

P.M. Lacharity  
AL-1  
(1)

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Before proceeding further with the witness, in view of the discussion that took place this morning among members of the committee, the Chair feels that in the interest of accuracy there ought to be placed in the record at this point a memorandum prepared and submitted to the committee by Mr. Mitchell, the General Counsel, which is described as a "tentative order of proof". Then "Preliminary Statement -- covering committee procedure, relations with agencies concerned, and introduction of letters exchanged Secretaries Forrestal, Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt estate, plus Truman Directives", which was done previously, when we started.

Then on the following page of this memorandum it is stated:

"The story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will be presented by an Army and a Navy Officer, who will summarize all available data. The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the

public the first organized comprehensive account of the attack."

And following that there is subdivision "A", under the heading of "The Attack", and under that subdivision "A" there are 17 points, outlined by the counsel, and discussed in the committee. That memorandum is dated November 7, and which is a revision of a previous memorandum dated November 1 and distributed to all members of the committee on the 1st of November.

Mr. Mitchell: I think it was the 2nd. I think the meeting took place on the 2nd. The memorandum is dated the 1st.

The Chairman: The memorandum is dated the 1st, yes, and the meeting took place on the 2nd, and the following meeting probably on the 8th, because the following memorandum was dated the 7th, which was the day before.

Under subdivision A there are 17 different points which were discussed with the committee in a session that lasted from 10:30 in the morning to about 1:30 in the afternoon.

Then there is a subdivision "B", which is "The Jap Plan". That is, the plan of the Japanese as discovered from the records since obtained from Japanese sources, captured Japanese ships, and so on, and which is to come later under Admiral Inglis' testimony.

These 17 points were thoroughly discussed by the committee and the list of witnesses was gone over and what they would testify to, or a general outline of their testimony was

discussed, and there were three or four or five witnesses added to the list, including Sumner Wells, Mr. Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Tyler, whose name has been mentioned here, and Mr. Lockard, whose name has been mentioned here, and also Captain Zacharias, whose name was suggested by Congressman Keefe of Wisconsin.

The only other changes made to this tentative suggestion of procedure was that under Item No. 12, which was headed as follows, "Summarize Percentage Personnel Mustered Various Departments", and then in parenthesis perhaps here summary testimony showing no drunkenness", -- the committee decided to strike out No. 12 and not go into that in this preliminary statement because that would be a matter that would have to be testified to, probably, by witnesses who were on the ground and in addition it was thought in any preliminary statement it would not be wise to go into that phase of the question.

Outside of those changes, this memorandum was discussed at length and no objection was raised to it, and every name, every additional name suggested by the members of the committee was added to the list of witnesses, and has been published.

I ask that this document, with these additions and corrections, be printed at this point.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to it being printed in the record, but I don't want my cross-

examination interrupted with it. I ask unanimous consent that it go in the record immediately after the conclusion of my remarks.

The Chairman: Yes, that is entirely satisfactory.

Mr. Gearhart: I have only two or three questions to ask anyway, and I don't want my remarks interrupted.

The Chairman: That is entirely satisfactory.

Mr. Gearhart: I want to say in explanation, if that is offered to establish any point, that there is no objection to that order of proof. That the only objection I have raised has been against the people who have been brought here to establish the things that are set forth in that document.

(2)

I objected to it on the ground that they are hearsay witnesses and I have never been in a court room where they allowed hearsay evidence when there were alive witnesses to furnish direct evidence.

The Chairman: It was understood during this whole discussion that this presentation, this preliminary presentation, was not to be made by eye witnesses, that it was to be made by a representative of the Army and a representative of the Navy, and that that relation and that delineation and narrative recital of what happened, the physical situation surrounding it, was to be given by a representative of the Army and of the Navy from the records in the War and Navy Departments, and

not by eye witnesses, which would require, as everybody understood, as the committee understood, and as counsel explained, probably two or three weeks, to get eye witnesses to everything that transpired out at Pearl Harbor.

I think it is due the committee, and the public, to say that there was no objection to this procedure, and that every suggestion of additional witnesses or modification of procedure was agreed to at the time.

Senator Brewster: Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to amend your statement.

In the first place, as to the extent of the discussion, it is my very clear recollection that most of our discussion was centered, in all of our recent meetings, on much more controversial matters, which have been fully aired on the floor, and need not be discussed here.

This matter was brought up, this memorandum you speak of was submitted, and I recall very distinctly -- which, apparently, the Chairman does not recall -- that I urged the point of view of Representative Keefe of Wisconsin, who, out of a considerable experience as a trial lawyer, preferred to approach this in chronological order, starting back and bringing the events in in chronological order, in order that we might make a proper record for posterity.

It was the recommendation of counsel, and it was, we

gathered, the opinion of the majority, that this was the way to proceed. This discussion of which you speak followed three or four votes in which there had been a sharp difference between the majority and the minority and there was no reason to think that any further agitation would have resulted differently.

I am not prepared -- I was not prepared, at any rate -- to hold too strong an opinion as to which course was better and I so stated, but I do feel that events have demonstrated that it has not been as fortunate as, perhaps, was anticipated. I think that is a fair statement of the attitude.

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Chairman: I might add to that that it was discussed in the committee and presented by the counsel as probably the most logical way to proceed so as to describe the actual attack, what took place on the day of the attack and the conditions which surrounded it and then bring it out in that method. It was the general understanding that that would be the course pursued.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson: I want the record to be clear.

Mr. Chairman, it is true that item No. 12 was discussed and the question of drunkenness was taken out. The discussion was not as full as indicated by the Chairman. I distinctly remember protesting doing it in this manner because I asked the committee to have counsel give us the exhibits at least ten days in advance so that the members of the committee would be fully acquainted with all of the facts.

It was stated then that we would get the exhibits either that Friday or Saturday or possibly Monday. As a matter of fact, I received mine on the Tuesday and Wednesday, the day before the hearing.

Now, it appears that we have not received all of the exhibits. I want this record to show that there was no vote taken on this method of handling the matter; there was no consensus, as far as I know, of any member concerned. We were

given this outline, it is true. There was no vote taken as to whether that was to be the method or not and I protested, as I did on the floor, that this method of trial would be a trial such as the Army and Navy and the various services wanted it to be.

The Chairman: Unfortunately, there was no stenographic record taken in any of the executive sessions of what discussion took place. Any Senator or any Congressman or any member of the committee could have moved that this method not be adopted as the procedure, and that we should adopt any other method of procedure. No motion being made, no vote was taken. The whole thing was discussed, each item was read by the counsel, Mr. Mitchell, item by item and discussed, each witness that was to be called and what he was expected to testify to in the various divisions of the tentative procedures of proof and the fact that no vote was taken on whether this should be the procedure was due to the fact that nobody made any motion about it and it was generally accepted as the procedure which would be followed.

Senator Brewster: Well, I don't think it is proper, Mr. Chairman, to carry this discussion to any great extent but I am quite sure that you are correct in stating that each item was read. That is not my recollection as to what was done. We had it for two or three days to examine it.



The Chairman: You had it for a week before that meeting, every member of the committee had it for a week before the meeting and that memorandum was dated the 1st of November. Every committeeman was given a copy of that and had it a week before we had the following meeting.

There was this new revision which had come about by the consideration of the November 1st memorandum and that was discussed, as I said a little while ago, in a meeting which lasted for about three hours. I don't say that that was the exclusive thing that was discussed. There were motions made to postpone the hearing that were voted upon also, but this memorandum was read and explained by the counsel to those present and that means all the members of the committee.

Put this in the record.

Mr. Murphy: At a previous meeting when the plan was before the committee certain members asked that it be put over to the following meeting; because they did not have enough opportunity to study it; that was the meeting previously to the November 8th meeting. And after the meeting on November 8th I dictated to my secretary a memorandum of what actually took place there and I have that memorandum that was made that afternoon and it is in accord with what the Chairman outlined except as to the three hours of discussion. I have a record here of what each member brought up at that time.

Senator Brewster: I trust that the Secretary's records will be presented to the committee and that they will be more accurate than the only other one that was presented to the Chairman and that we had to ask to have corrected because it was inaccurate.

The Chairman: That is not correct. The Senator had demanded a roll call, which was not taken in the committee by a vote, it was taken by a show of hands and I asked the Senator from Maine that if there was any way by which the Government Printing Office could indicate a vote by showing of hands that I would accept it. The vote was later taken as if it was by a show of hands and it was put in the record that way. That is why that mistake was made.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words.

The Chairman: The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas: I haven't said very much in this hearing and I am not going to say much now. It seems to me this is much to do about nothing anyway.

There is just one thing that I want to direct to the attention of the committee and that is this: This case is being prepared by General Mitchell anyway, but the committee employed him and unanimously accepted him as general counsel. I doubt if there is any individual here that would probably try the case the same way that he is trying it. However, we

selected him to do it and I am thoroughly satisfied with the way he is handling this case.

The Chairman: Well, go ahead, Mr. Gearhart and finish your interrogation.

Mr. Gearhart: Let me conclude this discussion by pointing out that the principle for which I contend, the violation of which I will constantly protest, is the calling of hearsay witnesses to prove facts when there are eye-witnesses available to the same point. I am not questioning what is in that paper at all, I never have and this is not in the nature of impeachment to offer it in the record. For that reason I will welcome it at the conclusion of my cross examination.

The Chairman: I will be glad to have it put in at the end of the Congressman's examination. Go ahead.

Mr. Gearhart: There is just one thing, Admiral Inglis, that I want to conclude my cross examination by asking you about, and that has to do with the order of May, 1941 transferring three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers and nine destroyers to the Atlantic. Then there was much discussion about two-thirds and one-third which left me with confusion confounded.

Before any of the ships were transferred to the Atlantic you would say that that was a hundred per cent of our fleet. What you mean is when they transferred these ships that numer-

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

ically, at least, the Pacific Fleet was reduced one-third, is that it?

Admiral Inglis: I will try to make that just as clear as I can, Mr. Gearhart. I cannot give you the precise dates when various specific ships were transferred from one fleet to another.

Mr. Gearhart: By that you mean that the ships were at different times, under different orders?

Admiral Inglis: I presume so.

Mr. Gearhart: Did that all occur during the month of May, 1941 or was it over a larger period than that?

Admiral Inglis: It would be my impression and understanding that it was over a considerable period of time. There was some shifting of ships around from one fleet to another for-- well, as a matter of fact, that has been going on forever, but as of the 7th of December, 1941 the numerical strength of the ships of the Pacific Fleet was roughly two-thirds that of the numerical strength of the ships of the Atlantic Fleet.

Now, the question has been raised about several ships which were not a part of either the Atlantic or the Pacific Fleet. These are the battleships North Carolina and Washington and the aircraft carrier Wasp in particular. Those ships had recently been completed and commissioned, they were still on their shakedown periods.

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

I have a personal recollection of one, the North Carolina, which was in the Brooklyn Navy Yard undergoing some repairs, having some very serious defects remedied. Those defects show up on a shakedown cruise and must be corrected before the ships are ready in all respects to join the fleet.

These ships I did not count in my numerical summary and they have no effect on these proportions which I have given you of two-thirds numerical strength.

I think I should also say again that that is numerical strength and not necessarily battle efficiency or battle fighting efficiency or power, because it so happens that the numbers in the Atlantic Fleet were increased to a good extent by the preponderance of destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet. On the other hand, there were more battleships in the Pacific Fleet, but I have counted each ship by one regardless of whether it was a battleship or a submarine or a destroyer.

In other words, of the aircraft carriers there were three assigned to each fleet and that again does not count the Wasp which had not yet joined either fleet and was still in the shakedown period.

Does that answer your question, sir?

Mr. Gearhart: It clears it up considerably.

Now, what was left in the Pacific Fleet when the ships that I have just enumerated were transferred to the Atlantic?

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

Admiral Inglis: I have the list of ships that were in the Pacific Fleet on December the 7th, 1941. Is that what you wish, sir?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Are you going to draw a distinction between the Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Inglis: I have the figures for the Asiatic Fleet also if you wish those.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, give those separately so that the record will be clear on it.

Admiral Inglis: I can give those by ships, that is, so many battleships, or I can give them by names of specific ships. Which way would you prefer it?

Mr. Gearhart: By ships.

Admiral Inglis: All right, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Have you the record in the other way, that is, by name?

Admiral Inglis: I have it any way you want it, yes, sir. It is much longer by names of ships. It runs into seven pages of tabulated data.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, let us have it by type then.

Admiral Inglis: Taking first the battleships: There were 6 assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, 9 assigned to the Pacific Fleet and none assigned to the Asiatic Fleet.

In the case of the aircraft carriers, there were 4

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, 3 to the Pacific Fleet and none to the Asiatic Fleet.

Well, I might add parenthetically that I have not counted the Long Island in my ad lib testimony. The Long Island was a very inferior type of carrier. She was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and makes the fourth one.

Heavy cruisers, 5 assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, 12 to the Pacific Fleet and 1 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Light cruisers, 12 to the Atlantic Fleet, 10 to the Pacific Fleet and 1 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Destroyers, 97 to the Atlantic Fleet, 54 to the Pacific Fleet and 13 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Submarines, 58 to the Atlantic Fleet, 23 to the Pacific Fleet, 29 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Minelayers, none to the Atlantic Fleet, 9 to the Pacific Fleet and none to the Asiatic Fleet.

Mine sweepers, 37 to the Atlantic Fleet, 26 to the Pacific Fleet and 6 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Patrol vessels, 5 to the Atlantic Fleet, 13 to the Pacific Fleet, 14 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Now, the numerical totals of all of those are Atlantic Fleet 224, Pacific Fleet 159, Asiatic Fleet 64.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, prior to May of 1941, which was prior to the transfer of any of the ships that I have listed

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Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

from the Pacific to the Atlantic, was the American Navy in the Pacific numerically stronger to the Japanese navy?

Admiral Inglis: Prior to May, 1941?

Mr. Gearhart: That is a date that I take from the Navy Court of Inquiry report as the date when the transfer of these ships occurred.

Admiral Inglis: I haven't those figures readily available. Again we will be very happy to get them for you.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, did you have the list of ships that were transferred?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: I thought by one order and you tell me by several orders, to the Atlantic.

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, I haven't got that readily available. What I have here is a list of the ships and the assignment of those ships to their respective fleets as of December the 7th.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, I will ask the question in this way: You are an expert in naval affairs. If you would add to the Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941 3 battleships, one aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers and 9 destroyers, would you say that the American Fleet in the Pacific would be numerically superior to the Japanese?

Admiral Inglis: If you will give me those figures again



Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

I will answer that definitively.

Mr. Gearhart: 3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers and 9 destroyers.

Admiral Inglis: That would give our battleship strength in the Pacific Fleet as 12 opposed to 10 Japanese battleships; aircraft carriers 4 opposed to 8 Japanese aircraft carriers; 16 heavy cruisers as compared to 18 Japanese heavy cruisers; 10 light cruisers as compared to 17 Japanese light cruisers; and 63 destroyers as compared to 109 Japanese destroyers.

On balance I would say that the Japanese fleet was superior to the Pacific Fleet with the increments which the Congressman has just given me.

Mr. Gearhart: So while we were inferior in May of 1941, we reduced our relative position to the Japanese Navy still further, that is the effect of it.

Admiral Inglis: Any transfer of ships from the Pacific Fleet resulting in a reduction would, of course, result in a deterioration of our own position.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, where do the orders effecting a transfer from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet emanate?

Admiral Inglis: That would be Chief of Naval Operations. Just what reasons would bring about these I am not prepared to say. I don't know whether they would come from any higher

Witness Inglis.

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

source or not, but the orders would be issued by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, whatever that higher authority would be the orders would probably come in the name of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Inglis: As far as the fleet is concerned that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you know anything about these particular orders?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: May I ask counsel to endeavor to secure them? I would like to look at them.

Mr. Mitchell: That is the order transferring ships to the Atlantic Fleet in May, 1941?

Mr. Gearhart: Beginning in May of 1941.

Mr. Gesell: I take it you want transfers both ways.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. If there are any transfers indicated from the Atlantic to the Pacific I would like to see those, too; that is, the orders providing for them.

The Chairman: Is that all the cross examination?

Mr. Gearhart: I am through, yes.

(Insert  
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(Tentative Order of Proof -- Preliminary Statement  
Covering Committee Procedure, et cetera, submitted  
by Mr. Mitchell, is as follows:)

Shel--  
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rlk 1

Draft of

November 7, 1945

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TENTATIVE ORDER OF PROOF

Preliminary Statement

Covering Committee procedure, relations with agencies concerned, and introduction of letters exchanged Secretaries Forrestal, Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt estate, plus Truman directives.

WARD B. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

rlk 2

The story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will be presented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available data. The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the Committee and the public the first organized comprehensive account of the attack.

#### A. THE ATTACK

1. Disposition Pacific Fleet 12/7. Show in map form.
2. Description
  - (a) Transports west of Hawaii on 12/7.
  - (b) Fleet base and Oahu ground and harbor installations - Map.
  - (c) Harbor nets and torpedo baffles.
  - (d) Depth of harbor and channel.
  - (e) Absence barrage balloons.
3. Brief notes installations neighboring islands.
4. Time differentials and distances.
5. Detailed map showing fleet in Pearl Harbor 12/7 -
  - (List of vessels - class and type)
  - Estimates of time required 12/7 to get fleet under steam and out of harbor.
6. Reconnaissance
  - Extent of offshore reconnaissance evening 12/6.
  - Extent of offshore reconnaissance morning 12/7.



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Number and types in operating condition  
 Headlines of aircraft in operating condition  
 Note specific reasons for lack of readiness such as  
 engines dismounted, guns dismounted, gas tanks empty,  
 ammunition not loaded.  
 Readiness of aircraft crews  
 Number and types aircraft participating in combat  
 Time required by type

Summarize state preparedness for combat of planes in  
 flight time attack.

Extent types and equipment up to date.

14. Anti-aircraft

Number of ship and shore units available  
 Number of ship and shore units operating condition  
 Availability ammunition and proximity to guns  
 Number ship and shore units manned and in action  
 Time required for various units  
 Defective ammunition  
 Extent gun types up to date

15. Brief summary work done in such departments as anti-sabotage,  
 first aid, civilian control, canteens, etc. Heroism.

16. The damage to U. S. ships, installations and personnel (photo-  
 graphs and supporting statistics).

Note extent damage self inflicted.  
 Indicate extent of sabotage, if any.

17. The damage to the Japs

B. THE JAP PLAN

1. Chronology

Date plan completed  
 Date left port  
 Date Dec. 8 fixed  
 Date instructed carry-out plan

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2. Route taken to and from

Fix position various key days before and after attack.  
MAP -- noting mileages from possible reconnaissance points,  
shipping lanes, etc.

3. Details of execution

4. Projected losses compared actual losses

5. Sources data used in planning

NOTE: The Jap Plan will be reconstructed from captured  
plans and statements made by Jap prisoners  
obtained after the attack.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

rlk 6

TENTATIVE ORDER OF WITNESSES

WASHINGTON\*

WITNESS

PRINCIPAL SUBJECT EXAMINATION

Admiral Richardson

Re - Complete story of the reasons why the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor, his trips to Washington in July and October, 1940, his discussions and disagreement with President Roosevelt and conversations with other officials, his relief, his part in the Bloch report of December 30, 1940, endorsed January 7, which led to the Knox-Stimson correspondence, and other matters pertaining to his Hawaiian command.

(At this point introduce Knox letter to Stimson dated Jan. 24, 1941, Stimson letter to Knox dated Feb. 7, 1941, plan for employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu, Martin memo. of Aug. 20, 1941, and read into record excerpts from defense plans.)

Mr. Hamilton, formerly Chief, Far Eastern Division, State Department

Re - Jap negotiations, details of information available to State Department, exchange of information with Army-Navy representatives, and State Department attitude toward basing fleet Pearl Harbor.

Captain McCollum\*

Re - Information available Army and Navy concerning Far Western developments, Jap military preparations, fleet loca-

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\*Whenever witness will be recalled for further examination on additional subjects, this is indicated by asterick.

WARDEN PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



PRINCIPAL SUBJECT EXAMINATION

rlk 7

WITNESS

- 1 Captain Safford\*
- 2 Colonel Bratton\*
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- 4 General Miles\*
- 5 Admiral Wilkinson\*
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- 10 General Garow\*
- 11 Admiral Turner\*
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- 15 General Arnold
- 16 Admiral Ingersoll\*
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tion, etc., reports made to responsible officers, State Department and White House, handling of "magic" intercepts and distribution of messages generally.

Re - Function and organization of intelligence units; information available to these officers and action taken thereon except as to events of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later; warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of messages, conferences held, agencies and persons consulted, action taken on replies received to warnings, related conferences at White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages on military situation.

Re - Function and organization of War Plans units; information available to these officers and action taken thereon (except as to events of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later); warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of messages, conferences held, agencies and persons consulted, action taken on replies received to warnings, related conferences at White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages on military situation.

Re - Warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of messages, conferences held, agencies and persons consulted, action taken on replies received to warnings, related conferences at White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages on military situation.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

rlk 8

WITNESSPRINCIPAL SUBJECT EXAMINATION

1  
2 FCC monitoring report  
3 Commander Safford  
4 Commander Kramer\*  
5 Admiral Noyes  
6 Colonel Bratton  
7 Colonel Sadtler  
8 Colonel Clausen  
9 Monitoring witnesses

Re - Winds message. Interception and decoding of original message giving winds code and second message Nov. 19. Steps then taken to monitor the Jap weather broadcasts. All available proof as to whether the "execute" message was ever heard or obtained. Also any information developed on hidden word messages. Exhibits may include excerpts testimony of officers at various points.

10 Commander Kramer  
11 Commander Safford  
12 Captain McCollum  
13 Admiral Turner  
14 Admiral Schuirmann  
15 Admiral Wilkinson  
16 Admiral Ingersoll  
17 Colonel Bratton  
18 Colonel Dusenbury  
19 General Miles  
20 General Gerow  
21 Colonel French  
22 Admiral Bearsdall

Re - The events of 12/6 and 12/7, including handling of final 14-part Jap message and messages re code burnings and 1:00 o'clock delivery, Marshall warning message, conferences among Cabinet officers and others, transmission of messages to White House and State Department.

WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

rlk 9

WITNESSPRINCIPAL SUBJECT EXAMINATION

Miss Grace Tully .

Re - Presidential files. Any documents which may be found in the Roosevelt papers bearing on the Pearl Harbor situation will be introduced through Miss Tully.

Admiral Stark

Re - All events, including information available to him, conferences with Cabinet officers and President Roosevelt, handling of warning messages, extent of knowledge of impending attack, conferences with War Department, etc.

General Marshall

Re - All events, including information available to him, conferences with Cabinet officers and President Roosevelt, handling of warning messages, extent of knowledge of impending attack, conferences with Navy Department, etc., and Dewey incident of 1944.

Mr. Thomas E. Dewey

Re - Communications with General Marshall and any additional information available to him.

Mr. Hull:

Re - All events, with particular reference to conversations and meetings with President Roosevelt and other Cabinet officers, General Marshall and Admiral Stark, the question of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, information available to him and handling of crucial messages, participation in warnings, and the events leading up to the Nov. 26th note to the Japanese Government.

Mr. Stimson

Re - All events, with particular reference to information available to him, his part in the warning messages, and his conferences with President Roosevelt and Cabinet officers.

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WITNESS

PRINCIPAL SUBJECT EXAMINATION

Knox papers

We are advised by the Knox estate that the only papers which may be available are at the Navy Department, and this is being investigated.

NOTE: Throughout the testimony in this branch of the presentation, particularly that directed to high-ranking officials, a detailed inquiry will be made into just what information was available to President Roosevelt and the Department of State as to impending attack, and what part, if any, either took in giving or withholding warnings to Pearl Harbor.

PEARL HARBOR

WITNESS

PRINCIPAL SUBJECT EXAMINATION

General Herron

Re - Condition of Pearl Harbor defenses prior to Short's appointment, earlier alerts, and general background information.

(To be determined)

Re - Delay construction fixed radar and additional airfields.

Captain Layton

Re - All classes of information including ship location reports and intelligence bulletins, messages of various classes intercepted before and after Dec. 7, activities of Jap consular agents, Mori tap, Merle Smith cable to Short, Wilkinson Manila report, etc.

Commander Rochefort

Admiral Mayfield

Mr. Shivers, FBI

Colonel Fielder

Colonel Bicknell

Admiral McMorris

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

PRINCIPAL SUBJECT EXAMINATION

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WITNESS

- 2 Admiral Bellinger
- 3 General Martin
- 4 General Davidson
- 5 Commander Taylor
- 6 Colonel Powell
- 7 Colonel Phillips
- 8 Admiral Smith
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- 10 Admiral Bloch
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- 13 General Short
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- 16 Admiral Kimmel
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- Re - Pearl Harbor air defense, reconnaissance, and all points bearing on air aspects of situation, including details of Martin-Bellinger annex.
- Re - Radar installations, efficiency of information center, adequacy of equipment and personnel.
- Re - All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.
- Re - All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.
- Re - All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.
- Re - All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.

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The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I have had no occasion to say anything up to date.

The Chairman: You have been very quiet. I will say that.

Mr. Keefe: May I say, as one member of the committee, I presume I am correct in the assumption that the weight to be extended to the testimony given by these two witnesses who have testified in behalf of the Army and Navy will be governed by the sources of their information, the character of the information, whether it is of their own knowledge, hearsay, or what not.

Does the Chair so understand the situation?

The Chairman: The committee will, of course, consider the nature of the testimony, the source from which it comes and the weight to be given to it.

Mr. Keefe: Yes, sir.

Now, I understand from both the Admiral and the Colonel that you have heretofore testified that your evidence, in the main, is purely hearsay; you have no definite knowledge from personal observation of any of the events which occurred at Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack, or immediately after and that the sources of your information are based entirely on material which you have discovered as a result

1 Witness Inglis  
2 Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

3 of searches made, and analyses made by those working for  
4 you on your respective staffs; is that right?

5 Admiral Ingles: Speaking for the Navy, that is cor-  
6 rect.

7 Mr. Keefe: Is that correct also for the Army?

8 Colonel Thielen: That is essential correct, yes, sir.  
9 I have been asked a few questions on cross examination in  
10 my professional capacity, which I answered to my own know-  
11 ledge.

12 Mr. Keefe: Do you qualify as an expert on all matters  
13 relating to the Army?

14 Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I do not.

15 Mr. Keefe: Do you qualify as an expert on all matters  
16 relating to the Navy, Admiral?

17 Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: So that neither of you qualify as experts  
19 in the accepted sense of the term "expert witnesses".

20 Now, I have a few questions that I would like to ask  
21 which have apparently not been heretofore developed in con-  
22 nection with the cross examination. I direct my attention  
23 first to the statement made by you, Admiral, to the effect  
24 that certain orders were issued declaring certain waters --  
25 they were issued as the result of the executive order of the  
President -- around the Hawaiian Islands to be defensive

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 borders, as I understood it.

3 Admiral Inglis: That order, if that is your point, sir,  
4 was, as far as the Navy was concerned, contained in a general  
5 order issued by the Secretary of the Navy, and it defined  
6 two defensive sea areas which were outlined on the chart  
7 in the course of the prepared statement.

8 Mr. Keefe: Will you refer to your prepared statement  
9 and see if I am in error, that you referred to it as an  
10 executive order of the President designating certain pro-  
11 hibited areas?

12 Admiral Inglis: It is not in my prepared statement. I  
13 gave that ad lib, because general orders of that nature usually  
14 derive from executive orders, and I personally assumed, as  
15 I gave that statement, that it was derived from an executive  
16 order.

17 Mr. Keefe: Is that a mere assumption on your part?

18 Admiral Inglis: If that is a question at issue, I  
19 will be very happy to verify that. I still think it did  
20 derive from the executive order.

21 Mr. Keefe: You have not seen the executive order?

22 Admiral Inglis: Not recently, no, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: Did you ever see it?

24 Admiral Inglis: I cannot say whether I ever did or  
25 not.



Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Do you know the content of that order?

3 Admiral Inglis: Not now, no sir. I can look it up.

4 Mr. Keefe: Do you know the date of the general order,  
5 if any was issued pursuant to the executive order?

6 Admiral Inglis: Not at this time, no, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: Have you a copy of that general order  
8 in your possession now?

9 Admiral Inglis: No. We will get it for you, though.

10 Mr. Keefe: Now, may I state, Mr. Counsel, that I  
11 would like to have, for purposes of identification, the  
12 executive order issued by the President, if any, establish-  
13 ing the prohibited waters around the Philippine Islands.

14 Mr. Gesell: The Philippine, or the Hawaiian Islands?

15 Mr. Keefe: I mean the Hawaiian Islands. Pardon me.

16 Well, if there is one relating to the Philippine Islands  
17 it might possibly be included in the same order, I don't  
18 know.

19 I would also like to have a copy of the order issued by  
20 the Navy, the general order, if such an order was in fact  
21 issued, including the date of that order.

22 Admiral Inglis: The Navy Department will produce that.

23 Mr. Keefe: Now, what is your present recollection, from  
24 the source of the material which you have, and which you  
25 studied, as to the purpose and intent of that order? What

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 did it generally establish?

3 Admiral Inglis: My recollection is that it established  
4 a defensive sea area. It gave the boundaries of this area,  
5 and it required that no merchant vessels, either foreign  
6 or U. S. be permitted to proceed through that area, nor no  
7 foreign men-of-war be permitted to proceed through that  
8 area without the approval of the Secretary of the Navy.

9 Mr. Keefe: Do you know how extensive the area was?

10 Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir. That was outlined on the  
11 chart during yesterday's presentation. It was not very ex-  
12 tensive. It did cover the approaches to Pearl Harbor and  
13 the Kaneohe Air Station.  
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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 Mr. Keefe: Was that a secret order?

2 Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

3 Mr. Keefe: Was it published to the world?

4 Admiral Inglis: I am morally certain it was, yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: So foreign ships would have notice of the  
6 existence of such an order?

7 Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: Did the order provide as to what action the  
9 Navy was to take in the event any foreign ships entered that  
10 prohibited area?

11 Admiral Inglis: I do not believe the specific action  
12 was prescribed, but certainly the Navy was to prevent any  
13 movement of that kind with all resources at its command.

14 Mr. Keefe: Your evidence, as I recall, indicates that  
15 the Navy did so on the morning of December 7 before the Japanese  
16 attack.

17 Admiral Inglis: That is a fair assumption.

18 Mr. Keefe: In the matter of sinking the submarine by  
19 the destroyer WARD.

20 Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: Is that right.

22 Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: Do you have, as the result of the search  
24 which you have conducted, any knowledge of any other ships or  
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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 vessels of any character having been sunk other than those  
3 which you have testified to?

4 Admiral Inglis: No, sir. You mean prior to December 7,  
5 on or prior to December 7?

6 Mr. Keefe: On or prior to December 7.

7 Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: Now I believe you testified that the aircraft  
9 carrier ENTERPRISE on December 7 was proceeding eastward.

10 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: Do your records indicate what that group of  
12 ships was composed of?

13 Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: That were escorting the ENTERPRISE?

15 Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: Will you identify them, please?

17 Admiral Inglis: That task force consisted of the aircraft  
18 carrier ENTERPRISE, the heavy cruisers NORTHAMPTON, CHESTER,  
19 SALT LAKE CITY; the destroyers BALCH, MAURY, CRAVEN, GRIDLEY,  
20 MC CALL, DUNLAP, BENEHAM, FANNING and ELLET. The total was  
21 one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers.

22 Mr. Keefe: That task force had been taking some material  
23 out to Wake Island?

24 Admiral Inglis: It had been taking airplanes to Wake  
25 Island, yes, sir.

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: Do I understand that the cruisers and de-  
stroyers were acting as convoys for the ENTERPRISE?

Admiral Inglis: The word that we use for it is "escort",  
sir.

Mr. Keefe: Escort?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir. The convoy is or are the  
ships which the escort escorts.

Mr. Keefe: Pardon me. I am not very familiar with Navy  
practice. The convoy is the whole works and the escort are  
those that escort the convoy, is that right?

Admiral Inglis: We usually speak of a convoy as the ships  
to protect.

Mr. Keefe: In this case the convoy was what? The  
LEXINGTON or the ENTERPRISE?

Admiral Inglis: The flagship was the ENTERPRISE.

Mr. Keefe: What were the ships that were being protected  
on their way along from Wake Island?

Admiral Inglis: In this particular case it was called  
a task force rather than either a convoy or an escort. How-  
ever, I will try to clarify that by saying that the ENTERPRISE --

Mr. Keefe: (Interposing) Let us get it right there.

The Chairman: Let him complete the answer.

Mr. Keefe: On the way out, when we were taking planes  
out to Wake, and other material, was that a convoy?

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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3 Admiral Inglis: We would call it a task force in that  
4 case, because there were no non-combatant ships in that group  
5 of ships.

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7 Mr. Keefe: So on both occasions then this group of  
8 ships that left Pearl Harbor and went out to Wake was a task  
9 force?

10 Admiral Inglis: That is right, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: And it was a task force on the way back?

12 Admiral Inglis: That is right, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: Is that correct?

14 Admiral Inglis: Yes.

15 Mr. Keefe: All right, we will strike the word "convoy"  
16 out of this discussion then.

17 Now what time did that task force leave Wake on the way  
18 back to Pearl Harbor? Do your records indicate that?

19 Admiral Inglis: I am afraid I cannot give you that  
20 off-hand. We will find it.

21 Mr. Keefe: Do you have available the log of the  
22 ENTERPRISE?

23 Admiral Inglis: We can get it. It may take some time,  
24 thought. These logs are not readily available. We will try  
25 to get them.

26 Mr. Keefe: In connection with your examination of the  
27 facts immediately before and after Pearl Harbor, did you have

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

access to the logs of the ENTERPRISE?

Admiral Inglis: The log itself was not available, but a number of extracts from the log were included in the court of inquiry and the Robert Board Report, and War Diaries, things of that nature.

Mr. Keefe: What do you mean when you say the log of the ENTERPRISE is not available? Do you mean it cannot be obtained?

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Admiral Inglis: No, sir, I do not mean that. I mean it was not readily available in the time we had to conduct this research.

Mr. Keefe: Now in order that this record may be clear -- because I am a boy from the country and do not understand all these things -- will you explain in the record just what the log of a ship is supposed to contain?

Admiral Inglis: The log of a ship in the Navy consists in general of two types of information. One is contained in columns which tabulate meteorological data such as temperature, humidity, height of the barometer, such data as the speed which the ship is making, the number of miles, nautical miles that have been steamed during each hour of the day, the drills that have been held, the ship's position at 8 o'clock in the morning, at noon, and at 8:00 P.M.

Then the other classification is under the term "Remarks",

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

and the remarks in the log contain a journal of events of interest, and those are divided into the various watches, that is the mid-watch is from midnight to 4:00 A.M., the morning watch from 4:00 A.M. to 8:00 A.M., and so forth.

The Watch Officer, the Officer of the Deck, signs in person the remarks, or the diary pertinent to his particular watch. That signature is also taken as an authentication of the corresponding data which appears in the columns, such as the meteorological data and the speed and mileage that the ship has covered.

Mr. Keefe: Does the log ordinarily contain information as to orders received by the ship?

Admiral Inglis: The log would probably contain the briefest sort of reference to the reason for the ship getting under way. I do not think for the purposes of this committee that would be particularly valuable, because it usually is couched something like this:

"In accordance with signal from Division Commander got under way and stood out of the Harbor."

That would not give the source of the Division Commander's order.

Mr. Keefe: Would it contain information, for example, as to when a flight of scout bombers or planes left the deck of a ship?



Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Would it contain memoranda as to any orders relating to the conduct of those planes after they left the ship?

Admiral Inglis: Will you repeat that question?

Mr. Keefe: Read the question, please.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral Inglis: In general, no, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Then if the ENTERPRISE, either on the 6th of December, 1941, as it proceeded from Wake to Pearl Harbor, towards Pearl Harbor, or on the early morning of the 7th of December, had escort planes in the air patrolling the area ahead of this task force, would that information be found in the log of the ENTERPRISE?

Admiral Inglis: I would expect the information as to the time and the number of planes which were launched would appear in the log; also the time and the number of planes which returned to the ship would appear in the log, and probably a brief word or two about the mission of those planes would appear in the log.

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Would the log also indicate whether those planes were armed or unarmed?

Admiral Inglis: Under those circumstances, on December 6 and 7, I would be inclined to think that it would not contain that information.

Mr. Keefe: I have indicated, I believe, that I would like to have the log of the Enterprise available.

Well, now, you testified, as I recall, in your general statement as it appears in our record of the testimony, page 72, that in addition to regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the USS Enterprise 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor launched scout bombers armed with machine guns shortly after 6 a.m. which searched to the eastward ahead of the ship, an arc of 110 degrees to a distance of 150 miles.

Where did you get that information?

Admiral Inglis: That information was taken from the action report of the Enterprise, and from various other original sources. I would hazard a guess that some of that came from the interrogation of the pilots of those planes.

Mr. Keefe: You say the action report of the Enterprise. What is that?

Admiral Inglis: Whenever a ship of the Navy is in action involving any shooting, the commanding officer is required to submit a report of the action, which contains numerous details,

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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such as the number of rounds of ammunition fired, the damage to his own ship, the estimated damage to the enemy, a narrative of the events.

Mr. Keefe: Was the Enterprise in action that morning at 6 a.m.?

Admiral Inglis: Her planes were in action at that time.

Mr. Keefe: In action against whom?

Admiral Inglis: Against the Japanese planes that attacked Pearl Harbor. Not at six o'clock, but in the course of that flight.

Mr. Keefe: Well, but, my dear sir, let us make this clear. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred at 7:55, according to your testimony. These ships left the Enterprise, these planes, according to your testimony, shortly after six o'clock a.m., nearly two hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. They certainly were not engaged in any action at that time, were they, against the Japs?

Admiral Inglis: They were engaged in action against the Japs sometime after 7:45 and before they landed at Ewa Field at times varying from 9:15 to 10:15, which I believe were the figures

Mr. Keefe: When they left the Enterprise, they were equipped and ready for action, were they not, at 6 o'clock

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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that morning?

Admiral Inglis: I think that is a fair assumption, because they were firing at Japanese planes on their way into Ewa Landing Field.

Mr. Keefe: You stated in your general statement that they were armed.

Admiral Inglis: That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And after leaving the Enterprise they were supposed to proceed on and land at Ewa; is that right?

Admiral Inglis: That is my understanding, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: As they were coming east that morning, and finally came over the Island, they engaged the Japs who were then attacking Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis: That is the story as I have it, yes sir.

Mr. Keefe: Do you deduce from any of the information you have been able to obtain, that the commander of that task force had any knowledge that there was likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor that morning at 6 o'clock?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Where is the action report of the Enterprise? Have you seen it?

Admiral Inglis: It is now in the Archives and records of the Navy Department.

Mr. Keefe: Have you seen it?

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: May I ask, Mr. Mitchell, that that action report of the Enterprise be produced?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: For use in connection with this examination.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, may I ask you this question:

So far as the world knew, and the people of America knew, and so far as the records show, this country was at peace with Japan at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 7th day of December, was it not?

Admiral Inglis: I cannot speak for the people of the world, but speaking for myself, that was my impression, that we were technically at peace, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: We were technically at peace?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Is that the way you want to say it?

Admiral Inglis: That is the way I want to say it, because with a task force approaching Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making a surprise attack on the Navy and Army at that location, I would say it was highly technical.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Do your records disclose, in the action report of the Enterprise, as to why these planes were launched in making reconnaissance on the morning of the 7th at 6 o'clock?

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Admiral Inglis: I am advised that the purpose given was routine flight training.

Mr. Keefe: Routine flight training?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir. I hope you will not try to pin me down too closely on that, because I am really not too well informed.

Mr. Keefe: Very well. We will try to go into that maybe at the time when Admiral Halsey, or someone who was on the job, testifies to it, perhaps.

Then, am I to understand that so far as the information available that you have from the record, the log of the Enterprise, the action report of the Enterprise, or whatever record you may have examined, or your researchers may have examined, that while we were technically at peace at six o'clock on the morning of the 7th day of December, the Enterprise, returning as part of the task force from Wake Island with the ships which you have described and enumerated, did have out in front of that task force a patrol of planes, 18 scout bombers fully armed, ready for action?

Admiral Inglis: That is my understanding, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And that those bombers, as they proceeded east, learned of the attack at 7:50, and proceeded then to Pearl Harbor and engaged the enemy?

Admiral Inglis: That is my understanding, yes, sir.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Is that right?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, then, at 7:55 when this attack came on Pearl Harbor, where do you locate this task force of Admiral Halsey specifically?

Admiral Inglis: Two hundred miles west of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Keefe: Directly west?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: All right.

Now, there was another task force, was there not, in which was included the aircraft carrier Lexington?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Who was in command of that escort?

Admiral Inglis: Admiral John Henry Newton.

Mr. Keefe: Where was that task force on the 6th of December, 1941?

Admiral Inglis: I have that as 460 miles from Midway, enroute to Midway.

Mr. Keefe: Well, where was it with respect to Pearl Harbor, and with respect to Halsey's task force?

Admiral Inglis: Will you get the other chart, No. 1, giving the disposition of the task fleet?

I make it as roughly, 350 miles, a little north of west

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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of Admiral Halsey's task force 8.

Mr. Keefe: Will you point out on the map, just for the purpose of observation, about where the Halsey task force was, and where the Newton task force was.

Admiral Inglis: There is task force 12, that blue dot, at which Command er Barrett is pointing. And then he is going to draw his wand in the direction immediately south of east to task force 8. I just made a very hasty estimate here of the distance between the two, and it comes out about 350 miles.

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Now the task force commanded by Admiral Newton was on the way to Wake Island, was it -- or Midway?

Admiral Inglis: Midway.

Mr. Keefe: Midway?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: To deliver certain Marine planes?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: To Midway?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Will you enumerate the ships that composed the task force commanded by Admiral Newton?

Admiral Inglis: The ships were the aircraft carrier Lexington, the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and Astoria



Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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and destroyers Porter, Drayton, Flusser, Lamson, and Mahan. A total of one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, nine altogether.

Mr. Keefe: Do you have any information as to whether reconnaissance was conducted by Admiral Newton by the use of planes?

Admiral Inglis: The evidence on that, Mr. Congressman, is a little bit -- in fact, it is very vague. In the testimony of Admiral Newton I believe he said that planes were out scouting, but he did not say what planes they were. They may have been planes from the Lexington, or they may have been planes from the heavy cruisers.

There is also something to indicate that the Lexington carried a heavy deck load of these Marine planes, which cluttered up her flight deck, making the launching of planes difficult.

Mr. Keefe: I want to clear this situation up if I can.

On page 179 of the testimony which you gave yesterday, under cross examination by Senator Ferguson, referring to the Lexington group under the command of Admiral Newton, Senator Ferguson asked you this question:

"Do you know whether they did any reconnaissance?"

Your answer was. "I understand, because of the additional Marine Corps planes on board, the flight deck was so cluttered

Witness Inglis

Questions by : Mr. Keefe

that they were not able to launch any."

"Senator Ferguson: So there was no reconnaissance from that?

"Admiral Inglis: Not from the Lexington."

Is that your testimony?

Admiral Inglis: I presume it is, sir, and that was my understanding yesterday. My attention was invited last night to --

Mr. Keefe (interposing): Well, that --

Mr. Gesell: Wait a minute, Congressman. Let him finish.

Admiral Inglis: Because of this cross examination of Senator Ferguson's, my staff attempted to look this matter up a little more thoroughly, and the best they could give me this morning was there was some doubt as to just what planes there were in the air. So I would prefer Admiral Newton to answer that.

Mr. Keefe: After you so testified, Admiral -- which, of course, I understand you are testifying just from your recollection of the material and papers and files, so on and so forth -- you were not there, and necessarily you have no personal recollection of it.

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: As a matter of fact, when you got through your testimony yesterday, some of your staff called your at-

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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attention to the testimony of Admiral Newton himself given before Admiral Hewitt, did they not?

Admiral Inglis: I am not sure to whom the testimony was given, but that is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: I now call your attention to the testimony of Admiral Newton himself given before Admiral Hewitt in the so-called Hewitt investigation which appears on page 318, questions 29, 30, and 31 on that page. This question was asked of Admiral Newton by Admiral Hewitt:

"Do you recall having any particular concern over the fact that the mission was advancing your course over 1,000 miles towards Japan?"

"Answer. I considered that I was going into waters that had not been frequented by our ships for some time, and there might be more danger from submarines than we had considered in the past. I set a speed of 17 knots in daylight, and zigzagging. I also had scouting flights made by planes to cover our advance."

Did you read that testimony of Admiral Newton himself?

Admiral Inglis: That was invited to my attention either late last night or early this morning, and very selection you just read.

Mr. Keefe: Then, as a matter of fact, whether the planes came from the flight deck of the Lexington, the

Witness Inglis  
Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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carrier, or whether they came from some other ship that was part of that task force, the record, as given in the testimony of Admiral Newton himself, said that he had not only scout planes covering his advance, but that also because he was in waters that our ships had not theretofore been traveling for some time, zigzagging his ships to avoid possible attack by submarines.

Did you gather that from the testimony?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir, that is precisely what the testimony says.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, then, what submarines would be liable to attack at that time?

Admiral Inglis: I am afraid that is a conjectural question which I am not prepared to answer.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I would like, for a moment, to address my remarks to the Colonel, and I would like to have placed back on the easel that map or plat showing the --

Colonel Thielen: The radar, sir?

Mr. Keefe: The radar chart.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question while the testimony is waiting?

Mr. Keefe: A question of whom?

Mr. Murphy: The gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. Keefe: You want to ask me a question?

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Mr. Murphy: Yes, sir.

I wonder if the gentleman is reading from the Hewitt report, or the Hart report?

Mr. Keefe: When I said Hewitt I meant Hart. Will you correct the record? I am reading from the Hart report.

Mr. Murphy: That is not the Hewitt report at all. It is page 318 of the Hart report.

Mr. Keefe: Thank you very much for your diligence in correcting me.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to the date of the Hart report?

Mr. Keefe: It is dated February 12, 1944 to June 15, 1944.

Senator Ferguson: Is it the report or the testimony?

Mr. Keefe: It is testimony in the hearing conducted by Admiral Hart.

Senator Ferguson: Do you want to correct the record in any way, making it show it is testimony rather than report?

Mr. Keefe: Well, it is all included. The testimony is included in the report.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, can I inquire whether or not Admiral Hart filed a report?

The Chairman: Does the Congressman know whether he

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did or not?

Mr. Murphy: May I suggest it would be better to call it the Hart record.

Mr. Gesell: I think the confusion comes because the transcript, which is the record, is called the report. As I understand it, that is the reason for the confusion.

Mr. Keefe: That is what I have understood it to be. In reading references to it in other parts of these very voluminous records, it is referred to as the Hart report.

In this report of course, is contained the testimony of innumerable witnesses, and I quoted from the testimony of Admiral Newton.

Now, I call your attention, particularly to this chart. I will get over here so I can see it myself. My eyesight is not good.

As I understood from your testimony, Colonel, this streak that you have indicated on the exhibit --

Is this going to be an exhibit? The record will not be very good, because the record will not show what I am pointing to unless we have it as an exhibit.

The Chairman: It is an exhibit that has been submitted to all of us here, which is not in color.

Mr. Keefe: What is the number of the exhibit? Army Exhibit No. 10.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Mitchell: That is going to be offered.

Colonel Thielen: That is page 8 of the Army exhibit,  
sir.

Mr. Keefe: Just so the record will indicate what we  
are talking about.

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Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Murphy: May I suggest that is the exhibit that has been verified by Colonel Murphy.

Mr. Keefe: And further authenticated by Congressman Murphy. That ought to make it unanimous.

At least here is a map blown up, as you testified, from an Army exhibit, showing what I understood you to say was information that was obtained from this mobile radar unit located, on the morning of the 7th of November, up here at Opana, is that right?

Colonel Thielen: The 7th of December, sir. Otherwise your statement is correct.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Now these dots in the center starting at 7:02 and going down through 7:39, 7:40, 7:43, indicate the flight of planes coming in?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Coming in Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Is that right?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Keefe: And that is taken from the chart made out there at this radar detecting apparatus, is that right?

Colonel Thielen: I do not know exactly how that record was made. We have it as an authenticated record of the plot of the Opana radio station, signed by the Assistant Signal



Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Officer of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. Keefe: What are these dots over here on the purple arrow pointing towards the Island? What do they indicate?

Colonel Thielen: Those are plots which were made at the times indicated by the Opana station.

Mr. Keefe: Well, the times of those are 6:45, 6:48, 6:51, so on and so forth.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir. There is no implication that those were Japanese planes.

Mr. Keefe: They may have been our own planes, so far as the evidence shows?

Colonel Thielen: They may have been.

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Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: There is no evidence to show what those  
3 planes were then?

4 Colonel Thielen: Not to my knowledge.

5 Mr. Keefe: I notice also, to the left of the large purple  
6 arrow pointing toward the island, two streaks, with an arrow  
7 pointing in the opposite direction, and two times indicated,  
8 10:39 and 10:27.

9 What does that arrow indicate?

10 Colonel Thielen: That is taken from the plot. That was  
11 indicated on the plot as an arrow. The clear arrow is an  
12 attempt to reproduce the arrow shown on the basic document, an  
13 original of which was offered to the committee yesterday after-  
14 noon.

15 Mr. Keefe: My question related to this arrow to the  
16 left. What does that indicate?

17 Colonel Thielen: It is the blue arrow. I am explaining  
18 the blue arrow which lies within the purple arrow. That is  
19 the arrow formed by the mask which was placed over the purple  
20 arrow.

21 Mr. Keefe: I am talking about the arrow which has to  
22 the left of it the time 10:39 and 10:27. What does that  
23 arrow indicate?

24 Colonel Thielen: It indicates a plot. That is the way  
25 it was given on the document from which that exhibit was taken,

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

as an arrow rather than as a succession of pips.

Mr. Keefe: Does that indicate, if the pips were on here would it indicate planes flying away from the Island?

Colonel Thielen: It appears to indicate one or more aircraft flying away from the Island.

Mr. Keefe: Why aren't the pips on here the same as on the other arrow?

Colonel Thielen: I can't answer that. That is the way it was on the original

Mr. Keefe: At least, so far as your testimony is concerned, then, the arrow to which I have referred which is pointed toward the top of the exhibit, and to the left of which appears the times "10:39 and 10:27", refers to planes that were leaving the Island?

Colonel Thielen: Two or more planes.

Mr. Keefe: Going away?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, then, I would like to know this: In your examination of the files relating to this aircraft attack on Pearl Harbor, did you find a record of the transmission to any authority in the Island of the planes as they left?

Colonel Thielen: There is no such statement in my testimony nor did I encounter any such statement in any other testimony.

Mr. Keefe: Do you know whether or not the records

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 contain information furnished from this mobile unit which  
3 was ultimately given to the authorities out there at Pearl  
4 Harbor which indicated the flight of planes away from the Island?

5 Colonel Thielen: No, sir. All I know about the outgoing  
6 flight is that it appeared on the historical plot, so-called.

7 Mr. Keefe: And you have no knowledge as to when that in-  
8 formation appearing on the historical plot may have been given  
9 to the authorities on the Island?

10 Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I have no such information.

11 Mr. Keefe: Have you ever checked the records to ascertain  
12 whether there was in fact any such transmittal of information  
13 as to this outgoing flight?

14 Colonel Thielen: I have not personally done so. I know  
15 that this whole Opana Station question was gone into very  
16 thoroughly by the researchers working with me.

17 Mr. Keefe: Well, from your knowledge and the informa-  
18 tion gained from your gleanings of this material that you went  
19 over and that your researchers went over, could you say whether  
20 or not when information was obtained at this mobile station  
21 whether that information was transmitted to the Commanding  
22 Officer, General Short, or anybody else in command out there  
23 at that time?

24 Colonel Thielen: It divides itself into two parts, sir.  
25 I have testified concerning that long inward plot which starts

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

at 7:02, which was reported to the Watch Officer at Fort Shafter, and I have further testified that the Watch Officer took no action in that connection.

Mr. Keefe: Well now, in order that I might be perfectly clear, I understood that this particular radar station had shut down some time after 7 o'clock.

Colonel Thielen: I didn't say that, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, was it in continuous operation all during the attacks?

Colonel Thielen: The plot indicates that it was in operation from 7:02 to 7:43. We have the testimony of Lieutenant Tyler that when he received notification of the attack at 8 o'clock he recalled all radar personnel to their stations. Whether they actually so returned or not I do not know. What happened after 8 o'clock I have only the knowledge indicated by the plot which we have been discussing.

Mr. Keefe: Then the historical plot which gives you the information that certain planes were spotted leaving the Island, certainly would indicate that that radar station was in operation at the times indicated on the exhibit, 10:39 and 10:27?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, that would so indicate.

Mr. Keefe: So if this station was in operation at 10:39 and 10:27 and picked up flights of planes, one or more,

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

leaving the Island, going away, would that information normally have been immediately transmitted to General Short's office, or somebody in command on that Island?

Colonel Thielen: It would unquestionably have been transmitted as far as the Information Center in order that the proper action could be taken by the Air Forces. Whether or not it would have come to General Short's personal attention or not I can't say.

Mr. Keefe: The plotting also indicates the direction that those planes were taking and the distance they were away at the time the radar picked them up.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So if they had had the information they would have known that these returning planes were flying away from the Island in this direction, would they not?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And the task forces at sea, both of them were out there for the purpose of going into action, weren't they?

Colonel Thielen: They were out there for that purpose?

Mr. Keefe: You can't answer that. You are from the Army. Pardon me.

Do you know whether or not in the search of your records and all of the material that came to your attention -- radar

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 being on land under the control and jurisdiction of the Army  
3 and the Navy not having any land-based radar -- do you know  
4 whether or not there are any records available as to when  
5 General Short's office, or anybody else in command, was notified  
6 of this plot showing these planes leaving the Island?

7 Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I have no such information. I  
8 should, however, like to point out in this connection that we  
9 have no definite information that those were hostile planes.

10 The Chairman: Are you through, Mr. Keefe?

11 Mr. Keefe: Just a moment, please.

12 I would like to ask the Admiral, if I may.

13 The Chairman: Go ahead.

14 Mr. Keefe: Do you have available -- strike that out.

15 Colonel, may I have your attention a moment, please.

16 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: There has been offered the duly certified  
18 record of the plotting of these planes, an instrument which is  
19 certified to by Lieutenant Murphy -- Lieutenant Colonel, I  
20 guess --

21 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I think that should be  
22 offered. I understood it was.

(3) 23 Mr. Keefe: I would like to have it identified and offered  
24 in evidence now.

25 Mr. Murphy: That will be Exhibit 4, Mr. Chairman.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

The Chairman: This is the one that was asked for yesterday and obtained. It was not put in the record as an exhibit.

Mr. Keefe: Will you have it identified as an exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell: We will make it Exhibit 4 and offer it in evidence. Exhibit 4 will be this this chart showing the plotting by the Radar Station at Opana on the morning of December 7. That is enough, isn't it, Colonel?

Colonel Thielen: That is a sufficient description.

Mr. Mitchell: Exhibit No. 4, Mr. Congressman.

(The document referred to was marked as Exhibit No. 4.)

Mr. Keefe: Now, Colonel, this Exhibit 4 is supposed to be a correct record. I note that you have, in preparing the big chart which has been exhibited to the committee, you have left off two words that appear in red ink opposite the numbers giving the time 10:39 and 10:27, the words being "enemy return".

Did you see those?

Colonel Thielen: I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Who put that on there?

Colonel Thielen: Presumably Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

May I explain the omission from this chart at this time?

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Colonel Thielen: In addition to the words "enemy return" appears a question mark. I have deliberately omitted from



Witness Thielen  
Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

my testimony all questionable material.

Mr. Keefe: That is why it was left out?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: I would like to point out that on the exhibit which we have prepared to offer the words "enemy return" and the question mark appear. Item 7 of the Army Exhibit.

Mr. Keefe: We have offered this and this shows the same thing. This is the original.

That is all of this witness. I want to talk for a moment to the Admiral.

Do you have a printed pamphlet known as, I think it is 2CL41, a certain security order?

Admiral Inglis: That is in the archives of the Navy Department. We haven't got it at hand but again we will produce it.

Mr. Keefe: Well, in preparing your statement for the Navy did you examine this security order issued by Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Inglis: My staff did, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Are you familiar with what it contains?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, not personally.

Mr. Keefe: Beg pardon?

Admiral Inglis: I am not personally familiar with that document.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

I have just been informed by my helper here that he did look at that and decided that it was outside of the scope of the outline handed to us.

Mr. Keefe: Well, it related, did it not, to the manner in which these ships were to be berthed and moored in the Harbor at Pearl Harbor for security purposes?

Admiral Inglis: I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, I am not familiar with the order.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I am sorry that in making your presentation you have omitted this very, very important and highly important matter.

Mr. Gesell: It is controversial.

Mr. Keefe: Is there anything controversial about it, Mr. Gesell? Is there anything controversial about the fact that such an order was issued? It is a printed order.

Mr. Gesell: If that is the order that has to do with the disposition of vessels in the Harbor, so as to effect the maximum anti-aircraft opposition, and matters of that sort -- we felt that should be taken up with the Officers who ordered the disposition of the fleet so they could give their reason and explain what was done, when it was done and why it was done.

Mr. Keefe: Well, the order was issued by Admiral Kimmel, wasn't it?

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Gesell: I believe so.

Mr. Keefe: And, which I understand is in a printed pamphlet, although I haven't been able to get it yet. As a member of the committee I am interested in it.

Mr. Gesell: We have it; if you ask for it we will be glad to give it to you.

Mr. Keefe: Well, we are going to ask for a lot of things as we go along in this matter, and maybe we will get them. We hope so.

I am now making the request that I be furnished with this order. And are there additional copies available so that the committee may have copies?

Mr. Gesell: I believe it is a printed order. Therefore there should be copies.

Mr. Keefe: There shouldn't be anything controversial about the fact. Here is an order which is printed. What could be controversial about it?

Mr. Gesell: Are you asking me, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Keefe: You said it was controversial.

Mr. Gesell: The question of why it was ordered and who it was ordered by is controversial.

Mr. Keefe: So that I may understand, wasn't it an order issued by Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. Gesell: I so understand.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Then there is nothing controversial.

Mr. Gesell: As to the content of the order, I take it not.

Mr. Keefe: Did you discuss that matter, Admiral, with our counsel?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, not personally. This is the first time I ever heard of it.

The Chairman: The Chair will ask counsel to attempt to secure sufficient copies of that printed order to furnish each member with a copy.

Mr. Keefe: Now, Admiral, a couple of other questions.

You gave some testimony as to the reconnaissance of planes around the 14th Naval District. That includes Wake, doesn't it, Midway, Johnston?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, there were 12 PBY's that left Pearl Harbor on the 30th of November, were there not?

Admiral Inglis: My presentation did not go back before the 6th of December in that connection.

Mr. Keefe: So you have no knowledge of that?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Witness Inglis  
Witness Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Keefe  
The Chairman

Mr. Keefe: You didn't make any examination of anything prior to the 6th of December?

Admiral Inglis: Not in connection with reconnaissance, no, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So you are not in position to testify as to any reconnaissance that took place on the 5th or 4th or any other time except the 6th and 7th; is that right?

Admiral Inglis: That is right.

Mr. Keefe: That is all.

The Chairman: The Chair would like to ask a question or two.

In regard to this map -- will you put that radar map back, the one that was just there. I guess Colonel Thielen can answer this question.

This long purple line in the center indicating an arrow, as far as the radar is concerned, shows the direction in which planes were flying?

Colonel Thielen: That is a graphical representation which we made to indicate that fact.

The Chairman: That arrow indicates what was recorded from two minutes after until 7:30; is that correct?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir. The white squares actually indicate that.

The Chairman: Those white squares were put in to indicate

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Witness Thielen

Questions by: The Chairman

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the time that synchronizes with the particular portion of that arrow?

Colonel Thielen: No, sir. More accurately, the white squares are the basic data. They represent the plots which were made. The purple arrow was added to indicate, make it more graphic to the committee, the direction of the attack.

The Chairman: In other words, the purple arrow, the long purple arrow indicates incoming planes?

Colonel Thielen: For the purpose of that attack, yes sir.

The Chairman: Yes. I understood you to say that there is nothing on the plot, as you call it, which indicates whether they were friendly or hostile planes?

Colonel Thielen: That is correct.

The Chairman: How close would they have to get to the point of attack before those in charge of the radar station would know whether or not they were enemy or friendly planes?

Colonel Thielen: As I understand the development of radar at that time there would be no indication whatsoever purely by radar. It would have to be either by visual recognition, or by an identification signal sent out by the plane radio independent of the radar.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: The Chairman

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The Chairman: Now, some question has been raised about these radar operators remaining at this Opana station after 7 o'clock, in view of the fact that their duty required them to stay until only 7 o'clock. Would you be able to say from the records, whether the reason they remained there was because the truck was late, or whether they wanted to get some more training.

Colonel Thielen: Well, it appears to me immaterial why. They had the option of resting while the truck arrived, or actually continuing to conduct training. They took the latter alternative.

The Chairman: Some importance seems to be attached to the fact that the truck was late, and I am wondering whether, if the truck had been on time, if they would have been there between 7:02 and 7:39 and would have made these records which you have exhibited.

Colonel Thielen: I don't think anybody could answer that.

The Chairman: That is speculative.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: And while they were waiting for the truck they decided to operate a little?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir. They showed commendable zeal.

The Chairman: The small purple arrow pointing the other

Witness Thielen

Questions by: The Chairman

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way indicating the direction of the planes being at 10:27 --  
is it?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: And going down to 10:39 --

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: That is 12 minutes.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Which was nearly an hour after the attack  
had ceased, as I understand it from your testimony, the  
attack having been over at 9:45.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: So, if that is a correct representation  
of the flight of enemy planes -- which could still be uniden-  
tified, I suppose, so far as the radar was concerned --

Colonel Thielen: Even more likely because of the range --  
the range is greater.

The Chairman: That would have indicated that 45 minutes  
or an hour, 45 minutes approximately, after the attack was  
over, the departure of these planes was caught on the instru-  
ment at that time?

Colonel Thielen: An outgoing flight was picked up.

The Chairman: Now, I don't know whether you testified,  
Colonel, or whether the Admiral testified yesterday, stating  
that on the 6th of December there were no searches made by



Witness Thielen

Questions by: The Chairman

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airplanes from Pearl Harbor; is that true?

Admiral Inglis: My testimony was that we had no written record of any searches.

The Chairman: No record -- no written record of any searches, and that is limited to the searches that would have been made from Pearl Harbor as a base, is it? The reason I ask, on your Item No. 10, which is the reproduction of that map there (indicating) in your black space, you say "Air searches flown in Hawaiian area." Then you have in that diagonal square, "6th of December, 1941," indicating that in that square there was some air flight in progress. Was that the airplanes from the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis: Those were the airplanes from the Enterprise. My statement that there was no written record of any reconnaissance applied to shore based planes.

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Witness Inglis:

Questions by The Chairman

1  
2 Admiral Inglis: Those were the airplanes from the  
3 Enterprise. My statement that there was no written record  
4 of any reconnaissance flights applied to shore based planes,  
5 but there were aircraft in flight from the Enterprise, as  
6 shown on the diagonal stripes.

7 The Chairman: So that there is no contradiction between  
8 your statement yesterday that there were no flights from shore  
9 bases on the 6th of December and this indication that from  
10 the Enterprise, which was two hundred miles west of Pearl  
11 Harbor, that there were these flights participated in by the  
12 eighteen planes that attacked from it?

13 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir, no contradiction.

14 The Chairman: All right. Now, at the time that these  
15 planes took off from the Enterprise in what direction was it  
16 going?

17 Admiral Inglis: The Enterprise was traveling almost due  
18 east.

19 The Chairman: Towards Pearl Harbor?

20 Admiral Inglis: Towards Pearl Harbor.

21 The Chairman: Now, in what direction was the Lexington  
22 traveling?

23 Admiral Inglis: The Lexington was going a little north  
24 of west, - a little north and west.

25 The Chairman: Towards --

Witness Inglis:

Questions by The Chairman

Admiral Inglis: Midway.

The Chairman: Midway?

Admiral Inglis: Yes.

The Chairman: And they were about how far apart?

Admiral Inglis: At the time of the attack, as we have just brought out, they were approximately 350 miles apart and rapidly drawing further apart.

The Chairman: Yes. One of them was going northwest and the other coming east?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Yes. Well, now, do the records from which you have taken your statement and upon which your statement is based indicate whether these planes that were armed, apparently, when they left the deck of the Enterprise had any knowledge of an attack or impending attack at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis: The record is completely negative in that respect and I would certainly assume that the pilots had no knowledge of that at all.

The Chairman: Now, let me ask you about these planes that left Hamilton Field, is it, San Francisco, Hamilton Field? That, I believe, is the Colonel's statement; it is in the Colonel's statement.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: At what time did you say they left on the

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Witness Thielen:

Questions by The Chairman

night of the 6th?

Colonel Thielen: 9:30 P.M. the 6th December.

The Chairman: 9:30 P.M.?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Unarmed and without radar, as you said?

Colonel Thielen: Unarmed; presumably without radar.

The Chairman: And probably having radio sets?

Colonel Thielen: Probably, yes, sir.

The Chairman: Probably, but you have no positive evidence on that score?

Colonel Thielen: No positive evidence. It would be extremely unlikely that they did not have.

The Chairman: They were headed for the Philippine Islands but were to stop at Hawaii for what purpose, - for refueling or do you know?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, that would unquestionably be one of the purposes of the stop.

The Chairman: Yes. And when they got there they found this attack in progress, is that right?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, that is correct.

The Chairman: And being unarmed they had no facilities with which to engage very effectively in the battle, did they?

Colonel Thielen: No, sir. They all attempted to land.

Witness Thielen:

Questions by The Chairman

The Chairman: They all attempted to land?

Colonel Thielen: Yes.

The Chairman: And some of them were destroyed in that process?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Your testimony, the testimony of both of you gentlemen has been referred to here as hearsay evidence. I suppose that you knew when you were asked to present this chronological narrative or physical narrative of what happened out there, not being there yourself, understood that you were not to testify from personal knowledge but from records that you were able to obtain in these various departments and that there is no misunderstanding that what you were to say here is, technically speaking from the standpoint of a lawyer, hearsay evidence.

Is that true, Admiral?

Admiral Inglis: That is my understanding, yes, sir.

The Chairman: Is that yours also?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, that is my understanding.

The Chairman: Of course, as a matter of law we all understand what you do not see yourself and testify about is legally referred to as hearsay, and there was no misunderstanding about that. Nobody expected it to be anything else, so far as I know.

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Witness Thielen:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

Is that your understanding of it?

Admiral Inglis: That was my understanding, yes, sir.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: I think that is all I want to ask him.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I did neglect to ask one or two questions that I had in mind, that I would like to complete if I may do so at this time.

The Chairman: Yes, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Colonel, I would like to ask you this: How many fixed anti-aircraft batteries were there on Oahu at the time of this attack?

Colonel Thielen: That will take a little counting, sir. There were a good many of them and in the Army exhibit, Section 1, page 1, - or, rather, beginning on page 2, we have a list of coast artillery units. In general this could be narrowed down to the gun I am sure and made very accurate with a little further study, but, in general, units other than the 64th Coast Artillery regiment, the six batteries at Schofield Barracks and the seven batteries at Camp Malakole, all of those other yellow squares situated at Fort Weaver, at Fort Durusi and Fort Rugen and at Black Point, which is down at the top of Diamond Head, are fixed batteries situated to protect the coastal defenses, the seacoast defense guns in that sector.

Witness Thielen:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Now, how many mobile batteries were there on the island that day?

Colonel Thielen: The only fully mobile unit was the 64th -- let me check that -- the 251st Coast Artillery regiment which would contain three batteries having three gun batteries, a total of nine -- well, wait a minute; the third battalion, with semi-automatic weapons, has four batteries. That would give us ten full mobile batteries.

The semi-mobile armaments had three coast artillery regiments with weapons which could be transported but for which the prime movers, as we call them, the trucks to tow them, were not available in sufficient quantity to move the entire regiment at one time.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I assume in making up your statement you had opportunity to and did read the Army Board's report?

Colonel Thielen: I read it, sir, not as closely as did my researchers. I read it not with the idea of extracting anything but for the purpose of acquainting myself with the background.

Mr. Keefe: Who was General Burgin?

Colonel Thielen: General Burgin commanded the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, which embraced two major divisions, the seacoast regiments and the anti-aircraft regiments.

Mr. Keefe: Now, on the morning of the 7th of December,

Witness Thielen:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

1941, when the attack took place, how many of these fixed batteries were ready for action?

Colonel Thielen: I believe that that could be figured out. May I invite your attention to Section 7 of the Army exhibit, from which we can probably deduce those facts? None, of course, were loaded.

Mr. Keefe: None were loaded?

Colonel Thielen: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Was the ammunition available?

Colonel Thielen: The ammunition was, in general, in boxes at the position.

Mr. Keefe: It had to be unboxed and taken out of the boxes to the guns to be loaded?

Colonel Thielen: That is for the three inch guns, the primary armament, that is true.

Mr. Keefe: That is after the so-called No. 3 alert went into effect?

Colonel Thielen: No, sir, no fixed guns were in position with ammunition at the gun positions under Alert No. 1.

Mr. Keefe: Yes, but I mean they were not loaded, you said.

Colonel Thielen: No, sir, they were not loaded.

Mr. Keefe: In order to put them in position to fire the ammunition would have to be taken out of the boxes in places where it was adjacent to the battery, is that right?



Witness Thielen:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

Colonel Thielen: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: Now, where was the ammunition for the mobile units?

Colonel Thielen: That was located at Aliamanu Crater.

Mr. Keefe: And how far away from the mobile batteries?

Colonel Thielen: That was quite close. That was near Fort Shafter, which is the nerve center of the island defense and the intersection of the road net which goes down along the south sector and critical area. There was also anti-aircraft ammunition at Schofield Barracks.

Mr. Keefe: Well, the ammunition for the mobile gun batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in an old volcano, is that right?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Keefe: And all the mobile batteries, wherever they were located, had to send up to this crater to get their ammunition, is that correct?

Colonel Thielen: Well, not all. As I pointed out, some was at Schofield Barracks, where some of the mobile batteries were situated.

May I review my brief, which I believe covered that? Would you care to hear it, sir, hear the discussion that I gave yesterday directly pertaining to this question?

Mr. Keefe: Well, if you care to repeat it, I haven't

Witness Thielen:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

asked for it, but I haven't any objection to it if you want to do it.

Colonel Thielen: It is directly responsive to your question, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Very well.

Colonel Thielen: Under Alert No. 1 only a limited amount of ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery Command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, including anti-aircraft. However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks.

Mr. Keefe: Now, in connection with your testimony did you read the testimony of General Burgin as he gave it to the Army Board?

Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I do not recollect it.

Mr. Keefe: May I call your attention to the fact that General Burgin testified before the Army Board, which is cited and referred to in the Board's report, and I quote:

"They were all ready to get into action immediately with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the sea-

Witness Thielen:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

coast, those batteries imbedded in concrete had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that to General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this anti-aircraft ammunition moved up into the seacoast to the battery positions and have it nearby the anti-aircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out.

"Ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions."

Is that correct?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, as applied to the mobile batteries. As I pointed out, they were located at Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks and Camp Malakole.

Mr. Keefe: Did you ascertain the facts with reference to the issuance of ammunition and why it was that ammunition had not been issued to these mobile batteries?

Colonel Thielen: I am not prepared to give a why, to give an answer as to why that was not done, sir. I may say that I have had a discussion with the people who were doing the researching on this subject and they assured me that testimony,

Witness Thielen:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

including that of ordnance officers, places us on very firm ground in the testimony which I gave yesterday and which I just repeated.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I call your attention to the testimony of General Burgin on that issue, in which he testified:

"They didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise. It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of a person who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazine. We tried the ordnance people without result. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray plead for his ammunition for the field artillery; I asked for ammunition for anti-aircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time and that we would have warning before any attack ever sprung up."

Did you find that, review that testimony before you made your statement to the committee here?

Colonel Thielen: I was generally familiar with that testimony and I know that my researchers knew it in detail.

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Witness Thielen:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Well, then, it is safe to say, is it not, that so far as the mobile units were concerned after the attack came they had to be dispersed to their positions and had to send to this crater in order to get their ammunition before they could enter the fight?

Colonel Thielen: To the crater and to Schofield Barracks.

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir. The ammunition was centrally located.

Mr. Keefe: How long did it take to get it, to get that done after the attack came, normally?

Colonel Thielen: That would, of course, depend upon the location of the various batteries. May I point out that the bulk of the anti-aircraft not in position, the 64th Coast Artillery, was located at Fort Shafter, which was only a mile from Aliamanu Crater.

Mr. Keefe: Well, then, let me ask you this question: In your research and in your examination to present this situation you have disclosed a good many other pertinent and very technical facts. Do the records any place disclose how long it actually did take?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And how long did it take?

Colonel Thielen: We have a schedule of that in the Army exhibit.

Witness Thielen:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

Mr. Gesell: It is right in the exhibit for each particular battery.

Colonel Thielen: For every battery.

Mr. Keefe: Well, you may have seen it, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. Gesell: It is before you, Congressman. It is the schedule that was discussed yesterday. I was calling your attention to it. It gives the time intervals.

Colonel Thielen: That is on page 11 of the Army exhibit.

The Vice Chairman: We went over that.

Mr. Keefe: He went over that?

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

The Chairman: Is that all?

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

The Chairman: Admiral, I want to ask one or two questions; maybe you testified about it yesterday. If you did, I don't want to repeat.

You stated, I think, that there was a net strung across the mouth of this channel into Pearl Harbor but that notwithstanding that net a Japanese submarine did get in. Is that true?

Admiral Inglis: That is true, yes, sir.

The Chairman: Does that record show when the net was spread and when the submarine got in?

Admiral Inglis: The record does not show when the sub-

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Witness Inglis:

Questions by The Chairman

marine got in and the record is not clear as to when the net was opened.

You see, those nets have a gate, as we call it, which usually can be opened to allow the passage of friendly ships and I am not prepared to give the information as to just when that gate was opened and when it was closed. I would say from the construction of the net that the submarine must have gone through that net at some time when the gate was open because the net seems to be very effective in stopping the passage of any ship except when the gate was open.

The Chairman: Do you know whether it was customary to open the gate in the daytime or at night or both?

Admiral Inglis: I don't know what the custom was at that place at that time.

The Chairman: How far was it from the mouth where the net was that this channel that had been chiseled out, how many miles is it to, we will say, the Ford Island?

Admiral Inglis: Roughly about two miles, sir.

The Chairman: About two miles?

Admiral Inglis: Yes.

The Chairman: Now, one other question and I think that is all.

You testified here that the Pacific Fleet, - which is independent of the Asiatic Fleet, I believe?

Witness Inglis:

Questions by The Chairman

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: I have no reference to that. The Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, was about two-thirds the size of the Atlantic Fleet. Now, how much of the Pacific Fleet was in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis: You will find that in the statement.

The Chairman: Well, I do not want to repeat.

Now, yesterday you said that there were six battleships in the Atlantic Fleet and attention was called to two others that were doing what you call --

Admiral Inglis: Shakedown.

The Chairman: (Continuing) -- shakedown.

Is that a naval term for practicing or try-out? Were they new ships that had not yet joined the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral Inglis: Mr. Chairman, I did not include in my statement any ships that were in the blueprinting stage, that were being built and had not yet been launched, or that had been launched but were not commissioned, or that were commissioned but had not been ordered to join the fleet. The ships are in various stages of completion from the time the blueprints are drawn until the shakedown cruise is completed.

Now, after a ship goes into commission with her full crew and her ammunition allowance and becomes a working organization, a period called a shakedown cruise or shakedown period is allowed the ship to work out all the kinks in the machinery and



Witness Inglis:

Questions by The Chairman

in the organization, to teach the crew their ship, and that, depending on the type of ship, may take anything from perhaps a month to sometimes as much as six months or even, in cases where they run into a great deal of difficulty with the machinery, perhaps as much as year.

Now, those two battleships, the Washington and North Carolina, were of that status. They had been commissioned, they had their crew and their ammunition on board, but they were still under shakedown and had not yet joined the fleet.

The Chairman: In other words, notwithstanding the fact that they were in the Atlantic Ocean or in some body of water adjacent to it, they were not a part of the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

The Chairman: That is all. I understand that Senator Brewster wants to ask you a question or two.

Senator Brewster: I have said I wanted to ask some questions. You said I wanted to ask a question. I would like to ask some questions. I haven't asked any questions so far.

I think four o'clock has rung.

Mr. Keefe: Will the gentleman yield to get some information here, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: We are constantly referring to Army exhibits, which I now have before me, and reference was made to the place-

ment of the various batteries and the time they got into action. Has that exhibit been offered in evidence in this case, or do you intend to offer it?

Mr. Mitchell: I was just waiting for a chance, Mr. Congressman. At the close of their testimony I was going to make a formal offer. You have copies of it, but I was going to put it into the record by a formal offer.

Mr. Keefe: I want to concern myself with that. I understand, then, that you are going to formally offer this Army exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell: We will do it now, if I may. I would like to get it over with before I forget it.

The Chairman: And also the Navy.

Mr. Mitchell: I offer as exhibit 5 the Army folder of documents, maps, and so forth, that was produced by Colonel Thielen in connection with his part in the narrative statement.

I also offer as exhibit 6 the Navy folder, with all papers therein contained, which are those produced by Admiral Inglis in connection with his statement, and that includes the document that you just have in your hand. They are all offered.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Chairman, as a matter of information: Of course, the testimony given by these gentlemen went right through these exhibits that were presented to each member of the committee. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. Mitchell: That is true, but I am offering the exhib-

1 its complete so that they will be formal parts of the record.

2 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could I make a request  
3 from counsel?

4 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

5 Senator Ferguson: I would like to request counsel to  
6 get the original plotting chart made by Private Elliott at the  
7 Opana station on the morning of the 7th of December, 1941.

8 As I understand it, they have been talking about orig-  
9 inals here and this seems to be a photostatic copy and at the  
10 next session I will want to ask some questions upon that plot-  
11 ting.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Where would that be, Colonel? Is it in  
13 Washington?

14 Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I think not. We have never  
15 come across that, the plotting that was actually made on the  
16 plotting board at the station.

17 Senator Ferguson: Are you talking about the station at  
18 Opana or the main station? I am talking about the one that  
19 Elliott plotted, that he actually plotted.

20 Colonel Thielen: I have never encountered any, - this  
21 is one point that I have gone into in some detail. I have  
22 never encountered any reference to the plot that was made by  
23 the enlisted men when they were tracking a plane. We have  
24 heard of Colonel Murphy's authenticated document which pre-  
25 sents the plot that was made.

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Mr. Mitchell: Who is he?

Senator Ferguson: Where was Murphy when this plot was being made? Why can't we get the original plot to show the line of flight and whether or not planes came in at six something and whether or not they went out at 10:45 and 10:25? What I want is the original plotting made by Elliott, that he describes in his testimony.

Colonel Thielen: I am sure the War Department will make every effort to get it.

Senator Brewster: Will the counsel indicate in connection with the presentation of the Navy and Army exhibits the number of items included which, as I think, were illustrated numerically, so that they can be identified in that way?

Mr. Mitchell: In the Navy folder they are itemized as Items 1 to 20.

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Mr. Mitchell: And in the Army folder I don't think they are. I doubt if it has a list. The mimeographed part of it is a document divided into sections, with thirteen pages. In addition to that there are six charts.

Senator Brewster: Can the radar records of any one distinct station from the other stations for this period from four o'clock to seven o'clock at all the stations on Hawaii and during the later part of the morning, whenever they were in operation, be made available, or copies of it?

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Witness Thielen;

Questions by Senator Brewster

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, anything that is in existence will be made available. I will give you my personal opinion as an artilleryman, though, that ordinary computations made at the time by personnel in the operation of such a device would not ordinarily be a matter of permanent record.

Senator Brewster: Do you think, Colonel, and would it be likely that records of the morning of December 7th would be destroyed?

Colonel Thielen: I believe, and again I am giving you a personal opinion based on professional experience, that Colonel Murphy, foreseeing the situation and the possible demands for information of this type, deliberately made this historic plot of information that was available.

Senator Brewster: Colonel Murphy was in charge of all the radar stations, was he?

Colonel Thielen: He was a Signal officer in the Hawaiian Department. The Chief Signal Officer, Colonel Powell, was in charge of the aircraft warning system.

Senator Brewster: Are either of those officers available here now?

Colonel Thielen: I believe Colonel Powell is. I understand Colonel Murphy has since died.

Senator Brewster: Colonel Powell, is he expected to appear, do you know?

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Mr. Mitchell: He is on the list.

Mr. Gesell: He is on the list.

Senator Ferguson: Was Murphy a witness before any of the Boards?

Mr. Gesell: No, not that I know of.

Colonel Thielen: I believe he died shortly after that time. I cannot state definitely.

Senator Brewster: Would you, Mr. Mitchell, advise Colonel Powell that we would be interested in whatever original as well as transcript of those records are available of those records?

Mr. Mitchell: I will ask Colonel Duncan to get ahold of him. Even if he hasn't these records here he can explain to you where he saw them and what was done with them.

Admiral Inglis: Mr. Chairman, may I make one brief correction in the statement that I made yesterday?

The Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Inglis: It won't take but a moment.

In my original statement I said that the three patrol planes from Kaneohe were to take off at sunrise, 5:27 Hawaiian time on the 7th, but that they did not take off until about 6:40. I later corrected that by saying that the plan was that they take off at dawn, one hour before sunrise.

I have since found that I was mistaken in both cases and the facts are that the order was for them to take off at sun-

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rise, which was at 6:26. They actually took off at 6:40. In other words, they were fourteen minutes late instead of an hour and thirteen minutes late.

Senator Lucas: Will you produce those records that show that also?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: I have two requests to make: One, that I be furnished with a copy of the summary of Far Eastern documents, the G-2 and Signal Corps documents as I understand, and I would like to have a copy of the log of the cruiser Boise for the last five days of November, 1941 and, say, the first ten days of December, 1941.

The Chairman: Well, gentlemen, if there is nothing further we will recess until ten o'clock tomorrow and the Chairman will express the hope that we will conclude with the testimony of Admiral Inglis and Colonel Thielen before twelve o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 o'clock P.M., Friday, November 16, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock A.M., Saturday, November 17, 1945.)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.