

Doc. 2045

(193)

Doc. #2045

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Vol. 45

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

January 25, 1946

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 8330 to 8521

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WARD & PAUL
(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)
OFFICIAL REPORTERS
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

C O N T E N T S

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TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

SHORT, Major General Walter C. (Resumed)

8338

- - -

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

S. Con. Res. 27

 Friday, January 25, 1946

Congress of the United States,
 Joint Committee on the Investigation
 of Pearl Harbor Attack,
 Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
 10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
 Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
 Ferguson, and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
 Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
 Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
 Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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2 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in
3 order. Does counsel have anything at this point?

4 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, the other day a request
5 was made for any further information that might be avail-
6 able regarding the message of December 7 to General Short
7 signed by General Marshall.

8 We have received the following memorandum from Colonel
9 Duncombe that I would like to read into the record.

10 The Vice Chairman: Of the War Department?

11 Mr. Masten: Yes.

12 The Vice Chairman: You may proceed.

13 Mr. Masten: (Reading)

14 " WAR DEPARTMENT

15 Washington, D. C.

16 "24 January 1946

17 "MEMORANDUM TO MR. RICHARDSON:

18 "The following inclosures relate to General Marshall's
19 message to General Short, dated 7 December 1941:

20 "(1) Copies of papers which show that, at the time of
21 the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings, a search was made for
22 General Marshall's handwritten draft of the message and that
23 the draft was not found.

24 "(2) A photostat of a copy of the encoded message sent
25 from the War Department. On the photostat, to avoid dis-

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1
2 closure of U. S. codes, the encoded text of the body of
3 the message has been blocked out.

4 "(3) A copy of Committee Exhibit 61, which is a
5 photostat of General Gerow's memorandum to The Adjutant
6 General concerning the message. This memorandum, as indi-
7 cated by General Gerow's memorandum in Committee Exhibit
8 39, 'was typed later during the day (7 December) and
9 formally made of record.'

10 "(4) A photostat of a handwritten memorandum by
11 General Adams, The Adjutant General, dated 29 January
12 1942.

13 "(5) A photostat of the message as decoded in
14 Hawaii.

15 /s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE

16 "5 Incls."

Lt. Colonel, GSC

17 We suggest that the memorandum I have just read,
18 together with enclosures 1, 2, 4 and 5, be spread on the
19 record at this point.

20 The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

21 Mr. Masten: I omit enclosure 3 since it is already
22 Committee's Exhibit No. 61.

23 The Vice Chairman: It may be so ordered.

24 (The matter referred to is as follows:)
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8 September 1944

NOTE FOR RECORD:

1. On 8 September, Mr. Schneider, Secretary to Mr. Justice Roberts and Secretary to the Roberts Committee, informed General North that

a. he had no recollection of having seen General Marshall's handwritten draft of the 7 December 1941 message,

b. all documents received by the Committee from the War Department were returned to the Secretary of War by Colonel Brown who acted as liaison officer,

c. Mr. Schneider has no signature indicating receipt by an official of the War Department.

2. On 8 September 1944 Lt. Col. William M. Connor Jr., reports that General Weir of the Judge Advocate General's Office stated that he does not have the handwritten draft in his possession.

THOMAS NORTH

Brigadier General, G. S. C.

Chief, Current Group, OPD

Col. Brown, who returned the papers to the War Department, and Col. Bratton, who carried the manuscript message in question to the Message Center, have both been questioned, and noth disclaim any knowledge of what became of the

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1 manuscript draft.

2
3 C. G. J.

4
5 SECRET

PRIORITY

18 SEPT 44

6 A WAR 181916Z WTJ

WASHINGTON D C

7 WAR 32425 18TH

8 DESIRE TO LOCATE HANDWRITTEN ORIGINAL OF
9 WARNING MESSAGE DISPATCHED ON SEVEN DECEMBER NINETEEN FORTY ONE
10 PERIOD THIS DRAFT WAS USED IN TESTIMONY BEFORE ROBERTS COM-
11 MISSION AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT IT WAS SUBMITTED TO THAT
12 COMMISSION PAREN FOR RICHARDSON FOR COLONEL CHARLES W WEST
13 FROM NORTH SIGNED MARSHALL PAREN COLONEL LEE HOW BROWN
14 COMMA USMC COMMA NOW BELIEVED STATION WITH HQ FIFTH MARINE
15 DIVISION COMMA WAS LAW OFFICER FOR THE COMMISSION PERIOD
16 REQUEST YOU CONTACT HIM TO DETERMINE WHAT DISPOSITION WAS
17 MADE OF THIS DRAFT AND RADIO YOUR FINDINGS.

18
19 C O P Y

20
21 S E C R E T

20 September 1944

22 GRUNERT PRESIDENT ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

23 BLDG # 36 PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO

24 To: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

25 OPERATIONS DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON D C

3. D. NOTDINHBAW .JUA8 8 DRAW

1 RERAD SEPTEMBER EIGHTEENTH FROM GENERAL NORTH INQUIRY
 2 COLONEL BROWN MARINE CORPS REVEALS HE DOES NOT RECALL WHAT
 3 DISPOSITION WAS MADE HANDWRITTEN ORIGINAL MENTIONED MESSAGE
 4 PERIOD HE SUGGESTED THAT ALBERT J SCHNEIDER NOW SECRETARY
 5 TO JUSTICE ROBERTS THEN CLERK OF COMMISSION MAY BE ABLE
 6 FURNISH INFORMATION LEADING TO DISCOVERY ITS WHEREABOUTS END

7 LT GEN GEORGE GRUNERT, U S ARMY

8 PRESIDENT, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

9 OFFICIAL:

10 R. G. HURT

11 Major AGD,

12 Aide-de-Camp

13 -----
 14 SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

15 Received at

16 DI 56 74/73 US GOVT

17 D1 WASHN DC DEC 7 1941 1201 PM

18 CG

19 HAWAIIAN DEPT

20 FT SHAFTER TH

21 529 SEVENTH

22 (*)

23 MARSHALL

24 1217 PM

25 (*Reporter's note: Context blocked out)

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WAR DEPARTMENT

The Adjutant General's Office

Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM:

Checked on the history of this radio of Dec. 7, 1941 with Lt. Col. John R. Deane, G.S.C., who states that a pencil draft of it was taken directly to the Message Center by Col. Bratton for immediate dispatch which was done.

T.A.G. did not enter the picture at that time in any way except as custodian of the record message.

E. S. A.

1-29-42

File

WARD & BYRD - WASHINGTON, D. C.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

The Adjutant General's Office

Washington, D. C.

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1-29-42

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M-1690

Roll 284

PART II

M-1690

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PART II

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SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

4758

SECRET

1549WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA ETAT 7 1218P

C G

HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

529 7th JAPANESE ARE PRESENTING AT ONE PM EASTERN STANDARD
TIME TODAY WHAT AMOUNTS TO AN ULTIMATUM ALSO THEY ARE UNDER
ORDERS TO DESTROY THEIR CODE MACHINE IMMEDIATELY STOP JUST
WHAT SIGNIFICANCE THE HOUR SET MAY HAVE WE DO NOT KNOW BUT
BE ON ALERT ACCORDINGLY STOP INFORM NAVAL AUTHORITIES OF
THIS COMMUNICATION

MARSHALL

(Time and date stamp - Received at 3 - 7 Dec 1941
Hq. Haw. Dept. AGO SRS)

Decoded by

Lt. J H BABCOCK

251P DEC 7 1941

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th
70E

WARD & SYL. WASHINGTON, D. C. .NOTDINBAW JUAS & GRAW

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1 Witness short

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2 TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT

3 (Resumed)

4 The Vice Chairman: General Short, do you have anything
5 further that you want to bring to the attention of the
6 committee before your examination is resumed?

7 General Short : Yes, sir.

8 First, I would like to have an opportunity for me and
9 my counsel to look over this material that has now been
10 introduced, because we have not seen it.

11 The Vice Chairman: You have that right.

12 General Short: I have a statement here. I do not know
13 whether I should read it now.

14 Senator Lucas asked me a question that I was unable
15 to answer at the time. I have the answer out of the testi-
16 mony of Admiral Inglis. I can read it now.

17 The Vice Chairman: Would you permit a suggestion,
18 General?

19 Since Senator Lucas asked you about that, don't you
20 think it might be desirable to wait a little longer until
21 he comes in? He is detained a few moments now.

22 General Short: I think it would be.

23 The Vice Chairman: Since he is the man that wanted
24 to know about it, I just offer that suggestion for your
25 consideration.

General Short: All right, sir, we will put it to
one side.

Larry fls

1 Witness short

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3 (Resumed)

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5 further that you want to bring to the attention of the
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9 my counsel to look over this material that has now been
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18 General?

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20 think it might be desirable to wait a little longer until
21 he comes in? He is detained a few moments now.

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23 The Vice Chairman: Since he is the man that wanted
24 to know about it, I just offer that suggestion for your
25 consideration.

General Short: All right, sir, we will put it to
one side.

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follows
Shack 10:15
AL-1 1

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Witness Short

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
Mr. Murphy

2 The Vice Chairman: With respect to the memorandum
3 from Colonel Duncombe and the attacked data which has been
4 spread upon the record, I assume, General, you are familiar
5 with General Marshall's testimony?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: That he wrote out in his own hand-
8 writing that message of December 7, and you know about that?

9 General Short: That is correct.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right.

11 Colonel Karr: We have no objection to the introduction
12 of that exhibit.

13 The Vice Chairman: Counsel states that he has no ob-
14 jection to that being put in the record, which has been done.

15 Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will continue his inquiry.

16 Mr. Murphy: General Short, the reference I made
17 yesterday afternoon and was about to read was from page 46
18 of volume entitled "Previous Testimony of General Short."

19 Colonel Karr: That is the Roberts Commission hearing?

20 Mr. Murphy: The Roberts Commission hearing. And,
21 apparently, a quotation from the prepared statement which
22 you presented to the Roberts Commission. It reads as follows:

23 "The question of just how the total reconnaissance was
24 carried out was never known by me."

25 General Short: About where is that on the page?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: Page 46, General, six lines from the bottom.

3 General Short: Yes, sir, I have it.

4 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

5 "The question of just how the total reconnaissance was
6 carried out was never known by me. If they called on us
7 for a squadron of planes they would assign it to a certain
8 sector, say, maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out
9 600 miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy
10 planes were searching all the other critical areas, and they
11 probably were. I say, that was a matter that was not under
12 my control."

13 My only reason for referring to that is that I get the
14 impression from that that you thought the Navy were doing
15 a pretty good job on reconnaissance.

16 General Short: On the critical areas. The best they
17 could do with the material they had.

18 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, my other question is, if you
19 thought they were having reconnaissance in the critical
20 areas, why did you have your pursuit planes on 4 hours notice?

21 General Short: Because, on my information from Washington,
22 I had nothing to indicate that we were going to have an air
23 attack.

24 Mr. Murphy: Did you think the reconnaissance was being
25 made as a result of the message of November 27?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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General Short: I thought the reconnaissance was being made on account of both that and the message of October 16. They were giving exactly the same instructions on October 16 as they were in the message of November 27.

Mr. Murphy: Is it your impression that there was no change in the situation from November 27 on than that which existed from October 16?

General Short: As far as the deployment of the Navy, because both messages stated that the Navy would take a defensive deployment preparatory to carry out --

Mr. Murphy: But you did say, General, many times in the record, that you felt after the 27th the Navy tightened up?

General Short: That is correct. They said they did.

Mr. Murphy: Right. At any rate, you did not have your pursuit planes on other than a 4-hour preparatory state; isn't that right?

General Short: However, I may state that when the situation arose they were actually in the air in 55 minutes.

Mr. Murphy: Some of them were.

General Short: All that were in condition to get in the air.

Mr. Murphy: General, do you have any report made by you to Washington immediately after Pearl Harbor on that situation?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 General Short: On the planes in the air?

3 Mr. Murphy: On exactly what happened. We have a report
4 before us, a letter, which Admiral Kimmel wrote to Washington,
5 and which I am going to discuss with you. Do you have a
6 report that you made as to what planes were ready, how your
7 anti-aircraft was situated, and so forth?

8 General Short: I think we made a written report. I
9 haven't got it immediately available.

10 Mr. Murphy: I think it is important that we have it.
11 I will ask the Army liaison to produce a copy of it if they will.

12 General Short: May I say one word to Colonel Duncombe
13 if he is here.

14 I think Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, can
15 tell you definitely whether we did put in a written report.

16 The Vice Chairman: The question was about a written
17 report made by General Short to the War Department following
18 the attack on December 7, 1941.

19 General Short: (Addressing Colonel Duncombe)

20 They want that and I think Colonel Phillips can tell
21 you definitely whether it was put in and when.

22 Mr. Murphy: Don't you know, General, whether you made
23 a report to Washington or not?

24 General Short: I think I did. I was just referring
25 to my Chief of Staff who would be responsible for assembling

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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the details of the report. We made several reports by telephone. I think we put in a written report.

Here is a report put in by radiogram on December 7.

Mr. Murphy: No, I want a report from the Commanding General to Washington of the over-all picture.

General Short: This was a previous report on the over-all picture.

Mr. Murphy: Signed by whom?

General Short: Signed by me.

Mr. Murphy: All right.

General Short: Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. Murphy: No, I would like to examine it, if I may. It probably is quite lengthy.

Captain Ford: It is about seven lines.

Mr. Murphy: Oh, then read it, General. I thought perhaps it was six or seven pages.

General Short: This was dated the 7th of December and was addressed to the Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.:

"JAPANESE ENEMY DIVE BOMBERS ESTIMATED NUMBER SIXTY ATTACKED HICKAM FIELD WHEELER FIELD PEARL HARBOR AT EIGHT AM STOP EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO AT LEAST THREE HANGARS WHEELER FIELD THREE HANGARS HICKAM FIELD AND TO PLANES CAUGHT ON THE GROUND STOP DETAILS NOT YET KNOWN STOP RAID LASTED OVER

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. PHOTOGRAPHERS

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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ONE HOUR STOP UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE SHIPS IN PEARL HARBOR BADLY DAMAGED STOP MARINE AIR FIELD EWA ALSO BADLY DAMAGED STOP DETAILS LATER"

Mr. Murphy: It is the details that I am interested in.

General Short: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to have a report, if there is one, by you, giving your explanation as to what happened and your impression of why it happened.

General Short: I think Colonel Duncombe will be able to find that.

Mr. Murphy: I have reference in that regard to a letter dated December 12 --

General Short: There are other radiograms making additional reports. The photostats are very dim and very difficult to read.

Mr. Murphy: I will ask the Army to get us the detailed report which the General made explaining what happened on December 7.

In that connection I refer to a letter dated December 12, 1941 sent by Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark in which he said the Army anti-aircraft guns were not manned. Did you know that Admiral Kimmel said that?

General Short: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Was that a fair statement?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 General Short: It was not. They were partly manned.

3 Mr. Murphy: There was only a skeleton anti-sabotage
4 crew, wasn't there?

5 General Short: That is correct, but they were able to
6 fire, and brought down a considerable number of planes in
7 that first raid.

8 Mr. Murphy: You do not agree with that statement of
9 the Admiral?

10 General Short: Not entirely. I don't know how he meant
11 it. He may have meant that the full crews were not there.
12 If that is what he meant that is correct.

13 Mr. Murphy: He also said:

14 "Ships in harbor opened fire very promptly but the
15 first attack was practically unopposed."

16 Do you agree?

17 General Short: We knocked down a number of planes in
18 the first attack wave.

19 Mr. Murphy: You don't agree then with the Admiral's
20 statement that the first wave was practically unopposed?

21 General Short: If he means the dive bombers that came
22 in a distance above the water estimated to have been anywhere
23 from 10 feet to 200 feet, the torpedo planes, that is probably
24 correct, because nobody fired on them until they were close
25 enough to identify.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Now, General --

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General Short: I have, Mr. Murphy, a radio report here by General Martin, commanding the Air Corps, on the 7th, which was a little more detailed than the one I read.

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8

Mr. Murphy: I will ask counsel and the liaison officer if they will assemble a report, the reports from Hawaii from the Army on what happened on December 7.

9

10

General Short: Yes, sir.

May I interject one other thing.

11

12

Mr. Murphy: Yes, sir.

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General Short: Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, the Chief of Staff, says that a detailed report was made about the 10th or 11th in written form.

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16

Mr. Murphy: You say that Colonel Phillips made a detailed report?

17

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General Short: I signed the report but he remembers more of the details.

19

20

Mr. Murphy: But did Colonel Phillips know what went on between you and Admiral Kimmel?

21

22

General Short: I think he knew anything of importance.

23

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Mr. Murphy: He testified that he didn't, didn't he?

General Short: No, no, I wouldn't say that. I would like to have you read that testimony.

25

Mr. Murphy: Well, let's get down to that exactly. The

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 fact is that one Phil Hayes -- was he a general or colonel?

3 General Short: He was a colonel.

4 Mr. Murphy: Colonel Phil Hayes was your Chief of Staff
5 up to November 1st of 1941; isn't that correct?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: And every time you had a meeting with the
8 Navy you took your Chief of Staff with you?

9 General Short: That is correct.

10 Mr. Murphy: Then on November 6 you got Colonel Phillips
11 as your Chief of Staff and you never brought him to the Navy
12 meetings with you; isn't that correct?

13 General Short: Yes, sir. Do you wish me to make an
14 explanation on that?

15 Mr. Murphy: Yes, why you wouldn't have your Chief of
16 Staff in your conferences with the other branch.

(3) 17 General Short: Colonel Hayes had been there for three
18 or four years. He knew all the Navy people and had been
19 present at all these conferences. I took him because I thought
20 he had considerable background of what had gone on before.
21 At the same time that Colonel Hayes had been attending con-
22 ferences with me Major Fleming had been carrying on a great
23 deal of the liaison work with the Navy and I thought he had
24 more of a background than my new Chief of Staff.

25 For that reason, the fact that he was an unusually keen

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 able officer, with a remarkable memory, I thought he would
3 know a great deal about the things that Colonel Hayes had
4 participated in.

5 Mr. Murphy: In other words, Major Fleming, who was
6 in daily contact with the District Engineer in Honolulu and
7 in contact with the civilian engineer and in contact with
8 the engineer at San Francisco and was one of your --

9 General Short: May I add, his contact with the engineer
10 in San Francisco was through the District Engineer in Honolulu.

11 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, he was one of your engineers,
12 in contact daily with the civilian authorities in Honolulu,
13 and with the District Engineer, and when you were discussing
14 matters subsequent to November 27 instead of having your own
15 Chief of Staff with you you took one of the members of G-4,
16 your engineer, with you?

17 General Short: Because I thought he had more background.
18 He had a background over a considerable period. He knew
19 probably most everything that Colonel Hayes had known for
20 the last year.

21 Mr. Murphy: How was your Chief of Staff every to learn
22 or ever to know or ever to understand if you were taking
23 the engineer to the conferences instead of your Chief of Staff?

24 General Short: I explained to the Chief of Staff any-
25 thing of importance.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: But the Chief of Staff never saw these
3 messages of the Navy, did he?

4 General Short: Yes, I am sure that the important ones
5 were delivered to him; copies of the important ones he did see.

6 Mr. Murphy: Did he at any time engage in conversation
7 where you had Admiral Kimmel in conversation?

8 General Short: After November 27, in those few con-
9 ferences, he was not present.

10 Mr. Murphy: He was not present at any conference after
11 the war warning. Was he ever present at any conference
12 between you and the Navy from the time he became your Chief
13 of Staff on November 6th?

14 General Short: He was not present at formal conferences.
15 He was present at a considerable number of informal confer-
16 ences where Admiral Kimmel and I talked.

17 Mr. Murphy: And the Chief of Staff, who was never
18 present at any formal conference between you and the Navy,
19 was the only person you talked to before you decided on
20 Alert No. 1?

21 General Short: Yes, sir, because I considered him the
22 best informed man on the staff.

23 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you considered him the best in-
24 formed man, but yet you never took him to the conferences.

25 General Short: May I put in here, that when you consider

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 a Chief of Staff you must not consider him on only one
3 phase. I would like to compare slightly Colonel Hayes and
4 Colonel Phillips.

5 Colonel Hayes was an excellent administrative man. He
6 had had dealings with the Navy over considerable periods of
7 time. Colonel Phillips was a far more competent man on
8 field work and training. A far more competent man.

9 Mr. Murphy: Isn't it so -- excuse me, go ahead.

10 General Short: This November 27, if anything was going
11 to come of it, it was going to come of it as field work.

12 Mr. Murphy: That is the trouble. It was going to
13 come of it as field work.

14 General Short: If anything came he was the more competent.

15 Mr. Murphy: In other words, you were field work con-
16 scious, weren't you?

17 General Short: I am talking fighting.

18 Mr. Murphy: Are you talking about the air, though? I
19 don't mean about the infantry.

20 General Short: He knew more than any staff officer I
21 had of the fighting, the combined Army.

22 Mr. Murphy: How could he when he is presiding as Chief
23 of Staff over a staff conference of your organization in-
24 telligently discuss with your staff what was going on if he
25 wasn't in conferences where the two services got together?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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General Short: I think I had better explain those conferences were conducted.

Mr. Murphy: I wish you would, and will you --

Senator Ferguson: I don't think the witness had completed his answer.

The Vice Chairman: Let him finish his question first.

Mr. Murphy: I wish you would discuss that. General, I don't want to interrupt. But in that connection I wish you would tell us what staff conference, if any, was had by the Army between November 27 and the date of the attack.

Shefner
Flows

WARD & PAUL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 General Short: The conferences were habitually held
3 on Saturday morning.

4 Mr. Murphy: Was there one held on December the 6th?

5 General Short: There was.

6 Mr. Murphy: All right. Now go ahead.

7 General Short: And the Chief of Staff conducted these
8 conferences but he did not do all the talking. Each staff
9 officer, the head of each section was called upon in turn.
10 If he had anything of interest or importance he discussed
11 it. If the Chief of Staff had anything to add to it, or
12 if some other section of the General Staff was interested
13 in the thing and had some additional information it was
14 brought in.

15 Mr. Murphy: You say there was a conference --

16 The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your answer, Gen-
17 eral?

18 General Short: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: All right.

20 Mr. Murphy: Now, there was a staff conference on De-
21 cember the 6th, 1941?

22 General Short: There was.

23 Mr. Murphy: And who were present at it, General?

24 General Short: I think -- I was not present at it but
25 I am sure that all of the General Staff and probably the

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 special staff were present at it.

3 Mr. Murphy: Well, you were not present, at any rate,
4 to give them the benefit of what you knew about what the Navy
5 knew, isn't that right?

6 General Short: That is correct.

7 Mr. Murphy: And there was no one else in your organiza-
8 tion who discussed anything from a staff standpoint with
9 Admiral Kimmel, was there?

10 General Short: I am sure that Phillips knew anything of
11 importance that I knew.

12 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, you said there was no
13 one--

14 General Short: He was present.

15 Mr. Murphy: You said before he was not.

16 General Short: Oh, yes. He conducted the conference.

17 Mr. Murphy: Oh, no, I beg your pardon, we are misunder-
18 standing each other. Phillips, your Chief of Staff, was not
19 at the formal conferences with the Navy?

20 General Short: No, sir, he was not.

21 Mr. Murphy: That is right. Now, then, he is the one
22 presiding over the staff conference and yet he had not been
23 present at the conferences with the other service, isn't that
24 correct?

25 General Short: That is correct.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

3 General Short: That is correct, but he knew what had
4 taken place.

5 Mr. Murphy: He knew only what you told him, isn't that
6 right?

7 General Short: That is correct.

8 Mr. Murphy: And he never saw the reports as such or
9 what went on or did not have the benefit of looking over these
10 people as they discussed things and sizing them up. He took
11 what you told him about what went on, isn't that correct?

12 General Short: That is correct.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, do you know whether the man from
14 the Engineers was requested by the Staff conference to give
15 his impressions as to what went on at the conference?

16 General Short: I don't know whether he gave his impres-
17 sion or not. He was there and if he thought there was any-
18 thing that needed to be added I am sure that he would have
19 added it.

20 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield right on that
21 point for one question?

22 Mr. Murphy: Yes, surely.

23 Senator Lucas: General Short, did Colonel Phillips
24 know about the war warning message that came from the Navy?

25 General Short: Oh, I am sure he did because that mes-

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 sage -- it happens that that particular message was not de-
3 livered to me personally, I think, but delivered to the G-3
4 section and unquestionably he brought it to me from the G-3
5 section.

6 Senator Lucas: It is your opinion that he saw that
7 message?

8 General Short: I am confident that he knew exactly what
9 was in the message.

10 Mr. Murphy: I thought, General, that Layton testified --
11 oh, no, that was the 24th, I beg your pardon -- no; I thought
12 it was Layton who testified that he delivered that war warn-
13 ing message to you personally.

14 General Short: I may be confused but I think the mes-
15 sage of the 24th was delivered to me personally but that the
16 message of the 27th was delivered to Colonel or Major Donne-
17 gan in charge of the G-3 section. It might have been the
18 other way around, but I do not think so.

19 Mr. Murphy: Now I wish you would turn to page 534 of the
20 Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings. I would like to read ques-
21 tion 838:

22 "General Grunert: One question, here. Somewhere
23 in my notes, here, I have something to the effect that
24 your Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, stated that he
25 was not informed as to what took place at your confer-

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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ences with the Admiral. Did you keep him informed, or did you discuss with him what happened?

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"General Short: Anything of any importance, I am sure I discussed with him. We were on a very friendly personal basis" --

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you are meaning there that you were on a very friendly basis with your own Chief of Staff?

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General Short: That is correct.

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Mr. Murphy: Yes. (Reading)

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"--and I am sure that if I picked up any piece of information that I thought was of any importance -- and I know that I talked to him about certain task forces, because when it came to sending an officer along, why, he would be the one that would get out the order."

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Now, that was a very accurate statement as far as what Phillips knew as to what the Navy was doing?

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General Short: That is a correct statement.

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Mr. Murphy: Then you told him whatever you thought was of importance?

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General Short: That is a correct statement.

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Mr. Murphy: And you then attended meetings with the Navy on November the 27th and December the 1st and December the 2nd and December the 3rd and then a meeting between Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeiffer on December the 4th where there

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 were many Navy men present, at least at some of the meetings
3 and not your own Chief of Staff, isn't that right?

4 General Short: I don't know who was present between
5 Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeiffer. On December 2nd there
6 was nobody but Admiral Kimmel and me. On December 3rd in all
7 probability Admiral Bloch was there, I don't remember defin-
8 itely and I do not know what additional naval officers were
9 there. I think in all probability that Major Fleming was
10 with me, although General Martin may have been.

11 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I would like to ask you to turn
12 to page 522 of the same record, question 790:

13 "General Grunert: The notes on the testimony before
14 the Roberts Commission indicates that General Wilson,
15 commanding the 24th Division, was never called in con-
16 ference or consulted regarding the warning message of
17 November 27th."

18 Was that a correct statement?

19 General Short: I sent a staff officer the afternoon I
20 received the message to General Wilson to explain exactly what
21 was in the message. I did not scatter copies around on ac-
22 count of limiting the strictly secret information as I had been
23 directed.

24 General Wilson had the north sector, which was much
25 less populated than the south sector and where we feared much

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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less subversive measures or sabotage. There were practically no changes made in the alert, in the sabotage alert as prescribed in our standing operating procedure in General Wilson's sector.

On the other hand, in General Murray's sector, the south sector, as a result of inspections by General Murray and by Colonel Fielder we very largely revamped the guard system in that sector, which was the more dangerous of the two sectors.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, General, General Wilson said he was never consulted about the war warning, and that is a correct statement.

General Short: But he does not say that he did not have the message, intelligence on the message of November 27th. A staff officer was personally sent to him to explain.

Mr. Murphy: Well, do you know that?

General Short: I do know it, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Who did explain it to him?

General Short: I do not know the name of the staff officer. I directed that the staff officers be sent and I know they were sent.

Mr. Murphy: Well, let me read you a little bit more.

"General Short: Did he say he got it from the Division Officer?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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"General Grunert: He said he was never consulted.

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"General Short: He had the north sector where the anti-sabotage work was not nearly as serious. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, I may not have had any with Wilson.

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"General Grunert: Wilson thought the Navy had an inshore and offshore patrol. Why was he not instructed and informed?

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"General Short: His job was quite different from that of the other divisions. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, and I had Murray personally inspect every post and he came back to me with recommendations and made a lot of changes --

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"General Grunert (interposing). That was in connection with your Alert 1?

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"General Short: Yes.

"General Grunert: But in connection with the possibility of his giving advice as to any other alert, he, Wilson, did not have any information?

"General Short: I did not have any conference with him as to whether he wanted to advise me as to something different."

Now, at any rate, General, Wilson was not at that meeting on Saturday morning, December 6th, was he?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 General Short: No, sir.

3 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, let us come to Colonel Fielder,
4 at the bottom of page 522, question 795. Colonel Fielder, he
5 was your G-2, wasn't he?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 "General Grunert: Colonel Fielder says he dis-
8 cussed the possibility of an attack with the Commanding
9 General in a purely academic way. I do not quite under-
10 stand how there is anything academic about discussing
11 the possibility of an attack.

12 "General Short: I do not. We discussed the pos-
13 sibility, probably because he was G-2 and was supposed to
14 have some information."

15 Do you know whether or not G-2, - what he meant by "a
16 purely academic way?"

17 General Short: I do not know why he used that termin-
18 ology, but he had more information on sabotage than anybody in
19 the Department. He had a very through understanding of it.

20 Mr. Murphy: About sabotage?

21 General Short: And any internal disorders and was sup-
22 posed to know more about what the Japanese population in Hawaii
23 were doing and thinking than anybody in the Department.

24 Mr. Murphy: That was covered very well by everybody,
25 but what about the air warning and the messages of the Navy?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Why didn't he see that or why was he left out of that con-
3 ference with the Navy?

4 General Short: Because we had no message of an air
5 warning.

6 Mr. Murphy: Well, the Navy had McMorris there, didn't
7 they, their war plans man? He was their war plans man, wasn't
8 he, McMorris?

9 General Short: He was the war plans man.

10 Mr. Murphy: Yes. Why didn't you have your war plans
11 man there if you were going to have a conference?

12 General Short: It was entirely up to me whom to bring.
13 McMorris I do not think was -- I am not sure but I do not
14 think he was in on the conference all the time. He was im-
15 mediately available where Admiral Kimmel could call him in.
16 That was true of all of Admiral Kimmel's staff. I took with
17 me to that conference General Martin, who was the head of my
18 air force, and Colonel Mollison, who was his Chief of Staff.
19 This was an air conference. They were the two best men, the
20 two best informed men in the Department on the situation. It
21 was perfectly logical to take them.

22 Mr. Murphy: General, you say it was an air conference
23 but it had nothing to do with the message of November the 27th,
24 did it?

25 General Short: Not directly because we had not received

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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the message.

Mr. Murphy: That is right, you did not get that message until some time around two o'clock in the afternoon and this meeting in the morning for about three hours was about something else entirely, wasn't it?

General Short: But it necessarily covered all the elements of danger because the conference was about the reinforcement of Midway and Wake by Army planes, but we had discussed the danger connected with the reinforcement and the danger connected with lessening the air equipment at Oahu.

Mr. Murphy: Did you ever at any time between November the 27th and December the 7th have your staff and the naval staff together to discuss the war warning?

General Short: There never was any time that I know of, and I have not heard of any time in the past, where the complete Army and Navy staff were assembled. If any previous commander ever did so I never heard of it.

Mr. Murphy: Now, your key officers, did you assemble them, I mean your G-3 and your G-2?

General Short: We did not.

Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to page 525, question 803. Do you have that, General, at the bottom of the page?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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"General Grunert: 'Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, informed the staff at a meeting on December 6 that the Japs were burning papers on December 5. Says it meant that war was imminent, to him.' Did he so inform his Chief of Staff or his Commanding General? If so, what conclusions were reached with regard to it?"

"General Short: I am sure he didn't inform me."
As a matter of fact, General, you did not see him about that until the next day, did you?

General Short: Well, I think that I did not but both my G-2, Colonel Fielder, and my Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, stated in their testimony before the Roberts Commission that they did inform me that they were burning papers. Colonel Fielder also stated to the Roberts Commission that he attached no importance to it because we did the same every day and he thought it was a routine burning of papers.

Mr. Murphy: Well, the fact is, General, that you did testify here and again in these hearings that you did not know about that until the next day.

General Short: All right, will you give me the quotations?

Mr. Murphy: All right. Now, you say that you did not testify on several occasions --

General Short: I am asking you to give me the quota-

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 tions where I did testify.

3 Mr. Murphy: I will.

4 Mr. Keefe: Why not do it now? You said you were going
5 to do it half a dozen times and you haven't done it. I
6 would like to get it while the General is being interrogated
7 on the subject.

8 Mr. Murphy: Be calm, I have the references here and I
9 have a thousand pages here. I promise you I will.

10 General Short: I would like to have the references so
11 that I can judge which one it was.

12 Mr. Murphy: I cannot turn to it right now, but I will
13 later.

14 Now, your Assistant G-2 said he thought that the burning
15 of papers meant that war was imminent. You were not at the
16 staff conference. Did anybody tell you, did your Assistant
17 G-2 tell you on December the 6th that he thought war was im-
18 minent and about that being discussed at the conference?

19 General Short: Not the Assistant G-2, he did not tell
20 me that. G-2 says he told me that they had been burning pa-
21 pers and he apparently -- he had heard the talk and the re-
22 port of the Assistant G-2. He apparently did not consider
23 it a matter of importance, and I wish to invite your atten-
24 tion to one thing further.

25 Bicknell said he got this information on the fifth.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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If he had considered it so terrifically important he would not wait till the morning of the sixth to report it.

Mr. Murphy: All I know, General, is that here is one of your staff saying under oath that he thought that war was imminent and that he discussed it at a staff meeting and you do not go to the staff meeting and apparently nobody tells you that in that staff meeting there was a feeling that war was imminent on the part of at least one person there, isn't that right?

General Short: And he also stated that he received the information on December 5th and apparently he did not tell Colonel Fielder and he did not tell me, which would not indicate that he attached such great importance to see that we got it.

Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate he was right, wasn't he?

General Short: He was right in that respect. He was a much less experienced man than the G-2.

Mr. Murphy: Now, may I ask counsel, do you have handy exhibit 37, the basic exhibit?

Mr. Masten: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to exhibit No. 37, the last paper. I think I can make it clear to the General, it is just a one sentence dispatch.

General, on December 6th, 1941 there was sent from

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 COM Fourteen, "ACTION: OPNAV," Information for the Navy:

3 "Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one
4 system although presumably not included your eighteen
5 double five of third."

6 Did you have any information from the Navy that they
7 had sent word to Washington that the Japs at Honolulu were
8 destroying their systems?

9 General Short: I did not.

10 Mr. Murphy: Now, did you have any information from the
11 Navy that on December the 6th a message was sent to Admiral
12 Kimmel:

13 "In view of the international situation and the
14 exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands you may
15 authorize the destruction by them of secret and confi-
16 dential documents now or under later conditions of
17 greater emergency X Means of communication to support
18 our current operations and special Intelligence should
19 of course be maintained until the last moment."

20 Did the Navy tell you about that?

21 General Short: They did not.

22 Mr. Murphy: You were not in any conference on any day
23 from the third on, were you, with the Navy?

24 General Short: That is correct.

25 Mr. Murphy: Right. Did you know from the Navy that

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 they had a dispatch on the 4th of December about destroying
3 confidential publications and other matters at Guam?

4 General Short: I did not.

5 Mr. Murphy: Did you know from the Navy that on the 4th
6 of December -- I beg your pardon. On the 4th of December --
7 rather, the 3rd of December that there was a message sent
8 to them,--and this is important in view of your testimony,

9 General:

10 "Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo One
11 December ordered London HongKong Singapore and Manila
12 to destroy Machine XX Batavia machine already sent to
13 Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed de-
14 stroy X All but one copy of other systems X and all
15 secret documents XX British Admiralty London today re-
16 ports Embassy London has complied."

17 The Navy did not tell you about that either, did they?

18 General Short: They did not.

19 Mr. Murphy: Did you know from the Navy that on the 3rd
20 of December they had a message:

21 "Highly reliable information has been received that
22 categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday
23 to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong,
24 Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to
25 destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 burn all other important confidential and secret docu-
3 ments."

4 Did you get that either, General?

5 General Short: I did not.

6 Mr. Murphy: Now, General, as I read your testimony in
7 the other hearings you testified that if you had received the
8 one P.M. message that there were two matters in the message,
9 one the ultimatum, the date, the one o'clock hour, and the
10 other about the destruction of the codes and you said that
11 that would have much more importance to you than the one
12 o'clock business, is that right?

13 General Short: Will you restate that, because I do not
14 believe you made your meaning clear.

15 Mr. Murphy: All right. Will you read the question?

16 (Question read.)

17 Mr. Murphy: Do you understand that?

18 General Short: The one o'clock business included both;
19 that is the reason I did not understand your question.

20 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate did you attach great im-
21 portance to the information about the destruction of the
22 codes or to the fact that there was a one o'clock hour set?

23 General Short: It would have been a combination of both.

24 Mr. Murphy: Did you testify before the Navy -- excuse
25 me, I don't mean to interrupt.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 General Short: I think you are misquoting me again.

3 Mr. Murphy: Again I am misquoting you?

4 General Short: Yes.

5 Mr. Murphy: Well, then, General, I guess I had better
6 quote you exactly so that I won't be accused of that after
7 this hearing.

8 General Short: All right, sir.

9 Mr. Murphy: I want to be eminently fair with you, but
10 I want the facts. When did I misquote you before, General?

11 General Short: When you have read from the -- I cannot
12 say exactly when but a number of times you have made a state-
13 ment that I think did not coincide exactly with my testimony.

14 Mr. Murphy: You think I misquoted you?

15 General Short: I don't mean intentional at all, but
16 when we quote without reading it is pretty hard to state
17 definitely what has been said.

18 Mr. Murphy: Well, I will quote you exactly, General.
19 I now refer to page 256 of your testimony before the Navy
20 Court of Inquiry.

21 General Short: 256?

22 Mr. Murphy: 256, General, question 179.

23 General Short: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: Question mark. Period.

25 "General, would you have made a very quick re-

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 estimate of the situation and have ordered such an alert
3 had you had that scrambled telephone conversation with
4 General Marshall?

5 "A. I think I would because one thing struck me
6 very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the
7 code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made an
8 impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or
9 code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase.
10 I would have had this advantage also: I could have
11 asked him the significance to him. But leaving that
12 out, the code machine would have been very significant,
13 the destruction of the code machine would have been very
14 significant to me. I would have been very much more
15 alarmed about that than the other matter."

16 General, would that be misquoting you by what I said
17 about that message?

18 General Short: You may have drawn the wrong inference
19 from my answer.

20 Mr. Murphy: What did you mean by that?

21 General Short: I meant by that just the delivery of the
22 ultimatum, because at previous times they had stated that the
23 negotiations were practically terminated. I was not talking
24 about the one P.M. I was talking about the ultimatum.

25 Mr. Murphy: General, you say you were not talking about

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 the one o'clock message?

3 General Short: Not the hour. In my statement there I
4 was comparing the importance in my own mind of the state-
5 ment that the code machines were ordered destroyed and the
6 statement that the ultimatum, - that an ultimatum was to be
7 delivered, not the hour of the ultimatum but that an ulti-
8 matum was to be delivered; that is what I had in mind.

9 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, General, you were saying that
10 the code machine business was very significant to you, isn't
11 that right?

12 General Short: That is correct.

13 Mr. Murphy: Right. And the fact is that the Navy on
14 the third and the sixth had several messages about code de-
15 struction and then this from your own Honolulu to Washington
16 on the sixth sent a message to Washington, isn't that so?

17 General Short: Let me get your last statement.

18 Mr. Murphy: On the sixth they sent a message to Wash-
19 ington about the destruction of the system?

20 General Short: Who did?

21 Mr. Murphy: The Navy.

22 General Short: I believe that that is correct but I
23 knew nothing about any one of them.

24 Mr. Murphy: Well, let me quote it correctly so that
25 we won't have any charges against me that I am misquoting.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 I do not want to misquote you.

3 General Short: Yes, sir, I have the message that they
4 sent on the sixth.

5 Mr. Murphy: Well, I will read it exactly:

6 "Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one
7 system although presumably not included your eighteen
8 double five of third."

9 Do you see that, General?

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: And the fact is that you time and again in
12 this hearing have stated that Admiral Kimmel gave you every-
13 thing of importance, isn't that right?

14 General Short: No, sir. I said he gave, - I was pret-
15 ty sure that he gave me everything that he considered of
16 importance to me that I should know.

17 Mr. Murphy: At any rate you considered these messages
18 important?

19 General Short: Very important, yes.

20 Mr. Murphy: And the fact is that they were very im-
21 portant, as you have testified.

22 General Short: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: And you and Admiral Kimmel had no confer-
24 ence about the air messages and you say you had no confer-
25 ence with him after the third?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 General Short: The message on the third came in after
3 the conference.

4 Mr. Murphy: Well, you had no conference?

5 General Short: We had no conference and I did not get
6 the message.

7 Mr. Murphy: And it was your understanding that Admiral
8 Kimmel was not to give it to you unless Washington told him
9 to give it to you, is that right?

10 General Short: I think his practice was definitely
11 to transmit messages, as I said, only when he received in-
12 structions from Washington to do so. He might mention the
13 thing to me informally, but he did not transmit the message
14 to me.

15 Mr. Murphy: Did you know, General, that Admiral Kimmel
16 was getting a lot of information over the months from Manila?

17 General Short: I think that I knew that he was getting
18 something on location of Japanese intercepts, perhaps, but I
19 did not know of anything else that I remember.

20 Mr. Murphy: Well, did you know that he got a message
21 from Manila about the winds code?

22 General Short: No, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: He did not pass that on to you either, did
24 he?

25 General Short: No, sir, I never heard of the winds

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 code for many months afterwards.

3 Mr. Murphy: Well, let me quote exactly. Did you know
4 that there had been sent on the 28th of November from "CINCAF,
5 ACTION OPNAV, INFO: COM SIXTEEN CINCPAC COM FOURTEEN", a
6 message on the winds code which I believe is already in the
7 record?

8 General Short: I did not.

9 Mr. Murphy: Did you know that there was a message on the
10 1st of December from "COM SIXTEEN, ACTION: CINCAF, INFO:
11 CINCPAC, OPNAV, COM FOURTEEN, 011422", as follows:

12 "J-V-J PRESS TONIGHT IN CLOSING SEVENTEEN HUNDRED
13 SCHEDULE STATED QUOTE 'ALL LISTENERS BE SURE AND LISTEN
14 IN AT ZERO SEVEN ZERO ZERO AND ZERO SEVEN THIRTY
15 TOMORROW MORNING, SINCE THERE MAY BE IMPORTANT NEWS' UN-
16 QUOTE XX SUGGEST FREQUENCIES SEVEN THREE TWO SEVEN X
17 NINE FOUR THREE ZERO X AND ONE TWO TWO SEVEN FIVE X
18 TIMES TOKYO LCT."

19 Did the Navy ever tell you about that message?

20 General Short: They did not.

21 Mr. Murphy: Did you know that Admiral Kimmel subsequent
22 to the 27th of November instituted a twenty-four hour war
23 plan?

24 General Short: I don't know what you mean by a "twenty-
25 four hour war plan."

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Well, let me quote exactly. I am refer-
3 ring to exhibit 118 in this record;

4 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF.

5 Pearl Harbor, T.H.,

6 1200, 30 November, 1941.

7 "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese
8 War within the next Twenty-four Hours."

9 And then subsequently a revision of that on December the 5th,
10 1941. Did you know that the Navy had taken those steps?

11 General Short: No, sir, I did not.

12 Mr. Murphy: Don't you think if you had had conferences
13 with the Navy where these problems were discussed from Novem-
14 ber 27th on that you most certainly would have been told about
15 a twenty-four hour plan that the Navy had?

16 General Short: That was a later date, I believe, than any
17 of our conferences.

18 Mr. Murphy: Well, one was the 30th of November.

19 General Short: The 30th of November.

20 Mr. Murphy: That is when it was constituted and you had
21 a conference on the first, on the second, on the third and
22 Major Fleming with Colonel Pfeiffer on the fourth.

23 General Short: That is correct, but I was not told about
24 that.

25 Mr. Murphy: Well, don't you think you should have been?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 General Short: I have not read the thing. I could not
3 make a statement.

4 Mr. Murphy: Well, I ask you to look it over now, if
5 you will, General, please. It has been an exhibit for some
6 days. (Handing document to the witness.)

7 Have you examined it, General?

8 General Short: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Murphy: Had you any word of that plan?

10 General Short: I had not.

11 Mr. Murphy: General, a while ago, -- oh, I don't want to
12 go off this subject yet. Don't you think you should have been
13 told about the fact that they after the 27th had a twenty-four
14 hour plan and that on the very 5th of December they had a re-
15 vision of it?

16 General Short: I think if you read it carefully that
17 they had two things in there: First, the details of what he
18 was doing to carry out his instructions for a defensive de-
19 ployment and the next the naval details of what he expected to
20 do in case that he put war plans, - was directed to put War
21 Plans 46 into effect.

22 I do not believe that he would have thought it necessary
23 to tell me what he expected to do on details of that kind.
24 He possibly would have -- he probably would have told me if he
25 had ever, - when he put the thing into effect. You see, among

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 other things they are to include the bringing back from the
3 West Coast another carrier and he undoubtedly did not think
4 that that was a matter, - he had not ordered it back, he just
5 contemplated doing it if the war came on. I can see why he
6 did not tell me.

7 Mr. Murphy: The fact is that he did have three or four
8 days ahead -- may I have it so that I will quote it exactly,
9 please?

10 General Short: Yes.

11 Mr. Murphy: He did have a plan called, "Steps to be
12 taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next
13 twenty-four hours."

14 General Short: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: And do you or do you not think you should
16 have been told about the creation of that plan on the 30th
17 of November 1941 and the revision on December 5, 1941?

18 General Short: Looking it over it is practically all
19 details of ship movements, and so forth and I can readily
20 understand why he did not think it directly concerned me.

21 Mr. Murphy: General, war within twenty-four hours would
22 very much concern you, wouldn't it, as the General in Hawaii?

23 General Short: Yes, sir, but the location of a par-
24 ticular ship might not concern me.

25 Mr. Murphy: General Marshall did tell you your mission

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 was to protect the base and the naval communications and your
3 first concern was to protect the Fleet, didn't he?

4 General Short: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: And wouldn't you be concerned then if there
6 were going to be war involving the Fleet within twenty-four
7 hours?

8 General Short: If there was going to be?

9 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

10 General Short: Definitely, but I would not necessarily
11 be concerned whether cruiser A was here and B over here, or
12 vice versa.

13 Mr. Murphy: Would you be concerned whether the Fleet
14 was in or out of the harbor?

15 General Short: Very decidedly.

16 Mr. Murphy: Wouldn't the twenty-four hour plan affect
17 that very decidedly?

18 General Short: I do not believe as I looked over that
19 paper that there is any provision for the Fleet coming in
20 from outside the harbor except to come in long enough to re-
21 fuel and go out. That provision was there.

22 Mr. Murphy: Now, General, I wish you would come back to
23 page 525 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings.

24 General Short: That is correct.

25 Mr. Murphy: General Martin was your air officer, isn't

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 that right?

3 General Short: That is correct.

4 Mr. Murphy: Now, will you turn to question 80??

5 "General Grunert: And General Martin did not seem
6 to know that the Interceptor Command was not activated
7 until December 17.

8 "General Short: Well, the fact was it was actually
9 operating, and there was such a technical difference
10 there that apparently Bergin and Martin, neither one
11 realized it hadn't gone out as an order. It was actual-
12 ly operating daily."

13 Was there some confusion in Martin's and Bergin's mind
14 about the status of the air warning service?

15 General Short: I think it was more likely confusion in
16 reference to terms used because I think they both knew that
17 it was actually in operation. The printed order or typed
18 order putting it into operation did not go out until the 17th.

19 Mr. Murphy: In other words, prior to December the 17th
20 the air warning service was under the control of the Signal
21 Corps and had not yet been turned over to the Air Corps, isn't
22 that right?

23 General Short: That is not correct.

24 Mr. Murphy: It is not correct?

25 General Short: No, sir. They were operating on a basis

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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of cooperation. The control officer in every case was an Air officer. We had not put the whole thing directly under the Air people. The Signal were responsible for the training of the operators and for the training of the men at the information center, but whenever they operated they had an Air officer in control, the control officer was always an Air officer.

Mr. Murphy: Well, the Signal Corps --under the order of the 17th it went under the Air Corps, did it not?

General Short: Even for training, yes, and they were not under it for training previous to that time.

WARD & PAUL
SHERMAN & GRAY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: But after the 17th it would be under
3 the exclusive control of General Davidson?

4 General Short: For training and everything else.

5 Mr. Murphy: For training and everything else?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: Then before the 17th, the Signal Corps
8 was doing the training?

9 General Short: They were responsible for the train-
10 ing when they operated as part of an interceptor command.
11 The Air Control Officer actually controlled the whole
12 operation.

13 Mr. Murphy: Then on page 1103 --

14 General Short: 1163?

15 Mr. Murphy: No, you do not have this, General. I am
16 now referring to Transcript of Proceedings Before the
17 Army Pearl Harbor Board, pages 973 to 1105, in which I
18 find the following -- I do not think there is another copy
19 of this available, General. Will you come up and check
20 me as I am reading it, so I will have it correctly?

21 Lieutenant Colonel Karr: Just go ahead and read it.

22 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

23 "General Russell. You were not to go into action as
24 a pursuit officer until these other people who evaluated
25 the information, had evaluated it, and told you that

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.
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Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 hostile aircraft was enroute to the Island? That is the
3 situation, isn't it?

4 "Colonel Tyler. That is right, sir.

5 "General Russell. I think it was not your job to
6 evaluate this information?

7 "Colonel Tyler. No, sir, it was not."

8 Do you know whether or not that is true?

9 General Short: I will tell you how the thing func-
10 tioned.

11 We had an officer from the pursuit squadron right
12 there in the Information Center. If he looked on the board
13 when this report came in, he should have known exactly
14 where our own planes were, and when a plane was reported
15 at a certain place, and he knew that that was our own
16 plane, then he would not alert pursuit planes.

17 You see, there was no way at that time for the men
18 operating the oscilloscope saying "This is an enemy plane,"
19 or "This is a friendly plane." All he could say is "There
20 is a plane at such and such a place," and it was up to
21 the officer representing the pursuit people to try to
22 determine whether there was any possibility of a friendly
23 plane there before we opened fire, or before we sent some-
24 one out to shoot it down.

25 Mr. Murphy: General, on the floor of Congress time

Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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after time after time there have been castigations at this gentleman. I do not know who he is, except his name is Tyler.

As I understand it from reading this record, he was there and his duty was to order these pursuit planes where to go, after he had been told by somebody else that there was a problem that called for that being done.

Is that your understanding?

General Short: If the Interceptor Command had been operating at 7:20, which it was not, before he had the bomber squadron at Wheeler Field, there would have been a check-up by the pursuit officer to be sure we would not go up and knock down our own planes.

There was nobody at the station at 7:20, as I understand, but a man named McDonald, who was a telephone operator, and Lieutenant Tyler, because the station as such had been closed about 7 o'clock.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, wasn't it his job to direct the planes from the ground after someone said there was a reason for them to leave the ground?

General Short: Under the circumstances, I will tell you what I think he should have done. He should have called the Pursuit Command at Wheeler Field and they would have made the check then whether they had planes in that vicinity, before they sent anyone up to fire upon them.

Mr. Murphy: As a matter of fact, would not they then have to call you, or somebody else, to reverse Alert 1 and put into some other order so that they could take them off the ground?

General Short: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Who had the authority to alter Alert 1?

General Short: There was a provision in the Standing Operating Procedure that in case of a surprise attack the alert would go automatically into effect. They would notify me after they would put it into effect.

Mr. Murphy: What was he then? A lieutenant? Could a lieutenant do anything about that?

General Short: I beg pardon?

Mr. Murphy: I say he was only a lieutenant. It was Lieutenant Tyler, wasn't it?

General Short: Yes, sir.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: He says at page 1101:

3 "General Russell and you knew the only thing you had
4 to do was to get in touch with the people who could put
5 those planes up, isn't that true?"

6 "Colonel Tyler: That is not exactly true, sir, because
7 we had nothing on the alert. We had no planes."

8 Would he be in error in that respect?

9 General Short: He would be in error. I have checked
10 that statement of his with General Davidson, who was the
11 Pursuit Commander at Wheeler Field, and he said there would
12 have been no question, that if he had received a message
13 from Tyler to alert the command he would have turned out
14 everything. He would have immediately checked afterwards
15 to find out whether there was justification for it, but the
16 first thing he would have done was to alert the command.

17 Mr. Murphy: In other words, the Second Lieutenant would
18 identify the planes as being enemy planes?

19 General Short: He would not, because he did not have
20 the information there. The station was closed. In normal
21 times there would be a pursuit officer there whose business
22 would be to identify them.

23 May I call your attention to paragraph 13. I think
24 that will answer you. The last two lines, or part of the
25 last three lines.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: "-- will be initiated by Department Order
3 except in the case of a surprise hostile attack."

4 General Short: In case of a surprise hostile attack
5 it went into effect automatically, it did not have to be
6 put into effect by the Department.

7 Mr. Murphy: In other words, if this lieutenant knew
8 there were any planes --

9 General Short: (Interposing) He could put it into
10 effect by simply calling the Pursuit Command, and they would
11 start operations and then notify me. The first thing they
12 would have done would be to start operations.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to page 517,
14 General, of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Question 764:

(4) 15 "General Frank. It strikes me that right within the
16 Army itself you had a situation between the Air Force and
17 the Signal Corps where this A.W.S. was operating on a co-
18 operative basis rather than on a positive command basis.

19 "General Short. Because it had not reached a state
20 of training where we thought it could work to the best
21 advantage.

22 "General Frank. But if the vast proportion of the
23 people concerned with its operation were Air Force people --

24 "General Short. (Interposing) Not the technical opera-
25 tion. The operation of the communications and the radar

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 system is definitely for the Signal Corps."

3 That is a correct statement?

4 General Short: That is absolutely correct. There
5 probably may have been ten times as many men of the Signal
6 Corps working as of the Air Corps.

7 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, General, we have a letter
8 placed in the record from Admiral Kimmel ordering the Navy
9 not to bunch the planes but to disperse them, and then, as
10 I remember it, the testimony was that the ones that were
11 dispersed and anchored in the Bay were destroyed and the ones
12 that were together were not destroyed.

13 General Short: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, your planes were bunched,
15 based upon a survey of General Burwell, isn't that correct?

16 General Short: That is correct. It was a very extensive
17 survey.

18 Mr. Murphy: I now direct your attention to page 526 --
19 by the way, I will get through in ten minutes -- page 526,
20 question 808:

21 "General Grunnert: General Rudolph, the Commanding
22 General of the bombers, stated that had he had any intimation
23 of preceding trouble his planes would not have been bunched
24 or concentrated but would have been ready for the air. Then,
25 in parenthesis, 'especially on a Sunday morning' parenthesis.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "Was he not informed by the Commanding General, or the
3 Commanding General of the Air Forces, of the warnings of
4 the immediate past?

5 "General Short: I went over the thing very fully with
6 General Martin, talked over with him at as great length as
7 anybody. I would imagine that he talked with his subordinate
8 commanders."

9 Would that be a proper subject for discussion at that
10 meeting on Saturday morning?

11 General Short: No, sir. I mean General Rudolph was
12 not present at that meeting.

13 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, General Martin, if General
14 Rudolph was telling the truth, should have passed on the
15 message to him, is that right?

16 General Short: He should have passed on the message to
17 him. I do not know whether he did or not. I would like
18 to read General Martin's report, what he says about that
19 in his report to the War Department.

20 Mr. Murphy: I wish you would.

21 General Short: I would also say, in view of General
22 Burwell's extensive study -- in the first place, General
23 Rudolph could not have dispersed those B-17's because you
24 did not dare take them off the runways, the ground was so
25 soft that you would have never gotten them into the air if

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 you had.

3 I would like to read this:

4 "8 DECEMBER 1941

5 "CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES WASHINGTON DC

6 "MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON QUESTIONS ASKED BY GENERAL
7 ARNOLD: COMMAND ALERTED PREVENTION SABOTAGE REQUIRED CON-
8 CENTRATION RATHER THAN DISPERSION STOP ALL PLANES NOW DIS-
9 PERSED COMMA PURSUIT IN BUNKERS STOP BOMBERS CANNOT BE
10 BUNKERED ON ACCOUNT OF SOFT GROUND OFF RUNWAYS STOP LOCAL
11 JOINT AGREEMENT PLACES RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEARCH ON NAVY
12 WHO MAY CALL ON ARMY FOR HELP WHEN THOUGHT NECESSARY STOP
13 PLANES IN FERRY FLIGHT ALL LAND OAHU TWO LANDED SMALL FIELDS
14 AND WERE BADLY DAMAGED COMMA ONE DESTROYED BY GUNFIRE AND
15 ONE BADLY DAMAGED STOP ATTACK SO PERFECTLY EXECUTED SURPRISE
16 ATTACK IN STRICT ACCORD WITH OUR PRESCRIBED TACTICS STOP
17 DIVE BOMBER WAS HIGHLY ACCURATE STOP EVERY EFFORT MADE
18 WITH THE BOMBERS LEFT TO LOCATE CARRIERS WITHOUT SUCCESS STOP
19 CASUALTIES DEAD SIX OFFICERS TWO HUNDRED SEVEN ENLISTED MEN
20 COMMA WOUNDED SOME SERIOUSLY THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVEN
21 ENLISTED MEN 'STOP MORALE HIGH.

22 "MARTIN."

23 Mr. Murphy: Now, General, will you kindly go to page
24 524 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, question 800:

25 "General Grunnert: You had a conference once a week.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 What did you confer on if it were not what the condition
3 of things was and what should or should not be done, and
4 so forth? I do not know whether this is the truth, but
5 that is what is in the record, and we will question about it.

6 "General Short: Undoubtedly that is correct. Burgin
7 was not in on the weekly conferences. I did confer with the
8 staff.

9 "General Grunnert: Then the weekly conference was a
10 staff conference and not a conference with subordinate commanders?

11 "General Short: No. We had a conference with subordinate
12 commanders on irregular occasions, whenever there was something
13 we thought we should take up with them."

14 Do you know whether there was a staff conference with
15 the subordinate commanders between November 27 and December 7?

16 General Short: I had a conference with General Martin
17 and General Burgin within an hour or an hour and a half after
18 the receipt of the November 27 message. I had probably at
19 least four or five conferences with General Murray, who was
20 commanding the Division in the South Sector. I do not be-
21 lieve I had a conference with General Wilson in the North
22 Sector, because there was nothing in particular that I felt
23 I needed to confer with him about.

24 Mr. Murphy: General, if you had had all of the radar
25 that you had ordered present, would you have had any different

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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schedule on Sunday morning December 7, in view of the situation as it then confronted you?

General Short: In view of the parts situation and in view of the fact that we had to train men, I doubt if I would.

I would like to read you, in that connection, a reference to this spare parts. This is a memorandum made out on yesterday.

" WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

24 January 1946

MEMORANDUM:

"I have examined the budget estimate for the FY's 1941 and 1942 and, in addition, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the first appropriated funds for the maintenance and operation of Radar sets SCR 270 were in the Third Supplemental Estimate, Fiscal Year 1942, page 35, submitted 13 November 1941, which was approved by the Congress on 17 December 1941. The original planning for these funds was made 10 October 1941 (preliminary estimate, F.Y. 1942).

"These appropriated funds were for the operation of this type of set for a period of two hours per day, five days a week, and 50 weeks a year to provide training of

(6)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 personnel in the operation of this equipment."

3 That was signed by K. C. Lawton, Colonel, Signal Corps.

4 That shows what the War Department planned their estimate
5 of funds on, and that was two hours operation a day five days
6 a week.

7 Mr. Murphy: Now, General, I would like to ask you, if
8 you will --

9 General Short: (Interposing) In connection with that,
10 there is a statement here from Major Berquist, now Colonel
11 Berquist, who was our Chief Control Officer and who was one
12 of the two officers who had some training prior to the
13 return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell. This is
14 from Volume 10, pages 1197 and 1198 of the Army Pearl Harbor
15 Board. This is a paraphrase and not a direct quotation:

16 "The design of the gasoline engines was defective and
17 we had very serious trouble. We had very serious trouble
18 with electric power failures."

19 He also said in connection with this number of hours,
20 on page 1197, and again I paraphrase:

21 "Colonel Berquist pointed out that some of the enlisted
22 men had been ruining their eyes because we had to keep them
23 on the radar work too long."

24 Now he was the man who was actively in charge of the
25 operation of the radar and Interceptor Command, the man that

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 we thought had the most knowledge.

3 Mr. Murphy: Berquist?

4 General Short: Berquist.

5 Mr. Murphy: Now in that connection I direct your atten-
6 tion to page 1088 of the hearing before the Army Pearl Harbor
7 Board. You do not have that.

8 "General Grunnert: But if somebody came down there
9 and said 'we have got to get this thing going, anything is
10 liable to pop any minute' you might have shortened up the
11 time?"

12 This is General Grunnert questioning Commander Taylor.

13 General Short: Yes.

14 Mr. Murphy: "Commander Taylor: I think both Berquist
15 and Taylor had that attitude, but unfortunately we could
16 not get that much information out of the people we dealt with.

17 "General Grunnert: Could not Berquist or Powell, or
18 you, as far as the Navy was concerned, have had access to
19 the Chief of Staff and said, 'The most important thing is
20 lacking. We have got to get it in'?

21 "Commander Taylor: We saw the Chief of Staff, but we
22 found that somebody else was always responsible.

23 "General Grunnert: So they were not sufficiently im-
24 pressed to make this their business or push it in comparison
25 with all the other things they had to do?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(7)

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "Commander Taylor: No, sir, they lacked the power
3 packs to get it going.

4 "General Grunnert: General Short expressed himself as
5 most concerned about getting this in. It seems to me if
6 you had approached him he would have been able to do something
7 about it. Do you know whether or not permanent radar equip-
8 ment had been on the island awaiting construction projects
9 such as roads, cables, and so forth?

10 "Commander Taylor: It could be, sir, but not according
11 to the Signal Corps. My information is from the Signal Corps
12 Officers on the station."

13 Do you know whether or not that is a correct statement?

14 General Short: Commander Taylor was a Naval Officer
15 and probably did not know as much about the details of what
16 was required and what had not been received as Colonel Powell
17 would have known. There was one thing that we had definitely
18 not received. I think it was sent from the States about
19 December 10 or 12. That was the plans for the erection of
20 the radar towers. The engineer could not go ahead and erect
21 those towers until he got the plans of the footings that
22 had been provided for in the specifications in the States,
23 and those were not received until after the attack.

24 Mr. Murphy: I understand he is talking here, General,
25 about the air warning service that was operating.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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General Short: As far as that is concerned, as I pointed out yesterday, on the station at Haleakula, in the park, the negotiations with the park people lasted from June 1940 to April 1941, and I personally had a conference with the head of the park system before we got that straightened out. So we were not asleep at the switch.

Mr. Murphy: I am thoroughly familiar with that. You made every effort, and you had your difficulties, but, as I understand it, Commander Taylor is talking about the mobile sets. He may be talking about the permanent sets, but I am not sure.

General Short: I am talking about the permanent sets.

Mr. Murphy: Yes, sir. He says this:

"General Grunnert: There was one remark that set me back when I saw it in your testimony. You said you never saw Short. Was he not the Commanding General and was he not around there?"

"Commander Taylor: I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff."

General Short: May I state there that Commander Taylor, being a Naval Officer, a Junior Naval Officer, may not have felt that he could come to me, but I am sure Colonel Powell, my Signal Officer, told him he could come to me any time, and he was the man who was responsible, although Taylor was helping him out.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Now I want to conclude, General, by
3 asking you to go to the supplemental part of the Army
4 Pearl Harbor Board hearing.

5 General Short: We have it here. Is it part of the
6 Roberts Commission?

7 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

8 Now, the bottom of page 1619, the fifth paragraph up,
9 beginning, "Now, General."

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

12 "The Chairman. Now, General, have you in mind the
13 contents of General Marshall's message of the morning
14 of December 7? You have in mind its content, have you?

15 "General Short. You mean the one --

16 "The Chairman. That never reached you.

17 "General Short. --"that didn't come until 2:58; yes,
18 sir. I know exactly what it was.

19 "The Chairman. If that message had reached you, let
20 us say, three hours before the attack, would have that
21 changed your dispositions?

22 "General Short. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone
23 immediately to either -- to at least an alert against an
24 air attack, and I probably would have gone against a
25 complete attack, because it looked so significant.

1 Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 "The Chairman. Well, can you tell me what was in
3 that message that would have stirred you up?

4 "General Short: The thing that would have affected
5 me more than the other matter was the fact that they had
6 ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us that
7 means just one thing; that they are going into an entirely
8 new phase, and that they want to be perfectly sure that
9 the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of
10 three or four days. That would have been extremely signifi-
11 cant to me, the code machine, much more significant than
12 just the ultimatum."

13 That was what I was referring to a while ago.

14 General Short: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, if the Navy had given you
16 that information on any of those days about the codes, you
17 probably would have gone into a more serious alert; is
18 that right?

19 General Short: Yes, sir. It would have been very
20 significant. I would like to call your attention to the
21 fact that when I made this statement about the ultimatum
22 that I had no conception of what that ultimatum consisted
23 of as magic as shown us. Here I found out how serious
24 it was. At that time I had no idea what it was.

25 Mr. Murphy: But, General, all we are interested in

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h3 2 is what you knew on December 7. Not hindsight.

3 General Short: Yes, sir. That is the reason for my
4 making the statement. I did not know the seriousness of
5 what the War Department had received.

6 Mr. Murphy: Now, you will recall that I said I
7 would show you in the transcript where you said you hadn't
8 seen the information until the next day.

9 Will you come to the next question?

10 "General McCoy. Didn't you have on the night of the
11 6th a bit of information from your intelligence officer
12 that they were burning the consular records?

13 "General Short: No, sir, I did not know anything
14 about that until probably the afternoon of the 7th, that
15 they had. I think that he did get some information that
16 they had burned something.

17 "General McCoy: It was not given to you?

18 "General Short: It was not given to me."

19 Isn't that what I said before?

20 General Short: As I have explained, I may have, in
21 the first part, thought that he meant the information given
22 me the following day about burning codes, and at that time
23 I did not remember, as I have stated, about the burning
24 of papers, but after reading the testimony of Colonel Fielder
25 and Colonel Phillips, I am sure the report was made to me

1 Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 of the burning of the papers on Saturday morning of the
3 6th.

4 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you did say at page 1620:

5 "As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had
6 really burned anything until the time that the FBI arrested
7 them on the 7th; they interrupted the burning. I wasn't
8 cognizant of the fact that they had burned the previous
9 day."

10 You did say that?

11 General Short: I believed that at the time. When
12 I later saw the Chief of Staff, I knew that my memory was
13 at fault. I am perfectly willing to accept your statement.

14 Mr. Murphy: General McCoy did say:

15 "And you would consider that a serious slip on the
16 part of your intelligence officer, then?"

17 "General Short: Well, that is a little questionable,
18 General, because we burn every day. Any secret stuff
19 that we are destroying, we burn to be sure that there is
20 no chance of helping somebody break the code, and I
21 wouldn't have been surprised if the Japanese consul's
22 office was burning every day. It wouldn't have surprised
23 me at all to learn that they habitually burned everything
24 in their waste-baskets every day. I don't know that I
25 would have gotten terribly excited about just the burning

h4

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h6

2 Mr. Murphy: You were at a social affair at Schofield
3 Barracks, some kind of a relief proposition, on the night
4 of the 6th?

5 General Short: That is correct.

6 Mr. Murphy: And the Air Corps had a party that evening
7 but not in this building?

8 General Short: On an entirely different post.

9 Mr. Murphy: At a different post?

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: Now I come to page 1622, the third
12 paragraph:

13 "General McCoy. And, as I remember it, you had in
14 mind, however, not any fear of an attack at that time,
15 and that you were trying to get warning of that, but that
16 you were trying to get the personnel accustomed to the
17 worst time, the most dangerous time?

18 "General Short: Frankly, that is more nearly correct,
19 that I was more serious about the training, rather than
20 expecting something to happen at that time."

21 That would be about the radar?

22 General Short: About all material.

23 Mr. Murphy: About everything.

24 General Short: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: Right.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h7

2 Now, then, General, I come down to page 1622, the
3 bottom of the page. The other day I made some statement
4 about the radar being on a volunteer basis, and at that
5 time you felt that wasn't correct. I believe you said
6 yesterday that it was on a more or less voluntary basis?

7 General Short: It was, as far as Sunday was concerned.

8 Mr. Murphy: That is what I meant.

9 General Short: And over hours. They were working
10 more than the prescribed hours.

11 Mr. Murphy: I think this will answer it squarely.
12 I direct your attention to the question at the bottom of
13 the page.

14 "Admiral Standley: In one of the affidavits made by
15 your officers, the affidavit of Grover C. White, the
16 Second Lieutenant, Signal Corps, he says, 'On Saturday,
17 December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to
18 request authority to have all stations operate from 4 a.m.
19 to 7 a.m. only, December 7, 1941.'

20 "General Short. Yes, sir.

21 "Admiral Standley: 'This was agreed to by the Control
22 Officer.' Have you any information as to why that request
23 was made that way on that Saturday?

24 "General Short. I haven't any information except I
25 had ordered these stations to work only from four until

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 seven, and then they were supposed to carry on routine
3 training for the rest of the day. In agreement, they had
4 gotten together and decided that if they carried on until
5 11 o'clock in the morning as a body, they would get more
6 out of it than they would if they went on their own after
7 7 o'clock, and they had agreed among themselves that they
8 would carry on the training three teams at a time until
9 11 o'clock and from thereon to four they would be on their
10 own and making repairs, and things of that kind. So that
11 since I had not ordered that, and they were doing it by
12 agreement, they apparently thought that they could eliminate
13 it on Sunday, by agreement. That's the only way I can
14 account for it.

15 "The Chairman. In other words, they were not going
16 to do the training after 7 o'clock on Sunday?

17 "General Short. On Sunday. They had agreed that
18 just on Sunday alone, in place of working right straight
19 through, they would stop at 7 o'clock on Sunday.

20 "Admiral Standley: We have a great many coincidences
21 in this incident here on the 7th.

22 "General Short: Yes, sir.

23 "Admiral Standley: And this is one of them. I was
24 trying to see if there was any reason why that request was
25 made on that Saturday, not to work after 7 o'clock in the

h8

WASH. STATE ARCHIVES

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h9

2 morning on Sunday.

3 "General Short: I think it was only because it was
4 Sunday, and they were working every day practically from
5 4 o'clock in the morning until four o'clock in the after-
6 noon, making a good long training day, and then they
7 decided that on Sunday they would chop off Sunday hours,
8 the only way I can figure it. They were working 12 hours
9 a day the other days."

10 Then, the next question:

11 "Admiral Standley: General, under the date of 5
12 November, 1941, you issued a Standing Operating Procedure.
13 That was signed by Adjutant General Colonel Robert H.
14 Dunlop, and you stated that copies of this were furnished
15 the Navy."

16 In that connection, General, the Army have testified
17 that they did not get a copy of your Standing Operating
18 Procedure of November 5 until sometime in early 1942.

19 Do you know whether or not that is correct?

20 General Short: I have no way of knowing. The Army
21 regulations at that time had a prescribed distribution of
22 every order that we issued, every paper of any kind the
23 Adjutant General was supposed to mail to Washington without
24 letter of transmittal, these various things, to meet the
25 Army regulations. The only record that was made of the

1 Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h10

2 mailing of these things was when the document was secret
3 and this was not a secret document. I have talked
4 with General Dunlop, who is here in town, and was Adjutant
5 General, and he says the fact that it was distributed by
6 the Adjutant General to all of the units in the Department
7 would make him sure that he must have sent it to Washing-
8 ton, but there would be no record of that, because it
9 wasn't secret.

10 Now I have a copy of the Army regulations in effect
11 at that time, and it mentions only corps areas, but the
12 Department, that worked on the same basis as corps areas,
13 applied it to them, and we habitually mailed these pre-
14 scribed copies of whatever we got out.

15 Mr. Murphy: I don't think it particularly material
16 anyhow. I was just going into it to clear up the record.

17 General Short : I would be glad to put this in the
18 record as an exhibit.

19 Mr. Murphy: What I say is this: Alert No. 1 could
20 not be confusing because you didn't say that, you said
21 sabotage.

22 General Short: That is correct.

23 Mr. Murphy: The fact is the Army, and I am just
24 trying to clear the record, said they didn't get it until
25 1942, but I don't think it would make any difference one

1 Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hll

2 way or the other, whether they had it or not.

3 General Short: Hawaii cannot prove whether they did
4 or not, because there are no records.

5 Mr. Murphy: Now, as to the AWS, I agree the record
6 says it is by cooperation, but I refer you to page 1628,
7 and I was only quoting you when I made the statement I
8 did:

9 "General Short: I hadn't definitely -- we hadn't
10 given it a definite organization. It was working, but
11 we waited to bring out the orders until General Davidson
12 got back from the mainland, so we would not have to revise
13 that. We were working informally.

14 "Admiral Standley: But it was still working under
15 the Signal Corps at that time?

16 "General Short: Yes, sir.

17 That is what I had reference to.

18 General Short: My answer there was not -- as far as
19 Aircraft Warning Service, not the Interceptor Command,
20 but specifically the Aircraft Warning Service, that was
21 entirely a Signal function, and I may have made the answer
22 on that account.

23 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, I was quoting a pretty good
24 witness.

25 General Short: The combined thing was a combination

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl2

2 worked by cooperation.

3 Mr. Murphy: Then I want to come to page 1633, the
4 third last paragraph from the bottom of the page:

5 "General Short: Frankly, I do not know how much
6 search the Navy made, as that whole business of search
7 was tied in between the ships and the planes, and it was
8 their responsibility, and I do not know when their task
9 forces -- as I say, they have two task forces out at the
10 time. I don't know what instructions their task forces
11 had as to search. I assume that whenever their task force
12 went out, if it located Japanese ships, it would report
13 them.

14 "Admiral Standley: But as for the search from Oahu
15 itself, which in wartime was to be an all-around search,
16 did you know that that was not being carried out daily?

17 "General Short: I didn't know just what the Navy
18 were doing, frankly. I knew they had task forces out
19 and I assumed any searching they did was tied in with the
20 task forces."

21 You made that statement?

22 General Short: May I say Admiral Standley's state-
23 ment where he says that they were supposed to make a complete
24 all-around search from Oahu would never be correct, because
25 they would use the perimeter from Wake to Johnston-Wake to

1 Witness short

questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl3

2 Midway so as to get the most economical use of their
3 planes?

4 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, the war plan called for
5 a 360 degree search, but they couldn't do it?

6 General Short: No, sir. If the Navy had been gone,
7 and the Army had had to do this, if we hadn't occupied
8 the outlying islands, we would have had to do it from
9 Oahu.

10 Mr. Murphy: Now, page 1634:

11 "Admiral Reeves: It seems to me, General, that the
12 reconnaissance search and the radar search are absolutely
13 parallel in locating possible ships at sea. One was a
14 longer range affair than the other, but otherwise there
15 was no difference whatever.

16 "General Short: Oh, there should be -- they would be
17 tied it.

18 "Admiral Reeves: It seems to me that prior to any
19 hostile or air -- or declaration of war, that neither of
20 these procedures was being operated regularly day after
21 day.

22 "General Short: They were being operated as a training
23 matter, Admiral, rather than as a real intelligence service
24 just combing the ocean.

25 "Admiral Reeves: Yes.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl4

1
2 "General Short: Now, I say I do not know just
3 exactly what the Naval instructions were, but I know
4 that was true from our point of view, that we were
5 operating as a training proposition.

6 "Admiral Reeves: Your failure to operate the radar
7 after 7 a.m., was that in any way dependent on the fact
8 that you thought the Navy reconnaissance planes were opera-
9 ting?

10 "General Short: It frankly was that we didn't think
11 -- from all the information that we had, we did not think
12 the situation demanded it.

13 "Admiral Reeves: Yes.

14 "General Short: We would have been working 24 hours
15 a day, if we had had anything to indicate that the situa-
16 tion demanded it."

17 Now, again at page 1636, at the bottom of the page,
18 referring to the carriers, General, five paragraphs up
19 from the bottom:

20 "General McCoy: Did any information come to you that
21 day from your own sources of information or from the Navy
22 that indicated the carriers were to the north of Oahu?

23 "General Short: The only thing that indicated that
24 to me was the fact that they picked up this group of
25 planes at 7:20 132 miles 3 degrees east of north. That

1 Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl5

2 would indicate one carrier was in there, was in that
3 direction."

4 I will ask that that be stricken. That is not the
5 part I wanted.

6 Go to the bottom of page 1638, General, the third
7 last paragraph:

8 "General Short: I think the system is all right.
9 I think that we made every serious mistake when we didn't
10 go to an alert against an all-out attack. I think that
11 our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of
12 the situation was not.

13 "General McCoy: Do you think there would have been
14 any change in your attitude, possibly, or a more complete
15 meeting of the situation, if there had been unity of com-
16 mand?

17 "General Short: I don't believe it would have had
18 any particular effect without the Commander in that in-
19 stance had decided that there was the danger of an air
20 attack. You could have had the same degree of alertness
21 under unity of command that you had under cooperation."

22 Did you make that statement, General?

23 General Short: I believe that is a perfectly correct
24 statement, that we made our estimate of the situation based
25 on the information we had from Washington, that one man

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl6

2 would have made the same estimate if he had been in full
3 command, if he had the same information, because Admiral
4 Kimmel and I absolutely independently arrived at the
5 same conclusion.

6 Mr. Murphy: Now, General, will you go to page 1639,
7 again, at the bottom of the page. You are referring
8 there to the conferences you had about Wake and Midway.

9 "* * * -- in the whole discussion the fear was sub-
10 marines, because Wake is close to some of the Japanese
11 bases, and not a question of air, although they would be
12 close enough that land-based planes could have operated
13 against them when they were executing the relief of Wake.
14 I don't think that that was given very serious considera-
15 tion, but there was a lot of discussion at that time,
16 owing to, the fact that we were going so far out to make
17 this relief, going practically into the Mandate Islands."

18 That was a discussion, was it not, about Wake and
19 Midway, General?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Is that a fair statement?

22 General Short: Yes, sir. But I think that that
23 statement may not be absolutely correct, inasmuch as I
24 remember that the Navy was not willing to send the carriers
25 closer than 200 miles to Wake, and I think for both reasons

1 Witness short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

hl7

2 and we even went to the point where Admiral Halsey took
3 a carrier, we had never flown P-40 planes off of a
4 carrier, and he took his carrier out and two planes and
5 made the experiment to determine that afternoon whether
6 we could do it, and we succeeded in doing it. That was
7 before the decision had been definitely made not to
8 replace them.

9 Mr. Murphy: General, it is getting close to the
10 adjourning hour, and I want to say that I am sorry that
11 I have to ask you some questions here where we talk about
12 radar going 132 miles, when we have passed from that time
13 to reaching the moon by radar.

14 General Short: I hope I did not give you the idea
15 that I thought you were purposely misquoting, but it is
16 hard to quote from memory.

17 Mr. Murphy: No. Life is too short for me to misquote
18 anybody.

19 The Vice Chairman: You are not quite through?

20 Mr. Murphy: I will want about five minutes.

21 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas, General Short
22 wants to present some material that you inquired about.

23 General Short: On page 8272 of the record, Senator
24 Lucas asked me how the midget submarines got in the
25 vicinity of Hawaiian Waters, and Admiral Inglis in his

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

hl8

2 statement in Exhibit 8, page 16, makes an explanation of
3 why he thought they got there, and I would like to read
4 that.

5 Senator Lucas: Let me say, General, I had forgotten
6 the testimony that the Admiral had placed before the com-
7 mittee, but since I have too read his testimony. I thank
8 the General for calling my attention to it again.

9 General Short: It is just eight or ten lines, if you
10 wish me to read it.

11 The Vice Chairman: Do you want it read, Senator?

12 Senator Lucas: That is perfectly all right.

13 General Short: (Reading)

14 "Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, five
15 midget submarines were launched from specifically fitted
16 fleet submarines as a "special attacking force to conduct
17 an offensive attack against American ships within the
18 harbor, and to prevent the escape of the American Fleet
19 through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air
20 strike. Available data indicates that only one of the
21 five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor. It
22 inflicted no damage on American units, and none of the
23 five rejoined the Japanese force."

24 The Vice Chairman: Is that all, General.

25 General Short: That is all.

hl9

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The Vice Chairman: We will stand adjourned until
 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock noon, the committee
 recessed until 2:00 o'clock p. m., of the same day.)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 AFTERNOON SESSION 2:00 p.m.

3 Mr. Clark: The committee will be in order.

4 TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT

5 (Resumed)

6 Mr. Murphy: General Short, I direct your attention to
7 page 1641 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, the fourth
8 last paragraph from the bottom of the page:

9 "General McCoy: If you had been furnished with all
10 of the things that you felt necessary, would that have made
11 any difference in this particular action?

12 "General Short: I do not believe it would."

13 Was that a correct answer?

14 General Short: What I intended to imply by that, that
15 in the absence of information from the War Department we
16 would not have been in a proper alert and that we would not
17 have been much more effective.

18 Mr. Murphy: Even though you had all the planes, all
19 the radar and all the things you required?

20 General Short: It would have made some difference in
21 the anti-aircraft fire, that is all.

22 Mr. Murphy: In the anti-aircraft fire you still would
23 not have the men at the guns?

24 General Short: Only the skeleton crews.

25 Mr. Murphy: Just to guard the guns from the islanders?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 General Short: And they could fire them.

3 Mr. Murphy: Now continuing:

4 "Admiral Standley: Right there: In case the patrol
5 planes that were necessary to make the effective off-shore
6 patrol were here in sufficient numbers, do you still think
7 that no change would have been made in the plans?

8 "General Short: None whatever, because you couldn't
9 tell when some of them might have been ordered away. If
10 they had been left they just simply would not have called
11 upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in most of our
12 exercises the assumption was that they had enough to make
13 the patrol, so they made the patrols and called upon us
14 to execute the bombing mission, because they considered
15 that our B-17's were more effective as bombers than their
16 own planes.

17 "Admiral Standley: Yes, but in this estimate they
18 stated definitely that there were not sufficient forces to
19 make a continuous air patrol as required in war.

20 "General Short: Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't be --

21 "Admiral Standley: Now, if you had had that force
22 here do you think under the circumstances you would have
23 been making that patrol every morning? Not you, I mean,
24 but the Navy?

(2) 25 "General Short: But the Navy.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "Admiral Standley: The combined effort, yes.

3 "General Short: Well, I think that would be a fair
4 question to ask the Navy. I don't hardly think under the
5 conditions that they would; I think that they would have
6 been doing it as an exercise now and then in connection
7 with us. I do not believe that they would have been doing
8 it habitually if they had had them, but I don't know. It
9 would be a fair question to ask them."

10 Were those questions asked you and did you make those
11 answers before the Roberts Board?

12 General Short: I think that is perfectly O.K., yes, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, General, one more question
14 near the bottom of the page:

15 "Admiral Reeves: Before you go to that, General, let
16 me ask General Short this:

17 "On the other hand, if you had had material and fully
18 equipped radar stations, would you have been operating them
19 throughout the day or would you have operated them as you
20 did on the morning of the 7th?

21 "General Short: I probably would have operated them
22 just as I did."

23 Is that a correct question and a correct answer, as
24 reported there?

25 General Short: That is assuming that I had just the

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 same information from Washington that I did have.

3 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to this
4 question by the Chairman of the Roberts Board, at page 630
5 of Admiral Kimmel's previous testimony. Do you have that?

6 General Short: Page 630?

7 Mr. Murphy: Page 630.

8 General Short: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Murphy: The very top of the page:

10 "The Chairman: (Justice Roberts) In the picture of it
11 as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if
12 that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it
13 was not going to get any warning from your distant reconnais-
14 sance?

15 "Admiral Kimmel: No, sir."

16 Do you think Admiral Kimmel was justified in making
17 that statement?

18 General Short: I do not know that he intended to answer
19 that we knew we would not get any, but with all the re-
20 connaissance that I know he had out I could not count on
21 getting them, put it that way.

22 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to page 109
23 of the Roberts Board hearing of the Army, General, and I
24 will only ask a few more questions.

25 General Short: Yes.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: Page 109. I see, down about 12 lines:

3 "Anybody who has lived here in the last year would
4 know he could hardly ever step out of his house without
5 hearing planes ***"

6 Do you see that?

7 General Short: Page 109?

8 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

9 General Short: Yes, sir, I have it.

10 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

11 "Anybody who has lived here in the last year would
12 know he could hardly ever step out of his house without
13 hearing planes, ***"

14 You made that statement, did you not, before the Board?

15 General Short: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: I go to page 127, General, the middle of
17 the page:

18 "General Short: Yes, habitually there were planes
19 in the air from 4 o'clock on. There were planes in the air
20 almost all the time except from about 11 o'clock at night
21 until 4 o'clock in the morning. As I said before, you
22 couldn't step out of your house and look in the air without
23 seeing planes."

24 Then at the bottom of the page General McCoy said:

25 "Well, they were apparently not up on that Sunday morning.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 "General Short: That Sunday morning they were not up,
3 most unusual. Each Sunday morning you are likely to --

4 "General McCoy: How do you explain that?

5 "General Short: I wouldn't be able to explain it
6 without asking General Davidson just why; but if they had
7 been up and training they wouldn't have had ammunition, for
8 normally in the training they did not carry ammunition."

9 In that connection, General, I direct your attention --
10 Will you give me the number of this exhibit, Kimmel
11 Exhibit 5 to Report of Action, dated December 19, 1941.

12 Mr. Masten: Exhibit No. 120.

13 Mr. Murphy: Exhibit No. 120. Do you have that?

14 Lieutenant Karr: We don't have it.

15 Mr. Murphy: I will read it to the General. There is
16 what is called the Kimmel Exhibit 5 to Report of Action,
17 and it is dated December 19, 1941, and on page 2, under
18 paragraph 4, it says:

19 "All planes, except those under repair, were armed with
20 machine guns and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition."

21 I was wondering why the Navy planes would have machine
22 guns and ammunition and not the Army?

23 General Short: Our planes were grouped for sabotage
24 alert. If you put machine gun ammunition in the planes and
25 a grenade was exploded you would probably set off the

