

Dec. 2006

(245)

Doc # 2007b

Vol. **6**

(5)

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Inve

Attack

<i>Reverend</i>	<i>Independent</i>
<i>Frank</i>	<i>Journal</i>
<i>Frank</i>	<i>Journal</i>
<i>Frank</i>	<i>Journal</i>
<i>Frank</i>	<i>Journal</i>
<i>Frank</i>	<i>Journal</i>
<i>Frank</i>	<i>Journal</i>
<i>Frank</i>	<i>Journal</i>
<i>Frank</i>	<i>Journal</i>
<i>Frank</i>	<i>Journal</i>

Pages: **814 to 1058**

NATIONAL { 4266
4267
4268

WARD & PAUL
(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)
OFFICIAL REPORTERS
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

Doc # 20076

5

Vol. 6

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

November 21, 1945

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 814 to 1058

NATIONAL {4266
4267
4268

WARD & PAUL
(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)
OFFICIAL REPORTERS
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

RICHARDSON, Admiral James Otto -- resumed

815

LEAHY, Admiral William D.

884

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

11

828

12

942

13

1012

14

PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. VI

(5)

1050

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Wednesday, November 21, 1945

- - -

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (Room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
of counsel, for the joint committee.

- - -

WARD N. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON --

(Continued)

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson, you were in the process of examining Admiral Richardson. You may proceed.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Richardson --

Admiral Richardson: Could I make an opening statement with respect to the testimony of yesterday?

The Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Richardson: I have not had an opportunity to verify whatever evidence there is in official records with respect to dispatches exchanged between me and Admiral Stark regarding the Army alert and, therefore, I request that the members of the committee hold in abeyance their judgment on that subject until I have had an opportunity to search the original records.

The Chairman: The committee will be glad to grant you that privilege, Admiral Richardson.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Richardson, I want to speak to you about this instrument that you handed to me yesterday which I did not have time to read yesterday, dated October the 16th, 1940.

I ask counsel when he received a copy of that, - when the committee received a copy of it.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, Senator, the Admiral tells me

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1 that he handed me not the one you have but this document
2 here, which is a copy of it, two or three days ago. I had
3 it in my files. I had not studied it myself or felt that
4 it was pertinent to what I was inquiring of him about, so I
5 did not pursue it further.
6

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, there is no question about
8 that. I just wanted to know when you had received it.

9 Mr. Mitchell: I don't think the committee has had it
10 at all yet.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, counsel has had it.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Well, yes, in the way I state.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, the Admiral may use the one copy
14 and I will use the other, so that we will know that we are
15 talking about the same thing.

16 Admiral Richardson: I have a copy.

17 Senator Ferguson: You have a copy?

18 Admiral Richardson: Yes.

19 Senator Ferguson: I assume, Admiral Richardson, that
20 that exhibit, - and might we have it marked exhibit, -
21 what is the last exhibit number, General?

22 Mr. Mitchell: This will be exhibit 11.

23 Senator Ferguson: Exhibit 11.

24 Mr. Mitchell: A communication dated October 16, 1940
25 directed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet by

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Richardson, the first three pages, if you will refer to it, were written by you?

Admiral Richardson: It was.

Senator Ferguson: And written about the time of October the 16th, 1940?

Admiral Richardson: Approximately on that date.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Do you know whether it was written on the flagship New Mexico?

Admiral Richardson: It was.

Senator Ferguson: Now, this is the instrument that you indicated as being delivered to Admiral Hart, Thomas C. Hart, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: And what is the last page on this exhibit 11 dated? The same day, October the 11th? The photostat does not give the initialling or writing at the top -- at least on mine it does not. Does it on yours?

Admiral Richardson: It says:

"Secret, October the 11th, 1940:

"U. S. Fleet Dispositions and Operations to Meet Special Situation in Western Pacific."

Senator Ferguson: Would you read it?

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Admiral Richardson: (Reading)

"Assumptions: The gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.

"(2) The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road is an unfriendly act to Japan.

"(3) The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce cooperation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.

"(4) Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.

"(5) The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with Japan.

"(6) The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations with the Western Hemisphere.

"(7) The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific--in Australia and Singapore-- and Dutch forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea -- Celebes Sea area.

"(8) The United States is prepared to accept war

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.

"(9) Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis powers.

"(10) The situation and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October 1940."

Shel--
Shack
fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Ferguson: Let us speak about the last, No. 10, that "The situation and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940."

As I understand it, you wrote this memo that you just read.

Admiral Richardson: No, I did not.

Senator Ferguson: Who did write it? Where did you get it?

Admiral Richardson: May I explain?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, I want you to explain.

Admiral Richardson: The Secretary of the Navy directed me and Stark to draw up a plan of action should decision be reached to stop trade between Japan and the Western Hemisphere.

In order to draw any war plan, you must start with some assumptions as to bases for the plan. This whole document which I have read is nothing but the assumptions that the officers who drew up this plan set up as the basis for their plan. It was drawn up by the officers in the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations in collaboration with me and Admiral Stark and my war plans officer, Commander Vincent R. Murphy, now rear admiral.

So that these assumptions, when I left Washington, had not been seen by the Secretary of the Navy or by the President of the United States, neither one of whom was in Washington

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h2

1
2 that day.

3 Senator Ferguson: Was this the substance of what you
4 had received from the Secretary of the Navy a few days pre-
5 vious?

6 Admiral Richardson: It was our joint conception of what
7 the Secretary informed us the day before, on October 10.

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes, and you made a memo of what he
9 informed you, and this is the memo?

10 Admiral Richardson: I made no memorandum. I did not
11 write one word of this. It was drawn up by the War Plans
12 officers of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations in col-
13 laboration with the War Plans officer of the United States
14 Fleet.

15 Senator Ferguson: Where did he get the information to
16 put in this document?

17 Admiral Richardson: He was present -- all of them were
18 present when the discussion was had with the Secretary of the
19 Navy.

20 Senator Ferguson: Would you say then that this repre-
21 sented a fair statement of what the Secretary of the Navy
22 said to you at a previous date?

23 Admiral Richardson: Yes, sir, this is a more formally
24 stated, comprehensive presentation of the assumptions arising
25 from what he did state to us.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Ferguson: Getting to the date of the 17th of October, can you explain that any more?

Admiral Richardson: The 17th of October?

Senator Ferguson: It is on the last line, the No. 10 item.

Admiral Richardson: That was the day that Great Britain was to reopen the Burma Road, and it was thought that the Japs, or the Japanese might take some aggressive action in connection with the reopening of the Burma Road.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know about when Admiral Hart received this instrument?

Admiral Richardson: Of my own knowledge, I do not know, but I think it entirely possible that I may have somewhere among my papers a letter from Admiral Hart written in December, informing me that he had received this document.

Senator Ferguson: Now when the document went to Admiral Hart, it had the sheet on it which you read; is that correct?

Admiral Richardson: Had what?

Senator Ferguson: It had the sheet on that you read? The last sheet was on it when you sent it to Admiral Hart?

Admiral Richardson: Oh, absolutely. It is Enclosure A in this letter.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Will you now read your letter which you wrote on the flagship New Mexico, October 16, 1940.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4
Admiral Richardson: May I have your copy? That is my own copy and it is clearer than this photostatic copy.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I will ask you what these things are on the margin.

Admiral Richardson: You can see them better on that copy.

Senator Ferguson: I will use this one. Before you read it, on the last page where your signature appears, at the top is 01 in the margin, and a line drawn. Do you know what that means?

Admiral Richardson: The numbers in the right-hand margin of the last page of the letter indicate numbers of my staff. 01 is the Chief of Staff. The initial which is rather indistinct is "T" for Taffender, who is rear admiral, who was my Chief of Staff. 11 is the operations officer. "B" stands for Beery, Rear Admiral Bernard H. Beery, then Captain. 16 is the War Plans officer. VRM stands for Vincent R. Murphy.

Senator Ferguson: Now, would those lines crossed through those numbers indicate that those respective officers had seen this instrument prior to sending it, or signing it?

Admiral Richardson: Those marks are the initials of the officers, and the initials I recognize as their own.

Senator Ferguson: Does it indicate when the line is

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h5

drawn through their number, that they have seen the instrument?

Admiral Richardson: My memory is not definite on that, but the line, I think, means that they are to see it, and an initial indicates that they have seen it.

Senator Ferguson: Now, will you read that instrument?

Admiral Richardson: This is "CinC File No. A16/01687.

"Long Beach, California. October 16, 1940.

"From: Commander-in-Chief, U.S.Fleet.

"To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S.Asian Fleet.

"Subject: International Situation - Reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.

"Enclosures: (A) Copy of Assumptions.

(B) Copy of Tentative Operations.

"1. During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet to Washington and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the President was considering in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road the following:

Shack
(3)
fols.
Hook
AL-1

Witness Richardson

- (a) Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peacetime move.
- (b) Declaring a complete embargo in shipments to and from Japan.
- (c) Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and the Americas.
- To accomplish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the first line. The impracticability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations's office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations (Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11 for submission to the Secretary and the President as to what the Navy proposed to do if directed to proceed on the proposed assumptions and tentative decisions.
2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has had no further word in regard to the memorandum referred to above,

Witness Richardson

but received a despatch today from the Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be forwarded to you via the HOUSTON. It is believed that further study in the Department and in the Fleet will result in some modifications in the operations proposed for the Fleet, particularly as regards distribution of patrol planes and cruisers.

3. The further operations indicated in paragraph 9 of Enclosure (B) are measures for the reduction and occupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the Mid-Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled and transports are ready. Due to the situation in the Atlantic, the Department did not feel that our main Fleet should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be necessary to call it back on short notice. It was felt, however, that active operations against ORANGE possessions might have a deterring effect on ORANGE full scale operations in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.

4. It will be noted that the above operations parallel very closely the present ORANGE Plan, modified by the despatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and further modified by the restriction of main Fleet operations in the Mid-Pacific area.

5. I was further told, in the Department, that no Army forces would be available and that the British had agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

6. In the event that the assumptions are not realized prior to about January 1, 1941, or decision is not reached to despatch the Advance Detachment before that time, there was discussion of assembling a train and transports in West Coast ports and holding a full dress rehearsal of operations against an atoll, as a Fleet exercise, utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being taken for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary transports, etc., to be ready around that time. If this is done, the reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may take place coincidently with this exercise, the idea being that Japan will be impressed by this evidence of United States determination to protect its interests. I presume you will be further informed of this eventuality as plans are more fully developed.

7. My secret serial A16/01683 of this date, covering the composition and preparation of the tentative detachment slated for reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, in case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to you by clipper locked box, a copy being sent on the HOUSTON with this letter.

8. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

"J. O. RICHARDSON."

Senator Ferguson: Is there anything under your name? I

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 see some marks here which are illegible.

3 Admiral Richardson: "Copy to OPNAV via air mail. This
4 copy to be acknowledged by despatch" -- no, "This copy
5 acknowledged by despatch 132,000 of October" something blank
6 "1940". It is very vague.

7 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer
8 in evidence now Exhibit 11, two parts of which have been read,
9 so that the other part will be in. It is the Enclosure (B).
10 Let it all be contained in the record.

11 The Chairman: Without objection it will be inserted at
12 this point as Exhibit No. 11.

13 (The document referred to was marked
14 Exhibit No. 11.)

15 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Richardson, do you have any
16 comment to make on this document Exhibit 11 that I may not have
17 covered, anything that you may want to put in the record to
18 clarify it?

19 Admiral Richardson: No.

20 Senator Ferguson: You have no comment on it?

21 Admiral Richardson: No.

22 Senator Ferguson: During your tenure as Commander in
23 Chief did we have any convoys in the Pacific?

24 Admiral Richardson: Only on one occasion was a single
25 ship convoyed by a ship under my command from Pearl Harbor to

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Guam, from Guam to Cavite, by a ship under the command of
3 Admiral Hart, and the ship on her return voyage was convoyed
4 in like manner from Cavite to Guam and from Guam to Pearl Harbor.

5 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall the name of that ship?
6 Do you recall that?

7 Admiral Richardson: My memory is not certain, but I be-
8 lieve it was the CHAUMONT.

9 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what the occasions were
10 for convoying that ship?

11 Admiral Richardson: I received orders to escort her to
12 Guam, to have the escort await for her return, that she would
13 be escorted from Guam to Cavite by a ship from the Asiatic
14 Fleet and likewise escorted from Cavite to Guam by a ship from
15 the Asiatic Fleet, and escorted from Guam to Honolulu by the
16 escort which accompanied her outward bound. I have no in-
17 formation or knowledge -- or I had no information or knowledge
18 at the time as to why she was escorted, what she was guarded
19 against, or what her cargo was.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, you received an order?

21 Admiral Richardson: I received a despatch from the Chief
22 of Naval Operations directing me to --

23 Senator Ferguson: (Interposing) From the CNO?

24 Admiral Richardson: The CNO.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: I will ask counsel, do we have a copy of that despatch?

Mr. Mitchell: I doubt it because I have never seen it.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Richardson, do you know where we could locate a copy of the despatch to you to convoy that ship, and could you give us about the date of it?

Admiral Richardson: I have frequently endeavored to recall when this incident occurred, and I have, unfortunately, no record in any of my papers as to the time. Any statement I made, would be a pure guess, but I should say around --

Senator Ferguson (interposing): After the instrument of October 11 that we just read?

Admiral Richardson: My guess would be that it was in December of that year, because I received a despatch to escort her when I was in the Hawaiian area. I did not return to the Hawaiian area until the 6th of December, 1940, so my guess is that it would be within the month of December, 1940.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

hl
fls
AL

Larry fls

LaCharity
fols.
Shack
(1)
AL-1

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not you wrote any letters about it? Is it mentioned in any of this correspondence that we have?

Admiral Richardson: I wrote no letters about it. I sent a despatch, however, to the Chief of Naval Operations and inquired as to whether the escorting of this ship indicated an intention to escort all U.S. Government vessels, or an intention later to escort all United States flag vessels. That is, ships flying the American flag.

I promptly received a reply from the Chief of Naval Operations saying, "Negative to your inquiry."

Senator Ferguson: That is the only knowledge you have about that convoy that you have given us, that you recall?

Admiral Richardson: I have an impression, I cannot state as an absolute certainty, that after I was relieved and after I returned to Washington, purely as a matter of curiosity I asked the then Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, as to why I was ordered to escort this vessel, and he stated that it was rumored that there were German raiders operating in the Mid-Pacific area within the Marshall Islands or north thereof and that I was directed to escort this vessel to protect her against possible attack by German raiders.

Senator Ferguson: Is there anything else you wish to add to that?

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Admiral Richardson: No. That is as complete an answer as I can give.

Senator Ferguson: I understand that you stated you left the position as Commander in Chief of the Fleet February 1, 1941.

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: And you at that time were succeeded by Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: And you also stated that he was a Commanding Officer under you in charge of cruisers?

Admiral Richardson: He was a Type Commander, not Commanding Officer, because with us Commanding Officers command a single ship.

Senator Ferguson: I see. Now, do you know how Admiral Kimmel came to succeed you, have you any information on that you could give the committee?

Admiral Richardson: When I was in Washington in October 1940, in conversation with Admiral Stark and Admiral Nimitz, who was then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now Bureau of Naval Personnel, I stated that in my opinion they should have in mind the names of officers whom they would consider favorably as the relief of all of the important officers in the Fleet, as any officer of the age of most of the flag officers of senior rank might break down in health or might be detached

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 For other reasons, and that in order that they might not be
3 taken unawares I thought they should have a tentative slate
4 of prospective reliefs, and they agreed with me and asked me
5 to suggest the names of possible reliefs.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did you make any suggestions?

7 Admiral Richardson: After some consideration I submitted
8 a list of names and in that list was the name of Rear Admiral
9 Husband E. Kimmel.

10 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us who else was in the
11 list?

12 Admiral Richardson: I do not remember with certainty,
13 and I hoped I would not be required to answer that question,
14 because I have very many friends in the Navy and I would hate
15 for them, any of them, to feel that their name was not on that
16 list.

17 Senator Ferguson: I have no desire to press for an
18 answer.

19 About how many were in the list, so that they may feel
20 that they were included?

21 Admiral Richardson: I think probably five or six.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, what was your suggestion --

23 Admiral Richardson: Just a minute.

24 Senator Ferguson: Pardon me.

25 Admiral Richardson: Much to my surprise, and as evidence

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 of how uncertain some testimony may be after five years, I
3 thought that in that letter I stated that I had not included
4 Admiral King's name because he was already afloat in the Pacific -
5 I mean in the Atlantic, but in looking over some old papers I
6 was surprised to find this entry, 29 October, letter from
7 Nimitz agreeing to King's shift up if I had to be taken out.

8 Senator Ferguson: Did you have in mind when you made
9 that suggestion about replacement of officers that you might
10 be replaced in the very near future?

11 Admiral Richardson: Not at all.

12 Senator Ferguson: Not by one of the names that you
13 mentioned.

14 Admiral Richardson: When I left Washington in October
15 Admiral Stark and Admiral Nimitz informed me that it was their
16 belief that I would remain in command until I completed two
17 years' service as Commander in Chief and I had no reason for
18 suggesting this excepting that when a man is over 60, in a
19 strenuous job, he might not hold out.

(2) 20 Senator Ferguson: What was the normal tour of duty --
21 is that how you express it in the Navy?

22 Admiral Richardson: That is how we express it, but there
23 is no such thing, because there have been officers remain
24 Commander in Chief one year, there have been officers remain
25 two years. My predecessor remained, I think, two years.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Ferguson: The normal, you would say, then, is two years -- average?

Admiral Richardson: Well, it was not normal for a number of years, and I believe that a feeling grew up in the Navy that a one-year tenure of office was too short, and there was a tendency, as exemplified by actual practice, to extend the cruise of a Commander in Chief to two years.

Senator Ferguson: Was 13 months an average tour of duty?

Admiral Richardson: I know of one or two flag officers who were detached as Commander in Chief after one year.

Senator Ferguson: When you say the Commander in Chief, that would be in the same position as you were?

Admiral Richardson: Same way.

Senator Ferguson: Was seniority recognized in the Navy, for instance as it is recognized in the Senate, that the next in line would take your position?

Admiral Richardson: Seniority is recognized in the Navy in the assignment of officers to duty up to and including that of Captain, but in the selection of officers for flag assignments an effort is made to base assignments on an estimate of the officer's ability rather than upon his lineal position on the list.

Senator Ferguson: Now, how long of a notice did you have that you were going to be removed, when you were Commander in

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Chief of the Fleet?

Admiral Richardson: I received a despatch on 5 January, about 11:30 in the morning Honolulu time, Sunday.

Senator Ferguson: And from whom did you receive that despatch?

Admiral Richardson: I am not positive. I think it came from the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, who was Admiral Nimitz, and was charged with the preparation of all orders, but it came to me in a secret code that was held by no one in the Fleet except me, and the reason it was in a secret code was that the same message involved many other changes of flag officers, and I was directed in the message to inform all of the officers concerned but to inform no one else in a public release of the impending changes made.

Senator Ferguson: When was the first public release that you were retired from that position as Commander in Chief of the Navy?

Admiral Richardson: My recollection is that it was on the 6th of January or possibly the 7th, Tuesday.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know who made that release?

Admiral Richardson: I have no idea.

Senator Ferguson: Did it come from Hawaii or did it come from Washington?

Admiral Richardson: Well, I read it in the newspapers in

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Hawaii.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you ever discuss your retire-
4 ment from that particular position with anyone in the service,
5 I mean in the Navy?

6 Admiral Richardson: May I correct the word. It was not
7 a retirement.

8 Senator Ferguson: What was it?

9 Admiral Richardson: It was relief or detachment.

10 Senator Ferguson: Detachment. Did you ever discuss that
11 detachment with anyone?

12 Admiral Richardson: I did not -- yes. I discussed it
13 with one official in the Navy Department.

14 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us who that official was?

15 Admiral Richardson: The Secretary of the Navy.

16 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us your discussion with
17 him about your detachment?

18 Admiral Richardson: Well, I said to the Secretary upon
19 reporting here --

20 Senator Ferguson: First, will you give us about the date,
21 if you can, Admiral.

22 Admiral Richardson: Well, my orders directed me, my
23 orders detaching me from command of the United States Fleet
24 directed me to report to the Secretary of the Navy for duty.
25 I reported, as nearly as I can remember, on the 24th day of

AL-8

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

March, 1941. I can verify that date.

Senator Ferguson: Well, if it near enough.

Admiral Richardson: By the Secretary of the Navy I was ordered on 25 March 1941 to report to duty with the General Board. When I went in to report to the Secretary of the Navy I said, in effect, in my experience in the Navy I have never known of a flag officer being detached from command of the U. S. Fleet in the same manner that I was, and I feel that I owe it to myself to inquire why I was detached, and he stated that the President would send for me and talk the matter over with me.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

H
fols.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Did the President ever send for you
3 and talk the matter over with you?

4 Admiral Richardson: He did not.

5 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever seek to go to the
6 President on the matter after being told that he would send
7 for you?

8 Admiral Richardson: By no means.

9 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any other discussion
10 with the Secretary of the Navy -- the Secretary at that time
11 was Mr. Knox, was it not?

12 Admiral Richardson: Yes.

13 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any other discussion
14 about your detachment? Will you give us the full story?

15 Admiral Richardson: No, I had no more discussion
16 about my detachment. I had some discussion about my duty,
17 to which I was to be assigned.

18 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us something about the
19 duties? Was it a promotion that you were going to; was this
20 general board a promotion?

21 Admiral Richardson: Oh, no.

22 In accordance with the law, upon detachment from the posi-
23 tion of Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, I
24 reverted from the rank of Admiral to that of Rear Admiral,
25 and from being senior to many people to whom I had been

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 senior only temporarily I reverted to my normal position
3 on the Navy list.

4 Senator Ferguson: What was the duty of this general
5 board?

6 Admiral Richardson: Well, it was a board that has been
7 held in high esteem by many people for many years. It is a
8 board of senior officers of the Navy that consider matters
9 referred to it by the Secretary of the Navy and advise him
10 on any subject that is referred to them. The primary duty
11 in time of peace was the consideration and recommendation as
12 to the building program, and the type and characteristics of
13 the ships to be built.

14 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any conversation with
15 the Secretary of the Navy that would indicate that he knew
16 why you were detached?

17 Admiral Richardson: He said to me, "The last time you
18 were here you hurt the President's feelings."

19 Senator Ferguson: Did he say what the occasion was
20 that you had hurt the President's feelings?

21 Admiral Richardson: He did not say.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you ask him.

23 Admiral Richardson: No, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Do you know on what occasion you
25 could have hurt the President's feelings?

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Admiral Richardson: Well, it would hurt my feelings
3 if a senior subordinate under me disagreed with me and I
4 couldn't make him change his mind.

5 Senator Ferguson: Then you feel that probably the
6 conversation that you had then on the -- was it the 8th
7 of October at a luncheon with Admiral Leahy and the President
8 -- was the occasion that you may have hurt his feelings?

9 Admiral Richardson: I think so.

10 Senator Ferguson: That is the occasion that you told
11 us that you were rather definite in your opinions?

12 Admiral Richardson: Unfortunately, I am definite in
13 most of my opinions.

14 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any other conversation
15 with the Secretary of the Navy as to why you were removed --
16 Pardon me -- detached. I want to use that word instead of
17 "removed." Detached.

18 Admiral Richardson: Mr. Chairman, may I say something
19 off the record?

20 The Chairman: Off the record.

21 (Discussion off the record)

22 The Chairman: Go ahead.

23 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement
24 made by the Admiral, it is apparent that he doesn't think
25 that is material and pertinent and I seriously doubt whether

h3

Witness Richardson

1
2 we should go fishing in every direction here in view of
3 the Admiral's last statement.

4 Admiral Richardson: I have no humility about making
5 this statement. I am perfectly willing to make it, if it
6 is useful. It is a trivial thing.

7 The Chairman: The chair thinks probably the Admiral
8 had better finish.

9 Admiral Richardson: There is a requirement in the Navy
10 that on every annual fitness -- I mean on every fitness report
11 submitted, an officer indicate his preference for duty, and
12 inasmuch as I had been informed that I would remain at sea
13 longer if that were carried out, I would have only a short
14 time remaining on the active list when I was detached, and
15 therefore I did not want to move my household effects from
16 Washington to some naval station, I did not want to be as-
17 signed to a responsible position in the Department for only
18 a short time, and really, as a joke, I entered on my last
19 fitness report that I preferred duty on the Naval Examining
20 Board.

21 In all my experience in the Navy -- and I have had
22 four years in the Bureau of Navigation, charged with assigning
23 officers to duty, I never heard of anyone looking at a fitness
24 report of a flag officer to see where they would assign
25 him to duty. So before I reported to the Secretary, I read

h4

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

4

Witness Richardson

Questions by: The Chairman
Senator Ferguson

1
2 in the paper, or heard a rumor, that I was to be assigned
3 to the Naval Examining Board in accordance with my request,
4 and when I reported to the Secretary, I said, "Mr. Secretary,
5 I have reported for duty. I am willing to do any duty that
6 can in any way contribute to the preparation of the Navy for
7 war, but having heard or read a rumor that I was going to
8 the Examining Board at my request I want to tell you that if
9 I am ordered to the Examining Board, I am going there gladly,
10 willingly, rather. I will do the job to the limit of my
11 ability, but if a press release is made that I was assigned
12 to the Examining Board at my request, I will inform the
13 press that it is a lie."

14 He said, "Well, Admiral, you, of course, won't go to
15 the Examining Board. Where do you want to go?"

16 And I said, "Any other place you send me."

17 So I went to the General Board.

18 The Chairman: That completes that statement? That is all
19 there is to that?

20 Admiral Richardson: That is all.

21 The Chairman: All right.

22 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, had you put on a long distance
23 reconnaissance at Pearl Harbor?

24 Admiral Richardson: I had, Senator Ferguson, and I
25 think in the previous testimony, I have covered it as com-

h6

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1

2

prehensively as I can.

3

4

Senator Ferguson: You have given us all of the data on that?

5

Admiral Richardson: I have.

6

7

8

9

Senator Ferguson: Did you have anything to do with the reconnaissance orders or directives as of 1941, that is what I was getting at. Were you consulted in relation to that after you left?

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Admiral Richardson: I discontinued prior to my detachment long range reconnaissance of the type that I established upon arrival in the Hawaiian area, and in lieu thereof I established a search of the operating areas and a search off the entrance of Pearl Harbor before ships left the harbor. That was incorporated in a security order which was in process of revision when I was detached.

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The first order, that revision, that was issued after I was detached, was issued over the signature of Admiral Kimmel on 15 February, and I knew what was in that order, and I previously stated that had I remained there, while I had not read this order thoroughly, it is my belief, based on the fact that the officer who prepared it on my staff remained with Admiral Kimmel until after that order was issued, it is my belief that had I remained there, the order would have been substantially as it is now, and would have

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 been over my signature.

3 Senator Ferguson: What were the places that you could
4 anchor the Fleet? What places were there to anchor this
5 fleet at the Hawaiian Islands?

6 Admiral Richardson: The main anchorages were within
7 Pearl Harbor, in Lahaina Roads off the Island of Molokai,
8 and for carriers, off Oahu, between the entrance to Pearl
9 Harbor and Diamond Head, and small vessels used Hilo and
10 Kahoolawe.

11 Senator Ferguson: Was all anchorage considered open
12 anchorage except Pearl Harbor?

13 Admiral Richardson: All were open anchorages, except
14 that it was possible for small ships to enter the harbor
15 of Hilo and enter Kahoolawe.

16 Senator Ferguson: The anti-aircraft protection was
17 placed to cover what anchorage? Lahaina Roads or Pearl
18 Harbor?

19 Admiral Richardson: There was no anti-aircraft protec-
20 tion any place except Pearl Harbor.

21 Senator Ferguson: At the time that you left did you
22 consider the anti-aircraft protection sufficient to protect
23 the fleet in Pearl Harbor?

24 Admiral Richardson: By no means. I so indicated in my
25 endorsement on the letter that was prepared by Admiral

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h8

1
2 Bloch under date of 30 December 1940, my endorsement being
3 dated 4 January, 1941.

4 Senator Ferguson: When we were given maps here, we
5 were shown that the Fleet was -- that the battleships were
6 moored in pairs. Do you know why that would be? Is that
7 the way you kept them?

8 Admiral Richardson: That is the only way you could
9 get them in the Harbor. There wasn't room for putting
10 the ships at individual berths.

11 Senator Ferguson: In other words, it was so congested
12 that it was necessary to put them in pairs?

13 Admiral Richardson: That was habitual practice.

14 Senator Ferguson: Could they have been placed in any
15 other position, all the Fleet as we have seen it on these
16 plats?

17 Admiral Richardson: No, there was not separate berths
18 adequate to berth each big ship separately.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you start, during the period that
20 you had the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, to place it in shape for
21 active duty, war duty?

22 Admiral Richardson: I did everything within my power
23 to make the officers and men of the Fleet become war-minded,
24 and one great deterrent of my effective accomplishment of that
25 aim was the fact that many officers who were long-time friends

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 would say, in effect, "Joe, we cannot be on the verge of
3 war, otherwise they would give us enough men to man the
4 ships."

5 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell me who told you that?

6 Admiral Richardson: One specifically will be a witness
7 before this committee, I think, possibly. His name is John
8 Henry Newton. I think his rank is vice admiral.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, would you say that the Fleet
10 was a liability or an asset in the defense of Pearl Harbor,
11 being in the Harbor, was it a liability or an asset?

12 Admiral Richardson: You are not on very safe ground
13 in expressing an opinion five years or four years after the
14 occurrence of an event in hopes that your mind will not be
15 conditioned by after-knowledge.

16 Senator Ferguson: You feel that you wouldn't want to
17 give an opinion on that question at the present time.

18 Admiral Richardson: I prefer not to.

19 Senator Ferguson: All right.

20 You have had considerable experience in the Far East
21 in your previous years in service, you stated?

22 Admiral Richardson: That is true.

23 Senator Ferguson: After you were retired as Commander-
24 in-Chief, was that experience utilized in any way?

25 Admiral Richardson: Not to my knowledge.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
Mr. Keefe

1

h10

2

Senator Ferguson: You were not consulted on any matters in the Far East?

3

4

Admiral Richardson: I was not.

5

6

7

Senator Ferguson: After the 5th of January when you received your first notice of detachment, did you confer with anyone in the State Department?

8

9

Admiral Richardson: Between that time and the time of my detachment?

10

11

12

Senator Ferguson: No, after your detachment, did you confer on any questions with anyone in the State Department officially?

13

14

15

Admiral Richardson: Oh, no, I had no official standing that would entitle me to confer with anybody in the State Department.

16

17

Senator Ferguson: You were not consulted by anyone in the State Department?

18

19

Admiral Richardson: Not on official business, no.

20

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

21

22

Mr. Keefe: Admiral, I have just one question that I think hasn't been pursued fully.

23

24

You were asked yesterday by Senator Ferguson as to Naval games. or maneuvers early in 1932 or 1936.

25

Admiral Richardson: In 1932, I think, only.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

h11

2

Mr. Keefe: 1932?

3

Admiral Richardson: I think only 1932.

4

Mr. Keefe: Only 1932.

5

Admiral Richardson: Yes.

6

Mr. Keefe: In which simulated attacks by air power were made upon Pearl Harbor.

8

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

9

Mr. Keefe: But the matter was not pursued so that I have any very definite ideas as to just what the conclusion of those Naval games were.

12

Now, there would be a record maintained, would there not, of the character of the simulated attack upon Pearl Harbor at that time?

15

Admiral Richardson: Undoubtedly. I cannot recall the part that I played in Fleet exercises of 1932, but I know that at that time I was the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Augusta, which was the flagship of the scouting force, and that ship participated in whatever exercises we had.

20

I do not remember what those exercises were in the Hawaiian area, but I believe there must have been a simulated air raid. I know that on return to the United States, the task force to which the Augusta was assigned, did conduct a simulated air raid on the West Coast of California, somewhat north of Santa Barbara. However, I know that many carrier

25

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 raids against Pearl Harbor have been simulated previous to
3 the 1941 Fleet exercises.

4 Mr. Keefe: Now, Admiral, the purpose of conducting
5 those maneuvers and those exercises and simulated attacks
6 is for the benefit of the Fleet in considering the defense
7 of Pearl Harbor, in connection with the Army?

8 Admiral Richardson: No, the purpose was primarily
9 to exercise the Army in Hawaii and the local Naval defense
10 forces which was composed of submarines, long-range patrol
11 planes, and in the War Plans --

12 Mr. Keefe: Pardon me, Admiral. What I am getting
13 at is this. Judges were appointed to judge the effectiveness
14 of the attack in those cases, were they not?

15 Admiral Richardson: My impression is that we did not
16 have umpires to determine the success of the failure of the
17 attack, but at the conclusion of every Fleet exercise, there
18 was what is called a critique attended by all senior officers
19 and at which those who played an important part in exercises
20 present their views as to what took place and what lessons
21 were learned and the Commander-in-Chief himself sums up
22 his conception of how well the job was done and how much was
23 learned and what mistakes were made.

24 Mr. Keefe: Now, is a record kept and filed with anybody
25 for future study?

h12

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 Admiral Richardson: The whole thing is printed.

3 Mr. Keefe: Printed by whom?

4 Admiral Richardson: Printed in a document and sent
5 to the Naval War College or the Chief of Naval Operations,
6 or should be.

7 Mr. Keefe: If there were maneuvers in 1932 and subse-
8 quent to that time when simulated attacks by air were made
9 upon Oahu and Pearl Harbor within Oahu there would be some
10 place in the Navy Department a printed report showing the
11 actual character of those attacks and the summaries?

12 Admiral Richardson: That is my belief.

13 Shf fls

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Have we such reports, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Congressman, there was laid on my desk this morning at ten minutes to ten from the Navy Department a document which I think is the report or material on the 1932 war game.

Mr. Keefe: Is it a voluminous report?

Mr. Mitchell: I haven't had time to examine it. I came in only about five minutes before I came to the committee room this morning. I understand that the Army's report of this game, of some of the 1932 games, is already in the hands of Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. I will be very glad to have it sent from my office. I just received it recently. I haven't had the time to study it.

Mr. Keefe: May I ask counsel whether or not there are any records or files in the hands of the committee showing the results of any war manoeuvres or simulated attacks on Pearl Harbor subsequent to 1932 and prior to 1941?

Mr. Mitchell: I think not. We have asked for them but we have not received them. I asked the Admiral about the war games of 1940 when I examined him and his information was not as definite as we wanted. We have asked for the report of 1940 in so far as, I think, they relate to attacks on Pearl Harbor.

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Will that report be made available to the individual members of the committee?

Mr. Mitchell: As soon as we get it we will let you have it.

Senator Brewster: Well, could the Admiral make a statement? He apparently has one in mind.

Admiral Richardson: I know that in the annual fleet exercise while I was Commander-in-Chief there was no simulated carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. I also know that many such attacks have been simulated in preceding years. Some times they have one of these simulated attacks and some years they do not have them, so that I could not state which years they had them.

Mr. Keefe: Now, one other question, Admiral. Prior to the time that you took the Fleet from the West Coast to conduct manoeuvres in 1940, I believe in January --

Admiral Richardson: I think the 1st of April.

Mr. Keefe: The 1st of April?

Admiral Richardson: When I took them out.

Mr. Keefe: Yes. Prior to that time the base of the Fleet had always been at San Diego and San Pedro, do I so understand your testimony, except the Hawaiian detachment and the Asiatic Fleet, perhaps?

Admiral Richardson: Well, "always" is a long time.

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Within my memory we had practically no ships in the Pacific.
I never served in the Pacific except on the Asiatic station,
until I went out there in the Augusta about 1932, so that in
thirty years service I was never on duty in the Pacific Ocean
except when I was on the Asiatic station.

From 1932 until 1940 the normal bases of the Fleet
were in the San Pedro, Long Beach and San Diego areas.

Mr. Keefe: That is all.

The Chairman: Admiral, I want to ask you a question or
two prompted by other questions.

Admiral Richardson: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: In this October 10th or 11th memorandum
in which you set out a number of assumptions from which war
plans were based, those were all theoretical assumptions?

Admiral Richardson: Wholly.

The Chairman: And did any of this materialize while
you were in command?

Admiral Richardson: My recollection is that that never
materialized. They opened the Burma Road and the Japanese
never did disturb us or the British very much, so that the
plan was never implemented.

The Chairman: Yes. Now, let me ask you this question:
While you were in command had the practice arisen of having
the Fleet go into Pearl Harbor periodically for recreation

Witness Richardson:

Questions by The Chairman

or for any other reasons?

Admiral Richardson: Oh, yes. In fact, it is probable that there were more ships in Pearl Harbor in December 1940 than there were in December 1941.

The Chairman: So that this was a recognized practice of the Fleet to assemble in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Richardson: A ship cannot remain at sea or anchored out in the open roadstead all the time. They must go in now and then for replenishment of provisions, for recreation, for upkeep, disabling engines if necessary and for the material maintenance of the ships and it was my custom for ships to go in periodically, all of them, not at the same time but for every ship to have a turn in Pearl Harbor.

The Chairman: In the correspondence between Admiral Stark and you, all through it is emphasized the caution in regard to practices or exercises or manoeuvres to do nothing that would create the impression of any offensive step being taken with reference to Orange, which I understand is Japan.

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

The Chairman: And in your conferences here in Washington with the Secretary of the Navy and with Admiral Stark and with the President was any further emphasis placed upon that precaution in connection with your exercises and manoeuvres?

Witness Richardson:

Questions by The Chairman

Admiral Richardson: No, because I had been so thoroughly indoctrinated with that idea over a great many years that I needed no further instructions.

The Chairman: Yes. That is, of course, I presume, always a precaution that the Navy takes and always takes regardless of circumstances under which it exercises and manœuvres, that it is not to be understood as an offensive action against any country?

Admiral Richardson: Absolutely.

The Chairman: That is all.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: Admiral, in your statement about the meeting at the White House October the 8th, 1940 you quoted the President or said in effect, and I am reading from the record at page 684 (Reading):

"That if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war."

You are quite clear that the President said that about the Philippines?

Admiral Richardson: That is according to my firm conviction, my best opinion and belief.

Mr. Murphy: Now, at the time that you were at the White House we did have ships based at Manila, did we not?

Witness Richardson:

Question: by Mr. Murphy

Admiral Richardson: They were on an Asiatic station. They might or might not have been at Manila, but they were in the Western Pacific area. They might have been in the Southern Philippines, they might have been in Manila and some of them might have been on the China coast.

Mr. Murphy: But what I mean is Manila was the base of the fleet. That was its home port, wasn't it, of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral Richardson: Quite right.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I notice in the letter of December 23, 1940, a letter from Admiral Stark, apparently, to Admiral Hart, the following on page 2: (Reading)

"In regard to your next paragraph I am completely with you and have sought at every turn to improve the security of Manila Bay and the Philippines. I might say, in this connection, that opinion in general, in regard to how far we should go in maintaining our position in the Philippines seems to be changing upward. While such a change is going on, it is not always practicable to be definitely final on questions that arise."

Apparently the view was changing as to the Philippines.

Do you have any other thing on that subsequent to October the 8th, 1940, as to our attitude as to what would have happened if the Philippines were attacked?

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Murphy
Sen. Lucas

Admiral Richardson: I have not. I have nothing further to add.

Mr. Murphy: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions by members of the committee?

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas: I would like to ask one or two questions.

Admiral, the question was asked you by one of the members of the committee as to whether or not in January 1940 the Pacific Fleet, of which you were in charge, was ready for war duty and you unqualifiedly answered "No, it was not."

Now, even though this may be somewhat repetitious I would like to ask you, Admiral, how many men were in the Navy under your command at that time, in January 1940, if you know?

Admiral Richardson: I do not know how many men were there at that specific time but I would like to further amplify my statement regarding lack of readiness of the Fleet by stating that it was as ready at that time as it had been ready in many years preceding.

Senator Lucas: Yes. All right. Now, you stated, as I recall, the percentage of men that were attached to the battleships?

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Lucas: And, as I recall, you said it was about 85 per cent of its actual strength.

Admiral Richardson: That had been the long custom in the Navy, to maintain about 85 per cent of the required complement on board ships because the Navy was faced with two alternatives:

Based on the number of men allowed by Congress they must either limit the number of ships in commission to those that they could fully man, thereby curtailing the opportunity for officers to acquire experience in command, or they had to maintain in commission ships that could not be fully manned for war operations.

Senator Lucas: That is correct. Now, one further question: With respect to the auxiliary equipment that would have been necessary to have placed the Fleet of which you were in command upon a wartime basis, will you give to the committee just as near as you can what you believed in 1940, at that time, would have been necessary in the way of auxiliary cruisers or whatever ships were necessary and whatever implements were necessary to have had it on a war footing basis in 1940 when you were in command?

Admiral Richardson: I would be unwilling to hazard without a thorough study a curbstone opinion as to the number of ships, auxiliary ships, that would have been required

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

to accompany the Fleet and service it in war operations.

Senator Lucas: Well, whatever would have been necessary in January 1940 in order to put this Fleet upon a wartime basis as has been suggested here by you, that was a matter that was wholly in the hands of the Congress of the United States as to the supplying of the men and the supplying of equipment and the tools to put it on a wartime basis?

Admiral Richardson: Absolutely.

Senator Lucas: Now, one other statement that I want to read into the record here from a letter that is already in the record as one of the exhibits and it is a letter that you wrote, Admiral, to Admiral Stark dated September the 18th, 1940. The fourth paragraph of that letter says this:

(Reading)

"During the past six months the Fleet has been visited by two Secretaries. During the last visit the Secretary made a most favorable impression upon the officers and men of the Fleet and I have frequently heard officers say, 'I hope that Colonel Knox remains as Secretary regardless of the outcome of the election.'"

That is all.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, please?

The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Richardson, during the early part of your testimony you testified while you were making one of your visits to the United States during the days you were Commander-in-Chief that you picked up at San Francisco five thousand men to take back to your Fleet. Is that correct?

Admiral Richardson: If I made such a statement it was erroneous. I did not pick them up at San Francisco. There were five thousand men made available to me on the West Coast ports. I think the majority of them were made available to me in the San Pedro, Long Beach and San Diego area, although some of the five thousand might have reported to ships that had proceeded to Mare Island and those that had proceeded to Puget Sound for repairs. The point I make is that they were not made available to me at San Francisco but on West Coast ports.

Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart: Wait a minute.

I did not want to insist on the San Francisco and I was not making any point on that. The point that I want to start from in this examination, you did obtain five thousand additional men on the West Coast?

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

Mr. Gearhart: And they were taken to your fleet in the

2911

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

Pacific?

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

Mr. Gearhart: That suggests to me a question. I would like to know how many men you had with your Fleet before you obtained these additional five thousand?

Admiral Richardson: I think it would be impossible for anyone to answer that question at this time.

Mr. Gearhart: Without endeavoring to be accurate can you give me round figures as to what the complement and manpower would be of a Fleet such as you were commanding at that time?

Admiral Richardson: Congressman Gearhart, the Commander-in-Chief of a Fleet, with constant changes in the number of men, with changes now and then in the number of ships, could not discharge his responsible position if he burdened his mind with such details.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, you testified that your Fleet was about 85 per cent of what it should have been in manpower?

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

Mr. Gearhart: What I am trying to find out is how did it affect that percentage that you have fixed at 85 per cent by the addition of five thousand additional men? That is the point that I am leading up to.

Admiral Richardson: Well, if the committee is willing

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

to accept a wild stab.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, I don't think that anything you say in the way of opinion is wild. I have that much respect for your opinion.

Admiral Richardson: It would be a wild stab.

The Chairman: Well, make a stab.

Admiral Richardson: It would be somewhere between one and seven per cent.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, then the five thousand improved the situation considerably?

Admiral Richardson: Five men would have improved the situation.

Mr. Gearhart: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Any further questions?

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I have one question.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Richardson, you were asked by a member of the committee as to whether or not it was not Congress whose duty it was to furnish men for the Navy and I think your answer was that it was.

Admiral Richardson: Well, I would like to --

Senator Ferguson: I wish you would elaborate on that.

Admiral Richardson: I would like to change it.

Senator Ferguson: Would you elaborate on it or change

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
it?

Admiral Richardson: It was not Congress' duty. Congress alone had the power to do it.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know, Admiral, what requests were made to Congress at or about that time for men and materiel for the Navy?

Admiral Richardson: Well, of course, I have no knowledge but having served as Director of the Office of Personnel, Bureau of Navigation, for almost three years and having been Budget Officer of the Navy Department for one year, having been Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for one year, having been Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel for one year, I know that we always asked for more men than we had any hopes of getting.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, were you acquainted with the fact that the Navy would make a request and then the Budget Director and his force would pass on it and then it would come to Congress as an estimate of the Budget Director? Are you familiar with that?

Admiral Richardson: I am.

Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know whether the period that you were talking about that it was Congress', at least, power to give more men, do you know what the Navy had requested and how much it had been reduced or increased by the

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Budget Director?

Admiral Richardson: I have no knowledge.

Senator Ferguson: You haven't those figures?

Admiral Richardson: - But I am perfectly willing to volunteer the statement that I believe that the President had it within his power by an Act of Congress to increase the number of men in the Fleet faster than he did do it.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, you stated something that you had a conversation with someone relative to the fact that if we needed men in the Navy we could take machinists or mechanically inclined people and use them in the Navy.

Will you tell me more about that? Where did you get that idea and whom did you discuss it with?

Admiral Richardson: Everything that you stated, Senator Ferguson, is in accordance with my statement except that you did not add the name of the President of the United States, which I did.

Senator Ferguson: When you would say that you got that idea from the President?

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: Now, were you at that time discussing with the President the amount of men that you felt that you needed?

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Admiral Richardson: I was. I discussed it with everybody. Everybody thought I was a nut on it.

Senator Ferguson: And what month was it that you had that discussion with the President?

Admiral Richardson: On both occasions.

Senator Ferguson: That would be when you had luncheon with Admiral Leahy and the President?

Admiral Richardson: If my memory serves me correctly I think that I would never forego the opportunity to urge that additional men be added to the Fleet. Therefore, I think I discussed the matter with the President at my meeting with him in July and also in October.

Senator Ferguson: Did you discuss it with the Secretary of the Navy when you received the information that is now at least partly contained in exhibit 11 in relation to the embargo or the patrol, whichever you want to call it, in the Pacific?

Shef--
Sheok
fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Shack
fols.
Shefner
(5)
AL-1

Witness Richardson

Questions by: The Chairman

Admiral Richardson: No, at that time, in my discussion with the Secretary of the Navy, I cannot state that I said anything with respect to the inadequacies of personnel, but I did state that the Fleet was not ready for action that might involve us in war, and the Secretary said, "Richardson, we have never been ready, but we have always won."

Senator Ferguson: That is all I have.

The Chairman: May I ask you on that point, the only way to get men in the Navy at that time was by voluntary enlistment, is that true?

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

The Chairman: And during that period was it true that the Navy, through posters and recruiting stations and by methods that the Navy usually adopts, were seeking to urge enlistment in the Navy?

Admiral Richardson: I cannot answer specifically.

The Chairman: Now, Admiral --

Admiral Richardson: Do you want me to finish?

The Chairman: Go ahead, yes. I do not want you to answer unless you feel free to do so.

Admiral Richardson: When I became Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel we had on the waiting list thoroughly acceptable qualified young men that wanted to enlist in the Navy as apprentice seamen. We had 8,000 of them. Some of them had been on

Witness Richardson

Questions by: The Chairman
Mr. Clark

that list for four or five months.

The Chairman: Were they later taken on the ships?

Admiral Richardson: They were taken on under a quota system in accordance with their position on the waiting list as funds appropriated by the Congress made it possible for them to do so.

The Chairman: Does counsel wish to ask any further questions?

Mr. Clark: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one question.

The Chairman: Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark: Insofar as the attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned, what, in your opinion, would have been the difference in the attack, or the result of the attack if there had been a full complement of men on each of the ships involved?

Admiral Richardson: I am not now aware of the state of personnel in the Fleet eleven months after my detachment.

Mr. Clark: Assuming it was only 85 percent of the full complement, what difference would it have made if it were a full complement?

Admiral Richardson: That being the only change?

Mr. Clark: Yes.

Admiral Richardson: I think the difference would have been infinitesimal.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Clark: That is all.

The Chairman: Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Does the Senator want to ask any more questions?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

The Chairman: All right.

Senator Ferguson: I am not quite clear, Admiral, on two of your statements to reconcile. I understood one of your answers indicated that the amount of men in the Navy was limited by the money appropriated by Congress, and in another statement you indicated that the President could have put more men on.

Now I am not undertaking to quote your testimony, but just to refresh your memory probably as to what you did say on those two items. How can we reconcile those two? The reporter may be able to read that to you.

Admiral Richardson: There is no need for him to read me that, because normally Congress does not, in its annual appropriation, limit the number of men. It provides so much money.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Richardson: But there is a general limitation on the number of men. Now it is my belief, which I am certain I can verify, or it can be verified, that under legislation

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 the Congress, the President had the authority to increase
3 the number of men allowed in the Navy, and I believe that there
4 were substantial appropriations made available to the President
5 which he could allocate for purposes that were not specifically
6 stipulated by Congress.

7 Senator Ferguson: So he could have used it for increasing
8 the Navy?

9 Admiral Richardson: So I think he could have used it
10 had he seen so fit.

11 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

12 Admiral Richardson: Now if you wish -- and I think it
13 has no bearing, but if you wish I can go into this further.

14 Senator Ferguson: That reconciles it.

15 The Chairman: Is that all?

16 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the atten-
17 tion of the Admiral to the fact that subsequent to the short
18 question which I asked him with relation to the 1932 maneuvers
19 there has been placed before me what purports to be the report,
20 and the preliminary reports incident to those maneuvers, con-
21 sisting of a bundle of perhaps 1,000 or more pages, of the
22 preliminary work done preparing for the maneuvers. One is a
23 report, Copy No. 1, entitled "Confidential Report of the
24 Chief Umpire Joint Army and Navy Exercises, Grand Joint Exer-
25 cise No. 4."

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 There is another large report entitled, "Confidential
2 Black Report (Army) on Grand Joint Exercise No. 4, February 6-12,
3 1932."

4 Then a bound volume containing many pages which appears
5 also to be a report, confidential, of Army participation in
6 the grand exercise No. 4.
7

8 Now from these reports that had been furnished a few
9 moments ago it appears quite clear that in initiating these
10 exercises umpires were appointed by both the Army and the Navy
11 to observe the results of those exercises and maneuvers, and
12 to make a full and complete report, confidential in character.

13 Now, as Commander in Chief of the Fleet, when you assumed
14 command, did you have the benefit of the examination of these
15 reports?

16 Admiral Richardson: Not those specific ones, but later
17 ones.

18 Mr. Keefe: Then you are sure now, Admiral, that so far
19 as the record now appears, those exercises were meticulously
20 conducted apparently, according to a long preparation by both
21 the Army and Navy, and that reports were filed by the umpires
22 appointed?

23 Admiral Richardson: I feel sure, I feel that I was on
24 perfectly safe ground when I said that I thought you could
25 find evidence of the holding of those exercises.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

The Chairman: Is that all?

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, at some time or other in the course of these proceedings it would be interesting if some of us had time to read these reports. I do not know when anybody will get time, when they are presented on such short notice, but I think that question should be explored, and I assume counsel will explore it, to bring it to us in concise form so we can understand what the report of the umpires was on those maneuvers.

Mr. Mitchell: I was going to ask if that is the 1932 maneuvers?

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Mr. Mitchell: I am frank to say I have not gone back to 1932 for maneuver reports. I supposed we were more directly interested in war games along a year or two before the Pearl Harbor attack, which would deal with simulated air attacks, and on that is where our inquiry was directed.

Mr. Keefe: Do you know whether these reports contain the report of a simulated air attack upon Pearl Harbor? Are they part of those maneuvers?

Mr. Mitchell: I do not know. They were brought in at the request of one member of the committee who asked for the 1932 maneuver report. If I thought that were directly involved here I would have had them long ago, I think.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2
3 Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, Admiral, if I understand
4 your testimony in response to questions by Senator Ferguson,
5 you at one time served as Budget Officer of the Navy Department.

6 Admiral Richardson: I did.

7 Mr. Keefe: And you had experience in coming before sub-
8 committees of the Appropriations Committee.

9 Admiral Richardson: I have.

10 Mr. Keefe: To present the Navy's budget estimate.

11 Admiral Richardson: I have.

12 Mr. Keefe: I think in your testimony yesterday you
13 stated that you made an effort to see the chairman of that sub-
14 committee upon one of your visits here.

15 Admiral Richardson: I did. I saw one and made an effort
16 to see the other.

17 Mr. Keefe: The former Senator from Nevada, I believe.

18 Admiral Richardson: I saw the then chairman of the
19 Senate subcommittee, the present Secretary of State. I en-
20 deavored to see Governor Scrugham, who was at that time a
21 Congressman and chairman of the subcommittee of the Appro-
22 priations Committee of the House.

23 Mr. Keefe: Now as a matter of fact, Admiral, when the
24 Navy prepares its request in the first instance for each
25 fiscal year it makes up the request which is submitted to the
President's Bureau of the Budget first, isn't that true?

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Admiral Richardson: The preliminary estimate made by the Navy Bureaus and officers of the Navy Department are submitted to the Budget Officer of the Navy Department.

Mr. Keefe: I understand that. That is the first step.

Admiral Richardson: And he himself, with the approval of the Secretary, frequently reduces the estimates, in the hope that his action will preclude more drastic action by the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. Keefe: In any event, following that the procedure is that the request from the Navy goes then to the Bureau of the Budget?

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: And you make a presentation to the Bureau of the Budget?

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: On the Navy's request.

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: After the individual departments of the Navy have submitted their request to the Budget Officer of the Navy he finally prepares the presentation for the Bureau of the Budget?

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: Then when the Bureau of the Budget finally acts, that budget is then submitted by the President to the

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 Congress?

3 Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

4 Mr. Keefe: In his annual budget message. That is true,
5 is it not?

6 Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Hook
fols.

7
8
9
10
11 WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

h1

2

Mr. Keefe: And during the course of the year there may be supplementary estimates submitted?

3

4

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

5

6

Mr. Keefe: By the Bureau of the Budget to the Congress?

7

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

8

Mr. Keefe: Now, when you come before the Congressional committee to present the request, do you have instructions to defend and present the budget as submitted by the President?

9

10

11

Admiral Richardson: If my memory serves me correctly, an Act of Congress provides that, as a representative of the Navy Department, I would be subject to imprisonment, if I asked for funds in excess of those set up in the budget.

12

13

14

15

16

Mr. Keefe: So that, as a matter of law, and as a matter of practice, the executive officers coming before a Congressional committee to present a budget support the President's budget as submitted to the Congress?

17

18

Admiral Richardson: In accordance with an Act of Congress.

19

20

21

Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, have you ever examined the complete submission of estimates by the Navy Department to the Bureau of the Budget?

22

23

Admiral Richardson: For what year?

24

25

Mr. Keefe: In the fiscal years, say 1934-1941.

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
Mr. Mitchell

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Admiral Richardson: I certainly did, in 1934-1935, because I was the budget officer of the Navy, but that is the only time.

The Chairman: The chair might suggest that those budget estimates are matters of record which could be obtained from the Department and from the budget messages of the President and the Appropriations Committee. The chair doubts whether the Admiral could remember all of them.

Admiral Richardson: I could not.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I have before me, Mr. Chairman, and may I say, Admiral, figures submitted to me by the Navy Department showing in each fiscal year the appropriations requested by the Navy Department, the budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress and the amounts in each fiscal year made available by the Congress.

Now, I assume, of course that you have no familiarity with those figures except perhaps the estimates which you examined when you were budget officer for the Navy.

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

The Chairman: Is that all, Congressman?

Mr. Keefe: That is all at this time.

The Chairman: Does counsel wish to ask further questions?

Mr. Mitchell: I have one question of the Admiral.

Admiral, you testified that following the letter from

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

h3

2

Admiral Stark to you of November 22, suggesting you examine into the question of security of the Fleet in port against a possible air raid. and your reply of November 28, when you got back to Pearl Harbor, you made that inquiry?

5

6

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

7

Mr. Mitchell: That is the one you described?

8

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

9

Mr. Mitchell: Which led up to the Bloch report and the Knox-Stimson letter. Had you made any study of the proposition before?

11

12

Admiral Richardson: I had not.

13

Mr. Mitchell: In your memorandum of September 12 to Secretary Knox in which you listed the objections that you had to basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor there was no reference there or statement about peril to the Fleet in port, was there?

17

18

Admiral Richardson: That consideration had not arisen in my mind.

19

20

Mr. Mitchell: So it was in your representations about basing, or your objections about basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor which you had in that document and which you presented to other officials of the Government, including the President, you had not included any point of that kind in there?

23

24

25

Admiral Richardson: Not air raids; not protection against air raids.

Shack
(9)
fols.
Hook
al-1

Witness Richardson

Questions by: The Chairman

Mr. Mitchell: That is the only question I have

The Chairman: Are there any further questions by the committee?

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request.

The Chairman: Is it a request of the Admiral?

Mr. Gearhart: A request of the counsel. I would like to have the log of the U.S.S. WRIGHT, the war vessel that I think was a part of Admiral Halsey's Task Force, the log from the 25th of November on to the fatal day of December 7.

Mr. Mitchell: If we can get it it will be made available.

Mr. Gearhart: Likewise if there is a log available of the cruiser HELENA, which I understand was in the harbor, and went through the attack.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask the Admiral one concluding question, and that is, if he has anything now that he wants to volunteer to the committee, rather than a direct question, relative to this issue that he believes to be relevant.

The Chairman: The Chair was about to ask the Admiral about the same thing. If the members of the committee are through with their questions, and I assume that they are, Admiral, if you have any further statement that you wish to make the committee will be glad to receive it.

Admiral Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to state that I never bore any resentment toward

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Richardson

President Roosevelt because of my detachment from command of the U.S. Fleet.

He was the Constitutional Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I was one of his senior subordinates, there was a difference of opinion, each of us frankly expressed his views, neither could induce the other to change his opinion, I was relieved of command of the Fleet, had I been Constitutional Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I would have taken the same action.

Because of this conviction, on 28 January 1941, 4 days before I was relieved of command of the Fleet with orders to proceed to Washington for duty, I sent to the Chief of Naval Operations by an officer, the following oral message:

"The day I was made Commander in Chief I realized then and thereafter that the same power which made me Commander in Chief could unmake me at any time. When I arrive in Washington I shall keep my lips sealed and my eyes in the boat and put my weight on the oar in any duty assigned."

Living up to this resolution has resulted in the circulation of many rumors which bear little relation to fact.

I hope my testimony given here has clarified the situation to some extent.

The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, Admiral, the Chair wishes to thank you for your frank and forthright

al-3

Witness Richardson

1
2 testimony and to say that the Chair feels sure that every
3 member of the committee has undoubted respect for your ability,
4 your opinion, and your patriotism, in the diligence with which
5 you have sought to follow your duty before the committee, as
6 well as while you have been in the Navy of the United States.

7 Admiral Richardson: Thank you, sir.

8 The Chairman: Now counsel may proceed.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, Admiral Leahy has been wait-
10 ing quite awhile. His engagement has been quite severe. I
11 wonder if you could not call him right now? The committee
12 can sit a few minutes longer.

13 The Chairman: If it is agreeable to the committee,
14 Admiral Leahy has been waiting here a couple of days, and
15 counsel desires to call Mr. Leahy now.

16 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I do not know, of course,
17 the scope of Admiral Leahy's testimony, but I think, in view
18 of the position which he held as Chief of Naval Operations
19 during the period covered today by something contained in
20 Admiral Richardson's testimony, and in view of the importance
21 and magnitude of the issues, any suggestion of disposing of
22 him in any brief fashion is unjust to his position, his prestige,
23 and the importance of the issues with which he was necessarily
24 concerned. I am sure his testimony is worth at least an
25 afternoon's session.

Hook
fols.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

hl
fls
AL

1
2 The Chairman: The chair is not advised as to what
3 particular point counsel wishes to call Admiral Leahy on
4 now. Admiral Leahy is on the list of witnesses, I imagine
5 to testify in a comprehensive way. The chair does not
6 know whether counsel wishes to interrogate him with respect
7 to this luncheon about which Admiral Richardson testified.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Under the circumstances, I think it
9 would be useless to try to finish his examination before
10 lunch.

11 Admiral Leahy, I believe, retired from the Navy in
12 1939. He was Governor of Puerto Rico in 1940, and he
13 went to Vichy in the fall of 1940, and he was not serving
14 in the Navy in 1940 and 1941. When I arranged to call him,
15 I did not suppose he had contacted the Navy during those
16 two years, and it would make his testimony on other matters
17 particularly wanting, although as an expert witness he might
18 testify to anything.

19 I had proposed to ask him as to his attendance at that
20 luncheon at the White House. I felt if any witness is
21 called to testify to a conversation with the deceased
22 President, every other person who was present in the room
23 should properly be called too. That was the reason I called
24 Admiral Leahy, and his description in that regard would be
25 very short.

1
2 It is up to the committee to say how much they want
3 to go into expert matters with him. If they say that they
4 will, then let us call Admiral Leahy back at two o'clock.

5 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I think it is evident
6 from the scope of Admiral Richardson's examination that the
7 preparedness of the Navy and of the United States defense
8 forces during the decade preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor
9 is one of the relevant matters about which of course Governor
10 Leahy speaks with considerable authority as Chief of Naval
11 Operations for four years. How far that may be gone into
12 I do not know, but I do think it deserves some time.

13 The Chairman: It is obvious to the chair that we can-
14 not conclude with Admiral Leahy, and therefore this committee
15 will recess until two o'clock.

16 (Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m. the committee recessed
17 until 2:00 o'clock p. m., of the same day.)
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The Chairman: The committee will come to order. Counsel, will you call the next witness?

Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Leahy.

The Chairman: Admiral Leahy, will you come around and be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY

(being first duly sworn by the chairman)

The Chairman: You may be seated there, Admiral. You may proceed, counsel.

Mr. Mitchell: Admiral, your rank is that of Admiral of the Fleet?

Admiral Leahy: Fleet Admiral.

Mr. Mitchell: Fleet Admiral?

Admiral Leahy: Fleet Admiral, United States Navy.

The Chairman: Admiral, will you talk into that microphone? The acoustics in this building are not excellent and we have to do that in order to be heard.

Mr. Mitchell: How long have you served in the Navy?

Admiral Leahy: I entered the Navy as a midshipman in 1893 and I have served continuously since except for approximately two years, from 1939 to 1942, during which time I was part time Governor of Puerto Rico and the rest of the time Ambassador to France.

Mr. Mitchell: You were Governor of Puerto Rico during

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 all of the year 1940 up to December?

3 Admiral Leahy: I went to Puerto Rico as Governor in
4 the fall of 1939 and left there in November, about the end
5 of November 1940.

6 Mr. Mitchell: And then you went to Vichy and how long
7 were you there as our Ambassador?

8 Admiral Leahy: I went to France as Ambassador, arriv-
9 ing in France on the 2nd of January 1941 and I left about the
10 end of April 1942.

11 Mr. Mitchell: You were Chief of Naval Operations at
12 one time, Admiral. What was that period?

13 Admiral Leahy: I was Chief of Naval Operations from the
14 2nd of January 1937 until the 1st of August 1939.

15 Mr. Mitchell: What is your present duty? What duties
16 are you now performing as Fleet Admiral?

17 Admiral Leahy: I am at present assigned to duty as
18 Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
19 Navy of the United States.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Were you in Washington in October 1940?

21 Admiral Leahy: Yes.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Were you present at the White House at
23 a luncheon on or about October 8th of that year at which
24 Admiral Richardson was present?

25 Admiral Leahy: I did have luncheon with the President

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 on October 8, 1940 and Admiral Richardson was also present
3 at the luncheon.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Will you state in your own way just what
5 occurred at that luncheon?

6 Admiral Leahy: I was at that time in Washington on duty
7 connected with the Government of Puerto Rico and the Presi-
8 dent asked me to have luncheon with him on the 8th of October.
9 I found after I arrived that Admiral Richardson was also to
10 be at lunch.

11 Many matters were discussed at the luncheon, some in
12 connection with my affairs in Puerto Rico and some with
13 Admiral Richardson in regard to the condition of the Fleet.

14 Perhaps it would be best for this inquiry for me to state
15 as well as I can remember the discussion that took place be-
16 tween Admiral Richardson and the President in regard to the
17 condition of the Fleet. My memory in that matter is good,
18 principally because I was exceedingly surprised to learn
19 that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet did not consider the
20 Fleet prepared for war and at that time I was apprehensive
21 in regard to an early war situation in the Pacific, although
22 I was very far from sources of information and I had no late
23 information in regard to that matter.

24 I do not remember how the subject was brought up but
25 Admiral Richardson told the President that the Fleet in

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Honolulu was not ready for war for numerous reasons.

3 He said the ships did not have their war complements;
4 that the facilities in Pearl Harbor were not sufficient to
5 keep the ships in a top condition at all times; that he had
6 not a sufficient number of fuel ships to make it possible for
7 him to operate the Fleet at any distance from the Hawaiian
8 Islands; that the personnel of the Fleet, the officers and
9 the crews, did not know why they were in the Hawaiian Islands;
10 that apparently nobody expected to be called upon for war
11 duty; that the families of the men and officers were in the
12 continental United States and they wanted to get home and
13 see their families; that the recreation facilities and the
14 means for taking care of his men when they were on shore in
15 Honolulu were almost non-existent, at least they were entire-
16 ly insufficient and that he felt that if there was a prospect
17 of calling upon the Fleet for war service it could be done
18 much more advantageously in a port on the Pacific Coast of
19 the United States where he could clear his ships for action,
20 get the additional things that would be needed and reinforce
21 his peacetime crews.

22 I think that covers very well all of the conversation
23 that went on between the President and Admiral Richardson
24 at this luncheon which I attended with them in the Presi-
25 dent's office.

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Mr. Mitchell: Did the President himself say anything
3 about basing the Fleet there that you heard?

4 Admiral Leahy: I do not remember that the President
5 made any comment whatever as to why the Fleet was in Pearl
6 Harbor or as to whether or not it might be required to re-
7 main there. He may have made a remark of that kind but I
8 have no recollection of it.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Did you leave the White House with
10 Admiral Richardson?

11 Admiral Leahy: We left the White House together and
12 we rode to where we were going, he to the Navy Department
13 and I to the Interior Department, either in a car which I
14 had or in his car.

15 During this short ride I expressed to Admiral Richard-
16 son my surprise to find that the Fleet was in the condition
17 which he had stated to the President and I said that I hoped
18 he would manage to correct as many of the deficiencies as
19 possible without any delay because I had been telling the
20 Congress and the people of this country for some time that
21 the Navy was ready for war and I was distressed to find that
22 it was not.

23 Mr. Mitchell: At the meeting at the White House did
24 you participate with Admiral Richardson in discussing the
25 condition of the Fleet? Did you take part in that conversa-

Witness Leahy:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 tion or were you a listener?

3 Admiral Leahy: Well, I was very generally a listener.
4 I do not remember having said anything about it although I
5 may have interjected a remark from time to time. I do not
6 remember anything that I may have said in regard thereto at
7 the White House.

8 Mr. Mitchell: The committee may examine.

9 The Chairman: The chairman has no questions at this
10 time. Congressman Cooper?

11 The Vice Chairman: No questions now, Mr. Chairman.

12 The Chairman: Senator George?

13 Senator George: No, I have no questions at this time,
14 Mr. Chairman.

15 The Chairman: Congressman Clark is not present. Sen-
16 ator Lucas?

17 Senator Lucas: I have no questions.

18 The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

19 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, there was some statement made by
20 Admiral Richardson to the effect that the President said
21 something relative to what we would do in the event that
22 there was an attack on the Philippines. Do you have any re-
23 collection of any such conversation?

24 Admiral Leahy: I have not.

25 Mr. Murphy: No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

Shack
hl
fls
S

1

The Chairman: Senator Brewster.

2

Senator Brewster: Did you hear all of Admiral

3

Richardson's testimony?

4

Admiral Leahy: I did not, Senator. I only heard very
small parts during the time I was here waiting to be called
as a witness.

5

6

7

Senator Brewster: Did you read in the papers the full
account of his statement as to his conversation with the
President?

8

9

10

Admiral Leahy: I did not, sir.

11

12

Senator Brewster: He referred not only to the incident
which has been cited as to the Philippines, but also as to
the reasons which seemed to the President sufficient for a
Fleet to be stationed in Pearl Harbor, and the effect that
it might have on the Japanese. Do you recall any conversa-
tion along that line?

13

14

15

16

17

Admiral Leahy: I have no recollection of any conver-
sation in the White House that might have a bearing on that
question, Senator.

18

19

20

Senator Brewster: Admiral Richardson said he expressed
himself rather strongly to the President as to what he felt
about the effect on a military-minded government, such as
the Japanese of the location of an inadequately prepared fleet
in Pearl Harbor. Do you have any recollection of anything

21

22

23

24

25

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2 of that kind?

3 Admiral Leahy: No, I do not remember Senator, anything
4 that was said about that in this conversation at the luncheon.

5 Senator Brewster: Do you recall as to whether Admiral
6 Richardson queried at all as to the reasons why the Fleet
7 was laying at Pearl Harbor?

8 Admiral Leahy: As I remember he stated none of the
9 officers or men knew why they were in Pearl Harbor, and that
10 he personally felt that they could accomplish preparations
11 for war service to much better advantage in a port on the
12 Pacific Coast. That is all I remember.

13 Senator Brewster: You do not recall that the President
14 made any rejoinder or any remark as to the reasons why he
15 felt the Fleet should be there?

16 Admiral Leahy: No, I do not Senator.

17 Senator Brewster: Did you make any memorandum of the
18 conversation at that time?

19 Admiral Leahy: I did not. I am speaking entirely from
20 memory. The only thing that impressed me was the fact that
21 the Commander-in-Chief, in whom I had great confidence, and
22 have always had, reported officially to the President that
23 the Fleet was not prepared for war, and I thought at that time
24 that a war was a very likely contingency.

25 Senator Brewster: You referred to the Commander-in-Chief.

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

h3

Admiral Leahy: I mean the President -- the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

Senator Brewster: Yes.

Admiral Leahy: Admiral Richardson.

Senator Brewster: Admiral Richardson had served under you as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for a period?

Admiral Leahy: That is correct, and I, of course, have served with him in other places in the Fleet at various times.

Senator Brewster: You would have considerable confidence in his recollection of events?

Admiral Leahy: Well, I would have complete confidence in Admiral Richardson, but whether or not he remembers the conversation, I could not say.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

AL fls.

P.M. Shack
(2)
fols.
Hook
AL-1

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Brewster: He apparently was rather positive and rather careful in his statement as to the matters to which he had given considerable thought, and he had written out the purpose of his conversation, so his testimony was affirmative, that "I do recall this as the conversation". Your evidence is apparently of a negative character, as to not recalling certain items of this testimony, is that correct?

Admiral Leahy: That is correct, sir. I cannot say the conversations did not take place, but I do not remember them.

Senator Brewster: You would not have any question if Admiral Richardson said he recalled it that he did recall it?

Admiral Leahy: I have no doubt whatever he would be correct. He may have made notes following the conversation or he may not.

Senator Brewster: In any event it was true that the particular matter in discussion was one with which he was very vitally concerned, was it not?

Admiral Leahy: He was very serious in his statement to the President, so much so as to definitely make an impression on me so that I have not forgotten what he said about the Fleet.

Senator Brewster: He had come there and he rather definitely indicated that he wanted to find out what the reasons were, or at any rate, he posed questions which were calculated

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2 to elicit that information?

3 Admiral Leahy: That I do not know, Senator, but I presume
4 so.

5 Senator Brewster: From his statement that he and the
6 officers of his Fleet did not know the reason why they were
7 there you apparently implied that he was in Washington to find
8 out if he could?

9 Admiral Leahy: Well, he made that statement. What his
10 purpose was, of course, I could not say.

11 Senator Brewster: As far as you were concerned, it was
12 not a matter with which you were at that time officially con-
13 cerned?

14 Admiral Leahy: No, I had nothing whatever to do with it
15 at that time, Senator, because I had separated myself from
16 the Navy Department and I had very little information. Perhaps
17 that accounts for my surprise.

18 Senator Brewster: Your presence was in that respect that
19 of a casual bystander, as far as official relations were con-
20 cerned?

21 Admiral Leahy: That is correct. I think I just happened
22 to be invited to luncheon at the same time that Admiral
23 Richardson was. I usually lunched with the President once or
24 twice when I came to Washington.

25 Senator Brewster: And there were some Puerto Rican matters

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

discussed at the luncheon, and he apparently was killing two birds with one stone?

Admiral Leahy: We discussed some of the problems before the Puerto Rican Government at that luncheon.

Senator Brewster: You naturally were interested in the naval aspects of the matter, as one who had been so long actively associated with the service?

Admiral Leahy: I was very much interested in it, Senator.

Senator Brewster: And you had been for four years Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Leahy: No, about two and one-half years, Senator.

Senator Brewster: What period did that cover?

Admiral Leahy: It was from the 2nd of January, 1937, to the 1st of August, 1939.

Senator Brewster: And during that period you were the Naval Officer primarily responsible for the preparation of our naval defense?

Admiral Leahy: That is correct, sir.

Senator Brewster: And the development of the Fleet?

Admiral Leahy: Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: And were associated with the presentation of the expansion program of the Fleet in the 1938 expansion bill?

Admiral Leahy: That is correct.

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster
Mr. Keefe

1

2

Senator Brewster: Which you submitted before the Naval
Affairs Committee as of that time?

3

4

Admiral Leahy: Yes, sir.

5

6

Senator Brewster: And also the preparation of the budget
for the Navy during that period?

7

8

Admiral Leahy: Yes, I was charged with the preparation,
with the supervision of the preparation of the budget in the
Navy Department at that time.

9

10

Senator Brewster: Yes.

11

Mr. Keefe: May I have that time exactly?

12

Admiral Leahy: From January 2, 1937 to August 1, 1939.

13

14

Senator Brewster: And you heard this morning the outline
of the procedure in the preparation of naval budgets in the
discussions between Congressman Keefe and Admiral Richardson?

15

16

Admiral Leahy: I heard that this morning, Senator.

17

18

Senator Brewster: And that was an accurate presentation
of the procedure in the preparation of the budget and submis-
sion to the Congress?

19

20

Admiral Leahy: I think from what I heard, it is an
accurate presentation of the procedure.

21

22

23

Senator Brewster: The only thing I was not clear about
-- and perhaps you may have answered this -- was the manner
of the Congressional presentation of the question of increased
items in the Navy. I always understood that was a matter of

24

25

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

h2

executive order, that the officials in the Navy Department could not testify in support of items in excess of the executive budget, and I think Admiral Richardson spoke of it as a Congressional provision.

Are you familiar with that?

Admiral Leahy: I am unable to answer that, Senator.

I know we were not permitted to introduce items that were in excess of those that were transmitted to Congress by Budget Bureau with the President's approval. Whether it is a statutory provision, or whether it is an executive order, I am unable to say, but it is a fact we were not permitted to do it.

Senator Brewster: I am familiar with that fact. I was simply surprised at that statement. I wanted to clarify it. It was the usual experience for the Budget Bureau to reduce somewhat your estimate?

Admiral Leahy: Well, during the time I had the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, they always reduced our estimates after we had cut them as much as we thought we could with safety. They did it carefully, always, with consultation always, to find out from the Navy, from me, what damage would be done if they did cut an amount from the budget, and we always told them, and they said, "We have only a certain amount of money which can be obtained, and we must

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2 divide it among the different departments, so you will have
3 to take so much of a cut."

4 Sometimes they would say, "Where do you want it?"

5 Then, if they were kind enough to give us a choice
6 of the lesser of the evils, we would choose the place where
7 the cut should be made, if it must be made.

8 Senator Brewster: Do you recall, Admiral, the episode
9 in connection with the Naval Expansion Program of 1938, the
10 question of the limitations proposed on Naval aircraft to
11 not exceeding 3,000?

12 Admiral Leahy: I would be unable to answer that without
13 looking at the records, Senator. I remember there was such
14 a limitation, but beyond that I would not like to make a
15 statement, and probably it might not be correct.

16 Senator Brewster: If there were a limitation of 3,000
17 at that time, then the later events have demonstrated the
18 wisdom of a very great increase in Naval aircraft that has
19 since occurred?

20 Admiral Leahy: That is quite correct, Senator. The
21 Navy Department was quite desirous of a large increase in
22 Naval aircraft at that time. I know at the time I was asso-
23 ciated with it, we were extremely anxious to build up the
24 air arm as much as we could. There was a limitation in the
25 number of carriers that were available.

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1

2

Senator Brewster: Yes.

3

Admiral Leahy: It would not have been worth while to get more planes than could have been taken on the carriers. Perhaps you remember well that we were advocating more carriers all the time.

7

Senator Brewster: Prior to that time, the limitation on Naval air craft had been whatever was commensurate with a treaty navy, isn't that correct? That is, there had never been an actual limit at that time. Is that not correct?

10

11

Admiral Leahy: I do not remember, Senator, that the treaty limitation limited the number of aircraft that we were permitted to have.

12

13

14

Senator Brewster: No, it did not. It simply set forth a number commensurate with the treaty navy, which might have been any number that the development of the naval art might have made advisable.

15

16

17

18

Admiral Leahy: That is correct, sir, and also what we could carry with the vessels that were permitted to us by the treaty navy.

19

20

21

Senator Brewster: It was after that time that you began to develop land based aircraft in the navy?

22

23

Admiral Leahy: No. we had developed land based aircraft long before that time, Senator, but in a very limited number. There was a question as to whether the Navy should have any

24

25

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2 land-based aircraft. Finally it was adjudicated with the
3 understanding that the Navy would have a limited number
4 of land-based aircraft for the purpose of patrolling about
5 their bases.

6 Senator Brewster: That was a matter of agreement with
7 the War Department?

8 Admiral Leahy: An agreement between the War Department
9 and a predecessor of mine, as Chief of Naval Operations.

10 Senator Brewster: Was the custom developed at that
11 time of carrying two or three or four times the number of
12 planes required for the complement of a carrier?

13 Admiral Leahy: I do not remember that we had such a
14 policy at that time, Senator? I doubt it very much. We
15 were having difficulty getting the planes that we really
16 wanted without getting a multiple of three in capacity.

17 Senator Brewster: To refresh your recollection, I
18 have before me the Act of 1938 as presented by you to the
19 committee, which provided for the authorization of the con-
20 struction of additional naval airplanes, the number not ex-
21 ceeding 3,000. That was the increase proposed at that time.
22 They at the same time imposed a limit. I do not know whether
23 you recall the circumstances, but on the floor that was
24 amended by striking out the words so it read "not less than
25 3,000."

34
Thick

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Brewster
Mr. Gearhart

1

2

Admiral Leahy: I remember that, sir.

3

Senator Brewster: You remember that episode?

4

Admiral Leahy: Yes, sir.

5

Senator Brewster: So after that you did have the authority for any number of planes in excess of 3,000, providing you could get the appropriations?

6

7

8

Admiral Leahy: I would hazard the guess that the reason for the limit of 3,000 was a bugetary limit which had been imposed upon us, but I am not certain. We wanted more than that, I am quite sure, and we had some friends in the House who arranged it for us.

9

10

11

12

13

Senator Brewster: That is all.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Leahy, according to your testimony, when you left the White House with Admiral Richardson, you expressed your surprise over what Admiral Richardson had said to the President about the Fleet not being ready. You further testified that you were distressed as you regarded war as "a very likely contingency."

Was anything said by the President at the White House which caused you to accept that thesis that a war was a very likely contingency?

Admiral Leahy: I have no recollection of the President saying anything in regard to that matter, but I had thought

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h7

1
2 that war was a likely contingency for several years, and I
3 was practically certain in my own mind that it was going to
4 come at some time in the reasonably near future.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Was anything said at that luncheon by
6 Admiral Richardson which added to your conviction that war
7 was a very likely contingency?

8 Admiral Leahy: On the contrary, the fact of Richardson
9 saying that his fleet was not ready for war should have led
10 me to believe that many people did not agree with me that
11 war was a contingency -- a likely contingency.

12 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, among all naval
13 and army experts, war with Japan had been regarded for many
14 years, perhaps as long as 30 years, as inevitable, is that
15 not correct?

16 Admiral Leahy: Well, I would not like to use the word
17 "inevitable." It was considered a reasonable probability
18 at some time in the future.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Army and navy experts have to keep them-
20 selves informed with respect to the manifested plans of
21 other countries in respect to expansion, do they not?

22 Admiral Leahy: They make every possible effort to
23 get all of the information that can be obtained in regard
24 to those very questions.

25 Mr. Gearhart: It was quite apparent to you, and I

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

presume to others in a similar position, that Japan's expansion program was bound, in time, to bring her into clash with the interests of the United States?

Admiral Leahy: Well it seemed inevitable to me.

h8

AL fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Shack
(6)
fols.
Hook
AL-1

904

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 Mr. Gearhart: Then, not being afraid of that word
3 "inevitable", it really was inevitable to anybody that under-
4 stood, even people beyond the exact range of the Army and Navy,
5 that we were in for trouble with Japan?

6 Admiral Leahy: Of course it is impossible for me to say
7 what other people thought. I know what I thought myself, and
8 I would think your statement would be correct.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

10 Admiral Leahy: But of course what they thought I could
11 not say.

12 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, you had no reason for
13 believing that you alone entertained that opinion, but it was
14 a general opinion?

15 Admiral Leahy: I am quite sure a great many other people
16 entertained that opinion.

17 Mr. Gearhart: At the time you were at the White House
18 and attended this luncheon the inevitability of war was be-
19 coming more and more a question of imminency of war in the
20 estimation of people who were closely watching the events in
21 the Pacific, is that not correct?

22 Admiral Leahy: I think that is exactly correct, but
23 again I must say that I cannot tell you what was in the minds
24 of other people, but the development in Asia indicated that
25 the difficulty with Japan was approaching much more rapidly

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 than it had been in the past.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Now as you got along into 1941 and had
4 become the Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief of the
5 Army and Navy of the United States, you became informed from
6 day to day, did you not, of the intercepted messages that were
7 being exchanged between the Japanese diplomatic and military
8 and naval authorities?

9 Admiral Leahy: In 1942 I assumed my present office, and
10 subsequent to that time I probably received all of the inform-
11 ation that was available to the State, War and Navy Departments,
12 I probably did.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 LaCharity
14 fols.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Lacharity
follows
Shack
(1)
AL-1

906

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. That is, the question is based upon the assumption that you were there in 1941. What were you doing there in the year of 1941?

Admiral Leahy: I was Ambassador in France.

Mr. Gearhart: While you were in France did you receive any information in respect to the plans of the Japanese which you transmitted to the White House?

Admiral Leahy: I received from time to time rumors from my acquaintances, and so forth, from other countries, as to what their information was in regard to Japanese activities and I reported them at once, of course, to the Department of State, under which I was serving.

I had much information of sharp interest at the time that the Japanese moved into Indo-China because they were dealing with the Government of France at that time and the Government of France kept me fully informed as to their demands and what they proposed to do.

That, of course, was immediately, instantly reported to our Department of State.

Mr. Gearhart: It was reported in the public prints that the Japanese went into Indo-China with the permission of the Vichy Government; is that true?

Admiral Leahy: That is correct; under pressure from the German friends of the Japanese.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Gearhart: Did you ever see any written assurances from the Japanese Government to the Vichy Government that they, the Japanese, would withdraw as soon as they had accomplished their objectives in other spots in the Orient?

Admiral Leahy: I did not. I was told by Marshall Petain the details of the agreement with the Japanese. I saw no written communication.

I thought of telling a story but I better not.

Mr. Gearhart: I would be very interested in hearing it, Admiral.

Admiral Leahy: There are too many of my friends in the news business here.

Mr. Gearhart: The next time I see you at the Army and Navy Club I will get that story in private.

Admiral Leahy: All right.

Mr. Gearhart: I will ask this concluding question, Admiral. Did anything occur, or was anything brought to your attention while you were in Vichy representing the United States to the Vichy Government, that caused you to feel that a war with Japan had become any less a very likely contingent?

Admiral Leahy: At the time that the Japanese moved into Indo-China with the permission of the Government of France I told the Chief of the Government that that convinced me that we would be at war with Japan over the Philippines in the near

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart
Sen. Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
future.

Mr. Gearhart: And did you advise Washington of that information which had come to you leading you to that conviction?

Admiral Leahy: I did.

Mr. Gearhart: Did you while you were in France receive any information which would lead you to believe that there was a danger of Hawaii coming under attack by the Japanese?

Admiral Leahy: I did not.

Mr. Gearhart: I believe that is all. Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Leahy, you were speaking about the French Vichy Government's agreement with the Japs in their occupation of Indo-China. Do you recall whether Marshall Petain, then acting as head of the Vichy Government, informed you as to what the agreement provided for in the number of men that the Japs could put in there under that forced agreement?

Admiral Leahy: He did give me such information, Senator, but I cannot remember the number. It was a small number of Japanese that were by agreement to remain in a small part of Indo-China. The French were to be permitted to continue the government of Indo-China and the Japanese were to withdraw as soon as they had accomplished their purpose, which was to facilitate their movement to the south. That was related to me

Witness Leahy

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 by the Marshall.

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

4 Admiral Leahy: I have no doubt it was true.

5 Senator Ferguson: Then later did they violate the agree-
6 ment as to the number of men they were to send in under the
7 alleged agreement?

8 Admiral Leahy: They later sent in more men than they
9 had agreed to send in and they took more widespread action in
10 seizing control of the government than was stated in the origi-
11 nal agreement.

12 Senator Ferguson: Did you, as Ambassador for the United
13 States, make protest to the Vichy Government that they were
14 doing this, did you protest that?

15 Admiral Leahy: No, I did not, because I got my informa-
16 tion from the French Government. It was the only way we could
17 get that information and they told me about it and expressed
18 their regrets and I transmitted that to our Government.

19 Senator Ferguson: That is what I am getting at. They
20 seemed to be claiming, at least, that they were unable to
21 stop this flow of Jap troops into Indo-China.

22 Admiral Leahy: They were unable to stop it. It was
23 unnecessary for them to tell me that because I knew that
24 quite well.

25 Senator Ferguson: And you notified the State Department