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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO 433
(Jap Intel No 46)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 24 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence duties of a Communications Officer on Staff
of Destroyer and Cruiser Squadrons.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Commander HANDA, Nikichi, IJN.
1930: Graduated from Academy.
1936: Graduated from Communications School.
1941(Oct): Communications Staff Officer of 3rd Destroyer
Squadron.
1943(May): Communications Staff Officer of 5th Cruiser
Squadron.
1944: Instructor at Naval Communications School.
1945(May): Communications Staff Officer, YOKOSUKA Naval District.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.


Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. F SHACKELFORD, USNR.

Interpreter: Mr. J. H. Taji.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY:

Commander HANDA, as Staff Communications Officer for Destroyer
and Cruiser Squadrons, devoted about 10% of his time to intelligence
duties which consisted mainly of estimating enemy strength, disposi-
tion and location. There was no intelligence Officer on the Staff
of either destroyer or cruiser squadron.



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Interrogation of Comdr. HANDA, Nikichi, IJN.

Q.1. What were your duties as Staff Communications Officer for the destroyer and cruiser squadrons.

A. Supervision of communications work for the Staff.

Q.2. To what extent did your work concern intelligence?

A. I devoted about 10% of my time to such duties.

Q.3. And just what were those duties?

A. Based on dispatches from the General Staff and from the fleets and based on my own experience, I would estimate your disposition, location, strength, speed and course. I did not prepare our action reports. This was done by the Senior Staff Officer.

Q.4. In what actions were you engaged?

A. MALAY STRAITS and MIDWAY.

Q.5. And what opposition did you expect at MIDWAY?

A. 250 landbased aircraft which my senior officer thought was too high, and one to two carriers. But so far as your carriers were concerned we thought we could disable them before you struck us. I was on the DD SENDAI at the time.

Q.6. What reports of battle damage did you receive?

A. We received two reports, each saying that 2 carriers were on fire. Communications then broke down and the messages became badly garbled. I didn't know that four of our carriers were sunk at MIDWAY until a year later.

Q.7. Was there an intelligence officer on the Staff of either the destroyer or cruiser squadron to which you were attached?

A. No.

Q.8. Insofar as you know, what Japanese ships had intelligence officers during the War?

A. None of them except possibly the carriers late in the War. Some of them may have had YOMUSHI.

Q.9. Who were YOMUSHI?

A. They were reserve officers trained at the YOKOSUKA Communications School for six months. Each new class was divided into two entirely separate groups, one studying communications and the other code. Those who didn't do well in code or who were disinterested in it were designated YOMUSHI. I don't think these latter really ever did much intelligence work after leaving the School. They handled paper and administrative details.

Q.10. How many reserve officers were trained as YOMUSHI during the War?

A. I don't know, but I think about 250.

Q.11. You became communications officer of the YOKOSUKA Naval District in May of this year. What were your duties?

A. Maintenance and construction of communications equipment. We were so busy devoting our time to preparing our communications for the defense of the Home Islands, I had no time for anything else.

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Interrogation of Comdr. HANDA, Mikichi, IJN, (contd).

Q.12. Did you do any intelligence work at all at the District?

A. No, and in my opinion the Navy never placed enough emphasis on intelligence throughout the War.

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