

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY - R E S T R I C T E D
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS NO. 291) TOKYO
Japanese Intel. No. 12 Date: 10 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS

Subject: Japanese Intelligence, its organization and use in
War Plans.

Person interrogated and background:

Comdr. TERAI, Y., IJN, a Naval officer of 19 years experience, a Naval Aviator with over 2,000 hours flying time, and for 3 years, between 1939 and 1942, Asst. Naval Attache in Washington, D. C., was Air Staff Officer in the 1st Section, First Department, of the Navy General Staff ("War Plans"). In this position, he was responsible for the over-all staff planning of employment of Naval aircraft.

1926 Graduated Naval Academy.
1926 On board Training Cruiser YAGUMO.
1926 To CL KUMA.
1927 To BB FUSO.
1927 To SS I-53.
1928 To KASUMIGAURA for flight training.
1929 Graduated, to TATEYAMA Air Unit.
1930 To BB KIRISHIMA as aviator.
1930 KASUMIGAURA Air Unit instructor.
1931 To CA ATAGO as Air Officer.
1932 YOKOSUKA Air Unit.
1933 SAEKI Air Unit.
1935 To Naval War College as student.
1937 Graduated, to YOKOHAMA Air Unit, to CHINA,
with First Combined Fleet.
1939 To WASHINGTON, D.C., as Asst. Naval Attache.
1942 Returned on GRIPSHOLM.
1942-1945 Navy General Staff.


Where interviewed: Naval War College.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. T. M. Curtis, USNR
Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer, USNR

Interpreter: Lt. Comdr. Frank B. Huggins, USNR

Allied Officers Present: None.

- R E S T R I C T E D -



Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAJ, Y., IJN)

- RESTRICTED -

SUMMARY

Comdr. TERAJ comments generally on Japanese Naval Aviation with emphasis on the staff planning done for the employment of Naval aircraft. Especially emphasized are sources, processing and use of intelligence information in staff planning. In addition, Comdr. TERAJ speaks in considerable detail of the organization and operation in the Japanese Navy of those functions which, in current U. S. Naval organization, come under the head of Air Combat Intelligence.

The Japanese Navy had no separate air training school such as the Army had at TOYOOKA. However, the Naval Academy at ETA JIMA had an "Air Unit" at IWAKUNI, and it was the plan for every Navy midshipman to go through that school. There he was taught the theory of flight, air navigation and communications, something of aerial gunnery, bombing, and observation, and was expected at least to solo in the air.

Intelligence officers as such were assigned only to large commands and headquarters. On individual ships and in Air Groups and squadrons, the communications officer handled many of the functions which we think of as duties of the intelligence officer.

Briefing of pilots on carriers was done by several different officers; the aerologist, the air officer of the ship (who had been given most of his "done" by the communications officer), and the Commanding Officer (of the ship) himself. Interrogation of pilots was handled by having each pilot report to the senior man of his flight and so on up the line until the senior man in the air would report to the air officer and the Commanding Officer.

Information for planning came from the Third Department and was processed for the Planning Section by Division 3 under Comdr. MIYAZAKI. Information on enemy Fleet movements and deployment of enemy aircraft was the most useful material provided, and this was found substantially accurate.

The Navy developed the suicide or KAMIKAZE tactics in the Philippines Sea Battles of 1944. This was not directed from above, according to Comdr. TERAJ, but started in the flying units themselves. It was up to any Squadron or Unit commander to decide whether his unit would adopt suicide tactics.

ZERO 53 was the best shipboard fighter developed by the Japanese.

The turning point in the war for Naval air forces came at RABAU when carrier aircraft were sent ashore and destroyed there.

5500 to 5600 operational Japanese Naval aircraft remained at the war's end, and 70% of these were trainers.

The Japanese had no separate photo squadrons in the Navy. Individual planes, primarily in reconnaissance squadrons, did take pictures. These were SAIUN (Myrths) planes, normally operating at some 12,000 feet altitude. Comdr. TERAJ, following his return to Japan on the GRIPSHOLM in 1942, introduced photo interpretation to the Japanese Navy. 30 men had been trained in this work, and 100 more were in training at the end of the war.

The Japanese Navy had made no provision for Flak Analysis or Flak intelligence, and apparently very little had been done in this field.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAI, Y., IJN)

- RESTRICTED - SUMMARY (Cont'd).

Plans called for training 30,000 pilots per year. The highest peak actually attained was in the Spring of 1944 when some 1200 to 1300 per month were trained.

Fuel, according to Comdr. TERAI, was clearly the most critical item for the Naval air forces. They were "scraping the bottom of the barrel" on pilots, too, but lack of fuel for training purposes was the real reason for lack of trained pilots and poorly trained pilots at the war's end.

- END SUMMARY -

- R E S T R I C T E D -

- R E S T R I C T E D -

- RESTRICTED - TRANSCRIPT

Q.1. Were you in the 1st Section of the Naval General Staff?

A. Yes. I was in the War Plans Division.

Q.2. What were your specific duties in this position?

A. This was the General Planning Section. It was Capt. OMAI's (Chief, 1st Section) duty to coordinate activities. I was Air Plans Officer. The organization of the 1st Section was this:

Captain OMAI, Chief of Section.

- (1) Capt. INOKUCHI, Coordinator and senior staff officer.
- (2) Comdr. YAMAGUCHI, Army-Navy liaison and joint operations planning.
- (3) Comdr. MIYAZAKI, Intelligence - gathering information given by other intelligence departments and coordinating it. NOTE: Comdr. MIYAZAKI is at the Foreign Central Liaison Office in TOKYO.
- (4) Comdr. TERAJ, basic planning for air operations which were passed up to Capt. OMAI and Adm. TOMIOKA if acceptable. These were very general plans. Much was left up to the Fleet Commanders in carrying them out. We planned simple, basic logistics also. Furthermore, based on the planning of operations, we would recommend new weapons and new air developments.

Q.3. Did the Navy have an Air Training School equivalent to the Army school at TOYOOKA?

A. No. That was left up to the Naval Academy where every midshipman had some training in the Naval Air Unit at IWAKUNI near HIROSHIMA. The Army separated Air from Ground while the Navy keeps its air and Fleet activities together.

Q.4. Was there any separate Naval Air Organization?

A. There is a separate Naval Air Headquarters for logistics rather than Command purposes. Planning was done by the Navy Dept., however, for all branches.

Q.5a. Did I understand that every midshipman attends the Air school at IWAKUNI?

A. Yes. After they graduate and go to the Fleet, then, of course, they go into specialties. Every midshipman learned to fly, however. This training started 2 or 3 years before the war.


Q.5b. Did this training include carrier operations?

A. No. The object was to get every man to solo. This did not work out exactly as planned due to war stress and demands.

Q.6. Did you fly from carriers?

A. No.

- R E S T R I C T E D -



Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAJ, Y., IJN) -----

Q.7. How many students graduated from the Naval Air School in 1940?
A. 300. In 1944? A. 3,000.

Q.8. What were the subjects taught in the school at IWAKUNI?

A. The subjects taught there were regular flight training, simple observation, navigation, bombing and gunnery, and communications. Communications training was carried out also throughout the Naval Academy training.

Q.9. Were there courses at ETA JIMA in Intelligence or information?

A. No.

Q.10. Were you with a squadron in China at any time?

A. Yes, for four months I was a squadron commander. The remainder of my time there, I was a Staff Officer.

Q.11. Are you familiar with carrier operations?

A. In general, yes.

Q.12. Were Intelligence or information officers assigned to carriers?

A. Not as an Intelligence officer. Large commands and headquarters would have full time Intelligence officers. Communications officers doubled in intelligence duties aboard individual Fleet units.

Q.13. In a squadron or air group on a carrier, how did information get to the pilots? Who did the briefing?

A. Information comes in by dispatch, RDF sightings, and all radio communications. The Captain of the ship receives this information and briefs the pilots. The pilots have a ready room with boards upon which information is listed. The communications officer passes information to the air officer who gets one of his subordinates to keep up the ready room plot. However, if they have a Flag aboard, the Staff Intelligence Officer handles these duties. The Captain of the ship invariably goes to the ready room to give the pilots a "oop talk" prior to an important mission. The weather information is provided by the air officer, as well as navigation information. A full time Aerologist is aboard all CV's, and he provides weather maps.

Q.14. When pilots return, who interrogates them? How does information get to the Captain?

A. When the pilots return to the ship, they tell their flight commander, and he passes the information up to the senior aviator who was on the flight, and he tells the Captain in the presence of the air officer. The air officer sometimes interrogates him.

Q.15. Would this information get back to the 1st Section, Navy General Staff? Who would act on it? Who processed it? Did it go through your intelligence division, i.e., 3rd Division, under Comdr. MIYAZAKI?

A. The 3rd Division receives this information, and it is used by the Air Planning people.

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Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAI, Y., IJN)

Q.16. Give an example of one of the campaigns in which you planned the employment of Naval aircraft.

A. OKINAWA.

Q.17. Who planned the PHILIPPINES air defense?

A. Capt. GENDA. He is out of the Navy now in KYUSHU somewhere. I don't know exactly where.

Q.18. How is the information that is gathered and processed by the 3rd Division used in Naval Air Planning? Use OKINAWA as an example.

A. OKINAWA was a simple one to plan because it consisted of attacking shipping, troop transports being designated as primary targets. We planned to work in conjunction with the Army to prevent a landing, and then to send out Fleet units to clear up cripples and make the defense complete.

Q.19. Why was there no air cover when the YAMATO was sunk?

A. We did provide cover, at least we tried to, but we lacked enough planes and were at extreme fighter range, and there were periods when no fighters could be provided. Communications and navigation were bad, and Japanese pilots could not find the YAMATO.

Q.20. Did you have any operational aircraft carriers at that time?

A. Yes. There were aircraft carriers but not enough pilots.

Q.21. How many aircraft did you have available in planning the defense of OKINAWA?

A. About 2,000 Naval aircraft. The Army had about a third of this number.

Q.22. Did the Navy adapt suicide tactics? If so, when?

A. Yes. The Navy developed them. This was done in the 26th Air Flot. under command of Rear Adm. ARIMA. During the PHILIPPINES action, Rear Adm. ARIMA had started the tactics. At the time of OKINAWA, all aircraft were suicide. It was up to the Squadron Commander at the time to decide whether or not his unit was to be a suicide unit. General Headquarters never directed that it be used, but did not try to stop this type of tactic. About the time I came to the Planning Section it was my job to evaluate this tactic, and I received reports of action. I did not believe it as effective as it might have been. New weapons were being developed (OKA and KIKA). Neither the Navy nor the Army ever directed the use of suicide tactics. Army General Headquarters did direct the landing of suicide aircraft at OKINAWA. The Navy had tried this in the MARIANAS but it aborted.

Q.23. What was the best carrier fighter developed by the Japanese?

A. The 53 ZERO.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. TERAI, Y., IJN)

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Q. 24. On planning for the employment of Naval Aircraft, what were your sources of information upon which plans were based?

A. The intelligence officer in the 1st Section gave us all the necessary information.

Q. 25. What type of information did he place at your disposal?

A. He gave us primarily movements of enemy fleet task forces and deployment of allied aircraft.

Q. 26. Were his estimates good?

A. Yes, usually so.

Q. 27. You were in Washington in December 1941. Did you know of plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

Q. 28. Who was in charge of air planning on the Naval General Staff at that time?

A. Capt. T. MYO was in charge of air planning at that time. He is in Tokyo at the Navy Department now.

Q. 29. Did information from submarine and aircraft reconnaissance come to the air planning department?

A. Yes, directly and also through the intelligence department.

Q. 30. When plans for an operation was determined, how did they reach the fleet? First, General plans.

A. If basic plans were okayed they would go to the headquarters of the combined fleet. Orders to the fleet were issued from there. The first section sent none out direct. These were sent out in written documents and by dispatch.

Q. 31. Can you name the point in time when employment of your Naval Air Forces changed from offensive to defensive operations?

A. The turning point at first was Midway. Our carriers became deficient at Rabaul where carrier aircraft were sent ashore and there destroyed. The real turning point came then.

Q. 32. How many naval aircraft remained operational on 15 August 1945?

A. 5,500 -- 5,600 aircraft, 70% of which were training planes. The army had about 7,000 in all, I think, but I am not sure. 50 % of these were trainers.

Q. 33. How effectively was photographic reconnaissance used in the navy?

A. We had no separate Photo Squadrons. We did have reconnaissance squadrons which also took photographs. We had no great success in securing photographs. The army was more advanced. The navy did not give special training to crews in the taking of pictures. Reserve Officers (10 in the beginning and 20 later and later still 100 more) were trained in photo interpretation beginning in December 1942. The final 100 never completed training because the war ended. (NOTE: Comdr. TERAI originated Photo interpretation training in the Japanese Navy upon his return from Washington)

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation: (Comdr. TEFAL, Y., IJN)

- R E S T R I C T E D -

A. (Q. 33. Contd.) Specially trained Photo interpreters were used quite fully in Air Fleets, 1 man per Air Fleet. Demands came from units down to squadrons for Photo interpreters and that was the reason for planning to train 100 more, but the plan never was fulfilled. Photos were sent in to the 1st Section and good use was made of them, for assigning special targets, especially with the suicide aircraft directed to land on OKINAWA. They were used by the fleets most fully.

Q. 34. What aircraft did you use as Photo planes?

A. Fast single engine SAIUN (MYRT) aircraft were used for this work in taking photos.

Q. 35. At what altitudes was most of your photographic work done?

A. Mostly at 12,000 feet for important targets.

Q. 36. Did your Intelligence Division make available target data and studies for air planning?

A. A great deal of information came in and was prepared by the 3rd Department. This was sent out by dispatch and followed up by publications. All this preparation was done by the 3rd Department.

Q. 37. What is your comment on the planning work done in 1st Section as to its effectiveness and usefulness, with particular reference to information provided you?

A. Most of our information came from Communications Intelligence. More Photo Intelligence was definitely needed.

Q. 38. What information was given aviators regarding U.S. Anti-aircraft weapons, methods, gun positions, etc.? (Flak Intelligence)

A. This work on our part was very meagre. There was no analysis in detail. We had no experts in this field.

Q. 39. How many squadrons were assigned to reconnaissance work?

A. We had two squadrons. One with the 3rd Fleet and one with 5th Fleet. These were land based toward the end of war.

Q. 40. Was this the greatest number you ever had?

A. Yes. This was greatest number we ever had.

Q. 41. How many planes did you have in these squadrons?

A. 36 Aircraft with 12 reserves, 48 in all, however difficulties brought this number down to 20 % effectiveness at times.

Q. 42. How many naval aviators were to be trained according to your plans?

A. We had plans for 30,000 a year. Later we reduced this to 18,000 and reached an actual peak of 1,200 - 1,300 per month. This was in the spring of 1944.

Q. 43. How many navy fliers did you lose during the war?

A. Roughly 10,000 Naval pilots.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Transcript of Interrogation: (Comdr. TERAI, Y. IJN)

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Q. 44. What would you say was your one most critical item in the Naval Air Forces?

A. The most critical item at the end, limiting our operations, was fuel and as a corollary to that, lack of well trained pilots. This also was due to scarcity of fuel. It was a vicious circle, starting, however, with lack of fuel.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

- R E S T R I C T E D -