

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 827 dated January 23, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "The 'Shibuya Incident' of July 19, 1946".

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Diplomatic Section

The Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, presents its compliments to the Chinese Mission in Japan and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Mission's note of January 8, 1947 concerning the appointment of an assistant prosecutor and an official Chinese observer at the trial of Japanese police by an Occupation court.

It is noted that the Chinese Government does not consider it practicable to appoint an assistant prosecutor from China, and that the Mission desires to nominate an American lawyer for appointment as assistant prosecutor. As the Mission is aware, the prosecutors in the trial of the Japanese defendants are Mr. John L. Murphey and Mr. Paul F. Faison who were advisers for the defense in the recently completed trial of the Formosan defendants involved in the "Shibuya Incident". It is understood that Mr. Herbert Berman is at present under orders to return to the United States but that he is actively assisting the prosecution in an unofficial capacity. Mr. Berman has expressed his personal desire not to become officially associated with the case.

The suggestion made by the Mission in its note under reply to the effect that the Chinese Government would be ready to nominate a representative to serve as a member of the Military Commission presently trying the accused persons is noted, but in the light of current directives can not be accorded favorable consideration. The Occupation court has been duly established in accordance with existing directives which provide only for regular Occupation courts to try non-United Nations nationals.

No objection is perceived to the presence of Dr. Y. Koung as an official Chinese observer at the trial of the Japanese defendants and Dr. Koung will be furnished with such appropriate documents and transcripts as may be available during the course of the trial.

Tokyo, January 10, 1947

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 827 dated January 23, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "The 'Shibuya Incident' of July 19, 1946".

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COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Diplomatic Section

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Yorksen C. T. Shen  
Mr. W. J. Sebald

SUBJECT : Conversation re Shibuya Incident.

In a telephone conversation upon an extraneous matter, Mr. Shen referred to the trial of the Japanese policemen involved in the Shibuya Incident.

Mr. Shen stated that while the Chinese Mission had no intention to interfere with the judicial process, he did wish us to understand that the Chinese Mission is taking a very important view of this trial politically and that is their intention closely to watch the proceedings. The Chinese Mission is most anxious to be assured that the trial is being conducted in accordance with their understanding of how the Japanese policemen should be punished.

Mr. Shen stated that from indirect information it seemed to him the military commission is entirely unfamiliar with the case and he has an impression that the members of the commission have only recently come to Japan. His general impression is that the court is not interested and compared with the trial of the Formosans, this trial is being taken lightly by all concerned. He also considers it strange that the defendant policemen should for all practical purposes be at liberty to proceed as though they were not accused individuals.

I intimated to Mr. Shen that Headquarters also takes a serious view of this trial and while I have only recently returned from Washington and am not entirely familiar with the details, I felt positive that everyone concerned with the trial is interested to see that proper justice is meted out to the accused individuals in every respect. I further stated that Mr. Shen's impressions must be erroneous and are undoubtedly gathered from persons who are not familiar with the procedure of military courts. Mr. Shen admitted that his information was obtained from persons who are attending the trial.

I suggested that it might be helpful if we could have an informal talk about the whole Shibuya Incident. He asked me to come out to see him on Monday morning to meet Mr. Koung who is the new head of his Legal Section to discuss the matter.

s/ WJS

January 11, 1947

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 827 dated January 23, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "The 'Shibuya Incident' of July 19, 1946".

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URGENT

CHINESE MISSION IN JAPAN  
TOKYO

Ref. No. 0214/ST

The Chinese Mission in Japan presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and, with further reference to the sentences passed upon the Formosans in connection with the Shibuya incident of July 19, 1946, has the honor to request that the following points kindly be brought to the attention of the Reviewing Authority.

Inasmuch as the decision of the Reviewing Authority has a direct bearing on the determination of the responsibility of the Japanese police, it is further requested that the military commission at present trying the three responsible Japanese police officers temporarily reserve its judgment until the decision of the Reviewing Authority in the previous case against the Formosans has been officially announced.

The points which the Mission desires to be brought to the attention of the Reviewing Authority are:-

1. During the trial of the Formosans the prosecution introduced considerable evidence relating to black market operations and fracas between Formosans and Japanese nationals of the Matsuda Gumi prior to July 19. It is submitted that such testimony irrelevant to the case unduly influenced the minds of the judges.
2. On the night of July 19, 1946, when a large group of Formosans was fired upon by the Japanese police, resulting in many people killed and injured, the Formosans were returning home from the Chinese Mission. The fact that they happened to pass by the Shibuya-ku police station, taking a usual route to return to their quarters, did not constitute an offense or riot.
3. In the previous case against the Formosans, as in the present trial of the Japanese police officers, the witnesses who testified for the police were mostly Japanese policemen directly involved in the incident. These men were possible accomplices of their superiors in their joint act of firing upon civilians. The police officers involved in the incident were never taken into custody nor suspended from the exercise of their authority. They were free at all times to influence witnesses or falsify testimony. Thus, from a legal viewpoint, the testimony of the police witnesses has no probative value. Yet it was upon such testimony that the Commission found the Formosans guilty of having fired upon the police, although the only neutral and disinterested witness in the trial testified to the contrary.
4. The Formosans, crowded together in a few trucks, were outnumbered and practically surrounded by the police who were armed and prepared for action. It is incredible that under the circumstances the Formosans would have provoked the firing of the police and thus placed

their

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January 23, 1947

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own life in grave danger.

5. The police on their own admission fired a total of 242 shots, causing the death of six defenseless civilians and injury to many others. There was no sufficient evidence to prove that the police were attacked or fired upon by the Formosans. (The death of Sergeant Haga may have been caused by police firing from the opposite side of the road.)

6. Testimony given by the police witnesses would indicate that deep-seated ill feeling against the Formosans existed in the Japanese police force. On the night of the incident the police not only were well prepared for action, but seemed mentally bent upon making an example of the Formosans. Unless there was satisfactory proof that the police opened fire on the crowd in self-defense or under strong provocation, they would be guilty of cold-blooded massacre which should under no circumstance be condoned.

The Chinese Mission has no intention whatsoever to interfere with the administration of justice. However, now that the trial has reached the result as it did, the Mission feels constrained to state its opinion as above and request that the same kindly be brought to the attention of the Reviewing authority.

The Mission is instructed by the Chinese Government to reserve its right to make further representations pending a satisfactory settlement of this serious incident in the interest of justice.

Tokyo, January 20, 1947

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 827 dated January 23, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "The 'Shibuya Incident' of July 19, 1946".

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Diplomatic Section

The Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, presents its compliments to the Chinese Mission in Japan and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Mission's note of January 20, 1947 on the subject of the "Shibuya Incident" of July 19, 1946.

Pursuant to the Mission's request, a copy of its note under reply was promptly forwarded to the Reviewing Authority presently reviewing the record of the trial of the Formosans implicated in the incident under discussion. The Mission is assured that careful consideration will be given to the various points raised.

With reference to the Mission's request that the military commission presently trying the three Japanese policemen temporarily reserve its judgment until the decision of the Reviewing Authority in the previous case against the Formosans has been officially announced, it is regretted that favorable consideration can not be accorded to this request as to do so would be tantamount to interfering with the independent jurisdiction of a duly constituted court.

Tokyo, January 21, 1947.

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 827 dated January 23, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "The 'Shibuya Incident' of July 19, 1946".

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY  
United States Army  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO 343

SPECIAL ORDERS  
NUMBER 321

EXTRACT

24 December 1946

3. Appointment of a Military Commission.

Pursuant to authority contained in letter, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, APO 500, 29 August 1946, AG 015 (29 Aug 46)IS-L, Subject: "Establishment of Military Commission", and letter, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, APO 500, 19 February 1946, AG 015 (19 Feb 46)IS, Subject: "Establishment of Military Occupation Courts", a Military Commission is hereby appointed to meet in the Tokyo-Yokohama area, Honshu, Japan, or at such other places as may be convenient, on or about 27 December 1946, or as soon thereafter as practicable, at the call of the president, to try Kuwashi Tsuchida, Keizo Hyodo, Haruo Miyauchi and such other persons as may be properly brought before it.

DETAIL FOR THE COMMISSION

COL NORMAN P. GROFF, 05024, Inf, Hq Eighth Army  
LT COL EUGENE S. BIBB, 0144077, CAC Hq Eighth Army, LAW MEMBER  
MAJ DAVID A. BOARDSLEY, 0429348, AC, Hq Eighth Army

FOR THE PROSECUTION

MR JOHN L. MURPHEY, Chief Prosecutor  
MR PAUL F. FAISON, Assistant Prosecutor

ADVISORY COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE

1ST LT HARLAN L. HAVILLAND, 0239137, MAC  
Accused will provide individual defense counsel if desired.

The proceedings of the Commission will be governed by letter, General AG 015 (19 Feb 46)IS, Subject: "Establishment of Military Occupation Courts", and such other rules and forms as it may adopt, not inconsistent therewith or with such Commander for the Allied Powers. The employment of an enlisted or civilian court reporter is authorized. (AG 334)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EICHELBERGER:

OFFICIAL:

J. M. GLASGOW  
Colonel, AGD  
Adjutant General

CLOVIS E. BYERS  
Major General, GSC  
Chief of Staff

(Kuwashi Tsuchida at 2)

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 827 dated January 23, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "The 'Shibuya Incident' of July 19, 1946".

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY  
United States Army  
APO 343

BEFORE A MILITARY COMMISSION CONVENED BY AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES EIGHTH ARMY, 27 DECEMBER 1946.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS.

1. KUWASHI TSUCHIDA 2. KEIZO HYODO 3. HARUO MIYAUCHI

CHARGE

Acts prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation.

SPECIFICATIONS

1. In that Kuwashi Tsuchida, chief of police of the Shibuya-Ku police station, Tokyo, Honshu, Japan, and Keizo Hyodo, assistant chief of police at said station, on or about 19th July, 1946, in the area surrounding the said station, a public place under jurisdiction of the occupation forces, acting in excess of their authority as chief and assistant chief of the Shibuya-Ku police station, did maliciously and wrongfully order and cause the police force assembled there under their command, to fire their weapons in an excessive and unnecessary manner upon a group of persons proceeding past the station, such persons including United Nations Nationals, thereby resulting in the death of seven persons, the wounding of others, and the disturbance of the peace and terror of the people in the neighborhood, to the prejudice of the objectives of the occupation.

2. In that the said Kuwashi Tsuchida, the said Keizo Hyodo, and Haruo Miyuchi, assistant police inspector at Shibuya-Ku police station, did on or about the 19th of July, 1946, in the area of Shibuya-Ku police station, Tokyo, Honshu, Japan, with free knowledge of the conduct of those under their command, wrongfully permit and allow policemen under their command to commit assault and battery upon Weng Tien-Lang, Chen Sheng-Ming, Hsieh Tsai Hsun, and Kuo Chung Hou, all United Nations Nationals, without provocation from such persons, and without necessity therefor in performance of their duties as police, resulting in permanent bodily injury to said persons, to the prejudice of the objectives of the occupation.

3. In that the said Kuwashi Tsuchida, on or about the 19th of July, 1946, wrongfully failed and refused to cooperate with the Allied Occupation Forces, in that, advised of the probability of altercations between the police under his command, and certain other persons, he wrongfully failed to advise the American Military Police thereof, or request their assistance, and wrongfully refused the assistance of an American military forces armored car present in the area, fully manned, when such assistance would have prevented the altercation that did occur later the same evening, in the area of Shibuya-Ku police station,

Tokyo

Encl. No. 15 to  
Tokyo's 827  
January 23, 1947

-2-

Tokyo, Honshu, Japan, a public place, under jurisdiction of the occupation forces, in which seven persons were killed and several others wounded, to the prejudice of the objectives of the occupation.


s/ Marcus L. Jones  
MARCUS L. JONES  
1st Lt            INF

26 December 1946



# INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH



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RECEIVED January 23, 1947

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RECD Feb 4, 1947

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Secretary of State

Washington

A-147, January 23, 1947

Following question and answer took place in Commons on January 22, 1947, in regard to British occupation force in Japan:

Brigadier Maclean (Conservative M.P.) asked the Minister of Defense what prospect there is of the British Commonwealth zone of occupation in Japan being increased to take in at least one large town, which would provide the British Commonwealth Occupation Force with some of the amenities which they at present lack.

Mr. Alexander (Minister of Defense): "The need for increased amenities for the British Commonwealth Occupation Force is fully realized. The desirability of adjusting the area of occupation has been under consideration for some time. It is now necessary, however, to examine the effect of the proposed withdrawal in the near future of certain British troops before further steps can be taken in the matter."

GALLAN

EFDrumright/ajg

Copy to Political Adviser,  
SCAP, Tokyo.

PERMANENT RECORD COPY. This copy must be returned to DC/R central files with notation of action taken.

FEB 14 1947

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/1-2347

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FORM DS-322  
7-18-46

5276  
**OUTGOING TELEGRAM**

CLASSIFICATION

INDICATE

Collect

Charge Department:

**Department of State**

PLAIN  
PRIORITY

Charge to

Mrs. Eduard Pestel  
135 Maple Avenue  
Troy, New York

Washington

**PLAIN**

**SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS**

TOKYO

JAN 24 1947

24 TWENTY-FOURTH  
INFO WAR DEPT CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR POLITICAL ADVISER

Mrs. Pestel, American wife of Eduard Christian Pestel, German national, <sup>Kobe</sup> scheduled for FEB repatriation, contends Pestel applied for Nazi Party membership (but never officially joined) solely to protect wife and children who were and are completely dependent on him.

Respectfully requests reexamination of case.

DEPTEL 21 JAN 23

As stated in ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ in regard to similar request by Mrs. Von Wolff, above is transmitted because of Mrs. Pestel's American citizenship, but without desire or intention to influence SCAP decision reached on basis overall repatriation policies and locally available info.

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JAN 24 1947 P.M.

No. 591



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THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Legation

1947 FEB 5 AM 9 59

Wellington, New Zealand, January 24, 1947.


Subject: New Zealand Occupation of Japan

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 4 10 28 AM '47

FACILITIES BRANCH

The Honorable The Secretary of State Washington.



I have the honor to enclose copies of editorials from two leading Dominion newspapers on the subject of New Zealand participation in the occupation of Japan.<sup>1</sup>

1/

The first enclosure, from The Press (Christchurch), dated January 3, 1947, points out that the New Zealand Brigade Group in Japan (commonly known as the "J" Force) is largely composed of young men who enlisted for 18 months service. Even though their release at this time is imminent, the Government, it is charged, has made no statement on how it proposes to replace these men or on the subject of compulsory military service in general. The editorial urges that the occupation troops should not be kept on duty for any longer period than is strictly necessary.

The second enclosure, from the New Zealand Herald (Auckland), dated January 17, 1947, takes a contrasting view, although it, too, censures the Government for silence on an issue of vital concern. The editorial recalls New Zealand's narrow escape in the war and denounces the alleged predisposition of New Zealanders to assume that their Pacific security is being guaranteed by the United States. For, it is stated, "already American occupation forces in Japan are being gradually whittled down, to the accompaniment of an occupation policy which demonstrates, even to some Americans a measure of over-confidence in the virtues of the Japanese." The Herald then illustrates how the Japanese war potential continues to be a menace and suggests that the New Zealand Government should not only make representations to Washington accordingly, but, for her own part, pursue a firm positive occupation policy.

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT

It is evident that the Government has delayed, and will continue to delay as long as possible, in stating its policy on the future occupation of Japan because of the domestic political considerations involved. As the first of the two enclosures partially demonstrates

1. The 4200 New Zealand troops now engaged in Japanese occupation duties constitute the bulk of the New Zealand Army and represent the largest per capita contribution of any of the occupying Powers.

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Handwritten notes and stamps: 25, 26, and other markings.


- 2 -

demonstrates, occupation duties in Japan do not have a wide appeal. While the New Zealand Government has made a notable effort to improve the living conditions of the occupation forces, there have been frequent charges in the press that the needs of the "J" Force have been disregarded and that, in any case, Japan is an American "show" in which the British Commonwealth forces play second fiddle.

With nearly one third of the occupation troops' enlistment periods about to terminate, the Government will probably be compelled to decide within the next month or two either to scale down the Japan Brigade Group (perhaps to battalion size) or institute some form of compulsory service. If there are no more volunteers, the retention of an occupation force of over four thousand men, each serving for a twelve month period, would require the drafting of every third man coming of age for one year's occupation duty. Senior officers in the New Zealand Army, recognizing the unpopularity of any large-scale conscription measure--particularly since it would rob the labor market at a time when labor is very short--are prone to take the realistic view that it will soon be necessary to decrease the size of the New Zealand occupation force in Japan. Meanwhile, according to reliable information, the New Zealand Government has formulated no policy on conscription.

END CONFIDENTIAL

Respectfully,

  
Avra M. Warren

Enclosures: *att. WPS*

1. Editorial from The Press (Christchurch) dated January 3, 1947.
2. Editorial from the New Zealand Herald (Auckland) dated January 17, 1947.

File No. 800  
Marshall Green/mem

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 591 dated January 24, 1947, from the American Legation, Wellington, New Zealand, on the subject NEW ZEALAND OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

SOURCE: The Press (Christchurch)  
January 3, 1947.

#### J FORCE

A statement of Government policy about the future of the New Zealand Brigade Group in Japan is overdue. Although it was recently reported from Japan that the force was to be concentrated in one area and that a building programme of permanent barracks and hospital had been undertaken, no statement on the subject has come from the Minister of Defence, and the future of the force is still in doubt. The force is at present composed for the most part of young men who enlisted for 18 months service or prior discharge; but although the time is approaching for them to be replaced, no call has yet been made for reinforcements and no statement of the Government's intentions has been made. In recent times very little information has come from Japan about the force. Parents and relatives of the young men have heard little, for example, about their experiences in the recent earthquake. The feeling that British troops in Japan are "poor relations", as exemplified in the report printed yesterday from a "News Chronicle" correspondent, will not help New Zealanders to regard happily the prospect of a long period of occupation duty, as seems likely to be envisaged by the Government. The present troops are men who have undertaken the duty at a critical period in their civilian careers; and it is imperative that they should not be kept on military duty for any longer period than is strictly necessary. This question is involved in the larger one of New Zealand's defence policy. The Government is presumably still awaiting advice about what part New Zealand will be expected to play in the defence of the Pacific area; but it should be able by now to give the public some interim information on this important point. In any case it should be able to make a comprehensive statement about the broader aspects of defence policy as it will affect young men now approaching their majority. It should, for example, indicate definitely whether it intends to introduce a system of compulsory military training, or at least say whether it is yet in a position to do so and if not, why not. In the meantime, the immediate and practical question is the future of the occupation force in Japan and its reinforcement. This should be answered without delay.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch 591 dated January 24, 1947, from the American Legation, Wellington, New Zealand, on the subject NEW ZEALAND OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.

SOURCE: New Zealand Herald (Auckland)  
January 17, 1947.

#### OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

The decision of the British Government, obviously reached after consultation with Canberra and Wellington, to withdraw British and Indian troops from the Empire occupation forces in Japan, finds New Zealand without a policy enunciated for the discharge of accepted responsibilities. The British action is logical and understandable. Even with conscription (which draws heavily on inadequate labour resources) Britain has more Imperial and foreign commitments than she has troops to discharge them. The strain in India and Palestine alone is more than a war-wearied nation should be called on to bear. All this is recognised in principle by New Zealand, whose responsible Ministers have openly confessed that Britain is carrying too heavy a load and that it is time the Dominions took a greater share of the burden, particularly in their own special zones of security. For New Zealand and Australia the essential security zones are the Pacific and the Far East. We have had one narrow escape--how dangerously narrow few New Zealanders realise even yet--from the menace of Japan. At the moment we appear to be content that Pacific and Far Eastern security should be guaranteed to us by the United States. Unfortunately there is no accompanying guarantee that New Zealand and American views on what constitutes real security will coincide. Already American occupation forces in Japan are being gradually whittled down, to the accompaniment of an occupation policy which demonstrates, even to some Americans, a measure of over-confidence in the virtues of the Japanese.

Britain finds it necessary to withdraw from Japan. She continues to entrust the main task of occupation to the United States, and leaves Australia and New Zealand to safeguard what Empire interests remain. It is an added responsibility and must be approached, at least as far as New Zealand is concerned, with three main considerations in mind: Is the present occupation policy, almost exclusively American in conception and execution, in keeping with New Zealand's requirements for security? How long is the occupation of Japan likely to be necessary? And, finally, what steps must New Zealand contemplate to clothe policy with action? In the first place, we cannot expect to play more than a very subdued second fiddle to the United States in matters of occupation policy. America, with the possible exception of Russia, is the only Pacific Power with the strength to enforce policy. We can, however, make representations to Washington. If we suspect that the MacArthur administration in Japan is too conciliatory, we could enlist the support of many realistic Americans by pointing out that an apparently submissive nation, with probably more than 1,000,000 trained men who escaped defeat in the field, cannot cease to be a menace until its trained military potential is no longer effective. That end probably cannot be achieved by peaceful means in less than a generation, and on these grounds alone the present American hope of a curtailed period of occupation contains real elements of danger.

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The final point concerns the manner in which New Zealand should prepare to meet her obligations. If she accepts the view that a feudal, warlike and barbarous race can be transformed into peace-loving democrats within a year or two, she need do very little. If, on the other hand, she takes a less ingenuous view of the problems of her own security, she must be prepared to demonstrate the strength and sincerity of her convictions. The units of New Zealand's J Force are due for repatriation from Japan at intervals during this year. So far no arrangements have been made for the provision of reliefs. There is an absence of assurance in the whole business that is most disturbing. The problem of Japan is too complex and infinitely too serious to be shelved for future reference. Although New Zealand cannot exert anything like the influence and authority of the United States in establishing Asiatic and Pacific security, she can at least formulate a clear policy and expound it with the vigour of her own beliefs.



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
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*Jan 27, 1947*

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SUBJECT: Memorandum of Interview with Left Wing Members of the Social Democratic Party.

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to inform the Department that on January 9, 1947, Dr. Roest, Chief of the Political Affairs Division, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, conferred with Mrs. KATO Shimuo, and SUZUKI Mosaburo of the Left Wing of the Social Democratic Party. The following topics were discussed:

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*xR 894.002*

1. Cause of the anticipated change in Cabinet.
2. Policy and ideas of the left wing of the Social Democratic Party.
3. Attitude of the left-wingers toward the Communist Party.

A copy of a memorandum of the interview, prepared by Dr. Roest, is enclosed.

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Enclosure: *att. MDS*

Copy of "Interview with Left Wing Members of the Social Democratic Party".

Original and hectograph to Department

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 833 dated January 27, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Interview with Left Wing Members of the Social Democratic Party".

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section  
Political Affairs Division

13 January 1947

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH LEFT WING MEMBERS OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

On 9 January 1947, Mrs. KATO Shimue, KATO Kanju and SUZUKI Mosaburo conferred with Dr. Roest and Miss Kuwaye on the following matters:

I - Causes of the Anticipated Change in Cabinet

The left wing members of the Social Democratic Party were informed by Dr. ARISAWA Hiromi (member of the Statistics Section of the Economic Stabilization Board) that the economic plight of this country will reach a critical stage in March and last through most of 1947. In order to surmount this crisis the country must have a government which has the confidence of the people.

Dr. ARISAWA discussed this with Mr. YOSHIDA and proposed the following:

- a. Mr. YOSHIDA would remain as the Premier "as General MacArthur has special confidence in him."
- b. Mr. YOSHIDA would seek support from the left-wingers of the Social Democratic Party.
- c. The Chairmanship of the Economic Stabilization Board would be offered to a left-winger.

Dr. ARISAWA alleged that the government is not too keen about the right wing members of the Social Democratic Party.

Mr. SUZUKI's counter proposal was:

- a. Since the Yoshida Cabinet has no support of the people, the alternative will be for the Social Democratic Party to organize a cabinet by itself.
- b. The Social Democratic Party will not introduce radical changes but will bring about gradual changes in a democratic manner, designed to revive industry.
- c. The two conservative parties should feel responsible for the anticipated economic crisis; and although the Social Democratic Party does not agree with their present policies, it is willing to cooperate with the "progressive" elements of the Liberal and Progressive Parties if these will accept its economic leadership.

Encl. No. 1 to  
Tokyo's 833,  
January 27, 1947.

-2-

c. The left-wingers do not believe popular support will be given so long as Mr. YOSHIDA remains in power, although the right-wingers are willing to accept Mr. YOSHIDA and establish a coalition government.

The public may welcome new people in the cabinet, but the working class will continue to oppose a right wing coalition cabinet, as in the past some right wing leaders of the Social Democratic Party betrayed the working class. Therefore, there is a danger that the Party will lose the confidence of the masses if it should participate in a coalition cabinet.

## II - Policy and Ideas of the Left Wing of the Social Democratic Party

The present policy and ideas of the left-wingers are:

- a. Japan at present is not ready to practice socialism.
- b. It is feasible to introduce socialistic policies with the aim to realize socialism eventually.
- c. At present the left-wingers are primarily interested in economic reconstruction. They organized the Economic Reconstruction Conference (Keigai Sukko Kaigi) in which representatives of capital and labor participate to solve economic problems. The NCIO and MFL also joined with a common aim to achieve the economic reconstruction of Japan. Thus far there has been no opposition from capitalists as the conference includes them.

## III - Attitude of the Left-Wingers Toward the Communist Party.

Although the public has misconstrued the liberal intentions of the left-wingers, they in no way are sympathetic toward the Communist Party nor do they favor the policies and tactics of that party. The left-wingers will continue to fight the influence of the Communist Party. They realize that the Communist Party has a right to existence and therefore they do not intend to suppress it. But the left-wingers' primary interest, however, is to familiarize the people with the policies of both parties and let them evaluate and judge the relative merits of each. They trust that Socialism will win out on that basis.

When asked regarding the fundamental difference between the right and left wing factions, the visitors replied that personality conflicts exist although there are no basic ideological differences. In the past, they feel, the right-wingers, while assuming leadership in the labor movement, have in reality favored the interests of capitalists. In the field of politics, the right-wingers though outwardly opposing the conservative forces, have repeatedly compromised with them. The left-wingers also are unfavorably impressed by the right-wingers' efforts to alienate the Communist Party and its labor support.

The left-wingers feel very confident that people will reject Communist tactics themselves as apparent in the recent changes occurring within the NCIO, which was formerly strongly dominated by Communist labor leaders. Such people have been removed, and left-wing Socialists are gaining influence amongst the workers.

When asked regarding the Communist Party's attitude toward them

Encl. No. 1 to  
Tokyo's 833,  
January 27, 1947.

-3-

personally, the visitors replied that although some Communists think that the left-wingers' interest in labor is a menace to the Communist Party, others are willing to cooperate with them in order to elevate the standards of labor in Japan, and have been consistently friendly.

P. K. ROEST  
Chief, Political Affairs Division

Prepared by: Misao Kuwaye  
Noted : CIK



January 28, 1947

My dear General McCoy:

The Australian representative on the Far Eastern Commission Committee No. 4 has proposed the creation of an International Advisory Board, to be composed of educational experts representing the different nations of the FEC, and to serve under General MacArthur on the Civil Information and Education Section of the SCAP Staff. It is understood that the proposal has the support of the New Zealand, Soviet and Chinese representatives on the Committee, and that the United Kingdom representative, although not pressing for such a Board, strongly urges, nevertheless, that some way be found to permit representatives of other countries to work on SCAP staff. The United States representative on Committee No. 4, Mr. F. A. Schuler, Jr., of the State Department, urgently desires instructions as to the position he should take at the forthcoming meeting of the Committee.

It is assumed that the proposal grows out of SCAP's original invitation for the nomination of experts by the countries represented in the FEC, to serve on his staff, and the fact that all nominations have been met by statements of General MacArthur that there were no vacancies. The situation, however unsatisfactory to the nations in question, and however embarrassing to the United States, which requested nominations in good faith, will have to be met in the light of the fact that the invitation has now been withdrawn, and that SCAP does not now desire international representation on his staff.

It is the opinion of the Department of State that the United States representative in the FEC should take the position that the present proposal is being made in the wrong forum. The function of the FEC is limited to the formulation of policies, principles and standards to enable Japan to fulfill its obligations under the Terms of Surrender, which formalations are transmitted to the Supreme Commander in the form of directives prepared by the United States. The Supreme Commander alone is charged with the implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the Commission.

General Frank R. McCoy  
 Chairman, Far Eastern Commission  
 Washington, D. C.

The FEC

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
The FEC has no jurisdiction under its Terms of Reference to propose modifications in, or to participate in, the existing control machinery in Japan. In fact, by paragraph II-C of the Terms of Reference the Commission is expressly directed to "proceed from" the fact that an Allied Council for Japan has been formed, and to "respect existing control machinery in Japan". The Allied Council for Japan, on the other hand, is by its Terms of Reference, established in Tokyo under the Chairmanship of the Supreme Commander, for the express purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to "the occupation and control of Japan", and the implementation of the Terms of Surrender "and of directives supplementary thereto". If it appears desirable for General MacArthur to have international advice to assist him in the control of Japan in the educational field, it would appear that the proposal should be made to the Allied Council for Japan, which is already established in Japan to advise the Supreme Commander in regard to the control of Japan.

It would be unthinkable for the FEC to sponsor another international advisory body in Japan to advise General MacArthur on educational matters. Each member of the Allied Council for Japan is entitled to have an appropriate staff of military and civilian advisers, and the nations represented on the Allied Council are entirely free to attach educational experts to their respective staffs, and to consult with and advise the Supreme Commander in this field as in any other. Any proposition that these educational experts be actually attached to General MacArthur's staff should come from the Allied Council for Japan.

It is recommended that the American representative on the FEC oppose the present proposal as not being within the competency of the FEC.

Sincerely yours,

*(Signature)*  
J. H. HILLDRING  
Assistant Secretary



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A-H:EAGross:cd

1/22/47



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
FEB 13 1947  
Mr. McDermott

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UNRESTRICTED

Tokyo, January 28, 1947

No. 838

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
FEB 17 1947  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FR

1947 FEB 12 PM 1 16

MAIL ROOM

SUBJECT: Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, January 23, 1947

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 811, January 10, 1947, and to previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, and to forward as an enclosure five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Allied Council, held on January 23, 1947.

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There were no official subjects placed on the Agenda. After a short discussion of procedural matters, the Meeting was adjourned.

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Enclosures:

3 Wa-leaf As stated

Original and Hectograph to Department

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- Copies to: American Embassy - London
- American Embassy - Nanking
- American Embassy - Moscow
- American Embassy - Canberra
- American Embassy - New Delhi
- American Legation - Wellington

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Encl. No. 2 to Despatch No. 838, January 28, 1947 from the  
U. S. Political Adviser for Japan, subject: "Twenty-fourth  
Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, January 23, 1947"

24-123

CORRECTED  
VERBATIM MINUTES  
of the  
TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING  
ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

Meiji Building, Tokyo, Thursday, 23 January 1947 at 1000 Hours

MEMBERS PRESENT

The Honorable George Atcheson, Jr., Deputy for the Supreme  
Commander, Chairman, and Member for the United States

The Honorable Yorkson C. T. Shen, representing the Member  
for China

The Honorable W. Macmahon Ball, Member representing jointly  
the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India

Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics

SECRETARY-GENERAL

Mr. Glenn Abbey

Office of the Secretariat  
Allied Council for Japan  
24 January 1947



THE CHAIRMAN: The meeting will please come to order. The first matter is the approval of the Minutes of the last meeting. The Verbatim Minutes were circulated to all the Members for correction. In the absence of objection (pause) they will be recorded as approved.

Are there any procedural matters?

MR. SHEN: MR. CHAIRMAN, I am not sure whether this belongs to the procedural matters or not, but I would like to know whether the release of press reports are approved--I mean the press reports on this Council meetings are approved before they are released. I am asking this little point because my impression was that the Japanese reports--press reports--on the day of the last meeting were not very accurate.

MR. BALL: MR. CHAIRMAN, did MR. SHEN mean the reports the day after the last meeting?

MR. SHEN: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: There have been no official--

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: The press reports sometimes contain misrepresentations, too.

THE CHAIRMAN: There have been no official press releases, as far as I recall.

MR. BALL: About any of the Council meetings.

THE CHAIRMAN: And as far as I know, there has been no censorship of news correspondents.

MR. SHEN: If the censorship is done in connection with press reports, I hope that, so far as they are concerned with this Council meetings, it would be done with close contact with the Secretariat of this Council.

THE CHAIRMAN: I don't think there has been any press censorship at all.

MR. SHEN: I am sorry, I just misunderstood what you said.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think it would be a very difficult matter

for civil censorship authorities to influence all the newspaper people to write their stories in accordance with the wishes of Members of the Council.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: Press releases, I mean press reports, as regards the meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, but not press reports in general.

THE CHAIRMAN: There have been no official press releases in regard to the Allied Council. The Allied Council Secretariat has not issued any press releases in regard to Allied Council activities. The only reports that have been in the papers are the reports which have been written by various news correspondents, and as far as I know, there has been no censorship whatsoever exercised in regard to these reports.

MR. BALL: It must be very hard, MR. CHAIRMAN, for the press to report a meeting when there isn't anything on the Agenda.

THE CHAIRMAN: My understanding is that for the next regular meeting, we will revert to the usual Wednesday, which will be Wednesday, the 5th of February. Is that correct?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: I would like to ask a question, sir. Don't you find it necessary or possible, MR. CHAIRMAN, to inform the Members of the Allied Council in any form in the nearest future about the internal political situation in Japan?

THE CHAIRMAN: If one of the Members wishes to place a subject on the Agenda, it can of course be discussed.

We come now to official matters. As there are no subjects on the Agenda for this meeting, that would conclude the business for this meeting.

We shall accordingly adjourn.

(The meeting adjourned at 1011 hours.)

Encl. No. 2 to Despatch No. 838, January 28, 1947 from the  
U. S. Political Adviser for Japan, subject: "Twenty-fourth  
Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, January 23, 1947"

24-123

CORRECTED  
VERBATIM MINUTES  
of the  
TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING  
ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

Meiji Building, Tokyo, Thursday, 23 January 1947 at 1000 Hours

MEMBERS PRESENT

The Honorable George Atcheson, Jr., Deputy for the Supreme  
Commander, Chairman, and Member for the United States

The Honorable Yorkson C. T. Shen, representing the Member  
for China

The Honorable W. Macmahon Ball, Member representing jointly  
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Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics

SECRETARY-GENERAL

Mr. Glenn Abbey

Office of the Secretariat  
Allied Council for Japan  
24 January 1947

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We shall accordingly adjourn.

(The meeting adjourned at 1011 hours.)

Encl. No. 1 to Despatch No. 838, January 28, 1947, from the U. S. Political Adviser for Japan, subject: "Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, January 23, 1947"

24-123

AGENDA

for the


TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

To be held in the Meiji Building, Tokyo,  
Thursday, 23 January 1947, at 1000 Hours

- I APPROVAL OF THE CORRECTED VERBATIM MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-THIRD MEETING (1 Session, Numbered 23-108).
- II PROCEDURAL MATTERS  
None held over or submitted as subjects for this Agenda.
- III OFFICIAL MATTERS  
None held over or submitted as subjects for this Agenda.

By Direction of the Chairman:

  
GLENN ABBEY  
Secretary-General

18 January 1947

Encl. No. 1 to Despatch No. 838, January 28, 1947, from the U. S. Political Adviser for Japan, subject: "Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, January 23, 1947"

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AGENDA

for the


TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

To be held in the Meiji Building, Tokyo,  
Thursday, 23 January 1947, at 1000 Hours

- I APPROVAL OF THE CORRECTED VERBATIM MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-THIRD MEETING (1 Session, Numbered 23-108).
- II PROCEDURAL MATTERS  
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- III OFFICIAL MATTERS  
None held over or submitted as subjects for this Agenda.

By Direction of the Chairman:

  
GLENN ABBEY  
Secretary-General

18 January 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION  
2516 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

30 January 1947

RESTRICTED

The Honorable George C. Marshall  
Secretary of State  
State Department  
Washington, D. C.

*Memo for Secretary*  
*1/31/47*  
*all*  
DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
JAN 31 1947  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 31 1947

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
/1-3047

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission provide that the Commission "may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."

At the forty-third meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, held on 30 January 1947 at 2516 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C., the Commission unanimously approved the enclosed request for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers relative to the Draft Diet Law.

*YR*  
*894.03*

As Chairman, I am forwarding this request for consultation to you with the request that you transmit it to the Supreme Commander as expeditiously as possible. I would appreciate your notifying me when the Supreme Commander's reply has been received.

Sincerely yours,

*Frank McCoy*

Frank R. McCoy  
Chairman

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
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FAR EASTERN COMMISSION  
2516 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

The attached copy of a document unanimously adopted at the forty-third meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, held at 2516 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C., on 30 January 1947, has been compared with the official text and is hereby certified to be correct.



Nelson T. Johnson  
Secretary General

Washington, D. C.  
30 January 1947

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

FW. 740.00119 Contact (Japan) 1-30-47

RESTRICTED

E N C L O S U R E

CONSULTATION WITH THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR  
THE ALLIED POWERS RELATIVE TO THE DRAFT DIET LAW

The Far Eastern Commission is making a study of the Draft Diet Law (FEC-101/5) and requests the Chairman to convey to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the substance of the following communication and also to state to him that the Commission would appreciate his views on the following matters.

1. Chapter 7. Ministers of State and Representatives of the Government. Articles 69 to 73.

To assist Japan in developing along democratic lines, it is desirable that the position of the legislature be strengthened as much as possible. This is particularly important both in a system of responsible cabinet government such as that contemplated under the new Constitution, and in the light of Japanese experience in the past, where the Diet was subordinate in fact to both the Cabinet and the bureaucracy.

In raising the following point, the Commission has had in mind the problems which must inevitably arise in the framing of a new constitution based upon a variety of democratic practices. In this connection, the provisions of Chapter 7 would appear to indicate that the drafters of this bill may have in mind the former system in Japan where the Ministers of State were not expected necessarily to be present in the Diet and to take full responsibility for leadership of its debates.

*It is queried whether it is*

Article 69 would appear to allow the appointment as "representatives of the Government" of persons who are not members of the Diet. [It would seem to be undesirable for a representative of the Government other than a Minister of State or a member of the Diet to have the right to speak before the Diet. Where the executive is responsible to the legislature, it is the universal practice that ministers themselves, or members of the legislature appointed as their parliamentary deputies, should be present in the House to explain and defend the actions of their Departments and the legislation they are sponsoring, and that they themselves should participate in debates. If persons other than members of the Diet were allowed to attend and speak in the place of ministers, it might be contrary to the principle of Cabinet responsibility to the Diet inherent in the Far Eastern Commission policy laid down in FEC-031/19. (Serial Number 54, approved 6 July 1946).

RESTRICTED

In making the foregoing comments, the Commission is not raising an objection to the right of any committee to hear any person it desires, including government employees and private individuals.

2. Article 35. Allowance of Diet Members.

The Commission is uncertain as to the effect of the provision linking the allowance of Diet members to the salaries of government officials, as "kanri" may be interpreted, and in the context may be intended, to include all appointed officials of the national Government, even those of the highest rank such as the Chief Justice. Would this provision be likely to prevent adequate remuneration being offered to those holding the most senior and important government posts?

*DCR*

JAN 31 1947

**RESTRICTED**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, SWNCC

**Subject:** Communication from the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission for Transmittal to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The Far Eastern Commission, acting under paragraph VI of its Terms of Reference which provides that the Commission "may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" requested its Chairman on January 30, 1947 to consult with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers relative to the Draft Diet Law.

There is enclosed a draft consultative message on this subject.

It is requested that the enclosure be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for transmission to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

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*[Signature]*  
J. H. Hilldring  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft Message.

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JAN 31 1947 P.M.

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ENCLOSURE

REQUEST FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE SUPREME COMMANDER  
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS RELATIVE TO THE DRAFT DIET LAW

The Far Eastern Commission is making a study of the Draft Diet Law (FEC-101/5) and requests the Chairman to convey to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the substance of the following communication and also to state to him that the Commission would appreciate his views on the following matters.

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In raising the following point, the Commission has had in mind the problems which must inevitably arise in the framing of a new constitution based upon a variety of democratic practices. In this connection, the provisions of Chapter 7 would appear to indicate that the drafters of this bill may have in mind the former system in Japan where the Ministers of State were not expected necessarily to be present in the Diet and to take full responsibility for leadership of its debates.

Article 69 would appear to allow the appointment as "representatives of the Government" of persons who are not members of the Diet. It is queried whether it is desirable for a representative of the Government other than a Minister of State or a member of the Diet to have the right to speak before the Diet. Where the executive is responsible to the legislature, it is the universal practice that ministers themselves, or members of the legislature appointed as their parliamentary deputies, should be present in the House to explain and defend the actions of their Departments and the legislation they are sponsoring, and that they themselves should participate in debates. If persons other than members

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of the Diet were allowed to attend and speak in the place of ministers, it might be contrary to the principle of Cabinet responsibility to the Diet inherent in the Far Eastern Commission policy laid down in FEC-031/19. (Serial Number 54, approved 6 July 1946).

In making the foregoing comments, the Commission is not raising an objection to the right of any committee to hear any person it desires, including government employees and private individuals.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: March 12, 1947

TO : NA: JMA JKE  
FE: JKP

FROM : NA: RAF

SUBJECT: "Japan after Surrender" by Eidus

Despatch encloses 11 page summary of an article entitled "Japan after Surrender" by K. H. Eidus, appearing the end of last year in "World Economy and World Politics".

Davies' covering despatch provides a fair statement of the theme and nature of the article. It is distinguished from similar pieces by its length, being a sort of year end roundup of the Soviet point of view on all phases of the occupation, and by a more than ordinarily detailed knowledge by the writer of events during the past year in Japan.

An interesting feature is the special vituperation reserved for the Social Democratic Party, or at least its right wing, the same as against the Social Democrats in Germany and throughout Europe. The Soviets, probably rightly, seem to regard socialism as a more dangerous rival over the long run than capitalism.

You may wish to glance at the marked passages.

NA: RAFearey: xa



THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Embassy, Moscow  
January 31, 1947

RESTRICTED

No. 783

Subject: Transmitting Summary of Article Entitled "Japan after Surrender" by K. H. Eidus.

The Ambassador has the honor to enclose a literal translation of significant portions of an article entitled "Japan after Surrender" by K. H. Eidus, published in the most recent issue of the authoritative journal "World Economy & World Politics", No. 10-11, 1946.

This article surveys the Japanese post-war scene. Eidus sums up the Soviet point of view which has during the past year and a half been monotonously presented in the Soviet press and at the meetings of the Allied Council for Japan. The enclosure, therefore, represents a useful roundup of the official Soviet point of view.

The main theme is, of course, that the United States has usurped for itself the position of arbiter of Japan's fate. It is charged that the United States is taking over Japan to guarantee the domination of American monopoly capital and to utilize Japan as a military base in the Far East. In this enterprise, the United States, according to the Soviet thesis, has the active support of the Japanese capitalists who now control the Japanese Government.

Eidus reveals Soviet irritation over failure of coalition by the Social Democrats and Communists. He says, "Among the broad working masses the attraction of a united front is very strong and the only obstacle towards its realization is the criminal policy of the Right Social Democrats who are playing into the hands of the Japanese heavy capitalists". The bitter expression of frustration on this subject is a gauge of the importance which the U.S.S.R. attaches to Communist utilization of the Social Democrats and reveals the extent of Soviet annoyance when a Social Democrat organization pursues an intelligent policy.

Enclosure as stated.

JDavies:rd

cc: Tokyo

ORIGINAL and Hectograph to Department.

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740.00119 Control (Japan) / 1-3147



Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 783  
dated January 31, 1947 from the  
American Embassy, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

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JAPAN AFTER SURRENDER

By K. H. Eidus

(Full summary of 14-page article from  
"World Economy and World Politics",  
No. 10-11, 1946)

More than a year has passed since the defeat and unconditional surrender of Japan. This is sufficient time to verify the correctness of the policy followed both by the occupation and the Japanese authorities in fulfilling the terms of the Potsdam Declaration regarding the demilitarisation of Japan and the democratisation of its social structure. How are the victor powers, however, carrying out this very important task?

On the 23rd October, 1946, in reply to a question from Mr. Hugh Baillie, President of the American United Press: "How Does Your Government Look upon the Occupation of Japan? Do you consider it successful on the existing basis?" Comrade Stalin replied: "There are successes, but greater successes might have been achieved". Comrade Stalin's answer defines the situation which had developed in Japan with perfect accuracy.

Japan suffered cruel defeat in the war. This had far-reaching political and economic consequences for her. Japan ceased to be not only a great power which she was before the war, but also a colonial power. She lost exactly half of the imperial territory which she possessed before she seized Manchuria in 1931. Together with territory Japan lost 30% of her former population: before the war the population of the Japanese Empire was 105 million, and in April 1946, 73 million.

By virtue of defeat and unconditional surrender, Japan temporarily lost her sovereignty. General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the allied powers, is the actual supreme ruler in Japan.

Occupation troops of the allied powers are on the territory of Japan - American, British, Australian, etc. (Soviet troops are not participating in the occupation of Japan.) Citizens of allied powers in Japan enjoy the right of extra territoriality and are under the jurisdiction of not Japanese but specially created courts ... The country has been deprived of the right of foreign relations, diplomatic, trade, cultural, etc. By order of the occupation authorities, the Japanese Government has recalled its diplomatic, trade and other representatives from everywhere ...

Japan has no more armed forces ... True, outside the country, on some territories which she previously occupied, there are still Japanese in military units but this is the fault of those allied powers which are using Japanese soldiers to suppress the national liberation movement in the colonies (Indonesia) and to fight against democracy (China). These armed Japanese units are under orders not of Japanese but of British or American authorities.

The economic

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The economic results of the war, too, are very serious for conquered Japan. She has been deprived of investments in Korea and her other former colonies in Manchuria, China and the countries of the South Seas. This means that she has lost at least a third of her industry. Industry in Japan proper also suffered gravely. A number of cities underwent considerable destruction from air bombardments. The finances of Japan were disorganised as a result of the war.

What then has the year which has passed since the surrender brought Japan?

During the past year the United States has been the arbiter of Japan's fate. Striving for world domination, imperialistic circles in the U.S.A. have sought gradually to take over Japan and to guarantee the domination of American monopoly capital.

The Far Eastern Commission in Washington has adopted a programme of provisional reparations payments, according to which output of steel in Japan will not exceed 3.5 million tons, and of pig-iron 2 million tons a year. The Japanese Government in turn drafted a plan according to which the smelting of both pig-iron and steel should be increased in the near future to 2 million tons a year, that is, approximately to the 1929 level which is around 30% of the maximum smelting of pig-iron and steel during the war years. However, the fulfillment of this plan is still very far off. During the past year no more than 200,000 tons of pig-iron were smelted. American and Japanese circles consider that the main cause of the poor work of the metallurgical industry is the shortage of fuel, principally coal. The coal industry is actually living through a crisis. The extraction of coal is around 20% of the pre-war level. The Japanese Government explains this situation by the lack of manpower. But actually the reason for this lag in heavy industry is the sabotage of owners who are not interested at the present time in a regeneration of industry. The Japanese capitalists do not wish to restore production at their plants, fearing that the latter will be confiscated as reparations.

The reconstruction of light industry, particularly textiles, is proceeding somewhat more rapidly. Of the 13 million spindles in Japan before the war 2.5 million remain, of which 1 to 1.2 million are working. The United States has begun to import a certain quantity of cotton into Japan, and this will make it possible to place around 2 million spindles in operation by the end of the year. It is the plan of the occupation authorities for the Japanese textile industry to reach a maximum of 1/3 of the pre-war output. Forty percent of this output is to be used to satisfy internal needs of the country, and 60% for export.

The slow tempos of reconstruction in Japanese industry have resulted in considerable unemployment. There are now more than 5 million unemployed in Japan. Nevertheless, certain branches of industry, such, for example, as the coal industry, are experiencing a shortage of manpower. This is explained by the extremely difficult labour conditions in the coal industry. Before and during the war there were many Koreans and Formosans engaged in this industry, who are now returning home.

The food

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The food situation in the country is exceptionally difficult, but especially in the cities. The distribution of rice and other rationed foodstuffs is being carried out in the minimum quantity and with great interruptions. Speculation and the black market are flourishing, but the foodstuffs sold on this market are naturally accessible to only an insignificant group of people. The peasants, not receiving anything in exchange for their products and not having sufficient rice for their own consumption, are not hastening with the deliveries to the government. The Japanese authorities are carrying out searches and are taking rice from the peasants by force. Despite these Draconian measures, however, the government has been able to fulfill its plan for rice collection by only 80%.

The food question in Japan has acquired an extremely political nature. The leaders of the Japanese Communist Party have openly stated that the government is sabotaging a solution of the food question, seeking to set city against countryside, workers against peasants, to cause rice riots and civil war in the country so as to have a pretext for crushing the incipient democratic movement by force. The Japanese authorities, guided by these motives, are taking no steps to ease the food situation by distributing government stores of rice among the population, confiscating rice from the landlords and wholesale traders, etc. On the contrary, they are pillaging the peasants, forcibly taking their last rice stores from them. The Socialist and Communist Parties, trade unions and peasant unions have repeatedly demanded of the government that the democratic public be given the right to control the distribution of rice, but they have always received a refusal. Recently, the Americans have, proceeding from political considerations, imported a certain amount of foodstuffs into Japan, but this is, of course, a drop in the ocean in comparison with the needs.

... Now, when Japan has lost her colonies, her dependence on the import of raw materials from abroad will be especially great ... Trade is going on in small proportions with China and other countries.

Japanese finances are in a chaotic condition. Japan's financial condition at the present time is characterised by sharp inflation ...

All the "emergency economic measures" have not saved the situation. Actually only these steps were carried out which worsened the position of the working masses, whereas the measures which could have infringed the interests of the great bourgeoisie, the industrial and financial magnates, such as taxes on surplus profits, remained on paper ... The Yoshida Government is not only not contemplating a tax on surplus wartime profits, but even wishes to annul the existing wartime profits tax. As if this were not enough, the government has paid the great capitalists enormous sums out of state funds as compensation for losses allegedly borne by the owners of war plants as a result of Japan's defeat in the war. Only the protest of the broad masses forced the government finally to give up further payments of this compensation...

The "emergency economic measures" have actually brought no results. Inflation continues at ever-growing tempos ... Japanese monopoly capital is at the present time not interested either in the restoration of industry, the rectification of finances, or in the general stabilisation of Japanese economic life as a whole. This explains the ineffectiveness of the economic measures formally taken by the government.

The political

-3-

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The political

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The political regime which the American occupation authorities have been supporting in Japan since her capitulation is reactionary and undemocratic. Unlike Germany, not only a local but the central Japanese administration was left in Japan. MacArthur and his headquarters carry out all their measures through the Japanese Government.

Immediately after the surrender the government of General Higashikuni came to power in Japan ... MacArthur, however, decided under the conditions of surrender and demilitarisation of the country that General and Royal Prince Higashikuni should not long remain in the post of premier. For this reason the Higashikuni Government was replaced by the Government of Baron Shidehara at the beginning of October 1945.

Shidehara was Minister of Foreign Affairs for a number of years in the period between the Washington Conference of 1922 and the seizure of Manchuria in 1931, that is, during the period when Japan, preparing for a new war and gathering her forces for this, was compelled to follow more or less peaceful policy and to refrain temporarily from direct military aggression. This so-called negative policy, as the Japanese militarists called it, was followed by Shidehara when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. As a result he passed for a liberal in Japanese and foreign circles, when, however, Japan in 1931 proceeded to open aggression in Manchuria and China, Shidehara, having done his duty, retired and until recently did not appear openly in the political arena. He is a representative and defender of Japanese financial capital. Shidehara is connected with circles of heavy monopoly capital in Japan even by ties of relation: he is the son-in-law of Baron Iwasaki, head of the Mitsubishi concern, the second concern in Japan in size and importance.

A conservative and reactionary, with the reputation of a liberal, 73-year old Shidehara was found for American reactionary circles. The Government of Shidehara enjoyed the full support of MacArthur and his headquarters, notwithstanding that the reactionary policy of Shidehara was causing tremendous dissatisfaction among the working masses of the Japanese people.

Having retained a reactionary regime in the country, the Shidehara Government attempted with the aid of the American occupation authorities to conceal it behind a pseudo-democratic facade.

As is known, in 1940 the Japanese military-fascist authorities abolished political parties in the country. After the surrender of Japan political parties started to come to life there anew. Not considering the literally hundreds of small parties of local importance, the overwhelming majority of which are extremely reactionary, five large parties arose in Japan: Liberal, Progressive, Cooperative, or Party of Cooperation, Social Democratic and Communist.

The Liberal and Progressive Parties are essentially reactionary conservative parties, which, by the way, in no way differ one from another. Members of the former bourgeois land-owning parties ... joined these. In order to camouflage themselves they once again acquired the names which they carried in the 80's and 90's of the last century when they acted as more or less of an opposition to the reactionary-bureaucratic ... governments, reflecting the liberal views of the pre-monopoly bourgeoisie of Japan at that time ... At the session of the Japanese Parliament held in December 1945, elected, or more accurately, appointed

in 1942

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in 1942 by General Tojo's military fascist government, 277 deputies were members of the Progressive Party, and 44 of the Liberal Party. When MacArthur on the 4th January 1946 issued a directive calling for a purge of state, political and public organisations of persons who had facilitated the Japanese aggression, a majority of these deputies had to give up their calling of deputies. The Liberal and Democratic Parties had several times to change their leadership since they were compelled to rid themselves of clearly compromised persons closely allied with military criminals. Both these parties have acted as mouthpieces for the blackest reaction from the moment they came into being. In their programmes and statements they insist particularly on the preservation in Japan of the "national structure", that is, the monarchy headed by the "divine" emperor, and at the same time are violently up in arms against the "communist menace".

The third party, the so-called Cooperative or Party of Cooperation, is a new petty bourgeois party which preaches class cooperation.

The Social Democratic Party had 15 deputies in the old parliament. The Party has a right and a left wing, but in the present party leadership it is the right social-chauvinistic elements which predominate, which at one time fully supported Japanese imperialistic aggression ... The Social Democratic Party stands for the preservation of the monarchy in Japan, putting forward a peculiar slogan of "Socialism under the Emperor". It is clear that with such political tendencies a majority of the party leadership were opposed in every way to adopting the proposal of the Japanese Communist Party for the establishment of a united democratic front. A struggle took place in the Party on this question between the right wing and the left wing which stands for the establishment of a united front. Under the influence of the growing domestic and international reaction and the open attacks of MacArthur and his henchman Atcheson, Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan, against Communism, the leadership of Japanese Social Democracy in July 1946 finally repudiated the creation of a united democratic front jointly with the Communist Party.

The Japanese Communist Party came out of underground only after the surrender of Japan. A legal Communist Party is a totally new phenomenon for Japan. From the moment it was established in the middle of 1922 the Japanese Communist Party was illegal and was subjected to all sorts of persecution. The last pre-war illegal Congress of the Party was held in December 1926. After this Congress the Central Committee and active membership of the party were arrested. Almost all the present party leaders ... were liberated from prison where they had spent 18 years, only after the end of the war. Some party leaders ... were abroad all this time, and only now have returned to Japan. The Communist Party is growing rapidly ... The Japanese Communist Party is the only one which opposes the monarchy and demands the establishment of a people's republic. This is eliciting the particular hatred toward it of all Japanese reactionary elements. American reactionaries also are openly opposed to the Communist Party of Japan, seeking to weaken its influence. The chairman of the Allied Council already mentioned, Atcheson, has called the Communist Party "an aggressive minority" which does not have the right to claim the leadership of the labour movement.

Recently the reaction has decided to oppose the Japanese Communist Party with a new provocative organisation--"The Federation of the Democratic Advance Guard" ... which is showing a tendency to become a clearly fascist organisation.

The American

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The American occupation authorities in the person of General MacArthur have, in accordance with the Potsdam Conference, taken some steps against those elements which led the country along the path of aggression. They have also proclaimed the establishment of democratic liberties, as the Potsdam Declaration required. However, even if these democratic measures have been carried out, it has been in a purely formal and superficial way, without affecting the foundations of the old political and economic system. In a majority of cases, however, MacArthur's directives concerning the democratisation of Japan remained on paper and were sabotaged by the Japanese authorities; this caused no protests from the American occupation authorities ...

Having formally dissolved military organisations, having removed the fascist leadership of the Japanese army and navy and remanded them for trial, the American administration has, however, continued to overlook the fact that the Japanese militarists are retaining their fundamental officer cadres in disguised form, having organized a number of "cooperative farms" which are really military settlements in which military discipline, drill and even military ranks are retained. The members of these "farms" are carrying on underground work, organising secret stores of weapons, engaging in military training, etc.

Moreover, it became clear from a statement by General Derevyanko in the Allied Council for Japan on 5 October 1946, that the Japanese Government is using thousands of Japanese officers, among them officers of the operational and specialised departments of the Japanese General Staff, on work in the demobilisation bureau under the Japanese Government, the activity of many of them having no relationship with the demobilisation and repatriation of Japanese soldiers and sailors. This proves that the officially dissolved Japanese General Staff and other military organisations are actually carrying on their activity under the sign of the demobilisation bureau. Such inadmissible facts have been possible only as a result of the patronage of the American occupation authorities ...

... Nevertheless, to this day many extreme reactionaries linked in the past with military fascist organisations remain in the highest state and public positions, including the government and parliament. The middle and lower links of the state, political and economic apparatus have remained almost untouched. The purge of these links was entrusted to the Japanese Government itself which is scarcely suited for such a "self-purge". The purge bore a superficial and formal nature. The most odious figures were removed but the system and apparatus were retained in their former form.

The provocative attacks by Japanese policemen on Formosans in Tokio in August 1946, when the police used machine guns, show that the Japanese police has not actually been disarmed and has firearms including machine guns. It is also doubtful that secret military-fascist organisations like the "Black Dragon" have actually ceased their existence; it is more likely that they are conspiring even more to continue their subversive work.

On the 3rd May 1946 the trial of the chief war criminals began in Tokio. But it would be vain to look for the magnates of finance capital who together with the militarists are the chief causes of Japanese aggression, in the dock. The former Minister of the Economy Ikeda, who is a representative of the Mitsui and who played the role of the Japanese Schacht, who was under house arrest, was very soon set free.

... MacArthur

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... MacArthur, in October 1945, issued a directive on the liquidation of the Zaibatsu. The Shidehara and Yoshida Governments, although they formally were subject to this directive, actually sabotaged its execution... It has recently become known that by taking refuge under the slogan of liquidating Japanese financial and industrial monopolies the USA is seeking to establish more favorable conditions for its investments in Japan. The "Wall Street Journal" reported that the American authorities are proposing to sell a number of Zaibatsu plants to Americans at a very low price. Thus, the Japanese Zaibatsu plants become American companies.

Japanese imperialist aggression was always connected with the Japanese feudal and military monarchy. After the defeat of Japan, progressive elements in the democratic countries demanded the liquidation of the Japanese monarchy which is the personification of the blackest reaction in the country. However, reactionary elements in the USA and Britain came out in favour of retaining the monarchy, fearing that its liquidation would lead to excessively radical consequences. Even during the war the former American Ambassador in Japan, Grew, argued for the retention of the Japanese Emperor ... After the surrender of Japan, MacArthur had several meetings with Hirohito, after which laudatory comments of the Emperor and MacArthur regarding each other appeared in the press. The American authorities did not raise the question of the Japanese Emperor's guilt of military aggression and of remanding him for trial as a war criminal.

While retaining the authority of the Emperor as the foundation of a reactionary regime, the American occupation authorities at the same time have sought to rid it of theocratic religious stratification connected with the belief of the Japanese in the "divinity" of the Emperor. The Emperor seeking to retain the throne for himself and his dynasty decided himself to repudiate the myth of his "divinity" ...

The task of democratisation of Japan proclaimed by the Potsdam Declaration demanded the repudiation of the old Japanese Constitution of 1889 and the writing of a new one ...

The Constitution of 1889 was a complete anachronism in the conditions of post-war Japan ...

MacArthur understood that to entrust the adoption to a new Constitution to the old Japanese Parliament meant to cause general indignation with the public. For this reason he ordered the Government to dissolve Parliament after the 89th session and to schedule new elections. Before this the Government, on the instructions of MacArthur, adopted a new electoral law which granted suffrage to women and lowered the age of the voters from 25 to 20 and the age of the candidates from 30 to 25; however, a number of restrictions remained which had been contained in the previous electoral law, such for example, as the qualification of domicile which particularly affected the interests of the workers as a result of the mass homelessness and movements from place to place in search of work.

On 18th December 1945 Parliament was dissolved and new elections were scheduled. Fearing a further growth of the democratic movement the Shidehara Government with MacArthur's support hastened to hold the new elections. The democratic elements demanded a postponement of elections pointing out that with the reactionary regime which had been dominating in the country, the reactionaries would inevitably be victors in the elections. MacArthur, however, refused to postpone the elections even when the Far Eastern Commission proposed that he do so.

Enjoying



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Enjoying the support of the Government of Shidehara and the material aid of the great concerns, with the "friendly neutrality" of MacArthur and his staff, reactionary elements developed furious activity ... The reactionaries openly bribed voters ... The state apparatus supported reactionary candidates; hundreds of thousands of democratically minded voters were excluded from the electoral lists ...

... As might have been foreseen, the reactionary parties won in the elections ... The Communist Party pointed out that at least 80 deputies fell under MacArthur's purge directives ... Only MacArthur was satisfied with the elections. In his report to the American Government he described the elections as "evidence of real progress on the path towards true democracy" ... The Communist Party, pointing out that an enormous number of voters had not been included in the electoral lists, demanded the annulment of the elections and the scheduling of new ones.

... The dissatisfaction which had increased in the country with the Shidehara Government finally forced him on 22nd April to retire ...

On 16th May a cabinet was formed headed by Yoshida ... The Yoshida cabinet represents a coalition, consisting of representatives of the Liberal and Progressive Parties ... Yoshida himself is not only a diplomat who occupied prominent diplomatic posts in Washington and London, but also a great mine owner. He is the son-in-law of Count Makino, former Lord Privy Seal, and is closely connected with court and financial circles. And it is to this reactionary Government and equally reactionary Parliament that the American occupation authorities entrusted the creation of a new Constitution!

The draft of the new Constitution was adopted at the 90th session of Parliament. According to the new Constitution the monarchy is retained in Japan, thereby consolidating a reactionary regime. True, the Emperor no longer comes forward in the role of "sacred and inviolate person". By the new Constitution the Emperor is "the symbol of the state and the unity of the Japanese people". He is no longer the bearer of state sovereignty; sovereignty belongs to the people. Nevertheless, the retention of the monarchy is the decisive aspect of the new Constitution; it is an indubitable victory for reaction--Japanese and international. Parliament received more rights than before. It is the only legislative organ and the Government is responsible to it but the Premier is appointed by the Emperor on instructions of Parliament ... The retention of a two-chamber system also signifies a victory for reactionary circles ...

Before the end of the Second World War, world public opinion considered that after the defeat and surrender of Japan it was first of all necessary to destroy the feudal remnants which had remained in the Japanese countryside and which are the economic foundation of political reaction in the country ... For this reason MacArthur proposed that the Shidehara Government draft a bill on land reform, shortly after the surrender.

The Government drafted an emasculated bill ... However, this more than modest bill was given a violent reception in Parliament by the reactionary "Liberals" and "Progressists" who pointed out that the class of landowners should not be destroyed for the countryside could not get along without their economic and cultural influence. Under the influence of these reactionary elements the session increased the maximum of land left to the landlord ... The carrying out of the reform was calculated for five years.

During

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During the past year the position of the peasants ... has actually deteriorated still further. The landlords, seeking to retain as much land as possible for themselves, have distributed it among their relatives and other spurious persons, and these new, fictitious owners have either driven the tenants from the land or offered them land for tenancy under new and even more difficult conditions. This elicited enormous discontent among the peasants. The number of so-called rent conflicts increased. Great agrarian disorders were to be expected in the near future.

For this reason the Yoshida Government was forced to concern itself anew with the land problem. It drafted a new bill which was confirmed at the 90th session of Parliament ... The reform must be carried out in two years.

The future will show whether the Yoshida Government will carry out this law or sabotage it the way Shidehara did, but it is already clear that in such a form the reform will certainly not solve Japan's agrarian problem. First of all the landlords in the countryside will as before lease land and, thus, the feudal exploitation of the peasants is retained. Secondly, the indebtedness of the peasants to the state will increase since to their old debts to the landlords and moneylenders are added new debts for land acquired at a high price. The agrarian problem would be really solved if the demand of the Japanese Communists were met for the confiscation of land from the great landowners and its distribution free of charge to landless peasants and to those with little land. The Japanese reactionary Government, however, cannot take such a resolute step and the occupation authorities would not permit the realisation of such a radical measure.

... The fact that the Japanese Communist Party which for almost a quarter of a century of its existence was subjected constantly to the harshest persecution ... received more than 2 million votes at the falsified elections, proves the deep roots of real democracy in Japan.

This is shown also by the unprecedented upsurge of the labour union movement. There are now thousands of trade unions in Japan with more than 4 million members. (Before the war the maximum number of trade union members was 700,000.) However, the trade union movement which was reborn after the surrender turned out, as before the war, to be split as a result of the criminal schismatic policy of the Right Social Democrats. The existence of two Japanese trade union organisations - the Japanese Federation of Labour, under the leadership of Right Social Democrats, and the National Congress of Industrial Unions under the influence of Left elements - weakens the strength of the proletariat and inflicts enormous damage on its interests. Among the broad working masses the attraction of a united front is very strong and the only obstacle towards its realisation is the criminal policy of the Right Social Democrats who are playing into the hands of the Japanese heavy capital.

The people's democratic movement has assumed broad proportions in Japan. One may judge the scale of this movement by the 1st of May demonstration in Tokio in which more than half a million people participated, and also by the tremendous hunger demonstration in Tokio on the 19th of May in which 250,000 took part. All these demonstrations have been held under the leadership of the Communist Party ... On the 20th of May MacArthur pointed out in his statement that in the future he would not allow such mass demonstrations. After this statement an intensified offensive began by reaction against the democratic and labour movement.

The position

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The position of the Japanese workers ... continues to be very grave ... The Japanese workers and employees are answering the reactionary measures of the Government with mass strikes demanding an improvement in their situation. One of the most widely disseminated forms by which the workers struggle against the owners, in particular against their sabotage and unwillingness to keep production going, is the establishment of workers' control in the plants. Despite the protests of the workers and of the democratic public, the Yoshida Government forbade the establishment of this control. Instead of this it proposed the establishment in the plants of joint committees of representatives of the owners and of the workers to solve production and other questions. The occupation authorities supported the Japanese Government in this question. Having forbidden workers' control in the plants, the Yoshida Government with the support of the occupation authorities, has gone over to an offensive against the labour movement. At the 90th session of Parliament it carried through a law regarding the so-called "settlement of questions connected with labour", which forbids a strike of workers and employees in plants of public utility, and the Government may declare any plants to be such.

In reply to these activities of the reactionary government and of heavy capital the Japanese workers have begun a counter-offensive. In September and October 1946, as a result of the grave economic situation of the workers and in particular of the threat of further mass dismissals as a result of the "industrial reconstruction" planned by the Government, a powerful wave of strikes rolled over Japan and assumed proportions unprecedented in Japanese history ... Millions of workers struck. The Right Social Democrats opposed the strikes. Almost all the strikes ended with victory for the workers. In November the strike movement embraced new strata of workers and employees.

The Japanese workers continue to be subjected to semi-colonial exploitation. In many places the system of contracting for workers has not only been retained but even strengthened and expanded, the contractors keeping the lion's share of the workers' wages ...

In order to improve the situation of the Japanese workers and to protect them from the arbitrariness of the owners, the Soviet representative in the Allied Council in Tokio, General Derevyanko, proposed that the Japanese Government be assigned the task of preparing new labour legislation in accordance with elementary democratic requirements. This proposal elicited the sharp objection of Acheson, chairman of the Allied Council. Having called the proposal of General Derevyanko Communist propaganda, Acheson indulged in a number of coarse anti-Soviet attacks.

The Japanese Government and the representatives of American monopoly capital are equally interested in preserving the reactionary regime in Japan. The Japanese reactionaries are ready for this to sacrifice even the freedom and independence of the country. According to the "New York Times" correspondent, Hannison, the Japanese Premier Yoshida in a talk with him insisted that the occupation regime in Japan should be kept for a long period in order to "protect her from the political and economic influence of the Soviet Union". "Either we have such an occupation, or Russia will subject us to her influence," said Yoshida. This statement of Yoshida's proves, first, that Japanese reaction is not counting on its own forces without the support of international reaction in the struggle against democracy, and, second, that the Japanese imperialists are seeking in every way possible to utilise the contradictions among the great powers which defeated Japan and forced her to surrender.

In turn,

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In turn, American reactionary circles, having feathered their nest in the apparatus of the occupation authorities in Japan, are supporting the reactionary regime in the country in the hope of using it against world democracy and against the Soviet Union. The Americans themselves and even their official representatives do not hide this. Thus, Major General Willoughby, Chief of Intelligence in MacArthur's Staff, frankly said that Japan is the USA's potential ally in the Far East. Lattimore, well-known expert on the Far East, American scholar, politician and journalist, has written that American reactionary circles wish to make China and Japan "a bastion against the USSR". On the day of the anniversary of the defeat and surrender of Japan, MacArthur made a statement which even the American press called ominous. He stated that Japan may become a "dangerous springboard for the beginning of war" since it is "the focal point for the clashes of ideologies now agitating mankind".

The facts adduced prove that reaction continues to dominate in Japan. This is causing the alarm of world public opinion. Although MacArthur in his official account points out that democracy has been formally established in Japan, in actual fact there cannot be even talk so far of its realisation. Meanwhile, only if Japan is genuinely democratized can it cease to be a focus of military danger in the East. The Soviet Union, which made an enormous contribution to the victory over fascism and military aggression both in the West and in the East, cannot permit Japanese imperialism to be reborn and once again to become a threat to our country and to universal peace.

("World Economy & World Politics"  
No. 10-11, 1946)