity.

Reflection as a principle and as a fact supposes and follows spontaneity; but as there can be nothing in the Reflective which is not in the Spontaneous, all that we have said of the one will apply to the other; and although spontaneity is not accompanied either with predetermination or deliberation, it is no less than will a real power of action, and consequently a productive cause, and consequently again, a personal cause. Spontaneity then contains all that is contained by the will; and it contains it previously to that, in a less determined, but purer form; and hence we arrive at the immediate source of causality and of the me. The me already exists with the productive power which characterizes it in the flashing forth of spontaneity; and it is in this instantaneous flashing forth that it instantaneously apprehends itself. We might say that it discovers itself in spontaneity, and establishes itself in reflection. The me, says Fichte, posits itself in a voluntary determination. This point of view is that of reflection. In order for the me to posit itself, as Fichte says, it is

necessary that it should clearly distinguish itself form the not-me. To distinguish is to deny; to distinguish one thing from another, is to affirm again, but by denying; it is to affirm, after having denied. Now it is not true that the intellectual life commences with a negation; and before reflection and the fact to the description of which Fichte has forever attached his name, there is another operation, in which the me finds itself without seeking, posits itself, if you please, but without having wished to posit itself, by the sole virtue, the peculiar energy of the activity, which it recognizes, as it manifests it, but without having previously known it; for the activity is revealed to itself only by its acts, and the first act must have been the effect of a power which has hitherto been ignorant of itself.

What then is this power which is revealed only by its acts, which finds and perceives itself in spontaneity, and again finds and reflects upon itself in will?

Whether spontaneous or voluntary, all personal acts have this characteristic in common, that they can be referred immediately to a cause which has its point of departure altogether in itself, that is to say, that they are free; such is the proper notion of liberty. Liberty can not be confined to the will, for in that case, spontaneity would not be free; and on the other hand, liberty can not consist merely in spontaneity, for then the will in its turn would not be free. If therefore the two phenomena are equally free, they can be so only on the condition that we discard from the motion of liberty every thing which belongs exclusively either to one or the other of the two phenomena, and that we allow to it only what is common to both. Now, what circumstance is common to both except that they have their point of departure in themselves, and that they can be referred immediately to a cause, which is their proper cause, and which acts only by its own energy? Liberty being the common characteristic

of spontaneity and of will, comprises both these phenomena in itself; it ought to possess and it consequently does possess something more general than either, and which constitutes their identity. This is the only theory of liberty that agrees with the different facts which are announced as free by the consciousness of the human race, and which in their diversities have occasioned theories in contradiction with each other, because they have been constructed exclusively for a specific order of phenomena. Thus, for example, the theory which concentrates liberty in the will must needs admit no other than reflective liberty, preceded by a predetermination, accompanied with a process of deliberation, and marked with characteristics which greatly reduce the number of free acts, which take away liberty from every thing which is not reflective, from the enthusiasm of the poet and artist in the moment of creation, from the ignorance which reflects but little, and scarcely acts otherwise than spontaneously, that is to say, from three quarters of the human race. Because the expression free-will implies the idea of choice, of comparison, and of reflection, these conditions have been imposed on liberty, of which free-will is only one form; free-will is free-volition, that is to say, volition; but will is so far from being adequate to the extent of liberty, that even language adds to it the epithet free, thus referring it to something still more general than itself. We may assert the same of spontaneity. Disengaged from the accompaniment more or less tardy of reflection, of comparison, and of deliberation, spontaneity manifests liberty in a purer form, but it is only one form of liberty and not liberty entire; the fundamental idea of liberty is that of a power which, under whatever form it acts, acts only by an energy peculiar to itself.

If liberty is distinct from free phenomena—as the characteristic element of every phenomena is to be more or less determined, but always to be so in some degree—it

follows that the peculiar characteristic of liberty in its contrast with free phenomena, is indetermination. Liberty therefore is not a form of activity, but activity in itself, the indetermined activity, which, precisely on that account, determines itself in one form or another. Hence it follows, once more, that the me or the personal activity, spontaneous or reflective, represents only the determined form of activity, but not its essence. Liberty is the ideal of the me; the me must needs constantly tend to it, without ever arriving at it; it participates in it, but is not identical with it. The me is liberty in action, not liberty in power; it is a cause, but a cause phenomenal and not substantial, relative and not absolute. The absolute me of Fichte is a contradiction. The very terms imply that nothing absolute and substantial is to be found in what is determined, that is to say, phenomenal. In respect to activity, substance then can not be found but beyond and above all phenomenal activity, in power not yet passed into action, in the indetermined essence which is capable of self-determination, in liberty disengaged from its forms, which limit while they determine it. We are thus arrived then in the analysis of the me, by the way of psychology still, at a new aspect of ontology, at a substantial activity, anterior and superior to all phenomenal activity, which produces all the phenomena of activity, survives them all and renews them all, immortal and inexhaustible in the destruction of its temporary manifestations. And it is a remarkable fact, again, that this absolute activity, in its development, assumes two forms parallel with those of reason, namely, spontaneity and reflection. These two elements are found in one sphere as well as the other, and the principle of both is always a substantial causality. Activity and reason, liberty and intelligence are therefore intimately combined with each other in the unity of substance.

The last phenomenon of consciousness which we have

not yet analyzed, sensation, would require similar developments, but the time does not admit of them. I must content myself with a few words which thinkers will comprehend, and which will serve at least as a touchstone for my future labors on the philosophy of nature.

Sensation is a phenomenon of consciousness no less incontestable than either of the others; now if this phenomenon is real, as no phenomenon is sufficient to itself, reason which acts under the law of causality and of substance compels us to refer the phenomenon of sensation to an existing cause; and as this cause is evidently not the me, it is necessary that reason should refer sensation to another cause, for the action of reason is irresistible; it refers it therefore to a cause foreign to the me, placed beyond the influence of the me, that is to say, to an external cause; this is our notion of the outward world as opposed to the inward world which the me constitutes and fills, our notion of an external object as opposed to the subject which is personality itself, our notion of passivity as opposed to liberty. But let us not be deceived by the expression passivity; for the me is not passive and can not be so, since it consists in free activity; neither is the object any more passive, since it is made known to us only in the character of cause, of active force. Passivity therefore is nothing but a relation between two forces which act on each other. Vary and multiply the phenomenon of sensation, reason always and necessarily refers it to a cause which it successively charges, in proportion to the extent of experience, not with the internal modifications of the subject, but with the objective qualities capable of producing them, that is to say, it develops the notion of cause, but without departing from it, for qualities are always causes, and can be known only as such. The external world therefore is nothing but an assemblage of causes corresponding to our real or possible sensations; the relation of these causes with each other is the order of the world. The world ac-

cordingly is of the same stuff with ourselves, and nature is the sister of man; it is active, living, animated like him; and its history is a drama no less than our own.

Besides, as the development of the personal or human force takes place in consciousness, in some sort, under the auspices of reason, which we recognize as our law even when we violate it; so the external forces are necessarily conceived of as submitted to laws in their development, or to speak more correctly, the laws of external forces are nothing but their mode of development, the constancy of which forms what we call regularity. Force in nature is distinct from its law, as personality in us is distinct from reason; distinct, I say, and not separate; for all force carries its law with it and manifests it in its action and by its action. Now, all law supposes a reason, and the laws of the world are nothing but reason as manifested in the world. Here then is a new relation of man with nature. Nature, like humanity, is composed of laws and of forces, of reason and of activity; and in this point of view, the two worlds are again brought closely together.

Is there nothing further? As we have reduced the laws of reason and the modes of free force to two, could we not also attempt a reduction of the forces of nature and of their laws? Could we not reduce all the regular modes of the action of nature to two, which in their relation with the spontaneous and the reflective action of the me and of reason, would exhibit a still more intimate harmony than that which we have just indicated between the internal and the external world? It will be perceived that I here allude to expansion and concentration; but so long as methodical labors shall not have converted these conjectures into certainty, I will hope and be silent; I will content myself with remarking that the philosophical considerations which reduce the notion of the external world to that of force have already gained currency, and secretly preside over modern Physics. What physical inquirer,

since Euler, seeks any thing in nature but forces and laws? Who now speaks of atoms? And even molecules, the old atoms revived—who defends them as any thing but an hypothesis? If the fact be incontestable, if modern Physics be now employed only with forces and laws, I draw the rigorous conclusion from it, that the science of Physics, whether it know it or not, is no longer material, and that it became spiritual when it rejected every other method than observation and induction which can never lead to aught but forces and laws. Now what is there material in forces and laws? The physical sciences then themselves have entered into the broad path of an enlightened Spiritualism; and they have only to march with a firm step, and to gain a more and more profound knowledge of forces and laws, in order to arrive at more important generalizations. Let us go still further. As it is a law already recognized of the same reason which governs humanity and nature, to refer every finite cause and every multiple law, that is to say, every phenomenal cause and every phenomenal law, to something absolute which leaves nothing to be sought beyond it in relation to existence, that is to say, to a substance; so this law refers the external world composed of forces and laws to a substance, which must needs be a cause in order to be the subject of the causes of this world, which must needs be an intelligence in order to be the subject of its laws, a substance, in fine, which must needs be the identity of activity and intelligence. We are thus arrived accordingly, for the second time, by observation and induction in the external sphere, at precisely the same point to which observation and induction have successively conducted us in the sphere of personality and in that of reason; consciousness in its triplicity, is therefore one; the physical and moral world is one, science is one, that is to say, in other words, God is One.

Let us sum up these ideas, and at the same time more fully unfold them.

150/COU

2379