The Philebus of Plato, tr., with brief explanatory notes, by F.A. Paley ...

Plato.

London, G. Bell & sons; [etc., etc.] 1873.

https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$b288450





THE PHILEBUS OF PLATO.

CAMBRIDGE:—PRINTED BY J. PALMER.

THE

PHILEBUS OF PLATO

TRANSLATED, WITH BRIEF EXPLANATORY NOTES,

BY

F. A. PALEY, M.A.,

TRANSLATOR OF 'PINDAR,' 'ÆSCHYLUS,' 'ARISTOT. ETH. V. AND X.,' ETC.

LONDON:

GEORGE BELL & SONS, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN

CAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO.

1873.

such a dialogue as the Philebus is a much more difficult task than to paraphrase it. I am not, indeed, fully convinced that Mr. Jowett is wrong in *principle*, viz. in representing Plato's meaning and argument in clear and terse English, and in clipping off or leaving out the verbiage and superfluity with which the author has thought fit to involve rather than to explain his argument. Still, there is something unsatisfactory in these constant evasions of the precise sense wherever it is more than usually involved or obscure. The very words of Plato are precious; and however difficult it may be to represent them closely in our idiom, they should not be slurred over. This then was one motive that led me to attempt the task. Another was, that I felt doubts of the soundness of Dr. Badham's rather frequent alterations of the text. It seemed to me that in many places he had mistaken intentional and deliberate eccentricity of style for the corruptions of transcribers; and I thought I could in several places say a word or two in favour of the vulgate.[1] Any how, I can assure the reader that I have taken great pains in making this translation; and that where I have given the sense somewhat differently from the others, it is with a full knowledge of the fact.

The subject of the Philebus, which is allowed to be one of the latest dialogues, "the relations of pleasure or knowledge, after they have been analysed, to the Good,"[2] is

[1] Mr. Grote says of Dr. Badham's Edition, that "it is distinguished by sagacious critical remarks and conjectures, but the obscurity of the original remains incorrigible." I should have put it thus: "but intentional obscurity is not to be made less obscure by arbitrary alterations." Mr. Grote does not appear conscious of any *intentionally* crabbed writing in the *Philebus*: he admits, however, that "we are frequently embarrassed by the language."

[2] Mr. Jowett, Introd. to *Phil.* p. 131.

virtually that discussed in that beautiful treatise, the *Tenth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics*, wherein the βίος ἀπολαυστικὸς is compared with the βίος θεωρητικός. It is also touched upon by Plato in *Protag.* p. 351—3, and *Resp.* p. 585 seqq. Though replete with noble and eloquent passages, the *Philebus* is, like the not dissimilar dialogues, the *Sophistes* and the *Politicus*, composed in a crabbed, involved, pedantic style, remarkable for disarrangements and inversions, repetitions and superfluities of words. It seems as if the author wished to make an abstruse subject more abstruse by purposely obscure writing. Nothing, at least, can be more certain than that Plato had two distinct styles. The easy and graceful flow of the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Symposium*, the *Gorgias*, the *Protagoras*,—generally, even of the *Republic*,—forms the strongest contrast with the affected and ingeniously complex wording of the *Philebus*, the *Sophistes*, and the *Politicus*. As it is very unlikely, and contrary to experience, that a naturally clear and lucid flow of words should become a muddy stream in a later age by the mere practice of writing, we are compelled to attribute this later affectation to deliberate intention. The inquiry, whether these dialogues are really Platonic, cannot, of course, be even touched upon here; albeit the *Sophistes*, at least, has been seriously questioned.[1] In reading the *Philebus*, we are forcibly reminded of some living poets, who seem to think artificial and ambiguous phraseology is an improvement on the simpler and more heart-felt outpouring which gained them fame in their earlier career. Such things there are, both in art and in literature, as mannerisms and eccen-

[1] See Mr. Campbell, General Introduction to the *Sophist.* and *Polit.*, p. xliii.

tricities, which do grow upon artists and writers, and are too often mistaken, both by themselves and by their admirers, for genius. But one can hardly attribute this failing or this weakness to Plato. The obscure style he has adopted in the three dialogues I have mentioned is evidently intentional and deliberately assumed. He *wished* them to be as difficult and as esoteric as possible;[1] and it is a mark of genius, perhaps,—if of perverted genius,—to have so perfectly succeeded. Plato delighted in putting forth views of a novel and subtle kind, (*e. g.* the questions about Being and Non-Being, *εἴδη* and *ἰδέαι*, *ποιοῦν* and *πάσχον*, *γένεσις* and *οὐσία*,) couched in language which even his well-trained and quick-thinking contemporaries would find it very hard to understand. We find hints of this in such passages as *Theæt.* p. 157. C., where Socrates asks his young friend, at the end of a most difficult disquisition on universal motion, and the non-existence of objects of perception, "Do these doctrines seem to you interesting? And would you like a further taste of them, as pleasing to your appetite?"

In adopting this involved style Plato may have had any of these objects in view. He may have designed it as an imitation of, or even a kind of satire on, such writers as Heraclitus, called *σκοτεινὸς*, or the verse-philosophy of Empedocles or Parmenides; or he may have thrown himself into a fashion which he has elsewhere shewn an inclination to ridicule, the *τὸ ἀπόρρητον* or *ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ*, the *oeconomia* or *disciplina arcani*, by which esoteric doctrines were com-

[1] Mr. Campbell (p. xlii.) shews himself conscious of this fact, which has been little noticed by editors:—"there can be no question that the transposition of words from their natural sequence, either for the sake of sound or emphasis(?) —becomes more frequent in these dialogues."

municated only to the fully-instructed, the *οἱ μεμυημένοι*. It can hardly be doubted that Plato does satirize this custom, which was probably a general one, in such passages as *Theæt.* p. 156. A., where he calls the doctrines of Antisthenes *τὰ μυστήρια*, those of Protagoras (p. 152. C.), as delivered to his disciples under seal of secresy, *ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ*, and jocosely says (p. 155. E.,) 'look carefully round you, lest some of the uninitiated should overhear you.' So also in p. 180. D., he speaks of the old philosophers who spoke obscurely in poetry, *μετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλοὺς*, and of the moderns who, as wiser and cleverer, blurted out all they knew, that the very cobblers might admire them for their *σοφία*. The verbs he so often uses, *ἐπικρύπτεσθαι, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἐνδείκνυσθαι* or *ἀποδείκνυσθαι*, 'to speak under reserve,' and 'to deliver a doctrine in plain terms,' have reference to the same custom. It is also satirized in the *Nubes* (140):

ΜΑΘ. ἀλλ' οὐ θέμις πλὴν τοῖς μαθηταῖσιν λέγειν.
ΣΤΡ. λέγε νῦν ἐμοὶ θαρρῶν· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὑτοσὶ
ἥκω μαθητὴς εἰς τὸ φροντιστήριον.
ΜΑΘ. λέξω· νομίσαι δὲ ταῦτα χρὴ μυστήρια.

3) But thirdly, Plato may have felt a desire, not wholly unconnected with literary vanity, of shewing how deep a metaphysician he was, and how far in advance of the *οἱ φαῦλοι*, or shallow thinkers. Mr. Grote remarks that the *Philebus* "was composed after Plato had been so long established in his school as to have acquired a pedagogic ostentation"; and this view, which I incline to think is the correct one, certainly leaves Plato open to the charge of pedantry and affectation. Whatever his real motive was, the fact appears undeniable, that the *Philebus* must be regarded as a treatise "made doubly difficult on purpose."

The subject of it is one much discussed before and after Plato, viz. the true position of Pleasure as a pursuit of rational man, *i.e.* whether it claims the first place, as it obviously does in the life of irrational animals. Plato holds, very wisely, and in opposition to a school of stern ascetic thinkers whom he calls *οἱ δυσχερεῖς*, that man is made for both Mind and Pleasure under due limitations, *i.e.* if a *πέρας* is put upon them, so as to constitute a *μικτὸς βίος*, a life made up of both, which, having all the conditions of reality, self-sufficiency, beauty, and proportion, constitutes the *Summum Bonum*. By an ingenious argument, full of subtle irony,[1] he shews that Pleasure, which the "Hedonists" put first, is not even second in rank, nor third, no, nor fourth, but at best only fifth, if not even sixth. This is the conclusion arrived at towards the end of the dialogue. Pleasure is degraded (in its merely sensual aspect) from the celestial to the bestial. Precisely in the same spirit, and with the same irony, in *Phaedr.* p. 248. D., the *βίος τυραννικὸς* is set down as *ninth* and last, while the poor despised philosopher is elevated to the first place of human happiness and true dignity. Thus the ordinary or popular notions respecting the conditions of happiness are inverted. So, too, in the *Sophistes*, the Sophist is (to use Mr. Campbell's words) "thrust down by the process of divisions, and is found in a low place among the class of imitators." Between the first aim and object of life, intellect tempered and relieved by moderate and rational pleasure (*i.e.* the *μικτὸς βίος*), and

[1] What can Mr. Jowett mean by saying (Introd. *Phileb.* p. 130) that "the Socrates of the Philebus is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony"? Surely the passage in *Phileb.* chap. vi., about the pleasure that young students take in the analysis of concretes, contains a keen satire on the hair-splitting of the Sophists.

one of its ingredients, viz. the pursuit of pleasure, Plato interpolates, so to say, ever and anon, some principle,—a *πέρας*, or an *αἰτία*, or a *μέτρον*, which by claiming precedence of pleasure as a good, virtually thrusts it further back in the scale. With Plato, *φρόνησις*, Intellectuality, is ever the first and highest prerogative of man. It is his pursuit in life, his hope and consolation amid suffering, his highest prerogative hereafter. The object, then, of the *Philebus* is to shew the vast superiority of science over pleasure, and above all, over the *τὸ ἄπειρον* or unlimited indulgence of merely sensual pleasure.

In carrying out this design, Socrates is represented as holding an animated conversation, in the presence of some hearers, with a gay youth, whose very name, *Φίληβος*, records his advocacy of youthful pleasures, and a friend and companion of the latter, more rational and less enthusiastic, but still a Hedonist in his creed, by name Protarchus. Whether this name has any allusion to 'First causes,' it is of no use to inquire.[1] The conversation begins quite abruptly, as in fact it ends. It assumes that a former conversation has been held on the same subject, and that Philebus, who probably has had the worst of the argument, has made over the advocacy of his views to Protarchus. In fact, Philebus is but a *τριταγωνιστὴς*, and is soon eliminated as a person in the drama; so that the dialogue may be described as held between Socrates and Protarchus. Both time and place are unknown, so far as the actions of the drama are concerned. A more important question is the position which the *Philebus* occupies in the Platonic Philosophy. Dr. Badham (Pref. p. xiv.) quotes the opinion of Trendelenburg, that it is

[1] Aeschylus has *πρώταρχος ἄτη*, *Agam.* 1163.

"intended to be subordinate and introductory to the *Timaeus* and the *Republic*." Mr. Campbell (*Gen. Introd. Sophist.* p. xxi.) says, "The style of the Philebus may be described as intermediate between that of the Republic and that of the Sophist. That of the Sophist and Politicus, again, is intermediate between the Philebus and the Timaeus and Laws," —a rather complex relationship, which it is hard to verify. It is clear, however, that the Sophist and the Philebus have a marked resemblance. Plato's mind was full of the doctrine of *classification*; and he presses this into his service as not only an aid to, but as the primary principle and foundation of true dialectic. Its misapplication to mere concrete or objective things, and its utter uselessness unless in application to abstract thought, are forcibly expressed both in the *Sophistes* and the *Philebus*. Mr. Jowett adds that, notwithstanding the differences of style, many resemblances may be traced between the *Philebus* and the *Gorgias*.

It was a favourite method with Plato to express a leading doctrine or principle, dialectical or metaphysical, by a brief and convenient formula. In the *Philebus* (as elsewhere) he uses ἓν καὶ πολλὰ, 'unity and multiplicity,' or the identity of parts with the whole, as a term for synthesis and analysis.[1] In the *Theætetus*, he expresses the doctrine of Protagoras, that there is no absolute or uniform standard of objective truth, by μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, 'man is a measure,' of what he feels or holds to be real. So πάντα ῥεῖ conveys the doctrine

[1] That is, as Mr. Grote expresses it, "systematic classification, generalisation and specification, or subordination of species and sub-species, as a condition of knowing any extensive group of individuals." In this sense, ἓν καὶ πολλὰ means "genus and the separate members of it"; the intervening ἀριθμὸς representing the different species, groups, or families. The equivalent formula, ἕν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν, occurs in *Theæt.* p. 185. D.

of Heraclitus, that everything is in flux, and a constant state of change. By *οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεται*, he means that nothing is real, everything is phenomenal. So *μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* expresses the unlimited, *ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα* (*Gorg.* p. 465. D.) the theory of Anaxagoras, that the universe would collapse without a guiding Mind; and perhaps also *τὸ τρίτον ἑτέρῳ* signifies 'relativity,' *Phileb.* p. 53. E.[1] All these doctrines come ultimately to the same thing, viz. the assertion of relativity and the negation of the absolute; *i. e.* the position, that things exist only in relation to something else, and not *per se*. In the *Philebus*, *ἓν καὶ πολλὰ* is applied to shew the vast difference between dialectic or logical analysis by ascending or descending grades, and the mere 'lumping together' things very different without regard to order, subdivision, or arrangement.[2] Elsewhere, as in *Phaedr.* p. 265, seqq., *Sophist.* p. 253. D., he insists on the necessity of the true method of analysis and synthesis, *διαίρεσις* and *συναγωγὴ*, and applies the process (*Phaedr.* p. 271. D.) to distinguishing the different kinds of minds, and the different lines of argument that will severally affect and influence them. The clumsy attempts of beginners to analyse and divide, he satirizes in a remarkable and rather difficult

[1] Dr. Badham alters this to *τὸ τρίτον ἕτ' ἐρῶ*. But compare the very similar expression in *Sophist.* p. 243, D., *τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα*, '*Existence* as a third element or principle beside two things or qualities enunciated.'

[2] This would appear to have been a favourite doctrine of Zeno's (Eleatic); see *Phaedrus*, p. 261, D., "The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic of Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by showing the contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence of the many. Zeno illustrated the contradiction by well-known examples taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems to intimate (p. 15) that the time had arrived for discarding these hackneyed illustrations; such difficulties had long been solved by common sense, as the mere familiarity with the fact was a sufficient answer to them."—*Mr. Jowett*, p. 132.

passage, *Phileb.* p. 14. C., seqq. True analysis and synthesis he illustrates by the grouping and classification of sounds vocal and instrumental, into vowels, semi-vowels, consonants, sharps and flats, (or treble and bass). And applying this to the subject of pleasure, he shews that the sensual and the intellectual, the pure and the mixed, the true and the false, the permissible and the gross or the immoral, are to be carefully distinguished; and that not everything that causes delight, *τὸ χαίρειν*, must be put down in the same category. Pleasure is *ποικίλον τι*, (p. 12. C.) and cannot be argued about as a whole, unless in the vaguest and most general way, more worthy of *ῥητορικὴ* than of *διαλεκτική*.

Another doctrine which the reader of the *Philebus* will do well to have a clear notion of, is that of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*. Plato would seem to have taken this, along with many other Pythagorean views[1] prominently put forward in the *Philebus*, from Philolaus. We know (if only from Arist. *Eth. Nic.* ii., ch. 5, *τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου,*) that the theory of 'law' or 'limit,' as the source of all order, was a dogma of that school. In the physical world, (and Plato takes in illustration 'hotter' and 'colder,' p. 24. B.) it is evident that heat, cold, wet, dry, hard, soft, etc., may go on to infinity, and so become *ἄπειρα*, or they may be such only up to a certain point, by the application of a limiting principle, *πέρας*, which allows them only in measurable quantity. Thus, iron may be made hot to such an extent that it would not only melt, but be vapourised;

[1] Such are, the praise of number, as the source and cause of order (and hence, according to the Pythagorizing Aeschylus, *ἔξοχον σοφισμάτων*, *Prom.* 459,) of *αἰτία*, or Causation, as allied to Mind in the regulation of the universe; the comparison of Pleasure to honey (p. 61. C.), etc. See Mr. Campbell, Introd. to the *Politicus*, pp. xvi.—xxvii.

cold may go on till mercury is frozen, or something beyond that, for aught we know. Steam may be got up to any pressure, or to a known and measurable pressure as marked by the steam-guage. It is this capability of becoming indefinitely more or less that is expressed by the formula *μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον*. By stopping at a certain point, the heat becomes both *ἔμμετρον* and *σύμμετρον*, *i. e.* you can say how great it is in itself, and what proportion or relation it has to some other hotness. The term *πέρας* therefore implies all the relations of number, measure, quantity, degree, etc., while *ἄπειρον* is that of which no limit can be predicated in any of these respects; which has no innate conservative principle, and no power of combining with anything else, since the very fact of combining would be a *πέρας*. Thus Plato argues that the *πέρας* or limiting principle is that which introduces harmony into the constitution of the universe, and is closely allied to the regulating Mind and to Causation. Whereas *ἄπειρον* is self-destructive: it can hold or sustain nothing in balance or proportion. Those seekers after Pleasure who never have enough, but ever cry out *more!* therefore follow that principle which is the source of all disorder. Hence the inference is drawn, that Mind must be better than Pleasure, the one as compared with the other. Those who pursue pleasure pursue destruction, or the correlative principle of mere *γένεσις* as contrasted with *οὐσία*, the moveable with the eternal, the relative with the absolute, the means with the end.

Mr. Jowett (*Introd.* p. 134) gives a somewhat different account of the Platonic *ἄπειρον*. He says it is rather the 'indefinite' than the 'infinite.' "It is the negative," he says, "of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable; of

which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded distinct kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression of sense; the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having certain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which in the scale of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good." He views it, it seems, rather as an abstraction than a reality in nature.[1]

Plato's subdivisions of Pleasure, though rather subtle, are not in themselves difficult to follow. The characteristic doctrine of the *Philebus*, and that which modern critics regard as the weakest part of the discussion, is False Pleasure. He deals with it as a psychological phenomenon rather than as an emotional effect; and in doing this he compares pleasure with other purely mental ideas, such as knowledge and false opinion, with which it really has no conditions in common. Properly speaking, *false* pleasure can only mean such as is delusive,[2] or which, being tried, ends in disappointment, or involves a greater amount of pain or trouble than was expected, or than it is worth; or which brings a feeling of satiety that becomes wearisome or distressing. Socrates, with his usual profession of preferring truth to everything, thinks the crowning argument against the Hedonists would be to shew that pleasures were not real. In trying to do this, he adopts an argument which is perhaps subtle and fanciful rather than unsound or downright illogical, although Mr. Grote does not hesitate to charge Plato with the latter fault; and Mr. Jowett says[3] "it is difficult to

[1] Others identify ἄπειρον and πέρας with Matter and Form. Mr. Poste well says that ἄπειρον contains the elements of existence devoid as yet of law; while Product (γένεσις) is Creation when law has been imposed by the originator of it, Cause.

[2] See *Phil.* p. 37 fin.

[3] Introd. to *Phileb.* p. 138.

acquit Plato of being a tyro in dialectics, when he overlooks such a distinction as that between the pleasures and the erroneous opinions, whether arising out of the illusion of distance or not, on which they are founded." The notion, that every abstract proposition could be proved by dialectics, —even such, for instance, as the immortality of the soul,— was a prominent feature in the Socratic philosophy. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the *Philebus*. An extreme reaction from the popular faith in the power of ῥητορικὴ led to an exaggerated notion, in the early age of logical reasoning, of what it could effect in proving almost anything. Plato's "faith in dialectics was a faith in an order of the universe which could be discovered by the patient use of genuine enquiry, and by this alone."[1] His argument to prove that there is such a thing as false pleasure begins by shewing that pleasure is properly a mental and not a bodily feeling. In this respect, he contends that it follows the analogy of opinion: they are alike subject to the conditions of *false* or *true*. Both are based on αἰσθήσεις, and these (as in dreams and madness) are liable to be false.

Perception (αἴσθησις) is a mental process partaking of the nature of experience, and this, of memory, μνήμη. It is thus that we realise by anticipation the pleasures of eating or the pains of hunger; it is thus, if we see a horse, that we refer the object before us to a written record in our minds as to what kind of creature a horse is. This is the origin of desire, ἐπιθυμία. Fancy is another faculty of the mind, not founded on direct or present perception, but on memory. A man may fancy he is looking at a horse, and can conjure up all the details of shape, attitude, colour, etc. He may

[1] Mr. Campbell, Introd. *Soph.* p. xiv.

fancy that he possesses, or will possess, such a horse. This may even be a hope, and the hope will be a pleasure; but, if the hope is false, the pleasure which is based on it, as it will never be realised, is in a sense false also. It cannot be doubted, however, that in another sense *all* pleasure is real, in so far as it exercises an emotional effect. As Mr. Jowett observes, "the pleasure is what it is, although the calculation may be false, or the after effects painful." Again, the bad man will hope for sensual pleasures, or for stores of wealth for purely selfish ends; and these would not prove in the end real or true or pure pleasures even if he attained them, because they would be inseparable from counterbalancing pains.

In another way both pleasure and pain are shewn to be false in as far as either arises from anticipation; they are intensified or diminished by nearness or distance, as an object in a picture seems greater or smaller, though it is not really so, by being viewed near or from a distance. In this way a hungry man has greater pleasure in expecting to dine in a few minutes, than if he knew he had to wait some hours. A patient feels more discomfort in taking his seat before the dentist than in contemplating the drawing of a tooth a month hence.

Yet another instance of false pleasure is the neutral state of neither pleasure nor pain. Some held that the absence of pain was the true definition of pleasure; but Socrates maintains that what *is* not pleasure cannnot *become* so. Pleasure is false also when it is a mere reaction or liberation from a state of pain (p. 51. A.). It is false so far as it almost always involves or implies some pain preceding or following, *i. e.* the pleasure of eating is just in proportion to the ante-

cedent discomfort of hunger;[1] and if eating becomes a surfeit, it will be followed by some subsequent discomfort. Only a few pure pleasures can be called real, because they do not satisfy a previous want, *e.g.* smelling sweet scents or looking at beautiful pictures. He contends that one reason why pleasures are false is the *μίξις ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης*, which is shown to occur both in bodily sensations and mental emotions.

Lastly, pleasure is but a *γένεσις*, not an *οὐσία*. It is but a transient state, depending on circumstances, not an absolute existence in itself. It is compared to a mean in relation to an end, as physic to the restoration of health. Pleasure is a process, a generation, a temporal affection, not an eternal being, like The Good; to which therefore it must be secondary and subordinate.

In examining the reality of pleasure, and its possible falseness, Plato takes it in combination with pain or grief under several aspects, both mental and bodily, because he regards them as in general connected, and as correlatives, the one being in a certain and definite proportion to the other. Both, under circumstances, may be false, either wholly or in part; as when they are influenced by being remotely or immediately anticipated. For here the play of the fancy steps in, which has nothing in common with reality.

Mr. Jowett maintains (*Introd.* p. 139) that, "on the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the dialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely considered, and the merely physical phenomenon

[1] Mr. Jowett thinks Plato's statement is an extreme case. Generally, he says (p. 139), while the gratification of our bodily desires affords some degree of pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, being almost done away with by use and regularity.

imperfectly analysed, too much weight is given to ideas of measure and number as the sole principle of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison of two elements which have no common measure, and which cannot be excluded from each other." Mr. Grote also (p. 610) says that one main defect of the *Philebus* is "the forced conjunction between Kosmology and Ethics,—the violent pressure employed to force Pleasures and Pains into the same classifying framework as cognitive belief,—the true and the false." Of the involved style of the dialogue Mr. Grote almost pettishly remarks (p. 584), that even after Dr. Badham's efforts, "the obscurity of the original remains incorrigible." Undoubtedly, the mental effort for understanding the *Philebus* is considerable; the difficulty is sustained (so to say) throughout, because obscure language and obscure reasoning,—the "paedagogic ostentation," as Mr. Grote calls it, are kept up with deliberate effort to the very end. Still, in spite of some faults, both of style and of reasoning, the *Philebus* contains several very brilliant passages, in which the author rises with his theme from affected pedantry to genuine enthusiasm and sublimity, as when he attributes the government of the universe to the Divine Mind, and where he denounces pleasure as a sorceress and the bane of all true thought and true happiness. It should be read with the *Sophistes* and the *Politicus*, which are similar both in style and subject. Those students who have mastered these three dialogues will have realised a department of the Platonic philosophy which stands out somewhat isolated from the rest, as representing his latest thoughts and maturest speculations.

THE PHILEBUS OF PLATO.

I. *Socrates.* Mind, now, Protarchus, what argument you 11
are going to take up from Philebus on the present occasion,
and against what on my part you are going to dispute, if it
should not suit your own view when fairly put before you. B
What say you to our making a general summary of each?

Protarchus. By all means.

Soc. Well then, Philebus says that gratification,—that is,
their pleasure and delight, and other emotions of that sort in
harmony with them,—is regarded as good by all creatures. And
our contention on the other side is, that good does not consist in
these; but sense, mind, memory, and the mental qualities allied
to them,—right judgment and true reasonings,—that all such
qualities are better than and therefore preferable to mere
pleasure at least, to all creatures that are capable of taking C
part in them; and to those that are so, it is and ever will be
the most useful thing in the world.[1] Is it not in some such
form as this that we state our case on each side, Philebus?

Philebus. Quite as you have put it, Socrates.

Soc. Such then is the proposition, Protarchus, that is now
offered to you. Do you accept it?

Prot. I am obliged to do so; Philebus (pretty fellow that
he is) has given it up.[2]

[1] Viz. *μετασχεῖν*, as Stallbaum explains. Dr. Badham thinks *ὠφελιμώτατον* is the singular in correspondence with the foregoing *ἀγαθόν*, as if the author had said *τὸν νοῦν εἶναι ὠφελιμώτατον*.

[2] He regards himself as the *ἐπίτροπος*, who undertakes the defence of his friend's view by commission.

Soc. On matters so important then the truth should somehow be arrived at by every means in our power. What say you?

Prot. I certainly think so.

II. *Soc.* Come then, besides these concessions,[1] let us come D to an agreement between us on another matter also.

Prot. What is that?

Soc. That, as Philebus has now given it up, each of us shall try to show some particular state and disposition of mind that is able to make life happy for all mankind. Is not this the course we should pursue?

Prot. Certainly it is.

Soc. Very well, then: your party says it is the state of enjoyment, and my party says it is that of intellectuality.

Prot. Yes, that is so.

Soc. But what if yet another habit of mind should be made clear to us, better than both of these; should we not say,—supposing this should appear to be more nearly allied to pleasure,—that though, of course, both our claims must yield to the life which contains these conditions of happiness[2] in a E manner likely to last,—yet the life of pleasure will have the 12 advantage over that of intellect?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. But, if more nearly allied to intellect, then intellect beats pleasure, and pleasure is beaten.[3] Do you admit these conclusions, or how say you?

Prot. For my own part, I do.

Soc. What then does Philebus think? Come, what say you?

[1] The stating the case and the consenting to argue it out.

[2] Dr. Badham, in reading ταύτην for ταῦτα, does not perceive that this would necessarily refer to ἡδονῇ just preceding, and so pervert the sense. It was to avoid this, I conceive, that Plato purposely used ταῦτα, which means 'this ἕξις and διάθεσις of the mind for happiness.'

[3] This clause is merely added to check at once, abruptly and decisively, th position of Philebus, that Pleasure is the best of all things. I see not th slightest reason to think the words corrupt, with Dr. Badham.

Phil. Oh, *I* think, and ever shall think, that under all possible circumstances pleasure stands first! As for you, Protarchus, you must decide for yourself.

Prot. Remember, Philebus, you resigned the argument to us, and you can have no further right to express your agreement with Socrates, or the contrary.

Phil. What you state is true. I only mean to say, that B
I make my peace with pleasure, and now appeal to the goddess herself[1] (that I advocate her cause).

Prot. Then Socrates and the rest of us will join in attesting to her that you said what you say.[2] However, the considerations that follow next upon these premises let us try to bring to a conclusion any how, whether Philebus approves of our view or whatever he may think of it.[3]

III. *Soc.* We must try then, commencing with the goddess herself,[4] who, as our friend here says, is known to all under the name of Aphrodite, though the most proper name for her is Pleasure.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, in men- C
tioning the gods by name is not a mere human sentiment, but goes far beyond the greatest fear. So now I give to Aphrodite any name that may be pleasing to that goddess.[5] But I am

[1] An allusion to the superstitious fear of saying anything disparaging of Aphrodite.

[2] Meaning, perhaps, (indirectly, at least,) 'that you avow yourself a regular sensualist,' in saying *ἡδονὴ νικᾶν δοκεῖ* &c. They thus shift from themselves the responsibility. The more obvious meaning is, 'that you clear yourself from the charge of disparaging pleasure.'

[3] An involved way of saying *ἢ βίᾳ Φιλήβου*, 'in spite of his dislike to it.'

[4] *ἀπ' αὐτῆς*, sc. *ἀρχομένους*, which word is supplied a little below. There is a playful allusion to the epic formula *ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα* &c. As Pleasure was not deified by the Greeks, Philebus is supposed to use Aphrodite as a synonym, to show his high esteem for it. Socrates says this to make sensual *ἡδονὴ* appear in an invidious light.

[5] Be it *ἡδονὴ* or anything else. Compare Æsch. *Ag.* 155, *Ζεύς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστὶν, εἰ τόδ' αὐτῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ, τοῦτό νιν προσεννέπω.* So *Phædr.* p. 246. D., *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ ἐχέτω τε καὶ λεγέσθω.*

quite aware that pleasure is a Proteus that assumes many aspects; and, as I said, if we begin with her we are bound to consider well and see what kind of nature she has. For though Pleasure is, so far as mere name goes, abstractedly one, yet we all know that it takes forms many and varied, and in some sense, unlike to each other. For observe: we talk of the *pleasures* of the dissolute man; the *pleasure* that a sober D
man takes in the mere fact of his soberness; the *pleasures* of one who talks nonsense, and is brimful of nonsensical notions and hopes; the *pleasures* again that the Thinker takes in the act of thinking; and if we venture to say that these two classes of pleasures are like each other, surely we shall justly be thought to have very little sense ourselves.

Prot. Very true, Socrates; but that is because these pleasures that you enumerate come from things that are opposite; yet it does not follow that the pleasures themselves are opposed to each other. For how can pleasure be anything else than as like as possible to pleasure,[1]—the thing itself to E
itself?

Soc. Well, my good friend, so is colour as like as possible to colour; so far as the mere fact is concerned, there will be no difference as to its being all *colour*. But we all know that black, besides being different from, is also most directly opposed to white. And so indeed is shape most like to shape, for the matter of that. It is all one *in kind;* but, parts compared with parts, some of them are most directly opposite to[2] each other, and others, we know, have a very wide difference. Many other things too we shall find in the same position; so 13
that you must not too far trust this kind of argument, which classes all the most opposite things under one head. I am afraid, indeed, that we shall find some pleasures to stand in direct opposition to others.

[1] *μὴ οὐκ* is used from the implied sense of *οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ἐστι μὴ οὐκ* &c. 'For surely there is nothing so like itself as pleasure is to pleasure.' So in *Theæt.* p. 153. A., *τίς ἂν πρός γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον—δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;*

[2] *i. e.* a curved line to a straight one.

Prot. Perhaps so; but what harm will that do to our argument?[1]

Soc. Because, we shall reply, you call them, as being unlike, by a wrong name.[2] You assert that all that is pleasant is also good. Now, that things pleasant are pleasant, no reasoner denies; but, though some of them,—the greater part, I fear,— B
are bad, and some, as we admit, good, you call them all 'good,' though you are willing to allow that the pleasures themselves[3] are unlike, if one should press you hard in the argument. What one condition or quality, then, is there in the bad and the good pleasures alike,[4] that makes you say all pleasures are a good?

Prot. What, Socrates! Do you think any man would grant, when he has taken as his axiom that 'Pleasure is the Chief Good,'—I say, do you suppose that any one will tolerate your assertion,[5] that *some* pleasures only are good, and that there are C
some others which are bad?

Soc. Well, you will at least allow that pleasures are unlike each other, and some even contrary.

Prot. No, not in so far as they are *pleasures*.

Soc. We come back to the same assertion, my Protarchus. For if so, we must say that neither is pleasure different from pleasure, but all are alike; and the instances just cited[6] do not

[1] *i. e.* they will still be ἡδοναί.

[2] "Dissimilar as they are, you apply to them a new predicate."—*Prof. Jowett.*

[3] Dr. Badham reads προσαγορεύεις ἀγάθ' αὐτὰ, ὁμολογῶν ἂν &c. So far from this ἂν being 'necessary to the sense,' it may be doubted if it is good Greek in this place, viz. as expressing the result of the condition εἴ τίς σε προσαναγκάζοι.

[4] ἐνὸν may be taken either as an accusative absolute, or as the object to προσαγορεύεις. "Quidnam in utroque voluptatum genere insitum *bonum* appellas?" In this case, πάσας ἡδονὰς is a redundant addition. He means, I think, τί οὖν ἔνεστι—ὥστε προσαγορεύειν, κ.τ.λ.

[5] He speaks with some excitement.

[6] Of χρῶμα and σχῆμα, p. 12. E. Dr. Badham reads τιτρώσκειν, depending on φήσομεν. I think he is wrong in saying Plato would have written οὐδὲ τὰ παραδείγματα—τρώσει. The Attics very rarely use οὐδὲ (as the Romans do use

affect us at all. Thus we shall have to bear a defeat from making random assertions, like the weakest and most inexperienced of reasoners. D

Prot. What do you mean?

Soc. Why, if I, following your example, and determined to fight it out, venture to assert that nothing is so like its opposite as what is most unlike it,[1] I shall be able to avail myself of your argument of 'it's all the same.' And thus we shall prove ourselves to be rather too young, and our reasoning will drift out of its course and be lost. So let us beat back, and perhaps if we start again from the point we began with,[2] we may hope to come to an understanding with each other. E

Prot. Tell me how you mean.

IV. *Soc.* Conceive me again questioned by you, Protarchus.

Prot. On what point?

Soc. Whether intellect, exact knowledge, mind, and all those qualities which I at first assumed in my thesis as 'good,' when I was asked what 'The Good' can be,—will not be open to the very same conclusions as your argument about pleasure.

Prot. How so?

Soc. All the kinds of knowledge, taken together, will seem so many, that some of them must be unlike to each other. And if some are even in some way opposed, surely I should not deserve the name of a sound reasoner on the present occasion, 14
if through fear of this result of 'contraries,' I were to assert that no one kind of knowledge is unlike another, and so were to let this argument be lost, as if it were mere idle talk, and

nec) unless a negative clause precedes; but ἀλλὰ φήσομεν is not a negative clause. Besides οὐδὲν would hardly stand as the direct negative to the infinitive, which usually requires μηδέν.

[1] *e. g.* 'Nothing is so like black as white.'

[2] Lit. 'into a position of sameness,' a well known metaphor from the grip of wrestlers. He means, that φρόνησις can be shown to have the same varieties that ἡδονὴ has; they are equally διάφοροι or ἀνόμοιοι or ἐναντίαι. 'If you get me into this fix with your ἡδονὴ, I shall get you fast with my φρόνησις.' So far, neither has any advantage over the other.

we ourselves were to get safe to the shore on the plank of a paradox.

Prot. Well, certainly *that* must not happen,—except indeed the getting off safe. However, I like the fairness of terms presented by your argument and mine. Granted that pleasures are many and unlike, and the kinds of knowledge many and diverse.

Soc. This diversity then, Protarchus, in the good which you and I respectively advocate, I propose that we should try B not to disguise or conceal. Let us rather bring it forward to the notice of all, and not shrink from the conclusion,[1] if our arguments on being examined should give evidence to show conclusively whether we ought to call Pleasure 'The Good,' or Intellect, or some other third thing. For now, of course, we are not contending with this object, that *my* view, or your view, shall be the winner; both of us, I suppose, are bound to aid that cause which is the truest.

Prot. Undoubtedly.

V. *Soc.* Then let us put this proposition on a still firmer footing by coming to an agreement upon it. C

Prot. What proposition?

Soc. One which causes much trouble to all,[2] whether they like or (as is sometimes the case with some people) dislike it.

Prot. Express yourself more clearly.

Soc. I mean, a proposition which has just now presented

[1] τολμῶμεν, 'let us bear the issue,' seems used like πεισόμεθα above, p. 13. D., which is Dr. Badham's correction of πειρώμεθα or πειρόμεθα. With ἐλεγχόμενοι it is not difficult to supply ὁ σὸς καὶ ἐμὸς λόγος from the preceding. He means, that Protarchus must bear to find pleasure put only second or third.

[2] He means, the correct application of synthesis and analysis (or classification) in dialectics. For Socrates' opinion of its value, see *Phædr.* p. 266. B. The formula ἓν καὶ πολλά, 'unity and diversity,' or 'diversity in unity,' was only a technical expression of it, attributed to Zeno, *ibid.* p. 261. D. The instances given below, of 'many Protarchuses,' are not true, but spurious analysis; and as such Plato ridicules them. The general meaning of what follows is, that the Sophists wasted time in frivolous subdivisions of concretes (which Plato ridicules in the *Sophista*), but neglected the analysis of abstracts.

itself, by a kind of chance, to our notice, and the nature of which is very strange; for it *is* strange, when so stated, that 'Many are One' and 'One is Many'; and it is easy[1] to argue against any one who takes either as his thesis.

Prot. Is this then your meaning,—when somebody says that I, Protarchus, who am by nature one, am also on the other hand several, thus assuming that there are ever so many D
me's, and some of them even contrary[2] to each other,—the tall and the little, and the heavy and the light, in one and the same individual, and so on in numerous other relations?

Soc. What you have mentioned, Protarchus, is only the popular notion of the marvellous on the subject of the 'One and Many.' Such a notion now-a-days it is allowed,[3] one might say, by all, that we ought not to take up; they regard it as puerile and obvious, and rather a hindrance than a help to argument. Indeed, they tell us that we should not enter- E
tain even such questions as this,—as when some one separately specifies the members or other[4] parts of a particular thing, and then gets another to admit that all these members together form that original 'One'; since he only laughs at him as he proves that he has been forced to make the portentous statements, that the One is many and infinite, and the Many but one!

[1] With *ῥᾴδιον*, which some connect with *θαυμαστὸν*, I prefer to supply *ἐστί*.

[2] Dr. Badham, who sees no force in the *καὶ*, removes the comma at *πάλιν*, and construes *πολλοὺς καὶ ἐναντίους*.

[3] The construction, as is so frequently the case in this dialogue, is involved. Instead of the impersonal *συγκεχώρηται*, we have the participle agreeing with the object, and used passively in continuation of *τὰ δεδημευμένα*. The combination is still more oddly varied below in *μήπω συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμευται*, where *μήπω* is opposed to *ἤδη* in the present passage. We may add, that *δημοῦσθαι*, not *δημεύειν*, is the proper word in this sense. In *Sophist.* p. 232. B., we have *δεδημοσιωμένα* in the sense of 'made public.'

[4] Reading *ἄλλα* for *ἅμα*, with Dr. Badham. (He might have added, that inf. p. 17. D. the Bodleian has *ἄλλα ἐννοεῖν* for *ἅμα ἐννοεῖν*.) This instance of unity in multiplicity, though equally futile, is different from the other; "Protarchus is one, but made up of twenty limbs;" and "there are twenty Protarchuses," according to his different and varying states.

Prot. And pray what other kinds of 'One and Many' are there, which have *not* as yet been given up or become hackneyed on this same subject?[1]

Soc. When, my son, we apply this doctrine of Unity not 15
to things that are born and die,[2] as in the case we just now took,—for in this instance, and in Unity of this sort, as I just now said, it is generally admitted that we should not take up such a subject for inquiry;—but when one essays to view Man as One,[3] or Ox, or Beauty or Goodness, it is about these and suchlike unities that all the pains are taken, with careful subdivision, and all the real difficulty is felt.[4]

Prot. In what respect?

Soc. In the first place, whether we must conceive that any B
such units have a *real* existence at all;[5] in the next, in what sense, if each of these is One and ever the same, (that is, not admitting of either birth or destruction,) we can conceive it still[6]

[1] Protarchus means to ask, 'Is there then some other kind of analysis which is not open to the same objections?'

[2] Not to mere concretes, but to abstracts. I think there is a subtle irony in the whole passage, intended to show how averse young or careless reasoners are to strict analysis in any form and on any subject.

[3] i. e. *abstractedly*, and not as in the case of 'how many Protarchuses' &c.

[4] Mr. Jowett translates, "about these and similar unities a warm controversy arises, when there is any attempt made to divide them." Mr. Poste, "Such unities earnestly examined and split into pluralities soon kindle genuine controversy." Dr. Badham inserts δὲ after μετὰ, and refers ἀμφισβήτησις to the difference of opinion that prevails as to the division of ἰδέαι, or abstract existtences, in concrete or sensible things, *e. g.* beauty in the beautiful, etc. It is possible that the words σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως were a gloss on ἀμφισβήτησις. If so, Socrates would mean, in his ironical way, that it was this *abstract* analysis, the utility of which the Sophists called in question, and attempted to throw ridicule upon.

[5] The ἰδέαι really exist; but concrete man, as opposed to abstract man, might seem rather to have a real existence.

[6] "Notwithstanding what is about to be said in the following sentence."—*Dr. Badham.* The eternity and unchangeableness of the ἰδέαι, or abstract types, is here alluded to, which is assumed to be an inherent quality of them. Mr. Grote remarks that Plato offers no explanation of his difficulty, and that perhaps

in the most unchangeable manner to remain this One and no other; then, whether we are to assume such a unit as separated into many parts and dispersed through the infinity of things created,[1] or existing as a whole outside of itself,—which, of course, would seem the greatest impossibility of all, that what is One and the same should at the same time be in One and in Many.[2] These, Protarchus, are the cases of 'One and Many,' C viz. in abstracts, and not in those others, the concretes, which are the causes of all perplexity, if not carefully defined and understood, and on the other hand, if they are so, a source of great facility and convenience.

Prot. If so, Socrates, it is our duty first to work out this argument thoroughly in our present discussion.

Soc. I should myself certainly be inclined to say so.

Prot. Then take it for granted that all of us, the present company, are willing to accept your views on these subjects. As for Philebus, indeed, it is best perhaps not to rouse him by putting any question, since he is well out of the discussion.

VI. *Soc.* Very well, then. Where shall one take up the fight that has raged so long and with such different results on D the matters in dispute? Shall we say at this point?

he felt it to be a real one in the doctrine of *ἰδέαι*, and threw it out in a spirit of fairness, or as a challenge to others to take up and solve.

[1] Which would in itself make the *ἰδέαι* perishable instead of eternal.

[2] If, for instance, Beauty, as an abstract or *ἰδέα*, is one and inseparable, and yet numerous objects that are concrete and phenomenal partake of it; then we have the paradox, that Beauty both is and is not One, and is within and without itself. Dr. Badham, citing the same doctrine from the *Parmenides*, p. 131. A., sees only two, not three questions in the present passage. I think, with Stallbaum, that there are three; (1) Is an abstract unity a real existence, (*e.g.* is '*man*' a mere conception, or an objective *οὐσία*)? (2) In what way can it remain eternally the same, existing as it does in things changeable? (3) Is it separable, or self-contained? Mr. Grote (in his 'Plato') puts it thus:—'Is the Universal Man distributed among all individual men, or is he one and entire in each of them? How is the Universal Beautiful (the Self-Beautiful-Beauty) in all and each beautiful thing? How does this one monad, unchangeable and imperishable, become embodied in a multitude of transitory individuals, each successively generating and perishing? How does this One become Many, or how do these Many become One?"

Prot. Which?

Soc. We say, if I mistake not, that this same 'One and Many,'[1] called into being by discussions, goes the round of every subject of conversation, whether new or old. And as this did not begin in our time, so there is no chance of its ever ceasing; but something of this sort, as it seems to me, is an unfailing and eternal property of the subjects themselves that arises in our minds.[2] And when any of our young men on any occasion has first tried it, he is as delighted with it as if he had discovered a treasury of wisdom, nay, he is transported E with pleasure, and would fain allow no subject to rest, at one time giving it a turn in this direction,[3] and lumping it together into one, at another, pulling it to pieces again and separating it into parts, thus perplexing himself first and principally, and next, whoever happens to be near him at the time, whether younger or older or of the same age with himself. And in doing this he spares neither father nor mother nor any other of his 16 hearers,—I might almost say, of the animals in general, and not merely the human kind. For, of course, he would not be

[1] Or, 'the doctrine of the identity of One and Many.' Plato means, that no subject of discussion can possibly occur, that does not involve analysis and synthesis in some form. The passage next following is very difficult. Mr. Grote remarks that "it is very interesting to read"; but he does not attempt a version of it.

[2] Or, 'feeling in us resulting from the subjects themselves.' Mr. Jowett incorrectly renders it "an everlasting quality of reason."

[3] Viz. in that of synthesis, while at another time he tries *unravelling*, *i. e.* analysis. Dr. Badham, who rightly says these participles continue the metaphor in πάντα κινεῖ λίθον, (used, I believe, in selecting stones for rough walling,) renders it "turning them upside down and rolling them back again." (Rather, 'first to one side and then to another.') But I doubt if the words mean this. What the young men delight in, Dr. Badham says, is "the sophistical employment of this contradiction which is the inherent property in all objects of conception." The unskilful and futile application of the doctrine of ἓν καὶ πολλὰ is certainly meant, and one which would enable the disputant to puzzle, and then laugh at his adversary. Mr. Poste renders it, "he now coils and ravels up multiplicity into unity, now unrolls and disperses unity into plurality." Perhaps ἀνειλίττειν meant 'to undo a piece of masonry just constructed.'

likely to spare any of the foreign people,[1] if he could but get some one to make them understand him.

Prot. Do you not see, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are young? Have you no fear lest we should set upon you with Philebus, if you go on abusing us thus? However, we know what you mean; and if there is any way or any shift by which the confusion we are now in would goodnaturedly go and leave the argument to ourselves, or if we could find any better way than this for discovering the truth, do you take up B the cause with zeal, and we will go with you to the best of our power. For the subject before us is no trifling one, Socrates.

Soc. Indeed it is not, my dear boys, as Philebus styles you in his address. There is, however, no better way, nor is there ever likely to be, than the one[2] of which I have ever been an ardent admirer, though many a time 'ere now it has escaped from me and left me friendless and forlorn.

Prot. What way is this? Only let us hear it.

Soc. It is one which it is not very difficult to make intelligible C to you, but which it is very hard indeed to adopt. It is one by which all the discoveries that were ever made in art have become known to us. Now mind what way I am speaking of.

Prot. Only tell us.

Soc. It was a gift of the gods to men, as it seems to me, that was flung down from some store-house in heaven by one Prometheus, together with very bright fire.[3] And our fore-

[1] The slaves of the household. There is an ironical allusion to his clumsy kind of reasoning, which no one could understand. And as a *taunt* Protarchus understands it in what next follows.

Mr. Jowett says (Vol. iii. p. 132), "Socrates seems to intimate that the time had arrived for discarding these hackneyed illustrations; such difficulties had long been solved by common sense, as the mere familiarity with the fact was a sufficient answer to them. He will leave them to Cynics and Eristics; the youth of Athens may discourse of them to their parents. To no rational man could the circumstance that the body is one, but has many members, be any longer a stumbling block."

[2] Repeat here ταύτης from ὁδόν τινα καλλίω ταύτης above.

[3] The faculty of thinking, or dialectic induction, combined with the clear

fathers,—better men than ourselves, and in closer converse with the gods,—have handed down to us this tradition, that all things which are said by us to *be*, are composed of both One and Many, and have in them the finite and the infinite[1] as part of their nature. With this constitution then of things before D
us, it became our duty in all cases to propose to ourselves some one general view for investigation, since we are sure to find it at the bottom of every subject.[2] When we have got hold of this,[3] after *one* we should consider *two*, should there be two, or if not, then three, or some other number, and again each of these units in the same way, till we have clearly perceived the true nature of the original one, viz. not only that it is One and Many, and contains an indefinite number of parts, but also *how many* that can be counted up.[4] But the note or character of infinity we must not apply to plurality, till one has fully seen all the number that plurality has between the original one and E
infinity. *Then* we may let each unit in them all pass into infinity, and concern ourselves no further with it.[5] The gods

light of reason and the fire of genius, seems to be meant by this modification of the ordinary and well-known myth. Dr. Badham thinks the language here is partly borrowed from some poetical form of the story.

[1] Lit. 'limit and infinity.' By *πέρας*, as Mr. Jowett well observes, is meant what we now call "law" in physics.

[2] Every subject and every thing may be viewed as an *ἰδέα*, *i. e.* as a *ἕν*.

[3] Reading *καταλάβωμεν*, with H. Stephens.

[4] Take *pleasure* as an illustration. It is one as an *ἰδέα* or general abstraction. Subdivide into pleasure *sensual* and pleasure *intellectual*. Again, take each of these two as a *ἕν*, and say that sensual pleasures are *five*, one to each sense. Again, take *pleasures of taste* as a *ἕν*, and you will get an infinity of viands and drinks. But do not *jump* to infinity and say, "Pleasure! oh, of course, pleasures are quite countless and endless," etc. It is interesting to read these early efforts after systematic classification, which is now made the basis of all true science.

[5] As when we have got, by subdividing, to 'pleasures of eating,' we need not count up the precise number of dishes that cause such pleasure. Or (as Mr. Grote has it) "When we reach this limit, and when we have determined the number of subordinate species which the case presents, nothing remains except the indefinite mass and variety of individuals."

then, as I said, so taught us to consider, to learn, and to inform each other. But the present degenerate race of philosophers[1] arrive at the One and the Many too quickly and 17
superficially;[2] for after the One they immediately get to the Infinite, and take no account of intervening numbers. But it is in these very numbers that the difference consists between our conversing with each other like logicians, or on the other hand,[3] like mere disputants.

VII. *Prot.* Some of these views of yours I think, Socrates, that I begin to understand; but on other points I should like to hear more plainly what you mean.

Soc. Well, what I mean is clear enough, surely, in the letters of the alphabet. You may therefore get an idea of it from the very rudiments of your own education. B

Prot. How so?

Soc. Articulate sound, you will grant, is one, as it proceeds from the mouth;[4] and yet again it is infinite in the number of variations in each and from every individual.

Prot. Certainly it is.

Soc. And yet[5] we are not fully informed by knowing either of these facts, viz. that there is Infinity or that there is Oneness in sound. No; it is the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds[6] that makes each of us a grammarian.

Prot. Most true.

[1] *i. e.* the Sophists.

[2] Read *βραχύτερον* for *βραδύτερον*, with Dr. Badham.

[3] For *πάλιν καὶ* I should read *καὶ πάλιν*.

[4] Vocal, not instrumental. By *πάντων* the various dialects of foreign nations seem to be meant.

[5] For *καὶ* we should probably read *καὶ μὴν*, as indicated both by the context and by the following *γε*.

[6] Viz. the capability of analysing and classifying sounds in vowels, consonants, dipthongs, mutes, etc. For *ὅτι πόσα* I would read *ὁπόσα*, the *τι* and the *π* being often confused. And in Æsch. *Suppl. ad fin.*, *ὁπόσ' εὔπλοιαν ἔπραξαν* should probably be restored for *τί ποτ' εἰυπ. ἐπ.* If here we retain *ὅτι πόσα*, the literal sense will be, 'but (the knowledge) that there is a certain number of them, and what they are,' etc.

Soc. And surely what makes a man a musician[1] is this very same knowledge.

Prot. How so?

Soc. Sound, we said, according to the former science,[2] is C One in itself.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. Now then let us assume two general kinds, the low-pitch and the high-pitch, and a third, the *homotone*, or note in unison. Is it not so?

Prot. It is.

Soc. Well, but you would not as yet be an accomplished musician if you knew only these facts. While, if you did not know them, you would be, one might almost say, good for nothing in musical science.

Prot. Assuredly so.

Soc. But when, my friends, you have mastered the number and the nature of the Intervals in sound, in respect of treble and bass, and the limits of these intervals, and the combinations that are made from them,—with a perfect knowledge of all which our predecessors taught us, their followers, to call them D 'harmonies'; when too, in the various movements of the body, you have discovered[3] that other corresponding effects are produced, (which, numerically measured, they tell us we should call by other terms, 'Time' and 'Metre';) and when at the same time you begin to perceive[4] that this is the view you ought to take about every 'One and Many';—when, I re-

[1] The τὸ before μουσικὸν seems to have crept in from the preceding τὸ γραμματικὸν, where τὸ belongs to ποιοῦν. One MS. is said to give τὸν μουσικόν.

[2] Reading κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην, viz. γραμματικὴν, and omitting καὶ τὸ with the Bodleian. If however we retain the καὶ, we obtain a good sense; 'according to γραμματικὴ as well as to μουσική.' So Mr. Jowett; "Sound is one in music as well as in grammar."

[3] Adopting Mr. Poste's ingenious and probable reading, μάθῃς for πάθῃ, which however may be defended, by supplying ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς from above.

[4] I suggest ἐννοῇς for ἐννοεῖν, which seems to be an assimilation of the infinitive immediately preceding, ἐπονομάζειν.

peat,[1] you have fairly realised all these facts and in this way, then you become an adept; and when, by careful thought, you E
have apprehended any other truth, so too you are made intelligent in that. But this Infinity[2] of number of and in each subject of thought makes you stray infinitely far from the right view, and does not allow you to become distinguished, or to make a figure in the world, as never having looked to any figures in anything.

VIII. *Prot.* It seems to me, Philebus, that Socrates has admirably put what he has just now said.

Phil. So it seems to me also; as far as *this* subject goes. But why in the world is the argument addressed to *us*, and what is its purport? 18

Soc. That indeed, Protarchus, Philebus has very properly asked.

Prot. He has, in sooth; and therefore do you answer him.

Soc. I will do so after a few more remarks on the subject itself. For as, when one has taken some one genus, he ought not, according to our view, to look at once to the nature of the Infinite, but to some number; so conversely, when one is obliged to take the Infinite first, he ought not to look to One immediately, but in this case too to a certain number contain- B
ing in each term a certain plurality, and so try to take in that view, thus ending in *One* from *all*.[3] But let us again illustrate our meaning by taking the case of letters.

[1] For the use of γὰρ *in apodosi*, see Dr. Thompson's note on *Gorgias*, p. 454. B.

[2] *i. e.* this sudden arrival at it, without attempting first to classify and distinguish. Of course, there is a play on the words as above on ἀνόητος, p. 12. D., and in many other places in this dialogue.

[3] If a man's attention is called to the Stars, he is not at once to say they are infinite, but to count the planets, constellations, different magnitudes, &c. If he begins, as it were, at the other end, and views all the stars as filling infinite space, he must in like manner not at once view them as ἕν, or the genus *star*, but go through the same process in synthesis as the other did in analysis. He is to look to ἀριθμὸς, which in each case (fixed stars, planets, &c.) has πλῆθός τι, a certain plurality. It is not difficult to supply from the preceding δεῖ βλέποντα. Dr. Badham construes δεῖ βλέπειν ἐπ' ἀριθμόν τινα, taking ἕκαστον to agree with

Prot. In what way?

Soc. When *Voice* was found to be unlimited,—whether it was a god who perceived this first or some god-like man, as there is a tradition in Egypt which says that it was Theuth; for he seems to have been the first to notice the vowel-sounds in that infinite, not as a One, but as a plurality, and again, other sounds, not of the vowel-kind, yet partaking of the nature of voice,[1] and to observe that these too had a certain number of C
their own; when moreover he had distinguished a third kind of letters which we now call *mutes*,—he next proceeded[2] to class by themselves the consonants and the mutes, so far as to make each class One, and the vowels and the medials in the same way, until he had ascertained their precise number, and so gave the name of 'letter' to each and all the primary sounds. Seeing however that none of us would ever comprehend any one genus of sound by itself, and without them all, he again considered this group or combination as One, and as making all these various sounds One,[3] and so sounded[4] the praise of one D
art by calling it Grammar.

πλῆθος, and making καταvοεῖν depend on ὥστε, "so that the enquirer may discover them therein." Mr. Jowett, "he who begins with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about for some number which is always an expression of plurality."

[1] The *semi-vowels*, according to Mr. Jowett. These include the liquids; λ, μ, ν, ρ, σ, ζ, ξ, ψ.

[2] It seems to me that the apodosis to ἐπειδή, etc., begins here. Dr. Badham, by reading λέγω for λέγων above, makes this clause, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, etc., begin abruptly and without any copulative. Mr. Poste's rendering of this passage is very loose: "he then divided first the voiceless and noiscless class, and then the vocal and semi-vocal classes, into their ultimate units." This kind of translation is of no use to students.

[3] After having analysed, he again combined by synthesis, and so made an *alphabet*. Mr. Jowett translates, "in consideration of this common bond, which in a manner united them, he assigned them all to a single art, and this he called the art of grammar." Mr. Poste has nearly the same words.

[4] There is clearly a play on φθόγγος in ἐπεφθέγξατο. For the classifying of the primary sounds, στοιχεῖα, under one ἰδέα, and their συλλαβαί, see *Theæt.* p. 203. C., 208. C. *Cratyl.* p. 424. C.

C

Phil. I understand this more clearly than your former remarks, Protarchus, to compare the statements themselves with each other. But the same defect seems to present itself in the argument as I felt some time ago.

Soc. Mean you, Philebus, again to ask, 'What has this to do with the subject?'[1]

Phil. Aye, that is what Protarchus and I have been asking ourselves for some time.

Soc. And yet you have been all the time close to what you say you have long been trying to find.

Phil. How is that?

IX. *Soc.* Was it not Intellectuality and pleasure that we first undertook to discuss, in order to decide which of them we should prefer?

Phil. Certainly it was. E

Soc. But we affirm, I think, that each of these is a One in itself.

Phil. We do.

Soc. Well then, this is the very point that our former argument requires us to determine; first, *how* each of them is at the same time One and Many; next, how it is that they do not pass at once into infinity,[2] but what number of parts each of them has, before they become infinite in their forms or mani- 19
festations.

Prot. It is indeed no ordinary question, Philebus, that Socrates has somehow brought us into, by his round-about introduction. And now it is for you to say which of us two is to answer what he now asks. It may perhaps seem ridiculous for me, who have engaged without any reserve to take up the argument[3] from you, to impose it on you again from being myself

[1] Cf. Arist. *Eccles.* 750, οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἐμὸν ἱδρῶτα καὶ φειδωλίαν Οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔπος οὕτως ἀνοήτως ἐκβαλῶ.

[2] The use μὴ is here remarkable. I shall be glad to see a passage where it is similarly used.—For τινά ποτε we must read τίνα ποτε, '*what* number,' because the ποτε is quite unmeaning with the indefinite τις.

[3] ὑποστῆναι διάδοχος is like ὑπέστης αἵματος δέκτωρ νέου, Æsch. *Eum.* 204,

unable to give a reply. But surely it is far more ridiculous that neither of us should be able. Consider therefore what we are to do. It seems to me that Socrates is now asking us about certain *species* of pleasure,—first, whether or not there are B such; next, how many and of what kind. And similarly with respect to Intellectuality.

Soc. You say rightly, son of Callias. If we cannot give an answer on everything that has unity, similarity, and identity, *i. e.* on any Notion, and its contrary, the Many which it contains; it is plain from our former discussion that none of us is ever likely to become good for any thing on any subject whatever.[1]

Prot. This, Socrates, seems to me to be pretty nearly the C case. But, good as it is, in the opinion of a man of sense, to have a knowledge on subjects in general, the next best course is to be fully aware of one's own powers. Now what is the bearing of this remark on the present occasion? I will explain. You, Socrates, freely gave us all the opportunity of conversing with you, and your own services for defining what is the best of all human possessions. For when Philebus had stated this to consist in pleasure, delight, joy, and other emotions of that sort, you argued against this view, and insisted that the chief good did not lie in these, but in those other mental qualities which we so often purposely remind D ourselves of, and very properly so, in order that each of these subjects may be kept before our minds[2] and so be thoroughly sifted. Now what *you* say, as it appears to me, is the good which we shall properly call 'superior to pleasure at least,' is mind, science, intelligence, art, and all such kindred acquire-

and χορηγὸς ὑπέστην, Dem. *Mid.* p. 336. Dr. Badham's version is not quite correct, "having unreservedly taken your place as your successor." But he follows Stallbaum, "me, quum tibi substitutus sim."

[1] If we cannot thus analyse every ἰδέα or genus of abstractions, we shall never be good reasoners. Mr. Grote well remarks that scientific classification, a thing so familiar and essential in modern science, was unknown before Plato's time.

[2] There is a play on ἀναμιμνήσκομεν and μνήμη.

ments: that these are what we *ought* to acquire, and not those others. Well, when these two propositions had been severally stated and debated on in the former conversation, we, in joke, uttered this threat: 'We won't let you go, till a satisfactory E conclusion has been reached by the determination of these questions.' You agreed to this, and lent us your company for this purpose: and we, you see, affirm, as school-boys do, that a present rightly given cannot be taken away again. So do not go on meeting us at every point of the discussion in the way that you are doing.

Soc. What way do you mean?

Prot. Why, throwing us into perplexity and asking such 20 questions as we have no chance of properly answering at present. *At present*, I say; for let us not suppose that even if we are all puzzled alike, the subjects now before us will come to a conclusion. No! if we cannot find an answer, you must; you promised. Therefore, take your own counsel in the matter, whether you will distinguish the kinds of pleasure and science, or give up classification, if there is any other way by which you are able and willing to make clear the present subject of discussion between us.

Soc. After such a speech as that there is no serious harm B to be expected by my illustrious self;[1] for that *if you are willing* is a phrase that removes all fear on any subject. But I have another motive for complying: it seems to me that some god has furnished us with a memory in this matter.

Prot. How so? Memory of what?

X. *Soc.* It was a long time ago that I heard, and now bethink myself of it, in a dream or waking, some talk about pleasure and intellect,—that neither of these is *the* good, but some other third thing, different from them and better than both. Now surely, if this view should clearly present itself to C us now,[2] pleasure must resign all claim to the first prize; for

[1] "By poor me," Dr. Badham. Mr. Poste, "Your words release an intimidated man from his apprehensions."

[2] In allusion to ἐναργὲς ὄνειρον,—'as clearly as it did in the dream of old.'

the chief good can no longer be identical with pleasure. How say you?

Prot. As you say.

Soc. Then, according to my view, we shall no longer require in addition the disquisitions necessary for distinguishing[1] the kinds of pleasure. And this will appear still more clearly as we advance.

Prot. You have said well; and conduct the discussion accordingly.

Soc. First, then, let us come to an agreement on some other minor points.

Prot. What are these?

Soc. Must *the good* have the condition of being final and complete, or is that not essential to it? D

Prot. I should say, Socrates, that if anything is an end in itself, it is the 'good.'

Soc. Well, is it also self-satisfying?

Prot. Of course it is; it must surpass all other things in this respect.

Soc. But this, I presume, we are especially bound to say of it,—that every created thing that has any knowledge of it pursues and hankers after it, with an eager desire to get hold of it and to keep it for itself. Nay, it cares not in the least for anything else than what results in good.[2]

Prot. There is no gainsaying this.

Soc. Then let us consider and decide between the life of E pleasure and the life of intelligence, viewing each separately.

Prot. How do you mean?

Soc. Let there be no intelligence in the life of pleasure, and no pleasure in that of intelligence.[3] For, if either of them

[1] τὰ εἰς διαίρεσιν, etc. 'If my view is right, that a τρίτον τι is best, *i. e.* the μικτὸς βίος, we need not be at the trouble of analysing and classifying pleasure.'

[2] Or, 'is accompanied with good in its results.'

[3] Mr. Grote contends that this is quite illogical; intelligence itself *is* a pleasure, and cannot be correctly placed in antithesis with it. But is not the antithesis a purely imaginary one, and so put as to show its non-practical nature?

is to be *the* good, it should require nothing in addition. If it should appear that either one or the other does stand in need of anything else, it will cease, I presume, to be our real Good. 21

Prot. Certainly it will.

Soc. Shall we try it in your own case, by way of testing these views?

Prot. By all means.

Soc. Answer then.

Prot. Say on.

Soc. Would *you*, Protarchus, like to live your whole lifetime in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

Prot. Indeed, I should.

Soc. Would you then think that anything further was wanted, if you possessed this fully and entirely?

Prot. Certainly not.

Soc. Mind, now. Do you really mean that you would not at all require[1] thought, intelligence, right reason, and other B faculties akin to these?

Prot. Surely not. I should have everything, I take it, in having the feeling of joy.

Soc. Then if you lived thus you would always and throughout your life be in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures.

Prot. Of course.

Soc. But surely, if you had not mind, memory, knowledge, and right judgment, in the first place you would necessarily be ignorant about the very fact, whether you are or are not enjoying yourself,—I mean, if you are to be destitute of *all* intelligence.

Prot. It could not be otherwise.

Soc. Well, but in the same manner if you did not possess C memory, of course you could not even remember that you once felt pleasure; and no recollection at all would remain of the pleasure that occurred at the present time. So too, if you had

[1] It seems to me easiest to read μῶν μηδὲ ὄναρ, 'not even in dream,' *i. e.* not at all, for μῶν μηδὲ ὁρᾶν τι. Dr. Badham proposes μῶν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι;

not right opinion, you could not think you were rejoicing when you really were; if you had no reasoning power, you could not possibly calculate for the future either, whether you will feel joy. In a word, you would have to live the life, not of a human creature, but of a jelly-fish, or some other of those living things with shelly bodies that inhabit the sea. Is this so, or can we form some other idea of the matter beside this? D

Prot. Certainly not.

Soc. Is then such a life as this worthy of our choice?

Prot. This way of putting it, Socrates, makes me unable to give any reply at present.

Soc. Then do not let us give in just yet, but take on the other side the life of Mind, and see into that.

XI. *Prot.* What sort of life do you mean by that?

Soc. I mean to ask whether any one of us would on the other hand be content to live in the possession of intelligence, mind, and science, and with perfect recollection of everything, but without any share at all, either great or small, of pleasure, E or on the other hand of pain, but with a complete absence of feeling in all such matters.

Prot. Neither of these lives, Socrates, seems to me to be desirable; nor is it likely, as I think, to appear so to any one else.

Soc. But what shall we say, Protarchus, of the two to- 22 gether,—of the life that is common by being made up of both?

Prot. You mean, of pleasure and mind or intellect?

Soc. That *is* the kind of life I allude to.

Prot. Why any one, of course, will choose this in preference to either of the others; and not only *any* one, but *every* one.[1]

Soc. Do we then begin to see what is the result that we are coming to in the present argument?

[1] As πᾶς means *quivis*, which has a notion of plurality from its indefiniteness, there seems no great difficulty in rendering πρὸς τούτοις as above. Mr. Poste, wrongly, as I think, translates it "in addition to either;" yet he is followed by Mr. Jowett. Dr. Badham's πᾶς ἡμῶν seems doubtful Greek.

Prot. Certainly: that three kinds of life are proposed for our choice, but of two of these neither is sufficient in itself, nor choiceworthy for man or any other creature. B

Soc. Then about these, at least, it is now clear that neither contains the Good. For in that case it would have been sufficient, and final, and choiceworthy to all plants and animals, that could so live during their whole term of existence. And if any of us made any other choice, it would be contrary to the nature of the really desirable; he would accept it without full conviction, either from ignorance or from a constraint very far removed from happiness.[1]

Prot. Well, it does seem that this is so.

Soc. Then I think we have proved to your satisfaction that Philebus' goddess, at least, cannot be regarded by us as identical with the Good.[2] C

Phil. For the matter of that, Socrates, neither is that mind of yours the good. If I mistake not, the same objections can be brought against it.

Soc. Perhaps they may, Philebus, against *my* mind, though not, I think, against the genuine godlike mind, which is quite another thing. As yet, then,[3] I put in no claim for the first prize on behalf of mind as against the common or mixed life. But we have still to see and consider what is to be done about the second prize. For it is possible that one of us may say, that the reason why the mixed life is desirable is because it contains mind; the other, because it contains pleasure. And thus, though neither mind nor pleasure is *the* good in itself, it may still be thought that one or the other of them is the cause of good in the joint life. On this point then I would yet more strongly maintain against Philebus, that in this mixed life, whatever the quality or condition is, by the reception of which D

[1] Some ἄτη, or mental delusion. "Some unblessed necessity," Mr. Poste.

[2] Perhaps we should read ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τἀγαθόν.

[3] Dr. Badham suggests that οὔπω may refer to the possibility of θεῖος νοῦς, as contrasted with ἀνθρώπινος, even yet winning the first prize, *i. e.* over μικτὸς βίος.

it is made at once desirable and good, to that quality not pleasure, but mind is more akin and more like. And so, according to this view, pleasure cannot justly be said to have any better claims even to the second prize[1] than it has to the E
first. Nay, its place is further off than even the third, if this 'mind' of mine can be trusted by us in this discussion.

Prot. Well, certainly, Socrates, pleasure does seem to me to have been fairly knocked down by the present argument; for it was in fighting for the first prize[2] that it met with an overthrow. As for intellect, I suppose we must say it showed 23
its good sense in not putting in its claim to the first prize; for it would have met with no better fate. But I am afraid that if pleasure loses the second prize, it will be held by its admirers to have downright disgraced itself. For not even they will any longer think it as beautiful[3] as it seemed before.

Soc. Well, had we not better let her alone now, and not vex her by applying the most accurate test of all, and so proving her inferiority?

Prot. That is all nonsense, Socrates.

Soc. What! because I said what was impossible, 'to give B
pleasure pain'?

Prot. Yes; and not only so, but because you seem not to be aware that not one of us intends to let you go yet, before you have got to the end of these difficulties by reasoning them out.[4]

Soc. Then, Protarchus, alack for the long dreary talk that remains! But in fact, it is by no means easy at present to finish the discussion. If I mistake not, you require some other shift. If you go in for the second prize on behalf of mind, you must have weapons different from your former arguments.

[1] For *μικτὸς βίος* stands first, and what makes it, as a cause, desirable, viz. *νοῦς* or its congener, stands second.

[2] The *present* subject of conversation.

[3] If the *καλλιστεῖα* are awarded to *two* others in preference.

[4] He means, it was equally unwise in Socrates to say above, *ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἐᾶν ἤδη.*

Some of them indeed, it may be, are the same. Must we then proceed?[1]

Prot. By all means.

XII. *Soc.* But let us try to use mutual caution in laying down its first principle. C

Prot. What principle do you mean?

Soc. Let us divide all things in creation into two classes,—or rather, if you please, into three.

Prot. Explain how you mean.

Soc. Let us take as examples some points in our late discussions.

Prot. Which points?

Soc. We said, if I mistake not, that the god had shewn to mankind that there was both an Infinite in things, and also a Finite.[2]

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Let us then assume these as two of the classes,[3] and a third as a One made up of them both.—But I am, as it seems, myself sufficiently ridiculous in my attempt to divide and count up[4] by classes. D

Prot. What mean you, my good friend?

Soc. Why, that we require yet a fourth kind.

Prot. Tell us what.

Soc. Consider what can be the *cause* of this blending the infinite and the finite, and set down this as a fourth in addition to the other three.[5]

Prot. Don't you think you will require a fifth also,[6] implying the principle of separation?

[1] With χρὴ supply πορεύεσθαι ὑπὲρ νοῦ, etc. Or perhaps ἔχειν ἕτερα βέλη, *i. e.* not simple analysis, but analogy from nature.

[2] *i. e. limit*, or limiting principle.

[3] Reading τούτω on Stallbaum's conjecture for τούτων.

[4] The allusion is to the λοιδορία of bad analysts, sup. p. 16. A.

[5] The doctrine of *causation* is alluded to also in the *Phaedo*, p. 97. C, and seems to have been an early speculation of the Platonic philosophy.

[6] This question is ironical, perhaps.

Soc. Possibly: but not, I think, just yet.[1] If we should require it, you, no doubt,[2] will make due allowance for me in E seeking for a fifth.

Prot. Of course.

Soc. First, then, let us separately take three of the four, and endeavour, with respect to two of them, by viewing each, when split up and divided, as many, and then again uniting the parts of each into one, to comprehend how each of them is, as we said, One and Many.[3]

Prot. If you would speak a little plainer about them; perhaps I might follow you.

Soc. I mean by the two that I now put forward first, those 24 which I just before named, the Infinite and the Limited. And that, in some sense, the Infinite is not only One but Many, I will try to show. As for the Limited, that must await our convenience.

Prot. It shall do so.[4]

Soc. Now consider. I warn you that what I ask you to think about is difficult and open to dispute, but think. And first, with respect to 'hotter' and 'colder'; can you conceive any limit to them? Or must we rather say that the qualities of 'more' or 'less,' residing in the very nature of the things themselves, will never allow a limit to be placed to them, so long as they *are* so resident? For, of course, if an end or limit B *is* put to them, the 'more and the less' themselves come to an end.[5]

[1] Dr. Badham thinks this is meant to shew the primary importance which Plato attached to the *αἰτία*, *i. e.* to 'First Cause.'

[2] *i. e.* as having yourself suggested it.

[3] Each of them, *ἄπειρον* and *πέρας*, as *ἓν καὶ πολλά*.

[4] We should read *μενεῖ*, perhaps, not *μένει*. Compare for the allusion *Theæt.* p. 173. C.

[5] So long as you keep urging a stoker to get up 'more steam,' the hotness or pressure is of the nature of indefiniteness. But when once you say, 'get it up to 100 pounds on the inch,' you put in the *πέρας*, which brings the indefinite at once to an end. It is then only 'hot' up to a certain mark, and not 'hotter.' I see no reason, with Dr. Badham, to construe *ἐν αὐτοῖς* apart from *τοῖς γένεσιν*.

Prot. What you say is very true.

Soc. And we further say that in 'hotter' and 'colder' this 'more' and 'less' is invariably found.

Prot. Most certainly.

Soc. Then our argument goes to shew that these are *always* without a limit; and if they have no limit, then they are, of course, altogether infinite.

Prot. I fully agree.

Soc. And you have well reminded me by your reply, that this very word 'fully' which you have uttered, and indeed a C
'gentle' utterance also,[1] have the very same force as 'more' and 'less." For wherever they come in, they prevent a thing from being of definite proportion; and so by producing in all actions a more vehement than some previous more gentle, and the converse, they in effect make up a 'more' and a 'less,' and get rid of definite quantity. For, as we said just now, if they did not get rid of this definite proportion, but allowed not only it, but the measurable to have existence in the place of the more and the less, and the violent and the gentle,—if so, I say, D
these infinites are driven from their rightful place, which they hitherto occupied; since they could no longer be 'more hot' or 'more cold,' if they admitted definite quantity. For the very notion of 'hotter,' as well as of 'colder,' is progressive; while 'only *so* hot or cold' stops there, and ceases to advance. According to this argument then,[2] the 'hotter' would at the same time be finite and infinite.

Prot. It certainly seems so, Socrates; but, as you remarked, these inquiries are not easy to follow. Perhaps, if on some future occasion they are again proposed to our notice, they will E

[1] It is rather hard to preserve the play on *σφόδρα* and *ἠρέμα φθέγξασθαι*. There is again a double sense intended, as before, on *ἄπειρος*, *ἐνάριθμος*, *τελευτή*, etc. The meaning is, that these qualities, though not actually comparatives, always take into account excess over or deficiency in an opposite quality; as a 'loud voice' means, by implication, 'louder than a soft one.'

[2] Viz. if *ποσὸν* could co-exist with *ἄπειρον*. Mr. Poste strangely mistranslates, "this proves the unlimited character of Hotter and his antagonist."

shew that the questioner and the questioned do not differ materially in their views.

Soc. There you speak well, and we will endeavour so to act. At present, however, consider whether we are to accept this proof of the nature of the infinite, that we may not protract the discussion too far by going at length into every point.

Prot. Well, what proof do you allude to?

Soc. Whatever things appear to us capable of becoming more or less,—that is, to admit of violent, or gentle, and excessive, and all such qualities as these,—all these we should 25
put in the category of the infinite, as class One, according to our former argument by which we said, if you remember, that we should bring under one head things that have been divided and dispersed,[1] and mark them as forming one natural genus, according to their peculiar property.[2]

Prot. I remember it.

Soc. Then whatever does not admit of the above conditions, but does admit their opposites,—first, of the equal and equality, next to the equal, of the double, and everything which is either number in relation to some other number, or measure with another measure,—all things of this sort, I say, we should seem to be doing right in putting down in the class of the B
finite. How say *you* to this?

Prot. Your division is an excellent one, Socrates.

XIII. *Soc.* Very well. But what character must we assign to the third,—that, I mean, which is made up of both finite and infinite?

Prot. It will be for you, I expect, to tell me that.

[1] That is, as it were, to restore them by a synthetical process to an original unity. See p. 23 E.

[2] Or simply, perhaps, 'to the best of our power.' "Corresponding to some one power and quality in them," Mr. Jowett. But he takes *μίαν* both with *δύναμιν* and with *φύσιν*.

[3] Comparative or proportional number or measure; in other words, ratios of number or measurement.

Soc. Say rather some god, *if* any god condescends to hear my prayers.[1]

Prot. Make your prayer then, and look out for divine aid.

Soc. That I am doing; and indeed it seems to me that some god has already become our friend.

Prot. How mean you, and what proof have you? C

Soc. I shall explain, of course,—and mind you follow my argument closely.

Prot. Only state it.

Soc. We spoke of a 'hotter' just now, I think, and a 'colder,' did we not?

Prot. We did.

Soc. Add to them then degrees of wet and dry, much and little, quick and slow, great and small, and all such qualities as we before set down under one head, as a class of things naturally admitting of a 'more' and a 'less.'

Prot. That of the Infinite, you mean? D

Soc. I do. And now bring into connexion with it,[2] as the next step, the family of those things which, on the other hand, admit of the finite.

Prot. What class is that?

Soc. The class of things which we ought to have united under one genus of the finite kind, but did not do so, as we did to that of the Infinite.[3] Perhaps, however, it will do as well even now[4]; by bringing both into a class of their own, the third kind will also become plain to us.

[1] Irony, and in reference to this *μικτὸν* being the most important and widely prevalent law in the universe and its government.

[2] In *γένναν συμμιγνύναι* the language is evidently borrowed from the interbreeding of animals. "Mix with them the tribe of Limit" (Mr. Poste) is hardly explicit.

[3] They had not yet made an enumeration of *the things which contain* the *πέρας*. These are supplied by Socrates further on in the passage beginning *ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις*, etc. (Dr. Badham). We may remark here a play between *συναγωγὴ* in the synthetical and the sexual sense. Sup. p. 23. E., they had agreed to classify both the *πέρας* and the *ἄπειρον*.

[4] For *ταὐτὸν δράσει*, (a doubtful phrase in the above sense,) Dr. Badham

Prot. What class, I repeat, and how do you mean?

Soc. The class of the equal and the double, and generally of that which stops contraries from remaining at variance with E each other, and makes them commensurable and in harmony by introducing number.[1]

Prot. I understand you. You seem to me to mean, by proposing to unite these, that certain products will result in each of them.[2]

Soc. You are right in your supposition.

Prot. Go on, then.

Soc. Is it not, in the case of diseases, the right union of these opposite principles which produces the natural state of health?

Prot. Certainly it is. 26

Soc. And in treble and bass, quick and slow time, which are in themselves infinite, the introduction of the same limiting agents produces the finite, and the most perfect musical composition generally.

Prot. Yes, and with the most charming effects.[3]

Soc. Well, you will also grant that, in seasons of too great cold or heat, the same agents come in and take away the excessive and the infinite, and produce an internal and external agreement.

Prot. Of course.

proposes *ταὐτὸν δράσασι*, the dative depending on *καταφανὴς γενήσεται*. Perhaps *ταὐτὸν δρῶσι*, the present participle, is rather nearer the mss. reading *δράσει* or *δράσῃ*. Or we might read *ἂν ταὐτὸν δράσῃς*.

[1] *i. e.* the application of ratios, 'This is three times as hot as that,' etc. There is a kind of play on the Pythagorean doctrine of *ἀριθμὸς* as the source of all order. (Aesch. *Prom.* 459.) As Dr. Badham remarks, Protarchus' question *ποίαν* refers, not to *ἐκείνη*, (which is the third or mixed kind,) but to the *πέρατος γέννα* which has not yet been enumerated.

[2] In blending the hot with the cold you get temperate air, health from the proper union of moist and dry, etc. Dr. Badham reads *μιγνύσι* (*μιγνῦσι*?) for *μιγνὺς*, but I do not think this is any improvement.

[3] Dr. Badham reads *μάλιστά γε*, which is perhaps right, and is given in the early editions.

Soc. Is it not then by these that seasonable weather and all else that is enjoyable are brought into existence for us, that is to say, from the limiting influences in union with the unlimited? B

Prot. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And there are other similar results without number, of which I say nothing, such as the beauty and strength that attend health, besides many other admirable mental qualities. It was this goddess Harmony, my handsome friend Philebus, that first saw riot and the general badness of all men,[1] and when no moderation was to be found among them either in their pleasures or in their surfeits, she enacted Law and Order, which brought with them Limit. And you, Philebus, say that she utterly spoils life; I, on the contrary, say that she preserves it. What do *you*, Protarchus, think of her?[2] C

Prot. That, Socrates, is quite my view of the matter.[3]

Soc. Now, then, I have described these three classes, if you understand me.

Prot. Well, I think that I do. You seem to me to say that one of these is the Infinite, one, and next in order, the limiting principle, in all existing things. As for the third, I do not quite comprehend what you mean by it.

[1] *πάντων* perhaps means 'all created things'; but *ἡδονὴ* is applicable to creatures only, and, in its application, only to man. For *πέρας* we should perhaps read *καὶ πέρας, i. e. κατιδοῦσα οὐδὲν πέρας ἐνὸν*, etc. Otherwise, *πέρας οὐδὲν ἐνὸν* must be the accusative absolute. Compare p. 13. B.

[2] Dr. Badham, reading *ἡ σὴ θεὸς*, would make Socrates appeal to the goddess Pleasure; which totally perverts the passage. For *πέρας ἔχοντ'*, *i. e. ἔχοντε*, in which he can see no meaning, he adopts *ἐχόντων* from the Bodleian, but transposes it, and reads *πέρας οὔθ' ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐχόντων*, where *ἐχόντων*, agreeing with *πάντων*, makes *ἐνὸν* quite superfluous. I think some scribe, finding *ἔχοντ'*, wrongly took it as an abbreviation of *ἐχόντων*. I must say, I much prefer the vulgate text here to Dr. Badham's alterations of it. Nor does he seem to me to be right in supplying *πάντας* to *ἀποκναῖσαι*, 'she has enfeebled them.' Mr. Poste and Mr. Jowett supply *τὴν ψυχήν*. The sense is simply, '*You* say that moderation spoils pleasure.'

[3] The reply seems purposely ambiguous. Protarchus is only half-hearted in rejecting pleasure as the good.

Soc. I see, my friend; what puzzled you was the great number of the results produced by this third. But the Infinite D also presented many kinds; and yet, as registered under the general class of 'the more and the less,' they all appeared to us as One.

Prot. That is true.

Soc. But the Finite, as it had not so many forms, did not cause us the same difficulty in making it naturally One.[1]

Prot. How should it?

Soc. In no respect. Suppose me then to mean by the *third*,—putting in this class as *one* everything resulting from the union of the other two,—'Birth into Being from those medium states which, by union with the Finite, are brought about from the Infinite.'[2]

Prot. I understand you.

XIV. *Soc.* Well, but we said that besides these three a E fourth class would have to be considered. In this consideration you must take a part. See now, whether you think it a necessary law, that 'Everything created is created by some Cause.'

Prot. I do. For how, without it, could anything be created at all?[3]

[1] There is certainly some difficulty in saying that the limiting agencies are 'not numerous,' or not *so* numerous as the class of the illimitable or infinite. He means perhaps, only *τὸ ἴσον, τὸ διπλάσιον, ἀριθμὸς, μέτρον*, sup. p. 25. A. Some have proposed to omit the first *οὔτε*, which however is grammatically necessary to the following *οὔτε*. Dr. Badham thinks "either *ἧττον* or an additional negative must have dropped out." Still, it is not certain that Plato's meaning is not as I have given it, viz. that as there was no great difficulty in classifying *τὰ πέρας ἔχοντα* by the aid of synthesis, so there need be none in the *μικτὸν γένος*, *i. e.* such results as health, economy, favourable weather, etc., though much more numerous in their manifestations.

[2] Dr. Badham renders this, "as a coming into being, derived from the proportions produced along with the limit." Mr. Poste, still less correctly, (or rather, less closely) "all births into being from the introduction of limit and measure." An example of *μέτρον*, or medium state, made up from *ἄπειρον* and *πέρας*, would be a fine season; and the *γένεσις* or product would be *health*.

[3] Possibly *τι* has dropped out before *γίγνοιτο*. Otherwise, the subject will be *πάντα*.

Soc. Then the producer, in its true nature, differs not, except in name, from the cause; and thus 'what makes' and 'what causes' would rightly be called one and the same thing.

Prot. It would.

Soc. But again, 'what is made' and what is 'brought into 27
being' we shall find to differ only in name, like the instance mentioned just above. What say you?

Prot. As you say.

Soc. Does not then that which *makes* always naturally precede, and what is *made* come into existence subsequently to that?

Prot. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Then 'cause,' and that which obeys cause[1] for production, are by no means the same, but different.

Prot. Of course.

Soc. Then the results produced, and the conditions from which all states are produced, present to us these three kinds?

Prot. They do.

Soc. May we then call that which is the producer of all B
these results a *fourth* principle, viz. cause? For we have sufficiently shewn that it is different from the others.

Prot. It is different, certainly.

Soc. It is proper, however, now that the four have been distinguished, with a view to remembering each, to count them up one after another.

Prot. Of course.

Soc. Well, then; the first I call the Infinite, the second the Finite; next, and thirdly, existence resulting from a union of these two; and if I venture to call the *cause* of this union

[1] If τὸ ποιοῦν is αἰτία, and τὸ γιγνόμενον is ποιούμενον, and if αἰτία precedes and γένεσις follows; then the producer, and that which obeys his mandate for the purpose of production, *i. e.* τὸ γιγνόμενον, are distinct, and as distinct, αἰτία makes a fourth, while γένεσις stands third. Or thus:—if γένεσις results from the union of ἄπειρον and πέρας, the cause of the μίξις, or that which imposes the πέρας, viz. αἰτία, makes a fourth.

and consequent production a fourth kind, I should not, I think, C
be unreasonable.

Prot. Of course not.

Soc. Come then, what is the next step in the argument? And with what object in view have we got so far? Was it not this: we were inquiring whether the second prize would fall to pleasure or to intellect. Was it not so?

Prot. It was.

Soc. Then now that we have arrived at this classification, we are in a position to form a better opinion as to the result about the second as before about the first,[1] for it was about these two first that, as you know, we raised a doubt.

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. Now go on. We put down the mixed life, I think, D
of pleasure and intellect, as entitled to the first prize. Was it so?

Prot. It was.

Soc. Very well. Then we now perceive what this mixed life is, and to what class it belongs.[2]

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. And we shall further assert, if I mistake not, that it is but a part of a general third class; for that third is not made up of two particular things, but of all the infinites together tied down by a limiting influence. So that with perfect propriety this life that has got the first prize would be made but a part of that other more general one.[3]

Prot. Most properly so.

[1] Viz. the *μικτὸς βίος*. There is obviously a play on *πρώτου* and *πρῶτον*.

[2] Viz. to the third, made up of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*. The perfect or best life, therefore, is a *γένεσις*, while *ἡδονὴ* remains an *ἄπειρον*. Far before it stands *φρόνησις*, which has the nature of a cause, *αἰτία*, inf. p. 30. B. The question of *οὐσία* in its turn being superior to *γένεσις*, *i. e.* end to means, is discussed later on.

[3] And of course, he infers, a part is inferior to the whole, a minor to a major. Thus *ἡδονὴ* is thrown still further back in the order of merit, and stands only fourth, instead of first, as its advocates claim.

XV. *Soc.* Very good. But what must we say, Philebus of *your* life, which is wholly of pleasure unmixed with anything else? In what class of those described above[1] must it be put to be rightly reckoned? And before you deliver your opinion, answer me on this point. E

Phil. You have only to say what.

Soc. Are pleasure and pain limited, or do they belong to the class of things that admit of a more and a less?

Phil. Certainly to those that allow a more. For pleasure would not be full and complete good, if it were not in its very nature unlimited both in quantity[2] and in the power of becoming yet more.

Soc. Nor, Philebus, would pain be complete evil;[3] so that 28
we must look for some other agency than the nature of the Infinite, to account for a part of the good that pleasures possess.[4] Let this therefore[5] be taken by you as one of the points not yet fully determined. But tell me, both Protarchus and Philebus, under which of the classes we have mentioned we are now to reckon intellect, knowledge, and mind, so as not to offend by our impiety? For, as it seems to me, the stake is by no means a small one between failure and success in the present inquiry.

Phil. Ah! you, Socrates, exaggerate the merits of *your* god. B

[1] In the ἄπειρον, or the πέρας? For, being ἄμικτος, it cannot belong to μικτὸν γένος.

[2] Or, 'numerical variety.'

[3] If τὸ ἄπειρον makes an evil a complete evil (*e. g.* as a tooth-ache would be πᾶν κακὸν if it were eternal, or ever increasing,) it cannot *also* make good complete good; *i. e.* it cannot at once be the cause of two results which are opposite, *i. e.* of the difference also between ἀγαθὸν and πᾶν ἀγαθόν.

[4] Perhaps ᾧ παρέχεται, the verb being passive. Otherwise we should rather expect παρέχει.

[5] Dr. Badham reads τοῦτ' οὖν δὴ for τούτων δή. Stallbaum reads τοῦτο, in which I think we must acquiesce. The reader will notice the play on ἀπεράντων γεγονός, in the sense of 'offspring of the ἄπειρον.' Mr. Poste renders it, "Well; let Pleasure be reckoned of the class of the Limitless." Taylor, "the issue of things unbounded." Stallbaum also says, "refertur τοῦτο ad ἡδονήν."

Soc. Well, and so do you, my friend, those of yours. Nevertheless, it is our bounden duty to answer the question that is asked.

Prot. Socrates is certainly right, Philebus, and we must do as he bids us.

Phil. You know that you have elected to speak for me.[1]

Prot. So I have; but at present I am well-nigh perplexed, and I want you, Socrates, to be our mouthpiece, in order that we may fall into no mistake[2] respecting the rival divinity by giving utterance to some incongruous sentiment.

Soc. I suppose I must comply, Protarchus; for after all, C
the task you impose is not very difficult. But tell me,—did I really, by exaggerating, as Philebus said, my νοῦς, in my joking way, cause you the perplexity you describe, in asking to what class Mind and Knowledge belonged?

Prot. Indeed, Socrates, you did.

Soc. Well, there really was no difficulty. All philosophers agree,—making themselves in good earnest[3] of great importance,—that mind is the ruling power of both heaven and earth.[4] And perhaps they are right in the assertion. But let us, if you please, inquire somewhat more at length into this very subject, to what class mind belongs.

Prot. Say on as you think proper, and do not concern D
yourself on our account about the length of the discussion. For be assured, Socrates, that we shall not quarrel with you on that account.

XVI. *Soc.* You say well. Let us then commence with some such question as this.

Prot. As what?

[1] He avoids the φθόνος of admitting that ἡδονὴ must stand third, or even fourth, and that νοῦς must take precedence of it.

[2] Viz. that of ἀσέβεια. The "rival" is of course Νοῦς *versus* Ἡδονή.

[3] Not παίζοντες.

[4] The doctrine of Anaxagoras is alluded to, who is included in πάντες οἱ σοφοί. He means that Νοῦς must stand before anything else, if it is the ruling principle, αἰτία, of the Universe, and therefore ἡδονὴ must give way.

Soc. Whether we are to affirm that all existing things, and this fair scene which we call the Universe, are governed by the influence of the irrational, the random, and the mere chance; or, on the contrary, as our predecessors affirmed, are kept in their course by the control of mind and a certain wonderful regulating intelligence.

Prot. None of these same[1] [random principles that you mention], my respected friend Socrates; for what you have just suggested seems to me downright impious. But the doctrine that mind regulates them all is worthy of the grand spectacle of the universe, the sun, moon, stars, and all the revolving heavens; and for my own part, I am not the man ever to speak or even think about them in any other way. E

Soc. Do you propose then that we on our parts should join in affirming a doctrine maintained by our predecessors, viz. that the facts are as just stated,—in other words, that we should not only think ourselves bound to quote, without risk on our side, the opinions of others, but should take the risk on ourselves,[2] and share the blame that must fall on us when some able disputant asserts that the universe is not governed by any such law, but proceeds on no fixed principle?[3] 29

Prot. Certainly, I should be glad to do this.

Soc. Proceed then to consider the point that next suggests itself to us in the present discussion.

Prot. You have only to state it.

Soc. Those elements which are found in the nature of the bodies of all created things without exception,—fire, water, and air, we get a glimpse of, and land too, (as sailors say in a storm,[4]) as existing also in the constitution of the Universe. B

[1] For *τῶν αὐτῶν*, which seems corrupt, I suggest *τῶν ἀλόγων*, 'none of the influences (or agencies) apart from reason,' *i. e.* the *τὸ εἰκῇ* and the *ὅπως ἔτυχεν*.

[2] *i. e.* not merely follow Anaxagoras, and hold him responsible, but assert his doctrine, and share the blame if its truth should be denied by others.

[3] Some sophists of the school of Diagoras and the later Epicurus are meant.

[4] A kind of proverb, as in Æsch. *Ag.* 872, *καὶ γῆν φανεῖσαν ναυτίλοις παρ' ἐλπίδα.* Socrates means, that these elements are dimly seen, or inferred to exist, in worlds beyond our reach as well as in objects within our ken.

Prot. You may well use that expression; for we are in good earnest thrown out of our reckonings by the difficulties in our present subject.

Soc. And now further remark this about each of the component elements in us.

Prot. What?

Soc. Why, that each of these elements in ourselves here on earth is small, insignificant, and existing by no means in a pure and genuine state, and that the power it possesses bears no proportion to the grandeur of its nature.[1] Take a single element as an instance, and draw the same conclusion respecting them all. There is, you will grant, fire existing in ourselves, and also fire in the universe.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. Then you will also grant that the fire in us is small, C
weak, and of inferior power, while that in the universe is wonderful both in respect of quantity and beauty, and, indeed, in every property that fire can have.

Prot. What you say is very true.

Soc. Well, now, is the fire of the universe fed, lit, and ruled by this,—I mean, by the fire that is resident with us on earth; or, on the contrary, is the fire in me, in you, and in all other creatures, possessed of all these conditions from the fire that is above us?[2]

Prot. That is a question that does not deserve an answer at all.

Soc. Well said; for the remark will equally apply, if D
I mistake not, to the element of earth subsisting in the creatures here, and that in the worlds without; and so, in fact, you will reply about all the other ingredients which I named in my questions a little before.[3]

[1] Hence something more than *mere matter* must have created us.

[2] Is the major controlled by the minor, or the converse?

[3] The total ignorance of the ancients respecting the principles of chemistry, heat, vital force, etc., rather exalts than degrades the ingenuity and thoughtfulness of these speculations.

Prot. No one who wishes to be thought sane can give any other answer.

Soc. No one, certainly. But now follow me in the next matter for consideration. All the elements we have just enumerated we comprehended under one general view, and applied to them the term 'body.' Was it not so?

Prot. Of course.

Soc. Take the same remark to apply to this that we call E
'the universe.' For, of course, on the very same principle it must be a 'body,' since it is composed of the same elements.

Prot. Nothing can be more true.

Soc. I want to know then, whether it is from this body, in its entirety,[1] that our human bodies are supported, and have received and hold the other conditions that we stated respecting them, or from our bodies that this universe is maintained?

Prot. This is another question, Socrates, that is hardly worth the asking.

Soc. Well, is *this* then worth,—or what will you say to it? 30

Prot. Say what question you mean.

Soc. Shall we not affirm that this human body of ours possesses a soul?

Prot. We certainly shall.

Soc. Then from what source, friend Protarchus, did it get it, unless indeed the body of the universe had a soul also?[2] For the universe certainly has all the properties of our bodies, and those of a kind more beautiful in every respect.

Prot. It is clear, Socrates, that our bodies have the animating principle from no other source.

Soc. True; we do not, of course, suppose, Protarchus, that the four kinds we mentioned, viz. the limiting, the unlimited, a kind made up of both, and a fourth representing Cause, which B
exists beside the others in all things,—that this fourth, I

[1] Or, 'in a general way.' There seems a kind of play on the double sense.

[2] The argument is this: the universe is both concrete and animated; our bodies also are concrete, and from the same materials. Therefore, the living and guiding principle in both, *νοῦς* or *ψυχή*, is probably identical also.

mean, which imparts life to the creatures we see, and enables them to exercise their bodies, and when those bodies receive any damage, provides a means of curing it,—that this, which in its arrangement and combination of various bodies and its healing powers is called perfect and universal wisdom,—that this, co-existing with the other like principles in the heavens as a whole, and in vast portions of them, and that too in a pure and perfect state, should *not* have been the contriver[1] in the world without of Nature's most beautiful and most highly prized works.

Prot. Why certainly that would be quite unreasonable. C

Soc. Then, if we should be wrong in this, we should perhaps state the case better by holding with that other conclusion, viz. that there are in the universal those principles we have so often specified,—the infinite, wide in its prevalence, the finite, sufficient to form with it a third, and besides these an almighty Cause, that orders and appoints years, seasons, and months, and which therefore would most justly be called Wisdom.

Prot. Most justly indeed.

Soc. But wisdom and mind there never can be apart from soul.

Prot. No, indeed.

Soc. You will allow then that in the nature of Zeus a D kingly soul and a kingly mind are implanted, on account of its influence as a Cause;[2] while other gods have other gifts and prerogatives, as they may severally please to have them called.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Now don't suppose, Protarchus, that we have advanced this argument without due reason. It is in defence of those philosophers who long ago declared their conviction that Mind is ever the ruling principle in the Universe.

[1] μεμηχανῆσθαι seems here used in a medial sense.

[2] Since he is the general director and regulator of the universe. Mr. Poste renders this, "In the frame of Jove, then, you will say the might of Cause engenders a kingly soul and a kingly reason, and other gods will be rightly called by such names as they may choose."

Prot. Well, it certainly is in their favour.

Soc. And it is also one that has already provided an answer to my inquiry, by telling us that Mind is the real originator[1] E of that which we called 'Universal cause'; and this *cause* is one of the four kinds. So now, I think, you have got from us our reply.[2]

Prot. I have, and in a manner that quite satisfies me. And yet, I really was not aware that you had given your answer.[3]

Soc. Why, sometimes a little pleasantry furnishes an agreeable rest from serious thought.

Prot. Well said.

Soc. Then to what class, my friend, Mind belongs, and 31 what property it possesses, has now been fairly well explained by us.[4]

Prot. Quite so.

Soc. But the class to which Pleasure belonged was in the same way ascertained some time ago.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. Let us then keep in mind these facts among others,[5] about both,—that Mind is, as we said, allied to Cause, and may be referred tolerably well to that class of things; whereas pleasure is not only in itself infinite, but of a kind

[1] Most critics think the word γενούστης is corrupt. Yet it is not more extravagant than other pretended derivations given by Plato, *e. g.* in *Phædr.* p. 244. C. and 251. C. and also ib. 238. C. It is acknowledged too by the ancient lexicographers, from this passage. (See *Hesych.* in v.) Plato himself seems to allude to this coined word in παιδιᾷ, inf. p. 30 fin.

[2] Protarchus had asked Socrates to be the προφήτης, sup. p. 28. B.

[3] The question propounded was (p. 28, A.) 'in which of the four classes Mind was to be placed.' Socrates showed that it belongs to the class of the αἴτιον, but his proof was so indirect and roundabout that it hardly seemed an answer.

[4] Sup. p. 28, C., διὰ μακροτέρων τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα.

[5] Beside other points that we are bound to keep in view for making our final decision.

that neither has nor ever can have beginning, middle, or end in itself or of itself.

Prot. We shall remember that, of course. B

XVII. *Soc.* Now then we are bound in the next place to see not only in what part of us each of them resides, but from what state or condition they are produced, when they exist at all. And first, of pleasure; as we took first for examination the class that it belonged to, so now let us take first these inquiries respecting it.—But here again I must remark, that we shall never be able to examine pleasure thoroughly, if we take it apart from pain.

Prot. If that is the road we should pursue, by all means let us pursue it.

Soc. Have you then the same view as myself respecting the origin of them?

Prot. What view is that? C

Soc. It appears to me that pleasure and pain taken together belong naturally in their origin to the mixed class.[1]

Prot. Refresh our memories, dear Socrates, if you please, as to which of the before-mentioned classes you mean by 'the mixed.'

Soc. That shall be done to the best of my power, my much esteemed friend.

Prot. Thank you.

Soc. Well then, let us conceive[2] by the term 'mixed kind,' that which we before said was the third of four.

Prot. That which you mentioned next after the infinite and the finite? That in which you put health, and (if I mistake not) harmony[3] also?

[1] Since pain and pleasure are seldom apart. Viewed *per se*, and apart from pain, which acts as a salutary πέρας, Pleasure was placed among the ἄπειρα. But, as the μικτὸν γένος was voted the best, so that kind of pleasure that is mixed with pain, *i. e.* controlled by fear of it from going into excess, is the truest and best kind of pleasure.

[2] I suggest ὑπονοῶμεν for ὑπακούωμεν.

[3] Or, 'just proportion.'

Soc. Well said. And now apply that 'mind' of yours as well as you can. D

Prot. You have only to say on.

Soc. I say then that whenever we find this harmony violated in living things, a breaking up of the natural condition and a production of pains occur at that same time.

Prot. What you say is quite reasonable.

Soc. But when the harmony is restored, and gets back into its normal state, we may say that then pleasure arises,—to use as few words and as brief an expression as is allowable on a subject of such importance.

Prot. I dare say you are right, Socrates; but let us try E and set these views in a yet clearer light.

Soc. Well then, it is easiest, I suppose, to comprehend common-place and obvious sensations.

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. Hunger, I presume, may be said to undo the harmony, and so to be a pain.

Prot. It is so.

Soc. And eating, which is the filling up again of a void, is a pleasure.

Prot. It is so.

Soc. And so again thirst is a spoiling of the harmony and a pain, while the effect of liquid is to fill again what had lost 32 its moisture, and so to cause pleasure. And still further, any secretion and dispersion of moisture that is unnatural to us, which are the effects of close heat,[1] is a pain; while the restoring of it and cooling down again to a natural state, is a pleasure.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. And the congealing of moisture by cold, beyond what is natural in an animal, is a pain, while the natural course of the moist particles, as they get back to their former state and become dissolved, is a pleasure. Or, to put the matter in one form[2], consider if the proposition be not a sound one, in respect

[1] Viz. in causing profuse sweat.

[2] Or rather, perhaps, 'quite generally,' ἐνὶ λόγῳ, or as a universal truth.

of the particular class of things resulting, by the natural law of vital production,[1] from the union of the infinite with the finite, as I before said,—that whenever this state suffers a break up, B that breaking up is a pain, while the return to its own essential properties, in the going back of all the elements to their places, is on the other hand a pleasure.

Prot. That may be granted: it appears to me to be probable in a general way.

Soc. Shall we then put down this as one kind of combined pleasure and pain in affections of this sort in each case?[2]

Prot. So let it be considered.

XVIII. *Soc.* Now then assume that, as an emotion of the mind alone,—*i. e.* in reference to the expectation of these feelings,—that the pleasure hoped for before the actual pleasure C is felt, is pleasing and cheering, while the prospect before the actual pain felt is alarming and painful.[3]

Prot. Unquestionably, this is a second sort of combined pleasure and pain,—the feeling that is produced in the mind itself, through expectation, apart from the body.

Soc. You are right in your surmise. For in these expectances,—which, as I view it, are each wholly independent of body, and so unmixed with actual pain and pleasure,—I think that we shall find a clear proof, whether the class of pleasure, as a whole, is worthy of our chief regard as the good; or *that* D is rather to be made over by us to some other of the forementioned classes,[4] while in respect of pleasure and pain,—just

[1] κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονός, *i. e.* by a γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν. The passage is so encumbered by surplus words, that it is difficult to render it at all closely. The εἶδος, or kind of state or being formed from ἄπειρον and πέρας, is the natural or normal state of comfort and enjoyment.

[2] Viz. consisting in a violation and restoration of the harmonies, or normal proportions.

[3] As thus; 'how delightful it will be to get home to a good dinner'; 'how we shall feel the want of food if we are detained three hours beyond the dinner-hour,' etc. These are the anticipations respectively of πλήρωσις and λύσις ἁρμονίας.

[4] Viz. to the κοινὸν or μικτόν. As a test of truth, Socrates prefers to take

as we might say of hot and cold, and all such natural conditions,—we must only occasionally take up with them, at other times rejecting them as not constituting the good in themselves, yet sometimes and in some particular instances admitting the nature of the good.[1]

Prot. You are quite right in saying that the object we are now in quest of has passed by some such track as that we are now upon.[2]

Soc. Then first let us consider this: If what we have just said is really the case, viz. that from the disarrangement of the E
elements in us comes pain, but pleasure follows from their being got safely back again, let us, I say, proceed to contemplate the negative state, when there is no such disarrangement or consequent restoration, and see what ought to be the condition of living creatures under these circumstances. And now attend very carefully to the question and say, Is it not certain that at that particular time every creature must be without the sense of either pain or pleasure, either in a small or a great degree?

Prot. It must certainly be so.

Soc. There is then, beside the other two, a disposition in us such as I have described; that is, beside that of a person in 33
a state of joy, and that of one in pain.

Prot. Of course.

Soc. Now, then, be careful to remember this; for in judging of pleasure the keeping clearly in mind or not this third state is a matter of great importance. And so, if you please, let us discuss one little point connected with it.

the most genuine and least mixed examples of pleasure and pain, *i.e.* those purely mental.

[1] Both pleasure and pain are dependant on circumstances for their character of good or bad. Pain *may* be good as discipline, pleasure as a necessary recreation, etc.

[2] A metaphor from chasing an animal into some other hunting-ground, as we say 'the fox has gone into another cover.' Compare Æsch. *Cho.* 300, ἦ τὸ δίκαιον μεταβαίνει.

Prot. It is for you to say what.

Soc. You are aware that if a man has chosen a life of intellect, there is no reason why he should not live always in this way.[1]

Prot. Do you mean that of having neither joy nor sorrow? B

Soc. Yes. We said before, in our comparison of lives, that one who had chosen the life of thought and intellect need not feel pleasure in any degree, small or great.

Prot. Certainly we affirmed that.

Soc. Very well; then this will be the life of the thinker; and perhaps of all lives it is the most god-like.[2]

Prot. Why, it certainly does not seem likely that the gods have any sense either of pleasure or pain.

Soc. Certainly it is not at all likely; either would be undignified if it did happen to them. However, this question[3] we will consider on a future occasion, if it should serve our C argument. We will assign this advantage to intellect for the second prize, if we should not be able to give it for the first.[4]

Prot. You say well.

XIX. *Soc.* But you will grant that the other kind of pleasure, viz. that which we said was purely mental,[5] takes place in us solely through memory.

Prot. How so?

Soc. It appears we must first take up afresh the subject of memory, and ascertain what that is. Nay, it may be that we ought even to make a preliminary inquiry into sensation before 'memory,' if the arguments on this subject are to be properly made clear to our minds.

Prot. How do you mean? D

Soc. Assume that of the various bodily feelings that we

[1] Whereas, if he has chosen the life of ἡδονή, he could not well be χωρὶς ἡδονῆς, nor indeed χωρὶς λύπης.

[2] As Aristotle also says, *Eth.* x, ch. 12.

[3] The possible neutrality of φρόνησις.

[4] *i. e.* if the μικτὸς βίος carries off that.

[5] That of the προσδόκημα, sup. p. 32. C.

from time to time experience, some stop at and cease in the body, before they reach the mind at all, and leave it wholly unaffected; while others[1] go through both, and impart a thrill, as it were, at once peculiar to each and common to both.

Prot. That may be conceded.

Soc. Then if we affirm that the sensations which do not pervade both do not gain the notice of the mind, while those which pervade both do obtain such notice, we shall state the argument in its most correct form.

Prot. Undoubtedly. E

Soc. Now you are not to take my expression 'not gaining notice' as having anything to do in this particular case with the origination of forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is the departure of something that was retained in the mind. But that something in the case we now speak of has not yet existed; and to talk of there 'being a loss' of what neither is nor hitherto has been, is absurd.[2] Is it not so?

Prot. Of course.

Soc. Then all you have to do is to make a change in the terms.

Prot. How?

Soc. Don't talk of the soul having 'no memory,' when she has no feeling of the bodily shocks; rather call that 'insensateness' which you are at present disposed to call 'forgetfulness.'

Prot. I understand.

Soc. But that other emotion,—when the soul and the body 34
in partnership with it is moved by one and the same feeling, and therefore has a part with it in the movement,—you may not unreasonably term 'sensation.'

Prot. Nothing can be more true than this.

[1] *e.g.* the sensation of fear, or the effects of music.

[2] "The proposition he is advancing is, that desire being of the opposite to that which is present, as the body is taken up with that which is present, the mind alone can be conversant with the absent opposite, and this through memory, without which desire is impossible." *Dr. Badham.*

Soc. Now then we begin to understand what we mean by the term 'sensation'.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. Well then, if any one chose to define memory 'the retention of an impression,' he would, in my judgment, speak B correctly.

Prot. Quite correctly.

Soc. But when we speak of *recollection*,[1] we mean something different from mere *memory*; is it not so?

Prot. Perhaps it is.

Soc. Is not this then also true?

Prot. What?

Soc. When the mind recals by itself,—as far as possible *in* itself,—feelings that it once shared with the body, then, I presume, we talk of its 'remembering' them. Do we not?

Prot. We certainly do.

Soc. But surely there is another sort of memory. For when the soul has lost the remembrance of some former experience—be it of something felt or something learnt,—and afterwards goes over the same ground again in itself, all these results so regained we call 'recollections' and 'memories'.[2] C

Prot. That is rightly stated.

Soc. The object then of all these preliminary remarks is this.

Prot. What?

Soc. Why, that we might realise in the fullest and clearest manner the pleasure which the mind feels independently of that of the body, and at the same time, what we mean by 'desire.' For it is by such considerations, as it seems, that the nature of bodily pleasure and mental pleasure becomes known to us.

XX. *Prot.* Now then, Socrates, let us proceed to the next step in the discussion.

Soc. Indeed there are many considerations about the origin

[1] The *process* of remembering differs from the *faculty* of memory.

[2] Or 'results recovered.'

E

of pleasure and its general aspect that we are bound to enter upon, as it seems. Even at the present point of the argument we should first, I suspect, take up yet another topic,—the nature of desire, and in what part of us it is felt. D

Prot. Let us, by all means, consider it; for we shall lose nothing by it.

Soc. Yes, we shall lose,—and that,[1] Protarchus, by the finding of what we are now looking for,—the perplexity we have hitherto felt on these very subjects.

Prot. You are right in your rejoinder.[2] However, let us proceed to the next point, and try to state what that is.

Soc. Well, did we not say just now that hunger and thirst and many other sensations of the like kind were examples of desires? E

Prot. To be sure we did.

Soc. To what one character, then, or principle of identity, do we appeal when we call things so very different by the same name?

Prot. Upon my word, Socrates, that may prove difficult to answer; however, we must give some reply.

Soc. Then let us resume the discussion from the same examples.

Prot. Which do you mean?

Soc. We say, you know, very often, 'he is thirsty'; and this must mean something.[3]

Prot. We do, of course.

Soc. And this means, in effect, 'he feels a void.'

Prot. Certainly.

[1] Dr. Badham reads *ταὐτά γε—εὑρόντες ἃ νῦν ζητοῦμεν*. He thinks it is impossible to make sense of *καὶ ταὐτά γε*. It seems to me a playful and not inappropriate paradox from the correlation of *ζημία* and *κέρδος*.

[2] Or, 'you have defended yourself on the right ground.'

[3] Dr. Badham reads *διψῆν* and *κενοῦσθαι*, with some inferior copies, and contends that "the common practice of Plato in such instances, and the extreme awkwardness of the received text, ought to have more weight than the want of manuscript authority." Perhaps for *τι* we should read *τις*.

Soc. Well, is not this thirst a desire?

Prot. It is, of drink.

Soc. Of *drink*, or of the satisfaction caused by drink?[1] 35

Prot. Well, I suppose it is of the satisfaction.

Soc. It seems then that when any of us begins to feel a void, he desires something that is contrary to that feeling: he is getting empty, and he wants to get filled.

Prot. Most clearly.

Soc. Very good. Now suppose a man feels that void for the first time: is there any conceivable source from which, either by the actual sensation of being satisfied or the memory of it, he could realise a feeling[2] that he is neither now conscious of nor has ever before been aware of?

Prot. Of course not.

Soc. But surely he who desires must desire something, if B language means anything.

Prot. Without doubt.

Soc. Then he does not desire that which he feels; for he is thirsty, which is an exhaustion, but what he wants is a replenishing.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. Then it must be *some* part of the thirsty man[3] that in some way realises repletion.

Prot. It must.

Soc. It cannot be the body then; for that, you know, is suffering from a void.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. It remains therefore for the mind to realise repletion,

[1] A similar refinement is the question in *Theæt.* p. 184, C, whether we see *with* the eye, or *by* or *through* it, ᾧ or δι' οὗ ὁρῶμεν.

[2] I construe αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτ' ἂν τούτου ὄ, etc. Both Dr. Badham and Stallbaum join πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτ' ἄν. It is not important to the sense.

[3] *i. e.* mental or bodily; otherwise he could not desire repletion at all. More literally, 'but *repletion* surely must be realized by *some* faculty in the thirsty man.'

that is, of course, by an act of memory.[1] For what else is there by which it could realise it? C

Prot. Hardly anything.

XXI. *Soc.* Do we now begin to see what result we have arrived at from these admissions?

Prot. What is it?

Soc. Why, our present argument tends to prove that *bodily* desire can never take place in us.

Prot. How can it prove that?

Soc. By shewing that the effort of every creature is always in the *contrary* direction to the feelings of the body.

Prot. It certainly is so.

Soc. But surely this impulse, leading as it does to something contrary to the actual feelings, shews that memory belongs to faculties opposite to those feelings.[2]

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Then our reasoning, by proving that it is *memory* that leads us to the objects of our desire, makes it clear that all D impulse and desire are mental, and also the governing principle of the whole living creature.

Prot. Rightly said.

Soc. Then this same reasoning does not allow that it is the *body* which feels thirst or hunger,[3] or has any sensations of this kind.

Prot. Most true.

[1] This is not memory proper (for it has just been said that a man cannot remember what he has never experienced), but a faculty of the human mind more allied to *ἀνάμνησις*, the recalling sensations inherent in the nature of the human race.

[2] Stallbaum renders this, "memoriam adesse eorum, quae affectionibus sint contraria." If a man recollects what he wished for when he was thirsty, that memory must be one of repletion, not of emptiness. And thus *μνήμη* and *ἐπιθυμία* are in the same category. Mr. Poste translates, "And desire, in aiming at the opposite of the bodily affection, indicates a Remembrance of that opposite."

[3] Since *δίψα* is a desire of *πλήρωσις*. This is one of the apparent paradoxes in which Plato delights.

Soc. Now then let us further understand the following point on this same subject. It seems to me that our argument tends to show us a particular kind of life under such states and feelings.

Prot. What states do you mean, and of what life are you E
speaking?

Soc. I mean the states of getting full and empty, and all others that are connected with the preservation of creatures or their impaired state,—in a word, when any of us, accordingly as he is placed in either of the said states, feels pain at the one, or pleasure at the other, according to the alternations he undergoes.

Prot. That is so.

Soc. But what shall we say when he is *between* these two conditions?

Prot. How *between* them?

Soc. Why, when he feels pain from his empty state, and has a recollection of former pleasures, knowing that by their occurrence he would now be relieved from his suffering, but as yet is not getting his fill. What are we to say of him then? That he is, or is not, between these two states? 36

Prot. That he is.

Soc. With an entire feeling of pain, or one of pleasure?

Prot. Not *pleasure*, certainly, but rather oppressed with a two-fold pain; bodily, in the actual suffering, mental, in a certain longing resulting from the expectation.[1]

Soc. Are you sure you are right, Protarchus, in your view about a twofold pain? Does it not sometimes happen that one of us who is getting empty is so situated that he has a sure hope of being filled, and sometimes on the contrary he feels it B
to be quite hopeless?[2]

Prot. Quite so.

Soc. Then does it not seem to you that, so far as he hopes

[1] As when a man gets impatient from having to wait long for his dinner.

[2] As a man in a desert where he knows there is no water. He means, that this is a truer account of the διπλῆ λύπη.

to be filled, he has pleasure at the memory of what he before was, while simultaneously, as he feels a void, he has pain at such times?[1]

Prot. It cannot be otherwise.

Soc. Then under these circumstances not only man but every other creature feels at the same moment both pain and pleasure.

Prot. It seems so.

Soc. But what, when he has no hope at all that, in getting empty, he will have the means of getting full again? Is not *this* rather the case in which the *double* feeling of pain would occur? You perceived just now that there was such a feeling, but fancied it was simply double.[2] C

Prot. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Let us then employ this inquiry into these feelings for the following purpose.

Prot. What is that?

Soc. Whether we are to call these combined pains and pleasures true or false; or some of them true, others not.

Prot. Why how can there be, Socrates, *false* pleasures or pains?

Soc. You might as well ask, Protarchus, how there can be true or false fears,—or true expectations or opinions, or such as are not true?[3]

Prot. Perhaps I might grant the possibility of this in D respect of opinions; but not of the rest.

Soc. What say you? We seem indeed to be mooting a subject by no means small.

[1] Dr. Badham suspects that τοῖς χρόνοις was added as a gloss. We might render ἐν τούτοις ἀλγεῖν 'to feel pain at that.' Perhaps, however, the sentence is purposely interlaced; 'at such times he feels at once pleasure and pain.'

[2] *Generally*, and not in this particular case only, *i. e.* as there must always be a πόθος in ἐπιθυμία. "A less appropriate word has been chosen for the sake of playing upon διπλοῦν."—*Dr. Badham.* Compare ἀληθῶς ψευδὲς, *Theæt.* p. 189. D.

[3] The last words, ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς, seem to me an interpolation. The doctrine of true and false opinion is fully discussed in *Theæt.* p. 194 seq.

Prot. You say truly.

Soc. But whether it has anything to do with our former discussion, that, son of a distinguished sire,[1] is the question to be considered.

Prot. Well, perhaps *that* question is so.

Soc. Then we must bid farewell to those other interminable topics, and, indeed, to any of the subjects that it is not relevant to enter upon.

Prot. Right.

Soc. Then tell me:—for I, at least, am always in a state of E
wonderment about these very difficulties that we have now brought forward for consideration.

Prot. How do you mean?

Soc. Are there not some pleasures false, and others that are true?

Prot. How can that be?

Soc. Then, according to you, neither in dreams nor in sober earnest,—in mad fits nor in delusions,—is it possible for any one ever to fancy he is enjoying himself, though he is not, or to fancy he feels pain, though he does not.

Prot. We all, Socrates, suppose all such cases to be possible.

Soc. Are we right then in supposing it, or must we consider whether this is correctly said, or not?

XXII. *Prot.* I should say, Socrates, that is a matter for 37
consideration.

Soc. Then let us come to a still clearer definition in what we now say about pleasure and opinion. You will grant, I suppose, that there is such a thing as our having an opinion about something.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. And also feeling pleasure.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. But surely the subject of our opinion is something.

[1] Compare Soph. *Trach.* 1017, ὦ παῖ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός.

Prot. Of course.

Soc. And also that in which the pleased takes pleasure.

Prot. O certainly!

Soc. Then that which holds an opinion,—be it rightly or wrongly,—never loses the property of *really* having an opinion.

Prot. How can it? B

Soc. Then that also which feels pleasure, rightly or not, can never, it is plain, lose the reality of being pleased.

Prot. Yes; this also is as you say.

Soc. Then how in the world does it happen that an *opinion* can become false or true, while it is the nature of pleasure alone to be true? For both alike have the property of *really* fancying as well as being pleased.[1]

Prot. That question requires consideration.

Soc. Is it that opinion is followed by the discovery of its falsehood or truth,[2] and so becomes not a mere opinion but a C certain kind of opinion in either case,—is this the point that you say you must consider?

Prot. That is so.

Soc. But there is yet another point beside this that we must come to an agreement upon,—whether it really is the case at all, that some things have certain qualities, while pleasure and pain alone are simply what they are, and do not admit of a particular character.

Prot. Clearly so.

Soc. But surely it is not difficult to see this, that they *have* certain qualities. We said long before, that both do decidedly[3] become great and small,—pains, I mean, as well as pleasures. D

Prot. Assuredly so.

[1] If ἡδονὴ and δόξα have precisely the same conditions, how is it that the latter is true or false, and the former only true?

[2] Soph. *Antig.* 389, ψεύδει γὰρ ἡ 'πίνοια τὴν γνώμην. The emphasis is on the preposition; 'that opinion is *followed* (which, may be, pleasure is not,) by a discovery of its falsehood or truth,' etc.

[3] Stallbaum takes σφόδρα to imply excess in degree. We might also render it "and each of these (great or small) in a high degree."

Soc. And further, if the condition of badness attaches to any of these, we shall say that an opinion thus becomes a bad one, and so likewise a pleasure.

Prot. Why, of course, Socrates.

Soc. But what if *rightness*, or the opposite to rightness, attaches to any of them? Shall we not then talk of 'right opinion,' if it has rightness, and of pleasure in the same way?

Prot. It must be so.

Soc. And further, if the opinion we have formed is mis- E
taken, we must surely allow that such opinion then,—erroneous as it is,—is not right, and does not take a right view.

Prot. How can it?

Soc. Well, if we perceive, in the other case, that some pain or pleasure is mistaken in the matter about which one is either pained or pleased,—shall we give it the epithet of 'right,' 'good,' or any other term of approbation?

Prot. Of course, that is not possible, since the pleasure will be a mistaken one.

Soc. Yet surely it may often happen that a pleasure is felt, not based on sound judgment, but involving some fallacy.

Prot. Undoubtedly; and the judgment, Socrates, in that 38
case and under such circumstances, we do call false; but no one would ever think of calling the *pleasure* a false one.[1]

Soc. Well, you stand up stoutly for the argument for pleasure, Protarchus, by your present reply.[2]

[1] Protarchus, in fact, has the right, and Socrates has the wrong, of the argument. For, as Mr. Grote remarks, the question of false or true is applicable only to the intellectual side of our nature, not to the emotional. "A pleasure (or pain) is what it seems, neither more or less; its essence consists in being felt. There are false beliefs, disbeliefs, judgments, opinions, but not false pleasures or pains." The pleasure on receiving good news that proves false, or the pain of alarm at some mere illusion, are fully as great and as real, as if both were true. Mr. Jowett observes (Introd. p. 138), "It is difficult to acquit Plato, in his own language, of being a tyro in dialectics, when he overlooks such a distinction."

[2] By τὰ νῦν he may mean that Protarchus is falling into the advocacy that Philebus had resigned. Or we may more simply render it 'by what you now say.'

Prot. Not at all; I only say what I hear.

Soc. And is there no difference at all, my friend, between the pleasure based on right judgment and accurate knowledge, and that which often arises in all or any of us with false notions and ignorance?

Prot. Why, it does seem likely that there is a considerable B difference.

XXIII. *Soc.* Let us then proceed to a consideration of this difference between the two.

Prot. Proceed in whatever way you think best.

Soc. Should I then take this direction?

Prot. Which?

Soc. There is, we say, false opinion and true opinion also.

Prot. It is so.

Soc. Well, now, these views,—true or false opinion,—are often attended, as we said just before,[1] by pleasure or pain.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Is it not then from memory and perception that judgment, and the attempt to discern by a judgment,[2] come to us in every case? C

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. Then must we not think that our position in regard to matters of this kind[3] is of the following kind?

Prot. What is that?

Soc. Would you not say that it often occurs to one who

[1] Sup. ἔοικέ γε ἡδονὴ πολλάκις—μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.

[2] As in the case that follows, when a statue may be mistaken for a man. By *memory* here is meant the faculty of applying past experiences. Dr. Badham alters τὸ διαδοξάζειν to τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν, and reads ἐγχωρεῖν γίγνεσθον for ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθ', which he calls "a strange elision." He explains the passage thus:—"From memory, then, and from sensations, our notions, and indeed the capacity for forming notions at all, are derived in every instance." I doubt if τὸ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν means this; and I cannot see that the alteration is any improvement on the vulgate. There is, however, mss. authority for ἐγχωρεῖν, and Dr. Badham says γίγνεσθ' is the reading of the Bodleian.

[3] Viz. about which a judgment has to be formed.

sees an object from a distance not very clearly, to wish to get a correct knowledge of what he sees?

Prot. I should say so.

Soc. Then, as the next step, such an one would be likely to put this question to himself.

Prot. What question?

Soc. 'What in the world is that object that seems to be standing by that rock under a tree?' Is not this what you D think a man would say to himself, if he saw some such objects presented to him on any occasion?

Prot. Of course.

Soc. Then, after that, our friend, by way of answer to himself, might say, 'Yes! it is a man,' by a correct guess.[1]

Prot. Most certainly.

Soc. Or on the other hand, from a perverse notion that what he saw was the work of some shepherds, he might perhaps call it a statue.

Prot. Just so.

Soc. Well, and if he has a friend with him, it may happen E that he expresses audibly to his neighbour what he before said to himself, and so gives actual utterance to the very same conviction; and thus that becomes a *statement* that we before called a *judgment formed.*

Prot. Of course.

Soc. And if he chances to be alone, thinking in his own mind on this same subject, he sometimes goes about keeping it for a long time to himself.

Prot. No doubt he does.

Soc. What then? Do you take the same view as I do of what results in this case?

Prot. What is that?

Soc. It seems to me that our minds under such circumstances resemble a book.

Prot. How so? 39

[1] Or, 'speaking at hazard.'

Soc. The memory coinciding with the impressions,[1] and those feelings which are closely allied to such coincidence,[2] seem to me, one might almost say, to *write* in our minds at that time certain words. And when this feeling has written what is really true, then a true judgment and true propositions result from it in us; but when this scribe of ours writes falsehoods, the contrary to the truth is the result.

Prot. This is just my view. I quite accept what you B have stated in this way.

Soc. Then further accept another artist who at that time arises in our minds.

Prot. Who is that?

Soc. A painter who comes after the writing-master[3] and makes pictures on the soul of what we had said to ourselves.

Prot. How and when are we to say that this other artist is produced in us?

Soc. When a man removes from the ken of the eye, or any other sense, what he then thought or said, and sees in the mirror of his own mind the images of what had been thought or said.[4] Is not this a case that often occurs in us? C

[1] The recollection of the event in agreement with the impressions formed at the time.

[2] The ocular appearance of a man, (or statue, as it may be,) agreeing with our past experiences (*μνήμη*) of what a man (or a statue) is, together with a confident feeling (*πάθημα*) that we cannot be mistaken, seems to write in our hearts the dictum—which however may be true or false,—'*That is a man.*' This view of the origin of opinion is not very different from the *κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον* in *Theæt.* p. 191. C.

[3] Mr. Grote says, "it is odd that Plato here puts the painter *after* the scribe, and not *before* him. The images or phantasms of sense must be painted on the mind before any words are written upon it (if we are to adopt both these metaphors)." I am not sure that this remark is a sound one, or in accordance with Plato's reasoning.

[4] When he ceases to look at the object, which he pronounced to be a statue, and *thinks* only about his conviction that it was such. Mr. Poste renders this, "when a man, besides carrying away from a sight or other sensation those opinions and propositions, somehow sees in himself the picture of what he believed and said."

Prot. Most certainly it is.

Soc. Then the portraits of true judgments and statements are true,[1] and those of false ones are false.

Prot. Quite so.

Soc. If then we have rightly asserted this, let us further consider the following point.

Prot. What is that?

Soc. Whether such feelings are necessarily limited to events present and past, and do not extend to the future.

Prot. I should rather say they apply to all times without exception.

Soc. Well, did we not before say that the pleasures and pains that were felt only in the mind[2] might precede those of the body? If so, it follows that such *foretaste* of pleasure or pain must in its very nature have reference to future time. D

Prot. That is very true.

Soc. Are we then to say that the letter-writing and the painting, which a little while ago we assumed to take place in us, relate to past and present time, but not to future?[3]

Prot. To future, most certainly.

Soc. Do you assent thus heartily, because *all* these impressions are, in effect, hopes in respect of the future, and we always, and all our lives through, are full of hopes?

Prot. Yes, I do.

XXIV. *Soc.* Now then, beside what you have already stated, answer me on this other point.

Prot. What point?

Soc. Is not an honest and religious and good man under all circumstances, beloved of the gods?

[1] If he was right in pronouncing it a statue, his thought about the conviction will be true. He may fancy that pulling out a tooth hurts much more than in reality it does. Here the imaginings, based on what he said to himself about it, are false.

[2] What he had called the προσδοκία, sup. p. 32. C., and the μνήμη, p. 34. B.

[3] If the δόξαι ἡδονῆς, etc., necessarily refer to the future, and are in themselves ζωγραφήματα, can we say that other fancies (*e. g.* hopes) do not also pertain to the future, as well as some fancies do to past or present?

Prot. Of course he is.

Soc. Well, a dishonest and thoroughly bad man is, you will allow, just the reverse? 40

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. But *every* man, as we said just now, is filled with many hopes.

Prot. To be sure he is.

Soc. And there are in all of us certain propositions,[1] which we called hopes.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. And also the phantasies of hopes depicted in us.[2] For instance, a man often in fancy sees a great store of gold coming to him, and many pleasures attending it; and as part of the picture he sees himself very much delighted at his own good luck.

Prot. Certainly. B

Soc. Must we then assert, or rather deny, that in these cases, speaking generally, the writings and paintings presented to the mind of the good are true, through their being favourites of heaven,[3] but the bad not true, quite in the other way?

Prot. We ought without doubt to assert this.

Soc. Well, now, the bad have in no less degree pleasures depicted in fancy, only these, I suppose, are false.

Prot. Of course.

Soc. Generally, then, the pleasures which the bad delight C in are unreal, but those of good men are real.

Prot. It is impossible to state the case otherwise.

Soc. Then according to our present views there are such things as unreal pleasures in the *souls* of men, though bearing

[1] The λόγοι are the γράμματα above mentioned.

[2] Perhaps we should transpose the article and read φαντάσματα τὰ ἐζωγραφημένα. He is describing what we are wont to call "castles in the air."

[3] He speaks with something of irony, as if the gods sent such dreams or fancies to their favourites. But Plato only means that generally good men conceive virtuous and intellectual, the bad sensual desires and pleasures. I see no reason to reject the reading of the Bodleian, (rightly punctuated,) τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς οὔ, πολὺ ἐναντίον, *i. e.* ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ.

a resemblance to true ones as a low parody. And similarly in the case of pains.

Prot. There are so.

Soc. Then in this case—according to our former statement —a man who forms notions at all must always have *real* notions, but sometimes on matters that are not, never were, and never will be realized.[1]

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. And it was the non-existence of these, I suppose, that D caused his notions to be false at that particular time, and therefore himself to form a false opinion. Is it not so.

Prot. It is.

Soc. Well, then, must we not allow equally to our pains and our pleasures, that the condition which these have find a counterpart in the former?[2]

Prot. How?

Soc. That it must be allowed that a man rejoices really at any time when he feels joy at all and under any circumstances, even without being able to say why; but that he sometimes does so at things that do not and never did exist, and often, or perhaps most frequently, at things that are not likely ever to happen at all.

Prot. This too, Socrates, must be as you say. E

Soc. Will not then the very same argument hold about fears and all strong impulses and emotions of that sort,—that all these are also false in certain cases?

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. Well, can we call opinions unsound[3] in any other respect than by their proving false?

[1] Note the play on ὄντως and μὴ ἐπ' οὐσι.

[2] *i.e.* must we not assume that what is true of δόξα is true also of ἡδονὴ and λύπη. It is difficult to render such sentences at all closely. Mr. Jowett does not attempt it, but merely gives a paraphrase, "And must not pleasure and pain be admitted to be analogous states?"

[3] I have omitted the words καὶ χρηστὰς, added in the MSS. and editions after δόξας, as an interpolation. Otherwise, we must supply ἢ ἀληθεῖς. The meaning is, 'But, if opinions are false, they are also bad.'

Prot. In no other way.

Soc. Nor can we understand pleasures, I suppose, being bad in any other way but in being false. 41

Prot. Rather, it is just the contrary to what you have said.[1] For one might pretty safely affirm that it is not at all through their *falseness* that pains and pleasures are bad, but because they involve some other serious badness.

Soc. Well, bad pleasures, and such as are so through their badness, we will speak of a little later on, should it still seem to us both advisable. But those which are false, and which exist or arise in us on many subjects and on many occasions, we have yet to discuss in a different way;[2] for perhaps we shall find this useful in making our decisions. B

Prot. Of course,—that is, if there *are* false pleasures.

Soc. There certainly are, Protarchus, in my view at least. But, so long as this opinion has a place in our minds,[3] of course it cannot be allowed to remain unquestioned.

Prot. Rightly said.

XXV. *Soc.* Let us then stand to our new argument like athletes.

Prot. Proceed we.

Soc. Well, now, we said, if our memories are correct, a little while ago, that when what we call *desires* are on us, C then the body separately by itself, and the soul also independently,[4] are doubly affected by these feelings.

[1] I read ἢ εἴρηκας. Dr. Badham gives πᾶν μὲν οὖν τοὐναντίον εἴρηκας. He thinks πάνυ τὸ ἐναντίον "not Greek" and "absurd."

[2] Viz. other than as πονηραί.

[3] Viz. that pleasures cannot be false. Dr. Badham takes a different view of the sense: "but until this judgment of mine (viz. that pleasures may be either false or true) is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt) from examination." I think Plato would have said παρ' ἀμφοῖν, not παρ' ἡμῖν, if he had meant this.

[4] I propose ἡ ψυχὴ for τῆς ψυχῆς. It was not the *body* that had the double πάθος, but the body that felt the pain, and the mind either pain or pleasure independently. Compare inf. p. 50. B., καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ

Prot. We remember,—this *was* said before.

Soc. Then that part of us which desired states contrary to those of the body, was the soul; while the part of us that manifested the pain,[1] or some degree of pleasure from actual impression, was the body.

Prot. Yes, it was.

Soc. Now then sum up the result of what happens under these circumstances.

Prot. Say what it is.

Soc. Why, that in this case both pains and pleasures are present to us at once; and that at the same time there occurs a consciousness of these feelings, each of which is contrary to the other; as, indeed, appeared to us just now. D

Prot. It seems so, certainly.

Soc. Has not this also been stated by us, and may we not now take it for granted, as we have already agreed about it?

Prot. What is that?

Soc. That both these feelings, pain and pleasure, admit of a more and a less, and so belong to the class of infinites.

Prot. That has been stated, of course.

Soc. Then what way is there of coming to a right decision about this?

Prot. In what respect, and how do you mean? E

Soc. If our intention in judging these feelings, in any cases of this sort,[2] aims in each instance at deciding which of the sensations of pain or pleasure is greater, and which less,—which is felt in a greater and which in a stronger degree; that is to

σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων. Mr. Jowett's rendering is very vague, "then the feelings of the body are divided from the feelings of the soul."

[1] The τὸ before παρεχόμενον should perhaps be omitted, unless Plato purposely composed an irregular sentence. The πάθος must here mean the act of drinking when thirsty, etc.

[2] Viz. of mental *versus* bodily feelings. Dr. Badham would read ᾗ for εἰ, and translate thus: "In that our wish to judge of these impressions (the desire in the mind existing along the opposite sensation of the body) is disposed in such cases to determine on each occasion which feeling is comparatively greater and which less."

say, pain compared with pleasure, or pain with pain,[1] or pleasure with pleasure,—

Prot. Well, this is so, and such is the object of our judgment.

Soc. What then? must we conclude, that though in matters of sight the seeing the sizes of things from a distance [or near][2] tends to make their reality uncertain, and causes us to form false notions of them; yet in pains and pleasures this same result does not occur? 42

Prot. Nay, Socrates, in the latter case it occurs all the more.[3]

Soc. Then our present conclusion proves to be contrary to that we arrived at just before.

Prot. What do you allude to?

Soc. We then said that the judgments, accordingly as they were themselves false or true, infected both the pains at the same time and the pleasures with their own falsehood or truth.

Prot. Most true. B

Soc. But now it seems that the pleasures themselves, by being viewed from far and near by frequent alternations, and at the same time by being set side by side with each other, appear, the pleasures as contrasted with the painfulness greater and more intense, and the pains on the other hand, through their being put along side of pleasures, to be that which is contrary to them.[4]

Prot. It cannot be but that this does take place, and for the reasons you give.

[1] The pain of the thirst with the mental pain of hopelessness in getting drink; and the mental pleasure of expectation with the bodily pleasure of actually drinking.

[2] I think καὶ ἐγγύθεν should be omitted. The words crept in from the combination a little below. If the greatness of an object is made less definite by distance, the greatness of a pleasure should be made less keen by its remoteness.

[3] We are more sure, and believe more in the reality, of *present* pleasures. "Pleasures and pains, by their comparative distance in time, and by their mutual contrast, produce false notions about themselves."—*Dr. Badham.*

[4] To have the opposite character to pleasures, *i. e.* to be pains by the very contrast.

Soc. Then the amount by which pleasures and pains severally seem greater than the realities, viz. so much as depends on *mere* appearance, cut off from each; and you will not say that it was a right appearance, nor venture to affirm that such part of the pleasure and the pain as depended on such mere C appearance, was itself right or true.

Prot. No, indeed.

Soc. Next then to this, and with the hope of getting to the truth in this way, we will view pleasures and pains, that both seem to be and really are still more false than those we have just spoken of, in the case of animals.[1]

Prot. What pleasures do you speak of, and how do you mean?

XXVI. *Soc.* We have said, if I mistake not, more than once, that when the normal state of any animal is disturbed by congestions or looseness, surfeits or deficiencies, and by certain D conditions of increase or decrease, pains, aches and discomforts, and all the feelings that we designate by such names, follow[2] as the result.

Prot. Yes, that has been affirmed several times.

Soc. And further, when they get back into their natural state, this restoration, we accepted as our conclusion, was what constituted pleasure.

Prot, Rightly said.

Soc. But what are we to call it, when none of these processes take place in our bodies?

Prot. And when can that happen, Socrates?

Soc. The question you just now asked, Protarchus, is E irrelevant.

Prot. Why so?

Soc. Because it does not prevent me from putting my question to you again.[3]

[1] *i. e.* in which the *mental* effects have less influence, or none at all. Perhaps, however, Plato merely means 'living creatures.'

[2] Or perhaps, "occur together."

[3] *i. e.* because it has not answered *my* question.

Prot. What do you mean?

Soc. If, I shall repeat, such a case of neutrality should occur,[1] what must necessarily be the consequence in us?

Prot. Do you mean, when the body is not moved in the direction of either pleasure or pain?

Soc. That is my meaning.

Prot. Why, this of course is plain, that in such a case neither pleasure could ever occur nor any pain.

Soc. Admirably answered. But, I imagine, you mean this 43
by your question, that it is a necessity that some of these processes should be going on in us, as the philosophers say; for everything is ever in a state of flux either up or down.[2]

Prot. Yes, they do say that; and I don't think they state an unimportant doctrine.

Soc. How could they, unless, indeed, they were of no importance themselves? However, my wish is to get clear away from this subject which is bearing down upon us;[3] and I am thinking to avoid it in this way; so do you join me in the attempt.

Prot. Only say how.

Soc. 'Granted that this is so,' let us say to the philosophers. And now do you answer me. When anything affects the state of any living creature, is it *always* aware of *every* B

[1] More closely, 'if it *should* happen that none of these states exist, etc., *i. e.* since you say it is not likely to happen. Mr. Jowett's rendering is, "admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary result if there were?" Similarly Mr. Poste. As far as the sense goes, we might omit the μὴ before γίγνοιτο. It is virtually repeated from ὅταν μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ᾖ. The true meaning of the particles εἰ δ' οὖν is too often overlooked.

[2] The doctrine of Heraclitus is alluded to, *Theætet.* p. 152. E. It may be remarked that this statement makes a near approach to the comparatively late discovery of the circulation of the blood, and the still later one of the constant interchange of warm and cold oceanic currents and strata of air. The meaning here is, that as there is ever movement, there can be no rest, *i. e.* no neutral state of 'neither this nor that.'—For ῥεῖ we should perhaps read ῥεῖν.

[3] A military or naval metaphor, perhaps. Socrates proposes to avoid a long argument on a disputed doctrine by simple acquiescence in it for the present.

thing that goes on in it,—that is, are we *never* unconscious that we grow, or have any such change taking place in us,—or is it quite the other way, that such changes are almost unperceived?

Prot. It is quite this other way.

Soc. Then we are wrong in what we just now stated, that the changes that take place in us one way or the other produce in us pains and pleasures.

Prot. Of course we were wrong.

Soc. Then what we say will be better stated, and less C liable to cavil, in this way.

Prot. How?

Soc. That *great* changes do cause in us pains and pleasures, but moderate or trifling ones do not cause either in the least degree.

Prot. This is a more correct way of stating it than that, Socrates.

Soc. Then if this is so, we come back to the life we just before spoke of.

Prot. What life was that?

Soc. The life that we said was devoid of pain and without joys.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. Then from these data let us set down three kinds of life, one that of pleasure, the next that of pain, and one that is D neutral. Or how would *you* state the case on this matter?

Prot. In no other way than this,—that the kinds of life are three.

Soc. Then the mere absence of pain can never be identical with the active sense of pleasure.

Prot. How can it be?

Soc. Then whenever you are told, that there is nothing in the world so delightful as to pass your whole life without pain, what do you suppose is meant by the person who says this?

Prot. Why, such an one appears to me to assert that the not feeling pain *is* pleasure.

Soc. Then, that we may use terms of better omen, of any three things whatever belonging to us that you please, take one to be gold, another to be silver, and a third to be neither this nor that. E

Prot. I assume this.

Soc. Can then the 'neither this nor that' become either this or that,—gold or silver?

Prot. Of course not.

Soc. Then neither would the middle life become pleasant or painful, according to the true view of the matter; it could not rightly be thought so, if any one chanced to think it such, nor rightly called so, if he used such a term.

Prot. How indeed could it?

Soc. Well but, my friend, there *are*, we know, some who say and think this.[1] 44

Prot. There certainly are.

Soc. Do they then really *think* they feel joy at that time, viz. when they are without pain?

Prot. Why, they say they do.

Soc. Then they *do* think they are then pleased, or they would not say so, I presume.

Prot. It may be so.

Prot. But they hold a false opinion about being in a state of joy, if, as we say, the nature of not being pained and of feeling joy is distinct.

Prot. But we did say they were so.

Soc. Must we then assume in our reasonings that these states are three, as we just now did, or only two,—pain, an evil to mankind, and riddance from pains, which, as in itself a good, gets the name of pleasure? B

XXVII. *Prot.* How is it, Socrates, that after our former agreement we are asking ourselves this question? I don't understand.

[1] Or, "we often hear people asserting this and expressing this opinion." For example, Soph. *Aj.* 553, *ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν γὰρ μηδὲν ἥδιστος βίος.*

Soc. The fact is, Protarchus, you do not understand the enemies that our friend Philebus has.[1]

Prot. And whom do you mean by them?

Soc. Men who are said to be very clever in physics, and who deny that pleasures are pleasures at all.

Prot. Then what do they say they are?

Soc. They maintain that what Philebus and his party call pleasures, are all so many escapes from pains. C

Prot. Then do you advise us to follow these, or how, Socrates?

Soc. Not to follow them, certainly, but to use them as guessers at truth, who make their guesses not by art, but by a well-intentioned yet stern natural dislike of pleasure,[2]—the dislike of those who heartily detest the influence that pleasure has, and believe there is no good in it, and so come to the conclusion that its very seductiveness is a mere juggle and not really pleasure. Well then, you may use these men for such D purposes, as guessers, when you have well considered some more of their dislikes; and after that you shall hear what seem to me to be true pleasures, in order that we may fully see from both of our statements the influence that pleasure possesses, and make a comparison of our views for the purpose of judging.

Prot. You say well.

Soc. Then let us go in quest of these, by way of allies, by following the course of their dislikes. I suppose then that they argue in some such way as this, beginning with first principles. If, they would ask, we wanted to understand the E

[1] As in *Theæt.* p. 156, Plato is thought to allude to Antisthenes, who was the founder of the Cynic and Stoic views. But Mr. Grote doubts this. He thinks those Plato alludes to "were most probably Pythagorising friends of his own; who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour, distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies towards the unseemly pleasures," *τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων*. See his long note, p. 609—10, ed. i.

[2] "By an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure."—*Mr. Jowett.*

true nature of any class of things, as of 'hard,' should we look at once to the hardest objects for better realising the idea, or to those which are scarcely hard at all? So now, Protarchus, you are bound to give an answer to these dissatisfied gentry, as you would to me.

Prot. O certainly! I tell them, that I should look to examples first in magnitude.[1]

Soc. Then if we wished to understand also the class of things to which pleasure belongs, we must not look to small pleasures, but to those that are called the highest and most 45
intense.

Prot. Any one would concede this so far.

Soc. Are not then the ready pleasures,—those which, as we are often saying, are also the greatest,—these bodily indulgences of ours?[2]

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Are these then greater, or do they become so, in persons suffering from illnesses, or in healthy subjects? And now mind, lest by a hasty answer we make a blunder.

Prot. How?

Soc. Why, we might perhaps say, in healthy subjects. B

Prot. Likely enough.

Soc. Well, but do not those pleasures exceed in intensity, for which also the strongest longings previously arise in us?

Prot. That is true.

Soc. And do not fever-patients, and persons suffering from the like ailments, feel thirst or cold in a greater degree, and all

[1] *i. e.* in the greatness of the quality they possess.

[2] Dr. Badham, adopting γε from some inferior copies, reads ἀλλ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροί γ', and the αὗται at the end of the sentence he gives to Protarchus. I think he is wrong in both. For the particles ἀλλ' οὖν — γε are used to extort a reluctant admission, which is not here in point; and the αὗται at the beginning of a sentence, by way of reply, is not, I think, after Plato's way. In saying Plato would have written αὗται αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, not αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα αὗται, he loses sight of the purposely disarranged and eccentric order of words adopted in this dialogue.

the other ordinary bodily affections;[1] and are they not more familiar with the sense of want, and have they not greater pleasures in being satisfied? Or must we say that this is not really the case?

Prot. Rather, as you put it now, it seems quite true. C

Soc. Well then, should we seem to be right in saying, that if one wanted to see examples of the greatest pleasures, we should go to the sick bed rather than to the healthy in order to view them? And mind that you don't suppose I mean by the question, whether those who are seriously ill feel *more* joys than those in health; but imagine me to be inquiring about the greatness of pleasure, and in what subjects excess in the feeling of delight occurs at any time. For we are bound, according to our view, to comprehend what is the true nature of pleasure, and what it is according to those who deny its existence at all.[2] D

Prot. I think I follow your argument pretty well.

XXVIII. *Soc.* Presently, Protarchus, you will shew that you understand me not less well;[3] for you will give an answer to my question. Do you perceive greater pleasures,—mind, I don't say *more*, but exceeding in intensity and capability of increase,—in a life of lewdness, or in one of self-restraint? And consider well before you reply.

Prot. Yes, I understand your meaning; I do perceive a

[1] καὶ πάντα, supply πάσχουσι. Dr. Badham renders this, "and as to all those things which they are accustomed to feel through the body, they are more affected with the want of these," etc. He suspects we should read πάντων for πάντα, *i.e.* πάντων ἐνδείᾳ ξυγγίγνονται. To my mind, the clause has only a general sense, and is meant to include such feelings as hunger, heat, desire to be relieved, etc.—Mr. Grote charges Plato with exaggeration in saying that a morbid state of body intensifies either pain or pleasure.

[2] Viz. as an active principle; who think that pleasure consists merely in the absence of pain.

[3] The subject next discussed verges on topics requiring a delicate treatment. Socrates feels sure that, in the cause of morality, an honest answer will be given to his question. So in *Gorg.* p. 494, ὅρα τι ἀποκρινεῖ ἐάν τίς σε τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ.

great difference. The virtuous are constantly kept in check by the mere force of the proverb which recommends *ne quid nimis*, to which they give ear; but as for your lewd and im- E
modest sensualists, the excess of pleasure that holds them in thrall makes them notorious.[1]

Soc. Rightly answered. And if this is so, it is clear that it is in a vitious condition both of mind and body,[2] and not in virtue, that the greatest pleasures and also the greatest pains are produced.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Then one is bound to take some of *these* pleasures by way of example, in order to see what nature and effect these have that we called *greatest*.

Prot. That is what we must do. 46

Soc. Consider then the pleasures from diseases of this kind, and see what their effects are.

Prot. To what diseases do you allude?

Soc. The pleasures from disorders of a less decent kind, such as the stern opponents we have spoken of thoroughly detest.

Prot. What pleasures?

Soc. Why, the ways of curing the itch by friction, and similar sensations which require no very different treatment. For tell me, in heaven's name, what are we to call such feeling when it arises in men? A pleasure, or a pain?

Prot. Why this, Socrates, seems to be a kind of evil of mixed character.

Soc. Now don't suppose that it was on Philebus' account[3] B

[1] Hesychius rightly explains *περιβόητος* by *ἐπὶ κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ φήμην ἔχων*. Dr. Badham renders it 'frantic,' and says it is "properly applied to Bacchanals shouting their *εὐοῖ*." "Talked of as men about town" is our equivalent phrase.

[2] Since the self-indulgent bring diseases on themselves. Dr. Badham says, "it is impossible that this passage should be correct as we now read it." I see no reason whatever to alter it. Socrates is viewing pain and pleasure here in close connexion, and the one as the consequence and measure of the other.

[3] *i. e.* as if *he* would defend such immoralities. This disguised way of denouncing the vice of pruriency has its counterpart in *Gorgias*, p. 494, E.

that I brought forward this subject; the fact is, without these pleasures, and such as follow in their wake,—that is, without these being fully seen into,—we might well-nigh despair of deciding for ourselves the matter we are inquiring into.

Prot. Then we must proceed to the pleasures akin to these.

Soc. Do you mean those which in their mixed nature partake of both pleasure and pain?

Prot. Certainly I do.

Soc. Well, now, there are some mixtures that are bodily, and in our bodies only, others that are mental, and only in the mind. But we shall find other mixed pleasures and pains that C
are common to both mind and body, and which get called, taken together, sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains.[1]

Prot. How is that?

Soc. Whenever a person, in the restoration or disturbance of the harmonies, is sensible of two opposite feelings at once,—as when he is cold and warms himself, or is hot and is getting cool, with the wish, I presume, to have the one sensation, but to get rid of the other; then what we call 'sweet mixed with bitter' is so present that he cannot easily get rid of the discomfort; and so it causes first a feeling of impatience, and then fierce excitement.[2] D

Prot. What you now say is singularly true.

Soc. Then mixed feelings of this kind are made up, some of equal pains and pleasures, some of one or the other in excess.

Prot. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Then say that the one sort,—when pains are felt greater than the pleasures,—is that which we before said belonged to the itching and the ticklings;—that is, when the boiling and scalding sensation is inside, and one cannot reach it by the rubbing and the scratching, but relieves only the

[1] Accordingly (as he afterwards shews) as the pleasure or the pain prevails in them.

[2] "The sweet has a bitter, as they say, and the two sensations fasten upon him, and cause impatience, and, finally, wild excitement."—*Mr. Jowett.*

surface; then, by bringing the parts to the fire, and in despair of relief changing the seat of the affection,[1] they produce, sometimes very great pleasure, sometimes, on the contrary, to the inward parts, by contrast with the pain of the outer, mixed pains and pleasures,—to whichever side they may incline,[2]—by forcibly separating and diffusing[3] what has become clogged, or by bringing together and blending in one what is too diffuse, and by thus bringing pains into direct contrast with pleasures. E 47

Prot. Most true.

Soc. Then whenever, on the other hand, the pleasure prevails in the combination in all such cases, while the small admixture of the pain just tickles us and makes us feel slightly uncomfortable, the greater amount of the pleasure that is poured in intensifies our feelings and sometimes makes us unable to sit still,[4] and by causing all sorts of changes of colour, of posture, and of breathing, produces in us complete extasy, and even utterances aloud when the fit is upon us.

Prot. 'Tis so, indeed. B

Soc. And it makes a man say too about himself, and about others,[5] that through the delight of these pleasures he almost dies; and, of course, he pursues these at all times, and so much the more, as he is without self-restraint and has a weak-

[1] Making the outer hotter, whereas the inner was so before. Some process of medical treatment seems meant, (as some profess now to treat rheumatism by putting the part to the fire) resembling our use of blisters and counter-irritation, as to disperse humors by making a surface-sore, or draw together and extract matter that has resulted from local inflammation. The relief given, though by a process itself painful, is the μίξις here spoken of.

[2] They are pains or pleasures according as one or the other feeling predominates in the mixture.

[3] The figure of speech (in διαχεῖν) is from the melting of hard wax. But he is speaking of the coarser pleasures, and the language is purposely guarded.

[4] So Persius, *Sat.* i. 82, 'Trossulus *exultat* tibi per subsellia laevis.' Extatic feelings are described *honesto nomine*. There is an euphemistic sense in the word ἀφροσύνη. Mr. Jowett's rendering does not bring out the full meaning, "he will be quite amazed, and utter the most irrational exclamations."

[5] Or, "and makes others say of him, that," etc.

ness towards vice. Of course, also, he calls these the greatest, and the man who lives most in the indulgence of them he reckons the happiest.

Prot. You have described all that happens, Socrates, according to the opinion of most men.[1] C

Soc. Yes, as far as the pleasures are concerned which consist in the mixed feelings of the body alone, when these feelings are combined, those within with those without. But with respect to those in the mind,[2] which have joint effects contrary to those of the body, mental pleasure at the same time in contrast with bodily pain, and pain with pleasure, so that both combinations form one mixture,—these we discussed a little while ago, and remarked, that when a man gets empty he longs for repletion, and that in his hope he feels joy, while in getting empty he feels pain. But there is another point that we did not then ask you to notice, and therefore we now say D it, that whenever the mind is at variance with the body, in all such cases, which are endless, the union of pain and pleasure is always one and the same.[3]

Prot. What you say appears to be most true.

XXIX. *Soc.* There still remains one more instance of the mixtures of pain and pleasure.[4]

[1] Either *πρὸς* or *εἰς* should be omitted, I think. Dr. Badham's rendering is rather awkward, "That which one meets with from the common run of men as to opinion."

[2] *i. e. τῶν παθημάτων*, not *τῶν ἡδονῶν*, which Stallbaum insists must be meant, from the antithesis with the preceding clause. I should read *σώματι τἀναντία ἃ συμβάλλεται*. Dr. Badham reads *περὶ δέ γ' ὧν* for *περὶ δὲ τῶν*, "of those conditions which contribute the opposite results," etc., forgetting that attraction can only take place in an accusative of the object, never in a nominative of the subject. Both critics suppose some words have dropped out before *αὖ κένωται*, *e. g. ὅταν μέν τις πληρῶται, χαίρει, ὁπόταν δ' αὖ*, etc. Mr. Jowett reads *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι, τἀνάντια (τἀναντία) ξυμβάλλεται*, "but where the pleasures of the mind mingle with the body, the combination takes place in another way." I do not think the Greek could bear this sense.

[3] *i. e.* pleasure and pain always coalesce in the same way.

[4] Sup. p. 46. B., he placed *second* the combination he now takes *third*. The

Prot. Which, do you say?

Soc. The combination which we asserted the mind often admitted by and within itself.

Prot. How can that be, and what do we mean by this particular case?

Soc. Take anger, fear, desire, outbursts of grief, love, E
jealousy, envy, and similar emotions,—do you not reckon all these to be certain painful feelings in the mind alone?

Prot. To be sure I do.

Soc. Shall we not then find that they are filled to the brim with exceeding joys? Or do we require to be reminded of what Homer says, "the anger that allows even a prudent man to be vexed, and which is much sweeter than honey poured down the throat;" and of the pleasures that exist, mixed with 48
pains, in violent grief[1] and longing desire?

Prot. We do not require to be told this; it is so, and it is not likely ever to be otherwise.

Soc. Of course, too, you remember scenes in the tragedies, when the spectators rejoice and weep at one and the same moment?

Prot. Of course I do.

Soc. And can you be ignorant of the disposition of our minds in the acting of the comedies,—that even here there is a mixture of pain and pleasure.

Prot. I don't quite see that.

Soc. Perhaps not. It certainly is not easy, Protarchus, in B
this case to comprehend in every instance the existence of such a mixed feeling.

Prot. It is not, as it seems to me.

three kinds, it will be remembered, were, (1) bodily only, (2) mental only, (3) in mind and body together.

[1] Speaking properly, though tears give *relief* in grief, and in this sense "there's bliss in tears;" yet Plato seems rather to have been thinking of tears of joy, when γεγηθὸς ἕρπει δάκρυον ὀμμάτων ἄπο. In this case, however, as mere emotion, not any mixture of grief, is the cause, the argument is not a sound one.

Soc. But let us get an idea of it all the more because it is obscure; in order that in other instances one may more easily understand what is meant by a mixture of pain and pleasure.

Prot. Say on.

Soc. The term *envy* we just now used,—will you define it to be a distress of mind, or how?

Prot. As you state it.

Soc. But surely the envious man will be found to feel a sudden pleasure when he hears of the misfortunes of others.[1]

Prot. Assuredly. C

Soc. Well, ignorance, and what we call a stupid state of mind,[2] is a misfortune.

Prot. Of course.

Soc. From these considerations then see what the real nature of the sense of the ridiculous is.[3]

Prot. You have only to state it.

Soc. There is, then, a kind of ill-nature, speaking generally, which takes its name from a particular habit; and of this general ill-nature ridicule is a part, that has for its subject the contrary to the injunction of the inscription at Delphi.[4]

Prot. You mean 'Know yourself,' Socrates.

Soc. I do. But it is clear that, if the very opposite were D said by the inscription, it would be 'Not to know oneself at all.'

Prot. Of course.

Soc. Now try, Protarchus, to divide this very fault of self-ignorance into three.

[1] Envy is 'a pain that causes us to feel joy,' viz. at the misfortunes of those whose prosperity we dislike. In this sense it is compared to the effect of tears, though by a somewhat forced application.

[2] Mr. Jackson (in the Journal of Philology) proposes *ἀβελτερίαν*, "the state of mind which we call *ἀβελτερία*."

[3] The habit of laughing at others can never be an amiable one. The essence of comedy is to hold up to ridicule the foibles and weaknesses of others.

[4] He means, by a somewhat complex and rather pedantic definition, that "ridicule is that part of general maliciousness that delights in holding up people to contempt for their conceit or self-ignorance." How this is another *μίξις ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης*, is shown p. 50, A.

Prot. How do you mean? I am afraid I shall not be able.[1]

Soc. You mean then that *I* must make the division for the present?

Prot. I do; and I not only say it, but I ask it.

Soc. Must not then each one of the self-ignorant have this affection in one of three respects?

Prot. How is that?

Soc. First in respect of property,—they must think they are richer than in proportion to their real means. E

Prot. No doubt there are many who have that weakness.

Soc. But there are still more, I suppose, who think themselves taller or better looking, and that all the other bodily accomplishments exist in them[2] in a degree much surpassing the reality.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. But by far the greatest number, I suppose, err in the third respect, that of the mental qualities;[3] they fancy themselves superior in virtue when they are not so.

Prot. Very true indeed.

Soc. And of these virtues is it not on the subject of wisdom 49 that, by laying claim to it under all circumstances and conditions, the mass of mankind is most full of rivalries and vain conceit?

Prot. Of course that is so.

Soc. Then if one called all and any feeling of this kind *bad*, one would not be far wrong.

[1] We should read, I think, *μὴ γὰρ οὐ δυνατὸς ὦ, i.e. δέδοικα μή.* The vulgate, *οὐ γὰρ μή*, etc., can only mean 'there is no chance of my being able.' The other idiom is more usual and more appropriate to the context.

[2] There is another way of taking the passage, which Dr. Badham renders literally thus: "to be in all things which pertain to the body in a degree beyond the reality which belongs to them." We might supply some such word as *χαρίεντας* after *εἶναι*.

[3] Dr. Badham reads *τὸ τῶν* for *τούτων*,—a probable, though not, I think, a really necessary correction. The words in this dialogue are purposely so interlaced, that the author may well have meant *πολὺ πλεῖστοι τούτων*.

Prot. Quite so.

Soc. This feeling then,[1] Protarchus, we must again subdivide into two, if we intend, by considering the childish form of envy, to get sight of a less obvious[2] combination of pleasure and pain.

Prot. How do you mean that we are to cut it in two?

Soc. All, who foolishly hold this false opinion about themselves,—these, I say, (which indeed is true of all men generally,) must, in some cases have bodily strength and power, in other cases, I suppose, the contrary. B

Prot. That must be so.

Soc. Then take this as your rule in dividing. Those who are conceited with weakness of body, and are unable when laughed at to resent it, you will not be wrong in calling ridiculous. But those who are able to avenge themselves you may call formidable and burly bullies, and not men of peace; and C you will give thus to yourself the best possible account of such men. For the self-ignorance of the strong *is* aggressive and discreditable, injurious as it is to others both in its reality, and as represented in action on the stage; but the self-ignorance with weakness takes rather the rank and the nature of the ridiculous.[3]

[1] Viz. of being μείζους and καλλίους, not of superior ἀρετή.

[2] ἄτοπον is said in reference to οὐ ῥᾴδιον ξυννοεῖν, sup. p. 48, B. Plato is shewing at length,—one might almost say, labouring to shew,—that scenic representations, especially comedy, involve the double feeling of pain and pleasure. One kind of *mixed* pleasure is "that which we feel in the ludicrous, where the mental pain of seeing the unbeautiful is mixed with the mental pleasure of laughing at it."—*Sir A. Grant*, on Ar. *Eth.* x. 3. This, however, is not what Plato says. The pleasure meant is that undoubtedly natural, though wrong feeling, which Plato attributes to envy, but which is not easy to analyse, that makes us like to hear others disparaged. The *pain* is the malady itself (inf. 50. A.) The idea, however, is worked out not only obscurely, but incorrectly. Mr. Grote remarks, in a note on this passage, "How the laugher can be said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here, or how he can be said to feel φθόνος, I do not clearly see. At least φθόνος is here used in a very unusual sense."

[3] I can see no reason either, with Stallbaum, to omit καὶ ἐχθροὺς, or with

Prot. You speak quite rightly; but I must confess the mixture of pleasures and pains in these instances has not yet become clear to me.

Soc. First then take the property of envy.

Prot. Only say on.

Soc. I suppose it is 'an unjust grief and pleasure.' D

Prot. That is certainly so.

Soc. In saying *unjust*, you will grant that it is neither unjust nor invidious to take pleasure in the misfortunes of enemies.

Prot. Of course it is not.

Soc. But can we say the same,—that it is 'not unjust' not to be grieved, but to feel pleasure when we see occasionally the misfortunes of friendly persons?

Prot. Of course that must be unjust.[1]

Soc. Well, we said that self-ignorance was a misfortune to all, did we not?

Prot. Rightly stated.

Soc. Then we are right too in saying that the fancied cleverness and comeliness and the other kinds of conceit[2] that E
we spoke of in friends, occur under three forms; and those attended with bodily weakness are ridiculous, those backed by strength are odious. Or shall we deny the truth of what I lately said, that this habit in friendly persons, when a man has it in a way not to harm others,[3] is ridiculous?

Schütz and Dr. Badham to read *αἰσχροὺς* for *ἰσχυρούς*, which here bears the opprobrious sense of 'big bullies.' Hence *ἰσχυρικὸς*, 'of the character of a good fighter,' *Theæt.* p. 169. B. Compare Dem. *Mid.* p. 559, *ὁρῶντας τὴν τούτου ἀφορμὴν, ἥπερ ἰσχυρὸν ποιεῖ καὶ φοβερὸν τὸν κατάπτυστον τουτονί.*

[1] The definition of envy is rather an odd one, but not incorrect. Aeschylus calls it a *double pain*, *Agam.* 835 (810). Socrates argues that the *injustice* of the pleasure which the envious feel must be limited to their feelings of jealousy towards friends.

[2] The exaggerated notions of their wealth, sup. p. 48. E. The 'three forms,' then, are, conceit of one's wit, one's beauty, and one's fortune. The sentence is *ἀνακόλουθον*, but I think the sense is as I have given it. In fact, *λέγοντες* refers back to *ὀρθῶς εἴπομεν*, 'Are we then right in saying,' etc.

[3] *i. e. μετ' ἀσθενείας.*

Prot. Certainly it is.

Soc. And must we not allow that it is a misfortune, as it is a kind of ignorance?

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. And do we feel delight, or rather sorrow when we laugh at it?

Prot. It is clear that we feel delight. 50

Soc. But *pleasure* at the misfortunes of friends,—do we not say it is envy that is the cause of this?

Prot. Necessarily so.

Soc. Then our argument tells us, that when we laugh at what is ridiculous in friends, in introducing the element of pleasure into envy, we do in effect blend together this pleasure with pain; since it reminds us that it was some time ago agreed, that envy was a mental pain, and that laughing was a pleasure; and thus that these two feelings[1] were produced in us together at those particular times.

Prot. That is true.

Soc. Then our argument now tends to shew us, that in B outbursts of grief and in tragedies,—and not in stage-acting only, but in the general tragedy and comedy of life,—pains are mixed up with pleasures, and in countless other instances besides.

Prot. It is impossible not to admit that, Socrates, even if one is ever so earnest in maintaining the opposite views.

XXX. *Soc* Well, now, we instanced anger, regret, passionate grief, fear, love, jealousy and envy, and other feelings C of that sort, and said that we should find blended in them those two emotions we have so often had occasion to repeat.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. Do we understand then that all we have hitherto argued about are grief, envy, and anger?

Prot. Of course we are aware of it.

Soc. Are there not many topics yet remaining?

[1] Reading τούτω for τοῦτο.

Prot. Indeed there are.

Soc. What now do you suppose was my principal object in pointing out to you the mixed feelings in comedy? Was it not for the sake of proving that it would be easy to shew the mixture incidental to fears, loves, and the other emotions; D and therefore that, when you had fully realised the nature of this one, you were bound to let me off and not[1] to protract the conversation by proceeding to the other questions, but (as I said) to comprehend just this, that both body independently of soul, and soul of body, and the two together in their joint affections, are full of pleasure blended with pains. Now therefore say, whether you intend to let me off, or to go on till midnight. However, by a brief promise I expect I shall get you to let me go: I shall be quite willing to-morrow to give you an E account of all these other emotions; but at present I am desirous to pass on to the remaining points of the argument for the decision which Philebus orders me to make.

Prot. You have said well, Socrates, but pray take your own way in going through the rest.

XXXI. *Soc.* Pursuing then the natural course, next after the mixed pleasures by a kind of necessity we should proceed in turn to those which are unmixed.

Prot. You have said very well. 51

Soc. It shall be my endeavour then by this change in our subject to make you see what they are. As for those who contend that there is no pleasure except in cessation from pains, I don't at all agree with them, though, as I said, I use their evidence to prove that there are some pleasures which seem to be such, but are not so in reality, and some others, neither few nor small, that we fancy to be such, but which are inseparably connected with pains and with intervals of rest from pains of the severest kind[2] in bodily and mental distresses.

[1] We must read, I think, to get any construction at all, ἀφεῖναί με καὶ μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα, etc., where καὶ is wanting in the MSS. By ἐκεῖνα he means the πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά.

[2] The pleasure of getting rid of a tooth-ache, for instance. Such a pleasure

Prot. And what pleasures on the other hand, Socrates, would one rightly conceive to be true? B

Soc. Those connected with what we call beautiful colours, with forms and outlines, with very many of the odours, with sounds, and all those things which, involving no consciousness nor discomfort in the want of them, afford us satisfactions at once perceptible and agreeable, and free from any mixture of pain.

Prot. What do we mean, Socrates, by this new account of objects of pleasure?

Soc. Certainly, what I mean is not at once clear, but I will try to make it so. What I am now trying to describe as beauty of form is not what most people would imagine by it, C such as that of animals or pictures,—but I mean (says our argument) the straight and the circular; and of these, such as are formed by the instrument for making rounds, both as circles and globes, and such rectangles as are made by rules and squares;—you understand my meaning? For these, I affirm, are not relatively beautiful, like other things, but are beautiful at all times by themselves and in their very nature,[1] and possess pleasures peculiarly their own, not at all resembling D those of the scratchings we spoke of.[2] So, too, the colours I refer to are those which are beautiful because they are of the same general character,[3] and the same in the pleasures they produce. Do we understand what our argument points to, or not?

Prot. I endeavour to do so, Socrates; but try on your part to state your meaning still more plainly.

Soc. Well, then, I am speaking of such sounds as are

is precisely in proportion to, and dependent on, the pain felt. But it is only imaginary; it is at best but a neutral state, not a pleasure proper. Merely *relative* pleasure, Mr. Grote observes, Plato regards as mere seeming and illusion.

[1] This is one of the many Pythagorean doctrines adopted in the Philebus.

[2] Which require to be preceded by some discomfort.

[3] καλὰ, sc. ὡς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τύπον. I see no reason to reject the words καλὰ καὶ ἡδονὰς as a gloss.

smooth[1] and distinct, which give expression to one clear melodious note; and I say these are not merely relatively but absolutely beautiful; and further, that they are attended by congenial pleasures in hearing them.

Prot. Well, no doubt this is so also.

Soc. As for the kind of pleasures connected with scents, E
it has less of the divine in it than those of sound; still, the fact of their having in them no necessary admixture of pains, in whatever way and in whatever part of us[2] these arise,—I regard as entirely on the side of correspondence[3] with those I have mentioned above. Well now, these, if you see my meaning, are two kinds[4] of what we are wont to call pleasures.

Prot. I understand you.

Soc. Now then let us add to these the pleasures attendant 52
on learning, if, as I suppose, these appear to us not to involve any previous hunger after knowledge, nor, consequently, any discomforts originating from such a feeling as want of information.

Prot. Yes, I agree with that view.

Soc. Well, now, if men have been filled with knowledge and some losses of it occur afterwards through forgetfulness, are you aware of any feelings of distress in them?

Prot. No, not naturally so, but perhaps there may be in

[1] I incline to read *φθογγῶν* for *φθόγγων*, rather than *φωνῶν*, which Stallbaum proposes and Badham adopts. It is said, indeed, that *φθογγὴ* is only used by the poets; but, as *τὰς τῶν φθόγγων* can hardly mean *ἡδονὰς*, (unless, indeed, the last clause of the sentence is to be regarded as an intentional tautology,) some feminine noun is here required. But I doubt if *αἱ τῶν φθογγῶν αἱ λεῖαι* can mean 'such of the sounds as are smooth.' I suspect we should omit the first *τὰς*, (which an interpolator meant to represent *ἡδονὰς*,) and also *εἶναι* after *αὐτάς*. These changes would make the syntax and the meaning clear and easy.

[2] *i. e.* in mind or body. Scent gives a lower pleasure, so to say, than music; but it has this in common, that it is not, like drinking when you are thirsty, accompanied by any previous discomfort.

[3] The one mental, the other bodily.

[4] Viz. those which are *per se* charming, and those which, if intrinsically of a lower kind, have no attendant pain. Mr. Jackson proposes *ὧν λέγομεν ἡδονῶν*.

certain reflections about such a mishap,—when a man has lost something and is pained from the want of it. B

Soc. But at present, my good Sir, our discussion is only about the actual feelings of nature, apart from any reflection.

Prot. Then you say with truth that sometimes forgetfulness does occur to us in learning without any feeling of pain.

Soc. Then we must say that these pleasures of learning are unmixed with pains, and by no means the lot of the many, but of the very few.

Prot. Of course we must admit that.

XXXII. *Soc.* Then, as we have now distinguished with sufficient care the pure pleasures and those which might fairly take some such name as 'impure,' let us add to our statement, that the excessive pleasures are immoderate, but those which are not excessive have the contrary quality of moderation. So also with respect to greatness and intensity, and to pleasures which become such either often or only seldom, let us attach to them the condition of belonging to the class of the infinite which more or less pervades both body and mind;[1] but those which are not so, let us place in the category of the proportional. C D

Prot. What you say is quite correct, Socrates.

Soc. Then beside these points there are yet these others in them which we have next to get a clear view of.

Prot. What do you mean?

Soc. The question, which we should say has relation to truth,[2] the pure and the unmixed, or the violent, the excessive, the great, and the satisfying?

[1] Perhaps we should read *καὶ ἧττον καὶ μᾶλλον δεχομένου διά τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερόμενον.* Mr. Jowett translates, "we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, which is always pouring, with more or less force, through body and soul alike." Cf. p. 25. C., *τῆς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένης φύσεως.*

[2] Perhaps *πρὸς ἀληθείας*, 'on the side of truth,' and *ὁπότερον* for *τί ποτε*. Dr. Badham would read *τί πρότερον*, 'the first in relation to truth.' Mr. Jowett, "How do they stand in reference to the truth?"

Prot. With what object do you ask that, Socrates?

Soc. Because, Protarchus, I wish to omit no characteristic of pleasure and knowledge in testing their real worth, if it should appear that one part in each of them is pure, and the other not pure; in order that each may come pure and unmixed to the trial, and so make it easier[1] for me and you and all the company here present. E

Prot. Rightly said.

Soc. Come then, let us take this view about all the kinds of things that we call pure,—let us take one of them first as an example and examine it thoroughly.

Prot. What then must we take? 53

Soc. Among the first, if you please, we will consider the kind to which *white* belongs.[2]

Prot. By all means.

Soc. In what way then can pure whiteness, and under what condition, be best presented to us? Shall we say the purity of it consists in the greatest degree and quantity, or in its being least mixed,[3]—that is, when no other particle of any colour is in it?

Prot. Clearly, in the white which is most genuine and pure.

Soc. Rightly answered. So then we are to account this the truest, Protarchus, and at the same time the most beautiful of all the whites, and not that which is most in quantity, or the largest in surface? B

Prot. Most correctly said.

Soc. Then we shall make no mistake at all in affirming, that a little pure white is whiter, as well as prettier and more genuine, than much white of a mixed sort.

Prot. No; your statement will be quite right.

[1] Either the last words τὴν κρίσιν should be omitted as a gloss, or for τὴν κρίσιν in the preceding clause we should read, with Dr. Badham, τὴν κρᾶσιν.

[2] Lit. 'as one of the first examples, let us look at *white* as a *kind*.'

[3] ἀκρατότατον, the form of the superlative should be, as from ἄκρατος, not from ἀκρατής.

Soc. What then? Surely we shall not require many examples of this kind for our argument about pleasure, but it is enough for us to understand from the instance now before us that, in the most inclusive sense, all pleasure, if unmixed with pain, would be sweeter, truer, and better in its kind, even a small than a great one, or little than much.[1] C

Prot. Assuredly it would; and we want no other example to prove it.

Soc. What then are we to say of another theory of pleasure? Have we not been told respecting it that it is in all cases a process of production,[2] and that there is no real *existence* in pleasure at all? For there are subtle reasoners who undertake to shew the truth of this other view, and we are bound to thank them for it.[3]

Prot. How is that?

Soc. I will discuss with you this very question more at length, by asking a few further questions, friend Protarchus. D

Prot. You have only to state the case and put your questions.

XXXIII. *Soc.* There are, then, two correlative principles,[4] one existing independently, the other which ever has something else for its aim.

Prot. What are the principles you mean, and in what sense do you speak of them?

[1] Excessive pleasures, involving or followed by pain, do not bring such real happiness as small pleasures that are harmless. These are the pleasures that form the Fifth Ingredient, inf. p. 66. C.

[2] This doctrine of pleasure, attributed to Aristippus, is discussed in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* vii. 12 and x. 2. It was a saying of Protagoras that *οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεται*, *Theæt.* p. 152, D., and this was a doctrine of the Eleatic school. But the "subtle reasoners" are thought to refer to Aristippus.

[3] Ironical: "We ought to be grateful to them for proving that there is no such thing as pleasure at all."

[4] *i. e.* Cause and Effect, or Means (*γένεσις*) and End (*οὐσία*). By showing that *ἡδονὴ* is only a *γένεσις*, Socrates contends that it falls short of *summum bonum*, which must be a self-existing *οὐσία*. In another sense he elsewhere shews that perfect life is a *γένεσις* (*i. e.* *μικτὸς* from *ἡδονὴ* and *πέρας*), while *ἡδονὴ* is an *ἄπειρον*.

Soc. One which in its very nature ever ranks first in dignity, and the other which falls far short of that.

Prot. Say what you mean still more clearly.

Soc. We have noticed, I suppose, handsome and well-born boys accompanied by manly admirers.[1]

Prot. Certainly I have.

Soc. Now, as these are two, so try and find two other principles resembling them in all things of which we predicate Relativity.[2] E

Prot. Say clearer, Socrates, what you mean.

Soc. Nothing very subtle, Protarchus; it is only the subject that is teasing us. What it asserts is, that there is always one kind of thing that exists for the sake of another,[3] and something else, for the sake of which whatever at any time takes place with a view to some result must be considered to take place.[4]

Prot. At last I understand your meaning, but only through its having been several times repeated.

[1] This is given as a case of relation of A to B, and in order to bring out the *τὸ τρίτον*, which is *relativity*. Of 'boy' and 'man' in the example, the *τὸ σεμνὸν* attaches to the latter, as to 'end' more than to 'means.'

[2] Or, *κατὰ πάντα* (*κάθ'*) *ὅσα*, etc., 'in all things in which we say there is a *third* to some other.' Dr. Badham's emendation is ingenious, *Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ, Λέγε σαφέστερον*, "I will say a third time, 'explain your meaning more clearly;'" Protarchus having (virtually) twice before inquired from Socrates his meaning. And *ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι* equally well concludes Socrates' speech, and is equivalent to *τῶν λεγομένων εἶναι*, sup. p. 16. D. It is, however, just possible that *τὸ τρίτον ἑτέρῳ* was one of those brief formulae of which Plato was fond, to imply 'relation of one thing to another,' The three are, in the above case, *παιδικὰ, ἐραστὴς*, relativity of one to the other. Taylor approves the emendation of Cornarius, *τὸ τρίτον Σωτῆρι*. But that familiar proverb seems here quite out of place.

[3] *Means* to an end.

[4] An *end* for which such means are employed; *e.g.* physic for health's sake, and health for which physic is had recourse to. This doctrine, with the same illustration, is touched upon in *Gorg.* p. 467. C. Mr. Jowett understands "relatives" and "absolutes" to be meant. There is an affectation of obscurity in the Greek expression.

Soc. And perhaps soon, my dear boy, we shall understand still better, as the argument proceeds. 54

Prot. That is sure to be the case.

Soc. Let us then get hold of these other principles.

Prot. What are they?

Soc. One, the process of becoming in all things, the other, the state of being.

Prot. I take on your word then the two facts of Existence and Production.

Soc. Most rightly said. And which of these, must we say, is for the sake of which,—production for existence, or existence, for production?[1]

Prot. Do you mean by your present question to ask, whether what we call existence is what it is (*i. e.* existence) for the sake of production?

Soc. That seems the drift of my question.

Prot. In Heaven's name, is *this* what you ask me,[2] 'Tell B me, Protarchus, whether you say shipbuilding is for the sake of ships, or rather are ships for shipbuilding? And so of all matters of that sort.'

Soc. That, Protarchus, is precisely what I do mean.

Prot. Then why don't you answer your own question, Socrates?

Soc. There is no reason why I should not. Do you however take part in the reply.

Prot. Oh, of course.

Soc. Very well, then; I say that it is for the purpose of producing some result that drugs and implements of every kind, and all material, are placed at every one's disposal; and C further, that every act of production takes place for the sake of bringing into existence some special thing, some for one and some for another; in a word, that production in general is for the sake of being in general.

[1] Means for end, or end for means?

[2] *i. e.* a question apparently so absurd. Dr. Badham would read ἆρ' ἐπανερωτᾷς τοιόνδε τι; Λέγ', ὦ Πρώταρχέ, μοι, etc. We might also conjecture ἆρ' ἃ ἐπανερωτᾷς μέ ἐστι τοιόνδε τι;

Prot. Nothing can be clearer than that.

Soc. Then surely pleasure, if it is a production at all, must needs be so for the sake of something produced.

Prot. Of course.

Soc. But certainly that for which whatever is at any time done, for the sake of another, *is* done, *that* stands in the condition of the good; while that done for the sake of something must, my excellent friend, be put in another category.

Prot. That must be so, indeed.

Soc. Then, if Pleasure is a production,[1] we must, to class D
it correctly, place it in some other position than that of the good.

Prot. Such will be the most correct placing.

Soc. Then, as I said at the beginning of this discussion, we are bound to feel grateful to any one who shall have explained to us the nature of pleasure, and proved that there is no real existence in it at all, since it is only a coming into being. For it is clear that such a one throws ridicule on those who say Pleasure is a Good.[2]

Prot. Decidedly.

Soc. But surely this same person will ridicule sometimes those who make the end consist in such productions.[3] E

Prot. How? Whom do you mean?

[1] *i. e.* only a mean,—a step, as it were, to a state or condition. But this is really a quibble. Properly speaking, Pleasure is a γένεσις because γίγνεται ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι. It has no real existence, because it depends wholly on individual tastes and special circumstances. But γένεσις in this sense is quite different from γένεσις in the sense of 'means.' Taylor renders γένεσις here "a generating anew," Mr. Poste "a Becoming."

[2] Ironically he pretends that Aristippus is against the party who advocate pleasure, and therefore is virtually on the side of Antisthenes, or the pleasure-haters called οἱ δυσχερεῖς.

[3] Such as are *mere* means, though mistaken for ends. In the next sentence Dr. Badham reads τῶν δσ' οἱ for τῶν ὅσοι. Thus ὅσα must depend on χαίρουσι. But there seems no reason why τῶν ἀποτελουμένων should not be masculine, and the middle voice. Τὰ ἀποτελούμενα could only mean 'actions which have their end in, or stop at, mere processes,' *i. e.* means.

Soc. Those who take pleasure in trying to cure hunger or thirst or any affection of that sort, such as can be cured by producing another state,[1]—and who are pleased at the producing it, as if that were pleasure itself. So they say they would not care to live at all if they could not feel hunger and thirst, and had no experience of all those other passions that usually go with such sensations, but which we need not specify.[2]

Prot. They certainly seem to say this. 55

Soc. Should not all of us admit, now, that the opposite to becoming is the gradually ceasing to be?

Prot. That must be so.

Soc. Then one who chooses this kind of life virtually chooses a state of destruction and production, and not that third kind of life, in which there is neither joy nor grief, but the purest use of the intellect?

Prot. Much inconsistency, as it seems, Socrates, is the result, if one regards Pleasure as our good.

Soc. Much indeed; and let us state this in another way, thus.

Prot. What way?

Soc. Surely it is unreasonable that there should be no B
good at all and no beauty[3] either in bodies or in many other things, but only in the soul; and that even there no other good should exist but pleasure, and that manliness, self-control, intellect, or any of the fine qualities which the soul claims as its own, should be neither good nor beautiful! It is unreasonable too to be forced to say, that one who does not feel joy, but grief, is bad at the particular time when he is in grief,[4] though, in fact, he may be the very best of men. Or

[1] Such as πλήρωσις for κένωσις. They mistake the πλήρωσις for pleasure itself; whereas it is but a means towards producing it: as if it were αὐτὴ ἡδονή, though it is only a γένεσις ἀλυπίας.

[2] The sentiment is conveyed by the well-known verse, τίς δὲ βίος, τί δὲ τερπνόν, ἄτερ χρυσέης Ἀφροδίτης;

[3] Since ἀγαθὸν is καλόν, and if ἡδονὴ is the ἀγαθόν. The proposition is put, after Plato's favourite way, in the form of a paradox.

[4] *i. e.* from the absence of ἀγαθόν, that is, of ἡδονή, in his soul.

again, that one in a state of joy, in proportion as he rejoices, C
is superior in respect of virtue at the particular time when he rejoices.

Prot. All these suppositions, Socrates, are as unreasonable as they can possibly be.

XXXIV. *Soc.* Well, now, don't let us endeavour at all costs to make a full and thorough investigation of pleasure, but at the same time shew ourselves to be, as it were, very niggardly of mind and science. Rather let us, like men in earnest, ring our theory all round, to find if it has any weak point in it, till we discover the purest forms that pleasure and mind present, and so are able to use the most genuine portions of mind and science, as well as those of pleasure, for the decision to be made between them.[1]

Prot. You say rightly.

Soc. Then, if I mistake not, one department of mathe- D
matical science is employed in the service of the arts, another in that of education and culture,—or how say you?

Prot. As you do.

Soc. Let us then consider first, in the case of the manual arts, whether one part of them be not more directly allied to science, and another part less so; and whether we ought not to regard the former sort as the purest possible, the other as less pure.

Prot. Yes, we ought.

Soc. In each of these then we should take separately the leading arts.

Prot. What arts, and in what way do you mean?

Soc. Thus: that if one separates from all the arts *counting*, E
measuring, and *weighing*, the residue in each, so to say, would be quite insignificant.

Prot. It would indeed.

Soc. For surely there would remain only conjecture for

[1] Or, εἰς τῆν κρᾶσιν, 'for the mixture to be made from both ingredients.' If we read κρίσιν, we might render it, 'for the impartial decision that we have pledged ourselves to make.'

the rest, and to exercise our senses by a kind of knack or tact, by calling in the aid of the faculties of guessing, which, indeed, many persons call *arts*, whereas their strength has really been produced by practice and exercise. 56

Prot. That certainly is the case.

Soc. Then, to take music first: I presume it is full of such haphazard, since it often[1] makes a tune not by measured time, but by guess-work resulting from practice. All flute-playing especially is full of it, as it tries to catch the precise time of each string in the lute, as the sound proceeds from it,[2] by conjecture, so as to involve much that is uncertain, and but little that is fixed and settled.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. Well, and we shall find medicine and farming and B steering and the command of armies to follow precisely the same principle.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. But the art of building, I presume, makes use of measures and tools more than any other; and as these impart to it a great degree of exactness, they cause it to be more really an *art* than most of the sciences are.[3]

[1] He is probably speaking only of common-place and inaccurate performances,—or, at least, the extempore playing by ear and not by notes. As for *αὐτῆς*, it seems to mean *στοχαστικῆς*, of which *σύμπασα αὐλητικὴ μεστή ἐστι.*

[2] Perhaps *φερομένης* is an interpolation. But I think it may refer to the notes of the lute passing, as it were, to the ear of the player who accompanies it on the flute. Dr. Badham suggests *φθεγγομένης*. 'But *φέρεσθαι* or *μεταξὺ φέρεσθαι* is often used of effects produced on the senses by sounds, sights, smells, etc., striking them. The passage is rather difficult, and not much can be said in favour of Mr. Poste's version: "There is a deal of this in music, accordant strings being estimated, not by measure, but by practised conjecture. And those who handle wind instruments measure the pitch of notes by conjecture during their vibration." Taylor quite missed the sense, "for in these the breath, by being well aimed as it is blown along, searches and attains the measure of every chord beaten."

[3] The construction is, *τὰ πολλὰ (μέτρα καὶ ὄργανα) πορίζοντα αὐτῇ πολλὴν ἀκρίβειαν, παρέχεται τεκτονικὴν τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν.*

Prot. In what way?

Soc. Why, it is so in ship-building and house-building and many other departments of carpentry. It employs, if I mistake not, a straight rule, and an instrument for drawing circles, a level and a line, and an ingenious contrivance for applying the plummet. C

Prot. Indeed, Socrates, you speak quite correctly.

Prot. Then let us class under two heads the so-called arts; those which go with music, and have less exactness in the performance; and those of building, which have more.[1]

Prot. Let that be assumed.

Soc. And of these let us allow that those are the most exact which we lately called leading arts.

Prot. I suppose you mean arithmetic, and such other arts as you lately spoke of in connexion with it.

Soc. Assuredly. But must we not, Protarchus, describe these also in their turn as two-fold? How say you? D

Prot. Of what sorts are you speaking?

Soc. In the first place, must we not speak of arithmetic as of one sort, as employed by the many, but another, as applied to philosophy?[2]

Prot. By what distinction can one set down one kind of arithmetic under one head, another under a different one?

Soc. The distinction, Protarchus, is by no means a small one; some mathematicians count up unequal units[3] in such things as pertain to number, *e. g.* two camps, two cows, two very small or two very large things; the other will never go E

[1] Plato, in his favourite way, pretends to disparage an art which formed so essential a part of a gentleman's education, and in which he himself was evidently an adept. Carpentry, in truth, was proverbially rather a rough art, if we rightly understand Eur. *Hipp.* 468, *οὐδ' ἂν στέγην γὰρ, ἧς κατηρεφεῖς δόμοι, καλῶς ἀκριβώσειαν*, where *καλῶς* means *πρεπόντως, εὐλόγως*. 'Men would be wrong in taking too much pains to make roof-timbers fit with minute exactness.'

[2] *i. e.* the ordinary practice of counting and summing up, and pure or abstract calculations.

[3] *i. e.* things that can be counted, one, two, three, etc., though, in fact, they are not all exactly the same, as in flocks and herds, men and ships.

a step along with them, unless one allows that no unit differs from any other single unit out of all the countless number of them that exist.[1]

Prot. You say very properly that there is no small difference in those who are engaged on numbers; so that it seems reasonable that the sciences are two.

Soc. Well, now, calculation and measurement, in building or in buying and selling, as respectively differing from the geometry of the scientific and the carefully computed reckonings,—must we say that each of these is one, or must we consider them as two? 57

Prot. For my own part, following the same course as before, I should affirm that each of these was two, as far as I have a vote in the matter.

Soc. Right: and now do you understand why we have brought forward these illustrations?

Prot. Perhaps I do; yet withal I should like you to give your own views on the question just proposed.

Soc. Well, then, it seems to me that the present argument has advanced thus far in looking for some counterpart to B
pleasures, which was its aim when we commenced it, and to be now inquiring whether there is a kind of science, as there is also a kind of pleasure, that is more pure than another.[2]

Prot. This, indeed, is very plain, that the argument has taken up these inquiries with this object in view.

XXXV. *Soc.* Very good. And did not the same argu-

[1] Unless a man shall regard all units as equal; which cannot be the case in counting concrete things, since no two apples or two nuts are *exactly* of the same size.

[2] A strangely involved sentence. The general meaning seems rightly expressed in Taylor's paraphrase, "These distinctions seem to me to have shown to us, that in science there is that very circumstance attending it which we had before discovered to be in pleasure; the one thus answering to the other. For, having found that some sort of pleasure was purer than some other sort, we were inquiring whether the same difference was to be found with regard to science." For ζητῶν we might plausibly read ζητοῦντες.

ment try to make out, by the agreement we came to above, that there are different branches of art in the various departments of knowledge, some more, others less plain and definite?[1]

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. And does it not now, in the last examples we took,[2] after specifying an art that bears the same name as another, and so bringing us to regard it as one, again put the question C to us as if there were two, and ask whether there is not a more definite clearness and purity in such matters in the art as employed by scientific men, than by the unscientific?

Prot. It does indeed appear to put this question.

Soc. What reply then, Protarchus, are we to give to it?

Prot. Why, Socrates, we have arrived at a surprisingly great difference between the sciences in respect of clearness.

Soc. Shall we not then give the answer more easily?

Prot. Of course; and let that answer be, that not only do these arts surpass greatly the others, but even in these such as are employed in the studies of your genuine philosopher are D immensely superior in exactness and truth respecting measures and numbers.

Soc. Let this then be taken as your view; and in faith in you let us confidently reply to those who are so clever at dragging words,[3]—

Prot. Well, what?

Soc. That there really are *two* arithmetics and *two* mensurations, and many other branches of learning of the like kind, which have this doubleness, though they share in a common name.

Prot. By all means let us give this answer to the clever people you mention, and may luck attend it. E

[1] Alluding to music and carpentry.

[2] Arithmetic and calculation. The question was, whether the vulgar and the scientific uses did not exhibit a marked difference in respect of accuracy. We still use the term '*pure* mathematics' in a sense not very different.

[3] The ἀντιλογικοὶ or ἐριστικοί, who pull, drag, or force arguments to suit their own views. "Masters of the art of misinterpretation."—*Mr. Jowett.*

Soc. These sciences then we affirm to be in an especial manner exact.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. But, Protarchus, the faculty of dialectic would disown us, if we preferred any other to her.

Prot. And what are we call this other science? 58

Soc. Evidently, one that should have cognisance of[1] all that we now call 'exact science.' For I imagine, on my own part, that all the world,—that is, all who have the smallest sense belonging to them,—fully believe that knowledge to be far the truest, which deals with abstract existence, and the real, and the naturally unchangeable. What do *you* think?[2] What decision would you, Protarchus, arrive at?

Prot. I did hear, more than once, Gorgias saying, my dear Socrates, that the art of persuading far surpassed all arts, in that it brought everything into subjection to itself not by B putting constraint on the hearers, but by their own consent; and that thus it was by far the best of all the arts. But now I should not care to oppose either you or that distinguished rhetorician.

Soc. *By force of arms*,[3] you wanted to say; but I fancy you dropped them through shame at making such an attack.

Prot. At present, you shall have it all your own way.

Soc. I wonder if *I* am to blame for your not rightly understanding me.

[1] Perhaps we should read δῆλον ὅτι πᾶσαν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην διάνοιαν (cf. *Resp.* p. 534. A.) Any how, ἂν may easily have dropped out after πᾶσαν. But I do not feel sure of the meaning of the clause as it is now read in the texts. It is clear, however, that Plato refers to a false kind of dialectic in ῥητορική. Mr. Poste appears to read ὅτι πᾶς τις or πᾶς ἂν κ.τ.λ., which he renders, "every one will recognise the faculty I allude to." Taylor supplies ἀκρίβειαν καὶ σαφήνειαν with τὴν λεγομένην.

[2] I read σὺ δὲ τί; sc. οἴει, opposed to ἔγωγε οἶμαι just above. Dr. Badham, in his usual hasty way, alters it to σὺ δ' ἔτι πῶς, which gives no intelligible meaning.

[3] There is a play on the formula ἐναντία θέσθαι τὰ ὅπλα, *Herod.* i. 62, and on ἀπολιπεῖν in the senses of 'leaving unsaid' and 'leaving a shield in the fight.'

Prot. In what respect?

Soc. I had not yet got, friend Protarchus, to asking this, what art or what science surpasses all in being[1] the greatest and best and most beneficial to us; but which has for its aim C certainty, exactness, and strict truth, even though it be small in itself and confer but small benefits,—that is the purport of my present inquiry. But now consider this point well, without fear of offending Gorgias, if you concede to his art the condition of being the best in respect of its serviceableness to men; while in respect to the profession of dialectic I have just mentioned,[2]—as I said then about white, viz. that if there was but little of it, but still pure, it surpassed much white that was not pure, in this very quality of being the most genuine,— D so now let us take this subject seriously in mind, and sufficiently consider the arguments both for and against it, without looking at any special benefits conferred by the sciences, nor to the repute in which any of them are held; but, if there *is* any natural faculty in our minds for loving truth and for doing everything for it, let us say, after a thorough search into it, if we can assert that this faculty above all others does, in all probability, possess this purity of mind and intellect, or if we must look for some other that has higher claims than this has in this respect. E

Prot. Well, I have given it due consideration, and I think it is difficult to allow that any other science or art has a greater hold on the truth than this has.

Soc. I presume you have made the present statement

[1] Either *εἶναι* has dropped out after *ἀρίστη*, or the author, with studied ambiguity, has left it to be understood.

[2] Dr. Badham reads *τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπερέχειν τέχνῃ διδοὺς—, κρατεῖν δ' ᾗ εἶπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματείᾳ.* I cannot feel any faith in the change, and prefer the old theory of *ἀνακόλουθον* in a long and rambling sentence. He is speaking of *ῥητορικὴ*, which some confused with dialectic, and asks if we can in good faith predicate *τὸ καθαρὸν* of it. The construction follows this general outline, *ᾗ δ' εἶπον ἐγὼ τῇ πραγματείᾳ——εἴπωμεν εἰ φαῖμεν ἂν ταύτην ἐκτῆσθαι τὸ καθαρὸν*, etc. We might accept *ταύτῃ* for *ταύτην* from Dr. Badham with less hesitation; but even here it seems best to construe *ταύτην διερευνησάμενοι.*

with the knowledge of this fact, that most of the arts, and those who are engaged in them,[1] in the first place make use of 59
mere opinions, and inquire intently into matters of opinion;[2] and if a man thinks he is inquiring into the nature of things, you are aware that the study of his life is about this world of ours,[3] how it was created, how it is affected by or how it affects others. May we say this, or how must we state the case?

Prot. As you have put it.

Soc. Then the labour which such a person takes up with is not about things ever existent, but about things that are being produced, or that have been or will be produced.[4]

Prot. That is very true.

Soc. Can we then affirm that there is any certainty, in the strictest truth of the word, in things, none of which ever B
were, or will be, or at this present are, in the same unchangeable state?

Prot. Of course not.

Soc. Then in matters that possess no fixedness nor permanency at all, how can any reasoning ever become fixed or settled to us?

Prot. In no way at all, I should say.

Soc. Then they are not the objects of thought or science that deals in perfect truth.[5]

Prot. It is not likely, I think.

XXXVI. *Soc.* Then you and I, who take this view,[6]

[1] Reading ὅσοι περὶ ταύτας, with Dr. Badham, for ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα.

[2] *i. e.* they are destitute of a fixed standard of truth. In the next clause we should perhaps insert δεῖν before ζητεῖν.

[3] Subjects which are δοξαστὰ, matters of speculation, not of fixed and abstract truth.

[4] For ἡμῶν perhaps we should read ἡμῖν, an ethical dative. Otherwise we must join ἡμῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος.

[5] "Then mind and science when employed about them do not attain the highest truth."—*Mr. Jowett.*

[6] Lit. 'This *you* and this *I*,' etc. Or, it may be rendered, 'Our distinguished selves,' like τὸν ἐμὲ, sup. p. 20. B. *Sophist.* p. 239. B.

are bound to give both Gorgias and Philebus a hearty farewell, and to call attention[1] to this point in our argument. C

Prot. What point do you mean?

Soc. That we have either in those abstract subjects of contemplation the fixed, the pure, the true, and what we call the genuine,—I mean, in those which always exhibit precisely the same conditions, without the least admixture with any other thing; or, as the next best resource, whatever is nearest akin to them; while all other things must be called secondary and be said to come after them.

Prot. What you say is very true.

Soc. Ought we not then, of the terms that are applied to such subjects, to assign the fairest to those which are themselves the fairest?

Prot. It seems reasonable.

Soc. Are not then 'Mind' and 'Intellect' such terms as D one would specially hold in honour?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. Then such terms, in abstract conceptions, may, if rightly given, be called fitly applied.[2]

Prot. By all means.

Soc. Well, but the claimants which were before brought forward by me for the decision, were none other than what we express in these very terms.

Prot. Of course they were, Socrates.

Soc. Very good; then if some one were to talk to us as artisans, and tell us that Intellect and Pleasure were set before E us as materials from which and on which we were to manu-

[1] Lit. 'To go through all the company to make them our witnesses in the matter.' Mr. Poste confounds this with *μαρτυρεῖν*, as also in p. 66. D.

[2] It seems best to construe *ἀπηκριβωμένα καλεῖσθαι*, 'the right words in the right place,' as we say. Mr. Poste's version merely evades the difficulty; "these names then may be given to the science of real Being with a superlatively just application." Mr. Jowett, "to have their truest and exactest application." Taylor, "Rightly then are these names in accurate speech appropriated to the intelligence and contemplation of real being." Stallbaum renders *ἀπηκριβωμένα* "quippe accommodata illis diligentissime."

facture something[1] by blending the two together, he would not use an inappropriate figure of speech.

Prot. That is very true.

Soc. Ought we not then, as the next step, to try to combine them?

Prot. Of course.

Soc. Would not then our success be better secured by first mentioning, by way of reminding ourselves, these further points?

Prot. What are they?

Soc. They are what we had in mind some time ago; but the proverb seems a good one which says that 'A sound view should be turned over twice and even thrice in discussion.' 60

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Come then, I conjure you in heaven's name;[2] for I believe what we did say then was expressed in some such terms as these.

Prot. How?

Soc. Thus: 'Philebus says pleasure is rightly the object of all creatures, and all ought to aim at it; that this, in fact, and no other, is *the* good to all without exception; and that these two terms, 'good' and 'pleasant,' are rightly given to what is in truth one,[3] and forms one natural class. But Socrates, in the first place, says this is not so, and affirms that B as in their names, so in their nature, the two qualities 'good' and 'pleasant' are different from each other; and that Intellect has a better claim to the conditions of the Good than Pleasure has.' Is not this, and nothing but this, what we then said, Protarchus?

[1] Viz. the μικτὸς βίος. This sentence affords a good example of the purposely involved style the author has adopted throughout the dialogue. The literal sense seems to be, 'Respecting then intellect and pleasure, with a view to the blending them together, if any one were to say to us, as to artizans, that they are laid before us from which and on which to make something, he would make a good comparison in his statement.'

[2] Viz. as about to pass a judgment of the most solemn import.

[3] Construe ὀρθῶς ἔχειν τεθέντα, etc.

Prot. Yes, it certainly is.

Soc. Should we not then still agree between ourselves on the following point?

Prot. What point is that?

Soc. That 'the Good' has in its nature this superiority C over all other things.

Prot. In what respect?

Soc. That if any creature possesses this always, fully, in every way and under all circumstances, it never requires[1] anything in addition, but has in the most perfect manner all that satisfies its wants. Is it not so?

Prot. It is so, certainly

Soc. And did we not essay in our argument to take each of these apart from the other, and assign to the life of one set of beings Pleasure unmixed with Intellect, and similarly to another Intellect without the least particle of Pleasure in it?

Prot. That was so.

Soc. We did not then conclude that either the one or the D other of them was sufficient in itself for any one, did we?

Prot. Indeed we did not.

XXXVII. *Soc.* And if we then went at all astray from the truth, let some one else now take up the matter again, and tell us what is the more correct view, classing under one general head memory, intellect, knowledge, and right judgment, and considering whether any one, without these, would care to have or to come into possession of anything whatever,—to say nothing of *pleasure*, be it as much or as intense as possible, —since in that case he could have no correct notion that he felt joy, no knowledge at all of what the feeling is that is upon E him, and no recollection whatever of that feeling for any moment of time. And the same you may say of Intellect; the question being whether, with the absence of all pleasure,

[1] Perhaps we should read ποτ' ἂν ἔτι, etc., the ἂν being more usually added when an optative precedes, as ᾧ παρείη. We should then, of course, translate, "it will never require," etc,

even the briefest and smallest, a man would care to possess intellect, rather than have it in conjunction with some pleasures; or all pleasures without intellect, rather than with some intellect.

Prot. That cannot be, Socrates: there really is no use in asking such questions many times over again.

Soc. Then perfect and thorough good, and such as all 61
would choose, can be found in neither of these alternatives.

Prot. How can it be?

Soc. Then we must get a notion what *is* 'the good,' either distinctly or in some general way, in order, as we said, to have some claimant to give the second prize to.

Prot. What you say is very right.

Soc. Then we have now come upon a way that will lead us to 'the good.'

Prot. What way?

Soc. Much as if a person, wanting to find out where somebody lived, were in the first instance to be correctly informed B
of the place of his residence.[1] I suppose he would have one great aid towards finding what he was looking for.

Prot. Of course he would.

Soc. Just so a course of reasoning has informed us, as indeed we were warned at first, not to look for the Good in the unmixed, but in the mixed life.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. But surely there is more hope that what we are seeking will become plain to us in the life that is well and properly mixed[2] than in that which is not.

Prot. Very much more, indeed.

Soc. Then let us proceed to make this mixture with a prayer to the gods,—Dionysus or Hephaestus,[3] or whichever C

[1] Construe *τὴν οἴκησιν αὐτοῦ*, not, as the natural order of words would suggest, *πύθοιτ' αὐτοῦ*.

[2] *i. e.* with no element of the purely sensual.

[3] Who in *Iliad* i. 595 is represented as acting cupbearer to the gods. Or his skill in the blending and alloy of metals may be meant, as described in *Il.* xviii.

of the celestials holds this special prerogative of blending things together.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. And now we may fancy ourselves wine-servers, and that we have sources at hand to draw from. That of Pleasure one may fairly compare to honey; that of intellect, a sober and wineless fount,[1] to a wholesome water with no sweetness in it;[2] and these we must endeavour to mix together in the best possible way.

Prot. Certainly we must.

Soc. Tell me then, before we begin, are we likely to hit D the right result by combining pleasure generally with intellect generally?

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. But that would not be safe;[3] I think I can put forward a notion of mine whereby we can mix with less risk.

Prot. Tell me what that is.

Soc. One kind of pleasure, we said, is more truly pleasure than another; just as one art is more exact than another art.

Prot. Undoubtedly it is.

Soc. And one kind of knowledge is superior to another kind, the one looking only to things that are born and perish, the other, to those which do not, but which are entities ever E the same. This knowledge then we, having regard to the truth of each, considered more true than that other.

Prot. And you rightly so considered it.

Soc. Then if we first see the result of the mixing together these truest portions of each, pleasure and knowledge,[4] [we

[1] In allusion perhaps to libations offered to the Σεμναί, *χοὰς ἀοίνους, νηφάλια μειλίγματα*, Æsch. *Eum.* 107. The comparison of pleasure with honey, though an obvious one, is said to be Pythagorean.

[2] *Tartness* in wine is the opposite quality to an excess of grape-sugar. "Austere water" (so Mr. Poste) conveys no intelligible sense, and Mr. Jowett's "pure and healthful" is but an evasion.

[3] Since *πᾶσα ἡδονὴ* would include vitious pleasures.

[4] Dr. Badham, in his somewhat dogmatic way, says "it is impossible to make any sense" of the MSS. reading, and gives *οὐκοῦν εἰς τἀληθέστατα—ἴδωμεν*,

may ask,] will these, when so blended, be sufficient to produce and furnish us with this most desirable kind of life; or do we further require some of those ingredients that are not quite so pure and genuine?

Prot. It appears to me, we had better do as you say. 62

XXXVIII. *Soc.* Let us then suppose that we have a man who has an intelligent perception[1] of the true nature of abstract justice; with reasoning powers on a par with his natural intuitions, and with similar views on all other abstract subjects whatever.

Prot. Well, let that be assumed.

Soc. Shall we then say that such a person has science enough if he can give an account only of circles and globes as mentally conceived, but has no knowledge at all of the sphere and the circles that are used by men on this earth,—and if he uses in house-building, in the same abstract and unpractical way, not only the circles but all other rules and measures? B

Prot. The disposing of our time and trouble,[2] as we now speak of it, on the abstract sciences *alone*, Socrates, would be absurd.

Soc. Do you mean then to say, that we should throw in, and mix up together with the abstract, this variable and not really pure art of the fallacious measure and circle of the practical builder?

Prot. Why, that must be done, if any one of us expects even to find his way home on any occasion.[3]

Soc. And must we also mix up music,—I mean the prac- C

which alteration he says, is "rendered certain by Protarchus' answer." It may be doubted if the hortative subjunctive would admit of the *οὐκ*, even in a formula virtually equivalent to *οὖν*. Protarchus' reply is tantamount to 'let us try the mixture, and see for ourselves;' as if Socrates had asked *οὐκοῦν δεῖ ἰδεῖν συμμίξαντας*, etc. Mr. Jowett translates, "if, then, we consider which are the truest sections of each, and begin by mingling them."

[1] *φρονῶν* here = *φρόνησιν ἔχων*.

[2] Or, 'the mental state that consists in,' etc.

[3] He must understand the difference between walking in a straight line and in a circle.

tice of it which we said, a little while ago, was full of guess-work and mere imitation, and deficient in pureness?

Prot. To me it appears necessary, if our life is to be really life in any conceivable way.

Soc. Would you then have me follow the example of a door-keeper who is hustled and overpowered by a crowd, and so, as being beaten, open wide the doors, and then let go the whole lot of sciences, to pour in and mix together, the less perfect with the pure?

Prot. For my own part, Socrates, I don't know what harm D one can get from taking in all the other sciences, if one has already those which stand first.

Soc. Then must I let them all loose together, to flow into the bed of Homer's very poetical meeting of the waters?

Prot. By all means.

XXXIX. *Soc.* Then there they go! And now we have to return to the source from whence we drew pleasures: for, though we had intended to mix them and the sciences in a certain way, by taking first portions of those only which were true, we failed in doing this.[1] Our fondness for Science generally caused us to let loose at once all the kinds of science, and that before the pleasures.[2] E

Prot. What you say is very true.

Soc. Then now is the time for you and me to take into consideration the question about pleasures also; whether we are to let go the whole of these also in a body, or should send off first only those of them which are true.

Prot. Certainly it is far better, as a measure of safety,[3] to let go the true pleasures first.

Soc. Then let them go on their way. But what next?

[1] *i. e. οὐκ ἐξῆν ἡμῖν οὕτω μιγνύναι ὡς διενοήθημεν.*

[2] Before you can mix together A and B, both ingredients must be present. But we let in all the sciences at once, when we ought to have let in some sciences and some pleasures.

[3] See p. 61. D. Lit. 'as far at least as safety is concerned.'

Must we not, as in the case of the Sciences, if some pleasures are necessary for our condition, mix in these also?[1]

Prot. Undoubtedly; such as are necessary at all events.

Soc. But surely if, as we said it was not only harmless but 63
even useful to possess a practical knowledge of all the arts through life, so we now assert the same about the pleasures,—that is, if we assume that it is beneficial to us, as well as harmless to all men generally, to be in the enjoyment of all pleasures all our lives,—then we are bound not to omit any of them in making the mixture.

Prot. How then are we to speak of these same pleasures,[2] and how are we to act with respect to them?

Soc. You should not put the question to us, Protarchus, but to the pleasures themselves and the intellectual faculties, by an inquiry of this sort about their mutual relation.

Prot. What is the nature of the inquiry? B

Soc. 'My friends, whether I am to call you Pleasures, or to address you by some other name, would you not be quite willing and content[3] to live in company with all intellectual exercise, or would you rather live without it?' For my part, I think they could not possibly avoid giving this reply to the question.

Prot. What reply?

Soc. 'That, as was before said, it is neither possible nor beneficial for one solitary class, unmixed with any other, to exist by itself apart from the rest. We think, however, that of all the various kinds, weighing one against another, that is the best for residing with us, which consists in the compre- C
hensive knowledge not only of things generally, but also of each of us Pleasures[4] in as perfect a manner as is possible.'

[1] *i. e.* as well as those which are true.

[2] Either αὐτῶν or τούτων is perhaps a gloss, or interpolation.

[3] Or perhaps, 'Would you prefer—rather than,' etc. But we should thus expect ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν rather than μῶν οὐκ ἄν, etc.

[4] Dr. Badham reads αὐτὴν αὖ τιν' ἡμῶν for αὖ τὴν αὐτὴν or αὖ τὴν, etc. Mr. Poste appears to read τὴν αὐτῶν ἡμῶν, "particularly as it includes the

Prot. 'And a very proper answer you have now given us,' we shall say to them.

Soc. Rightly so. And now in turn we must put a similar question to Mind and Intellect. 'Do you feel any want of pleasures in combining yourselves?' we should say to them. '*Pleasures* indeed!' they would perhaps say in contempt.

Prot. I dare say they would. D

Soc. And our address to them after this would run thus: 'In addition to those pleasures which are genuine,' we should say, 'do you further require that those which are the greatest and the most intense should reside with you?' 'Of course not, Socrates,' they would say, 'when they do but cause us endless interruptions, by disturbing the thoughts in which we are wrapt by insane delights, and do not only prevent us, the intellectual faculties, from being called into play at all, but totally ruin and spoil, in nearly every instance, the offspring that may be born of us, by causing forgetfulness of them con- E
sequent on neglect? No! those other pleasures that you have mentioned,—those which are pure and genuine,—regard, if you like, as almost a natural part of us; and beside them, such as are associated with bodily health and a well-ordered mind, and, indeed, all which put themselves in the train of Virtue generally, as of a goddess, and accompany her everywhere,—these, too, you may combine with us. But, of course, it would be utterly unreasonable to mix up with Mind any pleasures, be they what they may, that go with lewdness and vice of any kind, if one desires to see such effects of a mixture and a combination as are as beautiful and as harmonious as possible, and 64
to try to learn in and by them what is the real nature of Good both in man and in the universe, and what eternal principle we must conceive it to be.'[1] Shall we not say that Mind gives by this reply a sensible answer and one worthy of itself,[2] in its own behalf and that of Memory and Right Judgment?

perfect appreciation of ourselves," *i. e.* of the pleasures. Similarly Mr. Jowett. But this meaning cannot be got out of the Greek.

[1] "What character it discloses to human divination."—*Mr. Poste.*

[2] *i.e.* *νουνεχόντως*

Prot. Most certainly.

Soc. Well, but surely this too is a necessity, and nothing but this can ever occur as a result?

Prot. What may that be? B

Soc. If we do not mix up truth, no true result can be produced, nor, if produced, exist.

Prot. How can it?

XL. *Soc.* It is impossible. But, if anything more is wanted for a mixture of this kind, do you and Philebus say so. For myself, I regard the conclusion we have now arrived at as a kind of invisible order made for the good government of a body endued with a living soul.[1]

Prot. Add, then, Socrates, that such is my opinion also.

Soc. Perhaps then we should not be very far wrong in saying[2] that we now take our stand at the front door of '*the* C Good,'—the fore-court of the abode where such true Good resides.

Prot. Such, at least, is my opinion.

Soc. What principle then is there in this mixture, that would seem at once the most valuable, and the chief cause of such a disposition being acceptable to all? For, if we succeed

[1] This passage is difficult. Many copies omit the words ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος, and it may be doubted if the future participle would here be correct Greek, although ἄρχων would be an easy correction. What Socrates appears to mean is, that the subject which has been discussed, and the principles attained as the result, viz. the true laws of μίξις, form as it were an invisible rule of order for the right government of the τὸ σύνθετον in man, the compound of body and soul. Mr. Campbell (Pref. *Sophist.* p. xxi.) calls it "a harmony of ideas." Mr. Jowett, "an incorporeal law."

[2] Lit. 'if we say that, etc., perhaps we shall, in a certain degree, say rightly.' The meaning is, 'We are quite close to the true theory of Good, now that we have ascertained all its varied conditions." Dr. Badham, who takes οἰκησέως to depend on ἐπί, and thinks τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου "plainly absurd," proposes ἔπιμεν for ἐπὶ μέν. I think the version I have given is correct, and that the text is sound. The μὲν, as in numbers of passages, is followed somewhat irregularly, viz. by τί δῆτα for τί δὲ, etc. And I doubt very much if ἐπιέναι προθύροις is good Greek. It is possible, of course, that καὶ τῆς οἰκήσεως is a gloss, and that τῆς was interpolated along with it before τοῦ τοιούτου.

in getting a view of this, we will next proceed to consider whether it is more congenial and more allied to Pleasure or to Mind, in its place in our system of 'a general order.'

Prot. We shall be right in doing so; for such a rule will D be most useful for us in making our decision.[1]

Soc. Well, now, it is not difficult, in mixture generally, to perceive the cause that makes this or that kind of it worth either all or absolutely nothing.

Prot. How do you mean?

Soc. No one, I suppose, is ignorant of that.

Prot. Of what?

Soc. That all mixture, be it what it may and however made, that has not measure and a natural proportion, necessarily brings with it the spoiling not only of the ingredients used, but of itself in the first place. It would be no mixture, a process like that,—it becomes in reality a mere jumble that has nothing like mixture it,—a bringing together that actually E brings[2] loss on the owners whenever it is made.

Prot. Most true,

Soc. Now, therefore, we find this property of 'the good' has taken refuge in the nature of 'the beautiful.' For measure[3] and proportion, of course, are coincident all the world over with beauty and excellence.

Prot. Indeed they are.

Soc. But we further said that *truth* was associated with them in the combination.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Then, if we cannot get hold of *The Good* under one general principle, let us take it with three, Beauty, Symmetry, 65

[1] The rule or principle meant is the μία ἰδέα, or one typical and general aspect under which ἀγαθὸν may be viewed.

[2] There is a play on the two meanings of ξυμφορά.

[3] There is no word that I know of to express μετριότης in the sense of 'measureableness.' The meaning is, that as μέτρον has been found a necessary ingredient, καλὸν must be so too, as inseparable from, or virtually identical with, μέτρον, 'proportion.'

and Truth, and say, that we shall most properly regard them as One, and the real cause of the ingredients in the mixture remaining good, and through that, as being a good, that the mixture itself is also good.[1]

Prot. Yes, that is quite correct.

XLI. *Soc.* By this time then, Protarchus, any man will have become a competent judge of pleasure and intellect, and able to say which of the two is more akin to the Supreme B Good, and held in higher esteem among gods as well as men.

Prot. It is clear, no doubt; but still it will be better to argue the question fully out.

Soc. Let us then judge each of the three severally[2] in comparison with Pleasure and Mind; for we are bound to see to which of the two we should assign each as being nearer of kin to it.[3]

Prot. You mean by *the three* Beauty, Truth, and Measure, I presume?

Soc. Yes; and take Truth first, my Protarchus. And when you have got it before you, fix your mind's eye upon the trio, Mind, Truth, and Pleasure; then take some time to C think, and answer yourself, Is Pleasure or Mind more akin to truth?

Prot. Why should we take time? In respect of truth, I suppose, there is a great difference between Mind and Pleasure. *That* is the most vainly pretentious of things; and there is even a saying, that in the pleasures of love, (which, you know, are considered the greatest,) even perjury holds

[1] Good, or The Good, being an abstract principle, an *ἰδέα* that cannot be brought under mortal ken, Socrates proposes a practical rule for knowing what *is* really good. Let the combination of things that compose it, he says, be regulated by Truth, Beauty, etc., which taken together form *οἷον ἓν*, a sort of One for a rule, and the result will be a genuine *ἀγαθόν*. With *τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει* we must supply from the context *ἀγαθῶν ὄντων*.

[2] So as to have three terms in each case. Thus: (1) *Truth* as against mind on the one hand, and pleasure on the other; (2) *Measure* as against the same; (3) *Beauty* in the same contrast (inf. E.)

[3] A metaphor from the laws of guardianship.

a general pardon from the gods, on the ground that these pleasures are like children, and possess not an atom of sense. D Whereas Mind is either the same as Truth, or more like it than anything else, and the truest.

Soc. Next, then, make the same comparison with regard to moderateness, and consider if Pleasure has in itself more of it than Intellect, or Intellect than Pleasure.

Prot. This subject that you have proposed for consideration is not more difficult than the last. I suppose one could find nothing in the world that is in its nature more devoid of moderation than pleasure and ecstatic enjoyment, and nothing that has more of it than mind and science.

Soc. You have answered well. But still say about the E third quality, Beauty,—has Mind a larger share of it, or the class of things to which Pleasure belongs, so that Mind is more beautiful than Pleasure, or the converse?

Prot. Why certainly,[1] Socrates, no man ever yet either conceived in his dreams or saw when awake that science and mind ever were, in any way at all, or are, or ever will be, things of moral ugliness.

Soc. You say rightly.

Prot. But surely, when we see any one, be he who he may, enjoying pleasures, and those of about the most ecstatic sort; observing that either ridicule or the greatest disgrace follows the indulgence of them, we are ashamed of them ourselves, 66 and try to hide and put them out of sight as much as possible, reserving all such acts for night, as if it were not proper that they should see the light.[2]

Soc. You will proclaim then all the world over, Protarchus, sending word by messengers and telling it to all present, that Pleasure is a possession that stands neither first in value nor even second; that the first is surely that connected with measure and the moderate, with right time and place, and

[1] Dr. Badham rightly reads ἀλλ' *οὖν* for ἆρ' *οὖν*.

[2] Or, 'that the light should witness them' (so Taylor). He brings in this alternative, *γελοῖον* or *αἰσχρὸν*, from p. 49. C.

with all those qualities and conditions which we must suppose that, as being of the like kind, the Eternal Nature has chosen for its own.[1]

Prot. It seems so, certainly, from the course of our present argument.

Soc. The second, then, is that which has symmetry, beauty, B
perfection,[2] sufficiency, and all the qualities which belong to this other class.

Prot. It seems likely.

Soc. If then you set down as the third,—as far as I can divine—Mind and Intellect, you would not stray very far from the path of truth.

Prot. Perhaps not.

Soc. Must we not then allow that there are yet others that stand fourth,[3]—those which we put down as purely mental, the sciences, arts, and right opinions, as they are called? Are not, I repeat, these fourthly to be added to the former three, if, C
as we assert, they are more akin to The Good than to Pleasure?[4]

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. Then, fifthly, we must put those pleasures which we

[1] Dr. Badham (Preface, p. xvi.) would retain the reading of many MSS. τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν, against the Bodleian, which has χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν, and he reads εὑρῆσθαι for ῥῆσθαι. He says ὅποσα (ὁπόσα) τοιαῦτά (ἐστ') must be taken as a clause by itself. I am unable, after carefully reading his remarks, to understand the precise view he takes of the meaning, which is certainly obscure. Mr. Poste's version is to me strange, "whatever things are like to these, and inhabit the eternal sphere." Taylor, "in all things of that kind, whose nature and essence we ought to deem eternal." Mr. Jowett, "whatever similar attributes the eternal nature may be deemed to have attained." With Stallbaum it seems that we must take τοιαῦτα for ὡς τοιαῦτα ὄντα.

[2] Or 'finality,' *i. e.* which is an end in itself.

[3] Possibly the ἃ should be omitted: ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τέταρτα τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν,—ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ, etc. Dr. Badham suggests πέφανται in place of the former τέταρτα.

[4] Stallbaum, omitting the ἢ, understands "than Pleasure is." So also Dr. Badham; and they are perhaps right.

distinguished as painless,[1] calling them pure pleasures of the soul itself, some attending on sciences, some on perceptions.

Prot. It may be so.

Soc. 'But at the sixth class' (as Orpheus says) 'bring to a close the order in the song.' And in fact, our argument, too, seems to be closed with the determining of the sixth place.[2] After this then nothing remains for us but to add what we may call the finishing touch to all that we have hitherto said. D

Prot. Then let that be done.

XLII. *Soc.* Come then, as a third cup to the saving god, let us once again bring before the notice of the company and discuss the same proposition as before.

Prot. What proposition do you mean?

Soc. Philebus reckoned Pleasure, in its completeness and entirety, to be to us 'The Good.'

Prot. By using just now the phrase 'third cup,' you meant, as it seems, that we must take up once again from the beginning the original subject.[3]

Soc. Yes; and to what follows after this let us give our E

[1] Those minor harmless pleasures which were καθαραὶ λύπης, sup. p. 53. C. —I have followed Dr. Badham in reading ἐπιστήμαις in the next sentence for ἐπιστήμας.

[2] Perhaps (as no sixth ingredient of the Perfect Life is given) he means that the κρίσις comes sixth in order, after the enumeration of the five. Mr. Poste (*Analysis*, p. viii.) makes the sixth place belong to "Pleasures in allegiance with virtue." Dr. Badham (*Introd.* p. xiv.) says, "Of all the difficulties presented by this dialogue none is so important, and at the same time, so perplexing, as the assignment of places to the five different kinds." And he discusses the matter at length in as many pages. I am content to follow Mr. Grote's and Mr. Jowett's classification; 1. Measure; 2. The symmetrical, beautiful, sufficient, etc.; 3. Intelligent or rational will; 4. Sciences, cognitions, arts, right opinions, etc.; 5. The small list of true and painless pleasures." Dr. Badham thinks symmetry and truth are respectively synonyms of καλόν, ἱκανόν, τέλεον, and of νοῦς and φρόνησις, and that these stand third, not as inferior, but as the least comprehensive; and that mind is followed by its subordinates, left to themselves, science, art, and true conceptions.

[3] A short way of saying ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν τὸν ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγον,—a well-known Attic idiom. Stallbaum says without just cause, "mira profecto haec articuli collocatio est."

attention. I, having a clear view of the truths I have now expounded, and feeling a dislike of Philebus' account of the nature of Good,—and not only *his*, but that of others, many thousands in number,—affirmed that Mind was a far better and more profitable thing than at least Pleasure was to the life of men.

Prot. That was so.

Soc. Suspecting too that there were many other things better than Pleasure, I said that, if something should prove to be better than both these,[1] I would take the side of Mind in the contest with Pleasure for the second prize, and that Pleasure would be deprived even of second-class honours.

Prot. Yes, that you did say. 67

Soc. Well, after this it was shewn by most sufficient proofs that neither of these two *was* sufficient for us.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. In this discourse then both Mind and Pleasure were quite put out of the question, as not being either of them in itself *the* good, since they were found wanting in the self-sufficing quality, and in the property that should characterise the satisfying and the complete.

Prot. You have stated it quite correctly.

Soc. And now that another and a third claimant has come forward, better than either of these; again Mind has proved to be infinitely more nearly related and more suited to it than Pleasure, in all the conditions that characterise a superior.[2]

Prot. Assuredly so.

Soc. Then, according to the verdict which our argument

[1] Viz. the *μικτὸς βίος*, which would carry off the first prize.

[2] Or (Mr. Poste) "more allied and related to the victor." Mr. Jowett, "more akin to the nature of the conqueror." The order now meant seems to be (1) *μικτὸς βίος*, (2) *τὸ αὐταρκες*, (3) *μέτρον*, (4) *νοῦς*, (5) *ἡδονή*. Mr. Campbell (*Introd. Soph.* p. xvii.) gives "Measure, symmetry, reality, mind, and pleasure." It appears impossible to identify this enumeration with that given in chap. xli., nor is it clear whether it was designed to include any new term. Taylor, observing that *pure* pleasures formed the fifth in that list, here insists on reading *ἕκτον* for *πέμπτον*, because, he says, it is evident from the context that *sensual* pleasure is here meant.

has at last delivered, the real value of Pleasure will prove fifth in order.

Prot. It seems so.

Soc And not first; no, not even if all the cows and horses B and all the rest of the brute creation put together should affirm it by the fact of their pursuing enjoyment. Yet people in general rely on the evidence of these creatures as seers do on that of birds; and thus they conclude that our pleasures are decidedly the best for us as the object of life. They think, in fact, that the loves of brutes are witnesses of weight, more so even than a love of those reasonings which ever make their Guesses at Truth by the guidance of the goddess of Philosophy.[1]

Prot. That the Truth and nothing but the Truth has been spoken by you, Socrates, we are all of us now prepared to admit.

Soc. Then do you allow me to leave you now?

Prot. There is a little matter that yet remains,[2] Socrates; and I assume that *you* will not be weary of the discussion sooner than we.[3] (If you will stay), I will remind you of the points which are left.

[1] Stallbaum asks, What are ἔρωτες τῶν λόγων? and would read λόγους for λόγων. But Socrates often professed himself φιλόλογος, 'a lover of discussion.' He here says, that the love of truth, and of the pursuit of it, inherent in some minds, supplies a surer testimony of the real worth of Pleasure than the appetites of the brute creation. Mr. Poste's version is not good, "than those whom a muse of philosophy has inspired with the divinations of reason." Mr. Jowett, "than the inspirations of divine philosophy."

[2] Or, 'what still remains is but a small matter.'

[3] *i. e.* That, if *we* are willing to remain, *you* will have no objection on the score of weariness. This seems playfully said to illustrate the καρτερία and the τὸ φιλόλογον of Socrates. The *Symposium* ends in a very similar way. Stallbaum appears hardly to comprehend the point of these last words. He prefers ἀπαρεῖς, 'you will not go away.' There is a third variant, which is also the reading of the Bodleian, ἀπορεῖς.

47a