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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 6 March 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours
PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
Miss S. M. Betar, Stenographer
Questions by : Mr. Sackett

- Q We were talking yesterday about your entry of August 7 when you talked with Prince KONOYE and suggested that the program of penetration to the South should be postponed until Japan was strong enough to accomplish the desired results. How did you propose that Japan should prepare herself in order to be able to accomplish this penetration?
- A I did not make the expansion toward the South by use of force the basis of my suggestion. I felt that it was necessary to make up such a plan in order to quell the rising spirit and the fanaticism of the military at that time and it was with this plan I mentioned if the national strength was sufficient, I felt that natural resources could be obtained without resorting to force.
- Q You wrote in your diary that the ultimate penetration of the South would be by use of force of arms.

- A In order to postpone the plan, I thought I had to be concrete to that extent of saying that in the future such a thing has to be done; otherwise, the military will not even listen to me.
- Q But you didn't explain that fact to Prince KONOYE when you talked to him. You indicated to him that you thought Japan should postpone her expansion into the South until she was strong enough to bring it about successfully.
- A I was greatly in favor at that time for peaceful penetration to the South because unless Japan obtained natural resources the Navy and Army will always be in a turmoil.
- Q But in your talk with Prince KONOYE, you led him to believe that what you favored was postponing the military force into the South for a period of some ten years until Japan could be strong enough to use military force in the South. That was the argument you used with KONOYE on that day, isn't that right?
- A It is not written here in the diary but I have spoken to KONOYE that I desired penetration to the South without resorting to force.
- Q On August 11, you conferred with the Emperor and you write in your diary that he indicated that if the meeting with President Roosevelt failed, Japan would have to take a firm resolution. What did the Emperor say in that conversation to indicate what he meant by "firm resolution".
- A The Emperor feared that the talks with President Roosevelt would be disastrous and he felt that in the Imperial Conference much of the procedure had been too formal and he thought to eliminate all those personalities that are there in the way of clerks and general duties and thought to make only the Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff.
- Q Why did he want to lessen the size of the Imperial Conference and eliminate secretarial people?

- A Because he thought that the inclusion of secretaries would incur the possibility of having the secrets leak out and because those persons usually would start the plots with the young officers.
- Q Normally, the decisions made at the Imperial Conferences are kept secret from the public and lesser Government officials?
- A Yes, and until now, even those Cabinet members that did not participate in it did not know anything about it.
- Q But my original question was that the Emperor mentioned that if the meeting with Roosevelt failed, Japan would have to take a firm resolution or firm stand in your conversation with him. Did he indicate what he meant by a firm stand or resolution?
- A The Emperor was implying that Japan would either have to fight with America or to withdraw completely from China and either way, it would cause great consternation in Japan.
- Q What he meant was either way the decision went, there should be unanimity of opinion and agreement between the Government and the Army and everyone else rather than a division of opinion which seemed to exist in those days.
- A So the Emperor thought to inquire as to the opinions of various people concerned before the matter became formal and before decisions are reached.
- Q In other words, he, in his conversations with you predicted that if negotiations failed, Japan would either have to go to war with the United States or decide to completely meet the demands of the United States?
- A Yes.
- Q In that conversation, did he say anything to indicate that he thought Japan should meet the United States' demands and withdraw from China rather than go to war with the United States if negotiations failed.

- A That is the important point and decisions in regard to that has been decided and for that reason, the Emperor was implying such a thing.
- Q My question is did he indicate which stand he was for if negotiations failed? Did he favor war with the United States or did he favor complete withdrawal from China and backing down on the foreign policy?
- A The Emperor was always saying that he does not want war but on the matter of withdrawing from China, the procedure and the way that is to be done was so difficult that he was very much worried about it.
- Q As I understand it, the Emperor was in favor of negotiations and desired to avoid war but my question is that if that couldn't be accomplished and Japan was faced with one or the other of these decisions, in your conversation, did he indicate which he favored, going to war or avoiding the war or giving in completely as to the China War?
- A The Emperor naturally wanted to avoid war and he wanted to reach some settlement and settle the China Incident and thereby avert war.
- Q I understand but you still didn't answer my question. I'm assuming and agreeing with you that the Emperor did not want war with the United States. My question is that the Emperor recognized that if negotiations failed, Japan had one of two alternatives; either to go to war or to avoid war by meeting American demands. He certainly had some idea which of these two alternatives he favored.
- A If it was possible, the Emperor wanted to take the latter course. He has been saying what he said out here ...
- Q Did he say anything on that particular occasion to the effect that if the negotiations failed, Japan should take steps to withdraw from China and French Indo-China and thereby avert war?

- A The Emperor has been thinking from way before that he will withdraw; that he is in great favor of withdrawing completely from China and French Indo-China if the prestige of the Japanese Army can be maintained.
- Q As of this time, had the Emperor in his discussions with you made up his mind yet as to the change of course he favored - war, or withdrawal in case the negotiations failed?
- A Because the aspects of the failure and the way in which the negotiations failed would determine the future course that the Emperor took, that is very difficult for me to answer.
- Q By that, do you mean you didn't think as of August 11, 1941, the Emperor had yet made up his mind finally as to which course of action he favored if negotiations failed because they were still going on and he had not determined what Japan should do if they did finally fail?
- A The Emperor's sentiment was strongly in opposition to war with America and because the situation of the failure of the negotiations and the extent of that failure would determine the circumstances of the case and perhaps may be the cause of national consternation and chaos, the Emperor was greatly worried in that regard.
- Q We can say this that your conversation with the Emperor indicated as of this period, he did not want war with the United States and he also indicated that he was willing to recommend and advocate the withdrawal of troops from China to avert war. If Japan could accomplish that without losing face, that was his attitude, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q Can we say that he indicated in his conversations with you that if it was determined after negotiations failed that Japan could not withdraw troops from China without losing face, then he was in a frame of mind that Japan would have to fight the United States?

- A In that event, the Emperor referred the matter to the S_upreme C_ommand and the Government and if the Government and the S_upreme C_ommand reached a decision after threshing the matter out, the Emperor cannot do anything about it. Until such a decision has been reached, the Emperor wanted to express his own personal opinion as much as possible and for that reason he has been expressing his opinion as indicated here (diary).
- Q I appreciate in making up his final decision, he would be greatly influenced by what the high Government officials thought should be done but in contributing his opinion to the solution of what ought to be done, he certainly took a stand, did he not as to what he thought Japan should do if negotiations failed and Japan was unable to withdraw from China without losing face. He certainly had an opinion, whether that was finally controlled or not, that would be something else. What was his personal opinion?
- A The Emperor was strongly in favor of settling the China situation and averting war with America and in order to create just such an atmosphere, the Emperor expressed his opinion in that respect.
- Q Can't we say that in his discussions with you, the Emperor expressed his opinion, whether or not that would be the final decision of Japan was subject to further discussions with other Government officials, but he expressed his opinions at this time that if negotiations failed and it was concluded that Japan could not withdraw from China without losing face, Japan then would have to fight the United States as the only remaining choice left. He felt so, did he not?
- A The story to that extent wasn't made at this time.
- Q In other words, you don't think at this time he went so far as to express an opinion as to what Japan should do if negotiations failed and she couldn't withdraw from China?

- A Because failure of negotiations with America will lead to a decision by the Supreme Command and the Government to make war upon the United States and before such a decision is reached, the Emperor wanted to find some road which would avert such a catastrophe and for that reason, the Emperor has been expressing his opinion.
- Q You mean to say that the Emperor did not express such an opinion as I mentioned as of August 1941?
- A No.
- Q However, after the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941, the Emperor then concluded that it was impossible for Japan to withdraw troops from China without losing face and the only remaining solution of the problem that confronted Japan was to attack the United States. Is that right?
- A Because it was the decision reached by the Supreme Command and the Government that the Emperor could not do anything about it.
- Q But he, at that time, concurred in their opinion and proceeded to take the necessary steps to have war declared and a rescript issued, didn't he?
- A Yes.
- Q And as of December 1, 1941, the Emperor agreed with the high Government officials that war should be declared on the United States as the only solution of the problem?
- A Yes
- Q You refer on August 11 to the coming Imperial Conference. I would like to ask when it was first decided that there was going to be an Imperial Conference in those days which I know came about on September 6?
- A The Imperial Conference was not determined for any date at this time but it was said that in the aforementioned circumstances it will be put into session.

- Q Irrespective of the exact date it was going to be held on, when was it first determined that the situation in those days was such that in the near future, there would have to be an Imperial Conference?
- A No predetermination has been done nor expectation has been made. It was because negotiations with America was still being conducted at that time.
- Q As of August 11, according to what you wrote in your diary, you knew there was going to be an Imperial Conference in the near future because you write that the Emperor desired to be able to ask questions at the coming Imperial Conference, implying there was going to be one.
- A It isn't so. Perhaps there is an error in translation because it was just a talk and generalities at that time.
- Q In other words, what you really wrote in your diary was that at the next Imperial Conference, whenever it was, the Emperor wanted to have the right to ask questions.
- A He was just implying as to the future Imperial Conference and it was just abstract implication.
- Q You don't think as of August 11, 1941 it had yet been determined there would be an Imperial Conference on September 6?
- A No, I didn't hear anything about it.
- Q Do you recall when you first learned there was going to be an Imperial Conference on September 6?
- A I learned about that just the day prior to its opening and because it was brought forth so abruptly that my arguments had been made concerning it.
- Q What kind of arguments do you have in mind?
- A I told the Prime Minister that in view of the great problem, abrupt calling of an Imperial Conference would be harmful and not right.

- Q In other words, you felt that the matter to come before the Conference should have been discussed over a longer period of time in liaison conferences before calling an Imperial Conference?
- A And irrespective of the liaison conference, I felt that such an abrupt calling of an Imperial Conference would not give the Emperor enough time to make a decision or investigate the matter.
- Q In other words, was it customary to give the Emperor more notice of the holding of an imperial conference than was given in the case of the September 6 Conference?
- A The Emperor does not have very much time to make a decision but in this event it sort of seemed to have been a sudden imposition upon the Emperor and for that reason I thought that it was a very bad thing.
- Q Was the decision to call this Imperial Conference made on much shorter notice than normally?
- A Yes.
- Q I take it that the Emperor in his talk to you was complaining because he couldn't express himself freely at these Imperial Conferences. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Why was it that there was a policy prohibiting the Emperor from speaking freely his opinions at imperial conferences?
- A It is not prohibited but it sort of became a tradition of having it conducted formally and in that case everything is done formally and it isn't much expression of his opinion.
- Q At the Imperial Conference, itself, as I understand it, the Emperor is not permitted to express his opinions at all. Is that correct?

- A It does not mean that the Emperor absolutely cannot give his opinion.
- Q Well, by the Constitution, he could say all he wanted to but by tradition, he would never speak at length at imperial conferences. Is that correct?
- A Because traditionally under such a formal occasion, it seemed it would be bad taste to express an opinion and also anything that the Emperor would say at such an occasion would be highly significant and would have great ramification and import.
- Q The President of the Privy Council was permitted to voice his opinion at imperial conferences, was he not?
- A Yes, the President of the Privy Council can express his opinions freely. The significance of an Imperial Conference is that it is a conference held in the presence of the Emperor and does not imply a conference by the Emperor. For that reason, the Emperor's right to voice his opinion is made difficult.
- Q As I understand it, the people who attend the liaison conferences preceding an imperial conference thresh out their differences in advance but at the imperial conference, the President of the Privy Council and the Cabinet ministers who were not in attendance at the liaison conferences, and officials such as that could then express their opinions. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q But it wasn't considered an appropriate time for the Emperor to give his views?
- A Yes.
- Q How was it that the Emperor disclosed his views to the Government? Was it through his private conferences with the various ministers and Chiefs of Staff, etc. when they came to see him privately that he voiced his views?
- A Yes, the Emperor was expressing his opinion in that way frequently.

- Q And what he was saying to you on this occasion was that the tradition should be changed and that he should be allowed to participate in the conduct of the conversation at the imperial conferences freely until his heart's content. Is that right?
- A Yes, the Emperor has wished to do that.
- Q Did you talk to Premier KONOYE about that wish. If so, what did he say?
- A I told Prince KONOYE of the Emperor's wish in that respect and Prince KONOYE did not oppose it at all but actually that wasn't carried out.
- Q Who was there in the Government that was opposed to the Emperor voicing his opinion.
- A I didn't hear of anyone opposing it. I believe that the matter wasn't decided upon by the Supreme Command at all and under such a circumstance and conditions, the September 6 Imperial Conference was suddenly called and therefore it was conducted in the previous fashion.
- Q Isn't it a matter of fact that the Supreme Command opposed the Emperor actively participating in imperial conferences?
- A I do not know of any evidence in that respect.
- Q Do you remember what your conversation was with the War Minister on August 12?
- A I have heard from TOJO of all the information obtained in regard to America and Russia which was procured through military attaches and I have also heard of the report that the Chinese General, in SHANSI Province is being won over to the Japanese side.
- Q What did War Minister TOJO have to say about the negotiations or relations with the United States on that occasion?
- A I believe that his information was in regard to the difficulty of carrying out the American plan in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops in China and I do not know anything more concerning it.

- Q Did he say what he thought Japan should do in view of that difficulty?
- A He just gave me information to that respect and did not give me any terms.
- Q On August 13, you talked with Prince KONOYE, according to my translation, with reference to the coming Imperial Conference. Is that correct?
- A This matter of Imperial conferences refers to that spoken by the Emperor on the 11th.
- Q You mean the next imperial conference that might happen to be called?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you remember anything in particular about your conversation of the 13th of August with KONOYE?
- A In the first place, I said that serious consideration must be given to the proposal given by the Emperor in regard to the Imperial Conference, and second, that the Premier's proposal of going to America be carried out as much as possible.
- Q On August 14, what was your conversation with Mr. HASHIMOTO with reference to Prince HIRANUMA?
- A It was a report saying that HIRANUMA has been shot by a pistol from the Rightists. He was shot in the mouth four times.
- Q Do you know who was back of the shooting?
- A The attempted assassin was a member of a Rightists organization called MAKOTO MUSUBI which was an organization in the Ivaragi Prefecture. Its branch is in Okayama and this person was a Shinto priest - the person that did the shooting. And it happened that Okayama Prefecture is the native place of HIRANUMA and this person was able to meet HIRANUMA through invitation from HIRANUMA's native place
- Q Was there anything to indicate that the military people were back of this shooting?

- A The military was not involved.
- Q What was it that Baron HIRANUMA stood for that the assassin was opposed to.
- A He was saying he was not progressive but was utterly conservative and that he was more or less obstructing the progressive course of the Cabinet.
- Q What would you say the progressive course of the Cabinet was, in general? What did he have in mind as being the progressive course?
- A The demands or the sentiment held by this organization MAKOTO MUSUBI was pro-war.
- Q In other words, the assassination took place because Baron HIRANUMA was an advocate of peace while this organization to which the assassin belonged was arguing in favor of war?
- A This organization thought that HIRANUMA was obstructing Japan's development and expansion.
- Q Did this organization have any direct connection with the military people?
- A This organization had no direct connection with the military, although one of its factions may be allied with the military but that wasn't brought to light in this incident.
- Q Both this organization and the younger element of the military and certain of its leaders were in favor of war. They had that common program but you don't think there was a close relationship between the two?
- A I believe that there is actual alliance or involvement of this organization with that of the military but as far as this incident was concerned, the military was not involved.
- Q What did you know that leads you to believe that there was direct connection between this organization and the military?
- A Because the young officers and the Rightist element in the military were involved in these Rightist organizations in many ways and in many respect and in many forms.

Q Were there many such organization in existence in those days?

A There were numerous small organizations of such nature and their names changed frequently and their personalities also changed frequently, which seemed to be the unique characteristic of the Japanese.

Q But you think the younger military officers expressed their views through these organizations to the public.

A I believe that occasionally they do and because of the nature of those organizations, its office as well as its personalities, cannot be found out and funds for its activities are obtainable from a place where it is difficult to determine and upon the procurement of funds, the personnel suddenly increases and with that the possibility for an uprising and activities would arise so strongly it was very dangerous.

Q Do you know who was furnishing funds to organizations of this type?

A Generally, funds are obtained by suppressing the news of scandalous information concerning wealthy individuals and money is obtained in that way and also some fellows obtain money from the Secret Service fund.

Q What was the Secret Service fund? Was that a Government fund?

A In the Army organization, in the battlefields, there is such an organ whereby some of the fellows go up there and obtain money from Manchuria or those places where they can obtain it.

Q On August 14, what did Foreign Minister TOYODA have to say to you after having talked with the Emperor?

A I believe it was concerned mostly with problems of Japanese-American negotiations. I believe that TOYODA at this time was not very pessimistic about it.

Q Did he express to you his opinions as to what Japan's policy should be under the circumstances.

- A I believe it was at this time that he said that he would like the negotiations with America to be successful and that by all means Premier KONOYE should be sent to America and that in view of the situation a new atmosphere must be created and after the establishment of this new atmosphere, he felt that something good would come of it
- Q Did he indicate on that occasion he felt that if negotiations would fail, Japan should carry out its program in the South by the use of military force.
- A No, he didn't say anything in that respect because TOYODA was greatly opposed to that.
- Q Although he did join in that program, I think you said, after the policy had been decided upon?
- A And, therefore, he thought he would reach an agreement in a talk with America and not bring such a program into effect.
- Q Of course, he joined in the decision that was made on September 6 to fight the United States if negotiations failed, did he not?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you remember what Captain MAEDA of the General Staff had to say about the Dutch East Indies on August 16?
- A MAEDA gave an orientation talk on the Dutch East Indies by opening up a large-scale map and he talked upon oil, rubber and all the other natural resources.
- Q He joined in the views of the Navy Chief of Staff that it would be necessary for Japan to acquire oil in the Dutch East Indies by force, if necessary, did he not?
- A With that in mind, I believe he thought to inform us. I believe that he tried to impress us with the value and the worth of the Dutch East Indies to Japan.

Q Was that in the presence of the Emperor - this lecture?

A No.

Q In his lecture, did he openly state that Japan should take necessary steps to obtain oil in the Dutch East Indies by military force, if necessary?

A No, he did not give such a story. He just gave a talk on the geography and the products of that region.

Q But you think in the back of his mind he was interested in trying to interest you in desiring control of the Dutch East Indies. Is that correct?

A We received indirect or interdictory fire from him.

Q At the time you heard the lecture, did you and your friends feel this was an effort on the part of the Navy General Staff to try to win you over to their view of using force in the South Pacific?

A I felt that he was trying to impress us with the value of the Dutch East Indies and to impress us and to win us over to his way of thinking in that respect.

Q You already realized he knew from what you have told me that the Navy General Staff favored the use of military force to get these supplies from the South Pacific, didn't he?

A Yes.

Q On August 19, was the MATSUI referred to, General MATSUI?

A No

Q This is a different MATSUI?

A Yes.

Q On August 22, you talked to Foreign Minister TOYODA again after he talked with the Emperor. Do you recall what he had to say to you?

- A Because he was going to the Palace for various reasons and so frequently, I do not know just what he went there for.
- Q Do you have any recollection what you discussed with the Emperor on that day?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q On August 27, do you recall your conversation with the Chief Aide-de-Camp? What, if anything, did he have to say with reference to the Navy General Staff?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q What did Admiral NAGANO have to say to you on August 28?
- A This is another case when you talked to Admiral NAGANO with reference to United States relations.
- A NAGANO at this time spoke on the attitude and the opinion of the Navy in regard to the plan taken in regard to America and Britain.
- Q What did he have to say?
- A At this time, NAGANO said that Japan was more or less greatly becoming weak and that she needs a major operation of drastic surgery in order to save her and NAGANO WAS IMPLYING THAT war is just such a major operation.
- Q In other words, he told you on that occasion that he, as well as the Navy he represented, had come to the conclusion that it was to Japan's best interest to use military force to carry out its southern program?
- A I believe that NAGANO had just that sort of a feeling and he said that war is just such sort of a thing. He knew that I was in opposition to it and he thought I didn't know anything about it so he explained just what war is to me.
- Q In other words, there is no question but what NAGANO was one of the advocates of carrying out the southern expansion program by force, if necessary, and on that occasion, he so expressed himself to you, did he not?
- A Yes.

Q When you say he seemed to feel you were opposed to war and didn't fully understand war and that he explained war to you, what did he do or say to try to explain the war policy to you? I think you indicated that he said that Japan needed some drastic surgery and something to bring it together, I suppose. What else did he say?

A He argued that the great difference of American production and economic power makes it impossible for Japan, even though she may be successful during the initial stage but NAGANO at this time said that Japan by following her present course would greatly go down to oblivion anyhow and therefore she requires drastic surgery.

Q Some thirty days before, at the time he made his report to the Emperor, he expressed to you that he did not feel that Japan could be successful in fighting the United States, did he not?

A Yes.

Q On this occasion, approximately a month later, had he changed his opinion as to the ability of the Navy to fight a successful war?

A I believe so. I could not take it in any other way.

Q In other words, you observed or discerned a change in attitude on his part within that thirty-day period. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q That was in keeping with what you said yesterday, I think, that you noticed a strengthening of the position on the part of the Navy, generally, during that period of time. Is that true?

A I do not know if it was at this time, because I do not know when it was that KONDO replaced ITO. The reason why NAGANO changed his mind or has taken on this type of mind, is because the sentiment and the feeling of the younger officers had become so greatly stronger.

Q When you say KONDO supplanted ITO, didn't ITO supplant KONDO?

A KONDO supplanted ITO.

Q Is that right. I thought ITO was Vice Chief of Staff at the time of Pearl Harbor, was he not?

A ITO supplanted KONDO.

Q Well, some thirty days prior to that time, in making his report to the Emperor, NAGANO had reported to the Emperor that the Navy thought it should take a firm stand in the South Pacific and fight the United States, if necessary, to accomplish its program and indicated to the Emperor in a written report that he thought it could be successful, while at the same time NAGANO expressed his personal doubt on the question. Is that right?

A Yes

Q As a result of the lack of consistency in the Navy's view and NAGANO's personal view, the Emperor was somewhat critical of the advice he was getting. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q But during the next thirty days, you would say, when you talked to NAGANO on August 28, he had come around to seeing eye-to-eye with the younger Navy officers and by that time openly expressed to you that he favored the use of military force in the South Pacific if the United States negotiations failed?

A Yes.

Q What did General SUZUKI have to say about the national mobilization plan on that same day when he talked to you?

- A On this occasion, he reported to the Emperor of the plan of mobilizing all the natural resources. The making of this plan of mobilizing all the natural resources was made very difficult because so many things stopped coming from America but SUZUKI somehow was able to make plans of some kind and this plan was presented to the Emperor.
- Q Was it true that General SUZUKI suggested mobilizing Japan's resources in order that Japan might use military force in carrying out its southern penetration plan?
- A This mobilization of Japanese resources was not made for Southern expansion because this mobilization was conducted for the China Incident and it was existing at the time and this was made again because of the fact that many of the critical materials had ceased to flow in from America.
- Q We talked at considerable length yesterday about the leaders who were leading Japan in its policy of leading southern expansion by force. I am not clear in my mind where General SUZUKI fits into the picture. Will you tell me again of his attitude toward the southern expansion by military force?
- A SUZUKI at this time was greatly aware of the critical need of materials and especially because of the stoppage of the flow from America that he wanted to regain normal relationship with America and to carry on harmonious relations with her. For that reason, I believe SUZUKI was not aggressive at this time.
- Q When did he become aggressive?
- A While he was in the KONOYE Cabinet, he was greatly opposed to war with America and he had the same type of a task in the TOJO Cabinet but I believe he later took on the attitude and the belief of TOJO. Upon assumption of office in the TOJO Cabinet, the TOJO Cabinet received an order from the Emperor to avert war but until December when it has finally been more or less decided upon, his attitude changed along with it.

- Q In other words, you would say that when the TOJO Cabinet was formed, he then in his conversation with you, indicated that his attitude was in accord with that of Premier TOJO and then he came to favor the use of military force in the South Pacific as a necessary means of solving Japanese problems.
- A That was later on, after being in the TOJO Cabinet.
- Q Yesterday we clarified some of these men in our conversation as leaders and others as followers in the same program of the use of military force in the South. Would you say that SUZUKI was in the same category as TOGO, as being a follower more than a leader in the movement?
- A I cannot call him a leader at all.
- Q I believe we agreed among ourselves that TOGO and TOYADA engaged and entered into the enterprise more as followers than leaders. Would you put SUZUKI in that category?
- A I believe he is nearer to that.
- Q The other day when we were discussing these personalities, you mentioned this General SATO in the Bureau of Military Affairs. What was his attitude with reference to the use of military force to accomplish the Southern Pacific expansion?
- A SATO was under MUTO and he was of the mind that whenever necessary, to go down into the South by resorting to war.
- Q He had the same opinions as MUTO on that point, would you say?
- A I believe so.
- Q You talked to SATO on occasions, did you not?
- A I met him two or three times.
- Q On those occasions, he expressed to you his opinion that he felt military force should be used to go into the South Pacific?

- A I met SATO during the China Incident and at the time southern expansion was being a matter of issue, I did not meet him at all.
- Q You would clarify him in the same category as MUTO, except that MUTO by virtue of his position was more able to be a leader than SATO?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the attitude of the President of the Privy Council HARA with reference to the use or no use of military force?
- A HARA was totally opposed to it and was greatly concerned about it.
- Q Was HASHIMOTO, the Kwantung Army Colonel, active in military affairs in the Fall of 1941?
- A HASHIMOTO at this time was retired and he was more or less the sponsor of the Rightist organization and he was active in that respect. He was very aggressive in his viewpoint.
- Q Did he have any particular influence on Japanese foreign policy in those days?
- A He did not have any direct influence. He was only the leader of the Rightist organization.
- Q Was he closely connected with and respected by the younger Army staff officers, who favored the use of military force?
- A I believe because he was a military man, he had connections with the younger officers but I have no evidence in regard to that.
- Q Did you talk to him in those days about southern expansion?
- A I never talked to HASHIMOTO, not even for once. I didn't even know him.

- Q Was he in about the same category as the Admirals who were retired and who were leaders of the young staff officers?
- A Yes, he is just like them.
- Q I want to talk to you a little more so that I can get straightened out in my mind the origin and development of this new order in East Asia and this Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Although I realize that those phrases were used off and on many times by public officials and civilians in their public utterances, what I am interested in finding out is when these phrases were used officially and given out as a matter of official Japanese policy. As I understand it, the new order in East Asia program was publicly announced by Prince KONOYE along in July or August of 1940 when the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet was formed. Is that correct?
- A I have no accurate recollection. I believe so.
- Q Didn't Prince KONOYE in those days of his 2nd Cabinet advocate as a foreign policy of Japan the establishment of a new order in East Asia, having in mind close cooperation between Manchukuo, China and Japan?
- A Yes, but that sort of sentiment has been held from the First KONOYE Cabinet.
- Q I see, but when was it that the new order in East Asia first became part of the foreign policy of Japan in your opinion.
- A It became clear in the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet under the Foreign Ministry of MATSUOKA.
- Q But you think that Prince KONOYE, in his public utterances advocated it in the First KONOYE Cabinet even?
- A I have no accurate recollection that it was a positive national policy under KONOYE.

- Q Having in mind that there were many people referring to the new order in East Asia in those days, when would you say that policy became a definite part of the foreign policy of Japan?
- A I do not know exactly when it became so because I did not read anything about it that I did not know.
- Q Well, you and Prince KONOYE had certainly talked about the new order in East Asia, did you not?
- A I had talked to Prince KONOYE about it but it was not made a definite policy of the Government and I did not know whether it was a policy of the Government or not.
- Q At least, under the Second KONOYE Cabinet, with MATSUOKA as Foreign Minister, it was adopted as the foreign policy of Japan, was it not?
- A I believe that is definitely so.
- Q I don't have it here with me, but I was reading this morning in the Japanese Year Book, where he discussed the foreign policy of Japan. It is printed there at the commencement of the Second KONOYE Cabinet in July or August of 1940 that the new order in East Asia and the principles of Hakko Ichiu were to be part of the foreign policy of Japan under his premiership. Does that refresh your recollection any so that you might verify that?
- A Perhaps it may be part of the proclamation at the time the Cabinet is formed.
- Q Later in the fall of 1940, I think it was in December, there was a certain treaty or there were treaties entered into between Japan and the Nanking Government and Manchukuo wherein the new order in East Asia was referred to. By that time, you would say that the new order in East Asia was definitely in existence as a part of the foreign policy of Japan, wouldn't you?
- A Yes.

- Q And then, when was it that the name of the policy was changed from the New Order of East Asia to Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? What is the story about that change?
- A That is not clear to me. I don't know.
- Q Was there any difference between the policy of the New Order of East Asia and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere or did they mean the same thing fundamentally?
- A I believe fundamentally they meant the same thing. I believe that was due to the enlargement of the scope of the meaning and I think it was as a result of the boastful attitude that was started to be taken by Japan. And it was due to the fashion of that time to put "Dai", meaning "greater" or "great" in most any kind of a term at that time. I believe that the interpretation of that changed but the actual meaning was the same.
- Q Can we say that this is true; that in the earlier days when the Government or its officers referred to the New Order of East Asia as the foreign policy of Japan, it referred to cooperation between Japan, China and Manchuria, while after the outbreak of war and expansion into the southern Pacific, the slogan or phrase of "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was adopted and that included, in addition to those three I mentioned, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. Is that about what happened with reference to that foreign policy?
- A It greatly became enlarged. At first it included only up to French Indo-China and Thailand.
- Q In 1942, after the start of the war, there was formed in Japan a new ministry known as the Greater East Asia Ministry. As I understand it, as a result of that, or incidental of that, TOGO resigned. What do you know about that? What was back of the forming of that new Ministry? Why was it formed or what was the purpose of having a new Ministry?

- A It was organized after those regions has been occupied and it was made to handle the problem of the occupied areas in order to develop the natural resources there as quickly as possible and utilize it for the war effort as quickly as can be done.
- Q The relations with strictly independent nations were carried on by the foreign office, were they not, while with the formation of this new Ministry of Greater East Asia, the nations that Japan considered to be subservient and not independent were put under the control of this new Ministry? Is that correct?
- A Even those nations that were independent were brought under the scope of this new Greater East Asia Ministry and in such event, there were many difficulties arising and in that respect the Foreign Ministry were functioning toward that and there were all sorts of confusion.
- Q Strictly independent nations such as the Argentine or Brazil or Mexico, or countries in that category, were dealt with by the Foreign Office, were they not, but those nations that had become subservient to Japanese control were put under the direction and control of this Greater East Asia Ministry, were they not?
- A In regard to Thailand, diplomatic negotiations has been conducted by the Foreign Ministry and this problem and various relationships of this problem was not clear to me, although I was explained a great number of times in regard to that.
- Q As a matter of fact, what happened was that Premier TOJO, who was probably the outstanding leader in the affairs of the moment, created this Greater East Asia Ministry in order to complete this plan of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, did he not, and to bring those nations involved in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere into control by one Ministry. Is that true?
- A It was generally so and that sentiment and explanation is rather difficult.

- Q Wouldn't you say that the formation of this new Ministry was more or less a culmination of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere plan - to have Japan lead and dominate the nations of the Greater East Asia?
- A There may have been such an idea involved but the main purpose was to utilize or first to develop the natural resources there and utilize it.
- Q Isn't it true that Premier TOJO expressed to you in those days that Japan had by that time attained her goal of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and to evidence that accomplishment, this new Ministry was created.
- A He was saying that the task of securing all the natural resources were divided and he wanted to unify all the functions that were devoted to that end.
- Q From the time of the formation of this Ministry, Japan dealt with these nations under that ministry in a different manner than it did with the strictly independent nations?
- A Yes.
- Q Then, in 1943, wasn't there held a Greater East Asia Conference, attended by representatives from these various nations?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the purpose of that conference?
- A Because all those various regions became independent under Japan, it was planned that all those nations get together and establish a co-prosperity sphere and to aid each other economically.
- Q That was an effort on the part of the Japanese Government to bring to completion this foreign policy plan of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was it not?
- A Yes.
- Q And that was a program that Premier TOJO from the time he became War Minister advocated and sponsored on through the years, isn't that right?

- A I believe so, but I did not hear of these things at the time he was War Minister.
- Q In other words, you would say the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a program that was taken up by TOJO when he became Premier and advocated and carried into effect by the war and the formation of this new Ministry and the holding of this conference. Is that a fair statement?
- A Yes.
- Q In your conversations with TOJO, after he became Premier, he expressed to you, did he not, his desire to accomplish such a result and create this Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?
- A Yes, he talked to me as to what disposition he would take in regard to administrative matters of these regions that became independent under Japan.
- Q And he indicated to you in his conversations that he thought these various nations should be brought under the sphere of influence of Japan by the formation of this Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere organization. Is that right?
- A Yes, he was voicing that sort of ideology to me.
- Q During the many years that you were close to Premier TOJO, in your conversations he always advocated that Japan should sponsor this Greater East Asia Program, did he not?
- A Because Japan was victorious with what strength she had, he thought that Japan should be a leader of those countries.
- Q I understand, and he advocated that plan or program from the time he became Premier in October 1941, did he not?
- A I cannot say that he got into the war with such a plan in hand but I believe that the result of victory more or less brought forth such a plan.

- Q Certainly that general plan of the new order in East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was definitely a part of the Japanese foreign policy when Premier TOJO came into office in October 1941, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And he didn't discard that foreign policy but adopted it as part of his foreign policy?
- A Yes.
- Q I don't mean to imply that he originated that plan but he subscribed to it and carried it out to the degree that it was carried out.
- A And because the war went along so smoothly and so well he brought it forth clearly.
- Q But in his conversations with you, he indicated to you that he favored such a plan as evidenced by what took place. He was able to put it in effect.
- A Yes.
- Q He, certainly, during the time that he was in Prince KONOYE's Cabinet subscribed to that principle and that plan that Japan should try to bring out a new order in East Asia, did he not?
- A In the KONOYE Cabinet, because Prince KONOYE was greatly opposed to war with the United States, TOJO did not express such an opinion even though he may have held it within his heart. At that time, the extent of KONOYE's thinking was to obtain leadership in East Asia by peaceful means.
- Q KONOYE, during his premiership openly advocated the new order in East Asia but also stated he desired to accomplish that by peaceful organs but while TOJO was War Minister in his Cabinet, he subscribed to the principle of bringing about a new order in East Asia. Is that true?
- A Yes

Q Then, when TOJO became Premier, he adopted a policy of using military force, among other things to help accomplish this new order in East Asia, isn't that true?

Before the war, he did his utmost to avoid war but after the war started and progressed so smoothly and well, he brought it into the limelight but he had at all times subscribed to the principle of a new order in East Asia and the emphasis in the KONOYE Cabinet was to accomplish by peaceful means the new order in East Asia, but when TOJO came in, the emphasis of accomplishing the new order in East Asia came to be by using military force?

A Looking at the result, it is so.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 29 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt, AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, ~~(X)~~ Henry R. Sackett, _____, _____

~~(X)~~ _____, _____, _____

certify that on the 6th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me ~~(X)~~ KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan. *H. R. Sackett*
Place

6 March 1946
Date