

Witness Stark

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(3) A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy."

The Navy, in carrying out its functions, will provide and operate, among other things:-

"(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast.

(b) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Army."

Joint Action also states the functions of Army and Navy Air Components, and in order to minimize duplication, it provides:-

"(a) The functions assigned to the Army Air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal frontiers of continental United States and its

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2 overseas possessions, or in repelling air
3 raids directed at shore objectives or at
4 shipping within our harbors, or in supporting
5 naval forces to assure freedom of action of
6 the fleet.

7 (b) The functions assigned to the Navy air component
8 require the Navy to provide and maintain all
9 types of aircraft primarily designed and or-
10 dinarily used in operations from aircraft
11 carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft
12 tenders, or for operations from shore bases
13 for observation, scouting and patrolling over
14 the sea, and for the protection of shipping
15 in the coastal zones. These aircraft may be
16 required to operate effectively over the sea
17 to the maximum distance within the capacity
18 of aircraft development."

19 In accordance with Joint Action, the Commandant of the Four-
20 teenth Naval District and the Commanding General, Hawaiian
21 Department had entered into a "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
22 Plan" for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier dated 25 April 1941.
23 Among other things, this agreement assigned responsibility
24 for the aircraft warning service and anti-aircraft and fighter
25 defenses to the Army, while responsibility for distant re-

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2 connaissance was assigned to the Navy.

3 89. On receipt of the reply from Admiral Richardson, in
4 reply to the letter in which I had asked his comment on how the
5 War and Navy Departments could help them out out there, and
6 largely predicated on it, I caused the Secretary of the Navy,
7 on 24 January 1941, to send the following letter to the Secre-
8 tary of War:-

9 "The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while
10 in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base
11 itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy
12 Department and forces afloat for the past several
13 weeks. This reexamination has been, in part,
14 prompted by the increased gravity of the situation
15 with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad
16 of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on
17 ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan,
18 it is believed easily possible that hostilities would
19 be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or
20 the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.'

21 "In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a
22 major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant
23 taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that
24 will increase the joint readiness of the Army and
25 Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned

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2 above.

3 "The dangers envisaged in their order of im-
4 portance and probability are considered to be:

5 (1) Air bombing attack.

6 (2) Air torpedo plane attack.

7 (3) Sabotage.

8 (4) Submarine attack.

9 (5) Mining.

10 (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

11 "Defense against all but the first two --
12 that is, air attack, both bombing and torpedo --
13 of these dangers appears to have been provided
14 for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are
15 devoted principally to a discussion of the problems
16 encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of
17 which I consider to be of primary importance.

18 "Both types of air attack are possible. They
19 may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or
20 in combination with any of the other operations
21 enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may
22 be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum
23 at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking
24 force of carriers and thier supporting vessels.

25 "The counter measures to be considered are:

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(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

"The operations set forth in (a)" -- that is the location and the engagement of the enemy carriers and their destruction -- "are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

"Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present

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2 system relies wholly on visual observation and
3 sound locators which are only effective up to four
4 miles.

5 "Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear
6 inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in
7 Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 - 3" fixed anti-
8 aircraft guns (of which something over half are
9 grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and
10 109 - .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft
11 batteries are manned in part by personnel which is
12 also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery.
13 Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a
14 gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires
15 would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing
16 high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of
17 the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against
18 high altitude bombing attack.

19 "By late summer the defenses will be considerably
20 strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio
21 locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3"
22 mobile twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty
23 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft
24 strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the
25 new radio locators will have an effective range of

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2 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will
3 still be small for effective action against high
4 altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly
5 improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of
6 course, affect the critical period immediately be-
7 fore us.

8 "The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e)
9 might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl
10 Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some use-
11 fulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on
12 the ground might prove most advantageous.

13 "To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the
14 following proposals:

- 15 (1) That the Army assign the highest priority
16 to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-
17 aircraft artillery, and the establishment
18 of an air warning net in Hawaii.
- 19 (2) That the Army give consideration to the ques-
20 tion of balloon barrages, the employment of
21 smoke, and other special devices for improving
22 the defenses of Pearl Harbor.
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(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

"Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department."

90. Copy of this letter was sent to the then Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, Admiral Kimmel. On 18 February 1941 Admiral Kimmel wrote:

"I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We

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2 are taking immediate practical steps to minimize
3 the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking
4 force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces, - de-
5 stroyers and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol
6 craft will help when they arrive."

7 91. In the meantime on 7 February 1941 the Secretary of
8 War had replied to the letter of 24 January as follows:

9 "In replying to your letter of January 24,
10 regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon
11 the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish
12 to express complete concurrence as to the importance
13 of this matter and the urgency of our making every
14 possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort.
15 The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all
16 our overseas departments, and continues to hold a
17 high priority for the completion of its projected
18 defenses because of the importance of giving full
19 protection to the Fleet.

20 "The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred
21 and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in
22 Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these
23 are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less
24 efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36
25 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to

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2 Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with
3 the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit
4 group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and
5 seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In
6 addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with
7 their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be
8 assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by
9 carrier to Hawaii.

10 "There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands
11 eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns
12 (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA
13 machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight
14 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns,
15 and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

16 "With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service,
17 the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be
18 delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for
19 installation will have been made by the time the
20 equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the
21 information that delivery of the necessary equipment
22 cannot be made at an earlier date.

23 "The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
24 is being directed to give immediate consideration to
25 the question of the employment of balloon barrages

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2 and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base
3 facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at
4 the present time for installation and cannot be made
5 available prior to the summer of 1941. At present
6 there are three on hand and eighty-four being
7 manufactured -- forty for delivery by June 30, 1941,
8 and the remainder by September. The Budget now has
9 under consideration funds for two thousand nine
10 hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for
11 screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial
12 subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and
13 geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment
14 of smoke impracticable for large scale screening
15 operations. However, the Commanding General will
16 look into this matter again.

17 "With reference to your other proposals for
18 joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your
19 letter and this reply to the Commanding General,
20 Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to
21 cooperate with the local naval authorities in
22 making those measures effective."

23 Copies of this reply were sent to Commander in Chief, Pacific
24 Fleet, and Commandant, 14th Naval District.

25 92. Subsequent to the receipt of the letter of 7 February

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2 From the Secretary of War, the matter of anti-aircraft defense
3 and of planes for the defense of Hawaii was the subject of
4 frequent conversations with General Marshall and I offered
5 to transport planes via carrier whenever they could be made
6 ready. On at least two occasions during 1941, I sent a
7 carrier from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor to ferry Army
8 fighter planes.

9 93. You will note that the Secretary of War in his
10 letter of 7 February stated that the equipment for the aircraft
11 warning service had been ordered and would be delivered in
12 Hawaii in June, 1941, and that all arrangements for installation
13 will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. I
14 was informed that this equipment was delivered in Hawaii about the
15 middle of 1941.

16 94. On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, who was
17 Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor and Commander
18 of Pacific Fleet Task Force Nine, made, with the Commanding
19 General, Hawaiian Air Force, a joint estimate covering joint
20 Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile
21 action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area and
22 entered into an agreement covering joint air operation.
23 A copy of this agreement and estimate was forwarded to the
24 Chief of Naval Operations by the Commandant, Fourteenth
25 Naval District on 1 May 1941. The estimate, under the

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2 heading "Possible Enemy Action", reads in part as follows:

3 "(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

- 4 1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the
5 operating area.
6 2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships
7 and installations in Pearl Harbor.
8 3. A combination of these two.

9 (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous
10 form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack.
11 It is believed that at present such an attack
12 would most likely be launched from one or more
13 carriers which would probably approach inside
14 of three hundred miles."

15 On 20 June 1941, I sent a copy of this agreement entitled
16 "Joint Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl
17 Harbor Base" to the Commandants of all the Naval Districts
18 and to the Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic, Pacific
19 and Asiatic Fleets, calling their attention to the importance
20 of the problems presented therein.

21 95. Admiral Kimmel left with me, during his trip to
22 Washington in mid-1941, a memorandum dated 4 June, which
23 reads as follows:

24 "The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding
25 General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th

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2 Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army
3 and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

4 (a) That in activities in the defense of
5 Oahu and the other islands against enemy
6 bombing attacks the command shall be
7 vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by
8 Navy fighters which may be available.

9 (b) That in a mission which involves bombing of
10 enemy ships the command shall be vested in
11 the Navy Air Commander in charge of the
12 Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded
13 the Navy patrol planes take off to locate
14 the enemy ships and when located the Navy
15 directs the efforts of the Army and Navy
16 bombers in the offensive action which they
17 take against the enemy ships.

18 "The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps
19 in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in
20 air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison
21 are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses
22 but the conditions are steadily improving and it is
23 felt they are in much better shape now than they were
24 a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be
25 unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied

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2 and the personnel drilled in its use.

3 "There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters
4 and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes
5 now in the Islands. These in addition to some
6 obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that
7 the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at
8 least four times the number that they have there now
9 and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon
10 as it is practicable to do so.

11 "There are not now a sufficient number of Army
12 pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands."

13 96. In mentioning the Army's responsibilities with
14 respect to the defense of Pearl Harbor, I don't mean to
15 minimize the problems which were facing the Army at that time.
16 They, too were faced with a shortage of equipment and men.

17 97. My war warning despatch of 27 November must be
18 considered in the light of what had gone before. Commander
19 in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Asiatic
20 Fleet, were action addressees of the war warning despatch,
21 and they were directed to "execute an appropriate defensive
22 deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned
23 in WPL-46" (Navy Basic War Plan).

24 98. I might mention that on 26 November, we sent to
25 Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, two despatches asking his

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2 reaction to the possibility of reinforcing Wake and Midway
3 by Army units. These were routine matters having to do with
4 the general strengthening of our Pacific bases - a matter
5 we had long been pushing.

6 99. The same day that I sent the war warning, the Army
7 also sent a despatch to its field commanders. In order that
8 Navy coastal frontier commanders and Commander in Chief,
9 Pacific Fleet might be informed of what had been sent their
10 Army opposites, I sent the following priority despatch on 28
11 November to Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier
12 and Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier for
13 action and to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commander,
14 Panama Naval Coastal Frontier for information:

15 "*** Army has sent following to Commander
16 Western Defense Command:

17 'Negotiations with Japan appear to be
18 terminated to all practical purposes with
19 only the barest possibilities that the
20 Japanese Government might come back and
21 offer to continue. Japanese future action
22 unpredictable but hostile action possible at
23 any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat
24 not, be avoided the United States desires
25 that Japan commit the first overt act. This

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policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.

LaCharity follows

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AH 1

1 Witness: Admiral Stark

2 'A separate message is being sent to G-2
3 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States.
4 Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned
5 in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemi-
6 nation of this highly secret information to minimum essential
7 officers.'

8 "WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will
9 not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force
10 in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval Coastal Fron-
11 tier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed
12 a overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in
13 WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

14 100. On 30 November, I sent a despatch to Commander-in-
15 Chief, Asiatic Fleet, making Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
16 an information addressee, which reads as follows:-

17 "Indications that Japan about to attack points on
18 Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition.

19 "In order to ascertain destination this expedition
20 and for security our position in the Philippines desire you
21 cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days com-
22 mencing upon receipt this despatch. Instruct planes to ob-
23 serve only. They must not approach so as to appear to be
24 attacking but must defend themselves if attacked.

25 "Understand British Air Forces will search and

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1 Witness: Admiral Stark

2 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line
3 across Kra Isthmus near Singora.

4 "If expedition is approaching Thailand inform Mac-
5 Arthur. British Mission here informed."

6 101. On 3 December, we sent to Commander-in-Chief,
7 Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Command-
8 ant, 14th Naval District and Commandant, 16th Naval District
9 the following priority despatch:-

10 "Highly reliable information has been received that
11 categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to
12 Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore,
13 Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their
14 codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important
15 confidential and secret documents."

16 102. Also on 3 December, I sent a priority despatch to
17 Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commandant, 16th Naval
18 District for action, and to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
19 and Commandant, 14th Naval District for information, which
20 reads as follows:-

21 "Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo one
22 December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to
23 destroy purple machine. Batavia machine already sent to
24 Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy purple,
25 all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents.

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1 Witness: Admiral Stark

2 British Admiralty London today report Embassy London has
3 complied."

4 103. I considered that the urgent destruction by the
5 Japanese of their codes and ciphers and secret documents was
6 one of the most telling items of information we had received,
7 and our despatch informing Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet
8 and Pacific Fleet and the Commandants of the 14th and 16th
9 Naval Districts of this fact was one of the most important
10 despatches we ever sent. We felt that was just a matter
11 of time.

12 104. On 4 December, because of Guam's highly vulnerable
13 position, we sent her the following message:-

14 "Guam destroy all secret and confidential publica-
15 tions and other classified matter except that essential for
16 current purposes and special intelligence, retaining minimum
17 cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications
18 with CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be prepared
19 to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified
20 matter you retain. Report crypto channels retained."

21 Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
22 Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval District and Commandant, 16th
23 Naval District were all information addressees on this despatch.

24 105. We were also concerned lest Commander-in-Chief,
25 Pacific Fleet, might feel that he needed specific authorization

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2 from us before he could authorize destruction of secret papers
3 and codes in the outlying Pacific Islands. Accordingly, we
4 sent him a despatch on 6 December which reads as follows:-

5 "In view of the international situation and the
6 exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands you may
7 authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential
8 documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency.
9 Means of communication to support our current operations and
10 special intelligence should of course be maintained until the
11 last moment."

12 106. In the few days immediately preceding 7 December,
13 Admiral Ingersoll (then Assistant Chief of Naval Operations),
14 Admiral Turner (then Head, War Plans Division), and I went over
15 the information we had sent to the fleet commanders. We were
16 all of the opinion that everything we could do had been done to
17 get them ready for war, and that we had sent them sufficient
18 information and directives.

19 107. During the night and early morning of 6-7 December,
20 the Japanese transmitted to their Ambassador in Washington
21 an answer to the ten-point note which had been handed to the
22 Japanese on 26 November by Mr. Hull. The answer was in 14
23 parts, the 14th part being received some time early Sunday
24 morning, December 7. I was not acquainted with this despatch
25 until I arrived at my office Sunday forenoon. I would like

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2 to invite attention to the meat of the 14th part of this
3 message and compare it with the meat of my war warning mes-
4 sage. The Japanese message concludes:-

5 ** * * Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese
6 Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to pre-
7 serve and promote the peace of the Pacific through coopera-
8 tion with the American Government has finally been lost.

9 "The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify
10 hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude
11 of the American Government it cannot but consider that is
12 is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotia-
13 tions."

14 Our war warning message stated:-

15 ** * * Negotiations with Japan looking toward
16 stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased * * *".
17 Thus, what we learned on the morning of 7 December only con-
18 firmed what we had sent out on 27 November.

19 108. During the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we
20 had information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was
21 to present his Government's reply to the ten-point note to the
22 Secretary of State at one P.M. that same day. I was discussing
23 this note and the time of its presentation with the Head of
24 the Central Division (Captain Schuirmann) when General Marshall
25 called me on the 'phone to ask if I knew of it. I told him

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1 Witness: Admiral Stark

2 I did, and he asked me what I thought about sending the in-
 3 formation concerning the time of presentation on to the var-
 4 ious commanders in the Pacific. My first answer to him was
 5 that we had sent them so much already that I hesitated to
 6 send more. I hung up the 'phone, and not more than a minute
 7 or two later I called him back, stating that there might be
 8 some peculiar significance in the Japanese Ambassador calling
 9 on Mr. Hull at one P.M. and that I would go along with him in
 10 sending the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his
 11 communications were such that he could get it out quickly be-
 12 cause our communications were quite rapid when the occasion de-
 13 manded it. He replied that he felt he could get it through
 14 very quickly. I then asked him to include in the despatch
 15 instructions to his people to inform their naval opposites.
 16 I am informed that this despatch* was sent "First Priority"

17
 18 * The text is quoted for the convenience of the Committee:-

19 "Japanese are presenting at one P.M. Eastern Standard
 20 Time today what amounts to an ultimatum; also they are under
 21 orders to destroy their code machine immediately.

22 "Just what significance the hour set may have we
 23 do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform Naval authori-
 24 ties of this communication."

25 to the Army Forces in the Far East (Philippines), Caribbean

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1 Witness: Admiral Stark
2 Defense Command (Canal Zone), Hawaiian Department, and the
3 Fourth Army (San Francisco). I am told that the message was
4 sent at 1217 EST (0647 Honolulu time) to the Hawaiian Depart-
5 ment, but was not delivered in Hawaii until after the attack.

6 109. My presentation of the manner in which I discharged
7 my responsibility to keep the fleet commanders fully informed
8 of all significant military and political developments would
9 not be complete without a reference to certain very secret
10 information which we were receiving during this period. This
11 information was gathered by the intelligence centers at the
12 headquarters of Commandant, 16th Naval District (Cavite), Com-
13 mandant, 14th Naval District (Pearl Harbor), and the Office
14 of Naval Intelligence (Washington). There was a considerable
15 volume of this material received in Washington during 1941,
16 but it increased substantially during the last half of the
17 year. The volume was so great and the personnel qualified to
18 handle it so limited that we shared the work with the Army -
19 they processed the material one day, we did it the next.

20 110. To be useful, the diplomatic information obtained
21 from this source required careful evaluation, a task which
22 could be better performed here in Washington where the of-
23 ficers charged with this task had access to other sources of
24 information, such as the State and War Departments.

25 111. After this information was evaluated and distilled -

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2 so to speak - we sent our conclusions and recommendations to
3 the fleet commanders for their information and guidance.

4 112. I considered that the letters and despatches I sent
5 to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commander-in-Chief,
6 Pacific Fleet were sufficient to keep them informed on the
7 important military and political developments in the Pacific as
8 we knew them, and that they had received adequate information
9 and directives to be on guard.

10 113. I have gone into considerable detail - though by no
11 means mentioning all my letters and despatches - to indicate
12 to the Committee how I discharged my duties as Chief of Naval
13 Operations with reference to the expansion of the entire naval
14 establishment, its strength and efficiency; with reference to
15 plans for the use of the fleet in war; with reference to assign-
16 ment of forces available in accordance with war plans; and with
17 reference to keeping the fleet commanders informed of important
18 political and military developments affecting them.

19 114. I have endeavored to stick to the record of events
20 as they happened, rather than to give present impressions of
21 what has happened, or of conjecture as to what might have
22 happened, if some things had been done differently.

23 115. My correspondence with the Commanders-in-Chief in
24 the Pacific during the years 1940 and 1941 indicated that for
25 almost two years before the attack on Pearl Harbor the lack

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1 Witness: Admiral Stark

2 of physical resources was fully known to all the Navy officers
3 in critical positions, and that the danger of war with Japan
4 and a possible surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and methods of
5 meeting it had been fully considered.

6 116. By way of summary, I would like to point out that
7 during the critical period October, November and December,
8 1941, I sent the following specific warnings to the Commanders
9 in the Pacific:-

10 (a) Secret dispatch, dated 16 October 1941, con-
11 taining the statement:-

12 "The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has
13 created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will
14 probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-America. * * *
15 Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for
16 her present desperate situation there is also a possibility
17 that Japan may attack these two powers. * * *"

18 (b) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, copy to Admiral Hart,
19 dated 17 October 1941, containing the following words:-

20 "Personally I do not believe the Japs are going
21 to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the
22 'possibility'; in fact I tempered the message handed to me
23 considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any
24 case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we
25 should be on guard, at least until something indicates the
trend."

AH 10

1 .Witness: Admiral Stark

2 (c) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 7 November
3 1941, containing the paragraph:-

4 "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a
5 crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can
6 tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have
7 written you before; it continually gets 'worsen and worsen'!
8 A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable
9 policies cannot go on forever - particularly if one party can-
10 not live with the set up. It doesn't look good."

11 (d) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 14 November
12 1941, in which I stated:-

13 *** I note this morning in the press des-
14 patches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times
15 and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States
16 was necessary for the 'solution of the Pacific Crisis'. Com-
17 plete capitulation by the United States on every point of dif-
18 ference between the Japanese and this country was indicated
19 as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to recon-
20 cile such divergent points of view."

21 With this letter, I enclosed a memorandum for
22 the President, prepared jointly by General Marshall and me,
23 in which the following conclusion is stated:-

24 "War between the United States and Japan should
25 be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East,

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Witness: Admiral Stark

until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance."

and in which we recommended:-

"That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Stark

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WLC
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Hecht

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 (e) Secret dispatch, dated 24 November 1941, stating that -

2 "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations
3 with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled
4 with statements of Japanese Government and movements
5 their naval and military forces indicate in our
6 opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any
7 direction including attack on Philippines or Guam
8 is a possibility."

9 (f) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941,
10 including the statement that neither the President nor Mr. Hull --

11 "would be surprised over a Japanese surprise
12 attack."

13 (g) Secret dispatch, dated 27 November 1941, including the
14 paragraph:-

15 "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.
16 Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization
17 of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
18 aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next
19 few days. *** Execute an appropriate defensive
20 deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks
21 assigned in WPL-46" (the war plan).

22 (h) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating:-

23 "Highly reliable information has been received
24 that categoric and urgent instructions were sent
25 yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts

WLC2

1 Witness Stark

2 at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington
3 and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers
4 at once and to burn all other important confidential
5 and secret documents."

6 (i) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating:-

7 "Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from
8 Tokyo one December ordered London, Hongkong, Singa-
9 pore and Manila to destroy purple machine. Batavia
10 machine already sent to Tokyo. December second
11 Washington also directed destroy purple, all but one
12 copy of other systems, and all secret documents.
13 British Admiralty London today report Embassy London
14 has complied."

15 (j) Secret dispatch, dated 4 December 1941, stating:-

16 "Guam destroy all secret and confidential
17 publications and other classified matter except
18 that essential for current purposes and special
19 intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic
20 channels necessary for essential communications with
21 CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be pre-
22 pared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all
23 classified matter you retain. Report crypto channels
24 retained."

25 (k) Secret dispatch, dated 6 December 1941, stating:-

LC3

1 Witness Stark

2 "In view of the international situation and
 3 the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands
 4 you may authorize the destruction by them of secret
 5 and confidential documents now or under later condi-
 6 tions of greater emergency. Means of communication
 7 to support our current operations and special intel-
 8 ligence should of course be maintained until the last
 9 moment."

10 That concludes the statement.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1 Witness Stark

2 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Stark, in 1940, when the discussion
3 arose between Admiral Richardson, then Commander of the Pacific
4 Fleet, and officials in Washington, about basing the fleet at
5 at Pearl Harbor, according to the record we have to take no
6 question was raised by anybody prior to November, 1940, about
7 the safety of the fleet while in Pearl Harbor; is that in
8 accord with your recollection?

9 Admiral Stark: I do not recall anything up until the
10 letter which --

11 Mr. Mitchell: Which you wrote?

12 Admiral Stark: Which I wrote at that time. There may
13 have been.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Richardson gave the Secretary of
15 the Navy a memorandum dated September 12 in which he listed
16 all the objections he had to keeping the fleet based at Pearl
17 Harbor, and in that list there was no suggestion about the
18 dangers to the fleet while in Pearl Harbor. Can you remember
19 any instance where the safety of the fleet was discussed before
20 that? I mean, safety while in Pearl Harbor.

21 Admiral Stark: I do not, specifically. I have a rather
22 hazy remembrance that before I wrote Admiral Richardson asking
23 him to get data with Com. 14, with the Army, I had written
24 Admiral Bloch, in fact, I think a letter to Admiral Richardson
25 stated that I had gotten some information but it wasn't specific

WLC2

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 or complete enough for our purposes, and we wanted the entire
3 situation gone over.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Well, the first document in evidence we
5 have in this case that anybody was worrying about the safety
6 of the fleet while in Pearl Harbor is your letter of November
7 22, 1940 written to Admiral Richardson in which you referred to
8 a dispatch that you had sent in October to Admiral Bloch
9 asking him for a report on the question of safety.

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: What inspired you to write that letter,
12 how did it happen that it occurred?

13 Admiral Stark: The incident at Taranto and the British
14 success there in torpedoing ships at anchor in harbor.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that was an attack that the British
16 made on the Italian fleet in the harbor with torpedo planes,
17 was it?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: And bombers. Which was quite successful?

20 Admiral Stark: That is correct. Of course, we had long
21 and often thought of an attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility
22 and something which might some day be pulled. Our fleet
23 exercises always contained an exercise of an attack in which
24 the two sides, the attacking force wanted to get in, if it could,
25 and the defending force, of course, would first want to get the

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WLC3

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1 attacking force's carriers. I mean, it had been much discussed.
2
3 So, I am answering your question by saying that was the first
4 time I am thinking of what documentary evidence I can recall
5 at the moment. Whether or not I had mentioned it previously
6 in some of my letters to Admiral Richardson, I would have to
7 look it up.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Richardson didn't raise any ques-
9 tion about the safety of the fleet as a reason for going back
10 to the coast?

11 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

12 Mr. Mitchell: You agreed with him, didn't you, about the
13 better training facilities?

14 Admiral Stark: I did agree with him, yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: You didn't raise any question at that time
16 about the safety of the fleet?

17 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: It was after the decision had been made
19 to keep the fleet out there and a little time had passed that
20 then you began to think about that problem; is that it?

21 Admiral Stark: That is correct. When the fleet went
22 out there for that fleet problem I had no thought, and so far
23 as I know no one else had any thought whatsoever, of the fleet
24 remaining there. It all developed when we talked about bring-
25 ing the fleet back. We had not, not having envisaged the

7LC4

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 fleet going out there, we had not sent many things which
3 they would need to carry on their routine target practice,
4 which was one of the things Admiral Richardson was worried
5 about. The fleet had left with the idea of coming back.
6 The people on the coast all expected the fleet to come back.
7 The question of morale came up. Of re-enlistments. In other
8 words, personnel and morale and material conditions effecting
9 training of the fleet, and also getting it ready for war
10 quickly, that was what he was concerned about. Now, the drill
11 out there, and so forth -- and we did get them ready, but if he
12 came back to the coast he could strip a ship more effectively
13 and quicker than he could out there. It could be done out
14 there. But those were his primary reasons.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Now, as the result of your letter to
16 Admiral Richardson of November 22, 1940, you remember he
17 undertook an inquiry.

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: He went right out into the Army defenses
20 and inspected those, did he not?

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. We asked -- the letter to him
22 stated not only the fleet but the commandant of the naval
23 district, and also the Army -- so that all hands out there
24 would be in on that estimate.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Well, do you recall that it was as a result

WLC5

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 of an inquiry, started and conducted in that way, that
3 Admiral Bloch made his report of December 30, which is in
4 evidence here?

5 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. The report came in and our
6 reply was largely predicated on it.

7 Mr. Mitchell: I notice here --

8 Admiral Stark: That is, our action, I should say.

9 Mr. Mitchell: There has been handed me a copy of the
10 letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Director
11 of Naval Districts Division, dated December 31, 1940, a
12 memorandum signed by R. E. Ingersoll, Acting Chief of Naval
13 Operations. I have never seen it before. Have you any know-
14 ledge of that?

15 Admiral Stark: I would like to see it.

16 (Short pause.)

17 Mr. Mitchell: This is one of the papers that you have in
18 the brown envelope.

19 The Chairman: You mean the one we got today?

20 Mr. Mitchell: In the same envelope.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

Admiral Stark: I think I saw that. It had slipped my mind for the moment.

Mr. Mitchell: That letter was written before Bloch's report came in, wasn't it?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: His report was dated the 30th of December, indorsed by Richardson at Hawaii on the 7th of January.

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: I would like to put that in evidence and I will read it into the record.

The Chairman: All right. It is (Reading):

"From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

"To: Director, Naval Districts Division.

"Subject: Defense of Pearl Harbor by Army.

"1. The Chief of Naval Operations has for some time felt considerable concern over whether the Army's antiaircraft defense of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, including vessels of the United States Fleet berthed there, is adequate in view of the probability of an early surprise attack by carrier aircraft if Japan decides to make war on the United States.

"2. It is, therefore, requested that information be obtained concerning the details of the Army's Hawaiian

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 defense plan in this regard. We should be informed as
3 to their present and also the projected anti-aircraft
4 defense, including such features as the following:

5 "(a) Number, caliber, and proposed location of
6 anti-aircraft guns, including machine guns.

7 "(b) Use that is to be made of smoke screens from
8 either fixed or mobile sources.

9 "(c) Number and location of pursuit p lanes to be
10 used for this purpose, with probable percentage of avail-
11 ability/

12 "(d) The character and extent of the warning net
13 to be used, from shore or floating stations, and the
14 present percentage of availability of such stations.

15 "(e) Whether or not the present defense elements
16 have received adequate training.

17 R. E. INGERSOLL,

18 Acting."

19 Now, here is another letter dated January 9, 1941 that
20 has not yet been offered in evidence, from the Chief of Naval
21 Operations to the Chief of Staff. That is again signed by
22 Admiral Ingersoll. Did you know of that at the time it was
23 sent to the Chief of Staff?

24 Admiral Stark: January 9th?

25 Mr. Mitchell: January 9th.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, I think I saw that. I think
3 I have seen that despatch.

4 Mr. Mitchell: I will read that into the record. (Read-
5 ing):

6 "January 9, 1941.

7 "From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

8 To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

9 Subject: Installation of Aircraft Detection Equipment.

10 1. The Navy Department considers that improvement of
11 the antiaircraft defenses, and particularly of the aircraft
12 detection components of those defenses, in the Hawaiian
13 Islands is urgently necessary for the protection of the fleet
14 units there present. It is believed that in the spring and
15 summer of 1941 enemy air operations are much more likely to
16 take place in the Hawaiian area and in Alaska than in Puerto
17 Rico, Panama and the Continental United States.

18 2. For the foregoing reason the intended priority of
19 permanent installation of the fixed antiaircraft detection
20 equipment being procured by the Navy is as follows: - Midway,
21 Johnston, Guam, Palmyra, Samoa, Wake, Guantanamo. It is re-
22 quested that consideration be given to revising schedules of
23 delivery so as to provide Army installations in the Hawaiian
24 Islands and at Kodiak, Dutch Harbor and Sitka before com-
25 pleting installations at Panama and before proceeding with

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 installations in Puerto Rico and the continental United
3 States.

4 3. Confirmation is also requested of the understanding
5 reached on 8 January 1941 in a conference between the Direc-
6 tor of Naval Communications, the Chief Signal Office, and
7 representatives of the War Plans Divisions of both services,
8 that the Navy Department will be given priority in deliveries
9 of seven sets of mobile equipment and at least eight of the
10 eighteen sets of antiaircraft equipment for the use of Marine
11 Defense Battalions.

12 4. It was learned in the conference on 8 January that
13 delays are anticipated in obtaining steel for use in complet-
14 ing this equipment. It is recommended that the highest prior-
15 ity be given to production of this equipment and supplying
16 the material needed. The Navy Department will be glad to
17 cooperate in obtaining the necessary priorities.

18 R. E. Ingersoll,

19 Acting."

20 Now, following that this Bloch report came in. You re-
21 member that?

22 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: In which he condemned the situation at
24 Hawaii as inadequate for defense against an air attack?

25 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Mr. Mitchell: And then you said in your statement to-
3 day that you caused that letter to be written by Secretary
4 Knox to Secretary of War Stimson?

5 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

6 Mr. Mitchell: What part did you take in that?

7 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Turner said that he did, too.

9 Admiral Stark: That letter was formed in the War Plans
10 Division, gone over very carefully in the front office and
11 then submitted to the Secretary for signature.

12 Mr. Mitchell: You were in full accord with the conclu-
13 sions in that letter?

14 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, in complete accord with it.

15 Mr. Mitchell: From that time on, following that letter
16 to the Secretary of War, steps were taken by both the Army
17 and the Navy to prime the defense, both naval and military,
18 in Hawaii against a possible air attack, were they not?

19 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Now, we have had here in much of the
21 correspondence between General Marshall and General Short,
22 as to the latter's desire for more planes and guns and other
23 equipment. What did the Navy do? What did you do towards
24 supplying Admiral Kimmel with any additional equipment that
25 he needed or that was available for defense against an air

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 attack in the way of anti-aircraft equipment on the ground
3 or fighter planes or reconnaissance planes, PBY's?

4 Admiral Stark: We increased, - I have forgotten just
5 how much, of course it is a matter of record, - the number of
6 squadrons he had out there capable of long distance recon-
7 naissance. With regard to surface vessels, we were able to
8 do very, very little for him and we --

9 Mr. Mitchell: Well, were surface vessels of real
10 significance in the detection of an incoming enemy carrier
11 force?

12 Admiral Stark: They would have been helpful, yes, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: They would have had a great deal of
14 ground to cover, would they not?

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, they would have had a great deal
16 of ground to cover but still you will note in his letters
17 his constant request for them and my statement to him that
18 we could not supply them.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I inferred from his letters that
20 he was referring a good deal to patrols against submarines.

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, but they might have helped him in
22 an emergency to use his eyes. For example, we told him that
23 we did not have them and that he would have to detail such
24 craft from his own fleet, which meant a detail of destroyers.
25 I told him, - I think it appears in one of these personal

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 letters, - that statement and we also sent him an official
3 letter to that extent.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Am I wrong in thinking that that patrol
5 by surface craft was merely for the purpose of determining
6 submarines approaching and vessels?

7 Admiral Stark: Well, it was all to be used in that, in
8 the distance. It would have helped him for use in shore
9 patrol, but he might have extended them.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you were familiar with the plans
11 that were made from time to time thereafter affecting Hawaii,
12 directed towards the coordination and the union of action
13 between the Army and Navy forces in defense against an air
14 attack?

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember the Martin-Bellinger re-
17 port?

18 Admiral Stark: Very clearly, yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: In which they practically described the
20 Jap attack as it afterwards occurred?

21 Admiral Stark: Well, we thought that report was so good
22 when it came in that we distributed it as noted in the state-
23 ment.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, in August 1941 there was a
25 report or study by General Martin, the Army air commander,

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 that went directly to the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Did
3 you see that, that study of reconnaissance by Martin?

4 Admiral Stark: I do not recall having seen it at the
5 time. I may have. I have seen it since.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that report showed very clearly that
7 in order to insure against the complete thwarting of an air
8 attack by the Japs it would be necessary to detect their car-
9 riers at sea the afternoon before and bomb them?

10 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

11 Mr. Mitchell: That was the conclusion that Martin and
12 Bellinger reached together, was it not?

13 Admiral Stark: Well, the conclusion was to spot them
14 if you could before they could launch their planes.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that is what I am leading up to.

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Now, in order to be sure that your fleet
18 was not going to be bombed from the air they agreed that you
19 would have to catch the carriers before their planes were
20 launched, did they not?

21 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: And they figured out that the natural
23 way for the Japs to come in there would be at daylight, that
24 is, with the planes.

25 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: And it would be necessary to run a recon-
3 naissance out for seven or eight or nine hundred or a thousand
4 miles and detect them the afternoon or the night before in
5 order to damage them before their planes were launched, is
6 that right?

7 Admiral Stark: It is always the objective to get the
8 carriers before they can launch their planes.

9 Mr. Mitchell: And it was also equally true, as they said,
10 that actually if you could not do that, if you had to rely on
11 catching the planes in the morning after they had left the
12 carriers and had been launched at a distance up to two or
13 three or four hundred miles, they could not be confident that
14 the attack would not get home to some extent.

15 Admiral Stark: It is pretty difficult to stop all of an
16 air attack once it gets started. You might break up its ef-
17 fectiveness somewhat but some planes, we have always felt, are
18 very likely to get in.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, as a result of all those studies
20 and all those plans, which indicated very clearly that unless
21 you had a certain number of reconnaissance planes and a certain
22 number of bombers you could not count on discovering the Japs
23 before they had launched their planes, you were taking some
24 hazards by having your fleet in Pearl Harbor, isn't that cor-
25 rect?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Admiral Stark: There is always a hazard to have a fleet
3 on the firing line, sir, or in an exposed position and there
4 has been ever since the war started.

5 Mr. Mitchell: The number of planes that the Army had
6 and the number of planes that the Navy had were admittedly
7 known at both ends, both at Hawaii and in Washington by the
8 Army and Navy to be inadequate to run a full reconnaissance
9 over a 360 degree circle at a distance of seven or eight
10 hundred miles, is that true?

11 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

12 Mr. Mitchell: And isn't it a fact that your PBY's, plus
13 the bombers that were there for the Army, were so limited in
14 number that the best you could put out, or that the commander
15 out there could put out would be to run a sectional recon-
16 naissance, taking one sector one afternoon or morning and an-
17 other one another day?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. He did not have enough for a
19 360 degree search.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Well, even assuming that he left out the
21 west and southwest, where your task forces were operating and
22 Guam and Midway intervening and all that, and he even tried
23 to cover the area to the north, which was apparently the dan-
24 gerous area, there being little traffic up there, the command-
25 ers out there could not have run a reconnaissance that would

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 cover more than a third of the area in one day, could they?

3 Admiral Stark: Well, I do not understand just what you
4 mean by "a third of the way" or "a third of the area."

5 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I am speaking of a sector. There is
6 180 degrees on the north side on a horizontal line.

7 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell: I am speaking of a reconnaissance to the
9 north.

10 Admiral Stark: Yes. He did not have enough for that
11 whole northern semi-circle.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Well, could they have covered more than a
13 third of that northern semi-circle daily?

14 Admiral Stark: The air people have testified on that,
15 as to what they could cover, or if they have not testified they
16 can testify, considering the upkeep of their planes and their
17 pilots, and so forth, and I hesitate to get into detail on
18 that.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Well, Martin said he needed 189 big four
20 motored planes to run a 360 degree reconnaissance daily out
21 to a distance of seven hundred or eight hundred miles. That
22 would mean half that number at least to run the 180 degree
23 sector, would it not, and you did not have that many?

24 Admiral Stark: Kimmel had available, without regard to
25 Army planes, approximately 60 operating planes at that time.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 He had 82, I believe, out there, of which 60 were operating.
3 There are always a certain number laid up for repairs.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Well, he had a little less than a third
5 of the planes that Martin reported he needed for the 360 de-
6 grees.

7 Admiral Stark: As I say, that has been studied both by
8 the Army and the Navy. There has been testimony submitted,
9 not before this court but I believe before the Navy last sum-
10 mer, or perhaps before the Army, as to what could have been
11 done and witnesses can be called for that. I would hesitate
12 to pronounce an opinion.

13 Mr. Mitchell: I was hoping possibly that you had given
14 that subject some thought in 1941 when the question of the
15 safety of the fleet was at stake and that maybe you had formed
16 some ideas yourself about the extent of the hazards and the
17 difficulty of their discovering the Jap carrier fleet in that
18 way. Did you not give it some attention then?

19 Admiral Stark: Yes. What we did was to give them in
20 distributing all we had to different areas, all that we felt
21 that they needed, - all that we felt that we could give them.

22 Mr. Mitchell: That is right.

23 Admiral Stark: They needed more.

24 Mr. Mitchell: You gave them everything you had.

25 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: But it was not quite enough.

3 Admiral Stark: No, it was not.

4 Mr. Mitchell: That is just what I am getting to. I
5 think I am not making any statement exactly as to what the
6 record will show, but the impression one gains from it to date
7 is that admittedly they were away short of the reconnaissance
8 planes, fighting planes and anti-aircraft at Hawaii and that
9 the chances of detecting a carrier force in time to destroy
10 the carriers before the planes were launched was a rather
11 slim chance, as Mr. Churchill said about the Chinese.

12 Admiral Stark: When you haven't got enough planes to
13 search the entire area which you would like to search, whether
14 it is planes or what not, you narrow down to where you think
15 is the most likely area of travel and your next study is how
16 can you cover that or how much of it you can cover. That had
17 been studied out, I believe, and witnesses who have made that
18 study can be available.

19 Mr. Mitchell: I was trying to get your views on it.

20 Admiral Stark: I know it only by hearsay. I never made
21 a personal study of the number of degrees they could cover,
22 and so forth.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Well, were you troubled about the pos-
24 sibility of an air attack at Hawaii after the 1st of November
25 1941 as a possibility? Did it seem to you to be a real

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 hazard?

3 Admiral Stark: We always recognized the possibility.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Well, then, when you had a fleet out
5 there and you did not have an adequate anti-aircraft defense
6 why were you not worried about the safety of the fleet in
7 Pearl Harbor?

8 Admiral Stark: I stated in my letter that I was worried
9 about it.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Well, that is in November 1940.

11 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Mitchell: I am bringing you down now to the period
13 between November 27th and December 7, 1941. Had you lost
14 your fear of an air attack?

15 Admiral Stark: No, I won't say that I was fearing an
16 air attack. We recognized the possibility of it.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Well, had you changed your views?

18 Admiral Stark: And we recognized that we should be
19 ready so far as what we had available to use.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Well, suppose you did not have enough and
21 you thought there was a substantial hazard, didn't the ques-
22 tion arise in your mind and those of your staff here as to
23 what you ought to do, whether you ought to move the fleet
24 east a ways or make arrangements to keep a smaller number of
25 the vessels in the harbor at a time and things of that kind?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Admiral Stark: There are certain hazards which you have
3 to anticipate. As to just what should be kept in port and
4 what should be kept at sea of what was out there, that was
5 clearly up to the man on the spot.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Your idea was that having done everything
7 you could for him and given him all the equipment that you
8 could scrape up and he was still inadequately prepared to
9 defend against an air attack, that the responsibility of just
10 what he did to meet that situation was up to him, is that the
11 idea?

12 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. That was all we could do, ex-
13 cept we were pressing continually to get more material.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I know, but I am talking now about
15 on November 27th, when the clock had struck and the codes
16 were being burned and war was a matter of days and you could
17 not get any material in that length of time. You were up
18 against a second problem, weren't you, of how to handle the
19 fleet at Pearl Harbor?

20 Admiral Stark: Well, it was then up to the Commander-
21 in-Chief on the spot. I would not have presumed, sitting
22 at a desk in Washington, to tell him what to do with his
23 fleet. There were many factors involved, of which he was
24 the only person who had the knowledge, and once I had started,
25 if I had started, to give him directives, I would have been

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 handling the fleet. That was not my job.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I was wondering why when you sent the
4 warning message at that time, what does this "defensive de-
5 ployment" mean that was in your message of November 27th?
6 What does that mean as applied to the conditions that existed
7 there?

8 Admiral Stark: My thought in that message about the
9 defensive deployment was clear all-out security measures.
10 Certainly, having been directed to take a defensive deploy-
11 ment, the Army having been directed to make reconnaissance,
12 but regardless of the Army, our message to Admiral Kimmel,
13 that the natural thing, - and perhaps he did do it, - was to
14 take up with the Army right away in the gravity of the situ-
15 ation the plans that they had made and then make dispositions
16 as best he could against surprise for the safety not only
17 of the ships which he decided to keep in port but also for
18 the safety of the ships which he had at sea. He had certain
19 material which he could use for that and we naturally ex-
20 pected he would use it.

21
22 Mr. Mitchell: Well, the word "deployment", at least
23 in the Army sense, is to scatter, isn't it?

24 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Is that what you meant when you applied
it to the Navy command?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Admiral Stark: He should deploy what planes he had;
3 submarines are splendid craft to see without being seen.
4 They might have been employed. He could have used a light
5 force if he had seen fit and had them available. He had cer-
6 tain forces at sea. We were not handling them. That was his
7 force. Just what deployment he was using them for, that also
8 was up to him. He could search, - I am not stating that he
9 should and it is difficult to testify on this, particularly
10 in the light of hindsight.

11 Mr. Mitchell: I know.

12 Admiral Stark: It is awfully difficult to keep away
13 from it.

14 Mr. Mitchell: I am just trying to get a translation of
15 the words "defensive deployment".

16 Admiral Stark: Well, a defensive deployment would be
17 to spread and to use his forces to the maximum extent to
18 avoid surprise and, if he could, to hit the other fellow and
19 in conjunction with the Army, to implement the arrangements
20 which had previously been made for just this sort of thing.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Do you think the possibilities of a suc-
22 cessful surprise attack by the Japs in the way that it was
23 done was increased by moving the shipping out of the northern
24 ship lanes in October? Did that give the Japs a little better
25 chance to get through without being observed?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Admiral Stark: It never occurred to me, I never thought
3 of it in that light until I heard it brought up recently,
4 because there were not many ships up there, not an awful lot
5 anyway. It was easy to cross the lanes. A fleet that does
6 not want to be seen and that has adequate air scouting does
7 not have to be seen as a rule. They can steam darkened at
8 night. Also, they can search out the night area that they
9 propose to go through and I would not have said that it had
10 any bearing.

11 Mr. Mitchell: You were aware, of course, that the Jap
12 espionage system in Hawaii was working without any real
13 hindrance?

14 Admiral Stark: The Jap what, sir?

15 Mr. Mitchell: The Jap espionage system, their spies in
16 Hawaii.

17 Admiral Stark: We had always felt, - and again there are
18 other witnesses available to you there who can tell you just
19 what the Japs were doing. We had felt that not only in Hawaii
20 but at practically all our given posts the Japs knew every-
21 thing we were doing.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you told us here and you yourself
23 knew then in 1941 that the Japs not only had every opportunity
24 to watch the movements in Hawaii and to know whether the forces
25 there were alert or not alert, but they also had other means

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 of communicating it to their superiors in Tokyo. They had
3 access to the radio and to the cable companies?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, that is correct.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Don't you think that really the key to
6 this attack at Pearl Harbor was not only the fact that our
7 forces were not alerted but that the Japs knew it?

8 Admiral Stark: You mean they knew our forces were not
9 alerted?

10 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

11 Admiral Stark: That would be conjecture. I do not know,
12 sir. They may have, but I do not know. We have nothing, I
13 believe, of record to show it. I think it is very likely.

14 Mr. Mitchell: We have plenty in this record to show they
15 were getting dispatches from Hawaii every day telling exactly
16 what was going on and they were inquiring about the conditions
17 there. Some of these dispatches that we did get and decoded
18 in time talk about aircraft reconnaissance and all that sort
19 of thing.

20 Admiral Stark: That is true, yes, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: It is a fact, isn't it, that they must
22 have known everything he was doing and had every means of
23 reporting that fact to their government.

24 Admiral Stark: That is true, yes, sir. Just what they
25 reported in the last hours I do not know, but what you say is

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 quite true.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I do not mean over the last hours but I
4 mean over the last weeks.

5 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: As a matter of fact, that was a consider-
7 able hazard normally in the Japs making an attack of that
8 kind, a hazard to them, was it not?

9 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: And in order to decide whether they would
11 take it or not they would have to know something about the
12 extent of preparedness at the other end, wouldn't they?

13 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Did you know here in Washington between
15 November 27th and December 7, 1941 that our D.F. system,
16 direction finder system, had lost track of all but two di-
17 visions of Jap carriers and that they did not pick them up
18 again before the 7th?

19 Admiral Stark: I was familiar at that time in general
20 with the general picture. It is a long time ago and what I
21 heard recently that is so definite on that. Just how much
22 I am colored by hindsight on that I do not know. I do dis-
23 tinctly recall their changes of call signs and that sort of
24 material and also we asked -- it shows in the record, I be-
25 lieve, -- the Army to make reconnaissance over the Mandates

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 and we were not too sure at that time, in fact I say we were
3 not too sure; the last information we had as to the carriers
4 had come in some time previously as I recall.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Well, your report sheets that we have
6 here about the location of carriers seem to differ a little
7 bit from the ones that they were using out in Hawaii. Didn't
8 you get your information from Hawaii or did you pick it up
9 directly here in the Navy Department?

10 Admiral Stark: The information that came in with re-
11 gard to material of that sort came from the field. That is,
12 it came from Hawaii and it came from the Philippines. We
13 were dependent upon them for that information.

14 Mr. Mitchell: You had about the same data to work on
15 that they did?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Well, there are two in one of the old
18 records that has not been presented yet here, - there is
19 evidence by one of the officers in charge of that work in
20 Hawaii, of the direction finding reports and ship locations,
21 that they lost track of the Jap carriers around the 26th or
22 27th of November and that he reported it to his chief.

23 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Did anything like that occur around that
25 time? Did anybody call it to your attention, anything to

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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that effect?

Admiral Stark: I have no recollection of it now.

The Chairman: Are you ready to suspend?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

The Chairman: The committee will stand in recess until ten o'clock on Wednesday morning. The chair desires to hold a brief executive session with the committee and everybody else will please retire from the room.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 o'clock P.M., December 31, 1941, an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock A. M., Wednesday, January 2, 1946.)

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