



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












PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN

Frontispiece to Half-Title Page

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG  
*THE CREST-WAVE*  
OF  
*THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR*







GEN. ROBERT E. LEE

Frontispiece to Title Page

# THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

*THE CREST-WAVE OF  
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR*

BY  
FRANCIS MARSHAL



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DEDICATED  
TO THE  
AMERICAN SPIRIT

That its largeness shall dissipate all remaining sectional and hostile feelings that have been engendered by our Civil War, and bring to the fore its common nobilities, heroisms, and truths, rendering these into a heritage common to the American people.



Through lurid racks of cloud the sun outpours its surge.  
So war enshrouds the birth when nations strong emerge.  
This is the way of heaven—till Selflessness shall reign—  
The soul of man untombed to light his wide domain.



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## A WORD TO AMERICANS

Surely the time has come when we of the United States as one people can, without sectional feeling or sensitiveness, consider together events and their results, the arriving at which has been worked out by the people of sections of our common country while engaged in fierce strife embittered by misunderstandings grown into temporary hatred. It is ignoble longer to harbor such fosterings of our past while we study causes and effects.

Influenced not so much by personal considerations as by the desire to do something toward eliminating from our common American life the least vestige of that sectional animosity which was naturally engendered by our great family dispute of 1861-65, and believing that truth, faithfully and lovingly narrated, is as interesting, to those who read to gain knowledge, as glossily woven fiction, the writer has attempted to narrate the most decisive event of war that has transpired in the history of the building of our nation. Not that numerous histories of the Battle of Gettysburg have not been, and will not be, written, but because every history so far, in character and treatment, has been purely military, and therefore of interest only to the military student. This appears hardly fair toward the average reader, who supplies the bone, sinew, blood, treasure and suffering in time of war, and who is entitled, therefore, to full knowledge of the events of war in detail, scope, and results. Particularly is this knowledge due the American citizen in order that he may have a comprehension of the highest duty which he can be called upon to perform as a citizen defender of our republic.

For the reasons enumerated it is the endeavor in this writing to present a great military event in terms and language that, if not entertaining, will at least be easily understood, be the reader, citizen or soldier, woman or youth, constituting our unique and unparalleled American life. Especially addressed are the now aged of our war time, that they shall banish all lingering animosities of those beleaguered years, retaining the laudable impress of that time of stress only as sacred memories to be transmitted as ennobling heirlooms of our common Americanism. A special appeal is made to all citizens, young and old, who reside on either side of our almost obliterated sectional line; that all shall, rising to the lofty spiritual altitude of the Fraternal Spirit, forever overlook all vapory lines of partition in recalling those deeds of noble endeavor to establish American life on an enduring basis. Let us, through the bringing together of the North and South on the field of our common glory, become better acquainted with what *we* did on that blood sanctified field, learn the lessons which our brave sires and grandsires there wrote out in heroic blood, and, in truth and love, study together and assimilate the facts and deeds of our common inheritance of glory which were left to us Americans, and to the world, by our great ancestors on the field of Gettysburg half a century ago.

Shall we not emulate the example of the two soldiers who had been arrayed against each other in that War, and who, later, speeding on a train through a valley which their war had made a desolation but which was now smiling with rich farms, pointed out in good humor the positions of the victors and of the vanquished while they were building the new nation,—the Union? Like them, shall not we as a united people with glowing hearts study the culminating event of our family dispute in the light of the spirit of these two warriors, and proudly tell of its Crest

Wave, as it surged on the ocean of Life? its every unit an American Valor rushing to spume red on the rock-reef of Cemetery Hill on July 3, 1863, then to level the storm-waves of war in shining ripples, and as a united Energy breast the great Deep of life, its mightiest swimmer.

Let us Americans grow truer and larger of heart as we contemplate those mighty waves of war as they crashed together and receded to level in unity and oneness. Surely the time has come when Americans shall cease to trail enmities of the past as skeletons, and assimilate its experiences to be the bone and sinew of the present and their guide to right action in the future. Then the hard and bitter experiences of war will become ennobling memories.

— *The Author.*







PRESIDENT JEFFERSON DAVIS



## FOREWORD

So completely have the statistics of the campaign and battle of Gettysburg been dealt with by numerous able writers and historians — especially by men of marked military attainment and fame, and versed in the art and practice of war — that it would be both hazardous and foolishly presumptuous for me to attempt to improve or add to their voluminous records and discussions. (The statistical facts and data herein are not meant as a compilation,) so nearly agreed are the most competent authorities who have exhausted vast tomes of official reports and documents. These, however, are supplemented and enlivened by much material gleaned from organization histories and personal reminiscences, detailing the action of corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, companies, batteries, and collective and individual incidents. As Confederate records are lamentably rare and incomplete, the writer who deals with our Civil War, or any phase of it, comprehensively, must bear the odium of apparent favor to the Federal aspect because the data of the Federals comes nearer being complete.

Notwithstanding what may have been written before on this subject, the fact remains that there are as many viewpoints of any subject as there are human beings to consider it. And some of these hold elements of newness, and, perhaps, of information. Especially is this true of so momentous and many phased an event as the sixteenth decisive battle of the world — the Battle of Gettysburg. It is not the purpose here to present Gettysburg as a battle only, or mainly, nor simply as a contest of armed hosts. This is, in

fact, incidental to what may well be considered a large, perhaps deeper, view of the subject; a view which, in reality, is essential to an occult understanding of the battle itself; for greater forces than armies must have been engaged, acting through our fathers, on that field fateful to mankind!

The two dominant Federal and Confederate armies arrayed against each other at Gettysburg were, in personnel, unlike any other armies which had ever met in battle outside of the United States of America; for both were composed of citizens of a new nation, unlike any other that had existed; independent, highly intelligent men, mustered from every pursuit of a free and progressive life. The men of which these armies were composed were of warrior races and ancestry, and they had become good citizens. The noble daring and indomitable courage of their sires had found free and constructive scope in the exploiting and development of an imperial domain in the New World, as their more distant progenitors had in the Old. For such superb human material to submit itself to become disciplined into mere fighting mechanisms — automaton, like most armies — was an impossibility. Disciplined, yes; but not out of individual intelligence and initiative action subordinated to advance a common enterprise or purpose. Rather was the individual intelligence heightened by discipline, that it should work more intelligently and congenially, and act with coordination in close or dispersed mass.

This New Man on earth was regenerate of his regal ancestry in bone, fiber and blood, and also in mind. He was fed of a virgin soil, breathed an untainted atmosphere, and was further vitalized by the presence of imposing and wonderful forests primeval, and vast plains of reverential silence lifted, at spaces, into majestic ranges towering into the infinite blue. What wonder that a new and extraordinary war was inaugurated by such men over a country so formid-

able that it alone would have served to engulf the armies of Napoleon and those that opposed his adept genius? What wonder that the ranks of these American armies were studded brilliant with contented privates who competently judged, and freely voiced their judgment of epauleted generalship, while loyally serving and dying under it often because of lack of it? Is it a matter of surprise that these men represented not only themselves in person, but the spirit of an equally superb American womanhood — mothers, wives, sisters and sweethearts — which had bid them go forth to battle! Is it not a matter to be wondrously spoken of,— the campaigns and battles of unparalleled duration and fierceness to which these armies rollickingly submitted themselves?

The facts pertaining to these heroic incidents, though feebly woven, cannot but be of interest as our common heirlooms of glory, if nothing more. But, peradventure, they will help in finally misting away the lingering gauze of bitter memories of those torrential years of our family storm, and in bringing to view a clear sky that will long bless our country and mankind.

In this age of commercialism with its intense selfishness, it is well to study the great events in our rearing of a nation. It is good to know that, on occasion, men will rise above self; that hearts will thrill and send the red blood coursing in heroic deeds, leaping into action for a cause believed to be just. A warrior sleeps or stirs in the breasts of most men — and women; and they love war, not for its carnage and devastation, but because it speaks to the heroic life they feel within themselves; and to read of it lets them out to breathe its robust atmosphere and live in its splendid action. It is good that Americans shall read of and thus feel the vital events of their history in order that the fire of patriotism shall not die in their hearts.

The ceaseless war between Good and Evil, the Spiritual and the Material, Progress and Retrogression, is the universal cause of disturbance and revolution. In this revolution a local insurrection is like a volcanic obstruction heaved up in the boundless ocean of Being. Against such the infinite waves of the Great War dash and hurl until the obstacle is torn and washed below the level and disappears. The American Civil War was an incident or phase of the universal War.

Thus viewed, and in the light of its beneficent results, its regrettable phases become ameliorated to fade and mist away.

# THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

## THE CREST WAVE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

### CHAPTER I

#### CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR

**T**HUS far in human history true national life has eventuated only after war. War for a principle, sometimes — generally for something less noble and enduring — but war; and then national life has emerged into greater or less permanency of being. So, likewise, on the free soil of the New World. From a war for principle, the great principle of Human Freedom, the unjoined British subject Colonies emerged, an assemblage of States joined in a Confederation bound together by the neutral hostility of self-interest. Finding in this tentative step toward union that these same self-interests were best served, the next advance ensued and was enacted into a Constitution meant to bind the existing States into one indissoluble Confederation or Union, and also all territorial sections that should thereafter enter the Union and become an integral part of the nation. And in establishing this great principle, the American fathers accomplished far more than was affected in their rearing of a republic.

The Document of the Union of States against tyranny, and the American Revolution resulting therefrom, marked, and, for the first time in human history, established a fact

greater by far than the union of States — the fact that “All men are free and equal, in the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Yet, in this proud Declaration, the fathers immediately stultified themselves before the world, and undermined the structure of freedom which they proceeded to rear thereon, by permitting the greatest of all tyrannies, human slavery, to nest therein. But, withal, they wrought nobly! For did they not, for the first time in human history, compel tyranny to recognize the great principle of the freedom of man? And so firmly did they establish this principle of life, that when, in 1861, the same contest had grown to the dimensions of war, tyranny assumed the subservient rôle of rebellion, also for the first time in human history.

Civil wars have, without exception, been class wars — the Commonalty against Sovereigns, or against arrogant overlordship by an Aristocracy. The civil wars of the European ancestry of Americans followed this general course, even those numerous incited by the religious class for its own base or questionable ends. But, being near of kin to the English people, Americans are their direct inheritors. Hence, in England’s wars between mass and class, the near predecessors of our Civil War are found. English history is so familiar to Americans, however, that it is needless to present the progressive phases of the conquest of the powers of the Crown by the people, until the latter finally gained virtual supremacy over the aristocratic class, as well as over the Sovereign. What concerns Americans most is that, as the result of these wars of England, parts of the persecuted mass, that is of the great common people, and a less number of the aristocratic class — the latter with royal favor or disfavor — migrated and made homes in America; the former settling the northern, the latter the southern Atlantic seaboard.

The dominant settlement of the United States from the past of humanity through its European descendants was effected by the best, the most energetic and fearless representative elements of two distinct classes of humanity, the great common people and the aristocrat. And with them they unconsciously brought their old feud—the feud of humanity—the never-ending contest between freedom and tyranny. They were “Pilgrims” in fact! Bearers of the Ark, and chosen guardians of the Covenant of Human Freedom, primevally made by the Father with His children universal. Bearing this Ark, and blood-pledged for man to this holiest of covenants, the meager remnants of Puritans and Huguenots escaped annihilation at the hands of Aristocracy impelled by the agents of Retrogression, religious persecution and hate. These hardy, self-reliant representatives of the great commonalty of freedom, not seeking nor accepting favors, but simply a place on earth where they might plant and grow Freedom for themselves and their posterity, naturally, if unconsciously, sought the more rugged zone of the New World as being most congenial ground on which to bring to fruition the seed of their desire; clearing way for it through wildernesses, and compelling the penurious soil to give to it sustenance. With equal naturalness the adventurous representatives of Aristocracy—of tyranny—sought and obtained from the home government grants of landed estates in the warmer, more genial zone of physical ease and comfort.

Here, then, at the very outstart of what was to become the United States are found transplanted two of England’s long hostile classes, continued under their old conditions of royal favor, or more or less of persecution. And, to give virgin fuel to their ancient flame, African slavery found congenial home with the aristocrats of the South. Here, erected in America, and naturally hostile from old, and spe-



cially under their new conditions, were southern barons against northern yeomen. Surely a less apparent and needy cause than that of slavery would serve to touch the match and blaze this smoldering camp-fire! So England's history of its civil conflict between classes repeated itself in our American Civil War.

Our conflict between freedom and slavery, tyranny, was inevitable; and slavery had to disappear if either the nation or its free representative government were to live. Enlightened Democracy must win over the old proud Aristocracy, risen in rebellion — in tacit inferiority — against the threat at its domineering supremacy. A conflict adequate to the death of slavery was inevitable, but not necessarily a war. And when the good time comes around when the "hidden shall be revealed," the pages of history, then luminous with the truth, will display the fact that our family jar was fomented to war by the same lurking power which has been responsible for most armed conflicts of magnitude from the Dark Ages down to the present. Why should we, the flower of human progress, escape this calamity which has beset lesser peoples — many to their destruction as power-factors among the nations? But, as yet, this may be only touched upon — due to blind incredulity. The fundamental basis of the American Civil War being thus defined, that conflict may be studied with greater accuracy and a deeper comprehension than is possible with Slavery assumed as having been its root.

To say that war was inevitable to the settlement of the fostered natural conditions of conflagration is not enlarging on the truth. Had not the natural belligerent conditions been fostered, however, but left to their natural course of settlement, it would not have been true that war was inevitable to their adjustment. Hence, as a matter of truth, we must further touch upon a hidden feature of the



Civil War which has to do with the controlling under-currents of life, to none of which are our people awake, especially to the phase of this secret power which has ever conspired against our national life and free institutions, as being in their nature hostile to its purposes. Unfortunately we did not sufficiently suffer by our Civil War to awaken us to its secreted cause, and to the ever-increasing jeopardy impending from this Undiscovered. Nor has the time of awakening yet arrived. Nevertheless, if Americans will fully benefit by the lessons of our Civil War its deeper phases and under currents may not be overlooked, and a comprehension of these will save much future trouble. For, while in the newness of our unprecedented experience we submit ourselves to many ridiculous and tyrannical iniquities, our unalterable purpose of freedom holds us unconquerably hostile to permanent submission, and sure to depose them.

If, in any measure, it has been made to appear that our Civil War was an inheritance from the near or distant past, it is because those who recognize these facts have, in their study of history, penetrated somewhat beneath its mere superficial aspects, or masks of the truth. And it would be strange, indeed, if a mind, once turned in that direction, did not continue its penetration a bit, and there discover that few, if any, great wars have not been incited by a so-called religious force. That such was present in our Civil War is true. For who living doubts the insight, honesty, or knowledge of that event exercised and possessed by President Lincoln? Upon such correct data depended his successful prosecution of the war. We find the following among his records made in the early days of his administration:

“A few days ago I saw Mr. Morse, the learned inventor of the electric telegraph; he told me that, when he was in

Rome, not long ago, he found out the proof of a most formidable conspiracy against this country and all its institutions. It is evident that it is to the intrigues and emissaries of the Jesuit, that we owe, in great part, the horrible war which is threatening to cover our country with blood and ruin. The true motive power (behind Secession) is secreted behind the thick walls of the colleges and schools of the Jesuits. Sooner or later this nation will know the real origin of these rivers of blood and tears, which now spread death and desolation everywhere. And, then, those who have caused these desolations and disasters will be called to give an account of them. This war would have never been possible without the sinister influence of the Jesuits. We owe it to them that we now see our land reddened by the blood of her noblest sons. I do not pretend to be a prophet. But, though not a prophet, I see a very dark cloud over our horizon, and that dark cloud is coming from Rome. It is filled with tears of blood. It will rise and increase, till its flanks will be torn by a flash of lightning followed by a fearful peal of thunder. Then a cyclone such as the world has never seen will pass over this country, spreading ruin and desolation from north to south. After it is over, there will be long days of peace and prosperity; for the Jesuit and merciless Inquisition, will have been forever swept away from our country. Neither I nor you, but our children, will see these things."

Lincoln further records that the working tool of this secreted power was Democracy, which, expressed as a political party, was opposed to, and interfered with, the successful prosecution of the Federal war and to that extent acted as the ally of the Confederacy.

Looking back into the conditions preceding the war, it appears evident that true students of that time can honestly

agree with Lincoln that "This war would never have been possible without the sinister influence" of some power that was not then apparent to the general public. Left to its natural conditions, the sectional controversy over slavery could have been settled satisfactorily to both sections, had the Union slave States recognized the law suggested by Mr. Lincoln and passed by Congress in March, 1862, urging them to free their slaves by agreeing to pay the owners for them. Surely, it required some extraordinary and subtle influence to carry an entire population into a devastating war to maintain slavery, when two-thirds of that population was strongly opposed to war for that institution, and the majority of the other one-third would have been glad to be rid of it in a way that would not subject them to pecuniary loss. Under these cultivated conditions of elements naturally combustible, war was inevitable between the North and South.

Armed conflict having become inevitable, then, a consideration of War itself may be beneficial to those who think of it only as a wholesale slaughter by men become beasts. War, even as a selfish enterprise, sometimes has the appearance of an ultimate saving device employed by the Wisdom that attends to the well being of humanity. As famine and pestilence often relieve disorders of physical humanity that the entire body shall not become chronic with diseases, so does War; and when it is waged for the right or a principle, it eliminates mental disorders grown into fever and plague until there remains no other remedy.

Our local insurrection in the ceaseless Revolutionary progress of humanity viewed in this light, the belief in its inevitableness is sustained by what it effected of cleansing, national unity, strength and growth. Nevertheless, had our best wisdom met in a patriotic spirit personal and sectional ambitions would not have been victorious; and with-

out doubt peaceful methods would have accomplished more than did our Civil War. Only was it inevitable when the people of the United States — the vanguard of humanity — permitted wisdom to yield to the inflammation of selfishness.

Secession failed in its attempt to disrupt the Union, and in this the law was sustained by the bayonets of armed hosts. But the conflict did not fall short of giving to us, as individuals and as a people, a full measure of honest and ennobling examples, rare lessons, and sacred memories, with which to build more grandly and cement more firmly the new national life which it brought to us. We are no longer slaves to slavery, to its tyranny. A thousand free workmen earning prosperous homes in building our South are more cheering, more profitable, than a thousand slaves hopelessly dragging the depleted fields or trying to brighten their dingy quarters with a weird pathos of song. Are we not now masters of self-developed conditions of skill and craft of hand and brain, and not the bound subjects of raw, undeveloped conditions? Is cotton "King," or are we who manufacture it into profitable fabrics for the world and ourselves? Do our rich soils lie fallow of all but cotton and tobacco, or are they teeming with varied products? Is not the earth yielding its billions of mineral wealth to our blazing furnaces and gleaming forges? Is our South longer dependent, or independent; debtor or creditor to the world?

Are we not imbued with the real spirit, the true pride of life? Free Americans, every one! and proud of that priceless honor, bought and eternally sealed with great treasure and richer blood. Our Civil War was a sacrifice unto salvation; a throe in the birth of Freedom. From its swirling flames emerged the celestial form and spirit of Liberty, calling her benediction of "Freedom to all men." Her war-hammered diadem glitters with gleaming suns, the

States; each in rivalry only to outdo in generating and reflecting light to render more luminous the common Shield. Union at last — in a common cause and glory. This was a result of our Litigation confirmed by the decision of the Judge. These are some of the tangible, visible reasons why our American valor swept the slope of Cemetery Hill at Gettysburg, in July, 1863, like an ocean's tidal wave, to crest, spume red, fret back and level in robust waves of prosperous peace on the great Mother Deep. Because Secession failed, these exist.

## CHAPTER II

### THE FIELD OF THE CIVIL WAR

THE conditions were ripe for armed conflict in 1861, when Abraham Lincoln was elected President of the United States as the representative of the political party which had arrayed itself at the polls in opposition to the extension of slavery into the new territories of the West. Following the election Civil War broke out, the Confederate forces attacking Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina.

The field of conflict naturally embraced that section of the United States which had undertaken withdrawal from the Union, covered by the eleven States which had decided to erect themselves into an independent nation under the name of the Confederate States of America. The frontier or "border" States developed a difficult problem during the early war, as these, neither slave nor free, but both, essayed a neutrality which they were unable to effect, their position between the contending sections making them the great battlefields of the war.

The nature and conditions of the Confederate war held the South to the defensive while often acting in offensive defense in endeavors to hold its *terrain* free from the offensive invasion which was forced upon the Federal Government, the North, in contesting to bring the seceded States back into the Union under the plea of holding Federal territory and the Union intact. These facts of hostility, which, in ordinary war, give an advantage of three to one to the de-

fense, in this case were emphasized by the size and character of the territory over which this war operated. With a northern front of nine hundred miles, as the crow flies, six hundred miles on the west, and to the south and east a continuous ocean front of about fifteen hundred miles in a direct line, and some three thousand of irregular coast line, including the Mississippi River, this field of war embraced 800,000 square miles of territory, or an area equal to continental Europe. The surface of this field was so diversified and cut by formidable mountains, rivers, streams, the country interspersed with great forests and meagerly threaded with indifferent roads, as to render it phenomenally defensible. The Federal forces, after forcing the Confederate frontier at any point along its thousands of miles, were instantly involved not only with valiant antagonists, but with the entire country and its population, which at every step of advance multiplied many fold, demanding ever increasing detachments of soldiers to guard flanks, rear, and attenuating lines of communication and supply, while concentration of forces was difficult and often impossible. Of these adverse features of the war the Confederacy was almost wholly exempt while it was benefited by the Federal difficulties. Its extreme western or trans-Mississippi section could only with great difficulty be conquered and this supply source of the Confederacy cut off, by holding open the Mississippi River, the great waterway of the Confederates. The Alleghany Mountains, coursing north and south a little east of midway between the Mississippi and the Atlantic ocean, in their initial rise in the Central South offered no obstacle to passage east and west around their southern terminus; but, rising abruptly northward, they prevented the passage of armies except at the far north, and subordinate ranges curtained and defended the intervening valleys as foremade runways for



invasive operations northward, while opening into supply sections to the south.

This central mountain range furnished an impregnable flank protection to the defense, and its several great rivers, with their innumerable tributaries, served as lines of defense from behind which armies were obliged to drive their opponents at every step. The Federal armies were compelled either to reinforce east or west by passing one far northern defile over the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, or to maintain Eastern and Western armies so powerful as to do their separate parts of the common work unaided by one another. They were also forced to operate on a double line in progressing their necessarily invasive war. And their main western line, east of the Mississippi, was supplemented by operations west of that river, but more or less dependent upon that stream as a base. For this reason, and the more important one, of cutting off and isolating the trans-Mississippi supply region of the eastern Confederacy, the Mississippi was opened and held by the Federals as a first necessity to the success of their arms in the West. To insure success to the Federal Government the coastline of the Confederacy was closed to foreign trade by an effective blockade along an irregular shore of some three thousand miles, following bays and navigable inlets such as blockade-runners might harbor in. The order given by Lincoln in April, 1861, to blockade all ports from Virginia to Texas necessitated a great navy of deep-sea warships and a shallow water flotilla, while numerous strong detachments of land forces were required in attempts to penetrate inward against the numerically inferior forces necessary to the defense of the Confederate territory.

Multiplying these natural aids to the defense was the State of Virginia, a huge salient one hundred and fifty by one hundred and fifty miles, exterior measurement, thrust



northward at the northeast angle of the Confederacy; the Federal frontier, the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay as its north and east wet ditch, with Washington, the Federal capital, on the immediate opposite bank of the Potomac, in easy jeopardy unless strongly fortified. The west wall of this salient was built of the almost impregnable Alleghany Mountains, a subordinate eastward range of which, the Blue Ridge, curtained the fertile Shenandoah Valley for invasive movements of the Confederates across the Federal frontier into the rich Cumberland Valley stretching through Maryland and Pennsylvania to the Susquehanna River. This valley was covered to the south-eastward by the South Mountains, the continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, the impassable Alleghany Range guarding to the northwestward. This great salient, destined to be the vital battlefield of the war, furnished natural advantages to the defense so numerous and formidable that, in league with an alert and able army, they compelled successful attack to be delivered from its wet ditch, the Chesapeake Bay with its tributary rivers, which numerously cut the defensive *terrain* of the salient from its eastern coast to its western mountain rampart.

Seldom in the history of war have topographical and strategic advantages so urged to flank and rear operations against an enemy occupying the Virginia salient. For here a spacious inland waterway opened from Washington, the Federal capital, to Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy, and to its rear, along the course of the Potomac River, the Chesapeake Bay and up the James River, the Virginia shore frequently indented by bays into which considerable rivers empty. These afforded every advantage for the supply of armies operating from the shore inward, either against the flank of armies operating toward Washington, or for attack on the Confederate cap-

ital, itself, always threatening in flank and rear from these water-base positions, and hence holding the Confederates to its protection and away from Washington and invasion, in the presence of a competent antagonist.

From any side available for Federal penetration, except the water-front, this salient of the Confederacy was impregnable; so proving itself through four years of ceaseless and desperate assault made by an army of mettle and unconquerable valor such as the world has seldom seen save in its equally superb defending opponent; the first steady, stern, patient and invincible; its brother army of defense, fiery, impetuous, with spirit indomitable. These two armies contested four years, converting the center of Virginia into the fiercest vortex of war the world has ever seen in a like area. Within the lines of twelve miles square, having Fredericksburg for its eastern boundary, were fought four great battles and scores of lesser engagements, in which 129,000 men laid down their lives.





SEC. OF WAR EDWIN M. STANTON

## CHAPTER III

### MATERIAL RESOURCES

**T**HE South quickly became a solid unit in support of war; for the North, not content with placing itself as a barrier against the persistent and indefinite expansion of slavery, denied to sovereign States within the Union compact the right to secede and withdraw from that Union, and, with the proceeds of people, territory, and Union property, to set up and erect a new government, a new nation, necessarily hostile, and ever bent on the extension of slavery into the very territory from which it had been excluded by the North. To the South, then, the war necessarily became a war of presumptuous, degrading invasion, a war of tyrannical subjugation with the purpose of establishing negro equality. At the time the Act of Secession was passed by most of the Southern States, about two-thirds of the white population owned no slaves. This great common class of the poor white people was bitterly against slavery because the negro robbed the white man of his legitimate work, such as that of tilling the soil. Having strong color prejudices, they at the same time opposed the abolishing of slavery, because of their fear that the freedom of the slaves would raise him to their level. For this reason the negro-hater constituted the main portion of the soldiery in the Southern army.

With this urgent oneness of purpose and will dominant, and so maintained by the idea and the stern fact of invasion, the Confederate Government was, in practice, a

dictatorship thinly disguised. Nor did it delay in operating as such; for at an early stage in the war it established a universal conscription, first, of all white men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and, finally, of all from fifteen to sixty years of age who were not physically disabled for army service. So intensely patriotic did the South become, that it was better for the would-be stay-at-homes to face the guns of the enemy than those of a more certain kind which would surely pelt him, fired from every woman and lisper, should he skulk the front of war. Thus the depletions of war were promptly and continuously replenished so long as men and material resources existed in sufficiency to maintain armies possessing any considerable efficiency. For this reason, out of a population of fourteen millions, every able-bodied white man from the age of fifteen to sixty was available, and was, in some manner, effective in, or to, the Confederate armies in the field. Out of this fourteen millions there were four millions of slaves who were engaged in the raising of food supplies for the armies and for home consumption, and in erecting fortifications. In this manner all slave men, women, boys and girls of five years of age and upward, were employed, the vast majority in the fields raising provisions, some in the building of fortifications and field-works. This left every white man absolutely free to the military service — truly, a condition of aid to the Confederates unprecedented! These four millions of slaves were of vast importance to the war, not only in supplying the armies with food, but in releasing their equivalent of able-bodied white men to the actual fighting ranks, otherwise held home for producing supplies.

As a total of war efficiency, then, the Confederacy had a one-minded, war-urgent population, and every able-bodied man, white and black, effective in and for the war,

The armies organized and engaged in campaign found themselves operating in an intensely friendly country, where every inhabitant, knowing every stream and road over which they moved, was a self-constituted scout, spy, and guide to every open and blind road and path, misleading to the compelled invader. The defense moyed on interior or short lines against the enemy on exterior or long lines, the invader with ever-lengthening lines of communication and supply to guard by increased detachment every mile advanced. This last-mentioned fact saved the Confederates the usual detachment of men, of from twenty to fifty per-cent of the total army enrollment.

The combined material features favorable to the defense fully offset and equalized any preponderance of men the attack brought against it. And, in addition, as a mighty power in the Confederate war, was the spirit of the South, which permeated practically every unit of its population after the war was actually begun, not alone the soldiery, but quite as important, those left at home — wives, mothers, sisters, sweethearts, children — who smothered their aching hearts in the breast of the common cause while they called, “Go! Good-by,” to the objects of their love. The great masters of war count this spirit equivalent to the trebling of the numerical strength of the troops. What measure, then, shall define its power when actuating an entire people — proud and imperious — of which the soldiery was a part?

Another weighty advantage to the defense was, that operating on interior or short lines, it was able quickly and heavily to concentrate its forces at any endangered or advantageous point against the offensive; while the latter was forced to dispersion and exterior lines of operation. Illustrative of this feature of our Civil War is the fact that “In fifty of the great battles fought, the forces were

within two per-cent of being equal at the point of contact or fighting." Many of these potent factors of war strength are generally omitted, or are so seldom arrayed *en masse* by writers on the war, that the average reader is left to the illusion that war strength is almost wholly a matter of numbers of men and cannon arrayed and available. True, lacking men and guns, the other factors of war strength would be valueless and not to be counted; but, having the men and guns, these otherwise silent factors array and arm themselves to the aid of war with a potency far greater than the mere physical force of the same armies without them.

As the comparative fighting quality of the soldiery of the North and South during the Civil War is sometimes a matter of discussion, the following facts are given with a view to settling that point. As already stated, in fifty important battles the respective forces actually engaged on the firing line were within two per-cent of being equal. This was due to the heavy Federal detachments for rear and frontier guards holding against an active, bold regular and irregular cavalry, and often large bodies of infantry, and sometimes it was due to generalship. Thus, with forces practically even at the point of battle, the results demonstrated the relative merits of the troops engaged. The facts are that "Of the sixty severe battles of the war, ten show drawn battles and twenty victories for each side. In thirty-four battles the Federal forces remained in possession of the field, while the Confederates did the same in twenty-nine. In *eleven* assaults by large masses the Federals won, in *eleven*, the Confederates."

Man to man, then, the northern and southern soldiers proved themselves equals as fighters; and as armies, in being able to bear greater slaughter than any others in modern time up to the Civil War, excepting only those of Napoleon.



The losses sustained by individual regiments largely exceeded anything of record in modern war previous to ours; these in a single battle often standing decimation up to seventy to ninety per-cent of their number, entire divisions frequently suffering losses of forty to fifty per-cent in one action, Federals and Confederates alike. Longstreet's Confederate division at Gaines' Mill lost fifty per-cent of its men, and the Army of the Potomac, under Grant, in 1864, from May 5th to June 10th, nearly one-half its total of one hundred and twenty thousand men.

These facts are here detailed not only for the sake of truth, but because of the general misunderstanding existing, even yet, throughout our country, that the greater population of the North gave the Federal war a great advantage over the Confederacy by enabling the Federal Government to place on the battle line a superior force. The truth is far from this, all things considered, as has been shown and will appear later. Frequently, due to forced detachments, and, sometimes, to lack of generalship, there was not even numerical equality at the point of battle, and rarely did Federal superiority of numbers more than offset the physical and higher advantages possessed by the Confederates.

The main factors of Federal war strength, when arrayed, were limitless men and material resources, of which, however, but a moiety was available for the reason that the North did not make a common cause of the war, its territory being scarcely invaded. The war was almost foreign, even to its frontier. Hence, the farther its invasion of the South penetrated, the farther it left home behind and attenuated interest of close contact; while from the piling demands of the invasion, irritation took the place of friendly and close personal interest.

The general feeling toward the war was radically dif-

ferent in the two sections arrayed against each other. In the South, at the outstart, it was a class war, as already stated, instigated and inspired by ambitious politicians and deeper schemers, who appealed to the affiliated affluent slave owners, and were either abetted or sustained by them; while a large majority of the people of that section, the mass from which armies are drawn, were, in large measure, opposed to secession, this disposition affecting many of the dominant class also, including no less a personage than Robert E. Lee. It was not until hostilities were actually begun by the Confederates, and invasion was thereby made necessary to the Federal Government, and the cry of Invasion was raised, that the war became popular in the South. Then its aspect quickly changed from a class to a popular war, and thus remained till the echo of the last hopeless shot.

On the other hand, Mr. Lincoln foresaw from the first that if war ensued it must be a popular conflict, a war of the masses of the North, if it was to succeed and the Union be preserved. And while laboring to his utmost to avert an armed conflict, to this end offering to sacrifice everything but the Union to save the Union, he never lost sight of the fact that war was possible, and that if it eventuated, it must be popular to succeed. Seldom has a ruler faced a larger crisis, or one beset with so many and such perplexing difficulties, not only of domestic threatenings, but of jeopardies from abroad. And never has there been one who, either by experience or attainments, was apparently less fitted to meet and master such a crisis.

The inter-hostile main units of power in the North were further divided by radicals, the abolitionists, who would sacrifice everything else to the destruction of slavery, and the peace party, which was for peace at any price. At this time many Northerners sympathized with the South and



MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN



strongly denounced the war. These so-called "Copperheads" formed secret organizations to oppose Lincoln's plans, poisoning the popular mind, even from the halls of Congress and the Senate. Meanwhile the Democratic Party stood squarely arrayed against its new political antagonist, the Republican Party, in the purpose of the latter to restore and preserve the Union at the sacrifice of all else, if need be.

Among the leaders of these heterogeneous and conflicting interests, sentiments, and radical determinations, there were but comparatively few who forgot themselves and rose to the magnitude of the crisis. And the self-seeking ambitions of these patriotic few weakened their efficiency and denied to them the clear and lofty vision requisite to safe leadership in such a crisis. And further, narrow self-interests, jealousies, and fear for their future commercial supremacy, so powerfully operated on some European minds, especially in England, that any semblance of a fair opportunity for meddling in the difficulties of the United States to the detriment of Federal interests was eagerly sought. England hopefully watched for any precipitate act of war on the part of the Federal Government enacted against the Confederacy, or of peaceful surrender of Federal property — forts and arsenals — into the possession of the Confederates, and for any act which could be construed into a recognition of the Confederacy by the Federal Government as cause or pretext for its recognition by foreign powers.

At the vortex of this momentous turmoil, solitary and alone, stood Abraham Lincoln, a man practically inexperienced in public affairs, and judged incapable of exercising the knowledge imperative to their administration by most, if not all, of his new associates at the capital. In fact, he was looked upon by them as being a ludicrous accident

tossed into the presidential chair, and as having no definite plan or fixed purpose to lead and guide him in the administration of the great trust imposed upon him in the exalted position to which he unexpectedly found himself elevated. The question asked by those who thought themselves best able to judge — and to administer! — was: “How will it be possible for this incapable to bring order out of this chaos, or to unite its hostile elements and lead them to victory over the most formidable insurrection which it has been the fate of Government to face during man’s history?”

But Abraham Lincoln, before taking up the ponderous burden of the presidential office, had made a deep and profound study of the public affairs and of the government of the United States, especially in relation to the subject of slavery, over which his country had become so fatally involved and embroiled; nor had he failed to foresee and prophesy such disaster. He entered upon the momentous duties of his high office with a full understanding of the one dominant matter on hand, the slavery question, and the ruling conditions and forces centered upon it, and comprehending these more profoundly than did any other man of his time. While the leaders, his legitimate helpers, were busy in misjudging him, and scheming to make up for his deficiencies, with eyes narrowed to their personal interests of ambition, Lincoln sat quietly in observation, holding steadfastly to his oath to the main issue, “To preserve the Union,” remaining calm, unobtrusive, and apparently quiescent while making himself familiar with his new position and its duties, and gathering the reins of power and direction into his large hands. Nor did the great commonalty, standing more remotely alert, fail to suspect its own kind of crisis-ability as lying in wait in the great commoner who was winning its heart, to enjoy its implicit trust, and

lead it through the wild rage of great war, and save the Union — a loving trust, such as no other ruler has ever won from a people. For Abraham Lincoln ruled with the almighty power of love.

During the initial period of inaction, Abraham Lincoln made himself master of the situation by holding the northern turbulence from either weak or aggressive action; for authoritative movement could be made with his approval only. Meantime, the insurrectionists were, by the nature of their enterprise, compelled to ceaseless forward action, and in so doing they were obliged to proceed on aggressive lines, and of a nature which would force them either to abandon their undertaking utterly, or else to break the peace by armed hostility. The North was restrained from overt acts, while every reasonable inducement was being held out to the South to withhold its secession element from breaking the peace and rupturing the Union.

Thus, at the beginning of his first administration, Abraham Lincoln dominated men and forces by masterful inaction; utilizing these and conditions to maintain public peace, if possible, while consolidating his forces for war, should that eventuate. He so united parties, factions, and men in the free States, that these forgot their differences and arrayed themselves almost unitedly in the determination to preserve the Union at any cost, his Democratic opponent for the Presidency, Stephen A. Douglass, publicly declaring himself as a staunch supporter of the Union cause. When Fort Sumter was bombarded by the Confederate forces the North was ready to spring to arms in defense of the Union in overwhelming mass, and to pour its blood and treasure to sustain the Union cause under the accepted leadership of this calm, patient and modest man. At this trying time Lincoln proved himself not only a "master of men," but, greater than this, the master of a great



crisis involving the highest interests of the human race.

But the untried experiment of creating vast disciplined armies out of the free and independent citizens of a free republic yet remained to be made a demonstrated success. It was indeed a herculean task, when undertaken without the aid of an adequate nucleus of regular troops and educated, trained officers upon which to build by expansion, and from which to draw trained commanders to discipline a flood of raw material issued from a people utterly lacking experience or knowledge of war. These adverse conditions served to force upon the Administration, in the North, a swarm of influential politicians who sought scope for their personal ambitions in the new field of war. These men, though ignorant of the duties even of the private soldier, sought appointments as generals, in command of large field forces or of important military departments. This loaded down the Federal armies at the very outstart of the war with incompetent officers in high command, the little efficiency shown by most of them being due to regular officers, educated to war, serving under them as subordinates. Nor did this evil wholly disappear during the war.

In the Confederate armies, on the contrary, Mr. Davis placed West Point men in high command so far as the supply of such permitted. Hence, these armies had that great advantage over those of the Federal Government during the two first years of the war when, more than frequently, the officers with a military education were compelled to serve and suffer defeat under "political generals," even those who never acquired any ability in the art of war. In fact, until late in the war, a regular officer who sought command in the volunteer service — of which the armies were almost wholly composed — was, by the Federal Government, condemned to the extent of losing



his rank in the Regular Army, to which he would return after the war closed. Fortunately this inane practice was abandoned at last; but too late, however, to give the armies the benefit of large numbers of trained soldiers in high command.


The South had still another advantage over the North in the early years of the war. From the first settlement of the South, its dominant spirit had led its preponderant or leading people to regard themselves as belonging to the aristocratic class of humanity, this feeling having been inherited from their European ancestry, and brought with them in their migration to America. Aristocratic and chivalrous to a degree, they scorned labor and were the natural friends of slavery. Despising commercialism and mere wealth, for subsistence and comfort they confined themselves to owning large landed estates, and the raising of raw products, principally cotton and tobacco, selling these to the North and abroad, in exchange for manufactured products. These conditions of Southern life fostered the inherent spirit of its people, and with their sporting instinct and fiery natures rendered them natural soldiers ready for daring enterprise at the risk of life. It was only necessary that the South should make itself familiar with military tactics and evolutions to be ready for effective campaign and battle; for the discipline of orders and prompt obedience were natural to its everyday life at home.

It was not excess of numbers so much as the slower coursing blood of the Northern rank and file which gave it that patient, stern determination that enabled it to withstand the fierce onsets of its hot-blooded brothers of the South until the disparity in commanders was remedied by time and experience in war. One may wonder what might not be accomplished by combining these blood elements in disciplined hosts efficiently commanded in an adequate

cause. But this certain efficiency, dormant in the average American, surely must not be relied on until trained and disciplined, to cope successfully with ready-trained armies. The experience of our Civil War fully demonstrating the well-known military fact that raw levies cannot be molded into an efficient soldiery in less than a year at least. In the early engagements of that war it was mob meeting mob, as compared with the later superb grapples of the same men as disciplined soldiers. Discipline only makes soldiers, and often good ones out of natural cowards.

Viewing our Civil War in retrospect, it is not difficult to see that had it been possible for President Lincoln to pursue the same course as did Mr. Davis in selecting his leading generals, the conflict would have doubtless terminated years before it did. For, waged under such proper conditions of command, such as eventuated during the two last years of its continuance, the Executive would have been left free to give his attention to the broad political problems necessarily involved in the war, happily combining these with its expansive military interests, the latter in the hands of competency.

In the endeavor to remedy or mitigate the evils mentioned, and to effect a fair degree of efficiency in the conduct of the war, the harried President appointed and experimented with two commanders-in-chief of the Federal armies, McClellan and Halleck; but until the war had developed efficient generalship, and Grant was commissioned to that lofty responsibility, neither Mr. Lincoln nor the condition was in the least relieved. True, McClellan proved himself a masterful organizer of "raw" levies; and by the rare personal love and hero-worship which he was able to win from them, to transform these quickly into disciplined troops and a formidable army. Had he been a fighter as well as organizer and disciplinarian, what might



MAJ.-GEN. H. W. HALLECK



he not have accomplished with the superb volunteer Army of the Potomac in its first flush! The fact should not be overlooked that McClellan was limited in his conception of the large requirements essential to the formation of a disciplined army into a mobile moving and effective fighting mechanism; for did he not resist every effort made to induce him to consolidate the multiplicity of divisions into which he had divided the Army of the Potomac, and form them into corps, though the history of war shows that these larger units are imperative to full efficiency? Yet so stubbornly did he oppose corps formation that the President was finally compelled to make this change himself. Later, when McClellan was again given free hand, he overreached to the other extreme, and, by consolidating Mr. Lincoln's wieldy and efficient corps of moderate size into unwieldy grand divisions, not only condemned his original division formation, but proved his incompetency to apprehend large needs, or to profit by his own, or by general experience. If it be urged that at that time officers competent to command corps had not developed, it may be said, on the other hand, that for this reason there was more need for lessening the number of semi-independent commanders, in order that the commander-in-chief should be able more closely to supervise and direct operations through a few subordinates. While it is acknowledged that, in theory at least, McClellan was a competent strategist, it is true that he nullified this prime requisite of generalship by moral cowardice, displayed in the presence of his antagonist and in battle to such an extent that it apparently paralyzed his mental faculties; otherwise it is impossible to account for his action and inaction during the battles of his Peninsular Campaign against Richmond, and at Sharpsburg or Antietam. On these occasions he needlessly exposed fractions of his army to actual annihilation, while holding the major part idly

inactive and out of supporting distance, in both instances the smaller portion of his army thrown across a river into the face of the massed enemy.

That Halleck was a fatality superimposed on the war, and especially on the Army of the Potomac, will become apparent as we progress. His actions, supported by the Secretary of War,—stern, inflexible Stanton,—and enacted openly and surreptitiously against the superior knowledge and judgment of the President, and even the surpassing ability of General Grant, often jeopardized the Federal war at critical points during periods of extreme stress and peril. His frequent interference with higher orders is indicated in the following cipher dispatch from Mr. Lincoln to General Grant, sent during the rage of the battle campaign of 1864, against Lee's army: "I have seen your dispatch to the War Office, in which you say, 'I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, on the Shenandoah, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.' This, I think, is exactly right as to how our forces should move: but please look over the dispatches you may have received from here, ever since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here of 'putting our army south of the enemy,' or of 'following him to the death,' in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch every day and hour, and force it."

How truly the condition was told by the President is evidenced by the fact that General Grant was compelled to leave the Army of the Potomac at a critical time, and in person transmit his orders to Sheridan, in the Shenandoah Valley; for otherwise they would have been so changed by Halleck during transit through the War Office at Wash-

ington that Grant's purpose would have been either stultified or defeated — and this when Grant was commander-in-chief of all the Federal armies, and Halleck acting as a sort of adjutant to him and Stanton, the latter under his military thumb.

The President rarely considered it expedient or safe to interfere dominantly with this military "wisdom," knowing that such action on his part might be more disastrous to the war than would be the defeat of an army in the field. The fault-finding correspondence of Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, helps to make this fact evident: "Since Halleck has been here the conduct of the war has been abandoned to him by the President almost absolutely." What better evidence can be offered to elucidate the situation than this, and the dispatch sent by Mr. Lincoln to Grant, already quoted? Truly, if ever a ruler was hampered, thwarted, and often bound helpless by military incompetency, and by cabals of personally ambitious patriots, President Lincoln was that man until the advent of Grant. It can scarcely be questioned that Mr. Lincoln spoke only the truth in saying: "Had I not been interfered with and thwarted I would have successively ended the War two years sooner." When these complex and interthreading conditions, ruling in the North, at Washington, and with the head of military affairs, are contrasted with the solidarity of the South whose military affairs and armies were in the hands of warlike competency, a clear conception of the status of matters may be gained.

## CHAPTER IV

### FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE SYSTEMS OF RECRUITMENT

THE preceding chapter leads up to a consideration of the systems of recruitment, which, necessarily, were vital to raising and sustaining the armies. In this may be found the main cause of the well sustained strength of the Confederate forces, the course adopted by the Confederacy being far superior to the more or less haphazard one pursued by the Federal Government. At the beginning of the war neither the Confederate nor Federal Governments had what might be named a nucleus of an army capable of expansion even to first needs. Hence, the quickest and best means for raising and putting troops into the field was to allot to each State its quota of men required by the general government, leaving the method of their raising to the States, as well as their organization into regiments and batteries, and the commissioning of the officers of these smaller units. These were then turned over for muster into Government service, where they were brigaded and formed into divisions and corps of mixed State troops, as a rule, under commanders commissioned by, and, in the main, appointed by the Government.

The first levies once in the field as disciplined troops, the former method or system was anything but proper or effective as a means of maintaining or expanding the armies; and, in the main, the Confederates abandoned it for the efficient system of direct recruitment or conscription of the individual man into Government service to be assigned



to depleted regiments of veterans, whereby he quickly became an effective soldier under command of veteran company, line, and general officers. In this way the old regiments were maintained in strength, and were not, as weak units, compelled to fight beside strong units of raw men commanded by inexperienced officers. The Federal Government, meanwhile, persisted with the original method of recruiting its armies with raw levies organized and officered by the States. Hence, the veteran regiments became skeletons under veteran officers, while beside them were full units of raw troops commanded by officers as unqualified as their men. And it is a compliment to the soldierly qualities of the average American citizen that these undisciplined levies under command of ignorance seldom disgraced the Federal armies by unsoldierly conduct in battle, often winning where veterans would have withheld in hopelessness. But had the recruits been used to maintain the strength of veteran organizations, far more decisive results would have been obtained in numerous campaigns and battles, which would have tended to bring the war to an earlier close.

During the later years of the conflict when conscription became necessary, great riots ensued, requiring troops from the field to quell these and enforce the conscription in New York City. Nor did the Government ever dare to enforce full, legitimate conscription in any of the States, but permitted substitution, whereunder large money "bounties," paid to substitutes, enabled many thousands of the most desirable citizens for the armies to escape military service, sending in their stead an almost worthless class of mercenaries known as "bounty jumpers." These bounty men were an almost wholly unreliable element in the fighting ranks, mainly serving as blocks to honest and worthy conscription, which would have replenished the armies with

fitting material to be molded into brave and reliable troops. Nor did public opinion in the North look down upon the citizen who thus escaped his highest duty of citizenship, while the general government took no steps against this openly perpetrated fraud. It was one of the crying defects of the Federal system of recruitment, while giving just cause for much dissatisfaction on the part of the great mass who could not buy substitutes.

This truckling policy of the Government, which resulted in discrimination in favor of the man of means, robbed the trained veteran officers of ambitious incentive and spirit, and did more to destroy patriotism and create ill feeling among the very class from which the armies were composed than any other single thing in connection with the war.

Serious as were these faults in Federal recruitment, its armies suffered a greater evil through not promoting trained veteran officers to earned rank and positions of command. They were thus unjustly left with ambitions unsatisfied.

True, the somewhat pernicious right was reserved to the rank and file of the Confederate armies, of choosing new company officers. And while the veteran was yet in abeyance in raw levies, the good fellow, rather than the fit soldier, was often the wearer of insignia of rank. But once the veteran had evolved, who may question that he was more competent than any other to select the officer who would utilize his life to the best advantage of all concerned? Certainly he, rather than political favoritism and ignorance, was the competent judge and commissioning agent. And it may be questioned if his judgment was not superior, all things considered, to that of regimental commanders and their superiors, in the selection of line officers, when it is realized that the private

soldier was in immediate contact with, and his life largely at the disposal of, his company officers. These points of vantage would serve to subject other influences to that of soldierly efficiency in command. And further, this annual practice acted more to eliminate than it did to augment inefficiency of line officers, while serving as a spur to them. If an army was semi-disorganized for a short time by this election of line officers, it appears that this temporary weakening would be more than offset by the advantages noted. In the main ability for command was well utilized and rewarded in the Confederate armies; and had the Federal armies enjoyed this relief from incompetency in command, court-martials, cashierings, dishonorable discharges, and many deaths from other than the enemy's bullets would have been less numerous.

As this republic of ours must look to its citizens for its material for armies in time of war, we should in the future act on knowledge arrayed by our Civil War. And it left no more important lesson than in that relating to the false system of recruitment of the Federal armies. If this must be done through the agencies of the States — as appears best — then let the work be done under regulations established by, and the direct supervision of, the Government in manner that will insure equitable treatment of the citizen, while bringing to the ranks of the armies only fit material of individuals, to be disposed through the forces to their best advantage as fighting units. And, by all means, let these forces be officered as far as possible from the Regular Army — even to the taking of the many worthy and capable non-commissioned officers and privates from its ranks. Nothing can be much worse than the Civil War system, though it largely persisted in our Spanish-American War.

Having a war college, West Point, equaled by no other,

it is unjust to ourselves as a nation that its graduates shall not be called to high command when war requires the increase of our army; when small politics should be relegated to utter subordination to war's larger and then vital interests.

This much, then, as to mass ability in men: on the part of the North, limitless, theoretically; but, practically, seriously limited; and this availability greatly weakened and rendered less than effective by false methods which decreased effectiveness as needs rapidly increased through the demands of progressive invasion. And of finance, vast credits such as the world had never seen or been asked to give, even to old and firmly established nations, were open to the Federal Government. Its loans, though largely made from the people of the North, were readily obtained in Europe, the money world, though its leading money powers were in no manner anxious for the success of the Federal cause, so much did Europe fear the rise of this New and Prospering among mercantile nations. Nor were they friendly to the Federal war for reason that manufacturers yearned for the Southern cotton in most profitable exchange for Confederate war supplies. This trade was almost entirely shut off by the Federal blockade of the Southern coast. Europe's attitude was expressed in its demand that the Federal blockade of the South must be made effective or the Confederacy would be recognized. In this "schemed" emergency, the great commonalty of the North, together with the private cupidity of Europe, came to the rescue. The Federal blockade was made effective with the result that Europe went hungry for cotton, and its secret friend, the Confederacy, of needed munitions of war, which it had not the facilities or developed skill to manufacture. Blockade "running" thereafter became an important, if secret, item of European and Southern ma-

rine news. But the Federal credit had become firmly established.

A foreign emergency was passed; also one at home. For such a situation, pregnant with disaster, was not left unaided by the home opposition to the war, which surely never offered its aid to the Government, but continued to shout Failure! to the world from under the safe shelter of the very Government and people which were heavily taxed in order to replenish a sea of treasure, threatening to be drained by the ever-increasing expense of the war. As a result of these conditions, while a great majority of the people of the North were loyal and patriotic, the inspiration which characterized the spirit of the South was non-existent both in the Federal armies and in their rear. The Southern war was war, pure and simple, while in the North the seriousness of the war was not fully realized, and was effectively hampered by politics. It was often debatable which was uppermost.

## CHAPTER V

### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

WHEN the campaign season of 1863 opened, war had already raged for two years over the entire field of 800,000 square miles. Great armies had become disciplined and fought into veteran hosts, unique in many respects. They had not only proved themselves competent to any enterprise ever undertaken by soldiery, but the extent and character of the *terrain* had engendered a mobility and independence of movement and action on the part of the individual soldier, small groups of them, and of all units of organization up to army corps, and these combined in great armies. And of these armies, composed almost wholly of American citizens, those of the Confederacy had distinguished themselves for fiery dash and persistency, while the Federal soldiery, with its cooler Northern blood, had become famed for its patient steadfastness, which never knew discouragement or "let go" under two years of almost uniform defeat or but partial success.

During these years the Confederate cavalry had become a formidable arm of the service. The young men of the South had ever been sportsmen on horseback, and were, therefore, superb horsemen ready to mount as daring riders eager for dashing enterprise in war. Nor were able and unique cavalry leaders lacking to command these ranked horsemen. General J. E. B. Stuart, a young and dashing cavalry officer from the old army, in command of General Lee's cavalry, had from the first made the Army of the



Potomac feel the deft thrust and weight of his arm; while, in the West, Forrest and Wheeler had performed wonders. The Federal troopers, on the contrary, had from the first to be trained into firm-seated, confident horsemen, and under the disadvantage of not being considered an important arm of the service, or used as such by the Federal commanding generals. Further than this, no cavalry commander of marked ability had yet emerged from the Federal hosts to bring the cavalry to its own, or to consolidate its scattered regiments and brigades from mere outpost duty into regular divisions and corps of the armies, operating with them in close unison, or cooperating at a distance as formidable and self-dependent units. As a natural consequence, the Federal cavalry displayed a marked inferiority to that of the Confederacy wherever they met in conflict previous to 1863, at the very outstart of the Gettysburg campaign. The first cavalry battle of magnitude fought in the war occurred at Brandy Station, Virginia. With Stuart and his superb horse, the Federal cavalry proved itself worthy of its foe by gaining the advantage in that engagement. And from thence on, these prime equals, the Confederate and Federal cavalry, developed a cavalry war unique in history, restoring to that arm much of its past importance and glory, acting with success offensively and in defense against infantry and artillery as frequently as in conflict with its own arm.

The cavalry feature of our war should not be passed without calling attention to the group of a dozen or more of young men, from twenty-two to thirty years of age, who had developed into the most capable cavalry generals that the world has ever seen. And while the Confederate cavalry in the East declined after the death of Stuart in the campaign of 1864, the cavalry of the Federal armies was at its best at the close of the war, when

under Phil Sheridan, then promoted to chief command of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac. It fought battles of magnitude against infantry and artillery often when covered by field works, and blocked the way to Lee's retreating army at Appomattox. The cavalry had acquired the skill as well as the surpassing confidence to dismount and fight its equal of the other arms, while one-fourth of its number stood idle as horse-holders nearby, with mounts ready for all to leap into saddle and pursue whatever they had set moving rearward, fighting on foot with their inferior range carbines and horse artillery. The American cavalry not only restored that arm of the service from subordination to a parity with infantry and artillery, but advanced it into a field never before exploited nor thought of as possible to cavalry.

Returning to the general condition of the war in 1863, when the Gettysburg campaign opened: As its first step, the Federal cavalry was to win its first victory over that of the Confederates, showing that the two had finally arrived on a parity. Not so, however, in relation to the opposing armies as a whole, in the two years' conflict between which the Federals had gained scarcely one important victory. And but one month before the Gettysburg campaign opened, the Army of the Potomac had met with defeat at Chancellorsville. At the same time a part of the Army of the West, under Rosecrans, was blockaded at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Grant with the balance was isolated down the Mississippi River, gripping Vicksburg. Nor was the more or less cursory war in the trans-Mississippi region more encouraging to the Federal cause.

In the mean time, voluntary enlistment into the Federal armies had almost ceased, and conscription was the only resort for recruiting them. This system, unpopular at any time, at this period caused dangerous draft riots at some





LIEUT.-GEN. J. E. B. STUART



points, at so low an ebb was patriotism and support of the war. A crucial time had evidently arrived, and one to be taken advantage of by the Confederates. For at such a juncture a decisive victory, especially by the Army of Northern Virginia, would bring foreign recognition of the Southern Confederacy, and, with little question, the close of the war, with the Confederacy permanently established. And it may readily be seen that General Lee should not have ventured much if any distance beyond his own frontier, not only for fear of arousing the North, but from purely military and political reasons. A decisive battle fought in Virginia would have the same general effect and result as though waged in Pennsylvania, and with much more safety to his army and the Confederate cause.

These weighty considerations doubtless had attention from the Confederate authorities, but that they were duly valued under the conditions of success which had attended the Confederate war up to that time may be questioned. It appears that the well-founded hope, if not the enthusiasm, of the time overcame safe prudence and was checked, if at all, by Longstreet's proposal that in the event of a battle being fought in the enemy's country, none but a defensive battle should be waged. To this General Lee agreed in the coolness of discussion before the heat of campaign.

It was under these bright and prosperous, as well as possibly ominous, conditions that the invasive campaign was inaugurated which resulted in the Battle of Gettysburg.

## CHAPTER VI

### STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES

**I**MMEDIATELY following the battle of Chancellorsville, the victorious Confederate Army of Northern Virginia was powerfully augmented by the addition of three veteran divisions and by recruits. This increase of his force, together with the loss of General Jackson as commander of a corps, caused General Lee to reorganize his army from two into three corps, necessitating the appointment of two new commanders of corps, General Ewell to lead the Second — Jackson's old command — and General Hill, as chief of the Third, Longstreet retaining command of the First Corps. There were also several newly promoted commanders of divisions and brigades.

In strength of numbers, the Army of Northern Virginia reached a point not before attained; while in robust self-confidence and assurance of invincibility, in morale and *esprit de corps*, the veterans of Napoleon did not overmatch its superbly dominant spirit. According to Army Reports and Official Records, the respective armies mustered, June 30, 1863, effectives present with colors, under command of General Robert E. Lee, as follows:

Confederates, 80,000 men.  
Organized; Infantry, into three corps:

The First Corps, Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet.

The Second Corps, Lieut.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell.

The Third Corps, Lieut.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill.

These three corps contained 9 divisions, or 37 brigades, or 155 regiments.

Cavalry: Commanded by Lieut.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart; consisting of 3 divisions, or 7 brigades, or 30 regiments.

Artillery: Commanded by Maj.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton; made up of 15 battalions, or 69 batteries, or 287 guns.

While the artillery remained under the super-command of General Pendleton, it was temporarily distributed as follows: 5 batteries to each corps, 1 to each division, 2 in reserve; and 1 horse battery to each brigade of cavalry.

The Confederate corps and divisions were powerful and well balanced, with veteran officers of proper rank in command of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments, making a proper and superbly organized army. A chief commander for the artillery rendered that arm most effective in respect of massing and controlling its fire.

Federal Army: Effectives present with the colors, June 30, 1863, under command of Maj.-Gen. Joseph E. Hooker;

Total, 93,500 men.

Organized; Infantry, into seven corps, commanded by:

The First Corps, Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds.

The Second Corps, Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock.

The Third Corps, Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles.

The Fifth Corps, Maj.-Gen. George Sykes.

The Sixth Corps, Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick.

The Eleventh Corps, Maj.-Gen. O. O. Howard.

The Twelfth Corps, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum.

These seven Corps contained 19 divisions, or 51 brigades, or 206 regiments.

Cavalry: Commanded by Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasanton, one corps of 3 divisions, or 8 brigades, or 33 regiments.

Artillery: Commanded by Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt, ostensibly 14 brigades, or 65 batteries, or 370 guns.

The Federal artillery, under the command of General Hunt, was under the direct control of corps commanders

among whom it was distributed: to each corps a brigade of from four to eight batteries; to the cavalry 49 batteries; in reserve 21 batteries.

The Federal army was most defective in organization. The corps were too numerous and weak, while these and the divisions were wholly unbalanced, the units, even down to regiments being generally commanded by officers of rank inferior to their commands, in all arms of the service, especially in the infantry and artillery. The actual mixed command of the artillery, divided between the ostensible chief of artillery and the corps commanders, worked great mischief and detriment to the Federal artillery at the Battle of Gettysburg. Fortunately for the Federal army, its cavalry was completely reorganized at Frederick, Md., on June 28, 1863, by drawing in its last small, isolated and largely useless detachment, and consolidating all in one powerful cavalry corps, after which the cavalry arm of the Army of the Potomac asked and took no odds of the before unequalled Confederate Horse of Stuart.

When units of the respective armies in question are mentioned, it should be borne in mind that each Confederate corps represents a third, while each Federal corps stands for a seventh, of their respective armies. And the same ratio applies to divisions and brigades, barring the unequalized strength of the Federal units.

Perhaps no army of veterans ever took the field more superbly commanded throughout than the Army of Northern Virginia. General Lee, revered and loved by his officers and men, was ever competent to needs and opportunities; alert, wary and bold; ever taking into due account the general character and traits of his opposing commander, and whatever bore upon the general or the fixed policy acting to control the hostile army, that is, the moral power as well as physical force. Too great for jealousies or ill

will toward any, he possessed the rare faculty of winning loyal love and obedience of his subordinates, to the extent that they were never afflicted with envy or jealousy of him, but always gave him their best. A more noble and lofty personality than that of Robert E. Lee has scarcely appeared on the human stage. "Tall, superbly proportioned and commanding, his calm dignity never perturbed, he mellowed soldierly rigidity into a winning nobility of pose and carriage; while his strong alertly reposeful features and gray-blue eyes faced true and level. Ruddy with health, adorned by a manly endowment of iron-gray hair and beard. Never in haste, nor ever slow, in movement or speech, his voice bespoke a big warm heart too true and simple to harbor evil or pettiness. Approachable by all without lawless familiarity, with a soul too large to classify men, in his like kindly treatment of all, Robert E. Lee was the idolized commander of his men and officers; while in their hearts they loved and revered him as a father."

Longstreet, cool, capable and widely experienced in war and in command, was Lee's able second, and his loyal complement. Ewell and Hill were new to the command of corps, but superbly experienced in great war as generals of large command under inimitable Stonewall Jackson, whose invincible infantry had become famous as the "Foot Cavalry" because of its remarkable celerity of movement. True, this was Lee's first campaign lacking the aid of his right arm, Jackson: an officer whose unique ability and safe daring were not equaled by any commander in either the Confederate or Federal armies. His three corps commanders, however, were able generals, although this was their first experience in working together all as superior commanders. And Ewell's position proved trying, as he was at the head of Jackson's old command upon which Lee instinctively relied, as in the past; while the



subordinate officers, with the men, did not regard Ewell with that absolute trust and confidence which they placed in Jackson. Then, in the reorganization of the army, many new subordinate commanders were scattered through the corps. In fact, the entire army felt the loss of this great general, whose presence in emergency more than once reinforced it with a might not measured by the strength of an army corps. From the first he had in large measure been the intuitive brain and forehanded arm of General Lee, to catch and execute his behest, his boldest strategic thoughts. Of his death Longstreet said: "The dark clouds of the future then began to lower above the Confederacy." Jackson was the vital unit which could not be restored or replaced.

Though somewhat foreign to this narrative, it is not inappropriate here to interject a loving if quaint monument to Jackson. "Of medium height and firmly built, his jerky movements indicated action rather than nervousness. Nor did this characteristic detract from his general quaintness as he rode his raw-boned ambler with short stirrups, dressed in an old sun-browned and dusty coat, a little cadet cap cocked down over his nose, from under the visor of which his open gray eyes gazed in vision or flashed from his silence with quick, comprehensive order or command. Prayerful and Bible-reading in camp and on march; a familiar with his troops, an infallible fate to the enemy, what soldier need be told that this unique commander became the object of adoration and supreme trust of his troops? Nor was Lee behind the soldiers in his trust in Jackson."

Stuart, a born cavalry leader, would have won renown beyond Murat under the world's master of war, Napoleon. "At twenty-nine years of age a general of cavalry. Medium height, frame broad and powerful, heavy brown



beard flowing upon his breast; huge mustache, ends curled up; flashing blue eyes beneath a piled-up forehead, and of dazzling brilliancy like the eagles as he swung to saddle and charged into battle humming some merry song. War to him a splendid and exciting game in which his nature and genius found a congenial arena." A cavalier of whom an opposing general, Sedgwick, said: "Stuart is the best cavalry officer ever foaled in North America." And while Stuart was the most picturesque of the galaxy of young cavalry commanders staged by the war, there was an ample dozen in the opposing armies equally youthful, brilliant and daring, and his close equal in command of horse. These young riders made the American cavalry unique, fighting mounted or on foot, in battle with infantry and artillery, or alone on wide raids destroying railroads, storming fortifications, and even capturing water craft.

Pendleton, by nature an artilleryist, and as such largely experienced, selected none but his like as commanders of battalions and batteries. And this order of selection held good throughout Lee's army — experienced, specially fitted and capable men at every commanding post. Chivalrous men eager for chances. Soldierly worth won reward of adequate promotion. This last noted fact alone tends to render an army invincible; and General Lee was too great a commander and too just a man to overlook worth, or make it give way to personal or political favorites. For these reasons the Army of Northern Virginia was not dangerously infected by official jealousies and "discretionary" insubordinations which usually infest and often jeopardize armies. The Army of Northern Virginia was, as near as possible under its new conditions of reorganization, a homogeneous, inwardly and outwardly united, loyal fighting unit; and subject to one weakness, mainly, the habit formed by subordinate commanders of exercising large

discretionary authority. However, it must not be overlooked that this spirit of perfect harmony and homogeneity had been somewhat disturbed by the death of Stonewall Jackson, and the large recruitment of the army, for these necessitated the formation of one new corps and the promotion of many officers. But the greatest weakness which the Army of Northern Virginia suffered was its deprivation of Jackson. So true is this, that it may be said that had Jackson been at Gettysburg, Lee would, in all human probability, have been victorious.

In the largeness of his nature, and because of their ability, Lee gave wide latitude to his immediate subordinate commanders, especially as they were often wholly or semi-detached, and required to decide and act on their own initiative and judgment. This, becoming a habit, led to lack of promptness and concert of action on the part of his lieutenants when brought together and required to act as one unit. The serious, perhaps fatal, effects of this were made evident in the battle of Gettysburg, as will be specially noted in the summary of that conflict.

With the personnel of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia thus magnificently arrayed for invasive campaign, its equipment and impedimenta had not been neglected. Effectively armed and ammunitioned to the limit of difficult possibilities, the varying caliber of its arms and different kinds of ammunition gave some trouble. Stuart's cavalry, the ever-twinkling eye of the army, had been remounted; while the wagon trains had been replenished in vehicles and animals to needs requisite to the supply of the army from its well-stocked base at Staunton, West Virginia, along its practically safe line of communication behind the Blue Ridge Mountains. Further than this, any deficiency which might exist in transportation, live stock and subsistence would be readily made good


from the rich farming country through which the invasion was to be pushed. Nor was the campaign in plan left to the haphazard and excitement of active operations. General Lee had fully discussed his proposed procedure with his corps commanders, especially Longstreet, and it had been fully determined and agreed that in strategy the campaign should be offensive, but that in battle it should be strictly defensive. This fore-decision was made chiefly to guard against any deviation therefrom amidst the temptations of active campaign which might arise to lure the commander or his generals temporarily from this safer, more stable and promising course. The veteran Army of Northern Virginia stood eager at Lee's command, masterfully self-confident,—in effective strength, organization, equipment, discipline, and morale an army such as had never before been arrayed by the Confederacy.

While the perfecting of the Confederate army was in robust progress, the opposing host was suffering from fearful depletion. During the months of May and June it lost, through expiration of term of service, many thousands of its veteran troops. Sickness was excessive from hardship and exposure in the disastrous Chancellorsville campaign, and recruiting had almost ceased. In the main the cessation of voluntary enlistment was the result of the dispiriting effect upon the entire north of lack of marked success of the Federal armies. Like a strong but inexperienced runner, it had wastefully expended its first enthusiasm, and was pausing to get its second breath. With what force this general feeling acted and reacted between the armies and the people can scarcely be imagined. It was the most serious block to recruitment of the armies—even worse than a marked defeat in battle, as this would have acted to arouse rather than to have depressed the people in this period of quiescence. From these various

causes, the Army of the Potomac at this time was reduced to a total strength of some 90,000 men, including a worked-out cavalry corps of but 7,500 men.

And yet, at this most critical juncture, this crisis in the nation's destiny, Gen. Henry M. Halleck, commander-in-chief of the Federal armies, held one entire veteran corps at Port Royal, and one division at New Bern, North Carolina, two divisions at Suffolk, Virginia, one on the Virginia Peninsular, several in West Virginia and in the Shenandoah Valley,—86,000 men, in all, including the garrison about Washington. This formidable army was scattered about at points of little or no importance, where a small fraction of their number would serve the purpose better, excepting the Washington garrison. In the main they were held useless either for offense or defense, remote from the field of active operations, to which every possible Confederate soldier has been drawn from the very points Halleck strongly held. And these Federal detachments were composed of veteran troops of which the Army of the Potomac stood sorely in need. Meanwhile the Government frantically called for raw levies.

At this very time and later, when the Army of the Potomac was required to cover Washington, that city was garrisoned by one strong corps in the almost impregnable defenses about the capital, with one strong division somewhere in the Shenandoah Valley, its very isolation offering a tempting morsel to the enemy, and which was accepted when this division was destroyed by Lee's advance. Near Manassas was still another division of six thousand cavalry defending Washington from a few hundred of Mosby's transient partisans. Several thousand Federal troops were also held along the upper Potomac and in the West Virginia mountains guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, where small posts would have done the work better holding



MAJ.-GEN. JOSEPH HOOKER



against small and infrequent Confederate forays. Had the troops uselessly employed in these detached bodies been called to usefulness, the Army of the Potomac would have been amply strengthened, leaving a surplus for the defense of Washington if the Federal field army had disappeared and left the garrison force to cope with Lee's army alone. In any event, the Army of the Potomac, instead of being tied to the direct defense of the Federal capital, would have been, or should have been, left free to operate against Lee as opportunity should offer.

Notwithstanding the availability of these scattered troops for reinforcing the Army of the Potomac, and for the defense of Washington, not a man of them was called in for either purpose, while Hooker was ordered to maneuver his army so that at all times it would interpose between Lee's army and the Capital. Thus facing campaign, the Army of the Potomac found itself sorely depleted of veteran troops, their places partially filled with "raw" levies, while it was tied to Washington, with Halleck in full swing of authority, suspicious of Hooker, its commander, and watching for some excuse to remove him from command. That it did not become dispirited and demoralized under such somber conditions, and in face of the certainty of having to engage promptly with its superb antagonist is the highest encomium that can go down to posterity affirming the splendid material of which that stern, patient and indomitable army was composed.




## CHAPTER VII

### ON CAMPAIGN

THE great antagonists are prepared to move out in the greatest campaign the Southern Confederacy ever launched; Gen. Lee having the choice of either of two lines of operation, one to the east of the Blue Ridge directly threatening Washington, or the safer one down the Shenandoah Valley behind and protected by those mountains to the Potomac, and beyond almost to Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, by their extension northward, the South Mountains. The protected line is adopted, rendering it practically certain that if a battle is fought it will be on northern soil.

May we not re-embolden those now shadowy hosts as in columns they wind from their camps, stretching out over every available road along valleys, and over mountains, like huge trailing leviathans; here and there pushing and darting out eyed tentacles in observation to peer or engage and spit fire, then draw in to the sinuous bodies of the monsters feeling ahead hunting advantage, to uncoil and strike in fierce grapple of death? for this pictures hostile moving armies. On June 3d Longstreet's First Corps was secretly withdrawn from the general line along the south bank of the Rappahannock River, set in march toward Culpeper, where it arrived on the 7th. Ewell's Second Corps followed Longstreet on the 4th and 5th; while Hill's Third Corps, deployed to occupy its own and the vacated line, masked the withdrawal and then moved *en route* on the 14th, to join Longstreet at Culpeper.





Virginia between Washington and Richmond.

(Facing Page 70)



On the 5th, the movement of Hill's camps in extension west from Fredericksburg aroused the suspicion of Hooker, encamped at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg. He immediately felt out across the Rappahannock, and, as the result, decided that Lee was engaged in a movement toward the west with purpose to turn his right flank and advance northward, either to the east or the west of the Blue Ridge. Hooker's able and brilliant strategic ability determined him to attack, rout, and destroy the exposed, isolated corps of Hill, thus placing the Army of the Potomac not only in rear of Lee, but between his army and Richmond, the Confederate capital.

It may be readily seen that an attack in force made on Hill, thirty-five miles from Longstreet, as Hooker proposed, would compel Lee to abandon his invasion by recalling Longstreet and Ewell, while subjecting them to the imminent jeopardy of being defeated in detail by Hooker's concentrated army, or of being crushed by superior numbers should they succeed in effecting a concentration.

For some time previous to the beginning of his movement, Lee's pickets had been so alert to duty that Hooker's spies found it impossible to pass the Confederate line and secure information. Because of this vigilance, Hooker's advisement of Lee's movement came through the suspicious activity of Hill's men. From these indications Hooker became satisfied that something was under way of which he must have knowledge. He, therefore, began his operations on June 6th.

Hooker first ordered Pleasanton with his cavalry, on the right, to feel out toward Culpeper. On the 9th, his jaded seventy-five hundred cavalymen, outdistancing his two brigades of supporting infantry, engaged Stuart's ninety-five hundred superb troopers, and, at Brandy Station, fought a cavalry battle such as America had never

before witnessed. Pleasanton's reconnoissance was in the nature of a surprise. He caught Stuart with his regiments and brigades somewhat dispersed, and with this advantage to counterbalance the disparity in numbers and the physical condition of the opposing bodies of horse, the Federal cavalry here, for the first time, proved itself a worthy equal of Stuart's troopers, a position it never forfeited. In this battle it more than maintained itself against Stuart until infantry began to arrive to the aid of the latter from Culpeper. The presence of this infantry developed the information Pleasanton sought, that is, that Lee was in movement in force on Hooker's right; and the Federal cavalry withdrew unmolested, from the field. This cavalry fight also had another important effect. It frustrated Stuart's planned raid past Hooker's right-rear against his line of communication with Washington with the double purpose of cutting this, and of masking Lee's movement into the Shenandoah and safety behind the Blue Ridge.

Having obtained the desired information, on the 11th, Hooker put the left wing of his army in motion past the rear of the right wing, thus facing the Army of the Potomac due west. At this point a glance at Lee's position and condition will be interesting. On the 10th, the main body of Ewell's corps drew out from Culpeper, headed for the Shenandoah Valley. When it was demonstrated by Pleasanton's withdrawal, after the cavalry fight at Brandy Station, that he was not the advance of a movement in force by Hooker against the strung-out Confederate army, Lee knew it was safe to proceed with his well-initiated plan. This served as his notice from Washington that its officials had tied Hooker to the direct defense of that city, in continuance of their chronic scheme for its protection. Hence, holding Longstreet at Culpeper, Lee at once pushed Ewell out in the advance. Here the subtle generalship of



LIEUT. GEN. THOMAS J. (STONEWALL) JACKSON



Lee displayed itself, his never-failing faculty of utilizing the mighty power of thought, actuating men and, especially, armies. Ewell and most of his men had campaigned and fought through the length and breadth of the Shenandoah Valley under Jackson, their now dead and immortal leader, hence they were familiar with every road and path, and advantageous position.

What soldier does not love to recall past marches and battles? How much more, then, is he inspired when he lives them over again in actual campaign and conflict — and these avenging an idolized slain chieftain! Such were Ewell and his splendid corps, Jackson's old troops. Nor was this all of this phase of Lee's generalship. The advance of Ewell's command consisted of two cavalry brigades which, for some time past, had been operating throughout the Shenandoah region, until their presence there had become familiar to friend and foe. Halleck's little garrisons and posts, therefore, did not suspect that these everyday acquaintances were the advance of the Army of Northern Virginia; nor did they, until captured and destroyed by the oncoming flood.

On the 11th, then, we find Lee's army with Ewell, its advance in sight of the Maryland mountains, Longstreet at Culpeper, while Hill still held Fredericksburg. The Army of Northern Virginia was therefore stretched over a front of nearly one hundred miles, with a formidable adversary on its flank eager to take advantage of, but withheld from, such unusual opportunity.

Not with truth, as yet, can Lee be charged with careless or reckless generalship; though to the unpenetrating observer his detaching of Jackson at Chancellorsville against Hooker's distant flank, against Pope's rear at Manassas, may invite criticism, and, most of all, this wide separation of the three corps of his army on the flank of a concen-



trated antagonist which offered magnificent opportunity to his opponent to interpose between Hill and Longstreet, holding the latter in check while destroying Hill, thus placing the Federal army in Lee's rear and between his army and the Confederate capital. On purely strategic grounds it is absurd to think that Lee would thus operate to invite disaster, both to his army and to the cause for which he fought. The basis for detaching Jackson against Pope's rear was his knowledge of the character of Pope's and Jackson's ability, and again, at Chancellorsville, he acted on Hooker's timidity displayed in his failure promptly to launch a bold attack from his most advantageous flank position. The fact that in this case Lee permitted himself, apparently, to jeopardize his army and cause, can be reasonably accounted for only on the ground that he was acting on his knowledge of the past policy of the Washington authorities, to hold the Army of the Potomac directly to cover that city; the perpetuation of that policy being confirmed when Hooker's cavalry attack turned out as being a reconnoissance, rather than the advance of the Army of the Potomac moving to attack, as it should. Acting on this knowledge, the senseless fear of the Washington officials, the wide dispersion of his army displayed a high order of generalship on the part of Lee, for this dispersion, thereby made safe against attack by Hooker, in itself gave Lee weighty advantage by confusing Washington, thus rendering movement of the Federal army dilatory if not impossible at this otherwise dangerous stage in his operations.

That this effect was produced at Washington is evident; for while the generalship of Hooker informed him that Lee's advance was already in the Shenandoah, and he so notified Halleck, the commander-in-chief not only disregarded Hooker's notification, but, without mention of the







warning, sent orders to General Schenck, at Harper's Ferry, causing him in turn to give positive orders to General Milroy, at Winchester, to remain at that point of exposure in the valley, in the direct path of Ewell, then almost ready to envelop Milroy.

Commenting on the condition of the War Office at this time, President Lincoln said: "Our folks (Halleck and Stanton) appear to know but little how things are, and show no evidence that they ever will avail themselves of any advantage." It was not until 1864, when Grant was placed in supreme command of the Federal armies, that the President had learned that the commander of an army is in superior position for using it as a fighting power, that the commander-in-chief must be a fighter as well as a strategist, and that his authority is exercised better anywhere else than from the seat of political authority.

Meanwhile, his cavalry advance already in the valley, on the 10th Ewell followed with his three divisions of infantry and eighty guns, passing the Blue Ridge at Chester's Gap and reaching Cedarville, on the Shenandoah River, on the 12th, having covered a distance of fifty miles in this rapid march. But, advised by his cavalry of Milroy's isolated garrison, held at Winchester, Ewell continued the march of sufficient infantry to occupy Milroy's roads of escape. This veteran corps was toughened to campaign, sleeping without shelter, carrying only blankets, arms and ammunition, and, for rations, a little bread in haversacks, otherwise subsisting on the country, the rich and friendly Shenandoah Valley; hence the men were light-footed for forage and march, one occupation inciting the other.

On the 13th, Ewell began drawing in on caged Milroy, and finally destroyed his command, capturing ten thousand men, twenty-two guns, three hundred acceptable wagons,

and an abundance of stores—all, save the men, most serviceable to the Confederates at this juncture. Ewell's loss was but two hundred and sixty men.

In this encounter it cannot be truthfully charged that General Milroy did not bravely enact his hopeless part, though Halleck made of him a scapegoat to bear the burden of his own fatal blundering. In fact many competent commanders were made to suffer for the same reason by the military "wisdom" of Washington headquarters, which was mired in the absurd policy of holding large forces on the upper Potomac and outside of Washington's ample defense when small scouting parties would have performed the service better, giving these large units to the Army of the Potomac when the scale of battle often swung at balance.

Having learned that Ewell had passed Sperryville, Hooker began the movement of his army northward on June 13th, moving reluctantly under his orders to "Follow Lee." The phenomenal exposure of the Army of Northern Virginia caused him to urge Halleck for permission to move against Hill holding on at Fredericksburg with but 20,000 men, while Hooker had 70,000 across the Rappahannock, opposite him, with Longstreet thirty-five and Ewell seventy-five, miles away.

By the threat of Hooker's position, Lee was compelled to hold Longstreet thus dangerously exposed to the entire Federal army. But he safely trusted that his thrust of Ewell northward would so frighten Washington generalship that it would compel Hooker to forego his desire and most promising chance, and move northward to cover the Capital. Hooker's movement to the north relieved the entire Confederate dilemma, and, on the 14th, Hill left Fredericksburg *en route* for Culpeper and the Shenandoah Valley.

Hooker's army on the 15th was at and about Manassas and Fairfax, covering Washington. The course of the Federal army thus defined, Longstreet advanced from Culpeper, hugging the eastern flank of the Blue Ridge in order to confuse Hooker as to Lee's purpose, and at the same time to mask Hill's corps following the track of Ewell. Having accomplished these purposes, on the 19th, Longstreet passed the mountains through Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, and was in the Shenandoah Valley within supporting distance of Hill and Ewell.

Lee now had his army safely concentrated behind the Blue Ridge Mountains, ready for his next move across his enemy's frontier. This initial movement had placed his army behind these mountains, which, stretching northward to the Potomac, continue beyond that river through Maryland and into Pennsylvania, where they are known as the South Mountains. Seldom have topographical and political factors so propitiously combined to favor invasive war. These curtaining mountains were passable to armies only at wide intervals against an active foe, through passes easily defended, and extended far into the territory to be invaded; while the valleys behind them were wide and fertile, being occupied by a prosperous farming population with abundance for the needs of an army, including live stock. With base established at Staunton, in the southern debouchment of the Shenandoah Valley, well within Confederate territory, Lee's base and long line of communication were practically safe with scanty guards until he crossed the Potomac River, which was the only natural obstacle throughout the course of his advance.

The political factors were Washington, the Federal capital, situated within the field of operations, the condition of the Federal war, and threatening foreign intervention—the last practically assured should Lee crown his invasion

with victorious battle. True, Washington was strongly fortified and heavily garrisoned by a force independent of the Army of the Potomac, able to maintain the capital intact until the field army could relieve it, should the latter so operate as to uncover that city to the enemy. Free action, however, was not permitted to the Army of the Potomac, the commander-in-chief, Halleck, having refused the urgent request of General Hooker to attack Lee's dangerously exposed flank during his movement from the Rappahannock into safety behind the Blue Ridge. Unquestionably such an attack would have most effectually protected Washington, while offering unusual chances for the defeat of Lee's invasive campaign, if not of his army, thus stretched out and exposed over a hundred miles of front. This very timidity at Washington, preventing the Army of the Potomac from operating so as to directly uncover the capital added another advantage to the invasion, both in its restrictive action on the field army and in Lee's assurance that this chronic policy would be held in operation.

Lee, then, on the 15th, was in the midst of a flank march on a front of thirty-five miles between Hill and Longstreet, past the concentrated Federal army, some 100,000 strong; and was wide open to the greatest jeopardy to a competent enemy free to act as it should. Hill was at Fredericksburg with 20,000 men against Hooker's 70,000 across the river. Longstreet was at Culpeper, thirty-five miles away, and Ewell forty miles beyond Longstreet. Lee's army, then, held a front of seventy-five miles, with the enemy 100,000 strong nearer to either Hill or Longstreet than these two corps were to one another. Hooker had the choice of either breaking Lee's attenuated line by holding Hill in check while he smashed Longstreet, or of holding Longstreet stationary at Culpeper while destroying Hill at



Fredericksburg, and then march south and capture Richmond. This would effectually have drawn Lee after him away from his double threat and of invasion. This able strategist, tied hand and foot by his sleeping superior at Washington, quickly saw Lee's fatal position and pleaded for permission to take advantage of it. Halleck's timidity and utter incompetency, however, stood firm — like a mule in the road — and Hooker was ordered to hold his army from increasing the peril of his antagonist until Lee should recover his army to safety; then to trail on after him — to keep the invasion going safely past Washington!

Though later in this campaign General Lee displayed a wondrous absence of his otherwise consummate generalship, his apparent reckless disregard of fixed principles of war in this flank march must not be charged to any lapse in his strategy. Rather does it stand to the credit of his rare ability as a general. For in this he rose above commanding regard of these principles and of mere physical force and acted almost wholly on the moral force which he knew from past experience would dominate the situation. This was the chronic fright at Washington over any and every hostile threat toward the Federal capital, and the wholly inane strategy and tactics which were invariably used in safeguarding that city.

Lee, acting on the certainty of such procedure on the part of Hooker's superiors at Washington, who would compel him to do nothing else but to interpose his army between the Confederate army and Washington, made no mistake — not even taking a chance — in stretching his army out by the flank, as he did after Hooker had shown his hand. But under the conditions, General Lee, in every way, acted the part of the consummate general, disregarding the rules of war when the situation warranted these being made minor, or demanded that they should be utterly

disregarded. True, there have been few commanders who have possessed the ability of judgment to discern when the moral force shall take precedence over the physical. General Lee possessed this genius preeminently among the commanders of our Civil War, specially while he was aided by Jackson, either to initiate or to execute such war. In the Vicksburg Campaign General Grant made this same quality evident, as also did General Sherman in his campaign from Atlanta to the sea.

In the instance under consideration, General Lee operated to confuse, frighten, and hold his opponents to their fatality until his army was out of danger and again well gathered in hand across the Potomac. And in his disregard of the principles of war Lee relied with sublime certainty of the moral force, which in war, as elsewhere, "is three times more powerful than the physical." Lee displayed the rare competency which enabled him to "seat himself in his opponent's camp-chair and view the situation."

Ewell, with Jackson's old corps of "foot cavalry," covering twenty-five miles per day, had captured or dispersed Halleck's force at Winchester, disregarded Harper's Ferry, and was in force opposite Williamsport, on the Potomac. His cavalry was advanced to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, requisitioning from the rich Cumberland Valley towns and farms great herds of beef-cattle, horses, subsistence for man and beast, together with shoes and clothing, for the betterment and comfort of the advancing jubilant host. Retiring with these for deposit, and leaving general consternation behind, this cavalry joined Ewell on the 17th, at Williamsport, where he awaited the arrival of Hill and Longstreet. A Confederate cavalry brigade at Cumberland guarded against and rendered ineffective one of Halleck's divisions, thus isolated and useless in the upper Potomac region.



On June 22d, Ewell crossed the Potomac at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, concentrating his two columns at Hagerstown; thence moving on to Chambersburg. On the 23d his advance opened all of the Cumberland Valley as far as the Susquehanna River to the Confederate supply gatherers, who gaily brushed aside the inoffensive militia hastily mustered to oppose these veterans. Thus unmolested and turned free in this richly burdened army pasture, the entire Confederate host was feasted, laid up stores, and filled its wagons now drawn by exchanged horses; while the army, reshod with the enemy's footgear, stood elate astride the hostile frontier ready for any enterprise upon which its idolized chieftain should launch his eager soldiery.

It will be noted that as yet only Ewell's corps had crossed the Potomac while Hill and Longstreet remained on its south bank. By this strategy, made possible by Hooker's orders to cover Washington, Lee compelled Hooker to hold his army to the south bank of the river; and Ewell was left free and unmolested in his temporary war on subsistence. June 24-25, Longstreet and Hill crossed the frontier at the same points where Ewell effected his passage, thence following the course of that advanced corps.

The Confederate army at this time was entirely across the river frontier, with its advance stretched out and scattered through the length and breadth of the Cumberland Valley, even to the bank of the Susquehanna River, threatening Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, and Philadelphia. Hooker, now free to cross the Potomac, on the 25th and 26th moved his army in concentration on Frederick, Md., where it threatened Lee's rear and his line of communication, near the Potomac. Here again opportunity beckoned the Army of the Potomac to advance northward against Lee's exposed rear and his line of communica-

tion and retreat. Such a movement would hold Washington covered, and its own line, while forcing Lee to give battle with his two rear corps against the entire Federal army, before Ewell could possibly come to their aid. Fighting in this position, Hooker could be safely reinforced from the Washington garrison, by French with his 10,000 from Harper's Ferry, and by thousands of otherwise useless troops, in fact, by at least 60,000 men from Halleck's army of detachments worthlessly scattered about in Lee's rear.

General Hooker, appreciating this inviting opportunity, on the 27th, initiated movement by Harper's Ferry, in Lee's rear, the Army of Northern Virginia now covering from Chambersburg to the Susquehanna. Reynolds with three corps was stationed at Middletown and in the South Mountain passes. On the 28th Hooker ordered Slocum's Twelfth Corps to Harper's Ferry, to be joined by the garrison of Maryland Heights, 10,000 strong. Slocum, thus strengthened, was to cut Lee's communications, while Reynolds with his three corps would operate in the Confederate rear. This left three corps free to advantage or necessity, at Frederick. Halleck, however, denied Hooker this prime offering, for the reason that he would hold the useless position of Maryland Heights, swamped in Lee's wake, except, as proposed by Hooker, to be utilized by stripping it of its garrison and armament and leave it to itself. Of this operation proposed by Hooker, General Slocum, a most able officer, says: "Ordered by Hooker to move up the Potomac and place my corps, with the 10,000 men under French, I should have had ample time in which to intrench. With his way thus blocked, and the remainder of the army free to act on his flank, it is difficult to see how Lee could have escaped defeat." Of this Gen. Lee, himself, reported: "To deter Hooker from advancing farther west and interrupting our communication with Virginia, after he crossed


the Potomac, it was determined to concentrate our army east of the mountains." Had Hooker been left to his purpose his army would have been on Lee's line before he would have known it, or could have concentrated his army to draw Hooker from placing his to cut him off from Virginia.

Thus hampered and foiled by Halleck, Hooker resigned from command of the Army of the Potomac, because "In presence of the enemy he is not allowed to maneuver his own army." Here it may be remarked, that if for any reason Hooker was considered unsafe with the Army of the Potomac after Chancellorsville, it was unpardonable to postpone his removal from its command until a critical point in campaign had been reached on the verge of almost certain battle. For if Hooker had had his army less completely concentrated and in hand, the result from a change of commanders might easily become fatal to the Federal army, as well as to the cause and country for which it was fighting. In this affair, however, is mixed the political intrigue of a leading cabinet official, Secretary of the Treasury, Chase, ambitious for the Presidency as an opponent of Mr. Lincoln, his present chief. For thus were millions of treasure and thousands of valorous lives sacrificed, almost to the breaking of Lincoln's great heart, he having to submit to such shameful evils of personal and political ambitions, rather than that his country and countrymen should be subjected to worse by such aspirants holding places of great power in the Government. Patriots in general, traitors in particular! For did they not betray the President, whom they should have loyally supported, and the country which trusted them, because Mr. Lincoln placed and held them in position?

Major General George G. Meade, the modest commander of the Fifth Corps, reluctantly assumed the onerous honor of

chief command of the Army of the Potomac in place of Hooker. And the patient hardihood and patriotism of the superb old Army of the Potomac was thus tested for the fifth time within ten months by a change of commanders. Not so much that it fought its way to final victory as that it simply held itself together under the treatment meted to it, is that army's loftiest renown.





MAJ. GEN. W. S. HANCOCK

## CHAPTER VIII

### CAUSE OF HOOKER'S FAILURE; POSITION OF THE ARMIES PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

**S**INCE his fiasco at Chancellorsville, General Hooker had not enjoyed the confidence of either the Washington authorities or of his own army, for the veterans of the Army of the Potomac had, through long and bitter experience, become as subtly sensitive to their leader as is the mettled steed to the rein touch of its rider. While admiring his strategy, they were silent over his battle tactics, for its wasted smoke sullied their fair fame. Hooker's failure at Chancellorsville was not due, however, to physical cowardice, his splendid fighting qualities having already won him the title of "Fighting Joe" from the army. We accordingly must seek further for the true causes of his disastrous defeat.

In no phase of life is the adage "Familiarity breeds contempt" more apparent than in those callings which require men — the warrior most of all — to become familiars with death. Oddly enough at first glance, but quite natural on second thought, the soldier "eats, drinks and makes merry to-day, for to-morrow he may die." And, from the fact that he dies for duty, gives his life for something besides himself, we may hope that he finds a justice so just that it will hold him less guilty for his robust merriment than are the many who so fear death that they ceaselessly fail in duty, to themselves, their fellows, and to their country. This thought is in no manner meant as excuse for a

crime on the part of those in positions where the lives of thousands are in their hands. The fact remains that "drink" is the main factor in the soldier's merriment, as in his solace from fatigue. So true was this, at least in the Federal armies, that it was common knowledge among officers and men that many officers of high rank and of splendid abilities often permitted themselves to become so merry as to unfit them temporarily for command, and this knowledge has become widely spread through later years by the soldiers of those fading hosts.

As an illustration of this official merriment in the armies, the quaint story of President Lincoln may be mentioned. Appealed to by a committee of sober ministers alarmed in behalf of General Grant and the nation, charging the general with bibulous indulgence, the President eagerly asked them to tell him the special brand of whisky consumed by Grant so that he might supply the same to his other generals.

Among those knowing the conditions at Chancellorsville, the defeat of Hooker in that battle was mainly accounted for on the ground that he was under the influence of the "soldier's favorite," and that this defeated his brilliant strategy and befuddled his marked fighting ability. This was also the private conviction of his superiors at Washington, according to the diary of a cabinet officer. On any other grounds it is difficult to account for his act in withdrawing his advanced columns from their positions ready for aggressive battle, and placing his army huddled and congested in a defenseless forest blind, there to be practically corraled and saved from capture only by the kindly interposition of dense darkness.

Having accomplished his brilliant turning operation unknown to the most alert and able strategist of the War, placing his army in most advantageous position for bold



advance against Lee's flank and rear, and having issued his orders and placed his columns for such action in the morning, it was the natural thing for a convivial man, his day's work accomplished so well, then to "treat" himself royally—a fatal error, but natural to habitual indulgence; and Hooker could hardly have done otherwise. In confirmation of this is the following extract from the diary of Gideon Welles, at the time Secretary of the Navy: "The President first intimated to me that Hooker is intemperate. Senator Sumner laid 'Hooker's failure at Chancellorsville to whisky.' The President said of this failure: 'If Hooker had been killed by the shot which knocked over the pillar which stunned him (so reported) we should have been successful.' No explanation has ever been made of the sudden paralysis which befell the army at that time. It was then reported by those who should have known, that it was liquor. It was so intimated, but not distinctly asserted, in cabinet. Hooker lost command of the Army of the Potomac because of his generally reported intemperance, whereby he lost the confidence of his superiors."

The imminent peril and lurking terror which possessed Hooker's army on the night of its escape from Chancellorsville, as it waited the restoration of its bridges across the Rappahannock, damaged by a storm-swollen river, are vividly illustrated by the following word picture, drawn by Colonel Wesley Brainerd, who commanded the 15th New York Engineer regiment:

"Along the short section of the river to which the crossing in retreat was confined, each bridge head was lighted by big brush fires in order to show their position to the massing troops. Looking rearward past these fires into the darkness, there were seen the densely massed columns, the glare fitfully lighting their front and magnifying the pale, stern faces of the men massing back and becoming lost in

a boundless sea of blackness. Absolute silence dominated that great host, so that the noise of our construction work sounded magnified into signals to the enemy, whose guns we momentarily expected to boom and roar, hurling shot and shell into the mass, and to hear the wild Confederate yell as they charged into its rear. When we had the bridges lengthened and restored, they were thickly covered with brush. Artillery wheels, harness, and cavalry scabbards were all muffled. Then the almost whispered commands set that ghostly mass in motion, its front disgorging a few thin columns which silently crept over the bridges to be swallowed into the darkness and to safety beyond; while from the black rearward these were interminably replenished.

“Finally, after an age of time, it seemed, the last man was across: and, cutting loose the hostile shore ends of the bridges, the rushing current swung them and us engineers home and to safety. Looking up the abrupt home shore against a leaden sky, we could distinguish the blacker shadows outlined of sullen guns and their silent, immovable gunners ready to vomit fire and death into the black beyond, giving us their lurid brooding should the blackness disgorge an enemy to molest our work of alert bridge removing.

“If silent prayer for deliverance, and thanksgiving for safety, ever went heavenward from an army, such stole through the darkness with the bated breath of that ghostly waiting host of fearfully expectant, but orderly and undismayed soldiery, that black night in May, 1863.”

“Fighting Joe” Hooker, of capacity and ability above the average general, though conceitedly ambitious to the point of insubordination, was sent to reinforce the Western army as commander of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps. There he made himself a “thorn in the flesh,” to his superiors, until Sherman was glad to approve the endorsement of Thomas

that "Hooker's resignation be accepted." Then, disgruntled and soured, he attempted to right himself by rear assault on his past comrades in arms, and on the Federal war. Finally, he sank and disappeared, a self-ruined man — the ultimate fate of all such fighters for self to the sacrifice of their duty in life.

At the outbreak of the Civil War Gen. Scott, commander-in-chief of the army, was incapacitated by age to assume the new responsibility; and when Colonel Robert E. Lee declined that proffered position, the Federal Government appointed George B. McClellan as virtual commander-in-chief from among several men of mark who, having resigned from the old army to engage in civil pursuits, re-entered again to engage in the civil conflict. McClellan took immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, the first Federal army organized, and of which he made a superb fighting mechanism. But failing as a fighter, McClellan was succeeded by Pope, an unknown bombast of Halleck's from the West, who was quickly superseded by Burnside, who was forced into command of the army against his own judgment and becoming modesty, which would have more fittingly placed him in command of a division. Then McClellan again, soon followed by Hooker — all self-demonstrated failures as army commanders. And the Army of the Potomac was the instrument upon which this low-keyed gamut was run during the first two years of the war. Under this schooling the President was not slow to learn that purely military matters in great war must be left to educated and trained soldiers, and that only such are safe to the command of armies. But, lacking this knowledge at the beginning of the war, and the military eye, he overlooked the more modest rising officers, who were to win great fame, and appointed Gen. Henry M. Halleck as commander-in-chief of the armies.

The accounted worth of this officer rested on Works on Strategy and Military Law, which he had written and tried to practice, and on some capacity he had shown as a departmental commander in the West; where, among things of note done, he had nearly succeeded in driving U. S. Grant from the army for having won a signal victory without having first obtained his permission,—the pleading of W. T. Sherman with Grant saving him to the service. Halleck soon found himself bolstered by Stanton, the rugged Secretary of War; and they constituted the Washington Military team.

Of President Lincoln's so-called, "interference with the army," in the early war, it can be said with truth that his military advising was often most worthy of careful consideration. For Lincoln's rare common-sense abetted insight to an extent that gave him that higher rare quality, or faculty, intuitive perception, which enabled him to perceive the common line of Truth threading and keying every phase of outward expression, be it in government, statecraft, war, or ordinary politics. But, perhaps, the President did not realize until later in the war, that while war must be held subservient to statecraft, to let it be made the tool of politicians and their political schemes of personal ambition, is as fatal to both statecraft and war as it is to the armies on which both depend during war. That the interference of Mr. Lincoln with the Army of the Potomac was detrimental, on the whole, is not apparent. But after his authority was delegated to Halleck it became nearly fatal. To mediocre generalship it was cause for shifting of responsibility and excuse for failure; while competency withheld itself from prostitution by declining command of the Army of the Potomac except under conditions of real command. In one way this super-authority was used until 1864, in a manner almost as detrimental to the Federal

cause as would have been another hostile army. For it required the Army of the Potomac constantly to safeguard Washington by direct interposition between that city and Lee's army, when the strategic features of the field demanded the opposite course; and these reinforced by two years of bloody failure attempting to force the overland direct covering line, by which the Federal war was blocked until Grant finally proved the latter impossible, in 1864. A fine illustration of the Direct Covering Policy, we have just seen in operation, preventing Hooker from taking advantage of opportunities such as are seldom offered in war.

In considering President Lincoln's actions, the terrific public pressure to which he was subjected must be borne in mind, while that of a private political nature was equally strong and of a far more perplexing, if not mean and personal, nature. As the armies were overstocked with political generals, it is safe to say that politics, personal feuds, jealousies and ambitions had as much to do with the fatal selections of commanders of the Army of the Potomac and many of its subordinate officers, as these Inefficiencies in command had to do with the failure of that army until they were rooted out. But for these irregularities — incident to the wars of republics — these vital positions would have been filled by officers of proven capacity, by such as had won their way in war, to such generals as Hancock, Sedgwick and Reynolds. Nor under legitimate conditions would such worthy officers have declined chief command, as did the two last named. And why Hancock was not solicited to the same duty, with his masterful ability, which "was never responsible for a military error," as Grant stated, is one of the wonders of the war.

Not until 1864, when General Grant was given command of the Federal armies, and assumed general direction of the Army of the Potomac, was that army ever left free to

show its competency, cutting loose from Washington, both in position and chief command. And this, only after most of its original superb volunteer material had gone into permanent bivouac, and its place was occupied but not filled by drafted and bounty men. What would not its original stuff have accomplished under the same conditions?

At the present juncture in Lee's invasion, with everything at tension, there had been made a change in commanders of the Army of the Potomac. Seriously weakened of veteran troops, and having been somewhat recruited by raw levies, as we have seen, it was yet hardly a match for Lee's enthusiastic veterans in even battle; and the Federal Government was making frantic effort to obtain more recruits. Hence, with Halleck, we should look about to discover if there were the usual detachments of trained troops scattered about, and ascertain if some of these could not be spared to the field army, on which so much depends. For every possible man should be drawn to its strengthening.

First, as Hooker had already urgently pointed out, was the useless garrison of a useless point, Harper's Ferry, the division of French, 10,000 strong. And, strangely enough, this had already been turned over to Meade, dismantling that place,—though both were denied to Hooker but yesterday. At other points, useful and useless, there were under Halleck's personal direction as follows:

At Suffolk and Norfolk, Virginia — useless	30,000 men
Stahl's division of cavalry — just swept in from Manassas .....	6,000 men
In the Harper's Ferry region — useless in the main .....	16,000 men
Washington garrison — 5,000 sent to Meade later .....	45,000 men



In eastern West Virginia and lower Maryland — mainly useless . . . . .	35,000 men
At New Bern and Beaufort, N. C.— mainly useless . . . . .	20,000 men
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Grand total of Halleck's isolated detachments	152,000 men

All of these troops, however, were not available for the Army of the Potomac. But there were enough to enable Halleck to place in the field of the present campaign, under Meade if he chose, an army of 80,000 men — well-disciplined troops. In Washington alone were eleven regiments of artillery, 20,000 strong, which were perfectly available as field infantry, a division of which was thus utilized later by Grant, south of the Rappahannock, far distant from the capital.

After deducting all troops needed in Washington and at other points mentioned, Halleck had at his immediate command some 80,000 veteran troops which could, and, by all principles of war, should be with the Army of the Potomac, better as a part of it, but, at all events, operating with it. Instead of this, Halleck gave Meade the

Division of French . . . . .	10,000 men
Stahl's division of cavalry . . . . .	6,000 men
Lockwood's provisional brigade of infantry from Baltimore . . . . .	2,700 men
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Total out of 80,000 men mainly useless . . . . .	18,000 men

A pity that Milroy's 10,000 inanely sacrificed to Ewell at Winchester, had not been saved to supplement this meagerness to Meade! Who may question that if Halleck had assembled and placed at Meade's disposal these 80,000 use-

less troops, Lee would never have recrossed the Potomac with his army? The Army of Northern Virginia would have found its tomb in Northern soil, and the Southern Confederacy — carried on its bayonets — would have collapsed.

This much more must be noted in justice to Halleck and his strategy. Probably meant as a diversion to draw Lee back from Pennsylvania to the defense of Richmond, Halleck launched Key's Corps of 15,000 men on the Virginia Peninsular, in a "demonstration" out a few miles into the wind, the result of which was the capture of one Confederate brigadier, at home an invalid, and a few miles of railroad track torn up. At this time Richmond was defended by 9,000 men, unassailable, it was thought, behind their defenses, as certainly were the 40,000 Federals held in like impregnable works about Washington. This constituted Halleck's aid to the sorely pressed army fighting for the nation's life at Gettysburg. Of his strategy, he, himself, is quoted: "In 1862, I stated to McClellan very frankly my views in regard to the impracticability of his plan." That is, operating against Richmond up the Peninsular and James River. Yet at that very moment Lee was in fear that McClellan would advance along that line, it being, in Lee's opinion, the true and best operation looking to the capture of that Capital. While, two years later, Grant and his colossal final test of the overland line, favored by Halleck, confirmed the strategy of McClellan and Lee. For Grant "hammered" along the overland line only to be forced to the line of the James.

As stated in early pages, correct Federal strategy in Virginia required operations to be conducted from the waterfront, using its waterways as bases, lines of communication and supply. The opinion of General Lee, and the stern logic of war, both of which decided against Halleck,



are sufficient condemnation of his strategy, without calling on the field itself, to decide.

McClellan said of Halleck: "Of all men I have ever encountered in high position, Halleck was the most hopelessly stupid. It was more difficult to get an idea through his head than can be conceived by anyone who never made the attempt. I do not think he ever had a correct military idea from beginning to end." Grant said of him: "Halleck will never take a chance in battle, and a general who will never take a chance of battle never fights one." A most drastic criticism most impersonally expressed, especially unimpassioned in view of the fact that it was made by the man whom Halleck had almost driven from the army as a subordinate; and after, when their positions had been reversed and Halleck was acting as adjutant for Grant, the former had the presumption to systematically change and nullify the orders of his superior, in transmitting them to Sheridan, ordering him to make persistent battle, as already mentioned.

Making proper allowance for possible acrimony, due to the stress of the time, and for personal characteristics, the diary sketches of Halleck by Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln, do not far miss the truth when compared with voluminous evidence which has come to light during the half century succeeding the war. The following are extracts from the published diary of Mr. Welles: "I look upon Halleck as a pretty good scholarly critic of other men's deeds and acts; but as incapable of originality and directing military operations." During the Gettysburg campaign, Welles records: "I have seen nothing to admire in the military management of General Halleck, whose mind is heavy, and, if employed at all, is apparently engaged in something else than public matters on hand. At a time when activity should pervade military operations,

he sits back in his chair doing comparatively nothing. With Lee's advance already at Hagerstown, and Milroy captured, at Headquarters and the War Department, all is vague, opaque, thick darkness. I really think Stanton is no better posted than myself. Halleck has no activity, never exhibits sagacity or foresight, though he can record and criticise the past. He scolds and swears about the stupidity and worthlessness of others. This seems his way to escape censure himself and cover his stupidity in high position. . . . Halleck's inaction and inattention to passing military affairs, worries the President, yet he relies on him, and, apparently, on no one else in the War Department: and will not act without the consent of the dull, stupid, inefficient and incompetent commander-in-chief. . . . The President is kept in ignorance of military operations, and defers to the general-in-chief, though not pleased that he is not fully advised of matters as they occur. There is a modest distrust of himself, of which advantage is taken. . . . Halleck dropped an expression showing that he proposes to make Milroy a scapegoat for the stupid blunders, negligence and mistakes of those who should have warned and advised him. . . . The President was drawn into withholding the Harper's Ferry garrison from Hooker, as he was into withholding McDowell from McClellan, by being made to believe it necessary to the safety of Washington. Stanton was the moving spirit in the McDowell case, as Halleck is now against Hooker — prompted, perhaps, by Stanton. . . . With Lee along the Susquehanna, Halleck sits and swears and scolds and scratches his arm, and hates it; but exhibits little military capacity or intelligence; is obfuscated, muddy, uncertain, stupid, as to what is doing or to be done. . . . Secretary Blair wrote the President urging that Dix's command (on the Peninsular) should be brought to the Army of the Potomac; and says, 'Halleck

is good for nothing and knows nothing.' No suggestions to the Cabinet ever come from Halleck. . . . After the battle of Gettysburg Halleck is bent on driving Lee back, not on intercepting his retreat, is full of zeal to drive his army out of Pennsylvania instead of to intercept and annihilate the enemy. *Extreme partisans fear that success to the army will mean success to the Administration.*" In this last sentence is given a glimpse of the extent to which political ambition in high place worked against Mr. Lincoln, and against the war, waging to save the nation. Open insurrection against the Government on the part of such nefarious schemers would have been less dangerous to the country, as it would have been more honorable! In time of crisis, the man who secretly betrays his country by betraying its trust in him is to be wholly despised. The one who openly proclaims his disloyalty and dares the consequences is to be lauded for his honor, in comparison.

On Meade's assuming command, Halleck at once ordered Harper's Ferry dismantled, and turned over to him its garrison, both of which Halleck had just denied to Hooker.

Gen. Meade, an engineer officer, was a scholarly soldier thrust into command of an army in the midst of campaign from the command of a corps against his modest objections in favor of Reynolds, and was without knowledge of the position of his army or Hooker's plan of operations. But wisely retaining Gen. Butterfield as his chief-of-staff, who had acted in that capacity with Hooker, he was thus quickly informed, and promptly set the Army of the Potomac in motion northeastward along the outer flank of the South Mountains with purpose to find Lee's army, which he believed was in main force along the Susquehanna River threatening Harrisburg and Philadelphia.

In fact, the movements of the hostile armies were in the nature of a still hunt for each other; as Lee's bold if

dangerous strategy had befuddled the Federal commander, while the Army of Northern Virginia was without cavalry — its eye of observation; for through a misunderstanding on the part of Gen. Lee or his cavalry commander, Stuart, or both, the latter in an attempt to mislead or to circle round the Federal army found himself with all but three brigades of the Confederate horse on the outer flank of the Federals moving towards the Susquehanna, and he was forced to continue on almost to that river before he succeeds in riding round the Federal front and reaching Ewell; his troopers more asleep than awake from several days and nights of almost continuous riding. Meantime Gen. Lee was ignorant of the position of Stuart and of his antagonist, but presumes the former was somewhere in the rear of the army, where, strangely, he left three detached brigades of horse. Therefore Lee was without a single cavalryman in contact with his main forces spread from Chambersburg to the Susquehanna.

That a general of Lee's ability should have assumed such a jeopardy of position as that in which his army was now placed can be accounted for only on the supposition that he, with his army, was possessed by overconfidence, the outcome of that moral force which, surging through masses of men, especially armies, frequently carries them into imprudence or recklessness. Had Lee first fought a successful battle on the south side of the Potomac, his purpose would have been better served and with far greater safety to his army and cause. Ignorant of the fact that Halleck had safeguarded his rear and line of communication, and being advised on the 28th, by a spy, that the Army of the Potomac was across the Potomac, Lee's soldiery judgment naturally determined that his antagonist would operate in his rear. His one course was to concentrate his army and operate to draw his enemy away from his line of communi-

cation by a threat directed toward points which the Federal army must protect. In furtherance of this purpose, on the 28th Lee ordered his army to concentrate at Cashtown, near Gettysburg, south of the South Mountains, and began the crossing of this barrier by his two corps at Chambersburg, at its northern base, while drawing Ewell in from the Susquehanna River. Heth's division of Hill's Corps reached Cashtown the next day, sending Pettigrew's brigade forward nine miles to Gettysburg for a supply of shoes, not expecting there the presence of Federal soldiery.

Lee's reasons for selecting Cashtown rather than Gettysburg as his point of concentration, is difficult to determine; for the most casual inquiry, if a map was not available, would have identified Gettysburg as the great road center of the region he was penetrating; while Cashtown, a hamlet on the Chambersburg pike some ten miles west of Gettysburg, was in no manner important, and could be reached only over one pike. Then again, Gettysburg was about equidistant between Ewell, along the Susquehanna River, and Hill and Longstreet about Chambersburg. And had a speedy concentration been ordered on this central point, and diligently prosecuted, the bulk of the Confederate army would have encamped about Gettysburg on the night of the 30th. This accomplished, Lee, full master of the position, would be free to maneuver and compel Meade to attack him; or, after overpowering his left wing, to operate offensively against Meade's center and right with great promise of a successful battle.

Confederate concentration on Gettysburg, then, appeared as being better than the one less decisive and more consuming of time which was being made. It was easily within the chances of war that these might prove fatal in the looming battle. Thus viewed, Lee's concentration was not in keeping with the skill thus far shown in this campaign, nor

in harmony with the past generalship of the great confederate commander.

For the first time in his campaigns Lee was without Jackson to urge his infantry into "foot-cavalry," and snatch victory from the apparently impossible. However, Lee had his columns well in hand and in movement with the exception of Longstreet, who could not move foot until Hill had pulled out and had his corps filing over the mountain road. Nor had he assurance that Hill's advance would head into Ewell, his divisions making way toward Cashtown over either circuitous or impeding crossroads. For Lee was yet without a single cavalryman scouting ahead of his infantry columns, heading into a region which held his antagonist hunting for these very columns.

Meade, meantime, was operating with the view to placing his army in defensive position behind Pipe Creek, from Middleburg to Manchester, covering Baltimore and Washington, while threatening Lee's flank and rear and compelling him to withdraw from the Susquehanna and attack. Meade labored under the belief that the main body of the Confederate army was, at this moment, in the country to the east of Gettysburg toward Harrisburg. He made plans, therefore, and disposition of his army in accordance with this belief. Fortunately they were not adverse, and in some respects were favorable, to taking unexpected position at Gettysburg. With Lee already withdrawn from the Susquehanna and concentrating toward Gettysburg, in order to draw the Federal army from his rear near the Potomac, as he believed, a peculiar condition of affairs was in operation, not only in respect to the hostile armies, but in the minds of their respective commanders — conditions which gave rise to display of alert, resourceful generalship, and of the fighting abilities of the troops.

Battle imminent, the exact position of the respective



armies on June 30th will vitally influence that issue. Lee already has his forces moving in concentration on Cashtown. Longstreet is camped about Chambersburg, twenty-four miles from Gettysburg, Hill's Corps crossing and over the South Mountains to Cashtown, from twenty-four to nine miles distant. Ewell with two divisions, Rodes and Early, at Heidlersburg, eleven miles north from Gettysburg, Johnson's division at Fayetteville, twenty-one miles west, Stuart with three brigades of cavalry near Carlisle, thirty miles north, three brigades of cavalry along the Potomac some forty miles to the rear, and one brigade of horse with Ewell. Lee's front from east to west covers a distance of twenty-eight miles in a direct line, not including the cavalry along the Potomac.

With view, then, to taking position behind Pipe Creek, the Army of the Potomac, on June 30th, was feeling out to find the Army of Northern Virginia. Its left wing, consisting of the First and Eleventh Corps, under Reynolds, was stationed at Emmitsburg and Marsh Creek, from Gettysburg ten and eight miles distant respectively, and the center, composed of the Third and Twelfth Corps, at Taneytown, eighteen miles from Gettysburg, the Third Corps thrown forward toward Emmitsburg in support of the left wing. The right wing, the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps, were at Frizzleburg, Union and New Windsor, respectively, some thirty miles away from Gettysburg,—one brigade of the Cavalry Corps at Mechanicsville, fifteen miles away, watching out over the mountain roads, Buford's two remaining brigades with him in advance at Gettysburg. On the right, at Hanover, twelve miles from Gettysburg, Kilpatrick was feeling out into the region where the bulk of the hostile army was thought to be, after a sharp encounter with Stuart. For some inexplicable reason Meade had left the division of French, 10,000 strong, at Frederick,

Md., where its presence availed nothing, while if with the army it would have been of the utmost use.

The Army of the Potomac covered a front of thirty miles, with its flanks well covered by cavalry; and was placed for feeling out for the enemy by the left, and to not speedy support from the center should the advanced left have become seriously involved. The refused right, in rear of Pipe Creek, supported and held position for the center and left retiring upon that line.

If, however, the left being so involved as to render its withdrawal dangerous, the center and right were somewhat distant from Gettysburg compared with Lee's forces, and that strategic center of the entire region was where contact of the two armies would naturally occur as they were placed and moving.

The position of the Army of Northern Virginia in progressed concentration will give Lee considerable advantage over Meade in time requisite to bring his army together at Gettysburg; but the advantage will be somewhat offset by the delay he must suffer in passing some 60,000 men with their trains over a single mountain road, the Chambersburg and Gettysburg pike. Besides, Meade was operating to utilize the Pipe Creek line and not Gettysburg, as his field for battle.

Within the correctness of Official Reports — without going into details and eliminating all men not with the colors — there were present July 1, 1863:

Army of the Potomac, 85,674 men, out of its total enrollment of 117,930 men.

Guns, 354, of which, due to lack of artillery positions, there were in action at Gettysburg, 124 guns.

Army of Northern Virginia, present with colors, 71,675 men.\*

\* Figures of forces present are from those given by Comte de Paris,



Guns, with ample position for effective action, 265.

Unelated and uninspired, but sternly ready and dutiful, the faithful old Army of the Potomac settles in restful bivouac on the night of June 30, 1863; while its valorous antagonist, the Army of Northern Virginia, rests elated and over confident in itself and relying absolutely on its revered commander, and this superb spirit interchanges between officers and men. The Confederate army is infected with the mighty force of invincibility to an extent that takes hold on calm, self-commanding Lee, and overheats his usual cool judgment to the verge of recklessness, as it appears.

Thus, waiting the morrow, these two valiant hosts of Americans encamped under their furled banners — in their keeping, the fate of man's great self-governing experiment, and, therewith, the well-being of humanity.

corrected from official and regimental reports compiled by authoritative military writers.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE FIELD OF GETTYSBURG

**W**HILE the armies yet sleep we will precede then to Gettysburg and in its rural peace and morning silence make ourselves acquainted with its field before the alarm of war, its smoke and carnage, shall change this peace of life into an inferno of Death.

Standing upon Cemetery Hill, the town of Gettysburg at its northern base, we look southwest over the immediate slightly undulating valley of rich farms. Beyond, and three-quarters of a mile distant, rises a wood-fringed elevation known as Seminary Ridge forming the slightly raised boundary of the near valley. This ridge sweeps along a fronting distance of some three miles in direct course, its extension to the northeastward and east, in a three-mile curve, rising here and there into knolls and hills, quarter-circling around our point of view on Cemetery Hill and its ridge development. Somewhat to the right of our direct line of vision to the northwest, and on Seminary Ridge, stands the Lutheran Seminary overlooking the valley. General Lee will utilize its cupola as his vantage outlook on July 2d, and 3d, the Seminary Ridge with its eastward development being the position of his army.

Beyond Seminary Ridge, Willoughby Run flows southeast through its little drainage valley, beyond which a series of more or less defined ridges rise and base the South Mountains in the far distance. On July 1st the advance of the hostile armies will unexpectedly encounter one another in

force, and desperately engage on the ridge beyond Wiloughby Run; the battle extending during its growth to our right until it envelops the ground and hills to the north of our viewpoint. And in this battle, the Army of the Potomac will lose Reynolds, one of its four superb corps commanders.

In covering this landscape, directly in the line of vision southwestward, the eye has naturally followed the Gettysburg and Chambersburg pike. Along this highway, from Marsh Creek, eight miles distant to Chambersburg, the corps of Hill is stretched in bivouac, Longstreet behind it at Chambersburg. With this view of the more elevated *terrain* to the southwest, we face south and observe the Emmetsburg pike hugging the westward base of Cemetery Hill, and running off southwest. In its course this pike cuts diagonally through the valley, in the distance passing over a slight elevation, or groundswell, on the crest of which is a peach orchard, and on its eastern slope, a wheat field. Beyond the swell the pike drops out of sight on its course toward Emmetsburg, where the Federal left wing sleeps in bivouac under Reynolds, and its advance, Buford's two brigades of cavalry, is beginning to stir on the emerging edge of the distant mist-fields along the Chambersburg pike where yesterday it encountered Pettigrew, Lee's advance.

Now looking slightly to the left of the peach orchard and wheat field, there is seen in the far view an irregular line of rocky, wooded knolls, lining eastward and terminating in Plum Run gorge, marked by a depression strewn thick with great granite boulders. This is the Devil's Den, which holds nest at the immediate base of two abrupt rising cones of wooded rocks and bowlders. The nearest of these is named Little Round Top and its mate, Big Round Top. These formidable hills are one and one-half miles south

from our view-station on Cemetery Hill. The Round Tops, abrupt and formidable against ascent from the Devil's Den, will form the left of the Federal position, while their opposite or eastern slopes are more accessible.

The Federal line is foremarked by nature from the Round Tops northeastward, by the slope of Little Round Top, which dies into low ground for a distance of one-third of a mile, this depression dominated by the peach orchard crest along the Emmitsburg pike. Coming in over this low, dominated ground, the beginning of Cemetery Ridge is met, rising gradually to terminate its direct course in Cemetery Hill, where we stand. This crowning eminence gains an elevation of possibly sixty feet above the valley to its southwest, presenting thereto a semi-abrupt slope which forms an admirable, though exposed, position for artillery, to fire over the heads of infantry covered by an irregular stone wall at its base, some two hundred yards from the Emmitsburg pike, with its double post and insert-rail fence. To the north and east, Cemetery Hill continues itself in a curve, abruptly terminating in Culp's Hill, the eastern face of which is also abrupt, rocky and heavily wooded, with Rock Creek at its base. Across Rock Creek are seen Power's and McAllister's Hills, which will serve as detached posts beyond the Federal right on Culp's Hill.

This strong line of natural defense is in likeness to a shepherd's staff; from the Round Tops to Cemetery Hill, the straight portion, one and one-half miles long, Culp's Hill terminating the crook, one-half mile long and directly east of Cemetery Ridge. This curving line covers a running distance of three miles, while from flank to flank, in a direct line, it is but one and one-half miles. This is to become the Federal line, in itself exceedingly strong, and weak only in its openness to being turned on the left beyond Round Top.

The narrow valley of Rock Creek, with its fordable stream, at the eastern base of Culp's Hill, separates this elevation from the raised ground and detached hills which form the irregular extension of the Ridge around the north of Gettysburg, connecting with Seminary Ridge to the southwest. These hills to the east across Rock Creek form the Confederate left on July 2d and 3d. A series of brilliant cavalry combats will be fought among the hills and valleys a little farther to the east, where Stuart's troopers, in an attempt to push into the rear of the Federal army, will be defeated by Gregg, Custer, and other young Federal cavalry knights.

Running southward from Gettysburg and passing the ridge between Cemetery and Culp's Hills is a pike which dips behind Cemetery Ridge. There it forks into the Baltimore and Taneytown pikes, over which the Federal center and right will move into position up Cemetery Ridge, which covers these roads throughout its length. Roads from Hanover and York, southeast and east, also debouch behind Cemetery Ridge. Along these roads and their intersections, Kilpatrick with his Federal cavalry is now watching Confederate Stuart.

Such is the general field of coming battle, in the main an open country in which it is difficult to hide the movement of any considerable body of troops, especially over the Confederate zone, and then, only at night, for a few Federal signalmen posted on the Round Tops will overlook the whole field. They will be seen withholding the Confederates from most dangerous movements against the Federal left, which, unobserved, would be easily possible and which, otherwise would doubtless be undertaken. The immediate Federal zone to the rear, however, is perfectly covered and masked from the Confederates by the elevated defense line of Cemetery Ridge, behind which are the Federal lines of

supply and communication, and for intercommunication for quick passage of reinforcements from flank to flank and to intermediate points of need along the entire battle line.

The Army of the Potomac will find itself fighting in a natural fortress of unusual strength, compactness and accessibility. Culp's and Cemetery Hills form internal fortresses on the right, as do the Round Tops on the left, each surmounting the extreme flanks; while the Cemetery Ridge forms a line of defense which completely covers the roads in its rear, and from which reinforcements, reserves, battle-line enginery and ammunition can pass to the firing line in comparative safety and with great rapidity. On its southwest, or battle declivity, the advantageous slope of Cemetery Ridge is based by a stone wall which will serve as a breastwork; and within musket range of this wall the double post-and-rail fence along the Emmetsburg pike is sufficiently obstinate to hold its own against easy or quick removal, and should damage the formation and sap the impetus of assailing lines. About midway in the Federal position a considerable woods projects, affording concealment for brigades lying in wait on the flank of passing columns of attack. While this compact position will not permit of full array of the Federal artillery, the elevated positions for guns along the line are sufficient to permit the fire of every gun to be concentrated on any point in the open valley, three-quarters of a mile wide, over which attack must be made if the Federal center is assailed.

The Cemetery Ridge, then, is a remarkably strong position for defense except at its weak point, around its left. Here it may be easily turned either in close attack, or by the enemy taking position beyond, threatening Washington and Baltimore, and thus compelling its defenders not only to abandon their position, but to give offensive battle. Surely, attack at any other point along the entire Cemetery



Ridge position will be a most desperate undertaking such as will demand all the superb inspiration of the Army of Northern Virginia to attempt; and failing, all its daring valor to save itself from annihilation will be needed.

The Confederate position offers advantage for a turning movement to the right, while it perfectly covers Lee's line of communication, or retreat. Its weakness is in its circuitous enfoldment of the Federal position and its length incident thereto. To reinforce from one flank to the other would be impossible in emergency; while the center would be dangerously exposed by heavy detachments sent to aid either remote flank. The Seminary Ridge affords a fine position for artillery ranged for concentric fire. This should enable the Confederate guns to silence the Federal artillery with a dominance of convergent fire directed on any desired point. For the Federal gunners must reply with a divergent range if they will pay attention to the artillery, or keep silent and wait, to pay their compliments to assaulting columns of infantry. Such columns, launched from either position along the direct or straight front, will be under the direct and crossfire of artillery every step of the three-quarters of a mile ahead. The Confederate position as a whole, or at any point, has no special feature of strength, while it is open to a turning movement against its right as already noted. Its occupants signally defeated in front of the Federal position, the victor may, with safe temerity, quickly gather every fighting unit available and hurl it after the defeated with promise of a crushing victory.

As an entirety, and in detail, this field of Gettysburg is picturesque and beautiful as it dreams in rural peace and summer sweetness. An unusually open field, and in this respect offering a new experience, to the Confederate army in particular. From Cemetery Ridge the entire field is un-

der view, excepting behind the screen of woods which fringe Seminary Ridge, and along which the Army of Northern Virginia will find itself, on the 2d, stretching around the position of the Army of the Potomac, from opposite Culp's Hill, the Confederate left, to its right, fighting in the Devil's Den at the western base of the Round Tops.

We are now acquainted with the prospective battlefield of Gettysburg, and the naturally defined military positions thereon and their relative merits and defects. These are foreindicated because the present position and movements of the opposing armies should naturally bring them into the positions indicated; and, from the more concentrated condition of Lee's Army, Meade's battle will begin on the defensive, while Lee will be strongly tempted to take the offensive.

The first to appear in movement on the field of Gettysburg in the early morning of July 1st are the Confederate brigades of Davis and Archer. Buford, who has been sent by Reynolds to hold in check this advance guard of the Confederate army, has passed the night of June 30th a mile west of Gettysburg and before dawn has skillfully disposed of his forty-two hundred troopers behind Willoughby Run.







MAJ.-GEN. JOHN F. REYNOLDS

## CHAPTER X

### THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

July First

**A**T 6 A. M. a little squad of Buford's scouts in concealment make such a demonstration that their boldness leads the hostile advance to think itself in the presence of its enemy in force, which causes the head of column, Archer's brigade, to deploy, and precious time is gained to the distant Federal infantry. Archer is followed by the remaining divisions of Hill and those of Longstreet. At nine o'clock Buford's horse artillery opens on the Confederate advance, which quickly deploys and fiercely attacks the valorous weakness across the Run, Devin's and Gamble's brigades of troopers. Buford, himself, is in the thick of the fight directing the fire of his artillery in the desperate attempt to hold his ground, and sends word to Reynolds at Marsh Creek, eight miles away, to hasten to his aid. As the arriving Confederate brigades extend their line, threatening to envelop the attenuated front of the fast-thinning cavalrymen, Buford's condition becomes desperate, and seeing that it is but a waste of life to attempt more in his position, he decides to withdraw to Cemetery Hill, and defend that key to the entire field of Gettysburg. To Buford is given the credit of first recognizing the strategic importance of Gettysburg and Cemetery Hill.

At this critical moment Buford's signal men on the roof of the Seminary inform him that infantry is approaching over the Emmitsburg pike, and Reynolds comes spurring

ahead, riding to the soldier's call, the sound of battle. Reynolds — reported as sad-faced during the morning — becomes an inspiration to Buford and his men. Quickly surveying the ground Reynolds perceives its suitability as a battle-ground and orders his advance division under Wadsworth to occupy and hold it. He also dispatches hurry orders to Doubleday to let nothing delay the march of his two remaining divisions, under Rowley and Robinson, and to Howard to hasten his march for Gettysburg with the Eleventh Corps. By 10 A. M. Wadsworth's two small brigades are in position with Buford's tenacious troopers, blocking the way to the outnumbering Confederates, who come up with ever-increasing strength. Can Wadsworth and Buford maintain themselves till help comes? Fortunate for them that Lee so concentrated his army that now, in being compelled to move over a single road, it arrives in a single column and slowly. General Doubleday, arriving in person, aids Reynolds in establishing the best defensive line possible along the slope just beyond Willoughby Run. While thus engaged under a heavy fire from the enemy, noble Reynolds is shot in the head and instantly expires.

Of all men in the Army of the Potomac at the time his brave soul took flight, Major-General John F. Reynolds was the officer most endowed to command that army. A graduate of West Point he had performed his part in the war with Mexico; hence, when the Civil War broke out, he at once took important command as a well-experienced officer. Bringing with him the universal respect and warmest friendship of his past life contacts, in the Army of the Potomac he quickly won the same treasure from his new comrades; and, had he lived, his developing competency as a general must have forced him to supreme command of an army against favoritism and undiscerning incompetency.

Just now in command of the left wing of the Federal army, specially selected by Meade for fitness for that most dangerous and exacting command of the moment, he had won his way by solid worth and without acclaim. A warrior-soul of dauntless fire, but self-controlled; coolest where peril was thickest; quick, alert, never too fast or too slow — a man to be depended upon anywhere and under any conditions. Meade named him, among thousands of brave and devoted souls, "The noblest and bravest of men."


Let those who look down upon the soldier — this challenger of death — consider if he, himself, would array under this fearless challenge, even for duty's sake. Let him consider the fact that a simple fighter does not constitute a soldier. A true soldier is a true man, whatever be his rank.

Let man thank heaven for the ennobling of such through the ages, for had it not been for the warrior humanity would have long since sunk in such a despair of fear that he would have lost all soul or spiritual sense and would have made life wholly a burden to himself. In the sense of having saved man from spiritual death through fear, the soldier has been man's savior.

With saddened hearts, cleared visions, and deeper solicitude because of this holy offering of a true, hence, a great life, on the altar of freedom for futurity, we withdraw from contemplation of the great mystery, and look over the field where Reynolds fell. The brigade his presence inspired is so hot at its work that the men do not know of the death of their loved chief. But, as though quickly to avenge it, they rush forward, shatter the enemy's front and capture one thousand of his troops. But soon another portion of the Federal line, attempting to hold a bald position, is fiercely assailed and driven in, a part of its defenders fraying off almost into Gettysburg. The Confederates,

rushing in pursuit, are caught in flank by the victorious brigade which Reynolds had led; and some of the enemy succeed in regaining their lines, but leave two regiments to the keeping of the Federal brigade.

General Abner Doubleday, now left in command of the Federal First Corps at 11 A. M. finds his valiant little band victorious along the entire line, having utterly defeated the attack of Davis and Archer, and inflicted upon them a loss of more than one-half of their two strong brigades. This valor leads Heth to believe himself in the presence of a superior force, and he withholds further attack until he can restore his broken line with his two fresh brigades under Pettigrew and Brockenborough. The Confederates, accustomed to fighting in broken, wooded country where sudden attacks *en masse* are effective, have been taking their first lesson on an open, rolling *terrain* demanding deployed lines of defense and attack. Under these new conditions they find their massed assaults enveloped and subjected to an enflaming fire under which no troops can stand. This is what has happened to Heth's two brigades. Doubleday, utilizing Heth's respite interval, also rectifies his line while anxiously awaiting the divisions of Rowley and Robinson. At 11:30 A. M. the head of their column is seen in the distance sweltering along the Emmitsburg pike — four brigades with a total of between five and six thousand men making the total of the First Corps present on July 1st 8,200 men, aided by Gamble's brigade of cavalry. Rowley quickly deploys into line of battle, while Robinson is held in reserve near the Seminary. None too soon have these fresh divisions arrived, for Heth now attacks with his entire division of four strong brigades. Fortunately for the Federals, he delivers his heaviest blow against that portion of the line held by a regiment of Pennsylvania lumbermen, gigantic fellows proud of the name "Bucktails," from the



MAJ.-GEN. ABNER DOUBLEDAY





tail of that nimbleness which they sport in their hats. These men are fighting on the invaded soil of their own State, and they announce to the oncoming foe that "They are there to stay!"

Thus far the Army of the Potomac is adding sprigs to its wreath of proud fame. The ranked waves of Confederates seemingly dash against stone and iron, until Hill, believing he is in front of a largely superior force, contents himself with holding his eight strong brigades from further attack on the six small Federal brigades. He puts his eighty guns into action, however, with much noise and considerable effect among his tenacious antagonists. The prelude of the battle is thus announced as closed, and the curtain is raised on a wider scene of fierce grapple. For Howard, commanding the Eleventh Corps, leaves Emmitsburg on the direct pike to Gettysburg, Barlow's division following the First Corps, while the two remaining divisions under Schurz and Steinwehr move over the Taneytown road to give them free way for haste in reaching Gettysburg.

The situation of Meade on the morning of July first is peculiar, and that of his army in relation to its antagonist about Gettysburg somewhat precarious; for the Federal commander is still operating on the belief that the army of Lee is to the east of that town, and his right, at Hanover, can sustain an attack better than his left under Reynolds feeling out towards Gettysburg, thirty miles distant from his right, where, on June 30, Buford became convinced that Lee was assembling in force, and where Meade's left wing is becoming dangerously involved beyond quick support. He has not yet received Reynolds' dispatch of his engagement with the enemy, and the Federal corps commanders,—even Reynolds,—have no later orders than that of June 30th, governing their assembly behind Pipe Creek;

hence the left wing is left practically isolated and in battle with the advance of Lee's concentrated army. It is not until some hours have passed that Meade receives the dispatches of both Reynolds and Howard informing him of the situation, when he at once issues orders for the concentration of his center and left on Gettysburg.

At 11:30 A. M. Howard is making examination of the field from a housetop in Gettysburg for the purpose of determining the best position for his coming troops. Here he first hears of the death of Reynolds, and, by seniority of rank, finds himself in supreme command on the field. While making his observations, he sees the driven brigade of the First Corps fraying back toward Gettysburg, as noted; and in sending his report to Meade of the death of Reynolds and the condition of matters at Gettysburg, Howard reports that "The First Corps had given way at the first fire and was running." He has surely begun his new task in a questionable manner, in condemning the First Corps without knowledge of its action, thereby misleading the army commander by giving him to understand that one of his corps is practically out of action and worthless; and this regarding the left wing the marked exposure of which was already a matter of serious concern to Meade. Without knowledge of the field or of conditions, Howard knows that whatever is done at Gettysburg for several hours must be done by the First and Eleventh Corps; and, doubtless, he has not as full confidence in the Eleventh as he could desire, while he has just deceived himself regarding the First Corps. This indicates a dangerous carelessness on the part of Howard, which is confirmed when taken in connection with a similar action at Chancellorsville, where, had he given heed to Hooker's warning that Jackson was moving across the Federal front toward his flank and made preparation to defend it, his troops would have been in place, and the

reputation of the Eleventh Corps perhaps would not have become so sullied in that battle, nor the army so jeopardized.

That there will be much to do this 1st of July the heavy cannonade of Hill proclaims, for it tells of the enemy in force in front and engaged with the First Corps; while the numerous roads he sees converging at Gettysburg from the general direction of the now discovered enemy tell him that Lee's troops unquestionably should come pouring over these, aimed at the strategic point he now occupies. Howard must see that possession of this road center gives command of all the region roundabout. It appears that the commanding general should now hasten to Doubleday, ascertain the state of his battle, and become familiar with his position in order to know what disposition to make of the Eleventh Corps as it arrives. But from his lookout on the Gettysburg housetop, he makes a distant observation of Doubleday, and sets about to support him by occupying the curved extension of Seminary Ridge north and northwest of Gettysburg.


Like Buford and Reynolds, Howard sees and realizes the vital importance of the Cemetery heights, if the Army of the Potomac is to fight a battle in front of the proposed Pipe Creek line, as now appears probable, judging from the strength of the contest along Willoughby Run. The first thing, then, is to dispatch for all possible aid. Howard, therefore, sends couriers hotfooted to Sickles, with the Third Corps now probably at Emmitsburg, ten miles away, also orders to the marching divisions of the Eleventh Corps to hasten on.

The signalmen all day posted in the Seminary cupola, now wigwag to Doubleday the coming of the Eleventh Corps, as the division of Schurz emerges into view entering Gettysburg at 12:45 P. M. Howard assigns Schurz to the command of the Eleventh Corps, with orders to move the

division of Barlow and his own—now commanded by Schimmelpfennig—northward and to the west, over the Mummasburg pike, to take position in extension of the right of the First Corps; meanwhile holding Steinwehr's division and the reserve artillery on Cemetery Hill. But another new factor now appears on the extending field of battle. Rodes' division of Ewell's Corps, aiming for the very ground which Barlow and Schimmelpfennig are moving to occupy, moves down from the northwest, pushing ahead against the ineffectual objection of Devin's cavalry brigade, in observation in that quarter. Marching on Cash-town in the morning, Rodes has been reversed by Hill, to move on Gettysburg over the Mummasburg pike and he is on the field before Schurz can advance his divisions over the same road into the designated position on Oak Hill, the natural extension of Doubleday's position and commanding his right rear.

Ewell, who is with Rodes, sends an aid to expedite the arrival of Early with his division from Heidlersburg. Ewell is astonished to see Gettysburg occupied by the Federals, and, becoming suspicious, permits Devin's small cavalry command to check his further advance, while he makes himself acquainted with the state of affairs, and looks for advantageous position for his divisions. Discovering Oak Hill as being in command of all that section of the field, he directs Rodes to take position there, and by so doing greatly endangers the Federal battle. For, as said, Oak Hill is the natural extension to the right of Doubleday's line, and is the culminating height on Seminary Ridge at its eastward curvature. A Confederate force thereon is not only a direct threat against Doubleday's right flank, but it also commands all the roads in his rear coursing parallel with his position on Willoughby Run.

At 2:15 p. m. Rodes has his division deployed in double



LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL



line across Oak Ridge, his left on the Newville road, and advancing occupies its culminating height with four of his five strong brigades and twenty guns. This gives him command of the interval between Doubleday's right-rear and the Eleventh Corps which should be occupied by Schurz in force. Doubleday's line is now subjected to direct and enfilading fire from the hundred guns of Hill and Rodes until 2:30, when Hill renews his infantry attack with the divisions of Heth and Pender aided by Rodes. By the convergent movement of Hill's and Ewell's Corps Lee has united them on the field of battle at the very point where, like a wedge, Rodes forms a block to the welding of the two Federal corps. This movement, dangerous in presence of a concentrated foe, has worked well in this instance. Should Ewell now establish himself in his coveted position for to-day, circling round Gettysburg, and the Federal army take position on Cemetery Heights, Lee's line will be weak because of its shape and forced extension.

Howard, now returning from confirming Doubleday's position, learns that the Confederates are already in the position on Oak Hill which he had previously ordered occupied by Schimmelpfennig. In this initial emergency, probably judging the Confederate position too strong to attack, Howard simply sets two batteries in the interval between the First and Eleventh Corps, shooting at Rodes' four brigades and twenty guns, which proclaim themselves by their enfilading fire amongst the First Corps men. Here he might assemble his two, or, if necessary, his three divisions, and boldly attack Rodes in order to gain a subordinate position in protecting contact with Doubleday's jeopardized right. Instead, holding Schimmelpfennig inactive in observation of Rodes, he still further divides his forces in the very presence of the enemy by diverging Barlow to the right and away from Schimmelpfennig; then, by a swing



or wheel to the left, Barlow is placed perpendicular to what would have been the Federal line had not Rodes interposed and occupied Oak Hill Ridge.

The ground over which Barlow has to advance is destitute of strong position either for offense or defense; while the numerous roads and open country stretch to the aid of the strongest battalions. Schurz is permitted, however, to move Barlow ahead until he is so advanced and isolated that both his flanks are exposed to turning on the left from Oak Hill, and on the right by the arrival of Confederates along the Heidlersburg pike. With these mustering conditions of disaster in full swing on the Federal right, inferno breaks loose against Doubleday. While Hill assails his front with Heth's roughly handled brigades, with Pender's division in support, Rodes, left free by the divided condition of the Eleventh Corps, deploys to his right to connect with Hill's left. To cover this operation he feints with the brigades of Iverson, Ramseur and O'Neal, toward Doubleday's right-rear. This feint, made through the interval between the First Corps and Schimmelpfennig, threatens to separate completely the two Federal corps now engaged in fierce battle. Doubleday, seeing the danger, calls up his reserve and sends the brigade of Baxter against the threat of Rodes. Pushing over this debatable interval under a heavy artillery fire, Baxter disperses O'Neal's brigade and gains and holds a position on the Mummasburg road, though attacked from the west by Iverson and Ramseur. But Rodes gains his main purpose of connecting with Hill.

Lack of unison on the part of Rodes' three brigades in opposing the single brigade of Baxter alone prevents most serious trouble for Doubleday. This failure is due to the usual causes, the inefficient handling of O'Neal's brigade and the detached and isolated attacks made by Iverson.



Such lack of harmony and combination between large fighting units is quite common in war, as may be seen before the great battle is finished. But this condition should not find place in small units well disciplined and commanded. Rodes, himself, is new to the command of a division, as are some of his brigadiers to their commands. And this is a part of Jackson's old corps, itself under a new chief. Personal ill feelings and jealousies may be at work, also, exaggerating the natural differences in character and disposition of commanders; for so are these weaknesses of men permitted by men to interpose, even when the lives of thousands, and the cause for which they are all fighting are the stakes.

Baxter is reinforced by the brigade of Paul — both of Robinson's division — and the two are attacked by Iverson with his single brigade, which is almost annihilated. Daniels now undertakes the same task alone, and, after a desperate combat, the Federals are still in position, exchanging fire with the retiring Confederates. Judging from what has been done, had these three Confederate brigades attacked simultaneously, Baxter and Paul would have been wiped out. Meanwhile Heth has been unsuccessful in an attack on Doubleday's front.

Now, at 3:45 P. M., there is a lull in the battle between the First Corps and its persistent antagonists. But, like the pause of wrestlers for breath, it must presage still harder work, for fresh Confederate troops are constantly becoming available. Hill is preparing to attack with the full power of Heth's tired division reinforced by a fresh brigade of Pender's and assisted by two brigades of Rodes under Daniels and Ramseur. With this large preponderance of force Confederate success seems to be assured, and apparently, it is now made certain by unexpected Federal aid. For at this juncture the remote Eleventh Corps be-

gins work, that is, what has been made a detached and isolated part of the general battle. Two of Schimmelpfennig's brigades, advancing in oblique echelon between the Oak Hill slope and the Carlisle road, present double flanks to the artillery of Rodes on that hill, and are so demoralized by its fire that Doles, with his single brigade, easily pushes the two back to the intersection of the Mummasburg and Carlisle roads where some fences aid in the temporary reformation of this division. This divergent movement of Schimmelpfennig has still further separated the left from the right wing, and the Confederates have interposed there in force, occupying a formidable position, while fresh troops are constantly reinforcing them on both flanks against the ceaselessly decreasing Federals, lacking reinforcement. Not only is this condition of affairs true, but the Federals are alarmingly out of position, or, rather, in false position. Surely a crisis has arrived, a disaster to the Federals if the Confederates accept the alluring Federal invitation.

The battle has run in detachments: first, from Doubleday's west front, assailed by Hill; then to the north against his right flank by Rodes and Hill. It is now due to the northeast against Schurz, just now given a foretaste, and is arriving in the shape of Early's fresh division of Ewell's Corps, pushing along the Heidlersburg pike to deploy along the hills across Rock Creek, where he arrays three brigades front, Hoke on the extreme left, Hayes in the center along the road, and Gordon on the right, with Smith's brigade in reserve. Ewell, overlooking the entire field, while watching Rodes' detached attacks on Baxter, directs Early into position to envelop practically the Federal right wing, Barlow's division of which is busy against Doles to relieve Schimmelpfennig. Early's artillery at once opens on Barlow, while Gordon crosses Rock Creek in magnificent array, "Swinging lines of bright muskets gleaming among the

trembling wheat," as he moves against Barlow, now caught between Gordon and Doles. Fighting desperately, this division of the Eleventh Corps, commanded by a fine, rising young officer, General Barlow, is finally withdrawn, leaving behind a penalty of many dead and wounded, its brave commander among the latter, desperately disabled. Barlow's men fall back some five hundred yards and there reform, their left on the Carlisle road, their right across the Heidlersburg pike resting on the masonry buildings of the Almshouse. After a short but stubborn resistance under this powerful front and flank attack, everything lets go. Doles at once turns against Schimmelpfennig, and with his single brigade completely routs this entire division, which now engaged in a wild race rearward, run with Barlow's men against time. They confirm Napoleon's statement that "There are no poor regiments, there are some bad officers."

When, at 3:30, Howard bethought himself to order the withdrawal of the already base-running divisions of the Eleventh Corps, he also thought it advisable to repeat the same order to Doubleday; though that brave and wide-awake commander had already and repeatedly sent aids to Howard asking for instructions. Finally, when the order for the First Corps to withdraw was dispatched, it was not written, but was entrusted verbally to a staff officer. As the quite probable result, in an unknown country, and amidst the confusion of the surrounding rout, this officer either became lost, or forgot the kernel of the order, and it never intelligibly reached Doubleday.

Finding himself without occupation to his left, the Eleventh Corps gone, Rodes now orders a general attack of his division on Doubleday's right-rear, while Hill, in his front, hurls Pender's entire division at the decimated Federal brigades of Stone, Meredith and Biddle, numbering less than five hundred men each. Robinson's two depleted

brigades, Baxter's and Paul's, facing Rodes, are subjected to simultaneous assault by the lately repulsed brigades of O'Neal, Iverson, and Ramseur, aided by the fire of thirty guns. From behind a stone wall these two heroic Federal brigades defend their position under a rain of musketry and cannon fire during which brigadier Paul falls wounded. By the rout of the Eleventh Corps, the flank and rear of Robinson's command is now left completely open, without even a remote threat opposing the occupancy of this ground. Robinson is quickly enveloped on three sides, and, to save his gallant command, is compelled to fall back on Cutler's brigade, posted in a woods in his rear.

The position which the superb First Corps has held all day is lost. Left to themselves, isolated, abandoned, and finally chained to death and annihilation by their commanding general-in-chief, they fight on, slaughtered and unconquerable! Mangled and hurled in a vortex of cannonry, enveloped by thronging battalions, until even their one remaining door of escape is fairly closed. This corps has defended itself and its fellows of the Army of the Potomac, and made victory for it most probable. Now decimated, abandoned, and about to be swallowed up, it withdraws to the Cemetery Heights with the coolness and order of parading troops, and gains for itself safety from further attack.

In his report to General Meade, Howard held the First Corps responsible for the wild rout of the Eleventh, charging that "By the First permitting its flank to be turned, this made necessary the abandonment of its position, and thus exposed the left of the Eleventh, making necessary the withdrawal of the latter." This written and legibly signed by the commanding general who forgot to order the withdrawal of the Eleventh Corps until after it was in wild panic rushing its own withdrawal! By the general who had deliberately ordered the First Corps to stand its ground

and be executed to death, and denying it hope of relief from him. The general, who in later years said of this event, "I commanded from my outlook on Cemetery Hill:" while from that commanding elevation the field on which Doubleday was left to command so ably was entirely shut off from Howard's view by woods and a ridge. General Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artillery, relates years after that many of the Confederate survivors of the war who fought the First Corps during July 1st, 1863, had told him that the fighting of the Federal First Corps that day equaled, if, indeed, it did not surpass anything they had seen from first to last. A brave foe is in better position to see the truth than a friend seeking excuse for his own failures.

As already stated, the brigades of Paul and Baxter have been forced back on Cutler, and in consequence of this the position held by the First Corps along Willoughby Run must be abandoned. In executing this most difficult and hazardous operation of withdrawing a line of battle in the presence of an attacking enemy, such troops as are not actually fighting are withdrawn to the advantageous woods, now held by the remnants of the three brigades of Paul, Baxter and Cutler. This force serves as a nucleus and sustainment to the engaged troops as they gradually yield ground or are forced to the rear. Realizing the Federal situation, Confederate Hill now makes a fresh assault with Pender's division on Doubleday's entire front and against his left flank. For the inexhaustible First Corps has worn out its original assailant, Heth's division, which Hill has sent to a less active position for temporary rest.

At 4 p. m. Pender takes and holds the Federal line, while Heth's troops deploy south of the Chambersburg pike, Lane on the right, Perrin in the center, with Scales on the left near the pike. Scales, relieving Brockenborough in passing,



sweeps down the slope facing a wood near Willoughby Run. Meredith's little brigade is hidden there, and at eighty paces distant delivers a fire which checks Pender's advance and sends Scales' brigade flying, discouraged past the power of its commander to bring it back to combat. Lane, on the right, is held by the fire of a small detachment of Gamble's cavalry dismounted. Perrin is thus left alone in his tardy advance. Opposed by Biddle's brigade, fighting in the open and without reserve, the opposing lines riddle one another. But Perrin, temporarily checked, re-forms his line and drives Biddle from Willoughby Run, the latter finding safety on the western slope of Seminary Ridge. Scales now gives his attention to Meredith and Stone who hold the woods to his left. Maneuvering to cut these two Federal brigades off from retreat, they sustain a terrible loss, caught between a front and flank fire.

At this minor crisis — which the Federals must dominate somehow — Doubleday, having received no orders from Howard, now quite properly takes upon himself the responsibility his superior has shirked, and gives his valiant men a chance to live and fight another day. But the retreat of the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac must be made with order and dignity. Quickly withdrawing Meredith and Stone to Seminary Ridge, which affords good defense for covering retreat, Doubleday orders Robinson to occupy the Seminary and intrench it, and there gather the live remains of the brigades of Meredith, Stone and Biddle, two-thirds of whose original number are left on the honored field. With this orderly wreckage of the First Corps, he checks the creeping advance of the Confederates, for they have learned through the day to approach these little assemblages with circumspection. On the right, the stubborn resistance of the brigades of Robinson with Cutler's, has made possible the withdrawal from that ex-

posed part of the Federal line, leaving behind but one gun, dismounted. On the extreme left, south of the Hagerstown road, Gamble's cavalry still holds Lane in check, who, proposing to turn the Federal line by the south, is foiled. All of the First Corps now safely withdrawn and gathered about the Seminary, it will be useless waste of life and precious time to tempt the enemy further and delay march down the slope and across the valley to Cemetery Hill.

At 4 p. m. the decimated battalions of the First Corps are seen descending the eastern slope of Seminary Ridge, leaving it to their tired and satisfied antagonists as a vantage-point from which to view their march across the mile of exposed valley and up to nobly earned rest on Cemetery Hill. Its left flank is exposed to Ewell's troops along the near ridge. But Ewell, not satisfied with whipping an opponent and leaving him to peaceful rest, is dogging along the left of the First Corps' retreat from Seminary Ridge, with Ramseur and Doles watching a chance to nag and bite. Nor has he been so blinded by laughter at the Eleventh Corps' race that he forgets to send Hayes's and Hoke's fresh brigades after the flying divisions of hiding Schimmelpfennig, and of brave, wounded Barlow. These Confederate brigades are now on the outskirts of Gettysburg brushing aside the gallant troopers of Devin, which alone interpose to cover the flying rout now swarming the streets, back alleys and hiding-places of the town. This is what the weary and mangled First Corps has escaped into! But it fortunately meets Howard, at last awake to the immediate conditions. He has called one of Steinwehr's brigades from Cemetery Hill and posted it in front of the town in support of Devin, who, reinforced by the First Corps, check the Confederates for sufficient time only to permit of withdrawing the troops to Cemetery Hill. Steinwehr's brigade, Devin's and Gamble's troopers, and all of

the First Corps arrive there. But the little mighty brigade of Stone, the rear guard of the First Corps in its retreat, is now caught in the stern-tow riot of the Eleventh and is captured with the rest. This brave brigade leaves on the banks of Willoughby Run two commanders, most of its field and line officers, there sleeping or moaning with a large majority of its men.

From 9 A. M. until 4 P. M. the First Federal Corps was left under the command of Major-General Abner Doubleday without one superior order. With this attenuated and flanked line of battle covering one and one-quarter miles of hills and valleys of open and woods, with a considerable stream threading, General Doubleday fought and maintained his position intact for seven hours, this entire time fighting off a superior and constantly increasing enemy, with his own force rapidly dwindling. The rate may be correctly judged from the fact that the First Corps brought on the field in the morning 8,200 men, and at 4 P. M. nearly four thousand of them lay dead and wounded on the field, most of the remainder prisoners in the keeping of the Confederates, with an unusually small proportion of missing. The battle made by the Federal First Corps on July 1st was as notable a feat of arms as its commander's action was of generalship. Doubleday was steady, alert and resourceful to a marked degree under most difficult and unnecessary conditions, forced upon him by the faulty handling and placing of the Eleventh Corps. These facts, in no manner chargeable to Doubleday, but to Schurz and Howard, forced Doubleday ceaselessly to shift the positions and formations of his fighting units — a feat of generalship!

To resume the battle narrative: The exhausted hulk of the First Corps, with Steinwehr's division of the Eleventh, lies prone on Cemetery Hill, a natural stronghold and somewhat fortified by Steinwehr, but physically in a con-



dition of defenselessness; so that a vigorous assault, if immediately made by two Confederate divisions of average strength, should surely clear these heights to their free occupancy. The immediate defensive ground on the Cemetery Heights is too extensive for proper occupancy and defense by the Federal force present. Hence it is weak and indefensible against any considerable assault, such as the Confederates are amply able to make at any time after 4 P. M. The Federals are posted on the round and return bend of the Shepherd's Crook, before described; and with its present defense, can be taken in flank and reverse by any division which will take the trouble to march down Rock Creek valley a short distance and ascend Culp's Hill; another division, meantime, engaging the Federal northwest front on Cemetery Hill. Howard disposes his force the best he knows how, while anxiously observing Ewell's brigades feeling about as though disposed to make an attack. In fact, Early strongly urges his chief to consent to this; whereupon Ewell, equally aggressive in disposition, dispatches to General Lee, requesting permission and the support of Hill. In conversation with General Meade on this point, in after years, General Ewell said, "I, at 4 P. M., July 1st, had my corps, 20,000 strong, in column of attack, and on the point of moving on Culp's Hill, when I received orders from Lee directing me to assume the defensive and not advance. I then sent, urging Lee for permission to advance; but his reply was a reiteration of the previous order." To this General Meade made reply: "Had you occupied Culp's Hill on the afternoon of July 1st it would have produced the evacuation of the Cemetery Ridge position, and the Federal withdrawal by the Baltimore, Taneytown and Emmitsburg pikes." And most fortunate would have been the five thousand Federals to have been permitted to withdraw.

General Lee, in his report of the battle of July 1st, says: "The attack (on Cemetery Hill) was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to wait the arrival of the rest of our troops."

While the relative strength of the opposing forces could not be known to the opponents on July 1st, the predominant strength of the Confederates is plainly visible. The facts are that the total Federal force on the field after the arrival of the Eleventh Corps was 18,000 men; and unreinforced, this number is reduced at 4 P. M. to 5,000; while the Confederates now have at least 25,000 men present, as their losses have been made more than good by fresh troops constantly debouching onto the field.

A marked disposition is displayed on the part of some of Ewell's subordinate commanders to act on their own initiative; and even without orders from, or knowledge of, their superiors. This is Ewell's first campaign as the commander of Stonewall Jackson's old corps; hence, in this new relationship, full acquaintance has not been reached. Nor would Ewell, himself, be disposed to use his discretionary authority to attack without the orders of General Lee. It is scarcely questionable, however, that had Jackson lived to command the Confederate Second Corps, now immediately about the Federal position, it would be promptly assailed and captured. Two Confederate officers scout over Culp's Hill finding it vacant.

At 3:30 P. M. a powerful reinforcement arrives to the relief of the anxious Federals. Superb, magnetic Hancock comes riding up, in hot haste, bearing orders from General Meade to take command at Gettysburg, although the junior in rank of Howard. Hancock is empowered to exercise his own judgment as to whether Gettysburg or some other position he may discover en route shall be occupied by the

Army of the Potomac, instead of the contemplated Pipe Creek Line. In passing, it is well to notice that General Meade, the new commander, possesses the rare quality of being able to select men competent to necessities, and also the moral courage to place such in command of them, subordinating personality and personal pride to the more important and worthy interests of his army as a whole. These fine qualities he has displayed in thus commissioning Hancock to command over his seniors, and in so arranging his army that Reynolds should command the left wing.

Hancock, of whom General Grant says later, "He never made a military mistake or blunder for which he was responsible," possesses the "topographical eye," so rarely found, and recognizes at a glance the remarkable advantages for defense offered by the Cemetery Ridge position, as he rides along its rear length from the Round Tops finally to rise on Cemetery Hill and view its general characteristics and frontal command. Immediately dispatching to Meade and advising rapid concentration here, Hancock now gives himself to the immediate situation. His superb bearing, distinguished by its fiery energy, restores confidence and courage, even to the extent that the Eleventh Corps fugitives cease to run, are re-formed into order, and, with the steady division of Steinwehr, the First Corps, and the artillery and cavalry, are advantageously posted in such manner that a formidable show of defense begins to appear to the observant Confederates. Had General Lee been earlier on the ground, an attack would perhaps have been successfully accomplished before the appearance of the one-man reinforcement; for he, with that ability which grasps and masters a crisis, had in one and one-half hours organized from the meager wreckage a defense so formidable in appearance that a swarming foe dare not attack it. By holding the Cemetery Ridge position Hancock boldly

thrust the Army of the Potomac at Lee and tempted him into offensive battle. In any case, the usually alert, persistent dash of the Confederates has been absent from the field this day.

A pertinent criticism of the first day's battle of the Confederates is made by Col. Henderson, the able English military critic, who writes: "The absence of Lee's cavalry after crossing the Potomac, held him from having both Hill and Ewell in Gettysburg July 1st in full force; both only nine miles away, while Reynolds was fifteen miles distant. Had cavalry been in place Lee should have occupied Gettysburg the morning of July 1st, or if not this, then after the battle he would have occupied the Cemetery Heights, knowing that other Federal corps were not up." Howard's performance will suffice for his criticism, while the doings of Doubleday raise him above it.

It has become history, through Howard's official report, that he was responsible for selecting the Cemetery Ridge position for the Federal battle; but the facts are as herein related. For Buford was first to appreciate the importance of Cemetery Hill, so reported to Reynolds, and the latter ordered Howard to Gettysburg to occupy that position, as one of the staff of Reynolds affirmed. But it was Hancock who first saw and appreciated the full development of the Cemetery Ridge position, and on his recommendation Meade occupied it with his army. Nor did Howard ever correct his report reflecting on the First Corps, and as a consequence Doubleday was placed under a shadow and withheld from promotion.





MAJ.-GEN. DANIEL E. SICKLES

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## CHAPTER XI

### BEFORE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE

**B**OTH Lee and Meade have now decided to make this site the battle-ground for a decisive battle. Meade orders his entire army to hasten to the field of Gettysburg, and the seasoned veterans of the Army of the Potomac swing out on a forced march, day and night, while the few distant and belated divisions and brigades of the Army of Northern Virginia keep step with them, all rushing to a Feast of Death.

After the battle of July 1st it became evident to both commanders that the contest would be continued at Gettysburg on the morrow. Forced marches, then, are in order for the main portion of the Federal army and a portion of Lee's.

From the respective headquarters swarms of aids and couriers speed over strange roads where a wrong one taken may prove fatal to the army, bearing orders for putting the scattered corps in motion. Columns in movement compact themselves, turning heads toward Gettysburg with quickened step. Lazy bivouacs spring into chaotic life as the men hustle on equipments, fill canteens and haversacks—provided the Quartermaster's Department, with its thousands of gathering arms reaching for supplies throughout the country, has done its duty and delivered these to the Army Depot, and the thousands of corps, division, brigade, regimental, and company wagons have worked out of the depot chaos to find ways to their proper commands con-




stantly shifting and moving over strange roads. All this supply machinery of war having worked perfectly, then the plodding troops will have bacon, hardtack and coffee to put into their haversacks. The bivouac chaos falls into serried columns which pull out into dusty roads and swelter. Tired legs and galled feet do not count now. "Close up! close up, men! no straggling!" are the orders of the day and night ahead heard along miles of these racing columns of some 200,000 men. The usual five-minute halts for rest are cut down to the limit of human endurance; while the water details, loaded down with canteens in temporary exchange for equipment-burdens, are kept busy, for thirst must be quenched.

On forge these great columns in the waning sunlight to become ghostly creeping monsters in the moonlight, glinting through the dust-clouds which envelop them like a smoke from which strange sounds emerge. The dull thud of innumerable feet, the cluck of thousands of train wagons, ponderous artillery, and nimble ambulances; the clank of harness and the jingle of cavalry; sullen commands and teamster's cursing and savage lashing; a great breathing of toil, and a stench from sweating men and beasts such as reveal through their swirling envelopments that the moving life within is war's enginery of flesh and iron!

These leviathans stretch out interminable toward the coming vortex of war, twisting and undulating along every road pointing to the fateful circle; while far out on their flanks and in advance as tentacles are small bodies, groups, and strung files of horsemen and infantry feeling out and fending. These monstrosities alarming the rural peace cast off a strange wreckage,— of exhausted men, beasts, and disabled wagons, which straggle and trail on after the main bodies like dragged tails. As these strange things head out of the night into the waking smother of heat, the fragrance







First day's battle, north of Fairfield Road, the last Confederate attack, and second day's battle, south of Fairfield Road, the last Confederate attack.

from the open windows of houses where people are preparing breakfast steals to dusty nostrils as the halted columns drop to pieces, and little fires gleam and grow ambitious boiling precious coffee and frizzling bits of bacon for the provident veterans if the commissary machinery has done its work; water and hardtack are tempting enough to improvidence and greenness, while many tighten their belts for breakfast, and trust to their last meal to carry them through the unknown ahead.

General Lee is more closely examining the Federal position through the moonlight. And at 1 A. M. General Meade arrives to find the soldiery, weary from the battle of yesterday, sleeping among the tombstones of the Cemetery and beneath its cresting trees. The moon is sinking toward the west. The hours for rest and silence are fast speeding to make way for glorious dawn. Let us trace with Meade the Federal line, past its sleeping guardians and their pacing sentinels.

On the crest of Cemetery Hill we find the arrested racers of Schurz's division posted across the Baltimore pike, faced north toward Gettysburg; on their right and rear is Barlow's division, now under Ames, while Steinwehr's steady command sleeps on the left of Schurz. In extension of the line to the left, next to the Eleventh Corps, Robinson's division of the famed First Corps is posted along Cemetery Ridge, Wadsworth's division being on Culp's Hill, to the right of the Eleventh Corps. Doubleday is in rear of Schurz; for General Newton has been given command of the noble First Corps with which Doubleday fought so splendidly all day along Willoughby Run. Surely Meade may trust him to hold the ground to-day should Schurz's men again break into a mad foot-race to the rear. Robinson carries the line south to Ziegler's Grove, to become famous on the 3d as the point of direction for the

most desperate charge made in modern warfare up to that time. The artillery of these two corps is well posted along their front, and a portion of it is protected by light earthworks thrown up by Steinwehr while acting as reserve on the 1st. Directly south, or on the left of Robinson, are the brigades of Graham and Ward — Birney's division — of the Third Corps. These range along the depression of Cemetery Ridge, reaching to the low ground which is dominated by the Peach Orchard swell along the Emmitsburg pike. Next is Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, extending the line over the low ground toward the Round Tops, and on which heights he has posted two regiments. Williams' division of the same corps is a mile or more in rear of Cemetery Hill on Rock Creek, near the crossing of the Baltimore pike, mistaking that for the Federal right flank. And, finally, two brigades of Humphreys' division, Third Corps, are massed in the left-rear of Birney.

The remainder of the Army of the Potomac is approaching. Hancock's Second Corps arrives at 7 A. M., on the 2d, and is used to strengthen a weak point in the Federal line to the south of Ziegler's Grove, between the First and Third Corps. Hancock's divisions are in order from right to left, first Hayes, Gibbon next, and Caldwell, joining Graham of the Third Corps. Two brigades of the Third Corps, De Trobriand's and Burling's, and the corps artillery, are in march from Emmetsburg. The Fifth Corps, under Sykes, is some ten miles away on the Hanover pike. The United States Regulars are a part of this fine command, which has marched sixty miles during the last three days. It arrives at 1 P. M., and is held in reserve on the right till 3 P. M., when it is relieved by the Sixth Corps, and moved to the left in reserve. At 3 P. M., the Sixth Corps begins to arrive from Manchester, having marched thirty-five miles since 7 P. M. of the 1st.

Meade's cavalry is scattered and somewhat out of position in its disposition for the proposed Pipe Creek position. Gamble's brigade of Buford's division is on the Emmitsburg pike somewhere on the Confederate right; while Devin's brigade, on the Federal right, has been driven off by Ewell, and is now on the Taneytown road. Merritt's brigade is pushing in from Mechanicsville, off to the left; Kilpatrick is at Two Taverns, and Gregg has left Huey's brigade at Westminster to protect the railway terminal and supply depot of the army, while with his two remaining brigades he is hastening to take position to cover the right of the army to the northeast of Culp's Hill. The reserve artillery, put in march by Meade July 1st, will arrive shortly. Night marches, excessively fatiguing to troops, leave a heavy trail of stragglers that seriously weakens the fighting force present for battle. But by 9 A. M. all of the Army of the Potomac will be on the field excepting the Fifth and Sixth Corps and two brigades of the Third. This is a quick concentration, most creditable to Meade on so sudden a change of plan.

At 7 A. M., July 2d, the position and condition of the Army of the Potomac is as follows: Two of its strongest corps, two brigades of infantry, and all its cavalry, are from two to nine hours' march from the field on which battle should open at any moment. And had the Confederates attacked at daylight, they would have found the attenuated Federal line lacking the presence of the Second Corps, and unsupported by a single reserve; while the Federal left — the weak point — was held by but two semi-isolated regiments. At 9 A. M., still unmolested by a shot from the Confederates, additional troops have arrived, enabling Meade to rectify and strengthen his line. He shifts Geary's division from the extreme left near and on Round Top, and places it on the southeastern slope of

Culp's Hill; at the same time ordering Sickles to extend the Third Corps to the left to occupy the ground vacated by Geary. Hancock is placed between the First and Third Corps, in the space vacated by Sickles.

Meade, wrestling with the belief that the Confederates will attack his right on Culp's Hill, and himself thinking to move Slocum against Ewell, entrusts the oversight of his left to a staff officer, Colonel Meade, his son. And, more unaccountable, he permits Buford with his cavalry division to quit its guard of the extreme left, south of the Round Tops, and move off to Manchester, leaving this flank bare of a single guard. This on the verge of battle, when nothing requires the presence of Buford at Manchester further than to relieve the depot guard, which can as well remain there for a time as elsewhere. Nor does the commanding general do more than promise immediately to replace Buford with a force ample to occupy and guard the Round Tops, in answer to repeated and urgent requests made by Sickles.

Thus, left to himself, and doing his best to cover his long line, the brigades of De Trobriand, Burling and his artillery having arrived, Sickles deploys his corps on the immediate left of the Second, holding Burling in reserve. In this position he finds his small corps along Plum Run, in the low ground to its east overlooked by the peach orchard crest along the Emmitsburg pike, the Round Tops beyond his left neither occupied nor even guarded. Humphreys, meantime, throws detachments up the peach orchard rise as far as the Emmitsburg pike, where they can observe the approach of the enemy. Sickles's corps, then, is under a commanding rise in its front, the crest of which is perfectly open to occupancy by the enemy, while his left, and that of the Federal army, is open to being turned. If he is attacked, he is helpless, apparently, to defend himself on



his position or the Round Tops beyond his left. In this trying situation he decides to advance to the Emmetsburg pike rise with a part of his corps, and refuse the balance to the left along a line of strong, rocky and wooded knolls, running from near Little Round Top to the peach orchard on the Emmitsburg pike crest; and to do this before the enemy has chance to occupy this dominating ground. This move would seem commendable were it not that his appointed ground in the depression is a portion of a general line which must be maintained in its entirety, or the whole is deranged and weakened. By taking the stronger advanced position, he necessarily refuses his left toward but not covering Round Top. His position, then, constitutes a great exposed salient thrust out to the enemy on the extreme left of the Federal position, and nearly a mile in advance of its general line. Nothing better than this could be invented to invite assault in front and flank with direct and enfilading fire along both sides of the angle; while on its unprotected left flank loom the unmanned key of his and the entire Federal position. And Sickles, thus advanced, is in less advantageous condition to defend these heights than he would have been in the low ground. This salient may easily demand the utmost effort of the Federal army to its defense, unless Meade sees the error, withdraws the Third Corps in time, and gives much needed attention to the exposed left of his general line and its key. At this hour no one but Sickles appears to appreciate the vital importance of these abrupt hills, the Round Tops, or to fear what is concerning Sickles,— that Lee is preparing to attack by his right, as indicated by the movement of heavy columns toward that flank, which is evidently his most promising point of attack. Detailed examination of this new position taken by Sickles develops the facts that the Millerstown road leaves the Emmitsburg pike near

the peach orchard and runs in rear of his line along the rugged knolls and bouldered ravine, crossing Plum Run just north of the Devil's Den, and on past Little Round Top to the Taneytown road running in rear of the Federal position. Sickles then has this road in the rear of the rough, irregular wooded knolls which afford a natural defense for a portion of his refused left, and overlook a perfectly open country to the south, from whence attack will naturally come.

As time drags on without demonstration from Lee, Sickles, becoming convinced that an attack is preparing against him, sends Berdan with three hundred of his sharpshooters to feel out from the peach orchard across the Emmitsburg pike. Here Berdan quickly becomes engaged in sharp fire with Confederate skirmishers. Pushing these back, with persistent daring, he soon discovers heavy columns massing behind the Warfield woods. Appreciating the value of moments now, he boldly engages with these while dispatching to Sickles this information, confirming the general's belief that he is to be attacked. Upon this discovery Sickles makes his final dispositions. He wheels Birney's division to its left to occupy the wooded knolls beyond the Millerstown road, while he sends Humphreys' division forward into position on the high ground along the Emmitsburg pike, connecting with Birney near the peach orchard. This position taken by the Third Corps leaves the Round Tops without direct defense, and a gap between the right of Humphreys and Hancock's left, which the latter quickly fills with two of his regiments and a few guns. While Sickles has thrust his corps out into the very face of the enemy in a semi-isolated position, he has done the best possibly that could be done, under the conditions. For if attacked in the position which Meade has assigned to him, and his left open,—the Round



Tops unoccupied as they are,—he could, by no manner of means defend himself. And, with his left crumpled up, the Round Tops in possession of the enemy, Meade could not maintain the remainder of his line, nor do much else than to retreat away from his depot of supplies, as also, from Washington and Baltimore.

At 1 P. M. the Fifth Corps, assigned to Slocum, commanding the Federal right wing, is held in general reserve on the Baltimore pike near its crossing of Rock Creek, from which point this corps can reinforce any part of the line with quickness and facility. This ease of reinforcing is one of the admirable features of the Federal position. The reserve artillery is advantageously placed between the Baltimore and Taneytown pikes. At 1 P. M., July 2d, then, Meade has his entire army up and in position except the Sixth Corps.


A survey of the Confederate position at break of day, July 2d, finds Ewell's entire corps in position ready to assault. Johnson's fresh division has arrived and is on the extreme left of the Confederate line, across Rock Creek, on Benner's Hill, opposite Culp's Hill, after attempting to wrest it from Wadsworth in the night. The victor finds the position virtually won occupied by the foe, the Federal right. Early's division is on Johnson's right over against the sharp declivity connecting Culp's with Cemetery Hill. Rodes comes next, extending northwest of Cemetery Hill through the town of Gettysburg. Hill's Third Corps connects with the right of Rodes, Pender's division continuing along the flattening circle to Seminary Ridge proper, where he connects with Heth along the Ridge. Heth's division is held somewhat retired in semi-reserve between Pender and Anderson, whose division extends Hill's line to connect with McLaws' division of Longstreet's First Corps, Hood's division holding the extreme Confederate right, terminating

somewhat south of and overlapping the Federal left; so that if Lee attacks with his right, Sickles' salient will become enveloped, and place the Round Tops at the pleasure of the Confederates. Pickett's division of the First Corps is still at Chambersburg. This most hazardous situation on Meade's left, taken in connection with Berdan's discovery, the massing of Confederates behind the Warfield woods in front of the Federal exposure, is significant enough to attract Meade's prompt and special attention. But he does not see his danger.

The First Corps — Longstreet's — has marched all night, and has been given two hours' rest and refreshment on the bank of Marsh Creek, then resumed its march while waiting orders for assignment to position. The brigade of Law, Hood's division, is leaving New Guilford, to march twenty-nine miles in nine hours, then swing into fierce battle on the Confederate extreme right, without rest or breakfast, and fight till darkness. Stuart is hastening to hot conflict with the Federal cavalry to the east of Gettysburg. At 9 A. M. the entire Confederate army is in position on the field of Gettysburg, with the exception of the six thousand infantry of Pickett and Law. At this hour Lee is Meade's equal in troops present and two-thirds of Lee's infantry are well rested and fed, while Longstreet's two divisions have now had some four hours of rest and easy marching since they arrived at Marsh Creek in the early morning. On the contrary, the major part of the Federal army is just in from forced marches, tired and hungry, while two of its strong corps are four or more hours away.

It may be claimed that the condition of affairs cannot be determined from what can be seen of the field. But the entire field of Gettysburg between the arrayed armies is practically open *terrain*, and is overlooked from the cupola of the Lutheran Seminary — Lee's headquarters —





LIEUT. GEN. JAMES LONGSTREET

excepting the reverse side of the Federal position and the low ground along its left toward the Round Tops. There is no possibility of concealing movement of any considerable body of troops except in the Federal rear. So open is the field that a few signalmen on Round Top are worth battalions to Meade in preventing, during the day, a heavy movement of Confederate troops to their right, as related by a Confederate general, who writes: "That wretched little signal station upon Round Top that day caused one of our divisions to lose over two hours, and probably delayed our assault nearly that long. During that time a Federal corps arrived near Round Top and became an important factor in the action which followed." This fact General Warren, Meade's engineer officer, appreciated. For he, climbing the Round Top at the time Hood was about to attack, and finding the signalmen about to quit, set them to wig-wagging vigorously as though to hasten the approach of coming troops, and thus caused a Confederate delay which gave time for a part of the Fifth Corps to man Little Round Top and save it to the Federals. So do apparent trifles often turn the tides of battle.

The most important fact known, however, is that at no time during July 2d will Lee's force on the field be more numerous, Pickett's division and Law's brigade excepted, than at the hour of daylight. Under these conditions, and an attack having been determined upon and prepared during the night of the 1st, every moment of delay cannot but render it more difficult and less promising in results. A fractional part of the splendid initiative and daring exhibited by the Confederates in the second Manassas campaign, and again at Chancellorsville, if displayed at Gettysburg at any time within three hours after daylight of the 2d, offers far greater results with far less risk. The two

cases referred to were phenomenally unusual in war, and forbidden by its rules under the physical conditions in face of which Lee violated them and won. In this case the attack, actually demanded by all the principles of war, as well as by the conditions, is deferred, though it can be seen that Meade is constantly strengthening to meet it.

Lee's line of battle is five and one-half miles long while the direct distance across from flank to flank is three miles. Within this partial enfoldment the Federal army holds a position four miles in extent, its flanks one and one-half miles apart. The Confederate line would be greatly improved by withdrawing from the east of the town of Gettysburg and make that defensible point its left flank. This also would free the divisions of Johnson and Early to operate with Longstreet on the right with a strong column either in an attack against the Federal left or to turn Meade out of his position.

Three courses of action are open to Lee: (1) to fight it out where he is; (2) to retire and take position in the passes of the South Mountains and there compel Meade to attack, his present position being weak for defense, and (3) to move to his right and take a chosen position between Meade and Washington, where a Federal attack would be imperative on account of jeopardy to the Federal Capital. So preëminently does the position of Lee's army lend itself to a movement to its right to place it between Meade and Washington that Longstreet remarks to Lee in the morning of July 2d: "If we could have chosen a point to meet our plan of operations, I do not think we could have found a better one than that upon which we are now concentrated. All we have to do is to throw our army around their left and we shall interpose between the Federal army and Washington. Finding our object is Washington or that army,

the Federals will be sure to attack us in our chosen position." In such position Lee's lines to his rear would be well covered by his army, and the supplies therefor, requisitioned from the rich country about and in the Cumberland Valley, would be amply maintained. It is over this third alternative that controversy has arisen; not, however, between the principals in the case, Generals Lee and Longstreet, but among military critics. Did General Longstreet advise Lee in favor of this flank movement; and should Lee have made this movement, instead of fighting the battle at Gettysburg?

The following letter was written by General Longstreet on July 24, 1863, to his uncle, who had requested the facts regarding his action in the Battle of Gettysburg:

"My dear Uncle: My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to man the ability to judge, we may say with confidence that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington and dictated our terms, or at least held Washington and marched over as much of Pennsylvania as we cared to had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully chosen position in his rear. General Lee chose the plan adopted, and he is the person to choose and order. I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the commanding general. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views and to execute his orders as faithfully and as zealously as if they had been my own. I cannot help but think that great results would have been obtained had my views been thought better of; yet I am inclined to accept the present condition as for the best. . . . As General Lee is our commander, he should have all the support and influence that we can give him. If the blame — if there is any — can be



shifted from him to me, I shall help him and our cause by taking it. I desire, therefore, that all the responsibility that can be put upon me shall go there and remain there.

“Most affectionately yours,

“J. Longstreet.”

General Lee, in a letter written to General Longstreet, in January, 1864, says: “Had I taken your advice (at Gettysburg) instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all might have been.” Captain T. J. Grove, of Houston, Texas, then aid to General Longstreet, bearing a letter from that general in East Tennessee to General Lee, in Virginia, says: “In the winter of 1864, when you sent me with some dispatches, General Lee asked me into his tent, and in the conversation remarked that he had just been reading the Northern official reports of the battle of Gettysburg; that he had become satisfied from reading these reports, that if he had permitted you to carry out your plan on the third day, instead of making the attack on Cemetery Hill, we would have been successful.” The facts are thus established that General Longstreet did advise the flank operation, that General Lee rejected it, and that in doing so he made a grievous error. It remains to ascertain, if possible, what influences led General Lee to commit this error.

A reckless overconfidence prevailed among the troops at this time, which infected the Confederate army to such an extent that it fired even the calm, self-poised commander. An astute observer, and ever ready to utilize the feelings and opinions which rule men, Lee also doubtless realized that the least appearance of timidity would anger his troops, even against him, and render them sulky and less effective. He was morally unable to withhold from attack after the victory of the 1st.


The following statement of General Longstreet is sufficient evidence that General Lee was carried away by overconfidence. On the 1st of July, Longstreet was urging upon Lee the advantage of the flank movement to the Confederate right, when Lee said, "No, the enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there." And again, in reply to further argument of Longstreet, General Lee said, and most decidedly for him, "No, they are there in position, and I am going to whip them or they are going to whip me." And this decision is the complete reversal of Lee's deliberate determination before the campaign not to fight other than a defensive battle.

After considering whether he should not withdraw entirely from the east of Gettysburg from along the heights across Rock Creek, concentrate heavily on his right and deliver a massive attack against Meade's left near the Round Tops, on the evening of July 1st in conference with Ewell, General Lee decides that Ewell's corps shall deliver the main attack at daylight on the 2d, the center and left demonstrating in support; but during the night he changes his plan of battle to the extent of directing the attack to be made with both wings of his army at 9 A. M., Longstreet on the right to lead out, Ewell to advance as soon as he shall hear the booming of Longstreet's guns. It is claimed, however, that General Lee did not name a positive hour when Longstreet should advance to attack; that he did not give the point of attack, nor state the number of troops that were to engage, that is, the strength of attack; though by implication it is to be made by Longstreet's two divisions, supported on their left by Hill. Seeking reason for these apparent oversights in matters vital to the Confederate battle, we find it was the practice of General Lee to give great freedom to his lieutenants, whereby, after having acquainted them with his general plans and given them general instructions, they

were left to carry these into detailed execution in manner which seemed best to each commander, and most advantageous to the common purpose.

After giving Longstreet his general directions as to position and point of attack, Lee rides to his left to examine the Federal position, while Ewell makes preparations for his attack on its right. Rejoining Longstreet at 9 A. M., Lee finds the First Corps still in its line position, either because Longstreet does not understand that he is expected to make a prompt attack, or because he is unfamiliar with the ground within his radius, and the position he is designated to assail. In any case, the interval between 9 and 11 A. M. is spent in reconnoitering the ground. Lee then gives Longstreet definite orders to envelop Meade's left by moving north along the Emmitsburg pike, aiming at the peach orchard as the commanding point on that road. The Round Tops are in sight, and it is not thought to question that Meade has strongly occupied these formidable heights as the left key to his entire position. But Lee believes that the peach orchard marks the left termination of the actual Federal line of battle, which, if taken somewhat in flank and crumpled up, will isolate any force on the Round Tops and cause their evacuation. This somewhat surprising conclusion is confirmed by his order of battle on his right, which he has made so positive that his subordinates do not feel at liberty to change after the battle develops that the Round Tops should be the point of attack.

Lee's general order of battle is simultaneous attack by both wings, Hill to act in concert with Longstreet. In detail, it is the oblique order of battle: On the right to begin with Longstreet's divisions successively, taking the Federal left at the peach orchard somewhat in flank, it is supposed, and to be continued by Hill's divisions in echelon of brigades on Longstreet, a rapid succession of sledge



LIEUT.-GEN. R. S. EWELL



strokes delivered somewhat obliquely against the Federal front, to progressively shatter and crumple it up, beginning on its left with Sickles' salient. In the meantime Ewell is to engage the Federal right and hold it from reinforcing its left, while Hill's constantly increasing threat against its center will effect the same purpose. This is a most effective order of battle, once successfully under way on a flank and then followed up with prompt and vigorous strokes in quick succession. But lacking these requisites, the brunt of the battle must inevitably fall upon the flank assailing force fighting a heavy concentration against it. The shape of Lee's position makes this order most favorable on his right, as it practically involves both Longstreet and Hill as the column of attack; and the ground is such that there is no reason why these two corps shall not work in perfect harmony and close cooperation. But Ewell will be compelled to fight his own battle; and it will be most unusual if he so times his attack that it will support the Confederate right and center,—especially as he is to depend, not on definite time orders, but on hearing the guns of Longstreet, miles away behind hills and woods.

Stuart's ill-judged excursion is bearing much evil fruit, for had he, as usual, been available during the preceding days, Lee would know that the Round Tops are now occupied by only a few Federal signalmen. Possessed of this knowledge, it is scarcely doubtful that General Lee would desist from his questionable convergent attack, and, reinforcing Longstreet from Ewell's Corps, would swing his right around these heights and capture this keypoint of the Federal position. Such an operation, supported by Hill on its left, would envelop Sickles' salient in front, flank and left-rear, smash it in, and give Lee the Round Tops

from which to enfilade the entire Federal line with gunfire; also the Taneytown and Baltimore pikes. This would give the Confederates command of Meade's line of supply, communication and retreat, and force him eastward away from his supply depot, Baltimore and Washington; for his position on Cemetery Ridge would then become untenable.

To make his attack on the Federal left Longstreet has available but two strong divisions and his corps artillery, a force much too weak, surely, for the probable needs. And unless Hill does his part promptly and with vigor, the First Corps divisions will find themselves hard pressed. For this reason Longstreet persuades Lee to delay the assault, hoping that Law's brigade, if not Pickett's division, will arrive to his reinforcement. For, at this moment, when he should be engaged with the enemy, it is not fairly permissible for him to attack until his force is augmented. Lee is opposing a rule of war, "A smaller army shall not approach its antagonist with its two wings," and is preparing in exactly this manner to attack Meade, when the relative positions of the armies further prohibit it. Under these conditions strong concentration for attack is impossible anywhere; but, instead, comparatively weak and scattered assaults are to be made at widely separated points circuitous from his center, against a superior force on a strong position unusually favorable for reinforcing at any point. Lee's oblique order of battle on his right somewhat offsets the disadvantages of his position, enabling him to use his center coöperating with his right to break in Meade's left and crumple his line back upon Ewell. Nevertheless it will be strange if Meade does not find opportunity to interpose between Longstreet and Ewell when Hill becomes weakened in their support, or to crush one of these flanks. At Chancellorsville Lee interposed between Hooker and



Sedgwick with one-third of his army while the remainder under Jackson made a wide circuit across the front of the Army of the Potomac and hurled itself against Hooker's right flank with crushing effect.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE

**L**AW'S brigade has arrived to complete Hood's division, which, with that of McLaws', has moved from Willoughby Run along a wooded road debouching into the Emmetsburg pike to the south of the peach orchard, in front of which Alexander has placed his artillery. Ten hours have been wasted and the Confederate opportunity is past. Lee's orders as to the direction and point of attack being positive, Longstreet confines his assault to Sickles' immediate front, and orders Hood to make his immediate objective the hills overlooking the Devil's Den, held by Ward, of Birney's division. McLaws is to attack and envelop the peach orchard angle, which, in Lee's mind, is the Federal flank. Hill is promptly to join in to support and extend the attack of Longstreet, while Ewell is to assault the Federal right and hold it from reinforcing against Longstreet.

Ewell, ready to attack at daylight and again at 9 A. M., becomes impatient, and, receiving no instructions, under cover of a weak artillery fire from his batteries on Brenner's Hill, feels of the enemy preparatory to delivering attack when the expected signal from Longstreet is heard. At 3:30 P. M. Longstreet has 17,000 infantry and 57 guns arrayed against Sickles' 9,800 with 34 guns, when Hood moves forward into position for attack in double line formation, his right, Law's brigade, extended toward Plum Run, his left somewhat to the east of the Emmitsburg pike and south of the peach orchard. McLaws is ready to



MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. HOOD



strike that angle as soon as Hood is engaged. The movement of Longstreet's divisions has not been wholly concealed from the Federals by the Warfield woods and the slight ridge upon which they rise. And now, when Hood's lines move to attack, the Federal artillery opens fire from the peach orchard, to which Longstreet's batteries reply from their position near the Warfield farm house. Wilcox's skirmishers, Hill's right brigade, engage with those of Graham in a rapid fire in the fields west of the Emmitsburg pike. At this juncture Meade arrives with Sickles from a council of war called to consider "whether the Army of the Potomac shall remain waiting attack or withdraw southward into a defensive position," the orders for such a movement having been prepared in readiness for an expected flank operation by Lee. Longstreet's guns announce the decision. Seeing that the Third Corps is deployed in a thin line over strong ground which it is too weak to hold unaided, Meade sends Warren, his chief engineer, to ascertain what point most needs strengthening by the reinforcements which he has called. Sickles, learning that Meade does not approve of the position in which he has placed the Third Corps, suggests its withdrawal, but is informed that it is too late, for Hood's infantry fire, off to the southward against Birney, adds its rattle to the rapidly increasing boom of artillery.

Hood's division advancing across the open fields to the east of the Emmitsburg pike, Law, commanding the right brigade, gains a clear view of that portion of the field and of the Round Tops to his right-front. He realized their dominance of his field and of the Federal left flank. Law records: "Observing the formidable position of the Federal front, and not knowing where their left rested, I sent a few scouts out instructed to scale Big Round Top, if possible, and send back a runner to tell me what they discov-

ered. Meantime I captured a few Federals who came up a road skirting the eastern base of Big Round Top, who said they were on their way to hospital at Emmitsburg. Being questioned, they reported that there was a road leading around Round Top to where the Federal trains were parked about a mile distant; and that there was no Federal force there except the train guards, and none on Round Top. Soon my scouts returned and confirmed what the Federal prisoners had said. This important information I at once sent to General Hood with the urgent request that we should turn the Round Tops. My aide quickly returned with orders from Hood to attack at once as originally ordered. From the short absence of my aid I was led to believe that the information I had sent to General Hood was not referred to either General Longstreet or General Lee. I immediately proceeded to attack, at the same time sending a strong protest against this direct attack to General Hood."

Hood, an impetuous fighter, thus assumes a responsibility that is not his. Law makes his point of direction somewhat toward Little Round Top, Robertson holding contact with his left. This brings Robertson in front of the Devil's Den, across Plum Run, opposite the western base of Little Round Top, at 4 P. M., when he attacks at this point, encountering Ward, posted on the wooded knoll overlooking the Den. A fierce struggle ensues, in which Robertson is gaining ground until his advance exposes his left flank to De Trobriand's men, who drive it to the rear and force the remainder of the brigade to come from the right to its assistance. This relieves Ward, who retakes his original position. Anderson, in support of Robertson, did not follow his movement, as he should have done, and, in consequence, finds his brigade in front of the storm center of De Trobriand's position, where he is disastrously repulsed. Fortunately

for both Robertson and Anderson, Benning, who also failed to follow Law, now comes up in rear of Robertson, and these three brigades renew the attack upon De Trobriand and Ward. The combat at this point quickly becomes desperate, and Sickles's artillery joins with the infantry in hotly contesting the ground. Ward and De Trobriand, outnumbered, are slowly driven, both the attack and the defense suffering heavy losses. Law's brigade, left free and unmolested on its course toward the Round Tops, now crosses Plum Run at the western base of this eminence. His fine brigade of fiery Texans and Alabamians is reinforced by two of Robertson's regiments, which, by mistake, followed Law. To resist the fierce assault on this key position, there is but one battery — Smith's — and a small mixed force of four regiments quickly detached from the four brigades of Birney. These troops are quickly scattered among the rocks and boulders littering the slope. But they are routed, and Ward is compelled to unman his right in sending them aid. This forces De Trobriand to thin his front by extending to his left to fill the gap left by Ward's detachment, utilizing one regiment for this purpose. This attenuated line is posted in the wheat field behind a stone fence, with a woods in its front where Ward had held position. De Trobriand has left but three small regiments with which to defend his line, but so sturdily tenacious are his men that they repulse Anderson's second assault, wounding that brigadier. Benning's fresh troops, however, drive Ward from his position and capture three guns.

At this critical stage in Federal affairs, McLaws's division enters upon the scene. Ordered to form in double line of brigades, west of the Emmitsburg pike, facing northeast, and to strike the west front and point of Sickles' salient obliquely, McLaws, observing the change in direction Hood has made in his attack, throws a portion of his division



to the east of the Emmitsburg pike. Kershaw, commanding his right brigade, supported by Semmes's brigade, crosses to the east of the Pike and moves in support of Hood's left. Thus advancing, at 5.30 P. M. Kershaw strikes the center of De Trobriand's command now consisting of two small regiments, which hold a strong position on a wooded knoll. Extending to his left, Kershaw assails this weak line between the knoll and Graham's left, held by one regiment and the batteries of Clark and Bigelow.

Thus far the Confederate infantry attack has fallen entirely on the south front of Sickles's salient. With this line crushed, the Federal left broken in and taken in reverse, the Round Tops captured, Meade's position and army would be placed in great jeopardy. Meanwhile the Confederate artillery hammers Sickles' west front; first concentrating heavily on Humphreys and Graham, until, finally, Hill's guns open and concentrate their fire north against the Second Corps and the Federal batteries reply with equal vigor. The Confederate gun fire together with the threat of Hill's ready brigades serve to hold Meade from detaching reinforcements to Birney from contiguous parts of his line. But as Ewell does not attack his right, Meade is able to draw from there to his left. Sykes deploys on the left of Birney, across Plum Run valley and up Little Round Top, as Meade is now especially solicitous that this ground shall be held. Sykes does not, therefore, feel at liberty to detach reinforcements directly to Birney's urgent call. He crosses Plum Run, however, with Barnes and his division at 4.30 P. M., and reconnoiters the ground himself. Plum Run valley, and, with it, Smith's battery, are dangerously exposed. Sykes offers Birney the support of Barnes if he will extend his line to fully occupy this ground. Quickly accepting, Birney dispatches Burling's two remaining regi-



MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE SYKES



ments in reserve to join the one of De Trobriand now there. Sykes then puts Sweitzer's brigade into line on the right of De Trobriand, with Tilton's brigade on the right of Sweitzer extending up the slope to the peach orchard. It is these fresh troops that meet Kershaw's attack, first successfully resisted by Tilton. But Sweitzer's flank becomes exposed, and both of these brigades are driven back, leaving the three regiments of De Trobriand, toward Plum Run on the left, dangerously exposed in flank and front. These successes along Birney's front free the Confederates to swarm to their right toward Round Top in such force as to engage all of the Fifth Corps there in wait.

Warren reaches Little Round Top at 3.45 P. M. where the signal officer expresses to him his surmise that the Confederates are concealed in force across Plum Run, not remote from the base of the eminence on which they stand. Warren thereupon orders Smith to send a shot in that direction through the treetops, which causes a movement among the men of Law's brigade, and the glint of their muskets confirms the suspicion of the signal officer. Warren at once grasps the situation—the importance of the Round Tops and the imminent danger of their capture. He hastens to find Sykes, who gives him Vincent's brigade of Barnes's division with Hazlett's battery, which Warren directs to take position along the base of Little Round Top. Hastening back to its summit, Warren is just in time to see De Trobriand's little force driven from the gorge by Law, and falling back toward the peach orchard. This leaves the Round Tops entirely exposed, with Law's men ready to ascend and take possession. The signalmen are about to decamp for safety; but Warren sets them at active signalling with the hope that this will serve to deceive and delay Law for a few moments, during which many things may occur. Looking down the northeastern slope of

Little Round Top Warren sees Weed's brigade of Ayers's division, of the Fifth Corps, moving past in the direction taken by Barnes. Hastening to this column, Warren encounters a personal friend in Colonel O'Rourke, commanding one of the regiments; and that gallant youth, without waiting for permission, quickly swings his command out of the column and follows Warren up and over the crest. In the meantime Vincent has arrived and taken position on the southwestern slope of Little Round Top just in time to check Law's men, already beginning its ascent. But they immediately gather themselves and assail Vincent's center in its citadel of great boulders, from which they are unable to drive the Federals. The Confederates take cover among the rocks and the hostile lines pelt each other at almost touching distance. Finding effort against the center of Vincent's position unavailing, Law extends his left, which overlaps and overcomes his opponent's right, thus completely isolating Vincent's brigade. This leaves the crest of Little Round Top, commanding Meade's entire position, open to Hood, and Law's men now begin to climb for it.

It is at this crisis that O'Rourke's strong regiment pours over the crest from the opposite side and meets the Confederates face to face. Not a moment is to be lost by either party to the contest for the crest, the possession of which gives to the victor the keypoint of the Federal position. Here occurs a marked example of reversion. O'Rourke, though met by a wasting fire, neither stops to form his regiment into line, nor to fix bayonets; but shouting to his men to "Club muskets and at them!" this fighting Irishman hurls his regiment in solid column amongst the astonished Confederates; trusting the "shellaly" and strong arms to do the necessary — and he wins. Checking Law's advance, O'Rourke now has time to deploy into line and deliver a

hot fire, which not only saves the crest but relieves Vincent, enabling his men to come to the aid of this lonely regiment facing many times its own number. Following O'Rourke, Hazlett's battery has climbed Little Round Top, and takes position on the crest under a shower of lead. But the declivity is so abrupt that he cannot depress his guns sufficiently to rake the slope. He therefore directs his fire at the Confederate reserve in the valley at its base. The boldness of this brave artilleryman gives the infantry increased confidence to maintain a stern front against Hood's fierce Texans. Little Round Top and the Federal left, for the present, are safeguarded; but O'Rourke's gallant regiment, the One Hundred and Fiftieth New York, has lost one hundred men in a few minutes, among them its young commander, of bright promise, who died at his post of duty.

The irrepressible Confederates are checked for the moment. But the importance of the Round Tops having now become evident to the men as well as to their commanders, they desperately engage again, even in personal combat, along Law's entire front. Men hunt each other from behind boulders, trees and ledges. Many climb trees to secure more effective positions; others pile up little heaps of loose stones as head-fortresses, behind which they lie and fire. This inaugurated a new practice in war which was developed by the troops in quickly covering themselves behind impregnable breast works. The two uncaptured guns of Smith's battery along Plum Run catch the Confederate line obliquely and pour shells into its midst. Law, seeing that this man-hunting fight will continue indecisive, again hurls his men at O'Rourke's regiment: but Vincent, now in command of all the Federals fighting for the Round Tops, comes to its aid, and Law is again checked. Gallant Vincent and hundreds of his brave men pay the price with their lives. Nor have the Confederates escaped with equal loss, among

these, brave Hood, seriously wounded in the effort to capture the heights which, earlier, would have been his without a shot had he heeded Law's report and urge to assail and turn the Round Tops which his scouts had found unoccupied.

At this time, to the west of Plum Run, Kershaw has driven two of Barnes's brigades, and De Trobriand and Ward are thus endangered. Ward, weakened by his repulse of Robertson, cannot resist Benning, assaulting him both on his right and left. Smith succeeds in saving the remainder of his guns; but the Devil's Den hill is completely abandoned to the Confederates, who fill its woods and drive a Maine regiment from behind a stone wall, charge forward into the wheat field to the east of the peach orchard, and force Winslow to retire his guns, while threatening De Trobriand's flank. This brave and able Frenchman is at the same time assailed by Anderson, and is compelled to give ground on his right; for no troops can be spared to his assistance from his right near the peach orchard. At this point the Federal artillery, exposed to the fire of Longstreet's guns, is now in serious danger from Kershaw. In fact, one of his regiments, the Eighth South Carolina, is advancing against the batteries of Clark and Bigelow, when, fortunately for the latter, a Pennsylvania regiment, posted near in a sunken road, rises to the situation and stops the Carolinians with a scorching fire. But, uncertain of their position, the batteries retire behind the sunken road, and in doing this they still further expose the right of De Trobriand.

Caldwell's division of the Second Corps now arrives to the aid of Birney and Barnes. Cross goes to the support of De Trobriand's brigade, now reduced to a handful of men, while Kelly supports Ward, on De Trobriand's left, near Plum Run. This is Meager's old Irish brigade, following



its green flag with the golden harp, from beneath which strange music has hurtled, flaunting over many a battlefield. These fighting Irishmen charge into the thick of the fight and stop the victorious advance of Anderson's brigade. Birney, meanwhile rallying De Trobriand's men and Burling's two driven regiments about Cross, leads these troops against Kershaw, whose line has become so extended that it cannot resist this attack, and is driven back upon the brigade of Semmes, following close at hand in support. Semmes's untired troops advance against this first line, formed principally of Caldwell's division, which is quickly aided by Birney's second line, composed of the brigades of Zook and Brooke, of the Second Corps. The weight of these divisions overcomes both Semmes and Kershaw. The latter, however, refuses to order his men to retire, and they stand broken up into squads fruitlessly fighting on isolated bits of advantageous ground, with the exception of his left wing, which holds its position. Here Brigadier Semmes lays down his life.

Across Plum Run, on Little Round Top, Federal reinforcements have also arrived; for Sykes, on hearing of the necessity there, has ordered Weed's brigade to return and join that command on Little Round Top, where he arrives just as the hostiles are ready to reengage after their rest from exhaustion. Taking position on the right of Vincent's brigade, now commanded by Colonel Rice, the latter is able to extend and reinforce his left, under Chamberlain. Law, persistently bent on the capture of the Round Tops, now fiercely assails his antagonist before Weed has time to deploy his command; and during this interval Law's men attempt to pass Chamberlain's left and gain the crest from the southern slope of Little Round Top by forcing their way through the tangled gorge between the two eminences. They are met by the Twentieth Maine — tough, burly lum-

bermen, who, in war, as in their native forests, are accustomed to clearing ground in their front, rather than being driven from that they temporarily occupy. Here is waged a hand to hand contest over ground and among obstacles that would delight Indian warriors, the Confederates persistently attempting to work around the Federal flank as the Maine choppers extend their line and fight them back.

The battle thus far has been confined to the ground draining into Plum Run, just north of the Devil's Den, extending along the western slope of Little Round Top, on the Confederate right, and on the right bank of that stream, up the peach orchard slope. The attack has been made by Hood's four brigades and two brigades of McLaws' division, aided by Longstreet's artillery from beyond the Emmitsburg pike. The Federal force meeting this assault is Birney's of the Third Corps, aided by Barnes's division of the Fifth Corps and Caldwell's division of the Second. It is seen that the faulty position of the Third Corps has already involved one division of the Second and a division of the Fifth Corps. Nevertheless, the six Confederate brigades are by no means defeated; but still hold grimly to the base slope of the Round Tops, and are defiantly observing the remainder of the Federal line which they have so seriously shaken. As already seen, the Fifth Corps is in movement toward the left, the division of Barnes having arrived and engaged. The Sixth Corps, wearied by its long forced march from Westminster, goes into reserve, relieving the Fifth. At 5 P. M., Meade withdraws Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps from his extreme right and at 5.30 Geary, of the same corps, is ordered to detail the brigades of Kane and Candy. These troops are all sent to the left, leaving only Greene's brigade of 1,350 men to occupy the entire position held by the Twelfth Corps on the right.

Meade's utter neglect of his left in the earlier day in face

of Sickles' urgency, is now bearing fruit, for in his frantic effort to save his left he is denuding his right in the presence of Ewell from whom he should expect attack in aid of Longstreet. But Ewell is waiting to hear the guns from the right!

Longstreet's artillery is hammering at the peach orchard, with the skirmishers of Barksdale's brigade, McLaws's division, hotly peppering it. McLaws has been in position to attack since four o'clock, the brigades of Barksdale and Wofford wholly unengaged, while those of Semmes and Kershaw have been in action but a short time in support of Hood. In fact, the brunt of the battle thus far has fallen upon Hood's single division, which is now well exhausted.

At 6 P. M. Hill is waiting for McLaws, on his right, to move against the Federal west front in order that his right shall be protected in moving across his greater distance of open. In accordance with Lee's oblique order of battle, the movement of Hill's brigades must be determined by that of McLaws, while that of the latter is, to an extent, dependent upon Hood's. When McLaws sees Caldwell forcing back his two brigades under Kershaw and Semmes, he moves out to attack the peach orchard; Barksdale on the left against the west front of the angle, Wofford to his right-rear to assail its south front, aided by portions of Kershaw's brigade, which still remains near the Federal line. Sickles has given Graham, defending the orchard, a second brigade for the defense of this key to his exposed position, now completely enveloped and open to both a frontal and enfilading fire along its two fronts. Thus, completely enveloped in a hail of infantry fire, Graham's infantry is almost instantly wasted, nor does the canister belched from his guns retard the Confederate charge. The orchard is captured; Graham is a wounded captive; while such of his command as are not dead, dis-

abled, or captured are flying down the slope. Sickles hastens thitherward, has his leg broken by a bullet, and the command of the Third Corps devolves upon Birney. The batteries along the Emmitsburg pike abandon their untenable positions, while those in the left field, just outside of the sweep of the Confederate charge, fire into their column at close range, but without avail. Birney's command loses two thousand of its five thousand men in the space of a few minutes.

Into the gap made at the angle by crushing Graham, that is, at the center of the Third Corps, Barksdale leads his brigade and pushes straight ahead, closely followed by supporting batteries charging at a gallop, while Wofford, swinging in on his right-rear, takes in flank the Federals who are holding Kershaw. The Federal batteries and broken infantry now deluge Barksdale at close range. At this moment Colonel Alexander, commanding Longstreet's artillery, observes the victorious sweep of Barksdale's infantry, and, quickly limbering up his batteries, makes a dashing charge across the fields and onto the peach orchard crest, where his guns do murderous work — such a charge of numerous batteries of artillery is unusual.

The apex of Sickles's angle broken in and demolished, and Meade's left thereby placed in extreme jeopardy, the Confederates now extend their battle to involve a part of Hill's Corps and one of Ewell's divisions on the extreme left. It is now early twilight. For three mortal hours Longstreet's two divisions have done desperate battle alone. Not a man has stirred to aid or cooperate from either Hill's or Ewell's Corps, so that Meade has been left perfectly free to call troops and mass heavily against Longstreet from his center and right. Hill now pushes out in quick succession from his right three brigades only of Anderson's division, Wilcox, Perry and Wright, in their order from

right to left. Wilcox, personally instructed by Lee as to his point of direction, inclines to his left to clear the front of McLaws along the peach orchard crest, and in order to strike Humphreys to its right, in connection with Perry and Wright in echelon on his left. The remaining divisions and brigades of Hill are left stationary, the commanders impatiently pacing about the right flank of their commands eager to catch the expected order to advance. Ewell does not hear the signal until 7 p. m., when he immediately proceeds to attack Culp's Hill with Johnson's division, supported by six batteries on Brenner's Hill. After an artillery duel lasting an hour, Ewell's unprotected guns are silenced by those covered in the works Steinwehr threw up on July first while in reserve on Cemetery Hill. These are the only intrenchments thrown up by either army during the three days of naked battle. With these Federal guns active above the slope of Culp's Hill — in itself formidable — the position is deemed too strong to carry by frontal assault, and Ewell moves Johnson to the left into the gorge of Rock Creek, there to flank and attack the Hill from the southeast. It is 8 p. m. when Johnson finally finds himself in position to begin his assault. At this late hour the battle has extended to cover the front of both armies: For while the infantry between Johnson on the extreme left and Anderson, the right of Hill's Corps, is not engaged, the artillery is belching along the entire line, and in like manner is reciprocated by the Federal guns.

Returning now to the Confederate right: Barksdale is on Humphreys' left flank threatening his rear; Wilcox, Perry and Wright, are moving against his front. Humphreys' position is desperate, for he has loaned all but two brigades to previous emergency, and his right is weakly connected with the Second Corps by two of Gibbon's regiments. Humphreys is thus almost isolated; and, like the

mettled soldier that he is, he proposes to move forward and attack his oncoming antagonists, and at least check them long enough to permit him less endangered withdrawal. Birney, however, fearing that such a move will still further disconnect and expose his division, orders Humphreys to retire his right to connect with the Second Corps, holding his left in position to protect his retiring right and at the same time hold connection with his, Birney's, flank. Humphreys performs this most difficult feat amidst the din and excitement of battle, and under a galling fire. Forming double columns of battalions, his veterans move steadily to the rear, then swing into line and open a checking fire on the pressing Confederates, losing half of his men.

The condition of affairs in and about Sickles' salient are peculiar and dangerous in the extreme, unless powerful aid quickly arrives. By the capture of the peach orchard apex, the Confederates have impinged a powerful column of infantry and artillery between Humphreys to their left, and Barnes to their right along the south front of the salient. Barksdale concerns his brigade with Humphreys' affairs, in conjunction with Wilcox, to his left; while Wofford, supporting Barksdale's right-rear, finds himself also in not distant conjunction on his right with Hood. In fact, at the peach orchard, Wofford finds his victorious brigade — with Humphreys dislodged — free to charge down its eastern slope against the right flank of Barnes, held by Tilton without support. Kershaw and Semmes at once resume the offensive against Zook and Sweitzer, to the left of Tilton. These three Federal brigades, assailed in flank and front, are driven until, finally, Caldwell finds his left flank uncovered.

The entire Federal line from the slope of the peach orchard to Plum Run is now broken and sent reeling backward through the wheat field. The strewn ground bears





BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM BARKSDALE





evidence of the murderous character of the contest, General Zook being among the killed. The Confederate artillery descends the slope, and at close range pours a devastating fire against the flank of Barnes's retiring, disordered line. Brooke bravely charges these guns, is repulsed, and himself wounded; but this splendid officer does not relinquish his command in this emergency. At this moment the position of the Confederates in order toward their left is: Law at the base of the Round Tops across Plum Run, with the remainder of Hood's division more or less in his support and making connection across the Run with Kershaw and Semmes, posted practically along the captured Federal line toward the peach orchard. Here the Confederate line deflects northward, cutting off the apex of the captured salient. Semmes is across this cut-off, connecting with Wofford and Barksdale, farther to the left in contact with Hill's brigades in front of Humphreys.

Sickles' salient, after costing thousands of lives, is crushed in and no longer exists; while the more or less disintegrated remnants of the battalions and batteries which have so gallantly defended it are sullenly retiring across Plum Run into the position to which Sickles was first assigned on the low ground. But now the Round Tops are held by the Fifth Corps. Lee's oblique order of battle has been established in so far as Sickles' salient is concerned. From this position of vantage on their right the Confederates push forward, McLaws with purpose to interpose in the practically undefended ground between the routed Third Corps and the Round Tops, thus isolating these heights for capture by Hood, while together these two divisions envelop the Federal flank. But the victors now have to account with Hancock, who, when Sickles was wounded, was placed in general command of the Third Corps over Birney. Hancock's energy is bent to fill the

gap between his left and Little Round Top. Humphreys has just effected his retirement in extension of the Second Corps. All of his artillery horses being killed, the guns of his division were necessarily abandoned—a sore temptation to the enemy, though they are under Humphreys' fire. Bigelow, without support, places his batteries close in and pelts the advancing Confederate line with canister. This bold officer and most of his gunners are disabled, compelling the abandonment of his guns. But the determined bravery of these men has temporarily checked the hostile advance into the gap. This check is now made permanent by the appearance of Day and Burbank, with their two brigades of regulars, of Ayers's division of the Fifth Corps. They are seen in the direction of the Round Tops, crossing Plum Run, and swing into position on the near crest of the Devil's Den where the remnant of Ward's brave brigade still clings, opposing Law. The forced retirement of Barnes and Caldwell leaves Ayers's right flank exposed, and McLaws furiously charges him from this direction, while Law assails his front. But his regulars are equal to the fearful demand made upon their famed steadiness and courage. Losing eleven hundred out of an effective of two thousand men in a few minutes, Ayers slowly retires the remainder across Plum Run and takes position on the right of Weed's brigade of his division, ranged along the northern base of Little Round Top.

During the past hour the contest waged by Law against Chamberlain's Maine lumbermen in the Round Top gorge has slackened, but now the battle springs up with renewed life along the whole front about these heights. Weed is fatally wounded, with Hazlett's dead body by his side, shot while bending to catch his comrade's last words. Law has so attenuated his line in attempting to pass the Federal

flank in the gorge, that Chamberlain now charges and drives him at the moment that Ayers engages across Plum Run, as already described. Though Ayers is compelled to retire his two decimated brigades, his action, with that of Chamberlain, is sufficient to prevent Law from resuming attack upon the Round Tops. At the time that Ayers takes his retired position with Weed at the base of Little Round Top, General Crawford arrives with the brigade of McCandless and establishes it on the raised ground where Vincent and Weed lost their lives. Thus reinforced, the Federals advance and drive the Confederates from the base of the Round Tops and across Plum Run, and this stronghold on Meade's left is finally freed from direct attack. The Round Tops have been secured at a fearful cost, which would not have been exacted had Meade examined this portion of his position in person in the early day, as Sickles urged. Barksdale and Wofford, however, continue their advance down the peach orchard slope against the weak resistance of shattered groups of the Third Corps, and clear the ground to the northwest of the Round Tops down to Plum Run, giving free play to Alexander's batteries, and completely isolating the defenders of these heights. Some of Hill's batteries now join with Longstreet's guns in an artillery duel with the Federal artillery, while Alexander with his batteries closely follows the advancing infantry and bombards the weakened division of Humphreys.

With such energy do the Confederates press forward that the weakened Federals soon find themselves occupying the very ground which Sickles quitted to take up his advanced salient. Although this low ground is dominated from the rise along the Emmitsburg pike, now held by the Confederates, it offers some local advantages, the narrow valley of Plum Run being covered by brush and trees, among which McLaws' men have found cover from the

fire of the Federal guns. On the eastern border of this valley rises an abrupt bench, of some thirty feet elevation, up and over which the Confederates will have to climb in their advance, exposing them to an effective fire. At all hazards the Federals must defend this last possible line, covering the Baltimore pike, Meade's line of communication and retreat. Hancock, therefore, places every available man and gun to its defense. From his own corps — the Second, already depleted by the rough handling Caldwell's division has received — he detaches still further to the defense of the left two regiments from the division of Hayes, and, taking with him Willard's brigade, also of Hayes's command, he deploys it beyond Humphreys in the very center of the gap in the low ground where McLaws is attempting to push through. Hunt also places some forty guns from the reserve along the east bank of Plum Run, under the command of Major McGilvery. This formidable battery dominates along six hundred yards of front, while crossing fire with the guns of Hancock, at the same time covering the remnants of Caldwell's, Barnes's and Birney's divisions, which Longstreet has driven back in breaking in the salient.

This semi-fortress of guns and fresh infantry standing in grim readiness in the center of the breach, with the Federal general line on its right and the considerable force of defense on Little Round Top to the left, does not form a specially inviting object of attack to McLaws' victorious but heavily depleted brigades. In truth, due consideration of the fact that Meade's line must now be stripped of troops in march to his left demands vigorous attack from Lee's center and left, as well as by McLaws on the filling gap in his front before it can be stopped. But, instead, at this vital juncture, with the exception of Johnson's division, busy against Culp's Hill, there is a decided lull in the Con-

federate attack, although the brigades of Posey and Mahone just to the left of Wilcox, Perry and Wright, and Pender's division on their left, since four o'clock have been ready and impatient, waiting the order which should have been given them to advance in rapid succession against the Federal line, their assault to culminate on the section marked by Ziegler's Grove, the center of the Federal position. But this plainly evident Confederate opportunity is left unattempted until it is too late. Meanwhile the Federal weak point is becoming its strength. First, Lockwood arrives with his two regiments — from guard of Baltimore from insurrection, and are in support of the guns of McGilvery. Williams's division, of the Twelfth Corps, from the right, closely follows on a crossroad connecting the Baltimore and Taneytown pikes, just in rear of the filling gap. On the heels of Williams is Candy's brigade of Geary's division, from the right, the other two brigades of this division unwarrantably gone astray off beyond Rock Creek, where they are useless to any of Meade's pressing needs. To the south of these hastening columns marches Bartlett's brigade of the Sixth Corps, in reserve, following Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps; a bit later two more brigades of the Sixth Corps are set in motion. Finally, Newton, holding the west front of Cemetery Hill, is ordered to hold in readiness such portion of the First Corps as he can spare, and sends Doubleday with his division. Meade has, therefore, in position on his left, or in march, the live remains of the Third Corps, the Fifth, the Twelfth all but one brigade, a division of the Sixth, more than one-third of the First and Second Corps, and nearly one-half of his artillery; that is, nearly four out of his seven corps of infantry, and, approximately, one-half of his artillery.

General Longstreet, in recounting his battle thus far,

says: "This was an unequal battle. General Lee's orders had been that when my advance was made, the Second Corps, on my left, should move and make a simultaneous attack; that the Third Corps should watch closely and engage so as to prevent heavy massing in front of me. Ewell made no move at all until about eight o'clock at night, after the heat of the battle was over, his line having been broken by a call for one of his brigades somewhere else. Hill made no movement whatever, save of the brigades of his right division which were covering our left."

It is now 7.30 P. M., when Meade leaves his headquarters staff almost in a panic over his sudden departure for his left, so fearful is he that he will be attacked before his reinforcements can arrive to its succor, and that they will be defeated in detail as they successively appear on that part of the field. At this very time, on the Confederate side, Mahone and Posey, of Anderson's division, are wondering why they are not definitely ordered to advance on Wright's flank. But they do not feel warranted in moving out under their discretionary instructions from Hill, which hold them fast unless they, themselves, conclude that the initial assault by Longstreet is an entire success. Why, this delegating to brigadiers the corps commander's duty, if, indeed, not that of the commander-in-chief? For were either in immediate contact with the main attack, subordinates would not be left in doubt as to what they should do in the many contingencies which are sure to arise for prompt and authoritative decision amidst the changing hazards of such enterprises.

To the left of Anderson's waiting brigades, Pender goes to the right of his eager division in order more quickly to have the expected order for the advance of his command to the assault of Ziegler's Grove, the Federal center, where success would be fatal to Meade. While waiting, Pender



is fatally wounded by a stray missile, and his command devolves upon General Lane. At the left of Hill is Ewell's corps which has waited all day long for orders to attack Culp's and Cemetery Hills. This general assault, last ordered to be delivered at 4 P. M., is not enforced, the Confederates confining their serious efforts to Longstreet's two divisions, a little aided later in the day by three of Anderson's brigades, Wilcox, Perry and Wright. These three brigades we left moving against Humphreys, when he effected his withdrawal. They are led by Anderson, their division commander, over the ground abandoned by Humphreys, strewn with dead, wounded, ruined cannon and stragglers. This wreckage deceives Anderson into thinking that victory is already assured, and he advances with careless boldness, during which his line becomes broken and confused as the men follow Humphreys.

Under the orders of Hill, Anderson should guide his movement by Barksdale, on his right, whose objective is the gap in the Federal line to Humphreys' left. But this Anderson has not done in his careless progress, and as a consequence finds himself isolated and disorganized as his troops straggle through the woods and unexpectedly confront Humphreys, firmly arrayed. Here Perry's Floridians lose their nerve and leave Wilcox and Wright to assail Humphreys unaided. Anderson now sees his error and unwisely thins his line by extending to his right at the very moment when his concentrated strength is required in his immediate front against Humphreys. In the smoke and confusion of battle the hostile lines become entangled. One of the regiments of Wilcox steals around Humphreys' left, but is checked by the First Minnesota regiment after severe loss to both. Willard's Federal brigade, without support and with both flanks exposed, stands its ground, though it is almost obliterated, after losing its brave com-

mander. Hancock endeavors to maintain the partially formed Federal line at this point; while on his left General Meade leads Lockwood's command across Plum Run and attacks Anderson's brigade of Hood's division. McCandless supports and connects Lockwood with the Fifth Corps on the slope of Little Round Top. At this juncture three brigades of the Sixth Corps, Bartlett, Nevins and Eustis, reinforce the Fifth Corps line, extending from Little Round Top to McGilvery's batteries, and join with the extreme left in repelling stubborn Law's last attack on the Round Tops. The sun is low in the west when McLaws and Anderson make a simultaneous and resolute assault in a last attempt to break the new Federal line before it becomes fully established and firm. But McLaws is so detached from Law, on his right, that the latter is obliged to remain stationary, while Anderson is separated from McLaws's left, and in advancing widens the breach. Their line thus broken, and the flanks of each three units of the attack exposed, the Confederate advance is seriously weakened.

The Federals are rapidly re-forming and reinforcing their line in preparation for the Confederate final attack. Chamberlain, on the extreme left, with a few men, has driven Law's skirmishers from Big Round Top and established himself on its summit, where Fisher's brigade joins him and finally secures this commanding height. Sedgwick has three brigades around the southern base toward Plum Run, to guard against any stealthy force of the enemy. The division of Williams moves into position in support of McGilvery's guns; and Newton completes the new line with the division of Doubleday and a part of Robinson's, together with scattered troops and guns from the battle. Newton thus extends the new line of battle over the low ground, reaching to the Second Corps on the

initial slope of Cemetery Ridge, and covering the right of Willard's brigade. Thus the Federal line is fully restored on the very ground abandoned by Sickles in the morning when he advanced and occupied the fatal peach orchard salient. But it is no sooner formed than fiery Barksdale, on horseback, leads his brigade into a shot-storm, where he is killed by the fire of Burling's men, whereby the Army of Northern Virginia loses one of its most gallant and competent brigadiers. His maddened troops rush forward, but are outnumbered and driven back in such haste that they leave the body of their loved commander in the hands of the Federals. Wofford, in support of Barksdale's right, is checked on the flats of Plum Run by the opposing fire, and Anderson's brigade, of Hood's division, is not within supporting distance. Kershaw and Semmes have been too roughly treated to engage again, though Longstreet, present and directing the attack, is anxiously expecting them. Farther to the Confederate left, Anderson's division, of Hill's Corps, ascends the southern slope of Cemetery Ridge against Humphreys and Gibbon. Wilcox is on the right leading the attack, distantly followed by Perry. To their left Wright, caught by the oblique fire of some guns, in position in front of Gibbon, makes a dash and captures eighteen of them. Webb's Federal brigade then assails him, and a desperate combat is fought for their final possession. Lee, Hill and Anderson are watching Wright's desperate effort, together with the remainder of Hill's eagerly ready corps; but for some unaccountable reason, neither Posey, Mahone, nor Lane is ordered to his assistance.

Gallant Wright meanwhile fights his way to the crest of Cemetery Ridge, where he sees the Baltimore pike filled with an excited crowd of soldiery; and, believing himself master of the position, for a quarter of an hour he fights

off all comers with such fury that he leaves three-quarters of his gallant brigade on this ground,—in the very center of the Federal position,—when he is compelled to fall back before Gibbon's division advancing against him. Here again Lee refuses a most hopeful opportunity, for had Mahone, Posey and Lane promptly advanced to his aid, this powerful column would doubtless have been able to have made permanent lodgment on the position gained by Wright single-handed. There planted, Meade's army would have been cut in the center, and the way opened for its defeat in detail, its right and center so seriously weakened by Meade's heavy massing on his left, leaving the weakened portion of his line to contest against the unimpaired columns of Hill and Ewell's Corps.

Wilcox, taken in flank by McGilvery's guns, also encounters Humphreys on one flank and Hancock's reserves on the other. In this vortex he leaves five hundred of his sixteen hundred men when he retreats,—like Wright, without aid to assist him out of his extreme jeopardy. Thus abandoned, both Wright and Wilcox find their way back to the Emmetsburg pike as darkness falls, and the boom and rattle of war dwindles and ceases. Longstreet has destroyed Sickles' salient and virtually strengthened Meade's line.

As the Confederate attack is delivered in sections widely detached in space and time intervals, and even at the points of assault without harmony in simultaneous action by the local units, we, with the shifting Federal reinforcements, are enabled to pass from point to point and witness these several actions or successive detached battles the sum of which constitute the battle of July 2d.

We now return to the extreme Confederate left where Ewell, at 8 p. m., is attacking Culp's Hill across Rock Creek, with the division of Johnson. On Johnson's right

is Early's division extending to the town of Gettysburg, opposite the Federal line on the abrupt rise which connects Culp's and Cemetery Hills. On the right of Early is Rodes, connecting with Lane of Hill's Corps bending around the slope of Cemetery Hill and running off onto Seminary Ridge. As the Federal right has been stripped to reinforce the left, it is now essential to ascertain what defense the right can oppose to the formidable assault to be launched by Johnson at the very time when the brigade of Greene alone is left to extend itself in the futile attempt to man the line occupied by the entire Twelfth Corps before it was sent to the Federal left. Greene was left to occupy Culp's Hill only on the protestation of Slocum against utterly stripping this key to the Federal right and rear. To this wisdom of Slocum's, to the marked ability of brigadier Greene, and to the phenomenal activity and persistent valor of his thirteen hundred and fifty men, aided by eight hundred and twenty-five loaned by Howard from his Eleventh Corps, is Meade indebted for the salvation of his right.

Greene has placed a small detachment, well intrenched, extending out from the southern base of Culp's Hill, beginning at Spangler's Spring and running to Rock Creek. The remainder of his brigade is intrenched from the southern base up the hill, then along its crest connecting with Wadsworth's division of the First Corps. His position on the hill is exceptionally strong, having intrenchments on the crest of a steep declivity covered with rocks and a forest tangle. A long traverse has also been thrown up perpendicular to the main line, running westward along the southern slope. But his position is weak on the extreme right, where the works in which his detachment is lodged have been thrown up to aid in covering the Baltimore pike, a short distance in their rear. Nor can Greene

occupy that portion of the works vacated by Ruger's division on his right, though he stretches his brigade until it stands but one rank deep with wide intervals between the men. Wadsworth is well intrenched along the abrupt rise connecting Culp's and Cemetery Hills, his left meeting a part of Robinson's division of the same corps, which joins onto Howard's Eleventh Corps, both stretched across Cemetery Hill. This eminence is also defended by a numerous artillery covered by earthworks. This combined force constitutes the defense available on the Federal right to meet the assault of Ewell's Corps, strong and fresh for battle.

Johnson forms his division in double line of brigades; Jones on the right supported by Nichols, with Steuart on the left following Walker. His artillery is silenced on Brenner's Hill, as before noted. Ewell's advance is against Culp's Hill with the division of Johnson, his left extended to strike the low ground along its southern base. Greene's detachment is brushed out of the intrenchments between Rock Creek and Spangler's Spring, and the Confederates occupy the vacant Twelfth Corps works approaching Greene's right. But this carries the left of Steuart's brigade so far to the front that it is caught by an enfilading fire from Greene's troops in the traverse, and he is temporarily checked. Greene now extends his traverse-line westward in a strong position having a southern slope, and commanding the ground in its front over which Steuart must advance if seeking the Baltimore pike, near at hand, and giving access to the Federal rear. This is prevented by darkness and by Greene, who is heard giving orders to imaginary battalions. His right thus safeguarded by his antagonist's quiescence, Greene's efforts are concentrated on his left against Jones and Walker, who now push forward upon that flank. Vastly outnumbered,



Greene's men are behind works crowning a rocky faced hill, where they calmly await the approaching lines. Each moment these become more deranged and confused by the tangle of trees, brush and rocks, through which the men are picking their way in the darkness. When they are within sure range, Greene's troops open a steady fire which staggers the Confederate advance. Persistent, however, in their purpose, they suffer terribly. Jones is wounded, when Nichols comes up to his support out of the night. Greene, meanwhile, has been reinforced. A brigade of eight hundred and twenty-five men, from Schurz, is with him in position, while Wadsworth has extended his right to aid. Now Kane arrives with his brigade — lost while in march to the aid of Sickles — and he drives Steuart's skirmishers, on the extreme right. Nichols is repulsed, and Johnson's attack on the Federal right has failed — only because it was made too late. This and darkness alone save Meade's stripper right from being successfully turned, and its position in the right-rear of the Federal line taken and occupied by the enemy. And, as it is, Johnson holds lodgment in some of the Twelfth Corps works.

During Johnson's attack the two other divisions do not engage, even by a thrust in support. Ewell's attack upon the stronghold of the Federal right has failed also. Early and Rodes were ordered to attack when Johnson should be seen advancing. And though these divisions have been in position for hours, they have not proved themselves competent to combined attack; which, had they done, promptly seconding Johnson, the Second Confederate Corps would doubtless now be in possession of the heights on which the Federal right and center are thankfully resting as surprised occupants. Early had his division deployed and ready for the advance when he received the order for himself and Rodes to attack. In pursuance thereof he promptly put



his troops in movement, acting on the assumption that Rodes was doing likewise, and that they would thus give each other and Johnson support. In this preparedness, and prompt, soldierly action, there appears nothing but high commendation due Early. Rodes, however, delayed his attack long after Ewell ordered him to assault, continuing this disobedience for more than an hour after Early's hard-pressed brigades had been desperately engaged within his distinct hearing and knowledge. And further, a part of this delay was due to the fact that Rodes was engaged in a futile attempt to induce General Lane, adjoining him in Hill's Corps, to cooperate with him in his proposed attack. Lane, however, determined to act with his own corps unless otherwise ordered. Rodes claims that he had discretionary orders.

At 7 P. M. the brigades of Hays and Avery, of Early's division, climb the eastern front of Cemetery Hill against a fearful artillery and musketry fire. But, undaunted, these superb troops leap the trenches and break through the two small brigades of Ames, of the Eleventh Corps, physically and morally weakened by the experience of yesterday. They are speedily driven and followed by the Confederates among the intrenched cannon which form the Federal second line, which they capture. Here the Confederates find themselves in rear of the three remaining brigades of the Eleventh Corps, under Schurz and Steinwehr. These face about and act to the assistance of Ames, from their position along the western front of Cemetery Hill. Hays and Avery are in possession of the north front of the Hill, and are contesting possession of the captured Federal guns on this keypoint of Meade's right. For one mortal hour these two superb brigades of Louisianians and North Carolinians firmly hold their won ground against constantly increasing and superior numbers, while not a man comes to their aid

from the idle waiting division of Rodes or the brigade of Gordon, held in reserve by Ewell. Hancock hears the fire of Early's attack, and appreciating the depletion of the Federal right, immediately sends Howard two of his regiments and Carroll's brigade of splendid fighters. These troops arrive at the moment when the contest about the Federal guns is hanging in the balance.

About nine o'clock Rodes deploys his division, Lane deciding to cooperate with him, and his skirmishers push up the western slope of Cemetery Hill, and open fire from the position vacated by Steinwehr and Schurz when they faced about to fight to their rear. But suddenly Ramseur, commanding the brigade on the right, halts, not finding Lane in his right-rear in support of his exposed flank; for Lane, also, has stopped the advance of his command. This unwarranted action of Ramseur deranges the movement of the other brigades, and while fresh instructions are awaited, Carroll gains possession of the ground won by Hays and Avery, and they are driven back, the life blood of the latter consecrating the ground he so valiantly helped to win and defend. Rodes is now finally ready to deliver his part of the assault, aimed at the heart of Meade's position. But he is so out of time that he finds himself with his left, as well as his right, unsupported, since Early's two unaided brigades have been routed. This causes a further delay until night kindly shrouds withdrawal into his original position, none save the skirmishers of this fine division having fired a shot.

Ewell's three disjointed attacks against the Federal right and right-center, constituting the assault of the Confederate Second Corps, have failed, in spite of the superb fighting done by the troops when they were given opportunity. They have failed for the reasons (1) that Ewell's attack was made in the darkness; (2) that Rodes failed to make

prompt and simultaneous assault with Early in support of Johnson, also attacking only with a skirmish line; and (3) that but two of the seven brigades of Early and Rodes engaged — a responsibility lying more with the corps commander than with his by no means guiltless subordinates. Nor may the general-in-chief escape blameless, for in neither of his attacks, by his right and his left, has Hill's Third Corps been utilized to do little more than to stand a passive observer of the battles being fought to its right and left.

In the late night of July 2d and the early morning of the 3d, the hostiles find themselves located in their respective lines awaiting the portentous day, while the weary troops find rest in sleep, that sweet oblivion which hushes their ears to the last cry of departing souls, and the moans of the wounded.

The great battle of July 2d has ended. Its thundrous crash, rattle and din, its lurid glory and mangled horror, have died away and are buried in the silent night. The battle rage and shout of elemental men are hushed alike with the sleeping hosts of the living and of the dead. Save for the dotting lines of pickets — like ghosts in the moonlight — and the measured pace of the sentinels nearer in, the birds of night may hoot and flit their accustomed haunts, unconscious of the presence of armed hosts of living manhood. But there, between the ghostly picket lines, they fly, shrilling their night alarms; for a smothered Inferno finds voice in wailing moans, in groans and shrieks; in agonized curses and murmured prayers; delirious dreams of battle shouts and cheers, of home and love's messages voiced.





MAJ. GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK

## CHAPTER XIII

### CRITICAL THOUGHTS ON THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE

**T**HE cool, thoughtful and alert, decisive generalship which Meade has thus far displayed during his five days of unexpected and eventful command, is somewhat shadowed by his neglect of his left, which was responsible for Sickles' salient. Nor was Meade warranted in leaving to Sickles such wide judgment and discretion as might have been safely done had the commander of the Third Corps possessed a military education whereby he would know the principles and rules of war and its safe governance. For Sickles, while a most brave and loyal soldier, and an officer possessed of marked ability, was of the number — all too common in the Federal Armies — who began his service as a general, and therefore lacked the practical knowledge of war which is acquired by experience in winning promotion through the subordinate grades to final large command. Gallantly giving his services to his country in the early war, he, a lawyer by profession, entered the army as a general mainly through the influence of his political position, which enabled him to raise a brigade and go forth as its commander on his aided course to the early command of a corps with the rank of major-general. But no braver, more gallant or devoted soldier ever fought for country or cause. And let it be understood to his honor, that Sickles devoted himself wholly to his duties as a soldier, without political ambitions.

Evidently General Sickles appreciated these disadvantages, to judge from his persistent solicitation of his su-

perior's judgment and direction as to his assigned position and his action in relation thereto. Sickles loyally asked from General Meade only that which the commander-in-chief should have given of his own volition through foresight for the safety of his position and army. Had he done this, it is improbable that he would not have strongly occupied the Round Tops,—“The key of my whole position,” he says,—with a portion of the Fifth Corps, instead of massing its entirety as his reserve near to his right. With a division on Round Top, Hood's attack on Sickles would have been greatly weakened by such considerable force on his flank even had he then dared to attack Sickles' left. Had the Round Tops been properly occupied, then, Sickles would doubtless have formed on the ground to which he was ordered. But as Sickles was left to do his best with a force wholly inadequate to the weak position to which he was assigned, is it questionable that he did not do the right thing in strengthening his numerical weakness by occupying strong defensive ground? Again, is it reasonably to be questioned that, had he not done this, he could have held the weak position until reinforced? Scarcely. Then his change of position saved the Federal left from being broken in, and the Round Tops from being captured, if no more. And to Sickles alone belongs the credit, and to the splendid fighting of his 9,800 men who held his line until aid arrived.

In view of these facts, it scarcely became necessary for General Sickles, in later years, to defend himself against criticism for having taken up the salient position—criticism unfortunately based largely on Meade's report of the battle, hence being considered as being finally authoritative. Sickles' record and that of the Third Corps stand nobly monumental and firmly based on the fact that both fully performed their legitimate duty and responsibilities



with such heroism that criticisms cannot detract from, nor praise add to, their won meed of glory. Neither is it necessary that either shall claim the doing of more than was really accomplished. Forming a thin line without support on an extended and exposed position, these 9,800 infantrymen and artillerists successfully performed the apparently impossible for many hours, not one flinching or disheartened under the terrific punishment in which they lost nearly one-half of their number. Thus fighting alone, they withstood the continuous desperate assaults of a most formidable and competent enemy for hours, and until four times their number of fresh troops arrived to break the final victorious advance of the same foe they had so long withstood and seriously depleted.

Had Meade given due attention to his left during the long hours of his prepared waiting for Lee's attack, he might have seen the opportunity then urgently inviting him to heavily concentrate on that flank, swing on the Round Tops as his pivot, and throw his army in a turning movement to the right to envelop the Confederate right, which, during the 2d, was the least formidable division of Lee's army. The *terrain* on the Confederate right and center was most favorable to such a turning operation, affording no natural defensive ground looking southward; while the Round Tops as the pivot of a turning movement provided a fortress of defense dominating all the country thereabout, covering Meade's lines of communication and serving as a rallying point in event of defeat. And further, as Meade feared that Lee, himself, would engage in such an operation around his left, thereby placing his army between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, such a movement would have placed the Federal Army in its true position, from which Lee had drawn it by his operations along the Susquehanna River.

So just, eminent, and worthy is the renown won by General Robert E. Lee, that were it not that our single purpose is to discover and record the whole truth, in so far as lies within our power, we should hesitate to scribe even much which appears as being plainly apparent even to a casual student of our War. But would aught short of the evident truth be just, even to General Lee, himself; to his revered name, his fame, and his blessed memory? Did he ever evince a desire to obscure the truth relating to himself? He did not, because he was frankly honest as well as human, and knew that he was subject to influences and judgments of error, which he voluntarily acknowledged in simple justice to all, that they should stand as warning guides to others about him, and to those who should follow. We shall endeavor, then, to do only as Lee himself would, could he act as the unimpassioned but reverently loving student and recorder of his own doings. Unfortunate for our time and for posterity that his modesty and his consideration for others held General Lee from this duty to mankind.

In our consideration of the first day's battle we have searched out what appeared as being the only fair and reasonable explanation of Lee's failure to improve the urging opportunity of that day. And, as though in confirmation of that opinion, the conduct of the battle of July 2d is but the logical growth of the erroneous influences which apparently actuated his mind on the afternoon of the 1st; that is, overconfidence developed into a species of carelessness, if not mental blindness. Nor did the general plan finally adopted conform to a well-proven principle of war, which prohibits a convergent attack unless made by a force greatly superior to that assailed. Such an operation is open to chances of delay and misunderstood orders and the practical impossibility of close co-

operation between the widely separated forces; of passing reinforcements from one unit to another, and of personal supervision by the commanding general. From each and all of these causes the Army of Northern Virginia suffered irreparably, as evidenced by its disjointed attacks, and in the brunt of battle left to fall on two divisions only, while six stood ready without moving a man in time for effective aid to the two desperately engaged, from four o'clock until half-past seven P. M. These errors, however, do not account for the reasonless delay — from daylight until four o'clock P. M.— in making the attack, nor for the lack of definite orders to Longstreet after he was ready, as well as to the other corps commanders. This gave free rein to the usual tendency in such actions, to deliver isolated, successive blows, as opposed to properly timed combination.

Again, if any superior attention was given to the strength of the various columns of assault, it is not apparent, for each corps commander seemed to have determined these most important matters for himself; and in each case the attacking columns were too weak, nor were they supplemented by reinforcements ready at hand where most likely to be needed. For instance, Longstreet, delivering the main attack, was weakened by the absence of one strong division, yet no detachment was made from Hill's Corps to Longstreet's immediate and personal command. Had such been at hand to the aid of Hood, he would doubtless have quickly crushed his opposition and secured the Round Tops before Meade could have brought aid from his right to his left. To an extent the same remarks apply to the Confederate action on the left.

It cannot be reasonably questioned that, had Ewell's attack followed that of Longstreet in proper sequence and been made with weight and vigor, Meade would have been

prevented from detaching the Twelfth Corps and most of the First from his right, when they were apparently absolutely essential to the preservation of his left. Then Meade's right would have been driven from Culp's and Cemetery Hills for a certainty; also by Ewell's belated assault, had his three strong divisions attacked simultaneously. Had Anderson's division of Hill's Corps been promptly and vigorously advanced in continuation and support of Longstreet's battle, it is hardly doubtful that the Federal left would have been utterly crushed before adequate reinforcements could have arrived. Or later, had Wright's desperate grip-hold on Meade's center been reinforced — as it might easily have been by the major weight of Hill's ready troops — who may question that they would have made and held lodgment in the very center of Meade's position? Had any one of these plainly demanded actions been put into execution, it would have resulted in permanently breaking the Federal line of defense.

Some of these failures may be charged directly to subordinate commanders; but not so the general errors which either permitted or gave them birth. These larger facts in evidence show a weakness or shortcoming on the part of the commander-in-chief; as a dominant command, alert, centered, firm and continuous, is ever and everywhere absolutely requisite to success in any large undertaking, and especially in battle, where its ever shifting and unforeseen exigencies demand the active presence of the commander to meet them. In this great battle, after giving his lieutenants general instructions, Lee practically held himself aloof from his commanders, retiring to his headquarters at the Lutheran Seminary, distant from both of his attacking wings some two miles. When he descended to his battle line — as he did when witnessing Wright's lonely assault on Gibbon — Lee apparently made no effort to over-

come the inaction of Hill in failing to support Wright's won vantage. When, finally, he did enter into details, his orders served to hamper his lieutenants when they advanced and encountered conditions which demanded a departure from his positive instructions—the definite direction of Hood's attack, for instance, which presumably held him from swinging around the Round Tops and capturing them, as Law urged. The wholly improper, but apparently trivial, matter of trusting to the fickle wind as messenger to carry the signal of attack from Longstreet to Ewell quite probably lost the battle to Lee, while it made evident the fact that on so vital a matter as the simultaneous assault of his widely separated wings there was an absence of orders fixing a definite time to all the corps commanders as to when the general attack should be made. Lee's absence from his right during Longstreet's attack, and his failure to require from each corps commander frequent reports of his affairs, prevented the issuing of corrective or new orders to meet contingencies as the battle progressed. So true was this that Longstreet, fighting the main contest, was compelled frequently to absent himself from his desperate and constantly shifting battle, and repair to Lee's headquarters for instructions. None better than Lee knew the extreme difficulty of bringing about close cooperation between the different units of an army, even under the most favorable conditions. Hence, none of the usual, or of the unusual, precautions to effect this harmony should have been neglected.

These foregoing errors had their root in Lee's reversed decision to fight an offensive battle. For, if before launching on campaign, there were reasons which caused him to decide upon a defensive battle only, such reasons had surely been reinforced since. Again, it was a basic error in strategy that Lee decided upon a battle at Gettysburg

rather than the far more promising, effective and brilliant plan, urged by Longstreet, of operating to his right, taking up a chosen position between his antagonist and Washington, and there to await Meade, who would be compelled to attack. In fact, it was an error for Lee, with an inferior force, to fight offensively unless he should find his opponent's army widely scattered, as he did on July 1st but failed to improve that unexpected opportunity. Having abandoned great offensive chances then, and not improving them in the early morning of the 2d, Lee should have resumed his original defensive purpose.

Much discussion has arisen over Longstreet's proposed flank operation. Having failed to move General Lee to his plan of a flank movement to the Confederate right after fighting the battle of July 2d, General Longstreet on the night of that day sent out a reconnoissance to his right to discover more fully the *terrain* and general conditions there, thinking that Lee might conclude to move around the Federal left on the 3d rather than to reattack Meade in his position, as he was then planning to do, and which to Longstreet appeared almost hopeless of success. But Lee still adhered to his determination to fight Meade where he was. Of this General Longstreet records: "I was disappointed when General Lee ordered me to attack Cemetery Hill, probably the strongest position in the Federal line. I stated to Lee that I had examined the ground on our right, and was much inclined to think the best thing was to move to the Federal left. To this the General replied, 'I am going to take them where they are on Cemetery Hill; you to take Pickett's division and make the attack. I will reinforce you by two divisions of the Third Corps.'" Lee later thus acknowledged his error in not adopting and undertaking this flank movement: "If I had only taken your counsel even on the 3d of July, how



different might have been all." General Meade has also recorded: "I expected Lee to make this flank movement, and scarcely expected him to attack at Gettysburg." And again, "This was sound military sense. It was the step I feared Lee would take."

Longstreet may be charged with slowness in his preparation for attack; also both he and Hood with a serious shortcoming in duty in not reporting to General Lee the most important discovery of Law's scouts as to the defenseless condition of the Round Tops before his attack on the 2d. For had this fact been pressed to the cool consideration of the commander, it scarcely may be doubted that he, realizing its vital nature, would have availed himself of this advantage, dominating the field. There would have remained no ground upon which to rest the shadow of a criticism of Longstreet over his work of July 2d had he done every duty with full energy and promptness during that eventful day.

The certain result which would have eventuated at this time had Law's urgency been heeded is shown in this statement, made by General Meade: "The arrival of the Fifth Corps saved Round Top, where the enemy's artillery planted would have enfiladed the whole Federal line, and with results no one needs to guess." Yet this refers to conditions at one o'clock, after a considerable Federal defense was available for these previously naked heights.

Deeply considering these errors, enacted in the decisive battle of the war by one who theretofore and thereafter displayed only the commanding skill and deftness of a master craftsman; is it presumption for us to agree with the suggestive after-thought of General Lee, himself, when he uttered these prophetic words in regard to the final outcome of the battle of Gettysburg: "Perhaps it was all for the best?"



In fighting the battle of the 2d, the Confederates engaged but fifty regiments on their right, while Meade found it necessary to employ one hundred and ninety-seven of his infantry regiments in order to resume and hold his true position intact on his left alone. And during the entire day out of his total of two hundred and thirty-one regiments of infantry, Meade had two hundred and ten engaged, against eighty-six of Lee's total of one hundred and seventy-one. The Confederates had a preponderance of artillery, due to their more extended position, accommodating more guns, and because of their encircling location they had the advantage of a convergent fire. It thus appears that while Lee engaged but one-half of his regiments, Meade was forced, by the early neglect of his left, to put into action nearly seven-eighths of his, many of which were fearfully decimated. Concisely, seven-eighths of Meade's total of infantry regiments, at the close of battle, were physically exhausted by rapid marches or fighting or both; while one-third of all his regiments was numerically fearfully depleted by battle. The Confederates must have suffered equally from battle, as they were the attacking force; though their less complete reports reduce their loss below that of the Federals. But their troops were not wearied by reinforcing and counter-marches, while one-half of Lee's army had not moved a foot.

During the rage of battle at Gettysburg, to the east of that place a cavalry combat is going on between Stuart, who is finally appearing from his useless ride, and Kilpatrick, which results in little more than permission to each to take their respective places on the flanks of their armies.

The crest wave of the battle of Gettysburg had yet to come and fling its horrible ultimate of death and misery out of its manhood glory, to writhe and rot on some shore of the field to be more sacredly consecrated by the blood

of brave American brothers. But of the battle's fearful loss of 45,166 human beings, full three-quarters of this number — 5,664 dead, and 27,206 wounded — was suffered in the battle of July 2d. As a fighting unit, then, the Confederate army was in far better physical condition than its antagonist at the close of the 2d. But after a night's rest Meade's army was restored to a physical parity with its opponent. All things considered, Confederate attack should cease with the battle of the 2d. It is not too late for Longstreet's flank movement.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE CREST WAVE: THE BATTLE OF JULY THIRD

THE battle of the 2d has resulted, if not in defeat, assuredly not in Confederate success. The Federals with slight exceptions, occupy their original position, driven, it is true, on the left, but only to gain a far stronger position on the ground Meade first intended to occupy. Nor is his army so crippled that it cannot more stoutly maintain its rectified line against further attack, for the left, with the impregnable Round Tops, is now adequately manned. Lee has made a lodgment on his right at the base of Round Top in the Devil's Den and its woods. He has also gained the peach orchard crest as an advantageous position for artillery, perfectly open, however, to the fire of the Federal guns; also some intrenchments on his left at the southern base of Culp's Hill. But these Confederate gains are well offset by the Federal withdrawal from Sickles' salient, the manning of the Round Tops, and the rectified line. The battle has defined the impregnable hills on the extreme left as being the key to the entire Federal position, as the heights on the right form its salient stronghold on that flank. With the latter captured and the former held, Meade's line of retreat, at least, is safe, whereas, with the Round Tops in possession of the Confederates, his lines would be closed and his entire position rendered untenable. If the battle of the 2d has demonstrated one thing more than another, it is that the front of Meade's line is nowhere vulnerable except with the utmost



MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE E. PICKETT



difficulty and hazard. For has Lee not signally failed against the weakest section of the Federal position where it was almost fatally thrown out of true relationship with itself by Sickles' salient, and this but half manned? Now these weaknesses have been corrected and changed into formidable strength.

Only the minor portion of the Army of Northern Virginia was brought into action on the 2d, while all but a small fraction of the Army of the Potomac was either desperately engaged or greatly fatigued by marches. Hence, Lee has in hand on the 2d the greater proportion of fresh troops. But the Army of the Potomac is now united and refreshed, and has suffered a loss no greater than has its antagonist. It now has a weighty advantage on the left in having a preponderance of comparatively fresh troops along the front of Longstreet's two exhausted divisions, seriously depleted by their losses of the 2d. In any event, if an attack is to be made by the Confederates to deliver the blow anywhere along the Federal front appears well-nigh hopeless. But General Lee not only decides to make such, but proposes to repeat the program of the 2d in its entirety except as to the point of the main attack. This is to be delivered against the strongest point of the Federal position, its center, with purpose to pierce it and thus cut the Army of the Potomac in twain, then to fight and defeat it in detail. Acting to this end, the one forlorn chance of success in a direct attack consists in heavily massing against the Federal center a carefully organized column of attack, and so ordered that its various units shall act as one in delivering and following up a stunning blow, the balance of the army to support with a thrust sufficiently imminent to hold reinforcements from the point of attack. But to form such a column of sufficient weight is difficult to Lee unless he abandons his line

beyond the town of Gettysburg and details two of Ewell's divisions with Pickett's to that sole purpose, supporting it strongly with Hill's Corps. General Lee is proposing to make a frontal attack, though he must know that of such nine out of ten have failed in warfare.

Ewell is ready at the fair signal of daybreak, but he is forestalled; for it is not the purpose of Meade to leave the Confederates in undisputed possession of such of his works as Johnson's troops were found in on the night of the 2d by the returned Twelfth Corps. They must be driven out at all hazards before the day shall fully reveal to them the vital nature of the captured ground, in rear of Cemetery Ridge and in full view of the Baltimore pike, with the inevitable battle chaos of wagons, ambulances, and of stragglers, all rushing rearward in spite of cordons of cavalry attempting to stop and turn them back. During the night and early morning Meade has remanned his right with the troops taken from it to save his left, and without Ewell's knowledge. While Slocum directs the right wing of the army, Williams, commanding the Twelfth Corps, hurries his artillery into commanding positions on Power's and McAllister's Hills, where it sweeps the ground occupied by Johnson's troops, while the division of Ruger threatens their left flank from the south, posted along the Spangler stream. Geary, meanwhile, advances to strike the intrenchments occupied by the Confederate advanced line. The Federal artillery, now ceases its fire on this point, quitting it to the infantry. Johnson has been strengthened by three brigades from Early and Rodes, and at once hurls his battalions, in three lines in close order, to overrun this ground, sweep Geary away, and gain the Baltimore pike. All the unengaged guns of the Federal reserve artillery are run into position and sweep the slope up which the Confederates are pressing. Sedgwick,





MAJ. GEN. HENRY W. SLOCUM



south of the pike, stands ready to engage should they gain the ground on Geary's right, while Lockwood goes to his assistance. Under a storm of shot and shell from the Federal guns, and a rain of musketry, the Confederate infantry is without the aid of artillery, both on account of the ground and because the Federal batteries on Cemetery Hill and the various eminences about are able to hold Ewell's guns silent. The contest, indescribably fierce, is waged under a broiling sun, which compels short intervals of rest.

Johnson, listening in vain for the sound of Longstreet's guns; is left alone to withstand the entire Federal brunt of battle from daylight until eleven o'clock, when his heroic troops are finally driven back completely repulsed. This able and intrepid commander, with his equally competent soldiery, has performed wonders of heroic battle, as though under the expectant eye of their old loved chief. The combat is often waged hand to hand, like ancient war, in which individual strength and prowess replaced the more distant and orderly methods of modern warfare. On Johnson's right, the brigades of Jones and Nichols stand stubbornly to their work, neither gaining nor losing ground. Walker is on the extreme left along Rock Creek, opposed by Ruger. Steuart with Johnson's reinforcements, occupies particularly dangerous ground, where they are shattered under the crossfire of artillery and infantry. There is, nevertheless, a point of endurance beyond which even Jackson's old veterans cannot pass, although they refuse to abandon the attempt without a final desperate effort. After seven hours of almost incessant and fierce battle, Johnson, determining to put an end to what is becoming a useless waste of life, rushes at Geary's right with purpose to break through and gain the Baltimore pike. Kane's brigade, reinforced by Shaler, meets the Confederate onset. Steuart

leads his men in an attempt to pass Kane's right, where it is doubtful that even his veterans would go unless to follow their commander; but, thus led, they rush into a vortex of fire from the hemming Federals. Ruger's murderous musketry enfilades their left while they rush through Geary's fire in front. But this extreme Confederate valor is in vain, and they are repulsed by a combined forward movement of the Twelfth Corps, which drives them from the slope of Culp's Hill and across Rock Creek.

Years later a forest of dead trees, shot-wounded to their death this day, bear naked, ghostlike evidence of the hail of driving shot and lead hurled and withstood for hours by human beings. Geary's division alone — 3,702 men — have fired into this superb valor 277,000 rounds of ammunition, snatching intervals during the seven hours of battle to clean their foul and dangerously hot muskets.

Thus, at eleven o'clock, the Confederate battle against Meade's right has completely failed, and with fearful loss to brave Johnson's superb division. Not a Confederate soldier has been advanced against the enemy at any other point along the entire front. Johnson has lost 2,015 heroes; while Slocum, somehow, escapes with a loss of 1,156 men, though his troops have attacked intrenchments.

The midday heat is almost unbearable; and silence holds sway as the exhausted combatants rest, the Federals wondering when the expected general attack upon their position will come. But General Lee has not, for some reason, realized the hope expressed in his report, "To harmonize the action of his three corps, from which he expected success." It is difficult, however, to imagine how he can expect this harmony of action between his corps, in view of the fact that he, himself, gave Ewell orders last night to attack at daylight, with the assurance that Longstreet would


assault at the same time, and that the latter received his orders to attack at 7 A. M. on the 3d—long after day-break; and further, that Lee, himself, is engaged in making disposition of his troops that are to assault at Ziegler's Grove, between seven and eight o'clock, though Johnson has been desperately engaged on his left for some hours. In fact, it appears that even at this hour General Lee has not arrived at a positive decision regarding his main attack, for he is yet engaged in a discussion with Longstreet who urges a flank movement, which he has tentatively entered upon, deeming any other course utterly hopeless of success. In regard to Pickett's proposed assault on the Federal center, it is Longstreet's opinion that "The 15,000 men who could make such an assault with success on that field have never been arrayed in battle." Meanwhile, Pickett's division arrived in the evening of the 2d, has been designated to lead the attack wherever made, and awaits orders under the broiling sun in the field west of the Emmitsburg pike, near the peach orchard.

Conditions along the Confederate right on the ground captured on the 2d, that is, Sickles' salient, are favorable to a flank movement around the Round Tops. Lee now occupies practically the same line as that assumed by Sickles in forming the salient, except that to the right it extends southward along Plum Run, skirting the base of the Round Tops, where the brigades of Robertson and Law bivouacked during the night of the 2d. This line is now sufficiently manned or could be reinforced to mask and protect the flank of a turning column until it should debouch into the open to the south of Big Round Top, provided Lee's left had been drawn in during the night of the 2d, and proper disposition of the army made for such a flank attack. If now impracticable to do this in the daylight, Meade has not displayed disposition to interfere with Lee should he choose

to hold battle in abeyance until the night of the 3d shall pass.

After weighing all considerations, Lee finally decides against this operation to his right, and adopts the seemingly hopeless plan of assaulting the Federal center at Ziegler's Grove at the western base of Cemetery Hill. Attacking at this point, his column must move for a distance of more than three-quarters of a mile over ground swept by the direct and oblique fire of the Federal artillery from the entire west front of Meade's line. It is essential to the success of the attacking column that the Federal artillery shall be first crippled and silenced, and the Confederate guns are disposed to this end. At daylight Colonel Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artillery, has placed the six reserve batteries of the First Corps along the Emmitsburg pike in the vicinity of the peach orchard. Here he is later joined by Colonel Walton with the remainder of the First Corps guns, which are placed along the same road northward to occupy the high ground yesterday held by Federal Humphreys. All told these number seventy-five guns, battered at a distance of from nine to twelve hundred yards from Meade's line. This formidable array of artillery, forming a slight semicircle, is placed in front of the forming infantry column for the purpose of helping to clear the way for the infantry attack. Hill's sixty-five guns, crowning Seminary Ridge, are ready to engage, while Ewell's batteries are ordered to occupy the attention of the Federal artillery on Cemetery Hill. Lee thus has in position against Meade's west front one hundred and thirty guns prepared to open fire.

With his artillery ready, Lee has not yet fully formed and placed his column of attack. At his request, Longstreet accompanies him to examine the ground over which the attacking column must charge. At this time Lee has



BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER






in mind to employ the depleted divisions of Hood and McLaws to support Pickett by attacking along their front. This is made quite evident by the fact that none of Hill's command has been designated as a part of the column of attack, and that, while making his reexamination of the ground, Lee asks Brigadier Wofford, of McLaws' division, if he could successfully assail the Federal position where he had failed on the 2d. Wofford declaring it impossible, Longstreet then states that his two divisions, Hood and McLaws, suffered too severely in the battle of the 2d to enable them now to effectively support Pickett. Lee accordingly orders to the immediate support of Pickett's right Wilcox's brigade of Anderson's division, since morning some one hundred and fifty yards at the west of the Emmitsburg pike in front of the Warfield Ridge. This one brigade forms the right support and guard of Pickett's column. The latter takes temporary position in the right-rear of Wilcox, between the Warfield and Seminary Ridges, in order of Kemper's brigade on the right behind the Warfield rise, Garnett and Armistead extending the front to the left. One of Hill's light batteries is ordered to accompany Pickett. The remaining brigades of Anderson's division are formed from right to left; first, Perry, then Wright, Posey, and Mahone on the left along the southern extension of Seminary Ridge, occupying the same ground they did on the 2d. This disposition places Anderson's division, excepting Wilcox, in the rear of Pickett. On Pickett's left is Heth's division of Hill's Corps, now under Pettigrew, which forms the left of the column of assault, and, with Pickett, the first line. The brigades of Lane and Scales, of Pender's division, under Trimble, support Pettigrew, and with Wilcox form the second line. Hill's six remaining brigades with artillery are to stretch out and cover his entire line.

The column of assault, then, is the division of Pickett on the right of the first line, with Pettigrew's on his left, while the second line consists of the brigades of Lane and Scales supporting Pettigrew, and Wilcox in the right-rear of Pickett. In the event that Longstreet thinks necessary, he may call on the brigades of Perry and Wright. Without these two last-named brigades the column has a strength of 14,000 men. With what an advantage could two of Ewell's divisions be now used in support of this desperate venture! Or, even as it is, what prevents the fresh and intact division of Rodes, assisted by Early, from being ordered ready to assault the north and west front of Cemetery Hill in connection with Pickett? Such a convergent assault would completely envelop the north and west fronts of that stronghold, prevent reinforcements from the right from massing against either, and compel Meade to call on his left, thus weakening its strength against Hood and McLaws, the real danger point in Lee's line. Johnson, with Ewell's artillery, is still strong enough to hold most of the Twelfth Corps on Culp's Hill. This apparent wisdom, however, is evidently not considered, and Pickett is to be left to bear alone the brunt of the attack against the Federal army, otherwise left wholly free to mass against him, as not a Confederate soldier is prepared to move either against the Federal position in relief of Pickett or in his rear to support him!

Meade, after the repulse of Johnson anticipates further attack, and improves the respite given him until one o'clock in rectifying the position of his troops. The Twelfth Corps is in its old position on Culp's Hill with Lockwood's brigade added to the division of Williams. Shaler's and Neill's brigades of the Sixth Corps are in position along the east bank of Rock Creek, forming the extreme right of the Federal line, and covering the Baltimore pike. Wads-



Pickett's Charge, July 3, 1863.



worth's division, First Corps, is to Slocum's left on Culp's Hill. Continuing the line to the left is Carroll's brigade of the Second Corps, then the Eleventh Corps, Robinson's division of the First, on Cemetery Hill; then the Second Corps reinforced by Doubleday's division of the First in line between Caldwell and Gibbon somewhat to the left of Ziegler's Grove. Doubleday has the strong brigade of Stannard just arrived from the Washington defenses, which is posted a little in advance of the general line in a woods near the point where Wright and Webb contested so fiercely on the 2d. Behind Doubleday is Birney with remnants of the Third Corps. Joining Caldwell's division of the Second Corps on the left are McGilvery's batteries with Brewster of the Third Corps and two brigades of the Sixth in support; while Humphreys', massed in the second line, supports the guns and the Second Corps. To the immediate left of these Meade has his troops in position and in such formation as to render them a formidable column of attack, with practically no change ready to move against the depleted divisions of Hood and McLaws,— Lee's right,— and do execution to the Confederate army. Immediately to the left of McGilvery this column is arrayed; the brigade of McCandless, Fifth Corps, is its head across Plum Run on the flank of Confederate Semmes and in front of the interval between Benning and Wofford. Supporting McCandless is the brigade of Nevin, Sixth Corps, which is in the near front of Sweitzer of the Fifth; to the left of Sweitzer is Bartlett's brigade, Sixth Corps. At the western base of Little Round Top and to the immediate left of Bartlett are the brigades of Rice, Fisher, Tilton and Girrard, supported by Day and Burbank on its crest, all of the Fifth Corps, opposed to the Confederate brigades of Law, Robertson and Semmes. The brigades of Grant and Russell, Sixth Corps, are at the southeast base of Big Round Top; Kil-

patrick with the cavalry brigades of Farnsworth and Merritt is on the extreme left from Round Top to the Emmitsburg pike, facing the strung-out brigade of Anderson guarding the pike for the passage of Lee's trains, Law connecting with him with little more than a skirmish line.

Thus Meade has ready for attack by his left fifteen brigades of infantry and two of cavalry with ample artillery, most of this force not heavily engaged on the 2d; while opposed in its immediate front are eight depleted Confederate brigades, with Alexander's batteries almost out of ammunition.

The Federal artillery suffers under the disadvantage of being under the orders of corps commanders, as originally mentioned; and General Hunt, chief of artillery, is obliged to bear this fact in mind when readjusting the batteries, being unable to move and mass them as he desires. The scattered reserve guns, however, are brought together, and from these the shortages of corps batteries are made good, the supply trains of the latter having been left behind. This serious oversight would not have occurred had the care and handling of the entire artillery been in the hands of the chief of artillery, instead in the hands of those whose chief concern is infantry. Two batteries of rifle guns under Rittenhouse crown the crest of Little Round Top. McGilvery's eight reserve batteries are in their position of yesterday on the high ground north of the Round Tops. Major Hazzard, with four batteries of the Second Corps, is in position from the southern extension of Cemetery Ridge up to and along its crest. These are commanded by Rorty, Arnold, Cushing and Perrin. Woodruff, with his regular battery, is in front of Ziegler's Grove. More to the right, and out of the direct line of fire of the Confederate guns on Seminary Ridge, Major Osborne has eight batteries from the First and Eleventh Corps and one regular bat-



tery. Osborne's guns are placed in an irregular line to give a north and northwest fire, and are not ranged for action on the west front.

Meade's artillery is therefore placed in three groups: Osborne on the right on Cemetery Hill, with fifty guns ranged away from the ground over which the attack is expected; Hazzard at the center about Ziegler's Grove, with twenty-six pieces and Daniels' four light guns. McGilvery and Rittenhouse man the left with forty-four guns near and on Little Round Top. Five batteries are held in reserve. These one hundred and twenty-four guns are exposed on crests, and are so offset by Confederate artillery on the flanks that but seventy-four are in position along a mile of the central front to cover the ground over which the assault is to be delivered, and to contest the heavy preponderance of the enemy's artillery stretching in continuous batteries from Gettysburg, semicircling to the peach orchard. The Confederate artillery, therefore, has the double advantage of convergent fire and a heavy preponderance of guns over the Federal batteries, held to divergent range should they attempt to exchange direct compliments with their opponents.

The respective cavalry forces are in position: Kilpatrick near Round Top, as already shown, while Gregg is in the triangle formed by the York and Baltimore pikes with Gettysburg as its apex, the Salem Church road its base. This road intersects the triangle five miles distant from Gettysburg, while the Hanover pike divides it. Within this figure is Brenner's Hill ridge, McAllister's and Wolf's Hills, over against and to the southeast of Culp's Hill, among which Rock Creek meanders in a gorge-like valley. To the east along the Hanover pike these hills and ridges rise into Brinkerhoff's Ridge, from which Gettysburg and Cemetery Hill are overlooked by one standing on its abrupt, wooded

summit. Spreading eastward is an undulating, open farming country.

The cavalry in this section guard the flanks of its respective armies; and the ridges and numerous roads afford fine cover and passage ways for cavalry operating against flanks — Stuart especially, advanced from Carlisle, to steal through Gregg's guard onto the Baltimore pike and raise commotion in the Federal rear in aid of an attack against its front. Gregg, appreciating this fact — and Stuart, has posted his division on the commanding eminence of Cress's Ridge, where he overlooks the surrounding country while he connects with Slocum near Rock Creek, Stuart being some distance to the northwest of Gregg. Four brigades of Lee's cavalry, Jenkins, Imboden, Jones and Robertson, are coming in from near the Potomac River, and arrive after the battle has ceased. Federal Buford is at Westminster with his division acting as depot guard. From his crossing of the Potomac to July 3d Lee's strangely absent cavalry has been of little if any service to him.

Longstreet's column of attack is ready, and only waits for the artillery to clear way for it by pounding the Federal guns to wreck and shattering the infantry lines. At 1 P. M. Alexander's guns boom signal, which lets loose the murderous thunder of one hundred and thirty-eight Confederate cannon. War-wise Hunt has ordered his gun captains to reserve their reply for fifteen minutes while watching the Confederate fire, in order to determine on what points to direct their fire most advantageously. This decided, one hundred and twenty-four Federal guns let fly; and the mighty voice of two hundred and sixty-two cannon make such crash of thunder as never before trembled the New World, or from its fair fields of peaceful industry essayed proud competition with the elemental powers in aërial war. The simultaneous volleys from all

the Confederate batteries, seemingly directed on various points, produce greater havoc than would a successive fire, while they are more terrifying to the inactive infantry. Profiting by their faulty practice of the 2d, their range to-day is corrected, enabling them to deliver an unusually effective fire, not only among the Federal guns in action but also among the reserves, trains and ambulances in the rear. Buildings are destroyed, Meade's headquarters being shot to pieces, and his chief-of-staff, General Butterfield, is wounded therein. Everywhere men are hunting ground shelter, while stragglers, the wounded, and citizen spectators are crowding the roads to the rear.

A Confederate officer riding under this iron storm tells: "At first nothing existed but a horrible noise, until presently out of it came the howl and screech of every passing bolt hunting for me! Then reason quit work and one maddening thought possessed me — to find a hole and bury myself from them and sound."

The real bone and sinew of the old steady veteran fighters of the Army of the Potomac, however, remain at their posts. The infantry lies quietly in position, undismayed by the terrific cannonade tearing over and among them, for they have lain under artillery fire too often not to know that its damage is not commensurate with its roar and fiendish disturbance. But the exposed gunners suffer most seriously, as the Confederate fire is mainly to disable and silence their batteries. Casualties in men, horses and guns are replaced from the reserve. These conditions hold true in both armies, until the Confederates, overarduous to silence Hazzard's guns, advance their batteries so far that many of their guns are silenced. The hostile guns are placed about two-thirds of a mile apart; yet the fire from such a mass of cannon is so continuous, and their range so accurate on both sides, that a greater damage is effected

than is usual for artillery fire. A slight wind floats the smoke over the Confederate line, which serves to conceal their batteries from the Federal gunners. Due to their preponderance of guns the Confederate loss is less severe than that suffered by the Federals. Yet they have gained no great advantage in this respect. Longstreet's batteries, most advanced, are badly crippled. Kemper loses two hundred men from his brigade in the space of a few minutes while waiting for the order to charge, and severe loss is sustained along the whole line of Hill's and Longstreet's Corps. During the cannonade Hunt, concentrating his gun-fire, stands critical of the work of his old pupil the Confederate general of artillery, while the latter is wondering what his old instructor is thinking of it.

Two o'clock is near at hand. The Confederate caissons are nearly empty, with but one hundred and sixty rounds of ammunition in reserve. By Hunt's orders the Federal fire has gradually slackened, as though his guns were disabled. All battery commanders, except Hazzard, have obeyed Hunt's instructions to reserve sufficient ammunition for long-range work against the expected attacking column. With his guns in position to crossfire its ranks, Hunt expects to shatter and destroy it while at a distance from the Federal line. But Hazzard, in command of the guns at the center, from which direct fire is to issue, has been compelled by his corps commander to disregard Hunt's order: hence, his caissons are almost empty of long-range supply when Pickett appears, and the powerful center batteries are not operative until the column's near approach. Finally the Federal guns cease their fire, and Hunt withdraws the batteries from the Cemetery Hill front, only to replace them with the fresh batteries of Fitzhugh, Cowan and Parsons. This action, together with the silence of all their

guns, deceives Alexander into believing that Meade's artillery is disabled, and at 1:40 P. M. he notifies Pickett that his opportunity has arrived, but does not assume the responsibility of ordering Pickett to advance. The reluctance of Longstreet to order his men to death has caused him to attempt to shift the responsibility to Alexander. Thereupon Pickett sends successive aids to Longstreet for orders to advance; but, receiving no reply by their hands, he rides off in hot haste, reports his long waiting readiness to Longstreet, and demands orders to move out. Longstreet, believing this assault hopeless, and that Pickett and his gallant column are to be uselessly sacrificed, with a sad smile for Pickett, turns his horse and moves away without giving the order; whereupon Pickett curtly says: "I am going to move forward, sir!" salutes, dashes back, and orders the advance.\*

Pickett's division, called to attention, is re-formed. The broiling sun, as well as the hostile cannonry, having made sad havoc in its ranks, held all day in line waiting orders. His four thousand nine hundred veterans, inured to great battle, align under their riddled colors. Kemper's brigade holds the right, Armistead the left, with Garnett in the center — the latter sick and just out of an ambulance for the occasion. On Pickett's left is Pettigrew's division of Hill's Corps, composed of the brigades of Archer, Marshall, Davis and Brockenborough. Pickett and Pettigrew form the first line with double division front stretching away a mile or more. The second line has Wilcox in Pickett's right-rear, then Lane and Scales behind Pettigrew, under command of Trimble. Strangely, the brigades of Perry

\* The facts of this episode as related to the writer by an eye and ear witness, General E. P. Alexander, Longstreet's Chief of Artillery.

and Wright are neither formed as a part of this column nor in quick readiness to follow as support.

Covered by a swarm of skirmishers, this column sweeps out through the artillery, seven brigades front, just as the smoke of the guns is blown rearward, revealing to these doomed men the distant line which they must reach, there to fight and die. Pickett advances but a short distance when he is compelled to make a half-wheel to his left in order to place his line squarely in front of the point in the Federal position he is to assail; for it is one thousand yards to his left front. This maneuver throws his division in echelon across the Emmitsburg pike, thus presenting the three flanks of the echeloned brigades to the enfilading fire of McGilvery's forty-four guns and the six rifle pieces of Rittenhouse, all of which now open on Pickett with a most destructive concentrated fire. Staggered by this fire, suddenly belched from the Federal guns, Pickett's braves nerve themselves and swing on, wonderingly encouraged by the lack of a similar reception from in front. But Hazzard, as noted, has expended all of his long range ammunition; hence this isolated lone division escapes McGilvery's fire as it moves on to meet more bloody work from Hazzard's close range fire and the hail of musketry.

Having gained his distance to the left, in front of Hancock's position, Pickett is again compelled to make a half-wheel to his right, then halt and rectify his alignment when five hundred yards from the Federal line and while under Hazzard's canister fire. Meanwhile Pettigrew and the supporting brigades are trying to get into position, as will be seen later.

The section of Meade's line about to be assailed by this wave of war must now have our attention. Ziegler's Grove is a small wood on the western base of Cemetery



Ridge, near its final rise into the main Hill. While the crest of the Ridge is level, its western base is rocky and scattered with boulders, and lined off by stone fences which form a general line affording the Federal infantry good defensive cover. Woodruff's guns are in position on the edge of the grove. At the right-rear of the grove is the division of Hayes, Willard's brigade on the right, with Smith's on the left. The line is continued to the left by the brigades of Webb and Hall, of Gibbon's division. These troops are behind the stone fences. Up the slope behind these brigades are Hazzard's guns with Harrow's infantry brigade in their left-rear. At Hall's left the wall turns westward, or to the front, and runs onto a slight ridge where there is a small wood. Doubleday has concealed Stannard's Vermont brigade in these woods, Rowley and Stone in double line in rear of the general position. On Doubleday's left is Birney's division of the Third Corps, composed of the brigades of Graham, Ward and De Trobriand. The brigades of Shaler and Eustis, of the Twelfth Corps, are in their rear near the Taneytown pike, in reserve. Next in line on the left is Caldwell's division of the Second Corps in the first line, Humphreys' division of the Third Corps forming the second, both in rear of McGilvery's batteries. As the troops farther to the left do not move to engage against the attack, it is unnecessary to define their position at present. The position and work confronting Pickett's 14,000 in defective formation is similar to that disastrously undertaken by 40,000 Federals in six massive assaults on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, in 1862.

Pettigrew, putting his division in motion at the same time that Pickett started, but being somewhat in his rear, has had a greater distance to cover, and finds himself distanced. Besides, several of Pettigrew's brigades were considerably shaken in the battle of the 1st, and advance with



less alacrity and ardor than do Pickett's fresh battalions. As already shown, Pettigrew's four brigades, Archer, Marshall, Davis and Brockenborough, were deployed in this order from right to left, in one line. Such a length of front is difficult to maintain under the most favorable conditions. In this case the left of the line moves slowly, while its right, with the brigades of Lane and Scales, push ahead to overtake Pickett. The latter, meanwhile, makes his wheel to the left and approaches the ground diagonally in Pettigrew's front, toward which the latter is moving somewhat obliquely. In this somewhat irregular order to Pickett's left-rear, Pettigrew's brigades come into view of the Federal gunners and receive such attention as to cause them to halt at a distance of two hundred and fifty yards and open a useless musketry fire. They thus lose their momentum and become lost to the close aid of Pickett, who continues his course unobservant of his rear.

Wilcox, who was detailed to the support of Pickett's right, and under the command of Longstreet, is held by a dispute, in which Hill detains this brigade "Until it is decided that Pickett's attack is successful,"—an indecision most dangerously exercised at this vital juncture by Hill. Finally Pickett, observing his right uncovered, sends an urgent request to Wilcox, who thereupon moves out in column of battalions in order to make speed in gaining position and to attract a portion of the Federal fire from Pickett—a noble example to his corps commander. So long has Wilcox been detained that Pickett is out of sight in a depression, and enveloped in smoke. Wilcox, therefore, pursues a direct course and never reaches the flank of the advance which he seeks to protect.

While aligning his division for the final charge, Pickett observes that Pettigrew is still in his distant left-rear, and that Wilcox is not yet up on his right. Already under a

heavy fire, he does not delay for Wilcox, after sending him the request already noted, but moves ahead practically alone, his superb battalions closing the gaps of death which begin to tear through their ranks from the Federal flank and front fire. "Steady, and with an alignment as on parade, they sweep forward with unbroken front until reaching the post-and-rail fences lining the Emmitsburg pike, within two hundred yards of the belching Federal line." So says an admiring Federal who was behind the stone wall awaiting them. Observing Pickett's advance Lee may well repeat his admiration expressed of the Federal masses charging his line at Fredericksburg: "It is well that war is so horrible or we should learn to love it too well."

During this last stage of their advance, these mortal men have moved against a terrific fire of canister from Hazzard's and Woodruff's guns, and a storm of lead from the heavy lines of infantry in front, while shot and shell from McGilvery's batteries, off to their right-front, take them in flank, "Often destroying whole sections of men with a single shot." Climbing the pike fences, they are met by the musketry fire from Gibbon's entire division behind the stone breastworks, and men drop as though struck by a hail of death. Noble Garnett is shot dead in lead of his advanced brigade, within one hundred yards of the stone wall. His men, staggered for a moment by his death, are immediately steadied by Kemper, whose brigade comes up on their right, and together they open fire for the first time. This, however, is quite ineffective against the stone breastworks, and it quickly becomes evident that they must either charge them or fly. These intrepid warriors have permitted themselves to halt but for a few minutes while Armistead comes into line. Officers now spring into lead; and, with the fierce Confederate yell, these dauntless Virginians rush ahead through blast-storms of lead, the smoke

of battle engulfing the combatants. Breaking into a running charge under a hail of musketry, grape and canister, the brigades merge into one crowded, rushing line many ranks deep, through which the Federal cannon plow deadly furrows, while its front melts like snow before a belching volcano. Gibbon's voice, commanding a countercharge, is lost in the fearful din; but his men stand their ground, maintaining a rapid fire.

But an added danger now assails the heroic division. Its right flank, unprotected by Wilcox, is opposite the projecting woods in which Stannard forms line perpendicular to Pickett's right flank, and practically destroys the two regiments on Armistead's right. What remains of this brigade saves itself from a like fate by moving to the left in rear of the brigade of Kemper and dead Garnett. This side-drift of Armistead's men, and Stannard's hot fire, tend to deflect Pickett's column to the left against Hayes, who is also within close reach. Armistead thrusts his men into line between Kemper and Garnett, which compacts the whole of Pickett's front. The grapple, waged at such close quarters, is terrific. Webb is wounded among hundreds of his prone and dead troops. The Confederates quickly break through the first line of Federals, which at once lodges itself behind the second line up the slope near the guns. Hancock and Gibbon hasten all reserves toward the breach. Hall, at the left of the break through Webb's front, makes a half-wheel to the rear with his brigade, thus saving his exposed flank while forming line on Pickett's right, into which he pours a point-blank fire. Harrow, swinging round on his right, takes the crowding Confederates practically in rear with his left. Humphreys sends Carr's brigade to help check and destroy the fierce driving wedge. The Federal soldiery on the right and left rush in, forming massed lines four ranks deep, until muskets will

not reach past the front line to deliver their fire into the doomed column of massed men now warding to their right and left while fiercely fighting their way up onto the crest commanding the entire plateau of Cemetery and Culp's Hills. This is the point reached by Wright on the evening of the 2d. Gallant Armistead, at the head of one hundred and fifty unyielding survivors, with hat on sword as guidon, rushes up to attack Cushing's battery. This little mass of mightiness breaks through the swarming lines of Federals, leaps their intrenchments and reaches the guns on the crest! Young Cushing and dauntless Armistead are killed at the same moment, their brave souls taking flight together, even as they leave their bodies side by side in the shade of the trees. This spot becomes historic in marking the extreme point reached by Pickett's charge, the Crest Wave of the American Civil War.

Gallant Wilcox was last seen hastening to the aid of Pickett, in spite of the retarding jealousy of his corps commander. But he was thereby held to become so out-distanced that, not finding Pickett, he drives straight ahead, to become wholly lost later in the scrub growth on the low ground about the source of Plum Run. Still advancing, he finds himself in front of the Third Corps far to the right of Pickett, and after his assault has failed. Nothing daunted in his determination to aid Pickett, as he believes, Wilcox advances in full view of the amazed Federals who overlook and command the field. He is within two hundred yards of Stannard's victorious brigade, which, from the advanced woods so effectually helped to annihilate Pickett.

Stannard at once faces his command to the rear and advances to the cover of a fence, from behind which his men pour a withering fire into the flank of the bold enemy, while the hostile guns riddle his front. Halting

to return the fire of Stannard, Wilcox discovers his isolation and immediately retires, leaving two hundred of his men on the field.

In the meantime, to the left of Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble follow so close that all but two brigades strike the Federal line while Pickett is still engaged on the slope. Marshall's and Archer's brigades assail Hayes, but fail to break his front. Trimble resolutely supports these brigades. Lane breaches the first line and advances up the slope to attack the second, behind a stone wall. Archer and Scales have also succeeded in sweeping back the first Federal line beyond Lane and Pickett, and, with Lane, are advancing against the second. But Pettigrew's two left brigades, Davis and Brockenborough, which have not advanced with alacrity, are still loitering beyond supporting distance, and do not arrive in position until Pettigrew's and Trimble's advanced brigades are repulsed after a short but murderous contest at close quarters in which impetuous Trimble is wounded.

The steadily maintained fire of Hayes sends the four brigades, Marshall, Lane, Archer and Scales, in disordered retreat, leaving behind them two thousand prisoners, fifteen stands of colors, besides many killed and wounded. A few of Archer's and Scales' regiments, which overlap the right of Hayes, join Pickett, who is still fiercely engaged with Gibbon. These stray regiments are, in fact, the only direct reinforcements which reach Pickett, and are of slight aid, as he now finds himself completely isolated in the very midst of the strength of the swarming Federals. Whelmed in the vortex of these hopeless conditions, the superhuman valor of Pickett's Virginians, exemplified by Armistead and his one hundred and fifty, is all unavailing. Kemper is wounded; and, out of four generals, with eighteen field officers, Pickett and one lieutenant-colonel alone remain un-



scathed, though they act their heroic parts in that storm of lead lonely and exposed.

Pickett's matchless division has ceased to exist as an organized unit. Individually and in pitiful little groups, many of the survivors surrender, seeing the fate of those who attempt to re-pass the ground they have conquered through the raking fire sent searching for them by the Federals. But fourteen hundred of that immortal four thousand nine hundred reach safety behind Alexander's guns, or, with Pettigrew's and Trimble's men, take the short cut back to the Confederate line near the spot where Lee has watched the struggle. Twelve of their riddled flags are left behind, dyed with the life blood of the many who have fallen, in groups or single combat, attempting to wrench and bear these loved symbols from the victorious enemy.

So quickly was Pickett's battle fought that there was insufficient time for advancing the batteries designated to aid him, or to cover his possible retreat. Colonel Alexander, watching from his guns in Pickett's support, gives a vivid picture of the final clash of this desperate enterprise: "From the position of our guns the sight of this conflict was grand and thrilling, and we watched it as men with a life and death interest in the result. If it were favorable to us, the war was nearly over; if against us, we each had the risk of many battles yet to go through. And the event was culminating with fearful rapidity; for it seemed hardly five minutes before the fierce struggle was over. Listening to the rolling crash of musketry, it was hard to realize that they were made up of single reports, and that each musket-shot represented nearly a minute of a man's life in that storm of lead and iron. It seemed as if a hundred thousand men were engaged, and that human life was being poured out like water. No soldier could have looked on Pickett's charge and not burned to be in it."

None so well as participants can tell war's incidents and events, or so simply as the private soldier who bears the brunt of conflict. One of these infantrymen who was on Cemetery Hill under the cannonade and against Pickett's charge relates the general experience in telling of his own.

"In our rear the guns of Pettit's battery were flaming fiercely. Just to our right and rear the brass pieces of Brown were bellowing, while on the far side of the clump of trees (Ziegler's Grove) Cushing's three-inch rifled guns were added to the tumult with their sharp detonations. Along the ridge behind the infantry was the wildest and most terrible scene that ever marked a battle-field. Through the drifting smoke could be seen the batteries, where the toiling gunners, bareheaded and coatless, were working their heated guns. Everywhere, overhead and along the ground, the enemy's shells were bursting with deadly effect and adding to the dire confusion. Behind the guns the battery horses were rearing and plunging frantically under the lash of whips and the pain of wounds. The shouting, swearing drivers were fast at work unhitching wounded horses and replacing them with spare teams. Here and there a thick cloud of soil would shoot high in the air with a loud roar, showing where a well aimed shot of the enemy had exploded a caisson. In places cannon were up-ended or hurled over as a solid shot struck a wheel or axle, while on every side men were tossing their arms wildly and reeling to the ground as the jagged pieces of exploded shell tore through their quivering bodies. During all this tumultuous storm of missiles the infantry lay prone upon the ground for safety. These veterans had lain under artillery fire too often to become demoralized by the demonstration, terrible as it was. They left it to their comrades of the artillery to fight it out, while they clutched



their trusty rifles and waited for the deadlier strife of infantry, which their experience told them must follow.

“And yet, when the artillery fire was at its height, when the storm of bursting shells was sweeping over the crest of Cemetery Ridge, when, except artillerymen, every man was lying flat on the ground for safety, General Hancock rode slowly along the crest in rear of the infantry, accompanied by his staff, and an orderly carrying the corps flag. It was no piece of bravado. It encouraged and strengthened the men to see their general, to know that he was personally attending to affairs. The sight of him thus riding slowly amid the dire storm of death quickened the pulse of every soldier, and loud cheers greeted him as he rode along. In their enthusiasm men sprang to their feet forgetful of the deadly exposure, and some gallant fellows, with caps in air and cheer on their lips, were struck dead while thus paying tribute to the noble bearing of their commander.

“After an hour or more of this terrible cannonade the Confederate batteries ceased their fire. The Federal batteries had stopped their fire some time before in order to save their ammunition for the infantry assault, which all knew must soon come. The roar of the artillery had scarcely died away when long lines of Confederate infantry emerged from the woods on the opposite ridge. They presented a front over a mile in length. It was a grand sight! With waving flags and glittering bayonets glinting in the sunlight, with well aligned ranks and steady step, the veterans of Pickett and Pettigrew moved forward to the assault as if they were on parade. The skirmishers which preceded their advance exchanged fitful, scattering shots with the Federal pickets, but the main line moved forward with their guns at a right-shoulder.

“When they were half way across the interval the Federal batteries opened on them with shell and shrapnel, and

then with canister, but without retarding their advance. With a steadiness that challenged the admiration of their enemies, the Confederate veterans closed up the gaps in their ranks, and pressed on in good alignment. It was evident to each soldier on Cemetery Hill that artillery fire could not check them. Everything must depend on the rifles of the infantry, and a cool, deliberate aim. The infantry held its fire. The Confederates had reached the Emmitsburg pike, and were so near that the buttons on their coats could be easily counted. When, with a crashing sound, the rifles of the Second Corps blazed forth, and the hapless foemen went down like wheat in a hail-storm.

“Like a wounded bull, staggered for an instant, and goaded to determined madness, Pickett’s superb division closes up as it rushes forward at our lines without stopping to fire. They break through our first line; and a little wedge of those remaining alive follow one of their generals and surge up against Cushing’s guns, belching into their faces; while we infantry hem them in on both sides, four ranks deep, with our murderous fire.

“The superb charge of the Confederates is broken; and our dauntless foes, mangled and dead, strew the ground like leaves in autumn. Of those left alive many surrender, while others trickle back in pitiful little streams, like a broken ocean wave, to find safety from the still pelting storm behind the distant line of their watching comrades.

“Nor have we escaped a slaughter almost equal to that of our dauntless assailants: for of the three hundred men of my regiment who answered to roll-call that morning, one hundred and ninety-two have fallen.”

The Crest Wave of our American Civil War has run, crested, and broken. Had it overrun the Stars and Stripes of our love we would have been rended into two hostile peoples, and our doom as a nation would have been sealed.

Pickett's Charge! Its fame will live so long as dauntless courage and splendid heroism shall ennoble human life and enrich the heart-blood of men. The spirit of that acme of human valor was born immortal from mortal failure assaying the impossible. Pickett's Charge has become the martial pride of the American before the world. Among the great deeds of war performed by masses of men, that of Pickett's grand division of Virginians at Gettysburg is apexed.

Armistead and Cushing, fighting and dying together amidst the guns of the young Federal's cresting battery at Cemetery Hill, were representatives not only of the American, but of the causes for which they contested. Mature, intrepid, fierce Armistead recklessly giving his life after hope of success had vanished. Cushing, young, hopeful, cool and determined, standing to his guns almost alone in the face of a mad rush of splendid valor. In these two the Great Conflict became reduced for the moment almost to a personal duel between these host Champions. Glories of manhood, both! Superb representatives of Aristocracy and Democracy.

The place of their death would be fittingly crowned by a monumental symbol embodying to futurity the material death and spiritual rising there wrought for humanity by American brothers,—the place of burial and resurrection.

Expecting a counter-attack from Meade, following in the wake of Pickett's wreckage, the meagre ability of the shattered front of the Confederate is immediately utilized to make a brave show. That portion of the line vacated by Pickett is held alone by the decimated brigade of Wilcox aided by artillery. To his right, the only available force are the brigades of Wofford and Barksdale, woefully weakened from the battle of the 2d. These, commanded by Colonel Humphreys, are slightly advanced and a portion

deployed to his left as skirmishers to cover the guns occupying the line between his position and that of Wilcox. Perry and Wright are still waiting orders to advance in attack. It will be remembered that these two brigades were placed under Longstreet's orders should he deem them necessary to Pickett's success. They have not, however, been utilized, and Pickett's division is already annihilated.

For the late overconfident Confederates, the valiant hope of successfully storming the Federal position is swallowed in the present emergency of utmost exertion on the part of their officers to rally the remnants of the shattered and decimated brigades and divisions of the column of assault, and offer such resistance as they may to the momentarily expected counter-assault. Longstreet says: "They then drove the fragments back upon our lines. As they came back I fully expected to see Meade ride to the front and lead his forces to a tremendous counter-charge. I rode to my line of batteries, knowing they were all I had in front of the impending attack." Amidst the confusion of such a disaster, and the apparently endless stream of wounded, they succeeded in rallying but a few. The unsupported artillery, almost exhausted of ammunition, is left to make such noise and show of ready resistance as will, it is hoped, save the shattered center and weak right from a determined assault in force by the Federals. Colonel Alexander runs every available gun into advanced position along the Emmitsburg pike about the peach orchard, and pounds the Federal line with the utmost fury. General Lee himself rides through the returning drift of Pickett's division towards Meade's expected counter attack calling to the men: "Rally men, now is the time to stand fast. It is all my fault." He also finds time and the disposition to take interest in a horse that an aid is roughly treating in

its fright and also to request his staff to "turn back" out of the hostile fire. A noble man, for a certainty,—draining the bitter cup.

After Pickett's repulses, the Confederate center is held by the heavily weakened Third Corps, its major part now spreading its dismay through the more fortunate brigades, which are strung out beyond the making of a strong defense in covering the whole extent of Hill's line and that portion of Longstreet's left where Pickett's wreck is straggling through. In so far as infantry is concerned, the Confederate center is in no manner or sense prepared to resist a determined assault, even if delivered by a comparatively small column, its available defense being practically dependent upon its more or less disabled artillery. Longstreet, holding the right, the present most vulnerable point in the Confederate line, is dependent upon Alexander's guns and the seriously weakened and outstretched divisions of McLaws and Hood. Alexander's guns are fearfully exposed, having been run far to the front to hammer the expected Federal attack at all hazards, as the Confederates' strongest defense. Nor is Alexander in condition to work his guns for more than an hour, for lack of ammunition. Pickett is shattered and his ground is occupied by a thin line of skirmishers. Longstreet's seven remaining brigades, fearfully depleted from bearing the brunt of yesterday's battle, are over against more than two-thirds of the Federal army. These brigades occupy the extreme right, semicircling in a wide sweep of line beginning on the Emmitsburg pike, near the peach orchard, arching along Plum Run at the base of the Round Tops, then bending back to the Emmitsburg pike, where Anderson's brigade is guarding the passage for Confederate trains. To call this line of Longstreet's a line of defense, would be a gross misnomer; for it is little more than a dangerously exposed line



of picket-posts connected by skirmishers, and semi-isolated from the Confederate center.

At this time of practical defenselessness of the Confederates trouble breaks in on their extreme right in the shape of Kilpatrick's cavalry attacking Law's strung out infantry, guarding from the base of Round Top the Emmitsburg pike, over which are passing Lee's supply trains. The small brigade of Farnsworth is put at a task impossible to cavalry, routing infantry from ground thickly interspersed with stone fences, and this brigade is practically destroyed and its daring leader is killed. Merritt with his troopers goes at Anderson's men guarding the pike, and after a sharp contest is driven off.

Of Kilpatrick's chance Longstreet says: "Had Kilpatrick held his brigades together and swept through the open fields past our right and onto the roads in our rear no body of cavalry ever had chance to do more damage." Had Kilpatrick done this, first calling on the infantry brigades of Grant and Russell lying useless at the eastern base of Big Round Top, there should have been left no Confederates to the south of the peach orchard, nor would he have failed to drive Lee's decimated right pell-mell onto his wrecked center, Meade's massed column in front of Little Round Top swinging in, as they would have done with Kilpatrick's drive. General Alexander says: "If our right had been attacked after Pickett's repulse, the war would have been ended within an hour."

Of Kilpatrick's abortive attack Col. Henderson remarks: "Had Kilpatrick's been supported by infantry and his attack pushed against Law's weakened and scattered brigades, they would have been driven in, clearing the way for the Sixth Corps advancing from the north of Round Top, and Lee's right should have been smashed and turned."

Opposed to this Confederate line of weakness and confusion, Meade has promptly reformed the disintegration that had gathered about Pickett, and has his batteries well in hand, largely massed at his center from both wings. For Meade, for some unaccountable reason, is expecting Lee to renew his assault with his entire army. The Federal commander, who was on the left of his line at the time of Pickett's attack, hastens to the threatened point, taking with him the considerable remnant of the Third Corps. Humphreys has massed his division behind the Second Corps; Birney has come into position on the left of the Second in readiness to strike the expected attack in flank; Doubleday has joined Stannard with his remaining brigades; Robinson's division of the First Corps, has moved from Cemetery Hill, and is in position to reinforce the right of the Second Corps; while two brigades of the Twelfth, Shaler and Eustis, arrive from the extreme right. This powerful massing at the center is placed under command of Newton — Hancock wounded — and is quickly restored to order by the time Pickett's wreckage has reached the Confederate line, this realignment being made in readiness for Lee's expected renewal of attack. The troops stationed toward the left beyond Birney with the Third Corps and McGilvery's batteries were not drawn into the resistance against Pickett, and their positions have been but little disturbed. The offensive or defensive force,— the "ready Column" for attack, composed of the Fifth and Sixth Corps,— remains in position to the left of McGilvery, as before shown, as does Kilpatrick's cavalry. This ready force holding Meade's left is some 25,000 men strong, and is in close proximity to the depleted division of McLaws and Hood's, now commanded by Law. The batteries of McGilvery and Rittenhouse more than offset the guns of Alexander.



To oppose the formidable massing on the Federal left, Lee has Law's and McLaws' divisions and Alexander's batteries disposed as follows: On his extreme right Anderson's brigade is refused and semi-isolated on the Emmetsburg pike, guarding it for the passage of supply trains. Law's remaining brigades are strung along Plum Run facing an overmatching force of the Fifth Federal Corps at the base of the Round Tops; and the line is continued by Semmes and Robertson, with Benning in close support of the latter, whose position is on the knoll overlooking the Devil's Den from the west. Wofford is in Benning's left-rear in the wheat-field, with a considerable interval between, as there is, also between Wofford and Kershaw in position on the peach orchard crest to the right of Alexander's guns. Barksdale's reduced brigade is compelled to deploy as a skirmish line to cover the space. The weakness of this line is evident. Far too extended for its holding force, the brigades are scattered, with dangerous intervals, and are connected with Pickett's disintegration and Hill's confused weakness by a skirmish line only; while they are beyond the hope of reinforcement, and on ground that offers no defensive position if assailed by a swinging movement from the Federal left.

This with practical accuracy defines the conditions and positions of the contending armies, after the repulse of Pickett. While both armies have suffered terrible losses and are wofully exhausted from the three days of battle, it can scarcely be claimed that the Army of Northern Virginia is not in a decidedly worse condition than the Army of the Potomac for a prompt renewal of the contest. The latter, still formidable, has been quickly reformed and stands ready to repel the expected renewal of assault by Lee. Should Meade execute his present purpose and attack Lee's exposed right, such an operation will, if carried

to its legitimate conclusion, decide the fate of one or other of the armies, with every probability in favor of victory for his own.

Napoleon's decision exactly applies to this case, and as an educated soldier Meade must know it. "No matter what the condition of the force which has successfully attacked, or which has successfully repelled an attack, that of the defeated foe is worse, and demands hurled continuance, or hurled counter-attack." Wounded Hancock, who "never made a military error" sends a note to Meade, saying: "I have never seen a more formidable attack, and if the Fifth and Sixth Corps are now pushed up the enemy will be destroyed." Lee expects a counter-attack, and rides towards its source through Pickett's drift endeavoring to rally the men to resist it. The best interests of all the States, North and South, demand of Meade this imperatively plain course of action,—as do the principles and practices of war; while preeminent fame beckons the Federal commander. The magnitude of the responsibility and of the opportunity cannot escape the clear, penetrating mind of the Federal commander; and, with this realization, it is but natural that he also considers the fact that he may already have repelled Lee's invasion.

With thought to act with his massed left Meade passes Sedgwick without giving him any instructions, and gives Sykes, commanding the Fifth Corps, orders to reconnoiter the ground of his left-front, instead of directing that it be occupied in force; nor does he indicate to Sykes that this reconnoissance is a matter of any particular moment. The single brigade of McCandless is, therefore, advanced from its position on the upper stretch of Plum Run, and after a brief encounter with Benning's extended flank, compels the latter to retreat. Still advancing, McCandless is deceived by a simple expedient of

Kershaw's to conceal the Confederate weakness; and, being without support or special orders, McCandless halts, satisfied with having retaken nearly all of the battlefield of the 2d with his single brigade.

Law, in command of the Confederate brigades along the Devil's Den and Lower Plum Run, has meanwhile withdrawn them to the Emmitsburg pike, realizing their jeopardy. McCandless busies his men until dark in the humane work of collecting the wounded and burying the dead of the battle of the 2d, until now uncared for. When too late, the brigades of Wheaton, Nevin and Bartlett are advanced to his support, and these troops advance to within a considerable distance of the peach orchard and bivouac for the night.

This forward move of one brigade demonstrates the fact that had Meade promptly supported McCandless with the ready brigades of Sedgwick and Sykes, thus forming a powerful column of attack, it would have met only the two brigades sighted by McCandless, until it had reached the Emmitsburg pike. In fact, such a massive column as Meade could have promptly hurled and supported — more than 25,000 men — could have encountered no appreciable resistance other than such as Alexander could have made with his unsupported batteries, taken mainly in reverse and while perfectly open to the Federal artillery. Such a column advanced from the north of Round Top in combination with Kilpatrick supported by Grant and Russell swinging round the extreme right of Law, would have completely cut him off from the Confederate center, as its progress would have been along the cord of the bow which his circling scattered brigades formed. Under such conditions, Kilpatrick would certainly have more than realized what Longstreet feared from him.

The complete success which such an operation would

have won is not a matter of doubt; and, once established on the Emmitsburg pike, with Law isolated or driven and left to the care of the ample force yet disposable on the left for that and contingent purposes, the main turning column would have advanced against Hill's uncovered flank while his line was held by a confused conglomeration of weak and decimated battalions, and artillery, largely out of reach of aid from Ewell. The turning column, meanwhile, would be constantly augmented from the main line, swinging out to its right-front as uncovered by the column, and to support it, as previously outlined. Such an operation should have destroyed Lee's army. But Meade does not obey any of these plain commands of war, and the Army of Northern Virginia is thus left unmolested after the disastrous collapse of its final effort at Gettysburg. As soon as night shrouds the light Longstreet and Ewell are drawn in on the center, and the defeated army intrenches a strong, compact line along Seminary Ridge reaching from the Seminary to the peach orchard, and bristling with cannon. Behind this formidable front Lee reforms his effectives, while his impedimenta, sick and wounded take up their forlorn march for the frontier and home.

We must now give attention to a cavalry combat which, during the battle of the 3d, was fought off to the east of Gettysburg in the triangle formed by the York and Baltimore pikes. Lee had instructed Stuart to find his way around the Federal right in order to fall upon Meade's retreating columns on the Baltimore pike, should he be driven from Cemetery Ridge. But Meade, also, has posted his cavalry to provide for this contingency and to improve any advantage which might be offered by the Confederates.

Stuart's six thousand troopers, in four brigades, under

Jenkins, Chambliss, Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, are in movement at 3 A. M., on July 3d, toward Brinkerhoff's Ridge. While in march Stuart covers the left of Ewell as well as of the Confederate army. His purpose is to locate Gregg's brigades, then to conceal his column from his antagonist behind Cress's Ridge, and, under its cover, move by stealth and adventure to his purpose on the Federal right-rear at a point about opposite where Pickett will charge its front. Advancing, he peers over the crest of the Brinkerhoff Ridge and, half a mile distant on an opposite slope, observes Custer's brigade—left in observation by Kilpatrick—posted near the junction of the Hanover and Salem Church roads. If he can conceal his march southward behind Cress's Ridge, his cavalry may reach the Baltimore pike between Rock Creek and White Run, and at the same time isolate his opposing cavalry from the right of the Federal army. This position once gained in rear of Meade's line of battle, many things may be made to transpire by Jeb Stuart in aid of the Confederate main battle against its opposite front.

Riding to this end, the brigades of Jenkins and Chambliss are put in concealed march along the west base of Cress's Ridge, while Hampton and Lee, some distance in the rear, are ordered to follow in the tracks of the advanced brigades. But Hampton and Lee carelessly make themselves visible to Custer, and Stuart's concealed movement is frustrated. Meanwhile Gregg's cavalry, the brigades of McIntosh and Irvin Gregg, is in motion up from the Baltimore pike over the Hanover road, with the eastern slope of Wolf's Hill in view over which Stuart must move if he passes beyond Brinkerhoff's Ridge. Kilpatrick, on march to the left of the army, left Custer in observation on the same road until Gregg should appear. Coming unexpectedly upon Custer, Hampton and Lee immediately open





BRIG.-GEN. GEORGE A. CUSTER



fire on him with a battery. This Custer's guns quickly silence, and the Confederate cavalry retires behind the woods, hoping to draw Custer into this ambush. At this juncture Custer receives orders from Kilpatrick to join him on the left of the army. McIntosh, therefore, relieves him, and shortly after engages with Hampton and Lee, but is quickly driven back by their superior numbers. Stuart, hearing the sound of guns in his rear, halts Jenkins and Chambliss until Hampton arrives in person, and informs his chief of what is transpiring with his two rear brigades. Gregg, answering the urgent call of McIntosh, meets Custer marching toward the left, and requests him to delay and join his advance to the reinforcement of McIntosh. Custer has four magnificent Michigan regiments with which he is not anxious to escape battle exercise, and he delays his march to Kilpatrick to join adventure with Gregg. This gives Gregg four thousand troopers.

Stuart observes Custer's advance and sends Jenkins against him, withholding Chambliss to continue his original movement toward the Baltimore pike, with the purpose of turning Gregg's flank, thinking thus to insure defeat of the Federal cavalry; which accomplished, he will have free swing in Meade's rear. Stuart's troops are in a most advantageous position along the slope of Cress's Ridge, with stronghold among the buildings of the Rummel farm. However, Gregg determines to attack; and to this end two of Custer's regiments, the Fifth and Sixth Michigan, are sent to reinforce McIntosh, who is posted along the Salem Church road north of the Hanover pike. Gregg's guns, in position at the junction of these roads, open fire on the Rummel buildings, occupied by Lee's skirmishers.

In the endeavor to turn the flank of McIntosh, Lee has engaged the main portion of his own and Hampton's brigades, when Jenkins comes up on his right, extending the

Confederate line to the Hanover pike. The Federal gunfire clears the Rummel buildings, while Custer dismounts his troopers and deploys a skirmish line which advances against the Confederate skirmishers, consisting of Jenkins's men, dismounted and deployed in like manner. But Jenkins finds his men out of ammunition, and the Sixth Michigan sets the Confederates flying. Gregg, meanwhile, has advanced his left near to Cress's Ridge; and when Jenkins is discovered, Gregg brings forward his center, a part of the brigade of McIntosh, and both Lee and Jenkins are driven. In falling back, the two Confederate brigades become separated, and Jenkins is put in such jeopardy that Stuart is forced to recall Chambliss to his succor. Gregg is checked; but he has wholly defeated Stuart's original purpose. His entire force and energy are now required in the developing field at hand.

The regiment Chambliss has dismounted and sent ahead is met by the Fifth Michigan with a repulsing fire from its repeating carbines. Lee has mounted the First Virginia regiment, and, watching the combat to his right-front, now charges the right of McIntosh, which is held by the First New Jersey regiment. Its ammunition boxes empty, it is quickly driven back. Alert Custer, however, is at hand with the Seventh Michigan, mounted. But a fence intervenes, across which the hostile troopers exchange a hot fire, during which some of Lee's men dismount, rush forward and tear away the obstruction. The Virginians now charge, drive the Federal center, and compel the left of McIntosh to change front into position behind a fence, to escape being taken in flank. But the gallant Virginians have exhausted themselves, and now, caught in a hot fire, are forced to retire.

Hampton now returns, and, seeing the repulse of Lee on his left and Chambliss on his right, orders the First North

Carolina regiment and the Jeff Davis Legion to mount and charge. The Legion rushes at the Federal battery, disregarding its murderous fire, which continues until Custer's line is abreast the mouth of the guns. Hampton's brave regiments are repulsed; but Lee now charges, followed by the remainder of Hampton's brigade, and joins Hampton struggling against Custer in the midfield. Their advance has exposed them to the fire of skirmishers on their right behind a fence, and to Gregg's guns. The Federal reserves, joined by the mounted skirmishers, now charge the Confederates on both flanks, the First New Jersey engaging with sabres only. The combat quickly becomes general and desperate when, carbines empty, sabres flash and cut as the columns sway and clash. Hampton and many of the Confederate officers are disabled among their fallen men. Finally the Federals open out so that their artillery has play on Stuart's line, and the Confederates give way and fall back to the rear of the Rummel buildings. The fight ended, the Federals withdraw to their position, having lost in killed and wounded two hundred and eighty-nine men, and captured three hundred and thirty-five of the enemy. The Confederate loss is not definitely reported, but it could not have been less than that suffered by Gregg's brigades. Stuart's entire purpose is defeated, though he watches until evening for opportunity to act against the Federals. After nightfall, his command is withdrawn from brilliant battle to perform the sad and more arduous duty of covering the retreat of a defeated army and its pathetic trains of wounded braves.

The decisive battle of the American Civil War has been fought to a finish — and at what a cost! Out of his army of 85,674 men Meade has lost 22,990 men, of whom 3,063 are killed, 2,228 die of wounds, 12,264 are wounded, and 5,435 are missing. Lee's host of 71,675 men has been re-

duced by the loss of 20,448 men, of whom 2,592 are killed, 1,728 die of wounds, 10,978 wounded, and 5,150 missing. These figures of Confederate losses — from their incomplete reports — are evidently incorrect, for, while they show but 5,150 men missing, the Federal reports of prisoners captured from July 1st to 5th give the names of 12,227 men. Of this excess over the Confederate reports, missing, i. e., 7,077, there were 6,802 men wounded. Hence, adding this last number to the Confederate report, their loss in killed and wounded was 22,100 men, and their total loss, 27,525 men. The Confederate army suffered the irreparable loss of seventeen generals of ability and mettle such as we have seen fall in the division of Pickett. While the Army of the Potomac has lost twenty-one in rank, from brigadiers to corps commanders; of officers there were 339 killed and 1,042 wounded among these. The physical condition of the two armies, then, in number is: Federals, 70,510 men; Confederates, 42,475 men; while both are fearfully depleted of their old veteran officers.

The great Battle of Gettysburg, the successor of Waterloo, is ended. When Buford opened the bloody drama on the morning of July 1st to the west of the sleeping town until its closing scene enacted by Stuart and Gregg to its east, on the sunny hills and valleys the fate of a youthful nation of godlike destiny trembled on the steely bayonets of one hundred and fifty thousand men. Never before was there so mighty a target for millions of bullets, shot and shell, hurled from miles of muzzles of death. Behind these one hundred and fifty thousand brothers have held their lives as of no value save as a free offering, either for the maintenance or destruction of the nation. Both armies have fought and bled gigantically,— one of these superb hosts for Progress, the other, for Retrogression. Yet both have

wrestled to save the nation! for, without such monstrous sacrifice the nation would have died of its disease,— Freedom infected with Tyranny. Sacrifice is the price of freedom.

## CHAPTER XV

### AFTER THE BATTLE: DEDUCTIONS AND CRITICISMS

THE measure of greatness is the magnitude of conditions overcome and mastered. Applying this to Robert E. Lee, his colossal stature is obtained. The point from which he stepped into action was beyond the objects for which most men strive. General Lee has passed striving for personal glory and fame, utterly subordinating himself and his masterful abilities to the Cause he served,—to duty, as it appeared to him. In the midst of disaster such as would wreck a lesser life he hastens to fasten the responsibility for it upon himself while gathering the pitiful remains of his shattered battalions in his masterful hands, like a lion to stand with them awaiting the foe.

After Pickett's repulse, Lee, in momentary expectation of a counter assault, has no time in which to attempt a readjustment of his army, even were the troops in condition for any considerable movement. In fact, his only safety is in holding it stationary in position, for he thus conceals his weakness behind a bold front, which appears unbroken and formidable. This necessity serves to deceive Meade and his timid council, and it is this very showing that leads the Federal commander to the unreasonable belief that Lee is proposing to make a general attack after Pickett is driven instead of having made it in his support.

Wisely holding this advantage, Lee makes no withdrawals until night comes to his aid. But no sooner has

darkness fallen than Ewell withdraws his corps from the left, and by daylight of the 4th has it in position on the Cashtown road, north of the Seminary, while Longstreet is drawn in until his right rests at the peach orchard, extending to the left connecting with Hill. The Confederate cavalry is in hand, Stuart on the left guarding with three brigades, Fitzhugh Lee at Cashtown with one, guarding the supply trains there gathered. Imboden with his brigade, with a battery and infantry, is on Longstreet's right, while the brigades of Jones and Robertson hold the mountain passes in the rear, over which the army must pass.

The masterful hand of Lee has again gathered his strangely attenuated army; and, thus intrenched and guarded, Meade now needs to consider if it is yet wise to attack him on the 4th, after letting a far easier opportunity slip his hand. Yet the opportunity is inviting for the Federal commander to move by his left, with purpose so to operate against Lee's right flank and rear that his army shall be thrown back from the Fairfield road in order not only to force it onto a single line of retreat but to give the Army of the Potomac the short line, via Hagerstown, in pursuit. The Round Tops form an excellent point upon which to hinge such a movement, protecting, as they do, Meade's lines of communication to Westminster, his base of supplies. A deployment of the massing at Meade's center toward his left, would enable him to advance the prepared troops on his left on such an enterprise to envelop the Confederate right resting in the air at the peach orchard.

As the morning of the 4th breaks, the Federal line is astir scrutinizing beyond its front; and on the distant ridge the Army of Northern Virginia is discerned presenting its formidable aspect. Is it in order to mask a retreat, or to make the dreaded flank movement to the south of the mountains toward Washington? Meade and some of his



generals are still infected with the belief that Lee's army outnumbers the Army of the Potomac, though it is difficult to understand this error after the evidence of the three days of battle, and when a comprehensive view is taken of the entire field of war and the military operations therein.

In view of Lee's concentration on Seminary Ridge, Meade's movement of his right on the morning of July 4th appears strange, if not reasonless. He pushes Slocum, with the Twelfth Corps, out on the York road away from the enemy and from Howard, with the Eleventh, descending into Gettysburg, Sedgwick, with the Sixth Corps, moves forward on the left to occupy a portion of the battlefield of the 2d. These are divergent instead of convergent movements, such as the conditions seem to demand; neither do they serve in any manner to develop Lee's position or intentions, nor to harmonize with the evident thought of the Federal commander that Lee is about to retreat. That this thought is strongly in Meade's mind is shown by the fact that he sends his cavalry toward Williamsport, the point of Lee's crossing of the Potomac, to occupy the mountain passes in that direction. Buford is ordered from Westminster to march on Frederick, Md., there to join Merritt, and thence proceed to Williamsport. Kilpatrick's two brigades, with Huey's, are set in march for Monteray. McIntosh is at Gettysburg, where he is soon joined by Gregg with another brigade.

These several movements of his army indicate that Meade has determined that Lee is about to retreat. Why, then, does he not move Slocum to his left and thrust forward a strong turning column from that flank with purpose to drive back the Confederate right and cut Lee off from the Fairfield, if not, indeed, from the Chambersburg roads? For it is certain that Lee will not dare to attack his center with Howard at Gettysburg, on the flank of

such a venture. Nor would such a powerful turning force as Meade can easily form with Slocum and the numerous troops on his left be placed in any appreciable danger by such a movement, while its promise is most brilliant. It will at least develop Lee's purpose; and, this once determined, the reconnoissance in force would be promptly converted into a general movement forward by the left, wherein the entire army would engage, turning the flank of the enemy, to drive him from covering the Fairfield road, if, peradventure, Lee could succeed in saving his army from surrender. In fact, Meade should be informed of the purpose of his antagonist and prepare this movement by his left to launch at daylight of the 4th, for he is in a friendly country where every movement of the enemy is observed by many who are anxious for an opportunity to report the same to Meade. And, with his enterprising cavalry, aside from the usual scouts and spies, there should not be the least delay in collecting all needed information.

Giving all facts and conditions due weight, it is a fair conclusion that he is in fatal error in failing to demonstrate against Lee's right, holding the Army of the Potomac in hand ready to move forward in support should it develop conditions to warrant an attack. This conclusion is further sustained by the fact that should Meade operate by his left against Lee's right, he is in better position to frustrate any flank movement of the Confederates toward Washington if he still has fears in that direction, as he will also be in advanced readiness to move against the enemy's columns should it be found that they are in retreat. Nor would the lines of the Federal army be placed in jeopardy in the improbable event that Meade should be repulsed; for in that case his army would naturally retire on its base of supplies, covered by the Pipe Creek line.

Operating in this manner, it appears that all reasonable possibilities are provided for, as well as the unreasonable fears regarding Lee which Meade has entertained since the repulse of Pickett, and which still seem to influence him.

With the dispositions made, as noted, the hostile armies observe one another in the sweltering heat until about mid-day of the 4th, when Nature — as is her wont after heavy cannonading — pours down torrents of refreshing rain, cooling and laving the battle-grimed soldiery, the mad fever of the wounded, and the long-trenched graves of the dead. So mired do the roads become that Meade's army, with its artillery and trains, remains stationary, although a similar soil does not hold Lee from taking advantage of Meade's rain embargo and completing his arrangements for the orderly and unmolested withdrawal and retreat of his army.

When, on June 28th, General Lee was informed of the presence of the Federal army on the near side of the Potomac, had he ordered a speedy concentration of the Army of Northern Virginia on Gettysburg, his corps would have been assembled there by the night of the 30th, forestalling Meade as master of the field through possession of the Cemetery Heights. His dispositions would have been such, then, as to have avoided the faulty position into which the battle of the 1st lured him, if, indeed, Gettysburg would have witnessed any conflict. In this crippling position, he erred first in failing to take and occupy Culp's Hill and the Cemetery Heights on the afternoon of the 1st or in the early morning of the 2d. His next error was in making the convergent attack with the widely separated wings of his army — a mistake engendered by his faulty position. And, conscious of this disadvantage, Lee was at fault in failing to closely supervise the battle, and bring about the "harmony of cooperation," from which he hoped, and from which alone he could expect, success. His frontal

attack on the 3d had one chance in ten of success had it been of sufficient weight and properly organized. Utterly lacking these requisites it was foredoomed, as Longstreet knew. Did the impossibility noble Lee attempted to work overshadow his towering genius? for never before nor after Gettysburg was it obscured.

The terse remarks of Colonel Henderson, the English military authority, are pertinent in this connection: "This (Gettysburg) the greatest conflict of the American war, was the most prolific of blunders. July 2d presented a picture of mismanagement that is almost without parallel. Longstreet, ordered to attack in the early morning, did not till four o'clock P. M. The attack was disorganized. An utter absence of accord in the movement of the several commands. Then a double attack with its inevitable difficulties of unison.

"There are those who will say, that most of the cooperation in battles should be charged to the General rather than to the Staff. Lee's concentration (on the field) on convergent lines was bad."

Of the battle of the 2d, Confederate General Kershaw says: "There was a lack of cooperation and coordination on the part of corps, division and brigade commanders." But none of these subordinates were responsible for the plan and general supervision of the battle, which are functions of the commander-in-chief only.

Colonel Henderson again remarks: "If Lee's Staff was thoroughly inefficient at Gettysburg, it was not a few months before at Chancellorsville, a far more difficult field and maneuver."

The gravest error committed by General Lee was his failure to adopt the flank movement urged by Longstreet. While this confined the conflict to Gettysburg, and Lee to his defective position, it more vitally involved the southern

cause than did the battle as fought, for it offered more definite results with greater certainty and ease. It was Lee's simplest but most brilliant operation and such as he never before and never thereafter declined.

After the close of the battle of the 2d, General Lee's usually correct judgment was at fault in overestimating the advantage of the quite insignificant lodgments made in the Federal line. These, apparently, were the main influence which led him to renew battle on the 3d, assaulting the formidable center of the opposing army.

The battle of the 3d was confined, practically, to Pickett's charge, an undertaking which more than any throughout the entire battle of three days, was characterized by weak organization and inadequate provision. It is somewhere claimed that for Pickett's assault General Lee put thirty thousand men at the disposition of Longstreet. But, if so, they were nowhere in evidence as troops prepared and ready for that work. And Longstreet, knowing this, and convinced of the hopelessness of the attack, may have thought it less than murder to withhold the two unused brigades from the slaughter, and for after needs.

Of this culminating event of the three days of battle, Colonel Henderson records his criticism as follows: "The attack was poorly organized and launched. The column was too weak; its right and left support badly placed and supporting; and no artillery prepared to or did follow. There was no continuity; no adequate support, if any, massed and ready. For successful attacks it is essential to form in three lines with considerable intervals." (Pickett was in two lines at close interval.) "Napoleon's maxim, 'In a decisive attack the last man and the last horse should be thrown in,' was wholly disregarded." Federal General Doubleday remarks: "Every plan made by Lee was thwarted in the most unexpected manner."

General Longstreet, under whose immediate orders the column was formed, has been blamed for the attack, the claim being made that, under the discretionary latitude which may be exercised by a subordinate commander, he would have been warranted in withholding Pickett. It is not to be doubted that Longstreet would have done this had he been at a distance from the chief commander and acting more on his own responsibility. On this point General Longstreet very properly comments, saying: "When your chief is away you have a right to exercise discretion; but if he sees everything you see, you have no right to disregard his positive and repeated orders. I never exercised discretion after discussing with General Lee the points of his orders, and when after discussing he had ordered the execution of his policy. I had offered my objections to Pickett's battle and had been overruled, and I was in the immediate presence of the commanding general when the order was given for Pickett to advance." Reflecting on that day, he says further: "Gettysburg was the saddest day of my life. I foresaw what my men would meet and would gladly have given my position rather than share in the responsibility of that day. It was thus I felt when Pickett at the head of forty-nine hundred brave men marched over the crest of Seminary Ridge and began his descent of the slope. As he passed me he rode gracefully, with his jaunty cap jerked well over his right ear and his long auburn locks, nicely dressed, hanging almost to his shoulders. He seemed rather a holiday soldier than a general at the head of a column which was about to make one of the grandest, most desperate assaults recorded in the annals of wars. The troops advanced in well-closed ranks and with elastic step, their faces lighted with hope."

Dominated by these feelings of assured disaster, which were piled upon his previous equally firm belief that his



flank operation would insure brilliant victory, end the war and insure the establishment of the Southern Confederacy, it can scarcely be doubted that cool, deliberate Longstreet was influenced against his will, on the 2d and 3d of July, and, in consequence, acted with less than his usual deliberate promptness. He was, in mind and heart, absolutely loyal to his loved superior, even when he was called upon to enact momentous doings to which his best judgment was diametrically opposed, and in the result of which he was as much concerned at heart, personally, as his general.

General Law, writing of Longstreet at Gettysburg, says: "As to General Longstreet's disposition and action at Gettysburg, if an opinion were to be formed from his general account of that battle, which he published in 1887, the general would stand fairly charged with acting in a wrong spirit, if not as critically hostile of General Lee and of his entire plan of the battle of Gettysburg. But to form this judgment of General Longstreet, as being the spirit which did actuate him during that battle, would appear as being unwarranted and untrue. For, during the years intervening between 1863 and 1887, Longstreet had been subjected to bitter and evidently unfair criticism for his conduct at Gettysburg; and his paper, published in the latter year, plainly indicates the effect of this course, as the spirit it breathes is so antipodal to that expressed in the letters on this subject, written directly after the Gettysburg Campaign.

"It is perhaps fair to believe that unprejudiced history will record of General Longstreet that he was so positive in his opinion that the movement of the Confederate army to its right to interpose between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, not only appeared to him as being the only hope of success to the Confederates, but that it would almost certainly insure a brilliant and commanding victory;



that these convictions were so strong as to cause the commander of the First Corps to act in a half-hearted manner during the battle of Gettysburg; although at that time he was perfectly loyal to General Lee, and in his heart meant to hold himself subordinate to the plans and orders of his Chief, notwithstanding the fact that he was firmly of the opinion that General Lee was fatally in error."

With the defensive character of the Federal battle and the compactness of its line of defense, a lesser order of generalship may hold its own against a more skillful offensive, and with less chance of error, once the defensive army is in position. It was due to these conditions, perhaps, that the errors made by General Meade were few, especially as he did not venture to take the offensive from his stronghold.

Previous to the battle, he had his army advancing with too wide a front, and from which he would have suffered severely had Lee followed up the defeat of Meade's left wing on the 1st. His next error was his disregard of his exposed left flank, which, had it not been offset by a greater fault on the part of Lee, would have been fatal to the Federal battle on the 2d. And in applying the remedy, Meade so completely unmanned his right that for hours it was open to any fair enterprise moved to its capture. If these were minor faults the same cannot be said of Meade's failure to deliver a counter-stroke immediately following the repulse of Pickett. Of this Longstreet says: "As they (Pickett's wreckage) came back I fully expected Meade to ride to the front and lead his forces to a tremendous counter-charge." General Lee on the other hand, rode to the front, rallying his troops to resist such an expected blow. Nor is Meade blameless for not having attacked any time thereafter during the 3d and 4th of July.

Had the Federal commander possessed higher qualities

of generalship, the war would have ended at Gettysburg, and the humble name of George G. Meade would have been placed high in the Order of Fame, and highest among those who won lasting renown in our Civil War. For he would have defeated the great general of that war not so much with the aid of superior position as by the exercise of superior ability. Meade may have acted wisest for himself and his cause, however, by contenting himself in the safe course of, "Well done," and "Let well enough alone." Meade at Gettysburg and Grant at Vicksburg gave to the nation a new Independence Day. Perhaps additional years of great slaughter and suffering were required to teach us needed lessons, and eliminate unsoundnesses from the foundations of our national life?

## CHAPTER XVI

### LEE'S RETREAT

LEE'S supply trains, assembled at Cashtown during the rain of July 4th, draw out in stretching column over the Chambersburg pike, creaking under their loads of booty drawn by fat Pennsylvania stock; while great droves of cattle crowd wonderingly along the roads southward. Vehicles of every kind bear the wounded, following on the same road.

Two roads are open to Lee, one to the north, by way of Chambersburg, the other and more direct, to the south, via Fairfield to Hagerstown. Over the latter the Army of Northern Virginia moves on the night of the 4th. Hill leads; then Longstreet, followed by Ewell as rear guard. This fighting column takes with it only its essential ammunition and supply trains. Its line of march covers the left flank of the column of impedimenta and wounded. The column of impedimenta, including ten thousand animals and covering sixteen miles, is guarded by infantry, cavalry and artillery under command of General Imboden. This pitiful train of misery, anguish and death marches in momentary expectation of attack. Through the storm and darkness of the night, crowded into every description of conveyance, the wounded jolt over the rough and mired road, utterly lacking of care, food or comfort. Here and there along the moaning column squads of anxious guards, peering the blackness, stumble and splash, alert to every sound save the groans, prayers and curses of the human wreckage

they are risking their lives to safeguard. When breakdowns and jams occur in this train of agony, the living tumble the dead from the crowded wagons, and they are at last freed to rest and to release from pain scattered along the roadside.

While General Lee is thus moving his army in deliberate order toward safety, General Meade is in conference with his commanders in a second council of war, to which he presents these questions: "Must we remain at Gettysburg, or, without waiting for the movement of the enemy, undertake to-morrow either a movement on his flank or make an attack against his front? If he retires, must we follow him directly or try to reach Williamsport in advance of him by way of the Emmitsburg road?" The Federal commander is also engaged in a somewhat fear-colored telegraphic correspondence with Halleck, who, for the President, is urging that Lee's army shall not be permitted to escape across the Potomac. The council decides against every possible effective operation against Lee, either by flank movement, attack, or direct pursuit, and is of divided opinion on the remaining questions. Meade thereupon confirms and strengthens the inefficiency of the council by deciding to do nothing for twenty-four hours; and, then if Lee retreats, to follow on the long or outside line, via Emmetsburg, holding course along the southern base of the South Mountains. Meanwhile General Lee utilizes the precious time in placing his columns at a safe distance; and should have his army across the Potomac before it can, by any possibility, be overtaken by the Federal army, acting on Meade's strange decision of twenty-four hours' delay. Surely, under Meade's plan, the Army of the Potomac will not prevent the crossing of the Army of Northern Virginia into its own territory. It is within Meade's power, however, to interpose a temporary hindrance to Lee's cross-

ing of the Potomac. For, during the period of his command of the army, Meade has held the strong division of French inactive and useless at Frederick, Md. It is but a short distance from Lee's bridge at Williamsport, his only means of crossing the Potomac at high-water; and Buford is moving to join French. Lee's bridge may be destroyed before his infantry column can arrive to interfere. But French is not moved, and Nature finally interferes, not to favor the active and bold, but the dilatory and timid — as though to urge the latter from delinquency — and, by a sudden rise of the river, destroys the bridge.

This dire condition confronts Lee when his slightly harassed column reaches Williamsport on the 7th. His defeated army in retreat is held on the hostile shore of an impassable river where he throws up hasty works across a bend in it, presenting a strong front to Meade when, on the 12th, he has the Army of the Potomac scattered about in that neighborhood while councils of timidity hold it from the attack conditions demand. Meade's pursuit has been so dilatory and his inaction at Williamsport so unaccountable that the patience of President Lincoln becomes almost exhausted, and he telegraphs his commander that now is the time to attack and destroy the enemy before he can regain his frontier. Quite properly Meade considers this a criticism and requests to be relieved of the command of the army, when the President in his dilemma explains that while no criticism was intended, he again urges attack. Meanwhile Halleck, the commander-in-chief, remains in Washington, four hours distant, "Bent on driving Lee back, is full of zeal to drive his army out of Pennsylvania instead of intercepting and annihilating the enemy." Almost in despair, President Lincoln remarks in confidence: "Halleck has frittered away time, and dispersed our forces. Nor can I learn that he is ever apprised of the weakness of Lee

in Meade's front, or ever suspects what is being done. It is the same old story of this Army of the Potomac. Imbecility, inefficiency — don't want to *do*. Defend the capital. It is terrible, terrible, this weakness, this indifference of our Potomac generals, with such armies of brave men." When asked why he did not remove Meade, he replied: "What can I do, with such generals as we have? Who among them is better than Meade? To sweep away the whole of them from the chief command and substitute a new man would cause shock, and be likely to lead to combinations and troubles greater than we now have. I see all the difficulties. They oppress me. The general-in-chief and the Secretary of War should know who are competent generals better than I." The President endured this until he finally placed Grant in supreme command in 1864. By the 14th Lee has his bridge repaired, and his unmolested army crosses into Virginia, to feast and rejoice on the rich loot. Imboden has awaiting its needs within its frontier at Winchester.

Lee's invasion has been repelled, and the Gettysburg campaign, with its momentous possibilities, is finished. And, if among these of vast magnitude effected by Meade's victory that commander has failed of the greatest, the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia, and to rank himself among the world's great commanders, it is because he has not acted on his first and correct impressions at vital junctures,—breaking free from Halleck's or other retarding influence, as he might have done with safety under the President's telegrams urging him to the opportunity. The most drastic criticism of Meade's pursuit of Lee is due to the fact that the latter covered the distance from Gettysburg to Williamsport, with his vast train of wounded, impedimenta and booty, in three days, while Meade consumed six, meanwhile leaving the Confederate army unmolested



by any retarding force! Varied as are the fortunes of war, history scarcely records an instance where a defeated army escaped molestation during its retreat; especially where it found its way closed by an impassable river with the victorious army closed in on it in superior numbers.

General Meade has done well and nobly, when his lamest action is contrasted with that of the controlling military mind at Washington. For, even under the hamperings imposed upon him, he has not only defeated Lee's heretofore victorious army, but in doing that great feat of arms he has also repelled the Confederate invasion and defeated all that its success would have accomplished, both at home and abroad. He has unwittingly sealed the doom of the Southern Confederacy, and defeated those who schemed and plotted against the American republic. All thanks, then, to General George G. Meade, who, in failing to secure the essential substance of the Gettysburg campaign, thereby missed the personal crown of glory more than once offered through the ability of the Army of the Potomac during its continuance.

By the 1st of August, 1863, these two old antagonists have maneuvered from the Potomac to the Rappahannock, where, in practically the same positions from which they entered upon the Gettysburg campaign, they engage in no serious enterprise until May, 1864. Meade meanwhile makes a fruitless incursion to Mine Run, in the autumn of 1863, Lee enacting a like return directly thereafter, and equally fruitless. Then both armies settle into winter cantonment and rest.

The Gettysburg campaign, from June 3d to August 1st, has cost the Army of the Potomac 32,043 men, and the Army of Northern Virginia 29,695 men.



## CHAPTER XVII

### THE REFLEX

**H**AVING followed the crest wave of our Civil War from its formation to its glorious breaking on Cemetery Hill, and trailed its quick back-run to the Rapidan, let us follow on in rapid skirmish over the fields, valleys, hills and woods of Virginia, wherein were recorded the final struggles of the war.

In the West, fortunately remote from Washington, there had grown into victorious command a man of dominant generalship which the demands of the war and of the people of the North, finally overriding political and politico-military ambitions and jealousies, called to the head of the Federal armies. The obscure but rising general, Ulysses S. Grant, who, as the subordinate of Halleck when he was in command of the Middle Department, was disgraced and almost driven from the army because he won a victory without seeking the approval of his superior, had since climbed the heights of earned fame up a causeway of unbroken victories until he unlocked the Mississippi and clove the Confederacy in twain by the capture of Vicksburg. Returning from thence, he unprisoned the army of Rosecrans at Chattanooga and placed W. T. Sherman in command, another proven general whose similar experience with Secretary of War Cameron enabled him to counsel Grant to endure Halleck and bide his time in the army.

The Federal War was finally to have the benefit of generalship in supreme command of its armies, under the



GEN. U. S. GRANT



President. Mr. Lincoln called Grant to Washington and gladly accepted the wise condition imposed by the latter as the one on which he would consent to assume chief command, which was that he, Grant, should have command in fact, without hampering or interference from any source, properly submitting his plans, of course, to the President. The necessity for this foresighted wisdom on the part of Grant becomes apparent when we read in the official history of this time: "One of the considerations which caused General Grant to make his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac was the political and personal influences of various kinds and of various individuals which, centered in Washington, had thwarted some generals, and interfered with all who had commanded the Army of the Potomac since the beginning of the war. It was General Grant's duty himself to encounter these difficulties, and to withstand, if he could not prevent, political interference. If he remained in the East this was secured; but with the general in chief a thousand miles away, the Government might not be able to resist entreaties and threats of interested or anxious outsiders, and the best concerted schemes might come to naught."

But even with General Grant close to Washington, and by authority of the President, in full command of all the armies, the general-in-chief could not get his orders to Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley, correctly transmitted through his subordinate, Halleck, and the War Office! For in his Memoirs, General Grant leaves this condemning record against both. He says: "On the 15th of September, 1864, I started to visit Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive him out of the Valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee's army. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington to Sheridan to make a move, because

they would be stopped there, and such orders as Halleck's caution, and that of the Secretary of War, would suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine."

Should we not be grateful to the noble men who, as commanders, subjected themselves and their reputations to these positive jeopardies, ceaselessly undermining, stultifying, and thwarting their orders and best-laid plans? They were surely inspired by a feeling more lofty than personal ambition, for, under these conditions, they were practically certain of being not only thwarted of their laudable ambitions, but of losing whatever reputation they had previously acquired. Grant, with his iron will, was law-sent to our country's sore need to act against the otherwise unconquerable imbecility in the military conduct of the war at Washington. He had already proved himself one of the four generals of record who had found it possible to hold subordinate commanders to unity and harmony of action, both in campaign and battle. Nor in this larger field of gigantic war to which he was called did he fail in this in any vital respect or instance, where he found it possible to place officers of his own selection in command.

Fixing the 4th of May, 1864, as the date on which the Federal armies must be prepared and simultaneously move against the enemy in their fronts, he concentrated the Federal energy in two armies, that of the West under command of General Sherman, and the Army of the Potomac in the East, under General Meade, the lesser armies serving as auxiliaries to these. He personally directed the campaign against Lee and placed himself with the Army of the Potomac to generally direct its operations.

The North, awakened into renewed hope and confidence by the appointment of this silent, unpretentious victor to command its armies, recruited them with energy. Many

of the discharged veterans, volunteers of '61, reenlisted, but the majority of recruits were conscripts. A swarm of bounty men were also sent to the armies, and, still pursuing the inane policy of the early war-time, many new regiments often under officers of little or no experience in the field, augmented the Federal armies. While the numerical strength of the Army of the Potomac was thus vastly increased, its soldierly and fighting efficiency was by no means correspondingly augmented. The wide disparity in numbers of raw and veteran material did not permit the latter to quickly mold and toughen the new into effective soldiers.

Yet it is with this preponderance of raw material, good and bad, with which Grant must penetrate an intensely hostile territory against the most desperate resistance of the yet dominant and formidable veterans of which the Army of Northern Virginia is composed, and under the command of no less a master of war than Robert E. Lee, his army fighting a defensive war on its own ground, where every mile gained by its opponent serves to concentrate the Confederates and push them nearer to their supplies, while the army covering its lines of communication requires no detachments to guard them. On the contrary, the invader must constantly weaken his effectives by detachments to guard his lengthening lines through hostile territory, with a corresponding difficulty in supplying his advancing host. These last-noted conditions, alone, will diminish Grant's effectives on the battle-front thirty per cent. within the first month of his proposed invasion, progressing against Lee over a most difficult *terrain* affording every natural advantage to the defense, and made impregnable against direct attack by rough works with which the troops of both armies, for the first time, learn to cover themselves against direct assault.

When Grant crossed the Rapidan River he had :

Effective combatants .....	97,273	men
Absent from colors — details and train- guards .....	19,095	men
Total men to supply, not including sick and arrests .....	116,368	men
Guns, with 270 rounds of ammunition each	274	

IMPEDIMENTA.

Artillery carriages, battery wagons and forges .....	657
Horses for these.....	6,239
Vehicles for transport of artillery am- munition .....	609
Animals for these.....	3,721
Army's entire wagon-train, miles long if in one line .....	130
Miles covered by army in marching order, column of fours .....	31
Miles of impedimenta to one mile of troops	4¼

This Impedimenta illustrates Napoleon's statement that "an army moves on its belly."

The defense operating under average conditions, has an advantage of three to one over the offensive force. This enormous advantage, however, which should enable Lee to defeat Grant if the present relative strength of the respective armies can be maintained, must ultimately be overcome and more than offset by the fact that while Grant will be able to replenish the enormous losses which he must suffer, the inevitable depletion of Lee's army cannot be made good because the Confederacy is approaching exhaustion of men and resources. Again, the concert of action of all his armies, effected by Grant, precludes the Confederate practice of the past of reinforcing one army







LIEUT. GEN. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN

from another not seriously engaged by the Federals in its front.

The enrollment in the Federal armies in April 1864, was 603,000 men, of which force one-fourth were non-effectives. The losses through the year were made good by recruitment. The cost of the Federal war increased to the sum of \$2,500,000 per day. In the spring of the same year, the armies of the Confederacy numbered about 350,000 men, and through the year their losses were only one-half replenished by recruitment.

On May 4, 1864, the two main Federal armies, with the lesser armies, move simultaneously against the Confederacy; that under Gen. William T. Sherman against the Confederate army under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, at Chattanooga, Tennessee. Sherman drives Johnston back to Atlanta, Georgia, disappears into the heart of the Confederacy, and reappears at Savannah, on the Atlantic seaboard, thus completing the first stage of perhaps the most daring and remarkable invasive campaign which the history of war records. From Savannah Sherman moves northward, overcoming almost insurmountable obstacles nature there raised, and in presence of an ever active if not strong opponent hanging on his flank. Sherman's purpose in marching from Atlanta to Savannah is to break up the railways and destroy the arsenals of the Confederacy throughout the main zone of its army supply, then to turn northward and catch Lee between his army and the Army of the Potomac, which is pushing Lee southward.

Cooperating with the Army of the Potomac is the Army of the Shenandoah, first under Sigel and later Hunter, operating toward Lynchburg, Virginia, and the railroad in the region west of Lee. The Army of the James, under General Butler, is to operate against Richmond from the south along the James River. Under command of these

several generals these two auxiliary armies accomplish nothing of moment until General Sheridan takes command in the Shenandoah, and Butler's force is withdrawn to act directly with the Army of the Potomac in command of its corps chiefs under personal direction of Grant. The remaining auxiliary forces in the trans-Mississippi region and along the sea-front do little more than to hold small Confederate forces in their front away from concentration with Lee and Johnston.

Thus, for the first time during the three years of war, the Federal armies are to combine in action, and over an area equal to continental Europe. If this vast enginery of war, so widely dispersed, is held to work in harmony, the sun of General Grant's generalship will have risen to its zenith, to shine upon and guide the Federal armies, and the result must be the defeat and collapse of the Southern Confederacy. With the Confederacy overcome, will come the rehabilitation of the nation, the firm establishment of the great republic, finally on the safe and permanent basis of real unity generated and forged by the fierce metallurgy of war, wherefrom a mutually respecting, homogeneous people and nation shall emerge.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### AS THE END APPROACHED

#### THE WILDERNESS

ON May 4, 1864, Lee's outposts along the Rapidan River are swept back by Grant's ponderous columns, as the Army of the Potomac crosses that war-demarkating stream with an effective strength of 99,438 men, and 274 guns.\*

During March Meade had consolidated the Army of the Potomac into three corps, thereby seriously affecting the *esprit de corps*, while rendering its units too ponderous and unwieldy for proper handling and supervision by a single commander, especially in the region through which the Army of the Potomac is to operate. These reorganized corps consist of the Second under its old commander, Hancock, the Fifth under Warren, whom we saw acting so wisely on Round Top at Gettysburg, and Sedgwick with his old Sixth Corps. The old First and Third Corps are scattered among these three. The Eleventh and Twelfth are sent west, under Hooker, to win glory with Sherman, and with him return to greet their old comrades of the Army of the Potomac.

Immediately following his failure at Gettysburg, Lee regained his masterful generalship, and from then until the bitter end it constantly gained in grasp and brilliancy. During the winter of 1863, compelled to disperse widely

\* Figures of strength, &c., are from Humphreys' "Virginia Campaign."

his army for reasons of subsistence, he so disposed it that its front, near the enemy, would oppose a stout resistance while the distant divisions rapidly concentrated to its reinforcement without impediment over their various avenues of approach. These provisions are complimented by the fact that the roads from his cantonments converge, through open country, on the Wilderness, a vast woods of scrub growth penetrated by few and difficult roads through which an enemy must pass toward his camps if essaying to give battle in open country where superiority of numbers will avail most. It is the purpose of Grant to surprise Lee, pass the Wilderness and issue from its western margin to give battle in the open, before Lee can concentrate and hold him to contest in the wild tangle. To defeat this plan and give battle where superiority of numbers will be of least value, Lee advances into the Wilderness and confronts Grant's army with the Army of Northern Virginia, numbering 61,953 men.

The proportion between the two armies is affected by the addition of Burnside's Ninth Corps of 19,331 men, which joins Grant on May 6th, the second day of the first battle. The Ninth Corps, however, is not incorporated into the Army of the Potomac under Meade's command, but is personally directed by Grant. This addition, then, gives Grant a total strength of 118,769 men, 316 guns, against Lee with 61,953 men, 224 guns. This gives the defense an advantage of one to two, instead of the established ratio of one defensive equalizing three acting offensively.

Promptly at midnight of May 4th, the Army of the Potomac is in movement crossing the Rapidan on five bridges, with its artillery and ammunition trains, and is safely bivouacked the same day in Lee's front, having marched twenty miles over the few and difficult roads of the Wilderness. On the 5th, the army moves out with

its columns headed southwestward, hoping to clear the Wilderness, to catch Lee unprepared, and defeat his army in detail. That alert commander, however, has, on the 2d, observed the activity of his antagonist from his lofty mountain outlook, and is prepared to countermove in advance, to meet Grant while his army is still at a disadvantage in the vast scrubby woods. At 8 A. M., of the 4th, the hostile skirmish lines engage in the fierce and murderous battle of the Wilderness. In this battle campaign which in duration, continuous and desperate fighting has, perhaps, never before been incident to any war of record, the Army of Northern Virginia places *hors de combat* an army of men equal to its own numerical strength at the beginning of the campaign. For Lee limits his operations to a strict defensive, seldom thrusting out even a small column in attack beyond his works. The battle is fought in a perfect maze of scrub-growth, brush and vines so dense that often the hostile lines are first made aware of the presence of each other by a point-blank fire delivered at a low level by men prostrate behind rough intrenchments crowned by head-logs with space underneath through which to fire. So fierce and level is this leaden storm hurled that trees two feet in diameter are cut down as though felled with a coarse, dull saw. It is found that, during our Civil War, a ton of lead was flung to each man killed. This waste of ammunition is due to the fact that in battle men stood upright, as a rule, and seldom took deliberate aim; but, loading and firing rapidly with the old muzzle-loading arm, most of the pieces were discharged at a high trajectory and the projectile did not enter the hostile line. Not so when firing from a prostrate position through a low aperture, as delivered through this campaign, especially by the Confederate defense against the necessarily exposed assaults by the Federals. The excessive Federal loss during this



campaign is mainly chargeable to the level fire of the Confederates from underneath head-logs, and into exposed assailing lines hurled against these impregnable covers.

As the Wilderness battle progresses, here and there the dead brush takes fire from the gun-wads, and hundreds of wounded men are burned to death, their agonized shrieks blending with the murderous hum and zip of the leaden storm racing through the holocaust to add living fuel from the fierce lines of combatants, which scarcely give way to the licking flames. The utmost care is necessary to prevent friendly troops from firing into each other, so dense is the smoke-filled thicket. And there are thousands of acres of it, penetrated only at wide intervals by rough roads and bush paths practically unconnected by crossroads. This often makes necessary the cutting of roads for the passage of troops, and for the batteries, which find scope only from infrequent cleared spots and road intersections. So vast is this Wilderness tangle that one hundred and eighty thousand men, with their artillery and huge supply trains, are swallowed from sight in its labyrinth for days, and make their presence known only as they render it a roaring inferno of death, their ghostly columns stealing through it by night to grapple, fight and die in its day gloom, and issue their mangled streams therefrom. Never before in the history of war, have armies fought for principle or for empire over such a field!

Grant has failed either to emerge to the west of the Wilderness or to surprise Lee, while, on the contrary, Lee has confined his antagonist to battle emersed in this wild, where superiority of numbers is reduced to the minimum of advantage, and where his readily available troops can check and hold the Federals while his distant columns there concentrate. Safely ensconced behind their ever-extending works, the Confederates slaughter Grant's host while ob-

-serving his brave soldiery prove them impregnable by gigantic assaults in mass, and by miles of deployed lines, hurled against them almost continuously for more than a month; until, finally, when last ordered to such an assault to be made the following morning, the Federal infantry is observed by a staff officer busy writing names and home addresses on bits of cloth and sewing these to their blouses, so deadly have they proved such work. During this bloody period, the Army of the Potomac, ever failing in frontal attack, is successively swung to its left in repeated attempts to flank the Confederates out of their trenches and place the Federal army between Lee and Richmond. But Lee discovers the purposes of his adversary, and, moving on shorter parallel lines, Grant's advanced columns, in every instance, find themselves against one of these entrenched lines covering strategic road centers, which, once in possession of the Federals, would enable that army to interpose between Lee and his capital and source of supplies, and force him to battle in the open.

Grant's first objective is Lee's army, Richmond being secondary and necessarily incidental to the defeat of the Army of Northern Virginia. If, therefore, Grant can outflank Lee on his right and thus impinge his army between Richmond and her army of defense, Lee will be forced to open battle, where there will be fair promise of a great Federal victory, and the end of the war. With such momentous possibilities in objective, those who think to accuse General Grant of wanton disregard for human life, may coincide with his wise decision to expend that life freely in the delivery of unremitting sledgehammer blows in the endeavor to effect the immediate destruction of Lee's army, rather than to suffer the dangers from Lee's possibilities, to extend over a lengthened period, during which the aggregate expenditure of life and treasure

would, of necessity, be enormously augmented. Sharp, stupendous war is not only decisive, but it is also preeminently humane!

From May 5th to the close of the 7th, terrible battle rages. But Lee establishes and maintains his front so forcefully that Grant is well-nigh defeated. But instead of retreat, he begins a series of flank or turning movements to his left to turn Lee's right and force him to open battle cut off from Richmond.

While the Wilderness has been a field of success to the Army of Northern Virginia, it has proved fatal to two of its most able and renowned generals. Almost on the spot where Jackson received his death wound in the Battle of Chancellorsville, Longstreet is now so seriously wounded as to incapacitate him for duty for many months, when his determined skill of war is most needed.

The following brief pen portraits were recorded by one present at this time:

“After the close of the main fighting on the 7th, there is an interval of comparative quiet which is improved for rest, not alone by the troops, but by those who direct them. An eye-witness records this scene at headquarters: “The lieutenant-general, at the foot of a tree, one leg of his trousers slipped above his boot, his hand limp, his coat in confusion, his sword equipments sprawling on the ground; not even the weight of sleep erases that persistent expression of the lip which held a constant promise of something to be done. General Meade at the foot of another tree — a military hat, with the rim turned down about the ears, tapping a scabbard with his fingers, and gazing abstractedly into the depths of the earth through eye-glasses that should become historic. General Humphreys — Meade's chief-of-staff — a spectacled, iron-gray, middle-aged officer, of a pleasant smile and manner, who wears his trousers in

the manner of leggings, and is in all things independent and serene, paces yonder, to and fro. That rather thickset officer, with close trimmed whiskers, and the kindest eyes, who never becomes harsh or impatient to any comer, is Adjutant-General Williams. General Hunt, chief of artillery, a hearty-faced, frank-handed man, whose black hair and whiskers show the least touch of time, lounges at the foot of another tree, holding lazy converse with some of his staff. General Ingalls, chief quartermaster of the army, than whom no more imperturbable, efficient, or courteous presence is here, plays idly and smilingly with a riding whip, tossing a telling word or two hither and thither. Staff officers and orderlies and horses thickly strew the grove. Plans have been made and are ready to be issued at dusk which will put the great Federal host in secreted night march to the left, hoping to flank Lee. An occasional stray shell, searching the woods, scarcely disturbs the quiet and repose."

### SPOTTSYLVANIA

Failing to overcome Lee, Grant during the night of May 7th slips his first turning column southward past the rear of his battle lines, headed for Spottsylvania Court House, which strategic point will give him command of the roads on Lee's right flank and force his army onto exterior lines, leaving the shorter roads to Grant. This will tend to force Lee into the open where he can be fought with advantage. But Lee has not been asleep. His battalions are also hastening southward over more direct roads, and are found intrenched at Spottsylvania, ready to deliver their leaden compliments to the approaching Federal advance. On the 8th, the great battle of Spottsylvania opens, continuing almost incessantly and with the utmost fury until the 19th. The desperate nature of this contest may

be judged by the losses therein suffered. Grant's losses are 17,723 men, of whom the killed and wounded number 15,722.

Reports, which are fragmentary and incomplete, place the loss of the army of Northern Virginia at about 10,000 men.

The numerical sacrifice of human life, however, terrible as it is, does not equal the loss to the Federal army of one life which has issued from its ranks on its long furlough. Major-General John Sedgwick, one of its main bulwarks for years, the loved commander and father of the old reliable Sixth Corps, is among the dead. Smiling encouragement to some of his men new to battle, whom he saw dodging the bullets that whizzed past, he had just remarked, jokingly: "Soldiers, don't dodge bullets. Why, they can't hit an elephant at this distance." At that instant a veteran officer at his side heard the familiar thud of a bullet, and turned to remark it to Sedgwick, who at that moment gave him a smile and fell into his arms dead, shot through the head. No braver soldier than John Sedgwick ever commanded soldiers. Easily competent to all demands, he was ever cool, reliable and safe. Where he commanded superior attention was unnecessary, and he had molded the grand old Sixth Corps into a living colossus to give and take the shock of battle with steady calmness. Every atom of his being a soldier, he lacked only personal ambition to carry him to supreme command over the army he loved and graced; for Sedgwick had the honor of declining the command of the Army of the Potomac. Perhaps, also, his abounding good sense and clear judgment dictated him wisely in this, else his keen sense of duty might have overstepped his modesty and sense and led him to place his marked generalship at the mercy of the hampering fate which dwarfed and bound that requisite in most of the

commanders of the army until Grant assumed command on conditions of freedom. A Confederate General said of Sedgwick: "He has two mourners, his friends and his foe."

General Wright assumes command of the sad-hearted Sixth Corps, which never lost the impress of its revered father, Sedgwick.

During the battle of Spottsylvania one of the two instances of hand-to-hand combats fought by considerable masses during the war was waged most desperately at times for days. This occurred at a great salient in Lee's line, which by the valorous carnage there wrought, was made famous as the "Bloody Angle." At this angle, massed divisions, one after another, charged the breastworks defended by like deployed and massed divisions. Fifty thousand Federals engaged in its assault and defense against the defense and assault of Rodes, Ramseur, Gordon, McGowan, Perrin and Harris aided by two battalions of artillery. The line of works was taken and retaken, until living columns, moving to death, charged over the works amply graded on either side by piled dead. During this lengthened slaughter, the fighting lines frequently hugged the opposite sides of the works, over which muskets were thrust and discharged into the faces of the enemy; or, leaping upon the intrenchments, the bayonet and clubbed musket supplanted the execution of hurled lead, while at every opportunity the waiting guns plowed and enfiladed the rushing masses and lines of flesh and blood; yet these giants of war were the peaceful, kind hearted, laughing American boys of everyday home life. What potencies lie in wait in the average American!



## MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH ANNA RIVER

While Lee is maintaining the integrity of his position at Spottsylvania, Grant, forced to make a movement to his left, attempts to outwit the Confederate commander by detaching the Second Corps, which he sends toward Richmond a distance of some twenty miles, as a bait which he hopes Lee will attempt to gather before reinforcement may arrive to its aid. Hancock is to be rescued by an attack from the remainder of the army before Lee can intrench; or should he fail to seek Hancock, the latter will become the advance of a flank or turning movement. It is thought that Lee cannot escape being gored on one or the other horn of this baited dilemma.

Hancock, therefore, moves out on the night of May 20th, heading for Milford Station, on the Fredericksburg Railway, ordered to attack any hostiles he may encounter, and to take position on the right bank of the Mattaponi River. During the night of the 21st, other portions of the Federal army are secretly set in motion following Hancock. But Lee gains information of this movement, and parallels it with a portion of his troops, to be followed by the entire army on the 22d. On the 23d, the Confederate army is concentrated about Hanover Junction, where it is reinforced by some nine thousand veteran troops, including Pickett's famous division, now fully rehabilitated.

But General Lee is not so eager for Hancock's Corps as he is to interpose between the Federal army and Richmond, at the same time covering one of the main arteries of Confederate supply, the Virginia Central Railroad. By his movement to Hanover Junction he renders Hancock's movement abortive and compels Grant's direct attention.

After leaving the Wilderness country at Spottsylvania, the *terrain* is open, rolling, well intersected by roads.



This enables the Federal commander to observe closely the Confederate movements while concealing his distant corps. These are put in motion with instructions to follow Lee's movement and bring him to battle.

The Confederate army, meanwhile, has intrenched itself on the south bank of the North Anna River where, on the 23d, it is found occupying a strong line some three miles in length along the cord in a bend of the river against which both of its flanks rest. In fact, Lee is fully prepared and waiting for Grant, with infantry and artillery in position and well covered by works, while at all river crossings he is strongly fortified and in force. His position in general conforms to the bend of the river. This convex shape compels Grant to extend his front and widely separate the wings of his army—conditions not unlike those at Gettysburg, with the position of armies reversed and a river in front of the Federal line. The 24th is spent by Grant in continuing to develop the Confederate position, and at all points tested it is reported too strong to attack by the considerable columns pushed forward in these reconnoissances. After considering these discoveries General Grant determines that Lee's position is too formidable for attack, and prepares for another flank movement to his left. But in order to confuse Lee, a division of Federal cavalry is sent out on the 26th, to demonstrate on the Confederate left and to damage the Virginia Central Railroad, as though to clear the way for a Federal movement by the right. Lee's position is so strong, and the conditions are so inviting, that, observing the reluctance of Grant, the Confederate commander has prepared to attack the divided Federal army, and is only prevented by a sudden illness.

The series of minor engagements incident to the close proximity of the hostile armies mark the movement to the North Anna with a Federal loss of some 2,100 men,

killed, wounded and missing. If the Confederates suffered in proportion, their loss must have been about one thousand men.

### CAVALRY OPERATIONS

On the 9th of May General Sheridan is ordered from Aldrich, on the Orange and Fredericksburg Railway, to pass Lee's right, destroy the Virginia Central Railway, then adventure against and if possible into the defenses of Richmond, and if necessary to push on to Haxall's Landing on the James River and there to take supplies and make his way back to the main army. In the penetration of the enemy's territory, Sheridan passes Lee's right, crosses the North Anna River out of reach of hostile infantry, and now encounters Stuart. Sheridan continues his advance while these two superb cavalry commanders maintain a running fight day after day, during which great damage is done to the Confederate railways, their locomotives and rolling stock, and large quantities of stores are destroyed.

Stuart operates not only to defeat Sheridan in battle, but also to force him away from Richmond. With these purposes in view, he concentrates at Yellow Tavern, on the Brock pike, six miles from Richmond. Here, on the 11th, Sheridan attacks and routs his brigades. In this contest severe losses are suffered on both sides, and the Confederates cavalry suffers the loss of its leader, General Stuart. General Lee said of this great cavalry leader: "Stuart never left me ignorant of the enemy."

Pursuing the Confederate squadrons as they retire toward Richmond, Sheridan's troopers pass within the outer defenses of the Confederate capital, being the first and last Federal troops to perform that feat until the Army of Northern Virginia, its impregnable defense for four years, was no more. Demonstrating against Richmond, in aid of



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a movement of the Army of the James against that city from the south, Sheridan arrives at Haxall's Landing, where he remains until the 17th, when he starts out to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, arriving within its lines, near Hanover Junction, on the 24th.

#### COÖPERATIVE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE JAMES

The Army of the James, under command of Major-General Ben. F. Butler, consists of two corps, the Tenth, under General Gillmore, and the Eighteenth, commanded by General Wm. F. Smith, with a cavalry division under General Kautz.

This army numbers, in infantry . . . . .	31,872 men.
Guns, 82 . . . . .	2,126 men.
Cavalry, 6 guns . . . . .	4,701 men.
—	—
Total, 88 guns . . . . .	38,699 men.

In General Butler is found one of the most eminent examples of the "Political General" in high command during the Civil War. At the outbreak of the war, as an ambitious politician of the Democratic Party in Massachusetts, he quickly secured rank as a major-general, although he was a lawyer without experience or knowledge of the art of war. He first secured independent command in the riotous city of Baltimore and later at Big Bethel where, in June, 1861, in an insignificant skirmish, he was ignominiously beaten, due to lack of plan or soldierly knowledge. By issuing his famous order referring to the negroes as "Contraband of war," he attempted at the very outset of his adventure in the field of war to make our great national conflict serve his personal political ambitions. Later in the same year Butler commanded at New Orleans after the

taking of that city by Farragut, and administered in such manner as to win for him the lasting hatred of its inhabitants and the suspiciously derisive smile of all others who became acquainted with the real history of his administration.

We next find him in chief command of the Army of the James. Among his subordinates are General Gillmore, a West Point man, and General Wm. F. Smith, who, from a staff officer at Bull Run, has won his way first to the command of divisions in McClellan's campaigns and battles, then to the command of a corps under Burnside at Fredericksburg; and was with Grant in the great battle of Missionary Ridge, at Chattanooga, acting to assist greatly in making possible that great Federal victory. Brigadier Alfred H. Terry, in command of one of Butler's Tenth Corps divisions, also deserves special mention. A lawyer before the war, he had taken a lively interest in military matters. Entering the army at the outbreak of hostilities, during the first year he had won to the command of a regiment for his action in the capture of a Confederate stronghold. Then as brigadier, during 1862-63, he served in the operations about Charleston, winning such distinction for soldierly ability and gallantry that he is now found in command of a division in the Army of the James. Later, Grant will select him to command the second, and successful expedition against Fort Fisher, the first having ignominiously failed under the personal command of Butler. Terry's brilliant victory at Fort Fisher wins him promotion to a brigadier's rank in the Regular Army. He captures Wilmington, commands a military department after the war, and becomes a major-general in 1886.

Another man who became a magnificent soldier and won his way to high command simply by his soldierly

ability, without the material aid of politics, was John A. Logan. Fighting at the first Bull Run in a minor grade, he was promoted to a colonelcy, and won his knowledge of war through successive grades until, finally, Sherman found him competent to command the Army of the Tennessee during his unparalleled campaign from Atlanta to the Sea, and from there North.

In the Confederate army were like spirits. John B. Gordon first entered the army as captain of a unique company of wild Georgia mountaineers. Under Lee he advanced through the various grades until, as a lieutenant-general, he became noted as, perhaps, the most energetic and daring commander in the Army of Northern Virginia, Jackson and Stuart excepted. Political preferment succeeded his soldierly achievements. Logan forgot the politician in the soldier. Gordon and Terry were types of the non-political citizen-soldier. The three well serve as examples of soldierly men, laudably ambitious, but declining to use other than their developed ability for command wherewith to gain command. They were too honest, patriotic, and wise to seek positions which they were not competent to fill — and in which they would do great harm, both to their cause, and to themselves, by the certain display of their incapacity. General Sherman bespoke a requisite of war in saying: "I want officers who know how to and will obey orders."

In great war, our armies will ever be composed of citizen-soldiers. Hence it is not amiss that we give the points here introduced earnest thought in order that the experience of the past shall guide us in the future; that it shall lead the people to aid their President-commander-in-chief in this direction, by requiring that none but educated soldiers and those who have first won in the profession of arms shall be commissioned as generals in our armies. Let



the citizen demand, in this respect, so fortify the Executive against the politician that, in future, generalship such as Smith's, Gillmore's and Terry's shall not be used as a stepping-stone by incompetent ambition!

Grant had informed Butler that his objective was Richmond, and had instructed him to move the Army of the James on May 4th and to take and intrench City Point on the James River. From thence Butler is to operate on the south side of the James against Richmond from the south, cooperating with the Army of the Potomac advancing from the north, and is to act so aggressively that reinforcements from the defenses of Richmond cannot be sent to Lee. In doing this, he is closely to invest that city on the south, gaining ground to his left until his flank shall rest on the James above Richmond, if possible. There the Army of the Potomac will connect with that of the James if the former succeeds in throwing Lee back from his capital. If not successful in this, the two armies will unite to the east of Richmond.

On the morning of the 6th Butler disembarks his army from transports at Bermuda Hundred, the next day advancing some five miles and intrenching. On the 5th General Kautz, with his cavalry, sets out from Suffolk, Va., to cut the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad and delay its traffic of supplies and troops to Richmond. Moving rapidly, on the 6th Kautz cuts the Norfolk and Petersburg Railway and the telegraph line. On the 7th his troopers destroy a bridge on the Weldon Railway at Stony Creek, where he learns that three trainloads of Confederate troops have just passed north, and that five more trains are due there the same evening. Destroying another bridge over the Nottoway Creek, Kautz arrives at City Point on the 10th, as his force is not adequate to contend with the Confederates gathering to defend the railways. But the de-

struction of the bridges delays the arrival of reinforcements to Beauregard, in command of the defenses of Richmond, until the 12th.

The force available to oppose Butler's 38,699 men and 88 guns consists of 6,000 men and a few guns, more or less intrenched. On the 7th Kautz develops the fact that Beauregard is receiving reinforcements, and Butler has sent his cavalry on raid for the very purpose of interrupting their arrival. By the 11th, these reinforcements have arrived to increase Beauregard's force to 19,000 men; and, on the 15th, it numbers 24,000 men exclusive of those held in the defenses of Richmond.

Butler's landing is effected as a surprise, and, under the circumstances, necessarily in front of a weakly guarded point; while along his near front run lines of communication vital to the Confederates. Yet, instead of promptly sending out a reconnoissance in force with ready support to make and hold lodgment, one brigade marches out and back, reporting the enemy, whereupon Butler lies safe until the 9th, though it is confirmed that reinforcements are arriving. His opponent thus has ample time in which to gather an effective defense, if not to take the offensive and neutralize the Army of the James, for it is intrenched across a narrow neck in a sharp bend of the river, where a minimum force with artillery, counter-fortified, can hold these much-needed tens-of-thousands useless.

The left of Butler's intrenched line rests on the Appomattox River. Both Gillmore and Smith now urge him to cross that stream with sufficient force to operate to the south of Petersburg, to the destruction of the railways Kautz has damaged, thus cutting off reinforcements while he captures Petersburg, itself, before sufficient reinforcements can arrive to offer a successful resistance. The probabilities are all in favor of this operation, the vital

importance of which, the possession of Petersburg, is later proved by a year of ceaseless siege and battle by the combined armies of the Potomac and James. But Butler, unable to comprehend that Grant's instructions will be more effectively followed, and the enemy more effectually weakened by this larger operation, advised by Smith and Gillmore, on the 12th again moves out against the Railway, and by the 15th has his army facing the Confederate defense to the south of Richmond, ready to assault. But when thus in position, there are no troops available with which to make the proposed attack, for the enemy has been given ample time to gather a formidable force behind their ready outer defenses about Richmond. Butler has counted on the cooperation of Admiral Lee's flotilla, moving up the James to engage the powerful Confederate batteries on commanding bluffs along its course, the destruction of which is imperative to the safety of the right flank of the land force. But his plan places the army beyond help from the navy, mainly on account of the difference between the depth of the river and the draft of the vessels.

The commander of the Army of the James now finds himself confronted by a force of some 24,000 infantry, artillery, and cavalry, protected by a formidable line of works which completely command the open country along its front. From his safe position Beauregard can safely issue an attack against his opponent's weak line, especially so on the right, a mile from the river and without strong ground to rest upon. And further, the Army of the James has become so reduced by detachments, in the main useless, that it is practically equaled in numbers by the Confederates ensconced behind their impregnable works. Butler has therefore succeeded in defeating himself before he has had a chance to fire or receive a shot, and Beauregard has only to overcome the dispersed resistance of an equal number of

dispirited men whose main thought is how best to extricate themselves from the trap their commander has finally succeeded in setting for them. In order to understand more completely the position in which this unfortunate army finds itself, it is only necessary to examine the field to determine that Butler cannot assault Drury's Bluff with his right. He cannot turn the Confederate position, nor scarcely make a feint attack; while he cannot fall back to Bermuda Hundred, or any other position, without abandonment of his campaign against Richmond before he has fired a shot, even if able to withdraw his army without disaster. Butler has already bound and chained himself from offensive action. Had he moved as Smith and Gillmore urged, immediately following the intrenchment of his position at Bermuda Hundred, Petersburg must have fallen into his hands if assailed with skill and energy, six thousand men being the only force available for its defense at that time. With this strategic point in his possession, a small fraction of his army behind its prepared defenses could have held in check many times their number arriving from the south, even as Lee held Grant later, leaving the large portion of the Army of the James free to more closely invest Richmond on the south, and to extend its line to the James, above that city, as Grant had proposed. This done, Butler would have then also cut the Richmond and Danville Railway, entering Richmond from the southwest, thus completely isolating Richmond and with it Lee's army from most direct communication with the south, their source of supplies and reinforcement.

Observing the Army of the James in its anomalous position, and fearful that Sheridan may return and operate to the north of Richmond, Beauregard makes ready to attack Butler's right on the following day, with the purpose of cutting his army off from its base at Bermuda Hundred

and capturing it. For this purpose he has 22,000 men with artillery and cavalry. A bright moonlight on the night of the 15th facilitates the movement of the Confederates into position. But as day wakens a dense fog rises so blinding that anything like certainty of movement is impossible. Advancing, however, the Confederates strike Smith's exposed flank, and, after a long and stubborn resistance in the darkness, he retires his right, fearing that it will be completely turned. The fog finally lifts, and the disorganized lines of the combatants are reorganized, when the battle is renewed along the entire line, continuing with varying success well into the afternoon. But Beauregard is not successful in cutting the Federals off from their base, as one of his divisions fails to come into action against Smith's right. This enables the Army of the James to maintain its integrity until evening, when Butler withdraws behind his intrenchments across the neck of Bermuda Hundred. Beauregard counter-fortifies, and Butler is "bottled up," as Grant pertinently remarks. In drawing his line close in, Beauregard brings on a sharp engagement the result of which is to completely seal the country outside of his "bottle" to the general commanding the Army of the James.

The sum total of Butler's campaign, in benefit to the Federal war, is the part performed by Kautz with his cavalry, acting independent of other than general orders; for he has done much temporary damage to railways and destroyed large quantities of Confederate stores. As a priceless offset to this repairable loss, the Army of the James is reduced by 4,200 men, killed, wounded and missing while the Confederates lose 2,884 men from the same causes. Besides this fatality to life, Butler's failure has cost his government far more than the material loss he has inflicted on the Confederacy. After the war Butler in Con-

gress engages to kill off some of Grant's paroled Confederates, until notice is given by Grant that the parole given by him "shall be held inviolate if another war is necessary to uphold it." General Pickett is among those who are thus safeguarded. Such was Ben. Butler, as a general and man.

On the 22d, Grant learns of Butler's fiasco and thereupon orders him to retain sufficient troops to hold City Point, and to send the remainder, under Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac. It becomes necessary for Grant to repeat this order on the 25th, in which he directs that Smith embark at once and land his troops at White House on the Pamunkey River. Taking Brookes' division of his own corps, and those of Devens and Ames, of the Tenth, Smith embarks 16,000 men, sixteen guns, and a squadron of cavalry on the 29th. Butler retains 10,000 infantry and 4,600 cavalry. Beauregard holds 9,000 infantry and a small brigade of cavalry with which to hold Butler within his bottle, and sends the remainder of his force to Lee, Pickett's division among them.

On the evening of May 26th, the Army of the Potomac begins withdrawal from Lee's front and is on march to cross the Pamunkey River in the vicinity of Hanover Town, thirty miles south, and seventeen from Richmond. The advance, Russell's division of the Second Corps, is curtailed by Sheridan's cavalry on its forced march to Hanover Town. The final withdrawal of the Federal army is effected in the intense darkness of the night of the 27th, and it is hoped, without the knowledge of the enemy. At 9 A. M. of the same day Sheridan has reported that his cavalry occupies Hanover Town, with detachments along the road as far as Atlee's Station, on the Virginia Central Railway, ten miles from Richmond. Meeting with slight resistance, Russell reports his division across the Pamunkey.



This movement of the Army of the Potomac is evidently of vital importance for the nearness of Hanover Town to Richmond prevents further left flank operations by Grant to impinge between Lee and his capital, if this one proves unsuccessful. This is, then, in the nature of the final movement of the campaign, unless results of the fierce battle which under these conditions, must be fought here, compel its continuance into a second stage. The probability of a desperate battle being waged here lends special interest to the prospective field. Within its natural compass, several considerable streams meander through numerous swampy stretches. This feature gives additional importance to the main pikes and network of connecting roads. The principal pike from Lee's position on the North Anna, coursing to White House on the Pamunkey, intersects Hanover Town. The latter place either commands or threatens the principal roads into Richmond. If Grant can occupy and hold command of these roads, he finally will have accomplished his purpose to outflank and throw Lee back from Richmond, defeat him, in all probability, and hold the Confederate capital at his mercy; if, indeed, such a result does not close the war. That Grant will do his utmost to accomplish, and Lee to defeat, this scheme is a certainty, and the grapple will be terrific.

Near noon of the 28th, Wright's Sixth Corps has passed the Pamunkey, and is in position across the Hanover Court House road at Crump's Creek. Closely following, the Second Corps forms on the left of the Sixth, completing the covering of this road to Haw's Shop. The Fifth Corps is in position with its right on the railroad two miles in front of Hanover Town, and its left contiguous to the Totopotomoy crossing of the road from Haw's Shop to Old Church. At midnight the Ninth Corps crosses the



Pamunkey at Hanover Court House, Wilson's cavalry remaining on its north bank until the morning of the 30th, to cover the crossing of the trains.

On the morning of the 28th, Sheridan demonstrates from Hanover Town toward Richmond, and beyond Haw's Shop encounters the Confederates in force and lightly intrenched. A hard-fought combat lasts until evening, when the Confederates are driven back. From prisoners Sheridan learns that the corps of Longstreet, now commanded by Anderson, and that of Ewell are four miles from Haw's Shop: hence Lee's army is up in force, and Grant did not quit Hanover Junction unobserved, as he had hoped to.

On the morning of the 27th, Lee becomes convinced that the Army of the Potomac is withdrawing and in movement southward. He therefore sends his cavalry in the direction of Hanover Town to peer the enemy's movements, and began to move his army to Ashland, fourteen miles north of Richmond, an important road center. During the afternoon of the 28th Ewell's Corps, now under Early, has marched twenty-eight miles and is now in position at Hartley's Corners, at the intersection of the roads from Hanover Town and Richmond, his right on Beaver Dam Creek near Mechanicsville, his left on the Totopotomoy, four miles from Haw's Shop. Here Early faces the Federal Fifth Corps. Meanwhile, Anderson's Corps has taken position on the right of Early between Huntley's and Walnut Grove Church, covering the road from White House on the Pamunkey, via Mechanicsville to Richmond. Hill's Corps, with Breckinridge, extends from Early's left across the railway a mile north of Atlee's Station. Lee's cavalry is at Haw's Shop and Hanover Court House. Lee, therefore, is covering the very roads the Army of the Potomac is on, and Grant has again failed to outflank him. These masterful commanders, then, have again moved and ar-

rayed their hosts for battle, and in positions which both must exhaust every means to secure.

General Grant, never given to temporizing measures or to procrastination, on the morning of the 29th orders the commanders of the Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps to reconnoiter their fronts, supporting with their entire forces. Warren, with the Fifth, pushes out on the Shady Grove Church road; Hancock, over the roads from Haw's Shop, via Atlee's Station toward Richmond, and Wright, with the Sixth, moves toward Hanover Court House. The Ninth Corps with Burnside, is in reserve near Haw's Shop. Sheridan, with the divisions of Torbert and Gregg, is on the left of the army in observation on the roads to Mechanicsville, Cold Harbor and White House. The leading division of the Fifth Corps — Russell's — meets with strong opposition in its advance to Hanover Court House. Barlow, wounded at Gettysburg, now of Hancock's Corps, meets only outposts until he reaches the railway crossing of the Totopotomoy, where he encounters the Confederates in force, intrenched, and the skirmishers hotly engage. Birney is advanced to extend Barlow's right; while, on the morning of the 30th, Gibbon's division moves up on his left, and to the left of the Richmond road. The Second Corps is in front of the Confederate right, consisting of Anderson's Corps, the left of Early's, and Breckenridge. Griffin, leading Warren's advance along the Shady Grove Church road, encounters infantry pickets, which retire. Cutler's division moves up in support of Griffin. The Ninth Corps is held in reserve between the Fifth and Sixth.

The reconnoissance has developed the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia is in Grant's front and strongly intrenched, ready to contest the right of way over the roads along which the Army of the Potomac is moving toward Richmond in order to engage Lee's army, Grant's objective.

During the respite before the grapple it is enlightening of army life to note a group of officers gathered at an impromptu dinner after days of separation amidst war's jeopardies. They are in the shade of a bit of woods between the hostile batteries. Growing jolly, as befitting the occasion, they fill the air with Federal war songs, which causes the Confederate gunners to send their compliments searching the trees above for the songsters. Nor do these birds cease warbling until compelled by their own artillerymen beyond, who are receiving most of the Confederate tokens of regret over not being invited.

#### THE BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR

On May 30th Barlow's skirmishers open another great battle of the series. Grant moves his infantry close in to the Confederate line, and directs Wright to move up on Hancock's right, from Hanover Court House, and endeavor to place his corps across Lee's left flank. The Sixth Corps, in executing this order, finds itself in swampy tangles which hold it from arriving to do effective work on Hancock's right during the day. Meanwhile skirmishers of the latter capture the enemy's intrenched skirmish line, while batteries are being placed which silence Lee's guns.

Burnside has a sharp skirmish while moving the Ninth Corps into position; but by evening he is established across the Totopotomoy; his right resting on that stream near the Whitlock House, his left near the Shady Grove Church road. Warren, advancing on his road with Griffin's division supported by Crawford and Cutler, drives the Confederate skirmishers until they pass a stretch of swampy ground behind which Early's Corps is intrenched in the vicinity of Huntley's Corners, on the Old Church and Mechanicsville pike. Warren's advance is in ceaseless skirmish with cavalry, and from this it is reasoned that Lee's

infantry is not in his front. But Early has moved his right along this same road to Bethesda Church, and is, this afternoon, across Warren's flank, who has but one brigade in support of his skirmishers. When his advance reaches Bethesda Church it is assailed and quickly driven by Rodes' division, which follows the Federals to Shady Grove Church. Here the fire of a Federal battery checks the Confederates until the remaining brigades of Crawford and Cutler arrive and repulse Rodes after a stubborn combat. Early's brigades then withdraw a short distance covering the Mechanicsville road. To relieve Warren, Hancock advances Barlow at 7 p. m., and gallant Brooke, ever ready and able, attacks through the darkness with his brigade. His advance is over obstacles which, says Hancock, "would have stopped a less energetic commander," and at 7:40 he has captured the enemy's first line of rifle-pits, when Meade orders the attack to cease.

When Early advanced against Warren's left, Anderson's Corps assumed its vacated position at Huntley's Corners. Lee is thus massing heavily on his right, evidently with purpose to throw back Grant's left and drive him away from the roads to Richmond, while the purpose of the latter is exactly the reverse. With such disputants to argue, the debate must be long and heated. Anderson is posted with Pickett's division on his right, Field in his center, and Kershaw on his left. Some cavalry is also on this flank along the road from Old Church to Cold Harbor, near the crossing of the Matedequin. This cavalry is attacked by Sheridan about one o'clock, p. m., and is driven into Cold Harbor. Torbert's division remains and holds the ground within one and one-half miles of this point. Wilson's cavalry division, from the Federal right, is destroying bridges and railroads. At noon of the 30th, Smith's Corps, from Bermuda Hundred, begins to

arrive at White House, on the Pamunkey. The next day he is to move up the south bank of that stream, where his force will be exposed to any sudden dash from the Confederate right. Sheridan, therefore, is directed to keep a sharp lookout toward Cold Harbor and on the Mechanicsville road; also to send a brigade of his cavalry to Smith on the morning of the 31st. Lee, however, does not learn of Smith's arrival until June 1st, when this corps is first met in battle at Cold Harbor.

On the 31st, Grant presses against the Confederate line as close as is possible without bringing on a battle. He finds Lee's position so strong naturally and so formidably intrenched and manned, that an assault is not attempted, but his skirmishers are held close up, and an attack is threatened. Sheridan, finding Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division at Cold Harbor preparing to attack, anticipates him with Torbert's troopers, who possess themselves of that place, where they are reinforced by Gregg's division. Near dark Lee returns with Hoke's infantry division in support, and Sheridan orders his cavalry to withdraw because of lack of ammunition. But Meade directs him to hold the position at all hazards; and Sheridan remains, strengthening his works during the night. General Lee is beginning to press forward with his right, pursuing his purpose to drive the Federal left away from Richmond by gaining possession of the roads vital to Grant's plan of operations to his left. On this same day, Wilson, on the Federal right, gains possession of Hanover Court House, and Sheridan's brigade, sent to White House, returns, reporting that Smith was still disembarking, and that no enemy was found in that direction.

Meanwhile Lee continues secreted preparation on his right. Early's Second Corps is shifted somewhat toward the left, and Anderson's, on Early's right, extends the Con-

federate line still farther in that direction. Hoke's division is on the extreme right, near Cold Harbor, fronting Sheridan, as seen. Kershaw is one mile north, at Beulah Church. Pickett on the left reaches to Walnut Grove Church road, while Field's division holds the left of the First Corps on the Mechanicsville pike. This line is partly intrenched; and from behind it the intention is to launch a movement in force from Anderson's right toward Cold Harbor and Beulah Church, to be made by Hoke and Kershaw on the morning of June 1st.

While Grant knows, through Sheridan, that Hoke is near Cold Harbor, he is not aware that Kershaw is near him, nor that Anderson's Corps has been shifted to Early's right, and in position between Cold Harbor and Beulah Church. The demonstrated strength of Lee's line in front of Hancock compels Grant to seek a vulnerable point; and, being in conformity with the direction of his course and plan, he determines to send two corps to Cold Harbor, and from that point attack the enemy before the latter has time to discover the movement and intrench. Wright, therefore, is ordered from the Federal right to Cold Harbor on the left, fifteen miles distant, and is directed to hasten his march during the night of the 31st, in order to arrive to Sheridan's aid at daylight of June 1st. It is assumed that at that time Lee's cavalry and Hoke's infantry will attack him. The route of the Sixth Corps is through a strange country with intricate roads, which so delay its march that the entire corps is not in position in the vicinity of Cold Harbor until 2 P. M., June 1st.

General Smith lands his Eighteenth Corps of 12,500 men and sixteen guns at White House by 3 P. M. of the 31st; and, leaving Ames with 2,500 men to guard that landing, he is at Bassett's, near Old Church, with 10,000 men and all his artillery, by ten o'clock the same night. The



next morning he receives an erroneous order from Grant's headquarters which takes him to New Castle Ferry, instead of to Cold Harbor, as is meant, and where he is expected to take position between the Fifth and Sixth Corps. This mistake causes him to lose five hours, besides subjecting his already weary troops to many miles of extra and rushed marching; and as yet the Eighteenth Corps is not toughened to the pace of the Army of the Potomac.

In the meantime Wright is still distant from Sheridan, who is left alone to hold Cold Harbor against an overpowering force. On the morning of June 1st, Hoke, who is in contact with Sheridan, does not attack, but Kershaw, coming later to this work with two brigades, is repulsed by the rapid fire from the new repeating carbines of Sheridan's troopers and from his artillery. This gives Sheridan a respite until nine o'clock, when Wright's Corps begins to arrive. He then moves off toward the Chickahominy River to cover the Federal left. Sheridan has made a fine display of the unique use of American cavalry, intrenched and holding ground against infantry and artillery. Observing Wright's heavy columns in their front, Kershaw, Pickett and Field close in to their right on Hoke, with Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry beyond Hoke on the extreme right. Warren, seeing this movement of Anderson's troops in his left-front and beyond, deploys two divisions, with orders from Meade to attack. But these troops are delayed by swampy ground, Anderson's movement is completed with his brigades behind formidable intrenchments before Warren arrives to assault, and it is abandoned.

At 2 P. M. the Sixth Corps is all up and in position covering the roads to Cold Harbor from Bethesda Church, New Bridge and Despatch Station, near the Chickahominy, on the York River Railway. At six o'clock Smith is also



in position on the right of the Sixth Corps, and has orders to cooperate with Wright in his proposed attack. Grant is thus established at the strategic point, Cold Harbor, which would have easily been in Lee's possession had Hoke, supported by Kershaw, attacked Sheridan with promptness and vigor early in the morning.

After nearly four days spent in observing, fencing, skirmishing and adjustment, the foot-weary hostiles have ceased marching and are in readiness to grapple in fierce battle. The full-manned lines are but fourteen hundred yards apart, with open ground between. The Confederate skirmish line is in a strip of wood some three hundred and fifty yards in advance of their main line, which crosses the road from Cold Harbor to the Richmond road. Hoke's division, the Confederate right, has its left resting near this road, Kershaw on his left, then Pickett and Field. Opposed to these divisions of Anderson's Corps, the Sixth Federal is arrayed — Ricketts' division on the road from Cold Harbor to the Richmond pike, defended by Hoke. Russell is to the left of Ricketts, then Getty's division — Neill commanding — with Neill's brigade on the extreme left, and refused. Smith, with the Eighteenth Corps, connects with the right of the Sixth in the order of Brookes, Devens, and Martindale, the last division refused and holding the road from Bethesda Church toward Mechanicsville. At 6 p. m. Wright and Smith advance against a heavy musketry and artillery fire, and Ricketts penetrates the Confederate line through a slight gap left between Hoke and Kershaw. He carries the main line of intrenchments, compelling Anderson to send aid, when a new line is formed in rear to cover the breach. Russell and Neill maintain alignment with Ricketts, Russell's right brigade, entering the breach with Ricketts' men; but Neill's left does not become heavily engaged. The Eighteenth Corps

at the same time crosses the open ground under a heavy fire, captures the enemy's advanced line in the wood, and charges up close to the main works. Finding these too strong to carry, the assailants retire and hold the line in the wood, which they immediately strengthen. Smith's right, across the Beulah Church road near the church, has its skirmishers and artillery ceaselessly engaged during the remainder of the 1st.

This initial advantage to the Federals, however, has cost them heavily: the Sixth Corps, in killed and wounded, 1,200 men; the Eighteenth, 1,000. In the afternoon, Hancock is ordered to march during the early night in order to reinforce Wright's left in the morning, when it is proposed to make a general attack along the entire front of the army. Wright and Smith are to act in conjunction; Warren will attack supported by Burnside. But Smith is out of ammunition; and his troops, unaccustomed to long marches and quick succeeding battle, are exhausted from their exaggerated march from White House and their splendid fighting. In consequence, the attack is postponed till 5 A. M. on the 2d.

Sheridan, relieved by Wright at Cold Harbor, takes position farther to the left, guarding that flank of the army. Wilson, on the right, has had a sharp engagement with a large force of Confederate cavalry under General Wade Hampton, now commander-in-chief of Lee's cavalry in place of Stuart. Hampton is wounded, but drives Wilson, who leaves behind two railway bridges and considerable track destroyed.

During the night bonfires and cheering break out along a section of the Confederate line, when Grant learning the cause, remarks to Ingalls, "Why can't we light up too?" Soon corresponding fires blaze along the Federal front helping Pickett's men celebrate the birth of an heir to their

loved commander. In due time a silver service goes through the lines marked, George E. Pickett, Jr., from U. S. Grant, Ingalls and others.

On the morning of the 2d, Warren extends his left to connect with Smith, and contracts his right until it rests near Bethesda Church, doing this in such manner as to leave one-half of his corps available for attack. His position has a development of about three miles, by using artillery to form his left and by utilizing the numerous swamps of the Matedequin. Burnside withdraws and masses the Ninth Corps in Warren's right-rear. Wilson covers the right of the Federal line, operating from Bethesda Church to the Pamunkey against the main body of Lee's cavalry. Sheridan has in his front on the left Fitzhugh Lee's division. Hancock's night march has been delayed by intricate roads, heat and dust, to such an extent that his columns arrive at Cold Harbor at about 6:30 on the morning of the 2d. At 7.30 A. M., after a brief rest and breakfast, they are in line, having formed under a brisk skirmish fire. Gibbon is across the road from Cold Harbor to Despatch Station, Barlow on his left. Birney's Division is left with Smith. A slight shifting of divisions is made in the Sixth and Eighteenth Corps, all of which goes on under a lively fire of skirmishers.

Grant has thus shifted his army somewhat to his left and has it in position ready to attack. But a month of ceaseless fighting by day followed by night marches begins to affect his troops who are operating in the increasing heat. The attack proposed for 5 A. M. on the 2d is therefore postponed to 4.30 A. M. on the 3d, the corps commanders meanwhile making every preparation to be ready.

Nor has General Lee been idle, for, observing the Federal movement to the left, he has also extended and massed

heavily on his right. Beginning on the morning of the 2d, Breckenridge moves into position on high ground to the right of Hoke; while Wilcox and Mahone, of Anderson's Corps, extend the line beyond Breckinridge. Fitz. Lee crosses the Chickahominy, guarding toward the James River. Kershaw, on Hoke's left, is supported by the brigades of Law and Gregg, of Field's division. This re-adjustment leaves Early with his corps and Heth's division on the left of the army. The position is intrenched during the day under a heavy skirmish and artillery fire.

General Lee now attempts an offensive plan of his own. He orders Early to fall upon the Federal right flank while it is in motion, then to drive southward in front of the Confederate line, sweeping the Federals before him. The division of Rodes is accordingly moved out on the Shady Grove Church road, Heth following to take position on his left, while Gordon swings round to his right, keeping pace with Rodes. This operation finds Burnside still in movement under cover of his skirmishers yet occupying the corps intrenchments. These are driven and many captured by Rodes, who also gains the rear of the Fifth Corps, where he takes many prisoners.

The Fifth Corps has thinly manned its line in order to form its column of attack, as already mentioned. This has left Cutler and Crawford to cover the corps front of three miles from Bethesda Church to Smith's right. Griffin's division, however, is massed at the Church; and, quickly deploying, he attacks and forces Rodes back along the road of his advance. In this sharp encounter, Rodes loses one of his most valued brigadiers, General Doles. Heth is held in check by Chittenden's division, aided by Potter and Wilcox, all of the Ninth Corps.

Lee's flank attack is thus foiled, and Early's troops intrench on the Shady Grove Church road, Ramseur's divi-

sion holding the intrenchments as far as Anderson's left.

After a night's rest, and all in readiness, the entire Federal army, excepting Sheridan's cavalry, is ordered to advance and attack Lee's position at 4.30 on the morning of the 3d. Wilson, on the right, has been reinforced by two thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry, just up from Port Royal. But this addition to his force is reduced to an effective of one thousand of each arm by the exhaustion of a continuous march of twenty-eight hours. Wilson is to move from Hanover Court House and assail Lee's left and rear.

In not distant proximity the Army of Northern Virginia is ready behind its intrenchments. Hancock's Corps is formed with front of two divisions in double line; Barlow on the left, Gibbon on the right, with Birney in support. Barlow deploys his division with the brigades of Miles and Brooke in the first line, with Byrnes and McDougall in the second. Gibbon's first line consists of the brigades of Tyler and Smith, deployed; while McKean and Owens form the second line in close columns of regiments. This gives the Second Corps column of attack a development of four brigades front in double line, with a division in reserve serving as the third line. The Sixth Corps is formed with a front of three divisions; Russell on the left, Ricketts in the center, and Neill on the right. These formations are not for attack to be made by a single column over a long distance, as was Pickett's at Gettysburg but for general assault along an army front. In front of these two Federal corps, where Lee expects to receive the heaviest blows, he has massed many of his most famed brigades and divisions to oppose their like.

At 4.30 A. M., June 3d, Hancock, Wright and Smith move forward to the assault, and quickly capture the advanced rifle-pits of the Confederates under a heavy fire

from infantry and artillery. From thence the gallant lines charge close up to the main intrenchments through a murderous fire, the Confederate guns plowing their ranks with a crossfire along the entire front of the three corps. But this determined line is unable to carry the Confederate intrenchments, and, this decided, the assailants quickly throw up cover and maintain their position within from thirty to fifty yards of the hostile works.

Barlow's advance carries his division against the Confederate salient along the road from Despatch Station, which, after severe fighting, is captured, with three guns. These are turned against the retreating Confederates, who are followed into their main works by Miles and Brooke. But the second line, under less experienced commanders, has advanced less rapidly, and now is out of supporting distance at the critical moment, as was Pickett's at Gettysburg. The intrepid first line is not strong enough to hold and widen the breach under the storm of musketry and enfilading gun fire poured into its ranks, followed by an attack by Breckenridge, reinforced by Anderson. Forced from the intrenchments, these cool, determined commanders withdraw their brigades and intrench on a strong eminence fifty yards to their rear. This fine division loses heavily; Brooke is seriously wounded and two colonels are killed.

Gibbon orders his second line, formed in columns of regiments, to closely follow the first, pass the breach to be made, and then deploy. His column becomes divided by a swamp, thus losing its solidity of impulse. But his troops push on under a fierce fire, each half column gaining a lodgment in the assaulted works. Again the support fails: for, instead of pushing through the first line and then deploying, as ordered, Owens halts to first deploy; and in consequence,



Gibbon is driven clear of the hostile works, but intrenches in the near distance. In his division Brigadier Tyler is wounded, McLean killed, and Haskell, who succeeds the latter, is mortally wounded.

The gallant Second Corps has failed to dislodge Lee's right, and its dauntless commander reports that it will be unwise to attempt another assault. The Sixth and Eighteenth Corps have met with a similar experience and result, all losing heavily, especially from the enfilading fire of the Confederate artillery. The Federals have gained intrenched position within some fifty yards of Lee's works; but with Hancock all the corps commanders report that further direct assault will be useless. At 1:30 P. M. Grant orders a suspension of open attack, and that the advance toward the Confederate works be made by means of regular covered approaches. This work is taken up and progresses under the most trying conditions of heat, exhaustion and sickness; and under a ceaseless fire of artillery and musketry from the confederate lines, in close contact, until June 12th, when it is abandoned.

This last general assault on Lee's line cost the three assailing corps 4,000 men, killed and wounded, and the five corps 5,600 men, within the space of less than one hour. Among the Confederate officers wounded are Generals Kirkland, Lane, Finegan and Law.

The total casualties suffered by both armies in this campaign from May 5th to June 12th are as follows:

#### ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

Killed and wounded. . . . .	41,165 men
Missing. . . . .	7,440 men
	<hr/>
Total . . . . .	48,605 men



## ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

Killed and wounded. . . . .	20,000 men
Missing. . . . .	3,300 men
Total . . . . .	<u>23,300 men</u>

## BUTLER'S CAMPAIGN

Federal. . . . .	4,200 men
Confederate. . . . .	2,884 men
Total . . . . .	<u>7,084 men</u>

## TOTALS

Army of the Potomac . . . . .	48,605
Army of Northern Virginia. . . . .	23,300
Butler's Campaign . . . . .	<u>7,084</u>

Total losses in thirty-four days, not including sick . . . . . 78,989 \*

What such losses mean to armies will be best understood by looking into a detail or two. General Gibbon reporting of his division, Second Corps, states that "On the 3d of

May my command numbered. . . . .	6,799 men
Recruited to July 1st by . . . . .	<u>4,263 men</u>
	11,062 men

Losses to July 31, officers killed. . . . .	77
Enlisted men . . . . .	971
Wounded, officers . . . . .	202
Men . . . . .	<u>3,825</u>

Total loss . . . . . 5,075 men

\* Humphreys—who is followed in the above table—remarks that the figures are short of the actual losses, as reports are not complete, either Federal or Confederate.

Of officers lost 40 are regimental commanders. Four brigades have had 17 different commanders; thus depriving my division of the large majority of its experienced veteran officers, while reinforcements were raw recruits lacking drill and discipline, many never having fired a gun; the vast majority of these men much inferior in character to my old troops, though in many instances these constituted the major parts of regiments and even brigades."

Confederate reports do not afford such details; but General Early states that "From May 5th to June 12th he lost Johnson and his entire division; that of his brigadiers only one remains, four killed, four wounded, two captured, two promoted. Constant exposure, limited provisions, and service in the swamps having left his divisions not stronger than brigades, and his brigades with the strength of regiments."

Appropriately great-hearted Hancock, alone in his tent, sobs like a great father amidst the 10,000 men remaining of his 40,000, while by his order the corps band dirges the miserere to their memory.

It tells much of veteran officers in relation to their men to observe two of these — dependable friends — race across a zone of death, where they would not send subordinates, to notify an advanced regiment of the near withdrawal of the army and order it to come in to safety after dark to take its place in the next move of Grant.

While the armies are in observation and digging approaches, it will be of interest to notice some facts which their colossal contest during the past fierce weeks have emphasized,— first, the strategy and tactics of the opposing commanders. Grant, once his plan is determined, holds to it, giving little regard to that of his antagonist. Approaching him he does not delay to feel out with small detachments, but, moving up within close striking distance, the enemy's

position is developed by heavy columns with ready support, to push home any advantage or purpose with massive assaults, aided by powerful threats at remote points. These not usual methods failing, then a general assault is made along his entire front by heavy columns with ample reserves in close support. A ponderous war, like a fate in persistency. Nor does Grant change his methods after amply proving them fatal against the now fully developed field works the troops have become expert in hastily throwing up as cover. Defeated against these, he immediately advances to his unalterable purpose by wide swings or flanking movements, in which great skill and considerable craft are displayed. It is difficult to conceive of Grant fighting defensively.

General Lee, while equally fixed in his purpose, is most alert and sensitive to his antagonists — of his movements, character, disposition, and to what is proper for him to do under conditions and circumstances; operating to counteract, forestall, and overcome, with the positive nimbleness of an athlete. By exercise of these qualities in utilizing the advantage of shorter lines,— which this has enabled him to maintain,— Lee has thus far defeated Grant's purpose and forced him to some other course if he will attain it.

In the operations of these battle weeks certain officers with their commands have been doing specific work to which they appear to be specially adapted,— Hancock with his Second Corps, speedy and certain, leading out in flank movements and in battle more than others, and engaged in the most desperate and gallant assaults; Sedgwick's Sixth Corps, like its father, its old and almost revered commander, steady and dependable under all conditions; Sheridan's troopers partaking of his sturdy impetuosity and invincibility. In the Confederate army: the impress of Jackson so much a part of his old troops, and

Stuart of his troopers, that they continue as formidable and unique. Longstreet's men are found where hard, stubborn work is to be done; while the Army of Northern Virginia is the personification of its loved and revered commander. Troops long under an officer take on his qualities.

On the 12th of June, Grant inaugurates practically a new campaign against Lee and Richmond by swinging his army round to the east of that city, to the James River and Petersburg, to the south of the Confederate capital; and, in fact, the only true line of operations against hostiles operating within the Virginia salient north of the James. Grant has finally proved the "Overland" Line of operations impossible, even as it displayed itself from the time the building of the Virginian *terrain* and its surroundings were completed.

General Lee, therefore, has outmaneuvered Grant in the most bloody and desperate, if not the most skillful campaign of the Civil War; but at what a terrible cost the summary of casualties shows.

## CHAPTER XIX

### PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX

**A**FTER the determination of the Battle of Cold Harbor, on June 12th, General Lee boldly takes advantage of the brief interval in which his antagonist is settling down to some new plan of operations by detaching Breckinridge westward toward the head of the Shenandoah Valley to the aid of Confederate forces in that region operating against General Hunter. This detachment is made imperative by the fact that Grant also orders Sheridan, with his cavalry, to make a junction with Hunter, and work together in general and widespread destruction of Confederate railways. Shortly after the departure of Breckinridge, General Early, with his corps, is also detached, incidentally to aid Breckinridge, but mainly to make a raid down the Shenandoah Valley to threaten Washington, with the idea that this will have the effect of drawing Grant away from Richmond to the defense of the Federal capital. Early is left to make his diversion as far north as to appear before the defenses of Baltimore and Washington, capturing a Federal Paymaster's train east of Baltimore. At the needed time, however, the Sixth Corps and a division from the Army of the Potomac arrive in Washington, Early retires southward, and the Federal army remains at the south of Petersburg, defending the Federal capital by holding Lee's main force busy defending its own.

On June 9th Grant's engineers are instructed to intrench

a line in the rear of Cold Harbor to be held while the army is being withdrawn. The withdrawal is begun by Warren, who, on the 11th, secretly moves his two reserve divisions in march to Moody's, four miles from Bottom Bridge, on the Chickahominy, and on the night of the 12th follows with the remainder of his corps. Warren is to cross the Chickahominy and demonstrate along the several roads, well out toward Richmond, in order, if possible, to deceive Lee into believing that the Fifth Corps is the advance of the Army of the Potomac moving against Richmond from the east; while, in fact, Warren is the curtain behind which the Federal army with its immense trains is moving to cross the James River at Wilcox's Landing, and from thence move on Petersburg.

This great flank movement, covering a swing of fifty miles, the cord of which, twenty-five miles, is Lee's line, is effected in perfect order and without delay or interruption from start to finish. Nor is it a retreat, like that made by McClellan, in 1862, over a part of the same ground. Grant's more difficult feat, of swinging around Vicksburg, has given him rare practice in this kind of operations. So skillfully is the withdrawal of the army from the Confederate front made and its movement concealed that it is lost to Lee for several days.

With the exception of Smith's Eighteenth Corps, the army moves overland, Hancock pushing ahead immediately after Warren with the right of way, in order to make special crossing of the James and join Smith, coming by transports from White House to the vicinity of Bermuda Hundred. The speedy transit of these two corps is ordered by Grant for the sole purpose of taking Petersburg before it can be reinforced, and thus secure the key to the defenses of Richmond on its south, and with it, possession of the Confederate railways of supply to that city and to

Lee's army. In order to insure the early arrival of these two corps, Smith is given the right of way to White House and Hancock is hastened by special ferrying across the James before the pontoons can be laid. In this manner his corps with its artillery is across the James on the 15th, where Hancock finds Smith arriving. Butler at once strengthens Smith's command to 16,000 men, including cavalry and artillery, and starts him off with orders to capture Petersburg, as Grant has directed. After some hours of delay waiting for rations, Meade, at about 10 A. M., gives Hancock orders to proceed towards Petersburg and take position where the City Point Railway crosses Harrison's Creek, with his corps strengthened to 20,000 men with artillery.

Grant has thus, on June 15th, some 48,000 men with artillery, within striking distance of Petersburg — including Butler's force at Bermuda Hundred. At this time Beauregard has but 5,000 men — infantry and cavalry — aside from the considerable artillery in works, with which to make defense. Yet Smith, alone, has orders to attack and capture this railway center and southern door to Richmond. At this vital juncture in the enterprise confusion and failure ensue, due to lack of orders! For it appears that Smith is not informed that Hancock will move directly to his support, nor is Hancock advised that it is the plan that he shall do so, and act directly with Smith against Petersburg for its speedy capture, though he has been hastened for this very purpose.

Smith, under Butler's order, starts at daylight of the 15th, with his Eighteenth Corps, and in due time arrives before the strong works guarding Petersburg. He is met by an artillery fire so heavy and sustained that he believes it to be well supported by infantry; and, being alone, he deploys his columns and approaches with caution, but suc-



ceeds in capturing the works in his front, though suffering heavy loss from artillery fire, so well do the Confederates cover the field with their guns. The only force available to the defense of Petersburg is that opposing Smith. This consists of 3,400 infantry under General Wise, Deering's cavalry, and some militia, aside from the artillery. Nor, excepting Hoke's division, does aid arrive during the day; for General Lee disagrees with General Beauregard and still believes General Grant is preparing to attack Richmond from the east.

In the mean time, Hancock leaves the river at 10 A. M., on the 15th, under Meade's order to "Proceed to Petersburg by the most direct route and take position where the City Point Railway crosses Harrison's Creek." Either because of an error in his map, or from misunderstanding, this order leads Hancock, not to Petersburg, but in search of a non-existent point some miles away from that city and from Smith. This error is not corrected until 5.30 P. M., when Hancock receives a dispatch from Grant directing him to "Make all haste to the assistance of Smith, successfully attacking Petersburg." Directly following receipt of this order from Grant comes an aid from Smith with a message to Hancock, saying: "A despatch received from Grant states that you are moving to my support on the road from Windmill Point. Please hasten to my aid." The Second Corps at this time is near Old Court House, some four miles from Smith's left. By nine o'clock, two of his divisions arrive and relieve the tired troops of General Smith.

These dispatches give documentary evidence that neither Smith nor Hancock had been ordered to unite their forces and act together in an assault on Petersburg. General Grant, himself, remained silent in regard to this entire matter, except to state in his Memoirs that "Had my orders

been carried out, Petersburg would have fallen." In view of these facts, it is reasonably probable, if not morally certain, that General Grant had intended to issue specific orders to that effect if he did not believe he had really done so. At midnight of the 15th orders are received to defer attack, and on the 16th the entire army is about Petersburg. It has already been published that this miscarriage, which cost the siege of Petersburg, was due to the same cause which afflicted Hooker at Chancellorsville.

At 2 P. M., on the 16th, General Lee receives a dispatch from Beauregard telling him of the presence of the Federal army at Petersburg. Anderson's and Hill's corps are then in the vicinity of Malvern Hill, on the north bank of the James.

At 3 P. M., Lee telegraphs Beauregard that he is not informed that Grant has crossed the James, while all save the Sixth Corps and Wilson's cavalry are across. From the 16th to the 18th Beauregard holds five miles of fortified line with 14,000 troops in presence of the Army of the Potomac in full force, meanwhile losing but a few of his advanced works, though vigorously assailed by the Second, Fifth, Ninth and Eighteenth Corps. At 3:30 P. M., the 17th, General Lee telegraphs his cavalry commander at Malvern Hill, to push out and ascertain what has become of Grant's army. By the afternoon of the 18th the corps of Anderson and Hill's have arrived at Petersburg; and, after various attempts to dislodge Lee, the opposing armies settle down to engage in a protracted siege.

It may be a matter for wonderment that Beauregard, with a force of but 14,000 men, was able to maintain hold of Petersburg for two days against the combined efforts of four corps of the Federal army. But it must be borne in mind that Petersburg had previously been skillfully fortified,

and that these works were well equipped with artillery. These guns, served with great vigor and destructive effect, led to the belief that they were supported by a considerable force of infantry, and that the Confederate works could not be rushed and overrun without great loss of life. Consequently, Beauregard's line required to be first well reconnoitered in order that it might be assailed at advantageous points. Before this could be done and the Federal army moved into position to deliver a general attack, Lee was up with the corps of Hill and Anderson to man the ready fortified line. Meanwhile, Beauregard performed wonders in moving and massing his small force at the most threatened points, there to desperately resist powerful assaults, in which he lost sections of his line, only to quickly span the gaps with a new line in its rear. But the fatalities best tell the story.

From the 15th of June to the 18th of June, the Federal army loses, in killed, 1,298 men, 7,474 wounded, missing, 1,814 — a total of 10,586 men. This grave is the monument erected to the skill of Beauregard and to the valor of his 14,000.

A small determined force, well fortified and ably commanded, can withstand many times its number, often for long periods, as the famous sieges of historic record show, and which Lee will again illustrate with the dwindling Army of Northern Virginia at Petersburg. Besides, the troops of Beauregard are fresh; while the Army of the Potomac has, but a few days since, finished a most bloody, protracted and exhausting campaign of thirty-four days of almost ceaseless battle by day and night marches, closing this with several days of intrenchment work at Cold Harbor in the heat and in a swampy country, which greatly impaired the health and spirit of the army. Then, to cap the climax, it at once engaged in forced marches of extreme length in

order to place itself safely across the James before Lee could operate to attack it while in movement.

Thus for forty days has the Army of the Potomac been unremittingly engaged in enacting an unprecedented campaign. Is it, therefore, a matter for surprise if it finds itself in front of Petersburg on June 16th, marched and fought almost to a standstill? Nor is its condition worse than that of the Army of Northern Virginia, for, while the latter has moved over shorter lines, it has not been full rationed.

Meade's chief-of-staff relates of this campaign: "The Army of the Potomac arrived in front of Petersburg with the larger part of its officers—who had literally led their troops—either killed or wounded; and a large number of the men absent who filled the ranks at the beginning of the campaign." Again, "Its antagonist must have been in a similar condition, except that it had not suffered from attacking intrenchments, nor from as much night marching."

The vast recruitment which poured into the Army of the Potomac to make up for losses suffered was composed largely of raw levies, which were incorporated in regiments newly organized of men who had served their three years' term of enlistment, and were called on by the President to reenlist for another period of two years or throughout the war. The response was prompt and massive from these men upon whom a short term of peace at home had begun to pall. The experience of one regiment of which one-half consisted of raw recruits will serve to illustrate that of many. Leaving its State camp eleven hundred strong, under a veteran colonel and line officers, this regiment immediately joined the Army of the Potomac and engaged in the battle of the Wilderness, and in two weeks there were left four hundred men answering to roll-call.

As an illustration of the physical and moral condition of the troops in its effect on their spirit, it is related of some Federal troops with a splendid record, that at a time when the siege was well advanced, becoming hotly engaged at an important point, they offered but a weak resistance for a few minutes, and then flocked off out of fire, refusing to reenter, and returned to their camp. The superb personnel and morale of the old Army of the Potomac became greatly reduced during the siege by the heavy influx of conscripts and bounty men. Yet, so mightily had the Volunteers builded during their four years of great war, that mere absorption into the structure they had erected served to transform much poor material into good soldiers, so that the proud, all-enduring Army of the Potomac emerged from the war with its fair fame little tarnished and still invincible. Haloed in enduring glory with its superb antagonist, the Army of Northern Virginia, each made immortal by the other.

It is unnecessary here to follow the detailed progress of the Siege of Petersburg, as these are graphically given by General Humphreys, in his "Virginia Campaign of 1864-5," and by other military historians of the war. Hence the general scope and data of the siege will suffice.

The strength of the respective armies, as they engage in the Siege of Petersburg on July 20, 1864, is as follows:

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC	
Effectives, Infantry .....	37,984 men
Effectives, Cavalry .....	10,280 men
ARMY OF THE JAMES	
Effectives, Infantry .....	24,009 men
Effectives, Cavalry .....	1,188 men
<hr/>	
Total, not including Artillery .....	73,461 men

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

Effectives, Infantry .....	39,295 men
Effectives, Cavalry .....	8,436 men
<hr/>	
Total, not including Artillery .....	47,731 men

On December 20, the remaining divisions of the Second Corps and Kershaw's division joined Lee, giving him on that date a force of 53,764 men. Grant is also strengthened by the return of the Sixth corps and the division sent to Washington against Early's incursion.

Until the late winter of 1864 closed active operations of the armies at Petersburg, almost ceaseless battle was waged along the established line of works to breach and carry them, and both lines of fortifications were constantly extended westward in Grant's endeavors to gain control of the Confederate railroads and to turn Lee's right flank, and in the efforts of the latter to defeat these purposes. In the spring of 1865 these works had become so extended that Lee's fortified line covered a distance of forty-one miles from Bermuda Hundred southwestward; and Grant's, offsetting, were of equal development. The Army of Northern Virginia, reduced to 35,000 men, defended this line with less than 1,000 men to the mile.

At this time the Confederate Congress assured itself that there was not sufficient meat in the Confederacy to supply the armies, that its armies were deficient in transportation, and that the bread supply for Lee's army was in jeopardy.

On March 31, 1865, the effective forces of the contending Armies at Petersburg were:

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

Infantry .....	72,020 men
Field Artillery .....	5,862 men
Guns .....	263



## ARMY OF THE JAMES

Infantry .....	19,267 men
Field Artillery .....	3,077 men
Guns .....	126
Sheridan's Cavalry .....	13,820 men
<hr/>	
Total, not including Artillery .....	74,153 men

## ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

Infantry .....	46,000 men
Field Artillery .....	5,000 men
Cavalry .....	6,000 men
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Total .....	57,000 men

These figures do not include Lee's heavy artillery, local troops, or the naval force, participating in the siege.

General Lee is thus maintaining his numerical advantage of 1 to 2. But this is being constantly weakened by exhaustion of recruitment, as also by increasing lack of food, transportation, and equipment for his army. But these fatalities could be measurably overcome, and Lee's war continued, by withdrawing from Petersburg and moving his army around Grant's left toward the more impregnable country in the heart of the Confederacy, and his supply region; there absorbing the other scattered armies and forces and, ultimately, if necessary, retire into the mountain section, where, by battle and strategy, he could prolong his war indefinitely in that region. And it is these two last contingencies that Grant makes it his purpose to frustrate finally.

Indeed, General Lee had urged upon his government the advisability of abandoning Richmond, and moving his army into the interior, instead of engaging it in the siege of



Petersburg, directly after the siege was begun, realizing, as his superiors did not, that Richmond had ceased to hold strategic value, and that its political worth was naught as compared with his army; or, concisely, that the Confederacy could be sustained only upon the bayonets of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Wrestling like giants in a death grapple, for nearly a year, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia sweat the life blood of many thousands, until, finally, on the morning of April 2, 1865, General Lee sends a dispatch to President Davis that during the following night he would be compelled to abandon his lines, and would attempt to move his army to Danville, Virginia. Thus, after making one of the most skillful defenses of record, at 8 P. M. of the 2d of April, 1865, the Army of Northern Virginia draws out of its defenses and begins its last march. Lee's purpose is to reach Danville, where, covering the railway to the south fortuitous events may transpire.

But Grant divines Lee's purpose and, on the morning of the 3d, sets his army in strenuous pursuit over roads along Lee's left flank and rear. These flank columns deflect the course of the pursued army northward to an extent sufficient to throw Lee away from Danville, when he makes the effort to reach Lynchburg. That point gained, he will have reached a railway and also the entrance of the mountain country, where his army can be maintained and reinforced, and continue the war in this impregnable region. Grant, therefore, undertakes the task of preventing such a calamity. It is not necessary to urge either commanders or their troops to exert themselves to the utmost, for all see the end of the war in the capture of Lee and his long invincible warriors. Discomforts and lack of rest incident to forced marches disappear in the exhilarating excitement of the pursuit. Federal cavalry appears to multiply and spring

alert and daring on every left-flank road along Lee's advance, and Grant's infantry becomes wing-footed.

With this host thrusting its flank and rear, the crippled and starving, unyielding remnant of the proud Army of Northern Virginia turns upon its hunters, like a wounded lion pestered on its way to the jungle, giving blow for blow while sternly holding its course.

After more than four years of herculean effort made by the Army of the Potomac in campaigns and great battles, in the endeavor to reach Richmond,— but some sixty miles in direct line from Washington,— against the defense made by the Army of Northern Virginia, on the 3d of April, 1865, that city surrenders to General Godfrey Weitzel, commanding the Twenty-fifth Corps.— And President Lincoln, threading the dangers alone, seeks out the home of Gen. Pickett,— whom as a boy he had sent to West Point, and loved,— knocks at the door, introduces Abraham Lincoln, takes little George from the mother, kisses him and says: “For your sake, little fellow, I guess I shall have to forgive your father.”

The retreating army pushes steadily westward, subsisting on the scanty wayside gatherings, but still fending with its famed valor and dash, especially the rear guard, Stonewall Jackson's old Corps, under command of Lieutenant-General John B. Gordon, risen on merit from the rank of captain of a company of wild Georgia mountaineers. Marshal Ney with his French veterans, covering the retreat of Napoleon from Russia, was not more bold and determined than is fiery, fearless Gordon in covering the retreat of the dwindling remnant of this “Grand Army,” from Petersburg to Appomattox. Thousands of the less hardy Confederates, exhausted, disheartened, and literally starving, either scatter through the country and find their way to their homes, or surrender, to procure food. But the uncon-

querable nucleus of this noble army march and fight on until its day of doom, and then, with wondering surprise and indignation, press about their idolized commander, and, with undiminished confidence in him, and in themselves, beg that he shall lead them to cut their way through the surrounding host. Nor will thousands of these heroic souls surrender; but, learning that this is to be their fate, they throw down their arms, scatter, and find their way homeward to face bravely the wreck and ruin they find there,—there to work out their salvation and that of the South, under imposed conditions so humiliating and apparently hopeless as would have palled the hearts of less valor — or sent them afield again in an interminable partizan conflict.

As a dying campfire sparks and flashes up here and there with leaping brilliancy before expiring, so does the unconquerable valor of the veteran antagonists scintillate and flame before its final disappearance from the field of war to merge in and energize the elements of peace. Devens, of the Federal cavalry, makes, according to the assertion of his superior, “The finest cavalry charge of the war, his troopers actually riding with him over the Confederate intrenchments and capturing their defenders.” Also General Reed with eighty cavalry and five hundred infantry, suddenly surrounded by the Confederates, rather than surrender fights two divisions of cavalry until he, all his cavalry officers and Colonel Washburn, commanding the infantry are killed, when their troops surrender. And, on a larger scale: General Ewell, his corps reduced to 3,600 men, and Anderson with the remnant of his corps, 6,300 men, finding themselves hemmed in by the Sixth Corps and Sheridan’s cavalry, fight until their 11,000 men are reduced to 4,000, by death, wounds, and capture, Generals Ewell, Kershaw, and others being among the captured.

Finally, surrounded near Appomattox Court House, Vir-

ginia, on the 9th day of April, 1865, General Lee accepts General Grant's letter demanding the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, this being done, however, only after a sad council with his leading commanders, in which indomitable Gordon, holding the advance, declares: "My old corps is reduced to a frazzle, and unless I am heavily supported by Longstreet, I do not think we can do any more." To continue the hopeless struggle longer would be only a waste of life. General Lee, the noblest representative of Aristocracy, surrenders to General Grant, the humane representative of Democracy.

On the 9th of April, 1865, the material remains of the Army of Northern Virginia cease to exist as an army. It surrendered to physical exhaustion before it laid down its arms to men. Its proud and unique fame will not cease. With that of its great antagonist, the Army of the Potomac, their blended fame is immortal, while the men who raised it merge into peace, disappear, and become forgotten,—their ever living selves strengthened and ennobled by their mortal deeds.

There remained of the Army of Northern Virginia to surrender:

General Lee and his Staff .....	15 men
Longstreet's Corps. ....	14,833 men
Gordon's Corps. ....	7,200 men
Ewell's Corps. ....	287 men
Cavalry Corps. ....	1,786 men
Artillery Corps. ....	2,586 men
Detachments. ....	1,649 men
	<hr/>
Total, .....	28,356 men

The Federal losses of the Petersburg Campaign and Siege,

covering the period from June 15, 1864, to April 9, 1865, were:

Killed . . . . .	5,790 men
Wounded . . . . .	19,797 men
Missing . . . . .	10,476 men
	<hr/>
Total . . . . .	36,063 men

Confederate data is lacking. But it is fair to estimate their losses in killed and wounded as at least one-half of the proportionate losses of the Federals, as they made several desperate sallies, and often fought in the open in resisting Grant's flank extensions.

On April 25, 1865, General Joseph E. Johnston surrendered his Army to General Sherman, soon followed by that of the remaining Confederate forces,—the Army of Northern Virginia being gone.

## CHAPTER XX

### PEACE AND UNITY

**O**UR great American Civil War, which for a moment of eternity set in turmoil a spot on the infinite tide of Life, ended at Appomattox. Its crest wave which broke on Cemetery Hill had ebbed to dash and thunder on the rocks of war and finally level in the ocean of peace. We should know of its elements.

During the war the total enlistments in the Federal forces, army and navy, were about . . . . . 2,750,000 men  
In the Confederate armies about . . . . . 1,000,000 men

The Federal forces were composed of nationalities as follows:

American, per-cent. . . . .	75.
German, per-cent. . . . .	7.
Irish, per-cent. . . . .	9.
Mixed Foreign, per-cent. . . . .	9.
The war cost the Federal Government. . .	\$6,500,000,000

The cost of the war to the Confederacy must be represented by zero, as it became bankrupt. But the entire population of the Confederacy was utterly and pitifully impoverished thereby.

The casualties of the Civil War were:

Federals, killed in battle. . . . .	61,363 men
Died of wounds received in battle. . . . .	34,773 men
Died of disease. . . . .	183,287 men
Died of accident. . . . .	306 men

Executed. . . . . 7 men

Total Deaths — of which 29,038 were

Colored — . . . . . 279,735 men

Only fragmentary data is obtainable of Confederate losses. But, assuming the same percentage as appears in Federal reports, Confederate dead would be, from all causes, about 100,000 men.

Of the Federal Forces there were:

Discharged for disability. . . . .	224,306 men
Dishonorably discharged. . . . .	2,693 men
Dismissed the Service, officers. . . . .	2,423 men
Cashiered, " . . . . .	274 men
Resigned, " . . . . .	22,281 men
Deserted, Officers, 216. Enlisted men, 198,-	
829. . . . .	199,045 men

Yet the great heart of President Lincoln saved all but seven of them from the penalty of death that they had earned. He said that they were not mercenaries, but just our ordinary American boys away from home for a time soldiering.

At the close of the war the Federal army numbered 1,000,000 men  
 During the last three years of the war the Confederate army numbered about . . 450,000 men


The Civil War was the last considerable conflict waged with smooth bore, short range, muzzle loading arms, permitting of massed or close order battle. The long range, rifled, breech loading and magazine guns, small and large, which have compelled open order battle, were practically unknown in the Civil War. In it the telegraph and rail-



way were first employed in warlike operations of moment.

The general Campaign of 1864-65, naturally brought to fruition the fruit of the years of war's growth in generalship — most completely ripened in Lee, Grant and Sherman. Due to their more commanding positions, the two first named became more conspicuous and wider famed than Sherman, but it may not be questioned that, had the superior command of either Lee or Grant fallen to Sherman, he would have won to hold the superior meed as worthily. The three began the campaign of 1864 simultaneously: Grant and Lee from the banks of the Rapidan, in Virginia, Sherman, from Chattanooga, Tennessee; all starting on May 5, 1864, under Grant's initiative as the dominant force. From that day on, while the movements of the three were inter-affecting, they were focalized more in final results, for from then on, Grant and Lee were paired in opposition in the East, while Sherman, in the West, operated against several Confederate commanders to the same end as Grant, and under his general direction.

Sherman, starting out from Chattanooga with an army of 100,000 men, opposed by General Joseph E. Johnston — second only to Lee in the Confederate Armies for generalship — with an army of 70,000 men, continued a campaign to Atlanta, Georgia, one hundred miles south, through a most difficult mountainous country, sparsely settled, penetrated by a few indifferent roads, while one or more considerable rivers had to be crossed. The line of operations was along a single track railway through this country, open to easy raids, compelling heavy detachments to its defense every mile advanced until the enemy accused him of carrying ready-made railway bridges for his often broken track. Over this railway all supplies of every kind were brought to Sherman's army from his base four hundred miles in his rear. Previous to and during the campaign, Johnston



LIEUT.-GEN. JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON




prepared strong natural positions with extensive fortifications in addition to the formidable difficulties of the country itself. So strong and skillful were Johnston's prepared places for battle that in no case could they be taken by direct assault, thus compelling Sherman to wide turning movements — sometimes entirely away from his railway through country where he was forced to make his roads. Under these extreme conditions of opposition, and against an army equal to his own — equalized by its defensive war and by hostile nature — and most skillfully commanded, Sherman fought his way to Atlanta in a period of four months, and captured Atlanta, a veritable stronghold, by a series of brilliant turning operations. The losses in this campaign were, Federals, 31,687 men: Confederates, 34,979. The Confederacy, in Atlanta, also lost its main arsenal and manufactures of war.

It may be noted that, from the outstart, Sherman met with the famed field trenches which we have seen baffling Grant's massive assaults in Virginia. After once testing these Sherman ceased to assault them, but held his opponent to their shelter with heavy skirmish lines, thus freeing his main force to turning movements, whereby he compelled Johnston to abandon every one of his fortified positions without undue loss of men.

Atlanta captured, in the heart of the Confederacy, Sherman's new opponent, Hood — whom we observed at Gettysburg — attempted to spoil Sherman's campaign by forcing him back into Tennessee to protect his railway and his base at Nashville. But Sherman placed General George H. Thomas — the "Rock of Chickamauga" — in command of that section and city, the key of Tennessee, and left Hood to destroy himself and the Confederate war in the West by his eccentric operation into Tennessee, where his army was disastrously beaten and dispersed by Thomas.

Sherman, meanwhile, set out from Atlanta, to isolate himself with an army of 60,000 picked troops, and marched three hundred miles east to Savannah, on the Atlantic coast, through the remaining supply section of the Confederacy, destroying its arsenals and railways. From Savannah Sherman headed north and made way to Goldsboro, North Carolina, through four hundred and twenty-five miles of hostile country, crossing overflowed rivers and swamps, which made bridge and corduroy roadbuilding necessary for hundreds of these miles. With his army at Goldsboro, he was in position not only to destroy the considerable army which Johnston had collected against him, but he was in the true rear of Lee, held at Petersburg by Grant. Sherman thus brought the army of the West, by a march unparalleled in the history of war, to the support of the army of the East, the original idea of this undertaking and the details of its execution being his own; to which Grant, at first with hesitation, finally gave his approval. It is military opinion that had this unique feat of war been undertaken by a lesser master of the art of war it would have been crowned by disaster.

Meanwhile Grant was engaged in the campaign against Lee, in Virginia, over *terrain* not difficult after the Wilderness was passed, and made formidable only by the presence of Lee's army behind intrenchments such as we have seen Sherman turning. His announced objective was that army first, with Richmond secondary. Grant was at the head of an Army of effectives of 118,769, men, engaged offensively against Lee with 61,953 men, defending their own soil and homes. And Grant's base was always within a day's wagon-haul of his army, hence his lines were not dangerously open to incursion. From May 5th to June 12th he fought his way over sixty miles, from the Rapidan to Cold Harbor, with a loss to his army of 48,605 men, and



MAJ.-GEN. GEORGE H. THOMAS





depleted his opponent's by 23,300 men. Grant, in doing this, continuously assaulted Lee's impregnable field-works with massive columns, frequently hurling his entire army against these along its entire front; and, fatally unsuccessful, he then attempted to flank his wiley antagonist by great turning movements, but with equal unsuccess.

Lee's defensive war, utilized to the last point by his consummate skill, defeated Grant's first campaign, as the latter neither subdued the Army of Northern Virginia, nor captured Richmond. And to any general who had before commanded the Army of the Potomac, this defeat of his purpose would have meant close of campaign and withdrawal from continuance of aggressive operations for a time. Grant, not being thus constituted, immediately continued his campaign by swinging around Richmond by the east to Petersburg, and laid siege to that key to the southern defense of the Confederate capital. Here a year later the Great Confederate, with the frazzled remnant of his superb Army of Northern Virginia, was compelled to surrender.

Grant, a great fighting general who was never once whipped from first to last, in the Virginia Campaign was fairly outgeneraled by the faultless strategy and tactics of General Lee; while in comparison with Sherman, the award of superior generalship cannot be given to Grant. But his grand strategy, which combined and moved all the Federal armies over a field equal in area to the continent of Europe, on one Objective, and in one year subdued 800,000 square miles of territory defended by 400,000 men, demonstrated and insured his greatness above all other commanders in the American Civil War.

Considering Grant's genius for wide and harmonious combination, one can but wonder whether he, in command of the Confederate Forces in 1864-65, would not have asserted

himself above his modesty for the sake of the cause, and, drawing in Hood from his wild enterprise into Tennessee, unite his 60,000 men with Johnston on the flank of the Army of the Potomac at Petersburg, unlocking the Army of Northern Virginia to join with these, and, with this most of all powerful army which the Confederacy assembled, take position between Sherman and the Army of the Potomac and launch out at either; or, failing in such enterprise, then, with the concentrated military resources of the Confederacy, withdraw into its center or heart of impregnable mountains. Would the North have sustained further war against such a formidable stand? Perhaps General Lee had something of this nature in mind when he urged upon his government the advisability of moving his army into the interior and abandoning Richmond, instead of engaging in the fatal siege of Petersburg. At that time General Lee held the power to overrule the adverse decision of President Davis. And it may be questioned whether duty should not have overcome General Lee's modesty and sense of loyalty to his erring superior; for Richmond, as the Confederate capital, had ceased to hold essential political value upon which its strategic worth depended.

Grant's method of war,—to hammer and keep hammering,—has been severely criticised as productive of useless slaughter, whereas it was not only effective of results of victory but was also merciful of life. The virtue of hammering to speedy victory is reinforced by the fact developed in our war that for every man lost in action, there were three put out of service by disease, discharge and desertion. From May, 1864, when Grant began battle in the Wilderness, until Appomattox, April 9, 1865, he lost 124,390 men in killed, wounded and missing. The Army of the Potomac from April 5, 1862, to May 4, 1864, lost 139,751 men, and had gained but thirty miles in advance of Bull Run,

where the first battle of the two years' series of contests was fought.

The two great commanders developed in our Civil War, Grant and Lee, as they met at Appomattox, were, in person, character and development, most fitting representatives of the genius and people of their respective sections, the North and the South, as they were also of the respective causes for which the peoples of these sections fought.

Broadly and truly democratic was the great Northerner, in contrast with the great Southern aristocrat. Lee personified the passing aristocratic order; Grant, the more universal Democratic order, come to master all sections of these United States, and finally mold them into one homogeneous, free and progressive nation, by war mightily advanced toward its destiny in spite of all opposing powers which had conspired to its destruction.

One phase of the surrender is most aptly presented by an historian, who writes: "Grant represented the principle of equality and human brotherhood that makes the United States what it is. Lee was the type of a departed era, destined henceforth to take its place with the expiring traditions of royalty and aristocratic pretension. But no Bayard of romance could have borne himself with more knightly consideration for a fallen foe than did the plain man — Grant — whose action, not his dress, so well became him on an occasion giving him such opportunity for the display of the littleness and self-assertion of a small mind, or the greatness and self-forgetfulness of a noble soul."

Grant and Lee at Appomattox represented epochal conditions identical with those which were embodied in the opposing generals of the Republic of Rome, Cæsar and Pompeius, at Parsalus, 48 B. C. Pompeius, the spirit of the past outrun to disintegration; Cæsar, the spirit of the future; and whose victory over his antagonist marked the

moment when humanity could once more start hopefully on new lines of progress.

A duty to ourselves would be left undone, and we could be justly accused of either personal cowardice or a lamentable lack of confidence in common good sense, should we fail to review two special phases of our war, both of which caused, at that time, perhaps more personal bitterness of feeling than the main conflict itself. These were the destruction of private property by invading armies and the treatment of prisoners of war.

First, let us realize that in practice war is the exact reverse of peace. No man ever enunciated a plainer truth more concisely than did General Sherman when he said: "War is hell." In war, whatever is necessary to its aid and success, within broad and long-established bounds, is not only proper, but is absolutely demanded.

If Sherman had disregarded this rule of war, his campaign from Atlanta to the sea could not have been made, and in consequence the war would have dragged its devastating length through additional years during which not only many millions in value of material would have been destroyed in excess of that consumed by Sherman's army, but many additional tens of thousands of brave men would have been slaughtered. Which, then, was the most humane? The same question is put to the thousands of Northern citizens who suffered precisely the same personal losses and hardships from Lee's army during its Gettysburg campaign, even to the extent of burning Chambersburg as a companion-piece to similar Federal army acts. Both were war on sections which, as entireties, were hostiles engaged in war against the respective armies of invasion; hence, enemies; and, as such, properly subject to the rules of war, and under which they had placed themselves equally with their armed sons in the field.

In regard to prisoners of war, any human being deprived of his personal liberty quickly becomes dissatisfied and unreasonably critical of his conditions in every detail, especially so of his food and treatment. He naturally becomes mentally ill, and this mental condition together with physical inaction usually results in ill health. And, adding to these the previous hardships of war, permanent decrepitude may ensue. These conditions and reasons furnish the true reason for the vast majority of mutual complaints and cruel accusations regarding the treatment of Confederate and Federal prisoners of war during our civil conflict. It is true, nevertheless, that in isolated cases these prisoners were in the keeping of human monsters, cruel, vindictive and fiendish such as are every day met with amidst the pursuits of peace. How much more, then, will such flock to war's service of captivity, where their natures find freer and larger play? Such was infamous Wirz of Andersonville. Then two other facts of our war-time must be considered — the scarcity of subsistence in the South, and the quite natural bitterness of the people under invasion. These two influences were not active in the North amidst its plenty, and unsubjected as it was to the rigors of invasion. And while, here and there, the Confederate prisoners were subjected to real hardships and cruelties at the hands of inhuman keepers, public sentiment did not permit any marked continued case of general prison starvation and cruelty.

Viewed as a material contest, it is not away from the truth to conclude that the South should have emerged from our Civil War victorious. This opinion is reinforced by history. The Welsh have never been conquered, though vastly outnumbered and not to be compared with their assailants in resources. The Swiss, likewise, in the midst of hostile Europe have successfully defended their freedom. The weak, separate, and not overfriendly British

Colonies in America, loosely confederated, insurrected against mighty England and established the United States of America. For half the life of a generation the Cubans, sustained only by the indomitable spirit of the people, maintained war with Spain while denied all resources of war and barred from organization and arming for other than guerilla warfare by a foe so numerous and overpowering that the native habitants were billeted by the oppressors, and were held to bear the expense of their attempted subjugation. The Cubans would have succeeded without aid, or have died in attempting freedom.

Why, then, did our competent and valorous Americans of the South fail, abounding in all abilities as compared with the successes enumerated, and reinforced by the selfish interests and jealousies of Europe? Among the apparent contributive factors is this: the undertaking was hampered by the inabilities of Mr. Davis for so large an enterprise. The Confederate Government acted an effective part in the defeat of Secession. A tangible and certain reason is seen in our Southland to-day where its superb valor and heroism of war have been ameliorated to peace working wonders in its rich fields of upbuilding and prosperity, which were not possible while the incubus remained which overshadowed that fair land to bind its free people more than slavery shackled the bondman.

Invaluable as are these accrued benefits from the failure of secession, they are pecuniary and local. Surely there must have been interests of a higher and broader nature behind these lesser ones which acted to overcome so able and superb an effort. Because secession failed the American people are a Union and not separated into two hostile States. Its supreme effort at Gettysburg failed because the life of our nation, the Union, was at stake; because a principle as old as time, Freedom, the Cause of Man, was the wager.



By reason of its failure the American people, in their hearts, are imbued with the true spirit of life; they are free, united Americans, and proud of a citizenship which has been so splendidly won. Because we were not disrupted by secession but became united in freedom, we were fitted to stand on the frontier of human life formidable against error and inhumanity, ready to lead out as one people in the sacred cause of Humanity with selfless might, win wondrous victory over monstrous selfishness and tyrannies, performing the mission of the American nation! and enabled to take place in lead of the nations as the one moral Power among the Powers of the world. Setting example to ourselves and to the nations, we gave proof that only by pursuing the royal course of selfless, fearless endeavor can evil be overcome and peace, good-will among men, be established.

These discernible causes for the failure of secession may well make us thankful for the fierce heat of war, for the sweet and noble memories which have smoothed and bound us in unity, and for the noble and inspiring lessons of that prime endeavor and its defeat.

Surely there is a higher Genius than man's, which supervises his every affair, and directs to diviner ends than his farthest vision may perceive at the time. We may confidently look for its action in so great an event as our Civil War and view with favor these larger facts in considering its results,—mightily potent to futurity. Let us thankfully reconcile our hearts to the lesser regards of sectional or personal successes or failures as being merely incidental to these mightier purposes.

The reflex from the crest wave of our American Civil War leveled and settled at Appomattox into the great ocean of peace forever. But the superbly energized spirit thereof did not die; nor did it cease to act when the armies of its



embodiment melted and blended into civil life. For had it ceased to act on our new field, in our new national life, our vast expenditure of life and treasure would indeed have been wasted. The American national spirit was first awakened into full and robust being by that war, and it is this same spirit which, acting in the ways of peace, has wrought so wonderfully in our common life. It is this same spirit, acting through our national unity, which has, within the minute period of one hundred and forty-three years, enabled us to outdo the ages in material progress and development. It is this same spirit which inspired our humanity and forced us to step boldly into the world's arena as man's mailed champion against tyrannies. And in executing this championship commission of heaven, we found ourselves in moral leadership of the nations!

In the eternal war between Class and Mass, between Aristocracy and Democracy, in this latest submission of the ceaseless question to the arbitrament of armed hosts, Democracy was crowned with the wreath of laurel. But the spirit of neither was ignoble. Both fought for freedom, while each exactly represented its class or cause. The one waged for the right to govern itself, and to do its pleasure with the Mass: the other, to rule as pleases the Mass,—neither right; but the high principle, the right to freedom, was held superior to the mere right to property, and to the more ignoble right to gain, in our civil dispute.

From the war-wed spirits of the old North and South a new national spirit has arisen. And from a living memory Lincoln and Lee step forth alive, one an inspiration to noble being, the other showing the ways of kindly wisdom; hand in hand, to restore and inspire our mired patriotism; and again lead us, that the tyranny of greed with its attendant furies,—the tyrannies that seek to bind and limit the best in men,—shall be utterly cast down and forever banished

from our fair land, from this the most imperial domain ever entrusted to man, sealed to us by the dear blood of our fathers and their fathers' fathers, and by heaven's powers as the heritage and last hope of humanity.

For the American people there are valors of peace which, if performed, will resound through the ages when the heroics of war shall have ceased to echo.



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