

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 dicate the people that got this message that was attached to
3 it, this exhibit 12?

4 Captain Kramer: No, sir; not at all, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: What is this?

6 Captain Kramer: That is simply an explanation I believe
7 very recently drawn up of what those symbols mean, Senator.

8 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then "1" means special
9 interest to "DNI", is that right?

10 Captain Kramer: That is an incorrect interpretation of
11 that explanation.

12 Senator Ferguson: No, I am wrong. "1" is the Secre-
13 tary of the Navy?

14 Captain Kramer: Secretary of the Navy, yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: That is correct, is it?

16 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: And "10" was CNO?

18 Captain Kramer: Admiral Stark, yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: And "12" was War Plans?

20 Captain Kramer: Admiral Turner, yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: "2X" was what?

22 Captain Kramer: I have forgotten what that symbol was
23 used for.

24 Senator Ferguson: But it says, "Not used".

25 Captain Kramer: Well, apparently we actually used it, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: "P" for the --

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Captain Kramer: President.

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Senator Ferguson: For the White House?

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Captain Kramer: For the White House.

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Senator Ferguson: "S" for State; "G" for Captain Safford; "Mis." for miscellaneous, is that right?

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: "B" -- "BE-not used." "B-OP-16-BZ" I think. What is that?

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Captain Kramer: That is Wilkinson-Intelligence. That would be in the Navy.

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Senator Ferguson: Pound sign?

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Captain Kramer: Pound sign - London.

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Senator Ferguson: British, London?

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: "AF CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet. X-20-G1" --

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Captain Kramer: GX.

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Senator Ferguson: "GX. "Y" is "20-GY"?

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: "MONO" is for files?

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Captain Kramer: That means a monograph file, separate from the numerical file.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, I notice you had on the stamp an

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"AF" which was CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet, is that right?

Witness Kramer

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, that is true.

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Senator Ferguson: That was Admiral Hart?

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Why didn't you have Admiral Kimmel's symbol on that?

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Captain Kramer: Senator, everything that went to CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet, also went either as an action addressee or information addressee to Admiral Kimmel.

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Senator Ferguson: Who made up this designation of this so-called code at the bottom? We might call it a code.

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Captain Kramer: I believe the present custodian of the JD file, Commander Boone, quite recently.

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Senator Ferguson: But you knew all the time what these letters stood for?

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, did you ever personally use "AF" to send messages to CINCAF?

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Captain Kramer: Not that I recall, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: But you did not have any designation for CINCPAC, which was Kimmel?

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Captain Kramer: He was included in that "AF".

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Senator Ferguson: Now I show you the third page and it is October the 10th, 1941. Will you interpret it?

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Captain Kramer: One asterisk means interesting messages.

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2 A double asterisk means especially important or urgent mes-
3 sages.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, number --

5 Captain Kramer: No. 236-41 meant the two hundred
6 thirty-sixth gist of that kind made up during 1941.

7 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, what did you list
8 this on page 12 of exhibit 2 under?

9 Captain Kramer: Under JD file. (No. 5696.

10 Senator Ferguson: And what is on this paper in rela-
11 tion to that message?

12 Captain Kramer: "Tokyo to Honolulu, 24 September." That
13 being the originator's date, originator's message number 83
14 meaning, asterisks, as an interesting message.

15 Senator Ferguson: Just one of them? Just one?

16 Captain Kramer: One, yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Meaning "interesting message"?

18 Captain Kramer: That is right, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: And what was there on that? Read
20 what is on there?

21 Captain Kramer: The gist of this message is:

22 "Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl
23 Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose
24 of showing exact locations."

25 Senator Ferguson: Now, this particular paper that I have

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1
2 in my hand and have shown you with this written on it:

3 "Tokyo directs special reports on ships with Pearl
4 Harbor" --

5 Captain Kramer: "In Pearl Harbor" I presume it should
6 have been.

7 Senator Ferguson: It says "with".

8 Captain Kramer: Yes, "with Pearl Harbor", but it should
9 have been "in Pearl Harbor", I presume.

10 Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

11 "Which is divided into five areas for the purpose of
12 showing exact locations."

13 That particular sheet of paper was delivered to the re-
14 cipients who received exhibit 2, page 12?

15 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: So that when they would exhibit 2,
17 page 12, showing this bomb plat as we have referred to it
18 here, they had a signal or a flag showing them that it was
19 an important, as you say, interesting message?

20 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, will you tell me from your re-
22 cords who received that sheet with the flag on it telling
23 them what it was in your deliveries?

24 Captain Kramer: I cannot recall who specifically re-
25 ceived that but I must presume that all the usual recipients

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2 did receive that, namely, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral
3 Stark's office, Admiral Wilkinson, the head of the Far East
4 section and the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral
5 Noyes, who has initialed this sheet, and the Director of War
6 Plans.

7 Senator Ferguson: The President?

8 Captain Kramer: No, sir, we did not send those gists to
9 the President. We sent the original folder with the gist to
10 the Naval Aide to the President, who I do not believe used
11 those gists in showing things to the President.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, wait. Did you deliver the
13 gists to the aide for the President?

14 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, it would have gone to him,
15 too.

16 Senator Ferguson: And he would have it in the folder?

17 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: So that when he would take the folder
19 to the President he would have not only the message but your
20 flag, being the gist?

21 Captain Kramer: I do not know just what he did or did
22 not show the President.

23 Senator Ferguson: But that was at least in there?

24 Captain Kramer: It was delivered to him, yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, can you tell us why we

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2 have been almost three months on this hearing and I suppose
3 that we have spent many hours on this one message and we have
4 never known before that there was such a thing as a gist
5 sheet which went to the various people who received these
6 messages as a flag, calling the importance of the message to
7 the recipient of the message?

8 Captain Kramer: I have no knowledge whatsoever, Senator,
9 about what was furnished or has been or will be furnished
10 this committee, except what I have furnished.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you called this to my at-
12 tention this morning on some question that I put to you.

13 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: That would not indicate in any way,
15 except that the person who received this had a flag, that
16 this was an interesting message, is that right?

17 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: If I might just look at that: Now,
19 on that flag sheet -- let us call it a flag sheet -- this
20 flag sheet that carried this message No. 5696-A, Tokyo-
21 Honolulu, 24th September 1941, I assume that is.

22 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: No. 83, which is the identical sheet
24 there?

25 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Together with other papers, is that
3 right?

4 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: That flag sheet would indicate that
6 the messages indicated on that flag sheet were all delivered
7 at the same time?

8 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: And the flag sheet had only a sheet
10 with a flag showing "interesting messages"?

11 Captain Kramer: On that page, yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes, on that page; and there were
13 twelve messages, is that right?

14 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Delivered at that same time?

16 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Is that correct?

18 Captain Kramer: There are more than that, of course,
19 but twelve are shown there.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, where is the other? Do
21 you know, Commander?

22 Commander Baecher: Senator, this other sheet I can get.
23 I assumed if there are any others they would be in the Navy
24 Department. We were only asked for the sheet showing the
25 distribution of this one particular message.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know whether or not the fourteen parts and the other messages delivered Saturday night had a flag sheet?

Captain Kramer: No, sir, because my section abandoned the preparation of those gists I believe in early November or it may have been nearer the middle of November.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, why did you abandon the flag sheet idea when you delivered to the various parties twelve or fifteen messages? Why didn't you flag them on the most important?

Captain Kramer: Senator, the preparation of these gists required several hours work on the part of one officer and one yeoman in my office. The practice was abandoned in November because of the fact that the diplomatic crises were increasing in acuteness and it was felt by me that delays required by the preparation of these gists could not be accepted and therefore the original traffic without gists were delivered several times a day without waiting for the preparation of gists.

Senator Ferguson: Well, then, do I understand that after some time in November everything became important or interesting?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, that is the --

Senator Ferguson: That is, the gist of it?

witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Captain Kramer: That is the understanding, yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Is that correct?

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Captain Kramer: So much of importance that we wanted to get it out fast, yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: But on this particular message, the September 24th message, this gist that went with it, this gist sheet went with it so that anyone receiving that file on that day would have called to his attention at least two items, this being the first one that was interesting?

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: All right. Now I want to talk you to these files.

Mr. Richardson: Are you going to put those files in?

Senator Ferguson: No, that would take too much time.

I want you to point out in those files the things that refreshed your memory that you did not see the pilot message until you had returned from the delivery of the fourteenth part message to the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary of State in the Secretary of State's office. That was the second delivery on that day.

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It will be well to put on the record that these are the files that I started on this morning and asked about. Don't look at your yellow sheets. Don't look at your own memorandum. I want to see on these original records the things

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 that refreshed your memory that you did not make the delivery
3 of the pilot message as you first stated on Saturday evening?

4 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if the witness
5 has work sheets which he prepared at the time when he exam-
6 ined the files that it is perfectly proper for him to refer
7 to his work sheets in order to draw his attention to what-
8 ever sheets he wants to find in the file.

9 Senator Ferguson: I have no objection to him using the
10 sheets to assist him to find the other sheet, but I want to
11 see the original sheet and what he saw. I am talking now
12 about the pilot message.

13 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: That is 901.

15 Captain Kramer: I have transferred to this work sheet,
16 Senator, considerable data from these files. It was not till
17 I made a study of this compilation, the work sheet, that I
18 reached that conclusion that the pilot message was not de-
19 livered until the time I have indicated.

20 Senator Ferguson: No. Now, we will have to come back.
21 I want you to point on the pilot message or the other mes-
22 sages in these original Navy files the information that re-
23 freshed your memory that the delivery was made Sunday instead
24 of Saturday.

25 Captain Kramer: Starting with file No. 7137, which is

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 dated 5 September -- 5 December, rather.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, wait. We had better de-
4 scribe it. It is from Berlin to Tokyo, 5th of December
5 1941?

6 Captain Kramer: Originator's serial No. 1421.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, is that in exhibit No. 1? Will
8 you get exhibit No. 1 so that we can identify it for the com-
9 mittee?

10 Captain Kramer: According to my notes, sir, it is not
11 in exhibit 1. I compared this file with exhibit 1 when I
12 made the study.

13 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then will you read it,
14 what is not in exhibit 1, will you read that in?

15 Captain Kramer: (Reading)

16 "Chief of Office Routing: Re your No. 986. * * * *"

17 Asterisks to a footnote. The footnote says:

18 "JD-1:6944. I relayed the general outline of the
19 Japanese-U.S. negotiations to the Germans. The United
20 States will no doubt attempt to bring about a split be-
21 tween Japan and Germany by publishing details at some
22 time in the future. It is quite possible that they will
23 try to utilize them in an extensive propaganda program.
24 I believe that it would be to our interest to advise
25 the Germans and Italians in a very direct manner the

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contents of the Konoye message which received much
 publicity at the time and all other matters that we can.
 It may be more convenient for you to do this through
 the German and Italian ambassadors in Tokyo."

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: What was this message, do you know, the Kenoye message?

Captain Kramer: I believe, without referring to it, the message at the end of November disclosing to Berlin the tenor of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. We can refer to that letter.

Senator Ferguson: The next page is what? That helped to refresh your memory that the pilot message was delivered Sunday instead of Saturday?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is there anything on that?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir. That is the latest date of a block of about 11 messages, arranged chronologically in this file, preceding that message I just read.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now the next page is what?

Captain Kramer: The next page is File No. 7138.

Senator Ferguson: Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer: That is not in Exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson: Well, will you read that?

Captain Kramer: That is from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 3 December, 1941, originator Serial No. 1408, Secret.

"At the time of my interview with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in my 1407 the Minister told me the following: 'Britain and America have been making merry on the German

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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defeat at Rostov. However, this is all a fabrication. The facts in the case are that the inhabitants of Rostov were so violent in their antipathy and resistance and Soviet Army were so persistent in its attack on the German Army where it had broken through that General Kleist, who had kept the place in order, not to inflict unnecessary losses on his mechanized forces, retired voluntarily to prepared positions in the West. I am in receipt of a report to the effect that operations in Libya are proceeding very satisfactorily and only recently Rommel's Army has completely annihilated one division of New Zealand troops which came to the aid of the Tobruk garrison. Also I have the report that the encirclement of Moscow is progressing favorably."

Senator Ferguson: What is this message 1407?

Captain Kramer: It is JD-1:File No. 7132.

Senator Ferguson: Is it in Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, will you find that message there? What is its date?

Captain Kramer: 3 December, 1941, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right, will you read that one into the record?

Captain Kramer: "From Berlin

"To Tokyo

Witness Kramer

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"3 December 1941.

"Orig. Serial 1407.

"Re my 1405.

"In compliance with his request I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the 3rd. He said that Dictator Hitler was at a distant place at the present. He further said that he did not like to use the long distance telephone and because of snow planes could not be utilized. There is nothing for him (Ribbentrop) to do but go to the military headquarters himself and await the Dictator's arrival there. (He is expected to return to the headquarters tomorrow or the 4th, but if he could not be reached on this occasion he would be on the 5th) to establish contact with him. Although it is regrettable, he said the delay cannot be avoided.

"Ribbentrop: 'As I have told you before, we cannot make an official reply until the Fuehrer has given his approval. The Japanese Government is undoubtedly very anxious to have our reply as soon as possible. I myself am in agreement with it and have no objections, but will advise your home Government of that fact. Moreover I am of the opinion that the Fuehrer will be in agreement too, but we cannot say so definitely until the Fuehrer's return.'

"I told him that the situation is more critical than

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 is imagined and therefore we are very anxious to have a
2 formal reply as soon as is possible. From my previous
3 experience with Ribbentrop I feel fairly confident when I
4 say that you will not be mistaken if you assume there will
5 be no objections. Arrangements have been made for a direct
6 telephone connection between Ribbentrop at the general
7 headquarters and here. However he said that whenever possible
8 he would come back here and contact me."

9 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now what was the message
10 they were talking about?

11 Captain Kramer: It is not available, or at least was
12 not at that time.

13 Senator Ferguson: So you did not know, "Re my 1405",
14 you did not know what 1405 was?

15 Captain Kramer: Not from the reference indicated on
16 this message. It might have appeared later.

17 Senator Ferguson: Will you try to find out if it did
18 appear later, before the 7th?

19 Captain Kramer: That would have to be done by the
20 present custodian of those index files, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Will you try to find out if 1405,
22 referred to here, was ever received before the attack,
23 Commander Baecher?

24 Commander Baecher: All right.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now what was there on any of those

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 messages that indicated to you or that brought you to the
3 conclusion that you had not delivered the pilot message on
4 Saturday night?

5 Captain Kramer: This 7132 I just read is one of the
6 block of 11 messages I previously referred to.

7 Senator Ferguson: What I am trying to get at is how
8 do you know there were 11, that block was struck off at
9 that one point?

10 Captain Kramer: The group of 11 I referred to was the
11 extension back to only what appeared on my work sheet. It
12 extends further back three more messages, so there are
13 presumably 14 in the whole block.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now what is your next message in the
15 file?

16 Captain Kramer: File No. 7139.

17 Senator Ferguson: Is that in Exhibit 1?

18 Captain Kramer: On page 235 of Exhibit 1, yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: That is the long message and ends
20 on page 236?

21 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now will you go to the
23 next message, the one in 7139? That is the one you just
24 referred to?

25 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Witness Kramer

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Senator Ferguson: And said it was on page 235?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir. File 7140.

Senator Ferguson: Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer: That is on page 234 of Exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson: And it is the one at the bottom of the page?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What is this writing on that sheet?

Captain Kramer: That is my penciled notation using a double asterisk next to the name "Terasaki", with the footnote identifying Terasaki and his activities.

Senator Ferguson: So when this message at the bottom of page 234 was delivered did it have your memo on it?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, in the Navy.

Senator Ferguson: Will you read what was delivered to the Navy?

Captain Kramer: "Terasaki, Second Secretary, is head of Japanese espionage in Western Hemisphere. He and his assistants are being sent to South America."

Senator Ferguson: So you called to the attention of the various people that were to receive this message that the head of Japanese espionage in the Western Hemisphere was being transferred from Washington to some country in South America?

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WARD S. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kramer

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That was used as a flag, was it not?

Captain Kramer: Not quite that, sir. It was an additional footnote added after this message was typed.

Senator Ferguson: Whose initial is on that message?

Captain Kramer: The initial "J", sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now do you know why that message as delivered was not put in Exhibit 1 to be distributed to the committee, calling the attention of the committee to who this man was?

Captain Kramer: Apparently, Senator, the message appearing on page 234 of Exhibit 1 was taken from the copy in the Army files and not the copy in this file.

Senator Ferguson: Now "this file" is the Navy file?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand that the exhibits in No. 1 were made from the Army file and may not be true copies of what was delivered to the Navy officials, or to the President?

Captain Kramer: I sometimes added pencilled footnotes of that kind, sir. They were rather rare, however.

Senator Ferguson: But this is an example of one, and is one?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now you must have thought at the time that the head of the Secret Service being transferred to South America was a very significant point.

Captain Kramer: I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that is the reason for calling it to the attention of the various people that were to receive copies, is that correct?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir. Primarily domestic intelligence would take action in the premises.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now when was that message delivered to OPNAV, Admiral Stark, that is No. 7140, being the one in regard to the head of the Secret Service?

Captain Kramer: That was included in the block delivered Saturday evening, which could not be delivered to Admiral Stark. He would have seen it the following morning.

Senator Ferguson: At least it was delivered to the Secretary of the Navy and the White House, and to the various parties over at Admiral Wilkinson's that night?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir. I believe, at least I have brought it out in previous testimony, it was also specifically delivered to the domestic Intelligence Branch of the Navy, who saw occasional items of that nature bearing on domestic intelligence, Japanese agents, their movements and activities.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: How do you come to that conclusion?
3 Is there something on this particular sheet that would
4 indicate that?

5 Captain Kramer: No, sir, that is my distinct recollection,
6 however, that I did that.

7 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now we will go to 7141.
8 That is the next sheet in the Navy file, is it not?

9 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: And is that in Exhibit 1?

11 Captain Kramer: According to my notes on this work
12 sheet, it is not, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Will you read that?

14 Captain Kramer: "From Washington

15 "To Tokyo

16 "5 December 1941

17 "Serial 1262.

18 "From Kurusu to Secretary Tasiro.

19 "Re your 896. I feel confident that you are fully
20 aware of the importance of the intelligence set-up in view
21 of the present condition of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations.
22 I would like very much to have Terasaki, who would be
23 extremely difficult to suddenly replace because of certain
24 circumstances, remain here until we are definitely enlightened
25 as to the end of the negotiations. I beg of you as a personal

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 favor to me to make an effort along these lines. I shall
2 have him assume his post as soon as his work here is disposed
3 of."

4 Senator Ferguson: What is the reference to? To what
5 message?

6 Captain Kramer: To the one preceding this, 7140, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: That is 1245. In the book it is
8 1245?

9 Captain Kramer: No, sir, 890.

10 Senator Ferguson: 890 at the bottom?

11 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: They have got both numbers, is that
13 correct?

14 Captain Kramer: That is correct, yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now when was that message delivered
16 to the parties that you have named?

17 Captain Kramer: The same remarks that I made regarding
18 7140 apply in respect to 7141.

19 Senator Ferguson: So that was delivered Saturday evening?

20 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: The next is 7142, is it not?

22 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Is that one in Exhibit 1?

24 Captain Kramer: On page 237, yes, sir.
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: The message at the bottom of the page?

2 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Will you just read it? It is short.

4 Captain Kramer: " From Tokyo

5 "To Washington

6 "December 6, 1941.

7 "(Urgent)

8 "#897

9 "Re your #1268. "

10 The footnote indicates that is not available.

11 "To Counselor Iguchi from Kameyama.

12 "What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867" - which footnote
13 indicates is SIS #25640 regarding the destruction of codes
14 and one code machine in the Washington office - "was that
15 of the two sets of 'B' code machines with which your office
16 is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being
17 to continue the use of the other."

18 Senator Ferguson: Now this footnote was delivered to
19 the various recipients of these messages on Saturday evening
20 the 6th, is that correct?

21 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, as part of this message.

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And where will we find 25640?
23 Do you know where that one is?

24 Captain Kramer: No, sir, I could not find it readily
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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without the JD file number.

Senator Ferguson: And the JD file number is not on it?

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 Senator Ferguson: But the gist is here regarding
2 the destruction of codes and one code machine in the
3 Washington office?

4 Captain Kramer: That I would guess off-hand -- and
5 it is probably more than a guess -- is the Tokyo directive
6 of 3 December regarding the destruction of cryptographic
7 aids in Washington.

8 Senator Ferguson: It clearly indicated there was to
9 be one code machine left in Washington?

10 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: All others were to be destroyed?

12 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: So we knew that on Saturday evening?

14 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

15 Incidentally that is the first time we knew they had
16 more than one machine here.

17 Senator Ferguson: And that was delivered Saturday
18 evening with the 13-parts?

19 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, take the next page.

21 Captain Kramer: The next page is the first part of
22 the 14-part note.

23 Senator Ferguson: All right.

24 Now 7142 is Army 25835?

25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson.

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is that correct?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How does the Army number get on the Navy file here?

Captain Kramer: That was an Army translation, and was so numbered before being delivered to my section.

Senator Ferguson: Now, when we come to the 13 parts, they are in Exhibit 1, but they have no Army file numbers on them, do they?

Captain Kramer: No, sir. We had no army file numbers on any Navy translations.

Senator Ferguson: That would indicate that all of the 13 parts of the 14-part message were translated in the Navy Department?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir, except for the rough translations, some of which were done by the Army and sent to the Navy for typing up.

Senator Ferguson: But if they were done in the rough no number was put on them?

Captain Kramer: No, sir, only our number was used.

Senator Ferguson: Now, let us come to the 14th part. It was made in the Navy also?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: So all of the parts were made in the Navy?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All of the 14 parts have got "JD-1 #7143"?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Indicating that that is the Navy number?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, we will go to the next page after the 14th part in the Navy file, and we get a number 7144.

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is that correct?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is a Navy translation?

Captain Kramer: That is an Army translation, 7144 being the Navy file number of it.

Senator Ferguson: How does it come that the stamp, as we get back on these other Army files -- here is the stamp 25835, is it not?

Captain Kramer : Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (continuing): -- and no stamp is on the one that we were referring to, 7144?

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Kramer: I cannot account for that, except that it must have been a clerical error on that particular copy.

Senator Ferguson: The leaving off of the Army number?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, when was this message in 7144 delivered?

Captain Kramer: According to my study it was the first of the block that was delivered sometime between my departure for the State Department 9:30 Sunday morning and my return at about 10:20 Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson: That is the message that is in Exhibit 1, known as not to use a stenographer or typist?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The next number.

Now, you claim that that is the dividing line, because there they were in the book and they were in numbers, and that gives you the idea you delivered the 13 parts and not the pilot message, because the pilot message is not in the group, is that correct?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir. It is also my distinct recollection, in that connection that there were no file numbers beyond the 13 parts of the 14-part note delivered that Saturday night.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now who would put these file numbers on these pages in the Navy file?

Captain Kramer: My chief yeoman, normally.

Senator Ferguson: What is his name?

Captain Kramer: Bryant. He applied these numbers just before we made up the folders for delivery.

Senator Ferguson: Now, I notice that some of them are in stamped ink and some of them have been copied over. How do you account for that?

Captain Kramer: That copying over is apparently a development of the last several years, subsequent to Pearl Harbor by the present custodians of these files.

Senator Ferguson: Not by Bryant, but by the present custodian?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know why he would do that?

Captain Kramer: I do not know, unless he was simply doodling, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How is that?

The Chairman: Simply what?

Captain Kramer: Doodling.

Senator Ferguson: Then, you find him doodling on these official Navy files, is that correct?

Captain Kramer: Presumably he was making a study that began to bore him.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Well, it makes it rather difficult to read what was under this doodling, does it not?

2

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Captain Kramer: It is perhaps possible to get another file number, if it exists, with our stamp not written over, sir.

4

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Senator Ferguson: Now, that particular one did not have the stamp of the Army although it was translated by the Army?

7

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

10

Senator Ferguson: Now, go to the next file, 7145, which has not been doodled.

11

12

It has a stamp 25850, does it not?

13

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

14

Senator Ferguson: Is that in our book, Exhibit 1, here?

15

Captain Kramer: That is page 248 of Exhibit 1.

16

Senator Ferguson: That is the one o'clock message?

17

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

18

Senator Ferguson: Now, what is the next page? 7146?

19

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

20

Senator Ferguson: And that has a number 25853, the Army number?

21

22

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

23

Senator Ferguson: Is that in Exhibit 1?

24

Captain Kramer: On page 248, sir.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: That is 908?

Captain Kramer: That is the second one on page 248.

Senator Ferguson: Now we will come to the next one, 7147, and that has been written over, and it is difficult to read what was under it, is that correct?

Captain Kramer: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: That is Army #25854?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is that in the book?

Captain Kramer: Page 249, sir.

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Book
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: That is the top message, or the
2 destruction of the last remaining machine message?

3 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: What is this last number on here,
5 the SIS number?

6 Captain Kramer: 25858, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what that is? It is in
8 pencil.

9 Captain Kramer: Presumably it was omitted from this
10 copy at the time it was typed up by Army, but since it
11 appears in Exhibit 1 presumably it was determined shortly
12 after delivery of this message that it applied to their
13 file number and it was phoned over to us.

14 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether that is in the
15 book?

16 Captain Kramer: It is on page 249.

17 Senator Ferguson: It is the one preceding in the book
18 but not the one preceding in your official Navy files?

19 Captain Kramer: No, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now in the Navy files
21 it is back how many?

22 Captain Kramer: It is ahead four numbers, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Ahead four numbers?

24 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, in the Navy files.
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1

Senator Ferguson: Well, let us go to the next.

2

Captain Kramer: The next one is the so-called hidden word message, sir, translated by Navy.

3

4

Senator Ferguson: That is at the top of page 258, is it not -- or 253?

5

6

Captain Kramer: 251, I believe, sir.

7

Senator Ferguson: 251. And what is the Army number on that one?

8

9

Captain Kramer: It was a Navy translation, and we normally, in fact almost never had an Army file number on a Navy translation.

10

11

12

Senator Ferguson: Then there was no Army file number on that. Now the next one is a photostatic duplicate of it?

13

14

Captain Kramer: That is apparently an Army copy.

15

I do not know who made that photostat.

16

17

Senator Ferguson: You know nothing about that photostat that is in there?

18

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

19

Senator Ferguson: In fact there are two photostats.

20

Captain Kramer: There are two photostats.

21

Senator Ferguson: Now what is the next one?

22

Captain Kramer: That is the so-called pilot message, Navy File 7149, Tokyo Serial 901.

23

24

Senator Ferguson: Now on the bottom of this message

25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 there is scratched out in pencil "not available". That
2 is in re 902?

3 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: That is scratched out. Now your
5 file number on that is 7149?

6 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: The Army file is 25838?

8 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now that is the pilot message?

10 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Now just look at the Army one next
12 to it. By the way, when this file is made up is it made
13 up from the bottom up or from the top down? Which is the
14 earlier paper, 7150 or 7149?

15 Captain Kramer: 7149, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: 7149?

17 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now the next sheet of
19 paper, the Army number is 25857. 25838 was the pilot
20 message?

21 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: And the next number beyond it is
23 25857?

24 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Going the other way, the number was
3 the so-called hidden word message, one of them, and then
4 we come to the Army File No. 25854, is that right?

5 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now how do you account for the fact
7 that you have an Army number 25838 between the two sheets
8 25854 and 25857?

9 Captain Kramer: I do not account for that, sir. I
10 know in a general way that the Army system of numbering was
11 quite different than ours at that time, in fact similar to
12 what we had used a year or two before. In other words, I
13 believe it was their practice to assign a file number at
14 about the time a translation was to be worked on and completed.
15 It would, therefore, be quite possible that a much later
16 file number would be completed, because being a short message
17 and delivered prior to an earlier file number which might
18 require considerable work in clearing up garbles, and so
19 forth, in translation.

20 Senator Ferguson: But if the testimony later should
21 show that this pilot message was seen by an Army officer,
22 translated by two o'clock on Saturday, you would not want
23 any of these hypothetical things you have stated to indicate
24 that it had not been sent to the Navy in the regular channels
25 and as translated on the 6th, would you?

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Kramer: Not necessarily, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now let us try and find the next number as nearly as we can to 25838 Army instead of 25854.

Captain Kramer: I have an indication on my study of an Army file number 25835, which is Navy File No. 7142, appearing on page 237 of Exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now let us come back to 7142, and that appears before any of the 14 parts of the 14-part message, does it not?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, it does, because that block was arranged chronologically by my section. The block 7138 through 7143 runs chronologically with the dates of originator, 3 December, 5 December, 5 December, 5 December, 6 December, and 6 December.

Senator Ferguson: Now there isn't any doubt that this pilot message is shown to have been translated 12/6/41 which is Saturday, is that true?

Captain Kramer: That is true.

Senator Ferguson: The only reason why you say that the pilot message was delivered Sunday morning is due to the fact that in the Navy book it appears after the 14 -part message and after the 1:00 o'clock message, and therefore you came to the conclusion that it must have been delivered

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Sunday instead of Saturday?

2 Captain Kramer: That is the sole reason, Senator,
3 based on the practice in my office of disseminating these
4 things as soon as we got them.

5 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now I want you to look at this
6 pilot message -- and that is 7149 Navy and 25838 Army?

7 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: Now this is the original file of
9 the OP-20-GL. What does that mean?

10 Captain Kramer: That is the designation of the section
11 having present custody of this file, sir. In the days about
12 Pearl Harbor it was in the custody of Section 20-GZ.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now in that same book, or set of
14 papers, we have on the outside of it "JD-1:7001-7500"?

15 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: That would indicate that you started
17 your books on the 100 numbers?

18 Captain Kramer: When I had custody of these files
19 they were started with an even number, sir. We have started
20 this file with 7000. There has been apparently some regroup-
21 ing of these in later custodian's hands.

22 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand then that all of
23 the JD book 6501 to 7000 -- by the way, so that this record
24 may be clear, what you call a file is the intercepted decoded
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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messages?

Captain Kramer: The translations, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The translation is really the file?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir. For each of these translations there is another file with the work sheets.

Senator Ferguson: Is there a work sheet for these exhibits which you have here, that you have been given?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, there is a work sheet file for each translation prepared by Navy. Just what the Army files are in that respect I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: Well, would that file come over when this pilot message came over from the Army?

Captain Kramer: No, sir, not at all.

Senator Ferguson: That would not come over and should be in the Army file?

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So someone apparently has remade these files and put on the top 7001, and it should be on the bottom of this other file?

Captain Kramer: That is my recollection of the way those files were maintained when I had charge of the section. It is probable that the Chief Ship's Clerk, Bryant, can give more specific information on that point, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now what is this sheet

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Where is Bryant now?

Captain Kramer: I believe he is in this room, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, when did you first learn that there had been a blank sheet of paper with the exception of what we have read in that file?

Captain Kramer: I first learned, Senator, a week ago Saturday that there was not only this blank --

Senator Ferguson: Just stick to this now.

The Chairman: Let him answer.

Captain Kramer: Not only this blank file, but a half dozen or more other blank files in the 1941 translation file, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, I will put the question again.

When did you first learn that there was a vacant place in these numbers, and that 7001 had this sheet in it?

Captain Kramer: From first-hand knowledge is what I was testifying to.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, first-hand knowledge.

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Just recently?

Captain Kramer: Just recently, yes, sir. I have heard about this blank file, of course, for a year or more past.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Who had custody of these books that could have put this sheet in?

Captain Kramer: My chief yeoman, Bryant, primarily, who inserted them in that file, although my officer assistant, Lieutenant Harrison, might and did at times earlier in the year, do so, or an assistant yeoman in training by the name of Densford might well have done it as part of his assistance to my chief yeoman.

Senator Ferguson: Now, will you tell us if there are any other blank sheets, we will call it blank because there are not translations in this book, that are not initialed, or dated?

Captain Kramer: Not that I am aware of, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All others, if they are blank they are dated, and initialed?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And the only one not dated and not initialed, is this 7001.

Captain Kramer: On that point I have testified that earlier in the year Lieutenant Harrison whom I have referred to, used these files in preparing his gists, that if he in the process of preparing the daily gists discovered a duplication, an extra part of a multi-part message that had previously been assigned a file number, he would have

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 removed that extra part, cancelled the file number and
2 combined it with the earlier file number of that multi-part
3 message, and apparently, in fact obviously, from what appears
4 in these files, in doing so, he wrote the blank file nota-
5 tion out in handwriting and inserted it in the file. He
6 was not a typist, in my recollection, except of the "hunt
7 and peck" variety.

8 Senator Ferguson: Now, answering my question, I want
9 to know whether there is any other page in this book where
10 there is simply a typewritten notation and with the number
11 in pencil rather than in long-hand and initialed and
12 dated?

13 Captain Kramer: Not that I am aware of, sir, no, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Do you know of any reason why the
15 committee should not have seen this so-called blank page
16 with this memorandum on it that I have read prior to
17 bringing it here in the last few days?

18 Captain Kramer: I am not familiar, Senator, with
19 current policy.

20 Senator Ferguson: I am asking if you know of anything.

21 Captain Kramer: I do not, no, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

23 The Chairman: Is it any part of your duty to know.

24 Captain Kramer: No, sir.
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: I have a question or two, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Counsel wishes to pursue the inquiry.

Mr. Richardson: Captain, I wish you would turn your mind again to the Japanese words which were contained in the original winds code broadcast.

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: We have been talking here a great deal about the phrase HIGASHI NO KAZE AME.

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Has there ever been the slightest question anywhere by anybody as to what the English translation of those words was?

Captain Kramer: Not that I am aware of, no, sir.

Mr. Richardson: And that translation was "East wind rain":

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Now, "East wind rain" either in the Japanese language or the English language, by itself, was of no significance, was it?

Captain Kramer: Not without knowing the code referred to, no, sir.

Mr. Richardson: There had to be some additional Japanese language in the instrument which set up the code that placed an understanding that was to follow the use

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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of the words "East wind rain"?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson; Now, when you turn to the Japanese language contained in that dispatch, which is shown in Exhibit 142 under date of November 6, 1941 -- do you find it?

Referring now to the dispatch sent to the Commander in Chief?

Captain Kramer: Referring to the table of contents, sir, I can probably find it more readily.

Mr. Richardson: There is no paging on this thing.

Captain Kramer: I have it.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Mr. Richardson: Now, that document, as I understand
2 it, purports to be a document sent to the MacArthur staff
3 in Tokyo about November 6, 1941 and as I am advised it sets
4 forth under the title --

5 The Chairman: You don't mean 1941?

6 Mr. Richardson: 1941 is what it says at the top.

7 The Chairman: To the MacArthur staff in Manila?

8 Mr. Richardson: No. It recites here, 6 November 1941,
9 from the War Department to the MacArthur staff. That may
10 be an error.

11 Mr. Murphy: I believe you find that it should be 1945.

12 Mr. Richardson: It is of no importance because it
13 refers to Circular 2353. Does it not, Captain?

14 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Richardson: And Circular 2353 was the instrument
16 that fixed the original winds code?

17 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: The winds code which Captain Safford
19 says related to the winds execute which he testified con-
20 cerning?

21 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Richardson: Now, following the phrase "Circular
23 2353" are some 16 lines of Japanese?

24 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Mr. Richardson: And under the figure 1, about the
2 middle of the Japanese phraseology in that dispatch, occurs,
3 together with other words, the words "Higashi no kaze ame"?

4 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Richardson: The words which you have identified
6 as meaning "East Wind Rain"?

7 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Richardson: Now, in order to find out the meaning
9 that the Japanese agents would get from reading from an
10 execute under that code dispatch you would have to go back
11 into the language which preceded the phrase "Higashi no kaze
12 ame", would you not?

13 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Richardson: And when you do go back you find, do
15 you not, in the fifth line of the Japanese words, the word
16 "wagahoo"?

17 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: And then there follows some nine
19 Japanese words?

20 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Richardson: Ending with the word "wa"?

22 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Richardson: And it is true, is it not, Captain,
24 that the meaning of that phrase starting with "wagahoo" and
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 ending in "wa", constitutes in this dispatch which fixed
2 the code, as to what, so far as the United States was con-
3 cerned, the phrase "East Wind Rain", "Higashi no kaze ame"
4 was intended to mean to Japanese agents who read the code
5 execute?

6 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Richardson: Now, what is the definition of the
8 words commencing with "wagahoo" and ending with "wa"?

9 Captain Kramer: "Wagahoo", is the Japanese word literally
10 translated meaning "our side", or in better English, "we".

11 "No", is a preposition identical in character with our
12 prepositions, a possessive.

13 "Gaikoo" means "foreign".

14 "Kankei" means "relations".

15 In other words, the first four words means "Our foreign
16 relations".

17 "Kiken ni hinsuru", means "are approaching danger",
18 "kiken" meaning "danger", "hin", meaning "approaching", or
19 "in close proximity to", something of that nature.

20 "Baai" means simply "when".

21 Mr. Richardson: Then the definition would be "When
22 our foreign relations are approaching danger"?

23 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Richardson: Is there any word there or any permissible
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 translation which would give effect to such a word as "war"?

2 Captain Kramer: No, sir, except an evaluation which
3 would be stretched to mean that.

4 Mr. Richardson: In other words, unless the phrase
5 "our foreign relations are approaching danger", can be
6 construed to mean "war" there is no "war" permissible under
7 the Japanese translation of this dispatch?

8 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Richardson: And has there ever been any translation
10 by any of the experts in Washington of that dispatch that
11 differs materially from the translation which you have just
12 given?

13 Captain Kramer: No, sir; there has not.

14 Mr. Richardson: And when you refer to the translation
15 which appears in the translation which we received from
16 the Asiatic Fleet which is shown in Exhibit 142 as 1(c) the
17 phrase -- have you it before you?

18 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Richardson: The phrase contained in the dispatch
20 which came to us from the Asiatic Fleet having reference
21 to this same code establishment, the phrase is "IF DIPLOMATIC
22 RELATIONS ARE ON THE VERGE OF BEING SEVERED", do you, as
23 a Japanese scholar, believe that that phrase "IF DIPLOMATIC
24 RELATIONS ARE ON THE VERGE OF BEING SEVERED", is a permissible
25 translation of the Japanese words which you just read and

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 which you interpreted as meaning "When our foreign relations
2 are approaching danger"?

3 Captain Kramer: That is a close proximity to it, yes, sir.
4 It might be translated that way.

5 Mr. Richardson: All right. So, Captain, it would be
6 of no significance at all, would it, in determining whether
7 a dispatch was construed to mean "war", it would be of no
8 significance at all that the language of "Higashi no kaze ame"
9 was used?

10 Captain Kramer: Not "war", no, sir.

11 Mr. Richardson: You would have to use those Japanese
12 words I have just quoted simply as a flag to indicate that
13 here was an East Wind Rain message?

14 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Richardson: And then to determine what East Wind
16 Rain meant you would be completely confined to the meaning
17 which had been interpreted of the Japanese language that
18 you have just spelled out for us word by word in the original
19 dispatch creating the code?

20 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Richardson: So I ask you again, anyone looking at
22 a dispatch and seeing the words "Higashi no kaze ame" on
23 it would not have progressed in his understanding of what
24 the dispatch might convey by way of meaning unless he went
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 back to the original Japanese words in the original code
2 message and obtained a translation of what these words
3 between "wagahoo" and "ni", mean in that original dispatch?

4 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Richardson: Now, one thing further. There has
6 been some suggestion here that this blank page which the
7 Senator from Michigan examined you concerning, 7001, that
8 that blank page, it has been suggested here, might act as
9 a tell-tale to the abstraction from the file of what is
10 asserted may have been a wind execute message and, to be
11 more specific, and, as I understand the inference in the
12 testimony, simply for the purpose of bringing you to the
13 point of my next question, the suggestion is that this
14 message which you and Captain Safford have testified came
15 in either on the morning of the 4th of December or the 5th
16 of December, that went to Admiral Noyes, may have been the
17 message which when it was abstracted from the file was
18 succeeded in that file by that master page 7001, which, as
19 the Senator pointed out, has no stamp on it and no longhand
20 writing.

21 Now, did any dispatch ever go into your files of
22 which these files are a part where the dispatch had not
23 originally come through your office for transmission to the
24 proper recipients?

25 Captain Kramer: None, sir.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: And if by reason of a special arrangement entered into by Admiral Noyes, as testified to by Captain Safford, a message was to come from the teletype and be transmitted direct to Admiral Noyes for dissemination by Admiral Noyes under such system as he might authorize, could there be in your files at any time properly a copy of that message?

Captain Kramer: No, sir, unless by some chance it was sent back to my office for additional dissemination.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Richardson: That would mean, sir, would it not that it would have to have come back to you from Admiral Noyes, or someone under his authority, the message which Captain Safford says was to go direct to Admiral Noyes and be disseminated by Admiral Noyes without reference to you?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Would the return of such a message to you under those circumstances have been in the routine, or would it have been highly irregular?

Captain Kramer: It would have been unusual in that that type of message was the only instance in which in the set-up directed by Admiral Noyes it ever occurred.

Mr. Richardson: I have no further questions.

The Chairman: Captain -

Witness Kramer

h2

1 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

2 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I would like before
3 we proceed further, to read a memorandum --

4 The Chairman: Unless there are some further ques-
5 tions of the Captain --

6 Senator Ferguson: I have a question, Mr. Chairman.

7 Mr. Richardson: This has to do with my examination.

8 The Chairman: All right.

9 Mr. Richardson: I would like to read a memorandum
10 furnished me by Commander Baecher in response to a request
11 made for information regarding the handling of the ALUSNA
12 Batavia dispatch 031030 of December 1941, as to which,
13 just for the information of the committee, I will suggest
14 there has been some reference here, as to the possibility
15 that someone may have read this dispatch from Batavia
16 before the so-called winds execute message came in, and
17 put on the winds message as a result the definition which
18 the Batavia dispatch contained.

19 The information is this:

20 "(a) As previously stated, the time of receipt of
21 the above dispatch was 040621 GCT 4 December 1941 which
22 was 1:21 a.m. 4 December 1941, local time.

23 "(b) The time of decoding of this dispatch was 050645
24 GCT, which was 1:45 a.m. 5 December 1941 (local time).
25

h3

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 The 24-hour lapse between receipt and decoding is accounted
2 for by the routing designation which was 'deferred', the
3 lowest priority in handling.

4 "2. No further information is available regarding
5 the exact time of delivery to a naval officer inasmuch as
6 no written record was kept of delivery times."

7 That is all.

8 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

9 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

10 Senator Ferguson: In answer to some of Mr. Richardson's
11 question, and I think sometime ago, you stated that the
12 Japanese in their language were accustomed to understatement-
13 s. That is, they described things weaker than we would.

14 Captain Kramer: Often that is the case, yes.

15 Senator Ferguson: Could that account for the differ-
16 ence here between "war" and the other expressions?

17 Captain Kramer: No, sir, not in this case, I do not
18 think. However, as I pointed out in the previous testimony
19 in the case of the Dutch East Indies, later on in the mes-
20 sage --

21 Senator Ferguson: I think you have described that
22 before.

23 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, I have.

24 Senator Ferguson: Just one more group of questions on
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4

1 where these numbers are.

2 I wish you would look at No. 142. Have you got
3 that page? I can bring it to you.

4 Go to 7119. Your number, JD number.

5 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do you have that on the page?

7 Captain Kramer: I do, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: Now, that is translated -- the date
9 is not significant, when the message came in. You can't
10 tell anything about its order that way?

11 Captain Kramer: No, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Because you have got December 2,
13 December 3, and then December 2 down under 7122, 7123, and
14 7124. So let's go to the date of translation 12-6-41.
15 Navy, wasn't it?

16 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: The next one, 7120, translated
18 12-6-41, Army; 7121, 12-6-41 Army. Now, following, 7122
19 12-5-41, Navy. So that is a Navy.

20 The next one is 7123, 12-6-41, Navy. There you have
21 a Navy translation on the 5th between two Navy translations
22 on the 6th. Isn't that correct?

23 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Then you have 7124, translated
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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12-7-41, Army. So you have a Navy of the 5th between an Army of the 7th and the Navy of the 6th; is that correct?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So, it wasn't anything unusual to have a number out of its sequence, was it?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, it was.

Senator Ferguson: Well, you will find all through this, the same thing as I checked on this one.

Captain Kramer: If you will notice, Senator, from the dividing line just below which is 7110 and the Roman numeral V --

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Captain Kramer: The chronological dates run in order from 18 November down to file number 7123, 3 December. There should be another dividing line at that point indicating what was disseminated in that batch. All the dates of translation in that batch are five or six December. The 5 would indicate that those were translated late afternoon or evening of the 5th, and they were not disseminated until some of the first translations the morning of the 6th.

Senator Ferguson: Go over to 7090.

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: There you have 7.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: There you have a Navy, 12-5-41.

Another Navy 12-5-41. The next one 7092, Navy, 12-41.
7095, Navy, 12-5-41.

So you have a 4 in between two 5's.

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The same explanation there?

Captain Kramer: All that block on that page is of
similar character. They are 4 or 5 dates. That block
carries through the dividing line after file No. 7109.

Senator Ferguson: But, there is no dividing line
on here that I can see.

Captain Kramer: On the next page there is, sir,
below 7109.

Senator Ferguson: Oh, yes. That is all.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman --

The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: On page 252 of the Intercepts, there is
a message about which no witness has testified. We have
had no word on it. That is Exhibit 1.

There was a statement in the press at one time quoting
Senator Ferguson, I believe, to the effect that that refer-
red to the European war.

I do not think that we should come to a close of the

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h7

1 hearings without something on that message.

2 Captain, before you leave, do you know anything about
3 that Budapest message?

4 Captain Kramer: My study, Mr. Murphy, the other day
5 for Senator Ferguson, did not extend to File No. 7184.
6 It could be readily done in the next few minutes, I think,
7 since the file is here.

8 Senator Ferguson: I don't think the witness under-
9 stands your question.

10 Mr. Murphy: The particular message I am referring to
11 is from Budapest to Tokyo, December 7, 1941, No. 104.

12 Captain Kramer: That is the one.

13 Mr. Murphy: On the page 252:

14 "On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the
15 Government of this country a British Government communique
16 to the effect that a state of war would break out on the
17 7th.

18 "Relayed to Berlin."

19 And then:

20 "Army 25866.

21 "JD 7184."

22 As I said, there has been a reference in the papers
23 quoting Senator Ferguson as saying that that apparently
24 referred to the European War. Am I correct?
25

h8

Witness Kramer

1 Senator Ferguson: I don't know what the papers may
2 have quoted.

3 All I do know, and will state on the record now, is
4 that as I read that message it is the war between Great
5 Britain and Hungary and has nothing to do whatever with
6 Pearl Harbor or the Japanese American war, or Japanese
7 British war.

8 Mr. Murphy: It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, be-
9 fore we close, we ought to have a definite statement on
10 that, so we can dismiss it from our thinking.

11 Senator Ferguson: I think it is clear from the page
12 itself what they were talking about. There was a declara-
13 tion of war delivered by the British to the Hungarian
14 Government through the Japanese.

15 Mr. Gearhart: What is the fact? Was war declared
16 on Hungary on the 7th?

17 Senator Ferguson: That is true, - war was declared
18 between Great Britain and Hungary on the 7th. I do think
19 we ought to have testimony on it.

20 The Chairman: Are there any other questions?

21 Captain Kramer: Mr. Murphy, a hasty study in the
22 last minute on that point would indicate that Navy File
23 Nos. 7152 run chronologically from 15 November 1941
24 through 7 December 1941, which is the date of translation
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h9

1 of the message you were talking about.

2 Immediately following that block is one or more trans-
3 lations dated 8 December 1941. That would indicate to
4 me from further study, my first reaction would be that it
5 was translated by Army on the 7th and disseminated at
6 least so far as Navy is concerned, probably the afternoon
7 of the 7th.

8 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, there has been a request
9 made that the record be cleared on that. Apparently it
10 referred to the European war, and I think the record
11 should be filled in in regard to that gap so that we can
12 dismiss that from our thinking.

13 The Chairman: Mr. Gearhart.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Captain, you testified that you had no
15 intention of calling your memorandum to the attention of
16 this committee until you were asked a question about it.
17 Do I remember your testimony correctly in that regard?

18 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

19 Mr. Gearhart; Why had you reached that conclusion?
20 Because you thought the paper was unimportant?

21 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir; since I was here to testify
22 myself regarding the fact.

23 Mr. Gearhart: But you have referred to other notes,
24 from which you refreshed your memory, have you not?

25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Captain Kramer: The only notes or papers of any kind that I have referred to are papers since I arrived in Washington around the 6th of December of last year, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Of last year, you say?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Haven't you looked at any papers since you have been here on this particular mission?

Captain Kramer: I have not.

Mr. Gearhart: Since you have been here to appear as a witness?

Captain Kramer: None, except as I have previously testified, those shown to me last summer as Exhibits before the Hewitt Board of investigation.

Mr. Gearhart: From the examination that you have had on the subject of this memorandum, it would appear that the members of this committee considered that memorandum a very important document in this proceeding. Isn't that the impression you have gotten after listening to all the questions?

Captain Kramer: The impression I have gained, Mr. Gearhart, is that apparently at least some members of the committee attach a great deal of importance to the impressions I had of circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbor at the time I prepared that memorandum.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h11

1 Mr. Gearhart: Circumstances that are at variance to
2 a certain degree between the testimony you have given
3 before and the testimony you have given now?

4 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Gearhart: I noticed in the testimony of Captain
6 Safford, that he referred to some messages, intercepts,
7 and so forth, that had not theretofore been introduced
8 in evidence in this proceeding; do you recall that?

9 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Have you during the course of your
11 testimony referred to any messages of any kind that are
12 not already in evidence or were not in evidence before you
13 mentioned them?

14 Captain Kramer: I do not believe I have, sir.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Do you know of any messages, inter-
16 cepts of any kind, that have not been introduced in evidence
17 in this proceeding?

18 Captain Kramer: No, sir, I do not, with the possible
19 exception that from my own memory there are certain things
20 in back traffic of a year or more before that simply
21 parallel and throw some light on interpretation to be
22 put on messages of a nature similar to those immediately
23 preceding Pearl Harbor.

24 I refer, for example, to such things as messages
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

hl2

1 concerning ship movements.

2 Mr. Gearhart: Well, there are some messages on
3 ship movements that have been put in evidence. Do you
4 believe there are others on ship movements that have been
5 withheld from the record?

6 Captain Kramer: I do not believe that those in evi-
7 dence extend back before the beginning of 1941, although
8 I may be mistaken in that respect.

9 The first of January, 1941, I mean.

10 Mr. Gearhart: The ones we have been referring to
11 are rather recent. December 6, 1941. Referring to the
12 exhibits that appear on page 14 of Exhibit 2. Do you
13 mean that there are others that are closer, during the last
14 week, that are not included in Exhibit 2?

15 Captain Kramer: Not that I am aware, no. I have not
16 studied the files to determine that point.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Do you have any in mind that up to
18 now have been withheld from the record of this hearing?

19 Captain Kramer: None that I know of, no, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: You are familiar with the President's
21 order of November 7, directed to all chief executives of
22 all executive departments, agencies, commissions, and
23 bureaus, including the General Chiefs of Staff?

24 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: You are familiar with the fact that it is made the duty of every officer of the Army and Navy and whether presently in the service or out of the service to volunteer any information that may be of importance to this committee?

Captain Kramer: Fully aware of that, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Then, if you knew of the injunction the President had imposed upon you to reveal to us whatever evidence may be brought to your attention, why didn't you call that letter or memorandum that you prepared when in the South Pacific with Admiral Halsey to the attention of the committee?

Captain Kramer: I considered that by no stretch of the imagination as being considered as better testimony than I could give first-hand now, or better than I had given before previous hearings, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Don't you think it was your duty under that order of the President to state that the testimony you were giving at that time was not the testimony you would have given had you been called at the time you prepared the memorandum?

Captain Kramer: I am not at all certain I would have given that version in the detail I did if I had been called to testify at that time. That memorandum was pre-

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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pared under some degree of pressure without any particular attempt to rehash or refresh my memory on it, purely and simply Admiral Halsey a broad picture of the situation in Washington at that time, and was not intended to be as meticulously accurate as I could make it at that time.

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Mr. Gearhart: Certainly you had no idea of leading Admiral Halsey to conclusions that did not conform to the facts, did you?

Captain Kramer: No, sir. There was no question on what whatsoever raised during our conversations since he simply read that memorandum and we discussed no details concerning it.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, certainly you wanted to be accurate when you were relaying information to your Commander, did you not?

Captain Kramer: Certainly.

Mr. Gearhart: Then, did you not at that time prepare it with the utmost possible care in order that your commander would not be deceived?

Captain Kramer: I did, sir, keeping in mind the pressure under which I was working to do so, and my previous remarks on this point.

Mr. Gearhart: Then you made every effort at that time to make that memorandum represent your then recollection

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h15

1 of what had transpired during the days preceding Pearl
2 Harbor?

3 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: And you also prepared that paper with
5 the fact in mind that it might sometime aid you in the
6 case of you eventually appearing as a witness subsequently?

7 Captain Kramer: Would you repeat that?

8 Mr. Gearhart: As an aid to your memory in any subse-
9 quent proceeding?

10 Captain Kramer: At no time, whatsoever, Mr. Gearhart,
11 did I have the conception in mind in preparing that memo-
12 randum. In fact, my expectation was when I prepared it
13 that I would destroy it within a few days and prepare the
14 deposition or affidavit which I had promised Admiral Halsey
15 to do.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Now, there is one other question I want
17 to ask you, and that is about all I have.

18 Do you remember of having intercepted any messages
19 whatsoever from the civilian government of the Philippines
20 to Washington?

21 Captain Kramer: No, sir, I don't believe I ever
22 have seen a message from the High Commissioner or the
23 Philippine Government to Washington, sir.

24 Mr. Gearhart: You say you have never seen one?
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

hl6

1 Captain Kramer: I may have been shown one at some
2 time, as an exhibit, or otherwise. I recall none now. I
3 was not customarily shown such messages, however.

4 Mr. Gearhart: When you are monitoring for Japanese
5 exchanges, you naturally pick up those other exchanges,
6 don't you?

7 Captain Kramer: No, our monitoring system kept
8 entirely clear of U. S. Government or dependency circuits.

9 Mr. Gearhart: You know nothing then, of a short wave
10 telephone call between any of the High officials of the
11 Philippine Government and of the State Department in the
12 early days of December, December 6, 1941?

13 Captain Kramer: Nothing, sir.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Did you ever hear it discussed among
15 those with whom you were associated?

16 Captain Kramer: I may have. I don't recall having
17 heard it previously to your mentioning it.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Who would intercept messages of that
19 kind if any occurred?

20 Captain Kramer: I do not know so.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Wasn't the Government monitoring every-
22 thing that went through the air, the Army, the FCC?

23 Captain Kramer: I don't know what the rest of the
24 Government was monitoring, sir. I only have in a general
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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way, though I think a fairly comprehensive way, knowledge of what our Navy monitoring system was covering, and to a less degree what the Army monitoring system on foreign intercepts, was covering.

Mr. Gearhart: Was your station in Virginia equipped to pick up all short-wave broadcasts?

Captain Kramer: I do not know, sir.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Mr. Gearhart: Would it require different kind of
2 equipment to pick up the dot-dash than oral discussion?

3 Captain Kramer: I believe the same radio sets can be
4 used for both, sir, depending on the range. It would require
5 different appurtenances, however.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Did you have as one of your responsibilities
7 the transmittal of messages to our own commands?

8 Captain Kramer: None whatsoever, sir.

9 Mr. Gearhart: You had nothing to do with the trans-
10 mittal of messages say to the Naval Stations on the Pacific
11 Coast?

12 Captain Kramer: No, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Or to the Coast Guard, for instance,
14 that might be in charge of harbor defenses in different
15 places on the Pacific Coast?

16 Captain Kramer: None whatsoever, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Who would have to do with that?

18 Captain Kramer: Presumably some division of the
19 Office of Chief of Naval Operations, possibly War Plans,
20 though I am not certain on that point, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

22 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I propound one addi-
23 tional question?

24 The Chairman: Yes.
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: Captain Kramer, there has been much
3 speculation and much conjecture as to the conversation you
4 had with the Foreign Service Officer of Secretary Knox on
5 Sunday morning, December 7, when you were delivering important
6 magic messages to the Secretary.

7 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Lucas: Now, as I understand from your previous
9 testimony you were surprised when you learned of the attack
10 on Pearl Harbor?

11 Captain Kramer: At about a quarter to 2 in the afternoon,
12 yes, sir, very much so.

13 Senator Lucas: In other words, there was nothing in
14 the statement that you made to the Foreign Service Officer
15 of Secretary Knox which could give him any impression that
16 you knew or believed that the Japanese were going to attack
17 Pearl Harbor at 7 or 7:30 in the morning?

18 Captain Kramer: None whatsoever, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: Whatever you said at that time to this
20 Service Officer merely directed or called attention to the
21 difference in time at the various places in the Pacific
22 in line with what the 1:00 o'clock messaged called for?

23 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, that is it.

24 Senator Lucas: That is all.

25 The Chairman: Captain, when you first appeared here

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

1 you gave in detail your record in the Navy. I don't recall
2 whether anyone asked you about the decoration which you wear
3 upon your breast.

4 Would you mind telling us what that indicates?

5 Captain Kramer: It is not a decoration, sir. It is
6 simply a badge, of pure gold, I understand, presented to me
7 by the Navy Department in 1930 as a result of getting three
8 legs, as required, on this badge, which is known as the
9 Distinguished Marksman's Medal for rifle shooting.

10 The Chairman: Had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor?

11 Captain Kramer: No, sir, none whatever.

12 The Chairman: The committee thanks you for your forthright
13 testimony and before you are excused the Chair would like
14 to ask you if there is any other statement or information you
15 have to submit to the committee bearing upon the Pearl
16 Harbor situation which has not been elicited by the "few"
17 questions that have been asked you during your examination.

18 Captain Kramer: I think all knowledge I have of
19 circumstances and details surrounding Pearl Harbor have been
20 exhaustively elicited, sir.

21 The Chairman: The committee thanks you, Captain, very
22 much for your cooperation.

23 Captain Kramer: Thank you, sir.

24 The Chairman: You are excused.

25 (Witness excused)

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I should like to present
for examination Admiral Ingersoll.

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(9)

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The Chairman: Admiral Ingersoll, come around.

5

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL,

6

UNITED STATES NAVY

7

(Admiral Ingersoll was duly sworn by the Chairman.)

8

Mr. Richardson: Admiral, will you state your name to
the reporter, please?

9

Admiral Ingersoll: R. E. Ingersoll, Admiral, U. S. Navy.

10

The Vice Chairman: Will you spell your last name,
please, Admiral?

11

Admiral Ingersoll: I-n-g-e-r-s-o-l-l-i.

12

Mr. Richardson: How old are you, Admiral?

13

Admiral Ingersoll: I shall be 63 the 24th of June of
this year.

14

Mr. Richardson: How long have you been in the Navy of
the United States?

15

Admiral Ingersoll: I entered the Navy in March of 1901.

16

Mr. Richardson: What is your present rank?

17

Admiral Ingersoll: Admiral, U. S. Navy.

18

Mr. Richardson: Will you in a very brief way detail
what your progression has been in the Navy in point of
assignments generally during the time you have been with
the Navy?

19

20

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Admiral Ingersoll: I graduated from the Naval Academy
2 in 1905. My sea service following graduation was 6 years
3 in battleships, until 1911.

4 My next cruise was on the China Station, Asiatic Station,
5 1913 to 1916, most of which I was on the staff of the
6 Commander in Chief.

7 From 1919 to 1921 I was the Executive Officer of the
8 battleships CONNECTICUT and ARIZONA.

9 My next cruise was in the command of a surveying ship.

10 From 1928 to 1930 I was at that time a Captain and was
11 Chief of Staff of the Battle Fleet, Assistant Chief of Staff
12 of the Battle Fleet, and also Chief of Staff of the U.S.
13 Fleet.

14 In 1933 to 1935 I commanded the heavy cruisers AGUSTA
15 and SAN FRANCISCO.

16 From 1938 to 1940 I commanded a division of heavy
17 cruisers in the Pacific Fleet.

18 And from the first of January 1942 until the middle
19 of November 1944 I was the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic
20 Fleet, during this war.

21 At that date I was detached in order to command the
22 Western Sea Frontier, which is my present duty, which in-
23 cludes command of the 19th Fleet.

24 Mr. Richardson: What was your assignment during
25 November and December 1941?

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Admiral Ingersoll: I was at that time Assistant Chief
2 of Naval Operations.

3 Mr. Richardson: Your immediate superior was Admiral
4 Stark?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct.

6 Mr. Richardson: What were your duties generally speaking
7 in that assignment, Admiral?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: The Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-
9 tions had no duties assigned by law or by Navy regulations.
10 By Executive Order he was a member of the Joint Board which
11 was the forerunner of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By office
12 regulations prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations he
13 was in general supervision of all officers of the Office
14 of Chief of Naval Operations. I had no original cognizance
15 of any manner. As a matter of fact I had no office other
16 than myself. And all heads of sections took up their questions
17 with me usually before presenting them to the Chief of Naval
18 Operations.

19 Once the Chief of Naval Operations had established a
20 policy, I endeavored then to relieve him of all of the load
21 that I could of the details in carrying out that policy,
22 in signing papers and releasing dispatches, I kept him in-
23 formed of correspondence when I thought there was something
24 of which he should be informed.
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Mr. Richardson: Now, you testified in connection with
2 this Pearl Harbor matter first in what is called the Hart
3 investigation; did you not?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: I did.

5 Mr. Richardson: And then after that you also testified
6 before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Richardson: Are those the only two of the preceding
9 investigations where you have been presented as a witness?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct. I talked to
11 Admiral Hewitt when he passed through San Francisco. I am
12 quite certain that he did not consider me as a witness but
13 I did talk to him. I think he found I had no information
14 which was of value to him for the particular thing he was
15 looking for.

16 Mr. Richardson: You were not sworn except in the two
17 investigations that I have referred to?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct.

19 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, I wish to say as far
20 as counsel is concerned that I have made an examination of
21 your testimony in both of these hearings. I have no further
22 questions to ask you with reference to the general scope
23 of your testimony in those hearings, which I think was rather
24 full and comprehensive, but there has been developed in this
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 case this matter, by previous witnesses, questions concern-
2 ing the existence of what has been called an execute of
3 the winds code.

4 When I speak of the winds code you know, do you not,
5 what I am talking about?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: I do.

7 Mr. Richardson: Referring to page 429 of the testimony
8 that you gave in the Hart investigation I should like to
9 read you several questions and answers for the purpose of
10 directing your attention to the particular subject there
11 discussed. The question is this:

12 "68. Q. During November or December, '41, you were
13 cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged
14 under which they were to inform their nationals, concerning
15 against what nations they would make aggressive movements,
16 by means of a partial weather report?

17 "A. Yes, I do recall such messages.

18 "69. Q. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4
19 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating
20 that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the
21 United States?

22 "A. Yes.

23 "70. Q. Do you know why that particular information
24 was not sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific?
25

(10)

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 "A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that
2 the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also
3 received this broadcast. However, it may have been because
4 of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese
5 codes which had been sent to London and Washington which
6 indicated that war with the United States and with Great
7 Britain was imminent."

8 Keeping that testimony in mind I also wish to read to
9 you testimony which you gave before the Naval Court. I
10 read from page 825; question 33:

11 "Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63. This
12 document has been popularly termed by some witnesses as
13 the 'winds code'. State whether on or before 7 December
14 1941, you had seen or been informed of the contents of
15 this document.

16 "A. Yes, I had been. I remember a message of this
17 character.

18 "34. Q. Will you relate the circumstances under which
19 it came within your cognizance?

20 "A. This document bears the inscription, 'Translated
21 on November 28'. According to the system, I probably saw
22 that on the following day, on the 29th. I also recall that
23 at the time this message was received, or possibly the
24 execution which is referred to in the message, that there
25

1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 was some difference of opinion among the translators as to
3 just what was meant. Whether or not what I saw is exactly
4 in the form as it appears there or not I am not certain.
5 However, I did know definitely that they were setting up a
6 code to be used in a weather broadcast.

7 "35. Q. Can you state whether or not this information
8 was discussed by you and the Chief of Naval Operations,
9 Admiral Stark?

10 "A. I don't remember whether it was discussed with
11 Admiral Stark or not.

12 "36. Q. Did you take any action yourself as a result
13 of the information that was contained in this document 15?

14 "A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this
15 dispatch at that time, because, as I have stated before, I
16 believe there was some doubt in the minds of translators
17 as to just what the translation should be.

18 "37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt
19 was?

20 "A. No, I do not recall, except that there was some
21 doubt as to whether they had an exact translation -- a
22 difference of opinion among the translators as to what the
23 Japanese words meant.

24 "38. Q. Can you recall whether this difference of
25 opinion related to the subject of a declaration of war or

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 whether it related to severance of negotiations, or what the
2 discussion was about -- can you remember that?

3 "A. No, I don't remember that point now.

4 "39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941, did you
5 receive any information as to whether or not code words
6 had been received in the Navy Department which would put
7 in effect the action contemplated by the so-called 'winds'
8 message?

9 "A. Yes.

10 "40. Q. Will you state the circumstances?

11 "A. I recall that sometime I did see the messages
12 which were supposed to put this 'winds' message, translated
13 on the 28th, into effect. I do not recall whether I saw
14 them prior to December 7 or afterwards. If I saw them
15 prior to December 7, I am quite sure that would have been
16 considered confirmation of the information which had
17 previously been received and which had been sent to the
18 Fleet on December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction
19 of codes at London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere,
20 which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

21 "41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before
22 7 December 1941, any action was taken in the office of
23 Chief of Naval Operations as a result of the information
24 contained in this execution of the 'winds' code which you
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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state you saw?

"A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. If it was after December 7, there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all Fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

"42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the 'winds' code?

"A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December 1941."

Now, Admiral, having called that testimony to your attention, what is your present recollection with reference to your having seen any dispatch which purported to be an execute of this winds code which it is agreed had been sent out by the Japanese and intercepted by our interceptors?

Admiral Ingersoll: During these two investigations the circumstances under which I saw these things were not asked me. I recall that I was informed by officers who

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 came to my office and not by the means of the sheaf of
2 messages which was distributed daily that a message
3 supposed to be in the winds code had been received. I
4 assumed that it was correct, that they had the proper thing.
5 I thought that when I testified before Admiral Hart and
6 I thought so when I testified before the Naval Court of
7 Inquiry.

8 However, inasmuch as it had come in after the dispatches
9 sent to the Fleets regarding the destruction of codes it
10 was of no importance. Simply confirmed what we had already
11 sent out.

12 Mr. Richardson: Do you recall whether your information
13 with reference to this so-called execute came to you by
14 reason of some writing in a dispatch or memorandum or by
15 the telephone or orally?

16 Admiral Ingersoll: No. I remember distinctly that
17 officers came into my office with it. They had a piece
18 of paper with them which purported to be a message sent
19 in the wind code.

20 Mr. Richardson: Now, there has been some discussion
21 here, Admiral, that there were executed in connection with
22 Captain McCollum's office a group of cards which cards were,
23 as I recall, three or four inches square, and that they
24 contained thereon the English words, so far as the United
25

1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 States was concerned, "East Wind Rain, United States", that
3 there were no Japanese words on those cards at all, just
4 the English words as relating to the United States, the
5 English words as relating to England, the English words as
6 relating to Russia.

7 Now, do you recall having received one of those cards?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: No, I did not have a set of cards.

9 Mr. Richardson: Then the paper that you saw in your
10 office was not one of those cards?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: I am not certain just what the
12 paper was now that the officers brought in to me.

13 Mr. Richardson: Did you examine that paper?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: It is possible that I might have,
15 but I do not recall it specifically.

16 Mr. Richardson: Do you speak Japanese?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: No, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: Had you familiarized yourself with
19 what an execute of the so-called winds code would be?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, I knew that from the original
21 dispatch which had come in in the latter part of November.

22 Mr. Richardson: And that paper that was brought in
23 to you, that you saw, you accepted as an execute under the
24 wind code?

25 Admiral Ingersoll: I understood it to be a message

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 which had been received in the wind code.

2 Mr. Richardson: Do you know what became of it?

3 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know except that I know
4 they took it out of my office when they left.

5 Mr. Richardson: Then the officers when they went
6 away took it with them?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Richardson: Did you ever hear that made a subject
9 of any conversation or reference thereafter as far as you
10 can recollect?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: No, and I paid no further attention
12 to it because of the fact that it simply confirmed, if it
13 was a genuine message, it simply confirmed what we had
14 already sent out regarding the destruction of codes, which
15 was absolutely positive.

16 Mr. Richardson: What would be the significance that
17 you, as a high ranking Naval officer, immediately below
18 Admiral Stark, who was the head of Naval Operations, what
19 was your then interpretation of the meaning of the informa-
20 tion that an enemy, supposed, was burning, destroying their
21 codes and diplomatic papers?

22 Shefner
23 follows

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Admiral Ingersoll: I considered that the information which we received regarding the destruction of the codes and which was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one being the dispatch stating that, "This is a war warning" in effect and that all hope of negotiations had broken off.

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Now, the wording in that winds message did not say that we are going to be in a state of war or that hostilities now exist. It referred to a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or that the situation between the countries was becoming critical.

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The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes is this: If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The consuls stay on.

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Now, in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes but they told their consuls in Manila, in Hong Kong, Singapore and Batavia to burn their codes and that did not

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations, it meant war, and
3 that information was sent out to the fleets as soon as we
4 got it and it made no difference whether we ever got an ex-
5 ecute from the winds after that or not, and that is why I
6 think officers in high positions are vague about it. It did
7 not make any difference.

8 Mr. Richardson: You, then, as the second ranking officer
9 in the Office of Naval Operations at the time you saw this
10 execute, so-called, did not regard it as of primary importance
11 as a basis for information to be sent to the field?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: If it had been a truthful message in
13 the winds code the most it could have done was to have con-
14 firmed what we had already sent out and it was not as positive
15 that war was coming as we had sent out.

16 Mr. Richardson: Have you any recollection in your mind
17 that this so-called execute, or any so-called execute had
18 thereafter been determined to be what we may refer to as a
19 false alarm?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: I have since heard it but I did not
21 know it at the time and I did not know it when I testified
22 before the investigation of Admiral Hart and the Court of
23 Inquiry.

24 Mr. Richardson: Did you communicate the fact of the dis-
25 closure of this so-called execute to your chief, Admiral Stark?

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Ingersoll: I cannot recall definitely that I did
3 or did not. I may have done so.

4 Mr. Richardson: Any message which came to your atten-
5 tion that you deemed of sufficient importance, it would have
6 been your duty to have seen to it that your chief learned of
7 that message?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: It would have been.

9 Mr. Richardson: Do you think it at all probable, Ad-
10 miral, that the fact that you do not remember having ac-
11 quainted Admiral Stark with the information you had as to this
12 winds execute was because of the little importance you at-
13 tached to that document?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: I think I should state it another
15 way, that because of the little importance which I attach to
16 it is the reason I have forgotten whether I did or did not.

17 Mr. Richardson: Do you know what officers brought it
18 in to you?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: No, I cannot remember definitely.

20 Mr. Richardson: Was there more than one?

21 Admiral Ingersoll: There were several officers for whom
22 it would have been a logical thing to do. There were half
23 a dozen officers who might have brought it in.

24 Mr. Richardson: Now, let me ask you how definite your
25 information is, Admiral, on when it was brought in, whether

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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before or after December 7th?

Admiral Ingersoll: I am not absolutely positive of that except that I am absolutely certain that it was after we had sent out the messages regarding the destruction of the codes.

Mr. Richardson: Well, in view of the startling commotion caused by the attack on the morning of the 7th it would be fair, would it not, to assume that your best recollection is that it came to you before the 7th?

Admiral Ingersoll: I think that is correct but I can not fix it definitely.

Mr. Richardson: Was there more than one such so-called execute that was shown to you or discussed with you?

Admiral Ingersoll: I can only recall one occasion on which officers brought in a message to me of that character.

Mr. Richardson: Would there have been any duty after acquainting you with that information, a duty to also bring it to the attention of Admiral Stark?

Admiral Ingersoll: They might have done so, but having brought it to my attention they would have trusted me to give it to him.

Mr. Richardson: And it would have been your duty to do so?

Admiral Ingersoll: If I had thought it was of suffi-

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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cient importance.

Mr. Richardson: Is there any other recollection that you have which throws any light on this so-called wind execute that you are able to state to the committee at this time?

Admiral Ingersoll: No, none that I can think of.

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, in view of my preliminary statement that after an examination I feel that all the other questions I might otherwise want to ask the Admiral are covered by his earlier testimony which has been twice presented and is in the record which will be of record in this committee also, I have no further questions to ask Admiral Ingersoll at this time.

The Chairman: The chair has no questions. Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman: No questions.

The Chairman: Senator George?

Senator George: No questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Clark?

Mr. Clark: No questions.

The Chairman: Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas: No questions.

The Chairman: Mr. Murphy?

Mr. Murphy: Admiral, there is a message on page 251 of exhibit 1. Will you hand that to the Admiral, please?

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Will you hand that to the Admiral, please? Did you ever see
3 that?

4 Admiral Ingersoll: Which number, sir?

5 Mr. Murphy: On the top of page 251, Admiral. Do you
6 recall ever having seen that message?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: You mean the one stating:

8 "Relations between Japan and England are not in
9 accordance with expectation"?

10 Mr. Murphy: Yes, sir. I am wondering if there would
11 be any possibility that you might have confused that with
12 some other message, Admiral; that came into the Navy Depart-
13 ment on the 7th of December and was apparently submitted to
14 the receivers of magic.

15 Admiral Ingersoll: If that came in on the 7th of De-
16 cember I would have normally seen it on the morning of the
17 8th. I do not recall this particular dispatch now.

18 Mr. Murphy: Well, I am wondering. You said you saw one
19 winds intercept and that is something that might appear to
20 be a winds intercept and I am wondering if you saw that or
21 if you saw something other than that?

22 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not recall it sufficiently
23 well to remember what it referred to, what countries it
24 referred to or the status.

25 Mr. Murphy: Well, you do not have any recollection now,

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 then, do you, of what the winds intercept which you feel you
3 saw or had called to your attention, you do not know what
4 country that referred to either, do you?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: Except that the winds code required
6 definite answers in accordance with the code and as I recall
7 now the general tenor was in accordance with the winds code.

8 Mr. Murphy: You mean all three countries?

9 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

10 Mr. Murphy: Or one or two?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: I think it was all three countries,
12 as I recall it.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you say that it was received af-
14 ter the messages had gone out to destroy the codes?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: Oh, yes.

16 Mr. Murphy: You sent those messages out on what date?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: I believe the date was the third or
18 fourth, I have forgotten which. It is in the record.

19 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, do you have any recollection in
20 addition to this particular officer handing you -- or in
21 calling it to your attention, what did he do after?

22 Admiral Ingersoll: I have every recollection that they
23 took it away with them when they left my office and that I
24 never saw it again.

25 Mr. Murphy: Were you one of the persons who ever saw the

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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magic on the regular distribution?

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Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, I saw them. They were brought to my office.

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Mr. Murphy: Now, do you have any recollection of ever seeing anything like this in magic form in the dispatch case that contained the magic?

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Admiral Ingersoll: I do not recall having seen it and from what I know of the system it would^{not} have been in the magic because it would have been a copy of a broadcast in plain Japanese.

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Mr. Murphy: In other words, what --

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Admiral Ingersoll: It would not have gone through the magic setup or system.

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Mr. Murphy: In fact, if it had not gone through the magic system it would not get into Captain Kramer's hands for distribution as magic, would it?

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Admiral Ingersoll: No.

Mr. Murphy: And if it had not gone through Captain Kramer for distribution as magic it would not be in the magic files, would it?

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Admiral Ingersoll: I don't know enough about the magic files to know. It would undoubtedly have gone through his section for translation.

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Mr. Murphy: Now, then, there has been testimony here

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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that the Chief of Naval Operations and apparently his group in Washington participated in a frame-up of Admiral Kimmel. Do you know of anything, of any kind of evidence of anything like that?

Admiral Ingersoll: I have not the slightest bit of evidence of anything of that kind, that anything of that kind occurred or was contemplated or was talked about.

Mr. Murphy: Well, there is a Navy Captain that has testified here to a frame-up. You don't know anything about any frame-up in the Navy, do you?

Admiral Ingersoll: I certainly do not and Kimmel was my candidate for that job when he was appointed. I mean by that when my opinion was asked I suggested Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy: There has also been testimony here to the effect that someone in the Navy Department, - and on one occasion the witness said he had a suspicion of Admiral Stark, although he changed it once or twice, but at any rate at one time he had a suspicion of Admiral Stark that if there was a winds execute message that they had ordered it to be destroyed because they had failed to notify Kimmel, that they were hiding their failure in ordering the destruction of that paper. Do you believe there is any foundation for that charge whatsoever?

Admiral Ingersoll: I have never heard anything like that,

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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sir, and I do not believe it.

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Mr. Murphy: Well, there is a Navy Captain, Safford, who put it in this record. You don't know anything about destroying any papers, do you?

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Admiral Ingersoll: I don't know anything about it.

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Mr. Murphy: Now, then, there also has been testimony in the record to the effect that you had a recollection that on the night of December 6th you did receive a copy of the thirteen parts of the fourteen part message. What is your recollection on that?

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Admiral Ingersoll: My recollection is very distinct on that.

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Mr. Murphy: That you did receive it?

Admiral Ingersoll: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: And who delivered it to you?

Admiral Ingersoll: I cannot recall who delivered it to me. I recall very definitely that some time on the evening of December the 6th or early in the morning of December the 7th that an officer came to my house and rang the door bell and woke me up and I went down and read the first thirteen -- read what they told me were the first thirteen parts of a long message.

Mr. Murphy: Now, Captain Kramer --

Admiral Ingersoll: And I don't know whether it was before

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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or after midnight.

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Mr. Murphy: Yes. Captain Kramer testified that about a week or so before the night of December 6th he had awakened you and had taken to your house another message but he said he was rather positive in his recollection that he had not taken it to you and attributed your saying that you received it to faulty memory.

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Admiral Ingersoll: Well, I asked Captain Kramer about that today and he says he did not personally bring it to my house. All during the period before Pearl Harbor I used to be awakened up at least two or three times during the week by officers bringing messages, not only of this character but of every character of operational character to my house and so I could not recall every officer who brought them there.

I seem to recall, - and I may be mistaken, it was some other occasion, - that the officers that brought this thing to my house that night asked for my identification card, which Captain Kramer would not have done, so that would identify it, if Captain Kramer said he did not bring it out to me, that some other watch officer brought it. I also recall that they told me that the message had been taken or would be taken to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Murphy: Now, you were familiar with the two documents setting up the winds code originally, were you not?

1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Admiral Ingersoll: The one document setting it up.

3 Mr. Murphy: Well, there is one on page 154, if you will
4 refer to it, Admiral. There is one on page 154 which says:

5 "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our
6 diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of interna-
7 tional communications, the following warning will be added
8 in the title of the daily Japanese language short wave
9 news broadcast."

10 Then on page 155:

11 "When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous,
12 we will add the following at the beginning and end of our
13 general intelligence broadcast."

14 You were familiar, were you, with both of those dispatches?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: I remember very distinctly the one
16 which appears on page 154. That is the one which we have been
17 talking about as the "win's". My recollection regarding this
18 other one, which I believe is now called the hidden word, is
19 rather hazy.

20 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, Admiral, when the officer
21 did come into your office and referred to a win's intercept,
22 what did it mean to you?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: It meant to me that they had received
24 a message which was sent in compliance with this one on page
25 154.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Meaning what?

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Admiral Ingersoll: Well, relations between the United States and Great Britain and -- that is, Japanese relations with the United States, Great Britain and Russia were as stated in the code message there.

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Mr. Murphy: Did you have any understanding that that meant war or merely a breaking off in relations, the message as such?

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Admiral Ingersoll: As stated there on the face it says "rupture of diplomatic negotiations", and that is why it seemed to me that the messages regarding the codes were so much more in place.

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Mr. Murphy: Well, now, in view of your testimony to you see any reason in the world why anyone in the Navy, large, great or small, would want to destroy any paper which would show any receipt of the winds message?

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Admiral Ingersoll: No, I cannot see any.

Mr. Murphy: No other questions.

The Chairman: Senator Brewster is away. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: Admiral, you regarded the code destruction messages, both our directions to our agents in the Far East and the Japanese directions to their agents in our country, you regarded those messages as the most important ones, is that not correct?

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Admiral Ingersoll: I stated that I thought that the mes-
3 sages which we sent to the Commanders-in-Chief that the Japan-
4 ese were destroying their codes and the message regarding the
5 war warning on the 27th of November as the two most important
6 messages that were sent out. The messages which we sent out
7 to the Pacific, to Guam and Pekin, I believe, to destroy their
8 codes and the authority which we gave to Admiral Kimmel to
9 destroy codes on outlying islands and possessions were, of
10 course, in direct consequence of the messages which the
11 Japanese had sent out, because they indicated that the
12 Japanese expected to be at war in a very short time.

13 Mr. Gearhart: In addition to that we sent the message
14 to the naval attache in the American embassy at Tokyo di-
15 recting the destruction of codes there?

16 Admiral Ingersoll: It was the same general idea, of
17 course.

18 Mr. Gearhart: So in your estimation the winis activate
19 or execute was unimportant because the code destruction ori-
20 ers had gone out as far as America was concerned and had been
21 received as far as Japan was concerned?

22 Admiral Ingersoll: I considered one of the two most
23 important messages sent out and it made no difference in my
24 opinion whether there had ever been a winis message or
25 whether a winis execute was ever received.

1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: Now, your impression now is that the order
3 to our foreign agents in the Far East had been sent out before
4 we received the win's execute?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: I am sure of that. That is, before
6 we received the message which I thought was a win's execute
7 or was told was a message sent in the win's code.

8 Mr. Gearhart: And you say that our orders had been sent
9 abroad on the third or fourth?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: The message which we sent to the
11 Commanders-in-Chief informing them that the Japanese had
12 ordered the destruction of their codes in Washington, London,
13 Manila and other places I believe was sent on the third or
14 fourth. I think the messages to our own people to destroy
15 their codes were a day or two later, although I do not recall
16 the exact dates now.

17 Mr. Gearhart: But whether or not the win's execute was
18 received before or after we had sent out our notices would
19 render it unimportant after the code destruction messages
20 had gone out, is that not correct?

21 Admiral Ingersoll: That is the point I am trying to make
22 all along, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Well, the point that I am suggesting to
24 you as a companion and not a corollary is this, that the win's
25 execute messages became unimportant, and to use a legal phrase--

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Admiral Ingersoll: I did not understand you.

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Mr. Gearhart: That the win's execute would become unimportant even if received before, after our destruction of code messages had gone to the field, because it would be, as the lawyers say, it would become functus officio?

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Admiral Ingersoll: Well, when we received the original message which set up the win's code that became important then because that would be the first indication that we would get of when the Japanese thought they would rupture negotiations or be at war if a broader interpretation were placed on it and steps were taken to monitor that message and, also, Admiral Noyes took steps to insure that he would receive information as soon as it was received in the code, but once we had learned that they were destroying their codes then the win's message lost its importance.

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Mr. Gearhart: I agree with you on that, but I am asserting the further idea that it is equally important whether received before or after the order went out for the destruction of our codes in the Far East because if it came in before and the fact of its receipt initiated the order sending out the code destruction orders, when the code destruction orders went out it had served its purpose and it was no longer important. Does that sound reasonable?

Admiral Ingersoll: I am afraid I don't get your point,

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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sir.

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Mr. Gearhart: That is what I was thinking, Admiral.

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The point is this: Whether it came in before the orders were sent out for the destruction of codes in our far outlying Eastern agencies or whether it came in after we had sent out the order for the destruction of our codes it was after the fact equally unimportant, is that not correct?

Admiral Ingersoll: Oh, in regard to the destruction of our own codes, yes.

Mr. Gearhart: Of course.

Admiral Ingersoll: It made no difference at all and the destruction of our codes was not based on that supposition. It was based on the fact that the enemy had issued orders to destroy his codes.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes, but it would become an element in the fact that war was about to commence?

Admiral Ingersoll: Any true winds execute would confirm the other.

Mr. Gearhart: And it would not be any more important if it were received before our orders went out for the destruction of our codes or whether it was received afterwards.

Admiral Ingersoll: No.

Mr. Gearhart: It would be exactly in the same classification after the order went out.