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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

HISTORY OF THE

NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

OF THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

1945 - 19..

VOLUME III - POLITICAL AND LEGAL, Part A

THE POLITICAL PURGE

((First Occupation Year - Subject to Revision))

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THE POLITICAL PURGE

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I. INITIAL POLICIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

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Responsibility

1. The Supreme Commander's responsibility for the abolition of certain organizations and for the purge of individuals from positions of influence in Japanese political life followed from the Potsdam Declaration, the U. S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan and subsequent basic policy directives.

2. The Potsdam Declaration, by requiring the Japanese Government to remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people, provided for the elimination of undesirable organizations whose purposes were counter to the aim of this requirement.

3. The U. S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy[1/] specified that "institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression be vigorously suppressed," and "that ultranationalistic or militaristic, social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions be dissolved and prohibited."

4. The JCS Basic Occupation Directive[2/] instructed the Supreme Commander "to assure the dissolution of the Political Association of

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1/ JCS Serial No. 1064, 22 September 1945.
2/ JCS Serial No. 1868, 3 November 1945.

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Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, their affiliates and any successor agencies, and all Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies and their agencies and affiliates."[1/]

All existing political parties, organizations and societies were to be placed under control; those whose activities were consistent with Occupation objectives were to be encouraged and organizations whose activities were inimical to the achievement of the purposes of the Occupation were to be abolished.

5. The purge of individuals was provided for in the Potsdam Declaration, which stated that "there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

6. The Initial Post-Surrender Directive stated that "high officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultranationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression be taken into custody and held for future disposition."[2/]

7. The Basic Directive enjoined that "in no circumstances will persons be allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or private enterprise who have been

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1/ JCS Serial No. 18, 3 November 1945, para. 5g.
2/ JCS Serial No. 10, 22 September 1945, Part III.

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influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates."[1/]

8. The basic directive required the elimination of certain elements in the Japanese economic system by providing that the Supreme Commander "prohibit the retention in or selection for positions of important responsibility or influence in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture of all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression and of those who have actively participated in the organization" whose dissolution was ordered, "and of any who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends." The basic directive also provided that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, satisfactory to the Supreme Commander, he would "assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937, in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression."

9. The basic directive stated "the ultimate objectives of the United Nations. . .is to foster conditions which will give the greatest possible assurance that Japan will not again become a menance to the peace and security of the world."[2/] In accordance with this, the primary objective of the dissolution of organizations and the purge of individuals was preventive.

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1/ JCS Serial No. 18, 3 November 1945, para. 5b.
2/ Ibid., para. 3a.

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II. PRESURRENDER STATUS

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Political Control

1. The exercise of political control at all government levels by small groups of individuals has been characteristic of political developments throughout most of Japanese history. Often the individual or group in nominal political control was in reality the pawn of an actual controlling individual or group. The concomitant acceptance of such control by the mass of the Japanese people had made them a willing instrument to be used to further the schemes of aggrandizement of the ruling group.

Nationalism

2. The factor of geographic isolation was of major importance in the evolution of Japanese institutions and national traits. While Japan at various periods came under the cultural influence of China, it was free from Chinese political control. In consequence the Japanese developed a strong consciousness of their national identity.

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Isolation made the Japanese highly self-conscious, strongly aware of their differences from other peoples and possessing an irrational sense of superiority they subconsciously accepted themselves but were anxious to prove to others. The Japanese unaccustomed to dealing with foreigners individually or as a nation found it difficult to understand the actions and attitudes of other peoples.

3. A sense of nationalism early developed from this consciousness of distinctiveness. In the Kamakura period Nichiren and other religious leaders injected a strong nationalistic note into their teachings. The growth of nationalism was indicated in the historical writings of the Ashikaga period. History was given a strong nationalistic tinge by stressing the unique virtues of the Japanese political system which was attributed to the fact that Japan was a land of divine origin, ruled by an imperial line of divine ancestry.

4. In the feudal ages the revival of Shinto, a religion comprised primarily of nature worship which came to include some ancestor worship and much rationalization of primitive mythology and traditions in terms of nationalistic necessity, contributed much to the growth of national consciousness. Shinto scholars began to claim their religion as a native manifestation was superior to foreign beliefs.

5. Historical study stimulated by Tokugawa patronage of the philosophy of Confucianism led to the study of the myths and legends of ancient Japan. A group of Shinto scholars reintroduced the old myths and traditions to the educated public. These scholars searched primitive history for native virtues which would explain to their own

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satisfaction the feeling of superiority which their unreasoning nationalism led them to feel. With blind zeal they accepted naive myths and historically absurd traditions as truth and foisted them on the nation.

6. At the same time the political unity and complete isolation of the Tokugawa period which was marked by strong anti-foreign policies made for a rapid growth of nationalism.

Oligarchic Rule

7. The long feudalistic period, which was characterized by the rule of warrior aristocrats, created patterns of thought and behavior which in recent times made Japan amenable to the control of the ruling oligarchy. The extended period of government by military men so conditioned the Japanese that in modern times they uncritically accepted the expressed motives for and the leadership of the military.

8. The two centuries of strictly enforced peace of the Tokugawa period left the Japanese a docile people accustomed to firmly established patterns of conduct who looked to their rulers for all leadership and followed without question all orders from above.

9. The collapse of the feudal government and the restoration of imperial rule in 1868 conformed to the pattern of change from above, accepted without question by the masses below. The innovations were not the result of revolutionary action by the masses but were effected by carefully planned action by a small but vigorous group in control of the government.

10. The new government was in reality an oligarchy in the hands of fewer than 100 young men. These men with their military tradition and early training and impelled by the desire to create a Japan capable

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of holding its own in the modern world, quickly borrowed the features of western states which they considered essential adjuncts of government in strong nations.

11. The leaders of the controlled revolution of 1868 established the foundation for transforming Japan into a strong military and industrial power. During the ensuing period they led the nation in successful military and colonial ventures and Japan came to be accepted as a major power.

12. An important factor in the development of modern Japan was the perfection of the totalitarian technique of utilizing the educational system and military service for political indoctrination. In the schools and army young Japanese were taught to glory in Japan's military traditions and came to believe death in battle for the emperor was the highest honor and in the virtues of a vaguely defined "national structure" and "Japanese spirit." In a few decades the government and army were able to create in the average Japanese a fanatical nationalism and an even more fanatical devotion to the emperor.

Liberalism

13. Japan's rise as a military and economic power and the development of an educated citizenry open to world influence made strict control of the actions and thoughts of all the people increasingly difficult. The growth of an intellectual class with views divergent from those of the ruling oligarchy was presaged by the appearance of an entirely new literature. The intellectual group developed in the cities.

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where also developed a class of white collar workers. During the 1920's these two elements constituted a strongly liberal group whose influence in practical politics was slight but whose activity showed a democratic trend.

14. A second group to develop opinions at variance with those of the original oligarchy was a growing middle class of businessmen and financiers. The creation of a national legislature, the Diet, in 1890 gave this group and lesser government officials, a place in politics which they gradually improved. As business interests grew in influence leaders of the powerful interests were represented in the governing oligarchy. As members of this group they showed themselves willing to support whatever policy they thought would best further their interests.

15. The disappearance of the original oligarchs, the rise of political parties, the expansion of the electorate and the success of the democratic nations in the First World War cleared the way for liberal democratic trends in the 1920's. Business interests were dominant among the groups that constituted the ruling elements and believed economic expansion could be achieved more profitably by diplomacy than by colonial expansion through military force.

During this period the government of cabinets dependent upon party strength in the Diet indicated the growing influence of democracy in politics. Political changes were accompanied by challenges to time-honored social customs by college students and other members of the younger generation as well as the urban middle classes.

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Ultranationalism and Militarism

16. As a consequence of long-accepted feudal traditions, nationalism and indoctrination by the early oligarchy, large segments of the Japanese population found it impossible to accept or tolerate the challenge to established political and social authority that arose in the decade of the 1920's. These reactionaries were advocates of authoritarian rule at home and forcible expansion abroad. They tended to look to the armed forces as their idols and champions.

While ultranationalist and militarist sentiments were sometimes expressed in political parties the inherent distrust of representative government by the reactionaries led them to seek power through private pressure groups and extralegal cliques. Many ultranationalistic secret societies developed as a primary form of political expression.

17. Reactionary tendencies, which grew slowly and almost unnoticed during the 1920's, swept over Japan in the early 1930's in a wave of blatant militarism and fanatical nationalism. Basically the reactionary nationalistic and militaristic elements had gradually risen to influence but creation of fascist totalitarian regimes in many parts of the world did not go unnoticed. The raising of protective tariffs throughout the world following the 1929 world-wide depression led many Japanese to believe that the only solution was for Japan to again embark on a program of forcible colonial expansion to gain sources of raw materials and the markets needed to make the nation invulnerable.

18. The initiation of an unauthorized war of territorial aggrandizement by certain military elements in Manchuria in 1931 marked the

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ascendency of the ultranationalists and militarists within the ruling oligarchy. Despite internal tensions among the representatives of the armed forces, business, bureaucracy and court which made up the closely knit governing group such conflicts of interests were never permitted to cause a breach in the basic unity of the rulers.

19. The Manchurian Incident was accepted by businessmen and bureaucrats as a step toward the development of a self-sufficient economic empire which would make Japan invulnerable to economic or military attack. The people accepted this aggression with uncritical admiration.

20. The following decade was characterized by extremist attempts to seize power by direct action, political assassination and provocation of incidents that embroiled the country in foreign wars of conquest which by stimulating the nationalistic emotions of the people won their support for imperialist and military policies. All liberal forces were suppressed and efforts made to increase the nationalistic fervor of the masses. Abroad wars for local conquest whetted the ambitions of the militarists and their business collaborators.

21. The expansionist policy of the reactionary oligarchy culminated in the outbreak of a war in 1941 to realize Japan's ambitions in the Greater East Asia sphere. The militarists were dominant in the oligarchy but whatever misgivings the other ruling elements may have had, no break in the unity of the group occurred.

22. As the course of the war turned against Japan the more conservative members of the oligarchy gradually gained an increasing measure of

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control. All members of the group in the face of impending invasion and loss of power sought a solution that would safeguard their control of the nation. A majority within the oligarchy realized that the interests of the oligarchy as a whole were involved in the successful completion of a surrender move. Over the opposition of some military extremists who advocated a last-ditch suicide struggle the ruling group accepted the surrender terms of the Allies.

At the time of the Surrender many elements that had led Japan upon a course of militaristic expansion remained in a position of essential control. The removal and exclusion of these ultra-nationalistic and militaristic individuals and groups constituted a necessary part of the program to firmly establish a broad base for the growth of democracy whose roots are in the life of the mass of citizens.

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Application of the Purge

1. The Political Purge and the abolition of certain organizations affected the membership and organization of political parties, militaristic and ultranationalistic organizations, and the personnel of governmental bureaus, offices and departments, educational institutions, economic organizations controlled by the Government and certain additional economic organizations influential in the political field.

2. These measures involved the removal and exclusion of undesirable individuals from employment in many influential positions in the political, the governmental and the economic life of Japan and the dissolution of the affected organizations.

3. The purge and the dissolution of organizations had to be

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implemented by a complex set of control measures. As applied to institutions, these measures required the total dissolution of organizations which were of an undesirable nature and prohibited the future formation of any similar ones. As applied to individuals, they provided for removal of persons holding positions defined as public office, and for the exclusion from positions defined as government service. Exclusion provisions applied to three categories of prospective employees:

(1) Those who had been removed from public office by the Purge Directive.

(2) Those who held positions in government service but were not removed by the Directive.

(3) Those who had not held positions in the government service.

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ABOLITION OF ORGANIZATIONS UNDER 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

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Abolition of Organizations

4. On 4 January SCAP directed the abolition and prohibition of certain political parties, associations, societies and other organizations as follows: 1/

(1) The formation of any organization whose purpose or the effect of whose activity was to resist or oppose the Occupation Forces or to obstruct the execution of SCAP directives, to support military aggression, to arrogate leadership of other Asiatic peoples, to exclude foreign persons from economic or cultural activity in Japan, to provide military training or special benefits for former members of the military forces, or to alter policy by assassination and terrorism was prohibited.

(2) Existing organizations whose purposes or activities were the same or similar to those proscribed were to

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1/ SCAPIN 548, 4 January 1946. APPENDIX I.

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be dissolved; 27 such organizations were specifically named.

(3) The terms of the directive were applicable to any organization whose principal officers were members of organizations abolished in accordance with the directive; former commissioned officers of the regular Japanese Army, Navy or Special Volunteer Reserve on active duty since 1 January 1930; persons who served in or with military or naval police or intelligence organizations and groups whose membership included more than 25 percent of former members of proscribed organizations.

(4) All transactions involving property owned or controlled by organizations to which the directive was applicable were to be halted immediately. The Government was ordered to take custody of such property. ((a))

(5) Prior to the formation of any group for political activity or discussion of Japan's foreign relations, it was required to file and keep current a declaration of its name, purpose, names of officers together with addresses and personal histories; names and addresses of substantial financial supporters and their contributions and a membership roster.

((a)) The control of such property is the responsibility of the Civil Property Custodian and will be discussed in the monograph, "Property Control."

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Compliance

((a)) 5. The Home Ministry was the governmental agency responsible for effecting compliance. On 23 February 1946 the Government implemented the terms of the Directive in an Imperial Ordinance[1] which provided specific penalties for violations. Subsequent orders[2] issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs applied the provisions of the Imperial Ordinance to 121 organizations including the 27 specifically listed in the 4 January Directive.

((b)) 6. As reports required[3] by SCAP to ensure the holding of a free election were not received by 29 January 1946, SCAP raised the question of the requisite reports with the Home Ministry which promised a complete report by 15 March.

((c)) On 15 March the promised complete report was not received and on 20 and 25 March the responsible Home Ministry official was summoned by SCAP to provide all available data. The information presented proved to be inadequate and unreliable and governmental action to implement the Directive was incomplete. The Government failed to prohibit further activity of those parties which had not made the

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1/ Imperial Ordinance No. 101, 23 February 1946.
Home Ministry Ordinance No. 10, 23 February 1946.
2/ Ministry of Home Affairs Orders No. 19 and 20, 25 February 1946.
3/ SCAPIN 548, 4 January 1946. APPENDIX I.

((a)) Memorandum to Chief, GS, "Report of Conference," 27 April 1946.
((b)) Memorandum for Record, GS, "Information Concerning Political Parties," 29 March 1946; Memorandum to Chief, GS, "Report of Conference," 27 April 1946.
((c)) Memorandum for Record, GS, "Information Concerning Political Parties," 29 March 1946.

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required reports but to avoid any unnecessary interference with the approaching April national election it was deemed inadvisable to apply more forcible pressure.

7. On 27 April SCAP informed the Home Ministry that compliance with the Directive was incomplete, particularly regarding required information on political parties and organizations of doubtful character and that full compliance was required.

((a))

8. On 12 June the 23 February ordinances were amended by the Government to conform to SCAP's interpretation of the Directive and to provide for the additional administrative details involved. Increased authority was given to the Minister of Home Affairs to implement the Directive,[1/] and record forms were prescribed for use in reporting the information required by the Directive.[2/] The amended ordinances required reports on assets of prohibited or dissolved organizations, including the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, the Political Society of Great Japan, and their affiliates, agencies and successors.

((b))

9. The function of Japanese police in the enforcement of the Directive was defined on 2 July, after SCAP received complaints that police had made unauthorized house-to-house canvasses to determine the party affiliations of individual Japanese. The Government was advised that police officials could make investigations only if

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1/ Imperial Ordinance No. 312, 12 June 1946. APPENDIX II.
2/ Home Ministry Ordinance No. 27, 12 June 1946. APPENDIX III.

((a)) Memorandum to Chief, GS, "Report of Conference," 27 April 1946.
((b)) Memorandum for the Record, GS, "Application of SCAPIN 548," 6 June 1946.

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asked to do so by the responsible civilian agency and that such in-

((a)) vestigations must be limited to the task specifically assigned.

Application to Economic Organizations

10. The application of various provisions of the Directive was clarified through conferences between SCAP representatives and Government officials. A conference on 3 June 1946 discussed the status of organizations established purely for profit whose bylaws discriminated in any way against foreign nationals. The Government was instructed to provide SCAP with the names of all organizations which excluded foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions, so that the nature of these organizations

((b)) could be considered in determination of status.

Government officials were also informed that organizations discriminating against foreign nationals and having any purpose in

((c)) addition to that of making profit would be considered individually.

11. The application of the Directive to economic organizations was further clarified in conferences held with Home Ministry officials on 5 and 12 June 1946. The Government was advised that no blanket authorization could be given to exempt certain classes of organizations from the Directive but that the principle of creating the least possible disturbance in Japan's legitimate economic life would be observed. To that end responsibility of the Government in the application of the

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((a)) Memorandum for the Record, GS, "Home Ministry Interpretation of Imperial Ordinance No. 101," 5 July 1946.
((b)) Memorandum for the Record, GS, "Application of SCAPIN 548 and Clarification of Scope of Imperial Ordinance 101," 5 July 1946.
((c)) Ibid.

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Directive to nonpolitical organizations was to be limited to the following:

(1) Any organization discovered to be of a type specified in this directive, no matter what its professed nature, must be immediately dissolved.

(2) Certain stipulated categories of economic or cultural organizations must be screened to determine whether they were subject to the Directive. For the time being no other bona fide economic or cultural organizations had to be considered.

(3) The Government could ask exemption for any of the screened organizations found subject to the directive if objectionable personnel were dismissed. ((a))

12. At this time the Government was instructed to screen the following categories:

(1) Economic enterprises whose assets exceeded, in fair market value, ¥ 10,000,000 or whose production or gross sales exceeded ¥ 1,000,000 for any calendar year since 1937, or in the future exceeded these figures.

((a)) Pursuant to the policy of creating the least possible disturbance in the economy and to prevent the dissolution of necessary economic organizations, the Government proposed that the further screening of such enterprises be under the provisions of SCAPIN 550. The Government plan was to be submitted 30 September 1946. Discuss in revision.

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(2) Financial organizations such as the Bank of Japan, all ordinary and special banks, trust companies, savings banks, insurance companies, security exchanges and in addition those credit cooperatives, agricultural associations and loan companies whose assets exceeded ¥ 50,000,000.

((a)) (3) All Chambers of Commerce, Control Associations, Control Companies, Control Unions, Commerce and Industry Associations and Councils, Insurance Associations, Special Companies, Nidan, National Policy Companies and similar companies, associations and organizations associated with the economic life of Japan.

(4) Quasi-governmental enterprises which were not clearly " government services."

(5) Any enterprise or agency which, since 7 July 1937, was engaged in the exploitation of occupied areas, any system of private monopoly, the development of a totalitarian economy in Japan or propagandising for aggressive war.

((b)) 13. Eighteen specified banks were to be screened first, to be followed by munitions companies, national policy companies, special companies, special corporations, control associations, control unions, control companies and agricultural cooperative associations.

((a)) Memorandum for the Record, GS, "Application of SCAPIN 548," 12 June 1946.
((b)) Ibid.

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Application to Labor and Farmers' Unions

14. On 5, 11 and 18 July SCAP clarified the application of the portions of the Organizational Purge Directive dealing with the registration of organizations. Ministry of Home Affairs officials had contended that because labor or farmers' unions sometimes sought to attain political objectives, they should be required to register and provide membership lists as if they were political associations. It was, however, pointed out that the Directive specifically exempted unions from the application of this as long as the union's major aim or activity was economic. If national unions should temporarily devote major attention to national political activity they should be required to register, but not be required to report membership lists as did political parties or associations. ((a))

Property of Dissolved Organizations

15. The Government was specifically ordered by the 4 January Directive [1] to take action to prevent all transactions involving property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by organizations within the purview of the Directive's terms. Such property was to be held in the Government's custody and complete records were to be obtained and kept available for public inspection. Any of this property suitable for the production of food, shelter or other necessities of life was to be promptly exploited for those purposes.

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1/ SCAPIN 548, 4 January 1946. APPENDIX I.

((a)) Memorandum for the Record, GS, "Interpretation of SCAPIN 548," 15 July 1946. Memorandum for the Record, GS, 18 July 1946.

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16. On 22 April 1946 the Government was directed[1] to submit an inventory report of all property taken into custody and a report of all properties utilized or to be utilized for livelihood purposes, the income derived therefrom and its uses. Licenses issued by SCAP were required for the use of such property.

((a))

17. On 13 May the Government was instructed[2] that the provisions of the 22 April Directive applied to specifically named organizations, all their affiliates, agencies and successors regardless of the date of dissolution or whether the dissolution was voluntary or involuntary. On 2 August 1946 an army and a navy organization were declared[3] to come under the terms of the 4 January Directive. Their dissolution was ordered and the Government instructed to control their property.

18. Real properties of the dissolved organizations were licensed by SCAP for use by governmental agencies and private and corporate persons. No rental charges were required of governmental agencies, but private and corporate persons were charged rentals in accordance with

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1/ SCAPIN 1069-A, 22 April 1946.
2/ SCAPIN 1218-A, 13 May 1946.
3/ SCAPIN 1889-A, 2 August 1946.

((a)) By 14 August 1947 reports of inventory of dissolved organizations were received from 38 organizations having 7,112 branches showing assets of ¥ 112,295,417 following expense payments and disposals of ¥ 361,937,000. Other dissolved organizations reported no assets principally because of voluntary dissolution and disposal of assets between 15 August 1945 and 4 January 1946. Preliminary studies of the expenses and disposals of the 38 organizations which reported same, revealed that a good portion consisted of legitimate liquidation expense; however, considerable intentional dissipation was evident. In addition there was evidence of deliberate concealment, particularly of real property. Such activities were facilitated by the fact that each branch acted in most cases independently of the central office. Discuss in revision. (Be sure to coordinate with GFC)

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existing Japanese regulations. In addition the Japanese Government was directed to pay out of rental income, such expenses as were considered necessary to protect, preserve and maintain the property in its custody. In the case of the property used for governmental purposes, the Government was responsible for maintenance, care and preservation.

((a))

((a)) Report, CPC/GF, GHQ, SCAP, AG 386.7, "Treatment of Certain Public and Private Japanese Property," 14 August 1947, to War Department, CAD.

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The Political Purge

19. The Directive providing for the removal and exclusion of undesirable persons from public office was issued on 4 January 1946, simultaneously with the Directive ordering the abolition of certain organizations.

20. The Directive 1/ contained the following general provisions:

(1) It ordered the Government to remove from public office and exclude from government service all persons who had been active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression, influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society, or influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance

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1/ SCAPIN 550, 4 January 1946. APPENDIX IV.

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Political Society or the Political Association of Great Japan.

(2) It defined the term "public office" as any position in the government service customarily filled by persons of the first three civil service ranks or any other position not customarily filled by a member of the civil service which was equivalent or superior in rank to the first three civil service grades.

(3) It defined "government service" as all positions in the central and prefectural governments and all of their agencies and local branches, bureaus and offices. The term also included all positions in corporations, associations and other organizations in which the Government had a financial interest representing actual or working control.

(4) It defined the term "remove from public office" to mean the discharge of a person from the office held and the termination of his influence therein directly or indirectly without benefit of public or private pensions or opportunity of hearing prior to removal.

(5) It defined "exclude from government service" to bar purged individuals from holding any other positions in the government service, and to bar from government service individuals of purgeable categories who were not holding public office.

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(6) It required the revision of any existing civil service qualification regulations which hindered the appointment to government positions of officials who will foster the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people and who will respect fundamental human rights. . .[8]

(7) It ordered that removals from office be effected as expeditiously as possible, with priority given to the more important positions.

(8) It provided for the temporary retention of those required to insure demobilization of the Japanese armed forces in outlying areas or to carry out the provisions of the Directive and also for the temporary reinstatement of certain essential officials needed to perform indispensable peaceful executive activities of the Government.

(9) It included in its application candidates for prefectural governor, for mayor of a city or for either House of the Diet.

(10) It specified the procedures to be followed and reports to be made in carrying out the Purge.

(11) It made willful falsification or failure to make complete disclosures in any questionnaire or report punishable as a violation of the Surrender terms. The Government was ordered to provide adequate punishment in Japanese courts under Japanese law.

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21. The Directive 1/ defined the persons to be removed and

((a)) excluded; these were included under the following categories:

(1) War criminals.

(2) Career military and naval personnel, special police and officials of the war ministries.

(3) Influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies.

(4) Persons influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

(5) Officers of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion.

(6) Governors of occupied territories.

(7) Additional militarists and ultranationalists.

Immediate Effects

22. The immediate political effects of the Directive included

((b)) Cabinet reorganization; changes in Diet membership; resignations, removals, promotions and new appointments in the national and prefectural governments and replacement and selection of candidates for the political parties.

1/ SCAPIN 550, 4 January 1946. APPENDIX IV.

((a)) CIC, Compliance Branch, Memorandum "Compilation of SCAPIN 550 and Regulations and Interpretations Published by Imperial Japanese Government," 26 April 1946.

((b)) Monthly Report, GS, "Civil Government and Administration," January 1946.

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23. A number of members of the Shidehara Cabinet were affected by this Directive. After much debate and negotiation the Cabinet decided on 11 January to reorganize rather than to resign. The reorganization which included three new ministers and six new executives was
((a)) completed on 13 January.

24. Immediately after the Cabinet reorganization there were a number of personnel changes in the Government. Some incumbents resigned voluntarily while others were expelled. Within the Ministry of Home Affairs and the offices under its jurisdiction 32 officials
((b)) were retired and 10 were removed from office.

25. The Progressive Party received a serious blow when all but three of its leaders were affected. President Chuji Machida and other
((c)) important leaders of the Progressive Party resigned on 18 February.

The Cooperative Party lost 25 of its 28 members in the Diet. On 23 February members of the Executive Committee who came under the
((d)) Directive resigned en bloc.

The Liberal Party lost 13 of its officers and 12 of its ex-Diet members. One of the chief concerns of the Liberal Party following the Purge was the status of its president, Ichiro Hatoyama, who
((e)) remained under suspicion throughout the election campaign.

The Purge Directive took a heavy toll from the right-wing

((a)) Monthly Report, GS, "Civil Government and Administration," January 1946.
((b)) Ibid.
((c)) Ibid., February 1946.
((d)) Ibid.
((e)) Ibid.

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faction of the Social Democratic Party. The leadership and membership of

((a)) the Communist Party were not affected.

Legal and Administrative Implementation

26. The first purge criteria were announced by the Cabinet on 9 February 1946 and affected influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies described in the 4 January 1946 Organizational Purge Directive, and officials of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and Polit-

((b)) ical Association of Great Japan. The Cabinet announcement further suggested that all persons recommended for election by the Tojo Cabinet in 1942 should "refrain from running as candidates for office" and that all persons who had not been recommended should "exercise reflection and

((c)) self-discipline."

27. These categories were applied early so as to discourage probable purgees from becoming candidates for the Diet in the 10 April 1946 national election. As a result of the Cabinet announcement, 363 recommended candidates in the 1942 election, who were later disqualified by

((d)) the Purge, did not file as candidates in the election. The remaining 113 recommended candidates filed and were later disqualified.

((a)) Monthly Report, GS, "Civil Government and Administration," February 1946.

((b)) CIC, Compliance Branch Memorandum, "Compilation of SCAPIN 550 and Regulations and Interpretations Published by Imperial Japanese Government," 26 April 1946.

((c)) Monthly Report, GS, "Civil Government and Administration,"February 1946.

((d)) Letter, GHQ, SCAP, AG 091.112, GS, "Report on Purge of Public Office Holders Under SCAPIN 550," 2 August 1946, to Chief of Staff, War Department.

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25. On 28 February the Government incorporated in law 1/ the legal provisions necessary to implement the 4 January Directive. All incumbent officials of the first three civil service grades, those who held positions of comparable authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the Government and all applicants for future elective or appointive government positions were subject to screening to determine their eligibility. The ordinances incorporated and in some cases expanded the definition of the categories of undesirable persons given in the Directive. The provisions of the Purge were declared applicable to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies; and agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and the Political Association of Great Japan were enumerated and influential positions in each were listed. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion was greater than in the Directive and the exact title and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories were defined.

Methods 2/ for the removal of persons who were found to fall under the provisions of the Directive were established. Persons who willfully made false entries or incomplete disclosures in questionnaires or reports were made liable to penal servitude or imprisonment for less than

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1/ Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1, promulgated 28 February 1946. APPENDIXES V and VI.
2/ Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1, 28 February 1946. APPENDIX VI.

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one year or to a fine of less than ¥ 5,000.[1/]

39. A special Cabinet announcement on 10 March 1946 established extensive criteria for the determination of individuals subject to purge as "additional militarists and ultranationalists." Persons who

((a)) held specifically listed, high-level policy-forming positions in the Government between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were declared subject to removal and exclusion from public office.

Individuals who had occupied government positions of lesser importance were subject to the Purge provided there was conspicuous evidence that they played an important part in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with Japanese dominated nations, or in the initiation of the Greater East Asia War; in the suppression of opponents of militarism; in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries; or in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The Cabinet's interpretation also brought under the Purge: persons in the police and judiciary who had engaged in the suppression of civil liberties; other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had participated in proscribed activities; officials of companies that produced munitions;

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1/ Imperial Ordinance No. 109, 28 February 1946, Art VIII. APPENDIX V.

((a)) CIC, Compliance Branch Memorandum, "Compilation of SCAPIN 550 and Regulations and Interpretations Published By Imperial Japanese Government," 26 April 1946.

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the highest officers of patriotic societies not previously listed and persons recommended as House of Representatives' candidates by the Government in 1942.

On 16 April 1946 the Government announced a detailed definition of the criteria for the determination of police and judicial personnel subject to purge and who did not fall within earlier defined categories.

Effect on Candidates in April 1946 Election

30. In order to prevent purged politicians from participating in the Diet election campaign by supporting puppet candidates, the Government on 22 February promulgated an emergency imperial ordinance.[1/] This ordinance stipulated that election campaign costs paid by persons other than the candidates or their campaign managers must be included in the total tabulation of election expenses already strictly limited by law. This enactment was intended to prevent campaign expenditures by friends of candidates, supposedly without their knowledge.

31. Qualifications of all candidates for the House of Representatives were examined by the Government prior to the 10 April election. Of the 2,384 who filed, 383 were disqualified. The disqualified candidates included 113 persons previously ruled ineligible because they had ((a)) been recommended candidates in the 1942 election.

32. After the election but prior to 20 June when the Diet convened

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1/ Imperial Ordinance No. 96, 22 February 1946.

((a)) Letter, GHQ, SCAP, AG 091.112, GS, "Report on Purge of Public Office Holders Under SCAPIN 550," 2 August 1946, to Chief of Staff, War Department.

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for business, all of the successful Diet candidates were re-examined. Nine of the elected members were removed by the Government. One candidate, Ichirō Hatoyama, president of the Liberal Party and aspirant for the Premiership was removed by SCAP directive after the Government had failed to act.[1/]

33. On 8 June the Government was directed to remove and exclude Giichi Matsumura, member of the House of Peers and nominee for mayor of Kudamatsu City, who had been screened and approved by the Government.[2/] Matsumura was found to fall within the category of persons who had "denounced or contributed to the seizure of the opponents of the militaristic regime."[3/]

Effect on Other Groups

34. Application of the Political Purge Directive brought about a critical situation in the Cabinet on 10 March when the Cabinet announced extension of the Directive which affected four more of its members: Viscount Keisō Shibusawa, Minister of Finance; Sankuro Ogasawara, Minister of Commerce and Industry; Chuzo Iwata, Minister of Justice; and Joji Matsumoto, Minister without Portfolio. The Government requested and obtained SCAP's permission to retain these ministers until after the election. A fifth cabinet member, State Minister Ichizo Kobayashi, who was affected by the extension of the Purge Directive, resigned the

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1/ SCAPIN 919, 3 May 1946. APPENDIX VII.
2/ SCAPIN 1007, 8 June 1946. APPENDIX VIII.
3/ SCAPIN 550, 4 January 1946. APPENDIX IV.

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((a)) day before the announcement was made, and was subsequently designated as a purgee.

35. In March 30 new members were appointed to the House of Peers without having been checked for eligibility to hold public office. On 27 March SCAP directed that these appointees be denied their prerogatives until the Government had determined their eligibility and obtained SCAP's approval. 1/

Temporary Retention in Office

36. On several occasions SCAP granted permission for the temporary retention of individuals in public office. These included four members of the Shidehara Cabinet, the President of the Board of Trade and the Mayor of Tokyo. Extensions were made for the purpose of allowing the Government sufficient time to find successors for peculiarly qualified

((b)) persons performing essential governmental functions. All of these individuals were subsequently removed by a specified date. 2/

The retention of approximately 4,000 officials of the Demobilization Board, chiefly former army and navy officers subject to mandatory removal as career military personnel, was approved in May 1946. The Government had formally requested their retention to carry out the demobilization, repatriation and reassimilation into civilian life of

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1/ SCAPIN 548, 27 March 1946. APPENDIX IX.
2/ SCAPIN 1047, 30 June 1946. APPENDIX X.
SCAPIN 1085, 26 July 1946. APPENDIX XI.
SCAPIN 1175, 4 September 1946. APPENDIX XII.
SCAPIN 1176, 4 September 1946. APPENDIX XIII.

((a)) Monthly Report, GS, 'Civil Government and Administration,' March 1946.
((b)) Letter, GHQ, SCAP, AG 091.112, GS, 'Report on Purge of Public Office Holders Under SCAPIN 550,' 2 August 1946, to Chief of Staff, War Department.

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approximately 1,500,000 military personnel who were still overseas.

Administration by Japanese Government

37. Each Government ministry distributed questionnaires to its affected employees and established a ministry screening committee which reviewed the questionnaires. Briefs of the cases were proposed by the Chief of the Personnel Section of the Cabinet Secretariat and forwarded to the central screening committee.

The Ministry of Home Affairs distributed questionnaires to candidates for election to the Diet. The completed questionnaires were submitted to the Ministry which turned them over to the Cabinet Secretariat for processing.

This committee was first called the Past Records Examination Committee and later the Committee for Examining Fitness for Public Office. By Imperial Ordinance 1/ on 29 June 1946 it became the Public Office Qualification Commission, charged with the responsibility of making a final examination of individual cases and of recommending action to be taken. The Commission's chairman and five commissioners were appointed by the Cabinet.

The cases were submitted to the Prime Minister, who made the final decision for the Government. They were then sent to SCAP for review of the action taken.

36. On 10 May 1946 Government representatives were informed that:

1/ Imperial Ordinance No. 346, promulgated 29 June 1946. APPENDIX XIV.

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(1) implementation of the Purge Directive was not thorough enough; (2) implementation must be speeded up; (3) if necessary steps were not taken immediately, SCAP would remove the responsible Japanese officials; and (4) if results remained unsatisfactory, SCAP would take over the implementation of the Purge Directive. 1/

Status of Purge

39. The Government reported that by 29 July 1946 it had completed the screening of all holders of public office in the following governmental agencies and positions:

(1) Privy Council.

(2) House of Peers.

(3) House of Representatives.

(4) All Shinnin-rank officials. These are the highest rank of Japanese government service who are appointed by the Emperor in personal audience, and include the Premier, cabinet ministers, regional presidents and high judicial officers.

(5) Officials in all cabinet ministries down to bureau chiefs and in selected ministries down to section chiefs.

(6) Prefectural governors and city mayors.

(7) Presidents and division directors of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, and chiefs of district courts.

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1/ Report of Cabinet Deliberation, 10 May 1946.

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(8) Officers and directors of the Bank of Japan and other special banks, national policy associations, control associations and control companies.

(9) Public Procurator General, chief procurators of Courts of Appeals and district courts.

((a)) (10) Directors of local bureaus under jurisdiction of the various ministries.

(11) Presidents, deans and principals of universities, colleges and other schools under the direct control of the Ministry of Education.

Excluding the 3,384 persons screened as candidates in the April 1946 election or later as members of the House of Representatives 5,520 additional individuals were reported examined with 814 either bar-

((b)) red or removed by 29 July. An estimated 186,000 additional persons, chiefly career army and navy officers, members of special police agencies and officials of the war ministries, had been automatically excluded from government service.

40. On 30 September the Government reported the results of its screening of persons in the following categories:

((a)) Letter, GHQ, SCAP, AG 091.112, GS, "Report on Purge of Public Office Holders Under SCAPIN 550," 2 August 1946, to Chief of Staff, War Department.

((b)) Ibid.

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Organizations	Screened	Passed	Purged
Privy Council	28	19	9
House of Peers	520	348	172
House of Representatives	465	455	10
Cabinet	98	89	9
Imperial Household	11	9	2
Foreign	112	90	22
Home Affairs	517	173	344
Finance	52	46	6
Justice	236	199	37
Education	1,748	1,695	53
Welfare	85	62	23
Agriculture and Forestry	78	60	18
Commerce and Industry	53	39	14
Transportation	125	117	8
Communications	6	6	0
Government Controlled Banks and Commercial-Industrial Development Organizations	2,273	2,138	135
Electors of "Highest Tax" Members of House of Peers	1,554	1,516	38
Total	7,961	7,061	900

Extension of the Purge of Individuals

41. On 21 August the Government was ordered to prepare a comprehensive plan to accomplish the following:

(1) The exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies of personnel deemed undesirable under the letter and spirit of the Directive.

(2) The removal and exclusion from appointive positions in the prefectural and municipal subdivisions of personnel deemed undesirable under the letter and spirit of the Directive.

(3) The application of the provisions of the Purge Directive

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to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet.

((a)) (4) The exclusion of all purged personnel from all other influential political or economic posts.

42. The Government was advised also that the policies and procedures to be used in screening candidates for prefectural and local assemblies and for appointive offices in prefectural and local governmental subdivisions should be uniform and insofar as practicable should be substantially the same as those used for screening personnel for the

((b)) Diet and for positions in the national Government.

43. The Government was further required to submit its plan promptly for review and approval and to release simultaneously the full

((c)) text of the plan to the public.

((a)) SS, "Statement of Policy and Procedure to Implement the Provisions and Intent of the Purge Directive (SCAPIN 550)," 21 August 1946.
((b)) Ibid.
((c)) Ibid.

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In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel; Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

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Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultra-nationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable

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authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicuous evidence that these individuals had played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had

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participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kinjuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

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On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed. This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie, former intelligence agents, etc., had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

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The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter groups were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organization. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

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The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Facist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc., of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials

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were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were Listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos. 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of the federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

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Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were placed within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

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Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened, and the following report was made by the Japanese Government:

Candidates	Filed	Passed	*Provisionally Passed	Barred
House of Representatives	5,426	3,230	59	137
House of Councillors	1,406	1,365	10	31
Prefectural Governors	451	428	3	20
Mayors of 5 Principal Cities	43	42	-	1

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of these removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet. Of cases held pending for further investigation and determination of exact interpretation of the Purge Ordinances, one governor and six additional members of the House of Councillors were barred.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

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assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engaged in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees."

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been secured, listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. By early September 1947 lists had been compiled of the Governors of Occupied Territories (Category F) and of officials who held certain policy making positions in the Japanese Government between 1937 and 1941 (Category G); and by the end of that month the collection of documentary evidence listing the persons falling under the other various categories and provisions of the Purge Ordinances was rapidly approaching completion.

By early October approximately 1,405 persons, on whom documentary evidence was obtained, had been provisionally designated; this will result in the final designation of over 1,000 persons whose period for submitting protest has expired. Of those provisionally designated 130 individuals submitted letters of protest.

APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65, of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by October 1947 a total of 239 were listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 41 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 16 recommended for reinstatement, while 182 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but in August 1947 a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

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By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies and associations had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public service. There remained at that time the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

This remaining task was largely completed by early October 1947, by which time a total of 3,488 such persons had been screened in almost 300 companies and associations, and the total number of persons removed and/or excluded increased to 360.

Public Information Media Purge

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and antimilitarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of those provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organisational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified officeholders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

Early in October the Japanese Government reported that 134 information media companies had submitted counter-evidence, on which 95 have been acted, resulting in the request to SCAP for approval to remove 12 companies from the black list.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or

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SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP. In 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 4 October 1947 the Japanese Government screened 611,411 cases. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 25,600 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in government, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct or approve reinstatement of 21 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of early October 1947 reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947). 1,067

2. Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - Oct. 1947) 1,941

3. Career officers, gendarmes, intelligence agents, etc, barred by original directive 183,000

4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation 20,000

5. Provisionally designated (2 July 47 - 9 Oct 47). . 1,405

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of

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other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6,000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5,000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

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Category	Persons Provisionally Designated	Persons Purged	Persons Finally Designated
Public Information Media Organizations	967	110	857
Government Information Media Control Agencies	62	3	59
Officials of newspaper companies and news agencies	276	20	256
Book and magazine publishers	255	42	213
Motion picture and theatrical companies	28	0	28
Broadcasting corporations	15	0	15
Writers	331	45	286
Recommended candidates of 1942 elections	353	0	353
Principal officials of Ex-Servicemen's Associations	40,802	1,058	39,744
Officials of Butokukai	823	32	791
Others	111	0	111
GRAND TOTAL	204,304	11,124	193,180

SOURCE: Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee.

As a final action of this phase of the purge program five additional persons were reinstated upon recommendation of the Prime Minister on 19 July. These changes in status are not reflected in the foregoing summaries.

A cabinet pronouncement effective 11 May established an advisory group for Public Office Qualifications Examination within the Prime Minister's Office. It will assist the Prime Minister in the routine checking of the eligibility of applicants and nominees for positions in the public service.

In May the Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General's Office, established by law 15 February and now organizationally complete with local bureaus in the eight regions of Japan, began to function. Action taken in accordance with its mission of observing and investigating compliance with the injunctions against return to public leadership by purgees included the completion of the investigation of violations and referral of the cases to the Public Procurator's Office for prosecution. The Bureau is continuing investigation and surveillance of purged organizations and individuals.

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APPENDIX 11

THE PURGE

On 4 January 1946 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a sweeping directive requiring a purge of all persons who shared responsibility for Japan's program of aggression.

This directive, issued as SCAPIN 550, was designed to remove undesirable persons from positions of influence and authority in the political, economic and social life of Japan. For the fields of education and police, separate similar programs had been initiated as early as October 1945.

The removal and exclusion program has never been either in concept or administration a punitive measure but was and is a technique designed to eliminate the continuity of influence or exercise of power by persons whose past careers showed them to be undesirable leaders for a nation dedicated to democracy and the cause of world peace.

BASIS FOR THE PURGE

Potsdam Declaration

The international basis for the entire purge program is found in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "There must be removed for all time the authority and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

Occupation Directives

In accordance with initial U. S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan SCAP was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that no persons be "allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society". . . . . who have been influential in the activities of Imperial Rule Assistance Organizations, "or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the occupation."

SCAP was further directed to prohibit the retention in or selection for, positions of important responsibility in industry, finance, commerce, agriculture, or public or private financial institutions, agencies or organizations, of any persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, and of all those who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends.

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In the absence of evidence to the contrary, SCAP was directed to assume that persons who held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in any of the fields enumerated above have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.

THE 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

SCAPIN 550 which has become famous as the "4 January Directive" is SCAP's implementation of the early instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Purge Categories

This basic directive ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public office and to exclude from government service exponents of militant nationalism and aggression falling within the following defined categories:

Category A. War Criminals

Category B. Career Military and Naval Personnel: Special Police and Officers of the War Ministries.

This category included members of the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, the Supreme Military Council, the Imperial General Headquarters, the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Supreme Council for direction of the war; all career commissioned officers and enlisted personnel who served in or with the military or naval police or other special or secret intelligence police organizations; and all persons who served as higher officials in the Ministry of War or Ministry of Navy.

Category C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies.

Founders, officers, directors and other important officials, large financial contributors to, or editor of any publication or organ of such societies.

Category D. Persons Influential in the Activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan.

National officers, leading officials in Prefectural or Metropolitan subdivisions, editor of any publication or organ of the above or agencies or affiliates of the above organizations.

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Category E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansion.

Persons who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 were directors, presidents, vice presidents, advisors, auditors or controlling branch managers in Japanese occupied territory of above institutions.

Category F. Governors of Occupied Territories.

Certain specified higher officials such as governor general, civil administrator, and military administrator in Japan's wartime colonial empire.

Category G. Additional Militarists and Ultra-nationalists.

These broad provisions bring under the terms of the directive:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetuated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

INITIAL ACTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING THE PURGE DIRECTIVE

Ordinances Issued

On 27 February 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 109 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 which established the machinery for applying the Directive. These ordinances determined, first, who should be screened, second, who should be classified as undesirable in light of the Directive and third, how the removal of undesirables should be accomplished.

By the terms of these ordinances all incumbent officials of the then first three civil service grades, and those who held positions of comparable

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authority, all staff officers of 114 listed corporations, associations and other organizations under the special control of the government, and all applicants for future elective or appointive posts in the national government were subject to screening to determine their eligibility.

The seven categories of undesirables outlined by the Directive were defined in greater detail by the ordinances as follows:

1. No change was made in the category applying to war criminals (Category A).

2. The one affecting career military and naval personnel (Category B) remained substantially the same.

3. The provisions of Category C were defined as applying to influential members of 123 listed ultranationalistic or secret patriotic societies.

4. The many agencies and affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations (Category D) were enumerated and the influential positions in each duly listed.

5. The number of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion (Category E), as listed in the original directive, was increased.

6. The exact titles and positions of high Japanese officials in occupied territories (Category E) were defined.

7. The broad provisions of Category G were extensively interpreted by a special cabinet announcement appearing shortly after the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109.

It brought under the purge memorandum all persons who had occupied certain policy-forming positions on the highest government level between the outbreak of "The China Incident" and the Surrender.

It listed other high government positions of somewhat lesser importance and provided for the purge of individuals who had occupied them providing there was conspicuous evidence that these individuals had played an important part: (a) in the conclusion of alliances with the Axis or with puppet nations in preparation for the Greater East Asia War, (b) in the suppression of opponents of militarism, (c) in concluding economic agreements with occupied countries, (d) in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

The interpretation of Category G also brought under the purge: (a) those officials who had over a long period of time engaged in the suppression of civil liberties, (b) other officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had

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participated in activities proscribed under Category G, (c) officials of companies that had produced the weapons and sinews of war, (d) highest officers of patriotic societies not listed under Category C and (e) any person who was recommended as a candidate by the TOJO Government in 1942.

The ordinances provided for a screening committee to examine questionnaires and to decide upon individual eligibility. In the event that the individual was found to fall under the criteria as defined in the ordinance, the Prime Minister was to designate him as an undesirable person, and to order his removal and exclusion from office. The ordinances also provided for the collection of questionnaires and contained a penalty clause designed to insure that such questionnaires would be filled out truthfully and completely.

Initial Operation and Effect Of The Purge

The impact of the Purge Directive was immediate and profound. On 13 January 1946, only 9 days after the Directive was issued, the Cabinet of Baron Kinjuro Shidehara underwent extensive re-organization. Three ministers and six cabinet executives and many other high government officials resigned. In view of the imminence of the approaching April elections the government released the criteria as soon as they had been determined in the form of Cabinet announcements, without waiting until the entire bill had been written. Thus, by the end of February when Imperial Ordinance No. 109 was officially promulgated, action had already been taken to bring under the purge (a) persons who had been influential in patriotic and secret societies, (b) influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations, and (c) career naval and military personnel.

On 10 March 1946, the day of the Cabinet announcement interpreting Category G, the Shidehara Cabinet sustained a second wave of resignations; five ministers retired. Many members of the House of Peers followed suit. Within the month 30 new appointees, duly screened under the new ordinances, were appointed to fill the vacancies thus created.

That part of the 10 March interpretation which rendered ineligible for public service all members of the Lower House who had been recommended by the Tojo Government greatly altered the political scene. Leadership of political parties changed, political allegiances shifted and new candidates were sought to replace those previously scheduled to run in the April elections. Of the 3,384 candidates for the Lower House, 252 were barred. Of the 252 barred, 113 were candidates recommended by Prime Minister Tojo in the 1942 elections. Another 268 "recommended candidates" did not file.

When the Diet convened on 20 June 1946 all successful candidates to the Lower House were re-screened and their cases reviewed. As a result ten more were removed, nine of these by Japanese Government order and one, Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Liberal Party, by SCAP directive.

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On 16 May 1946 the Japanese Government prepared a still more comprehensive and detailed interpretation of those paragraphs of Category G relating to other government officials, members of the Diet, artists, writers, publishers, editors and businessmen who had engaged in activities proscribed under the Directive. These extended criteria were not publicly announced at the time lest such an announcement interfere with the completion of screening by the scheduled deadline. Nevertheless, this document represented an early extension of the purge program into industry and the field of public information, an extension to be perfected and completed the following year.

Statistical Summary

By August 1946 the Japanese Government announced the substantial completion of the initial phase of the purge program. The Privy Council, the Diet, the Cabinet, Prefectural Governors, all officials of the then first three ranks, judges of higher courts, officials of government controlled companies, procurators of certain higher courts, and officials of higher educational institutions directly under the Ministry of Education had all been screened. These totalled 5,520 persons, of which 814 were barred or removed, and 4,706 were passed. This figure was subsequently increased by 4 January 1947 to 8,899 persons screened, of which 7,832 had been passed and 1,067 barred or removed. In addition 183,000 career officers of the army and navy, members of the gendarmerie, former intelligence agents, etc., had been categorically barred. The way was now clear for the anticipated extension of the program to local government, to industry and to the field of public information.

EXTENSION OF PURGE PROGRAM

Preliminary Steps

In August 1946 a statement of SCAP policy was issued requiring the Japanese Government to prepare a comprehensive plan for: (a) the exclusion from prefectural and municipal assemblies and from appointive posts of all personnel deemed undesirable under the provisions of SCAPIN 550; (b) the application of that directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet; (c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from any influential political or economic posts. This statement also provided that the Japanese Government should publish the full text of the plan simultaneously with its submission to SCAP.

The Extension Plan

On 22 October the government submitted to SCAP and simultaneously released to the public a plan which comprehensively implemented the 4 January Directive.

In the ensuing two months the essential features of this plan were incorporated into definitive and appropriate form for issuance as law.

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The Extension Ordinances

On 4 January 1947, one year from issuance of the original directive, the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1947 and Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, thus implementing all the features of the approved plan. These ordinances contained provisions which were designed to reach into all fields.

Criteria for Screening

The screenable positions were extended to include all elective and appointive posts in the national and local governments and specified positions in certain companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations. These latter groups were defined to be positions in: companies in which the government had special interests; organizations subsidized by the government or serving for the public benefit; principle newspaper companies, news agencies, publishing companies, motion picture and theatrical companies, broadcasting corporations and other media of mass communication; political parties, their branches and similar organizations; and influential companies, financial institutions and other economic organization. The specific offices considered to be policy-making positions and approximately 470 such companies, organizations, etc., were specifically listed.

Criteria for Purging

In a manner similar to that in which definition of screenable positions was enlarged, the purge criteria were also more specifically defined.

No changes were made in the definition of the categories applicable to war criminals (Category A) career military and naval personnel, etc. (Category B), officials of financial and development companies involved in Japanese expansion (Category E) and officials in occupied territories (Category F). With regard to the influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies (Category C) the criteria were specifically defined to include those persons in the local branches thereof who had held positions comparable to those previously defined as applying only to the national level. The criteria applicable to persons influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, (Category D) were further defined in the case of parent organizations and major affiliates to include officials of all local subdivisions thereof, down to and including chiefs of town and village branches.

The category in which the most far-reaching and comprehensive definitions were made was that applying to additional militarists and ultranationalists (Category G).

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The provision in this category, implemented by Cabinet announcement of 10 March 1946 described heretofore, which applied to government officials and professional men who had participated in activities such as mentioned in this category was defined more clearly. Those falling under the provisions of the ordinance were government officials who took part in the planning or execution of propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of (1) instigating war; (2) suppressing opponents of jingoism; (3) advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, and militarism or ultranationalism; (4) guiding or controlling thought or speech for the same purpose; (5) political direction or economic exploitation of Japanese occupied territories; (6) furthering important plans for wartime general mobilization or economic control, and other plans for the direction of war.

Diet members in or outside the Diet who had in writing, speech or action been conspicuously active in instigating or directing war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or inspiring dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Facist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism were considered undesirable within the purview of the provision.

Men of letters and artists who by their works had advocated aggression or militant nationalism, actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through their political or philosophic doctrine laid down an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of a similar nature, or the China Incident or the Pacific War; who had advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda of the above effect; who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or antimilitaristic ideologies; or who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism were by this provision brought under the terms of the Directive. This added definition made it possible to measure by a clearer standard the writings, speeches, articles, news reports, etc., of this group of people.

Closely associated with the above was the more elaborate interpretation of the criteria as applied to the principal officials and editorial personnel of organizations in the information media field. As published in the Cabinet Ordinance certain officials of newspaper companies, magazine or book publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations and any other media of mass communication in or outside Japan who held office during the period between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 and whose companies engaged in the activities listed in the preceding paragraph as criteria for judging men of letters and artists were brought under the Directive. These listed officials

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were the Chairman, Vice-chairman, President, Vice-president, Managing Director, Standing Director, Chief of Compilation Bureau, Chief of Research Bureau, Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Chief of Editorial Staff, or any other official who exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above positions. Previously the criteria as it applied to the information media field had been so vaguely defined as to be difficult of application; this had largely been remedied.

Perhaps the most sweeping extension of the provisions of this broad category, was in the interpretations as they applied to certain top officials of what had previously been referred to as "influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms or producing iron or steel." This category had now been broadened to include all policy-making officials down to but not including ordinary directors, but including all other officials, regardless of title, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the above in any company which was conspicuously influential in the manufacture of strategic or critical material of war, conspicuously monopolistic in the production of basic productive materials or business of communications or transportation, or domestic or foreign trade; holding companies or influential companies closely associated thereto; and companies capitalized in excess of one hundred million yen or which had commanded excessive economic power. Two hundred and forty-six such companies were Listed in the ordinance.

Injunctions

Contained in Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 are four injunctions designed to prevent the continuity of influence and power by purgees in those positions and organizations in the public service from which they had been removed. Penalty clauses are included which make violators of the above injunctions liable to confinement for not more than three years or to a fine not exceeding 15,000 yen.

Non-Succession Provisions

A feature designed to allow new leadership to come to the front in municipal governments was incorporated in Imperial Ordinances Nos, 3 and 4 of 1947, also issued on 4 January 1947. These ordinances provided that mayors, deputy-mayors, headmen of wards in Tokyo, headmen and deputy-headmen of towns and villages and headmen of the federations of neighborhood associations (CHONAI KAI CHO and BURAKU KAI CHO), who had held such positions consecutively from 1 September 1945 until 1 September 1946, even though they did not fall under the provisions of the purge ordinance, were to be barred from filing as candidates for those respective positions for a period of four years. So much of this as it applied to the headmen of federations of neighborhood associations was revoked when, on 3 March 1947, these federations were abolished.

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Administration

Because of the increased amount of screening anticipated at all levels, estimated by the government at between 500,000 and 700,000 cases, a reorganization of the screening system was effected by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947.

This ordinance provided for one Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, forty-six Prefectural Committees (including 5 major cities) and 118 Municipal Committees (cities with population of 50,000 or more).

The Central Committee was made responsible to the Prime Minister who makes final decision on all cases screened by that committee. The local committees make recommendations to their respective prefectural governors who give final decision thereon.

The Central Committee's authority was limited to positions in the national government, positions in organizations comparable thereto, and the top elective posts of the prefectures and 5 principal cities. All other posts in local government and those in local branches of screenable organizations were placed within the screening authority of the local committees.

Publicity

The results obtained by the publicity of the extended purge plan in October 1946 made it desirable that in the future all activities and results in connection with the purge be given wide publicity. This publicity program is accomplished in several ways. The Central Government, through the Prime Minister, the governors, and the mayors of the five principal cities, releases to the press and posts semi-monthly bulletins listing by name all those persons who have been screened during the preceding two weeks, together with results of the screening. The questionnaires of all such persons together with copies of the purge ordinances are made available for public inspection at the offices of the screening committees concerned. A copy of the questionnaire of each candidate is also available for public inspection at the office of the appropriate election administration committee, as well as the screening committee's office. News releases and radio broadcasts explain to the people not only the purpose behind the purge but also the important provisions of the purge ordinances.

Schedule of Screening

The order in which various groups would be screened was determined by schedule. Proposed appointees for local committees were screened first. The general elections then impending necessitated screening election officials and candidates next. Screening of economic entities, principal public offices, political parties and public information media organizations followed.

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Activities Prior to Elections

Prior to the General Elections in April 1947 all candidates for the more important elective posts were screened, and the following report was made by the Japanese Government:

Candidates	Filed	Passed	*Provisionally Passed	Barred
House of Representatives	3,426	3,230	59	137
House of Councillors	1,406	1,365	10	31
Prefectural Governors	451	428	3	20
Mayors of 5 Principal Cities	43	42	-	1

*No final decision could be reached in these cases noted as "provisionally passed" because research in the information media field had not been completed.

During the same period the Local Committees screened an estimated 72,550 candidates for headmen of wards, towns, and villages; 21,126 candidates for deputy-mayors, deputy-headmen and accountants of cities, towns and villages; and about 42,252 members of election administrative committees.

Activities Subsequent to Elections

Subsequent to the elections and prior to assuming office, successful candidates for the important elective posts, screened by the Central Committee were re-examined. Eleven members-elect to the House of Representatives and four members-elect to the House of Councillors were removed. One of those removed was ISHIBASHI, Tanzan, former Finance Minister of the Yoshida Cabinet. Of cases held pending for further investigation and determination of exact interpretation of the Purge Ordinances, one governor and six additional members of the House of Councillors were barred.

The Central Screening Committee also post-screened 2,803 successful candidates for prefectural assemblies and 284 assemblymen of the five principal cities.

During the same period the Local Committees post-screened 158,757 persons who had been elected to the assemblies of cities, wards, towns and villages.

Economic Phase

This phase began about 15 April 1947, at which time it was estimated that 3,200 persons holding policy positions in approximately 300 companies would require screening.

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assume positions legally screenable. They also received pensions and other benefits to which, if they had been purged, they would not be entitled.

On 12 March 1947 the government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 77, which is primarily directed against those potential or "invisible" purgees who engaged in political activity, and as such cannot effectively be applied to all "invisible purgees."

On 2 July 1947, the government issued Cabinet Order No. 119 of 1947 which provides that the Prime Minister can effect the provisional designation of any person concerning whom there is sufficient evidence to indicate that he falls within the purview of the Memorandum. This designation is effected by individually notifying the persons concerned. A period of thirty days is provided from the date of receipt of such designation during which the person so notified can, if he so desires, file a letter of exemption with a questionnaire which is examined and processed in the normal manner. If no such exception is filed within the thirty day period, the designation becomes effective under the provisions of the basic Ordinance, and is publicly announced and made a matter of official record.

By the end of July 1947 documentary evidence had been secured, listing substantially all officials who held policy positions in the designated economic companies between 7 July 1937 to 2 September 1945. By early September 1947 lists had been compiled of the Governors of Occupied Territories (Category F) and of officials who held certain policy making positions in the Japanese Government between 1937 and 1941 (Category G); and by the end of that month the collection of documentary evidence listing the persons falling under the other various categories and provisions of the Purge Ordinances was rapidly approaching completion.

By early October approximately 1,405 persons, on whom documentary evidence was obtained, had been provisionally designated; this will result in the final designation of over 1,000 persons whose period for submitting protest has expired. Of those provisionally designated 130 individuals submitted letters of protest.

APPEAL BOARD

On 23 February 1947 the Japanese Government promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 65 of 1947 setting up a Board of Appeal. Prior to this time any person, who felt that a mistake had been made or an injustice committed in his case could appeal to the Prime Minister. However, relatively few such appeals had been received. But with the greatly enlarged amount of screening conducted, appeals increased until by October 1947 a total of 239 were listed with the Appeal Board. Of these, 41 were rejected or recommended for rejection, 16 recommended for reinstatement, while 182 were undergoing either examination or deliberation. Initially Ordinance No. 65 provided that before an appeal could be submitted an appellant must have vacated his position; however, in July 1947, this provision of the Ordinance was revoked and appeal is now possible immediately upon designation. At first the Appeal Board was handicapped by lack of a sufficient secretariat but in August 1947 a Cabinet Order was issued which provided a secretariat sufficiently large to enable the Board to investigate and prepare cases more promptly.

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By the middle of July 1947 approximately 3,150 persons holding leading and influential positions in over 240 companies and associations had been screened and their cases reviewed by SCAP; a total of 292 persons had been removed and/or excluded from public service. There remained at that time the screening of those persons whose questionnaires had not yet been obtained, the seeking out of those whose positions were not listed in the mandatory provisions of the ordinances but who had, nevertheless, exercised influence and authority commensurate with such listed positions and the formal designation of those who had resigned to escape the legal injunctions against purgees.

This remaining task was largely completed by early October 1947, by which time a total of 3,488 such persons had been screened in almost 300 companies and associations, and the total number of persons removed and/or excluded increased to 360.

Public Information Media Purge

Paragraph 5 of the "remarks" section of Appendix I, Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 constituted the basis of the Public Information Media Purge. This paragraph brings under the provisions of the Directive any scholar, journalist or editor and any principal official of a publishing house, newspaper or magazine, broadcasting corporation, motion picture or theatrical company who between 7 July 1937 and 7 December 1941 advocated aggression, or militant nationalism, espoused totalitarianism or a advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation over other nations, denounced liberals and antimilitarists, or in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultranationalism.

The just and equitable application of those provisions necessitated extensive research in every field of public information, including not only a study of the media itself but of the organizational structure of public information companies. This program was undertaken in March 1947 by a Cabinet Secretariat sub-committee, which during the ensuing three months compiled a list of 225 newspapers and news agencies, 15 motion picture companies, 5 broadcasting companies and 5 organizations controlling the dissemination of information, deemed to have engaged in activities proscribed under Category G. This list was published as part of an amendment to the "remarks" outlined above. This amendment brought under the provisions of the Directive specified officeholders in listed companies but provided an opportunity for any individual or company to produce satisfactory evidence as to why exemption should be granted.

Early in October the Japanese Government reported that 134 information media companies had submitted counter-evidence, on which 95 have been acted, resulting in the request to SCAP for approval to remove 12 companies from the black list.

PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

This term grew out of the need to prevent persons who had resigned to escape being purged from legally continuing their influence, which they might have exercised as long as they did not publicly commit actions or

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SUMMARY

From its inception the Purge has remained preventative. Although SCAP was authorized to intern active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression, the desire to preserve the preventative nature of the program restricted the use of this authority to suspected war criminals only.

Except for the initial Purge Directive issued to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946 and certain memoranda issued after post-review of the government's action directing the removal of specific individuals, SCAP has insisted that the Japanese Government itself implement and administer the purge program, subject to the right reserved by SCAP to review any action of the Japanese Government to insure compliance with the word and spirit of SCAPIN 550.

By 4 January 1947 of 8,899 cases acted upon by the Japanese Government 1,770 had been reviewed by SCAP. In 27 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Between 4 January 1947 and 4 October 1947 the Japanese Government screened 611,411 cases. Of the total number screened during this period SCAP reviewed 25,600 cases, representing persons holding important elective and appointive posts in government, officials in the major economic and financial concerns, and influential persons in the political and social life of Japan. In 47 instances the action of the Japanese Government was disapproved.

Further action by SCAP upon post-review of the Japanese Government's action has been to direct or approve reinstatement of 21 individuals unjustly or mistakenly barred or removed.

Statistics on persons affected by the Purge Program as of early October 1947 reduce to the following approximate totals:

1. Barred and removed - Initial phase (4 Jan 1946 - 4 Jan 1947). 1,067

2. Barred and removed under the Extension (4 Jan 1947 - Oct. 1947) 1,941

3. Career officers, gendarmes, intelligence agents, etc, barred by original directive 183,000

4. Persons who resigned their positions in order to avoid designation 20,000

5. Provisionally designated (2 July 47 - 9 Oct 47). . 1,405

These figures do not, of course, include the tens of thousands of

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other undesirable leaders who are forever barred from Public Service but who have held no office since the purge became effective and therefore have not yet been designated by name. Nor are nearly 6,000 Thought Control and Special Higher Police removed by SCAP's Civil Liberties Directive of October 1945 included. Because they are barred only from positions in the Justice, Welfare, and Home Ministries and from police work, their status is somewhat different from that of persons purged under SCAPIN 550 who are barred from all Public Service. A similar group, likewise not included in the above, is the approximately 5,000 teachers who have been removed from the field of education.

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Range

Red - what was in our original

Blue - have or will incorporate (new since our F.C. draft went over)

Green - Extraneous

Not used

1.- Duplication of data in more appropriate monograph

2 - " " " " Chapt I, subject monograph

3 - Considered extraneous

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CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

20 November 1947

RECOMMENDED MODIFICATION OF MONOGRAPH,

SUBJECT: "THE POLITICAL PURGE".

1. EXPLANATION - In the following recommended modifications the suggested wording has been prepared for additions and for those portions which require change. All other comments and identifying terms, such as titles, page and paragraph are underlined.

Title Sheet - The basic title, "The Political Purge", if it is to be used to refer to the implementation of both SCAPIN 550 and SCAPIN 548, should read: "The Political Purge and The Abolition of Politically Undesirable Organizations".

Index Sheet - Under Section III, General, reference to 4 October 1946 Directive should be omitted. The title of the other sub-titles should be modified; see specific recommendations dealing with these as they exist in the main body of the monograph.

I INITIAL POLICIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Page 1 Par. 1. The Supreme Commander's responsibility for the abolition of certain organizations and for the purge of individuals from positions of influence in Japanese political life followed from the Potsdam Declaration, the U. S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan and subsequent basic policy directives.

Par. 2. The Potsdam Declaration, by requiring the Japanese Government to remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people, provided for the elimination of undesirable organizations whose purposes ran counter to the aim of this requirement.

Page 3 - A new paragraph should be inserted between Par. 7 and Par. 8, and it should read as follows:

8. The basic directive ~~also aimed at~~ required the elimination of certain elements in the Japanese Economic System by providing that the Supreme Commander "prohibit the retention in or select for positions of important responsibility or influence in industry, finance, commerce, or agriculture of all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and

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aggression and of those who have actively participated in the organizations "where prosecution is ordered" ~~enumerated in paragraph 4, above;~~ "and of any who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends". ~~Interestingly enough this same section of~~ the basic directive also provided that in the absence of evidence satisfactory to the Supreme Commander, to the contrary, he would "assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937, in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression".

Page 3 Par 8. This paragraph should be renumbered as paragraph 9 and should read as follows:

9. The basic directive stated "the ultimate objectives of the United Nations....is to foster conditions which will give the greatest possible assurance that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world". In accordance with this, the primary objective of the dissolution of organizations and the purge of individuals was preventative.

Page 4 II PRESURRENDER STATUS

NO COMMENT

Page 12 III 2 SEPTEMBER 1945 - 1 SEPTEMBER 1946

Par 1. The Political Purge and the abolition of certain organizations affected the membership and organization, militaristic and ultranationalistic organizations, and the personnel of governmental bureaus, offices and departments, etc. to end.

Par 2. These measures involved the removal and exclusion of undesirable individuals from employment in many influential positions in political, governmental and economic life of Japan and the dissolution of the affected organizations.

Page 13 Par 3. The purge and the dissolution of organizations had to be implemented by a complex set of control measures. As applied to institutions, these measures required the total dissolution of organizations which were of an undesirable nature and prohibited the future formation of any similar ones. As applied to individuals, they provided for removal of persons holding positions defined as public office, and for the exclusion from positions defined as government service. Exclusion provisions applied to three categories of prospective employees:

(1) Those who had been removed from public office by the purge directive.

(2) Those who held positions in government service but were not removed by the directive.

(3) Those who had not held positions in the government service.

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IV PURGE UNDER 4 OCTOBER 1945 DIRECTIVE

This entire section (page 14-19 incl) should not be treated in this portion of the History, for it is not a part of the political purge, nor is it a part of the program for the abolition of certain societies, parties, associations, etc. The term "purge" tends to be misleading when used in reference to the implementation of the provisions of the 4 October 1945 Directive. Normally the "purge" is considered to be the so-called political purge. The purpose of the 4 October 1945 Directive is quite different from that of the purge directives.

Government Section is not responsible for the administration of the SCAPIN with wich this section of the monograph deals, and cannot, therefore, properly make additional comments or recommendations.

Page 20. Headings on this page should be modified to read as follows:

ABOLITION OF ORGANIZATIONS UNDER 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

Contents

Paragraph
Abolition of Organizations - - - - - - - - - - - - 22

Abolition of Organizations

Par 22. The dissolution and prohibition of certain organizations was directed by SCAP on 4 January 1946 as follows: (etc)

Page 25 Par 36. (1) Any organization discovered to be of a type specified in this Directive, no matter what its professed nature, must be immediately dissolved.

Page 28. The headings on this page should be modified to read as follows:

THE POLITICAL PURGE DIRECTIVE OF 4 JANUARY 1946

Contents

Paragraph
The Political Purge - 40

The Political Purge

Par 40. The directive providing for the removal and exclusion of undesirable persons from public office was issued on 4 January 1946, simultaneously with the directive ordering the abolition of certain organizations.

Page 30 Par 42 - The directive defined the persons to be removed and excluded; these were included under the following categories: (etc)

Page 36 Par 61. Copy Paragraph 58, Page 41, Monthly Summation of Non-

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Military Activities, March 1946, and add the following:

"and was subsequently designated as a purgee".

Page 41 Par 71. (3) The application of the provisions of the Purge Directive to all elections of members of both Houses of the Diet.

ROGER W. SNOW, Jr.
Major FA
Public Service Qualifications Division

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SCAPIN 548 MONOGRAPH:

I. INITIAL POLICIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Responsibility

1. The Supreme Commander's responsibility to purge both organizations and individuals from positions of influence in Japanese public life followed from the Potsdam Declaration, the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan and subsequent basic policy directives.

2. The Potsdam declaration provided for a purge of organizations by requiring the Japanese Government to remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

3. The JCS Basic Occupation Directive specifically required the removal of all legal hinderances to the formation of employees along democratic lines subject to any necessary safeguards to prevent the perpetuation of militaristic influence under any guise or the continuation of any group hostile to the objectives and operation of the occupation forces.

4. The U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy specified that "institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression be vigorously suppressed" and "that ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions be dissolved and prohibited."

5. The JCS Basic Occupation Directive instructed the Supreme Commander "to assure the dissolution of the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, their affiliates and any successor agencies, and all Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies and their agencies and affiliates."

6. This directive stated that all property, real and personal, owned or controlled by any of the organizations referred to above, should be considered public property. If there was any doubt as to the status of any property it was to

Property control here <

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be considered public property.

7. It ordered the impounding of all gold, silver, platinum, currencies, securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers and all other assets of the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, their agencies and affiliates or any successor or similar organizations, and all Japanese nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies, agencies and affiliates and their officials, leading members and supporters. It further specified the same treatment for all organizations, clubs or other associations prohibited or dissolved by SCAP./

8. It also directed the control of all existing political parties, organizations and societies. Those whose activities were found to be consistent with the requirements of the military occupation and its objectives were to be encouraged. Those with activities inconsistent with such requirements and objectives were ordered abolished.

JCS No. 1 9c

The rest of Chapter I. has already been covered in the revision of Chapter III, Individual Purge. No further changes in the light of SCAPIN 548.

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PURGE OF ORGANIZATIONS UNDER 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

Organizational Purge

CHANGED 1. A Directive calling for the abolition of certain political parties, associations, societies and other organizations was issued on 4 January 1946, in coordination with the directive providing for the removal and exclusion of undesirable persons from public office.

EXPANDED 2. This directive specified that the Japanese Government should require the dissolution and prohibit the formation or activity of any political party, association, society or other organization and of any individual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose purpose, fell within any of the following categories:

(1) Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in accordance with SCAP directives.

(2) Support or justification of aggressive Japanese military action abroad.

(3) Arrogation by Japan of leadership of other Asiatic, Indonesian or Malayan peoples.

(4) Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions.

(5) Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries.

(6) Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan.

(7) Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement or justification of a tradition favoring such methods.

CHANGED 3. More specifically, proscribable organizations were also defined as groups:

(1) Any of whose principal officers were:

a) Members of organizations abolished in accordance with the directive.

b) Former commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or the Special Volunteer Reserve, who served on active duty at any time since 1 January 1930.

c) Any person who served in or with the military police or

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naval police, or any special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organization.

(2) Whose membership included more than twenty-five percent former members of an organization or organizations abolished or prohibited in accordance with the directive.

EXPANDED 4. The directive listed 27 organizations as examples of the sort of group deemed to be proscribed under the provisions enumerated. The organizations listed and other organizations, whose purposes or activities were the same or similar, were to be immediately dissolved, together with any organizations which they controlled or were affiliated with.

ADDED 5. The Japanese Government was ordered specifically and in detail to take immediate action to prevent all transactions involving property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by an organization dissolved or to be dissolved in accord with the directive or of the type proscribed. All such property, including all books, files and records of such organizations, was to be seized and held in the government's custody. Complete records of all such property were to be obtained and kept available for inspection as public records. Officials receiving such records were designated as personally responsible for their safekeeping and use as required by the directive.

ADDED 6. Any of this property suitable for use in the production of food, shelter or other necessities of life was to be allowed to be exploited as promptly as possible for those purposes.

EXPANDED 7. In accordance with the policy directing control of all political parties, organizations and societies, the directive specified that they and all groups whose purpose or activity consisted of; proposing or supporting candidates for public office; influencing the policy of government; or the discussion of the relations between Japan and foreign powers; must file a declaration including:

(1) Their name

(2) Their purpose

(3) The address of their headquarters office

(4) The names and addresses of their officers together with a statement as to their military or police service and the names of any associations, societies or parties of which they are or have been members.

(5) A roster of the names and addresses of their membership.

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ADDED 8. These declarations were to be filed in the office of the mayor of the town or city in which the organizations had or intended to have their principal office. The declarations were to be kept up-to-date. They were to be kept available for public inspection. No fees were to be charged in connection with their preparation.

ADDED 9. In order to provide safeguards against the use of the directive in any manner at all similar to the old repressive registration and control measures used by the Japanese it was specified that the provisions requiring the filing of a roster of the names and addresses of members would not apply to groups or other organizations of workers or employees who meet for the purpose of discussing questions relating to wages, hours and working conditions or the choice of persons to represent them in negotiations with their employers about such questions.

The directive stated that the purpose of these provisions was to secure public knowledge of the character of political organizations in Japan and to prevent the formation of secret, militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic societies and organizations.

It was specifically stated that they should not be interpreted nor should they be applied in a manner which would interfere with freedom of assembly, speech or religion except in connection with specified purposes and activities.

ADDED 10. The Japanese Government was ordered to enact appropriate laws or ordinances to carry out the terms of the directive and to prevent further activities contrary to its terms.

Compliance

CHANGED 11. The Home Ministry was the governmental agency responsible for effecting compliance.

ADDED 12. In a series of conferences between SCAP representatives and officials of the Home Ministry the details of the Imperial Ordinance called for in the directive were worked out. On 23 February 1946, Imperial Ordinance 101 was promulgated. This ordinance added specific penalties and transcribed into Japanese law the terms of the directive.

ADDED 13. Home Ministry Orders 19 and 20 issued 25 February 1946, ordered the application of Imperial Ordinance 101 to 121 organizations representing the 27 listed by SCAP plus those regarded by the Japanese Government as coming under the provisions of the directive.

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14. As reports required by SCAP to insure the holding of a free election were not received by 29 January 1946, SCAP raised the question of the requisite reports with the Home Ministry, which promised a complete report by 15 March.

15. On 15 March the promised complete report was not received and on 20 and 25 March the responsible Home Ministry official was summoned by SCAP to provide all available data. The information presented proved to be inadequate and unreliable. Governmental action to implement the directive was regarded as incomplete.

CHANGED 16. The Government had failed to prohibit further activity of those parties which had not made the required reports even subsequent to the tardy promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 101 a month and a half after the directive was issued.

17. In order to avoid any unnecessary interference with the approaching April national election it was deemed inadvisable to place more forceable pressure on the Government at that time.

18. On 27 April SCAP again informed the Home Ministry that compliance with the directive was incomplete, particularly regarding required information on political parties and organizations of doubtful character and that full compliance was required.

19. The function of the Japanese police in the enforcement of the directive was defined on 2 July, after SCAP received complaints that police had made unauthorized house-to-house canvasses to determine the party affiliations of individual Japanese. The Government was advised that police officials could make investigations only if asked to do so by the responsible civilian agency and that such investigations must be limited to the task specifically assigned.

Application to Labor and Farmer's Unions

20. On 5, 11 and 18 July SCAP clarified the application of the portions of SCAPIN 548 dealing with the registration of organizations. Ministry of Home Affairs officials had contended that because labor or farmer's unions sometimes sought to attain political objectives, they should be required to register and provide membership lists as if they were political associations. It was, however, pointed out that the directive specifically exempted unions from the application of this provision as long as the unions' major aim or activity was economic. If national unions should temporarily devote major attention to national political activity they should be required to register, but not be required to report membership lists as did political parties or associations.

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ENTIRE SECTION PP21-27 ADDED

Control of Property of Dissolved Organizations

21. The provisions of SCAPIN 548 ordering the Government to take such action as necessary to prevent all transactions involving property of dissolved organizations required effectuation by several administrative SCAPINS.

22. A directive issued 22 April 1946, ordered the Japanese Government to submit inventory reports on property taken into custody under the provisions of SCAPIN 548, and prohibited the use of such property for any purpose whatsoever without authority or license issued by SCAP.

23. Directives issued 13 May and 2 August 1946, required the dissolution of certain other organizations whose existence was considered inimical to the objectives of the Occupation AS SUCCESSORS TO PREVIOUSLY DISSOLVED GROUPS

24. Real properties of these dissolved organizations were licensed by SCAP for use by governmental agencies and private and corporate persons. In cases of use by governmental agencies, no rental was required in order to alleviate, to some extent, the strained finances of the Japanese Government. In the case of private and corporate persons, rental was charged in accordance with existing Japanese regulations. In addition, the Japanese Government was directed to pay out of rental income, such expenses as were considered necessary properly to protect, preserve and maintain the property of these organizations. In the case of the property used for governmental purposes, the Japanese Government was responsible for maintenance, care and preservation of the property.

Compliance

25. Reports of inventory of dissolved organizations were received from 38 organizations having 7,132 branches showing assets of ¥112,295,417 following expense payments and disposals of ¥261,937,000.

26. Other dissolved organizations reported no assets principally because of voluntary dissolution and disposal of assets prior to the issuance of the directives during the period between 15 August 1945 and 4 January 1946.

27. Preliminary studies of the expenses and disposals of the 38 organizations which reported same, revealed that a good portion consisted of legitimate liquidation expense; however, considerable intentional dissipation was evident. In addition, there was evidence of deliberate concealment, particularly of real property. Such activities were facilitated by the fact that each branch acted in most cases independently of the central office.

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Application to Economic Organizations

28. The application of various provisions of the directive was clarified through conferences between SCAP representatives and Government officials.

29. A conference on 3 June 1946 discussed the status of non-ideological organizations established purely for profit whose by-laws discriminated in any way against foreign nationals. The Government was instructed to provide SCAP the names of all organizations which excluded foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions, so that the nature of these organizations could be considered when determining their status.

30. Government officials were also informed that organizations discriminating against foreign nationals and having any purpose in addition to that of making profit would be considered individually.

CHANGED 31. The application of the directive to economic organizations was further clarified in conferences held with Home Ministry officials on 5 and 12 June 1946. The Government was advised that no blanket authorization could be given to exempt certain classes of organizations from the directive but that the principle of creating the least possible disturbance in Japan's legitimate economic life would be observed. To that end the responsibility of the Government at that time in the application of the directive to non-political organizations was agreed to be limited to the following:

(1) Any organization discovered to be of a type specified in the directive, no matter what its professed nature, must be immediately dissolved.

(2) Certain stipulated categories of economic or cultural organizations must be screened to determine whether they were subject to the directive. For the time being no other bona fide economic or cultural organizations had to be considered.

(3) The Government could ask exemption for any of the screened organizations found subject to the directive if all objectionable personnel were dismissed.

CHANGED 32. It was determined that the Government should screen the following categories:

(1) Economic enterprises whose assets exceeded, in fair market value, ¥10,000,000 or whose production or gross sales exceeded ¥1,000,000 for any calender year since 1937, or in the future exceeded these figures.

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PURGE OF ORGANIZATIONS UNDER 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

Organizational Purge

CHANGED 1. A Directive calling for the abolition of certain political parties, associations, societies and other organizations was issued on 4 January 1946, in coordination with the directive providing for the removal and exclusion of undesirable persons from public office.

EXPANDED 2. This directive specified that the Japanese Government should require the dissolution and prohibit the formation or activity of any political party, association, society or other organization and of any individual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose purpose, fell within any of the following catagories:

(1) Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in accordance with SCAP directives.

(2) Support or justification of aggressive Japanese military action abroad.

(3) Arrogation by Japan of leadership of other Asiatic, Indonesian or Malayan peoples.

(4) Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions.

(5) Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries.

(6) Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan.

(7) Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement or justification of a tradition favoring such methods.

Changed 3. More specifically, proscribable organizations were also defined as groups:

(1) Any of whose principal officers were:

a) Members of organizations abolished in accordance with the directive.

b) Former commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or the Special Volunteer Reserve, who served on active duty at any time since 1 January 1930.

c) Any person who served in or with the military police or

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naval police, or any special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organization.

(2) Whose membership included more than twenty-five percent former members of an organization or organizations abolished or prohibited in accordance with the directive.

Expanded 4. The directive listed 27 organizations as examples of the sort of group deemed to be proscribed under the provisions enumerated. The organizations listed and other organizations, whose purposes or activities were the same or similar, were to be immediately dissolved, together with any organizations which they controlled or were affiliated with.

Added 5. The Japanese Government was ordered specifically and in detail to take immediate action to prevent all transactions involving property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by an organization dissolved or to be dissolved in accord with the directive or of the type proscribed. All such property, including all books, files and records of such organizations, was to be seized and held in the government's custody. Complete records of all such property were to be obtained and kept available for inspection as public records. Officials receiving such records were designated as personally responsible for their safekeeping and use as required by the directive.

Added 6. Any of this property suitable for use in the production of food, shelter or other necessities of life was to be allowed to be exploited as promptly as possible for those purposes.

Expanded 7. In accordance with the policy directing control of all political parties, organizations and societies, the directive specified that they and all groups whose purpose or activity consisted of; proposing or supporting candidates for public office; influencing the policy of government; or the discussion of the relations between Japan and foreign powers; must file a declaration including:

(1) Their name

(2) Their purpose

(3) The address of their headquarters office

(4) The names and addresses of their officers together with a statement as to their military or police service and the names of any associations, societies or parties of which they are or have been members.

(5) A roster of the names and addresses of their membership.

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Added 8. These declarations were to be filed in the office of the mayor of the town or city in which the organizations had or intended to have their principal office. The declarations were to be kept up-to-date. They were to be kept available for public inspection. No fees were to be charged in connection with their preparation.

Added 9. In order to provide safeguards against the use of the directive in any manner at all similar to the old repressive registration and control measures used by the Japanese it was specified that the provisions requiring the filing of a roster of the names and addresses of members would not apply to groups or other organizations of workers or employees who meet for the purpose of discussing questions relating to wages, hours and working conditions or the choice of persons to represent them in negotiations with their employers about such questions.

The directive stated that the purpose of these provisions was to secure public knowledge of the character of political organizations in Japan and to prevent the formation of secret, militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic societies and organizations.

It was specifically stated that they should not be interpreted nor should they be applied in a manner which would interfere with freedom of assembly, speech or religion except in connection with specified purposes and activities.

Added 10. The Japanese Government was ordered to enact appropriate laws or ordinances to carry out the terms of the directive and to prevent further activities contrary to its terms.

Compliance

Changed 11. The Home Ministry was the governmental agency responsible for effecting compliance.

Added 12. In a series of conferences between SCAP representatives and officials of the Home Ministry the details of the Imperial Ordinance called for in the directive were worked out. On 23 February 1946, Imperial Ordinance 101 was promulgated. This ordinance added specific penalties and transcribed into Japanese law the terms of the directive.

Added 13. Home Ministry Orders 19 and 20 issued 25 February 1946, ordered the application of Imperial Ordinance 101 to 121 organizations representing the 27 listed by SCAP plus those regarded by the Japanese Government as coming under the provisions of the directive.

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14. As reports required by SCAP to insure the holding of a free election were not received by 29 January 1946, SCAP raised the question of the requisite reports with the Home Ministry, which promised a complete report by 15 March.

15. On 15 March the promised complete report was not received and on 20 and 25 March the responsible Home Ministry official was summoned by SCAP to provide all available data. The information presented proved to be inadequate and unreliable. Governmental action to implement the directive was regarded as incomplete.

Changed 16. The Government had failed to prohibit further activity of those parties which had not made the required reports even subsequent to the tardy promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 101 a month and a half after the directive was issued.

17. In order to avoid any unnecessary interference with the approaching April national election it was deemed inadvisable to place more forceable pressure on the Government at that time.

18. On 27 April SCAP again informed the Home Ministry that compliance with the directive was incomplete, particularly regarding required information on political parties and organizations of doubtful character and that full compliance was required.

19. The function of the Japanese police in the enforcement of the directive was defined on 2 July, after SCAP received complaints that police had made unauthorized house-to-house canvasses to determine the party affiliations of individual Japanese. The Government was advised that police officials could make investigations only if asked to do so by the responsible civilian agency and that such investigations must be limited to the task specifically assigned.

Application to Labor and Farmer's Unions

20. On 5, 11 and 18 July SCAP clarified the application of the portions of SCAPIN 548 dealing with the registration of organizations, Ministry of Home Affairs officials had contended that because labor or farmer's unions sometimes sought to attain political objectives, they should be required to register and provide membership lists as if they were political associations. It was, however, pointed out that the directive specifically exempted unions from the application of this provision as long as the unions' major aim or activity was economic. If national unions should temporarily devote major attention to national political activity they should be required to register, but not be required to report membership lists as did political parties or associations.

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Control of Property of Dissolved Organizations

Entire section IP 21-27 Added

21. The provisions of SCAPIN 548 ordering the Government to take such action as necessary to prevent all transactions involving property of dissolved organizations required effectuation by several administrative SCAPINS.

22. A directive issued 22 April 1946, ordered the Japanese Government to submit inventory reports on property taken into custody under the provisions of SCAPIN 548, and prohibited the use of such property for any purpose whatsoever without authority or license issued by SCAP.

23. Directives issued 13 May and 2 August 1946, required the dissolution of certain other organizations whose existence was considered inimical to the objectives of the Occupation AS SUCCESSORS TO PREVIOUSLY DISSOLVED GROUPS.

24. Real properties of these dissolved organizations were licensed by SCAP for use by governmental agencies and private and corporate persons. In cases of use by governmental agencies, no rental was required in order to alleviate, to some extent, the strained finances of the Japanese Government. In the case of private and corporate persons, rental was charged in accordance with existing Japanese regulations. In addition, the Japanese Government was directed to pay out of rental income, such expenses as were considered necessary properly to protect, preserve and maintain the property of these organizations. In the case of the property used for governmental purposes, the Japanese Government was responsible for maintenance, care and preservation of the property.

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25. Reports of inventory of dissolved organizations were received from 38 organizations having 7,112 branches showing assets of ¥112,295,417 following expense payments and disposals of ¥261,937,000.

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(3) The Government could ask exemption for any of the screened organizations found subject to the directive if all objectionable personnel were dismissed.

Changed 32. It was determined that the Government should screen the following categories:

(1) Economic enterprises whose assets exceeded, in fair market value, ¥10,000,000 or whose production or gross sales exceeded ¥1,000,000 for any calender year since 1937, or in the future exceeded these figures.

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(2) Financial organizations such as the Bank of Japan, all ordinary and special banks, trust companies, security exchanges and in addition those credit cooperatives, agricultural associations and loan companies whose assets exceeded ¥50,000,000.

(3) All Chambers of Commerce, Control Associations, Control Companies, Control Unions, Commerce and Industry Associations and Councils, Insurance Associations, Special Companies, Eidan, National Policy Companies and similar companies, associations and organizations, associated with the economic life of Japan.

(4) Quasi-governmental enterprises which were not clearly "government services."

(5) Any enterprise or agency which, since 7 July 1937, was engaged in: the exploitation of occupied areas; any system of private monopoly; the development of a totalitarian economy in Japan; or propagandizing for agressive war.

33. It was decided that the Government should first screen 18 specified banks, then munitions companies, national policy companies, special companies, special corporations, control associations, control unions, control companies, and agricultural cooperative associations.

Added 34. At this time, as mentioned ~~in the~~ IN THE SECTION Political Purge ~~Extension of the Purge~~ (Paragraphs 42-47) the Government was instructed to prepare a comprehensive plan including; "c) the exclusion of all purged personnel from all other influential political or economic posts."

Added 35. In pursuance of the policy underlying this instruction and in accordance with the definitions and agreements set forth above, (paragraphs 30-31) the Government was already screening the organizations specified in order to forestall the dissolution of these organizations under the provisions of SCAPIN 548 personnel found to be ultranationalists were removed in a manner that was similar to removal and exclusion under SCAPIN 550.

Added 36. Under these circumstances the Japanese Government found it more practicable to propose including the screening of Economic organizations and the removal and exclusion of their undesireable officers within the scope of the proposed extension of the operation of the purge under the provisions of SCAPIN 550 rather than to continue administration of this important phase of the program under SCAPIN 548.

Added 37. THE GOVERNMENT AGREED TO SUBMIT ITS PLAN ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1946.

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PURGE OF ORGANIZATIONS UNDER 4 JANUARY 1946 DIRECTIVE

Organizational Purge

1. A Directive calling for the abolition of certain political parties, associations, societies and other organizations was issued on 4 January 1946, in coordination with the directive providing for the removal and exclusion of undesirable persons from public office.

2. This directive specified that the Japanese Government should require dissolution and prohibit the formation or activity of any political party, association, society or other organization and of any individual or group whose purpose or the effect of whose purpose, fell within any of the following categories:

(1) Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in accordance with SCAP directives.

(2) Support or justification of aggressive Japanese military action abroad.

(3) Arrogation by Japan of leadership of other Asiatic, Indonesian or Malayan peoples.

(4) Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions.

(5) Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries.

(6) Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan.

(7) Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement or justification of a tradition favoring such methods.

3. More specifically, proscribable organizations were also defined as groups:

(1) Any of whose principal officers were:

a) Members of organizations abolished in accordance with the directive.

b) Former commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or the Special Volunteer Reserve, who served on active duty at any time since 1 January 1930.

c) Any person who served in or with the military police or

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naval police, or any special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organization.

(2) whose membership included more than twenty-five percent former members of an organization or organizations abolished or prohibited in accordance with the directive.

4. The directive listed 27 organizations as examples of the sort of group deemed to be proscribed under the provisions enumerated. The organizations listed and other organizations, whose purposes or activities were the same or similar, were to be immediately dissolved, together with any organizations which they controlled or were affiliated with.

5. The Japanese Government was ordered specifically and in detail to take immediate action to prevent all transactions involving property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by an organization dissolved or to be dissolved in accord with the directive or of the type proscribed. All such property, including all books, files and records of such organizations, was to be seized and held in the government's custody. Complete records of all such property were to be obtained and kept available for inspection as public records. Officials receiving such records were designated as personally responsible for their safekeeping and use as required by the directive.

6. Any of this property suitable for use in the production of food, shelter or other necessities of life was to be allowed to be exploited as promptly as possible for these purposes.

7. In accordance with the policy directing control of all political parties, organizations and societies, the directive specified that they and all groups whose purpose or activity consisted of; proposing or supporting candidates for public office; influencing the policy of government; or the discussion of the relations between Japan and foreign powers; must file a declaration including:

(1) Their name

(2) Their purpose

(3) The address of their headquarters office

(4) The names and addresses of their officers together with a statement as to their military or police service and the names of any associations, societies or parties of which they are or have been members.

(5) A roster of the names and addresses of their membership.

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8. These declarations were to be filed in the office of the mayor of the town or city in which the organizations had or intended to have their principal office. The declarations were to be kept up-to-date. They were to be kept available for public inspection. No fees were to be charged in connection with their preparation.

9. In order to provide safeguards against the use of the directive in any manner at all similar to the old repressive registration and control measures used by the Japanese it was specified that the provisions requiring the filing of a roster of the names and addresses of members would not apply to groups or other organizations of workers or employees who meet for the purpose of discussing questions relating to wages, hours and working conditions or the choice of persons to represent them in negotiations with their employers about such questions.

The directive stated that the purpose of these provisions was to secure public knowledge of the character of political organizations in Japan and to prevent the formation of secret, militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic societies and organizations.

It was specifically stated that they should not be interpreted nor should they be applied in a manner which would interfere with freedom of assembly, speech or religion except in connection with specified purposes and activities.

10. The Japanese Government was ordered to enact appropriate laws or ordinances to carry out the terms of the directive and to prevent further activities contrary to its terms.

Compliance

11. The Home Ministry was the governmental agency responsible for effecting compliance. (SRS returns to Police Bureau.)

12. In a series of conferences between SCAP representatives and officials of the Home Ministry the details of the Imperial Ordinance called for in the directive were worked out. On 23 February 1946, Imperial Ordinance 101 was promulgated. This ordinance added specific penalties and transcribed into Japanese law the terms of the directive.

13. Home Ministry Orders 19 and 20 issued 25 February 1946, ordered the application of Imperial Ordinance 101 to 121 organizations representing the 27 listed by SCAP plus those regarded by the Japanese Government as coming under the provisions of the directive.

SRS mentions Home Ministry Ordinance #10

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14. As reports required by SCAP to insure the holding of a free election were not received by 29 January 1946, SCAP raised the question of the requisite reports with the Home Ministry, which promised a complete report by 15 March.

15. On 15 March the promised complete report was not received and on 20 and 25 March the responsible Home Ministry official was summoned by SCAP to provide all available data. The information presented proved to be inadequate and unreliable. Governmental action to implement the directive was regarded as incomplete.

16. The Government had failed to prohibit further activity of those parties which had not made the required reports even subsequent to the tardy promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 101 a month and a half after the directive was issued.

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18. On 27 April SCAP again informed the Home Ministry that compliance with the directive was incomplete, particularly regarding required information on political parties and organizations of doubtful character and that full compliance was required.

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1069-A

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1216-A SCAPIN 1889-A Kaikoku Seikatsu

23. Directives issued 13 May and 2 August 1946, required the dissolution of certain other organizations whose existence was considered inimical to the objectives of the Occupation AS SUCCESSORS TO PREVIOUSLY DISSOLVED GROUPS. not 13 MAY

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Conclusions

25. Reports of inventory of dissolved organizations were received from 38 organizations having 7,112 branches showing assets of ¥112,295,417 following expense payments and disposals of ¥261,937,000.

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Report, CPC/GP, GHQ, SCAP, AG 386.7, "Treatment of Certain Public and Private Japanese Property" 14 August 1947 To WD, CAD.