

INTERROGATION OF

Captain Tatsukichi Miyo, I.J.N.

Date and Time: 27 November 1945, 0940-1155 hours.

Place : NYK Building, Room 306, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : Captain Tatsukichi Miyo, I.J.N.
Lt. Colonel B. E. Sackett, Infantry
2nd Lt. Douglas L. Waldorf, Infantry
2nd Lt. Fred H. Uyehara, Infantry, Interpreter.
Tec 4 Lester E. Dalcher, Stenographer.

Questions : By Lt. Colonel B. E. Sackett.

Q. - State your age and marital status.

A. - I am 43 years old, married and have five children.

Q. - When were you Chief of Staff of Second Fleet.

A. - November 1935 to November 1939 I was Chief of Staff of Second Fleet, and after that was a member of the Navy General Staff of Navy for three years, was member of the General Staff until December 1942.

Q. - What were your duties as a member of the Naval General Staff.

A. - I was in Operations.

Q. - That had to do with tactical operations.

A. - Yes.

Q. - Who was the head of the section you were in during 1941.

A. - Rear Admiral Tomioka, Sadatoshi.

Q. - Was Captain Tomioka the head of the First Section.

A. - Yes.

Q. - Then what position did Admiral Fukutome have.

A. - He was the over-all head of Section.

Q. - Who were Captain Tomioka's principle assistants.

A. - I was in charge of aircronautics.

Q. - When did it first appear that war with the U.S. would be undertaken.

A. - As things progressed it was realized it was inevitable, but not until

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November 1941 did they realize it was inevitable.

Q. - Before November, exercises were held in September 1941 at the Naval War College dealing with the problem of planning for attack on Pearl Harbor. You know about those plans of course.

A. - We had a plan like that but it was of utmost secrecy and it was not made public there. Was known only to a few. The general personnel that was there did not know to its details, only the persons who were directly concerned in that plan knew about it.

Q. - Did you take part in those exercises at the Naval War College.

A. - Yes, I participated as an umpire. The games were held every year at the Naval College at which the heads of various fleets and their staffs were brought for further tactical plans and operational methods. I was just called in to act as an umpire at the game.

Q. - When did you first learn of the plans for the Pearl Harbor attack.

A. - Not positive of the date but I remember about the early part of 1941. The story came out from the Headquarters Combined Fleet that in the event of war with the United States we would have to cripple the American fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Q. - As a result of the exercises in September 1941, detailed plans were drawn for forthcoming operations in the event there was war. What part did you play in drawing those plans.

A. - I was in charge of air tactics of the Naval General Staff and I participated in the drawing of plans as such.

Q. - What plan did you work out regarding the use of air power in the Pearl Harbor attack.

A. - I was not directly concerned with drawing up of attack on Pearl Harbor. After studying the methods of attack I was one of those who opposed it as being too difficult. I believe the order or tactical plans came out from Staff of Combined Fleet.

Q. - Do you have a copy of the Combined Fleet tactical plan.

A. - I do not have it. We are not allowed to carry those things as an individual, whenever our duties were changed the documents and such orders as Combined Fleet Orders are left for our successor.

Q. - Do you know where any copies of orders relating to that operation are now located.

A. - I do not know. Probably burned up.

Q. - Do you have any diaries or notes.

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A. - No.

Q. - When did you burn your diaries and notes.

A. - I did not write those things.

Q. - How many copies of the orders were in your office.

A. - Two only, had one or two copies of the actual plan regarding attack on Pearl Harbor.

Q. - When did you see any of these orders last.

A. - After the start of war I have not seen it. Before the war I think it was sometime in the early part of December.

Q. - What do you remember about those orders now.

A. - I remember the general plan but do not remember any details.

Q. - What was the general plan as set out in the order from the Combined Fleet Staff.

A. - The idea was to sail out from Shurama and pass between the air security patrols of Midway and the Aluetions and approach as near Hawaii as possible.

Q. - You worked on the air phases of the plan, what were those phases.

A. - I was concerned with its over-all plans and had no special phase of its attack.

Q. - Did you discuss the air phases of the over-all plan with the Army General Staff or with other staff officers of the Naval General Staff or the Combined Fleet Staff.

A. - As this was just a Naval operation I believe that the Army General Staff was only notified of this plan and not any of the details. As this plan originated from the Combined Headquarters we were always in close liaison with the Combined Fleet Headquarters.

Q. - Who did you discuss these phases with on the Combined Fleet Staff.

A. - In private I had no talk with any member of the Combined Fleet Staff, but as my duty I did talk with the staff member of the Combined Fleet Captain Sasaki.

Q. - He was the air officer of the Combined Fleet.

A. - Yes.

Q. - Why did you believe this plan would not succeed.

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A. - I did not believe it would not succeed. I just thought it was very difficult.

Q. - Why was it difficult.

A. - To approach Hawaii without detection was a very difficult maneuver, and it depleted the air strength of the Navy in our Southern campaigns and we had to divert that squadron to attack Pearl Harbor. So from the operation point of our Southern campaign, there was opposition.

Q. - Who opposed the Pearl Harbor strike.

A. - I was one of those who opposed, and Tomioka, and Kami Shigenori. As I was the responsible person these men supported my view. In the Operations Division of the Navy General Staff I was the only responsible person in the Air Division.

Q. - What was Admiral Nagumo's views and those of his staff officers.

A. - I had no direct conversation with Admiral Nagumo concerning this Pearl Harbor attack. The only person I had any conversation with was Commander Minoru Genda. The conversation was about actual attack on Pearl Harbor and I did not discuss whether he thought the attack would succeed or not. I heard that Admiral Nagumo was not too enthusiastic about this plan.

Q. - If everything went according to the plan how much time did you anticipate the American defenses at Pearl Harbor would have had to get into action before your first plane hit.

A. - That is the point that I cannot give a clear answer to. That time depended on the alertness of the American forces and that is the point I had in mind when I opposed the plan. If the American forces had been well prepared they could have been at their defensive posts in five to ten minutes. So as far as I am concerned I can give no definite answer on that time element. My idea was that they might have radar to warn them of the approaching airforce so that was the point that I opposed this plan on, and it was not until later when we received the Roberts report that we knew that there were no radar there.

Q. - As a good air staff officer you had a calculated risk in your assumptions regarding these plans. According to those calculations how far out from Pearl Harbor did you anticipate the American defenses being able to detect your planes.

A. - We had no knowledge of security patrols from Hawaii and our estimated distance was then about 500 miles.

Q. - That was a pretty big risk to take wasn't it.

A. - We knew that it was a dangerous task, that our air fleet might face annihilation but our plan was to approach as close as possible the day before and to attack Hawaii with our full strength the next day.

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- Q. - Then it was necessary to have this attack as complete a surprise as possible in order to succeed. Did you receive any intelligence reports from Hawaii just before the attack which would indicate the alertness of the defenses.
- A. - I believe that the task force which sailed to attack Pearl Harbor had intelligence reports from the Intelligence Section. I believe that they had no reports on the actual defensive conditions of the American forces in Hawaii.
- Q. - Did they have any reports indicating the extent to which defenses were manned and alerted 24 hours a day.
- A. - I do not have any clear knowledge of that. I have heard that the feeling of war wasn't felt too keenly at Pearl Harbor.
- Q. - In order not to affect that feeling what was the plan. How were you going to make sure that the attack was launched and consummated before the feeling of "everything being all right" was dissipated and changed.
- A. - We did not use and consider such feeling as those that were predominant in Hawaii as we did not actually know of the defensive conditions, we took all precautions in commencing this attack.
- Q. - It was agreed, was it not, in the planning, that the Pearl Harbor attack would be the first offensive action of war.
- A. - The object of attacking the fleet in Pearl Harbor was to cripple or destroy the American Fleet so as that fleet would not hinder our Southern operations.
- Q. - The attack was the first phase then.
- A. - Yes.
- Q. - Why was it decided to launch the attack on the 8th of December.
- A. - We saw no way out of the strained relationship between Japan and America. We felt that the diplomatic relationships were reaching the straining point and we felt that we had to fight to be able to go on as a nation and it was agreed in all circles that war would have to start sometime in early December. The life of Japan was being choked to death.
- Q. - Why was it decided to attack on the 8th of December rather than on any other date.
- A. - The condition of the moon at that time came into consideration. The navy did not want the moon before midnight and they wanted moonlight early in the morning to facilitate preparation for the attack. The second reason was we had knowledge that the American fleets that went out to sea usually came in on Friday or Saturday and left again on

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Monday or Tuesday. These two things coincided on the date of December 8th, and that was the date decided the attack was to be made.

Q. - When, what date, was it decided that the attack would take place on the 8th of December.

A. - 2nd of December.

Q. - Who decided that date and how was it decided.

A. - The order came out from the Navy Ministry.

Q. - What did it say.

A. - The order was issued, originating from the Grand Imperial Headquarters, and it said that to take necessary action on or after December 8th. After conferring with various officers and sections regarding the condition of the moon and the whereabouts of the American fleet I suggested the date of December 8th.

Q. - Did you also suggest the time on the morning of December 8th, Japan time, when the planes should take off from the carriers.

A. - The minute detail of the operation was left to the commander of the task force.

Q. - Then I presume that on 2nd of December your Headquarters sent a message to the Combined Fleet Headquarters telling it to put the plan in operation; to start the attack on the 8th of December, Japan time. Is that right.

A. - Yes.

Q. - Did you draw up that message.

A. - Captain Kami.

Q. - What did the message say.

A. - That on December 8th plan of operations will be put into affect.

Q. - Do you know where any copies of this message is now located.

A. - No.

Q. - Were those records also burned.

A. - I don't know.

Q. - Do you know where any records are relative to these things we have talked about.

A. - I don't know.

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Q. - Do you know that they have been destroyed.

A. - If I had been responsible for the document I might be able to tell of its whereabouts, but in my present position I am unable to give any positive answer.

Q. - Who was in charge of those documents.

A. - The staffs of fleets all had responsible persons to handle those things and I am unable to give details regarding it.

Q. - Who was the responsible person in your section.

A. - The responsible person of each section handled those orders and like my case when I left the Naval General Staff the orders were left with my successor.

Q. - Now the strike at Pearl Harbor was the first action of the war. It had to be a surprise. How was that to coordinate with the Declaration of War. Was it to come at the time of Declaration of War, or when.

A. - I had no knowledge of the exact time that the war would be declared. So I cannot give an answer to that.

Q. - Wasn't any discussion had on your staff or did you learn of any discussion regarding this. Because obviously it had to play an important part in your plan.

A. - I think that the Naval Headquarters might have had some discussion regarding that element of time, but as far as I am concerned I was chiefly connected with the operations so I cannot give a definite answer.

Q. - Because of the fact that you were connected with operations, that time element had to be a part of your calculated risk. Isn't that so.

A. - As far as our department is concerned, our plan was drawn whereby the attack was to commence at daybreak, and although our higher-ups might have requested that the Declaration of War be made at a certain time - we had no right to do anything like that we did not consider that in our plans.

Q. - What information do you have from unofficial discussions with anyone, regarding what the higher-ups discussed about that time element.

A. - I have not heard of any discussions nor have I had any talk with any individuals regarding that element of time between the Declaration of War and our attack on Pearl Harbor.

Q. - Do you know or have you heard indirectly, in any way, who decided those questions and what their decisions were.

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- A. - I think the government set the time and I have not heard of any individuals being involved in setting the time of Declaration of War.
- Q. - What Department and who in the government.
- A. - I believe that the time was set by a conference with the Emperor and the Prime Minister and Navy and Army Minister, and Chiefs of Staffs of both Departments, and the Foreign Minister.
- Q. - When was this conference held.
- A. - This conference, I heard, was held on December 1st.
- Q. - From whom did you hear this.
- A. - I first heard of it when I was called into the MacArthur Headquarters to answer questions regarding the Pearl Harbor attack. In the talk during that time with various persons there, the talk among us relative to answering the questions, the fact that conference was held on December 1st, and the Declaration of War was decided upon came out.
- Q. - Specifically who did you have these conversations with, (what Japanese), recently.
- A. - Learned from the 48 questions in MacArthur's Headquarters of this conference 1st December.
- Q. - Did you ever hear of this conference, either before or after the time you speak about, from any persons connected with the Japanese Foreign Office or Army.
- A. - No, I did not.
- Q. - If you remember General Order #1 which gave the details for the operation plans - do you remember that order.
- A. - I do not.
- Q. - You read that order a number of times did you not.
- A. - I do not remember anything in it but I have read it.
- Q. - Would you let me refresh your recollection. Don't you remember that in order that it was stated that "Y" Day would be the day that the plan went into effect.
- A. - I remember something like that.
- Q. - Don't you further remember that "X" Day was the day that the attack was to start.

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- A. - I do not remember "Y" Day, but I do remember that "X" Day was the day designated for commencement of activities.
- Q. - What was the date of the order which called for the assembly of the forces at Hitokappin Bay in the Kuriles.
- A. - 26th November.
- Q. - What did that order say.
- A. - I don't remember.
- Q. - Who issued the order.
- A. - Probably the Combined Fleet Headquarters. The order for movement must have originated from the Imperial Grand Headquarters but definite orders to assemble at definite points were in all probability issued by Combined Fleet Headquarters.
- Q. - Then the force left the assembly points to go out to sea on this attack plan on the 26th of November.
- A. - Yes, they departed from the port on 26th November.
- Q. - They maintained radio silence at sea did they not.
- A. - Radio was silenced.
- Q. - On the 2nd December the task force at sea received the message that the attack would take place as scheduled on the 8th December.
- A. - I am not sure of definite date, but they must have received it around the 3rd.
- Q. - After that did you send, or did your staff send, any messages to the task force.
- A. - Reports on weather and relationship between the United States and Japan were sent, hopelessness of peaceful settlement between the two nations were in all probability reported to the fleet commanders. The report on the diplomatic situations were sent to the fleet.
- Q. - By whom and when.
- A. - I don't remember.
- Q. - How do you know these reports were sent to the fleet.
- A. - When these reports were sent out they passed through my hands.

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Q. - Then you know who drew up the reports.

A. - The reports were sent in from the Meteorology Section and the Information Section and the Foreign Department.

Q. - These reports were sent to the fleet in code.

A. - Yes.

Q. - What specifically did the messages to the fleet say about the diplomatic relationships, and what dates were the messages sent.

A. - The final reports on diplomatic situations probably sent out around the evening of the 7th December, Japan time. The actual wording I do not remember but I think it said the peaceful settlement between the two nations seems hopeless.

Q. - The fleet did not reply to any of these messages. The messages were sent for the information of the task force commander and did not require any reply.

A. - As I was not the responsible party to take communications to the fleet I do not know of the exact details, but I believe that all of this information required no reply. The only one that might have required a reply was in the event that orders were given out for them to return to the base.

Q. - You remained in Tokyo at the Naval Staff Headquarters all during December 1941.

A. - Yes.

Q. - You did not take part in the operations at Pearl Harbor.

A. - No.

Q. - Who on the Army General Staff did you confer with regarding the attack plans. Any attack or war plans before the Pearl Harbor strike.

A. - I remember talking with the personnel of Aviation Section of the Army General Staff, but no detailed report was given about Pearl Harbor attack. No minute detail of this Pearl Harbor attack were given to the Army, - just the general over-all plans.

Q. - Did you attend any conferences in November with either the Combined Fleet Staff members on Admiral Yamamoto's flagship the Nagato, or conferences at the Naval General Staff at which were present the Admirals of the fleets.


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A. - No.


Q. - Does this cover all of the information and knowledge which you have relating to the matters we have discussed.

A. - All I do know.


I, Fred H. Uyehara, 2nd Lt., Infantry, hereby certify that I acted as interpreter at the interview set out above, that I truly interpreted and translated the English questions into Japanese and the replies thereto from Japanese into English, and that the English translations of the answers set out above (11 pages) are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.


FRED H. UYEHARA, 2nd Lt., Infantry.

WITNESSES:


B. E. SACKETT, Lt. Colonel, Infantry.


DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, 2nd Lt., Infantry.


Lester E. Dalcher, Tec 4, 36477987, Steno.