


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A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

OF

M. COUSIN'S

LECTURES ON LOCKE.

BY

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PART I.



DUBLIN:

WILLIAM M^cGEE, 18, NASSAU-STREET.

LONDON: LONGMAN, GREEN, LONGMAN & ROBERTS.

1862.

B1297

M6

63972

DUBLIN:

Printed by J. M. O'Coole and Son,
6 & 7, GREAT BRUNSWICK STREET.




P R E F A C E .

MORE than four years ago, the author of the present treatise read a paper before the Undergraduate Philosophical Society on "M. Cousin's Criticism of Locke," in which most of the views here advocated were maintained. He cannot, therefore, be censured for rushing into print without having sufficiently matured his views, and considered the justice of them; while, at the same time, the present essay is so enlarged, that the original paper forms but a small fraction of its contents. Its object may be briefly explained. For some time past M. Cousin's lectures on Locke have formed a portion of the Undergraduate Course in this University, and it is impossible to deny that they are, in many respects, suited for this purpose. M. Cousin's style is at once clear, lucid, and elegant, conveying the most profound distinctions in philosophy in language almost wholly free from the crabbed technicalities of the schoolman or the Kantian. It attracts the youthful student, where a greater affectation of philosophical precision would only repel him; but it attracts without substituting imagination for reflection, or leaving the facts of consciousness to soar among the clouds. Nor can it be denied that it embodies much of what is valuable in modern philo-

sophy since the time of Locke ; and if the highest object of the metaphysician be to teach “*’ου φιλοσοφια αλλα φιλοσοφειν,*” M. Cousin certainly possesses, in no ordinary degree, the power of setting his readers a-thinking ; nor should we forget the high reputation of the lecturer, and the somewhat lavish encomiums bestowed on his work by the highest philosophical authorities in the United Kingdom. But to these great merits are joined still greater defects. If the work of M. Cousin embodies almost all that is solid in the philosophy of Locke’s opponents, it overlooks almost every important truth that is inculcated in the *Essay on the Human Understanding*—if it is of great value as a philosophical treatise, as a criticism it is, I apprehend, absolutely worthless—if the author is thoroughly acquainted with the philosophy which he advocates, he is utterly ignorant of that which he undertakes to refute ; while in his eagerness to subvert the real or imagined doctrines of Locke, he is not unfrequently betrayed into assertions most damaging to himself, and indeed to all true philosophy. It is therefore, I think, of no small importance that these defects should be thoroughly exposed, and that the youthful student, when about to profit by what is sound in these lectures, should be provided with an antidote against what is unsound. The general dissatisfaction with which M. Cousin’s criticisms have been regarded for some years past in this University may seem to render the task which I have undertaken almost a superfluous one ; but that dissatisfaction has as yet scarcely found its appropriate expression in

print, and the student is still left to be carried away at first by the eloquence, ingenuity, and authoritative manner of the critic, and then gradually to discover the series of errors and misrepresentations which runs through these lectures on Locke, and perhaps not to discover some of them at all ; while a complete and detailed vindication is no less due to the memory of Locke, whose immortal essay has, here at least, never lost its authority. The only work I am acquainted with which seems to preoccupy the ground I purpose taking, is Dr. Webb's very able essay on the Intellectualism of Locke, a work which, however, was not written exactly with the design of the present treatise, and which, I think, does not supply the deficiency I have alluded to. Its display of varied and multifarious learning, its adoption of so much of the Kantian phraseology and of the Kantian philosophy (which the author almost makes his stand-point in judging of other systems), the acquaintance which it presupposes with modern, and even ancient philosophy, and the lofty generalizations which are so frequently compressed into a few words, conspire to render it almost unintelligible to those for whom the following essay is chiefly intended ; while again, M. Cousin's criticisms are usually dismissed in a very brief and summary manner from some higher view of the philosophy of Locke, and Dr. Webb has not even contemplated examining the whole of them in detail. I purpose, therefore, to examine *all* the *unfavorable* criticisms of M. Cousin, contained in his lectures on Locke, and to show that in every instance he has either misrepre-

See 6



sented the doctrine of Locke, or is himself obviously in error. In doing this, I have no desire to depreciate the genius of the French philosopher ; for no philosophical ability will enable a man successfully to criticise a work which he has not studied, nor will any effort of ingenuity or logical acumen render that perfect in execution which is faulty in its very conception. I have endeavoured to make myself intelligible to those who have only read the original work of Locke and M. Cousin's criticism upon it ; and in order to render my essay as complete as possible, I have borrowed, without hesitation, any refutation of any part of that criticism which is to be found in Dr. Webb's work or any other publication I have met with ; but in fact, I may say that the following refutation is neither mine or Dr. Webb's—it is Locke's. It is by distinct quotations from the Essay on the Human Understanding that I seek to refute in detail each of the critic's misrepresentations, going no further into the general system of Locke than is necessary in each place to give full force to the refutation. In the performance of this task I have not thought it necessary to cover my pages with those quotations in Latin, Greek, German, and Italian, which have now become almost a matter of course in a metaphysical treatise ; and even M. Cousin's criticisms I have quoted from Dr. Henry's Translation,* which is the text-book in this University, rather than from the original work ;

* The edition of M. Cousin's Psychology, invariably quoted in the following pages, is the fourth, published by Ivison and Phinny, New York, 1856.

and in quoting Locke in refutation, I have confined myself to the Essay on the Human Understanding, and those portions of the writings of that author which are usually appended to it as notes. How far I have been successful in effecting my purpose, I must leave to the judgment of the impartial reader.

In the Appendix I have discussed a few points in the philosophy of Locke on which his expositors still differ, and I have also considered the justice of the charge of Pantheism brought against M. Cousin.

The first part, now published, completes the investigation of the first five chapters of Dr. Henry's Translation, being the portion of that work contained in the ordinary undergraduate course ; the second part will contain an examination of M. Cousin's remaining criticisms, with the supplementary discussions.



A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

OF

M. COUSIN'S LECTURE ON LOCKE.

ON taking up M. Cousin's work, the first question that occurs to us is, what is the general method or principle on which his criticism is conceived? and this question is one of no slight importance, as any serious error, at the outset, may vitiate the whole of the after part of the enquiry. This question of method has been very fully discussed by M. Cousin himself, in his first lecture, and although the different subjects in relation to which it is treated of will prevent me from laying down these principles in his own words, I doubt not but my reader will perceive on comparison the exact coincidence of his views with those I am about to apply to his own lectures. In conducting a criticism on a philosophical work—a criticism which aspires to be complete, and does not merely animadvert on some isolated points of the author's theory, without undertaking a general comprehensive examination of his system—we may proceed on two different principles. We may commence by investigating the origin of the book, if I may so speak,—the system in the mind of the author which gave birth to the volume before us; we may maintain that the author adopted a particular

system, and belonged to a particular school ; and taking these assumptions with us, proceed to a criticism of his work. We will thus almost confine our attention to the parts of the work which are closely related to the school or system with which we have identified the author ; regulating the prominence of each doctrine by its relation to our fundamental assumption, and interpreting every dubious expression in harmony with the system that we have attributed to the writer—in short, we will apply our criticism of a particular school of philosophy to a work which we suppose to have emanated from a member of that school. But there is also a very different course which we may follow in criticising such a work as the *Essay on the Human Understanding* ; we may commence by investigating what is actually maintained in the book before us, by carefully studying that book in its entirety, omitting nothing that is found in it, and interpolating nothing that is not found in it ; and at the end of our patient enquiry endeavor to rise by generalisation and deduction to the system of the author ; applying to that system our criticism of the book, instead of applying to the book our criticism of the system. There are, no doubt, many cases where we may fairly adopt the former course. When the philosopher, whose work we are studying, has expressly identified himself with some school or party, or professed himself the disciple of some previous or contemporary philosopher, we may surely be allowed to criticise him on his own declaration ; when the work we are studying is not the chief philosophical treatise of the author, and when, from his other works, we can readily ascertain to what school he belonged, we can scarcely be censured

for taking this knowledge with us as a guide to our present investigation ; and, lastly, if the author be a professed philosopher, and if his disciples, who heard his lectures, and had the advantage of personal intercourse with him, agree in attributing certain doctrines to him, we would be called on to consider their testimony in forming a judgment of his system. But the present case is not analogous to any of these. No one could be farther from attaching himself to any school than Locke. Instead of professing himself the disciple of any previous philosopher, he has scarcely mentioned as much as the names of any of his predecessors throughout the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. In the words of M. Cousin, "He seeks for truth at his own risk, by the force of reason alone." (*Psychology*, p. 93, fourth edition). He tells his reader, "not to expect anything but what, being spun out of his own coarse thoughts, is fitted to men of his own size." (*Epistle to the Reader*.) "This I am certain," says he, "I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing discourse ; truth has been my only aim, and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or no" (*Essay*, Book I. iv. 23,) ; and, accordingly, he tells us that his system is erected on his own "experience and observation," and not "leaning on borrowed or begged foundations."*

* M. Cousin, indeed, calls Locke "the successor of Bacon and Hobbes." (*Psych.* p. 256.) But the critic himself afterwards states that that philosopher had very little acquaintance with the former (*Ps.* p. 334), and Locke disclaims any intimate knowledge of the latter (*First letter to Stillingfleet*, note to Book IV. iii. 6).

(Book I., v. 25.) Nor is it less manifest, that the *Essay on the Human Understanding* is the great work of Locke—that which contains his system, and without which his smaller metaphysical treatises are scarcely to be understood ; nor, indeed, does M. Cousin appeal to these treatises in proof of the system which he has assigned to the author : while, in the third place, Locke was not a professed philosopher. He founded no school properly so-called. His professed disciples, especially the French sensualists, with whom M. Cousin is disposed to identify him, had no personal intercourse with their chief, and derived their information, as to his doctrines, solely from his works,—that is to say, they had only the very same ways of becoming acquainted with the system of Locke that we have ; and, consequently, to take his doctrines from them would be to take, at second-hand, what we can obtain new upon equally easy terms. But the absurdity reaches a climax, if we take his system from these second-hand writers, when we are about to criticise and investigate it as it is expressed in the original work. The cases, therefore, in which we may adopt the first kind of criticism seem exhausted, and this method is not applicable to the work of Locke, except it be applicable, as a general rule, to every work on any subject. This question, therefore, I must briefly investigate on the principles of M. Cousin.

Shall we then, generally, and without regard to any special extraneous information we may possess, commence by enquiring what is the system of the author ? In the first place, it is the most difficult question. It is not always that we can reduce even a clear and intelligible book to a regular system : as, in fact, the *Essay on the Human Understanding* is a remarkable

example, for while it is intelligible to the most ordinary readers, no one has perhaps as yet reduced it to a regular and consistent system. But if the expositors of Locke were as remarkable for their harmony as they are for their disagreement, and if the very first sentence in the Essay did not contradict the views of Locke's so-called followers of the school of Helvetius or Maillet,* still I deny that a critic should commence by an enquiry into (or, rather, an assumption with regard to) the system of Locke. He would by so doing not only commence, contrary to the ordinary rules of investigation, with the most difficult question—he would also begin by systematising that which he was ignorant of—that which he had not studied. What system could he then obtain but a hypothetical system? and this system would be true or false. If true, it could not aspire to the rank of certainty; it would still be hypothesis. If false, then, instead of truth, under the vicious form of hypothesis, we should have merely hypothesis without truth. And what will be the result? If what Locke has written does not harmonize with our hypothesis, will we, on that account, abandon it? Is it not more probable that we will either wholly ignore whatever is not in conformity with it, or distort and misrepresent the whole work, in order to bring it into unison with our own misconception of its character? Wisdom, then, good sense, and logic, alike demand that, omitting provisionally the question of Locke's system, we should be content first to ascertain what is actually stated in the Essay on the Human Understanding; and when we have done this, fairly and

* M. Cousin, I believe, was the first to discover that Maillet was a philosopher of the school of Locke.

fully, it will be time enough for us to attempt to reduce it to a system, and to enquire to what school of philosophers we are to refer its illustrious author. The regular order, then (to adopt M. Cousin's language more closely), of the critical problems is settled in the following manner :—

First—To investigate, without any systematic prejudice, in simplicity and good faith, the various doctrines actually maintained in the work of Locke, omitting none of them, and imagining nothing that is not distinctly stated in the book before us.

Second—To investigate the system of the author, by all the means in our power, with the firm resolution not to suffer what is actually set down in the *Essay on the Human Understanding* to be wrested by any hypothesis, and with our eyes constantly fixed on the writings of Locke and their unquestionable characters.

Is this, then, the course that the philosophical critic has adopted? and are his Lectures on Locke illustrious examples of those principles of investigation which he has so brilliantly unfolded in the first of them? Far from it. He sets out with the question of Locke's system, and this he does not even investigate—he assumes it, without investigation, to have been that which he terms Empirical, or rather, Sensualistic. His translator tells us this in his Introduction (Ps. p. 89). M. Cousin himself repeats it in his very first page. “Such is the *chief*; as for his *school* you know what it has been. . . . I mention this, because it is important that you should always hold in your hand the thread of the movement and progress of the *sensual school*” (Ps. p. 94); and the first enquiry he enters on—that concerning the method of Locke—he commences with these words: “What, then, is

that method which, in its germ, contains the whole system of Locke—the system that has produced *the great sensual school* of the eighteenth century?" (Ibid.) while similar assertions are multiplied *ad libitum* as we proceed through the work. He has, then, commenced with the difficult and perilous question of the system of Locke, and he has rendered it doubly perilous by hypothetically, or rather gratuitously, assigning a system to Locke without even an effort at investigation. But surely the philosophical critic will not omit to compare his hypothesis, in the most rigorous manner, with the entire contents of the Essay on the Human Understanding, and to show that everything maintained in that Essay is necessitated by it, or at least completely consistent with it? Again we are disappointed. After charging Locke with "extreme confusion," and with "contradictions direct and express," which are met with not only from chapter to chapter, "but even in different paragraphs of the same chapter;" he proceeds, "I shall devote myself, then, after having *pointed out*" (he should have said "*asserted*," for hitherto he has not even attempted to produce a single instance of it), "once for all, the innumerable inconsistencies of Locke, to the task of disengaging from the midst of these barren inconsistencies whatever there is fruitful, whatever has borne its fruits, that which constitutes a system and the true system of Locke. [This system," he continues, "consists in deducing all ideas from two sources, sensation and reflection." (Ps. p. 127.) Here, then, if M. Cousin has taken his first step falsely, how is it possible that he should be set right? If he will only examine that which is fruitful, that which constitutes the true system of Locke (or rather, as we have seen, the

system which he has hypothetically assigned to Locke); and if he will pass over everything else, everything that does not harmonise with this system, under the designation of "barren inconsistencies," what possible conclusion could such an enquiry lead to, except that this system was indeed Locke's? Criticise the writings of any other philosopher on the same principle; take Reid, for example, or Stewart, or Kant; set out with the hypothesis that he was a sensualist, and resolve to hunt up every passage that, taken by itself, might give a colour to this theory, and to pass over all the rest as "barren inconsistencies," and see at what result you will arrive. To prove after this fashion the sensualism of M. Cousin himself would be no difficult task. It was already running a great risk to commence by hypothetically assigning a system to Locke, even though it was afterwards to be confronted with the actual doctrines of the Essay; but how will it be, when even this possibility of return to truth is interdicted, when the fundamental question of the inventory of the actual doctrines of the Essay on the Human Understanding is absolutely omitted, and its place supplied by garbled extracts, brought together for the avowed purpose of sustaining our hypothetical assumption? And even before commencing a detailed investigation of M. Cousin's criticisms, we may see more than one indication of the falsity of his fundamental hypothesis—of the weakness of the foundation on which the whole of his elaborate superstructure depends. His account of the work he undertakes to criticise is one of these. "There reigns," says he, "under a clearness sometimes real, but oftener apparent and superficial, an extreme confusion; and contradictions, direct and express, are to be met with not



only in different chapters, but even in different paragraphs of the same chapter." (Ps. p. 126.) "I have already told you, *and I shall have frequent occasion to repeat it,** that nothing is less consistent than Locke; contradictions occur not only from book to book in his essay, but from chapter to chapter, and almost from paragraph to paragraph." (Ps. p. 178.) Is it probable that a mind so sober and cautious as that of Locke should have produced such a work as this? Or is it not infinitely more probable that what appear to be inconsistencies and contradictions to the critic are not contradictions between different parts of the Essay, but contradictions between the language of Locke and the system which has been hypothetically assigned to him?—especially when Locke himself, instead of regarding his work as a mass of contradiction and inconsistency, considered it "an edifice uniform and consistent with itself." (Book I. iv. 25.) There are indications, too, of a more special character, that the critic is mistaken in supposing that the origin of ideas is the great central point in the system of Locke which determines the character of his philosophy. It was not this question of the origin of ideas which suggested to him the composition of his Essay (Epistle to the Reader); it was not by his solution of this question that he hoped to remedy ontological extravagance, scepticism, and idleness (Book I. i. 4-7); nor was it in this solution that he placed the originality of his work (Book I. i. 8, Note, Second letter to Stillingfleet). It was by an enquiry into the certainty and extent of human *knowledge*

* Here it may be just observed that when M. Cousin first called our attention to these alleged inconsistencies, he said he "pointed them out *once for all.*" (Ps. p. 127.)

that he hoped to obtain the remedies he sought for ; it was by an experimental proof of the weakness of our speculative powers that he was first set on the investigation ; and it was in his theory of knowledge—of intuition—that he centred the novelty or originality of his Essay. Nor let it be said that his solution of the question concerning the origin of ideas determines his theory of knowledge. As far as intuitive knowledge is concerned, we shall see that M. Cousin thinks Locke's theory of the origin is even inconsistent with it ; and with respect to the three great limitations of our knowledge as enumerated by Locke, viz., the want of ideas, the want of discoverable connexions between our ideas and the want of tracing these connexions, it is plain that the origin can affect the first only, whereas Locke seems disposed to lay the greatest stress on the second. This discussion has probably appeared somewhat dry and unproductive to my reader, but I think it of no small importance ; for I could scarcely hope to convince him that a philosopher and critic of M. Cousin's celebrity had fallen into the almost unbroken series of marvellous misconceptions of which I am about to accuse him, unless I had first shown that his criticism was wrong in its very conception ; that it was carried on in such a manner as to render the correction of an erroneous hypothesis an absolute impossibility ; and that there are many indications that its fundamental hypothesis is not only gratuitous but positively erroneous.

I now turn to M. Cousin's criticism of Locke, and first of Locke's method. Here the critic accuses the English philosopher of falling into two errors, precisely analogous to those I have just pointed out in his own method, viz., of examining the origin of ideas

before taking an inventory of them, and of wholly omitting to take such an inventory. This charge is founded on the section in which Locke describes the method which he means to follow in the composition of his work (Book I. i. 3), a method which would be undoubtedly faulty and unphilosophical as a method of *investigation*, but which may not inconveniently be adopted as a method of *exposition*. Before, therefore, M. Cousin made these charges against Locke, he ought to have enquired whether Locke investigated the subject in the same order that he expounded his views ; and if, on enquiry, it appeared that he did not, it is plain that there would be no real foundation for his animadversions. And this it is not difficult to prove. Locke has nowhere asserted that his method of exposition is the proper philosophical method of investigation ; nay, by calling it “ *historical*,” instead of “ *philosophical*,” he seems to imply the contrary (Book I. i. 2). But whether he thought it the proper method of investigation or no, it is plain that it was not the method which he followed in his own researches. It was concerning the extent of human knowledge that he began to enquire (Epistle to the Reader), and this was still the object of his investigation, even when he was arranging his work. “ It shall suffice to my present purpose,” says he, “ to consider the *discerning faculties* of a man as they are employed about the *objects* which they have to do with” (Book I. i. 2) ; and this investigation he carried on so long that Mr. Stewart is of opinion that the whole of the fourth book was composed before the remainder of the Essay.* The third book

* Had the Essay on the Human Understanding been printed in

was, by Locke's own confession, an "afterthought" (Book III., ix. 21), and that philosopher expressly informs us that it was *after* the work had been written "by incoherent parcels" that it was brought into that order that we see it (Epistle to Reader), M. Cousin's charge, therefore, falls to the ground, so far as it relates to his *order* of investigation. The second part of it remains to be considered, viz., that Locke entirely omitted to take an inventory of our actual ideas. But this is obviously untrue. Though Locke has not mentioned his intention of taking such an inventory *in his section on method*, it is precisely in taking such an inventory that the greater part of the second book of the Essay is occupied; and at the end of it Locke himself says—"Thus I have, in a short draught, given a view of our original ideas, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up" (Book I. xxi. 73). M. Cousin has, therefore, failed to establish either of his charges against the method of Locke. There is, however, one point in the foregoing observations to which I would call particular attention, as it is of much use in determining the questions we are next to discuss. Locke, we have seen, terms his method "*historical*," and only professes (in the early part of his work) to give "a true *history* of the *first beginnings* of human knowledge" (Book II. xi. 15); and his inventory, he has told us, is one of our "*original ideas*." From this juxtaposition, it can scarcely be doubted, that by "*original ideas*" he means those which are *first* in the human mind, those which are chronologically (not

this order, which, most probably, was the order of composition, I doubt if Locke would ever have been taken for a sensualist.

always logically*) prior to the others which are also found to exist there. This chronological antecedence, too, appears to be the usual meaning which Locke annexes to the term "origin," or "original," when not immediately applied to ideas (*see* Book I. iii. 23, iv. 7, 15 ; Book II. iv. 1, &c.), and it is the meaning attached by M. Cousin himself to the term "historical," for he identifies the "historical" with the "chronological" condition (Ps. p. 138). When, therefore, Locke speaks of the origin, or original of ideas, we must understand him as merely meaning the chronological antecedent, unless we see some special reason to the contrary ; for though some writers have been lax enough to put these terms sometimes for the chronological, and sometimes for the logical condition of anything, we must not suppose (without some reason for it) that Locke departs from his historical method, and from his ordinary use of the terms, in order to perplex his system with an ambiguous phraseology. Before, then, we can charge him with the fallacy of "*post hoc ergo propter hoc*," we must inquire whether the "*propter hoc*" is to be found in his system at all. But I am anticipating.

The first book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding* consists chiefly of a polemic against innate principles and innate ideas. This is, therefore, the first question which M. Cousin discusses ; and in order to test the validity of his objections, it is first necessary to get a clear conception of the doctrine which Locke is opposing. This doctrine Locke enunciates at the outset in language as simple and precise

* On the distinction between the logical and the chronological order see Ps. pp. 136-8.

as the question seems to admit of ; and if his expressions subsequently become vague and metaphorical, it is because they are borrowed—professedly borrowed—from his adversaries, who were, no doubt, willing to veil the extravagance of their doctrine in a mist of imagery ; and if we consider the single specimen of their language, which Locke has quoted from Lord Herbert of Cherbury, we shall find little reason to charge him with “disguising his doctrine in a masquerade of metaphor.” *His* doctrine, certainly, is not disguised. It is, as we shall see, simple and clear ; and from the doctrine of his opponents Locke seems to have pulled off the mask as well as he could. “It is an understood opinion,” he says, “amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles, some *primary notions, κοιναι εννοιαι, characters*, as it were, stamped upon the mind, which the soul receives in its *very first being*, and *brings into the world along with it*” (Book I. ii. 1). Whether there were “some men” who held this theory we shall enquire presently. It is enough here to remark that the innate principles, or innate ideas, which Locke opposes are plainly supposed to exist in the mind, *as ideas*, chronologically prior to experience ; in opposition to which view, Locke states his own doctrine with equal clearness and simplicity. He tells us that he hopes to show, in the following parts of this discourse, “how men, *barely by the use of their natural faculties*, may attain to all the knowledge they have without the help of any *innate impressions*, and may arrive at certainty without any *SUCH original notions or principles* ;” since “we may observe in ourselves *faculties* fit to attain *as easy and certain knowledge* of them as

if they were *originally* imprinted on the mind (Ibid). And this view of the question at issue is consistently maintained throughout the discussion. His opponents argue that "certain principles, both speculative and practical," must needs be "constant impressions, which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, *as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties*" (Book I. ii. 2); while he holds, on the contrary, that the "capacity" of knowing "is innate, the knowledge acquired" (Book I. ii. 5). "There is a great difference," he tells us, "between an innate law and a law of nature—between something imprinted on our minds in their very *original*, and something that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of by the use and due application of our natural faculties"; and he goes on to condemn those who "deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature" (Book I. iii. 13). "God," he says again, "having endued man with those *faculties* of knowledge which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodness to plant those innate *notions* in his mind than that, having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him bridges or houses" (Book I. iv. 12). Finally, he repeats the same account of the tenets of his antagonists in the beginning of the second book. "It is a received doctrine that men have native ideas and *original characters* stamped upon their minds in their *very first being*" (Book II. i. 1). These extracts, I think, make it sufficiently evident what doctrine he intended to refute; and it is plain that, if such a doctrine was maintained in his time, Locke's adoption of the historical or chronological method must have forced upon him the consideration of it

prior to investigating the origin of ideas, "in order," as he says himself, "to *clear his way* to those foundations which he conceives are the only true ones whereon to establish those notions we have of our own knowledge" (Book I. iv. 25) ; and this, as we shall see, M. Cousin himself is disposed to allow. If, therefore, anything were wanting to complete the proof that Locke views innate ideas only in a chronological light, it is furnished by the part of his work in which he considers them, and his avowed object in treating of them in that place. But this is rendered still more manifest by his expressed agreement with Lowde's doctrine of "innate ideas," or "native inscription" (Preface to Fourth Edition, note to Book II. xxviii. 11), though he censures part of Lowde's phraseology as seeming to imply that these ideas were in the mind *before* (in his language) the soul "exerted" them. The reader will probably also have observed in the passages quoted several instances of Locke's using the term "original" in an exclusively chronological sense; and I am convinced that the more he studies this first book of Locke, the more clearly will he perceive that this is the meaning systematically attached to that term by the English philosopher (see more especially Book I. ii. 9, 14, iv. 1, &c.). It is further worthy of remark, that Locke has not, in this book, decided the question as to the true character of those principles, which have passed for innate on account of general consent. He attributes them, we have seen, to our "inherent faculties," and consequently postpones the consideration of them till he has first examined these faculties themselves. "He hopes to show in the following part of his discourse," how men may acquire these truths by the use of their natural

faculties. "This ready assent of the mind to some truths," he says, "depends neither on native inscription nor the use of reason; but on a faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter;" which he hopes to make plain "in the sequel of this discourse." Again, "universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding the terms is, I grant, a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence depends not on innate impressions, but on something else, as we shall show hereafter" (Book I. i. 1, 11, 12, 18). Nothing, therefore, can be more unfair than to criticise the first book of the Essay, out of relation to the remainder of that work; or to assume the author's views on an inspection of the negative portion of his theory which is there expounded, without recurring to the positive part of it, in which he afterwards accounts for the origin of these principles. Their true character will be determined by Locke's account of our faculties, which is not given in the first book. But if we *will* form a judgment as to the origin of these principles from the first book, I think we can scarcely refer them (logically) to experience. Even if we had not Locke's admission of the very precarious and limited character of empirical knowledge in the fourth book (Book IV. cap. iii.), we could hardly expect so sober a philosopher to maintain that experience was "fit to attain *as easy and certain knowledge* of these truths, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind" (Book I. ii. 1), or to derive the "*self-evidence*," which he attributes to these propositions, from an experimental connexion between the ideas which compose them (Book I. ii. 18). Again, he tells us, that "these speculative maxims *carry their own evidence with them*"—(Book I. iii. 1).

“Moral rules,” he considers “capable of *demonstration*” (Ibid.); and he speaks of the “*moral and eternal obligation which these rules evidently have.*”—(Book I., iii. 6.) He grants, “that the existence of God is so many ways manifest, and the obedience we owe to him *so congruous to the light of reason*, that a great part of mankind give testimony to the *law of nature.*—(Ibid.) He thinks the duty of parents to preserve and cherish their children, is “*one of the most obvious deductions of human reason.*”—(Book I. iii. 12.) “The knowledge of a God, is *the most natural discovery of human reason*” (Book I. iv. 17); and the notion of the Deity is suitable to the “principles of common reason.”—(Book I. iv. 10.) The principle of contradiction, Locke refers for its credentials to *common sense** (Book I., iii. 4). Modern critics have cried out that this is a most important admission—an admission which, in fact, surrenders the whole system of Locke. If it did so, Locke would scarcely have been guilty of *repeating the same reference*, with the result of his investigations before him, as he has deliberately done in Book IV. viii. 1. Common sense, indeed, is a principle to which he is rather fond of appealing, (see Book IV. xviii. 11, where he seems to identify it with “reason” and the “principles of all our knowledge,” and Book IV. xix. 7;) while of this principle of contradiction, he

* The reader may, perhaps, be somewhat perplexed by the apparently contradictory language of Locke in these passages, as to the office of reason in the origin of these principles. In fact, he divides them into two classes, one perceived by intuition (to which he seems occasionally to apply the term “reason”); the other by demonstration, which are more properly said to be discovered by reason. *Neither* are referred to sense or experience.

says, "It carries *its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof*" (Book I. iii., 4). It is true there are one or two passages which might seem to imply that these principles were generalizations from experience (Book I. ii. 12, 15, 18, 21); but these are almost sufficiently qualified by the context, and are of no weight against the mass of evidence that can be adduced on the other side. Similar passages, too, are repeated in subsequent portions of the Essay. For example, he says, (speaking not only of these general maxims or principles, *but also of certain particular propositions* which are assented to on first hearing) "whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are *all known by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof, one from another*" (Book IV. vii. 10), which would be plainly untrue of generalizations from experience; since, to go no farther, in them the general is proved by the particulars. I must again apologize for detaining my reader so long on this topic; for a clear conception of what Locke is maintaining and refuting in this opening polemic, is absolutely necessary to a right understanding of the subsequent books of the Essay: and the preceding remarks will afford no slight confirmation of the view of the nature of Locke's faculties, which will be taken in the following pages.* I now turn to M. Cousin.

In his criticism on the first book, M. Cousin has, throughout, the air of a man who is unwilling to grant what he is unable to deny, and who seeks to insinuate

* On the chronological sense of the term "innate," see further Book I. iv. 1, 20.

all kinds of objections against the reasonings of Locke, without making himself distinctly responsible for any of them. He commences by saying that Locke was the first who made the question of the origin of ideas the grand problem of philosophy (Ps. p. 116); which is not true : for we have seen that it was rather the extent and limitations of our knowledge which Locke made the grand problem of philosophy, while the question of the origin had been made the grand problem by some of his predecessors—Gassendi, for example. The critic then lays down, correctly enough, the theory against which Locke is arguing, viz., “that there are *ideas* in the mind at the moment its action begins, which it does not acquire, which it possesses from the first day just as they will be at the last, and which, properly speaking, have no progress, no generation, and no origin.” (Ps. p. 117.) But if this just exposition leads us to expect a just criticism, I fear we shall be disappointed. He commences with the insinuation that Locke “*rightly or wrongly* imputes this doctrine to his adversaries.”—(Ibid.) This real or imaginary doctrine is, he tells us, opposed to the solution which Locke *wished* to give of this problem, and to the system with which he was *preoccupied*.”—(Ibid.) Again, he resumes, “*according to Locke*,” (Ibid) there are persons who believe in these innate principles. He next proceeds to expound, or rather to caricature, Locke’s argument against “these persons.” He wholly passes over the argument, which alone Locke thought decisive of the question; viz., that we may attain as easy and certain a knowledge of these principles by means of our natural faculties, as by means of native inscription. He seeks to make the English philosopher appear

ridiculous, by placing the idiot in a position of prominence which he does not occupy in the original work. He expounds the arguments of Locke in such phrases as "he replies for the savage," he "interrogates the infant," "he appeals to the testimony of savage nations who, *according to him*, have no idea of God." He charges him with having "recourse to travellers who are often prejudiced and ignorant of the language of the people they visit,"* and with "appealing to children and savages, concerning whom observation is so difficult" (Ps. pp. 117, 119); as if Locke had not also argued from the phenomena of consciousness in general, urging that a close inspection of these so-called innate principles, and still more of the ideas of which they are composed, compels us to recognise empirical conditions of their development. (Book I. iv. 1, 8. Book II. i. 1, xi, 16.) When the critic has, by these means, brought his hearer's mind into a state scarcely less favourable to his ulterior misrepresentations than if he had refuted the entire polemic against innate ideas, he adroitly adjourns the question. But there is at least one of his insinuations, which I cannot pass over, since his translator turns it into the direct assertion (borrowed from Coleridge)†, "If the dependence of

* To the charge which has so frequently been urged against Locke, of giving heed to ill-informed and prejudiced travellers, I do not think he is fairly obnoxious. If we examine the number of travellers he quotes on the subject, both in his text and his third letter to Stillingfleet (note to Book I. iv. 8.), I think it will appear that he consulted almost all that were available at that day.

† Coleridge, indeed, says that Locke "*either* labours to subvert a mere thing of straw, an absurdity, which no man ever did or could believe," *or* that his argument "involves the old mistake of 'cum hoc ergo propter hoc.'" But, as we have seen, that there

the mind upon experience, as the condition of all knowledge, were all that Locke meant to maintain by his attempt at refuting innate ideas, he would maintain what nobody denies, *while he has, in fact, undertaken to refute what nobody ever in reality believed.*" (Ps. p. 285.). This assertion I cannot allow to pass uncontroverted : but for an extended refutation of it, I must refer my reader to Dr. Webb's excellent chapter on the subject. (Intellectualism of Locke, cap. III.). I would remark, however, in the first place, that even if it were true that this doctrine had not been maintained by Locke's predecessors and contemporaries, still the polemic in question would be neither useless nor misplaced. It was, at least, a possible theory, and when Locke was determining the origin of ideas, he was bound to exclude every solution of the question different from his own, whether it had or had not been maintained by his predecessors ; and this supposition, especially, was one which, if at all admissible, would have rendered dubious the whole of the following part of the Essay. But it was not only a possible theory, but, in the days of Locke, it was one which would not have appeared very extravagant or absurd to philosophers in general ; for, according to a theory which was then very prevalent (and which, as we shall see, M. Cousin attributes to Locke himself), the idea was regarded as a separate entity, having a possible, and frequently an actual existence, out of consciousness ; and it will be no easy matter to show why such an idea might not exist out of consciousness, anterior to experience, as well as subsequent to it. Further, it is this very form of the doctrine

is no "propter hoc" in the first book of the Essay, we may summarily dismiss the latter alternative.

in question which is combated by Locke. (see Book I. ii. 5, iv. 20, etc.). But it is more material to observe that the doctrine was actually held. It will not be disputed that many writers maintained what were called by them "innate ideas." The only question that can be raised is, whether by this and similar phrases, they meant to indicate logical priority only, chronological priority only, or both together. If the first, Locke has, no doubt, laid himself open to the insinuated charge of M. Cousin, and the expressed one of Coleridge and Dr. Henry ; if the second or third, it is equally plain that he has not. Now, without going beyond the books immediately before us, we have first Locke's express assertion that the second or third form of this doctrine was held ; and I do not see why we should reject his testimony as to a matter of fact which came under his own cognizance, and with respect to which he could scarcely have been mistaken. Next, we have the quotation which he makes from Lord Herbert of Cherbury, in which that philosopher enumerates chronological and logical antecedence (*prioritas* and *independentia*), as two distinct and co-ordinate marks of his innate principles (Book I. iii. 15). Lastly, what is in this place most to the purpose, we have the admission of the same fact by M. Cousin himself. This admission is to be found in his discussion of the real and ideal beautiful, which Dr. Henry has printed as an appendix to his Lectures on Locke (Ps. p. 549) ; where, after expounding his own doctrine on the subject (which makes the idea in one sense innate, since it is logically independent of experience), he proceeds : " Such is the theory of the genesis of the idea of cause, of the idea of the triangle, the circle, &c. ; and it seems to me that in this central theory,

the two extreme theories—that of *innate general ideas*, and that of comparative general ideas—lose what is false in each, preserving what is true. *The exclusive theory of innate general ideas originates* in the impossibility of explaining certain general ideas by collection and comparison, that of comparative general ideas *in the impossibility of conceiving ideas as innate*. Men cannot explain the ideal beautiful by the combination of different individual beauties spread out in nature; *they therefore have recourse to the desperate hypothesis of an innate ideal beauty*; and, *the absurdity of a primitive ideal*, by which we judge of all individual objects, has *forced*, and still keeps numbers in the incomplete and false theory of the comparative ideal. The ideal is neither *anterior to experience*, nor the tardy fruit of a laborious comparison.” It is surely needless to adduce any further evidence against M. Cousin, or his devoted admirer Dr. Henry. The doctrine that ideas and principles exist in the mind “anterior to experience,” was actually held in the time of Locke, and that philosopher was imperatively called on to refute it.

Let us now pass on to where M. Cousin resumes the adjourned discussion, in order to dispose of this question of innate ideas, before we proceed to the question of their origin. Here, in order to avoid giving an opinion on the real point at issue, the critic has recourse to the following extraordinary process. The unit of thought, he tells us, is a judgment, not an idea (Ps. p. 278); but then comes language, which expresses these judgments by means of propositions (Ps. 278). These propositions contain several elements, and these elements are called ideas (Ps. p. 280). There are, therefore, in nature,

he concludes, neither propositions nor ideas; for the proposition is only the form of a judgment; and the ideas are given us in the propositions (Ibid). But Locke divides the general doctrine of innate ideas into two points, general *propositions* and *ideas* (Ps. 282). In this form the question is easily decided; for since there are in nature neither propositions nor ideas, there are in nature neither innate propositions nor innate ideas (Ibid). Now, this is at best to decide the question in favour of Locke on a technicality, and not on the merits of the case. It denies the existence of innate propositions and innate ideas on no *peculiar* ground, but only on the same ground, and in the same sense, that it would deny the existence of adventitious ideas and propositions. It seeks to destroy the question, not to decide it. But let us take a glance at the process itself. Is it true that *ideas* are the elements of *propositions*? I confess I thought it almost self-evident that this was not the case—that *terms*, and not the *ideas* they stand for, are the elements of propositions; in which I am confirmed by every logician, every grammarian, and every philosopher,* except M. Cousin, whom I have consulted. Yet M. Cousin puts forward this extraordinary paradox as something so obvious that it needs no proof—at least there is but one remark in his discussion which could be intended as a proof of it; viz., that it is by the aid of language that we analyze our thoughts. But I cannot help thinking that this also is a mistake. If we express our thoughts—our judgments—by *several*

* That is, all who use the terms in the same sense with M. Cousin. See Ps. pp. 280, 281.

significant words, this presupposes a mental analysis of the judgment, independent of language; but if we express our judgment by means of a *single* significant term, I do not see how such a term would aid us in analyzing it. Indeed, this theory seems so paradoxical, and so little is alleged in its defence, that but for the very express manner in which it is stated, I should suppose that I had mistaken M. Cousin's meaning (see Ps. p. 280-1.). But it is strange that a philosopher of M. Cousin's ability should have imagined that he had destroyed the question by this reduction of it, even supposing it fully established; for, it is plain, that if we must give up innate ideas, or innate propositions, the question will at once revive in the shape of innate judgments. And, in fact, it is precisely in this form that the doctrine is combated by Locke. The elements of the innate principles, against which he contends, are not terms but ideas (Book I. iv. 1); and by all writers, except M. Cousin, terms have been regarded as the elements of propositions, ideas of judgments. When the critic says, that "Locke reduces the doctrine of innate ideas to two points, general *propositions* and ideas" (Ps. p. 282), he may, indeed, be verbally accurate, but he is in reality wholly erroneous. The fact is, that Locke's term, which corresponds to M. Cousin's "judgment," is "mental proposition;" the "judgment" of the former philosopher being, as we shall afterwards see, something entirely different from that of the latter. Locke's "mental proposition," like M. Cousin's "judgment," is the mental act corresponding to a verbal proposition, an act affirmative or negative, a consideration of ideas (Book IV. v. 3, 6.). This remark we will find of some importance, when we come to M.

Cousin's criticism on Locke's theory of judgment ; at present it is only adduced to show, that if Locke reduces the doctrine of innate ideas to "innate general *propositions* and ideas," he does not thereby exclude from his consideration what M. Cousin would call "innate *judgments*." And, in fact, in speaking of these innate principles, he expressly adverts to "mental" as well as "verbal" propositions (Book I. iv. 1), apparently identifying the doctrine of his antagonists chiefly, if not wholly, with the former.* But, after all the pains he has taken to avoid deciding the question in favour of Locke, M. Cousin ends by (I think inadvertently,) doing so in the most positive and distinct manner. Reducing all mental acts to judgments, he proceeds, "these judgments have conditions which belong to the domain of *experience*. Take away *experience*, and there is *nothing* in the senses, nothing in the *consciousness*, nothing in the *understanding*" (Ps. p. 283). "It is an undeniable fact, that unless certain experimental conditions are supplied, the mind does not enter into operation, does not judge" (*Ibid.*). This concedes everything for which Locke contends in the first book—nay, I think everything for which he contends in the second. Connect this statement with M. Cousin's admission that the doctrine of innate ideas, as opposed by Locke, was actually held (quoted in page 32), and I think it must be confessed that the first book of the Essay is

* The language of Locke is here apparently in agreement with that of M. Cousin, in making propositions consist of ideas ; but an examination of the passages referred to in M. Cousin will convince us that he would only apply the term "proposition" to what Locke calls a "*verbal* proposition." He maintains that *ideas* do not exist independently of *language* (Ps. p. 280).



completely absolved—that it refutes an error actually maintained, and states the truth in opposition to it. We may, therefore, pass on to the second book of the Essay on the Human Understanding.

Having proved that there are no ideas in the mind anterior to experience ; that there are no “*original characters*,” or “*native ideas*” inscribed on it in its very first being, Locke proceeds to compare it to “white paper, void of all *characters*, without any *ideas*” (comp. Book II. i. 1, with Book II. i. 2), having brought nothing into the world with it except its inherent faculties. He then asks whence do these faculties get *materials* to act upon, “whence has the mind all the *materials* of reason and knowledge?” to which he replies in one word, “from experience ;” subdividing this experience into sensation and reflection (Book II. i. 2). “These,” he tells us, “are the *originals*,” (a word which we have seen he almost invariably uses in an exclusively chronological signification) “whence all our ideas take their *beginnings*.” (Book II. i. 4.) We see then already, that these ideas of experience are looked on in a two-fold point of view, as the *first* ideas which enter the human mind, and as the *materials* out of which all the ideas which afterwards enter it are framed, but *how* framed we cannot determine until we have examined the nature of the faculties employed in framing them. These two points of view are expressed, with great variety of language, throughout the second book of the Essay. In the first light, ideas of experience are styled “*original ideas*” (Book II. i. 5, xxi. 73), the “*beginnings*” of knowledge, the “*first objects*” of the human mind (Book II. xi. 15), etc., and the capacity recipient of them is termed “the *first capacity* of the

human intellect," "the *first step* a man makes to the discovery of anything," "the *original* of all knowledge" (Book II. i. 24), "the *first operation* of all our intellectual faculties, and the *inlet* of all knowledge" (Book II. x. 14); all which expressions seem to imply a chronological priority in these ideas, but I apprehend imply nothing as to their logical antecedence. In the second point of view these ideas of experience (that is to say, simple ideas of sensation and reflection), or the capacities recipient of them, are called the "fountains" or "sources" of ideas and knowledge (Book II. i. 2, 4), the "*foundations* of other ideas (Book II. xii. 1), the "*groundwork*" whereon to *build* all those notions we shall ever have naturally in this world" (Book II. i. 25); still more frequently they are called the "*materials*" (Book I. ii. 15; Book II. i. 2, 25, ii. 2, vii. 10, xii. 1, xiii. 1, etc.), the "*matter*" (Book II. i. 6, 22,) or the "*ingredients*" (Book II. iii. 2, xxi. 3,) out of which our remaining ideas and our knowledge are framed. These expressions give us a pretty good general idea of the office of these ideas of experience in the system of Locke. They are the first that enter the mind, and they are the materials on which it operates in forming other ideas, or in arriving at knowledge, which consists in the perception of relations between ideas (Book IV. i. 1). They are thus the origin of all ideas, in this sense, that even those ideas "which seem most remote from sensation and reflection," are "no other than what the mind, *by the ordinary use of its own faculties employed about ideas of sensation and reflection may and does attain to*" (Book II. xii. 8). We are, therefore, here thrown back again on the faculties of Locke; and it is plain that the nature of these faculties will

determine the true character of Locke's philosophy. It is further to be observed that Locke calls these ideas of experience—these immediate data of sensation or reflection—*simple* ideas ; because the ideas, which external objects produce in the mind, “enter by the senses, *simple* and unmixed” (Book II. ii. 1) ; and because “these simple ideas being each *in itself*” (as opposed probably to artificial decomposition by the mind in abstraction) “uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas” (Ibid). Hence it is the immediate data of experience which Locke throughout denotes by the term “simple ideas ;” and, in conformity with this, he divides them into simple ideas of sensation, and simple ideas of reflection ; for the reader will do well to observe that this division is one of simple ideas only, and not of ideas generally. Locke never speaks of complex ideas of sensation, and complex ideas of reflection. On the contrary, he subdivides complex ideas, on a very different principle, into modes, substances, and relations ; in which, ideas formed by the mind out of simple ideas of sensation, are frequently classed with those which are formed by the mind out of simple ideas of reflection. This settles the meaning of the term “simple idea” in the philosophy of Locke ; but a few words are necessary to ascertain precisely the meaning of the two modes of experience enumerated by that philosopher, on which he founds his subdivision of ideas of experience. It has not, perhaps, been yet finally settled what Locke means by sensation, or what he means by reflection.

First, as to sensation, M. Cousin has omitted to investigate the question ; but in some passages he

seems to adopt, without investigation, what I believe to be the false alternative. The reader is probably aware of the distinction drawn by Reid and Stewart, between what they have called "sensation;" that is the change in the state of the *mind*, which is produced by an impression on the organ of sense, and what they term "perception," that is, the knowledge which we obtain, by means of our sensations, of the qualities of *matter*. The terms sensation and perception were not however used in this restricted sense prior to the time of Reid. Philosophers spoke rather of the "perception" of *ideas*, than of the "perception" of *objects*; and Locke enumerates three meanings of the word "perception," all different from that of Reid (Book II. xxi. 5). He uses the term in the wide sense of thinking in general (Book II. vi. 2), or with a special reference to simple ideas, rather than to external objects (Book II. ix.). Sensation also had been used to denote all the knowledge, whether of the object or the subject, which we attain by the senses. Since, therefore, nothing can be inferred from the use of these phrases by Locke, it becomes a question whether his sensation was intended to coincide with the sensation of Reid, or whether he meant to include under it both the sensation and the perception of the latter philosopher; for it is plain that a difference here will make no small difference in the original stock of ideas with which, according to Locke, we are supplied by experience. Our decision must, I think, be in favour of the latter alternative. The term sensation was used by Locke's predecessors in the more extensive signification, and Locke never hints at a restriction of its meaning; nor has he any term which he uses in opposition to it in the sense of Reid's

perception. Our ideas of the primary, *real* or original qualities of matter, which are ideas of the object "*as it is in itself*" (Book II. viii. 23.), and therefore are perceptions in the sense of Reid, are enumerated by Locke among the *simple ideas* of one or of divers *senses* (Book II. iii. 1, v. 1). He seems plainly to take the same thing for granted, throughout the eighth chapter of the second book, where he treats of primary and secondary qualities; for instance, when asserting that *all* our ideas of secondary qualities are dissimilar to anything that exists in the bodies themselves, he asserts this only of *most* of our *simple ideas* of sensation, and goes on to mention our ideas of primary qualities plainly as the exceptional case (Book II. viii. 7, 9). Space, too, as we shall see, he considers as a simple idea of sensation. But the mere juxtaposition of two passages in this eighth chapter is, I think, conclusive on this question. "Concerning the *simple* idea of *sensation*," he says, "it is to be considered, that whatever is so constituted in nature, as to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause *any* perception (we shall see that this last word is merely equivalent to "*idea*." It is plainly applied here to ideas of secondary qualities, as well as primary, that is to Reid's sensation, as well as his perception), "in the mind, doth hereby produce in the understanding a *simple* idea"—(Book II. viii. 1, and compare Locke's definition of sensation, Book II. i. 23). "If, then, external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas therein, and yet we perceive these original" (that is, primary or real) "qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves, or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the

brain, or the *seat of sensation*, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of perceptible bigness may be perceived at a distance, it is evident that some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion which produces the ideas which we have of them in us. *After the same manner,*" he continues, "that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive *that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced*, viz., by the operation of insensible particles on our *senses*" (Book II. viii. 12, 13). And if this were not sufficiently decisive, we might add that, our ideas of primary qualities be not original data of experience, they must be derived from these data by some of our faculties. But Locke never hints at any of his faculties being employed in framing them—he treats of them among simple ideas of sense before he has enumerated the faculties at all, and if they are to be referred to the operation of some of the faculties, it is not easy to see to what faculty they are to be referred. On the whole, then, I think we may positively conclude that Locke means to designate by the term "sensation," both sensation proper and perception proper.

A similar inquiry remains with regard to reflection. In the first place, we have the view of Mr. Stewart, who thinks that Locke intended to include under this designation the reason or understanding proper—the faculty of relations. It is in this sense he tells us, that Locke uses the term "when he refers to reflection our ideas of cause and effect, of identity and diversity, and all other relations," in proof of which he quotes a

passage, in which Locke states that all of these relations "*terminate in,*" and "*are concerned about,*" simple ideas of sensation or reflection ; which, he adds, he takes to be the whole materials of all our knowledge (Book II. xxv. 9). But to "*terminate in,*" and "*be concerned about,*" simple ideas of sensation and reflection, is not *to be* simple ideas of sensation and reflection ; and Locke, on the contrary, tells us that all these relations are complex ideas, and therefore formed by the mind from ideas of sensation and reflection, but not such ideas themselves. We have, indeed, seen that Locke does not divide complex ideas into complex ideas of sensation, and complex ideas of reflection—a fact which is too frequently overlooked ; nor could reflection, which is a subdivision of *experience*, be possibly identified with the *à priori reason*. While, to complete the proof, Locke does not even say that these relations "terminate in," and "are concerned about" simple ideas of reflection, but simple ideas "*either of sensation or reflection,*" so that the passage affords as much reason for saying that Locke identified the understanding proper with sensation as with reflection ; but the former position will scarcely be maintained.

Let us turn to M. Cousin. "Locke," he says, "evidently confounds reflection with consciousness. Reflection, in strict language," he adds, "is undoubtedly a faculty analogous to consciousness, but distinct from it, and pertains more particularly to the philosopher, while consciousness pertains to every man as an intellectual being" (Ps. p. 122). The passage of Locke, on which he founds this statement, extends to five sections ; and, as he does not particularise the portion of it which proves his point, his criticism is

not very easy to reply to. However, his own remark, that reflection is a faculty analogous to consciousness, ought to have prevented him from hastily concluding that Locke confounded the two, if he applies to the former language equally applicable to the latter ; while in the passage he has quoted (Book II. i. 1-5) the remark, that reflection is "very like sense," and "might properly enough, be called *internal sense*," would seem to imply that it is distinct from consciousness. This, indeed, is implied, in making reflection a subdivision of experience co-ordinate with sensation ; for, consciousness is evidently the condition of all experience, not of any particular kind of it. But let us hear the critic out : "Still more," he proceeds, "Locke arbitrarily reduces the sphere of consciousness or reflection, by limiting it to the operations of the soul. It is evident that consciousness or reflection has for its objects all the phenomena which pass within us, sensations or operations" (Ps. p. 122). This sentence is completely wrong. In the assertion, that "Locke arbitrarily reduces the sphere of consciousness or reflection to the operations of the soul," there is a true and false proposition blended together. Locke *does* limit reflection to these operations, not, however, arbitrarily, but in conformity with the language of the best writers before and since ; while he expressly maintains that consciousness has for its objects "all the phenomena which pass within us, sensations or operations." "Consciousness," says he, "is inseparable from *thinking*" (and in what a wide sense he uses the term "thinking," we may see by Book II. i. 9, vi. 1, xix. 1), "and, as it seems to me, essential to it" (Book II. xxvii. 9). "Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own

mind" (Book II. i. 19). "Our being sensible of it, is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts; and to them it is, and will be, necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it" (Book II. i. 10). Nor is Locke's reflection merely consciousness under this limitation—this arbitrary limitation—because there is no reason for limiting it to the operations of the mind, and not extending it to sensation. If this be the reason why M. Cousin considers the limitation arbitrary, he is wholly mistaken; for sensation is itself one of the operations of which reflection takes cognizance (Book II. xix. 1, compare vi. 2). But reflection is distinct from limited consciousness of any kind. It is "*internal sense*" (Book II. i. 4), "*internal sensation*" (Book II. xi. 17, xx. 3), a "capacity recipient of the *impressions* made upon the mind, by its own operations" (Book II. i. 24). It consists in the mind "*turning inward on itself*" (Book II. i. 8, vi. 1, xix. 1), and "*observing,*" "*considering,*" or "*contemplating,*" its own acts or operations (Ibid), which can scarcely be said of consciousness. But the most decisive passage is that where Locke maintains that ideas of reflection are *later* than ideas of sensation, "because they need attention" (Book II. i. 8); for if Locke held with his critic, that attention was necessary to all consciousness (Ps. p. 183), then "because they need attention" would be no reason why ideas of reflection should be *later* than ideas of sensation. Indeed, the whole of these two sections (Book II. i. 7, 8,) are occupied in showing the distinction between reflection and the consciousness of its objects; and that we are conscious of the operations of our minds before we obtain clear ideas of them from reflection is throughout assumed. The

critic, however, shows no want of confidence. He proceeds to make the following reduction of Locke's origin of ideas. "The true powers, the special sources of ideas, according to Locke, are sensations on the one hand, and the operations of the mind on the other, only under this general condition, that we have a consciousness of the one as well as the other, *and that we can fall back upon ourselves and reflect on them and their products*" (Ps. p. 122). I confess I do not comprehend what is meant by the last clause. Does M. Cousin mean that it is necessary "*to fall back on ourselves and reflect,*" in order to acquire our ideas of *sensation*? If so, Locke merges sensation into reflection, and not *vice versâ*. Or does he mean that we obtain our ideas of sensation only on the condition that we *can* fall back? This is to make the acquisition of these ideas depend on an untried and unrealized possibility; and, again, since Locke includes Reid's perception in his sensation, to fall back on ideas of sensation, is not in all cases to fall back on *ourselves*; it is, in some instances, to *fall back* on the external world, if that phrase have any meaning. Ascending to the preceding clause, to annex the condition of consciousness to a sensation would, in an English writer, be mere idle tautology; and even in France, I believe, the application of the term to what we are not conscious of is of very recent origin. Finally, to revert to the first clause, the doctrine of Locke is perverted and reversed. Locke has mentioned the origin of ideas in almost innumerable passages, in the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, and in these passages I believe I may safely say he has *never* made sensations and the operations of the mind co-ordinate sources of ideas. *Wherever* he

mentions sensation as one source, he mentions reflection as the other,—*wherever* the operations of the mind are alluded to as one origin, the external objects themselves are named as their co-ordinate. The former are the *immediate* sources of simple ideas, the latter the *remote* ones.

Here, then, the critic has fallen into a serious error, and one which, as his method renders the correction of it impossible, cannot fail to have an evil effect on the following criticism. His next step makes the evil worse. Divorcing sensation from the (other) operations of the mind, and reducing reflection to consciousness of the latter, he enquires, “Is it the sensibility or the operations of our soul which first enters into exercise?” (Ps. p. 122 ; and by “the *sensibility*” in this place, the reader will have no difficulty in seeing that he simply means “*the senses*”—see especially the analysis of the sensibility on the following page). And he answers, “Locke does not hesitate to pronounce that our first ideas are furnished by the sensibility” (Ibid). The operations of the mind are then (Ps. p. 123) identified with the faculties,* though they are plainly more extensive ; and, the result is, that according to the critic, the senses furnish the whole of the original materials from which our ideas and knowledge are framed, as we shall see more clearly when we have discussed the faculties of Locke. This is nothing else than to ignore reflection

* It is true, indeed, that M. Cousin allows that the will, together with pleasure, and pain, and the passions, are operations of the mind, in the system of Locke, though not faculties (Ps. p. 124). Yet, he considers his investigation of the nature of these operations complete, when he has investigated the nature of the faculties (Comp. Ps. p. 123, with Ps. p. 125).

altogether as a source of ideas—to identify sensation with all experience—to derive from it *all simple* ideas, and to deduce all complex ideas from the operations of the mind about the objects of the senses.

Before passing on to an examination of the faculties, however, it is necessary to take a glance at another class of simple ideas, which, though wholly overlooked by the critic, have given rise to considerable speculation of late years: I mean those simple ideas of sensation or reflection which Locke says, with great variety of expression, are “suggested” to the mind by experience, or ideas of experience (Book II. ii. 2 ; iii. 1 ; vii. 7, 9 ; xii. 2, etc.), which “arise from” (Book II. iv. 1), “join themselves to” (Book II. vii. 2), are “annexed to,” or “concomitant to” (Book II. vii. 3, 6), or “offered to us by” (Book II. vii. 9) these ideas of experience—which these ideas “carry with them” (Book II. xiii. 26, xvii. 2), “bring along with them” (Book II. xvi. 1,) etc. ; by all which phrases it seems to be implied that these suggested ideas are not to be regarded as immediate data of sensation or reflection. The explanation of these expressions by the supposition that reflection is used in a loose sense for the understanding proper, is plainly inadmissible ; not only because Locke does not use the term “reflection” in this loose sense, but also because many, if not most, of these suggested ideas are attributed to sensation, which this theory cannot account for. Dr. Webb thinks that Locke recognised a special faculty of rational suggestion, and supposes that these ideas are called simple, because each of them is suggested to the mind by a single datum of

experience. But I cannot agree with either portion of this theory. Locke has mentioned no such faculty of rational suggestion in his enumeration of the faculties (to which enumeration Dr. Webb has scarcely paid sufficient attention), nor has he used the term "suggest" in any fixed or definite meaning; for although it usually seems to imply that the idea is not an immediate datum of experience, yet it is sometimes applied to *all* our simple ideas, however acquired. For example, "but all this is still confined to these simple ideas which it" (the mind) "received from those two sources, which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions; for *simple ideas* are *all* from things themselves, and of these the mind can have no more nor other than what is suggested to it" (Book II. xii., 2. See also xiii. 1, xix. 1, and ii. 2); and I find similar expressions very freely used in reference to pleasure and pain, which could scarcely be supposed to require a faculty of rational suggestion for their acquisition" (Book II. vii. 1-7). Moreover, if attained by a faculty operating on the data of experience, they ought to be classed as complex ideas. The reason assigned by Dr. Webb for calling them simple ideas, would be scarcely sufficient to induce Locke to depart from his classification, even were it applicable in all cases. But that it is not so, may be proved from the very ideas as particularised by Dr. Webb.* The idea of power, for example, is, by Locke himself, derived from "our taking notice how *one* thing comes to an end and

* We shall see also, by the cases of infinity and substance, that ideas are sometimes called *complex*, which are suggested by a single datum of experience.

ceases to be, and *another* begins to exist which was not before (Book II. xxi. 1); and it seems quite impossible to derive the idea of *succession* from a *single* datum of experience, though it is “*suggested* by our senses ;” and “*constantly offered to us* by what passes in our minds” (Book II. vii. 9). It is not, however, to be supposed that Locke would have used these loose and ambiguous phrases so constantly, if he thought that these ideas were mere data of experience. I apprehend the fact is, that he considers simple ideas less as immediate data than as the materials which the mind operates on in framing complex ideas ; and that, in consequence, he frequently classes complex ideas among simple ones, when they are rarely used *as* complex, and constantly used as materials or ingredients of more complex ones ; in which cases he usually make use of some phrase which does not imply that they are immediate data of sense. In this view these simple suggested ideas are in reality complex, and formed like other complex ideas, by some of the faculties enumerated by Locke, which we shall presently consider, but classed among simple ideas because they are *used* as simple ideas, rather than as complex ones. Thus, with respect to existence and unity—ideas which Locke classes among simple ideas, both of sensation and reflection, and which, he says, are suggested to the understanding by every object without, and every idea within—he says, “*When ideas are in our minds we consider them as actually being there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us ; which is, that they exist, or have existence ; and whatever we consider as one thing, whether a real being, or an idea suggests to the understanding the idea of unity*” (Book II. vii. 7). These are

plainly abstract considerations, requiring the faculty of *abstraction*. Again, in a single section (Book II. xxi. 3), he enumerates the ideas of power,* extension, duration, number, figure, and motion, as all involving "somewhat of relation," and so requiring for their formation the faculty of comparison (being "that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas comprehended under relations" Book II. xi. 4). These comprehend the greater part of the ideas now under consideration. The reason, too, which I have given for classing them among simple ideas, is expressly adverted to by Locke, in one very important case, that of the idea of power. "Our idea, therefore, of power, I think, may well have a place amongst other simple ideas, *and be considered as one of them*, being one of those *that make a principal ingredient in our ideas of substances*."—(Book II. xxi. 3.) But the idea itself is complex not simple. "He has the most perfect idea," says Locke, "of any of the particular sorts of substances, who has gathered, and put together, most of the simple ideas that do exist in it, among which are to be reckoned its active *powers*, and passive capacities, which, *though not simple ideas*, yet, *in this respect, for brevity's sake*, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them" (Book II. xxiii. 7). The same reason, too, will apply to another of them, motion, which Locke has enumerated, along with thinking and power, as the three ideas which have

* Power not merely involves "somewhat of relation;" it is a relation, and nothing more. "Most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances, when truly considered, are only *powers*; all which ideas are *nothing else*, but so many *relations* to other substances" (Book II. xxiii. 37). As relations, they are the product of the faculty of comparison *only*.

been most modified in forming complex ideas (Book II. xxii. 10) ; and to these three he adds, in another place, unity and duration (Book II. xviii. 6) ; and I think the same reason will be found applicable to the remainder, though not, perhaps, to the same extent. The suggested ideas, then, are complex ideas, formed by the ordinary faculties, but applied to the same use as simple ideas. Their character will depend on that of the faculties employed in framing them, and we are thus thrown back, for the third time, on the faculties of Locke. The question, therefore, as to the nature of these faculties is of vital importance ; the whole system of Locke will be determined by the answer to the question, "Can these faculties add anything to the data of sensation and reflection?"—and it, therefore, becomes us to examine these faculties, and M. Cousin's criticism upon them, with all possible precision. This is doubly necessary, because the remainder of M. Cousin's criticism on the second book of Locke, and most of the remainder of that book itself, are employed in investigating certain ideas, which, according to Locke, are "no other than what the mind, *by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas of sensation or reflection, may and does attain to*" (Book II. xii. 8). A mistake as to what the mind can attain to, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, must be fatal to a criticism on such a point, and it becomes us, therefore, to examine this question with the utmost diligence.

Locke enumerates in all six faculties (or seven, if we suppose that he intended to count a distinct faculty of denomination), viz., perception, retention, discernment, comparison, abstraction and composition. That most of these can add nothing to the data of sense or

reflection is very evident; and I think, on close enquiry, it will appear that the faculty of comparison is the only one with respect to which we can fairly raise the question. Before considering this, however, I must correct a mistake into which M. Cousin has fallen with respect to the first of them, into which his previous error with regard to reflection seems to have led him, viz., that this faculty only takes cognizance of *sensations*. "About what," he enquires, "is perception exercised? To what is it applied? To *sensation*. And what does it? It does nothing but perceive the *sensation*, nothing but have a consciousness of *it*;" "the first faculty of the mind then adds nothing to the *sensation*; it merely takes knowledge of *it*;" "the materials are always in the last analysis, ideas of *sensation* due to perception;" "the understanding is for Locke only an instrument whose whole power is exhausted on *sensation*," and again Locke has added to *sensation* "only faculties whose sole office is to operate upon it" (Ps. pp. 124, 125). The critic has been led into this mistake, partly by his previous error, partly, perhaps, from confounding Locke's "perception" with that of Reid, which certainly could not extend to ideas of reflection. But that it is a mistake is easily shown. In a passage quoted by M. Cousin himself (Ps. p. 123) Locke says, "what perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he *does* himself; what he sees, hears, feels, etc., *or thinks*, than by any words of mine" (Book II. ix. 2); and at the conclusion of the discussion, he says of *all* the faculties of the mind "that they are exercised about *all its ideas in general*," though, for reasons he assigns, the instances he has hitherto given have been chiefly in simple ideas, (Book II. xi. 14) and retention, which M. Cousin

himself says merely continues or recalls a *perception* (Ps. p. 124), is defined by Locke to be "the keeping of those simple ideas which from sensation *or reflection*, it hath received" (Book II. x. 1); not to mention that when Locke has enumerated reflection as a mode of experience, co-ordinate with sensation, he could not exclude simple ideas of reflection from the sphere of perception without gross inconsistency. M. Cousin, too, has another criticism on the point, quite inconsistent with this; for he says, "The perception of Locke is undeniably consciousness" (Ps., p. 124); and this consciousness, M. Cousin holds, applies to all the phenomena of mind, whether sensations or operations; whereas he charged Locke with arbitrarily limiting it, *not to sensations, but to the operations of the mind* (Ps. p. 122). He cannot, therefore, now restrict the consciousness, that is the perception, of Locke to *sensations* only, and this without producing a tittle of evidence in favour of his restriction. To return, however, to the faculty of comparison, we may observe in the first place, that Locke only held that simple ideas of experience formed the whole materials of our knowledge, "when we have taken a full survey of them in their several modes, compositions, and *relations*" (Book II. i. 5), which seems to imply the necessity of a faculty distinct from experience, taking a view of its data in their relations, before the materials of knowledge are complete; and also, that the relation is something distinct from the related ideas. But this faculty not only completes the *materials of knowledge*, it furnishes us with *knowledge itself*, since knowledge is the perception of a *relation* of agreement or disagreement between our ideas (Book IV. cap. i.); and it can scarcely be maintained that a faculty which

transforms the materials of knowledge into knowledge itself, adds nothing to these materials, and possesses no originative power.* And the doctrine of the Essay throughout is, that experience furnishes the ideas between which the relation subsists, but not the relation itself. The mind, we are told, gets "all its ideas of relation *by bringing two ideas together*, so as to take a *view* of them at once, without uniting them into one" (Book II. xii. 1). "Besides the ideas, *whether simple or complex*," says Locke, "that the mind has of things *as they are in themselves*, there are *others* which it gets from their *comparison* one with another. The understanding," he proceeds, "in the *consideration* of anything, is not confined to that precise object. It can carry any idea, as it were, beyond itself, or at least *look* beyond it, and see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind *so considers* one thing, that it does as it were set it by another, *and carry its view* from one to the other, *this* is, as the words import, *relation* and respect" (Book II. xxv. 1); and we must bear in mind, that a relation and an idea of relation are the same thing in Locke's phraseology. Accordingly, the idea of relation is not so much an idea properly so called, as a way of considering two things together. "Relation," says Locke, "*is a way of comparing or considering two things together*, and giving one or both of them an appellation from that comparison, and sometimes even the relation

* It might, perhaps, be proper to include discernment with comparison here, though we can scarcely say that the identical judgments it gives rise to, *add* anything to the data of experience. Identity, however, being a *relation*, is partly concerned in the following remarks, which may rather be understood of the *faculty of relations* than of comparison.

itself a name" (Book II. xxv. 7).^{*} As such, relations are made by the mind (Book II. xii. 1), and their connexion with simple ideas, consists in their "*terminating in,*" and "*being concerned about,*" simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection (Book II. xxv. 9), which is the connexion, and the only one, that Locke insists upon at each step of his argument (Book II. xxv. 11 ; xxvi. 2, 6 ; xxviii. 18). They are not complex ideas properly so called, but are classed with them because they are formed by the mind, which requires certain simple ideas to operate on in their formation ; but as for complex ideas proper, it is plain that substances and modes divide the whole class between them ; for modes are those "complex ideas which contain *not* in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves," and substances are those which *do* contain in them such a supposition ; so that when Locke enumerates relations as a third kind of complex ideas, he says that they "*consist in the consideration and comparing* one idea with another" (Book II. xii. 3, 8). In the case of the idea of causation or power, we have an admission that we can frame the idea of this relation without experiencing the relation itself ; for Locke, after placing the relation in the *consideration* of one thing operating or conducing to the production of some simple idea, or collection of simple ideas which did not before exist (Book II. xxvi. 1), gives the following reason *why* he asserts that this relation terminates at last in simple ideas of sense or reflection, "*for,* to have the idea of cause and effect, *it suffices to consider* any simple idea or substance as

^{*} That the relation and the comparison is the same thing, see further, Book II. xxviii. 19.

beginning to exist by operation of some other, *without knowing the manner of that operation*" (Book II. xxvi. 2), and therefore of course without the operation or relation becoming an object of experience.* Indeed, as a mode of comparing or considering two things, relation could not possibly be a simple datum of experience, except it is sensation or reflection which compares and considers. But not only is it "not contained in the real existence of things," but it is something "extraneous" and "super-induced" (Book II. xxv. 8). The most decisive passage, however, as to the originative power of this faculty, occurs in Locke's first letter to Stillingfleet (Note to Book II. ii. 2), where he answers an objection of that writer, that the idea of substance is "grounded upon plain and evident reason;" and, therefore, "comes not in by sensation or reflection." His answer runs as follows:—"I *never* said that the general idea of substance *comes in* by sensation or reflection, or that it is a simple idea of sensation or reflection, though it be *ultimately founded* on them; *for* it is a *complex* idea, made up of the general idea of something or being, *with the relation of a support to accidents*. For general ideas *come not into the mind* by sensation or reflection, but are creatures and

* The same view of this relation is elsewhere maintained. It is the "*effects*" only which bodies produce, that we immediately attain by experience (Book II., vii. 8); and so far are we from having an immediate experience of power, that we cannot even *conceive* any operation upon anything, but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas; so that the power we conceive (or "*observe*") is only in "*reference*" to the change of perceivable ideas (Book II. xxi. 1; see, too, Book II. xxiii. 9). Yet Locke has been charged with holding that the *production* of change was attained by the senses.

inventions of the understanding, as I think I have shown ; and also how the mind makes them from ideas which it has got by sensation and reflection ; and *as to ideas of relation*, how the mind *forms them*, and how they are *derived from*, and *ultimately terminate in*, ideas of sensation and reflection I have likewise shown. . . . To explain myself, and clear my meaning in this matter, all the sensible qualities of a cherry come into my mind by sensation ; the ideas of perceiving, reasoning, thinking, knowing, &c., come into my mind by reflection. The ideas of these qualities and actions or powers *are perceived by the mind to be by themselves inconsistent with existence*, or, *as your lordship well expresses it*, ‘we find we can have no true conception of any modes or accidents ; but we *must* conceive a substratum, a subject, wherein they are,’ *i. e.*, that they cannot exist or subsist of themselves. Hence, the mind perceives their *necessary connexion* with inherence, or being supported ; which, being a *relative idea*, *superadded* to the red color in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, *the mind frames the correlative idea* of a support. *For I never denied that the mind could frame to itself ideas of relation*, but have showed quite the contrary, *in my chapters about relation*. But because a relation cannot be founded in nothing, or *be the relation of nothing*, the *thing here related* as a supporter, or a support, is not represented to the mind, by any clear and distinct idea.” Here, then, is Locke’s own exposition of the expressions, I have been commenting on, in his chapters about relation, and, in the instance here discussed it is plain that not only is the relation superadded, by the mind, to the two ideas between which it exists, but that one of the related ideas is given

by the comparison itself, not by experience, external or internal. There cannot, therefore, remain a shadow of doubt, that this faculty of comparison possesses, in the system of Locke, an originative virtue, and super-adds an important element to the data of sensation and reflection. Here, then, is a real difficulty for the critic, who has set out by assuming that Locke was a sensualist. Let us, therefore, interrogate him with all precision, with respect to the faculties of Locke; and especially with regard to this faculty of comparison. Here is his discussion of the question. The error which I have already pointed out—of supposing that perception takes notice of sensations only—runs through it, and unduly limits the *matter* which the other faculties are exercised upon, but at present we are concerned only with what the faculties can *add* to that matter.

“ Now, what is the character, and what is the office of these faculties? About what, *for example*, is *perception* exercised? To what is it applied? To sensation. And what does it? It does nothing but perceive the sensation—nothing but have a consciousness of it; add that, according to Locke, the perception is passive, forced inevitable, it is still scarcely anything but the effect of sensation. The first faculty of the mind, then, adds nothing to the sensation; it merely takes knowledge of it. In *retention*, *contemplation* continues this perception, when faded *memory* recalls it. *Discernment* separates, *composition* reunites, these perceptions; *abstraction* seizes their most general characters; but still the materials are always, in the last analysis, ideas of sensation due to perception. Our faculties add nothing to the knowledge which they draw from them, but that of their own existence and of their action (Ps. pp. 124–125). This is the whole discus-

sion. Five out of the six faculties are discussed "*for example,*" and the sixth—the faculty of comparison—that which we have seen the critic was more especially bound to consider—is passed by without a single syllable. But this is not all. From inspection of the five faculties, which are taken as examples of the six, a conclusion is drawn which we have seen would be absolutely overturned had M. Cousin bestowed the smallest attention on the sixth. It was plainly incumbent on him to examine *all* the faculties, and not to content himself with taking some of them as examples of the remainder. He would probably be a little surprised at a critic who took the sensibility and the will as examples of the faculties in his own system, and drew a conclusion from them as to the nature of the third faculty—the reason. But if he *would* take examples—examples extending to five-sixths of the whole—why should he omit that faculty which appears to be the chief one, and which, even at first sight, seems the one which it will be most difficult to reconcile with the system he has pre-assigned to Locke? I will not say that the omission is wilful, but I will say that it is, perhaps, the strangest and most unaccountable that ever occurred in the writings of a philosophical critic. There could be but one *reason* assigned for it, viz., that it was *convenient* to the critic to omit the consideration of it.

Such is M. Cousin's investigation of the faculties. He concludes, "thus on the one hand *sensation* always precedes; on the other the understanding is for Locke only an instrument whose whole power is exhausted on *sensation.*" Locke, he tells us, has opened the route to the exclusive doctrine of sensation transformed, "by adding to *sensation* only faculties

whose sole office is to operate upon *it, without any original power of their own*" (Ps. p. 125). This question is of vital importance, not only in relation to the system of Locke, but in relation to the ideas which we are next about to discuss at great length. These ideas, Locke tells us, are "derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than the mind, *by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense or from the operations it observes itself without them, may, and does attain to*" (Book II. xii. 8). Now, the mistake, which I have already pointed out, can scarcely fail to vitiate M. Cousin's criticisms here. Locke will refer to sensation, not only sensations proper, but perceptions—M. Cousin scarcely recognises his right to refer to it anything but sensations proper. Locke will exercise his faculties upon simple ideas of reflection, as well as simple ideas of sensation—M. Cousin holds that he can legitimately exercise them on ideas of sensation only; and again, Locke will superadd to the data of experience, whenever the addition is made by the faculty of comparison, whereas M. Cousin absolutely restricts him to these primitive data.* In such a criticism we may well anticipate misapprehensions of Locke's meaning, and supposed discoveries of contradictions, paralogisms and absurdities; but it will much strengthen my case, and weaken M. Cousin's,

* In short, M. Cousin commenced his criticism with the assumption that Locke was a sensualist; and declared his intention of carrying it on in such a manner that he could not correct the falsity of this assumption, if it were false. We have now seen that it *is* false, since Locke concedes an originative virtue to the faculty of comparison; and we are therefore led to anticipate that the remainder of M. Cousin's criticism will prove a series of blunders.



to go through each of these criticisms in detail, and point out their mistakes by means of distinct quotations from Locke's chapters on the subject under discussion. I shall commence, like both Locke and his critic, with the idea of space ; in his remarks on which, M. Cousin has crowded into a few pages almost every mistake into which a critic could fall. I shall first quote the critic.

“The idea of space,” says he, “must necessarily be derived from one or other of these two origins,” that is to say, sensation and reflection (Ps. p. 127) ; which, if the idea of space be a simple idea, is undoubtedly true. “The idea of space,” he proceeds, “is certainly not acquired by reflection, by the consciousness of the operations of the understanding. It comes, then, from sensation. Here you have the systematic principle. We shall allow Locke to start from this principle, and arrive at the idea of space. . . . According to Locke, the idea of space comes from sensation. Now, from what sense is it derived? It is not from the sense of smelling, nor of taste, nor of hearing. It must be, then, from sight and touch. So Locke says (Book II. xiii. 2), ‘we get the idea of space *both* by our sight and touch, which I think so evident,’” etc. (Ps. p. 127.) In this, M. Cousin is undeniably correct ; for, although the title of this chapter is “simple *modes* of space,” yet by this phrase Locke means such modes of the simple idea of space as distance, immensity, figure, and place ; it being rather the object of the chapter to deduce these from the simple idea of space, than to account for the simple idea itself. Simple modes, however, are “only variations or different combinations of the same simple idea,” so that a simple idea of space is requisite for the formation of these modes ; and accordingly, space is distinctly recognised

as a simple idea, and as a simple idea of sensation (Book II. cap. v. xiii. 27, 28 ; xv. 9, note ; xvii. 22 ; xviii. 1). The critic's next step is, however, a strange one. "If the idea of space is an acquisition of the sight *and* touch," he says, "in order to know what it should be under this condition, we must recur to previous chapters, where Locke treats of the ideas we gain by the sight, and *especially* by the touch. Let us see what *the touch* can give according to Locke and according to all the world" (Ps. pp. 127, 128). Now Locke, we must bear in mind, classes our simple ideas as they are ideas of one sense, ideas of divers senses, ideas of reflection, or ideas both of sensation and reflection (Book II iii. 1 ; v. vi. and vii.) ; and according to M. Cousin himself, Locke has given us "an analysis of the sensibility and of the different senses which compose it ; of the ideas we owe to *each* of them, and to the *simultaneous* action of *several*." (Ps. p. 123). When Locke, therefore, as in the case before us, refers a simple idea "*both* to the sight and touch," "to know what it should be under these conditions," we should refer to the previous chapter where he treats of simple ideas of *divers* senses, and *among these we will find space expressly enumerated* (Book II. cap. v.). This, therefore, will not answer the critic, and he accordingly proceeds to divide sight from touch, and to see if Locke has enumerated space among the simple ideas derived *from each of them separately*. Even this, however, is not quite satisfactory to M. Cousin ; for though, of course, Locke has not, in contradiction to his system, *again* enumerated space among simple ideas of *one* sense, yet he has already mentioned casually that the idea of space is derived from the sight (Book II. ix. 9). Sight

must, therefore, be also thrown out of account, and we must enquire what the "touch aided or *not aided* by the sight" can give (Ps. p. 128). "We must recur to previous chapters where Locke treats of the ideas we gain by the sight, and *especially* by the touch. Let us see what *the touch* can give according to Locke and according to all the world" (Ps. pp. 127-128). But even for the "*especially*" in the first clause, there is no foundation in the theory of Locke; on the contrary, if he has given greater prominence to either of the senses involved in this process, it is to the sight; while by the second clause the sight is wholly laid aside and the inquiry confined to the acquisitions of the touch alone. The touch is found to give "something which resists, something which is solid, which is, in a single word, body" (Ps. p. 128). M. Cousin raises a provisional objection to the sense of touch giving even this idea, but as he does not press it, and as it seems to arise from his overlooking the fact that Locke's sensation includes the perception of Reid—I shall pass it by. "But, I choose rather," he continues, "to suppose that in reality, the touch, sensation, gives the idea of body; that sensation may go thus far I am willing to grant, that it goes farther Locke does not pretend" (*Ibid.*). He next seeks, by a side-wind, again to introduce the sense of sight, which he had so strangely laid aside. "*In that chapter,*" says he "in which, almost without anything of the spirit of system, he investigates the products of *sight and touch*, Locke produces nothing from *them*, but the idea of *solid*, that is to say, of body" (*Ibid.*). This passage is truly a marvellous one. First, *what chapter* does the critic mean? Is it the *third* chapter, or the *fourth* chapter, or the *fifth*

chapter? Before, we were "to have recourse to the previous *chapters* where Locke treats of the ideas we gain by sight, and especially by the touch." Now it has come down to "*chapter*" without telling us which. But the passage is wholly wrong. Locke is no where guilty of the monstrous absurdity of "producing" (*sic!*) the idea of the *solid* from the *sight*, while in the *third* chapter, where he investigates ideas of one sense, he does produce from it light and colours (Book II. iii. 1). Nor is it true that he produces nothing from the touch but the idea of solid; for he says, "the *most considerable* of those belonging to the touch are *heat, cold, and solidity*; all the rest consisting almost wholly in sensible *configuration*" &c. (Book II. iii. 1). But the chapter to which M. Cousin probably refers is the *fourth* chapter, which he ought to have seen is a chapter, neither on the products of the sight, nor the touch, nor both, but on the idea of solidity, and the idea of solidity alone; and this idea is again *exclusively* referred to the touch, which alone would sufficiently distinguish it from space. (For the object of this chapter see the introduction to it, Book II. iii. 2., and the title of the chapter, which is "of *solidity*.") But, moreover, the critic could not have stumbled on a worse chapter to prove that Locke confounded space and solidity than this fourth chapter of the second book; because two whole sections out of the six which that chapter contains are occupied in showing the difference between these very ideas (Book II. iv. 2, 5), and one of these is afterwards quoted* for this very purpose by M.

* There is, however, one slight excuse for M. Cousin's error, in not referring to the fifth chapter, where Locke treats of simple ideas of divers senses, and in referring to the fourth chapter, in which

Cousin himself (Ps. p. 132). Let us, however, follow the critic. "If afterward," says he, "and in the spirit of his system, Locke pretends—as we have seen he does—that the idea of space comes from sensation, that is, from the sight and touch, it follows that he reduces the idea of space to that of body, and that for him space can be nothing else than body itself" (Ps. p. 128). Were the premises here as true as they are absurdly false, the conclusion would not, on M. Cousin's own showing, necessarily follow. For that philosopher has accused Locke of wholly omitting to take an inventory of our actual ideas; and, consequently, if Locke has mentioned nothing but solid or body when investigating the products of the sight and touch, this does not prevent him from afterwards referring other and dissimilar ideas to the same senses; since he was not aiming at making a complete inventory of ideas of sense in those chapters where he investigated their products. M. Cousin's first argument, therefore, to prove that Locke confounded space with body, gives way on every side. But he has another in reserve, to which he attaches no slight importance.

"In fact," he says (cap. xiii. 10), "Locke says, 'the idea of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space (whereof this is but a particular and limited consideration), namely, by our sight and

he treats of solidity. The quotation from Locke, on which he founds his criticism runs thus in the original:—"I have showed above (cap. iv.) that we get the idea of space by the sight and touch," etc. (Book II., xiii. 2). But here "cap. iv." is so obviously a misprint for "cap. v." that it is strange that M. Cousin should have overlooked it; for Locke has *not* "showed" what he refers to in cap. iv., and he *has* done so in cap. v. Dr. Henry, in quoting the passage, omits the reference.

touch. . . . ' Same chapter same section, ' to say that the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist. . . . ' This is clear ; the *space*" (it ought to be "*place*," which is only " a particular and *limited* consideration" of space) "*of the universe*, is equivalent to neither more or less than to the universe itself ; and, as the idea of the universe is, after all, nothing but the idea of body, it is to this idea, that the idea of space is reduced. " Such," he adds, " is the necessary genesis of the idea of space, in the system of Locke." (Ps. p. 129) ; and in his recapitulation he thus sums up the arguments for his thesis, that Locke confounded space with body. " As the touch, *aided by the sight*," (*en passant*, I have not been able to find out exactly what M. Cousin intends to convey by the phrase "*aided by the sight*,") " gives only body and not space, Locke, by his mere process implicitly reduces space to body. He does the same thing expressly, when he says, that to ask if the world exists in any *place*, is simply to ask if the world exists. This confusion of the existence of *space*, with the existence of the world, is the confusion of the idea of *space* with the idea of body.' (Ps. pp. 143, 144). But I must observe, that to confound space with body (supposing it done in the passage before us) is not to reduce the idea of space to that of body ; for the confusion would equally exist, if, with the Cartesians, we reduce the idea of body to that of space or extension. And this, if M. Cousin's interpretation be correct, is precisely what Locke has done ; for he has, on that interpretation, identified not *space* but *place* (two words which M. Cousin most unwarrantably interchanges) with the universe—that is to say, he makes the universe identical with " a

particular and *limited* consideration" of space, instead of making space a particular and limited consideration of the universe. If, therefore, space and body are confounded in this passage, the latter is reduced to the former, and not *vice versá*, and the meaning of the passage is the direct contrary of what M. Cousin endeavours to affix to it. But, in fact, it has quite a different bearing, and does not confound the two ideas at all. Locke has stated, that "in our idea of place we consider the *relation* of distance between anything, and any two or more points which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another" (Book II. xiii. 7), and he is engaged in illustrating *this* remark in the section from which M. Cousin's quotations are taken. By merely keeping this in mind, the reader will easily see the true bearing of the section, and the absurdity of the construction put upon it by M. Cousin, when they are placed in parallel columns; and the same point might be made still stronger by quoting the corresponding passage in which Locke again explains the twofold meaning of the word "place," in Book II. xv. 6 :—

LOCKE'S ESSAY, BOOK II. XIII. 10. M. COUSIN'S QUOTATION THERE-
FROM.

Title—"Place."

"That our idea of place is nothing else than such a relative position of anything, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can have no idea of the *place* of the universe, though we can of all the parts of it; *because* beyond that we have not the idea of any *fixed, distinct, particular beings*, in reference to which we

can imagine it to have any relation of distances ; but *all beyond* is *one uniform space or expansion*, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For, to say the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist ; this, though a phrase borrowed from *place*, signifying only its existence, not location ; and when any one can find out, and frame in his mind, clearly and distinctly, the *place* of the universe, he will be able to tell us *whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space*. Though it be true that the word has sometimes a more confused sense, and stands for that *space* which a body takes up ; and *so* the universe *is in* a place. The idea, therefore, of place, we have by the same means that we get our our idea of space, (whereof this is but a particular consideration), viz., by our sight and touch, by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension or distance."

SECOND QUOTATION.

"For to say the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist."

FIRST QUOTATION.

"The idea of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space (whereof this is a particular and limited consideration), namely, by our sight and touch."

EXPOSITION THEREOF.

"This is clear ; the space of the universe is equivalent to neither more nor less than the universe itself ; and as the idea of the universe is, after all nothing but the idea of body, it is to this idea that the idea of space is reduced !" (Ps. p. 129).

Comment is almost needless, and if any be wanting it is supplied by the discussion which commences

with *the very next sentence* to that I have last quoted from the *Essay on the Human Understanding* and is continued with slight digressions to the end of the chapter. But it is worth while to call attention to another paralogism of M. Cousin's criticism. "The *space of the universe*, is equivalent to the universe itself, ergo, the idea of space is reduced to the idea of body," is his reasoning. But the conclusion will not follow except "the *space of the universe*" be equivalent to "*all space*," which the section I have quoted is alone sufficient to disprove.

This is the evidence which M. Cousin adduces to prove that Locke reduced the idea of space to the idea of body. Let us take a hasty glance at the evidence which may be adduced to prove that he did not. We have seen that Locke classes solidity among ideas of one sense and space among ideas of divers senses ; we have seen that two whole sections of his chapter on solidity are devoted to pointing out the distinction between these ideas ; further we have seen, in the very section which M. Cousin quotes in proof of his theories, expressions wholly irreconcilable with it. Yet all this is but a fraction of the evidence in favour of the antithesis. M. Cousin himself informs us that "Locke himself, *when not under the yoke of his system*, distinguishes perfectly the idea of body, of solid, from that of space, and establishes very clearly the difference" (Ps. p. 131). In proof of this assertion he quotes a section of Locke's chapter on space, where, if anywhere, we must suppose that that philosopher *was* under the yoke of his system ; and then he proceeds, "this is followed by various considerations on the difference between body and space ; considerations which occupy more than *ten*" (he might have said

“fifteen”) “*continuous sections*, and to which I must refer you, lest I multiply citations too much” (Ibid). Marvellous! The system of Locke is to be found in *two isolated paragraphs* of his *official* chapter on space, and *more than ten continuous sections of that very chapter* are devoted to the *refutation* of his system! But even this is not all. In the *last* of these sections (in which he recollected Locke strenuously argues in favour of the real existence of a *vacuum*) Locke proposes to use the term “*extension*,” in reference to the space which is occupied by bodies, or which lies between different bodies, and the term “*expansion*,” in reference to “space in general *with or without body possessing it*; so as to say, space is *expanded*, and body *extended*” (Book II. xiii. 27); and in conformity with this distinction he proceeds to consider duration and *expansion* together in the fifteenth chapter. In this chapter, as we might expect from its title, I believe I may say with strict accuracy that the distinction between body and space occurs in *every* section. It again frequently turns up in the seventeenth chapter on “Infinity,” and in many other detached passages in the Essay, most of which occur *after* his discussions of the question in his official chapters on solidity and space (see Book II. xiv. 24; Book IV. vii. 12, 13, etc.). In fact, Locke’s eagerness to refute the Cartesian theory, that extension is the essence of body, has led him to devote more of his book to pointing out the difference between the ideas of space and body than between *any other two ideas whatever*; and yet, the critic charges him with confounding them, nay more, with resolving the former into the latter!

Equally unsatisfactory is M. Cousin’s account of *how* Locke fell into the confusion he attributes to

him. "The idea of body," he says, "is the historical and chronological condition" of the idea of space, while the idea of space is the logical condition of the idea of body (Ps. pp. 135-139). Locke confounds the chronological with the logical condition, or rather he confounds the chronological antecedent of an idea with the idea itself (Ibid). This is easily disposed of. Locke nowhere affirms that the idea of body is the chronological antecedent of the idea of space, and he *does* affirm that the idea of space is the logical condition of the existence of body. "I appeal," says he, "to every man's thoughts whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity as it is from scarlet color. *It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet color exist without extension; but this hinders not but they are distinct ideas. Many ideas require others as necessary to their existence or conception, which yet are very distinct ideas. Motion can neither be nor be conceived without space; yet motion is not space nor space motion. Space can exist without it, and they are very distinct ideas; and so, I think, are those of space and solidity.*" (Book II. xiii. 11.).

But my reader is probably thinking that, however complete my refutation of M. Cousin may be in details, I have not removed the basis of his objection; for that objection rests less upon Locke's reducing the idea of space to body than on his deducing it from sensation; and though Locke may distinguish these two ideas very clearly, yet he makes space equally with solidity a simple idea of sensation. Now, the characteristics of the idea of space which seem inconsistent with its being a simple idea of sensation, as enumerated by M. Cousin, are three:—1. That it is

a necessary idea, *i. e.* that we cannot conceive the non-existence of space. 2. That it is illimitable or infinite; and 3. That it is a pure and wholly rational conception, which eludes every effort to represent it to sense or imagination (Ps. pp. 133-141). But surely it cannot be maintained that this is the only idea of space which we possess. Even M. Cousin himself frequently speaks of "different spaces," or "particular spaces," and a particular space he explains to be "the place of this particular body." (See Ps. pp. 232, 233, 277, 279, &c.) Such a space plainly wants the second characteristic, and I think the third also. It is plain that we perceive and imagine both body and color, and yet it is obvious that we cannot perceive or imagine either of them except *as extended*, nor can they be perceived or imagined as extended without perceiving or imagining them as *in space*. Such a space, therefore, is not illimitable, nor does it escape from the grasp of sense or imagination. In fact, the controversy between philosophers is here chiefly one of words. M. Cousin calls us by the general title of "space," that which Locke terms immensity, and regards as a "mode" of that "space" which is a simple idea of sensation. Whether Locke can legitimately deduce such a mode from the original idea, we shall consider when treating of infinity. Let it suffice here to remark that Locke seems to have been perfectly aware that the idea of immensity possessed the three characteristics which M. Cousin assigns to the idea of space. Its necessity seems implied in its inseparability, since "the continuity cannot be separated neither really nor *mentally*," (Book II. xiii. 13.)—in its being the logical condition of the existence of solidity and motion—and in the

necessary existence" (though not, perhaps, quite in the sense of M. Cousin) of a vacuum, and the imagination that space, in itself, is *actually* boundless to which the *idea* of space or expansion of itself naturally leads us.* (Book II. xvii. 4). The passage last alluded to, also establishes the second characteristic of the idea, and the third characteristic is (as we shall see more clearly hereafter) implied in Locke's statement "that we have no *positive* idea of infinite space." (Book II. xvii. 18.)

These objections, therefore, being laid aside, let us see if Locke can deduce the idea of space, as distinguished from immensity, from the sight and touch. With regard to the latter sense, I shall now quote passages from M. Cousin himself which admit it, and admit in language which goes much farther towards confounding space with body than anything he has been able to extract from the writings of Locke. I find one of these admissions at the very outset of his criticism. Having conceded that the touch may give the idea of that which resists, of solid, of body, he enquires, "And what are the qualities of a solid, of that something which resists? Greater or less degree of solidity. The greater solidity is hardness; the less is softness; *from hence also, perhaps, figure with its dimensions* (Ps. p. 128). Figure with its dimensions! Is this figure then *unextended*? and are its "three dimensions" (Ibid.) not dimensions of space? The last clause quoted, in fact, gives up the whole point in dispute, especially as the idea of space is a general idea according to the critic (Ps. pp. 232, 233), and might, therefore, be derived by abstraction

* This is expressed more strongly in the concluding paragraph of the same section.

from a few of these "figures with their dimensions." The admission, indeed, is made with a "perhaps;" but it is elsewhere repeated without any "perhaps," to qualify it. "Solidity," we are told, "envelopes extension, which contains size and form" (Ps. p. 249). "The eminently primary quality is solidity, *which implies more or less extension, which directly implies form*" (Ps. p. 244); and still more decisively in his criticism on Berkeley, "the foundation of all the primary qualities is extension; *extension is solidity, is impenetrability, is resistance!*" (Ps. p. 457.) What would not the critic have given to discover such a passage as this last in the *Essay on the Human Understanding!*—and with what an air of triumph would he have brought it forward, to prove that Locke confounded space with body! Finally, as M. Cousin has nowhere investigated the question, whether this idea can be derived from the sight (though Locke has given that sense at least equal prominence with the touch,) I shall quote Sir William Hamilton's brief, and, I think, conclusive proof, that we attain a knowledge of extension and figure by means of it. "It is admitted," says he, "that we have by sight a perception of colors, consequently, a perception of the difference of colors. But a perception of the distinction of colors necessarily involves the perception of a discriminating line; for, if one color be laid beside, or upon another, we only distinguish them as different, by perceiving that they limit each other; which limitation necessarily affords a breadthless line—a line of demarcation. One colour laid upon another, in fact, gives a line returning upon itself—that is a figure. But a line and a figure are modifications of extension. The perception of extension, therefore,

is necessarily involved in the perception of color" (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, Vol. II. p. 165). With this quotation we may take leave of the idea of space. We have seen that M. Cousin, with all his ingenuity, has failed to establish a single charge, and that, as we have been led to expect, the contradictions which he so frequently declares he finds in the parts of the Essay relating to this subject (Ps. pp. 126, 127, 129,) turn out not to be contradictions between different passages of the Essay, but between the language of Locke, and the system which has been gratuitously (may I not now say falsely?) assigned to him. The miserable failure of M. Cousin's first, and one of his most elaborate criticisms, will prepare the reader for a similar result in the case of the other ideas which we have next to consider. The first of these is that of duration or time. Of the generation of this idea, and of that of succession, which is so intimately connected with it, Locke gives us the following account:—"Reflection on the appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession; and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration. *For whilst* we are thinking, or *whilst* we receive successively several ideas in our minds, *we know that we do exist*, and so we call the existence or the continuation of the existence of *ourselves*, or anything else commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the *duration* of ourselves, or any such other thing co-existent with our thinking" (Book II. xiv. 3). Here it is manifest that succession and duration are described as two ideas quite distinct from each other; the latter requiring, in addition to the perception of the train of our ideas

—which is sufficient to give us the former—the *perception of our own existence* commensurate with that train, and a comparison between them. It is also clear that upon Locke's system the first duration which will be perceived is our own duration—a discovery which M. Cousin seems inclined to refer to any one except its true author. In the next section, however, Locke goes on to prove the necessity of perceiving the train of our ideas, in order to form an idea either of succession or duration; and his remarks on this subject will, for the most part, apply equally to both of them. The critic then, instead of having recourse to the third section—where Locke explains the origin of both ideas, and shows their difference—proceeds to quote the fourth section, in which Locke insists on the necessity of that element which is common to both, and concludes that the English philosopher confounded duration with succession. The section runs as follows:—“That we have our notion of succession and duration from this original, namely reflection on the train of our ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no *perception of duration*, but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings. When that succession ceases, our *perception* of duration ceases with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself while he sleeps soundly, whether an hour, or a day, or a month, or a year. Of which duration of *things* he has *no perception at all*, but it is quite lost to *him*, and the moment wherein he leaves off to think till the moment he begins to think again *seems to him* to have no distance. And so, I doubt not, it would be to a waking man, were it possible for him to keep only one idea

in his mind without variation and the succession of others" (Book II. xiv. 4, quoted Ps. p. 150). "In this whole passage," exclaims the critic, "there is—1. A confusion of two ideas very distinct—duration and succession. 2. An obvious paralogism; for duration is explained by succession, which, in its turn, is explicable only by duration" (Ps. p. 151). I confess myself dull enough to be unable to see either the confusion or the paralogism "in this whole passage," even when taken by itself and out of its relation to the context; for Locke is at particular pains to show that it is not of duration itself but of our perception of duration that he is speaking, and it is not duration itself but our idea (or perception) of duration which is (to a certain extent) explained by succession. But M. Cousin will never stop at *two* objections. There is something magic in the number *three*, and, *nolens volens*, we must have a third. "3. Moreover," says he, "see to what results the theory of Locke leads. If succession is no longer merely the measure of time but time itself—if the succession of ideas is no longer the mere condition of the conception of time but the conception itself—time is nothing else than what the succession of our ideas makes it. The succession of our ideas is more or less rapid; time, therefore, is more or less short, not in appearance but in reality. In absolute sleep, in lethargy, all succession of ideas, all thought, ceases; therefore not only *we* have no duration, but there is no duration of *anything*" (as if, in the very passage on which he founds his charge, Locke had not recognised a "*duration of things*," which, he says, is "*lost*" to the sleeper); "for not only *our* time but *time itself* is nothing but the succession of *our* ideas. Ideas exist but under the eye of consciousness, but there is no consciousness

in lethargy, in total sleep; consequently there is no time. The timepiece vainly moved on; the timepiece was wrong; and the sun, like the timepiece, should have stopped" (Ps. pp. 151, 152). Here it is obvious the critic has substituted duration itself for *our perception* of duration in the passage of Locke. But perhaps the best refutation may be given in the words of Locke himself on another occasion. "*Men in love with their opinions,*" says he, "may not only suppose what is in question *but allege wrong matter of fact. How else could they make it an inference of mine that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep?* I did not say there is no soul in a man because he is not sensible of it in his sleep; but I do say that he cannot think at any time, sleeping or waking, without being sensible of it. *Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts,* and to them it is and to them it will always be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it" (Book II. i. 10). The passage I have quoted is all the evidence that M. Cousin brings forward in favour of his assertion that Locke "says not merely that the succession of our ideas is the condition of the conception of time, but that time itself is nothing else than the succession of our ideas" (Ps. p. 150). He adds, however, the following argument:—"Experience, whether external or internal, gives only the *measure* of time and not time itself;" therefore Locke reduces time to the measure of it (Ps. p. 152). This argument is easily refuted. "We must *carefully distinguish,*" says Locke, "betwixt *duration itself* and the *measures* we make use of to judge of its length. Duration itself is to be considered as going on in one constant, equal, uniform course, but none of the measures of it which we make

use of can be known to do so ; nor can we be assured that their assigned parts or periods are equal in duration one to another ; . . . the notion of duration still remaining *clear*, though our measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrated to be exact" (Book II. xiv. 21) ; and Locke has, moreover, repeatedly acknowledged the existence of a time or duration beyond all succession of human thoughts, in this and the two following chapters (see Book II. xiv. 24, 26 ; xv. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 ; xvii. 5, 20). Finally, the critic urges, against the empirical origin of the idea of time, the same three characteristics which he had found in the idea of space (Ps. p. 145). But here again the question is about words, M. Cousin calling that time or duration which Locke calls eternity, and regards as a mode of duration ; and that we have an idea of duration, distinct from eternity, is proved by the critic himself ; for he says that the duration which is first given us is *our own duration*, and this is plainly not given us either as necessary or illimitable. Locke's idea of eternity we shall discuss under the next head, the idea of Infinity.

"If the idea of the infinite subsist," says M. Cousin, "the system of Locke must be false ; it is necessary, therefore, that the idea of the infinite should not subsist" (Ps. p. 154) ; and, indeed, if M. Cousin is correct in saying, that Locke deduced all our original ideas from sense, and the consciousness of mental operations about sensual ideas, and that these operations are performed by faculties which have no original power of their own (Ps. p. 125), the remark must be accepted as a just one ; for everything which sense or consciousness attains is finite. If, on the other hand, as I have maintained, Locke concedes an

originative power to the faculty of comparison, and by means of this faculty passes beyond the sphere of experience, it is quite competent for him to maintain that we have an idea of the infinite, provided only it be a relative or comparative idea. Here, then, we seem to have an *experimentum crucis* between the two views of the philosophy of Locke. If M. Cousin is right, Locke will deny that we have any idea of the infinite ; if I am right, he will affirm the existence of the idea, but resolve it, or that part of it which transcends experience into a relation. We must, therefore, examine this question with great care.

Locke commences by stating that, in their primary meaning, finite and infinite, are to be regarded as *modes* of *quantity*, that is to say, of space, time, and number ; their application to wisdom, power, &c., being properly figurative (Book II. xvii. 1). They are then to be regarded as *modes*, not *relations* ; and, as the preceding chapter will show us, as *simple modes*, that is to say, “ variations or *combinations* of the same simple idea” (Book II. xii. 5). So far all is in favour of M. Cousin. No “ variation” of the finite can give the infinite, and, as we have conceded no originative power to the faculty of composition, no combination of finite elements could produce the infinite. A few sections further on, the same view seems to be taken still more decidedly. “ We have *no idea*,” says Locke “ of *infinite space*” (Book II. xvii. 8), and the previous section plainly extends the remark to “ *infinite quantity*,” in general. The point seems established, and the sensualism of Locke placed beyond dispute.

The appearance, however, is wholly illusory ; though Locke classes finite and infinite as modes of quantity—though he places immensity among the simple modes,

of the idea of space, and eternity among the simple modes of the idea of duration—yet he does not mean to imply that they are mere modes and nothing more; they are modes with a relation superadded. This he states distinctly in his analysis of our idea of infinity of space, which (as well as infinity of duration) he has already told us, consists not of “variations or combinations of the *same* simple idea,” but “of *two parts very different, if not inconsistent*” (Book II. xvii. 8). “So much space,” he tells us, “as the mind takes a view of, in its contemplation of greatness, is a clear *picture*, and positive in the understanding; but the infinite is still *greater*. 1. Then the idea of so much is *positive and clear*. 2. The idea of *greater* is also *clear*, but it is a *comparative* idea, *viz.*, the idea of so much greater as cannot be comprehended, and this is plainly *negative* not *positive*”* (Book II. xvii. 15); and he further explains how the negative part of this idea is relative, “so that the *negation* of an end in any quantity is only in other words, to say that it is *bigger*, and the total *negation* of an end is but carrying *this bigger* still with you in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity, and adding this idea of *still greater* to *all* the ideas you have, or *can be supposed to have*, of quantity; . . . so that what lies *beyond* our *positive* idea towards infinity lies in obscurity, and has the indeterminate confusion of a *negative* idea” (*Ibid*). And not only has Locke resolved our idea of infinity into two parts, a positive mode† and a relative or negative idea, but it is in

* I may here observe that the word “positive” is used by Locke in opposition to “relative” as well as to “negative.” (Book II. xxv. 6.)

† See a similar analysis of infinite duration (Book II. xxix. 15).

the latter part that he places the true infinity—it is by the *relation*, that he transcends the limits of experience. “All our *positive* ideas,” says he, “of any quantity, whether great or little, *have always bounds*, though our *comparative* idea—whereby we can add to the one and take from the other—*hath no bounds*” (Book II. xvii. 18). And still more clearly with respect to the infinity of number, which we easily apply to both infinite space and infinite duration, “so that of what remains to be added” (after the highest positive idea of a number which we can frame), “WHEREIN CONSISTS THE INFINITY, we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused idea, from or about which we can argue with no certainty or clearness; no more than we can in arithmetic about a number of which we have no *such* distinct idea as four or four hundred, but *only* this *relative* obscure one,* that *compared to any other* it is *bigger*” (Book II xxix. 16); and, if any doubt remained on the subject, it would not be difficult to multiply quotations to the same effect. To obviate another misapprehension, I may add that Locke’s infinite is not merely an indefinite, but a true infinite. The relative idea explained in the foregoing passages is not that which is greater than *this finite*, but that which is greater than *any finite*; it is bigger when compared to *any other*: it is greater than all the ideas we have, or *can be supposed to have*, of quantity—in short, “nothing finite,” as Locke tells us, “bears *any proportion* to the infinite” (Book II. xv. 12; xxix. 16). It is, then, not an indefinite or indeterminate quality, but an infinite quality; and, as such,

* The *relation*, we have seen, is “*clear*,” though the *related idea* is “*obscure, imperfect, and confused*.”

it is beyond the sphere of actual or possible experience ; but then, it is not *positively* conceived *as infinite*, since we cannot frame any idea of an infinite *mode*, and it is by such a mode only that the infinite could be positively conceived. We can now easily understand what Locke meant by denying that we have any idea of space infinite. Finite and infinite being regarded *as modes of quantity* (Book II. xvii. 1), Locke very truly denies that the latter mode can be realised in thought ; and in saying that we have no idea of infinite space, he means precisely the same thing as when he afterwards denies that we have any *positive* idea of infinite space (Book II. xvii. 8 ; and xvii. 18)—viz., that we have no idea of infinite space *as a mode*. But he maintains, with equal earnestness, that we have an idea of the infinity of space, formed by joining to a finite mode the relative idea of infinity (Book II. xvi. 8 ; xvii. 7–10). Locke also gives a brief account of how we come to frame this relative idea of infinity. Although all that we can positively think is finite, we have always a power of enlarging this finite, and this power we can exert as long as we please, without exhausting or even diminishing it. This inexhaustible power of addition suggests to us an inexhaustible remainder, on which we can draw as long as we please without perceptible diminution. A man, for example, may take any finite portion of space, and commence by doubling it, and then doubling again. “ He finds,” says Locke, “ after he has continued this doubling in his thoughts, and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases, he has *no more reason* to stop, *nor is nearer* the end of such addition, than he was at first setting out ; the power of enlarging his idea of space by farther additions, remaining *the same*,

he *hence* takes the idea of infinite space" (Book II. xvii. 3, 13). The relative idea of infinity thus formed, could not even co-exist with the idea of the infinite as a mode of quantity; for if we could form the idea of an infinite mode, our power of addition would be at an end, and the ground of our relative idea of infinity cut away; so that Locke's denial of an idea of infinity as a positive mode, is so far from militating against the view that I have taken of his philosophy, that it is a necessary consequence of it. I have dwelt thus long on Locke's idea of infinity, not merely for the sake of refuting M. Cousin's criticism. I believe that the positive merits of that theory are of the highest order, and have been too frequently overlooked. If established (and I do not see any objection of much weight that can be alleged against it), it would in the first place destroy all the extravagant speculations of the Absoluto-Infinitists of Germany, which plainly proceed on the supposition that we have positive ideas of the Infinite and Absolute; and in the second place, it would remove the Atheism that has resulted from denying that we have any idea of the infinite at all; and thirdly, I think it would lead to a truer theory on the subject, not only of the infinite, but of negative thinking in general, than that which has been so generally adopted in this country from Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel. In this system negative thinking is identified with the negation, and almost with the absence of thought, and the state of the mind when *thinking* of the Infinite Being, is scarcely different from what it is in lethargy or deliquium.*

* This will be probably censured as a misrepresentation. But we must not confound the state of the mind in thinking of the infinite with a state of activity *immediately preceding or following it*.

This theory, I conceive, rests on a mistake, as to the nature of negative thinking. A negative idea is not that which is not realised at all, but that which is realised *only* by its *relation* to some other object of which we have a positive idea ; and therefore, though in one sense we have no idea at all of its object, yet in another sense we have ; for we may have a very clear idea of the object to which it is related, and a very clear idea of the relation it bears to that object ; while, lastly, Locke corrects another error which has generally been associated with this theory, that the idea of the infinite arises from an imbecility, an inability, or an impotence of thought, whereas Locke traces it to a *power* of thinking, and shows that this power is peculiarly adapted for suggesting the idea of the infinite simply because it is *inexhaustible*.*

We can now compare M. Cousin's three marks of the ideas of space and time, with Locke's ideas of immensity and eternity, or what is the same thing, *infinity* of space and time. We have already seen that Locke probably considered that these were *necessary* ideas, in the sense of M. Cousin,—we can now easily see that he can and does assert their *illimitability*

* I have also discussed this question at some length, because I think Dr. Webb's discussion of it is by no means exempt from error. In the first place, he scarcely distinguishes the simple ideas of space and duration from their simple modes. He seems to consider infinity as a simple mode *of* these ideas, whereas, we have seen it is a *relation*, which "*arises from the contemplation of them*" (Book II. xvii. 22). But after considering them as simple modes, or "*combinations of the same simple idea,*" he makes Locke analyse them into *three* elements (instead of *two*), and overlooks his identification of the negative and relative portions of the idea. Finally, he says, these "*simple modes*" are "*suggested*" by an "*impotence of thought,*" whereas, in truth, it is a *relation* that is suggested by a *power* of thinking.

(see especially Book II. xvii. 3); and, thirdly, it is plain, that they cannot be represented to sense or imagination, because we have no positive ideas of them, and can only cognize them by means of the relation they bear to finite spaces and times. This completes our defence of Locke's theory of space and time against the critic. Let us now turn to his attempted refutation of Locke's account of the idea of infinity.

This idea of infinity being, according to M. Cousin, impossible in the system of Locke, he asserts that that philosopher "has *repulsed* and *eluded* it as much as possible" (Ps. p. 154). I wish M. Cousin had taken the trouble to inform us exactly what he means by these phrases. "He begins," says the critic, "by saying that it is *obscure*," and "after having sported awhile with the idea as obscure, Locke objects again that it is *purely* negative, and has *nothing positive in it*" (Ibid). *Objects* to what? But whether the last proposition be an objection or no, it is certainly not to be found in Locke; for we have seen that that philosopher analysed the idea into a *positive* mode *and* a relation; so that he could not, and does not, assert that it is "*purely* negative, and *has nothing positive in it*." And as for his statement that the idea is obscure, M. Cousin has already attacked Locke for omitting to take notice of the actual characteristics of our ideas, and now that Locke does notice a few of the actual characteristics of the idea of infinity, he calls this "repulsing" and "eluding" the the idea! "Obscure or not," asks the critic, "is it not in the intelligence?" (Ibid). as if Locke had ever denied that it was, or as if he had not admitted its existence, by stating that it was obscure; for that

which does not exist is neither clear nor obscure. This, however, is but a prelude to his serious attack. "At last," says the critic, "being obliged to explain himself categorically, after many contradictions—for Locke speaks elsewhere, and *here also*, of the infinity of God (Book II. xvii. 1), and even of the infinity of time and space (Book II. xvii. 4, 5)—he ends by resolving the infinite into number (Book II. xvi. 9). 'Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity,' and he proceeds to quote as Locke's reason for this last assertion "*for*, even in space and duration, when the mind pursues the idea of infinity, it then makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers—as of millions of millions of miles or years—which are so many distinct ideas, kept by number, from running into a confused heap wherein the mind loses itself" (Ps. pp. 156, 157). Now, in the first place, the "many contradictions" here, are, like their predecessors, wholly imaginary; and if M. Cousin had read the passage to which he refers about the infinity of God, he would have seen that Locke said there, that finite and infinite were properly modes of quantity, and are attributed to God primarily, in respect of his duration and ubiquity, and only secondarily and figuratively, in respect to his other attributes (Book II. xvii. 1). But, in the second place, to say that number gives us the *clearest* idea of infinity, is not to resolve the infinite into number, for it rather implies that something else also gives us an idea of infinity, which is *not so clear*; and this is precisely the doctrine of Locke. But, in the third place, if the last passage quoted from Locke be his reason, and his only reason for saying that number gives us the clearest idea of infinity, as the critic would lead us to believe; then it is plain, that it only makes

clearer *one* element of the idea of infinity, that is the positive element; whereas the relative element "*wherein the infinity consists*" may not only be given, but given with equal clearness by something else besides number. But there are worse mistakes still to come. "What," asks the critic, "is number?" and he answers, "it is the last analysis, *such or such a number*, for every number is a *determinate* number, it is then a *finite* number; whatever it may be, and *as high as you please*"* (Ps. p. 157). But suppose *no* finite number be as high as I please. However let us go on. "The reduction of the infinite to number, is then the reduction of time infinite, to its measure indefinite or finite" (Ibid). "Indefinite or finite!" Why, I thought every number was in the last analysis "a *finite* number, whatever it may be, and as high as I pleased." Now it turns out to be indefinite *or* finite! But the critic's definition of the indefinite gets over this difficulty; for he tells us that the indefinite is the finite multiplied by itself (Ps. p. 153), according to which definition every *square* number will be indefinite, since it results from multiplying a finite number by itself. But let us examine the conditions which M. Cousin attaches to infinity of number. If every number that is such or such a number—that is a determinate number—that is a definite number—be, ipso facto, finite; then to have an infinite number it would be necessary that it should not be such or such a number, but that it should be indeterminate, indefinite. And is not this to fall into very confusion of the infinite and indefinite,

* The statement that Locke resolves the infinite into some determinate and finite number, is not easily reconcilable with the previous statement that it is purely negative and has nothing positive in it.

with which the critic unjustly accuses Locke? However he is wholly wrong as to the sense in which Locke says that number gives us the clearest idea of infinity. This will appear from the paragraph immediately following that which M. Cousin has quoted, but which, with his usual artifice, he has dexterously suppressed. "When it" (the mind) "has added together as many millions, &c. as it pleases, of known lengths of space or duration, *the clearest idea it can get of infinity is the confused incomprehensible remainder of endless addible numbers*, which affords no prospect of stop or of boundary" (Book II. xvii. 19). This is *how* number "gives us the clearest idea of infinity," and I appeal to any man of common sense if this be reducing the idea of the infinite to a determinate number. Why did M. Cousin suppress this passage? It, in fact, forms the last clause of the sentence, on the first clause of which he has built his preposterous charge; and the matter is made worse by not only omitting the clause in which Locke explains *how* number gives us the clearest idea of infinity; but, by retaining the "*for*," which properly applies to it, and interpreting it as if it belonged to the first, not the last, clause of the sentence. But the critic's conclusion is rendered yet more preposterous, because Locke has already clearly explained the difference between infinity of number and infinite number; and, while affirming that we have an idea of the former, has denied that we have any idea of the latter. "How clear soever," says he, "*this idea of infinity of number be, there is nothing yet more evident than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number*. Whatever positive ideas we have in our minds of any space, duration or

number, let them be ever so great, *they are still finite; but when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder, there we have our idea of infinity*" (Book II. xvii. 8; see, too, xvi. 8). But though, this "endless addibility of number," affords us the clearest idea of infinity, it does *not* afford us the *only* one. On the contrary, the very idea of space leads us "*necessarily* to conclude it to be actually infinite" (Book II., xvii. 4). M. Cousin's criticism, therefore, breaks down on all sides, and we may pass to the next idea on our list, that of personal identity. The chief cause of controversy with respect to this question is, that critics have not taken sufficient pains to ascertain precisely what Locke means by the term "person;" and this is the more inexcusable, because Locke has warned them in the outset that this is the principal thing they have to attend to.* When Locke has stated, at the very beginning of his discussion, that it is one thing to be the same *substance*, another to be the same *man*, and a third to be the same *person*, we must not, surely, take it for granted that he means the same thing by all three terms, or by any two of them (Book II. xxvii. 7). Nor was the term "person" used in the time of Locke in the same fixed and precise sense that it is now (on its various meanings in former times see Archbishop Whately's note in the appendix to his logic), and we have consequently no means of ascertaining the exact meaning in which Locke uses it, without recurring to his own explanation of the term in his chapter on Identity and Diversity. This being premised, "to find wherein personal

* "That which has made the difficulty about this relation has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed" (Book II., xxvii. 1).

identity consists," says Locke, "we must consider what person stands for, which, I think, is a *thinking* intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can *consider* itself *as itself*, the same *thinking* thing in different times and places ; *which* it does only by that *consciousness* which is inseparable from *thinking*, and as it seems to me essential to it, it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus, it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions ; and by this everyone is *to himself* that which he calls self, *it not being considered in this case* whether the same self be continued in the same or divers *substances*" (Book II. xxvii. 9). And the same view of the person is consistently maintained throughout the chapter. It is on this account that Locke says "consciousness *makes* personal identity" (Book II. xxvii. 10) ; for, "it is consciousness that *makes* a man be himself *to himself*," "it is by the consciousness that the mind has of its present thoughts and actions that it is self *to itself* now" (Ibid). It is that "whereby I am myself *to myself*" (Book II. xxvii. 24), etc. From this point of view, Locke is undoubtedly correct in placing personal identity in consciousness. If I have forgotten any of my actions, so as to be unable, by any effort, to recover the memory of it, I am not *to myself* the person who did it, though I may be so to every one else. I do not impute it to myself—I do not hold myself accountable for it—I am to myself as if I had never done it. If, on the other hand, my present consciousness falsely appropriates to me an action which I did not do, I am still *to myself* the person who did it, though I may not be so to any one

else—nay, though every one else may be aware that the action was never committed at all ; nor would this imputation cease, even if I were persuaded that my substance or my body had changed since I committed the action. Thus Locke tells us that “person,” or rather “self,” is “a forensic term *appropriating* actions and their merit” (Book II. xxvii. 26) ; but it is consciousness that appropriates actions and their merit to us, and, therefore, personal identity is placed in consciousness. Locke’s meaning, then, in placing personal identity in consciousness is easily ascertained. He does not hold that *personality* consists in consciousness—for personality consists in the distinct existence of a “*rational being*”—but *personal identity* consists in consciousness, because, as the sameness of a plant or an animal consists in a participation in the same life and organization, though the material particles which participate in it may vary from time to time, so a number of different rational beings would constitute the same person, if they successively participated in the same self-consciousness. By this theory Locke thinks he has placed our moral responsibility beyond the reach of being questioned, even by those who doubt whether their souls may not have changed since the acts, which are now appropriated to them by consciousness, took place ; because it is this very consciousness that makes them proper subjects for reward and punishment. Into the merits of this theory it is beyond my province to enter. I will only say that it is very ingenious, and has been copied without acknowledgment by many later writers on psychology ; and in fact it differs more in appearance than reality from the generally received doctrine that we must accept the immediate testimony of conscious-

ness, before any deductions of the speculative reason ; for consciousness immediately affirms that we did this or that act, and no one can aim at more than a demonstration that we are not really the identical beings who performed it. And however absurd it may be to question the unity or identity of the soul, it may still be of advantage to philosophy to show that no speculative scepticism on these points can free the sceptic from moral obligation. But I must pass on to M. Cousin.


He commences as usual with an enquiry—"Is the idea of personal identity found or not found in the human understanding? Let every one answer for himself. Is there any one who doubts his personal identity, who doubts that he is *the same* to-day he was yesterday, and will be to-morrow?" (Ps. p. 157.) "The *same*" *what?* Does the critic mean the same man, or the same substance, or the same person? He is apparently unaware of the distinction which Locke has drawn between these three terms, and speaks throughout his criticism as if they were (in the system of Locke) of the very same import. He refutes Locke's doctrine without examining what it is—or rather, in direct contradiction to the distinction of Locke, he identifies "person" with "mental *substance*;" for he tells us, in commencing his next criticism, that the idea of substance is "a generalization from the fact we have just been discussing" (Ps. p. 162). This mistake as to the nomenclature of Locke, prevents a serious collision between that philosopher and his critic, for throughout they are speaking of a different identity. Notwithstanding this, however, the criticism is by no means free from additional misrepresentations. Locke is censured for

not mentioning memory as well as consciousness, as the chronological condition of our idea of personal identity ; the fact is, that besides stating that the consciousness he speaks of is “ a present representation of a past action,” Locke has mentioned memory *in express terms* more than once (see Ps. p. 159, and Essay, Book II. xxvii. 13, 24, 27). A still more serious error is his charge against Locke of confounding *personality* with consciousness ; as for instance, when he says, “ Deep sleep, lethargy, which is a species of sleep, reverie, intoxication, or passion, which frequently destroy the consciousness, and of course the memory must not only destroy the sense or feeling of existence, but *existence itself*” (Ps. p. 160). “ Any one who has badly measured by memory the time of his existence, has really had less of *existence* (Ps. p. 161); and see a longer passage on the same page ; while finally, he says it was necessary in the system of Locke “ to destroy the idea of *personal existence*, by confounding it with the phenomena which reveal it ” (Ps. p. 162). This charge is, perhaps, not made with his usual clearness ; for, obvious as the distinction is, M. Cousin appears to have confounded personality, or personal *existence*, with personal *identity*; *i.e.* the identity of a personal being existing now, with another existing previously. The very title of Locke’s chapter should have corrected the critic here; for it has no relation to personality or personal existence at all. It is simply “ of identity and diversity,” and “ personal identity ” is merely discussed as a particular kind of *identity* ; and if the critic had looked at Locke’s remarks on the necessity of the principle of identity being suited to the idea (Book II. xxvii. 7, etc.), he would have seen that Locke’s definition of the term “ person,” was such as to compel

him to place personal identity in consciousness. At all events, that philosopher did not place *personality* in consciousness, or confound personal substance with its phenomena, for he holds that we know "more certainly" the existence of a "spiritual *being* within us," than even the existence of objects of sense without (Book II. xxiii. 15). This criticism is therefore as valueless as its predecessors, so that we may pass on to the idea of substance.*

Locke's views with regard to the idea of substance, we have already incidentally expounded in treating of the true nature of the faculty of comparison; when we found that it was composed of the general indeterminate idea of something, or being with the relation of a support to accidents—a relation which the mind found itself compelled to superadd to the data of experience; for the ideas of "qualities, actions and powers," are "perceived by the mind to be by themselves inconsistent with existence, and hence the mind perceives their *necessary* connexion with inherence, or being supported," which is "a relative idea superadded to the red color in a cherry or thinking in a man" (Note to Book II. ii. 2). Then (as in the case of infinity, where the mind, having got the idea of the finite, and the relation of greater which the infinite bears to it in all its forms, framed to itself an idea of the infinite correlative, so here) the mind having got the idea of phenomenon, and of the relation of being supported, frames to itself the correlative idea of something related to the phenomenon as a supporter,

* I have treated of this question at less length, because M. Cousin does not quote a single passage to prove that Locke confounded personal *existence* with consciousness; nor am I aware of any passage which could even give a color to this charge.



X though in both cases we know nothing of this "something," except the relation which it bears to the term that is positively known. Although, therefore, no substance may fall directly under the eye of experience, yet Locke can legitimately maintain the existence of the idea, because he transcends experience by means of the faculty of comparison to which he has assigned an originative power. So much for Locke. Let us now turn to M. Cousin.

He commences by telling us that substance is a generalization from the fact of personal *identity*, which he has just been discussing, which I think more than questionable, as it appears to me that the idea of *identity* does not necessarily enter into that of substance at all. He proceeds to tell us that the idea of substance is not given by sense or consciousness (Ps. p. 163), and therefore he concludes that there can be no such idea in the system of Locke. In proof of this he quotes Locke's assertion, that this idea is one "which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection" (Book I. iv. 18); and on this sole ground he asserts that "Locke *systematically* denies the idea of substance" (Ps. p. 164). Now, even supposing this passage to imply that we have no idea of substance, the critic's assertion is far too strong, since to deny the idea of substance in a single isolated passage (which is not in his official chapter on the subject), is not to deny it "*systematically*." This might be said even were there no evidence to produce on the other side, whereas M. Cousin himself tells us in the next sentence — "Unquestionably *many passages* might be cited, in which he unconsciously *admits* it" (Ibid.). If so, I think it can scarcely be said that he *systematically* denies it. But in the second

place, he only denies the existence of the idea, if he held, in the most rigid sense, that all our ideas, simple or complex, are acquired by sensation or reflection ; for otherwise he might deny that we have or can have the idea from sense or reflection, and yet maintain that we have it otherwise. And this is precisely what he does maintain. This will appear by merely comparing the passage before us with another which I have already quoted. "The idea of substance we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection" (Book I. iv. 18). "I never said that the general idea of substance *comes in by sensation or reflection*, or that it is a simple idea of sensation or reflection ; FOR it is a complex idea, made up of the general idea of something or being, with the *relation* of a support to accidents" (Note to Book II. ii. 2) ; and he goes on to show that both elements are "creatures and inventions of the understanding" (*Ibid*). Locke then, instead of systematically denying, systematically affirms the existence of the idea of substance. "But," cries the critic, "*he openly repels it*, in one place as of little use in philosophy, in another as obscure" (Ps. p. 164). Does "*he openly repels it*" mean "he openly *denies* it" ? If so, the two clauses of this passage are contradictory, for that which does not exist is neither clear or obscure, neither of little nor of much use in philosophy. But if "*he openly repels it*," does not mean this, what *does* it mean ? It is certainly anything but precise philosophical language. "Locke, however," repeats the critic, "everywhere *repels* the idea of substance, and when he officially explains it, he *resolves it into a collection of simple ideas of sensation or reflection*" (Ps. p. 165). This is certainly a strange process on the part of Locke. He

first *systematically* denies the existence of the idea in toto ; then he proceeds *officially* to *analyse* this *non-entity* into a collection of simple ideas of sensation or reflection ! But we have already seen that Locke does neither. He admits the existence of the idea and he resolves it, not into a collection of *simple* ideas, but into two *complex* ideas, an *abstract* something and a *relation* of a support to accidents. It is worth while, however, to examine the arguments which M. Cousin brings forward in favour of his second charge, that Locke *officially* resolves the idea of substance into a collection of simple ideas of sensation or reflection. The charge of denying the existence of the idea is, I should hope, sufficiently refuted.

First then, the chapter which M. Cousin quotes is not, to use his phrase, “official,” for it is not on the idea of substance at all. Locke has divided *complex* ideas into modes, *substances*, and relations (Book II. xii. 4), and in the chapter before us Locke considers one of these *classes* of complex ideas, viz. (as the title of the chapter informs us) “our complex *ideas* of *substances*” (Book II. xxiii.) ; and M. Cousin’s mistake in taking this for a chapter on our idea of *substance* is the more inexcusable, because Stillingfleet had fallen into the same misapprehension and had been corrected by Locke himself. “That I was *not* speaking,” says Locke, “of the general idea of *substance* in the passage your lordship quotes, is manifest from the title of that chapter, which is ‘of the complex ideas of *substances*’” (Note to Book II. ii. 2). It is on this mistake, however, that M. Cousin’s criticism is based, for none of the passages which he quotes, even when taken alone, *could* mean anything more than that *our complex ideas of substances*

consist of collections of their qualities. Moreover, Locke's definition of substances is alone sufficient to show that the idea of substance is not a collection of simple ideas, but one of the members of the collection which form our complex ideas of substances. "The ideas of substances," says he, "are such *combinations* of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things, subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of *substance* is always *first* and *chief*" (Book II. xii. 6, and see his examples there). With this preface I proceed to the quotations by which M. Cousin seeks to establish his charge placing the original and the portions quoted in parallel columns.

LOCKE'S ESSAY, BOOK II. xxiii.
SECTION 3.

M. COUSIN'S QUOTATIONS THERE-
FROM.

FIRST QUOTATION.

"It is the ordinary qualities observable in *iron* or a *diamond* put together, that make the complex ideas of *those* substances, which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a *philosopher*; *who*, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of *THOSE* substances than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them; only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, *besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong and in which they subsist.*"*

. . . . "No other idea of substances than what is framed by a collection of simple ideas?"

. . . .
. . . .
. . . .

(These connecting dots are taken from M. Cousin. It will be seen that by means of them he connects two paragraphs separated by more than two sections in the original.)

. . . .
. . . .

BOOK II, xxiii. 6.

"Whatever, therefore, be the secret abstract nature of sub-

* The sequel of this passage is even more distinct.

stance in general, all the ideas we have of *particular sorts of substances* are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, *co-existing in such (though unknown) cause of their union as to make the whole subsist of itself.*

It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that we represent *particular sorts of substances* to ourselves.

. . . Every one frames in his mind a combination of those simple ideas he has usually observed or perceived to exist together; *all which he supposes to rest in, and be, as it were, adherent to that unknown common subject, which adheres not in anything else.*"

BOOK II. xxiii. 37.

"All our ideas of the several sorts of *substances* are nothing but collections of simple ideas, *with a supposition of something to which they belong and in which the subsist*, though of this something we have no clear distinct idea at all."

.

SECOND QUOTATION.

. "It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves."

THIRD QUOTATION.

(This passage is quoted in full, and correctly.)

CRITICISM ON THE ABOVE.

"Locke everywhere repels the idea of *substance*, and when he officially explains *it*, he resolves *it* into a collection of simple ideas of sensation or of reflection"! (Ps. p. 165.)

A mere inspection of these passages will, I have no doubt, convince my reader that Locke neither ignores the idea of *substance* nor resolves it into a collection of simple ideas of sensation or reflection. Indeed the passage last quoted by the critic himself is absolutely inconsistent with such a view, unless, after his usual

custom, we translate "no clear and distinct idea" by "no idea at all;" and even then it will be our ideas of substances, not our idea of substance, which is resolved into a collection of simple ideas. But fortunately we have Locke's own commentary on some of the expressions quoted, and I think it will be found quite decisive of the point in dispute. Stillingfleet having taken exception to a passage in this chapter, as implying that our idea of substance is "*a complication of many ideas together*"—which is the very same objection that M. Cousin has now alleged against the same chapter—Locke replies as follows:—"That I was not speaking of the general idea of substance in the passage your lordship quotes is manifest from the title of that chapter, which is 'Of the complex ideas of substances;' . . . so that in this paragraph I only gave an account of the idea of distinct substances, such as oak, elephant, iron, &c., how they are made up of distinct complications of modes, yet they are looked on as one idea, called by one name, as making distinct sorts of substances. But that my notion of substance in general *is quite different from these, and has no such combination of simple ideas in it*, is evident from the immediate following words, where I say, 'the idea of pure substance in general is *only* a supposition of we know not what support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us.' And these two *I plainly distinguish* all along, PARTICULARLY WHERE I SAY, 'Whatever, therefore, be the secret and abstract nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas co-existing in such (though unknown) cause of their union as makes the whole subsist of itself'" (First

Letter to Stillingfleet ; Note to Book II. xxiii. 1). The reader will probably have observed that the last quotation is from the very section—almost the very paragraph—that M. Cousin cites to prove that Locke held the direct contrary of what he himself quotes the passage to establish ! It will be found in the second quotation pp. 99-100 of this Essay, with M. Cousin's interpretation set down in the opposite column. This, too, is the uniform doctrine of the Essay. It is by means of this idea of substance that he distinguishes complex modes from complex ideas of substances (see Book II. cap. xii.)—a distinction the very foundation of which would be cut away if Locke resolved our general idea of substance into a collection of qualities. And in the only section of that work in which the general idea of substance is professedly discussed it is explicitly reduced to a relation—"If any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all but only a supposition of he knows not what *support* of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us. . . . The idea, then, we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, *support* of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, *sine re substantive*, without something to *support* them, we call that *support* substantial ; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, *standing under* or *upholding*" (Book II. xxiii. 2). It would be idle to follow M. Cousin farther in his criticism, or to examine the absurd consequences which he deduces from a doctrine which is no more Locke's than his own. But it may not be amiss to observe, in conclusion, that Locke has ac-

knowledged not only the idea but also the principle of substance, not in its logical formula, but in its internal energy. (See First Letter to Stillingfleet; Notes to Book II. ii. 2, xxiii. 2, and Book IV. iii. 6; also Essay, Book II. xxiii. 4, the section whose *title* M. Cousin has quoted for a very different purpose.) Finally he accepts the statement of Stillingfleet, who says that "the idea of substance is grounded on plain and evident *reason*," which he considers quite consistent with his own view of the subject (Note to Book II. ii. 2); and the only correction which he would probably make in M. Cousin's phraseology is, that instead of the vague and indefinite term "reason" he would substitute, for the (logical) origin of the idea, the more precise and definite expression, "the intellectual faculty of comparison."

We have next to consider another very important relation—that of cause and effect; and here I must make a few prefatory remarks before examining the criticism of M. Cousin. In the first place, it is plain that experience must inform us of the existence of the ideas or objects between which the relation exists. For example, if experience had not informed us of the existence of heat and of fire, we should never have come to regard fire as the cause of heat, or heat as the effect of fire.* Again, it is generally admitted, that even when experience has supplied us with the two ideas between which this relation exists, the relation itself is not immediately perceived. We might have felt heat, and have seen fire, and yet not know that the latter had produced the former; as would certainly

* We might, however, conclude from the mere observation of fire, that it had *some* cause, as Locke would have willingly allowed.

be the case, if we had felt the heat when no fire was visible, and seen the fire at such a distance as not to feel the heat of it. We must, therefore, take a second element from experience ; we must observe the successions of phenomena, and this not merely once but frequently ; for, if we had observed but once that heat followed from fire, we could not regard these phenomena as cause and effect ; since, in every case, many phenomena besides the fire had anteceded the heat, and we could not know, without a further appeal to experience to which of the antecedents the consequent was due. Lastly, every one is probably aware, that the laws of causation are far better known in the material world, than in the phenomena of mind, besides which these laws attract our notice more strongly in the former case than in the latter. A philosopher, therefore, in illustrating this relation will naturally select the related ideas from sensation, rather than reflection, as I have preferred fire and heat to two ideas, or two emotions of the mind. All this is very trite and simple, and yet it suffices to overturn the whole criticism of M. Cousin.

He begins by saying, that "Locke commences by investigating the origin of the idea of cause, and without hesitation refers it to sensation." (Ps. p. 169). I need scarcely repeat that *no* complex idea is referred by Locke to either sensation or reflection ; and that as a *relation*, this complex idea of cause is necessarily referred to the faculty of *comparison*. As such a relation, too, it is an idea "not of things as they are in themselves," but one of those which the mind "gets from their comparison, one with another" (Book II. xxv. 1, 11) ; though it "is concerned about" simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection, and *so*

“terminates in them.” But it is necessary to examine the passage which M. Cousin quotes in proof of his charge, in order to show that not only is Locke guiltless of such a strange inconsistency as referring a *relation* to *sensation*, and therefore classing it among simple ideas, but also that he has not made this relation “terminate in,” and be “concerned about” ideas of sensation only. The passage, as quoted by M. Cousin, reads as follows :—

“Of cause and effect—whence their ideas got. In the notice that our senses take of *the constant vicissitudes of things*, we cannot but observe that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist, and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect. That which produces *any simple or complex ideas* we denote by the general name, cause—that which is produced, effect. Thus, finding that, in that substance which we call wax, fluidity, which is a simple idea that was not in it before, is *constantly* produced by the application of a certain degree of heat, we call the simple idea of heat *in relation to the fluidity of wax*, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect. So, finding that the substance wood, which is a collection of simple ideas so called, by the application of fire is turned into another substance, called ashes, that is another complex idea, consisting of a collection of simple ideas quite different from that complex idea which we call wood, we *consider* fire *in relation to ashes* as the cause, and ashes as the effect. . . . Having thus, from what our senses are able to discover in the operation of bodies one on another, got the notion of cause and effect . . . ” (Book II. xxvi.

1, 2). "This," says the critic, "is positive—the idea of cause has its origin in sensation" (Ps. p. 170).

That in this passage the idea of cause is not described as an idea of sensation (that is, a simple idea of sensation—for once again, there is no complex idea of sensation in Locke) is, I think, very manifest; for it is plainly described not as a simple idea, but as a relation between simple ideas. Nor does this relation exist between simple ideas of sensation only, as is evident from the *generality* of Locke's exposition; for he has here told us, that "that which produces ANY *simple or complex ideas* we denote by the general name, cause;" and if his examples are drawn from the material world, we have seen that this is only what we might have anticipated. But, my reader has probably begun to suspect by this time, that where M. Cousin leaves blanks (as in this passage) there is something of importance suppressed. And so it is. The paragraph which occupies the place of the first blank in this passage is alone sufficient to prove, both that Locke did *not* place this idea in experience, but in the region of the pure intellect, and also, that he did not confine its sphere of application to simple ideas of sensation. "So, that," says Locke, in this very remarkable paragraph, "*whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing of ANY particular simple idea or collection of simple ideas, whether substance or mode, which did not before exist, hath THEREBY, in our minds, the relation of a cause, and is so denominated by us.*" Nor is the paragraph corresponding to M. Cousin's second blank of little consequence, since it explains *what* the idea of cause is, which we have thus got "from what our senses are able to discover in the

operation of bodies one on another; *viz.*," continues Locke, "that a cause is that which makes *any other thing, either simple idea, substance, or mode*, begin to be, and an effect, *that* which had its beginning from *some other thing*." The generality of these expressions is surely sufficient, even if we had no further evidence, to prove that Locke did not intend to confine this relation to simple ideas of *sensation* or their combinations; so that, when quoted in their entirety, the very sections on which M. Cousin bases his criticism are sufficient to refute it. But besides extending the relation to ideas of reflection, these passages place the relation itself, not in experience, but in a consideration or comparison of the mind, as the passage first omitted by M. Cousin places beyond a doubt. And not only so, but Locke has freely admitted that the relation itself is *not* the object of experience. "To have the idea of cause and effect," says he, "it *suffices* to *consider* any simple idea or substance as beginning to exist by the operation of some other, *without knowing the manner of that operation*" (Book II. xxvi. 2; see also, Book II. xxi. 1). It is the change of perceivable ideas only which the senses attain. The *relation* between the idea which we call the cause and that which we call the effect, is not the object of sense or of experience, but is superadded by the faculty of comparison. And in fact, M. Cousin no sooner says that Locke finds the origin of this idea in *sensation*, than he so far recedes from his position as to tell us that Locke does not pretend that the senses show us anything more than the succession of one idea to another (Ps. p. 170); which is quite true. But then it in reality surrenders his objection that Locke without hesitation refers the idea

to sensation (Ps. p. 169) ; for ignoring the office of the higher faculty of comparison, the critic is now obliged to maintain that Locke reduces the idea of causation to that of succession (Ps. pp. 170-171). But surely the critic must have known that the idea of succession was not one which Locke could "without hesitation" refer to "*sensation*." It is first enumerated among simple ideas "*both of sensation and reflection*" (Book II. vii. 1, 9), where, however, Locke says "that, though suggested by our senses," it is "*more constantly* offered to us by what passes in our minds." This latter assertion Locke expands in his chapter on duration, pointing out that "we have our idea of succession" chiefly, if not wholly, "from *reflection* on the train of our ideas" (Book II. xiv. 3, 4, etc.) ; and what is more, this part of Locke's theory has been noticed, with special approbation, by the critic himself (Ps. pp. 149-150). What M. Cousin, therefore, regards as the same criticism of Locke, is in reality two inconsistent criticisms ; for if that philosopher refers the idea of cause to sensation, he cannot reduce it to succession ; and if he reduces it to succession, by doing so he refers it either to both sensation and reflection or to reflection alone. M. Cousin, however, makes choice of the latter criticism ; and passing by the supposed origin in sensation, he proceeds to prove that succession is not causation. As Locke would never have dreamt of disputing this fact, it is unnecessary to follow the critic in his proof, although much of it is very exceptionable, and would admit of easy refutation. I ought, perhaps, to remind the reader that the critic has already charged Locke with confounding succession with time, so that the present confusion would involve the confusion of time with

causation—a result which I have not been able to discover in the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Having completed his proof, however, and having repeated his charge of contradiction against Locke, M. Cousin proceeds to make a new attack on that philosopher. “I have already cited,” says he, “the positive passage (Book II. cap. xxvi.) in which Locke derives the idea of cause from sensation. Well, now let us turn over a few pages, and we shall find him forgetting both his fundamental assertion, and the particular *examples, all physical, produced to justify it*; and concluding, *to the great astonishment of the attentive reader*, that the idea of cause no longer comes from sensation, but from sensation or reflection: ‘in which and all other cases, we may observe, that the notion of cause and effect has its rise from *ideas* of sensation *or* reflection, and that this relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in *them*’” (Book II. xxvi. 2; Ps. pp. 178, 179). I think I have shown from the “positive passage” itself, and still more from its context, that the attentive reader need not have been so much surprised at finding that the relation of cause and effect sometimes “had its rise from” ideas of reflection, and “terminated in” them; and if the reader had been inattentive enough to suppose that Locke reduced causation to succession, he ought to have been greatly astonished if he found that it did *not* do so. But M. Cousin cries out, “This ‘*or*’ is nothing less than a new theory. *Hitherto Locke had not said a word about reflection*” (Ps. p. 179). This last assertion could scarcely have been made by an *attentive* reader of Locke; for the words with which that philosopher introduces his subject are these—“I shall begin with the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things

that do or can exist are concerned, and that is the relation of *cause and effect*; the idea whereof, how derived from the TWO fountains of all our knowledge, *sensation and reflection*, I shall in the next place consider"! (Book II. xxv. 11.) "It is, I *grant*," pursues the critic, "an evident contradiction to the passage before cited" (Ps. p. 179). I am much obliged to him for the *concession*. "But," he asks, "is this contradiction thrown in here at hazard and *afterward* abandoned and lost? Yes, in regard to the twenty-sixth chapter" (undoubtedly; for it forms a part of the *last* paragraph of his discussion on the idea of cause); "in regard to the entire work, no" (Ibid.); and in proof that this "contradiction" is not "thrown in here at hazard, and *afterward* abandoned and lost," he turns from the *twenty-sixth* chapter of this second book to the *twenty-first*! Nor is this a mere verbal correction. The student of Locke reads the twenty-sixth chapter with the results of the twenty-first before him, and if Locke has in that chapter sufficiently explained the office of reflection in attaining our idea of cause, there is no need to repeat the same thing over again in the latter place. This twenty-first chapter is "on power." "At the bottom" says M. Cousin, "a chapter on power is a chapter on cause. For, what is power, but the power to produce something, that is a cause." To treat of power, then, is to treat of cause (Ps. p. 179). This statement is indisputable. "Now, what," proceeds the critic, "is the origin of the idea of power, according to Locke, in the chapter expressly devoted to this enquiry? It is, *as in chapter twenty-sixth, at once sensation and reflection*" (Ibid). This is certainly a new view of the contents of chapter twenty-sixth. It is a manifest contradiction, I grant, to the positive

passage I have already cited, in which the critic says that in that chapter Locke, without hesitation, refers the idea to sensation. It is, however, a more correct view of the contents of that chapter. In both chapters Locke refers the related ideas, both to sensation and reflection—the relation itself being, of course, attributed to the faculty of comparison, “upon which depends *all* that large tribe of ideas comprehended under *relations*” (Book II. xi. 4). This last doctrine, too, is distinctly unfolded in the passage next quoted by M. Cousin, though it is, of course, ignored by that philosopher. Locke there gives the following account of the genesis of this idea of power, “*Concluding* from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will, for the future, be made in the same things, by like agents, and by the like ways, the *mind* CONSIDERS in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed ; and, in another, the possibility of making that change ; and SO *comes by* that idea which we call power. . . . In which, and the like cases, the power we *consider* is *in reference* to the change of perceivable ideas,” etc. (Book II. xxi. 1.) But to revert to M. Cousin. He has already told us, that the origin of the idea of power is, according to Locke, “*at once*” sensation and reflection—he has told us, too, that when Locke refers an idea to different modes of experience, he attributes it to their “*simultaneous*” action (Ps. p. 123) ; and yet, he now proceeds to put the question “*But this second* origin does it *precede* or *follow* the *first*? We derive, according to Locke, the idea of cause both from sensation and from reflection. But from which of these do we derive it *first* ?” (Ps. p. 180). Surely, on M. Cousin’s own showing, no question could be more

utterly senseless. It would be no less ridiculous than if I said I ascertained the position of a star in the heavens, by means of its right ascension and declination, and you were to ask me, "by which of them did you *first* ascertain it?" This, however, is only an *argumentum ad hominem*. The idea of power, we have seen, is not derived first either from sensation or from reflection, but it is derived first and last from the faculty of comparison.* Having divided Locke's supposed origin into two, the critic says—"Here Locke says that it is *not* in sensation, but in reflection, that the idea of power is *first* given. It is a manifest contradiction, I *grant*," (how very free M. Cousin is in granting this kind of concessions to his imaginary opponent!) "to his official chapter on cause" (Ps. p. 180). Here it seems we have come back again to our old theory as to the contents of the twenty-sixth chapter, for this is Locke's "official chapter on cause." We commenced by saying that in this chapter Locke, without hesitation, referred the idea to sensation; then we said he confounded it with succession, thereby implicitly reducing it to reflection; then we affirmed that the origin in that chapter, as in the twenty-first, was "*at once* sensation and reflection," and now we

* The reader will probably have observed that the only question which M. Cousin discusses with reference to *any* of the ideas under consideration, even those of them that are avowedly complex, is whether they are given by sensation or reflection *as immediate data, as simple ideas*. The office of the faculties, in framing them from the data of experience, is in *every* instance *wholly* ignored. Even M. Cousin's own account of the faculties will not excuse this proceeding. They may have no originative power—they may be condemned to operate only on sensations; but surely if they operate at all, there must be *some* difference between the sensation before and after this operation.

have finally reverted to the old sensation theory again. But how does the critic establish his new charge, and prove this "manifest contradiction"? He quotes a passage in which Locke states that "the *clearest* idea of *active* power is had from spirit" (Book II. xxi. 4, quoted Ps. p. 180). The "*clearest* idea," then, in this place, means the *first* idea; it meant the *only* idea when we were treating of infinity, and "no clear and distinct idea" meant "no idea at all," when we were discussing the notion of substance. Further, power is now identified with active power, although Locke has expressly divided it into active and passive (Book II. xxi. 2); and with the idea of passive power "we are abundantly furnished by almost all sorts of sensible things" (Book II. xxi. 4). Nor let it be said that passive power is not the idea we are in search of; it corresponds, no doubt, with the effect rather than the cause, but it is the *relation* we are seeking after, and the relation is as much contained in "effectuation" (if I may use the phrase), as in causation; it is the same relation looked on from opposite sides. But by saying that we have the *clearest* idea of active power from spirit, Locke does not mean either the first idea or the only idea; in fact he introduces the passage quoted by M. Cousin (Book II. xxi. 4), with the assertion that every change, every instance of passive power, is also an instance of active power. "But yet," says he, "if we will consider it attentively, bodies by our senses do not afford us *so clear and distinct* an idea of *active* power as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds;" and he assigns as a reason for this, that the power which is exercised by bodies on one another, seems only to be transferred, and not to originate; and therefore for the origination—

the absolute commencement—of motion, we must have recourse to spirit. This doctrine has been adopted in a mutilated form by a great modern intellectualist, Sir William Hamilton, whose writings are, indeed, far more open to M. Cousin's criticism than the original work of Locke; for while Sir William Hamilton agrees with Locke that every change that is observed in the material world, is a mere change of form, the operating forces themselves remaining unaltered — "*Omnia mutantur, nihil interit;*" and while he confines his examples, fully as much as Locke, to objects of sense, he overlooks the power of absolute origination which Locke finds in volition, and extends Locke's doctrine of causation in matter to causation in general. I mention this chiefly for the purpose of showing that Locke's doctrine might have been made much more sensualistic than it is, without forming a part of a system of sensualism, or even of empiricism. Locke then concludes—not that external bodies cannot give us any idea of active power, or the first idea of active power—but that they can give us but a "very obscure, imperfect idea" of it, and that therefore the mind receives "its idea of active power *clearer*, from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external sensation"* (Book II. xxi. 4). It is in consequence of this element of absolute origination that Locke thinks reflection on the operations of our minds gives us the clearest idea of *active* power. This is evidently quite independent of any supposed consciousness of the relation between the cause and the effect in the case of volition; it consists merely in this, that a

* When Mr. Stewart censures the phrase "external sensation," employed by Kant, he is probably not aware that it is borrowed from Locke. (See, too, Book II. xi. 17.)

voluntary determination does not exist, in a different form, anterior to its actual occurrence, as ice pre-exists in the form of water, or gunpowder in the form of charcoal, nitre, and sulphur. Locke may or may not have believed that in the peculiar case of volition, not only the cause and the effect (the me and the determination of my mind), but also the relation itself, fell under the eye of consciousness. The passages we are considering give us no information on this subject; but M. Cousin, ignoring their obvious meaning, interprets them to signify that in volition the relation itself is the object of consciousness, and that it is for this reason, and for this reason only, that Locke says that reflection on the operations of our minds gives us the clearest idea of active power. The idea of causation is thus made empirical; but it is made so by ignoring, or rather reversing the doctrine of Locke, and that doctrine so interpreted, is identified with the theory of M. de Biran—a theory which no doubt accounts for the existence of the *idea*, but fails to explain nine-tenths of the cases to which we habitually apply it (Ps. pp. 181–183). The theory of Locke is at once less empirical and more complete.

But though Locke has professedly discussed *the idea of cause* only, M. Cousin *will* introduce the *principle of causality* also. These two questions have, really, no connexion. It is quite possible that the ideas of beginning to exist and of causation might be both purely a priori, and yet we might see no necessary connexion between them; and on the other hand, it is quite possible that though the ideas were both purely empirical, there might be a mental principle which, as soon as experience had furnished us with these ideas, compelled us to judge that everything that

begins to exist has a cause. But let us examine M. Cousin's criticism on Locke's treatment of the principle of causality. He first tells us that Locke derives it from the external world. "It is so far from being true," says he, "that the senses and the external world give us the principle of causality, that, were it not for the intervention of this principle, the external world, *from which Locke derives it*, would for us have no existence" (Ps. p. 176). "In the first case," he says again, "in regard to the *idea of cause*, Locke confounds the antecedent of an idea with the idea itself; and in the second case, in regard to the *principle of causality*, he derives from the phenomena of the outward world precisely the principle without which there would be no outward world. He takes for granted the very thing in question" (Ps. p. 178). M. Cousin, however, does not attempt to inform us *where* Locke has derived this principle from the outward world; so that, I presume, he thinks that this origin of the *principle* is involved in Locke's account of the origin of the *idea*. If this be his ground for the assertion (and I am unable to imagine any other,) there are a considerable number of faulty links in the agreement. For, first, Locke does not derive the idea from the outward world, but from the faculty of comparison. Secondly, he does not derive the materials on which this faculty operates, in arriving at the idea, exclusively from the outward world; for he has told us they are simple ideas either of sensation or reflection. Thirdly, M. Cousin himself was obliged, almost at the outset, to abandon the thesis that Locke derived the idea from sensation, and to charge him with resolving it into succession, which is not, in the system of Locke, a simple idea of sensation. Fourthly,

the critic has also been compelled to recognize a second, and, as he thinks, inconsistent origin for the idea in reflection—while, fifthly, if Locke did derive the *idea* from the outward world, it would not follow that he derived the *principle* from it. M. Cousin has also been betrayed, by his love of antithesis, into an assertion which is scarcely consistent with his own system; for he says that without the principle of causality there would be for us no outward world—an assertion repeated in many different forms of expression throughout this discussion (Ps. pp. 176–180) and elsewhere. Now, this, I apprehend, cannot be maintained by a philosopher who believes in primary qualities of matter; for the very distinction usually laid down between primary and secondary qualities, is, that we know the former as they exist in the bodies themselves, whereas the latter are known *only as powers or causes of sensations*. I think, too, that neither space nor figure are presented to us under the notion of causes, nor perhaps is color either; and were we directed by the principle of causality only, we could only attribute our sensations to *some* unknown cause, finite or infinite, material or immaterial. However, the critic does not seem quite satisfied with his objection that Locke derives this principle from the outward world, and he has another criticism prepared—inconsistent, indeed, with the former, but which may condemn Locke with those who acquit him on the first charge.* Speaking of the passage

* Perhaps, indeed, as Locke is charged with reducing the idea of causation to that of succession, the critic would say that his principle of causality could be only an inductive principle; *e.g.* that every phenomenon has an antecedent phenomenon from which it invariably follows; but, even thus, Locke would be guilty of no

from personal to external causation, he says, "for Locke, who treats of the *idea* of cause, *but never of the principle of causality*, the problem did not even exist" (Ps. p. 184); though how Locke derived the principle from the external world without treating of it, he has not deigned to explain. It is true, however, that Locke has nowhere professedly treated of the principle of causality; and on this very account the critic should have been cautious in attributing to him any particular theory on the subject. But if, by his statement that Locke never treats of the principle, M. Cousin means that he nowhere "*accepts* and unfolds" the principle of causality, but everywhere "*employs*" it (Ps. p. 383), he is unquestionably wrong. Locke, at least, distinctly "*accepts*" the principle. "*Whatever* change is observed," says he, "the mind *must* collect a power *somewhere* able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it" (Book II. xxi. 4); which is, I think, the most concise and accurate statement of the principle I have anywhere met with, and contrasts most favorably with the three imperfect and mutilated forms of it, given by Mr. Mansel in his *Prolegomena Logica*—and I must ask my reader's pardon for adding, that if it had been stated in this form by Mr. Mansel, his reasonings against its (necessary) objective validity would appear as worthless as they really are—for he never really attempts to conceive an event taking place without *some* cause; but he only imagines a

paralogism. The Berkeleian must admit the existence of a class of feelings called sensations, and of a regular order of succession among these—and this is all that such an inductive principle would require for its basis. It could, therefore, scarcely be said to be *derived from the outward world*.

fanciful cause substituted for one of the ordinary known ones; nor, indeed, could it be inferred from even the mutilated forms of the principle that he has given us, that fire (and not something else) is the cause of the melting of wax; nor, consequently, is their necessity overthrown by showing that this last proposition is not necessary. I have referred here to Mr. Mansel for the same reason that I previously referred to Sir William Hamilton—to show that, in this great question of causality, Locke held a doctrine of more advanced intellectualism than some of the leaders of that party in our own day. As might be expected, Locke never questions the objective validity of this great principle. He holds it to be a law not only of the actual but the possible. “I shall begin,” says he, “with the most comprehensive relation, *wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned*—and that is the relation of cause and effect” (Book II. xxv. 11); and accordingly he employs the principle, without hesitation, in his demonstration of the existence of God (Book IV. cap. x.). The reader may, therefore, judge of the truth of M. Cousin’s assertions, that he derives the principle from the outward world, and that he nowhere accepts it.*

Another idea of relation, or rather class of ideas of relation, remains to be considered, and then our list is complete. I mean what Locke has called “moral

* As if it were destined that all kinds of inconsistent accusations should be heaped upon Locke, in relation to this subject, he has, in addition to M. Cousin’s charges, been accused of holding that the *production* of change, as well as the change itself, is perceived by the senses (which I have already disposed of); and with attempting to *demonstrate* the principle of causality. This charge is founded on Book IV. x. 3, where Locke demonstrates *that there is something from eternity, by means of the principle of causality.*

relations," and to his very brief and explicit account of which I invite particular attention, as no part of Locke's system has been treated more loosely. "There is another sort of *relation*," says that philosopher, "which is the *conformity* or *disagreement* men's *voluntary actions* have to a *rule* to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of, which I think may be called moral relation" (Book II. xxviii. 4). This *relation* (for it is important to bear in mind that it is a relation), then, consists in comparing our voluntary actions to some rule or standard, and perceiving their agreement or disagreement to it. But what is meant by such a rule or standard? and what by conformity to it? "This rule," says Locke, "being nothing *but a collection of several simple ideas*, the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action, that the simple ideas belonging to it may correspond to those which the law requires" (Book II. xxviii. 14). The rule, then, being a collection of simple ideas, is not a relation but a mode, and does not, therefore, enter into the subject of the present chapter any further than is necessary for explaining the nature of these relations. Accordingly, Locke says, in his reply to Lowde, speaking of this chapter—"I was not *there* laying down *moral rules*, but showing the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral *relations*, *whether those rules were true or false*" (Preface to the fourth edition, note to Book II. xxviii. 11); and in the text itself, as if on purpose to guard against this misapprehension, we find the following:—"In these I call moral *relations*, I have a *true notion* of RELATION, by comparing the action with the rule, *whether the rule be true or false*" (Book II. xxviii. 20). Locke, therefore, in general,

cautiously abstains from laying down rules, and confines himself to showing how, the rule being given, we form our ideas of the rectitude or obliquity of any voluntary action, by its conformity or non-conformity to that rule. In a treatise on ethics, it would, no doubt, be a most serious defect to omit laying down these moral rules ; in a treatise on metaphysics or psychology, it is perhaps a defect also ; but if it be so, the defect is in Locke's chapters on modes, not in the chapter we are now considering, for the rule to which we refer is a *mode*, and we can consider nothing under the head of moral *relations* but the conformity or non-conformity of actions to this rule.

But as modes are made arbitrarily by the mind, it is easy to frame any number of these rules or standards, independent of, or inconsistent with, each other ; and therefore, if we had but a single set of terms to express the agreement or disagreement of our actions with rules, we might be entirely at cross purposes in our use of them ; while again, there are many of these rules to which we might never have occasion to refer. It is necessary, therefore, to examine what are the rules which men generally have occasion to refer to, and conformity or non-conformity to which have either usurped the general designations of these relations, or acquired special names of their own. "Rectitude" and "obliquity" being the most general designations (though almost usurped by certain particular rules), the next special relative names which attract the attention of Locke are "moral good" and "evil ;" the application of which terms he investigates as follows :—"Good and evil," says he, "are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is

only the conformity of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on by the will of the law-giver, which good and evil we call reward and punishment" (Book II. xxviii. 5). Moral relation in general being then the relation of our voluntary actions to *some* rule, when that rule has rewards or punishments annexed to it, this relation receives the special designation of moral good or evil. Of these rules, with punishments annexed to them, which may be called positive laws, there are three very general and very important ones—the relations of actions to which have also got specific designations of their own. These rules, as being at once the most important to us, and the most universal in their operation, are those which it is chiefly or solely incumbent on Locke to examine; they are the divine law, where these relations are called by the names sin and duty; the civil law, where they are designated crime and innocence; and the law of opinion, by reference to which they are styled virtue and vice. Such, according to Locke, is the use of these terms in the ordinary acceptation of them. There may, no doubt, be another law to which men ought to refer their actions, rather than to any of the three which have been mentioned. On this point Locke (hitherto, at least) has asserted nothing; but he has asserted that the terms already mentioned are ordinarily applied to the three laws here enumerated, and that if there be a fourth higher law, these terms are not applied with equal propriety to conformity or non-conformity to it. These rules, then, are moral rules, and it is by reference to them that we judge that our actions are morally good or evil, according as they are or are not conformed to them.

The reader will very probably be inclined to object here that Locke has mis-stated the proper application of the terms, and that virtue and vice are properly applied, not to the law of opinion, but to the higher law of conscience. But this is only a question about the application of words. Locke himself says that in this place he “only reported, as a matter of fact, what others call virtue and vice” (Preface to fourth edition, note, Book II. xxviii. 11) ; and he may have been mistaken as to this matter of fact, without the truth of his theory being at all affected thereby ; and indeed both Locke and the objector may be right as to the matter of fact, for the ordinary use of the terms may have altered since his time. However, there is another objection which might probably be suggested by Locke’s use of the terms, viz., that if he thought there was a higher law, he has not only failed to enumerate it in this chapter, but that he has appropriated *all* the terms expressive of moral relation to the lower laws, and has left the relations of our acts to the higher rule completely nameless. Further, he considers enforcement by reward and punishment, that is, by pleasure and pain, essential to the lower laws ; and when he appropriates all the terms by which we express moral relations to these, he must be understood as teaching a morality of self-love—teaching that those actions which obtain pleasure for us are morally right, and that those which bring pain upon us are morally wrong. I shall refer to the supposed omission of the higher law before I conclude. Locke has at least left room for it, by stating that the three positive laws already mentioned are those “to which men *generally* refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions” (Book II. xxviii. 6) ; and I

think it can scarcely be said that he has appropriated the terms "right" and "wrong" to any of the rules under consideration ; but there is a limitation in the phraseology of Locke, which prevents us from identifying his views with the selfish system ; for the enforcements of these moral rules are not pleasure and pain simply, but reward and punishment, that is to say, pleasure and pain "*that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself*" (Book II. xxviii. 6), but is annexed to it by the positive decree of the legislator (Ibid). If, then, by these terms Locke means to inculcate a system of morals, it will be, indeed, a peculiar one ; for an action will be held to be morally good, if *any* legislator has annexed a reward to it, although it may bring with it, as a natural product, an amount of pain far more than sufficient to counterbalance the reward ; and again, it will be morally evil, if it has any penalty annexed to it by a positive law, though its natural pleasurable consequences be vastly more important than the penalty so annexed to it. This, I think, is sufficient to prove that by his phraseology Locke did not mean to inculcate the selfish system, or indeed any other system of morals ; for the system to which his language (or rather his account of the language of others), would lead us, is so monstrously absurd that we could not impute it to him even conjecturally. I have found it necessary to dwell somewhat longer than I had intended on these prefatory remarks ; but this chapter has been so much mistaken, both by Locke's critics and his expositors, that it is important to place its contents in a clear light. Summarily, then, moral relation consists in the conformity or non-conformity of our voluntary actions to some rule or law to which we refer them ; this rule

or law consists of a mode or collection of simple ideas, and is therefore not a relation ; and thirdly, the rules to which men usually refer their actions, and by reference to which they call them morally good or evil, &c., are those rules which have rewards and punishments annexed to them by the positive decree of the legislator. Let us now turn to M. Cousin.

He commences by stating at once what he takes to be the doctrine of Locke, and his own refutation of it. "It is an undeniable fact," says he, "that when we have done right or wrong—when we have obeyed the law of justice, or have broken it, we judge that we merit either reward or punishment. . . . But suppose there is neither *good* or *evil* (the reader will observe that these terms are used in a sense quite different from that of Locke), neither justice or injustice in itself—*suppose there is no law*, there can then be no such thing as merit or demerit *in having broken or obeyed* IT (!) there is no ground for peace of conscience, or for the pains of remorse . . . there is no ground for the punishments inflicted by society in this life, nor, in the other, for those appointed by the supreme legislator. The idea of reward and punishment rests then upon that of merit and demerit, which rests upon that of law. Now what course does Locke take? *He deduces the idea of right and wrong, of the moral law and all the rules of duty, from the fear and hope of rewards and punishments, human or divine*: he grounds the principle upon the consequence; he confounds, not as before, the antecedent with the consequent, but the consequent with the antecedent" (Ps. pp. 200, 201). Before pointing out the mistake as to the philosophy of Locke, contained in this passage, I shall call attention to another error, into which the critic's

extreme desire of explaining *how* Locke went astray has led him—an error, too, which he subsequently repeats; for, he tells us that the idea of right and wrong is both the logical and chronological condition of the idea of reward and punishment (Ps. p. 213). But what *is* this idea of reward and punishment? According both to Locke (Book II. xxviii. 5) and to his critic, it resolves itself into pleasure and pain. “This idea,” says the latter, “is that of reward and punishment, which resolves itself into pleasure and pain, happiness and misery” (Ps. p. 213). Is, then, the idea of right and wrong the logical and chronological condition of happiness and misery? and can I not feel pain or pleasure until the ideas of right and wrong are fully developed in my mind? This question needs no answer. Reward and punishment are but pleasure and pain annexed by a legislator to certain voluntary actions: they would have a place in the government of a devil as well as in that of a human or divine legislator, and are ideas perfectly distinct from and independent of those of right and wrong, with which they are connected neither logically or chronologically—neither as antecedent nor as consequent. But M. Cousin invariably assumes that not only divine government and human government, but that *every* government, of *every* description, real or imaginary, has and *can have* no other object in view than the enforcement of the moral law—a proposition which, when thus nakedly stated, requires no refutation, but without which most of M. Cousin’s arguments on this question are utterly fallacious. For example, he says, “suppose there is neither justice or injustice in itself: suppose there is no law (which he evidently considers as the necessary consequence of the first supposition),

. . . . there is no place for reward or punishment" (Ps. p. 201); and again, after showing, or attempting to show, that if there is nothing right or wrong in itself, penal laws could not be defended *as right* (which is an identical proposition; for if nothing be right, it is not right to enforce a law), or even as useful (Ps. p. 210), he quietly assumes that no law could exist which is neither right nor useful, and concludes, "the idea of right and wrong is grounded only on itself—on the reason which reveals it. It is the condition of the idea of merit and demerit *which is the condition* of the idea of reward and punishment" (Ps. p. 211). If it were so, we should have few complaints of unjust laws, or defects in the moral government of the world. But to go no farther, it is plain that none of the financial laws of a country are imposed for the sake of enforcing that which is just and right *in itself*; for it will not be easy to establish, *a priori*, that it is right I should pay ninepence in the pound of my income to another, and that (in the absence of legislation on the subject; for legislation does not make a thing right, but only enforces what is right already) I should be very wrong in not doing so.

However, to return to Locke, we find this very strange charge:—"He *deduces* the idea of right and wrong, of the moral law and all the rules of duty, *from the fear and hope of rewards and punishments, human and divine*" (Ps. p. 201). It certainly would be a new course to deduce the moral law from the punishments annexed to it. We should thus have a variety of problems of this kind—"Given six months imprisonment, with hard labour as the punishment, to find the offence;" and the solution could scarcely be given

with mathematical precision. But M. Cousin does not exactly say that Locke deduces the moral law from the penalties which, in that philosopher's language, are *annexed* to this law as an *enforcement* of it. He says that he deduces the moral law and all the rules of duty from the *fear* and *hope* of rewards and punishments. Let us see, then, if it will mend the question to put it in this form—"Given the strength of a man's fear and hope, to find the moral law?" The doctrine here attributed to Locke is that of a lunatic. No rule--no law--could possibly be *deduced* either from fear and hope or from pleasure and pain,* nor is there a single passage in Locke that could give a color to such a charge. The law or rule is, according to Locke, a collection of simple ideas, among which neither hope or fear, pleasure or pain, are enumerated. But it is one thing to say that reward and punishment presuppose *a law of some kind*--it is another thing to say that they presuppose *the ideas of right and wrong*; and Locke, I think with perfect justice, maintains the first of these propositions, while denying the second. Moreover, the moral relation is the conformity of our actions to a rule, however this rule be arrived at; and if Locke has stated the true rule by which we are to judge of these actions, his account of moral relations is not vitiated by any deduction of that rule, however fanciful or absurd. The relation of the same action to the same rule is the same, however the rule is arrived at, and if the proper rule be stated we have got the true measure--the true touchstone--of

* It is scarcely necessary to add, that Locke does not "*deduce*" the laws from anything--such a deduction would be quite out of place in a chapter on *relation*. He merely "*enumerates*" the laws to which men usually refer their actions.

morality. But as yet Locke has not affirmed that any of the rules he has enumerated is the true rule to which we ought on all occasions to refer our actions. Nor, indeed, has the critic hitherto touched on the real subject of this chapter at all. That subject is "moral *relations*;" and surely M. Cousin does not mean to say that Locke reduced *these* to fear and hope or to pleasure and pain (M. Cousin's language seems at one time to imply that Locke reduces moral rules to the former of these, and at another to the latter; but they are plainly very distinct), for to do this it would be necessary for him to maintain that according to Locke hope and fear, pleasure and pain, are *relations*: a thesis which I suppose even M. Cousin will scarcely be disposed to advocate. In fact, if M. Cousin had studied this chapter with any degree of care, I have no doubt he would have remodelled a large part of his criticism; his error arising from the same cause that we have so often met with before, viz., overlooking the passage in which Locke enunciates his theory, and mistaking some paragraph in which he unfolds a particular portion of that theory, for his complete doctrine on the subject.

Having resolved Locke's idea of right and wrong into reward and punishment, the critic proceeds to identify him with the utilitarian, and upon that supposition to give a refutation of his doctrine (Ps. pp. 202-213). If by utility M. Cousin means utility to the person himself, it is plain from the restriction already pointed out ("that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself") that even Locke's use of the terms does not coincide with such a doctrine; if by utility he means utility to mankind in general, so far is Locke from making this the sole

rule of right, that he has not mentioned it in his enumeration of moral rules at all: and if (as seems to be the real state of the case), M. Cousin vacillates in his employment of the term, putting it sometimes for one and sometimes for the other of these two utilities, his remarks are still less applicable to the doctrine of Locke. Take the following as an example: "If the good were nothing but the useful, the admiration which *virtue* excites would be always in proportion to *its* utility. But such is not the fact. The most useful virtuous act can never be so much so, as *many natural phenomena*. . . . But who ever experiences for *the sun* the sentiment of admiration and respect which the most unproductive act of virtue inspires." (Ps. p. 204.) Now, this passage, besides constituting our sentiment of admiration the measure of the moral worth of our actions, (which it is not, since by M. Cousin's own account, self-sacrifice has fully as much to do with determining its quantity as virtue) is one which could not have been applied to the doctrine of Locke by any attentive reader of his work. What is Locke's definition of moral relation? "There is another sort of relation, which is the conformity or disagreement *men's voluntary actions* have to a rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which I think may be called moral relation, as being that which denominates *our moral actions*" (Book II. xxviii. 4). And the same limitation to voluntary actions, and even human voluntary actions, is repeated in the same section, and in sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 16 of this twenty-eighth chapter. The argument of M. Cousin is only valid, if the sun be an agent who benefits us by his *voluntary actions*; and scarcely even then, for,

as we have seen, Locke almost confines his doctrine to *human* voluntary actions. At the close of his refutation of utilitarianism, however, M. Cousin proceeds to a definite criticism; and for that purpose quotes first a remarkable section (Book II. xxviii. 8), in which Locke has hazarded the only opinion he has given in this chapter as to the true touchstone of moral rectitude. In the other sections, which seem objectionable, he is, as we have seen, merely stating as a matter of fact the common use of the terms. In this he certainly goes farther. But it is necessary to premise a few observations.

Supposing that, according to Locke, there is a true rule of moral rectitude, to which men ought to refer their voluntary actions in preference to any positive law *as such*, would this rule require a separate treatment, if it coincided exactly with one of the positive laws already mentioned? In the system of Locke I think not. The rule is but a collection of simple ideas, and where this collection is the same, the relation of our voluntary actions to it will be the same also. Suppose, for example, that this law or rule (it ought to be observed that, though I sometimes use these terms as synonymous, they are distinct in Locke; for a law is a rule enforced by rewards and punishments) coincides exactly with the Divine law. Then I may refer my voluntary actions to this rule on account of the rewards and punishments annexed to it, and you may refer yours to it because it is the supreme law of your nature, by which you ought to regulate your conduct irrespective of any positive sanction of it; but the rule referred to is the same in both cases, and consequently the same actions will stand in the same relation to it, and we shall be agreed as to moral rectitude

or obliquity of any action ; that is to say, the notion of *moral relation* will be the same. A separate treatment does not therefore appear necessary, even if the coincidence of the two rules were casual. Locke, we must recollect, is treating of *relations*, and moral relation comes in *as a particular kind of relation* ; and as it would be out of place to deduce or lay down moral rules in a chapter on such a subject, so it would be equally out of place to investigate the nature of *moral obligation*, or to determine which rule we were under the strongest obligation to obey. We are here concerned not with the rule, nor with our obligation to obey the rule, but simply and solely with the *relation* which our voluntary actions bear to the rule, when it has been already laid down. But while Locke would thus be blameless even if the coincidence of the two rules were casual, he is much more so, if it be necessary. Now *how* has he defined the Divine law ? By the Divine law, he tells us, he means, “ that *law*, which God *has set* to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them *by the light of nature* or the voice of revelation ” (Book II. xxviii. 8). But how is this law “ promulgated to them by the light of nature ” ? Is it by those faculties which enable us to foresee the *natural consequences* of our actions—the pleasure or pain which will result from them in the established course of things ? No ; for in the preceding section Locke has told us that it is essential to a *law*, (as distinct from a *rule*, which the Divine law undoubtedly is), that it should be enforced by “ some good or evil, that is *not* the natural product and consequence of the action itself ” (Book II. xxviii. 6). But how is such a law as this promulgated to us by the light of nature ? Apparently only by our moral judgments—

by our perception of right and wrong—by our sense of merit and demerit. If this be so, the two rules necessarily coincide; and consequently a separate treatment of them would be quite superfluous in a chapter on moral relation. Now let us turn to the passage quoted by the critic.

“Divine law the measure of sin and duty.—First, the Divine law, whereby I mean that law which God has set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule, whereby men should govern themselves, I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny. He has a *right* to do it. We are his *creatures*; he has *goodness* and *wisdom* to direct our actions to that which is best; and he has *power* to enforce it by rewards and punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life; for nobody can take us out of his hands. THIS IS THE ONLY TRUE TOUCHSTONE OF MORAL RECTITUDE, and by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether as sins or duties, they are like to procure them happiness or misery, from the hands of the Almighty’ (Book II. xxviii. 8). Here, then,” proceeds M. Cousin, “the *punishments and rewards of a future life* are declared the sole touchstone, the sole measure of the rectitude of our actions” (Ps. p. 214). The paragraph which I have printed in capitals is the only opinion that Locke has expressed, as to the true rule of moral rectitude in the chapter, and M. Cousin’s interpretation of it is given below. The justice of his criticism evidently depends on whether the pronoun “*this*,” with which the paragraph commences, refers to “rewards and punishments,” or to “law,” in the

preceding sentence ; for, if it refer to the former, the punishments and rewards of a future life are undoubtedly made the sole touchstone of moral rectitude ; but if it refer to the latter, then it is the Divine law, and not the rewards and punishments attached to it, which is made the rule of right, and touchstone of morality. Now, I think, it must plainly refer to the latter ; for, first, “ *this* ” is in the singular number, whereas “ rewards and punishments ” is in the plural ; secondly, to call “ rewards and punishments ” a “ touchstone ” would be a strange expression, and that term is, in another part of this chapter, plainly commuted with “ rule ” (Book II. xxviii. 14) ; but, thirdly, the context sets the question at rest, for Locke there says, “ THIS is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude, and by reference to THIS LAW,” &c. It is, then, the Divine law which is made the sole true touchstone of moral rectitude ; which is precisely what we might have expected, if Locke holds that Divine law coincided accurately with the moral law ; and this, undoubtedly, he does. “ Virtue and vice,” says he, “ are names pretended and supposed everywhere to stand for actions *in their own nature* right and wrong ; and SO FAR AS THEY ARE REALLY SO APPLIED they are COINCIDENT with the divine law above mentioned ” (Book II. xxviii. 10). Equally futile is another criticism of M. Cousin’s on the passage before us. “ It is of no avail,” says he, “ to say that God has a right to do so,—to establish, namely, such a law (though it is in itself indifferent) ; because we are his creatures ; for that is without meaning, unless it be, that he is the most powerful and we the weakest : and that would be to appeal to the right of the strongest ” (Ps. p. 215). I must



differ with this very decidedly. As our Creator and Preserver, God has a right to command our obedience in anything morally indifferent—the Jewish ceremonial law, for example—very different from the right of the strongest; for surely no one will say that a being who has hitherto had no connexion with us stands to us in the same relation as our Creator and Preserver, provided he be equally powerful. Locke, too, has enumerated *three* reasons why God has a *right* to impose laws upon us. 1. That we are his creatures. 2. That he has *wisdom* and *goodness* to direct us to what is best; and, 3. That he has power to enforce his laws by rewards and punishments; which would be only a repetition of the first reason, if that reason also was an appeal to the right of the strongest.* Besides, Locke uses the term “right” rather in a jurisprudential (to coin a word) than an ethical sense; and indeed his whole treatment of the subject has been influenced, and I think influenced for the worse, by the writings on natural jurisprudence, which were so much in vogue in his time. The reader will easily trace the effects of this influence in the parts of the chapter we have already considered. But before taking leave of this part of the subject, I may observe that Locke has not called this rule, which is the sole touchstone of moral rectitude, by the title of the divine law only. He has, apparently, looked at it in the twofold light I have alluded to—calling it by the two names of the “divine law,” and “*the law of nature*” (Book II. xxviii. 11, and Preface to Fourth Edition, Note to Book II. xxviii. 11).

In M. Cousin’s criticisms on Locke’s account of the

* M. Cousin, of course, passes over the *second* reason. It would not answer to discuss *it*.

civil law and the philosophical law, I am little concerned ; for I have shown that Locke is only speaking there of the laws to which men usually refer their actions, and the names which they usually give to these relations ; nor has he hazarded, with respect to either of them, any such assertion as “ this is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude.” One of M. Cousin’s criticisms, however, I cannot pass over. The critic, forgetting that he had previously told us that “ the punishments and rewards of a *future* life are declared the sole touchstone, the sole *measure* of the rectitude of our actions” (Ps. p. 214), tells us now that Locke ‘ even cites a passage of St. Paul, which he forces aside from its natural sense,* to get at the conclusion that there is no other *measure* of virtue than good or bad fame” (Ps. p. 218). This is an old objection, to which Locke has long ago given a

* How ill the charge of forcing aside Scripture from its plain natural sense comes from M. Cousin the reader will judge by the following passage :—“ Reason, then, is *literally* a revelation—a necessary and universal revelation—which is wanting to no man, and *which enlightens every man on his coming into the world*—‘ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.’ Reason is the *necessary mediator between God and man*, the ‘ Logos’ of Pythagoras and Plato, *the Word made flesh*, which serves as the interpreter of God and the teacher of man, *divine and human at the same time*. It is not, indeed, the Absolute God, in his majestic individuality, but it is *his manifestation in spirit and in truth* ; it is not the Being of Beings, *but it is the revealed God of the human race*,” &c. (Ps. p. 437). Yet Dr. Henry ridicules a writer in the *Princeton Review* for drawing “ so many frightful consequences” from M. Cousin’s calling reason a “ revelation” (as if *that* were the most exceptionable of his expressions!) and for identifying his doctrine with even the modified rationalism of “ Marheineke and Rohr” (Ps. Introduction, l, li.) The reviewer was certainly wrong. He ought to have identified M. Cousin, not with Marheineke and Rohr, but with Strauss.

satisfactory answer. "By which words," says he, alluding to the paragraph immediately preceding the quotation from St. Paul, "and the rest of that section, it is plain that I brought this passage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general measure of what men call virtue and vice throughout the world, was the reputation and fashion of each particular society within itself; but that, *though it were so*, yet for reasons I there give, men in that way of denominating their actions, did not, for the most part, *vary much from the law of nature, which is that standing and unalterable rule*, by which they *ought* to judge of the moral rectitude and pravity of their actions, and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices. Had Mr. Lowde," he adds, and if he were alive he might write M. Cousin's name for Mr. Lowde's, "considered this, he would have found it little to his purpose to have quoted that passage in a sense I used it not" (Preface to Fourth Edition, Note to Book II. xxviii. 11); and the reader will see, by reference to the passage, that in making the *law of nature* (and not good or bad fame) the rule by which we ought to determine the virtuousness or viciousness of actions, Locke has only repeated in the note what he had already stated in the text (Book II. xxviii. 11).

But M. Cousin cannot leave the subject without another blunder, which, if less important in an ethical point of view, shews even more strikingly his ignorance of the philosophy of Locke. "Locke," he says, "takes the consequence for the principle, the effect for the cause. And you will observe that this confusion is a necessary consequence of his system. This system admits no idea that is not derived from reflection or from sensation. *Reflection being here out of the question, it*

is to sensation that Locke has recourse ; and, as sensation cannot explain the idea which mankind have of good and evil, the object is to find an idea more or less resembling it, *which can come from sensation*, and take the place of the former. Now, this idea is that of punishment and reward, which resolves itself into *that of pleasure and pain*, happiness or misery, or in general into utility" (Ps. p. 219). "Reflection," says the critic, "being here out of the question, it is to sensation that Locke has recourse." Is it possible that he is ignorant of all the moral systems—very plausible moral systems too—that have been founded on reflection? Did he never hear of Hutcheson's moral sense, or Smith's moral sentiments, or the various ramifications of the same system, maintained by Shaftesbury, Hume, Hartley, Mackintosh, and others? Nor is this system by any means out of favour at the present day ; for there seems a very general disposition at least to combine it with those systems which found morality in reason. But Locke has recourse to *sensation*, we are told, and *sensation* supplies him with the idea of reward and punishment, which resolves itself into pleasure and pain. Can we be informed in more direct terms that Locke considered pleasure and pain simple ideas of *sensation*, and of sensation *to the exclusion of reflection*? Now, let us turn to the Essay on the Human Understanding. Here I find pleasure and pain classed among simple ideas of *both sensation and reflection* (Book II. vii. 1-7). Of these two origins, too, the preference is evidently given to *reflection*. This mode of experience has been defined by Locke as "that notice which the mind takes of its own *operations* and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to

be ideas of these *operations* in the understanding" (Book II. i. 4) ; and he immediately adds, (evidently for the purpose of including the ideas of pleasure and pain) "The term *operations* here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, *such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness*" (words professedly used as the synonyms of pleasure and pain ; Book II. vii. 2) "*arising from any thought*" (Ibid). Again he calls these ideas "*internal sensations*" (Book II. xx. 3), a term which is used for reflection in contradistinction to "*external sensation*" (Book II. xi. 17), or sensation proper ; and although he states in the chapter before us, that they are simple ideas of both sensation and reflection, he equally says that they are made known to us, by reflection on what we feel in ourselves (Book II. xx. 1). Nor is there a single passage in the Essay which could be interpreted to mean that these ideas are derived exclusively from sensation. The reader will judge, by this specimen, of the careful manner in which the critic studied those portions of the Essay which he was not about to comment upon. With this observation I must take leave for the present of Locke's views on morals. There are, indeed, many exceptionable passages on this subject in the Essay on the Human Understanding ; and what Locke's views on morals were, is a point which I think lies fairly open to dispute. But though many objectionable passages occur in Locke, the critic has not succeeded in laying hold of any of them ; and as the passages he has cited simply prove nothing at all, I shall reserve the discussion of Locke's real system for an appendix.

I have thus concluded the examination of the several

particular ideas successively taken up by Locke and his critic, the discussion of which occupies the greater part of the second book of the Essay, and between three and four of M. Cousin's lectures. In each case we have arrived at the same result, the chief difference consisting in the *number* of errors committed by M. Cousin, who has not hitherto succeeded in substantiating a single charge against the illustrious object of his animadversions. He proceeds, however, to a few general criticisms on the second book of the Essay.

He begins by attacking Locke's division of ideas into simple and complex, or rather, his doctrine that simple ideas are those which first enter the mind. On the contrary, M. Cousin tells us that there are a large number of complex ideas very early in the mind (Ps. pp. 221, 222), and that these are afterwards rendered simple by abstraction* (Ibid.). To form a judgment on the value of this criticism, we must first ascertain distinctly what Locke means by complex, and what by simple ideas. The critic volunteers to give us this information. "All those ideas," says he, "which are derived *immediately* from these two sources—sensa-

* That these complex ideas, however early in the mind, are not immediate data of sense, and therefore not equivalent to the simple ideas of Locke, is evident from M. Cousin's own account of them. "All our primary ideas," says he, "are complex, and for the evident reason that all our faculties, or at least a great number of our faculties, enter into exercise at the same time; and their simultaneous action gives us at the same time *a number of ideas, bound and blended together*, which form a whole" (Ps. p. 221). It is obvious that none of the *acquisitive* faculties can thus "bind" and "blend" together its own products and the products of other faculties; and Locke is, therefore, strictly accurate in distinguishing the acquisitive faculties which thus provide us with "*a number of ideas*," from the combinative faculty, which binds and blends them together.

tion and reflection -- are by Locke denominated *simple ideas*" (Ps. p. 221). This we have already seen is (with certain not very material restrictions) a correct account of Locke's simple ideas. "*Compound* or complex ideas," continues M. Cousin, "are those which we form subsequently, by the *combination* of simple and primitive ideas" (Ibid.). This he repeats a little below, adding "association" to "combination," and stating that from these complex ideas themselves are formed ideas still more complex—formed, I presume, also by combination. The complex idea of Locke is, therefore, officially described by the critic as a *compound* idea, formed by a *combination* of simple ideas—that is to say, of the immediate data of sense and reflection.

He then proceeds to inform us that these immediate data are really complex and not simple, and that they are subsequently decomposed and rendered more simple (Ps. p. 222); and at the end of this discussion he tells us, that "general ideas, formed by abstraction," are "what we are to understand by the complex ideas of Locke" (Ps. p. 223). Now, this is the direct contrary of what the critic has informed us just two pages before. Can any two things be more opposed than forming a "*compound*" idea by "*combination*," and forming a "*general*" idea by "*abstraction*"? And the critic himself has been at pains to show that this general idea is really simple, while the particular idea—the immediate datum—is really complex (Ps. p. 222). The last portion of his doctrine, however, only makes the contradiction between his two accounts of Locke's complex idea the more glaring. For if the compound idea, formed by combination of simple ideas, be complex,

much more will the idea which is formed by a *combination* of *compound* ideas. Moreover, M. Cousin had only to open the work of Locke in order to reconcile his contradictory assertions. Complex ideas, according to Locke, "are made out of simple ideas;" and "the acts of the mind, whereby it exercises its power over its simple ideas, are *chiefly these three*:—

1. *Combining* several simple ideas into one *compound* one, and thus all complex ideas are made.*
2. The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, *without uniting them into one*, by which way it gets all ideas of *relations*.
3. The third is separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence; this is called *abstraction*, and thus all *general* ideas are made" (Book II. xii. 1). Complex ideas are then neither compound ideas nor abstract ideas, but consist of three classes—compound ideas, relations, and abstract ideas; and M. Cousin has followed up his strange omission with respect to the faculty of comparison by ignoring the second and most important class of complex ideas—ideas of relation. A criticism founded on such a defective and erroneous view of the nature of complex ideas is of course of no value, and the reader will easily see by Locke's account of abstraction, given above,

* This passage at first seems to coincide with the first assertion of M. Cousin; and Locke undoubtedly does sometimes use the term "complex ideas" in the sense of compound ideas; but it is not in this sense that the term is used in opposition to simple ideas, for then abstractions and relations would be simple ideas, which they plainly are not. *Relations* (which are derived by the *second* operation) are, *in this very chapter*, classed as complex ideas (Book II. xii. 3), and so I think are abstractions, for Locke speaks of "*decompounded*" as well "*compounded*" complex ideas (Ibid).

that that philosopher acknowledged the presence of complex ideas in the mind at a very early period, though he attributed them to the combinative faculty, and held that simple ideas entered by the senses simple and unmixed (Book II. ii. 1). The difference of opinion as to whether immediate data of sense or abstract ideas are to be called simple (Locke holding the former, and his critic the latter), is well explained by Dr. Webb, and by Mr. Mansel. Locke speaks of simple apprehensions of sense—M. Cousin of simple concepts of the understanding. Nor are these simple apprehensions of sense really decomposed in abstraction. Take, for example, the idea of blue. We may form from this by successive abstractions the ideas of color, sensation, phenomenon, and thing or object : each of which are in one sense more simple ; yet, there is no true decomposition, no separation of the idea into different ideas (which would be required to refute the definition of Locke, Book II. ii. 1). When, from the idea of blue we form that of color, there is no supplementary idea which, together with that of color, makes up the idea of blue ; nor when from color we pass to sensation, is there any idea framed in the mind, which is neither color nor sensation, but the difference between the two. The simple ideas of Locke are, therefore, not only simple as regards their genesis, being immediate data of experience, but they are also simple in respect to their essence, in this sense, that though we can form partial conceptions of them we cannot analyse them into more than one idea ; while abstract ideas are, at least, complex with regard to their genesis, since they presuppose immediate data of experience, and an operation upon these by the faculty of abstraction.

The nomenclature of Locke, therefore, seems preferable to that of his critic.

M. Cousin next objects that Locke has not recognized (or has rather expressly denied) the activity of the mind in attaining these simple ideas of experience. The criticism is again true to the ear. Locke, undoubtedly, says that the mind is passive in the reception of simple ideas, active in the formation of complex ideas. But a very slight examination will convince us that, by stating that the mind is passive in the acquisition of simple ideas, he merely meant to deny its *voluntary activity*, or, perhaps, rather the dependence of the ideas of experience on the will (Book II. ix. 1). That the mind is in another sense active in the reception of them he has everywhere admitted. His very definition of the two modes of experience is "our *observation* employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds" (Book II. i. 2); and reflection is "that *notice* which the mind takes of its own operations," &c. (Book II. i. 4). He insists on the necessity of *attention* for the acquisition of our ideas of reflection (Book II. i. 8). He says that unless "*notice*" is taken of the "*impressions*" on our organism, there is no perception (Book II. ix. 3); and he illustrates by the case of an infant "how *covetous* the mind is to be furnished with all such ideas as have no pain accompanying them" (Book II. ix. 7). See, too, Book II. xix. 3. With this charge concludes the critic's "*exact and faithful analysis of the second book*" of the Essay (Ps. p. 225). The reader is, I hope, in a position to judge of its faithfulness and exactitude, and I may, therefore, without further delay, take up the unfavourable criticisms on the third book, which

occupy most of the remainder of M. Cousin's fifth lecture.*

He commences by taking exception to Locke's remark that "words ultimately derive their origin from such as signify sensible things" (Book III. i. 5). He denies the truth of this assertion absolutely, and adduces certain words whose sensible derivations have not as yet been made out (Ps. p. 228). He does not, however, dispute the justice of Locke's observation as a general rule, and it is not improbable that that philosopher intended it for nothing more. But he objects to a conclusion which has been drawn from it by what he calls the school of Locke (for he does not venture to attribute it to Locke himself, though he probably wishes his reader to attribute it to him), viz., that all ideas are equally derived from sensible ideas (Ps. p. 229); and in opposition to this, he thus points out the true conclusion to be deduced from it, were it

* Before taking leave of the second book, it may be as well to remark, that Locke would gain little by some of the confusions attributed to him, even if he were the most thorough-going sensualist. Take, for example, the idea of space. He reduces this to body, says the critic. But what is body? It is evidently a kind of substance (Book II. xxiii. 15, etc.). To this M. Cousin would answer, that Locke resolves our idea of substance into a collection of qualities. Be it so. What, then, is a quality? By Locke's own statement, it is a *power* to produce an idea in our mind, a *cause* of sensation, or perception in us. How, then, about this idea of cause, or of power? According to the critic, Locke resolves it into succession. Let us see, then, what Locke has gained by this long series of reductions. I will not argue that the idea of succession could not be derived from mere capacities of sense, or that Locke himself says that it is a *suggested* idea. I would merely say that M. Cousin's charge of confounding succession with duration would thus involve a confusion of space with time, and that Locke's derivation of space from *sensation* would be inconsistent with his deduction of succession from *reflection*.

fully established. "Even if it were true," says he, "and absolutely so, which is not the case, let us see the only conclusion which could be justly drawn from it. The phenomena of the external world first strike a man's notice; these phenomena, of course, receive the first names; the first signs are drawn from tangible objects, and they are tinged, in some sort, with their colors. And when man, subsequently, in falling back upon himself wishes to express the new phenomena of the mind and of thought, *analogy* leads him to connect the signs he is seeking for with those he already possesses; for *analogy* is the law of all language forming or developed" (Ps. p. 228, 229). That Locke repudiates the conclusion of his so-called disciples in the sequel of this very passage (Book III. i. 5), has been remarked by Mr. Stewart; and there is another very remarkable passage in which he seems to adopt the conclusion, not of his disciples, but of his critic. "*If the names of things,*" says he, "*may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of men's ideas,* (as I am apt to think they may very much) one may have occasion to think by the name *duration*, that the continuation of existence with a kind of resistance to any destructive force, and the continuation of solidity, (which is apt to be confounded with . . . hardness) *were thought to have some analogy, and gave occasion to words so near of kin as durare and durum esse*" (Book II. xv. 4). The first and last clauses of this passage, considered together, afford a very valuable commentary on the section in the third book, and I think remove whatever appears objectionable in that section, taken by itself.

The critic next objects to Locke's statements that the meaning of words is purely arbitrary. As, how-

ever, he assigns no reason for disputing this (I think) obvious truth, I am unable to argue with him. I am unable to see any connexion between sounds, and things so wholly heterogeneous and dissimilar to them as the greater part of our ideas are ; and although there are a few instances in which a sound seems peculiarly suited to represent a certain idea—as when that idea is that of another sound resembling the former, or of a muscular action similar to that which is requisite in order to pronounce the sound—yet this is plainly unnecessary, and the same idea might be as well represented by any other conventional sign. That a word should have a natural meaning, independent of our conventions, appears so improbable to any person who can dissolve for a moment the obstinate association between words and things, that Locke was at least justified in assuming the contrary until M. Cousin or some of his critics brings forward “some one root that carries of itself its own signification, which has a natural meaning, which is the foundation of subsequent convention, instead of coming from convention” (Ps. p. 230). M. Cousin, however, does not appear certain of this objection, but pretermittting it, he proceeds to urge that Locke “should have excepted the laws of the relations of words to each other” (Ibid); that is, as he proceeds to explain it, the laws contemplated by universal grammar. I am surprised, however, that any one could interpret Locke’s simple remark as an exclusion of these rules; and I am inclined to think that this criticism is not put forward so much for its own sake, as for the sake of introducing the following objection. “Now it is remarkable *that in the book on words* Locke has never touched upon the relations of words, never upon *syntax*, nor the

true foundation of language. There are a multitude of special reflections, and ingenious too, but no theory, no true grammar" (Ps. p. 231). This intended attack is in reality a panegyric on Locke. The third book of the Essay is not a "book on words"; it is a book on words, *so far forth as related to our knowledge*. This Locke has himself informed us (Book III. ix. 21), where he says that at first he had no intention of treating of words at all, but that when he came to examine the extent and certainty of our *knowledge*, he found it had so near a connexion with words that unless their force and manner of signification were at first well observed, very little could be pertinently or clearly said concerning knowledge, "which being conversant with truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was, for the most part, so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge." This was Locke's object in treating of words, and it is plain that nothing could be more foreign to it, or indeed to the general design of the Essay, than such an universal grammar, or disquisition upon syntax, as M. Cousin seems to expect from our author; whose abstaining from such inviting speculations, and rigid adherence to his object, are deserving of our commendation rather than dispraise.

But the critic's main assault on the third book is his attempted refutation of Locke's assertion "that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are creatures and inventions of the understanding; made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas" (Book III. iii. 11. Ps. p. 231). He commences by declaring

“you see here the very foundation of *Nominalism*” (Ps. p. 231); although Locke, by saying “they concern only signs, *whether words or ideas*,” evidently leaves open the question between Nominalism and Conceptualism, which differ in the alternative they adopt. The critic however does not in this discussion distinguish Nominalism and Conceptualism; and his objection to their doctrine is equally applicable to both, though verbally applied to Nominalism only. To see the futility of this attempted refutation of Nominalism, however, a few preliminary remarks are necessary.

The reader is of course aware that there are two kinds of division. One is the division of an universal or logical whole into its subjective parts—the division, in simpler language, of a genus into its species; the other (also called partition) is the division of an integral or physical whole into its integrant parts or portions. The division of Irishmen into Protestants and Catholics may serve as an example of the former; that of Ireland into Ulster, Leinster, Munster, and Connaught as an example of the latter. Nothing can be more distinct than these two methods of division; one remarkable difference being that in the first case the name of the whole may be predicated of each of the parts in the same sense, in the latter case it cannot; for if it accidentally happens that the same name is applicable to the whole and one of the parts, it will be found that it is not applied to the two in the same sense. For example, Dublin and Cork are the names of two Irish counties, and also of two cities situated within them, and therefore forming a part of them; but then the names are not applied to the counties and the cities in the same sense, nor are they

applicable to the remaining parts : as we could not say Kingstown is Dublin or Mallow is Cork. This distinction seems almost too obvious to insist upon ; yet, strange to say, it seems to have been overlooked by M. Cousin.

He commences the inquiry by examining the general idea of "book," and determining that, apart from particular existing books, there is nothing which is neither this book or that book, but book in itself (Ps. p. 232). So far he is on the side of the Nominalist or Conceptualist. "But," he asks, "are there not other general ideas? Let us examine. I perceive a body, and at the same moment my mind cannot but take it for granted that the body is in a certain particular *space*, which is the place of this particular body. I perceive another body, and my mind cannot but believe that this other particular body is also in a particular space ; and thus I arrive, and arrive very soon, as you have before seen, without need of passing through a long series of experiments, at the *general idea of space*. It remains to ascertain if this *general* idea of space is exactly the same as the general idea of book ; that is, if the word space signifies nothing more than the word book. Let us consult the human mind, and the truth of internal facts. It is an unquestionable fact that when you speak of book in general you do not connect with the idea of book that of real existence" (the reader will observe that, though the critic has verbally ignored the Conceptualist doctrine, yet it is really rather against Conceptualism than Nominalism that he is arguing). "On the contrary, I ask if, when you speak of space in general, you do not add to this idea a belief in the reality of space? It is certain, that, when you

speak of space, you have the conviction that out of yourself there is something which is space ; and also, when you speak of time, you have the conviction that there is out of yourself something which is time, although you know neither the nature of time nor of space. . . . To the general idea of time and space is united the invincible conviction of the reality of something which is space and time. . . . Here is the root and ground of Realism " (Ps. pp. 232, 233). This discussion is then generalised as follows :—" The force of Realism lies in general ideas, which invincibly imply the external existence of their objects—these are, as you know, universal and necessary general ideas" (Ps. p. 234). These "universal and necessary general ideas" (excepting space and time,) he does not, however, discuss, or even enumerate, in this place. They appear to be the other ideas we have already examined : infinity, substance, cause, identity, and perhaps, right and wrong ; but I shall confine myself here to the ideas of space and time, discussed by M. Cousin in the passage before us, reserving the application of his theory of universals to the others, for the Appendix, in which I shall consider the justice of the charge of Pantheism, which has been urged against his philosophy, and with which the present subject has a very intimate connexion. To turn, then, to space and time, I will begin by asking a few questions like M. Cousin. I ask any man of common sense, whether space and time contain in them particular spaces and times, in a manner analogous to that in which Irishmen contains Protestants and Catholics ? or whether they do not rather contain them in the same manner that Ireland contains Leinster and Connaught ? I ask him if space and

time seem to him to be physical or logical wholes? I ask him if the very phrase, "*space in general*," does not seem awkward to him when it is put (as here) for "space infinite"; and whether, if he speaks of an "universal space", he does not rather mean a space which is everywhere—which includes the universe—than one which is universal in the logical sense; that is, which may have species subordinated to it? And, let me ask M. Cousin where are the species of this genus—this universal or general space? What are their distinct names? What are the differences by which they are marked off from each other? Or is this general space a species infima, which has nothing subordinated to it but individual spaces? But M. Cousin's own expressions prove most clearly that space and time are physical and not logical wholes, and that, therefore, they are not general ideas at all. "I ask," he says, "if you believe that there are without you nothing but particular spaces—that there is not an universal space, *capable of embracing all possible bodies—a space, one and continuous, of which different particular spaces are but arbitrary PORTIONS and MEASURES*" (Ps. pp. 232, 233). But what kind of whole is that which is "one and continuous"? What kind of whole is that whose parts are "*portions*" and "*measures*" of it? Or how does this universal space "embrace" bodies? Is it by being predicable of them—by being *their* genus also? Certainly not, except we make body a kind of space. But how does it "embrace" body? Is it not by embracing or containing the space in which bodies are contained? and if so—if this universal space contains particular spaces, and the bodies which occupy them, in the same manner,—it does not con-

tain these particular spaces in the same way that a general idea contains the ideas subordinated to it. M. Cousin seems to be somewhat sensible of the weakness of his argument here, for he deems it necessary to disprove that particular spaces and times are portions of space and time in the physical sense, before he can assert that space and time are general ideas to which particular spaces and times are *logically* subordinate. But his proof rests on positive denial of infinity of number, which we met with already. "Different times" says he "and different spaces are not the constituent elements of space and time. Time and space are not solely for you, the collection of different times and different spaces ; but you believe that time and space are in themselves, that it is not *two* or *three*" (which must be taken to represent *any finite number*, for this, together with the denial of an infinite number, is essential to the argument) spaces, two or three ages which constitute space and time : *for everything derived from experience, whether in respect to space or to time is finite, and the characteristic of space and of time for you is to be infinite without beginning and without end*" (Ps. p. 233). A more infelicitous argument it would be impossible to urge. If it is the characteristic of space in general and time in general to be infinite, then particular spaces and particular times must be infinite also : for every idea that is subordinated to the general idea must contain all that is contained in it—which is no more than to say that the general name must be predicable of it ; and this of course holds most strongly with the leading—the characteristic—portion of the general idea. Surely if these particular spaces and times be spaces and times at all—if they come under

the general ideas of space and time—they must possess all the marks of the general ideas. They must be universal—they must be capable of containing all possible bodies—they must be one and continuous—they must be arbitrary portions and measures of themselves—and lastly, they must be infinite. If they be not so, then the terms space and time are not applied to them in the same sense as to the genera, but in senses as different as when Dublin or Cork is applied to a county and a city ; unless indeed the critic will say that the peculiarities of universal space and universal time are not implied in the names, which are used to connote only what is common to them and to particular spaces and times. This, indeed, is to make a general idea of space and time ; but an idea which has nothing really existing that corresponds to it ; for apart from *individual* spaces and times (among which we must now *include universal space and universal time*), there will be no more something, which is space in itself, or time in itself, than there was something which was book in itself. But that space and time, when put for universal space and universal time, cannot be predicated of particular spaces and times, is still more manifest from the passage immediately following that which I last quoted. It is this —“ Time resolves itself into eternity, and space into immensity” (Ps. p. 233), and surely we could not call what we have hitherto termed particular spaces and times, particular immensities and eternities. Nor are M. Cousin’s previous accounts of these ideas of space and time a whit more consistent with his paradox that they are general ideas. “ The idea of space,” says he, “ is given you as a *continuous whole*, in which you can very readily form useful and convenient

divisions, but at the same time *artificial* divisions, under which subsists the idea of space without limit ; For *beyond* any *determinate portion* of space there is space still, and *beyond* that space there is still space for ever and for evermore" (Ps. p. 133). "The divisions of time, like those of space, are *purely artificial*, and involve the supposition of an *unity*, an *absolute continuity* of time." . . . *Before* all finite time, and *beyond* all finite time, there is still time unlimited, infinite, inexhaustible" (Ps. p. 145). Let my reader attempt to apply such terms as those I have here italicised to any *general* idea, and I think he will soon be convinced of their unmeaningness and absurdity. I think, therefore, I have sufficiently established that M. Cousin's refutation of Locke is founded on a confusion of logical division with physical division or partition, in the ideas of space and time ; ideas which (at least in M. Cousin's sense of them), are not general ideas at all, but ideas as individual as I or you. But before leaving the subject, I may observe that M. Cousin has elsewhere adopted the Realist theory of ideas in its fullest extent, almost repeating the language of Plato. The passage is too long to quote here, and the theory has been too frequently refuted by philosophers, since the time of Roscelinus, to need any arguments from me. M. Cousin's statement of his doctrine will be found in Ps. pp. 545, 546.*

"I conclude," says the critic, "with pointing out another proposition, or rather pretension, of Locke,

* I ought, perhaps, to add that, if M. Cousin is right in thinking these ideas of space and time general ideas, yet Locke has evidently not considered them as such, and therefore the passage before quoted, on which M. Cousin founds his criticism, was not intended to apply to them.

which it is important to reduce within just limits. *Everywhere* Locke attributes to words the greatest part of our errors ; and if you expound the master by his disciples, you will find in all the writers of the school of Locke, that all *disputes* are about words—that science is nothing but a language, and of course, a language well formed is a science well constructed. I undertake,” he continues, “to show the untruth of these exaggerated assertions” (Ps. p. 234, 235). I have already remarked that Locke is not to be confounded with, or interpreted by, his so-called school, and in the second part of this work I shall have occasion to point out some very startling differences between Locke and his school, admitted by the critic himself. I may, therefore, set aside the identification of science with language which is not pretended to have been discovered in the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, and confine myself to the charge that Locke attributes to words the greatest part of our errors, and that if we interpret him by his disciples, he held that all *disputes* were about words. Now the fact is, that M. Cousin has exactly transposed the tenets of Locke and his so-called disciples. Locke maintained that the greater part of *disputes* were about words ; his disciples, following Hobbes, maintained that the same was true of all *errors* ; for the reader must observe that *errors* and *disputes* are very different things, and that it is the very characteristic of a verbal *dispute* that there may be no *error*, that the parties may be quite agreed in opinion, and differ only in their use of the terms. In proof of this charge against Locke, M. Cousin gives the convenient reference “*everywhere*.” I had almost responded to this with a “*nowhere*”; but I find there is one section whose

title seems to bear out the critic's statement. Its *contents*, however, will shew that by "errors" Locke does not intend errors properly so-called, that is the reception of false propositions as true, so much as obscurity and confusion. The section runs thus, "*Misuse of words the great cause of errors.* For he that shall well consider the *errors and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion*, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, will find some reason to doubt whether language, as it is employed, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst mankind. How many are there that, when they would think on things, fix their thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters! and who then can wonder *if the result of such contemplations and reasonings* about little more than sounds, whilst the ideas annexed to them are very confused or very unsteady, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I say, that *such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake WITHOUT ANY CLEAR JUDGMENT OR KNOWLEDGE*" (Book III. xi. 4); that is to say, without any intelligible proposition being distinctly assented to, which must be the case in every *error* properly so-called. It is almost needless to call my reader's attention to the next following section in which Locke says that words are not the *fountains* of knowledge, but the *pipes* whereby it is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind; or to Book III. ix. 21, where he seems to admit that the imperfections attributed to words (which are the principal causes of the "errors" spoken of in the section just quoted) might with equal propriety be attributed to our

“want of knowledge and inability to penetrate into the real constitutions” of things, which is a defect chargeable, not upon words, but upon our understandings. Locke has fortunately set the question at rest, by attributing the greater part of errors to another and a very different cause—to wrong associations of ideas—which, he says, “gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, *and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said, of all the errors in the world*” (Book II. xxxiii. 18). Locke, then, has not attributed to words the greatest part of our errors, and M. Cousin’s refutation of this doctrine does not bear upon Locke at all. That philosopher has, indeed, attributed to words the greatest part of our *disputes*; but this position the critic has not called in question, unless the following be intended for a refutation of it: “If you look more closely you will see that the greater part of the disputes, which seem to be about words, are at the bottom disputes about things.” In proof of which somewhat questionable assertion he urges: “*Humanity is too serious to be excited and often to shed its best blood for words.* Wars do not turn on disputes about words; and I say the same of other conflicts, theological and scientific controversies,” &c. (Ps. p. 235); which would be a valid objection if these disputes about words *were known to be so by the disputants*, but not otherwise.

This terminates M. Cousin’s criticism on the third book of Locke, and completes my examination of the portion of his lectures included in the ordinary undergraduate course. I hope before very long to complete my examination, and to prove that the critic’s mis-

representations of the fourth book of Locke are even more gross and flagrant than those I have hitherto exposed. The present work having been prepared for the press somewhat hastily, it is not impossible that it may contain some misquotations, both from Locke and M. Cousin ; but I am confident that these will not be found to alter the sense of the passages, nor will any argument be found to turn upon any words not found *verbatim et literatim* in the books before us. I am aware that in another point of view I may be accused of misquoting M. Cousin ; that is, in taking his doctrines not from his original work, but from the translation of Dr. Henry, which is known not to be very accurate. I have quoted this translation chiefly because it, and not the original work, is the text-book in this university. Were I to give a translation of my own (besides my want of qualification for the task), I would lie more open to the charge of unfairness ; and to quote the French of the original would be to make my book difficult or unintelligible to many of those for whom it is intended. It was therefore necessary to have recourse to a translator, and in taking the translation of so ardent an admirer of M. Cousin as Dr. Henry, I will at least escape the charge of taking the French philosopher's system from a hostile source, where it was wilfully garbled and misrepresented. I must also add, that if I have quoted Dr. Webb's work chiefly for the purpose of opposing it, I have not done so with the view of depreciating perhaps the most valuable work yet published on the philosophy of Locke ; it is simply because of its extraordinary merit that I thought it advisable to call attention to the few mistakes which I think are to be

found in it; and how much I am indebted to the essay on the Intellectualism of Locke for the views here advocated, and the refutations here attempted, will be readily perceived by any one who studies the two works. How far these views are correct, and how far this refutation has been successful, I leave to the judgment of the impartial reader.



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