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witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
regard to things within his province. That is what the
disussion was bet ween Captain Safford and me. He wanted
to specify.

Senator Ferguson: Tell the Admiral what to do?
Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you thought that that was not the way the Navy did business?

Admiral Noyes: That is right.

Senator Ferguson: Is that right?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Now, did you at that time think Japan was bluffing as far as the United States was concerned?

Admiral Noyes: On what date?

Senator Ferguson: On the 6th.

Admiral Noyes: No, I don't think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Prior to that did you think they were bluffing?

Admiral Noyes: Sometimes I would see a message, these intercepted messages, which would have a little bit of a favorable tendency in that direction, but on the whole not.

I never had any feeling that way that lasted over one message.

Senator Ferguson: Then you came to the conclusion

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Witness Noyes Questons by: senator Ferguson that this was really business and that Japan was not bluff-ing in these messages?

Admiral Noyes: I have made a list of messages that you could read that would lead you to believe that they weren't going to war.

Senator Ferguson: They were not going to war? Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: They would indicate that they were bluffing. Will you give us those?

Admiral Noyes: 1180, page 181; 842, page 186; 1204, page 192; 844, page 199; 857, page 199; 1393, page 200; 985, page 204; 865, page 208; 1226, page 212; 1243, page 227; 1256, page 227.

Senator Ferguson: I will ask you the occasion for making up that list.

Admiral Noyes: Sir?

Senator Ferguson: What was the occasion of making up that list?

The Chairman: Did you finish your answer to the former question? Did you complete your answer to the former question after you read that list? The Chair thought you started to say something else.

Admiral Noyes: No, sir. I think Senator Ferguson asked to 1f I ever thought there wasn't going to be war. As

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Witness Noyes

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I say, I didn't get this book until two weeks ago. I just did it as a matter of interest, to pick out certain messages from those messages. In most of these messages Nomure

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

and Kurusu and even the Prime Minister, the Japanese Prime Minister, give the impression that they are sincere. And the other thing that I said, that the Japanese would be glad to -- in other words, if we would leave them alone, they

would occupy Southeast Asia and not necessarily attack us.

But, of course, I didn't think that would ever be.

Senator Ferguson: Going back, I had been asking you whether or not you thought that they were bluffing, and you said at times you did, and at times you did not.

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, you made up this list to demonstrate that they didn't mean to go to war.

Admiral Noyes: No, sir. That is not my thesis, sir. I said among those messages, you will find times when the Prime Minister seemed to be optimistic, says we are trying one more thing. There are several messages in there where the Japanese seem to be endeavoring to patch things up.

Senator Ferguson: Now, look on page 204, the message to Berlin. The last part of that message:

"Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that wer may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon

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Witness Noyes

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson I say, I didn't get this book until two weeks ago. I just did it as a matter of interest, to pick out certain messages from those messages. In most of these messages Nomura and Kurusu and even the Prime Minister, the Japanese Prime Minister, give the impression that they are sincere. And the other thing that I said, that the Japanese would be glad to -- in other words, if we would leave them alone, they would occupy Southeast Asia and not necessarily attack us.

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"Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that wer may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon

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witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."

Admiral Noyes: If you go back, I think you will find that the preceding one to that shows that the Japanese told Hitler that they were afraid if they went ahead with Thailand that we would intervene.

Also at this time Hitler was trying to get Japan to go to war with Russia. My general conclusion was -- I merely meant to say, Senator Ferguson, that in going over all of them there are times when you see some evidence of Japan trying to do something to smooth things over, but the net result was certainly all to the bad.

Senator Ferguson: Well, look at the one on page 195.

They are referring there to the message of the 26th:

"Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable."

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. That is one of the worst ones.

Senator Ferguson: That didn't leave much doubt, did

it?

Admiral Noyes: Well, look at the one, ifyou will, sir on page 197, that follows that.

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Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, what are we after with this examination?

The Chairman: The Chair doesn't know.

Mr. Richardson: I don't think thewitness knows anything about these dispatches, and I don't think his opinion amounts to anything, therefore.

The Chairman: The Chair can't pass on that question, but the Chair has been unable to see just where this meticulous inquiry about these particular messages leads.

It may be that the Senator from Michigan can explain it.

Senator Ferguson: I am not going to comment upon the evidence, but the witness gave me a list of messages and I was inquiring about some other messages that seem to contradict the ones he had.

Mr. Richardson: I know, but my suggetion is that the list of messages is just as far out of relevance in this proceeding. I want to get through with it and get through with this witness.

The Chairman: The Chair would like to cooperate, and I am sure the member at the far end of the table to the left would also be glad if we could do that.

Mr. Richardson: I have no witness to follow this witness this afternoon, so perhaps I shouldn't have interrupted.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: The witness has been on the stand all day, and I have only had him for a short time.

The Chairman: It has perhaps only been a short time, but it probably just seems long.

Mr. Richardson: No, I don't even make that criticism; I just wondered whether we couldn't get along.

Senator Ferguson: Of course, I am not accustomed to ask the other members of the committee what questions I should ask; neither do I ask counsel.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I think if the committee is able to endure it, counsel ought to be able to do so, and I think that the propriety of counsel raising these issues is somewhat open to question.

Members of the committee have repeatedly raised that question but I hadn't supposed that we secured counsel in order for him to tell us how to cross-examine witnesses.

I regret that the issue has been raised in just this way .

The Chairman: The Chair would like to say that counsel were secured, not only present counsel, but all counsel, to assist and guide the committee in the interrogation of witnesses and the elucidation of facts, and the Chair sees no impropriety in counsel suggesting that the witness's testimony might be terminated. The whole thing started by counsel

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WASHINGTON.

witness Noyes Questions by: Senator Ferguson asking the Chair a question that he couldn't answer. From there on, it went.

Mr. Richardson: I just want to say that I agree with Senator Brewster. I have been waiting for some kick in the shins when I made one of these objections, but this is the first time I have received it.

I won t do it any more.

The Chairman: The Chair hopes that counsel will feel free to kick any shins that need to be kicked. Maybe we ought to have done more of that.

Will you proceed so that we can finish with the Admiral today if possible?

Senator Ferguson: I might say that I haven't questioned the Chairman's questions to the witnesses.

The Chairman: You haven't had much chance, because the Chair has asked very few questions of any witness.

Go ahead.

Senator Ferguson: I could say many things right now but for the purpose of getting through with the witness I will not say them.

I just want to find out why you prepared this list of messages that you just read.

Admiral Noyes: Senator, I have been waiting to testify, present in this committee room, since last Monday. For two

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

weeks before last Monday I have been standing by away

from the committee room.

I made it purely for my own information; while studying it over I made notes, as I read through this exhibit 1,
which was given to me by counsel for the committee.

Senator Ferguson: Did you make any list that would indicate that they were going to war?

Admiral Noyes: That is a combination of both, sir.

It is a list of both. It has to do with the probability of war. Negative or positive.

Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, then, the list is on both sides?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir, and I am very sorry that I brought this up. I tried to tell you this is my personal opinion and I recognize the fact that I didn't have any business to express my personal opinion on this matter.

The Chairman: You were asked if you stated to Captain Safford that you thought the Japanese were bluffing and in enswer to that question, I think you went into this.

Admiral Noyes: That is where I got into it, yes.

The Chairman: You were led into it. You didn't just
go into it.

Senator Ferguson: Is the Chair through?
The Chairman: For the moment.

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Senator Ferguson: Of course, other people have tried

Admiral, it is your understanding that the Navy sent direct communications, that is, the direct intercepts to Admiral Kimmel prior to July, 1941, or up until sometime

to take me off the track, but I will ask more questions

Admiral Noyes: I tried to explain that in my answer this morning by saying we had a strict rule not to send exact translations or direct reference to enemy intercepted messages mixed up with any other Navy business. There was no objection to sending from time to time an exact translation of any message under my cognizance for the purpose of helping people who had had it as a reference in other messages.

In other words, for the mechanics of decrypting.

Senator Ferguson: If you look back on the question, we will get through quicker. If you will try to keep to the question.

Admiral Noyes: I know of no reason why there were less after July than before July unless it was on account of the international situation.

Senator Ferguson: On May 26, 1941, did you know that Admiral Kimmel had written a letter to Admiral Stark asking

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: senator Freguson

him specifically for this kind of information?

Admiral Noyes: I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know there was a circular sent out through the various departments along that line?

Admiral Noyes: A circular, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, to the various departments.

Admiral Noyes: In regard to magic?

Senator Ferguson: No, about sending information direct to Kimmel.

Admiral Noyes: I had nothing to do with that, sir.

That was the Director of Naval Intelligence, who sent out information.

The messages I sent were at the request of someone else.

Senator Ferguson: You say there may have been a change from July until November because of the intenational situation. Will you explain what you mean by that answer?

Admiral Noyes: I understood your question, Senator Ferguson, to be on the assumption that the number of messages sent out decreased after July.

Senator Ferguson: There isn't any doubt about that.

That is what I was asking about, and that is a fact, as I take it from this record.

Admiral Noyes: I had nothing to do with the preparation

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

of the record, and I supposed the record was supposed to

bear on subsequent events.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever get an order from Admiral Stark on that?

Admiral Noyes: I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Ingersoll?

Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Anyone, to your knowledge?

Admiral Noyes: All of the orders in regard to the handling of magic came from the Chief of Naval Operations. I could make no change in the orders or the general policy without his approval.

Senator Ferguson: Then, as far as you were concerned, there was no change in policy, as far as youpersonally were concerned, you knew of no change in the policy of sending messages to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral Turner has indicated on this record -- I want you to be specific on this -- that be obtained some information from you that Admiral Kimmel was getting all of the magic, and Admiral Stark to the same effect.

What have you got to say about that?

Did you believe that Admiral Kimmel was getting all

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Sénator Ferguson

of the magic?

Admiral Noyes: I knew that he was not, sir. It would not have been a possibility to do it. There was no way to get the messages to him.

Senator Ferguson: And there was no way for him to decode it?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: You knew specifically that Admiral Kimmel or his source there did not have any machinery or equipment to decipher or decode magic, that is purple?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. Magic includes all.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. I changed it to purple.

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What is your answer?

Admiral Noyes: Purple.

Senator Ferguson: You knew that?

Admiral Noyes: I knew that, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know of anyone ever asking you that question as to whether or not they were able to get purple or not?

Admiral Noyes: No, sir, except when it was discussed when the machine was sent to Cavite, when the purple machine was sent to Cavite the decision had to be made between Cavite and Honolulu. It was sent by the approval of

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Naval Operations because it was the best listening post

for us. It wasn't sent for the benefit of Admiral Hart.

That was a secondary consideration.

Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us when it was sentto Cavite?

Admiral Noyes: No, sir, I cannot.

Senator Ferguson: What year?

Admiral Noyes: 1941, I think.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what part of 1941?

Admial Noyes: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: With whom did you discuss the question?

Admiral Noyes: Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll.

Admiral Ingersoll certainly, and I think with Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson: At that time did the British have their's, their machine?

Admiral Noyes: I think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson: We had already sent one to the British, is that correct?

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: We had already sent one to the British, is that correct?

Aimiral Noyes: The NavyAid not to that, so I am not sure of that.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know who did furnish the British with the deciphering machine?

Admiral Noyes: I am not familiar with the -- I cannot give you a specific answer to the question. I imagine it was the Army, sir.

S enator Ferguson: At least you don't know who did it? Admiral Noyes: I don't recollect. I didn't have anything to do with it. I did not do it personally.

Senator Ferguson: But you 111 have a 11scussion with Admiral Stark that you only had the one machine and it could be sent to Cavite and not sent to Hawaii?

Admiral Noyes: I recommended that it be sent to Cavite because that was the best place to intercept Japanese traffic and receive information during that time and that was--I will say that that was about the time of the message that the counsel put in the record this morning, when we sent a joint message to the Philippines, the Commanding General in the Philippines and the Commandant 16th Naval District to make a full exchange at their end of the line.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Do you know when --

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Airiral Noyes: I think that was March 1941.

Senator Ferguson: You say this is in March 1941?

Admiral Noyes: I think the message was sent in March 1941 and it would have had to be, - the machine would have had to be there before the message was sent.

Senator Ferguson: Now, to you know whether you discussed that matter with Admiral Turner?

Admiral Noyes: I do not, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And would your a newers be the same on Admiral Turner about a conversation of purple being translated at Hawaii, as it was with Admiral Stark, that you do not recall any such statement to Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark on that question, that Kimmel was getting the purple?

Admiral Noyes: In regard to Admiral Turner, his testimony indicates that he was referring to traffic analyses and
I think that he got confused between the business that Commander Rochefort was describing this morning in his testimony,
the analysis of traffic, radio direction finder bearings
and that kind of strictly naval work as contrasted with diplomatic dispatches, which was what was the primary use of the
purple code.

Senator Ferguson: Were you at the time breaking the Japanese navy cole?

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Questions by: Sen. Fergusan

Admird Noyes: We were working on them. Actually we -it is a relative matter with all codes. There is no code
ever read -- there is no one code ever read a hundred per
cent. We speak of it in percentage. Some codes can be
read ten per cent, some ninety per cent, and I never heard of
any one that could be read for any length of time a hundred
per cent.

Senator Ferguson: How much of the nawy code were you in 1941 able to read?

Admiral Noyes: I would have to refer you to Commander Rochefort's testimony.

Senator Ferguson: You don't know?

Admiral Noyes: Not of my own knowledge. I heard him this morning but I do not recollect his exact statement.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether we were able to read all of it, whether there was a top and a lower code?

Admiral Noyes: Whether we could read all Japanese naval codes?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Noyes: The naval codes hadgiven us much more trouble than the other codes in general, that is the reson that we had -- since it was directly naval traffic, before I took over the job we had that setup, with the people in Hawaii concentrated on the naval systems and they were the hardest

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

and they had not got as far as we had with the diplomatic through more or less luck.

Senator Ferguson: Now, there is one message that is mentioned in Safford's testimony; that is No. 843, on November the 27th, 1941, prescribing a schedule of Tokyo news broadcasts. That is just a short time after -- it is not in a book. That is just a short time after the setting up of the wind code. I will send it to you so that you can see it. It is from Tokyo to Washington, 27th of November 1941, purple 843 is the number (handing document to witness).

Adriral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever see that before?

Admiral Noyes: I could not say, sir. I probably did. I am familiar with what it means. It was used in connection with the -- Captain Safford thought it had a connection with the winds execute. It is a list of Japanese stations and their frequencies.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. When did Captain Safford discuss that with you, or was that what you took from his testimony?

Admiral Noyes: Oh, we discussed, as soon as the --

Senator Ferguson: Oh, when it care in?

Admiral Noyes: When the winds execute came in. This came in actually prior to the -- well, it came in the -- they were translated the same day apparently. This was the day before,

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this schedule message came in a day before the setup for the winds code was sent out from Tokyo or, rather, it was sent out a lay before, as I remember it.

Senator Ferguson: No.

Admiral Noyes: No, I am wrong on that.

Senator Ferguson: On the 19th.

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: It was sent out on the 19th.

Adriral Noyes: It was not translated until the 28th.

Senator Ferguson: That is right.

Admiral Noyes: We got them both translated on the same day.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall a discussion with Safford that the message that he has now referred to in his testimony, that is not in the book, Number 843, which I have shown you, had something to do with setting up a program for this wind code?

Admiral Noyes: Well, for the reason, I should say, that does not check, because the winds code had been sent out on the 19th and this schedule was not set up until the 27th, so it could not --

Senator Ferguson: I just want to know whether you had a ilscussion with him?

Aimiral Noyes: I to not recollect, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, didn't you tell us that you did

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

have a discussion with him at some time?

Admiral Noyes: I did have a discussion --

When? Senator Ferguson:

Admiral Noyes: (Continuing) -- in regard to the implementing winds code.

When? Senator Ferguson:

Admiral Noyes: At about the time that it care in.

Senator Ferguson: And was it on that schedule that I have shown you, 843?

Admiral Noyes: I have no specific recollection of any discussion of this particular schedule. I am perfectly willing to accept his statement that he thought that this schedule was received,-that this schedule was likely to be one on which the winds execute might be received. He may have said that; I don't know.

Senator Ferguson: That 1s all.

The Chairman: Mr. Keefe?

Mr. Keefe: In view of the fact, Aimiral, that there was a little disorepancy as to the time you testified before the Naw Court I have checked that record and find that it was in September 1944 and not December.

Aimiral Noyes: Thank you, sir. My recollection was at fault.

Mr. Keefe: The Navy Gurt had concluded its hearings on

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

the 19th of October 1944.

Admiral Noyes: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: The Hewitt examination followed and took place in December.

Now, I ar very much mystified by certain portions of your testimony and some time or other in the course of trying to work out some sort of a report to come to some determination on this testimony we will have to judge the witnesses that testified and we have got to believe some.

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir, I realize that.

Mr. Keefe: And that is going to be a pretty difficult task in view of the testimony that has been given here, as I see it.

Airiral Noyes: I have been here this past week, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I would like to refer you to the testimony which you gave before the Navy Court of Inquiry and I
want to ask you whether or not this question was asked you,
or these questions were asked you and did you make these
answers? This is question 82;

"Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your office for the handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the execution signal was received?

"As We had a special twenty-four hour watch for all

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Communication Intelligence matters.

"Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words that were expected and these cards, sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution of that signal?

"A. I could not say. "

Now, I want to stop right there.

Admiral Noyes: Did you say question 82, sir?

Mr. Keefe: Well, that is the way it appears in our record, questions 82 and 83. I read you the questions and read you the answers..

Now the question is were those questions asked you and the you make those answers before the Naval Board of Inquiry?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: Now you come before us in this matter and you say that after hearing the testimony of Captain Kramer you think that you did direct the preparation of some cards. Now, did you or didn't you?

Admiral Noyes: I stated that I had a discussion with Captain Safford after my return to Washington this summer which --

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, the question is -- perrion me. I don't want to interment you but I would like to have this as

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

short and as succinct and as clear as possible without a lot of rearing around the bush. Did you or did you not direct the preparation of these oards?

Admiral Noyes: I authorized the preparation of them, sir. Mr. Keefe: Well, is there a distinction to be made between authorization and direction?

Admiral Noyes: I think that the suggestion probably care from Captain Safford or Captain Kramer and I approved of its being done. They were in my division.

Mr. Keefe: Well, can't you answer that specific question? Did you yourself direct the preparation of those cards?

Adriral Noyes: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: Can you answer that yes or no?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, then the answer is "Yes, sir". We have got that/guch settled then. Now, the next question is were those cards prepared?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And who prepared them?

Admiral Noyes: I do not recollect, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Were they delivered to you?

Admiral Noyes: I do not recollect, sir. They were delivered to me or to the ones who were to use them but I do not know that I made the delivery or Kramer. I should think that

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Kramer would have been probably the one to deliver it.

Mr. Keefe: I don't care for argumentation that is not an answer. I am asking you a simple questions and they can have simple and direct answers. That has been the trouble with this whole hearing, every answer is an argument; instead of being an answer to the question we go off around the bush and saying all around about what this one said and that one said and everything else instead of getting a direct answer to the question.

Now, I am going to have difficulty, in passing on the character of the witnesses that testified here, to determine who is telling the truth. They cannot all be telling the truth, as I have listened to this testimony and I want to see 1f we cannot pin some of these things down. We have now reached the point where you have testified here that you did direct the preparation of these caris.

Admiral Noyes: And that the cards were distributed.

Mr. Keefe: Distributed to whom?

Admiral Noyes: I should eay, to the best of my recollection --

Mr. Richardson: He is asking you for your personal knowleige now.

Mr. Keefe: I am asking you to testify not about what someboly else told you or someboly told him or what you heard

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

here in this room. I am asking you to test your recollection and your knowledge of the things that you are testifying about, trying to apply what are ordinary rules of evidence and the construction of evidence.

To whom were those cards distributed?

Admiral Noyes: If you ask me to whom I personally delivered the cards, I do not recollect.

Mr. Keefe: To whom were they delivered by your direction?

Admiral Noyes: I believe that they were delivered to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Wilkinson, the Naval Aide, probably Admiral Turner.

Mr. Keefe: The Naval Aide to whom?

Admiral Noyes: The Naval Aide to the President.

Mr. Leefe: Yes. Now, it is perfectly sensible, is it not, Admiral Noyes, that that procedure would have been infulged in due to the importance that had been previously attached to this winds code that had been set up?

Adriral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And the evidence is before this committee that as to no other message other than this proposed winds execute was any such arrangement Made. That is true, isn't 1 17

Admiral Noves: That is correct, sir.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Yes. It is also true, is it not, that due to the fact of secrecy of magic these cards would not have been delivered to any persons other than those entitled to receive ultra-magic, isn't that true?

Airiral Noyes: That is true, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And the very purpose of delivering these cards was so that when and if this winds code execute message came in it would be possible to immediately contact the recipients of those cards and advise them of the receipt of that message, isn't that true?

Admiral Noyes: At night, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, at night, yes. They could have those cards at home with them, isn't that true?

Adriral Noyes: That was the liea of the caris.

Mr. Keefe: So you had a plean set up by which a telephone message could be sent to the Chief of Naval Operations or to the President or to this one or that one of the six that you have named and they could be given language that wowld indicate to them what the winds execute message was and by turning to the card they could interpret it and understand it, isn't that true?

Aimiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, you levised that plan yourself, didn't you?

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Witness Noyes

Queestions by: Mr. Keefe

Admiral Noyes: I am not sure whether I devised it or whether it was suggested to me. It may have been a joint af fair. It care, - Krarer and Safford and myself --

Mr. Keefe: I am trying to give you the ore lit.

Admiral Noyes: Sir?

Mr. Keefe: I am trying to give you the credit in this case.

Admiral Noyes: Well, Safford I see took credit for it already.

Mr. Keefe: Safford does not take credit for that. The testimony of both Captain Kramer and Captain Safford is that this whole card system was your production.

Admiral Noyes: Well, it was undoubtedly my direction.

Mr. Keefe: All right.

Admiral Noyes: I thought you asked me if I initiated the 1dea, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, we have got this far, that the cards were made out, they were distributed and in the hands of those entitled to receive ultra-magio. You are sure about that, aren't you?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Before this committee now, that much you are sure of?

Admiral Noyes: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: There can be no mistake about that?

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Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So that subsequent refreshment won't change your opinion later, is that right?

Admiral Noyes: My opinion has only been changed once, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I am not so certain about that if I go through your testimony, as I will before we get through.

The Chairman; You mean today?

Admiral Noyes: I mean this particular incident.

Mr. Keefe: What 1s that?

Admiral Noyes: I did not mean that there was only one discrepancy. I mean that I changed my opinion on this after talking to Captain Safford upon my return to Washington.

Mr. Keefe: Well, what I want to be sure is what you are testifying to now a fact?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: I am asking for facts.

Admiral Noyes: To the best of my recollection it is a fact.

Mr. Keefe: Not rumors, suspicions and not conjectures and not composite ideas resulting from conversations where you worked out something to say, but I am asking for simple facts. You realize that, do you not?

Admiral Noyes: I understand that, Mr. Keefe.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: And the reason I am asking it is because this question was asked you. Question 84:

"As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony given before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had prepared a series of six cards and each had been delivered to officials in the Navy Department who would be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall if any such system was established?

"No, I could not say." That is what you told the Court of Inquiry? Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: But since that time, after talking with other individuals you now are prepared to come here under oath and tell this committee as a fact what you have stated to us this afternoon in respect to those caris, is that right?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. One other individual, not individuals.

Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, was this question asked you before the Naval Court of Inquiry at that time:

Then at no time did you learn from anyons the execution of the winds message in any form and at no time 414 you tell anyone of the execution in any form of

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Witness Noyes

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

the winds message, is that the way you want to leave your testimony on this subject?

"A. That is might, yes."

Now, you want that changed before this committee, do you not?

Admiral Noyes: I do not, sir. I have stated before this committee that there was no authentic execute on the winks message.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Admiral, I don't want to split hairs.

Admiral Noyes: I am not trying to split hairs, Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe: I think you are.

Admiral Noyes: I am sorry.

Mr. Keefe: Now, listen to this question that was asked you:

"Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds message in any form."

Admiral Noyes: I did not take that question to be an execute, a false execute at the time. That is the reason I answered as I did.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Question 136. Was this question asked you and did you make this answer:

of the winds message, have you any recollection whether Lieu-

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

tenant Commander Kramer came in with an execute of the winds message and said, 'Here it is'?

As I remember it we received some outside information which afterwards turned out not to be correct." What information was taken to mean that an execute of this winds message had been received which turned out not to be correct? Did you make that answer?

Admiral Noyes: That it turned out not to be correct? Mr. Keefe: Nop I am not asking you that. I am asking you the simple question --

Admiral Noyes: Well, I haven't been able to find it. Mr. Keefe: Well, I assumed that you made it because I ar reading it from the record.

Almiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, Admiral Noyes, Captain Kramer has testified that the watch officer on duty, as he says, on the 5th of December came to his door and handed him a message that had just been taken off the teletype. Captain Kramer looked at 1t and told this committee that he believed at that time that it was an authentic winds execute message; that he walked down with the watch officer to Captain Safford's office and said to Captain Safford, "Here it is".

Kramer says that Safford then carried the ball from there on and indicated that he had gone to your office. Captain

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Safford said that he sent one of his subordinates to your office with that ressage.

Now, my question is did a masage, true or false, good or bad, of the character described by Captain Safford and Captain Kramer reach your office either on the 4th or 5th of December?

Admiral Noyes: I could not give you a specific answer to that question, sir.

Mr. Leefe: Why not?

Admiral Noyes: Because to say that a false message written on yellow teletype paper, - I cannot say that a message written on yellow teletype paper was not delivered to me in my office on the 4th or the 5th.

Mr. Keefe: Well, was it ever delivered to you? Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Then we are to understand that your memory fails on that subject, is that right? You have no recollection of receiving this message, regardless of whether you considered it to be a true winds execute or a false winds exeoute, you cannot tell this committee whether you received such a message?

Admiral Noyes: With the exception that I have a partial recollection of receiving a ressage with a Russian slant, which caused a dispute and that would fit in with a winds

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

ressage except for some parts of Captain Safford's testimony. I testified to that this morning, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, the difficulty that I have with this testimony of yours is that Colonel Saitler, who has apparently told the same story all through all these hearings, comes before this corrittee and says that he received a telephone message from you on the 5th, in which you told him that the winds execute message was in.

Now, he testified meticulously that he talked to Colonel Bratton; that Colonel Bratton took a please of paper out of his pocket with some words on it, looked at them and said to Colonel Saitler, "What were the words on this?" And Saitler did not get them. They then talked to General Miles and General Miles told him to call you on the telephone and a scertain the exact words on the message and Colonel Saitler says he did call you on the telephone and that you told him that you were busy, that you were just going to a meeting and did not have time to talk to him.

Now, your testimony is, if I understand it, that your mind is a blank as to all of that, you have no recollection of anything of that kind taking place. Is that right?

Admiral Noyes: I testified that I had talked to Colonel Saitler numerous times during that week. I have mo recollecthon of a convergation such as he describes. I believe from

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

listening to his testimony yesterlay that he said it was a message regarding only severance of relations with the Brit-ish that he refers to.

Mr. Keefe: Well, my lear sir, Colonel Saitler never saw the message. The only thing that Colonel Saitler knows about it is what you told him and he told us that you told him that over the telephone.

Admiral Noyes: He said in his testimony yesterday I told him there was a message in that looked like severance of relations with the British.

Mr. Keefe: Exactly, that is what Colonel Sadtler said that you told him over the phone.

Aimiral Noyes: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: And when the reported that to Colonel Bratton, Colonel Bratton wanted him to tell him what was the Japanese word upon it and Sadtler could not tell Bratton that and General Miles directed him to call you back and get the exact words that were in the message and you maid you were busy and going to attend a meeting.

Now, you wouldn't think Colonel Saitler could possibly be mistaken and make up a story that was not absolutely true in that respect, do you?

Admiral Noyes: I should be very sorry to think that any of these witnesses were intentionally mistaken, sir.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Witness Noyes

Mr. Keefe: Well, to you think that took place exactly as Colonel Saitler stated?

Admiral Noyes: I do not, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Then do you deny that it did take place?

Admiral Noyes: I do not, sir, I deny that it took place exactly as he said.

Mr. eefe: Well, then you tell us what iii take place?

Aimiral Noyes: I io not know, sir. I would not have said

that the message is in just the way I have been quoted. I

might very well have called him and told him that we had a

questaonable message that we were considering and that is the

most that I would have done, or that could have resulted in

the train of circumstances that occurred.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, that is an argument. That is not a statement of facts, Admiral.

Admiral Noyes: I do not recollect that I made any such remarks over the telephone as Colonel Soitler states that I made.

Mr. Keefe: Well, you do not want to testify under oath that you did not, do you?

Admiral Noyes: I do not, sir. I stated that I hadn't a recollection.

Mr. Keefe: Then the nature of your story is you do not remember what was said?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Or you don't remember that there was even a telephone conversation?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, then, why then build up something and a mue and say that if I had a telephone conversation I may have said so and so when your recollection is a perfect blank and you don't know whether you telephoned him at all or not, and you certainly don't remember what you did say if you did telephone. Now, that is a fair assumption, isn't it?

Admiral Noyes: You are right, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Then let us get down to some facts. Now, did you talk to anyone else about this winds code execute that you do remember about?

Admiral Noyes: I have no recollection of specific conversations with anyone else in regard to false executes on the wind message.

Mr. Keefe: I did not ask you for your recollection as to specific conversations. I asked you the simple question did you talk to anyone else? We will go to the question as to what the conversation was in a minute.

Admiral Noyes: I do not recollect, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did you talk to the Chief of Naval Operations, Adriral Stork?

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Aimiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Or you don't remember that there was even a telephone conversation?

Adriral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, then, why then build up something and a mue and say that if I had a telephone conversation I may have said so and so when your recollection is a perfect blank and you don't know whether you telephoned him at all or not, and you certainly don't remember what you did say if you did telephone. Now, that is a fair assumption, isn't it?

Aimiral Noyes: You are right, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Then let us get down to some facts. Now, 111 you talk to anyone else about this winds code execute that you do remember about?

Admiral Noyes: I have no recollection of specific conversations with anyone else in regard to false executes on the wind message.

Mr. Keefe: I did not ask you for your recollection as to specific conversations. I asked you the simple question did you talk to anyone else? We will go to the question as to what the conversation was in a minute.

Admiral Noyes: I do not recollect, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did you talk to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stork?

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Aimiral Noyes: In regard to the execute you mean? Mr. Keefe: In regard to this message that had been brought to your office.

Admiral Noyes: I have no recollection of discussing it with him personally. You mean in regard to the setup, I assume, and not the execution.

Mr. Keefe: I am talking about the execute message.

Admiral Noyes: The execution I did not ever discuss with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I want to ask you if these questions were put to you and did you make these answers before the Naval Court of Inquiry? Question No. 141.

"In my previous examination I asked you" --The Chairman: May I ask whether there is a chance to finish with the Aimiral today?

Mr. Keefe: Yes, in just a few minutes I can get through. The Chairman: Let us go ahead then.

Mr. Keefe: (Reading)

"In my previous exemination I asked you, at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution on the winds message in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form? I ask you if that is the way you wish to leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your attention to the fact that you have just testi-

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

fiel that you did receive some information. From where did this information come?

"A. I beg your parton. I said to the best of my recollection there was a folse alarm about it.

"Q. But that was information about the winds message, was it not? The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from that subject, 111 1t?

"A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could."

Then you did hear from some source about the HC. e xecution of the winds message, is that right?

"A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the so-called winds ressage was finally received.

Did you ever discuss this winds message" -- and #Q. they are referring to the winds execute message, the one you have just been talking about -- "111 you ever 11 souss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

When the message came in, as I remember it we considered it more important than a later study of it in-The ressage only said that relations were dicated. straine 1.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

- "Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?
- "A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?
- "Q. Yes.
- "A. No.
- "Q. Did you give him any information?
- "A. He got a copy of 1t."

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers? You can answer that yes or no if you remember.

Admiral Noyes: I don't think the record is correct, but I have no objection to accepting those. It does not sound,—it sounds as if something is misplaced in the record to me. I never had a chance to go over my testimony, but I see nothing that is contrary to what might have been said, with the exception of —

Mr. Keefe: Well, I haven't time --

Senator Brewster: What exception?

The Chairman: Let the witness finish.

Mr. Keefe: I thought he had finished.

The Chairman: He started to say, "With the exception of" some thing.

Admiral Noyes: I noticed in reading this over that it looks as if the question did not belong with the, - the answer did not belong with the question, but I don't know that it makes any particular difference so far as the facts go.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: I will read it to you again.

Admiral Noyes: I am perfectly willing to accept the facts as stated, having in mind what you just read.

Mr. Keefe: Question 145:

"I asked you whether you discussed it?

"Ao With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?

"Q Yes.

"A No.

"Q Did you giwe him any information?

"A He got a copy of 1t."

That is perfectly clear and logical, isn't it, and fallows in sequence, loesn't it?

Admiral Noyes: All right, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, you made those answers, didn't you?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, was that answer true that the Chief of Naval Operations ili get a copy of this me ssage?

Admiral Noyes: He got a copy of the ressage setting up the winds code, that is what I said. I don't think it is correctly written up from the notes. He 111 not get a copy of the execute. They said they wanted to know if he had any information on the setup or the execute, as I followed you in your reading, and he did get a copy -

Mr. Keefe: Evidently you did mot follow me in the reading

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

because I will read it to you again and demonstrate to you that your interpretation could not possibly be a fact. This is what I said:

"Did you ever discuss this winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations"?

Without going back, the previous questions were referring to the winds execute message, and then the question is:

"D11 you ever ilscuss this winds message or the re-

"A When the message came in, as I remember at that time we considered it more important than a later study of it indicated."

Now, get this:

There wasn't anything in the original cole that talked about the relations being strained, was there? That was what was alleged to have been in the winds execute message.

Airiral Noyes: Oh, I beg your parion, sir.

Mr. Keefe: All right.

Admiral Noyes: The winds execute message contained nothing but a weater report, an apparent weather report. The description as to what it meant finally you will find on page 154.

Mr. Keefe: Yes, I am very familiar with it. I have got

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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it right in front of me.

Admiral Noyes: That is the only place where any words in regard to severing diplomatic relations occurs. When the execute came it was merely to have the words in Japanese, "East wind, rain; North wind, cloudy; or west wind, clear." That was all the Japanese would mean.

Mr. Keefe: Then I understand your present statement to be that you did not discuss this winds code execute message with the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Noyes: I did not discuss an execute message with the Chief of Naval Operations, that is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did you discuss it with anyone else, the message which was delivered to you either by Captain Safford or one of his assistants?

Admiral Noyes: I think I very probably did.

Mr. Keefe: With whom 111 you liscuss it?

Admiral Noyes: Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll would have been the most probable ones, outside of my own division.

Mr. Keefe: I am not lealing in probabilities. I cannot arrive at a lecision in this matter basel upon probability.

Did you talk to Almiral Wilkinson or linet you?

Admiral Neyes: I have no recollection of a conversation in regard to any specific false execute ressage with any

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Wit ness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

individuals.

Mr. Keefe: Where are the cards now that were me de out by Captain Kramer?

Admiral Noyes: I have no idea, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did you have one of ther in your office?

Admiral Noyes: I had one in my possession, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Where is it now?

Admiral Noyes: I do not know, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Have you made any search among any of those other people who had those cards to determine what has become of them?

Admiral Noyes: I have not, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, you had one of these cards in your possession?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Do you recall what was stated on the card? Admiral Noyes: "East wind, rain- U.S.; north wind,

cloudy - USSR; west wind, clear - British."

Expressions to that effect. I wouldn't be sure of the exact way of expressing it but to that sense.

Mr. Keefe: Were the Japanese words on there?

Adriral Noyes: No, sir. The Japanese words would have been of no value because nobody could, - the code was intended purely for telephoning to people at their homes and

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

the idea was that over the telephone there would merely be said that a weather report had been received "East wind, rain" which to the recipient of this card would remind him which country was involved.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I want to get this one thing straight, Admiral. You had this pick-up station or intercept station over here at Cheltenham?

Admiral Noyes: Cheltehham was the receiving station for the Navy Department. It was not a pick-up station. It was the main traffic station of the Navy.

Mr. Keefe: Well, the testimony here up to date is quite undisputed, it seems to me, that a message was taken off the teletype. We haven't heard yet from the Lieutenant who took it off, Lieutenant Murray. Some of them were identified by Lieu tenant Murray. Now, if a message came over the teletype, that message would have to be written down at the station that received it, isn't that true?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. It had to be typed at the station.

Mr. Keefe: It had to be typed at the station that received it, isn't that right?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And typing it at the station sends it over the teletype here to the Navy Department where it is teletyped on the teletype machine?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe: That is the way it is receive??
Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Now the only way you could identify the winds execute message was by finding the words that were set up in the original code set-up, isn't that true?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So when the testimony is, as testified by Captain Safford before the Naval Court of Inquiry, that the watch officer saw the identification words on this teletype and tore off this page, the Japanese word must have been there to identify it, isn't that true?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Without that nobody would have even thought of it being a winds execute, isn't that true?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And the Japanese word that was there would indicate with whom relations were strained or broken off?

Admiral Noyes: It may, after the other requirements of the code were met.

Mr. Keefe: Of course I understand that. Now you found a message taken off the teletype which Kramer, with all the other inconsistencies in his testimony but I think he was clear finally before this committee that he then believed that that was an original, authentic winds code execute message, and Safford believed it to be such, two of the high men handling that sort of traffic in this Division, and

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

that message found its way into your office and from there on the matter becomes blank. Now with all this refreshing of your mind you are still unable to tell us what became of the message that was actually delivered to you from Captain Safford? I do not care whether it was on the 4th or the 5th. That is immaterial. Dates do not make any difference.

Admiral Noyes: It is quite material to me, sir. When you ask me to identify a specific piece of paper and to line it up with the testimony of three different people, it puts me in a very difficult position.

Mr. Keefe: Admiral Noyes, I am not asking you to do any such thing. Here is a message that the testimony is clear and convincing on that both the Army and Navy had gone to great lengths to receive it, and the evidence is clear on that score, and you have gone to the extent of setting up an absolutely clear system that would apply only to this one message when it came in, so that this message could be identified out of all the other messages, it was the only one that was to be handled and brought directly to your office and the only one for which these cards were made out.

Now that takes it completely out of the ordinary traffic, doesn't it?

Admiral Noyes: It was out of the ordinary traffic, there is no question of that, sir.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Keefe The Chairman

Mr. Keefe: Still you do not remember this message, or anything about it?

Admiral Noyes: You ask me to bring together a 200-word message, which is a message that long (indicating) at least, on the 4th, which Safford testified to, a small strip of paper on the 5th, which Kramer testified to, and a different message on the 5th, about an entirely different set-up, where the British and Russia were both brought in, and they are not the same thing.

I am not able to identify the disposition of any one of those three supposed messages.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I would think, Admiral, there might be some justification for this last statement of yours were it not for the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that you actually telephoned him. He did not telephone you, you telephoned him and told him the message was in, clearly demonstrating the extreme interest that was applied to this one particular message, and you do not deny that you telephoned that to Colonel Sadtler. That is all.

The Chairman: Admiral, I want to ask you a question or two.

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: I understood in regard to this telephone message that your testimony here before us is to the effect

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Witness Noyes Questions by: The Chairman you may have telephoned him but you do not recall.

Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

The Chairman: If you did telephone him.

Admiral Noyes: That is correct. I telephoned many times a day. We had a secret telephone between my office and the office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army for the purpose of discussing these matters.

The Chairman: You were all down there in offices that were closely associated, weren't you?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: In and out all during the day?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: You were not, any of you, quarantined against the other so you were afraid to go back and forth, and you did go back and forth and held many conversations about things that were then of interest to your Department and to the Navy and the Government with respect to this Japanese situation, is that true?

Admiral Neyes: That is correct, Senator.

The Chairman: Now about these cards that we have been talking about here. As I understand it, whether you initiated that or whether Kramer or Safford initiated it, it was a matter of convenience, so you could distribute those cards -- which were identical, as I understand it.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: The Chairman

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir, they were identical.

The Chairman: (Continuing) -- to four or five people.

Admiral Noyes: Yes.

The Chairman: So if they happened to be at home at night and what you were looking For, that is the execute message came in, you could call these people and say, "The weather report is here." Nobody could understand that except the two people at each end of the telephone, is that correct?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

The Chairman: The general public wou dinot understand it? Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

The Chairman: They would not know what you were talking about. They would not know you were talking bout a Japanese secret code message, would they?

Admiral Noyes: That was the purpose of the cards.

The Chairman: You would call up and say, "The weather report is in", and the other man would say, "Well, what is it?" You would say, "It is East Wind Rain", and he knew what that meant. You did not have to go into details, or to give a blueprint. That card was for that purpose, is that true?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

The Chairman: So it does not make a lot of difference

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information.

Witness Noyes Questions by: The Chairman who initiated it, or who actually wrote that out, if there was such a card system and it was distributed to these four or five topnotchers who were entitled to this secret

Admiral Noyes: I might say the original question which I was asked before the Navy Court of Inquiry indicated. they were cards for use in the office, and having been away for a year in the Pacific, away from Washington, I did not recall them in that sense.

The Chairman: The first impression I got in reference to these cards was that they were cards that were distributed among the high officers in the offices and kept there. I evidently was mistaken. They were supposed to take them home with them?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: They could keep them in the office if anybody called them there, and they would understand the meaning?

Admiral Noyes: Yes.

The Chairman: This teletype business, you had both white and yellow teletype paper, didn't you, or pink and yellow?

Admiral Noyes: I could not say, sir.

The Chairman: Did you have more than one color?

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: The Chairman

Admiral Noyes: I do not know, sir. I thought the general run of teletype rolls was yellow.

The Chairman: A lot of it is white. I have seen white teletype paper, although I do not know what the Navy uses.

Admiral Noyes: I think we would use white, if we did not have yellow. In other words, I do not know of any color code distinction in a teletype message.

The Chairman: If you were using both yellow and pink, or white and pink, or any other color, would you be able now to identify which color any particular message was in that was handed to you?

Admiral Noyes: The only way I could identify a message now, unless it recalls something to my memory, would be my initials on the message.

The Chairman: Now about the execute message which has been referred to here. When you referred to the message shown to you on either the 4th or 5th you were talking about the message that you call the false execute message?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Now in the code set-up, the weather set-up, the Japanese from Tokyo sent a message to their Ambassador here that in the event of a breaking off of relations or interfering with communications, if they heard a weather report containing these words this is what

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Witness Noyes Questions by: The Chairman it meant: "East Wind Rain: Trouble with the United States", or a break in relations?

Admiral Noyes: Yes.

The Chairman: "North Wind Cloudy: With Russia; West Wind clear: With England."

Admiral Noyes: It would indicate on account of the probable severance of relations with the country indicated, upon receipt of the message codes and papers were to be destroyed.

The Chairman: In other words, if other means of communication became impossible and they heard a weather broadcast of that sort and heard these words they would know what they meant?

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir. I believe the reason the Japanese sent the British message on the 7th was that some one of their stations had not checked in with the word "Haruna", indicating that the papers had been destroyed, and they may have found out, or have suspected that they never had gotten the message, and they sent that out to try to get that set destroyed.

The Chairman: Now prior to the 7th the conditions under which this weather report were to be broadcast had not taken place, that is, there had been no break in diplomatic relations nor communications, had there?

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: The Chairman

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

The Chairman: Now the message that was received here on the 7th, is that a message that you regarded and interpreted as a true execute message, according to the weather set-up?

Admiral Noyes: The one in the FCC?

The Chairman: Yes, the one that you referred to earlier as having gotten here on the 7th. I think it is on the last page of the exhibit.

Admiral Noyes: Page 3(d) of Exhibit 142?

The Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Noyes: It says in English, and this is in the middle of the news, "but today especially at this point I will give the weather broadcast West Wind Clear, West Wind Clear, twice.

The Chairman: That meant there was no trouble with Russia?

Admiral Noyes: That meant diplomatic relations severed with England.

The Chairman: Of course neither of those signals or symbols were to be interpreted as meaning war, necessarily.

Admiral Noyes: That is right, sir.

The Chairman: It meant there might be severance of diplomatic relations between the respective countries. Well,

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: The Chairman

now, if that was to be regarded as an execute message based upon the weather signals that had been previously given to the Japanese diplomatic representatives, would there have been any need or any occasion for sending an execute message either on the 4th or 5th, and if they sent one on the 4th or 5th would they necessarily have repeated it on the 7th?

Admiral Noyes: I should think it is very unlikely, sir.

The Chairman: So if the message that was received here was really an execute message and was so intended to be regarded by the Japanese to their representatives, would there have been any need to send another one on the 7th?

Admiral Noyes: No, sir, except I think this one on the 7th was just intended to clean up some things in some British point.

The Chairman: That related to the British?

Admiral Noyes: They had not got an answer back from some British station and they were afraid they were going to lose their codes at that place, or for some reason the British had held them up.

The Chairman: Now with reference to Admiral Phillips, he was an acquaintance of yours?

Admiral Noyes: No, sir, I did not know him personally. I knew who he was.

The Chairman: Do you know whether he came there

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Witness Noyes Questions by: The Chairman specifically to see you that Sunday morning, or just came to see somebody?

Admiral Noyes: Admiral Phillips was at an Asiatic station, I think sir.

The Chairman: I am talking about the man who came in to see you on Sunday morning the 7th.

Admiral Noyes: I think that was Admiral Little, sir.

The Chairman: He was referred to here as Phillips.

Admiral Noyes: I beg your pardon, sir. He was talking about Manila.

The Chairman: I am talking about the man who came into your office on Sunday morning and wanted you to make an appointment with Secretary Hull.

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Who was that?

Admiral Noyes: I think it was Admiral Little. I do not know whether Admiral Phillips was in Washington at that time or not.

The Chairman: Was there anything unusual about that? Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

The Chairman: You say he gave you some information that he had from British sources and then you gave him some idea about this Fleet going down through the South China Sea.

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: The Chairman

The Chairman: Then you called up to see if you could make an appointment with Secretary Hull, and you talked to one of his subordinates.

Admiral Noyes: Normally a foreigner is supposed to go through the Office of Naval Intelligence, and he wanted to cut a corner and asked me if I would be willing to call the Secretary of State's office. I knew one of the Secretary of State's people and I just called him up.

The Chairman: Was this man an acquaintance of yours?
Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: He was?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: So he knew you and you knew him?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: It being Sunday and most of the officers probably not being there, he chose you as a sort of agent through whom he could seek an appointment with the Secretary of State?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: You performed that function and he left?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Cooper.

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Questions by: The Vice Chairman

The Vice Chairman: Admiral, you stated that you had a conversation with Captain Safford, I believe, about four months ago.

Admiral Noyes: During the summer. I could not give you the exact month, sir.

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Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: During this last summer?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: What was the description that Captain Safford gave you about the winds message at that time?

Admiral Noyes: To the best of my recollection, Captain Safford said, he said that he still thought there had been an execute of the winds message. I said, well, I don't think so. Why can't you show me something, if it is true, some record that we can get together on. I said, When did it come in. He said that it came in at Winter Harbor, I think, and they have destroyed their records. I didn't want to put any pressure on Captain Safford to change his opinion.

I just told him that I had no recollection of it, and that he would have to show me something to indicate that there was an authentic execute.

The Vice Chairman: I understood you to state that the description that Captain Safford gave here in his prepared statement of a winds execute message was different from the description that he gave you last summer; is that correct?

Admiral Noyes: It is correct in that he didn't give me any description like that.

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Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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He said, in the first place, that it came in at Winter Harbor, he thought, and he didn't tell me anything about this business about the Russian slant, the negative Russian business. That wasn't mentioned.

The Vice Chairman: When he talked to you that summer, he said the message came in at Winter Harbor, Maine?

Admiral Noyes: Yes.

I don't think he was positive.

The Vice Chairman: When he testified here, I think he said it came in over the Cheltenham station, didn't he?

Admiral Noyes: That is rigt.

The Vice Chairman: That is, two different places?
Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Now then, whatever description he gave you last summer about a winds execute message, your impression of that it was different to the description he gave here. Is that correct?

Admiral Noyes: Specifically to the extent of station and in the fact he did not mention any, he mentioned very little of what was contained in his present statement.

The Vice Chairman: And he teld you that he was going to prepare a statement, and would show it to you?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And he never did do that?

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Admiral Noyes: But he stated that he didn't think it was proper after this inquiry was ordered by Congress; that was his reason, and I agreed with him on that.

Admiral Noyes: That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

The Vice Chairman: Admiral, I would like to ask you this question:

You were present during the appearance of Admiral Ingersoll here?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Before this committee?

Admirel Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You heard his testimony about the so-called winds execute message?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: In which he said, in substance, that he thought it had been magnified beyond all reasonable proportion of importance?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Do you agree in that statement?

Admiral Noyes: I do, sir.

The Vice Chairman: It is your opinion then that if such a message had been received as Captain Safford contends, it would have been very little importance in the light of

Questions by: The Vice Chaimman

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other information you had?

Admiral Noyes: I should have recommended no action whatever in regard to such a message.

The Vice Chairman: Even if a correct execute winds message, just as Captain Safford contends, had been received on either the 4th or the 5th of December and brought to you, you would not have recommended that any action be taken on it?

Admiral Noyes: I would not have recommmended that any action be taken, Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman: Because you didn't consider it of any importance then?

Admiral Noyes: We had already informed our people in the field everything that the message would have told.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

That is all.

The Chairman: I overlooked one question.

In regard to these cards, in your former testimony, I believe, before the Naval Inquiry, you either said that you did not know about the cards, or didn't remember them?

Admiral Noyes: I said I didn't remember.

The Chairman: After you came back here, you testified, I believe, on the Pacific Coast, after having been in the Pacific since 1942, you testified from memory and after you

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witness Noyes Questions by: The Chairman 1 Senator Ferguson h5 got back to Washington, you talked it over with Captain 2 Safford, and you concluded that he was correct, and that 3 you were mistaken in the first instance, and that there 4 was a system of cards? is that true? 5 Admiral Noyes: That is correct. 0 The Chairman: That is all. 7 Senator Ferguson. 8 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, on the 6-7 of December, were you in civilian clothes? 10 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. 11 Senator Ferguson: Was Admiral Hart in civilian 12 clothes? 13 Admiral Noyes: Admiral Hart? 14 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Stark. 15 Admiral Noyes: Admiral Stark? 18 Senator Ferguson: Yes. 17 Admiral Noyes: I said right away, "yes." I may be 18 wrong. I didn't think we put on uniforms until after the 19 attack at Pearl Harbor. 20 Senator Ferguson: You were all in civilian clothes? 21 Admiral Noyes: All the same way. 23 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll. 23 Now, Admiral Biddle, was he in civilian clothes or 24

in British uniform?

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Admiral Noyes: Well, I think if we were, he was.

I think the Attache people in foreign stations wear the same rig we do.

The Chairman: Inasmuch as Britain was at war, he might well have been in uniform, and our Naval officers in civilian clothes?

Admiral Noyes: That is true. Yes, you are probably correct, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Chairman: If there are no further questions, thank you very much for your presence here. You are excused.

(Witness excused)

The Chairman: The committee will recess until ten o'clock Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:35 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock a. m., on Monday morning, February 18, 1945.)