

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO



INTERROGATION NO. 278

Division of Origin: Military Analysis Division, USSBS

Subject: Southeastern Asia Campaign - 7 December 1941 - March 1942

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Name: Saburo ENDO Present Rank: Lieutenant General
Service: Army (Regular) Length of Service: Since 1907
Present Status: Active duty Military Pilot: No

<u>Recent Military Background</u>		
<u>Command & Title</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Beginning</u>
Dai 3 Hikotanchō	China	August 1940
" " "	French Indo-China	Fall of 1941
" " "	Palembang	1942
Deputy Commander, Kokuchi Kaijakhō	Japan	April 1942
Kokushi Kaijakhōcho	Japan	January 1943

Where interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogators: Colonel Ramsey Potts, AC
Alexander P. DeSeversky, former Major, AC

Interpreters: Lieutenant Commander Walter Nichols, USNR
Mr. T. Sato, a Civilian (Nisei)

Allied Officers Present: Colonel Robert Terrill, AC
Major Edwin McElwain, GSC

Maj SEVERSKY: I'd like to ask a few brief questions about your experiences in CHINA. Did you lead any operations against General CHENNAULT and the Chinese Air Force--Flying Tigers?

A. During the time I was in CHINA the Chinese Air Force had been wiped out. As far as I knew there was no Chinese Air Force to speak of, and my principle duty was in training. I had no operations against the Chinese Air Force. I have heard of CHENNAULT but have never encountered him and I know little of his operations or our operations against him. I know the plans, etc., for the MALAY Campaigns, but little about our operations in CHINA.

Q. Do you know anything about the Japanese bombing campaigns against CHUNG-KING, and CHENG-TU?

A. I was in HANOI, the Northern part of FRENCH INDO-CHINA just before the beginning of the war; then I got orders to bomb KUMMING. I don't know the exact reason, but I think the purpose of it was to cover up our intention of going South and try to make the enemy think we were going North. I didn't even know at that time I was going to operate south. Then while in HANOI I received orders to alert our planes for operations down in the southern area, but no date was specifically mentioned; I merely got the plan of operations and was told "the day would be given later"--it was known as X-day.

Maj McELWAIN: That was while you were still with DAI-SAN HIKODAN?

A. Yes, I got orders on December 3, 1941, to advance to PNOM-PENH.

Q. Before that, when did you get the first preliminary order to advance South?

A. You mean the order sending me over to HANOI?

Q. Yes?

A. 2 December 1941

Q. That is the first time you know of any plan to move south?

A. I had a general idea that that is where I was going, but had seen no orders to that effect.

Q. But before that time you had orders to attack KUMMING?

A. Yes, as a feint. Although I was given orders on the third to proceed to this place, X-day had not been fixed yet. On the 6th. I got orders to bomb PENANG and attack ALOR STAR on the eighth. All the Japanese air forces in this area were under Lt Gen SUGWARA who is now in KYUSHU. We had three objectives in this plan: the first was to cover the advance of YAMASHITA'S forces by sea; the second was to cover the landings on the north coast of MALAYA and the third was to destroy British air power around SINGAPORE.

Maj McELWAIN: Did you plan to employ your air forces primarily in defense of ships, primarily against airfields as a counter-air-force air force, or primarily in support of ground forces by strafing and dive-bombing?

A. Purely as a direct escort force to defend against attacking planes.

Q. The mission was to destroy the British air force?

A. The enemy air force attacking the ships.

Q. Rather than attack enemy ground troops?

A. That is right. There were three HIKODANS in this HIKOSHIDAN CAPS: The 12th., made up entirely of fighters; the 7th. under YAMAMOTO (Major General) composed of medium bombers; (Note: Determined by Col POTTS to be KI - 3 light bombers) and the 3rd., composed of fight bombers. The 10th. HIKODAN was assigned to cover the invasion by Maj Gen SHIROTANI. The Army was in charge of the South area. The only Naval unit assigned to this area was the 22nd. KOKUSEN-1. In this area operations were under command of the Navy with support from the Army, as was the case in the PHILIPPINES area operations. The Army commander in this area was Lt Gen OBATA; he died later on Guam.

Q. After the landing in the PHILIPPINES, did the control pass to the Army?

A. It was a joint command after the occupation.

Q. What was the percentage after you had established yourselves ashore--the number of Army planes in the PHILIPPINES, the number of Navy planes? In other words, in the opening phases up to Dec 20 what were the percentages of Army and Navy planes?

A. I don't know about the PHILIPPINE area, but from what I have heard, the Navy had more planes than the Army in the area.

Q. Did those planes come from carriers or did some of them come down from FORMOSA?

A. They were land-based Navy planes. The Carrierplanes were all in the Central PACIFIC theatre. Due to the fact that the Navy planes had longer range, they were assigned principal targets in the Southern PHILIPPINES area and the Army was assigned targets in the Northern area.

Q. How many planes did you have available at the beginning of the MALAYA campaign.

A. I am not certain, but in rough figures, about 600 planes.

Q. How many Navy?

A. I am not certain but about one-third that number. They were not included in the 600 - making a total of 800.

Q. Did the Army have anything to do with the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse?

A. No, ~~Army~~ Navy planes. The Army range was not long enough.

Q. What was, in your estimation, the comparative average skill of the Army pilots as opposed to the Navy pilots at that time, the beginning of the war?

A. The Navy pilots were better because they had better navigational experience, but the daring and morale of the Army pilots was just as good. The planes used by the Army in attacking MALAYA were old type planes which had non-retractable landing gear, for example. They often went out on long-range missions which precluded the possibility of returning to their bases and were therefore given orders to land on fields which were not definitely known to be occupied. They often sortied shipping despite bad weather, distance to the target and approaching darkness. In morale and willingness, the Army pilots were just as good, but the Navy pilots had more thorough training.

Q. What type of plane did you have under your command?

A. I had five sentai in my HIKODAN: two light bomber sentai, one fighter sentai, one attack plane, sentai, and one reconnaissance sentai.

Q. What types of planes?

A. Type 99 twin-engine bomber (Sally); Type 100 HQ reconnaissance; (Oscar) Type 1 fighter; (KI-43) Type 99 attack plane (KI-51).

Q. Did you participate in the assault on the SINGAPORE itself or did you just support the initial phases of it?

A. Yes, I participated in support of the Army--the 25th. Army under YAMASHITA. On our schedule we were supposed to occupy SINGAPORE on 11 February, and were supposed to occupy PALEMBANG on the 14th.; but we didn't get full support until the 15th., so I covered both the parachute attack on PALEMBANG and the landings on the 15th.

Q. What types of planes did you use in your parachute attacks?

A. All the transport planes in the HIKOSENTAI.

Q. How many transports?

A. About 30.

Q. Was the parachute drop on PALEMBANG modeled in any way after the German drop on CAFFE? Did they use that as a background--as a model?

A. No, I wasn't too familiar with the history of the CRETE parachute attack so I developed the plan for this attack myself.

Q. Did you have to use your bombers to carry any of the troops. (See **).

A. We didn't use any bombers--just 30 transports. The bombers carried equipment. I had planned to drop the parachute troops on the airfield, but it wasn't for me to decide because the parachute troops were not under my command. They refused to land on the airfield and landed outside. My commander higher up told me I would have to agree with that plan.

Q. Who thought of dropping them on the refineries?

A. The central authorities decided that at SAMBOHOMBU.

Maj SEVERSKY: I'd like to get this "ground support" straight: SINGAPORE was bombed several times. What did you expect to hit there? Did your organization ever bomb SINGAPORE?

A. The principal object was to wipe out enemy air power by bombing of airfields, etc. That was not our principal objective when we started out: We landed at SUNGAI PATANI and the day we arrived we were bombed by British planes and about half the outfit was wiped out. Therefore, though it hadn't been planned for us to bomb SINGAPORE, we had to. We attacked only at night and never in daylight because we created a lot of confusion by bombing at night. The largest force ever sent over was about three planes.

Maj McELWAIN: Who ran the 100-plane raids on SINGAPORE which were supposed to have taken place, according to the newspapers? What was the largest force you ever put over SINGAPORE?

A. The most we ever sent over SINGAPORE was about three planes and usually about one or two because we had so few. Also, by bombing at night we felt that we created great confusion, although the damage wasn't so great. About 100 planes attacked SINGAPORE with the Yamamoto force in a joint operation, my unit supplying part of the fighter escort.

Col POTTS: I believe you stated before that your purpose in bombing SINGAPORE was to neutralize enemy airfields, and you had no objective in bombing ships in the harbor, supply dumps, ammunition dumps, etc.

A. Our principal target was airfields because we operated at such high altitudes that we couldn't hit anything smaller than that; but our operations at night were carried out at very low altitudes, 200 metres. We cut off our engines high up and would glide in and get under the searchlights.

Maj SEVERSKY: When you arrived at SUNGAI PATANI, that was not your principal mission, to attack the air forces. Did you decide to attack the air forces or was it decided for you at that time, or were you simply speaking of the attacks on SINGAPORE?

A. I was only speaking of the attacks on SINGAPORE.

Q. Was your mission at the beginning of the MALAYAN Campaign to neutralize the airfields or to do something else?

A. That was our third mission. Our first mission was to protect the transports; our second mission was to protect the landings; our third mission was to support ground forces.

Maj McELWAIN: How about ground support? Did you ever have the idea of assisting ground operations by attacking tanks, enemy forces, gun positions, supply dumps?

A. Yes, ~~that~~ that was our primary objective.

Q. Did you do much of it?

A. We did. Our primary objective was to attack enemy strong points. The enemy air force interfered with that so we had to change our plans in order to destroy the enemy air force. That finished, we returned to our job of supporting the ground forces by attempting to destroy the enemy ground forces. This three-fold operation, covering the route down, covering the landings, and wiping out the enemy air forces--was the overall mission of the HIKO SHIDAN. My particular HIKODAN was assigned the duty of ground support. Since it included the medium bomber SENTAI; it was assigned that duty because other planes couldn't strafe.

Maj SEVERSKY: You had a portion destroying enemy air and a portion attacking enemy strong points. Is that right?

A. Yes. In three months, up to March 10, 1942, we shot down 136 enemy planes, and destroyed 103 on the ground.

Maj McELWAIN: Who did that--the whole Japanese force?

A. My outfit alone. We also sank seven ships.

Q. Did you do that while attacking the strong points or were they shifted over to that as a plane task force for a short period?

A. The attacks on the shipping were carried out in the completion of our mission before the landing at PALEMBANG. On the 14th. we attacked PALEMBANG three times in order to wipe out the enemy airfields there, in preparation for the landings. The figures given include the number of enemy planes destroyed in all phases of operation over a three-month period, and include the results of our attacks on PALEMBANG.

Q. At the time you pushed into SINGAPORE, what was the directive that the overall command in the south had been given from headquarters in TOKYO as to where you would go: Would you just keep pushing until you had to stop or were you told to take so much and stop?

A. I had no knowledge of our plans. Originally I thought SINGAPORE would be the end of the line; then when we captured SINGAPORE I was told to attack PALEMBANG. I was quite surprised and thought we were going pretty far afield. Then, to my amazement, I was told to attack JAVA. I did not agree with this plan of attack; my opinion was that unless we limited ourselves to this area and strengthened it for a defensive war, we would lose.

(The area indicated included the BONINS, the MARIANAS, PHILIPPINES, CELEBES, MALAYA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA.)

Q. The question is, did you think that the Army commanders in the field, having such easy successes, made their own decision to push on and then told TOKYO they were going to do that, or did the impetus come from TOKYO?

A. I really don't know about this, the reason being: That I was in TOKYO at the time of the February 26th., 1936, incident--rebellion of the young officers in TOKYO, and was therefore suspected of complicity and was sent to KYUSHU. From then on I haven't known what went on in Central Headquarters; you might say I was banished.

Q. Col TERRILL: You got yourself "in Dutch" with TOKYO?

A. Yes, and as a result of this I was always sent to do odd jobs and was used as a "pinch-hitter". Whenever trouble came up someplace I was called back to TOKYO and sent out to settle matters. I was, for instance, sent out on the "Russian incident in 1939."

Q. Maj McELWAIN: How many Japanese planes were involved in that incident?

A. I don't know what had been going on up there, but I was sent to stop it because the situation had deteriorated. I was told "This must be stopped, and you arrange it!" One reason for stopping the fight was that towards the end we were left with only 152 pilots.

Q. How many did you have at the beginning?

A. I was in HAMAMATSU at the time so I don't know.

Q. What was the reason for these losses? Did the Russians have a lot more pilots or were they better trained?

A. We were heavily outnumbered by the Russian planes; we were using Army planes; the Navy never had a plane in the area.

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(PACIFIC)
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SUPPLEMENTARY INTERROGATION NO. 278

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 28 November 1945

Interviewed: Lieutenant General Ende
Interrogator: Major Robert Braucher (GSC)
Interpreter: Lieutenant Commander Nichols (USNR)

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Q. You said that there was about 600 Army planes in SOUTH FRENCH INDO-CHINA at the beginning of the war. Can you give the composition of that force?

A. The 3rd. HIKODAN had five HIKOSENTAI, with strength as follows:

	<u>FIGHTER</u>	<u>BOMBER</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
59 FR	30		
64 FR	30 (not under 3rd FB until PALEMBERG)		
27 FR		30 (type 90 SE)	
75 FR		30 (type 90 SE)	
90 FR		30 (type 90 SE)	
15 FR			12 (HQ reece)
HQ			2 (HQ reece)
			2 (Transports)

Total 166 planes. Those are rough figures. The establishment was 27 in three squadrons of nine, but each unit had some reserve planes. These reserve planes had crews, but because of sickness and maintenance problems only about 20 planes out of 30 would be operational. By 17 March, when they arrived at BANDRENG, JAVA, we had only 50 planes left. We moved into KALIDJATI on 3 March, and by 8 March when the Dutch surrendered, only 50 planes were left, and I was not very confident of success. We were armed only with guns and swords when the Dutch came in with about 390 vehicles including tanks, and we expected to be killed, but they surrendered when our planes attacked the vehicles and stalled them on the road. We destroyed about 200 and the rest fled.

Q. How many planes did the 7th., 10th. and 12th. HIKODAN have?

A. The 10th. was much smaller and had old types, perhaps 75. The 12th. had about 70 or 80 Type 97 fighters. (NOTE) I don't know about the 7th.

Q. How many did the 22nd. KOKUSENTAI (Navy Air Flotilla) have?

A. About 50 heavy bombers, 36 fighters. The bombers all were Type 96. The planes which attacked the Prince of Wales and Repulse were mostly Type 96, but there might have been a few Type 1 bombers.

Q. We have been told that the Japanese Army flew 3000 sorties against SINGAPORE. Does that seem correct to you?

A. I am positive that there were not so many against SINGAPORE. The 7th. HIKODAN sent about five big daylight raids, but the other attacks were with a few planes at night. The 3rd. HIKODAN only sent two or three planes each night. I don't think between the 3rd and 7th. HIKODAN there were more than 1000 bomber sorties on SINGAPORE. The 3000 figure must include escorting fighters, attacks on PALEMBANG, and supports of YAMASHITA's ground troops. The normal bomb load was 700 kg for heavy bombers and 300 kg for light bombers. I looked at SINGAPORE later and there was no rough damage for 3000 sorties.

Q. What was the Navy effort - the 22nd. KOKUSENTAI - aside from sea patrols and attacks on the Prince of Wales and Repulse?

A. They escorted convoys and cooperated in the SINGAPORE attack, attacking warships and transports to prevent bringing in reinforcements and supplies. The Navy probably attacked SINGAPORE more often than the Army, but I think with fewer sorties. The Navy had greater Range, and could bomb from FRENCH INDO-CHINA from the beginning, while the Army had to capture airfields close to SINGAPORE. first.

Q. At PALMBANG were the 30 transports converted bombers?

A. We had both Lockheeds and converted Type 97 bombers, both carrying troops.

Q.

• Q. How big was the bombing attack before the paratroop attack?

A. The first attack was on the 7th. or 8th. of February, with all the planes of the 3rd. HIKODAN except the 27th. HIKOSENTAI, but were rained out and only the fighters of the 59th. KIKOSENTAI got through, to strafe. The next day we made a full-scale attack with 20 medium bombers. No heavy bombers were used in these attacks. On the second raid we destroyed all the planes on the ground, but the Dutch had brought in more when we attacked with 20 bombers on the 13th. On the 14th. we again attacked with 20 bombers during the landing operation to silence antiaircraft fire. We did not drop many bombs because we were going to use the field. We wanted only to destroy fighters and silence F.F. fire. The distance was pretty long, and the planes probably carried less than 3000kg -- perhaps an average of 200 kg per plane. Six tons might be a correct estimation. We tried to avoid damaging the town, the airfield or the oil installations.

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Q. How many paratroops were dropped?

A. Between 10 and 20 in each plane, about 400 - 500 in all. They were specially trained in KYUSHER.

Q. How many paratroops were lost?

A. The losses were very light, not more than 20 men. The crew of one bomber carrying supplies was lost to A.A. in the landing, but there were no other losses. The 20 were in subsequent fighting.

Q. What was their mission?

A. To prevent demolition of airfield and oil installations by the Dutch. They were successful in both - capturing both immediately. There was no damage at all to the oil installations until Dutch planes attacked later. Some damage was caused by the Dutch bombing - two or three fires, not substantial - but none at the time of the drop.