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AUGUSTE COMTE.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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VERGIL'S CONCEPTION OF FATE.

BY ARTHUR L. KEITH.

THE most casual reader of Vergil's *Aeneid* can scarcely fail to be impressed with the largeness of the part played by the idea of fate or destiny. Without a clear understanding of the poet's conception of fate, much of the real significance of his epic poem will be lost, for his idea of fate is intricately involved with the plot and character and thought. Vergil, as well as other writers, recognized the difficulty inherent in the definition of the idea. The contradiction between the fore-ordained and the freedom of the will may never be explained away. Cicero has told us (*De Div.* II, 8, 9): *anile sane et plenum superstitionis fati nomen ipsum*, "the very name of fate is puerile and full of superstition". The Homeric heroes acknowledged the supremacy of fate, yet played that they were free. And so we of this generation admit the existence of the inevitable laws that govern the universe toward its larger issues and yet pretend to believe that man's will is absolutely free. Vergil, like the rest of us, was confronted by the insoluble difficulties of the situation, and if the lines he draws are not always clear, the fault is not his own.

The idea of fate is prominent in Greek poetry from Homer down through the tragedians. There were formal discussions of the subject with which Vergil may have been familiar, though they probably did not greatly influence his own conception. His treatment of the idea of fate differs from that of Homer as far as day from night. Homer's heroes act as if moved by free-will though the inevitable doom lay always in the background. Vergil's hero is forever under the shadow of destiny and yields im-

plicit obedience to the unseen power. The hereditary doom of Aeschylus's tragedies is far removed from Vergil's idea of fate. In the causes that lead up to the fall of Troy there may be a suggestion that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children but the suggestion is not developed. Indeed, Dido is broken by the fates not because she is the *descendant* of those who have outraged the laws of right but because she is the first queen of a people who were in the distant future to prove Rome's most formidable enemy. Dido's dying curse that entailed sorrow and suffering for later generations of Romans does not enter largely into the story of the Aeneid and even if it did, it differs in important particulars from the fatal curse of Attic tragedy.

We can hardly dismiss Vergil's indebtedness to the Stoic philosophy toward which he inclined in his more mature years. His Aeneas is so characteristically a Stoic that we must believe that the poet accepted somewhat of the Stoic attitude. His ascription of purpose and providence to fate represents an obligation to Stoic philosophers which must be recognized, yet in the working out of his ideas he has achieved a distinct originality. We feel that fundamentally his idea of fate was a development of the experiences through which he had passed, the events which he had witnessed, culminating in the establishment under Augustus of the world-empire. He had seen personal fortunes thrust aside by the onward march of stern events. Born in the village of Andes, near Mantua, he spent his youth in the innocent pleasures of that sheltered nook, but soon he was destined to be swept into the current of the great events of his age. Things which once seemed permanent proved transitory. His father's estate was confiscated and though it was later restored, Vergil learned through experience and observation that the course of events seemed to be determined by a power beyond himself. The civil wars of the past century must have profoundly moved him, susceptible as his poetic temperament was, and it would be strange indeed if he did not share in the general depression of the time. But when the clouds had lifted and Augustus was seen to have ushered in the reign of peace and order and prosperity, a new significance was attached to the power which before had seemed to act blindly and it was recognized that there was an intelligence in the unseen power. If there had been no Augustus, it is easy to see that Vergil's reaction toward fate would have been quite different. He

felt with Horace that Augustus was the supreme gift of the fates to mankind.

This more hopeful conception of fate is somewhat related to Vergil's philosophical attitude toward the development of history. Differing from his contemporary Horace, he did not find his chief interest in the present. His vision extended far into the past as he traced the process by which from humble beginnings Rome had achieved her present greatness, and then this view reached out into the future of the empire to which had been established neither goals of history or seasons. This broad outlook of the poet is responsible in large measure for the idea of destiny as it appears in the *Aeneid*. The importance of the historical element in his conception of fate is suggested by a ready computation. Fate is mentioned more than four times as frequently in the *Aeneid* than it is in the *Bucolics* and the *Georgics*. These pastoral and agricultural poems are relatively independent of the idea of destiny that gives history its real significance. Thus from the poet's reflection on his own experiences, and from his philosophical attitude toward history, we may believe that his conception of fate developed, unaided in any great degree by the thoughts of his predecessors.

Consideration of this idea in Vergil may be limited to the *Aeneid* where we find its greatest development. Five times within the first forty lines we are confronted with the fates. They are directly mentioned on an average once in every seventy-eight lines, if we take the entire poem. But these figures do not give the whole truth. Even when not directly mentioned, the fates are omnipresent. In the background of every event, of all signs and omens, lies fate. Perhaps its universal presence may be regarded as its most outstanding attribute. The various incidents of the last night at Troy are big with fate. We feel that the serpents are directed against Laocoon by the unerring and invisible power. The wooden horse is clearly felt as an instrument of fate. Likewise, we see the guiding hand of destiny as Aeneas overcomes every obstacle in his journey toward the promised land. His adventures with Harpies and Cyclopes, his long dalliance with Dido, his bold defiance of the dangers of the lower world, and the wars he fought in Italy gain significance from the fact that they appear as incidents in the onward march of destiny. Omens and signs and dreams are but the visible indications of the invisible power. The

fire that played about the temples of Iulus is significant that his line is marked by fate. Omens which preceded Aeneas's arrival in Latium indicated that he was the man of destiny. The designs on Aeneas's shield represent the fates of the coming generations and as Aeneas lifts to his shoulders the fame and fates of his descendants we feel that the fates are always as near to their chosen people as the shield is to the hero who bears it.

This omnipresence of the fates is aided by their close association with the gods. This association is so close at times as to indicate that the poet aimed at no exact distinction. In some vague way they seem almost identical. A frequent recurring expression is *fata deum*, the fates of the gods. We also meet *fata Iovis* (4, 614) and *fatis Iunonis* (8, 292). Even when not related thus by the limiting genitive they are often almost as closely connected in other ways. The fates and the gods receive credit equally in many situations.

dum fata deusque sinebant (4, 651).

sat fatis Venerique datum (9, 135).

vel quae portenderet ira

magna deum vel quae fatorum posceret ordo (5, 706).

nec pater omnipotens Troiam nec fata vetabant stare (8, 398).

matre dea monstrante viam data fata secutus (1, 382).

cur nunc tua quisquam

vertere iussa potest aut cur nova condere fata? (10, 34).

It is not easy to disentangle fates from gods in these passages. Perhaps some of these instances represent Vergil's well known habit of duplication. There is practically no difference between *fata obstant* and *placidasque viri deus obstruit auris*, (4, 440). The poet aims at no nice distinction of responsibility.¹

There is no lack of situations that point toward the same identification. In the first book Venus reproaches Jupiter for changing his purpose in regard to the Trojans, and Jupiter in replying seems to identify his power with theirs:

manent immota tuorum

fata tibi (1, 257),

and then a moment later supplements with:

neque me sententia vertit. (1, 260).

¹ Such instances as these should aid the interpretation of *qui fata parent, quem poscat Apollo*, (2, 121): "for whom the fates prepare (death), whom Apollo claims". Apparently, with the intention of escaping the co-equality suggested by the association of *fata* with Apollo, some editors have wrongly interpreted *fata* as the accusative, in the sense of *death*.

If Jupiter is only the agent carrying out the decrees of the fates, surely the many reproaches here and elsewhere heaped upon him are misplaced.

But in spite of this close relationship instances will be found, as noted later, where the gods attempt to thwart or to delay the fates. Jupiter, however, is an exception. His will and theirs accord entirely. The supreme divinity and the purpose of the fates may not collide. Yet the poet does not always clearly show which power dominates.

Sometimes Jupiter seems to be the author of the fates and to dispose them in his own way. Consider the following passage:

sic fata deum rex

sortitur volvitque vices, is vertitur ordo. (3, 375).

"Thus the king of the gods allots the fates and fixes the succession of circling events and this order revolves". This passage is not easy to interpret. The fates are not thought of here as persons but as lots to be drawn from an urn. True, Jupiter does not manipulate the urn or its contents in order to obtain a lot to his liking and whatever is "write" on the lot is "writ". There is plenty of room for chance but after all the general situation places Jupiter above the fates on the principle that the one who casts the lot is greater than the lot itself. A similar situation is found in 12, 725, where Jupiter holds the scales which decide the fates of Aeneas and Turnus. Here again he stands in the position of controller, though it must be admitted that after the eternal laws of gravitation or whatever principle is involved has been manifested, he has no choice but to comply. But some element of the willing, disposing power is Jupiter's. Compare 4, 110:

*sed fatis incerta feror, si Jupiter unam
esse velit Tyriis urbem Troiaque profectis.*

"I am harassed with uncertainty because of the fates, whether Jupiter wills the Tyrians and Trojans to have one city". This same power is implied in Venus's question:

Quem das finem, rex magne, laborum, (1, 241).

and Jupiter's reply:

Imperium sine fine dedi. (1, 279).

But on the other hand there are indications of the independence of the fates. Jupiter declares his own impartial attitude and leaves the responsibility to the fates:

*Rex Juppiter omnibus idem
Fata viam invenient.* (10, 113).

True, Jupiter in his reply to Venus in the first book, as we have seen above, seems almost to identify his will with that of the fates, yet he reads the secrets of the fates from a scroll which appears to have been independent of himself. The *fates* also have some measure of will-power. This will may be exercised apart from the gods.

They call (*voco*), they allow and forbid (*sino, veto*), they demand (*posco*), they drag to and from (*trahunt retrahuntque*), they conquer (*supero*), they pursue and drive (*urgeo, ago, iacto*), and so on through a large variety of activities they appear as active agents.

It is evident that Vergil did not feel the need of differentiating clearly the functions of the fates and of the gods. The fates allow and forbid and determine, yet *sic placitum* and *dis aliter visum* are used of the gods. Perhaps it is safe to say that generally the idea of the fates in the poet's mind dominates the power of the gods, that the fates represent the eternal laws without author, without beginning or end, the ultimate, impersonal necessity, while the conception of the gods is more intimate, more personal and included within the larger idea of fate. Gods may be persuaded and implored, fate is *inexorabile* and *ineluctabile*. The only hope in the face of an adverse decree of fate is that a later decree of the same fate may counterbalance the effect of an earlier decree:

fatis contraria fata rependens. (1, 239).

But notwithstanding their independent volition, the fates are largely impersonal. Their great power and influence issue from abstract principle, not from personality. Parcae, as fates, represent a slightly closer approach to personification. They spin the threads of death for Lausus:

extremaque Lauso

Parcae fila legunt. (10, 814).

In the fourth Eclogue, 46, the personification is more evident:

*'Talia saecla' suis dixerunt, 'currite' fusis
concordes stabili fatorum numine Parcae.*

'Hasten, blest ages', the Parcae, harmonious in the immutable power of the fates, said to their spindles'. Fortune also lacks a definite personality. She may threaten (*minor*) and will (*volo*) and persuade (*suadeo*) and begrudge (*invideo*). She is *Fortuna omnipotens*, she is *dura*, but she is involved in no stories, as is

Juno with Venus, or Venus with Apollo. *Fata*, *Parcae*, and *Fortuna* are all associated correlatively with the gods as being of equal responsibility, yet while stories could form around the gods none developed about the fates. To a large extent they remained colorless abstractions though they lost thereby none of their power. *Fatum* was so impersonal that by metonymy it could be used and was often used in Vergil and elsewhere with the meaning of death and destruction, in which form destiny so frequently manifested itself. This is a curious development in the face of the fact that the larger and ultimate issue of fate was, with Vergil at least, beneficent, as we shall see later.

Descriptive terms suggest a personality but they never get beyond vague suggestion. The beneficent aspect is not represented through any adjective but is suggested by the consideration of the ultimate and favorable issue. The adjectives used with *fata* suggest the immediate situation and therefore show the stern and forbidding aspects, as *iniqua*, *acorba*, *crudelia*, while *fortuna* is *dura*, *improba*, *inimica*. These adjectives are the reflex of the poet's feeling in the face of personal misfortunes. He may chide the unseen power as well as the gods who bring discomfiture upon man. Sentimentally he may protest the conduct of the fates while intellectually he accepts.

Fate is inexorable as regards its final destiny. This is true whether it is identified with the gods or considered independent of them. Jupiter's will regularly coincides with that of the fates but other gods and mortals often try to avert their operations but always without avail. The course of fate may be retarded. Juno recognizes that she can only delay:

Atque immota manet fatis Lavinia coniunx.

At trahere, atque moras tantis licet addere rebus. (7, 314).

Dido in her curse realizes that she can not circumvent the fates so as to keep Aeneas from his destined land, yet she may impose conditions that will render his lot harder. Jupiter and the fates may apparently of their own accord postpone the final fulfilment of destiny's decree:

nec pater omnipotens Troiam nec fata vetabant

stare decemque alios Priamum superesse per annos. (8, 398).

The fates with Apollo's assistance may find an easy fulfilment of a prophecy not issuing directly from the fates but their own decrees yielded to no entreaties:

desine fata deum flecti sperare precando. (6, 376).

The conception of fate as inexorable may have a close connection with the inevitableness of death. We have already observed that the word is the equivalent of death. Every man has his own day, a brief and irreparable time of life there is to all. His own fates call Turnus and he comes to the goal of his allotted life. The day of the Parcae and their hostile power approaches. Fate reflects the certainty and stern unyieldingness of death. In the processes of universal or national life there is a continuing force which the larger fate directs to a happy issue, while the individual must yield to death. From the personal fate one may not escape but he may derive pleasure in the contemplation of the far results of time, as Deiphobus does when he speeds Aeneas on his way:

i decus, i, nostrum: melioribus utere fatis. (6, 546).

The relation of the fates to the individual man is stern and inflexible. The righteous man may have a show of volition but it must accord with fate. Fate may drive a willing subject:

fatis egere volentem. (8, 133).

Aeneas may seek Italy but back of his quest lies the will of the fates:

Italian petiit fatis auctoribus. (10, 67).

The Trojans wandered for many years over the sea driven by the fates:

*Multosque per annos
errabant acti fatis maria omnia circum.* (1, 31).

But we learn that their will was brought into harmony with the will of the fates:

*consilio hanc omnes animisque volentibus urbem
adferimur, pulsati regnis.* (7, 216).

Man's will may hasten an approaching doom:

fatoque urgenti incumbere vellet. (2, 653).

But on the whole, man's volition is much circumscribed and we are frequently reminded that he is doing something *inventus* and *non sua sponte*. Vergil's actors thereby become passive and not active characters. We find nothing more than a suggestion of the thought that man makes his own destiny. Through omens and signs and oracles and even by a descent to Hades, man's duty is to ascertain the will of the fates and then to bring himself into accord with their behests. Any deviation from the will of the fates brings disaster to the offender, even apart from the question of guilt or innocence. In the case of Dido it is hard to see that

the poet ascribed to her any defect or wrong, but she stands in the way of fate, and the individual must break or fall before the decree of destiny. Vergil knows the story of Laomedon, of Ganymedes, and of Paris but he does not develop the idea that Troy fell because of the errors of the Trojans or of their ancestors. Its fall is rather the travail through which a new Troy may be born.

Fate is not deliberately striving to reward the good or to punish the bad, so far as the individual is concerned. She is interested in larger issues, the issues of the state, and the individual is but an incidental matter. She is not perversely cruel to the individual. She injures him or permits him to be injured only as he obstructs the progress toward the larger, ultimate goal. Vergil's conception of fate in this respect seems to differ materially from that of Shakespeare. In the latter's *Macbeth* the part played by the fates seems to be that of malignant persecution by which Macbeth is driven into sin and then punished for it. No such situations are found in Vergil's *Aeneid*. The Dido episode may come to the mind of the reader but there is a difference. Dido suffers cruelly and without adequate cause so far as guilt is concerned. In her queenly bearing, in her womanly conduct, in her warmly hospitable treatment of the outcast Trojans, there is no trace of sin. The poet's sympathies and our sympathies follow her as they do not and cannot follow Macbeth. Aeneas himself, representing of course the poet's point of view, loves and pities her. He tears himself away from his love only when bidden to do so by the higher powers and in order to fulfill a higher destiny, and love for a woman made no exemption. The gods conspired against Dido and threw the temptation before her without her seeking but there was a great purpose to be fulfilled and that purpose was the founding of a city on seven hills which was in time to rule the world, and that larger purpose justified the sacrifice of individual fortunes, including those of the innocent. Without this larger purpose, Dido might appear in much the same role as Macbeth. Vergil does not think of fate as capricious and perverse. The ultimate purpose, while it may not in every instance be clear, is always present. And differing from Aeschylus, fate is far more concerned with the future than with the past.

If man's volition is thus circumscribed, it follows that his duty is in like manner restricted. By omens and oracles Aeneas learns the will of the higher powers and his duty is to obey. The

gods indicate Italy as the end of his journeys and at great personal cost he accepts their bidding:

hic amor, haec patria est. (4, 347).

Their will represents the highest form of love and of patriotism. Again and again we are reminded that the Trojans are fulfilling their duty in following the fates as they are given, cruel and extreme though they are. While the end does not appear and while at times they seem to be leading aimlessly, yet man's duty is to follow with implicit confidence:

quo fata trahunt retrahuntque sequamur. (5, 709).

Man's doubts and perplexities spring primarily not from the weighing of right and wrong but from the uncertainty of the will of the fates. Aeneas's fault in his dalliance with Dido arises from the fact that he has delayed the operations of the fates, and when he turns his will to further their will, he is no doubt redeemed in the eyes of the poet. Personal merit there is but it is hardly thought of as apart from the will of the higher powers, and like the attending circumstances, it is more incidental than necessary:

sed mea me virtus et sancta oracula divom

cognatique patres, tua terris didita fama,

coniunxisse tibi et fatis egere volentem. (8, 131).

Yet in this connection we cannot afford to ignore the sixth book. The various elements of this book are often inconsistent and defy rational explanation but it is evident that Vergil intended here a serious representation of some deep convictions on the meaning of life. In the cheerless lot of infants caught away from their mothers' breasts by one dark day and plunged in the nether world, we see the operation of a relentless fate which without apparent purpose, has thrust the unoffending children into hopeless misery. Dido's case is somewhat different. Though more sinned against than sinning, she had been an obstacle in the progress of destiny and had cast away her own life and for these acts may be regarded as suffering the consequences of her faults. Palinurus and Deiphobus have committed no offense adequate for the punishments they suffer. They too have been the victims of circumstances. But in the case of others the poet seems to be trying to adjust punishment and reward to guilt and merit, as if the question was solely one of personal responsibility and not of fate. Again and again he shows the crime that lay back of the punishment. He recites the category of vices without a suspicion that fate is in any way involved. Likewise, virtues receive their

reward as if their holders were free agents and chose to do good apart from all connection with the unseen power:

*hic manus ob patriam pugnando volnera passi,
 quique sacerdotes casti, dum vita manebat,
 quique pii vates et Phoebæ digna locuti,
 inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artis,
 quique sui memores aliquos fecere merendo:
 omnibus his nivea cinguntur tempora vitta.* (6, 660).

The prophetic Anchises can review the fates and fortunes, characters and deeds of coming generations and the course of character and event is inexorably established, yet in much of the sixth book the idea of personal responsibility and freedom of will has dominated strict necessity. This book, which is sometimes called Vergil's masterpiece, is neither consistent within itself or with the remaining eleven. It almost stands as a thing apart from the rest of the work. As the personal interest controls the Dido episode, so in this sixth book Vergil breaking away for a time from the conception of destiny which rules the rest of the poem, seems to anticipate the more modern belief that man carves his own destiny, that there is no such thing as destiny or fate outside of a man's own endeavors. Vergil's inconsistency in this matter need not surprise us. There are few of us who do not shift the proportions of the content of fate and free-will under the influences of some recent experience or mood.

But the dominant element in Vergil's conception of fate is that which concerns itself with the fortunes of imperial Rome, in the nationalistic and patriotic aspects. Rarely, if ever, is the poet completely free from the influence of this idea. From the first to the last we feel ourselves under the spell of an unseen, but purposeful power, guiding men and events to one far off divine event, the consummation of which was becoming increasingly apparent in the establishment of Augustus upon the imperial throne. In all the vicissitudes of Roman history, Vergil, writing under the beneficent reign of Augustus, could now see the hand of an intelligent and foreseeing fate. This conception removes history from the realm of the accidental and brings it into relation with the philosophical thought with which Vergil was familiar. In the choice of his subject and its view-point, aside from other considerations, the poet was no doubt guided by the opportunity thus afforded of showing that the marvelous development of the Roman empire had been the concern of the invisible powers from re-

motest antiquity, for the purposefulness of those powers can be realized better through prophecy than by historical narrative of accomplished facts, though naturally the Roman reader would be assisted in his interpretations by the knowledge of what had actually happened.

The entire *Aeneid* is constructed on this fundamental conception. As the pages are turned, whether in prophecy, omen, or event, we find conscious destiny at work. The first sentence places before us the lot of a man exiled by fate from Troy making his way through adversity to a promised land where he might found a city and introduce the gods to Latium, whence are to spring the Latin tribe, the Alban fathers, and the walls of lofty Rome. Hostile Juno and potentially hostile Carthage are immediately introduced but we are soon to see that they cannot do more than delay the progress of destiny beginning with this scion of Trojan blood, for the fates have decreed:

*hinc populum late regem belloque superbum
venturum excidio Libyae.* (1, 20).

In the midst of dire adversity, the Trojans can see beyond the present and find comfort in their great future:

*tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi fata quietas
ostendunt; illic fas regna resurgere Troiae.* (1, 205).

In the story of the overthrow of Troy, while the parting of the clouds permits us to see the dread powers responsible for the catastrophe, we may also catch glimpses of the greater city and greater destiny awaiting the exiles. Hector's prophetic spirit is looking forward to this consummation when he entrusts to Aeneas's keeping the sacred emblems and Penates:

*hos cape fatorum comites, his moenia quarre,
magna pererrato statuas quae denique ponto.* (2, 294).

In the circumstance that the fates do not permit Aeneas to die, we see their purpose to use him for some great end. The omens of the tongue of fire marks out Iulus as the founder of a great line. Creusa's ghost points out to Aeneas distant Latium as his goal where he is to find prosperity and a royal bride. In the third book, Apollo's oracle while ambiguous as to the place of their destined empire admits no doubt as to the fact of empire itself:

*Dardanidae duri, quae vos a stirpe parentum
prima tulit tellus, eadem vos ubere laeto*

*accipiet reduces. Antiquam exquirite matrem.
hic domus Aeneae cunctis dominabitur oris
et nati natorum et qui nascentur ab illis. (3, 94).*

The Penates are likewise cognizant of the great future awaiting the Trojans, and promise their assistance:

*nos tumidum sub te permensi classibus aequor
idem venturos tollemus in astra nepotes
imperiumque urbi dabimus. tu moenia magnis
magna para, longumque fugae ne linque laborem. (3, 157).*

The Latin god Faunus is also aware of the distinction due to his people from their approaching union with the Trojans:

*externi venient generi, qui sanguine nostrum
nomen in astra ferant quorumque a stirpe nepotes
omnia sub pedibus, qua Sol utrumque recurrens
aspicit Oceanum, vertique regique videbunt. (7, 98).*

But to pass by the many isolated instances which keep this idea before the reader, we may note three sustained efforts of the poet to develop to its fullest extent the idea of Rome's predestined greatness. The length of these passages shows the importance which the poet attaches to the idea. They are of course all prophetic and have the sanction of divinity. In the first, Jupiter reassures Venus of the future of her people. In the next, the place supplying the mystic element, Anchises shows Aeneas the souls of his great descendants and learns the deeds they are to perform. And lastly, Vulcan with prophetic powers, represents on Aeneas's shield all the race of his descent and the wars fought in order. Space will not allow any lengthy quotation of these elaborate representations but they are obviously the most serious efforts of the poet and he has been careful to give appropriate setting to each. In the first (1, 257-296), from the sacred scrolls of the fates Jupiter reads the destiny of the Trojans. He passes through the almost sacred succession of Lavinium and Alba Longa to Rome. He reveals the story of Romulus and the wolf, than which story there was none more venerable in the eyes of the Romans. The change of Ilus to Iulus is made in order to prepare for Augustus's divine lineage. To these people Jupiter, apparently speaking now in his own right, has given neither goals of history or seasons but he has given power without end:

*his ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono,
imperium sine fine dedi. (1, 278).*

No words could have appealed more powerfully to Vergil's generation than these. He recites, but without names of actors, the dramatic justice wrought by Rome's conquest of Greece, and then reaches the climax in the forecasting of the birth of Augustus who is to bound the empire by the ocean and his fame by the stars; and yet not the climax after all for the greatest thing is that which Augustus represented, the establishment of the reign of peace:

aspera tum positis mitescent saecula bellis. (1, 291).

It was the beneficent purpose of the fates that wars should be only a preparation for the divine event which Vergil's generation was witnessing, and the Roman reader must have thrilled with patriotic pride and religious awe as he saw in retrospect what the fates had been working out through the centuries and realized that he was part of the chosen instrument.

The destined greatness of Rome also dominates the revelation of Anchises to Aeneas in the sixth book. This prophecy gains distinction from its peculiar associations, delivered as it is in the Elysian fields by the spirit of the father of the people. The opening words well express the intent of the passage:

*nunc age, Dardanium prolem quae deinde sequatur
gloria, qui mancant Itala de gente nepotes,
inlustris animas nostrumque in nomen ituras
expediam dictis et te tua fata docebo.* (6, 756).

It is interesting to note how the entire prophecy abounds in such words as *gloria*, *inlustris*, *egregius*, *honore*, *incluta*, *amor patriae*, and phrases of kindred meaning. Fate is cognizant of the long line of Roman heroes, of localities regarded as sacred in Roman thought, of incidents and events hallowed by centuries of tradition. The chronological sequence is violated in order that the first Romulus may be immediately followed by Augustus, the second Romulus, who as in the first book, is the culmination of the line of heroes who even a thousand years before the poet's day was promised for the establishment of the glory of Rome:

*hic vir, hic est, tibi quem promitti saepius audis,
Augustus Caesar, divi genus, aurea condet
saecula qui rursus Latio regnata per arva
Saturno quondam.* (6, 791).

Already in anticipation of his military prowess remote parts of the earth are trembling with alarm. But again, as in the first

book, the crowning glory does not lie in the achievements of Roman arms but in the establishment of the reign of peace and again the beneficent aspect of destiny appears:

*tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
 (haec tibi erunt artes) pacique imponere morem,
 parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.* (6, 891).

The remainder of the revelation hardly concerns us here. It is an epilogue suggested by the recent death of the youthful Marcellus, the heir of the throne, and as an aftermath in which the intensely human note predominates it stands in striking contrast to the contemplation of the glories of imperial Rome.

The third and last sustained effort to portray Rome's destined greatness appears in the eighth book and involves the use of the shield which Vulcan made for Aeneas. Vergil of course got the suggestion of this device from Homer but there is the widest possible difference in the application. The designs on Achilles's shield have nothing of the prophetic element and deal almost wholly with peaceful themes and are intensely human. The designs on Aeneas's shield accord well with the poet's conception of a fate concerned with the destiny of a great nation. The personal note is completely lacking. Homer saw no impropriety in representing peaceful subjects on the shield, though it was an instrument of war. The shield may have fit in well with Vergil's purpose to depict the martial splendors of Roman history. Among the scenes represented are the story of Romulus and Remus and their foster-mother, the wolf, the seizure of the Sabine women with the subsequent war and treaty, the horrible punishment meted out to Mettus, the story of Porsenna and Cocles and Cloelia, Manlius surprised by the Gauls, the story of the geese, and the hard lot of Catiline in Tartarus and the happy lot of Cato in Elysium, and finally the culmination of wars and heroes, Augustus in the triumph at Actium. The aftermath of peace of the other two great prophecies is not found here. Perhaps the poet was carried away with the general enthusiasm for the extraordinary event which secured the supremacy of Augustus and assured the stability of Rome, so that for the moment one could think of nothing but the splendid victory. Perhaps also the warlike shield and the warlike occasion render the peace motive inappropriate at this place. Weary as the Romans were with war they still loved to contemplate the wars with which their history was crowded and to believe that an all-powerful fate had de-

creed this prosperous series of battles down to the victory of Actium. As father Aeneas lifts this shield to his shoulders somehow in a very real sense he carries the fame and fates of the coming generations. This association of *Jama* with *fata* is more than a happy use of assonance. The poet intends a close connection between the two ideas. The fates were vitally concerned with the fame of their chosen people and to the course of their history, destiny had given unity and significance.

Vergil accomplished something new in the development of his theme by establishing a vital and significant connection between the heroic background which he chose for his poem, and the events leading through the centuries down to and including his own generation. It becomes, in fact, an interpretation of the spirit of his age. And no single motive contributes so largely to the working out of this interpretation as the conception, not original with Vergil, of course, but one to which he first gives adequate expression of fate, the unseen, but purposeful and almighty power, concerned in the greatness of imperial Rome, and through a thousand vicissitudes working itself out into the consummation of the empire under the reign of Augustus. In its ultimate effects it was beneficent but ruthless toward all creatures which obstructed its progress. This conception of a fate concerned in the national fortunes is particularly appropriate for a great national epic, especially for that of Rome. In this circumstance lies the explanation of the popularity enjoyed by the *Aeneid* from the very first and the appeal of the poem was no doubt heightened by the fact that the emphasis was not upon war itself but upon the justice of the war and the peace for which war was a preparation:

iure omnia bella gente sub Assaraci fato ventura resident.
(9, 642).

In this conception of fate we hardly expect to meet the personal note, but it is there as a strong undercurrent, and if the poet has not put humanity first he at least compels its recognition. It was the note of humanity which almost made the poet lose sight of the imperial destiny of Rome as he arouses our sympathies for the unhappy Dido. It was the personal note again when after representing the long line of Roman heroes and achievements, he fastens our thoughts upon the youthful Marcellus. For the human lot there are tears and mortal things touch the heart:

sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt. (1, 462).

It may well be that as the poet described the splendor of the kingdom of this world he felt a growing sadness at the doubtful doom of human kind. The unseen power was intelligent and beneficent but something was lacking which the poet fully sensed and for which the world was yearning. It is curious that that need was to be supplied before Vergil's generation had passed away and out from an obscure corner of the Roman empire was to arise the founder of the kingdom not of this world whose dominant note is humanity. As Vergil was once thought to have forecast the dawn of this age, this new and spiritual kingdom may also have borrowed something of Vergil's conception of a persistent destiny leading to the final triumph of humanity.

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN EARLY PERSIA.

BY CAPTAIN ELBRIDGE COLBY.

PROCOPIUS of Cæsarea writes in that book of his history of the wars which deals with the Persian campaigns:

But as time went on Kobad became more high-handed in the administration of the government, and introduced innovations into the constitution, among which was the law which he promulgated providing that Persians should have communal intercourse with their women, a measure which by no means pleased the common people. Accordingly they rose against him, removed him from the throne, and kept him in prison in chains.¹

In so writing Procopius not only lives up to his reputed fondness for strange tales, but also shows how partial historians can distort history by telling only a part of the truth.

The "law" referred to by Procopius was the doctrine of Mazdak, and it is our great misfortune that, as Reynold Nicholson has remarked,² none but hostile accounts survive of this interesting reformer. First among the annalists of these events were the Greeks, remote in time and place, and willing, in view of the intense Græco-Persian rivalry of the sixth and seventh centuries, to exemplify so easily the rottenness of the Persian rule. Cedrenus Georgius tells the incident thus:

Moreover Kobad the last son of Perozes began to use the kingdom very badly, a law even being promulgated which commanded that wives should be common to all. And so the Persians took the rule from him.³

Agathias, who was more nearly contemporaneous, but still wrote nearly a century after the events, says:

¹ *De Bellico Persico*, tr. Dewing, I, v, 1-2.

² *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. viii, p. 509. Cf. Browne, E. G., *Literary History of Persia*, p. 166: "Magian priests by whose hands the national chronicles were shaped."

³ *Historiarum Compendium*, ed. Bonn, p. 624.

Kobad⁴ . . . rendered himself disagreeable and unendurable to his subjects by changing the policy of the state and reversing customs established by holy wisdom. They say that he published a law to make women common, not following the intention of Socrates, nor Plato, nor to procure for his people the advantages which these philosophers believed one could get from such a community, but to give to all men an audacious freedom of enjoying whatever women pleased them, however else she might be bound to another by the laws of marriage. So they fell into the most shameful prostitutions which were authorized by this law. This much offended the people of condition who could not resign themselves to suffer this shame. Consequently this new ordinance was the occasion of a conspiracy against him and of the ruin of his grandeur.⁵

These accounts tell nothing of the doctrine save that part which refers to women, and attribute the downfall of the king purely to this circumstance. Agathias, it is true, does suggest something of the religious basis of the new theories by the words "holy wisdom". But the similarity of the patent facts in the accounts is noteworthy, with respect to what they include as well as with respect to what they omit.⁶ This similarity is all the more remarkable in that, but a few lines previous, Agathias has said: "I do not agree with what Procopius has written concerning Kobad, believing that I ought to follow as more true what I found in "the chronicles of the Persians."⁷ Hence we must assume that "the chronicles of the Persians" accessible to Agathias differed little or not at all, concerning these particular events, in emphasis at least, if not in facts, from the Procopian account.

The essential characteristic of the Mazdakite belief, however, hinges about these words "holy wisdom", for it was in origin at any rate, religious.⁸ The "chronicles of the Persians" may have lied, but Persian tradition as recorded some centuries later by Firdausi pictures Mazdak as saying:

⁴ For divergent views concerning the previous conduct of Kobad, compare Agathias, IV, xxviii, with Tabari, *Chronique*, tr. Zotenberg, p. 151.

⁵ *Hist. Just.*, IV, xii, §§ 4-5. (tr. Cousin, p. 517).

⁶ *Jos Stylites*, ed. Wright, § 20, is equally guilty.

⁷ *Hist. Just.*, IV, xii, § 12. Elsewhere Agathias says guardedly: "Procopius has written very exactly what took place during the reign of Justinian" (i. e., 527-565 A. D.) and Kobad's deposition was in 498 A. D. The problem of sources is complicated not a little by the fact that Procopius, in speaking of Kobad, says: "The Persian accounts do not agree." (D. B. P., I, vi, 9.)

⁸ This is pointed out by Noeldeke as the chief thing distinguishing it from modern communism. ("Orientalischer Socialismus" in *Deutsche Rundschau*, Feb. 1879, pp. 284ff.)

I will establish this in order that the pure religion
 May be made manifest and raised from obscurity.
 Whoever follows any religion but this,
 May the curse of God overtake that demon.⁹

Mazdak, whatever his origin,¹⁰ and whatever the origin of his principles,¹¹ was the one who popularized and made notorious the ideas which bear his name. He may have been a man of deep religious faith and austere life¹² trying to do the will of God¹³ and preaching his doctrine "not from any base or selfish motive but simply from a conviction of its truth."¹⁴ Yet, as Browne says, "the charges of communism and antinomianism, especially in what concerns the relation of the sexes, were those most frequently brought against Mazdak."¹⁵

That the incidental, rather than the fundamental, things were most frequently head-lined in all the accounts unjustly, is coming to be the final judgment of modern historians. Mazdak's own

⁹ *Shāh-nāmāh*, ed. Turner Macan, Calcutta, 1829, p. 1613, q. Nicholson, op. cit. This religious character is not quite so plain, though, as these lines might indicate. Another translation by another authority reads: "I want to put in order these inequalities, so that purity (i. e., justice) may appear and noble things may be distinguished from base ones. He who does not become one of this faith (i. e., this new socialistic teaching) would, like a demon, be cursed by God." (J. J. Modi, "Mazdak, The Iranian Socialist," in *The Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume*, Bombay, p. 121). This commentator eschews the religious aspect almost entirely in extracting Firdausi and interprets Mazdak as a minister stirred to socialism by a famine.

¹⁰ Nicholson, op. cit., p. 508, says "son of Bāmdādh, probably a native of Susiana". The Pahlavi "Vendidād" and the "Bahman Yasht" (q. Modi. op. cit., pp. 117-119) agree on the phrase "Mazdak, son of Bāmdād." Noeldeke, op. cit., p. 154, says "man from Madharija named Mazdak". Mirkhond, tr. De Sacy, p. 353, says "a native of Persepolis" and is followed by Malcolm, *Hist. Persia*, i, 132. Tabari, t. Zotenberg, ii, 148, says "of Nishapur in Khorassan" as does Modjmélal-Tewarikh (q. St. Martin in notes to *Le Beau, Bas Empire*, ed. Paris, 1827, vii, 322. I have found no substantial warrant for Rawlinson's phrase: "Archimagus, or High Priest of the Zoroastrian religion" (*Seventh Oriental Monarchy*, ii. 5) nor even for Hodgkins'; "The reformed Zoroastrianism of Mazdak" (*Italy and Her Invaders*, iii, 488) unless we can so interpret Tabari. (cf. Note 20 below).

¹¹ Said by some to have been invented by Zarādusht, son of Khurragan, (cf. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 508; Jos. Stylites, ed. Wright, 20; Browne, op. cit. p. 170). Noeldeke claims (op. cit., *Excursus IV*, p. 457) that "the teaching of community . . . can be found earlier even than Zarādusht." Modi. op. cit. pp. 128ff., finds a Chinese origin.

¹² This is Hodgkin's opinion (op. cit., iii, 488). It is also Noeldeke's (op. cit., p. 154 and p. 459) and Browne's (op. cit., p. 170).

¹³ Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 154.

¹⁴ Rawlinson, *Seventh Oriental Monarchy*, ii, 5; Malcolm, (*Hist. Persia*, ed. 1829, i, 104) calls him "a religious imposter".

¹⁵ *Literary History of Persia*, p. 170.

testimony can never be obtained.¹⁶ The Greeks, as we have seen, played him up like a scandal dispatch in modern journalism. The Zoroastrians were even more unfriendly,¹⁷ and the whole Persian legend about him is tinged with intolerance.¹⁸ Nor is this otherwise than might be expected, knowing what we now do of human psychology and of human history as it is written on everything that touches religion. The Mormons of Salt Lake, the Jesuits of Elizabethan England, the Arians of the Sixth Century, and Mazdak of Peersia have all been popularly described to us by their own inveterate enemies. Just as in the reign of John of England we must look with caution on the words of ecclesiastical chroniclers when they speak of a king who quarrelled with the Church, so with what concerns the Mazdakites, we must approach the records with reservations and seize with avidity on every favorable phrase and sentiment. Mingled with economic measures, with royal intrigues, with innovations in morality, there was in the theories of Mazdak a religious idea.¹⁹

This is the manner in which the scribe Tabari told of his ideas:

Among the commands which he laid upon the people and

¹⁶ "His book, a Pahlavi document, *Mazdak-nāmah*, known to have existed, is now lost".—Browne, op. cit., p. 169. Cf. the *Dabistan*, tr. Shea, 1843, i, 372.

¹⁷ "The intolerance of Zoroastrian priests" is mentioned at length in T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, London, 1896, chap. vii, pp. 177-184.

¹⁸ "Chosroes I (532-578 A. D.) gained the title of Núshírwán (of immortal soul) by which he is still remembered as the kingly embodiment of virtue and justice, through his high-handed suppression of Mazdak, which in the eyes of the intolerant Magian priests, constituted his chief claim to 'immortality.'"—Browne, op. cit., p. 135.

¹⁹ Note how Bury (Later Roman Empire, i, 306-307) has avoided mention of religion and has used the phrases "naturally equal" and "contrary to nature", which might almost have been stolen from Rousseau, or at least from other philosophers like Helvetius and Holbach. The Oriental sources line up on this question as follows:

Macoudi speaks in a political frame of mind, mentioning a "re-volt" (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 124)

Mirkhond declares: "He pretended that his new faith was revealed to him by God". (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 125)

Alberuni calls him a pseudo-prophet (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 126).

The *Dabistan* recites his theories as applying only to members who embrace the same religion (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 128)

In the Pahlavi *Vendidad* he is cited as an example of an "impious starving heretic" (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 117)

In the *Bahman Yasht*, his beliefs are "heresy", he is "opposed to the religion", and causes "disturbance among those in the religion of God" (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 118)

The *Dinkard* considers him an "apostate" and uses his name as synonymous with apostasy. (Modi, op. cit., p. 120).

earnestly enjoined was this, that they should possess their property and families in common; it was, he said, an act of piety that was agreeable to God, and would bring the most excellent reward hereafter; even if he had laid no religious commandments upon them, yet the good works in which God was well pleased consisted in such co-partnership. . . . They asserted that God placed the means of subsistence in the world in order that His servants might share them in common, but men had wronged one another in that respect. The Mazdakites said that they would take from the rich for the benefit of the poor, and give back to them that had little their due portion at the expense of those who had much; and they declared that he who possessed more than his share of wealth, women, and property, had no greater right to it than anyone else.²⁰

But this was not all. There were, it appears, if we pick up trifles here and there and put them all together, a few other elements to the doctrine besides the communism founded on religious theory. These, if we assume that hostile historians have

²⁰ Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, pp. 154, 141. The ethical basis of the doctrine was summarized by Firdausi not unfairly in the *Shāh-nāmah*, ed. Macan, p. 1614, lines 7ff. as follows:

Five things turn a man from righteousnes;
 The sage cannot add to these five:
 Jealousy, anger, vengeance, need,
 And the fifth one that masters him is covetousness.
 If thou prevail against these five demons,
 The way of the Almighty will be made manifest to thee.
 Because of these five, we possess women and wealth,
 Which have destroyed the good religion in the world.
 Women and wealth must be in common,
 If thou desirest that the good religion should not be harmed.
 These two produce jealousy, covetousness, and need,
 Which secretly unite with anger and vengeance.
 The demon is always turning the heads of the wise,
 Therefore these two things must be made common property.

Tabari differs from Firdausi in the amount of emphasis placed upon the religious trend. Where Firdausi shows Mazdak in the beginning in a position of authority as king's minister suddenly devising new economic principles to meet emergencies thrust upon him by a famine which sends the populace to clamor at the door of the palace (q. Modi. op. cit., p. 120), Tabari says: "He pretended to be a prophet. He taught the old religion with this exception, that he abolished marriage and ownership in property, saying that 'the God of the Universe has given these equally to all men' . . . Kobad sent for him and inquired about it." (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 124).

Cf. also the accounts in Rawlinson (op. cit., ii, 5); Nicholson (loc. cit.) from whom the Firdausi is quoted; and Browne (op. cit., p. 170), who goes on to remark that Mazdak deserves some credit as an early instance of "that passion for philosophical speculation which is so remarkable a characteristic of the Persians, who have probably produced more great heresiarchs than any other nation in the world." (op. cit., p. 136). Noeldeke emphasizes the philosophical element of the doctrines when he says: "Mazdak lehrte, dass alle Menschen gleich geschaffen seien und das es Unrecht sei, wenn der Eine mehr Gueter und mehr Weiber habe als der Andere." (op. cit., p. 458).

misplaced the emphasis,²¹ were not unimportant. Browne had pointed out that in the Pahlavi translation of the Vendidâd, the words of the Avesta text: "The ungodly heretic who does not eat" are illustrated by the gloss "like Mazdak".²² And all the trustworthy evidence goes to show that Mazdak did preach the sacredness of animal life and forbade the slaughtering of animals for food,—though he did permit milk, cheese, and eggs,—and continually emphasized abstemiousness and devotion.²³ He also preached simplicity in dress—uniformity in dress we cannot find—and a separation of families so that at least the child should not know his father or the father the child.²⁴ This last may well have been cited by his enemies at the time, as an inevitable result of his suggestion regarding promiscuous intercourse, or it may have been founded on some ideal of state education such as Platon contemplated. Which, it is difficult to say.

But Plato, Sir Thomas More, Francis Bacon, and William Morris never created such a stir in the world with their ideal commonwealths, philosopher-kings, and social systems as did Mazdak. The reason is obvious. Mazdak converted a monarch, of all monarchs an oriental monarch, an absolute monarch who could impose his will upon the realm. That the lower classes should embrace the creed is not surprising, when we consider its promises; but that Kobad should become on his throne a disciple of such a teacher, is truly amazing. Mirkhond²⁵ says "that Mazdak claimed to authenticate his mission by the possession and exhibition of miraculous powers. In order to impose on the weak mind of Kobad, he arranged and carried into effect an elaborate imposture. He excavated a cave below the fire-altar on which he was in the habit of offering, and contrived to pass a tube from

²¹ Bury speaks only of the "community of property and wives" (op. cit., i, 306-7) and Hodgkin only of "rights of property both in jewels and wives" (op. cit., iii, 488). Though Rawlinson mentions other things, they are only as "added tenets" and his chief emphasis is on "property and marriage", on "adultery, incest, theft", and on "the appropriation of particular women by individual men." (op. cit., 11, 5-8).

²² Op. cit., p. 169.

²³ Cf. Rawlinson, ii, 5-8 who cites these among the "added tenets"; Mirkhond, tr. De Sacy, p. 354 and Modi, op. cit., p. 125; and Noeldeke, op. cit., p. 460, who says "Nach Biruni verbot er, das Vieh zu schlachten, bis es von selbst verendete; da klinglt, als haben er Genuss des Fleisches crepiertes Thiere gestat was kaum richtig ist." See also Modi's translation, op. cit., p. 126.

²⁴ Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 142.

²⁵ Tr. De Sacy, q. Rawlinson, op. cit., ii, 5-6 and also Modi's translation, op. cit., p. 125.

the cavern to the upper surface of the altar, where the sacred flame was maintained perpetually. Having then placed a confederate in the cavern, he invited the attendance of Kobad, and in his presence pretended to hold converse with the fire itself, which the Persians viewed as the symbol and embodiment of divinity. The king accepted the miracle as an absolute proof of the divine authority of the new teacher, and became thenceforth his zealous adherent and follower." This, however, seems a trifle too unusual a tale for full credence as indicating the real cause of Kobad's acceptance of the new creed, and may be looked upon by a reasonably skeptical historian as an invention of a hostile chronicler, if not in its facts, at least in its complete results. Although Tabari says Kobad became a disciple of Mazdak "and followed him in all things",²⁶ it is a difficult situation to imagine. Noeldeke has suggested that the Mazdakite movement about this time lost its religious character, as any movement with such concrete applications probably would when taken up by the people. But Noeldeke²⁷ is the first commentator who has analyzed the political motives of the king, saying that Kobad espoused the cause of Mazdak because he found the nobility and the Zoroastrian priests leagued against him. They would of course have been leagued against him afterwards; but it seems much more reasonable to suppose that he supported as friends the many enemies of his enemies than that he deliberately made enemies for himself by espousing such a cause. It was under his patronage that the Mazdakites extended their name and their influence to the Mediterranean²⁸ and into Armenia.²⁹ It was because of his patronage of these theories that the nobles and the priests of Persia aroused themselves sufficiently to overthrow him and force him into exile.³⁰ But the purely political character of his adherence to these theories is even more strikingly illustrated by the easy manner in which in 502 A. D., after escaping from prison and obtaining aid from the Ephthalites, Kobad was able to return to the throne. He actually was reinstated by a man who killed many

²⁶ Tr. Noeldeke, p. 144.

²⁷ Nicholson (op. cit., p. 508) and Browne (op. cit., p. 170) accept this explanation.

²⁸ Cf. St. Martin's notes to Le Beau: *Bas-Empire*, vii, 338.

²⁹ Cf. St. Martin: *Reserches sur l'Armenie*, i, 328-329; and Lazare Parbe, *Vie de Vahan*, p. 47, q. Rawlinson, loc. cit.

³⁰ Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 142. This is the cause universally assigned. Cf. Procopius, Agathias, Jos. Stylites, Mirkhond, Rawlinson, Hodgkin, Bury, and Browne, as cited above.

Mazdakites.³¹ He actually announced that personally he held with Mazdak's doctrines; but officially he could not support them. Their political usefulness to him was over. That, it appears, is the only reasonable explanation.

The cautious historian must, however, always admit the possibility that chroniclers hostile to the theory have magnified all the unfavorable facts. When Rawlinson speaks of "the disorders of its votaries" and "extreme or violent measures" which had now "ceased to endanger the state",³² there is presented an unfavorable picture indeed. But it does seem that no inconsiderable eruption did occur. Says Tabari:

The mob eagerly seized their opportunity . . . and the Mazdakites became so powerful that they used to enter a man's house and forcibly deprive him of his dwelling, his women-folk, and his property, since it was impossible for him to offer resistance.³³

But even more conclusive is the indirect evidence offered in Kobad's son, Chosroës' later speech to the nobles and the priests after his coronation in 531 A. D.³⁴ "He dwelt upon their religion and the heavy losses they had incurred. The systematic regulations which he made for the purpose of compensating the sufferers, establishing the position of children of doubtful origin, etc., show that the social revolution must have developed considerably and that the upper classes bore the brunt of it."³⁵

Yet, the political character of Kobad's first adventure with the doctrine in 498 is illustrated not only by his political divorce from, and religious adherence to, Mazdak; but also by the fact that Mazdak himself escaped serious punishment. As Rawlinson says, "Mazdak was seized indeed and imprisoned; but his followers rose at once, broke open his prison doors, and set him at liberty. The government felt itself too weak to insist on its intended policy of coercion. Mazdak was allowed to live in retirement unmolested, and to increase the number of his disciples."³⁶ The politician was punished: the religious leader escaped. But his proselytizing was for many years probably of a purely religious character. Only when he sought again to secure

³¹ "Zarmihr, son of Sôchrâ, killed many Mazdakites and put Kobad back on the throne". Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 142.)

³² *Op. cit.*, ii, 13.

³³ *Tr. Noeldeke*, p. 141.

³⁴ *Tabari*, tr. Noeldeke, p. 106ff.

³⁵ *Nicholson*, *op. cit.*

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, ii, 8, 13.

converts in high political circles did he meet determined opposition.

It seems that succession to the crown in Persia was not of a purely hereditary character. A contemporaneous traveller thus described the method of "election":

Some time after his accession the king chooses from his sons the most intelligent one, enters his name on a document, and keeps it in a sealed letter in his treasury without his other sons and the ministers knowing it. When the king dies, the assemblage [of princes and ministers] take out the letter, and he, whose name appears in the sealed letter cover, is to be raised to the throne.³⁷

Now, of the children of Kobad, there were three whose names figured prominently in those days. Of course, the brother, Zamasp, who had been king during the four years of Kobad's exile, was dead and therefore no longer an aspirant. Of the children, Chosroës was the favorite son and presumably destined for the crown. But the Mazdakites³⁸ had succeeded in converting Phthasuarsas and his sister Sambyke,³⁹ and naturally wanted Phthasuarsas to succeed. Their intriguing caused a crisis which ended in a wholesale slaughter of Mazdakites at the end of the year 528, or the beginning of the year 529,⁴⁰ regarding which the evidence is various. Malalas, first emphasizing the new spreading of the dogma, reports that:

The king, having called a meeting, was able to gather all the Mazdakites together with their bishops⁴¹ and gave orders to his army surrounding them, to kill them. And so the soldiers, in his presence, put to the sword all the Mazdakites with their bishop Indazar, and clergy. He burned all their books and issued a decree that any others found in the empire of Persia should be burned.⁴²

Theophanes' story is similar except that he says distinctly that

³⁷ Kentok Hori, "A Chinese Account of Persia in the Sixth Century", in *Spiegel Memorial Volume, Bombay*, 1908, p. 248.

³⁸ Confused with Manichees by Malalas and Theophanes. References under Note 39 show which is the correct name, now generally accepted.

³⁹ Noeldeke, *op. cit.*, p. 460; Malalas, ed. Bonn, p. 444; Theophanes, ed. Bonn, p. 261; Smith's *Dict. Greek & Roman Biography*, iii, 719, q. Rawlinson, ii, 26; and Modi, *op. cit.*, p. 124, note 2.

⁴⁰ Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 172. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, ii, 26, says "about the year 523". Rawlinson's account is the fullest concerning the designs and intrigues on the succession.

⁴¹ Text reads "Manichees". For change see Notes 38 and 39 *supra*.

⁴² Malalas, "Chronographia", ed. Bonn., p. 444-445. This is related on the authority of Bastagarius "who after being baptized was known as Timotheus".

it was Kobad who ordered the event and gives the details concerning the Phthasuarsas intrigue. He attributes the initiative in the affair to Glonazes, an archmagus, other magii, and Bazanes, a Christian bishop. His account is very similar in respect to the burning of books and the hue and cry raised throughout the empire.⁴³

There has been an inclination among historians to show that Kobad embarked upon the extermination of his former co-religionists at the instigation of Chosroës.⁴⁴ In popular legend at least Chosroës is credited with this slaughter, by which he is said to have earned his title of Núshirwán, "of immortal soul". At any rate, the names of Chosroës and Mazdak are still linked as, respectively, "the Just King"⁴⁵ and "the accursed Mazdak".⁴⁶ According to the current account,⁴⁷ Prince Chosroës, after exposing the evil designs and juggler's tricks of Mazdak to his father Kobad, deceived the heresiarch by a feigned submission and fixed a day when he would make formal and public profession of the new doctrine. Invitations were issued to the Mazdakites to a great banquet which the prince would provide in one of the royal gardens; but as each group entered the garden, they were seized by soldiers who lay in wait for them, slain, and buried head downwards in the earth with their feet protruding. When all this had been disposed of, Chosroës invited Mazdak, whom he had himself received in private audience, to take a walk with him through the gardens before the banquet, and to inspect the produce thereof. On entering the garden, "Behold," said the prince, pointing to the upturned feet of the dead heretics, "the crop which your evil doctrines have brought forth." Therewith he made a sign, and Mazdak was at once seized, bound and buried alive head downwards in the midst of a large mound of earth specially prepared for him in the middle of the garden. This is the legend of Persia.

Now, there is here a contradiction, because some accounts

⁴³ Theophanes, "Chronographia", ed. Bonn., p. 261.

⁴⁴ Nicholson, op. cit., p. 508; Noeldeke, op. cit., p. 465. Cf. Sa'di, the poet:

The blessed named Núshirwán doth still for justice stand,
Though long hath passed since Núshirwán hath vanished
from the land (q. Browne, op. cit., p. 135).

⁴⁵ Browne, op. cit., p. 166.

⁴⁶ Browne, op. cit., p. 168, from a late 12th century Pahlawí manuscript of "Bahman Yasht", cf. Modi, op. cit., p. 118. Also *Dabistan*, q. Modi, pp. 119-120.

⁴⁷ Given in its fullest form in the "Siyásat-námah" of Nidhámú 'l-Mulk, ed. Schefer, pp. 166-181, trans. pp. 245-266. Here extracted from Browne, op. cit., p. 170.

credit Kobad with the slaughter of the Mazdakites and some Chosroës. But the contradiction can perhaps be simplified by recognizing that the extermination was attempted on a large scale on two separate occasions. The Byzantine Malalas speaks clearly of two different occasions;⁴⁸ and Browne resolves the difficulty by placing the first massacre in 528 or 529 and the second in 531 "soon after Núshírwán's (i. e., Chosroës') accession to the throne."⁴⁹ The words of Malalas, in his second passage, can readily be interpreted to refer to an occurrence after Chosroës' accession in respect to both date and circumstances. After speaking of Chosroës becoming king, he says:

During this same time the king of the Persians had tolerated the heresy of the Manichees spreading through his realm. The Persian Magi, since he opposed this doctrine, conceived a plan with the great men of the kingdom, for depriving the king of his rule and putting his brother in his place. And the king of the Persians, hearing this, cut off his brother's head.

I conceive that in this passage by "the king of the Persians", Chosroës is meant, since Kobad did not avert his troubles by killing Zamasp; by "Manichees"; Mazdakites;⁵⁰ by "the Persian Magi", the Mazdakite heresiarchs, for the Greeks were inaccurate and very free in their use of ecclesiastical terms when referring to Persia, even calling Indazara a "bishop" when he was not a Christian even. Though not very specific in distinguishing between the two persecutions, Rawlinson, I believe, makes the same division and would place the second Malalas passage at the later date. Speaking of the accession of Chosroës, he says:

Zames, Kaoses, and all the other sons of Kobad were seized by order of Chosroës, and, together with their entire male offspring, were condemned to death. When Chosroës had by these means secured himself against the claims of the pretenders, he proceeded to employ equal severity in repressing the disorders, punishing the crimes, and compelling the abject submission of his subjects. The heresiarch Mazdak, who had escaped the persecution instituted in his later years by Kobad, and the sect of the Mazdakites, which, despite that persecution, was still strong and vigorous, were the first to experience the oppressive weight of his resentment; and the corpses of a hundred thousand martyrs blackening upon gibbets proved the determination of the new monarch to make his will law, whatever the consequences.⁵¹

⁴⁸ "Chronographia", ed. Bonn, pp. 444-445 and p. 472.

⁴⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 172.

⁵⁰ Cf. note 41, *supra*. This view is supported by Noeldeke, *op. cit.*, p. 462.

⁵¹ Rawlinson, *Seventh Oriental Monarchy*, ii, 43, 101, who cites Mirkhond and Tabari.

And if we for the moment recall that Tabari is in other respects one of our best sources, we gain further credence for our distinction. Tabari's chronicle is a very condensed and much abbreviated document. Yet, he has an account of the slaughter within the reign of Chosroës.⁵² And another, Arabic source, al-Yacubí, says that Mazdak and his master Zarátusht Khurragán were put to death by Chosroës.⁵³

To summarize briefly, then, we might well conclude that the whole Mazdak episode, from beginning to end, took place in the following stages:

(1) A religious movement popularized by Mazdak in the role of a vigorous social reformer.

(2) Kobad's conversion and his use of the Mazdakites as a political weapon which resulted in his fall. (498 A. D.)

(3) Kobad's return to power and his political rejection of the Mazdakites. (502 A. D.)

(4) New political ambitions of the Mazdakites culminating in the first massacre, under Kobad, possibly instigated by Chosroës. (528-529 A. D.)

(5) Accession of Chosroës and his purely political measures in exterminating the Mazdakites to make more secure his crown. 531 A. D.)

Beyond this there is little to say. The name and the influence of Mazdak still persisted, though in a very limited fashion in Persian social, religious, and philosophical history; but never again assumed much political importance.⁵⁴

⁵² Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 154.

⁵³ Al-Ya qubi wrote about three hundred years after these events transpired. (Cf. references in Browne, op. cit., p. 169, note.)

⁵⁴ He was spoken of in philosophical treatises, and according to Biruni, his name turned up again two centuries later, when al-Muquanna, "the Veiled Prophet of Korassan" in 777-780 tried to make "obligatory for them all the laws and institutes which Mazdak had established." (Browne, op. cit., p. 318.) For details of the persisting re-occurrences of his name see Browne, op. cit., 312. Cf. also, *ibid.*, 247, 316, 323, 328, 382, 387, and a bibliography of the entire subject, p. 169. Among modern writers, not here quoted, who have treated of the subject are, Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ed. Bury, v, 181-182; and Malcolm, Sir. J., *History of Persia*, ed. London, 1815, i, 132.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE.

BY HARRY ELMER BARNES.

I. LIFE AND WORKS.

IT was one hundred years in May of this year since Auguste Comte published the famous prospectus of his comprehensive social philosophy under the title of *Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société*.¹ In the century which has passed many one-sided philosophies of society have been proposed and many incomplete schemes of social reform propounded. Many writers in recent years have, however, tended to revert to the position of Comte that we must have a philosophy of society which includes a consideration of biological, psychological and historical factors, and a program of social reform which will provide for an increase both in technical efficiency and in social morale.² Further, there has also developed a wide-spread distrust of the "pure" democracy of the last century and a growing feeling that we must endeavor more and more to install in positions of political and social power that intellectual aristocracy in which Comte placed his faith as the desirable leaders in the reconstruction of European society.³ In the light of the above facts a brief analysis of the political and social philosophy of Comte may have practical as well as historical interest to students of philosophy and social science.

Auguste Comte was born in Montpellier in 1798, and received his higher education at the *École Polytechnique*. During six years

¹ See the brief article on this matter in the *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1922, pp. 510-13.

² See *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1920, pp. 174-202; and G. S. Hall, *Morale: the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct*.

³ For an extreme statement of this point of view see E. Faguet, *The Cult of Incompetence*.

of his young manhood he was a close friend and ardent disciple of the progressive French thinker, Henri de Saint Simon.⁴ In 1824 there came a sharp break which led Comte into a somewhat ungracious depreciation of his former master. They differed chiefly in the degree to which they placed confidence in the revolutionary philosophy and tendencies of the times, Comte being inclined to take a more conservative position than his teacher. Comte's earliest work of importance was the prospectus of his social philosophy which was mentioned above.⁵ In 1826 he worked out in lectures the first formal exposition of the principles of the Positivist philosophy in his own home, where he was honored by the attendance of such distinguished men as the scientist Alexander von Humboldt.

Comte's first great work—the *Cours de philosophie positive*—appeared between the years 1830 and 1842. From 1836 until 1846 he was an examiner for the *Ecole Polytechnique*. After his dismissal from this position he was supported chiefly by contributions from his disciples and admirers. His friendship with Clotilde de Vaux (1845-6) doubtless contributed strongly to Comte's eulogy of women which appeared particularly in his *Polity*. He founded the *Positivist Society* in 1848. Comte's last and most important work—the *Système de politique positive*—appeared between 1851 and 1854. He died in 1857.⁶

In the first of his chief works—the *Philosophy*—Comte worked out in more detail than in his earlier sketches and essays his main theoretical positions. These include the hierarchy of the sciences; the necessity for, and the nature of, sociology, with its two main divisions of social statics and social dynamics; and the law of the three stages of universal progress, with ample historical illustrations and confirmation. The *Polity* was a detailed expansion of his theoretical doctrines, and their practical application to the construction of a "Positive" or scientifically designed commonwealth. While many are inclined to maintain that the *Philosophy* contains all of Comte's important contributions to sociology, such

⁴ See W. H. Schoff, "A Neglected Chapter in the Life of Comte," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 8, 1896, pp. 491-508.

⁵ For a list of Comte's works see M. Defourny, *La Sociologie positiviste*, pp. 19-22.

⁶ An excellent brief survey of Comte's life is to be found in John Morley's article on "Comte" in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

is far from the case.⁷ Though the *Polity* is verbose, prolix, involved and repetitious, nearly all of Comte's chief postulates are developed in it with far greater maturity and richness of detail than in the *Philosophy*.⁸

II .COMTE'S GENERAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

It is generally conceded by the foremost students of Comte's social philosophy that his chief contribution lay in his remarkable capacity for synthesis and organization, rather than in the development of new and original social doctrines. He derived much from writers on social philosophy from Aristotle to Saint-Simon. From Aristotle he derived his fundamental notion as to the basis of social organization, namely, the distribution of functions and the combination of efforts. From Hume, Kant and Gall he received his conceptions of positivism in method and his physical psychology. From Hume, Kant and Turgot he obtained his views of historical determinism, and from Bossuet, Vico and DeMaistre his somewhat divergent doctrine of the providential element in history. From Turgot, Condorcet, Burdin and Saint-Simon he derived his famous law of the three stages in the intellectual development of mankind. From Montesquieu, Condorcet and Saint-Simon he secured his conception of sociology as the basic and directive science which must form the foundation of the art of politics. Each had made special contributions to this subject. Montesquieu had introduced the conception of law in the social process, stressing particularly the influence of the physical environment; Condorcet had emphasized the concept of progress; while Saint-Simon had insisted upon the necessity of providing a science of society sufficiently comprehensive to guide this process of social and industrial reorganization. It was the significant achievement of Comte to work out an elaborate synthesis of these progressive contributions of the thought of the previous century and to indi-

⁷ Cf. L. Chiappini, *Les Idées politiques d'Auguste Comte*, Introduction.

⁸ This point has been especially stressed by Comte himself, and by G. H. Lewes and Frederic Harrison. For a vigorous attack on the value of the *Polity* see *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 8, 1896, p. 506.

cate the bearing of this new social science upon the problems of European society in the nineteenth century.⁹

The outstanding doctrines of Comte, namely, the classification of the hierarchy of the sciences with sociology at the head; the division of this subject into statics and dynamics; the law of the three stages of universal progress; and the conception of the organic nature of society, with its corollary of society as a developing organism, have been so often repeated in resumés of sociological theory that they have become common-places. Even a cursory reading of Comte's major works, however, is bound to impress the reader with the fact that he had much more to offer than can be intelligently summarized under the above headings. There are few problems in social theory or history that he did not touch upon.¹⁰

Comte's fundamental methodological position is that if human knowledge is to be extended in the future this must be accomplished through the application of the positive or scientific method of observation, experimentation, and comparison. Sociological investigation must follow this general procedure, with the addition that when the comparative method has been applied to the study of consecutive stages of human society, a fourth method, the historical, will have been constructed, from which may be expected the most notable results.¹¹ Nothing fruitful can be hoped for from the metaphysicians. Comte's strictures upon their methods and results are particularly vigorous and to some equally convincing.¹²

Comte constructed a hierarchy of the sciences, beginning with mathematics and passing through astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology to the new science of sociology, which was to complete the series. The fundamental theoretical foundations of this classi-

⁹ F. Alengry, *La Sociologie chez Auguste Comte*, pp. 389 ff., 435-76; Defourny, *op. cit.*, pp. 350-54; H. Michel, *L'Idée de l'état*, pp. 451-58. For studies of Comte's thought see E. Littré, *Auguste Comte et la philosophie positive*; Depuy, *Le Positivisme d'Auguste Comte*; L. Lévy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Auguste Comte*; G. H. Lewes, *Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences*; and E. Caird, *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*.

¹⁰ An excellent attempt to estimate Comte's contribution to social science has been made in French by Defourny, *op. cit.*; and Alengry, *op. cit.* A more special treatment of his political theories is attempted by Fezensoc, *Le Système politique d'Auguste Comte*; and by Chiappini, *Les Idées politiques d'Auguste Comte*. In German we have H. Waentig, *Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung für Socialwissenschaft*.

¹¹ Martineau, *The Positive Philosophy of Comte*, Vol. II, pp. 241-257.

¹² *Polity*, Vol. I, pp. 58-60, III, p. 446, IV, pp. 564, 646.

fication were: First, that each science depends upon those below it in the series; second, that as one advances along the series the subjects become more specific, complex, and less amenable to scientific measurement and prediction; and, finally, that the difficulties of sociology are due to the greater complexity of the phenomena with which it deals and the contemporary lack of proper investigation and measurement of these phenomena, rather than to any generic difference in desirable or possible methodology or procedure.¹³

While Comte did not elaborate to any great extent the organic conception of society, still he may be said to have offered the suggestions for the later school of so-called "Organicists" and is notable for holding that the organic doctrine was no mere analogy but a reality. It is the individual who is an abstraction rather than the social organism. Coker has summed up in the following manner his organic doctrines to be found in the *Philosophie positive*: Society is a collective organism, as contrasted to the individual organism or plant, and possesses the primary organic attribute of the *consensus universel*. There is to be seen in the organism and in society a harmony of structure and function working towards a common end through action and reaction among its parts and upon the environment. This harmonious development reaches its highest stage in human society, which is the final step in organic evolution. Social progress is characterized by an increasing specialization of functions and a corresponding tendency towards an adaptation and perfection of organs. Finally, social disturbances are maladies of the social organism and the proper subject-matter of social pathology.¹⁴ In the *Polity* he elaborated the similarity between the individual and the social organism. In the family may be found the social cell; in the social forces may be discerned the social tissues; in the state (city) may be discovered the social organs; in the various nations are to be detected the social analogues of the systems in biology.¹⁵ The great difference between the individual organism and the social organism lies in the fact that the former is essentially immutable,

¹³ Martineau, Volume I, Chapters I-II, particularly, pp. 8, 29. Cf. G. H. Lewes, *Comte's Philosophy of Science*. See the discussions of this classification by H. Spencer, *Classification of the Sciences*; F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 45ff; L. F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 65ff.

¹⁴ F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, pp. 123-4; Cf. L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 204.

¹⁵ *Polity*, II, pp. 240-242.

while the latter is capable of immense improvement, if guided according to scientific principles. Another distinction is that the social organism allows a far greater distribution of functions combined with a higher degree of coördination of organs.¹⁶

Sociology, Comte defined specifically as the science of social order and progress, and, in a more general way, as the science of social phenomena.¹⁷ It is closely related to biology, the subject-matter of the latter being organization and life; that of sociology order and progress.¹⁸

Comte divides sociology into two major departments, social statics, or *théorie générale de l'ordre spontané des sociétés humaines*, and social dynamics, or *théorie générale du progrès naturel de l'humanité*.¹⁹ He finds that the underlying basis of social order is the principle which he assigns to Aristotle, though it probably belongs more rightfully to Plato, namely, the distribution of functions and the combination of efforts, the former takes shape in the specialization and division of labor in society, and the latter is realized through the institution of government.²⁰

The government principle in social progress is to be found in the law of the three stages of intellectual advance.²¹ Through each of these stages—the theological, metaphysical, and scientific—there must pass the proper development and education of the individual, the various realms of human knowledge, and the general process of social evolution. None of these stages can be eliminated, though intelligent direction may hasten the process and lack of wisdom retard it.²² Each stage is the necessary antecedent of the following one, and any period is as perfect as the condition of the time will allow. All institutions are, thus, relative in their degree of excellence and none can hope to attain to absolute per-

¹⁶ Martineau, II, pp. 258-62, 299-301; *Philosophie positive*, fifth edition, 1893, Vol. IV, pp. 469-81.

¹⁷ Martineau, pp. 140-141, 218, 258; III, pp. 383-5.

¹⁸ Martineau, II, pp. 140-141.

¹⁹ *Philosophie positive*, IV, pp. 430, 498.

²⁰ *Polity*, II, pp. 242-4.

²¹ Martineau, Vol. I, pp. 1-3, and Vol. III passim; see also L. T. Hobhouse in *Sociological Review*, Vol. I, pp. 262-79. Comte possessed almost as great a love for triads as did Vico. Thus, he finds three stages of intellectual progress, three divisions of cerebral functions, three types of social forces, three grades of society, three social classes, three stages of religion, and three classes of regulating power in society.

²² *Polity*, IV, translated by Congreve, General Index, 1822, pp. 558-60.

fection.²³ Objectively considered progress may be regarded as consisting in man's increasing control over the environment.²⁴ Again, progress may be broken up into three constituent parts, intellectual, material, and moral. Intellectual progress is to be found in the law of the three stages; material progress in "an analogous progression in human activity which in its first stage is Conquest, then Defense; and lastly Industry"; and moral progress "shows that man's social nature follows the same course; that it finds satisfaction, first in the Family, then in the State, and lastly in the Race."²⁵ In securing progress the desires and emotions are the driving forces and the intellectual factors are the guiding and restraining agencies.²⁶

While Comte's philosophy of history has been criticized by many for being too one-sided and merely stressing the intellectual factors²⁷ most of his critics have overlooked those passages in which he foreshadows Spencer and Giddings by describing the three great stages of human progress as the Military-Theological; the Critical-Metaphysical; and the Industrial-Scientific.²⁸

Comte laid great stress upon the family as a fundamental social institution and upon religion as one of the most important regulating agencies in society. While somewhat utilitarian in his attitude towards the social applications of religion, his exposition of the principles of the Positivist creed is developed in great detail in the *Polity*. His doctrines regarding the basic importance of the family and religion, appreciated by Ward, have been recently revived with a more scientific analysis and application by Professor Ellwood.²⁹

²³ Cf. Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 432; Martineau, II, pp. 232-4. This doctrine of the relativity of the excellence of institutions was not, however, an original conception, as Dr. L. M. Bristol would seem to indicate, *Social Adaptation*, pp. 20-1, for it was perhaps the central feature of Montesquieu's philosophy.

²⁴ *Polity*, II, pp. 235-9.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, p. 157.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, III, pp. 55ff. Cf. L. F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chaps. VI, XVI.

²⁷ Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 303-4.

²⁸ *Philosophie positive*, IV, pp. 17ff, 578-87; *Polity*, III, pp. 44-45 and *passim*. Cf. W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 393-4. "Whatever addition it may receive, and whatever corrections it may require, this analysis of social evolution will continue to be regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the human intellect." Morley, *loc. cit.* Benn with undue enthusiasm declares it the best sketch of universal history ever written—*Modern Philosophy*, p. 156.

²⁹ *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 74ff; *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 186-7, 356-8; *The Social Problem*, pp. 189ff; *The Reconstruction of Religion*.

Finally, as Lester F. Ward so clearly pointed out, Comte holds that the great practical value of sociology is to be looked for in its application to scientific social reform, and in his most elaborate work he develops at great length what he believes will be the ultimate type of social organization, if society is wise enough to study and apply the science which investigates the laws of its organization and progress.³⁰

II. SPECIFIC POLITICAL DOCTRINES.

1. *Sociology and Political Science.*

Comte makes no clear distinction between political science and sociology. Indeed, he seems to regard sociology as the perfected political science of the future. At the same time, he clearly differentiates sociology from the older political philosophy, as dominated by metaphysical methods and concepts. Sociology has nothing in common with the old *à priori* method that characterized the earlier political philosophy. It must be based on the assured scientific procedure of observation, experimentation and comparison.³¹ It is doubtful if Comte conceived it as possible that there could be a science of the state distinct from the general science of society.³² At any rate, his political theory is inextricably connected with his psychology, theology, ethics, and economics, which are included within his sociology. In general, Comte denied that the special social sciences were true sciences. He held that society must be studied as a whole by a unitary science—sociology.³³ Political science, to Comte, was that part of his sociology which was concerned with the history of the state and the theory and practice of its organization, but he rarely, if ever, treated these subjects in isolation, but dealt with each as a part of social evolution and organization as a whole.³⁴

2. *The Nature of the State.*

Comte's ideas concerning the nature of the state and its distinction from society, nation, and government are vague and un-

³⁰ *Polity*, passim, particularly Vols. II, IV.

³¹ Martineau, II, pp. 241-57.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 225-6.

³³ Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 28.

³⁴ Martineau, II, pp. 210-22, 235. *Polity*, IV, pp. 558-60, General Appendix, 3rd part, "Plan of the Scientific Operation necessary for the Scientific Reorganization of Society."

certain. Comte was too much interested in the ultimate Positivist society of the future to devote much attention to an elaboration of the theoretical foundations of the contemporary national *bourgeois state*. This was, at best, merely a transitory form of social organization. "Between the city, uniting man and his dwelling place, and the full development of the Great Being around a fitting centre, a number of intermediate forms of association may be found, under the general name of *states*. But all of these forms, differing only in extent and permanence, may be neglected as undefined."³⁵ Comte's whole position would have made it hard for him to conceive clearly such an entity as society politically organized, as distinct in practice, at least, from its material and spiritual aspects. His own theory of society was so all-inclusive, with its mixture of family ethics, theological dogmas and economic arrangements with politics, that it was not favorable to clearly differentiated concepts in the political realm. The only point on which he may be said to be unmistakably clear is his dogma that there can be no fixed social relations of any permanence without a political organization, that is, a government. The first principle of positive political theory, he says, is that "society without a government is no less impossible than a government without society. In the smallest as well as in the largest associations, the Positive theory of a polity never loses sight of these two correlative ideas, without which theories would lead us astray, and society would end in anarchy."³⁶ When, however, Comte begins to discuss the governmental arrangements in his state or society he immediately introduces conceptions quite foreign to orthodox notions of governmental organization by his advocacy of increasing governmental rectitude through the influence of family morality, and by entrusting its encouragement and surveillance to the priests of the religion of Humanity. In short, it seems that Comte regarded the state as the organ for the direction of the general material activities of society. While this is the most frequent connotation of the term state, as employed by Comte, he often uses it in sense identical with the nation and with society in general.³⁷

Upon the question as to what constitutes the fundamental attributes of the state, Comte is a little more clear. In fact, he quite agrees with what are now considered the indispensable at-

³⁵ *Polity*, II, p. 241.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 224; Cf. *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 485-95.

³⁷ Cf. Chiappini, *op. cit.*, pp. 97ff.

tributes of any state or political society, namely, population, territory, a sovereign power, and a governmental organization. He is particularly insistent upon the territorial prerequisite for the state.³⁸ His belief in the indispensability of government has just been pointed out above. Finally, in his unequivocal statement of the necessity of adequate social control in any stable society and the recognition that political organization ultimately rests upon force, Comte makes it plain that he discerned the necessity of a sovereign power for the creation and maintenance of a permanent political society.³⁹ Comte also anticipated the modern trends in political science by stressing the importance of the psychological and economic factors in the state. He sums up his position on these points very briefly in the following passage: "When Property, Family, and Language, have found a suitable Territory, and have reached the point at which they combine any given population under the same, at least the same spiritual, government, there a possible nucleus of the Great Being has been formed. Such a community, or city, be it ultimately large or small, is a true *organ* of Humanity."⁴⁰ More than the mere statement of Comte's doctrines regarding the fundamental elements of any state, this passage is an admirable example of how he was wont to introduce into political thought highly visionary and figurative ethical and theological concepts.

3. *The Genesis of Political Institutions.*

A. Philosophical Analysis of Principles.

Comte treated the subject of the origin of society, state, and government in both an analytical and in an historical manner. In his analytical treatment he based his procedure on the Aristotelian dogma of the inherent sociability of mankind and declared the notion of a state of nature mere metaphysical nonsense, and the allied contract theory of political origins untenable.⁴¹ Man, he held, prevailed over the other animals because of his superior sociability, and in developing this important element of a social

³⁸ *Polity*, II, pp. 237, 241. For his excessive emphasis on this point he is criticized by Defourny, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-6, 301-2.

³⁹ *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 247-9. See below, however, for an account of his failure to develop a theory of sovereignty.

⁴⁰ *Polity*, II, p. 241.

⁴¹ *Philosophie positive*, pp. 431-47; Martineau, II, pp. 157-8.

nature the prolongation of human infancy was perhaps the most important factor.⁴²

The unit of society, according to Comte, is not the individual but the family. The great function of the family in history has been to generate the basic elements which would ultimately produce the state. The growth and perfection of language was the main factor making it possible for the state to develop from the family.⁴³

A *society*, therefore, can no more be decomposed into *individuals* than a geometric surface can be resolved into lines, or a line into points. The simplest association, that is, the family, sometimes reduced to its original couple, constitutes the true unit of society. From it flow the more complex groups, such as classes and cities.⁴⁴

During the whole continuance of the education of the race, the principal end of the Domestic Order is gradually to form the Political Order. It is from this latter, finally, that the critical influence originates, whereby the family affections are raised up to their high social office, and prevented from degenerating into collective selfishness.⁴⁵

While society, in a psychological sense, is ultimately based upon the social instinct, grounded in sympathy and expressed mainly in the family, the wider and more highly developed forms of social organization, as exemplified by the state and society, are based upon the Aristotelian principle of the distribution of functions and the combination of efforts.⁴⁶ It is this coöperative distribution of functions which marks off the political society from the domestic association, which is based upon sympathy.⁴⁷ The great point of superiority of the social organism over the individual organism is that it allows of a higher degree of distribution of functions, coördinated with a more perfect adaptation of organs. The perfect distribution of functions and coördination of organs in society is the ultimate goal of social evolution, and it is in a study of the relation between these two principles that one is to look for the relation between society and government.⁴⁸ The

⁴² *Polity*, I, pp. 511-13. Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Bk. III, Chaps. i-ii; J. Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 340-44, 360-69.

⁴³ *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 153, 183; *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 447-469.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 153.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 183.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 234, 242; *Philosophie positive*, IV, pp. 469-81.

⁴⁷ *Polity*, II, p. 242.

⁴⁸ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 469-81; *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 243-4.

reason for this is that too much specialization, while it leads to the development of a great skill and a high degree of interest in narrow fields, is liable to result in the disintegration of society through a loss of the conception of the unity of the whole and of the mutual relations between the individual and society. It is the function of government to coördinate human activities, and to guard against the dangerous elements in specialization, while, at the same time, conserving its beneficial effects.⁴⁹

In proportion as a distribution of functions is realized in society there results a natural and spontaneous process of subordination, the principle being that those in any occupation come under the direction of the class which has control over their general type of functions, i. e., the next class above them in the hierarchy of industrial differentiation. Government tends naturally to arise out of the controlling and directing forces which are at first centered in the smaller and functional groups of society. In the past, war has been the chief factor in unifying in one central unit this divided governmental power. Industry, however, is coming more and more to be the source of social discipline and governmental control.⁵⁰ "The habits of command and of obedience already formed in Industry have only to extend to public spheres, to found a power in the State capable of controlling the divergencies, and regulating the convergencies, of the individuals within it."⁵¹

This material basis of government in the principles of the division of labor, combination of efforts, and superiority and subordination⁵² harmonizes with the psychic characteristics of humanity, which leads some to command and others to obey. While it is necessary to recognize the almost universal desire to

⁴⁹ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 481-7; *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 243-4.

"Cette conception constitue, à mes yeux, la première base positive et rationnelle de la théorie élémentaire et abstraite du gouvernement, proprement dit, envisagée dans sa plus noble et plus entière extension scientifique, c'est-à-dire, comme caractérisé en général par l'universelle réaction nécessaire d'abord spontanée et en suite régulière, de l'ensemble sur les parties."

Philosophie Positive, Vol. IV, p. 485.

"Fidèle à la pensée de Comte, nous pouvons définir le gouvernement dans son sens général et propre, la force de cohésion sociale qui agit, ou mieux encore le principe de coopération mis en oeuvre." Chiappini, op. cit., pp. 102-3.

⁵⁰ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 487-93; *Polity*, Vol. II, 245-6. Cf. Spencer's doctrine of the military and industrial orders in society.

⁵¹ *Polity*, Vol. II, p. 246.

⁵² Cf. the doctrine of von Haller and Simmel.

command, it is no less essential to observe that people find it very agreeable to throw the burden of expert guidance upon others.⁵³

But one must go beyond this fundamental analytical basis of the state, in the distribution of functions and the combination of efforts to construct a complete system of political philosophy. With this Aristotelian axiom must be combined the Hobbesian notion of force as the ultimate foundation upon which governmental organization rests. "Social science would remain forever in the cloud-land of metaphysics, if we hesitated to adopt the principle of Forces as the basis of Government. Combining this doctrine with that of Aristotle, that society consists in the Combination of efforts and the Distribution of functions, we get the axioms of a sound political philosophy."⁵⁴

To the doctrines of Aristotle and Hobbes, however, must be added the more specific notions of Comte himself. He finds that, in addition to the requirements just named, there is demanded an efficient general regulating power or system of social control. "Close study, therefore, shows us that there are three things necessary for all political power, besides the basis of material Force: an Intellectual guidance, a Moral sanction, and lastly a Social control."⁵⁵ This regulating power is to be found in the religion of humanity and is to be administered by the priests of that cult.⁵⁶ There are, thus, in the perfect state three grades of society: the family based on feeling or affection; the state or city based on action; and the church based primarily on intelligence, but, in reality, synthesizing all three.⁵⁷ These grades of society correspond to, and have their basis in, the three fundamental powers or functions of man's cerebral system, which Comte took from Gall's phrenology and made the basis of his psychology and much of his social science.⁵⁸

This final element, the church, with its universal surveillance and guidance of all social activities, will make possible the dissolution of the great tyrannical states and the completion of the

⁵³ "Ainse la spontanéité fondamentale des diverses dispositions individuelles se montre essentiellement en harmonie avec le cours nécessaire de l'ensemble des relations sociales pour établir que la subordination politique est, en général, aussi inevitable qu'indispensable. *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 493-5. Cf. *Polity*, Vol. II, p. 244. Cf. Giddings' theory of "Protocracy" in his *Responsible State*, pp. 17ff.

⁵⁴ *Polity*, Vol. II, p. 247.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 249.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 249-50.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 250-1.

⁵⁸ Cf. Martineau, Vol. II, Chapter VI; *Polity*, Vol. I, pp. 540-93.

social organism without any danger from anarchy or license.⁵⁹ In the place of the conventional political state, as it now exists, there is to be a group of cities united by the common religious tutelege provided by the worship of humanity as administered by its priests. Such political entities are, after all, as large as any which could be constituted without the entry of tyranny. Comte, thus, tended partially to revive the localism and municipal character of the Utopias of Plato and Aristotle, and, to a certain degree, anticipated Le Play and modern regionalism:

The foundation of a universal Church will enable the gradual reduction of these huge and temporary agglomerations of men to that natural limit, where the State can exist without tyranny . . . No combination of men can be durable, if this is not really voluntary; and in considering the normal form of the State we must get rid of all artificial and violent bonds of union, and retain only those which are spontaneous and free. Long experience has proved that the City, in its full completeness and extent of surrounding country, is the largest body politic which can exist without becoming oppressive. . . . But besides this, the Positive Faith, with its calm grasp over human life as a whole, will be sufficient to unite the various Cities in the moral communion of the Church, without requiring the help of the State to supplement the task with its mere material unity.

Thus the final creation of a religious society whereby the great organism is completed, fulfils all the three wants of the political society. The intellectual guidance, the moral sanction, and the social regulation which government requires to modify its material nature, are all supplied by a Church, when it has gained a distinct existence of its own.⁶⁰

B. The Historical Evolution or Political Institutions.

In his treatment of the origin of the state from a historical point of view Comte reminds one of Hegel's narration of the successive migrations of the Weltgeist until it finally settled among the German people.⁶¹ Comte ranges over the history of humanity and traces the stages through which the race has passed in its preparation for the final goal of its evolution—the Positivist State. One considerable difference between Hegel and Comte is that Comte presented a much more accurate interpretation of the facts

⁵⁹ *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 251-3, 304.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 251. This independence of the Church is possible only when its realm of domination is more extensive than that of the political group. *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 252-3.

⁶¹ Cf. Dittman, "Die Geschichtsphilosophie Comtes und Hegels, ein Vergleich," in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Vol. 38, pp. 281-312; Vol. 39, pp. 38-81.

of history than Hegel and, when viewed in the light of his times, he is by no means so devoid of historical information as some modern historical critics might seem to indicate.⁶² He seems to have been acquainted with Gibbon and Hallam, for instance, and grasped the significance of many fundamental movements in history, particularly in the field of economic development, which escaped many later and more erudite "political historians." A comprehensive grasp of the vital factors at work in history is as essential to a true conception and interpretation of history as a detailed knowledge of the objective facts of history. Judged by this criterion Comte was no less of a real historian than many of the extremely careful and critical "political historians" of the nineteenth century.

It is beyond the purpose of the recent work to present in detail Comte's philosophy of history. All that will be attempted is a brief statement of his fundamental principles and a summary of the portions dealing with the evolution of political institutions. Comte's philosophy of history is based on as ingenious a system of triads as distinguished the work of Vico.⁶³ In the first place, social evolution, like social organization, is based on the tripartite functions of man's cerebral system—feeling, action and intellect. Feeling or emotion, which is the basis of morality, passes through three stages in which man's social nature finds satisfaction first in the family, then in the state, and finally in the race. Or, as he puts it in other words, altruism in antiquity is domestic and civic, in the Middle Ages collective, and in the Positive period it is universal.⁶⁴ Still another way of describing this type of evolution is to say that the sympathetic instincts of humanity advance through the stages of attachment, veneration, and benevolence. There is a close relationship between these different views of moral evolution, as fetichism, which founded the family, also developed the feeling of attachment; polytheism, which founded the state, fostered veneration; while monotheism, with its universality, favored the sentiment of benevolence.⁶⁵ Man's activational evolution proceeds

⁶² E. g. G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians of the Nineteenth Century*, p. 585.

⁶³ One should look for Comte's philosophy of history, not exclusively in the last volumes of his philosophy, but in the third volume of his *Polity*, for he himself tells the reader (*Polity*, Vol. III, p. 5) that his complete theory is to be found only in that volume. For Comte's most compact summary of his philosophy of history see the *Polity*, Vol. III, pp. 421-2.

⁶⁴ *Polity*, Vol. III, pp. 154-60.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 156-7.

through the stages of conquest, defence and industry.⁶⁶ Finally, the evolution of the intellect follows the famous three stages—the theological, metaphysical, and positive or scientific.⁶⁷ In this process emotion is the dynamic power, action the agent of progress, and intellect the guiding force.⁶⁸

Comte did not, therefore, as many writers would seem to indicate, base his philosophy of history exclusively on the single element of intellectual evolution. Even the law of the three stages of intellectual progress aimed at a larger synthesis, which would include material and spiritual factors, though probably the religious element played a predominant part in his scheme. His periods of intellectual development, in broad outline, were the theological, divided into fetichism, polytheism, and monotheism; the period of the western revolution from 1300 to 1800; and the beginnings of the positive period from 1800 onward. Each of these periods was further subdivided.

(To be Continued)

⁶⁶ Ibid, I, p. 507.

⁶⁷ Ibid, IV, p. 157.

⁶⁸ Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chaps VI, XVI. Social evolution, as a whole, is a combination of all three of these special types of evolution. Defourny well summarizes this point: "L'évolution totale de l'espèce humaine peut donc, en somme, se résumer sous cette forme: La civilisation a été successivement d'abord théologique, militaire, et civique; ensuite metaphysique, feodal, et chrétienne; elle sera enfin positive, industrielle, et universellement altruiste. Elle se caractérise a chaque époque a un triple point de vue, parce que l'homme est doué d'un triple activité cérébrale." Op. cit. p. 151. Cf. W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 393-4.

MAN—THE TAMER OF CHAOS.

BY EDWIN MILLER WHEELOCK.

[The essay which follows, is made up of gleanings from a manuscript left by Edwin Miller Wheelock at his death in 1901—a work evidently completed in 1874, and which must have been intended by Mr. Wheelock for publication in book form. The paper which appeared in the September issue, 1920, of the *Open Court*, under the title of "The Psyche—A Study in Evolution", was, in reality, gathered from the same source. Interspersed through the manuscript are passages from *Proteus*, a complete edition of which was published by the Open Court Publishing Company in 1910, and it might seem that *Proteus* was originally part of a more extensive work which the author had projected.

The preface to the manuscript bears the significant date of March 30th, 1874. That date marked the end of his connection with the Reconstruction Government in Texas, and brought to a close a warfare of absorbing interest—a career which had begun with his resignation of a Unitarian pastorate at Dover, New Hampshire, and his enlistment with the Northern armies in 1862, and which in its varied phases makes up a rare story of heroic and earnest action. The outline of that story, condensed from an unpublished biography, the present writer endeavored briefly to sketch in the *Open Court* for September, 1920, and in the issue of the same magazine for February, 1922, he dealt with the "John Brown sermon" of Mr. Wheelock—a noteworthy utterance spoken just before the execution of the great abolitionist and the prophetic character of which Von Holst deemed worthy of mention in his *Constitutional History of the United States*.

Edwin Miller Wheelock, on the active side of his career, was a soldier of freedom, whether in pulpit or camp, but on his reflective side he was a prose-poet, whose pre-occupation with the deepest problems of being has given to us a series of essays remarkable for their exquisite verbal beauty and high philosophic appeal.—Charles Kassel.]

CREATION moves through transformation on transformation, arriving at highest results without miraculous leaps or arbitrary shocks. Yet, in nature, from kingdom to kingdom and from

stage to stage, there is always an uplifting. The beginning of the animal is not the organic sequent of the vegetable kingdom; nor the viviparous animal of the oviparous, nor man of the Chimpanzee. At each stage, there is a lift between successive orders, a break in the level sequence, where plastic nature interpolates a new thought, and the *Praesens Numen* makes the bridge from kind to kind. The transition is not the measured increment of a progressive series, but a new inflowing of originating Spirit.

There are two kinds of Birth. There is the propagation of individuals of the same species on the same plane, which is ordinary generation; and there is the birth of species, or ascent from a lower to a higher plane, which is creation. In the former the all-fructifying Spirit acts through finite parentage; in the latter it operates directly through the matrices of nature, the Universal Mother.

If we trace any new type of being to its beginning, we find, of necessity, that it rests upon something both higher and lower than itself. On the natural side it has been evolved from something lower, as animal life from vegetable; and on the higher side from nothing less than the ever-brooding Creative Spirit. The creation of every new type of life, be it the human species or any other, has some lower nature on the maternal side and the all-vitalizing power on the paternal. Each new type of life includes what is below it as its basis and background, and something more; and that something more must come from above and beyond nature.

From this view-point of science, nature is seen as a vast system of evolution climbing upward, from the nebula to the mineral, from the mineral to the plant, from the plant to the animal, and from the animal to Man,—the glorious flower of the whole, for whom everything beneath serves only as root and stem.

The tendency of each type is not to change into the next higher, but to perfect itself after its own plan. The mollusk does not attempt to transform itself into a vertebrate, but it changes by degrees into a more perfect mollusk, and the branches it gives forth, whenever they reach their ultimate of progress, become extinct. The same holds good in all other types.

The starting point of every form of life is always from a prepared matrix. The sun was the matrix of the earth; the earth or mineral realm was the universal matrix of the vegetable

kingdom; this in turn was the basis of the lowest forms of the animal kingdom; these lowest forms furnished the matrices for those higher, and so on up to the highest. Man, the last creation, having the most complex organization, could only be formed from the highest animal form next below him. In the body of man all the organs of the animal creation find their completion, and every other brain is condensed in his. All inferior forms, animal, vegetable and mineral, are fragments, portions, prophecies of the grand type.

In previous chapters we penetrated, as with a mental telescope, the foregone ages, even into that voiceless eternity, when as yet time, and space, and nature were not. We beheld the birth of the Material Universe; matter evolved from the prior substance of Spirit and existing at first in the form of the rarest and subtlest ethers. We saw this grand *ovum*, or germ, fecundated by the Creative Spirit, developing into vast nebulae or nuclei, from which successively unfolded solar systems, planetary systems, flaming spheroids, geological epochs, mineral aggregations, plants in their regular order of ascension from lowest to highest, animals rising from the sponge and the jelly-fish, through sea-worms, fishes, reptiles, birds, and beasts, the diapason closing full in *Man*.

In the first dawn of being, vitality was united to matter; this vitality in each ascending period became of a higher and yet higher order,—the vitality of the mollusk, the fish, the reptile, the mammal, the responsible and immortal man.

From the first, Creation has striven to put forth the human form. Low down in the series we find animal forms with but a spine and head; then limbs and other organs begin to show themselves, one by one,—claws and fins shadowing forth the five fingers of man, and the approach to the human form growing more distinct, till man appears, with his dual nature, animal and spiritual, and rounds the full circle.

And all these changes are law-developed and law-governed, with no savor of chance or of miracle. By no miraculous, unlinked, and unrelated effort of divine power were they caused; the large analogies of nature all forbid. Nor yet did matter climb its spiral round from chaos to crystal, from crystal to plant, from plant to animal, and from animal to man, by the power of any laws inherent in itself. Life and its powers are spiritual, and it was spiritual forces that pushed each of nature's successive kingdoms into air and life. The worlds, with their contents, are out-

goings from God. It is the Spirit of God that tints the flower, that forms the fruit, that arches the firmament, that rounds and lights the star. It was the Creative Spirit, that, through the power of an upward attraction, drew the atomic particles into higher, and still higher, and finally into the highest forms;—the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, each growing out of the kingdom next below, with the Divine Spirit as its procreant and vitalizing cause.

The chain of Nature's being is continuous still. See her branches and families interweave. Thus, for example, we find bitumen and sulphur linking earth and metals; vitriols uniting metals with salts; crystals connecting salts with stones; and lithophytes joining plants and stones. Again, the polypus unites plants to insects; and the humming-bird insects to birds. The African vegetable serpent connects plants with reptiles, the tube-worm joins shells with reptiles, the eel forms a passage from reptiles to fish, the flying-fish unites fish with birds, the bat and flying squirrel link birds to quadrupeds, and the monkey gives the hand equally to quadruped and to man. Man by his physical nature is linked to the brute creation on the one hand, and by his spiritual soul to Heaven, on the other!

Nature discloses innumerable plants, rising step by step, the lowest interweaving with the lifeless mineral, and the highest piercing the domain of animal life. Above these are myriad animals, in regular lines of ascent, the lowest blending with the vegetable, and the highest stretching forth his hand to man. This is the grand ladder of progression, up which, from the lowest round, man has climbed to his kingdom. He seems, indeed, to halt midway between animality and divinity. He is semi-beast, demi-god. As Deity's highest personification on earth, he appears cut off from the animal world. But this is only an appearance, for the closest relations exist.

As life, in its climbing path, has left way-marks all along, from the simple cell to the most complex animal, so has it left traces at every step from the animal to the human being. As the crystal is but a mineral flower, and the plant but a vegetable crystal and the animal but plant with senses, locomotion, and nerves, so is man an animal in every respect; but in addition thereto he possesses a unique moral and spiritual life, in which consists his humanity.

The evolved man sits in the ear of nature, and hears the deep-keyed utterance and diapason of her communings. The crystal

privacies of space open to his gaze. He wins the Divine Secrets. He can approach undazzled the primal essence where suns, and stars, and galaxies roll out like sparkles from an eternal flame. He is omnipresent in the great circle of the Universe. He is the root and fibre whose bloom and fruitage is the world, and everything in nature, and each thread in the web of universal being, has its end in man's heart and brain.

Every animal of the barn-yard, the field and the forest has contrived to get a footing in man, and we may still trace the remains and hints of these relationships. His faculties reveal the animal kingdom through which he has arisen. The thin line of nervous matter of the Hydra and the Amphioxus, is a prediction of the convoluted brain of the mammal and of man. The proboscis of the elephant is but an extended nose; the wing of the bat but an altered hand; the shell of the turtle but modified ribs.

All life springs from the cell. The nebula of Chaos was the parent cell of the Universe. From its sheddings solar systems were born; whose cells floating away became planets. In minerals and crystals we again perceive laminæ or cells, but now they have advanced a step, they follow a definite line, and form beautiful geometrical figures. In the plant kingdom we have the constant germ or cell, but now metamorphosed into organs, performing distinct offices. Man, standing at the summit, has passed through all lower degrees of evolution, and it is, therefore, in human embryogony that we find unrolled the great panorama of organization.

The whole animal creation, from the mollusk to the man, have passed through the same gateway, and travelled the same path. The degree of development varies with the length of the path. The brain in all living beings is formed on one plan, and the process of growth is the same in each; but at a certain point the lowest stop. Others go farther before their development is arrested. Man, beginning at the same point, goes farthest of all. He ascends to and surpasses the highest, hence he is the most intelligent.

Birds have a third eyelid, which is of essential use to them, and is always present. In man the same eyelid is readily seen as a minute scale, of no possible use. In man there is a little cartilage, hardly visible, joined to one of the nostril-bones, and entirely useless. But in the horse these shut off the great cavity of the nostrils from foreign bodies, and in the whale they grow

to the size of bolsters, sealing the nostrils against a thousand fathoms of water as the animal plunges into the abysses of the ocean. In the grazing animals a strong muscle supports the head while eating. The same is found in man, but as it is not needed, it is only a thin white line of cartilage. As the organic remains in the rocky strata show the lines of the earth's progress, so these abortive and useless organs in man reveal the animal stock from which he was derived.

Man is the builded aroma of the world. The human body, as Pan's last flock, crops every nature that it touches. That which is scale in the fish, coil in the serpent, woolly or hairy coat in the quadruped, impenetrable mail in the pachyderm, becomes in man the four-fold clothing of the surface of his body. Nature is a force willed from the first to sculpture the images and paint the portrait of human attributes in plant, beast and bird; for the human is a traveling form, which reaches from man to God and involves all beings as it goes. Each mineral, animal and plant prophesied of man, and mollusk, sauroid and pachyderm were his heralds.

Man is the Microcosm. He is the embodiment of all the forms and forces of nature. He looks in all directions; he has relation to all beings and things; he can be acted on by all substances and forces. Every mineral, every vegetable, and every animal existence is contained in man, and draws its nutriment from the paps of his destiny. Humanity is built upon the kingdoms below, as coral continents rise into the red light of the sun. Plant and tree, knotty oak and nodding *weed*, dove and butterfly, rotifer and mammifer, are but so many steps of the Psychical essence on its way to man. Through geologic eras, with their million-yearred convulsions and slow adjustments; through a thousand dumb material forms, she has won her patient way.

The roots of man are deeper than can be told, and belong to the Immensities and Eternities. They reach down below the protoplasm and the granite, to that depth where the individual is lost in his source. For the creation, from the beginning, was in preparation of man. Long before he emerged into existence, the sun of a myriad epochs had decomposed the granite, soaked the land with light and heat, and covered it with plants and animals—the manufacturers of soil. Each particle of oxygen, each atom of lime waited for him, ready to obey his thought. The earth, the water and the air worked for him; the glacier and the frost

plowed for him. The huge mountain chains are but gases and fluid wind, which took form and solid mass to serve his turn. Humanity is the primal fact on this planet.

Nature is an outgrowth from man and takes his color and expression. Lands, seas and atmospheres are his sheddings. Stocks and stones are but the outer vegetation of the seeds of the soul. Each solar orb turns on the occult axis of spirit. Space itself has no existence; it is but a geometrical figure drawn by the finger of the Infinite. Man is the form for whose end all things exist. The end of nature is man and he is related to the farthest star. He is set by the Maker in the rhythm of His plan, receiving and transmitting the rush of Destiny.

When, in the immense day of creation, the hour for humanity struck at last, upon this crust of soil which the ages, and seasons, and forces had refined, man was placed to co-operate with sun and moon, rainbow and flood, to govern matter as the vehicle of powers higher than its own and as the organ of the Reason that made the world. In his ear the well kept secret of the Universe is whispered at last—that all things exist to moral ends and from moral causes, *and that it is for man to tame the chaos!*

Man is the bond where-with God has bound in one the sheaves of His great universe. Through him the very stones, or the horny nails and terminations of the earth, return to God; and the creation lives on the perpetual condition of spending alike its worlds and particles, its days and its very seconds, upon humanity. Not a stone, or a plant, or a living creature, but carries up its heart's thread into his loom, there to be wound into human nature, and thence forth to follow the lead of his own immortal destinies.

SUPERNATURALISM AND SATANISM IN CHATEAUBRIAND.

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

(Concluded.)

THE Supernaturalism in Chateaubriand's works conveys no illusion to the reader; it impresses him rather as singularly unconvincing. It is felt as a study in style, for which the author, as a matter of fact, recommends it, in his Preface to *les Natchez*. With Chateaubriand, as with all pseudo-classicists, the Supernatural is used merely as mythological trappings, as a rhetorical device for the embellishment of epic poetry. He himself did not believe in his own Supernaturalism, as is sufficiently evident from his farewell to the Muse in the conclusion of *les Martyrs*, a conclusion which was suppressed in all editions subsequent to the first:

“Fidèle compagne de ma vie, en remontant dans les cieux, laisse-moi l'indépendance et la vertu. Qu'elles viennent ces Vierges austères, qu'elles viennent fermer pour moi le livre de la Poésie, et m'ouvrir les pages de l'Histoire. J'ai consacré l'âge des illusions à la riante peinture du mensonge: j'emploierai l'âge des regrets au tableau sévère de la vérité.”⁷⁰

This was the principal defect of Chateaubriand's Supernaturalism. Nodier, that schoolmaster of Romanticism, repeatedly said that two things were necessary for the successful treatment of the Supernatural in literature. The poet must himself believe what he says, and the reader must believe the poet. These two requirements are lacking in Chateaubriand's Christian Supernaturalism. Dante, Tasso, Milton and Klopstock addressed themselves to readers who believed in their Supernaturalism as firmly as they did

⁷⁰ “Faithful companion of my life, in ascending to Heaven, leave with me independence and virtue. May they come, these austere Virgins, may they come to close for me the book of Poesy, and to open for me the pages of History. I have consecrated the age of illusions to the portrayal of lies: I will employ the age of regrets to the severe tableau of truth.”

themselves. But Chateaubriand had no belief himself and could expect none from his readers. A belief in the Supernatural was very far, indeed, from the spirit of the dechristianized France of the early nineteenth century. Most of the ideas of his day in this sphere of thought were quite different from the views that the contemporaries of his master Milton entertained. The tremendous belief in the personality of the Devil that had grown up during the Middle Ages flourished just as vigorously in the middle of the seventeenth century. Milton himself fully believed in the existence of the diabolical beings whom he described. He was as firm, although not as fantastic, a believer in a real, personal Devil, as Luther, who lived in a constant consciousness of contact and conflict with Satan. We never think of doubting Milton. "As well might we doubt the reality of those scorching fires of Hell that had left their marks on the face of Dante; or of the fearful sights and sounds that beset Christian on his way through the Valley of the Shadow of Death." Even Christopher Marlowe, in telling the story of the bargain between Faustus and Mephistopheles, believed that he narrated established facts. The conception of the Devil of a Milton, a Bunyan, a Marlowe still represents the seriousness of the medieval fear of Satan. These men lived in an age of faith in which angels and demons were not abstract figures, but living realities. In the France of the year 1809, Heaven and Hell had lost their "local habitation," and angels and demons were considered as figments of the human imagination.

Nor is the subject matter of Chateaubriand so well fitted for supernatural action as is that of Milton. Even an unbeliever will suspend his own opinions and follow the supernatural interventions in the lives of biblical characters. But it is a different thing to inject into historical events Heaven and Hell and all the powers thereof. How incongruous must appear Erminius in connection with Constantine; and how much more ridiculous must sound a reference to Louis XIV from the lips of that allegorical demon Rumor, a daughter of Satan! In *les Natchez* the Supernatural was more out of tune than in *les Martyrs*. The earlier of the two romances dealt with events of less than two centuries ago and not a century from the time of writing. In the later romance, on the other hand, the Supernatural would have been perfectly proper if the author had treated it as the belief of the men and women of that day and not as his own belief. But he offered this "merveilleux chrétien" in full faith and forgot the fifteen hundred years that separated him from the characters of the story. The Supernatural

which is employed in the novels of the past and of the peasantry in the nineteenth century is presented as the point of view of the characters and not of the narrators. Chateaubriand, however, puts the interventions of Heaven and Hell on a parity with the historical events. His superhuman agents claim as much reality as his historical personages.

The fact that Chateaubriand employs the Supernatural as poetic paraphernalia makes matters worse. Even the non-believer is displeased to find a temple of religion transformed into a store-house of epic bric-à-brac,—to see sacred symbols used as poetic props and pulleys. This sort of marvellous machinery is as forbidding to men of taste as it is shocking to men of faith.

The further fact that *les Martyrs* is written in prose is prejudicial to its Supernaturalism. In Greek verse, in Latin verse, or even in Milton's English, as George Saintsbury says, we could put up with this marvellous material, but not in plain French prose.⁷¹ Mme. de Staël had a clearer vision of the requirements of Supernaturalism in the literature of her day when she demanded verse for its treatment: "Il faut des vers," she wrote in her book, *De l'Allemagne*, "pour des choses merveilleuses." A demon who stalks in stately verse is endurable; one who talks in plain prose is wearisome. In Romanticism, which was primarily a school of poetry, the demon should have spoken in rhymed alexandrines. In the latter and prosaic half of the nineteenth century it was, of course, perfectly proper for the Devil to talk like the rest of us. Among his strong points is his adaptability to the morals and manners of each generation.

VIII

Chateaubriand failed utterly in his efforts to bring back Christian Supernaturalism. His supernatural apparatus was as antiquated as his Christian epos. Even this "enchanteur," as our author was called by the frequenters of Mme. Pauline de Beaumont's salon at the Abbaye-aux-Bois, could not bring the world again under the dead hand of the past. He did not understand that an epic poem cannot be produced at will. It is the work not only of individuals, but of times and conditions. The age had long passed for the writing of epics. A Christian epos on the morrow of the French Revolution! His period was critical, analytical, and even somewhat cynical. His theories found no adherents, and his Christian epics no imitators. You will look in vain throughout the literature of the nineteenth century for a work which contains a medley of the "mer-

⁷¹ *History of the French Novel* (2 vols., 1917-19), i. 30.

veilleux" in the manner of Chateaubriand. His contention that an artificial and rhetorical, a figurative and fictive Supernaturalism had in itself a poetic value and was necessary to the dignity of an epic poem, was disproved by his own works. His strictures upon a mechanical application of the "classical marvellous" were turned against his own exploitation of the "Christian marvellous." Chateaubriand's chief service lies in his unwitting application of the *coup de grâce* to the external conception of the Supernatural. He has proved that there is no intrinsic worth in mythological fictions, whether pagan or Christian. But his distinction between classical and Christian mythology would not hold water. He decreed the abolition of classical mythology, and literary history proves that he was wrong. The Supernatural, classical as well as Christian, was successfully used in the poetry of the Romantic period, but not as a stylistic embellishment. It was employed as subject-matter, and aimed to call forth a particular emotion in the reader. The symbolical Supernaturalism was especially in vogue during the past century. It adds to the intellectual emotion of a philosophical idea the esthetical emotion of a symbolical form.

Indeed, Chateaubriand himself admitted that his "merveilleux chrétien" was a failure. He knew that the supernatural passages were the weakest parts of *les Martyrs*, and realized that the merits of the work could not rest on its Heaven and Hell. "Neither the good nor the bad angels," he confessed, "will obtain mercy for the book." Its redeeming qualities he sought anywhere but in its marvellous machinery. The "merveilleux chrétien" is missing in his two short stories. The conflict of human passions in them is not overlaid by a contest of angels and demons. The religious emotion is nevertheless far better produced in them than in the greater works with all of their Christian marvels. The short pieces express very powerfully the Christian spirit. *Atala* and *René* have remained his masterpieces, while the more pretentious so-called epic poems, *les Natchez* and *les Martyrs*, were promptly forgotten.

Moreover, Chateaubriand's Christian Supernaturalism is Christian in name only. He committed the error of imitating too accurately the classical mythology in the Christian, so that they are almost identical. His angels are for the most part the Greek and Latin personifications of natural processes. Virgil's gods of the sea are turned into angels of the sea. Uriel, as the angel of love, is the Greek Eros, and Gabriel, as the messenger of the Lord, is Iris. Chateaubriand realized later,—too late, indeed,—that what he

offered was not a Christian Supernaturalism, but a caricatured classicism, that he had only modified the old epic features of the *Aeneid*, instead of filling his poem with a faith which Virgil lacked (*Mémoires d'outre-tombe*, iii. 15). His was too superficial a conception of the Supernatural. He knew too well that the "merveilleux chrétien" does not mean to a modern man the description of Heaven and Hell. The marvellous element of Christianity is the Christian conscience, as it manifests itself in our daily lives, the Christian soul, as it reveals itself in acts of self-denial. The habitation of the spirits of good and evil is not in Heaven and Hell but in our own hearts. The conflict between God and Satan is fought within and not without us.

Of Chateaubriand's Christian Supernaturalism all that remains is his Satanism. The interest in biblical and medieval subjects which our author awakened among the Romanticists was confined almost wholly to "diablerie." Certain passages in his books inspired a few of the most beautiful Satanistic works of modern times. Alfred de Vigny derived his poem, *Eloa* (1823), from Chateaubriand, and suggested on his part Lamartine's *la Chute d'un Ange* (1838), Gautier's *la Larme du diable* (1839) and Victor Hugo's posthumous *la Fin de Satan*. In Lamartine's poem, however, the angel who became a human being through love of a mortal woman, soon loses contact with his former friends and takes up his abode among men. Flaubert's *la Tentation de Saint-Antoine* (1849) and Anatole France's *Thaïs* (1890), go back to Chateaubriand's description of the Thebaid. Little did this "avocat poétique du Christianisme" dream that all his efforts in behalf of Christian Supernaturalism would turn out to be only a "boost" for Beelzebub. In one important respect, Chateaubriand experienced the fate of his master. Milton started out, in his poem, "to justify the ways of God to men" (*Par. Lost*, i. 26), and ended by conferring lustre upon Lucifer. His French imitator set out with the intention of rehabilitating Christianity in the arts and in literature, and his work redounded to the glory of Gehenna. Of all his Christian Supernaturals it is Satan who appealed most strongly to his contemporaries. In the Romantic period the Devil became an absorbing and alluring character and has dominated most literary forms down to the present day. To call the roll of the writers of the nineteenth century who celebrated Satan in verse and prose is to marshal the names of almost all the makers of modern French letters. If we admit that the nineteenth century literature reached its highest perfection in France, it should

not be overlooked that this is at least in some degree due to the skillful exploitation in it of the fascinating Prince of this World.

IX

Chateaubriand's real Satanism must rather be sought apart from his Supernaturalism. The influence of Milton's Satan is not limited to Chateaubriand's spirit of darkness. It also extends to his human characters. Medieval legends inform us that persons who conjured up the Evil One often had trouble in parting with him when once he had answered their summons. Diabolus belongs to that genus of genii which, once having escaped from its bottle, refuses to return. Chateaubriand could not well rid himself of the Devil he had summoned. In vain did this Christian poet endeavor to paint his Satan in the blackest colors. The image of a bright and beautiful archangel would unfailingly emerge in a fascinating form and at the most unexpected junctures. The Miltonic Satan whom he so admired and whom he transplanted into his own literature and country, continued to be Chateaubriand's inspiration for the remainder of his life. Referring to the temptation scene, which was translated almost literally in the *Génie du Christianisme*, Sainte-Beuve asks:

"Ce démon, ce glorieux Lucifer, n'est-ce pas le même qui, avec tous les charmes de la séduction et sous un air de vague ennui, se glissant encore sous l'arbre d'Éden, a pris sa revanche en plus d'un endroit des scènes troublantes de Chateaubriand?"⁷²

Satan dictated to our author many a phrase and fashioned many a figure more or less in his own image. The Devil is more cunning and crafty than this religionist was aware. The Evil One knows that humanity is on guard against him. To tempt man, Satan changes his name as well as his form.

The real Devil in *les Martyrs*, however, is not Satan or any other of the horned company that sit in the infernal parliament, but the wretched seducer and murderer of Velléda. Nor is Satan in *les Natchez* as much of a devil as René, the melancholy misanthropist, the social rebel and the unfeeling lover. René is the human incarnation of Milton's "great spirit inspired by melancholy."⁷³ A

⁷² "Has not this glorious Lucifer, still gliding under the tree of Eden, with his charms of seduction and his air of vague ennui, taken his revenge in more than one passage of Chateaubriand?" *Causeries du lundi* (15 vols., 1851-62), ii. 157.

⁷³ Luther held that Satan was a mournful character and could in no way endure bright, cheerful music.

man solitary in his conscious superiority to his fellows, cursed with a mysterious sorrow wandering through many lands, vainly seeking happiness, is kin to the "grand solitaire désespéré" in Milton. How deeply Chateaubriand felt the melancholy of Milton's Satan may be seen from the following passage in his *Génie du Christianisme* (Pt. II, bk. iv., chap. 9):

"Satan repentant à la vue de la lumière qu'il hait parce qu'elle lui rappelle comme il fut élevé au-dessus d'elle, souhaitant ensuite d'avoir été créé dans un rang inférieur, puis s'endurcissant dans le crime par orgueil, par honte, par méfiance même de son caractère ambitieux; enfin, pour tout fruit de ses réflexions, et comme pour expier un moment de remords, se chargeant de l'empire du mal pendant toute une éternité: voilà, certes, si nous ne nous trompons, une des conceptions les plus pathétiques qui soient jamais sorties du cerveau d'un poète."⁷⁴

His doubt and disquiet, his disillusionment and despondency, his disdain and defiance, his disordered soul and embittered heart, his mournful and morbid temperament, his rebellious and restless spirit, his unbounded egotism, his outward coldness and inward glow, his weariness of mind, his weakness of will, his hatred of life, all these qualities stamp René as a demon clad in human flesh. Indeed René is, as his creator tells us, "possédé, tourmenté par le démon de son cœur."

In the person of René, who stands at the very threshold of the new age, the Devil cast his long dark shadows over the weary nineteenth century. With this character begins the cult of sadness, the poetry of complaints. From René may be said to spring the melancholy and misanthropy of Romanticism, already dimly discerned in Rousseau's *Saint-Preux* and Goethe's *Werther*.⁷⁵ René is the personification of the diabolical malady of the century—*la maladie du siècle*. The priest d'Aureville, a brother of Barbey, well understood this diabolic quality of melancholy when he termed it "la grande diablesse." In René we find the first and fullest expression of that world-weariness or *Weltschmerz*, as the Germans call it, which is gnawing at the heart of modern man.

In René may be discovered, furthermore, the origin of the

⁷⁴ "Satan repenting when he beholds the light, which he hates because it reminds him how much more glorious was once his own condition; afterwards wishing that he had been created of an inferior rank; then hardening himself in guilt by pride, by shame, and by even mistrust of his ambitious character; finally, as the sole result of his reflections, and as if to atone for a transient remorse, taking upon himself the empire of evil throughout all eternity—this is certainly one of the most sublime conceptions that ever sprang from the imagination of a poet."

⁷⁵ Cf. P. Hainrich, *Werther und René* (Greifswald, 1921).

"révolté" who feels a voluptuous joy in standing out against the world, in warring with the cosmos, in breaking all bonds of family and society. It must not be forgotten that the Romantic idea in France, as later in England, was at bottom revolutionary. It differed considerably from the moonshiny sort of Romanticism that we find in Germany. In this respect the later school called "Young Germany" more nearly corresponds to French Romanticism. All the French Romantics were members of the Opposition. Chateaubriand himself, who began as a bulwark of Bourbonism, joined the Opposition in 1824, when he was dismissed from office.⁷⁶ It was on this occasion that he threw off the mask which he had until then worn. His counter-revolutionary ideas stood, as he himself admits in his *Congrès de Vérone* (1838), against his own judgment ("contre mes propres lumières"). What Blake said of Milton is equally true of his French disciple. He, too, was "of the Devil's party."

In the character of René, Chateaubriand is the first to paint the man-demon found among many Romantic authors and in a number of their best creations. He is a man who, conscious of his own powers and of the loftiness of his own aspirations, looks down with disdain upon the masses of his fellow-men who lack powers and aspirations equal to his. The keenness and depth of his own ideas and sufferings lift him in self-appraisal above the masses of his fellow-men whose ideas and sufferings are on a lower plane of thought and emotion. This man-demon, never finding his counterpart among men, must needs content himself with the love of a tender, but shallow, feminine nature. The personality of a woman of this sort he absorbs almost involuntarily and becomes the cause of her moral anguish. He accepts love without loving in return and feels no pity for the sufferings which he inflicts on the woman who loves him. That is why vital contact with such a demoniacal nature is dangerous to a woman and is certain to lead to a bitter conflict. This conflict between a man-demon and a woman-angel finds its most beautiful symbolical expression in Vigny's poem, *Eloa*.⁷⁷

In the various aspects of his diabolical character René was imitated with many variations by the contemporaries of Chateaubriand. René sired the long procession of phantoms who struck terror into the heart of his own creator. Who can number all these sad and suffering, sentimental and sinning heroes of the Romantic

⁷⁶ Cf. Gustave Lanson, "la Défection de Chateaubriand," *Revue de Paris*, t. IV (1901), pp. 487-525.

⁷⁷ Demonic women of the type of Corinne and Lélia are few as compared with men.

School? Their name is legion: Obermann, Adolphe, Mardoche, Joseph Delorme, Antony, Didier, Hernani, Gilbert, Frank, Julien, Rastignac, and among women, Corinne and Lélia. They all call René father. Childe Harold also belongs to the progeny of Chateaubriand's hero. Manfred, too, as Chênédollé has aptly remarked, is but "a René dressed à la Shakespeare." It was Chateaubriand who created that Satanic character which is wrongly ascribed to Byron. Byronism was full blown in the work of Chateaubriand when Byron was still a school boy. The so-called Byronic pose was already assumed by René. Southey gave Byron too much credit in designating him as the coryphæus of the Satanic School. The laurels of Lucifer belong to the French poet. Chateaubriand, indeed, was the Sachem of Satanism rather than of Romanticism. What the Romanticists call the fascination of the Abyss is already contained in his writings. He poured the morbid virus into Romanticism. He developed in the Romantics the taste for the *malsain* and the *macabre*. From him they derived the tendency to gloat over decay and death. In Chateaubriand may already be discerned the prevailing traits of the Satanic School which is characterized by Brandes as "a school with a keen eye for all that is evil and terrible, a gloomy view of life, a tendency to rebellion," and "a wild longing for enjoyment, which satisfies itself by mingling the idea of death and destruction, a sort of Satanic frenzy, with what would otherwise be mild and natural feelings of enjoyment and happiness."⁷⁸ We need only point to Atala's dying speech with its Satanic lyricism or to René's letter to Céluta with its Satanic love of destruction and its sadistic lust for murder.

In Chateaubriand this Satanism received a Catholic coloring. He advocated a religion that should furnish occasion for esthetical joy and emotional pathos. He taught the Romantics that religion, far from being an obstacle in the way of sin, may, on the contrary, be found even an aid to the delight in sin. The horror of sin, he showed, added to the enjoyment of sin. It imparted to it a special flavor. This point of view is best illustrated by Stendhal's well-known story of the Italian lady who remarked one day: "Voilà un bon sorbet, néanmoins il serait meilleur s'il était un péché!" It is too bad that this good lady was not born a century later and in America.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ *Op. cit.*, iii. 297; i. 39.

⁷⁹ A sherbet on the Continent contains alcohol. Professor Todd has called the present writer's attention to a similar story of a French lady who held up a glass of cool water with the remark: "How delightful it would be if it were only sinful to drink it!"

X

Chateaubriand's Satanic influence reaches down to the present day. All our modern devil-worshippers have stolen their firebrands from his Hell. His Catholicism threw the decadents straight into the arms of the Devil. "Sentimentalism in religion," says Professor Guérard, "is ever a dangerous thing, but when it is intensified in literature, it leads straight to the Devil."⁸⁰ Barbey, Baudelaire and Huysmans were directly influenced by Chateaubriand. Their writings may be considered the natural offspring of his *Génie du Christianisme*. It is from this writer that Barbey and Baudelaire derived their Catholic Satanism: the belief in Satan as the most essential element in the Catholic creed. René and his progeny were already "Diaboliques," and there are passages in the works of Chateaubriand worthy to rank with the rankest "Fleurs du Mal." "Hath not the author of René," asks Anatole France, "also sown burning words throughout the world?" Through Chateaubriand, Baudelaire, that singer of Satan, found his admiration for the Miltonic archangel, than whom he could imagine none more perfect in manly beauty. ("On conçoit qu'il me serait difficile de ne pas conclure que le plus parfait type de Beauté virile est Satan,—à la manière de Milton.") Baudelaire's worship of Venus also goes back to Chateaubriand's description of this demon of Voluptuousness. In his essay on Wagner's *Tannhäuser* (1861), Baudelaire writes:

"The radiant ancient Venus, Aphrodite, born of white foam, has not imprudently traversed the horrible darkness of the Middle Ages. She has retired to the depths of a cavern, magnificently lighted by the fires that are not those of the Sun. In her descent under earth, Venus has come near to Hell's mouth, and she goes certainly to many abominable solemnities to render homage to the Arch-Demon, Prince of the Flesh and Lord of Sin."⁸¹

But in contrast to Baudelaire, who was an ascetic, even a monastic, sinner, Chateaubriand lived the part he portrayed. This religionist not only painted Diabolism, but also practised it. René was beyond a shadow of a doubt the image of his creator. Chateaubriand himself said that a man paints only his own heart in attributing it to another (*Génie*, Pt. II, bk. i., chap. 3). He also realized that the Satan in *Paradise Lost* is but a fallen Milton. He liked to put himself into all of his characters from Chactas to Aben-Hamet, but he was most pleased to portray himself in René. It is in this character, to whom he has given his second Christian name, that Chateaubriand, with a fearful but fascinating truthfulness, has con-

⁸⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

centrated most of his soul, of his life and of his experience. All of his characters are victims of melancholy, but René is the best projection of his *moi mélancolique*. In René may be seen Chateaubriand's misanthropy, vaingloriousness and arrogance, his aloofness of soul, his egotism grazing the incredible, his self-idolatry bordering on insanity. Even in his death he wished to resemble the Promethean Satan whom he admired and imitated all his life. He asked to be buried on the storm-tossed promontory rock of Grand Bé, separated even in death from the masses of his fellow-men.

It was Chateaubriand himself, this arch-sentimentalist, who posed as a man burdened with a mysterious and apparently causeless curse, dragging himself wearily from land to land and from continent to continent, with the mark of Cain on his brow, leaving everywhere misfortune in his trail. "I drag my weariness painfully after me all day long," he bitterly complains, "and gasp my life away." "J'ai le spleen," he wails, "véritable maladie, tristesse physique." He regarded the belief in happiness as a folly and sneered at the love of life as a mania. In his biography of Rancé, written but four years prior to his death, Chateaubriand still speaks of his passionate hatred of life ("la haine passionnée de la vie").

In René is also painted the nostalgic and nympholeptic Chateaubriand who has written the most intoxicating phrases on voluptuousness and death.⁸² He revels in descriptions of fatal and carnal love, that of Chactas for Atala, of René for Céluta, and of Eudorus for Velléda. Such love between Eudorus and Cymodocée is finally illuminated with the halo of martyrdom. Chateaubriand's narration of this martyr's criminal adventures with Velléda in the presence of Cymodocée and her family was not necessary to account for the penitential severities imposed upon him by the Church.⁸³ Our author offers the psychological phenomenon of the delight obtained from treading on forbidden ground. The details of the physical union of Eudorus, this model of a martyr (another portrait of the author, by the way) with the distraught and wayward Gallican druidness given in the first edition of *les Martyrs* so shocked contemporaries that the paragraph was suppressed in subsequent editions.

⁸¹ Not only the goddess of beauty, but also mortal women, famous for their beauty, such as Aspasia, Laïs, and Cleopatra, have, in consideration of this fact, been turned by the Catholic Church into demons, ladies of Hell. See also Heine's description of the Wild Army in his poem, *Atta Troll* (1842). "What glory for them!" exclaims Anatole France in *le Jardin d'Epicure*.

⁸² Cf. Jules Lemaitre, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

⁸³ This lack of tact is also noted in the author himself in the case of the English clergyman's daughter.

As a demonic lover, René is limned after the likeness of Chateaubriand, that eternal philanderer, as the late James Huneker called him.⁸⁴ This apologist of Christian morality and flower of orthodoxy was faithless to his own wife and engaged in a succession of intrigues with the wives of other men. It has taken volumes to tell of the love affairs which he carried on almost to the day of his death.⁸⁵ Chateaubriand was a votary of the beautiful Venus rather than of the beatific Virgin. The artist was converted, but the man remained the same. He remained René. Even if the author of the *Génie du Christianisme* changed his spots, he certainly never shed his skin. He may have professed Christianity, but he never practised it. Preaching the life of Jesus, he played the part of Don Juan. He followed the Prince of Pleasure rather than the Prince of Peace. The contemporaries of Chateaubriand were not blinded by his pretended piety. A vein of scepticism was surmised under the cover of his orthodoxy. "He hid his poison under the cloak of religious thought, and poisoned with the Host." ("Dans René Chateaubriand a caché le poison sous l'idée religieuse; c'est empoisonner dans une hostie.") This was the severe condemnation pronounced by his friend Chênédollé against the "restaurateur de la religion." Chateaubriand was never a believer and lacked the strength to remain a philosopher, just as he wished to be a Romantic and could not free himself from the fetters of pseudo-classicism. His brand of Catholicism was not in the least to the glory of God nor of His Saints. That is why this self-styled "Father of the Church" has not yet been admitted into the Catholic calendar. Perhaps the writer of this study, has unwittingly acted the part of the *advocatus Diaboli*.

⁸⁴ *The Pathos of Distance* (New York, 1913), pp. 311-19.

⁸⁵ A whole shelf might be filled with books on Chateaubriand the Charmer. See, among others, Francis Henry Gribble, *Chateaubriand and his Court of Women* (1909), and Dr. Portiquet, *Chateaubriand: l'anatomie de ses formes et ses amies* (1912). See also A. Bardoux, *Madame de Beaumont* (1884); *idem*, *Madame de Custine* (1888); *idem*, *Madame de Duras* (1898). Ch. de Robethon, *Chateaubriand et Madame de Custine* (1893); G. Mangras, et F. de Croze, *Delphine de Sabran, Madame de Custine* (1912); E. Biré, "Une amie de Chateaubriand: Madame Bayart," *le Correspondant* for 1901; G. Pailhès, *la Duchesse de Duras et Chateaubriand* (1910); A. Beaunier, *Trois amies de Chateaubriand* (P. de Beaumont, Mme. de Récamier, Hortense Allart) (1910); E. Sichel, "Pauline de Beaumont," *Nineteenth Century*, vol. LXXI (1912), pp. 1147-63.

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