

United States Department of State

Voting Practices in the United Nations 1995

Report to Congress Submitted Pursuant to Public Law, 101-167

March 31, 1996



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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to Public Law 101-167, I am transmitting herewith the annual report for 1995 on voting practices at the United Nations.

This report assesses the voting practices of the governments of UN member states in the General Assembly and Security Council for 1995, and evaluates the actions and responsiveness of those governments to U.S. policy on issues of special importance to the United States.

Two copies of this report are being sent to each U.S. diplomatic mission abroad with instructions that one copy be provided to the government and the other retained for use of the mission.

Sincerely,

Warren Christopher

The Honorable

Newt Gingrich,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

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Warren Christopher

The Honorable Al Gore,

President of the Senate.

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I - INTRODUCTION

The thirteenth annual report to Congress on voting practices in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council in 1995 is submitted in compliance with Public Law 101-167. The report statistically measures voting records of UN member states individually, by geographical regions, and by selected bloc groupings, in comparison with the U.S. voting record. It also lists and describes important General Assembly resolutions and decisions adopted by the 50th General Assembly in the fall of 1995, as well as all Security Council resolutions for the entire year.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The 50th session of the General Assembly opened on September 19 and held 100 plenary sessions before recessing on December 23. It adopted 282 resolutions, about the same as during each of the past three years, but significantly below the 332 resolutions of 1990. After some success in reducing the number of resolutions—by combining some issues, considering others only every two or three years, and dropping some entirely—a plateau has been reached beyond which further reduction may prove difficult. Without a reduction in the number of contentious arms control issues, additional significant progress in the Middle East peace process, and an improvement in human rights practices in many countries, the number of resolutions introduced in the General Assembly is likely to remain fairly constant.

Of the 282 resolutions adopted, 76.6 percent (216) were adopted by consensus, a very modest decrease from 77.4 percent in 1994 and 77.2 percent in 1993. It nevertheless represents a high rate of consensus agreement.

On non-consensus issues, the average overall General Assembly voting coincidence of all UN members with the United States has increased steadily and dramatically in the past several years. It reached 50.6% in 1995, the first time it has exceeded 50% since 1978. This figure is more than three times the low point of 15.4% in 1988. When consensus decisions are factored in as votes identical to those of the United States, an even higher measure of agreement with U.S. positions is reached (88.2%), down a little from 88.8% in 1994.

The coincidence figure on votes considered important to U.S. interests (57.9%) is once again higher than the percentage registered on

I - INTRODUCTION

overall votes (50.6%). A side-by-side comparison of important and overall votes for each UN member is at the end of Section III.

The increase in voting coincidence in recent years has occurred in all the major issue categories. The figure on arms control issues rose from 17.1% in 1990 to 52.8% in 1994 and to 60.9% in 1995. On human rights issues, voting coincidence rose from 37% in 1990 to 75.9% in 1994 and 81% in 1995. On sensitive and still contentious Middle East issues, the voting coincidence figure rose from 20.1% in 1990 to 38.5% in 1994 before dropping back to 35.2% in 1995. Contributing to the overall rise in voting coincidence has been a decrease in U.S. isolation (on certain issues on which the United States found itself alone or in very limited company). Finally, an active U.S. role in the UN has increased the rate of voting coincidence. Resolutions introduced by the United States in the past few years on human rights, electoral assistance, entrepreneurship, privatization, improved management and oversight of the United Nations, more efficient UN peacekeeping operations, and the Middle East peace process have garnered much support.

As in past years, Israel (97.0%) and the United Kingdom (85.1%) were among the highest in voting coincidence with the United States. Most members of the Western European and Others group (WEOG) continued to score high coincidence levels (the average was 73.2%). The Eastern European group also scored high again (average 73.9%), continuing the rapid rise in coincidence with the United States following the liberation of these countries from communist domination, and surpassing WEOG for the first time. Most geographic and political groups increased their voting coincidence with the United States in 1995 by about 1%, with the Latin American and Caribbean group advancing over 3% while WEOG decreased slightly (by 0.1%).

The lowest scoring countries were China, Cuba, India, DPR of Korea, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Vietnam, all under 25%.

At the 50th General Assembly, realization of U.S. priorities was mixed. Some gains were made on UN reform, the UN budget, peace-keeping, and human rights monitoring. Little progress was made, however, on Security Council expansion and on efforts to support initiatives on the fissile material cutoff treaty and the chemical weapons convention. Debate on Cuba and the Middle East offered unhelpful rhetoric, but resolutions supporting the Middle East peace process and noting the shortcomings of human rights practices in Cuba were adopted. Libya's withdrawal of its bid for a rotating Security Council seat was an important achievement. U.S. arrears in payment of assessed dues, and the unilateral reduction of U.S. peacekeeping contributions to 25 percent, colored every endeavor, troubled many friends of the United States, and made the process of exerting U.S. leadership at the United Nations

more problematic. The U.S. embargo of Cuba—viewed as violating international norms proscribing extraterritoriality and intervention, restricting free trade, and contradicting the post-Cold War spirit of cooperation—remained a contentious issue. Active U.S. engagement and assertive multilateral efforts helped lead to key successes:

- Agreement on a no-growth budget that acknowledges the need to reduce low-priority spending, defers the proposed increase in UN salaries opposed by the United States, and includes a number of significant reform measures, including increased outsourcing of services and strengthening of oversight.
- Increase in the focus of member states on UN reform. A resolution containing U.S. proposals on paperwork reduction—increased use of technology, better formatting and consolidation of reports, a comprehensive review of page limits for documents, and a requirement that cost estimates be provided for requested reports—was adopted. Some progress was made in convincing UN member states that the Special Committee on Decolonization and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices in the Occupied Territories have outlived their usefulness and are symbolic of a bureaucratic inertia which the United Nations must overcome if it is to remain viable in the future.
- Progress in building a more effective structure for future peacekeeping operations, including adoption of U.S.-supported initiatives on a rapidly deployable headquarters team, information security measures, and inspectorate representation on all peacekeeping operations.
- Adoption of U.S.-initiated resolutions on the human rights situations in Cuba, parts of the former Yugoslavia, and Sudan. Adoption of these and other resolutions on human rights, including one condemning the executions in Nigeria, sent a strong message that such matters are not purely internal issues.
 - Withdrawal by Libya of its bid for a rotating Security Council seat.
- Adoption of a resolution on the Middle East peace process sponsored by the United States, Russia, and Norway, again by an overwhelming majority. This resolution welcomes the peace process started at Madrid and supports the subsequent bilateral negotiations and the series of agreements reached. Most other Middle East resolutions retained the outdated rhetoric of the past, and attempts to moderate them failed due to Palestinian inflexibility, but the number of abstentions continued to climb. Israel continued to enjoy wide acceptance and participated normally in the General Assembly, albeit at some disadvantage due to lack of membership in any regional group. Israeli credentials were again accepted without challenge.

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- Adoption of all three U.S. initiatives on arms control: on compliance with arms control agreements, U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear arms negotiations, and moratoria on the transfer of anti-personnel land mines, including concrete steps leading to the eventual elimination of such weapons. A resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, urging completion of the Treaty as soon as possible in 1996, was also adopted. The most contentious arms control resolution of the session was one strongly deploring continued nuclear testing and calling for its immediate cessation. The United States led a large number of countries in abstaining on the resolution because of its immoderate language.
- Progress on President Clinton's initiatives on international organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. A resolution calling for resumption of negotiations on an agreement to curb illicit payments in business transactions was adopted. There was reaffirmation of the provisions on terrorism—eliminating safe havens and eradicating money laundering—contained in the declaration on terrorism adopted by the General Assembly in 1994. A resolution treating terrorism as a human rights issue was also adopted.

SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council was again in 1995 a major focus of U.S. attention in the United Nations. The continuing tendency toward consensus among its members facilitated the Council's adoption of 66 resolutions during the year, fewer than in each of the past three years, but still far more than during the Cold War era when Council action was often frustrated. The large number of resolutions adopted reflects the continuing reliance of member countries on Security Council action to assist in resolving threats to peace and security following the end of the Cold War.

The Security Council was again heavily involved in giving direction to UN peacekeeping and mediation efforts throughout the world in 1995. These efforts are described in Section V.

Voting coincidence percentages for Security Council members were again high. Most resolutions were adopted unanimously: 60 out of 66 (91%). There was only one veto (by the United States) on a resolution regarding Jerusalem (see description in the Middle East part of the Security Council section). The U.S. veto, the first since 1990, was the only negative vote in 1995, and there were only eight abstentions out of the 1,005 votes cast on the 67 resolutions considered. The abstentions

were by Russia (five times on the former Yugoslavia) and China (twice on the former Yugoslavia and once on Haiti).

FORMAT AND METHODOLOGY

The 1995 voting report continues the feature added in 1993: an additional column in the tables in Section II (overall votes) presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. Since not all states are equally active at the United Nations, we have credited to each country a portion of the 216 consensus resolutions based on its participation in the 97 recorded plenary votes. Each country's participation rate was calculated by dividing the number of Yes/No/Abstain votes it cast in plenary (i.e., the number of times it was not absent) by the total of plenary votes. This is the same methodology used in Section III (important votes) for the past five years. This column provides another perspective on UN activity. We believe it reflects more accurately the extent of cooperation and agreement at the General Assembly.

Other columns in the report remain the same. The presentation is consistent with provisions of PL 101-167, and the methodology employed is the same since the report's inception.

The tables in this report provide a measurement of the voting coincidence of UN member countries with the United States. However, readers are cautioned about interpreting voting coincidence percentages. The percentages in the last column, using the older methodology. are calculated using only votes on which both the United States and the other country in question voted Yes or No; not included are those instances when either abstained or was absent. Abstentions and absences are often difficult to interpret, but they make a mathematical difference, sometimes major, in the percentage results. Inclusion of the number of abstentions and absences in the tables of this report enables readers to include them in calculating voting coincidence percentages if they wish to do so. The percentages in the second column from the right reflect more fully the activity of the General Assembly. However, this calculation assumes, for want of an attendance record, that all countries were present or absent for consensus resolutions in the same ratio as for recorded votes. Moreover, the content of resolutions should be considered in interpreting the figures in either column. There may be overwhelming agreement with the U.S. position on a matter of less importance to us and less support on a resolution we consider more important. These differences are difficult to quantify and to present in one or two coincidence figures.

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A country's voting record in the United Nations is only one dimension of its relations with the United States. Bilateral economic, strategic, and political issues are often more directly important to U.S. interests. Nevertheless, a country's behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to its bilateral relationship with the United States, a point the Secretary of State routinely makes in his letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors. This is also why copies of this report are presented to UN member foreign ministries throughout the world, to member state missions to the United Nations in New York, and to members' embassies in Washington. The Security Council and the General Assembly are arguably the most important international bodies in the world, dealing as they do with such vital issues as threats to peace and security, disarmament, development, humanitarian relief, human rights, the environment, and narcotics—all of which can and do directly affect major U.S. interests.

II - GENERAL ASSEMBLY — OVERALL VOTES

There were 97 recorded plenary votes at the 50th UNGA — 66 on resolutions as a whole, 27 on separate paragraphs, 1 on a procedural motion, and 3 on decisions. Of these 97 votes, the United States voted Yes 37 times and No 46 times; it abstained on 14 votes.

COMPARISON WITH U.S. VOTE

The tables which follow are based on the 83 instances the United States voted either Yes or No in plenary. Columns show the number of times the United States and the country listed cast identical (Yes/Yes or No/No) and opposite (Yes/No or No/Yes) votes, as well as the number of times the country abstained and was absent for these 83 votes. The voting coincidence percentages are derived by dividing the number of identical votes by the total of identical and opposite votes, the same method used in all previous editions of this report. The column headed "Voting Coincidence (Including Consensus)"—which was new with the 1993 report—presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. Extent of participation was also factored in (See the section on format and methodology in the Introduction).

Section II has four parts. The first lists UN member states both alphabetically and in rank order by voting coincidence percentage. The second lists them by UN regional grouping, in rank order by voting coincidence percentage. The third lists countries by other important groupings, again in rank order. The final part compares 1995 voting coincidence percentages of UN members with the preceding five years.

Countries with asterisks in the Voting Coincidence columns did not vote during the session. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, Central African Republic, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Iraq, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Somalia did not vote at the 50th UNGA because their financial contributions were in arrears. In 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was denied permission to participate further in Assembly proceedings until it applied for and was granted readmission. An Iraqi attempt to reinstate its right to vote—on the grounds that circumstances beyond its control (sanctions imposed by the Security Council) led to its inability to pay—was defeated.

The United States once again voted No in plenary more often than any other UN member. It voted No alone in plenary five times at the 50th UNGA (about the same number of times as at each of the past four

sessions, but considerably fewer than the 20 times at the 44th session in 1989). The United States voted with only one other country on 15 occasions (all 15 with Israel). Four times it voted No with two other countries (with Israel and the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, or Micronesia; and with France and the United Kingdom). Five times the United States voted No with three others (again with Israel each time, plus the United Kingdom most times, and including Russia, France, Canada, Japan, or Georgia). The U.S. votes in isolation were on arms control issues. Votes with Israel were mostly on issues regarding the Middle East, Palestine, and the occupied territories. Those with the United Kingdom were on decolonization and arms control issues.

All Countries (Alphabetical)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES		ABSENCES	VOTING COING INCLUDING CONSENSUS	CIDENCE VOTES ONLY
Afghanistan	20	43	5	 15	82.2%	31.7%
Albania		18	18	6	93.1%	69.5%
Algeria	21	43	10	9	83.5%	32.8%
Andorra		13	15	16	94.2%	75.0%
Angola	12	21	12	38	86.1%	36.4%
Antigua/Barbuda	29	29	17	8	88.5%	50.0%
Argentina	44	20	19	0	92.8%	68.8%
Armenia	37	23	20	3	91.4%	61.7%
Australia	42	28	13	0	90.2%	60.0%
Austria	48	18	17	0	93.6%	72.7%
Azerbaijan	26	24	16	17	89.4%	52.0%
Bahamas	34	31	15	3	88.5%	52.3%
Bahrain	26	43	6	8	83.6%	37.7%
Bangladesh	29	44	10	0	84.7%	39.7%
Barbados	36	28	,14	5	89.6%	56.3%
Belarus	35	22	24	2	91.8%	61.4%
Belgium	49	15	19	0	94.6%	76.6%
Belize	34	33	16	0	88.2%	50.7%
Benin	26	42	12	3	84.9%	38.2%
Bhutan	28	30	13	12	87.4%	48.3%
Bolivia	36	43	4	0	85.3%	45.6%
Bosnia/Herzegovi	na 33	16	9	25	92.0%	67.3%
Botswana	35	41	7	0	86.0%	46.1%
Brazil	30	43	9	1	85.0%	41.1%
Brunei	30	44	9	0	84.8%	40.5%
Bulgaria	47	17	19	0	93.9%	73.4%

	IDENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ARSTEN		VOTING COING	CIDENCE VOTES
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES		ONLY
Burkina Faso	23	46	7	7	82.8%	33.3%
Burundi	22	39	9	13	83.8%	36.1%
Cambodia	29	31	11	12	87.3%	48.3%
Cameroon	27	43	11	2	84.7%	38.6%
Canada		18	15	0	93.7%	73.5%
Cape Verde		41	8	12	83.2%	34.9%
Central Afr. Rep.		0	0	83	*	*
Chad		42	7	8	84.2%	38.2%
Chile		44	2	1	84.9%	45.0%
China		51	13	5	81.1%	21.5%
Colombia		46	7	1	84.1%	38.7%
Comoros		0	0	83	*	*
Congo		31	9	21	85.6%	41.5%
Costa Rica		32	4	18	85.7%	47.5%
Cote d'Ivoire		39	14	4	85.7%	40.0%
Croatia		13	22	9	94.8%	75.0%
Cuba		53	18	3	80.5%	14.5%
Cyprus		39	10	0	86.5%	46.6%
Czech Republic .		14	21	0	95.0%	77.4%
DPR of Korea		42	14	23	79.6%	8.7%
Denmark		19	15	0	93.3%	72.1%
Djibouti		45	2	15	81.9%	31.8%
Dominica		16	10	43	87.9%	46.7%
Dominican Rep		0	0	83	*	*
Ecuador		40	7	0	86.3%	47.4%
Egypt		46	13	1	83.3%	33.3%
El Salvador		39	6	2	86.1%	48.0%
Equatorial Guinea		5	22	37	96.5%	79.2%
Eritrea		23	6	21	89.4%	58.9%
Estonia		10	23	5	96.2%	81.8%
Ethiopia		38	11	2	96.2 <i>%</i> 86.4%	45.7%
Fiji		30	16	6	88.3%	50.8%
Finland		13	21	0	95.3%	79.0%
_		15	17	1	95.5%	76.9%
Gabon				_		
		39 6	12 9	7 65	85.3%	39.1%
Gambia		6			88.3%	33.3%
Georgia		8 15	25	2	97.0%	85.7%
Germany		15	18	0	94.7%	76.9%
Ghana		43	14	5	84.0%	32.8%
Greece	45	20	18	0	92.9%	69.1%

COUNTRY					,	VOTING COIN	CIDENCE
Grenada						INCLUDING	VOTES
Guatemala 30 35 10 8 86.5% 46.2 Guinea 28 41 5 9 84.5% 40.6 Guinea-Bissau 20 35 8 20 83.9% 36.4 Guyana 36 38 9 0 86.9% 48.6 Haiti 29 44 3 7 83.6% 39.7 Honduras 37 44 2 0 85.1% 45.7 Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83.1 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * Iran	COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY
Guatemala 30 35 10 8 86.5% 46.2 Guinea 28 41 5 9 84.5% 40.6 Guinea-Bissau 20 35 8 20 83.9% 36.4 Guyana 36 38 9 0 86.9% 48.6 Haiti 29 44 3 7 83.6% 39.7 Honduras 37 44 2 0 85.1% 45.7 Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83.1 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * Iran	Grenada	17	11	14	41	91.6%	60.7%
Guinea-Bissau 20 35 8 20 83.9% 36.4 Guyana 36 38 9 0 86.9% 48.6 Haiti 29 44 3 7 83.6% 39.7 Honduras 37 44 2 0 85.1% 45.7 Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83.1 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * Ireland 46 20 17 0 92.9% 69.7 Israel 64 2 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Italy 4			35	10	8	86.5%	46.2%
Guinea-Bissau 20 35 8 20 83.9% 36.4 Guyana 36 38 9 0 86.9% 48.6 Haiti 29 44 3 7 83.6% 39.7 Honduras 37 44 2 0 85.1% 45.7 Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83.1 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * Ireland 46 20 17 0 92.9% 69.7 Israel 64 2 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Italy 4	Guinea	28	41	5	9	84.5%	40.6%
Haiti 29 44 3 7 83.6% 39.7 Honduras 37 44 2 0 85.1% 45.7 Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83.1 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * *			35	8	20	83.9%	36.4%
Haiti 29 44 3 7 83.6% 39.7 Honduras 37 44 2 0 85.1% 45.7 Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83.1 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * *	Guyana	36	38	9	0	86.9%	48.6%
Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83.1 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * * Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * * * Iraq 0 0 0 83 *			44	3	7		39.7%
Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83.1 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * * Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * * * Iraq 0 0 0 83 *	Honduras	37	44	2	0	85.1%	45.7%
Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * Ireland 46 20 17 0 92.9% 69.7 Israel 64 2 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Jamaica 36 36 11 0 87.4% 50.0 Japan 46 15			10	20	4		83.1%
India 11 53 19 0 81.1% 17.2 Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * Ireland 46 20 17 0 92.9% 69.7 Israel 64 2 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Jamaica 36 36 11 0 87.4% 50.0 Jamaica 36			16	18	0		75.4%
Indonesia 24 48 9 2 82.9% 33.3 Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * Ireland 46 20 17 0 92.9% 69.7 Israel 64 2 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Jamaica 36 36 11 0 87.4% 50.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Jordan 28 44 8 3 84.1% 38.9 Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Lebanon 16				19	0		17.2%
Iran 18 48 10 7 81.7% 27.3 Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * Ireland 46 20 17 0 92.9% 69.7 Israel 64 2 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Jamaica 36 36 11 0 87.4% 50.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Jordan 28 44 8 3 84.1% 38.9 Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26					2		33.3%
Iraq 0 0 0 83 * * Ireland 46 20 17 0 92.9% 69.7 Israel 64 2 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Jamaica 36 36 11 0 87.4% 50.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Jordan 28 44 8 3 84.1% 38.9 Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26			48	10			27.3%
Ireland 46 20 17 0 92.9% 69.7 Israel 64 2 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Jamaica 36 36 11 0 87.4% 50.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Jordan 28 44 8 3 84.1% 38.9 Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kuwait 30 44 4 5 84.0% 40.5 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Liberia			0	0	83		
Israel 64 2 17 0 99.3% 97.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Jamaica 36 36 11 0 87.4% 50.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Jordan 28 44 8 3 84.1% 38.9 Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kuwait 30 44 4 5 84.0% 40.5 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia <td< td=""><td>•</td><td></td><td>20</td><td>17</td><td>0</td><td>92.9%</td><td>69.7%</td></td<>	•		20	17	0	92.9%	69.7%
Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Jamaica 36 36 11 0 87.4% 50.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Jordan 28 44 8 3 84.1% 38.9 Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kuwait 30 44 4 5 84.0% 40.5 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein				17			97.0%
Jamaica 36 36 11 0 87.4% 50.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Jordan 28 44 8 3 84.1% 38.9 Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kuwait 30 44 4 5 84.0% 40.5 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>17</td><td>17</td><td>0</td><td>93.9%</td><td>74.2%</td></td<>			17	17	0	93.9%	74.2%
Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Jordan 28 44 8 3 84.1% 38.9 Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kuwait 30 44 4 5 84.0% 40.5 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lebanon 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0</td><td></td><td>50.0%</td></t<>					0		50.0%
Jordan 28 44 8 3 84.1% 38.9 Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kuwait 30 44 4 5 84.0% 40.5 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Madagascar					0		75.4%
Kazakstan 38 25 20 0 91.0% 60.3 Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kuwait 30 44 4 5 84.0% 40.5 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malaysia	-						38.9%
Kenya 26 39 18 0 86.1% 40.0 Kuwait 30 44 4 5 84.0% 40.5 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5							60.3%
Kuwait 30 44 4 5 84.0% 40.5 Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Mali					0		40.0%
Kyrgyzstan 19 15 13 36 90.5% 55.9 Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Mali 25 40 3 15 83.4% 36.2 Mali			44	4	5		40.5%
Laos 17 46 9 11 81.4% 27.0 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta			15	13	36		55.9%
Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.0 Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2					11		27.0%
Lebanon 16 46 11 10 82.0% 25.8 Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2					8		87.0%
Lesotho 26 30 12 15 86.9% 46.4 Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			46	11	10		25.8%
Liberia 0 0 0 83 * * Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Maldives 30 41 8 4 85.1% 42.3 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			30	12	15	86.9%	46.4%
Libya 16 55 12 0 80.8% 22.5 Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			0	0	83	*	*
Liechtenstein 47 18 17 1 93.5% 72.3 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Maldives 30 41 8 4 85.1% 42.3 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			55	12	0	80.8%	22.5%
Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Maldives 30 41 8 4 85.1% 42.3 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			18	17	1	93.5%	72.3%
Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Maldives 30 41 8 4 85.1% 42.3 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			11	21	4	95.9%	81.0%
Madagascar 23 28 3 29 85.5% 45.1 Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Maldives 30 41 8 4 85.1% 42.3 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			17	16	0	94.0%	74.6%
Malawi 25 40 3 15 83.8% 38.5 Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Maldives 30 41 8 4 85.1% 42.3 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			28		29	85.5%	45.1%
Malaysia 28 43 12 0 85.0% 39.4 Maldives 30 41 8 4 85.1% 42.3 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2	_						38.5%
Maldives 30 41 8 4 85.1% 42.3 Mali 25 44 5 9 83.4% 36.2 Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			43	12			39.4%
Mali			41	8	4	85.1%	42.3%
Malta 45 21 17 0 92.6% 68.2			44	5	9	83.4%	36.2%
			21		0		68.2%
Marshall Islands 41 22 18 2 92.0% 65.1				18	2		65.1%
			44	5	7	83.5%	38.0%

	VOTING CO IDENTICAL OPPOSITE ABSTEN- INCLUDING					
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES
Mauritius	34	45	4	0	84.6%	43.0%
Mexico	32	45	6	0	84.6%	41.6%
Micronesia	40	20	22	1	92.7%	66.7%
Moldova	44	16	21	2	94.0%	73.3%
Monaco		15	17	4	94.3%	75.8%
Mongolia		38	7	3	86.5%	47.9%
Morocco		38	10	9	85.3%	40.6%
Mozambique		33	6	21	84.6%	41.1%
Myanmar		50	15	1	82.2%	25.4%
Namibia		32	9	14	86.3%	46.7%
Nepal	32	37	12	2	86.7%	46.4%
Netherlands		12	21	0	95.7%	80.6%
New Zealand	43	24	16	0	91.5%	64.2%
Nicaragua		39	7	3	86.1%	46.6%
Niger		46	8	3	83.5%	36.1%
Nigeria		48	9	4	82.5%	31.4%
Norway		12	19	5	95.4%	79.7%
Oman		46	7	5	83.2%	35.2%
Pakistan		48	16	0	83.0%	28.4%
Palau		1	2	78	93.9%	66.7%
Panama		41	5	0	86.1%	47.4%
Papua New Guine		38	11	0	86.8%	47.2%
Paraguay		30	10	11	88.1%	51.6%
Peru		39	10	0	86.5%	46.6%
Philippines		41	10	0	85.8%	43.8%
Poland		14	19	2	94.9%	77.4%
Portugal		19	16	0	93.3%	71.6%
Qatar		49	3	7	81.9%	32.9%
Rep. of Korea		20	22	5	92.3%	64.3%
Romania		15	22	1	94.5%	75.0%
Russia		14	31	0	94.8%	73.1%
Rwanda		22	11	25	88.5%	53.2%
St.Kitts/Nevis		1	8	69	97.3%	83.3%
St. Lucia		16	5	44	87.9%	52.9%
St.Vincent/Gren.		2	6	64	96.4%	84.6%
Samoa		32	11	0	88.8%	55.6%
San Marino		7	1	62	89.9%	65.0%
Sao Tome/Princip		0	0	83	*	*
Saudi Arabia		47	6	7	82.5%	32.9%
Senegal		45	1	9	83.3%	38.4%

			************		VOTING COIN	
COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES		ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES
Seychelles	1	3	0	79	76.8%	25.0%
Sierra Leone	11	25	11	36	84.4%	30.6%
Singapore	31	40	12	0	86.1%	43.7%
Slovak Republic	48	15	20	0	94.6%	76.2%
Slovenia		12	25	1	95.5%	78.9%
Solomon Islands	40	32	10	1	88.7%	55.6%
Somalia	0	0	0	83	*	*
South Africa		40	7	0	86.3%	47.4%
Spain		20	16	0	92.9%	70.1%
Sri Lanka		44	14	0	84.6%	36.2%
Sudan		54	14	0	80.9%	21.7%
Suriname		34	13	2	87.8%	50.0%
Swaziland		34	14	0	88.1%	50.7%
Sweden		19	17	0	93.3%	71.2%
Syria		52	6	12	79.4%	20.0%
Tajikistan		2	16	44	98.3%	91.3%
Thailand		42	12	1	85.2%	40.0%
TFYR Macedonia		13	23	i	95.2%	78.0%
Togo		46	13	Ö	83.9%	34.3%
Trinidad/Tobago.		35	12	3	87.3%	48.5%
Tunisia		46	8	3	83.6%	36.1%
Turkey		20	14	1	92.9%	70.6%
Turkmenistan		4	0	66	93.5%	76.5%
Uganda		42	11	2	95.5 <i>%</i> 85.1%	40.0%
Ukraine		23	25	1	91.5%	59.6%
United Arab Emir.		23 43	25 7	7	83.9%	37.7%
		10	16	0	96.5%	85.1%
United Kingdom			17	_		35.7%
UR Tanzania		36		10	85.1%	
Uruguay		41	7	0	86.0%	46.1%
Uzbekistan		2	14	55	97.7%	85.7%
Vanuatu		34	6	20	84.7%	40.4%
Venezuela		44	6	0	84.9%	42.9%
Vietnam		52	6	13	79.3%	18.8%
Yemen		43	1	17	82.0%	33.8%
Yugoslavia (S/M)		0	0	83		
Zaire		22	7	36	86.6%	45.0%
Zambia		41	6	3	85.5%	44.6%
Zimbabwe	25	43	11	4	84.1%	36.8%
Average	29.7	29.0	11.6	12.6	88.2%	50.6%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage)

Tajikistan 21 2 16 44 98.3% 91.1 Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.1 Georgia 48 8 25 2 97.0% 85. Uzbekistan 12 2 14 55 97.7% 85. United Kingdom 57 10 16 0 96.5% 85. St.Vincent/Gren 11 2 6 64 96.4% 84.4 St.Kitts/Nevis 5 1 8 69 97.3% 83.3 Estonia 45 10 20 4 96.2% 83. Estonia 45 10 23 5 96.2% 81.4 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.6 Norway 47 12 19 5 95.4% 79.2 Equatorial Guinea 19 5 22 37 96.5% 79.2	COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING COING INCLUDING CONSENSUS	CIDENCE VOTES ONLY
Tajikistan							
Latvia 47 7 21 8 97.1% 87.1 Georgia 48 8 25 2 97.0% 85. Uzbekistan 12 2 14 55 97.7% 85. United Kingdom 57 10 16 0 96.5% 85. St.Vincent/Gren 11 2 6 64 96.4% 84. St.Kitts/Nevis 5 1 8 69 97.3% 83. Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83. Estonia 45 10 23 5 96.2% 81. Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81. <					_		97.0%
Georgia 48 8 25 2 97.0% 85. Uzbekistan 12 2 14 55 97.7% 85. United Kingdom 57 10 16 0 96.5% 85. St. Vincent/Gren 11 2 6 64 96.4% 84.9 St. Kitts/Nevis 5 1 8 69 97.3% 83. Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83. Estonia 45 10 23 5 96.2% 81.8 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.8 Lithuania 47 12 19 5 96.2% 81.8 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.8 Lithuania 47 12 19 5 92.2 37 96.5% 79.2 Requatorial Guinea 19 5 22 37	•						91.3%
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United Kingdom 57 10 16 0 96.5% 85. St. Vincent/Gren. 11 2 6 64 96.4% 84.6 St. Kitts/Nevis 5 1 8 69 97.3% 83.3 Hungary 49 10 20 4 96.2% 83. Estonia 45 10 23 5 96.2% 81.6 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.6 Netherlands 50 12 21 0 95.7% 80.6 Norway 47 12 19 5 95.4% 79.2 Equatorial Guinea 19 5 22 37 96.5% 79.3 Finland 49 13 21 0 95.3% 79.6 Slovenia 45 12 25 1 95.5% 78.5 TFYR Macedonia 46 13 23 1 95.2% 78.6 Czech Republic 48 14 21 0 95.0% 77.4 France 50 15 17 1 94.6% 76.6 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.6 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.6 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.6 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.6 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.6 Liceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.6 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.6 Luxembourg 50 18 15 0 93.7% 75.6 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.8 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.8 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.3 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.5							85.7%
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Estonia 45 10 23 5 96.2% 81.6 Lithuania 47 11 21 4 95.9% 81.0 Netherlands 50 12 21 0 95.7% 80.0 Norway 47 12 19 5 95.4% 79.2 Equatorial Guinea 19 5 22 37 96.5% 79.2 Finland 49 13 21 0 95.3% 79.0 Slovenia 45 12 25 1 95.5% 78.3 TFYR Macedonia 46 13 23 1 95.5% 78.3 TFYR Macedonia 46 13 23 1 95.5% 78.3 TFYR Macedonia 46 13 23 1 95.5% 78.3 TFYR Macedonia 48 14 21 0 95.0% 77.4 Poland 48 14 21 0 95.0% 77.4 Poland 48 14 21 0 94.9% 77.4				_	69		83.3%
Lithuania				20	4		83.1%
Netherlands 50 12 21 0 95.7% 80.6 Norway 47 12 19 5 95.4% 79.1 Equatorial Guinea 19 5 22 37 96.5% 79.2 Finland 49 13 21 0 95.3% 79.0 Slovenia 45 12 25 1 95.5% 78.0 TFYR Macedonia 46 13 23 1 95.2% 78.0 Czech Republic 48 14 21 0 95.0% 77.4 Poland 48 14 19 2 94.9% 77.4 France 50 15 17 1 94.6% 76.5 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.5 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.6 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.2	Estonia	45	10	23	5	96.2%	81.8%
Norway 47 12 19 5 95.4% 79.1 Equatorial Guinea 19 5 22 37 96.5% 79.2 Finland 49 13 21 0 95.3% 79.0 Slovenia 45 12 25 1 95.5% 78.2 TFYR Macedonia 46 13 23 1 95.2% 78.0 Czech Republic 48 14 21 0 95.0% 77.4 Poland 48 14 19 2 94.9% 77.4 France 50 15 17 1 94.6% 76.9 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.9 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.9 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.2 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.0 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.5% 75.0	Lithuania	47	11	21	4	95.9%	81.0%
Equatorial Guinea 19 5 22 37 96.5% 79.3 Finland 49 13 21 0 95.3% 79.0 Slovenia 45 12 25 1 95.5% 78.0 TFYR Macedonia 46 13 23 1 95.2% 78.0 Czech Republic 48 14 21 0 95.0% 77.4 Poland 48 14 19 2 94.9% 77.4 France 50 15 17 1 94.6% 76.9 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.9 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.9 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.9 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.9 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.9 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.0	Netherlands	50	12	21	0	95.7%	80.6%
Finland	Norway	47	12	19	5	95.4%	79.7%
Slovenia 45 12 25 1 95.5% 78.9 TFYR Macedonia 46 13 23 1 95.2% 78.0 Czech Republic 48 14 21 0 95.0% 77.4 Poland 48 14 19 2 94.9% 77.4 France 50 15 17 1 94.6% 76.9 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.9 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.9 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.2 Italy 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.2 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.2 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.2 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Lu	Equatorial Guinea	a 19	5	22	37	96.5%	79.2%
TFYR Macedonia	Finland	49	13	21	0	95.3%	79.0%
Czech Republic 48 14 21 0 95.0% 77.4 Poland 48 14 19 2 94.9% 77.4 France 50 15 17 1 94.6% 76.9 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.9 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.9 Turkmenistan 13 4 0 66 93.5% 76.9 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.9 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.9 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.9 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 <t< td=""><td>Slovenia</td><td> 45</td><td>12</td><td>25</td><td>1</td><td>95.5%</td><td>78.9%</td></t<>	Slovenia	45	12	25	1	95.5%	78.9%
Poland 48 14 19 2 94.9% 77.4 France 50 15 17 1 94.6% 76.9 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.9 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.9 Turkmenistan 13 4 0 66 93.5% 76.9 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.9 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.0 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.5% 75.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.0 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 It	TFYR Macedonia	46	13	23	1	95.2%	78.0%
France 50 15 17 1 94.6% 76.9 Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.9 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.9 Turkmenistan 13 4 0 66 93.5% 76.9 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.9 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.0 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.0 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.7% 73.0 Bul	Czech Republic	48	14	21	0	95.0%	77.4%
Germany 50 15 18 0 94.7% 76.9 Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.9 Turkmenistan 13 4 0 66 93.5% 76.9 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.9 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.0 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.0 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.0 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.7% 73.9 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.7% 73.2 M	Poland	48	14	19	2	94.9%	77.4%
Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.6 Turkmenistan 13 4 0 66 93.5% 76.6 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.2 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.6 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.6 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.6 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.4 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Mo	France	50	15	17	1	94.6%	76.9%
Belgium 49 15 19 0 94.6% 76.6 Turkmenistan 13 4 0 66 93.5% 76.6 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.2 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.6 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.6 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.6 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.4 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Mo	Germany	50	15	18	0	94.7%	76.9%
Turkmenistan 13 4 0 66 93.5% 76.8 Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.2 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.8 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.8 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.6 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.6 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.6 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.6 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.4 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.3 Ru			15	19	0	94.6%	76.6%
Slovak Republic 48 15 20 0 94.6% 76.2 Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.8 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.5 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.3 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.5	•		4	0	66	93.5%	76.5%
Monaco 47 15 17 4 94.3% 75.6 Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.6 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.6 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.8 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.3 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.5			15	20	0	94.6%	76.2%
Iceland 49 16 18 0 94.3% 75.4 Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.5 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.5 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.5	•		15				75.8%
Japan 46 15 22 0 94.5% 75.4 Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.5 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.3 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.3					0		75.4%
Andorra 39 13 15 16 94.2% 75.0 Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.4 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.3 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.5			15		0		75.4%
Croatia 39 13 22 9 94.8% 75.0 Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.0 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.0 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.0 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.0 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.0 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.0	•		13		16		75.0%
Romania 45 15 22 1 94.5% 75.0 Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.5 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.5 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.5 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.7							75.0%
Luxembourg 50 17 16 0 94.0% 74.6 Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.5 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.5 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.5							75.0%
Italy 49 17 17 0 93.9% 74.2 Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.5 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.5 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.5					-		74.6%
Canada 50 18 15 0 93.7% 73.8 Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.3 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.3	•						74.2%
Bulgaria 47 17 19 0 93.9% 73.4 Moldova 44 16 21 2 94.0% 73.5 Russia 38 14 31 0 94.8% 73.5					_		73.5%
Moldova							73.4%
Russia					_		73.3%
·							73.1%
Austria			18	17	0	93.6%	72.7%
							72.3%
					-		72.1%
							71.6%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

				-	VOTING COING	CIDENCE
	IDENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ABSTEN-		INCLUDING	VOTES
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY
Sweden	47	19	17	0	93.3%	71.2%
Turkey		20	14	1	92.9%	70.6%
Spain		20	16	0	92.9%	70.0%
Ireland		20	17	0		
Albania		18	18	6	92.9%	69.7%
				_	93.1%	69.5%
Greece		20	18	0	92.9%	69.2%
Argentina		20	19	0	92.8%	68.8%
Malta		21	17	0	92.6%	68.2%
Bosnia/Herzegovi		16	9	25	92.0%	67.3%
Micronesia		20	22	1	92.7%	66.7%
Palau		1	2	78	93.9%	66.7%
Marshall Islands .		22	18	2	92.0%	65.1%
San Marino		7	1	62	89.9%	65.0%
Rep. of Korea		20	22	5	92.3%	64.3%
New Zealand		24	16	0	91.5%	64.2%
Armenia	37	23	20	3	91.4%	61.7%
Belarus	35	22	24	2	91.8%	61.4%
Grenada	17	11	14	41	91.6%	60.7%
Kazakstan	38	25	20	0	91.0%	60.3%
Australia	42	28	13	0	90.2%	60.0%
Ukraine	34	23	25	1	91.5%	59.6%
Eritrea	33	23	6	21	89.4%	58.9%
Barbados	36	28	14	5	89.6%	56.3%
Kyrgyzstan	19	15	13	36	90.5%	55.9%
Samoa		32	11	0	88.8%	55.6%
Solomon Islands		32	10	1	88.7%	55.6%
Rwanda		22	11	25	88.5%	53.2%
St. Lucia		16	5	44	87.9%	52.9%
Bahamas		31	15	3	88.5%	52.3%
Azerbaijan		24	16	17	89.4%	52.0%
Paraguay		30	10	11	88.1%	51.6%
Fiji		30	16	6	88.3%	50.8%
Belize		33	16	Ö	88.2%	50.7%
Swaziland		34	14	0	88.1%	50.7%
Antigua/Barbuda		29	17	8	88.5%	50.0%
Jamaica		36	11	0	87.4%	50.0%
Suriname		34	13	2	87.8%	50.0%
Guyana		38	9	0	86.9%	48.6%
Trinidad/Tobago		35	12	3	87.3%	48.5%
						48.3%
Bhutan	28	30	13	12	87.4%	40.3%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

					VOTING COIN	
COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES		ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES
Cambodia	29	31	11	12	87.3%	48.3%
El Salvador	36	39	6	2	86.1%	48.0%
Mongolia	35	38	7	3	86.5%	47.9%
Costa Rica	29	32	4	18	85.7%	47.5%
Ecuador	36	40	7	0	86.3%	47.4%
Panama	37	41	5	0	86.1%	47.4%
South Africa	36	40	7	0	86.3%	47.4%
Papua New Guine	ea . 34	38	11	0	86.8%	47.2%
Dominica	14	16	10	43	87.9%	46.7%
Namibia	28	32	9	14	86.3%	46.7%
Cyprus	34	39	10	0	86.5%	46.6%
Nicaragua	34	39	7	3	86.1%	46.6%
Peru	34	39	10	0	86.5%	46.6%
Lesotho	26	30	12	15	86.9%	46.4%
Nepal	32	37	12	2	86.7%	46.4%
Guatemala	30	35	10	8	86.5%	46.2%
Botswana	35	41	7	0	86.0%	46.1%
Uruguay	35	41	7	0	86.0%	46.1%
Ethiopia	32	38	11	2	86.4%	45.7%
Honduras	37	44	2	0	85.1%	45.7%
Bolivia	36	43	4	0	85.3%	45.6%
Madagascar	23	28	3	29	85.5%	45.1%
Chile	36	44	2	1	84.9%	45.0%
Zaire	18	22	7	36	86.6%	45.0%
Zambia	33	41	6	3	85.5%	44.6%
Philippines	32	41	10	0	85.8%	43.8%
Singapore	31	40	12	0	86.1%	43.7%
Mauritius	34	45	4	0	84.6%	43.0%
Venezuela	33	44	6	0	84.9%	42.9%
Maldives	30	41	8	4	85.1%	42.3%
Mexico	32	45	6	0	84.6%	41.6%
Congo	22	31	9	21	85.6%	41.5%
Brazil	30	43	9	1	85.0%	41.1%
Mozambique	23	33	6	21	84.6%	41.1%
Guinea	28	41	5	9	84.5%	40.6%
Morocco		38	10	9	85.3%	40.6%
Brunei		44	9	0	84.8%	40.5%
Kuwait		44	4	5	84.0%	40.5%
Vannatur	00	0.4	^	00	0.4.70/	40 40/
Vanuatu Cote d'Ivoire		34	6	20	84.7%	40.4%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

					VOTING COIN	
COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES
Kenya	26	39	18	0	86.1%	40.0%
Thailand		42	12	1	85.2%	40.0%
Uganda		42	11	2	85.1%	40.0%
Bangladesh		44	10	0	84.7%	39.7%
Haiti		44	3	7	83.6%	39.7%
Malaysia	28	43	12	0	85.0%	39.4%
Gabon	25	39	12	7	85.3%	39.1%
Jordan	28	44	8	3	84.1%	38.9%
Colombia	29	46	7	1	84.1%	38.7%
Cameroon	27	43	11	2	84.7%	38.6%
Malawi	25	40	3	15	83.8%	38.5%
Senegal	28	45	1	9	83.3%	38.4%
Benin	26	42	12	3	84.9%	38.2%
Chad	26	42	7	8	84.2%	38.2%
Mauritania	27	44	5	7	83.5%	38.0%
Bahrain		43	6	8	83.6%	37.7%
United Arab Emir.	26	43	7	7	83.9%	37.7%
Zimbabwe		43	11	4	84.1%	36.8%
Angola		21	12	38	86.1%	36.4%
Guinea-Bissau		35	8	20	83.9%	36.4%
Mali		44	5	9	83.4%	36.2%
Sri Lanka		44	14	0	84.6%	36.2%
Burundi		39	9	13	83.8%	36.1%
Niger		46	8	3	83.5%	36.1%
Tunisia		46	8	3.	83.6%	36.1%
UR Tanzania		36	17	10	85.1%	35.7%
Oman		46	7	5	83.2%	35.2%
Cape Verde		41	8	12	83.2%	34.9%
Togo		46	13	0	83.9%	34.3%
Yemen		43	1	17	82.0%	33.8%
Burkina Faso		46	7	7	82.8%	33.3%
Egypt		46	13	1	83.3%	33.3%
Gambia		6	9	65	88.3%	33.3%
Indonesia		48	9	2	82.9%	33.3%
Qatar		49	3	7	81.9%	32.9%
Saudi Arabia		47	6	7	82.5%	32.9%
Algeria		43	10	9	83.5%	32.8%
Ghana		43	14	5	84.0%	32.8%
Djibouti		45	2	15	81.9%	31.8%
Afghanistan	20	43	5	15	82.2%	31.7%

All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

	IDENTICAL		ARSTEN		VOTING COING	CIDENCE
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES		ONLY
Nigeria	22	48	9	4	82.5%	31.4%
Sierra Leone		25	11	36	84.4%	30.6%
Pakistan		48	16	0	83.0%	28.4%
Iran	18	48	10	7	81.7%	27.3%
Laos	17	46	9	11	81.4%	27.0%
Lebanon	16	46	11	10	82.0%	25.8%
Myanmar	17	50	15	1	82.2%	25.4%
Seychelles		3	0	79	76.8%	25.0%
Libya		55	12	0	80.8%	22.5%
Sudan		54	14	0	80.9%	21.7%
China	14	51	13	5	81.1%	21.5%
Syria	13	52	6	12	79.4%	20.0%
Vietnam	12	52	6	13	79.3%	18.8%
India	11	53	19	0	81.1%	17.2%
Cuba	9	53	18	3	80.5%	14.5%
DPR of Korea	4	42	14	23	79.6%	8.7%
Central Afr. Rep	0	0	0	83	*	*
Comoros	0	0	0	83	*	*
Dominican Rep	0	0	0	83	*	*
Iraq	0	0	0	83	*	*
Liberia	0	0	0	83	*	*
Sao Tome/Principe	0	0	0	83	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	83	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M) .	0	0	0	83	*	*
Average	29.7	29.0	11.6	12.6	88.2%	50.6%

UN REGIONAL GROUPS

The following tables show the percentage of voting coincidence with U.S. votes in plenary. They list UN member states by UN regional grouping, in rank order by voting coincidence percentage.

African Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE	ABSTEN-			
COUNTRY	VOTES				INCLUDING	VOTES
		VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY
Equatorial Guinea	ı 19	5	22	37	96.5%	79.2%
Eritrea		23	6	21	89.4%	58.9%
Rwanda		22	11	25	88.5%	53.2%
Swaziland	35	34	14	0	88.1%	50.7%
South Africa		40	7	0	86.3%	47.4%
Namibia		32	9	14	86.3%	46.7%
Lesotho		30	12	15	86.9%	46.4%
Botswana		41	7	0	86.0%	46.1%
Ethiopia		38	11	2	86.4%	45.7%
Madagascar		28	3	29	85.5%	45.1%
Zaire		22	7	36	86.6%	45.0%
Zambia		41	6	3	85.5%	44.6%
Mauritius		45	4	0	84.6%	43.0%
Congo		31	9	21	85.6%	41.5%
Mozambique		33	6	21	84.6%	41.1%
Guinea		41	5	9	84.5%	40.6%
Morocco		38	10	9	85.3%	40.6%
Cote d'Ivoire		39	14	4	85.7%	40.0%
Kenya		39	18	0	86.1%	40.0%
Uganda		42	11	2	85.1%	40.0%
Gabon		39	12	7	85.3%	39.1%
Cameroon		43	11	2	84.7%	38.6%
Malawi	25	40	3	15	83.8%	38.5%
Senegal		45	1	9	83.3%	38.4%
Benin		42	12	3	84.9%	38.2%
Chad		42	7	8	84.2%	38.2%
Mauritania		44	5	7	83.5%	38.0%
Zimbabwe		43	11	4	84.1%	36.8%
Angola		21	12	38	86.1%	36.4%
Guinea-Bissau		35	8	20	83.9%	36.4%
Mali		44	5	9	83.4%	36.2%
Burundi		39	9	13	83.8%	36.1%
Niger		46	8	3	83.5%	36.1%
Tunisia		46	8	3	83.6%	36.1%
UR Tanzania		36	17	10	85.1%	35.7%
Cape Verde		41	8	12	83.2%	34.9%
Togo		46	13	0	83.9%	34.3%
Burkina Faso		46	7	7	82.8%	33.3%
Egypt		46	13	1	83.3%	33.3%
Gambia		6	9	65	88.3%	33.3%

African Group (Cont'd)

					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
		OPPOSITE			INCLUDING	VOTES
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY
Algeria	21	43	10	9	83.5%	32.8%
Ghana	21	43	14	5	84.0%	32.8%
Djibouti	21	45	2	15	81.9%	31.8%
Nigeria	22	48	9	4	82.5%	31.4%
Sierra Leone	11	25	11	36	84.4%	30.6%
Seychelles	1	3	0	79	76.8%	25.0%
Libya	16	55	12	0	80.8%	22.5%
Sudan	15	54	14	0	80.9%	21.7%
Central Afr. Rep	0	0	0	83	*	*
Comoros	0	0	0	83	*	*
Liberia	0	0	0	83	*	*
Sao Tome/Principe	0	0	0	83	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	83	*	*
Average	21.5	33.4	8.4	19.8	85.1%	39.2%

Asian Group

	~	VOTING COINCIDENCE				
	TTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Tajikistan	21	2	16	44	99.0%	91.3%
Uzbekistan	12	2	14	55	99.0%	85.7%
Turkmenistan	13	4	0	66	98.3%	76.5%
Japan	46	15	22	0	93.8%	75.4%
Micronesia	40	20	22	1	92.8%	66.7%
Palau	2	1	2	78	99.5%	66.7%
Marshall Islands	41	22	18	2	91.8%	65.1%
Rep. of Korea	36	20	22	5	92.6%	64.3%
Kazakstan	38	25	20	0	88.8%	60.3%
Kyrgyzstan	19	15	13	36	93.5%	55.9%
Samoa	40	32	11	0	88.9%	55.6%
Solomon Islands	40	32	10	1	88.6%	55.6%
Fiji	31	30	16	6	88.3%	50.8%
Cambodia		31	11	12	48.3%	48.3%
Bhutan	28	30	13	12	89.0%	48.3%
Mongolia	35	38	7	3	86.3%	47.9%

Asian Group (Cont'd)

	IDENTICAL OPPOSITE ABSTEN-				VOTING COINCIDENCE		
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES	
Papua New Guinea	34	38	11	0	86.8%	47.2%	
Cyprus	34	39	10	0	85.7%	46.6%	
Nepal	32	37	12	2	80.9%	46.4%	
Philippines	32	41	10	0	84.1%	43.8%	
Singapore	31	40	12	0	84.9%	43.7%	
Maldives		41	8	4	85.7%	42.3%	
Brunei	30	44	9	0	84.2%	40.5%	
Kuwait	30	44	4	5	84.6%	40.5%	
Vanuatu	23	34	6	20	87.4%	40.4%	
Thailand	28	42	12	1	85.0%	40.0%	
Bangladesh	29	44	10	0	84.7%	39.7%	
Malaysia	28	43	12	0	84.7%	39.4%	
Jordan	28	44	8	3	84.0%	38.9%	
Bahrain	26	43	6	8	84.9%	37.7%	
United Arab Emir	26	43	7	7	47.8%	37.7%	
Sri Lanka	25	44	14	0	84.6%	36.2%	
Oman	25	46	7	5	84.0%	35.2%	
Yemen	22	43	1	17	83.7%	33.8%	
Indonesia	24	48	9	2	82.7%	33.3%	
Qatar	24	49	3	7	82.9%	32.9%	
Saudi Arabia	23	47	6	7	82.5%	32.9%	
Afghanistan	20	43	5	15	84.6%	31.7%	
Pakistan		48	16	0	82.8%	28.4%	
Iran	18	48	10	7	83.0%	27.3%	
Laos		46	9	11	81.6%	27.0%	
Lebanon		46	11	10	70.8%	25.8%	
Myanmar	17	50	15	1	82.2%	25.4%	
China		51	13	5	53.4%	21.5%	
Syria		52	6	12	80.2%	20.0%	
Vietnam		52	6	13	61.6%	18.8%	
India		53	19	0	76.8%	17.2%	
DPR of Korea		42	14	23	82.0%	8.7%	
Iraq		0	0	83	*	*	
Average	24.8	35.6	10.6	12.0	85.5%	41.1%	

Latin American and Caribbean Group

-	DENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ABSTEN		VOTING COING	CIDENCE VOTES
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY
St. Vincent/Gren	11	2	6	64	96.4%	84.6%
St.Kitts/Nevis		1	8	69	97.3%	83.3%
Argentina		20	19	0	92.8%	68.8%
Grenada		11	14	41	91.6%	60.7%
Barbados		28	14	5	89.6%	56.3%
St. Lucia		16	5	44	87.9%	52.9%
Bahamas		31	15	3	88.5%	52.3%
Paraguay		30	10	11	88.1%	51.6%
Belize		33	16	0	88.2%	50.7%
Antigua/Barbuda	29	29	17	8	88.5%	50.0%
Jamaica	36	36	11	0	87.4%	50.0%
Suriname	34	34	13	2	87.8%	50.0%
Guyana	36	38	9	0	86.9%	48.6%
Trinidad/Tobago	33	35	12	3	87.3%	48.5%
El Salvador	36	39	6	2	86.1%	48.0%
Costa Rica	29	32	4	18	85.7%	47.5%
Ecuador	36	40	7	0	86.3%	47.4%
Panama	37	41	5	0	86.1%	47.4%
Dominica	14	16	10	43	87.9%	46.7%
Nicaragua	34	39	7	3	86.1%	46.6%
Peru	34	39	10	0	86.5%	46.6%
Guatemala	30	35	10	.8	86.5%	46.2%
Uruguay		41	7	0	86.0%	46.1%
Honduras	37	44	2	0	85.1%	45.7%
Bolivia		43	4	0	85.3%	45.6%
Chile		44	2	1	84.9%	45.0%
Venezuela		44	6	0	84.9%	42.9%
Mexico	32	45	6	0	84.6%	41.6%
Brazil		43	9	1	85.0%	41.1%
Haiti		44	3	7	83.6%	39.7%
Colombia		46	7	1	84.1%	38.7%
Cuba		53	18	3	80.5%	14.5%
Dominican Rep	0	0	0	83	*	*
Average	28.9	32.5	8.8	12.7	86.9%	47.1%

Western European and Others Group

	IDENTICAL	OPPOSITE	A ROTENI.		VOTING COING	CIDENCE
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY
United Kingdom	57	10	16	0	96.5%	85.1%
Netherlands	50	12	21	0	95.7%	80.6%
Norway	47	12	19	5	95.4%	79.7%
Finland	49	13	21	0	95.3%	79.0%
France	50	15	17	1	94.6%	76.9%
Germany	50	15	18	0	94.7%	76.9%
Belgium	49	15	19	0	94.6%	76.6%
Monaco	47	15	17	4	94.3%	75.8%
Iceland	49	16	18	0	94.3%	75.4%
Andorra	39	13	15	16	94.2%	75.0%
Luxembourg	50	17	16	0	94.0%	74.6%
Italy	49	17	17	0	93.9%	74.2%
Canada	50	18	15	0	93.7%	73.5%
Austria	48	18	17	0	93.6%	72.7%
Liechtenstein	47	18	17	1	93.5%	72.3%
Denmark	49	19	15	0	93.3%	72.1%
Portugal	48	19	16	0	93.3%	71.6%
Sweden	47	19	17	0	93.3%	71.2%
Turkey	48	20	14	1	92.9%	70.6%
Spain	47	20	16	0	92.9%	70.1%
Ireland	46	20	17	0	92.9%	69.7%
Greece	45	20	18	0	92.9%	69.2%
Malta	45	21	17	0	92.6%	68.2%
San Marino	13	7	1	62	89.9%	65.0%
New Zealand	43	24	16	0	91.5%	64.2%
Australia	42	28	13	0	90.2%	60.0%
Average	46.3	17.0	16.3	3.5	93.8%	73.2%

Eastern European Group

	VOTING COIN	CIDENCE				
		OPPOSITE			INCLUDING	VOTES
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY
Lotvio	47	7	21	 8	97.1%	87.0%
Latvia		•		_		
Georgia		8	25	2	97.0%	85.7%
Hungary		10	20	4	96.2%	83.1%
Estonia		10	23	5	96.2%	81.8%
Lithuania	47	11	21	4	95.9%	81.0%
Slovenia	45	12	25	1	95.5%	78.9%
TFYR Macedonia	46	13	23	1	95.2%	78.0%
Czech Republic	48	14	21	0	95.0%	77.4%
Poland	48	14	19	2	94.9%	77.4%
Slovak Republic	48	15	20	0	94.6%	76.2%
Croatia	39	13	22	9	94.8%	75.0%
Romania	45	15	22	1	94.5%	75.0%
Bulgaria	47	17	19	0	93.9%	73.4%
Moldova	44	16	21	2	94.0%	73.3%
Russia	38	14	31	0	94.8%	73.1%
Albania	41	18	18	6	93.1%	69.5%
Bosnia/Herzegovir	na 33	16	9	25	92.0%	67.3%
Armenia		23	20	3	91.4%	61.7%
Belarus		22	24	2	91.8%	61.4%
Ukraine	34	23	25	1	91.5%	59.6%
Azerbaijan		24	16	17	89.4%	52.0%
Yugoslavia (S/M) .		0	0	83	*	*
Average	40.5	14.3	20.2	8.0	94.3%	73.9%

OTHER GROUPINGS

The following tables show the voting coincidence percentage with U.S. votes for UN member states in plenary. It lists countries by other important groupings, in rank order by voting coincidence percentage.

Arab Group

	IDENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ADOTEN		VOTING COIN	
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	VOTES
Morocco	26	38	10	9	85.3%	40.6%
Kuwait	30	44	4	5	84.0%	40.5%
Jordan	28	44	8	3	84.1%	38.9%
Mauritania	27	44	5	7	83.5%	38.0%
Bahrain	26	43	6	8	83.6%	37.7%
United Arab Emir	26	43	7	7	83.9%	37.7%
Tunisia	26	46	8	3	83.6%	36.1%
Oman	25	46	7	5	83.2%	35.2%
Yemen	22	43	1	17	82.0%	33.8%
Egypt	23	46	13	1	83.3%	33.3%
Qatar	24	49	3	7	81.9%	32.9%
Saudi Arabia	23	47	6	7	82.5%	32.9%
Algeria	21	43	10	9	83.5%	32.8%
Djibouti	21	45	2	15	81.9%	31.8%
Lebanon	16	46	11	10	82.0%	25.8%
Libya	16	55	12	0	80.8%	22.5%
Sudan	15	54	14	0	80.9%	21.7%
Syria	13	52	6	12	79.4%	20.0%
Iraq	0	0	0	83	*	*
Somalia		0	0	83	*	*
Average	20.4	41.4	6.7	14.6	82.9%	33.0%

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL (OPPOSITE		BSENCES	VOTING COING INCLUDING CONSENSUS	CIDENCE VOTES ONLY
Philippines	32	41	10	0	85.8%	43.8%
Singapore	31	40	12	0	86.1%	43.7%
Brunei	30	44	9	0	84.8%	40.5%
Thailand	28	42	12	1	85.2%	40.0%
Malaysia	28	43	12	0	85.0%	39.4%
Indonesia	24	48	9	2	82.9%	33.3%
Average	28.8	43.0	10.7	0.5	85.0%	40.1%

European Union

	IDENTION	ODDOOITE	VOTING COINCIDENCE			
COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
United Kingdom .	57	10	16	0	96.5%	85.1%
Netherlands	50	12	21	0	95.7%	80.6%
Finland	49	13	21	0	95.3%	79.0%
France	50	15	17	1	94.6%	76.9%
Germany	50	15	18	0	94.7%	76.9%
Belgium	49	15	19	0	94.6%	76.6%
Luxembourg	50	17	16	0	94.0%	74.6%
Italy	49	17	17	0	93.9%	74.2%
Austria	48	18	17	0	93.6%	72.7%
Denmark	49	19	15	0	93.3%	72.1%
Portugal	48	19	16	0	93.3%	71.6%
Sweden	47	19	17	0	93.3%	71.2%
Spain	47	20	16	0	92.9%	70.1%
Ireland	46	20	17	0	92.9%	69.7%
Greece	45	20	18	0	92.9%	69.2%
Average	48.9	16.6	17.4	0.1	94.1%	74.7%

Islamic Conference

				VOTES		
VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY	
21	2	16	44	98.3%	91.3%	
13	4	0	66	93.5%	76.5%	
48	20	14	1	92.9%	70.6%	
41	18	18	6	93.1%	69.5%	
19	15	13	36	90.5%	55.9%	
26	24	16	17	89.4%	52.0%	
30	41	8	4	85.1%	42.3%	
28	41	5	9	84.5%	40.6%	
26	38	10	9	85.3%	40.6%	
30	44	9	0	84.8%	40.5%	
30	44	4	5	84.0%	40.5%	
28	42	11	2	85.1%	40.0%	
29	44	10	0	84.7%	39.7%	
28	43	12	0	85.0%	39.4%	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	VOTES VOTES 21	21 2 16 13 4 0 48 20 14 41 18 18 19 15 13 26 24 16 30 41 8 28 41 5 26 38 10 30 44 9 30 44 9 30 44 4 28 42 11 29 44 10	VOTES VOTES TIONS ABSENCES	VOTES VOTES TIONS ABSENCES CONSENSUS	

II - OVERALL VOTES

Islamic Conference (Cont'd)

	IDENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ABSTEN-		VOTING COING	VOTES
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		ABSENCES		ONLY
Gabon	25	39	12	7	85.3%	39.1%
Jordan	28	44	8	3	84.1%	38.9%
Cameroon	27	43	11	2	84.7%	38.6%
Senegal	28	45	1	9	83.3%	38.4%
Benin	26	42	12	3	84.9%	38.2%
Chad	26	42	7	8	84.2%	38.2%
Mauritania	27	44	5	7	83.5%	38.0%
Bahrain	26	43	6	8	83.6%	37.7%
United Arab Emir.	26	43	7	7	83.9%	37.7%
Guinea-Bissau	20	35	8	20	83.9%	36.4%
Mali	25	44	5	9	83.4%	36.2%
Niger	26	46	8	3	83.5%	36.1%
Tunisia		46	8	3	83.6%	36.1%
UR Tanzania	20	36	17	10	85.1%	35.7%
Oman		46	7	5	83.2%	35.2%
Yemen		43	1	17	82.0%	33.8%
Burkina Faso		46	7	7	82.8%	33.3%
Egypt	23	46	13	1	83.3%	33.3%
Gambia		6	9	65	88.3%	33.3%
Indonesia	24	48	9	2	82.9%	33.3%
Qatar		49	3	7	81.9%	32.9%
Saudi Arabia		47	6	7	82.5%	32.9%
Algeria		43	10	9	83.5%	32.8%
Djibouti		45	2	15	81.9%	31.8%
Afghanistan		43	5	15	82.2%	31.7%
Nigeria		48	9	4	82.5%	31.4%
Sierra Leone		25	11	36	84.4%	30.6%
Pakistan		48	16	0	83.0%	28.4%
Iran		48	10	7	81.7%	27.3%
Lebanon		46	11	10	82.0%	25.8%
Libya		55	12	0	80.8%	22.5%
Sudan		54	14	0	80.9%	21.7%
Syria		52	6	12	79.4%	20.0%
Comoros	_	0	0	83	*	*
Iraq		0	Ö	83	*	*
Somalia		0	0	83	*	*
Average	22.2	37.0	8.4	15.3	84.5%	37.5%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

DENTICAL OPPOSITE ABSTEN-						VOTING COIN	CIDENCE
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Philippines							44.6%
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JIII JULIA TO 12 0 00.170 TU.170			40	12	0	86.1%	43.7%

II - OVERALL VOTES

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)

					VOTING COIN	CIDENCE
	IDENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ABSTEN-		INCLUDING	VOTES
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY
Mauritius	34	45	4	0	84.6%	43.0%
Venezuela	33	44	6	0	84.9%	42.9%
Maldives	30	41	8	4	85.1%	42.3%
Congo	22	31	9	21	85.6%	41.5%
Mozambique		33	6	21	84.6%	41.1%
Guinea		41	5	9	84.5%	40.6%
Morocco	26	38	10	9	85.3%	40.6%
Brunei	30	44	9	0	84.8%	40.5%
Kuwait	30	44	4	5	84.0%	40.5%
Vanuatu	23	34	6	20	84.7%	40.4%
Cote d'Ivoire	26	39	14	4	85.7%	40.0%
Kenya	26	39	18	0	86.1%	40.0%
Thailand		42	12	1	85.2%	40.0%
Uganda	28	42	11	2	85.1%	40.0%
Bangladesh	29	44	10	0	84.7%	39.7%
Malaysia		43	12	0	85.0%	39.4%
Gabon		39	12	7	85.3%	39.1%
Jordan	28	44	8	3	84.1%	38.9%
Colombia	29	46	7	1	84.1%	38.7%
Cameroon	27	43	11	2	84.7%	38.6%
Malawi	25	40	3	15	83.8%	38.5%
Senegal	28	45	1	9	83.3%	38.4%
Benin		42	12	3	84.9%	38.2%
Chad	26	42	7	8	84.2%	38.2%
Mauritania	27	44	5	7	83.5%	38.0%
Bahrain	26	43	6	8	83.6%	37.7%
United Arab Emir.	26	43	7	7	83.9%	37.7%
Zimbabwe	25	43	11	4	84.1%	36.8%
Angola	12	21	12	38	86.1%	36.4%
Guinea-Bissau	20	35	8	20	83.9%	36.4%
Mali	25	44	5	9	83.4%	36.2%
Sri Lanka	25	44	14	0	84.6%	36.2%
Burundi	22	39	9	13	83.8%	36.1%
Niger	26	46	8	3	83.5%	36.1%
Tunisia	26	46	8	3	83.6%	36.1%
UR Tanzania	20	36	17	10	85.1%	35.7%
Oman	25	46	7	5	83.2%	35.2%
Cape Verde		41	8	12	83.2%	34.9%
Togo	24	46	13	0	83.9%	34.3%
Yemen		43	1	17	82.0%	33.8%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)

11	IDENTICAL OPPOSITE ABSTEN-					
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES			INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Burkina Faso	23	46	7	7	82.8%	33.3%
Egypt	23	46	13	1	83.3%	33.3%
Gambia	3	6	9	65	88.3%	33.3%
Indonesia	24	48	9	2	82.9%	33.3%
Qatar	24	49	3	7	81.9%	32.9%
Saudi Arabia	23	47	6	7	82.5%	32.9%
Algeria	21	43	10	9	83.5%	32.8%
Ghana	21	43	14	5	84.0%	32.8%
Djibouti	21	45	2	15	81.9%	31.8%
Afghanistan	20	43	5	15	82.2%	31.7%
Nigeria		48	9	4	82.5%	31.4%
Sierra Leone		25	11	36	84.4%	30.6%
Pakistan	19	48	16	0	83.0%	28.4%
Iran	18	48	10	7	81.7%	27.3%
Laos	17	46	9	11	81.4%	27.0%
Lebanon	16	46	11	10	82.0%	25.8%
Myanmar	17	50	15	1	82.2%	25.4%
Seychelles	1	3	0	79	76.8%	25.0%
Libya		55	12	0	80.8%	22.5%
Sudan		54	14	0	80.9%	21.7%
Syria		52	6	12	79.4%	20.0%
Vietnam		52	6	13	79.3%	18.8%
India		53	19	0	81.1%	17.2%
Cuba	9	53	18	3	80.5%	14.5%
DPR of Korea	4	42	14	23	79.6%	8.7%
Central Afr. Rep	0	0	0	83	*	*
Comoros		0	0	83	*	*
Iraq	0	0	0	83	*	*
Liberia		0	0	83	*	*
Sao Tome/Principe	0	0	0	83	*	*
Somalia		0	0	83	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M)		0	0	83	*	*
Average	23.8	35.7	8.8	3 14.8	85.2%	39.9%

II - OVERALL VOTES

Nordic Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS A	BSENCES	VOTING COING INCLUDING CONSENSUS	CIDENCE VOTES ONLY
Norway	49	12 13	19 21	5	95.4% 95.3%	79.7% 79.0%
Iceland Denmark		16 19	18 15	0 0	94.3% 93.3%	75.4% 72.1%
Sweden	47	19	17	0	93.3%	71.2%
Average	48.2	15.8	18.0	1.0	94.3%	75.3%

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

		VOTING COINCIDENCE				
		OPPOSITE			INCLUDING	VOTES
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	110105	ABSENCES	CONSENSUS	ONLY
				_		
United Kingdom	57	10	16	0	96.5%	85.1%
Netherlands	50	12	21	0	95.7%	80.6%
Norway	47	12	19	5	95.4%	79.7%
France	50	15	17	1	94.6%	76.9%
Germany	50	15	18	0	94.7%	76.9%
Belgium		15	19	0	94.6%	76.6%
Iceland	49	16	18	0	94.3%	75.4%
Luxembourg	50	17	16	0	94.0%	74.6%
Italy	49	17	17	0	93.9%	74.2%
Canada	50	18	15	0	93.7%	73.5%
Denmark	49	19	15	0	93.3%	72.1%
Portugal	48	19	16	0	93.3%	71.6%
Turkey	48	20	14	1	92.9%	70.6%
Spain	47	20	16	0	92.9%	70.1%
Greece		20	18	0	92.9%	69.2%
Average	49.2	16.3	17.0	0.5	94.2%	75.1%

HISTORICAL COMPARISON

The following table shows percentage of voting coincidence with the United States in plenary for each UN member in the 50th UNGA and each of the prior five years.

	50TH	 49TH	48TH	47TH	46TH	45TH
COUNTRY	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991	1990
Afghanistan	31.7%	33.3%	31.4%	25.0%	17.5%	12.5%
Albania	69.5%	77.8%	80.8%	36.8%	55.0%	14.8%
Algeria	32.8%	31.3%	23.1%	18.5%	12.3%	13.6%
Andorra	75.0%	76.0%	85.7%	*	*	*
Angola	36.4%	31.3%	22.0%	23.4%	12.8%	15.1%
Antigua-Barbuda	50.0%	45.5%	27.7%	30.0%	28.2%	17.1%
Argentina	68.8%	67.9%	53.8%	44.4%	41.0%	12.5%
Armenia	61.7%	56.6%	48.8%	53.8%	*	*
Australia	60.0%	66.7%	55.8%	57.4%	58.8%	41.1%
Austria	72.7%	71.7%	63.4%	55.8%	51.1%	31.4%
Azerbaijan	52.0%	48.0%	35.0%	34.0%	*	*
Bahamas	52.3%	47.1%	32.1%	19.6%	26.2%	18.4%
Bahrain	37.7%	43.5%	29.6%	23.5%	19.1%	16.7%
Bangladesh	39.7%	36.2%	25.0%	22.4%	17.6%	15.7%
Barbados	56.3%	44.9%	34.0%	25.4%	24.6%	17.7%
Belarus	61.4%	56.9%	37.8%	34.0%	41.7%	16.9%
Belgium	76.6%	77.8%	72.5%	63.8%	70.0%	67.2%
Belize	50.7%	43.5%	36.0%	23.7%	24.6%	17.3%
Benin	38.2%	41.8%	29.4%	25.0%	21.0%	15.1%
Bhutan	48.3%	41.2%	28.6%	26.7%	19.0%	14.5%
Bolivia	45.6%	43.7%	33.3%	32.7%	25.8%	17.1%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	67.3%	58.6%	34.8%	19.4%	*	*
Botswana	46.1%	40.3%	28.6%	23.9%	20.9%	17.9%
Brazil	41.1%	39.1%	28.0%	22.7%	22.7%	14.9%
Brunei Darussalam	40.5%	37.7%	23.1%	21.2%	16.4%	15.7%
Bulgaria	73.4%	77.6%	71.1%	60.5%	64.4%	35.6%
Burkina Faso	33.3%	34.8%	27.3%	22.1%	18.6%	14.8%
Burundi	36.1%	30.4%	23.3%	20.5%	19.7%	14.1%
Cambodia	48.3%	49.2%	29.4%	**	20.7%	**
Cameroon	38.6%	39.0%	31.3%	21.4%	19.7%	18.2%
Canada	73.5%	74.5%	66.7%	60.0%	69.6%	60.0%
Cape Verde	34.9%	40.0%	24.0%	33.3%	21.9%	17.9%
Central African Rep.	**	41.7%	28.6%	18.2%	25.9%	18.4%
Chad	38.2%	**	22.4%	20.0%	18.2%	16.0%
Chile	45.0%	46.4%	33.9%	28.4%	25.0%	16.5%
China	21.5%	22.8%	10.6%	16.4%	16.4%	16.3%

II - OVERALL VOTES

COUNTRY	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993	47TH 1992	46TH 1991	45TH 1990
Colombia	38.7%	35.3%	25.0%	22.7%	22.7%	14.8%
Comoros	**	45.0%	22.9%	22.6%	19.0%	15.7%
Congo	41.5%	34.5%	23.8%	37.0%	20.8%	14.1%
Costa Rica	47.5%	50.0%	35.7%	32.8%	27.1%	25.4%
Cote d'Ivoire	40.0%	44.8%	27.1%	24.5%	31.0%	18.9%
Croatia	75.0%	71.1%	84.0%	78.9%	*	*
Cuba	14.5%	15.5%	6.3%	11.1%	7.8%	9.2%
Cyprus	46.6%	40.3%	32.7%	22.4%	21.5%	16.3%
Czech Republic (3)	77.4%	78.8%	70.0%	61.9%	63.0%	46.3%
D.P.R. of Korea	8.7%	9.1%	7.8%	12.9%	15.5%	*
Denmark	72.1%	75.0%	67.5%	56.5%	61.2%	50.0%
Djibouti	31.8%	42.4%	26.9%	21.2%	17.9%	16.9%
Dominica	46.7%	52.9%	41.9%	28.9%	29.3%	21.6%
Dominican Republic	**	**	37.0%	46.2%	28.2%	18.6%
Ecuador	47.4%	37.8%	30.9%	26.1%	23.5%	15.8%
Egypt	33.3%	34.8%	22.9%	25.0%	19.4%	16.3%
El Salvador	48.0%	47.5%	30.6%	30.5%	23.1%	18.9%
Equatorial Guinea .	79.2%	**	**	0.0%	**	**
Eritrea	58.9%	70.4%	0.0%	*	*	*
Estonia	81.8%	75.0%	70.6%	57.5%	67.6%	*
Ethiopia	45.7%	38.7%	27.3%	22.8%	20.3%	14.1%
Fiji	50.8%	50.0%	42.2%	33.3%	28.6%	19.5%
Finland	79.0%	77.8%	69.2%	58.1%	62.5%	38.9%
France	76.9%	75.8%	71.1%	63.8%	70.6%	76.7%
Gabon	39.1%	46.2%	24.3%	25.8%	21.2%	17.1%
Gambia	33.3%	46.3%	26.5%	28.8%	21.9%	17.6%
Georgia	85.7%	81.0%	76.2%	**	*	*
Germany	76.9%	77.8%	74.4%	63.8%	71.4%	69.1%
Ghana	32.8%	30.9%	20.5%	18.9%	16.1%	14.6%
Greece	69.2%	71.4%	58.5%	50.0%	48.9%	41.7%
Grenada	60.7%	43.3%	29.3%	33.3%	26.3%	21.1%
Guatemala	46.2%	45.1%	32.7%	25.8%	24.1%	17.7%
Guinea	40.6%	42.6%	27.3%	25.0%	20.6%	16.9%
Guinea-Bissau	36.4%	**	22.0%	26.8%	18.8%	19.7%
Guyana	48.6%	41.9%	33.3%	21.9%	22.9%	14.8%
Haiti	39.7%	42.6%	24.5%	24.6%	15.4%	17.2%
Honduras	45.7%	45.1%	28.6%	28.8%	23.9%	19.2%
Hungary	83.1%	79.6%	71.1%	61.4%	56.8%	42.2%
Iceland	75.4%	77.4%	67.5%	56.5%	61.7%	47.8%
India	17.2%	16.1%	15.7%	18.5%	17.5%	13.0%
Indonesia	33.3%	31.5%	18.9%	20.6%	12.5%	14.6%
indonesia	00.070	01.070	10.5/0	20.070	12.570	14.070

Jordan 38.9% 34.8% 22.0% 19.7% 13.6% 14.8% Kazakstan 60.3% 60.0% 46.2% 38.3% * * Kenya 40.0% 39.4% 31.9% 25.9% 19.0% 17.4% Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lesotho 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Liechtenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8%	COUNTRY	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993	47TH 1992	46TH 1991	45TH 1990
Ineland	Iran	27.3%	24.2%	18.9%	21.4%	15.4%	14.5%
Israel 97.0% 95.2% 93.5% 92.3% 87.5% 88.2% Italy 74.2% 79.2% 73.7% 63.8% 66.0% 65.5% Jamanica 50.0% 42.9% 32.0% 24.2% 26.2% 16.9% Japan 75.4% 78.4% 65.8% 53.7% 61.7% 58.3% Jordan 38.9% 34.8% 22.0% 19.7% 13.6% 14.8% Kazakstan 60.3% 60.0% 46.2% 38.3% * * Kenya 40.0% 39.4% 31.9% 25.9% 19.0% 17.4% Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8%	Iraq	**	23.7%	12.2%	9.3%	7.6%	13.3%
Italy 74.2% 79.2% 73.7% 63.8% 66.0% 65.5% Jamaica 50.0% 42.9% 32.0% 24.2% 26.2% 16.9% Japan 75.4% 78.4% 65.8% 53.7% 61.7% 58.3% Jordan 38.9% 34.8% 22.0% 19.7% 13.6% 14.8% Kazakstan 60.3% 60.0% 46.2% 38.3% * * Kenya 40.0% 39.4% 31.9% 25.9% 19.0% 17.4% Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.7% 15.2% 12.3% 16.2% <	Ireland	69.7%	70.6%	65.8%	54.5%	53.2%	41.1%
Jamaica 50.0% 42.9% 32.0% 24.2% 26.2% 16.9% Japan 75.4% 78.4% 65.8% 53.7% 61.7% 58.3% Jordan 38.9% 34.8% 22.0% 19.7% 13.6% 14.8% Kazakstan 60.3% 60.0% 46.2% 38.3% * * Kenya 40.0% 39.4% 31.9% 25.9% 19.0% 17.4% Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Liberia ** *<	Israel	97.0%	95.2%	93.5%	92.3%	87.5%	88.2%
Japan 75.4% 78.4% 65.8% 53.7% 61.7% 58.3% Jordan 38.9% 34.8% 22.0% 19.7% 13.6% 14.8% Kazakstan 60.3% 60.0% 46.2% 38.3% * * Kenya 40.0% 39.4% 31.9% 25.9% 19.0% 17.4% Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lebanon 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Libenia </td <td>Italy</td> <td>74.2%</td> <td>79.2%</td> <td>73.7%</td> <td>63.8%</td> <td>66.0%</td> <td>65.5%</td>	Italy	74.2%	79.2%	73.7%	63.8%	66.0%	65.5%
Jordan 38.9% 34.8% 22.0% 19.7% 13.6% 14.8% Kazakstan 60.3% 60.0% 46.2% 38.3% * * Kenya 40.0% 39.4% 31.9% 25.9% 19.0% 17.4% Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lesotho 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** * 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Liberia **	Jamaica	50.0%	42.9%	32.0%	24.2%	26.2%	16.9%
Kazakstan 60.3% 60.0% 46.2% 38.3% * * Kenya 40.0% 39.4% 31.9% 25.9% 19.0% 17.4% Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lesotho 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Liberia 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Liberia 74.6%	Japan	75.4%	78.4%	65.8%	53.7%	61.7%	58.3%
Karya 40.0% 39.4% 31.9% 25.9% 19.0% 17.4% Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lesotho 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Liechtenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Malawi 38.5% 4	Jordan	38.9%	34.8%	22.0%	19.7%	13.6%	14.8%
Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lesotho 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Liechtenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Madagascar 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Malawi 38.5%	Kazakstan	60.3%	60.0%	46.2%	38.3%	*	*
Kuwait 40.5% 45.7% 34.5% 26.8% 20.6% 15.7% Kyrgyzstan 55.9% 48.9% 52.2% 50.0% * * Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lebanon 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Liechtenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Luxembourg 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Malawi 38.5%	Kenya	40.0%	39.4%	31.9%	25.9%	19.0%	17.4%
Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lesotho 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Lichentenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Luxembourg 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% <td>-</td> <td>40.5%</td> <td>45.7%</td> <td>34.5%</td> <td>26.8%</td> <td>20.6%</td> <td>15.7%</td>	-	40.5%	45.7%	34.5%	26.8%	20.6%	15.7%
Laos 27.0% 19.6% 12.2% 12.9% 9.8% 13.8% Latvia 87.0% 80.0% 65.8% 55.6% 60.5% * Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lesotho 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Liechtenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Luxembourg 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malia 36.2% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 15.7% Malia 36.2%	Kyrgyzstan	55.9%	48.9%	52.2%	50.0%	*	*
Lebanon 25.8% 28.8% 17.5% 18.5% 15.4% 15.7% Lesotho 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Lichtenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Luxembourg 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Malia 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Mauritin	Laos	27.0%	19.6%	12.2%	12.9%	9.8%	13.8%
Lesotho 46.4% 39.3% 24.5% 23.9% 21.0% 18.2% Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Liechtenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Luxembourg 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% *	Latvia	87.0%	80.0%	65.8%	55.6%	60.5%	*
Liberia ** ** ** 29.6% 22.6% ** Libya 22.5% 26.4% 12.2% 15.2% 12.3% 14.6% Liechtenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Luxembourg 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malata 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marriania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Maur	Lebanon	25.8%	28.8%	17.5%	18.5%	15.4%	15.7%
Libya	Lesotho	46.4%	39.3%	24.5%	23.9%	21.0%	18.2%
Liechtenstein 72.3% 70.6% 64.1% 54.8% 51.2% 37.8% Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Luxembourg 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% <t< td=""><td>Liberia</td><td>**</td><td>**</td><td>**</td><td>29.6%</td><td>22.6%</td><td>**</td></t<>	Liberia	**	**	**	29.6%	22.6%	**
Lithuania 81.0% 81.0% 68.6% 54.5% 56.5% * Luxembourg 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia<	Libya	22.5%	26.4%	12.2%	15.2%	12.3%	14.6%
Luxembourg 74.6% 77.8% 74.4% 63.8% 68.0% 67.9% Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% *	Liechtenstein	72.3%	70.6%	64.1%	54.8%	51.2%	37.8%
Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8%	Lithuania	81.0%	81.0%	68.6%	54.5%	56.5%	*
Madagascar 45.1% 42.1% 22.9% 19.0% 18.2% 16.2% Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Monaco 75.8% 75.4% 84.6% * * * Mongo	Luxembourg	74.6%	77.8%	74.4%	63.8%	68.0%	67.9%
Malawi 38.5% 41.7% 26.5% 39.5% 26.9% 25.9% Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Mo	_	45.1%	42.1%	22.9%	19.0%	18.2%	16.2%
Malaysia 39.4% 37.0% 20.8% 16.9% 13.6% 15.7% Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% M		38.5%	41.7%	26.5%	39.5%	26.9%	25.9%
Maldives 42.3% 45.8% 30.9% 23.5% 20.6% 16.9% Mali 36.2% 34.8% 21.3% 26.8% 19.0% 15.7% Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% <td< td=""><td></td><td>39.4%</td><td>37.0%</td><td>20.8%</td><td>16.9%</td><td>13.6%</td><td>15.7%</td></td<>		39.4%	37.0%	20.8%	16.9%	13.6%	15.7%
Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Monaco 75.8% 75.4% 84.6% * * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Ne		42.3%	45.8%	30.9%	23.5%	20.6%	
Malta 68.2% 70.2% 60.0% 43.4% 30.0% 25.9% Marshall Islands 65.1% 65.5% 55.8% 60.5% 39.5% * Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Monaco 75.8% 75.4% 84.6% * * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Ne	Mali	36.2%	34.8%	21.3%	26.8%	19.0%	15.7%
Mauritania 38.0% 40.0% 18.4% 19.0% 15.2% 14.6% Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Monaco 75.8% 75.4% 84.6% * * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%		68.2%	70.2%	60.0%	43.4%	30.0%	25.9%
Mauritius 43.0% 43.3% 33.3% 28.6% 16.4% 14.1% Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Monaco 75.8% 75.4% 84.6% * * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%	Marshall Islands	65.1%	65.5%	55.8%	60.5%	39.5%	*
Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Monaco 75.8% 75.4% 84.6% * * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%	Mauritania	38.0%	40.0%	18.4%	19.0%	15.2%	14.6%
Mexico 41.6% 33.3% 28.3% 20.3% 20.6% 15.2% Micronesia 66.7% 69.2% 55.0% 63.6% 26.2% * Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Monaco 75.8% 75.4% 84.6% * * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%	Mauritius	43.0%	43.3%	33.3%	28.6%	16.4%	14.1%
Moldova 73.3% 76.6% 69.4% 57.1% * * Monaco 75.8% 75.4% 84.6% * * * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%		41.6%	33.3%	28.3%	20.3%	20.6%	15.2%
Monaco 75.8% 75.4% 84.6% * * * Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%	Micronesia	66.7%	69.2%	55.0%	63.6%	26.2%	*
Mongolia 47.9% 41.8% 30.8% 23.0% 25.9% 14.8% Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%	Moldova	73.3%	76.6%	69.4%	57.1%	*	*
Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%	Monaco	75.8%	75.4%	84.6%	*	*	*
Morocco 40.6% 46.9% 26.5% 21.9% 16.9% 15.7% Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%	Mongolia	47.9%	41.8%	30.8%	23.0%	25.9%	14.8%
Mozambique 41.1% 33.3% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 17.6% Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%			46.9%	26.5%	21.9%	16.9%	15.7%
Myanmar (Burma) 25.4% 25.4% 18.4% 14.3% 15.0% 15.2% Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%							
Namibia 46.7% 36.2% 23.1% 20.3% 17.9% 16.3% Nepal 46.4% 39.7% 32.7% 27.5% 23.2% 17.5%			25.4%	18.4%			
Nepal							
·						23.2%	17.5%

II - OVERALL VOTES

COUNTRY	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993	47TH 1992	46TH 1991	45TH 1990
					1991	
New Zealand	64.2%	63.0%	54.8%	51.1%	55.8%	39.3%
Nicaragua	46.6%	47.8%	35.2%	23.1%	22.1%	17.7%
Niger	36.1%	39.7%	29.1%	23.5%	20.9%	15.0%
Nigeria	31.4%	37.5%	26.5%	24.2%	19.4%	15.9%
Norway	79.7%	74.5%	67.5%	55.3%	61.2%	46.8%
Oman	35.2%	38.0%	29.1%	23.7%	19.4%	16.7%
Pakistan	28.4%	32.4%	26.3%	21.7%	17.6%	18.5%
Palau (5)	66.7%	**	*	*	*	*
Panama	47.4%	43.8%	44.0%	35.6%	37.2%	33.3%
Papua New Guinea	47.2%	41.4%	38.8%	31.6%	23.9%	17.1%
Paraguay	51.6%	45.1%	45.5%	26.2%	25.9%	17.7%
Peru	46.6%	45.5%	31.5%	26.9%	24.6%	15.4%
Philippines	43.8%	38.8%	17.0%	21.5%	22.1%	16.0%
Poland	77.4%	78.4%	68.4%	58.1%	61.7%	48.7%
Portugal	71.6%	75.0%	69.2%	58.7%	59.6%	61.8%
Qatar	32.9%	38.8%	29.6%	25.0%	18.6%	16.9%
Republic of Korea	64.3%	55.9%	44.2%	36.2%	35.3%	*
Romania	75.0%	76.5%	71.4%	61.4%	65.2%	40.5%
Russia (1)	73.1%	66.7%	68.6%	59.6%	41.9%	16.7%
Rwanda	53.2%	60.0%	30.2%	26.5%	25.0%	13.9%
St. Kitts-Nevis	83.3%	44.9%	0.0%	27.5%	22.7%	20.0%
St. Lucia	52.9%	46.3%	25.5%	29.1%	25.0%	19.7%
St. Vincent-Gren	84.6%	49.2%	26.0%	24.5%	26.3%	16.9%
Samoa	55.6%	57.1%	48.4%	46.3%	36.0%	20.8%
San Marino	65.0%	51.4%	73.1%	54.5%	*	*
Sao Tome-Principe	**	**	**	28.3%	21.0%	**
Saudi Arabia	32.9%	41.8%	30.2%	25.7%	17.4%	16.7%
Senegal	38.4%	45.8%	23.4%	24.6%	17.2%	17.3%
Seychelles	25.0%	35.7%	20.0%	25.9%	22.0%	14.8%
Sierra Leone	30.6%	46.0%	27.8%	17.9%	23.2%	15.9%
Singapore	43.7%	41.2%	33.3%	27.9%	23.5%	17.3%
Slovak Republic	76.2%	79.6%	70.6%	*	*	*
Slovenia	78.9%	76.0%	65.7%	63.6%	*	*
Solomon Islands	55.6%	56.9%	57.7%	75.0%	26.1%	18.3%
Somalia	**	**	**	**	12.1%	14.8%
South Africa	47.4%	41.7%	**	**	**	**
Spain	70.1%	68.3%	59.5%	51.0%	52.0%	45.1%
Sri Lanka	36.2%	30.3%	25.9%	21.2%	17.6%	17.1%
Sudan	21.7%	25.9%	20.0%	14.1%	10.9%	11.3%
Suriname	50.0%	43.8%	32.1%	26.5%	22.1%	16.3%
Swaziland	50.7%	50.0%	28.6%	24.2%	24.6%	16.5%

COUNTRY	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993	47TH 1992	46TH 1991	45TH 1990
Sweden	71.2%	69.8%	61.9%	54.3%	58.0%	35.2%
Syria	20.0%	22.6%	13.7%	16.4%	14.1%	13.8%
Tajikistan	91.3%	62.0%	30.8%	19.0%	*	*
Thailand	40.0%	37.7%	17.4%	23.9%	23.2%	16.5%
TFYR Macedonia (4)	78.0%	76.6%	47.5%	*	*	*
Togo	34.3%	37.7%	19.1%	25.0%	23.9%	17.5%
Trinidad-Tobago	48.5%	45.7%	25.5%	24.6%	17.9%	16.7%
Tunisia	36.1%	38.2%	25.0%	20.0%	15.2%	14.6%
Turkey	70.6%	65.0%	57.1%	42.6%	41.2%	36.4%
Turkmenistan	76.5%	55.3%	40.0%	38.5%	*	*
Uganda	40.0%	34.8%	18.6%	16.0%	14.5%	16.3%
Ukraine	59.6%	63.3%	41.3%	35.1%	31.6%	16.7%
United Arab Emir	37.7%	44.9%	30.4%	24.6%	18.8%	16.9%
United Kingdom	85.1%	84.4%	80.0%	73.6%	79.6%	81.8%
U.R. Tanzania	35.7%	29.9%	18.4%	20.3%	16.7%	16.0%
Uruguay	46.1%	47.1%	37.5%	35.7%	35.8%	18.2%
Uzbekistan	85.7%	53.1%	**	**	*	*
Vanuatu	40.4%	48.8%	83.3%	27.3%	20.3%	18.6%
Venezuela	42.9%	37.9%	29.6%	25.4%	23.5%	17.5%
Vietnam	18.8%	19.7%	6.5%	11.3%	10.9%	12.3%
Yemen	33.8%	33.3%	20.0%	14.5%	12.3%	12.5%
Yugoslavia (2)	**	**	**	0.0%	19.4%	14.6%
Zaire	45.0%	0.0%	36.1%	33.3%	15.4%	17.1%
Zambia	44.6%	38.6%	36.1%	22.1%	19.0%	17.1%
Zimbabwe	36.8%	29.9%	18.4%	19.4%	18.5%	18.5%
Average	50.6%	48.6%	36.8%	31.0%	27.8%	21.3%

- * Not yet a UN member
- ** Non-participating UN member
- (1) Figures before 1992 are for the U.S.S.R.
- (2) Not permitted to participate since the 47th UNGA.
- (3) Figures before 1993 are for Czechoslovakia.
- (4) Listed alphabetically as "The Former Yugoslav Republic...".
- (5) Admitted as a member 12/15/94, but did not vote in 49th UNGA.



III - GENERAL ASSEMBLY — IMPORTANT VOTES

PL 101-167 calls for analysis and discussion of "all such votes on issues which directly affected important United States interests and on which the United States lobbied extensively." For the 50th General Assembly in 1995, 15 votes meet these criteria.

Section III consists of four parts: a listing and description of the 15 important votes at the 50th UNGA; voting coincidence percentages with the United States on these important votes, arranged both alphabetically by country and in rank order of agreed votes; voting coincidence percentages by UN regional groupings and other important groupings; and a comparison of important with overall voting coincidence percentages from Section II.

LISTING AND DESCRIPTION

The following 15 important votes are identified by a short title, document number, date of vote, and results (Yes-No-Abstain), with the U.S. vote noted. The first paragraph summarizes the subject matter of each vote, and the second provides background and the U.S. position. The resolutions are listed in chronological order of adoption.

1. IAEA Report

A/Res/50/9 November 1

144(US)-1-8

Affirms confidence in the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; welcomes the IAEA's efforts to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness and cost efficiency of the safeguards system; commends the Agency's efforts to implement safeguards agreements with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), expresses concern about the continuing noncompliance of the DPRK with the safeguards agreement, and urges the DPRK to cooperate fully in the implementation of the agreement; and expresses concern that Iraq has continued to withhold information from the IAEA about its nuclear-weapon program in violation of its obligations, and stresses the need for Iraq to cooperate fully with the Agency in achieving implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions.

The United States traditionally supports this resolution endorsing the IAEA's efforts to promote peaceful use of atomic energy, guard

against its use for military purposes, and monitor the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States also supported inclusion of paragraphs commending IAEA's efforts relating to North Korea and Iraq.

2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba

A/Res/50/10 November 2

117-3(US)-38

Calls on states to refrain from promulgating and applying laws and measures whose extraterritorial effects affect the sovereignty of other states and the legitimate interests of entities or persons under their jurisdiction, as well as the freedom of trade and navigation; and urges states that have such laws to repeal them.

This Cuba-sponsored resolution, couched in terms of blocking efforts to extend extraterritorially the effects of the U.S. embargo against Cuba, gained increasing support from 1994. The United States again voted against the resolution, maintaining that the UN General Assembly, a multilateral body, is an inappropriate venue for discussion of this essentially bilateral issue. The United States believes it has a sovereign right to determine who will be its trading partners and to regulate its commercial activities in a manner supportive of its foreign policy objectives. The United States shares other UN members' objective of a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. There are two elements in the U.S. program to achieve this objective: exerting pressure on the Cuban Government for political and economic change through the economic embargo; and, less well known but equally important, supporting the Cuban people through private humanitarian aid, improved communication, and an enhanced flow of ideas and information. The resolution did not reflect U.S. movement in 1995 in reaching agreement with Cuba on legal immigration that boosted private and humanitarian contacts with the Cuban people, and expressing readiness to ease sanctions in response to significant Cuban reforms. Furthermore, it made no mention of the need for political and economic reform in Cuba. Resolutions condemning the U.S. embargo weaken efforts to achieve the goal of bringing about peaceful political and economic change in Cuba. Israel and Uzbekistan also voted against the resolution.

3. Middle East Peace Process

A/Res/50/21 December 4

148(US)-4-1

Welcomes the peace process started at Madrid and supports the subsequent bilateral negotiations; fully supports the achievements of the peace process, especially the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements and other agreements signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Jordan-Israel peace

treaty; welcomes the appointment by the Secretary General of a UN special coordinator in the occupied territories; and encourages regional development and cooperation.

The United States, Norway, and Russia, with 80 cosponsors, introduced this resolution, which follows up on the U.S. resolution in 1994, to support the progress made in peace negotiations and to urge the parties onward. The resolution renews the General Assembly's support for the Middle East peace process begun in Madrid in 1991.

4. Special Committee on Decolonization

A/Res/50/38 December 6 146-4(US)-3

Asks the administering powers—including the United States for American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands—to ascertain expeditiously, by means of popular consultations, the wishes of the peoples of non-self-governing territories regarding their future political status; asks the administering powers to facilitate the dispatch of UN missions to the territories to review their status; and, stressing that achieving the goal of eradicating colonialism by the year 2000 requires full and constructive cooperation, appeals to the administering powers to continue to give full support to the Special Committee.

The United States, pointing out that 11 of the 12 territories being considered in this resolution had attained self-government, introduced several important amendments in an attempt to reduce significantly the number of territories listed as non-self-governing. It is the U.S. view that the number of countries considered should be reduced, that the mandate of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee should be reevaluated, and that this committee should be eliminated.

5. Israeli Nuclear Armament

A/Res/50/73 December 12 56-2(US)-100

Calls on Israel and other states of the region to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Calls on states of the region to place all nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency as a confidence-building measure.

While unambiguously supporting the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and universal adherence to the NPT, the United States voted against this resolution in the belief that the introduction of a resolution on a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) made it redundant. Moreover, this armament resolution is counterproductive and inappropriate, given the positive developments in the Middle East

peace process. It is the U.S. view that, with the establishment of the regional arms control and security working group of the Middle East peace process, in which the UN participates, there is even less justification for having the General Assembly address these sensitive Middle East arms control issues.

6. Political and Economic Coercion of Developing Countries

A/Res/50/96 December 20 100-30(US)-22

Urges adoption of measures to eliminate the use by some developed countries of unilateral coercive economic measures against developing countries as a means of forcibly imposing their will; and asks the Secretary General to monitor the imposition of such measures, including the impact on trade and development.

This Group of 77 resolution continues a Cuban initiative directed against the United States. Western allies and many of the former Eastern bloc countries voted against the resolution.

7. Israeli Settlements

A/Res/50/129 December 20 126-2(US)-28

Reaffirms that Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, are illegal and an obstacle to economic and social development; recognizes the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people in the territory and on the Arab population of the Syrian Golan; and reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people and the population of the Syrian Golan to their natural and other economic resources.

The United States believes this issue should be addressed through the ongoing direct negotiations among the parties in the region, and that the General Assembly should not specify the outcome of the negotiations. Israel also voted against the resolution.

8. Palestinian Self-Determination

A/Res/50/140 December 21 145-2(US)-19

Reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and expresses the hope that the Palestinian people may soon exercise their right to self-determination in the current peace process.

The United States generally supports the principle of the right of self-determination, and is profoundly committed to the achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East. It was not possible, however, to support this resolution because it takes positions on issues supported by one party to the ongoing negotiations and not by the other. The U.S. view is that the United Nations is not the forum to debate permanent status issues, which are for the parties to discuss and resolve. Instead of interjecting itself into the controversy by taking positions which could be seen as prejudging such issues, the United Nations should promote and support the agreements the parties have reached. Israel also voted against the resolution.

9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization

A/Res/50/185 December 22 156(US)-0-15

Commends the electoral assistance provided to member states at their request by the United Nations and requests that such assistance continue on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that the fundamental responsibility for organizing free and fair elections lies with governments; asks the United Nations to ensure that there is adequate time to organize and carry out an effective mission before providing such assistance, and that conditions exist to allow a free and fair election; commends the steps taken by the United Nations to ensure the continuation and consolidation of the democratization process in states requesting assistance, including providing assistance before and after elections have taken place, and including needs-assessment missions aimed at recommending programs to consolidate the democratization process, and asks that such efforts be strengthened; and asks the High Commissioner for Human Rights to support democratization activities.

This resolution continues the effort begun by the United States in 1989 to strengthen the UN role in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democracy. It calls for continued UN action in the field of democratization, strongly links democratization and human rights, focuses on post-electoral assistance and institution building, and emphasizes the importance of the stability and continuity of electoral processes.

10. Human Rights in Iran

A/Res/50/188 December 22 78(US)-27-58

Expresses concern at the high number of executions and of instances of torture, and at the discriminatory treatment of minorities, such as the Baha'is, by reason of their religious beliefs; also expresses concern at continuing threats to the life of author Salman Rushdie; and calls on Iran to allow the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights to visit Iran as soon as possible and without conditions.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, introduced by the European Union, to highlight Iran's continuing systematic and gross violations of human rights.

11. Human Rights in Iraq

A/Res/50/191 December 22 111(US)-3-53

Strongly condemns the massive and extremely grave violations of human rights in Iraq, including summary and arbitrary executions, political killings, systematic torture, and mutilation as a penalty for certain offenses; and condemns Iraq's continued refusal to take advantage of resources available to alleviate the suffering of its people.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, introduced by the European Union, to condemn Iraq's abysmal human rights record and its egregious flouting of international law.

12. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia

A/Res/50/193 December 22 144(US)-1-20

Condemns violations of human rights and humanitarian law in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) by all sides to the conflict, while recognizing that the leadership in territories under Serb control in Bosnia and Croatia and the commanders of Serb paramilitary forces and political and military leaders in the FRY bear responsibility for most violations; expresses outrage at human rights violations committed in connection with ethnic cleansing in areas under the control of Bosnian Serbs; condemns attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa by Bosnian Serbs; condemns human rights violations by members of the Croatian armed forces in formerly Serb-held areas of Croatia; and welcomes the Dayton agreement and its committing of the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to respect human rights fully.

The United States introduced this resolution to highlight the continuing massive and systematic violations of human rights, particularly in areas of Bosnia and Croatia under Serb control, and to provide pressure for improvement.

13. Human Rights in Sudan

A/Res/50/197 December 22 94(US)-15-54

Expresses deep concern at the continuing human rights violations in Sudan, including detentions without due process, the use of children as soldiers, and deliberate aerial bombardments by the Government of

Sudan of civilian targets; urges investigation of and an end to cases of slavery and forced labor; welcomes the Special Rapporteur's recommendations regarding placement of human rights monitors; and deplores Sudan's continuing refusal to cooperate in any way with the Special Rapporteur, and the unacceptable threats against him.

The United States introduced this resolution to highlight Sudan's abysmal human rights record and to provide pressure for improvement.

14. Human Rights in Cuba

A/Res/50/198 December 22

66(US)-22-78

Calls again on Cuba to cooperate fully with the Human Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur on Cuba by permitting him to establish contact with the Government and citizens of Cuba; urges the Government of Cuba to ensure freedom of expression, information, and assembly; and calls on Cuba to release persons detained for political activities.

Continuing its effort since the mid-1980s to focus international attention on human rights abuses in Cuba, the United States introduced this resolution to reflect the continuing violations of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms described in the interim report of the Special Rapporteur.

15. Human Rights in Nigeria

A/Res/50/199

December 22

101(US)-14-47

Condemns the arbitrary execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his eight co-defendants, and expresses concern about other human rights violations; calls on Nigeria to ensure observance of human rights by releasing all political prisoners, guaranteeing freedom of the press, and ensuring full respect for the rights of all individuals, including trade unionists and members of minorities; and asks the Secretary General, using his good offices mandate and in cooperation with the Commonwealth, to undertake discussions with the Government of Nigeria on the possibilities of international assistance in the restoration of democratic government.

The United States cosponsored and worked assiduously for adoption of this resolution introduced by the European Union. The executions of the Nigerian environmental and human rights activist and others in November were widely condemned by the international community, including the United States. These executions underscored the regime's refusal to abide by the most basic international standards of

human rights. The trials violated the right to a fair and public trial by an impartial tribunal.

COMPARISON WITH U.S. VOTES

The tables which follow summarize UN member performance at the 50th UNGA in comparison with the United States on the 15 important votes. In these tables, "Identical Votes" is the total number of times the United States and the listed state both voted Yes or No on these issues. "Opposite Votes" is the total number of times the United States voted Yes and the listed state No, or the United States voted No and the listed state Yes. "Abstentions" and "Absences" are totals for the country being compared on these 15 votes. "Voting Coincidence" is calculated by dividing the number of identical votes by the total of identical and opposite votes.

The first table lists all UN member states in alphabetical order. The second lists them by identical votes in descending order; those states with the same number of identical votes are further ranked by the number of opposite votes in ascending order. Countries with the same number of both identical votes and opposite votes are listed alphabetically. Subsequent tables are comparisons of UN members by regional and other groupings to which they belong, again ranked in descending order of identical votes.

All Countries (Alphabetical)

		LOPPOSITE			VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	COINCIDENCE
Afghanistan	2	6	3	4	25.0%
Albania	8	3	4	0	72.7%
Algeria	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Andorra	8	4	2	1	66.7%
Angola	1	2	6	6	33.3%
Antigua-Barbuda	7	4	3	1	63.6%
Argentina	9	3	3	0	75.0%
Armenia	7	4	3	1	63.6%
Australia	10	5	0	0	66.7%
Austria	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Azerbaijan	4	5	2	4	44.4%
Bahamas	8	3	4	0	72.7%
Bahrain	4	5	5	1	44.4%
Bangladesh	4	7	4	0	36.4%

COUNTRY	DENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING S COINCIDENCE
				ADOLINOLO	
Barbados	8	4	3	0	66.7%
Belarus	_	3	6	0	66.7%
Belgium		3	2	0	76.9%
Belize		5	2	0	61.5%
Benin		4	7	0	50.0%
Bhutan		3	6	1	62.5%
Bolivia		5	2	0	61.5%
Bosnia-Herzegovina		3	1	4	70.0%
_		6	1	0	57.1%
Botswana Brazil	-	5	2	0	61.5%
		7	5	_	
Brunei				0	30.0%
Bulgaria		4	2	0	69.2%
Burkina Faso		6	6	0	33.3%
Burundi		5	4	2	44.4%
Cambodia		3	5	2	62.5%
Cameroon		5	6	0	44.4%
Canada		4	1	0	71.4%
Cape Verde		4	5	3	42.9%
Central African Republic	0	0	0	15	*
Chad	4	6	4	1	40.0%
Chile	8	5	1	1	61.5%
China	1	10	4	0	9.1%
Colombia	6	6	3	0	50.0%
Comoros	0	0	0	15	*
Congo	2	2	6	5	50.0%
Costa Rica		4	1	2	66.7%
Cote d'Ivoire		4	8	0	42.9%
Croatia		2	2	2	81.8%
Cuba		9	4	1	10.0%
Cyprus		5	3	0	58.3%
Czech Republic	-	2	3	0	83.3%
DPR of Korea		9	4	2	0.0%
Denmark		4	1	0	71.4%
Djibouti		5	1	5	44.4%
Dominica		3	2	3	70.0%
					70.0%
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	15	
Ecuador		5	1	0	64.3%
Egypt		5	5	0	50.0%
El Salvador		3	3	0	75.0%
Equatorial Guinea		0	6	7	100.0%
Eritrea	4	2	4	5	66.7%

	IDENTICA	L OPPOSITE	ABSTEN-		VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES			S COINCIDENCE
Estonia	9	1	2	3	90.0%
Ethiopia		5	5	1	44.4%
Fiji		4	4	3	50.0%
Finland		4	1	0	71.4%
France		3	2	0	76.9%
Gabon		2	8	1	66.7%
Gambia		4	1	8	33.3%
Georgia	_	0	5	1	100.0%
Germany		3	2	0	76.9%
Ghana		8	4	0	27.3%
Greece		4	3	0	66.7%
Grenada		3	3	2	70.0%
Guatemala		1	6	3	83.3%
Guinea		5	4	1	50.0%
Guinea-Bissau		3	6	3	50.0%
Guyana		5	2	0	61.5%
Haiti		5	2	0	61.5%
Honduras	-	5	1	0	64.3%
		2	3	0	83.3%
Hungary		4	1	0	71.4%
Iceland		8	4	0	27.3%
India		9	•	0	
Indonesia	_	-	2	0	30.8%
Iran		11	1		21.4%
Iraq		0	0	15	
Ireland		4	1	0	71.4%
Israel		0	0	0	100.0%
Italy		4	1	0	71.4%
Jamaica		5	2	0	61.5%
Japan		3	2	0	76.9%
Jordan		5	5	1	44.4%
Kazakstan		4	4	0	63.6%
Kenya		5	7	0	37.5%
Kuwait		5	2	2	54.5%
Kyrgyzstan		3	6	3	50.0%
Laos		6	4	4	14.3%
Latvia		1	3	1	90.9%
Lebanon		7	4	1	30.0%
Lesotho		6	4	0	45.5%
Liberia		0	0	15	
Libya		12	1	0	14.3%
Liechtenstein	10	4	1	0	71.4%

	DENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ABSTEN		VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES			COINCIDENCE
Lithuania	. 10	2	3	0	83.3%
Luxembourg		4	1	0	71.4%
Madagascar		3	1	8	50.0%
Malawi		6	1	2	50.0%
Malaysia		7	4	0	36.4%
Maldives		6	3	1	45.5%
Mali		6	4	Ó	45.5%
Malta		3	3	0	75.0%
Marshall Islands		3	3	1	72.7%
Mauritania		6	4	1	40.0%
Mauritius		4	3	Ö	66.7%
Mexico		6	1	0	57.1%
Micronesia		2	5	0	80.0%
Moldova		2	4	1	80.0%
Monaco		3	1	1	76.9%
Mongolia		5	2	Ö	61.5%
Morocco		5	5	1	44.4%
Mozambique		4	5	3	42.9%
Myanmar		9	3	0	25.0%
Namibia		6	4	1	40.0%
Nepal		3	6	1	62.5%
Netherlands		3	2	0	76.9%
New Zealand		5	0	0	66.7%
Nicaragua		5	2	1	58.3%
Niger		6	5	Ó	40.0%
Nigeria		9	2	2	18.2%
Norway		3	2	0	76.9%
Oman		6	3	2	40.0%
Pakistan		8	3	0	33.3%
Palau		0	1	14	0.0%
Panama		4	2	0	69.2%
Papua New Guinea	_	6	4	0	45.5%
Paraguay		5	1	1	61.5%
Peru		5	2	Ó	61.5%
Philippines		6	4	0	45.5%
Poland		1	3	1	90.9%
Portugal		4	2	Ó	69.2%
Qatar		7	1	2	41.7%
Republic of Korea	. 7	4	4	0	63.6%
Romania	. 9	2	4	0	81.8%
Russia		3	4	0	72.7%
		9	-7	9	12.1 /0

COUNTRY	DENTICAI VOTES	L OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING S COINCIDENCE
Rwanda	4	0	6	5	100.0%
St. Kitts and Nevis	4	0	3	8	100.0%
St. Lucia	. 7	3	1	4	70.0%
St. Vincent-Grenadines	6	1	1	7	85.7%
Samoa	9	6	0	0	60.0%
San Marino	6	2	0	7	75.0%
Sao Tome and Principe	. 0	0	0	15	*
Saudi Arabia		6	3	1	45.5%
Senegal	5	5	1	4	50.0%
Seychelles		1	0	14	0.0%
Sierra Leone	. 1	3	5	6	25.0%
Singapore	6	5	4	0	54.5%
Slovak Republic	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Slovenia		3	3	0	75.0%
Solomon Islands	9	6	0	0	60.0%
Somalia	0	0	0	15	*
South Africa	. 8	6	1	0	57.1%
Spain	9	4	2	0	69.2%
Sri Lanka	4	7	4	0	36.4%
Sudan		11	3	0	8.3%
Suriname		4	3	0	66.7%
Swaziland	6	4	5	0	60.0%
Sweden		4	1	0	71.4%
Syria		10	2	1	16.7%
Tajikistan		0	5	4	100.0%
Thailand		6	5	0	40.0%
TFYR Macedonia	8	3	4	0	72.7%
Togo		7	5	0	30.0%
Trinidad and Tobago	7	5	2	1	58.3%
Tunisia		6	4	0	45.5%
Turkey		3	3	1	72.7%
Turkmenistan		1	0	14	0.0%
Uganda		6	4	0	45.5%
Ukraine		4	5	0	60.0%
United Arab Emirates	4	5	4	2	44.4%
United Kingdom	. 11	2	2	0	84.6%
U.R. Tanzania		6	5	2	25.0%
Uruguay		4	4	0	63.6%
Uzbekistan		0	2	6	100.0%
Vanuatu		2	2	6	71.4%
Venezuela		5	2	0	61.5%

All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

	ENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ABSTEN		VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	COINCIDENCE
Vietnam	1	9	3	2	10.0%
Yemen	2	5	0	8	28.6%
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	15	*
Zaire	0	1	6	8	0.0%
Zambia	7	6	1	1	53.8%
Zimbabwe	4	6	4	1	40.0%
Average	5.8	4.2	2.9	2.1	57.9%

	DENTICAL	OPPOSIT	E ABSTEN-		VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	COINCIDENCE
Israel	15	0	0	0	100.0%
United Kingdom	11	2	2	0	84.6%
Latvia		1	3	1	90.9%
Poland	10	1	3	1	90.9%
Czech Republic	10	2	3	0	83.3%
Hungary	10	2	3	0	83.3%
Lithuania	10	2	3	0	83.3%
Belgium	10	3	2	0	76.9%
France	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Germany	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Japan	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Monaco	10	3	1	1	76.9%
Netherlands	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Norway	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Slovak Republic	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Austria	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Canada	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Denmark	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Finland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Iceland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Ireland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Italy	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Liechtenstein	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Luxembourg	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Sweden		4	1	0	71.4%
Australia	10	5	0	0	66.7%
New Zealand	10	5	0	0	66.7%

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	. OPPOSITI VOTES			VOTING COINCIDENCE
Georgia	. 9	0	5	1	100.0%
Estonia	. 9	1	2	3	90.0%
Croatia	. 9	2	2	2	81.8%
Romania		2	4	0	81.8%
Argentina		3	3	0	75.0%
El Salvador		3	3	0	75.0%
Malta		3	3	0	75.0%
Slovenia		3	3	0	75.0%
Bulgaria		4	2	0	69.2%
Panama		4	2	0 .	69.2%
Portugal		4	2	0	69.2%
Spain	-	4	2	0	69.2%
Ecuador		5	1	0	64.3%
Honduras	-	5	1	Ö	64.3%
Samoa		6	0	0	60.0%
Solomon Islands	-	6	0	0	60.0%
Micronesia		2	5	0	80.0%
Moldova		2	4	1	80.0%
Albania		3	4	0	72.7%
Bahamas		3	4	0	72.7%
Marshall Islands		3	3	1	72.7%
Russia		3	4	0	72.7%
TFYR Macedonia		3	4	0	72.7%
Turkey		3	3	1	72.7%
Andorra		4	2	1	66.7%
Barbados	-	4	3	0	66.7%
Costa Rica		4	1	2	66.7%
Greece		4	3	0	66.7%
Mauritius		4	3	0	66.7%
Suriname		4	3	0	66.7%
		5	2	0	61.5%
Belize Bolivia		5	2	0	61.5%
		5	2	0	61.5%
Brazil		5	1	1	61.5%
Chile		5 5	2	0	61.5%
Guyana		5	2	0	61.5%
Haiti		5	2	0	61.5%
Jamaica			2	0	
Mongolia	_	5			61.5%
Paraguay		5	1	1	61.5% 61.5%
Peru		5	2	_	
Venezuela	. 8	5	2	0	61.5%

		OPPOSITE	E ABSTEN		VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS		S COINCIDENCE
Botswana		6	1	0	57.1%
Mexico		6	1	0	57.1%
South Africa		6	1	Ö	57.1%
Uzbekistan		0	2	6	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina		3	1	4	70.0%
Dominica		3	2	3	70.0%
Grenada		3	3	2	70.0%
St. Lucia		3	1	4	70.0%
Antigua and Barbuda		4	3	1	63.6%
Armenia		4	3	1	63.6%
Kazakstan		4	4	0	63.6%
		4	4	0	63.6%
Republic of Korea		4	4	0	
Uruguay		-	-	_	63.6%
Cyprus		5	3	0	58.3%
Nicaragua		5	2	1	58.3%
Trinidad and Tobago		5	2	1	58.3%
Zambia		6	1	1	53.8%
Tajikistan		0	5	4	100.0%
St. Vincent-Grenadines		1	1	7	85.7%
San Marino		2	0	7	75.0%
Belarus		3	6	0	66.7%
Swaziland		4	5	0	60.0%
Ukraine		4	5	0	60.0%
Kuwait		5	2	2	54.5%
Singapore	. 6	5	4	0	54.5%
Colombia	. 6	6	3	0	50.0%
Malawi	. 6	6	1	2	50.0%
Guatemala	. 5	1	6	3	83.3%
Vanuatu	. 5	2	2	6	71.4%
Bhutan	. 5	3	6	1	62.5%
Cambodia	. 5	3	5	2	62.5%
Nepal	. 5	3	6	1	62.5%
Egypt	. 5	5	5	0	50.0%
Guinea	. 5	5	4	1	50.0%
Senegal	. 5	5	1	4	50.0%
Algeria	. 5	6	4	0	45.5%
Lesotho		6	4	0	45.5%
Maldives		6	3	1	45.5%
Mali		6	4	0	45.5%
Papua New Guinea		6	4	0	45.5%
Philippines		6	4	0	45.5%
1 Hillippines		U	4	U	40.070

	DENTICAL	OPPOSITE			VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	COINCIDENCE
Saudi Arabia		6	3	1	45.5%
Tunisia		6	4	0	45.5%
Uganda		6	4	0	45.5%
Qatar		7	1	2	41.7%
Rwanda		0	6	5	100.0%
St. Kitts and Nevis		0	3	8	100.0%
Eritrea		2	4	5	66.7%
Gabon		2	8	1	66.7%
Benin		4	7	0	50.0%
Fiji		4	4	3	50.0%
Azerbaijan		5	2	4	44.4%
Bahrain		5	5	1	44.4%
Burundi		5	4	2	44.4%
Cameroon		5	6	0	44.4%
Djibouti		5	1	5	44.4%
Ethiopia		5	5	1	44.4%
Jordan		5	5	1	44.4%
Morocco		5	5	1	44.4%
United Arab Emirates		5	4	2	44.4%
Chad		6	4	1	40.0%
Mauritania		6	4	1	40.0%
Namibia		6	4	1	40.0%
Niger		6	5	0	40.0%
Oman		6	3	2	40.0%
Thailand		6	5	0	40.0%
Zimbabwe		6	4	1	40.0%
Bangladesh		7	4	0	36.4%
Malaysia		7	4	0	36.4%
Sri Lanka		7	4	0	36.4%
Pakistan		8	3	0	33.3%
Indonesia		9	2	0	30.8%
Guinea-Bissau		3	6	.3	50.0%
Kyrgyzstan		3	6	3	50.0%
Madagascar		3	1	8	50.0%
Cape Verde		4	5	3	42.9%
Cote d'Ivoire		4	8	0	42.9%
Mozambique		4	5	3	42.9%
Kenya		5	7	0	37.5%
Burkina Faso		6	6	0	33.3%
Brunei		7	5	0	30.0%
Lebanon		7	4	1	30.0%

COUNTRY	DENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITI			VOTING COINCIDENCE
Togo	3	7	5	0	30.0%
Ghana	. 3	8	4	0	27.3%
India	3	8	4	0	27.3%
Myanmar	3	9	3	0	25.0%
Iran	. 3	11	1	0	21.4%
Equatorial Guinea	2	0	6	7	100.0%
Congo	. 2	2	6	5	50.0%
Gambia	2	4	1	8	33.3%
Yemen	2	5	0	8	28.6%
Afghanistan	2	6	3	4	25.0%
U.R. Tanzania	2	6	5	2	25.0%
Nigeria	2	9	2	2	18.2%
Syria	2	10	2	1	16.7%
Libya	2	12	1	0	14.3%
Angola	. 1	2	6	6	33.3%
Sierra Leone		3	5	6	25.0%
Laos	. 1	6	4	4	14.3%
Cuba	1	9	4	1	10.0%
Vietnam	1	9	3	2	10.0%
China	. 1	10	4	0	9.1%
Sudan	. 1	11	3	0	8.3%
Central African Republic	0	0	0	15	*
Comoros	0	0	0	15	*
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	15	*
Iraq	0	0	0	15	*
Liberia	0	0	0	15	*
Palau	0	0	1	14	0.0%
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	15	*
Somalia	0	0	0	15	*
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	15	*
Seychelles		1	0	14	0.0%
Turkmenistan	0	1	0	14	0.0%
Zaire	0	1	6	8	0.0%
DPR of Korea	. 0	9	4	2	0.0%
Average	5.8	4.2	2.9	2.1	57.9%

UN REGIONAL GROUPS

The following tables show the voting coincidence percentage with U.S. votes on the 15 important votes. They list countries by UN regional groups.

African Group

		. OPPO SI TE			VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	COINCIDENCE
Mauritius	8	4	3	0	66.7%
Botswana	8	6	1	0	57.1%
South Africa	8	6	1	0	57.1%
Zambia	7	6	1	1	53.8%
Swaziland	6	4	5	0	60.0%
Malawi	6	6	1	2	50.0%
Egypt	5	5	5	0	50.0%
Guinea	5	5	4	1	50.0%
Senegal	5	5	1	4	50.0%
Algeria	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Lesotho	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Mali	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Tunisia	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Uganda	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Rwanda	4	0	6	5	100.0%
Eritrea	4	2	4	5 .	66.7%
Gabon	4	2	8	1	66.7%
Benin	4	4	7	0	50.0%
Burundi	4	5	4	2	44.4%
Cameroon	4	5	6	0	44.4%
Djibouti	4	5	1	5	44.4%
Ethiopia	4	5	5	1	44.4%
Morocco	4	5	5	1	44.4%
Chad	4	6	4	1	40.0%
Mauritania	4	6	4	1	40.0%
Namibia	4	6	4	1	40.0%
Niger	4	6	5	0	40.0%
Zimbabwe	4	6	4	1	40.0%
Guinea-Bissau	3	3	6	3	50.0%
Madagascar	3	3	1	8	50.0%
Cape Verde	3	4	5	3	42.9%
Cote d'Ivoire	3	4	8	0	42.9%
Mozambique	3	4	5	3	42.9%

African Group (Cont'd)

IC	DENTICAL	. OPPOSITE	ABSTEN	_	VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	COINCIDENCE
Kenya	3	5	7	0	37.5%
Burkina Faso	3	6	6	0	33.3%
Togo	3	7	5	0	30.0%
Ghana	3	8	4	0	27.3%
Equatorial Guinea	2	0	6	7	100.0%
Congo	2	2	6	5	50.0%
Gambia	2	4	1	8	33.3%
U.R. Tanzania	2	6	5	2	25.0%
Nigeria	2	9	2	2	18.2%
Libya	2	12	1	0	14.3%
Angola	1	2	6	6	33.3%
Sierra Leone	1	3	5	6	25.0%
Sudan	1	11	3	0	8.3%
Central African Republic	0	0	0	15	*
Comoros	0	0	0	15	*
Liberia	0	0	0	15	*
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	15	*
Somalia	0	0	0	15	*
Seychelles	0	1	0	14	0.0%
Zaire	0	1	6	8	0.0%
Average	3.4	4.4	3.7	3.4	43.5%

Asian Group

	IDENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ABSTEN		VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	COINCIDENCE
Japan	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Samoa	9	6	0	0	60.0%
Solomon Islands	9	6	0	0	60.0%
Micronesia	8	2	5	0	80.0%
Marshall Islands	8	3	3	1	72.7%
Mongolia	8	5	2	0	61.5%
Uzbekistan	7	0	2	6	100.0%
Kazakstan	7	4	4	0	63.6%
Republic of Korea	7	4	4	0	63.6%
Cyprus	7	5	3	0	58.3%
Tajikistan	6	0	5	4	100.0%
Kuwait	6	5	2	2	54.5%
Singapore	6	5	4	0	54.5%

Asian Group (Cont'd)

		. OPPOSIT	E ABSTEN-		VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	COINCIDENCE
Vanuatu	. 5	2	2	6	71.4%
Bhutan	. 5	3	6	1	62.5%
Cambodia	. 5	3	5	2	62.5%
Nepal	. 5	3	6	1	62.5%
Maldives	. 5	6	3	1	45.5%
Papua New Guinea	. 5	6	4	0	45.5%
Philippines	. 5	6	4	0	45.5%
Saudi Arabia		6	3	1	45.5%
Qatar	. 5	7	1	2	41.7%
Fiji	. 4	4	4	3	50.0%
Bahrain	. 4	5	5	1	44.4%
Jordan	. 4	5	5	1	44.4%
United Arab Emirates	. 4	5	4	2	44.4%
Oman		6	3	2	40.0%
Thailand		6	5	0	40.0%
Bangladesh		7	4	0	36.4%
Malaysia		7	4	0	36.4%
Sri Lanka		7	4	0	36.4%
Pakistan	. 4	8	3	0	33.3%
Indonesia		9	2	0	30.8%
Kyrgyzstan		3	6	3	50.0%
Brunei		7	5	0	30.0%
Lebanon		7	4	1	30.0%
India	. 3	8	4	0	27.3%
Myanmar		9	3	0	25.0%
Iran		11	1	0	21.4%
Yemen		5	0	8	28.6%
Afghanistan	. 2	6	3	4	25.0%
Syria		10	2	1	16.7%
Laos		6	4	4	14.3%
Vietnam		9	3	2	10.0%
China		10	4	0	9.1%
Iraq		0	0	15	*
Palau		0	1	14	0.0%
Turkmenistan		1	0	14	0.0%
DPR of Korea		9	4	2	0.0%
Average	. 4.4	5.3	3.2	2.1	45.1%

Latin American and Caribbean Group

COUNTRY	DENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING S COINCIDENCE
Argentina	9	3	3	0	75.0%
El Salvador	9	3	3	0	75.0%
Panama	9	4	2	0	69.2%
Ecuador	9	5	1	0	64.3%
Honduras	9	5	1	0	64.3%
Bahamas	8	3	4	0	72.7%
Barbados	8	4	3	0	66.7%
Costa Rica	8	4	1	2	66.7%
Suriname	8	4	3	0	66.7%
Belize	8	5	2	0	61.5%
Bolivia	8	5	2	0	61.5%
Brazil	8	5	2	0	61.5%
Chile	8	5	1	1	61.5%
Guyana	8	5	2	0	61.5%
Haiti	8	5	2	0	61.5%
Jamaica	8	5	2	0	61.5%
Paraguay	8	5	1	1	61.5%
Peru	8	5	2	0	61.5%
Venezuela	8	5	2	0	61.5%
Mexico	8	6	1	0	57.1%
Dominica	7	3	2	3	70.0%
Grenada	7	3	3	2	70.0%
St. Lucia	7	3	1	4	70.0%
Antigua and Barbuda	7	4	3	1	63.6%
Uruguay	7	4	4	0	63.6%
Nicaragua	7	5	2	1	58.3%
Trinidad and Tobago	7	5	2	1	58.3%
St. Vincent-Grenadines	6	1	1	7	85.7%
Colombia	6	6	3	0	50.0%
Guatemala	5	1	6	3	83.3%
St. Kitts and Nevis	4	0	3	8	100.0%
Cuba	1	9	4	1	10.0%
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	15	*
Average	7.2	4.1	2.2	1.5	63.6%

Western European and Others Group (WEOG)

COUNTRY	DENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING COINCIDENCE
United Kingdom	11	2	2	0	84.6%
Belgium	10	3	2	0	76.9%
France	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Germany	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Monaco	10	3	1	1	76.9%
Netherlands	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Norway	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Austria	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Canada	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Denmark	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Finland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Iceland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Ireland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Italy	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Liechtenstein	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Luxembourg	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Sweden	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Australia	10	5	0	0	66.7%
New Zealand	10	5	0	0	66.7%
Malta	9	3	3	0	75.0%
Portugal	9	4	2	0	69.2%
Spain	9	4	2	0	69.2%
Turkey	8	3	3	1	72.7%
Andorra	8	4	2	1	66.7%
Greece	8	4	3	0	66.7%
San Marino	6	2	0	7	75.0%
Average	9.5	3.6	1.5	0.4	72.5%

Eastern European Group

COUNTRY	DENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITI VOTES			VOTING COINCIDENCE
Latvia	10	1	3	1	90.9%
Poland	10	1	3	1	90.9%
Czech Republic	10	2	3	0	83.3%
Hungary	10	2	3	0	83.3%
Lithuania	10	2	3	0	83.3%
Slovak Republic	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Georgia	9	0	5	1	100.0%
Estonia	9	1	2	3	90.0%
Croatia	9	2	2	2	81.8%
Romania	9	2	4	0	81.8%
Slovenia	9	3	3	0	75.0%
Bulgaria	9	4	2	0	69.2%
Moldova	8	2	4	1	80.0%
Albania	8	3	4	0	72.7%
Russia	8	3	4	0	72.7%
TFYR Macedonia	8	3	4	0	72.7%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7	3	1	4	70.0%
Armenia	7	4	3	1	63.6%
Belarus	6	3	6	0	66.7%
Ukraine	6	4	5	0	60.0%
Azerbaijan	4	5	2	4	44.4%
Yugoslavia (S/M)	0	0	0	15	*
Average	8.0	2.4	3.1	1.5	76.9%

OTHER GROUPINGS

The following tables show percentage of coincidence with U.S. votes for other major groups, in rank order by identical votes.

Arab Group

IDENTICAL OPPOSITEABSTEN- VOTING COUNTRY VOTES VOTES TIONS ABSENCESCOINCIDENCE							
Kuwait	6	5	2	2	54.5%		
Egypt	5	5	5	0	50.0%		
Algeria	5	6	4	0	45.5%		
Saudi Arabia	5	6	3	1	45.5%		
Tunisia	5	6	4	0	45.5%		
Qatar	5	7	1	2	41.7%		
Bahrain	4	5	5	1	44.4%		
Djibouti	4	5	1	5	44.4%		
Jordan		5	5	1	44.4%		
Morocco	4	5	5	1	44.4%		
United Arab Emirates	4	5	4	2	44.4%		
Mauritania	4	6	4	1	40.0%		
Oman	4	6	3	2	40.0%		
Lebanon	3	7	4	1	30.0%		
Yemen	2	5	0	8	28.6%		
Syria	2	10	2	1	16.7%		
Libya	2	12	1	0	14.3%		
Sudan	1	11	3	0	8.3%		
Iraq	0	0	0	15	*		
Somalia	0	0	0	15	*		
Average	3.5	5.9	2.8	2.9	37.1%		

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

			•	•	
COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE
Singapore	6	5	4	0	54.5%
Philippines	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Thailand	4	6	5	0	40.0%
Malaysia	4	7	4	0	36.4%
Indonesia	4	9	2	0	30.8%
Brunei	3	7	5	0	30.0%
Average	4.3	6.7	4.0	0.0	39.4%

European Union (EU)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING COINCIDENCE
United Kingdom	11	2	2	0	84.6%
Belgium	10	3	2	0	76.9%
France	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Germany	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Netherlands	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Austria	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Denmark	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Finland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Ireland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Italy	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Luxembourg	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Sweden	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Portugal	9	4	2	0	69.2%
Spain	9	4	2	0	69.2%
Greece	8	4	3	0	66.7%
Average	9.8	3.6	1.6	0.0	73.1%

Islamic Conference

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING COINCIDENCE
Albania	8	3	4	0	72.7%
Turkey	8	3	3	1	72.7%
Tajikistan	6	0	5	4	100.0%
Kuwait	6	5	2	2	54.5%
Egypt	5	5	5	0	50.0%
Guinea	5	5	4	1	50.0%
Senegal	5	5	1	4	50.0%
Algeria	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Maldives	5	6	3	1	45.5%
Mali	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Saudi Arabia	5	6	3	1	45.5%
Tunisia	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Uganda	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Qatar	5	7	1	2	41.7%
Gabon	4	2	8	1	66.7%
Benin	4	4	7	0	50.0%
Azerbaijan	4	5	2	4	44.4%
Bahrain	4	5	5	1	44.4%

III - IMPORTANT VOTES

Islamic Conference (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	DENTICAI VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING COINCIDENCE
Cameroon	4	5	6	 0	44.4%
Djibouti		5	1	5	44.4%
Jordan		5	5	1	44.4%
Morocco		5	5	1	44.4%
United Arab Emirates		5	4	2	44.4%
Chad		6	4	1	40.0%
Mauritania		6	4	1	40.0%
Niger		6	5	0	40.0%
Oman		6	3	2	40.0%
Bangladesh		7	4	0	36.4%
Malaysia		7	4	0	36.4%
Pakistan		8	3	0	33.3%
Indonesia		9	2	0	30.8%
Guinea-Bissau		3	6	3	50.0%
Kyrgyzstan		3	6	3	50.0%
Burkina Faso		6	6	0	33.3%
Brunei		7	5	0	30.0%
Lebanon		7	4	1	30.0%
Iran	_	11	1	0	21.4%
Gambia		4	1	8	33.3%
Yemen		5	0	8	28.6%
Afghanistan		6	3	4	25.0%
U.R. Tanzania		6	5	2	25.0%
Nigeria		9	2	2	18.2%
Syria		10	2	1	16.7%
Libya		12	1	0	14.3%
Sierra Leone		3	5	6	25.0%
Sudan		11	3	0	8.3%
Comoros		0	0	15	*
Iraq	_	0	0	15	*
Somalia		0	0	15	*
Turkmenistan	_	1	0	14	0.0%
Tantinomotari		,			0.070
Average	3.6	5.4	3.4	2.6	40.1%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

		. OPPOSITE			VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES			SCOINCIDENCE
Malta	_	3	3	0	75.0%
Panama		4	2	0	69.2%
Ecuador		5	1	0	64.3%
Honduras		5	1	0	64.3%
		3	4	0	
Bahamas		4		_	72.7%
Barbados		•	3	0	66.7%
Mauritius		4	3	0	66.7%
Suriname		4	3	0	66.7%
Belize		5	2	0	61.5%
Bolivia		5	2	0	61.5%
Chile		5	1	1	61.5%
Guyana		5	2	0	61.5%
Jamaica		5	2	0	61.5%
Mongolia	. 8	5	2	0	61.5%
Peru	. 8	5	2	0	61.5%
Venezuela	. 8	5	2	0	61.5%
Botswana	. 8	6	1	0	57.1%
South Africa	. 8	6	1	0	57.1%
Uzbekistan	. 7	0	2	6	100.0%
Grenada	. 7	3	3	2	70.0%
St. Lucia	. 7	3	1	4	70.0%
Cyprus		5	3	0	58.3%
Nicaragua		5	2	1	58.3%
Trinidad and Tobago		5	2	1	58.3%
Zambia		6	1	1	53.8%
Swaziland		4	5	0	60.0%
Kuwait		5	2	2	54.5%
Singapore		5	4	0	54.5%
Colombia		6	3	0	50.0%
Malawi		6	1	2	50.0%
Guatemala		1	6	3	83.3%
Vanuatu		•	2	6	71.4%
Bhutan		2 3		1	
			6	-	62.5%
Cambodia		3	5	2	62.5%
Nepal	. 5	3	6	1	62.5%
Egypt		5	5	0	50.0%
Guinea		5	4	1	50.0%
Senegal		5	1	4	50.0%
Algeria		6	4	0	45.5%
Lesotho		6	4	0	45.5%
Maldives	. 5	6	3	1	45.5%

III - IMPORTANT VOTES

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITI		ADCENCE	VOTING SCOINCIDENCE
				ADOLINOLO	
Mali	5	6	4	0	45.5%
Papua New Guinea		6	4	0	45.5%
Philippines		6	4	0	45.5%
Saudi Arabia		6	3	1	45.5%
Tunisia		6	4	0	45.5%
Uganda		6	4	0	45.5%
Qatar	_	7	1	2	41.7%
Rwanda		0	6	5	100.0%
Eritrea		2	4	5	66.7%
Gabon		2	8	1	66.7%
Benin		4	7	Ö	50.0%
Bahrain		5	5	1	44.4%
Burundi		5	4	2	44.4%
Cameroon		5	6	0	44.4%
Djibouti		5	1	5	44.4%
•		5	5	1	44.4%
Ethiopia		5	5	1	44.4%
Jordan		5 5	5 5	1	44.4%
Morocco United Arab Emirates			5 4	2	
		5	•	1	44.4%
Chad		6	4	-	40.0%
Mauritania		6	4	1	40.0%
Namibia		6	4	1	40.0%
Niger		6	5	0	40.0%
Oman		6	3	2	40.0%
Thailand		6	5	0	40.0%
Zimbabwe		6	4	1	40.0%
Bangladesh		7	4	0	36.4%
Malaysia		7	4	0	36.4%
Sri Lanka		7	4	0	36.4%
Pakistan		8	3	0	33.3%
Indonesia		9	2	0	30.8%
Guinea-Bissau		3	6	3	50.0%
Madagascar		3	1	8	50.0%
Cape Verde	3	4	5	3	42.9%
Cote d'Ivoire		4	8	0	42.9%
Mozambique	3	4	5	3	42.9%
Kenya	3	5	7	0	37.5%
Burkina Faso	3	6	6	0	33.3%
Brunei	3	7	5	0	30.0%
Lebanon	3	7	4	1	30.0%
Togo	3	7	5	0	30.0%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	DENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING COINCIDENCE
				ADSENCES	
Ghana	. 3	8	4	0	27.3%
India	. 3	8	4	0	27.3%
Myanmar	. 3	9	3	0	25.0%
Iran	. 3	11	1	0	21.4%
Equatorial Guinea	. 2	0	6	7	100.0%
Congo	. 2	2	6	5	50.0%
Gambia	. 2	4	1	8	33.3%
Yemen	. 2	5	0	8	28.6%
Afghanistan	. 2	6	3	4	25.0%
U.R. Tanzania	. 2	6	5	2	25.0%
Nigeria	. 2	9	2	2	18.2%
Syria		10	2	1	16.7%
Libya		12	1	0	14.3%
Angola		2	6	6	33.3%
Sierra Leone		3	5	6	25.0%
Laos	. 1	6	4	4	14.3%
Cuba	. 1	9	4	1	10.0%
Vietnam	. 1	9	3	2	10.0%
Sudan	. 1	11	3	0	8.3%
Central African Republic	. 0	0	0	15	*
Comoros		0	0	15	*
Iraq	. 0	0	0	15	*
Liberia	. 0	0	0	15	*
Sao Tome and Principe	. 0	0	0	15	*
Somalia		0	0	15	*
Yugoslavia (S/M)		0	0	15	*
Seychelles		1	0	14	0.0%
Turkmenistan		1	0	14	0.0%
Zaire		1	6	8	0.0%
DPR of Korea		9	4	2	0.0%
Average	. 4.3	4.9	3.3	2.6	46.8%

III - IMPORTANT VOTES

Nordic Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES			VOTING COINCIDENCE
Norway	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Denmark	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Finland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Iceland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Sweden	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Average	10.0	3.8	1.2	0.0	72.5%

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

	IDENTICAL	OPPOSITE	ABSTEN-		VOTING
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES	TIONS	ABSENCES	COINCIDENCE
United Kingdom	11	2	2	0	84.6%
Belgium	10	3	2	0	76.9%
France	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Germany	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Netherlands	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Norway	10	3	2	0	76.9%
Canada	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Denmark	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Iceland	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Italy	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Luxembourg	10	4	1	0	71.4%
Portugal	9	4	2	0	69.2%
Spain		4	2	0	69.2%
Turkey		3	3	1	72.7%
Greece		4	3	0	66.7%
Average	9.7	3.5	1.8	0.1	73.6%

COMPARISON OF IMPORTANT AND OVERALL VOTES

The following table shows voting coincidence percentage with U.S. votes for both important votes and all plenary votes, in a side-by-side comparison.

COUNTRY ICAL VOTES SITE VOTES PER VOTES ICAL VOTES SITE VOTES PER VOTES Afghanistan 2 6 25.0% 20 43 31.7% Albania 8 3 72.7% 41 18 69.5% Algeria 5 6 45.5% 21 43 32.8% Andorra 8 4 66.7% 39 13 75.0% Angola 1 2 33.3% 12 21 36.4% Antigua and Barbuda 7 4 63.6% 29 29 50.0% Argentina 9 3 75.0% 44 20 68.8% Armenia 7 4 63.6% 37 23 61.7% Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Asabamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 <th></th> <th>PORTANT V</th> <th>OTES</th> <th></th> <th colspan="3">OVERALL VOTES</th>		PORTANT V	OTES		OVERALL VOTES		
COUNTRY VOTES VOTES CENT VOTES CENT Afghanistan 2 6 25.0% 20 43 31.7% Albania 8 3 72.7% 41 18 69.5% Algeria 5 6 45.5% 21 43 32.8% Andorra 8 4 66.7% 39 13 75.0% Angola 1 2 33.3% 12 21 36.4% Antigua and Barbuda 7 4 63.6% 29 29 50.0% Argentina 9 3 75.0% 44 20 68.8% Armenia 7 4 63.6% 37 23 61.7% Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0%	IDENT-		PER	IDENT-	OPPO-	PER	
Albania 8 3 72.7% 41 18 69.5% Algeria 5 6 45.5% 21 43 32.8% Andorra 8 4 66.7% 39 13 75.0% Angola 1 2 33.3% 12 21 36.4% Antigua and Barbuda 7 4 63.6% 29 29 50.0% Argentina 9 3 75.0% 44 20 68.8% Armenia 7 4 63.6% 37 23 61.7% Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahramas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahramas 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3%							
Algeria 5 6 45.5% 21 43 32.8% Andorra 8 4 66.7% 39 13 75.0% Angola 1 2 33.3% 12 21 36.4% Antigua and Barbuda 7 4 63.6% 29 29 50.0% Argentina 9 3 75.0% 44 20 68.8% Armenia 7 4 63.6% 37 23 61.7% Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 35 22 61.4%	Afghanistan 2	6	25.0%	20	43	31.7%	
Andorra 8 4 66.7% 39 13 75.0% Angola 1 2 33.3% 12 21 36.4% Antigua and Barbuda 7 4 63.6% 29 29 50.0% Argentina 9 3 75.0% 44 20 68.8% Armenia 7 4 63.6% 37 23 61.7% Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Balarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6%	Albania 8	3	72.7%	41	18	69.5%	
Angola 1 2 33.3% 12 21 36.4% Antigua and Barbuda 7 4 63.6% 29 29 50.0% Argentina 9 3 75.0% 44 20 68.8% Armenia 7 4 63.6% 37 23 61.7% Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% <tr< td=""><td>Algeria 5</td><td>6</td><td>45.5%</td><td>21</td><td>43</td><td>32.8%</td></tr<>	Algeria 5	6	45.5%	21	43	32.8%	
Antigua and Barbuda 7 4 63.6% 29 29 50.0% Argentina 9 3 75.0% 44 20 68.8% Armenia 7 4 63.6% 37 23 61.7% Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% <tr< td=""><td>Andorra 8</td><td>4</td><td>66.7%</td><td>39</td><td>13</td><td>75.0%</td></tr<>	Andorra 8	4	66.7%	39	13	75.0%	
Argentina 9 3 75.0% 44 20 68.8% Armenia 7 4 63.6% 37 23 61.7% Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bo	Angola 1	2	33.3%	12	21	36.4%	
Armenia 7 4 63.6% 37 23 61.7% Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Beljium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Boliv	Antigua and Barbuda 7	4	63.6%	29	29	50.0%	
Australia 10 5 66.7% 42 28 60.0% Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bossn	Argentina 9	3	75.0%	44	20	68.8%	
Austria 10 4 71.4% 48 18 72.7% Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% <	Armenia 7	4	63.6%	37	23	61.7%	
Azerbaijan 4 5 44.4% 26 24 52.0% Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% <	Australia 10	5	66.7%	42	28	60.0%	
Bahamas 8 3 72.7% 34 31 52.3% Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% B	Austria 10	4	71.4%	48	18	72.7%	
Bahrain 4 5 44.4% 26 43 37.7% Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bu	Azerbaijan 4	5	44.4%	26	24	52.0%	
Bangladesh 4 7 36.4% 29 44 39.7% Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% B	Bahamas 8	3	72.7%	34	31	52.3%	
Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% <td< td=""><td>Bahrain 4</td><td>5</td><td>44.4%</td><td>26</td><td>43</td><td>37.7%</td></td<>	Bahrain 4	5	44.4%	26	43	37.7%	
Barbados 8 4 66.7% 36 28 56.3% Belarus 6 3 66.7% 35 22 61.4% Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% <td< td=""><td>Bangladesh 4</td><td>7</td><td>36.4%</td><td>29</td><td>44</td><td>39.7%</td></td<>	Bangladesh 4	7	36.4%	29	44	39.7%	
Belgium 10 3 76.9% 49 15 76.6% Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% <td< td=""><td></td><td>4</td><td>66.7%</td><td>36</td><td>28</td><td>56.3%</td></td<>		4	66.7%	36	28	56.3%	
Belize 8 5 61.5% 34 33 50.7% Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% <td< td=""><td>Belarus 6</td><td>3</td><td>66.7%</td><td>35</td><td>22</td><td>61.4%</td></td<>	Belarus 6	3	66.7%	35	22	61.4%	
Benin 4 4 50.0% 26 42 38.2% Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5% <td>Belgium 10</td> <td>3</td> <td>76.9%</td> <td>49</td> <td>15</td> <td>76.6%</td>	Belgium 10	3	76.9%	49	15	76.6%	
Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%	Belize 8	5	61.5%	34	33	50.7%	
Bhutan 5 3 62.5% 28 30 48.3% Bolivia 8 5 61.5% 36 43 45.6% Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%	Benin 4	4	50.0%	26	42	38.2%	
Bosnia-Herzegovina 7 3 70.0% 33 16 67.3% Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%	Bhutan 5	3	62.5%	28	30	48.3%	
Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%	Bolivia 8	5	61.5%	36	43	45.6%	
Botswana 8 6 57.1% 35 41 46.1% Brazil 8 5 61.5% 30 43 41.1% Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%		3	70.0%	33	16	67.3%	
Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%	_	6	57.1%	35	41	46.1%	
Brunei 3 7 30.0% 30 44 40.5% Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%	Brazil 8	5	61.5%	30	43	41.1%	
Bulgaria 9 4 69.2% 47 17 73.4% Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%		7	30.0%	30	44	40.5%	
Burkina Faso 3 6 33.3% 23 46 33.3% Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%		4	69.2%	47	17	73.4%	
Burundi 4 5 44.4% 22 39 36.1% Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%		6					
Cambodia 5 3 62.5% 29 31 48.3% Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%							
Cameroon 4 5 44.4% 27 43 38.6% Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%		3		29	31		
Canada 10 4 71.4% 50 18 73.5%		5		27	43		
		4		50	18		
		4	42.9%	22	41	34.9%	

III - IMPORTANT VOTES

	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENT- ICAL	OPPO- SITE	PER	IDENT- ICAL	OPPO- SITE	PER
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		VOTES	VOTES	CENT
Central African Rep.		0	*	0	0	*
Chad		6	40.0%	26	42	38.2%
Chile		5	61.5%	36	44	45.0%
China	1	10	9.1%	14	51	21.5%
Colombia	6	6	50.0%	29	46	38.7%
Comoros	0	0	*	0	0	*
Congo		2	50.0%	22	31	41.5%
Costa Rica	8	4	66.7%	29	32	47.5%
Cote d'Ivoire	3	4	42.9%	26	39	40.0%
Croatia	9	2	81.8%	39	13	75.0%
Cuba	1	9	10.0%	9	53	14.5%
Cyprus	7	5	58.3%	34	39	46.6%
Czech Republic	10	2	83.3%	48	14	77.4%
DPR of Korea	0	9	0.0%	4	42	8.7%
Denmark	10	4	71.4%	49	19	72.1%
Djibouti	4	5	44.4%	21	45	31.8%
Dominica	7	3	70.0%	14	16	46.7%
Dominican Republic	0	0	*	0	0	*
Ecuador	9	5	64.3%	36	40	47.4%
Egypt	5	5	50.0%	23	46	33.3%
El Salvador	9	3	75.0%	36	39	48.0%
Equatorial Guinea	2	0	100.0%	19	5	79.2%
Eritrea	4	2	66.7%	33	23	58.9%
Estonia	9	1	90.0%	45	10	81.8%
Ethiopia	4	5	44.4%	32	38	45.7%
Fiji		4	50.0%	31	30	50.8%
Finland	10	4	71.4%	49	13	79.0%
France	10	3	76.9%	50	15	76.9%
Gabon	4	2	66.7%	25	39	39.1%
Gambia	2	4	33.3%	3	6	33.3%
Georgia		0	100.0%	48	8	85.7%
Germany		3	76.9%	50	15	76.9%
Ghana		8	27.3%	21	43	32.8%
Greece		4	66.7%	45	20	69.2%
Grenada		3	70.0%	17	11	60.7%
Guatemala		1	83.3%	30	35	46.2%
Guinea		5	50.0%	28	41	40.6%
Guinea-Bissau		3	50.0%	20	35	36.4%
Guyana	8	5	61.5%	36	38	48.6%
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	IMPORTANT VOTES IDENT- OPPO-			OVERALL VOTES IDENT- OPPO-			
COUNTRY	ICAL VOTES	SITE	PER	ICAL VOTES	SITE VOTES	PER CENT	
Haiti	. 8	5	61.5%	29	44	39.7%	
Honduras	. 9	5	64.3%	37	44	45.7%	
Hungary		2	83.3%	49	10	83.1%	
Iceland	. 10	4	71.4%	49	16	75.4%	
India		8	27.3%	11	53	17.2%	
Indonesia	. 4	9	30.8%	24	48	33.3%	
Iran	. 3	11	21.4%	18	48	27.3%	
Iraq	. 0	0	*	0	0	*	
Ireland		4	71.4%	46	20	69.7%	
Israel	. 15	0	100.0%	64	2	97.0%	
Italy	. 10	4	71.4%	49	17	74.2%	
Jamaica		5	61.5%	36	36	50.0%	
Japan	. 10	3	76.9%	46	15	75.4%	
Jordan		5	44.4%	28	44	38.9%	
Kazakstan		4	63.6%	38	25	60.3%	
Kenya	. 3	5	37.5%	26	39	40.0%	
Kuwait		5	54.5%	30	44	40.5%	
Kyrgyzstan		3	50.0%	19	15	55.9%	
Laos		6	14.3%	17	46	27.0%	
Latvia	. 10	1	90.9%	47	7	87.0%	
Lebanon		7	30.0%	16	46	25.8%	
Lesotho		6	45.5%	26	30	46.4%	
Liberia		0	*	0	0	*	
Libya		12	14.3%	16	55	22.5%	
Liechtenstein		4	71.4%	47	18	72.3%	
Lithuania		2	83.3%	47	11	81.0%	
Luxembourg		4	71.4%	50	17	74.6%	
Madagascar		3	50.0%	23	28	45.1%	
Malawi		6	50.0%	25	40	38.5%	
Malaysia		7	36.4%	28	43	39.4%	
Maldives		6	45.5%	30	41	42.3%	
Mali		6	45.5%	25	44	36.2%	
Malta		3	75.0%	45	21	68.2%	
Marshall Islands		3	72.7%	41	22	65.1%	
Mauritania		6	40.0%	27	44	38.0%	
Mauritius		4	66.7%	34	45	43.0%	
Mexico		6	57.1%	32	45	41.6%	
Micronesia		2	80.0%	40	20	66.7%	
Moldova		2	80.0%	44	16	73.3%	
		_	00.070		, 0	, 0.0 /0	

III - IMPORTANT VOTES

		IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENT- ICAL	OPPO- SITE	PER	IDENT- ICAL	OPPO- SITE	PER	
COUNTRY	VOTES	VOTES		VOTES	VOTES	CENT	
Monaco	10	3	76.9%	47	15	75.8%	
Mongolia	8	5	61.5%	35	38	47.9%	
Morocco		5	44.4%	26	38	40.6%	
Mozambique		4	42.9%	23	33	41.1%	
Myanmar		9	25.0%	17	50	25.4%	
Namibia		6	40.0%	28	32	46.7%	
Nepal		3	62.5%	32	37	46.4%	
Netherlands		3	76.9%	50	12	80.6%	
New Zealand		5	66.7%	43	24	64.2%	
Nicaragua		5	58.3%	34	39	46.6%	
Niger		6	40.0%	26	46	36.1%	
Nigeria		9	18.2%	22	48	31.4%	
Norway		3	76.9%	47	12	79.7%	
Oman		6	40.0%	25	46	35.2%	
Pakistan	4	8	33.3%	19	48	28.4%	
Palau	0	0	0.0%	2	1	66.7%	
Panama		4	69.2%	37	41	47.4%	
Papua New Guinea	5	6	45.5%	34	38	47.2%	
Paraguay	8	5	61.5%	32	30	51.6%	
Peru	8	5	61.5%	34	39	46.6%	
Philippines	5	6	45.5%	32	41	43.8%	
Poland	10	1	90.9%	48	14	77.4%	
Portugal	9	4	69.2%	48	19	71.6%	
Qatar		7	41.7%	24	49	32.9%	
Republic of Korea	7	4	63.6%	36	20	64.3%	
Romania	9	2	81.8%	45	15	75.0%	
Russia	8	3	72.7%	38	14	73.1%	
Rwanda		0	100.0%	25	22	53.2%	
St. Kitts and Nevis	4	0	100.0%	5	1	83.3%	
St. Lucia		3	70.0%	18	16	52.9%	
St. Vincent-Gren	6	1	85.7%	11	2	84.6%	
Samoa	9	6	60.0%	40	32	55.6%	
San Marino	6	2	75.0%	13	7	65.0%	
Sao Tome-Principe		0	*	0	0	*	
Saudi Arabia	5	6	45.5%	23	47	32.9%	
Senegal		5	50.0%	28	45	38.4%	
Seychelles	0	1	0.0%	1	3	25.0%	
Sierra Leone	1	3	25.0%	11	25	30.6%	
Singapore	6	5	54.5%	31	40	43.7%	

ır	IMPO DENT-	PORTANT VOTES OPPO-			OVERALL VOTES IDENT- OPPO-		
	ICAL	SITE	PER	ICAL	SITE	PER	
	OTES	VOTES		VOTES	VOTES	CENT	
Slovak Republic	10	3	76.9%	48	15	76.2%	
Slovenia	9	3	75.0%	45	12	78.9%	
Solomon Islands	9	6	60.0%	40	32	55.6%	
Somalia	0	0	*	0	0	*	
South Africa	8	6	57.1%	36	40	47.4%	
Spain	9	4	69.2%	47	20	70.1%	
Sri Lanka	4	7	36.4%	25	44	36.2%	
Sudan	1	11	8.3%	15	54	21.7%	
Suriname	8	4	66.7%	34	34	50.0%	
Swaziland	6	4	60.0%	35	34	50.7%	
Sweden	10	4	71.4%	47	19	71.2%	
Syria	2	10	16.7%	13	52	20.0%	
Tajikistan	6	0	100.0%	21	2	91.3%	
Thailand	4	6	40.0%	28	42	40.0%	
TFYR Macedonia	8	3	72.7%	46	13	78.0%	
Togo	3	7	30.0%	24	46	34.3%	
Trinidad and Tobago .	7	5	58.3%	33	35	48.5%	
Tunisia	5	6	45.5%	26	46	36.1%	
Turkey	8	3	72.7%	48	20	70.6%	
Turkmenistan	0	1	0.0%	13	4	76.5%	
Uganda	5	6	45.5%	28	42	40.0%	
Ukraine	6	4	60.0%	34	23	59.6%	
United Arab Emirates	4	5	44.4%	26	43	37.7%	
United Kingdom	•	2	84.6%	57	10	85.1%	
U.R. Tanzania	2	6	25.0%	20	36	35.7%	
Uruguay	7	4	63.6%	35	41	46.1%	
Uzbekistan	7	0	100.0%	12	2	85.7%	
Vanuatu	5	2	71.4%	23	34	40.4%	
Venezuela	8	5	61.5%	33	44	40.4%	
Vietnam	1	9	10.0%	12	52	18.8%	
	2	9 5		22	5≥ 43	33.8%	
Yemen(S/M)	0	0	28.6%	22 0	43 0	33.8% *	
Yugoslavia (S/M)	_	1	0.0%	18	22		
Zaire	0	6				45.0%	
Zambia	7		53.8%	33	41	44.6%	
Zimbabwe	4	6	40.0%	25	43	36.8%	
Average	5.8	4.2	57.9%	29.7	29.0	50.6%	



IV - GENERAL ASSEMBLY — CONSENSUS ACTIONS

Of the 282 resolutions adopted by the 50th UNGA in 1995, 216 (76.6%) were by consensus. In addition, 77 of 80 decisions were adopted by consensus. Combining resolutions and decisions, the percentage of those adopted by consensus was 80.9%. The percentage of resolutions adopted by consensus thus remains at approximately last year's level, but is significantly higher than in the earlier years for which these reports have been compiled. The number of plenary votes is considerably below what it was just a few years ago. The number of plenary votes on resolutions and decisions is less than half the total eight years earlier at the 42nd UNGA.

The following table illustrates these developments:

Resolutions and Decisions

UNGA	Votes	Consensus	Total	Percentage Consensus
50th	70 66	293 301 298 265	362 371 364 343	80.9% 81.1% 81.9% 77.3%
46th		272 297 272 245 224	348 387 391 383 378	78.2% 76.7% 69.6% 64.0% 60.6%

The important resolutions listed and discussed below were adopted by consensus at the 50th UNGA. All were selected on the same basis used in determining important votes discussed in Section III above, i.e., they were "issues which directly affected United States interests and on which the United States lobbied intensively."

This section has two parts. The first lists and describes the 22 important consensus resolutions adopted at the 50th UNGA. The second statistically incorporates these important consensus resolutions with important votes at the 50th UNGA to provide a different perspective on the degree of support for U.S. positions at the United Nations.

IMPORTANT CONSENSUS RESOLUTIONS

The following 22 consensus agreements are identified by shortened titles. Each listing provides the resolution number, date of adoption, a summary description, and an explanation of the U.S. position. The resolutions are listed in numerical order.

1. Establishment of an International Criminal Court

A/Res/50/46 December 11

Establishes a preparatory committee open to all UN member states and specialized agencies to discuss further the major substantive and administrative issues arising out of the International Law Commission's draft statute for an international criminal court; and decides that the committee shall meet in two sessions of three weeks each in 1996.

The United States supported the resolution, which provides for further discussions among governments on the question of establishment of an international criminal court. These discussions will lead to further consideration by the General Assembly of whether to convene a diplomatic conference to finalize the statute.

2. UN Convention on Financial Guarantees

A/Res/50/47 December 11

Adopts and opens for ratification the multilateral Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, achieved after five years of negotiations, unifying the standards in international trade for U.S.-law based letters of credit and European-law based bank guarantees; the Convention's final text adopts the U.S. approach of "firm" guarantees, thus permitting such instruments to be used in trade as collateral, thereby increasing available finance sources for commerce.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, which is consistent with U.S. efforts to upgrade international banking law standards to reflect current practices in international commerce and thereby facilitate trade.

3. Host Country Relations

A/Res/50/49 December 11

Recognizes the key role of the United States, as host country, in ensuring the security and normal functioning of UN missions in the United States; and supports the efforts of the United Nations and the

host country to combat the problem of financial indebtedness of missions and diplomats.

The United States joined consensus on this resolution, which reflects U.S. efforts to carry out its host country obligations.

4. Compliance with Arms Limitation Obligations

A/Res/50/60 December 12

Urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the spirit and all the provisions of such agreements; encourages efforts by parties to develop additional cooperative measures that can increase confidence in compliance with obligations and reduce the possibility of misunderstanding; and notes the contribution that verification experiments and research have made in improving verification procedures, thereby enhancing confidence in such procedures as a basis for determining compliance.

The United States introduced this resolution on compliance with arms agreements, a U.S. priority in the United Nations since 1983. The issue of compliance is of fundamental importance to international security and world order.

5. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

A/Res/50/65 December 12

Welcomes the continuing efforts in multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) and urges all participants, as a task of the highest priority, to conclude a universal and verifiable treaty that contributes to nuclear disarmament and prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons so as to enable its signature at the 51st session of the General Assembly in 1996.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, which urges completion of the treaty as soon as possible in 1996. It maintains the momentum of the negotiations and advances the U.S. goal of reaching a universal and effectively verifiable treaty.

6. Moratorium on Export of Anti-Personnel Land Mines

A/Res/50/70 O December 12

Urges states to declare moratoria on the export of anti-personnel land mines; welcomes moratoria already declared; emphasizes the importance of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or Have Indiscriminate Effects as the authoritative instrument governing

the use of anti-personnel land mines; encourages the widest possible accession to the Convention; and encourages further efforts to seek solutions to the problems caused by such mines, with a view to their eventual elimination.

The United States introduced this resolution, with a record number of cosponsors (111), noting that it builds on the momentum of the past two years, calls on governments to adopt moratoria on the transfer of anti-personnel land mines, and calls for concrete steps leading to the eventual elimination of such weapons. This is a goal first proposed by President Clinton in his speech to the General Assembly in 1994 and reaffirmed in 1995.

7. Excessively Injurious Weapons

A/Res/50/74 December 12

Welcomes the fact that additional states have ratified or accepted the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on use of certain excessively injurious conventional weapons; urgently calls on all states that have not done so to become parties; commends the protocol on blinding laser weapons to all states with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument; and calls upon states to intensify their efforts to conclude negotiations on a strengthened protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on use of mines, booby traps, and other devices.

The United States joined consensus on this resolution because it moves forward the task of restricting the use of certain conventional weapons deemed to be inhumane.

8. Chemical and Biological Weapons

A/Res/50/79 December 12

Calls on all parties to the convention on biological and toxin weapons to participate in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference; welcomes the work done by the ad hoc group to consider measures, including possible verification measures, to strengthen the convention; notes that a Fourth Review Conference will be held in Geneva in November-December 1996, and a preparatory committee for the conference will meet in Geneva in April 1996; and calls on all signatory states that have not yet ratified the convention to do so without delay.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, which maintains the momentum toward a global, verifiable ban on such weapons, a major U.S. arms control objective.

9. Assistance in Mine Clearance

A/Res/50/82 December 14

Welcomes UN efforts to foster establishment of national mineclearance capacities in countries where mines constitute a serious threat, and urges states to assist such countries; appeals to states to continue to contribute to a UN fund for assistance in mine clearance; urges states and organizations to provide to the Secretary General information useful in strengthening the coordination role of the United Nations in mine awareness, training, detection, and clearance; and calls upon states that have the capacity to do so, to help locate, remove, or destroy mines, in accordance with international law.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, which represents increased global cooperation in the task of eliminating the proliferation and indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel land mines. It complements the U.S. initiative on export moratoria on anti-personnel land mines and the U.S.-cosponsored resolution on excessively injurious weapons.

10. Situation in Haiti

A/Res/50/86 December 15

Commends the Haitian authorities on the progress accomplished in the advance of democracy, respect for human rights, and reconstruction; expresses readiness to extend the UN component of the International Civilian Mission to Haiti beyond February 7, 1996; expresses confidence that the forthcoming presidential election will further strengthen democracy; reaffirms the commitment of the international community to increase its technical, economic, and financial cooperation with Haiti in support of its economic and social development efforts and to strengthen Haitian institutions responsible for dispensing justice and guaranteeing democracy, respect for human rights, political stability, and economic development; and commends the contribution of the Organization of American States to strengthening democratic institutions, including through election monitoring.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, which reflects U.S. policy and efforts to restore democracy in Haiti.

11. External Debt Problems of Developing Countries

A/Res/50/92 December 20

Recognizes that equitable, development-oriented, and durable solutions to the external debt problems of developing countries can

contribute substantially to the strengthening of the global economy and to the efforts of developing countries to achieve sustainable development; recognizes that the evolving debt strategy has to be supplemented by appropriate external financial flows to indebted countries: emphasizes the importance for developing countries of continuing their efforts to promote a favorable climate for attracting foreign investment. and stresses the need for the international community to improve market access, stabilize exchange rates, and improve access to technology for the developing countries; stresses the importance of implementation of the Naples terms, agreed upon in the Paris Club in December 1994, for the poorest and most indebted countries; encourages private creditors to continue efforts to address commercial debt problems of middleincome developing countries: stresses the need for wide implementation of debt-relief measures through debt conversion programs, such as debt-equity swaps, debt-for-nature swaps, and debt-for-development swaps; urges creditor countries and multilateral financial institutions to continue to extend concessional financial assistance to support economic reforms, stabilization, and structural adjustment programs so as to enable developing countries to extricate themselves from the debt overhang: stresses the need for expeditious conclusion of the work of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in addressing the problems of low-income countries undertaking strong adjustment and reform programs; recognizes that the evolving debt strategy must be accompanied by a favorable international environment, including full implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations; and underscores the need for encouragement of private flows to all countries.

The United States was able to join consensus on this resolution because it was balanced in character, acknowledging the concerns of the heavily indebted countries while fully respecting the rights of the donors and the prerogatives of the individual lending institutions that assist developing countries. The resolution also, and most importantly, does justice to those measures best suited to resuming or maintaining sustainable economic growth in any country: stability, sound macroeconomic policy, a favorable investment climate, accessible markets, environmental protection, and participation in international trade. The United States did, however, express its reservations on paragraphs that included the Group of 77 concept of sustained economic growth and sustainable development. The U.S. view is that sustained economic growth can take place only in the context of sustainable development.

12. Program of Action for Least Developed Countries

A/Res/50/103 December 20

Reaffirms the Program of Action as the basis for continuing cooperation between the least developed countries, which have the responsibility for their own development, and their development partners, based on shared responsibility and strengthened partnership; calls on governments, organizations, financial institutions, and investment funds to implement the Program of Action to ensure economic growth and sustainable development in the least developed countries and to enable them to participate in the process of globalization and liberalization; notes that many least developed countries have been implementing courageous and far-reaching reforms and adjustment measures, and emphasizes the need for national policies aimed at establishing economic stability by rationalizing public expenditures and adopting sound monetary and fiscal policies so as to ensure a dynamic private sector; urges donor countries to implement their commitments, including aid targets, so as to provide a substantial increase in the level of external support; stresses the importance of grant-based programs and the need to ensure adequate replenishment of the International Development Association and the soft-term windows of the regional development banks; emphasizes the need to alleviate the debt burden of the least developed countries and to increase concessional financing; and calls for significantly improved market access for the products of the least developed countries.

The United States was able to join consensus on this resolution introduced by the Group of 77 countries because it notes the responsibility of countries for their own development and emphasizes the need for sound monetary and fiscal policies and a dynamic private sector in the countries being assisted by the Program of Action.

13. Business and Development

A/Res/50/106 December 20

Values the promotion of entrepreneurship in the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and industries, and of privatization, demonopolization, and the simplification of administrative procedures; calls for completion of the draft international agreement on illicit payments; and encourages private-sector involvement in the construction, use, and maintenance of infrastructure.

The United States introduced this resolution. It promotes private enterprise, in continuation of the U.S. effort begun in 1988. The purpose is to revitalize economies and promote development through free enter-

prise and market opportunities. It revives UN activity for completion of the draft UN agreement on illicit payments.

14. Special Session on UNCED and Agenda 21

A/Res/50/113 December 20

Decides to convene a one-week special session in June 1997 at the highest possible level of participation and with participation by all relevant bodies; asks the Secretary General to prepare a comprehensive report containing an overall assessment of the progress achieved in the implementation of Agenda 21 since the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), as well as recommendations for future actions and priorities, such report to include sectoral assessments, country profiles, emerging trends and issues, and follow-up recommendations; asks the Secretary General to mount a public information program to raise global awareness of the special session; and decides to keep preparations for the special session within the agreed level of the 1996-1997 budget.

The United States, one of the prime movers in efforts to protect and improve the world environment, joined consensus on this resolution, which convenes a special session of the General Assembly to assess progress made and recommend future work to promote improvement and protection of the environment and environmentally sound economic development. The United States would have preferred, however, to conduct a General Assembly review of the follow-up to UNCED during the regular session of the Assembly.

15. Triennial Review of UN Operational Activities for Development

A/Res/50/120 December 20

Regrets that there has not been any substantial increase in resources for operational activities for development on a predictable, continuous, and assured basis; urges developed countries to increase substantially their official development assistance, including contributions to the operational activities of the UN system; emphasizes that recipient governments have the primary responsibility for coordinating, on the basis of national strategies and priorities, all types of external assistance in order to integrate such assistance effectively into their development process; urges UN development agencies to continue efforts to develop an agreed division of responsibility; reaffirms that the country strategy note remains a voluntary initiative of recipient countries that should be formulated by recipient countries in accordance with their development plans and priorities; decides that the country strategy note, where in place, should be the common framework for country pro-

grams of UN system organizations; decides that the UN system, where requested, should assist in strengthening the capacity of civil societies and nongovernmental organizations involved in development work; requests that the UN system strengthen efforts in monitoring and evaluations; asks the Secretary General to undertake work to enable a more effective response to the needs of recipient countries, to consider ways of enhancing coordination, to identify ways of encouraging wider participation in the pool of candidates for resident coordinator positions, to develop guidelines for staff performance appraisal, including their contribution to UN system coordination, and to consider gender balance when making appointments, particularly at senior levels and in the field; and decides that an evaluation of the impact of activities for development should be conducted, with progress reports in 1996 and 1997.

The United States welcomed the progress made on the country strategy note and the program approach, but stressed the need for greater attention to evaluation, capacity building, and the resident coordinator system. This resolution contains focused and useful recommendations in these three areas. The resolution also emphasizes recipient-state responsibility for development and planning, the need for coordination of development efforts, and the need to eliminate duplication.

16. Situation in Central America

A/Res/50/132 December 20

Commends the efforts of the peoples and governments of the Central American countries to consolidate peace and promote sustainable development by implementing the agreements adopted at the summit meetings; supports the decision of the presidents of the Central American countries to declare Central America a region of peace, freedom, democracy, and development, and encourages the initiatives of the Central American countries to consolidate governments that base their development on democracy, peace, cooperation, and respect for human rights; draws attention to the decision of the presidents of the Central American countries in which the Alliance for Sustainable Development of Central America hopes to become, with the support of the international community, an example of sustainable development for other regions; emphasizes the work accomplished by the Central American Integration System; supports the concern of the Central American countries to create a new model of regional security based on a reasonable balance of forces and the preeminence of civil authority; encourages the Security Commission to pursue negotiations for the preparation of the treaty on democratic security in Central America with a view to establishment of a new model of regional security; stresses the importance of intensifying negotiations between the Government of

Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca with a view to reaching a firm and lasting peace agreement, thus completing the peace process in Central America; asks the Secretary General, UN organizations, and the international community to continue their support for the peace process and hence for efforts to promote national reconciliation, democracy, and development in Guatemala; welcomes the Contadora Declaration signed on August 22, 1995, by the political forces of Guatemala, in which they committed themselves to assuring that the government which will take office on January 14, 1996, will respect the agreements already reached in the peace process and will make every effort to bring that process to an early and successful conclusion; calls upon the Government of El Salvador and all the political forces involved in the peace process to complete the implementation of all remaining aspects of the peace agreement; notes with satisfaction the establishment by the Secretary General of a trust fund for the UN Mission in El Salvador and the extension of the Mission's mandate for six months from October 31, 1995, in order to continue to observe and monitor the implementation of the remaining commitments; recognizes the achievements made by the people and Government of Nicaragua in their efforts to consolidate peace, democracy, and reconciliation, as well as the importance of reaching a national understanding in order to define a national development strategy through political dialogue and consultation among all sectors of the country; and reiterates the importance of the support of the UN system through its operational activities to facilitate development and to strengthen peace, and urges the international community to lend its support.

The United States supported this resolution, which recognizes the steps made toward peace, democracy, and development in the countries of this region that is important to U.S. security.

17. New Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990s

A/Res/50/160 December 22

Reaffirms the need for effective implementation of the New Agenda, calls on donor countries to fulfill their aid commitments, and calls on African countries to implement the measures necessary to achieve the goals of the New Agenda; decides to establish an ad hoc committee of the whole of the 50th session of the General Assembly to prepare a mid-term review in 1996 of the implementation of the New Agenda; decides that the ad hoc committee should meet for 10 days in September 1996 to prepare the mid-term review on the basis of a report to be prepared by the Secretary General; decides that the ad hoc committee should submit its findings to the General Assembly at its 51st session and propose concrete measures and recommendations for

sustained economic growth and sustainable development in Africa beyond the 1990s; and asks the Secretary General to include in his report specific information on the projected total resource requirements needed system-wide, the amount expected to be mobilized, and proposals to address any resource gaps.

The United States, a leading supporter of international efforts to assist the economies of Africa, joined consensus on this resolution, which renews the commitment of the international community to support Africa's own efforts to achieve economic growth, and which notes the urgent need for African countries to increase and mobilize internal resources for development by promoting domestic savings, improving banking facilities, and increasing capital formation.

18. Rape and Abuse of Women in Areas of Armed Conflict

A/Res/50/192 December 22

Strongly condemns the abhorrent practice of rape and abuse of women in the areas of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which constitutes a war crime; expresses outrage that the systematic practice of rape has been used as a weapon of war and an instrument of ethnic cleansing; calls upon states to protect women from such acts and to strengthen mechanisms to investigate and punish all those responsible; and reminds states of their obligation to cooperate with the international tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of using rape as a weapon of war.

The United States cosponsored this resolution to highlight its deep concern regarding this heinous practice and its use as a deliberate weapon of war.

19. Human Rights in Myanmar (Burma)

A/Res/50/194 December 22

Deplores the continued violations of human rights in Myanmar; calls for the unconditional and immediate release of political prisoners; urges the Government of Myanmar to engage in a substantive dialogue with political leaders as the best means to promote national reconciliation and restoration of democracy; expresses concern that most representatives elected in 1990 are still excluded from participating in meetings of the National Convention created to draft a new constitution; urges the Government of Myanmar to allow all citizens to participate freely in the political process and to accelerate the process of transition to democracy; urges an end to human rights violations: torture, abuse of women, forced labor, forced relocations, enforced disappearances, and sum-

mary executions; and encourages the Government of Myanmar to create conditions to end the flow of refugees to neighboring countries and facilitate their voluntary return and reintegration.

The United States joined consensus on this resolution, which calls international attention to the abysmal human rights situation and the shortcomings of the political process in Burma. Unlike last year, however, the United States could not cosponsor the resolution because it did not deal with some issues precisely or urgently enough: it did not reflect the failure of the Burmese army to honor the ceasefire fully; it did not include the language adopted by the Human Rights Commission encouraging the Secretary General to hold discussions with the Burmese Government for the purpose of stimulating progress towards democratization and national reconciliation; it did not make specific mention of the decision of the International Labor Organization to condemn Burma's continued use of forced labor for military and civilian infrastructure projects; and it did not give sufficiently specific and urgent attention to the expulsion of the National League for Democracy from the National Convention, which is the mechanism for drafting a new constitution and facilitating a transition to democracy.

20. Implementing Outcome of Fourth World Conference on Women

A/Res/50/203 December 22

Takes note of the report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, as adopted on September 15, 1995; endorses the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action as adopted by the Conference; calls upon states, the UN system, and others to implement the Platform for Action, in particular by promoting an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective at all levels, including in the design, monitoring, and evaluation of all policies in order to ensure effective implementation of the Platform; stresses that governments should take a leading role in coordinating, monitoring, and assessing progress in the advancement of women; emphasizes that governments should develop comprehensive implementation strategies or plans of action to implement the Platform for Action; calls upon governments to create or strengthen national machinery for the advancement of women; encourages nongovernmental organizations to contribute to the design and implementation of these national plans of action; recognizes that creation of an enabling environment is necessary to ensure full participation of women in economic activities; reaffirms that implementation of the Platform for Action will require action by all to create a peaceful, just, and humane world based on all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the principle of equality for all people of all ages and from all walks of life, and, to this end, recognizes that broad-based

and sustained economic growth in the context of sustainable development is necessary to sustain social development and social justice; considers that an enhanced framework for international cooperation for gender-related issues must be developed during 1995-2000; decides that the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Commission on the Status of Women shall constitute a three-tiered intergovernmental mechanism that will play the primary role in the overall policy-making and follow-up, and in coordinating the implementation and monitoring of the Platform for Action; and asks the Secretary General to assume responsibility for the coordination of policy in the United Nations for implementation of the Platform for Action and the mainstreaming of a system-wide gender perspective in all activities of the UN system.

The United States, which has been among the countries in the forefront of efforts to promote the advancement of women, actively supported this resolution and joined consensus on it.

21. UN Common System

A/Res/50/208 December 23

Decides to defer consideration of a portion of the report of the International Civil Service Commission regarding remuneration for professional staff and asks the Commission to review its recommendation and conclusions therein, taking into account views expressed by member states in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly,

The United States, believing that the Commission used an inappropriate methodology in concluding that a salary increase was needed to recruit or retain qualified professional staff, strongly opposed the ICSC's recommendation, and succeeded in deferring its consideration.

22. Budget for 1996-1997

A/Res/50/215 December 23

Adopts a program budget for the biennium 1996-1997 in the amount of \$2.608 billion.

The United States did not endorse the budget level adopted, but did not block its adoption for several reasons. First, this agreement on the budget acknowledges the need to reduce low-priority spending. Second, the proposed 9% pay increase for professional UN staff was not accepted, and funds to implement it were not included in the budget. Finally, this budget resolution includes a number of significant reform measures, including provisions for a review to increase outsourcing of services and for strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

The budget is higher than what the United States preferred and recommended. But, being below the level of expenditures for UN programs during the 1994-1995 period, it is a true no-growth budget, which is unprecedented and a sharp departure from past practice.

COINCIDENCE PERCENTAGES

Tables below consolidate statistically the 15 important votes, discussed in Section III, with the 22 important consensus agreements above. They are meant to provide another perspective on cooperation between the United States and UN member states on important issues at the 50th UNGA. Since not all states are equally active at the United Nations, refined coincidence percentages are also provided for the number of consensus agreements credited to a state based on its participation in all UN voting overall.

What the four columns of figures represent:

- Voting coincidence. The percentage obtained when each UN member's record on important votes is combined with full credit for participating in all 22 important consensus resolutions. Countries with large numbers of absences score low in the Adjusted Coincidence column of this table because they get little credit on the 22 consensus resolutions.
- Absences. The number of times a country did not participate in the 97 recorded plenary votes. Countries most frequently absent for votes were Seychelles, 93; Palau, 91; St. Kitts and Nevis, 83; St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 78; Gambia, 78; Turkmenistan, 77; San Marino, 75; Uzbekistan, 65; Tajikistan, 54; and St. Lucia, 53. (Central African Republic, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Iraq, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and Yugoslavia did not participate. An asterisk appears in the voting coincidence columns for these countries.)
- Participation Rate. Calculated by dividing the number of Yes/No/ Abstain votes cast by a UN member in plenary (i.e., the number of times it was not absent) by the total of plenary votes (97).
- Adjusted Coincidence. This modifies the voting coincidence percentages in column one by applying the "Participation Rate" to consensus agreements. For example, if a UN member state were absent for 10 of the 97 votes in 1995, it would be given credit for only 89.7% (20) consensus resolutions rather than 22.

The first table is organized alphabetically by country. The second lists countries by rank order of Adjusted Coincidence; when this figure is identical for two or more countries, they are ranked by participation

rate; when this figure, too, is the same, countries are listed alphabetically.

Important Votes and Adjusted Consensus

COUNTRY	VOTING	ADOFNOTO		ADJUSTED
COUNTRY	COINCIDENCE	ABSENCES	TION HATE	COINCIDENCE
Afghanistan	80.0%	17	82.5%	77.1%
Albania	90.9%	7	92.8%	90.4%
Algeria	81.8%	9	90.7%	80.6%
Andorra	88.2%	19	80.4%	86.5%
Angola	92.0%	44	54.6%	86.7%
Antigua and Barbuda	87.9%	10	89.7%	87.0%
Argentina	91.2%	1	99.0%	91.1%
Armenia	87.9%	4	95.9%	87.5%
Australia	86.5%	0	100.0%	86.5%
Austria	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
Azerbaijan	83.9%	18	81.4%	81.4%
Bahamas	90.9%	5	94.8%	90.6%
Bahrain	83.9%	10	89.7%	82.6%
Bangladesh	78.8%	1	99.0%	78.6%
Barbados	88.2%	5	94.8%	87.8%
Belarus	90.3%	2	97.9%	90.2%
Belgium	91.4%	0	100.0%	91.4%
Belize	85.7%	1	99.0%	85.6%
Benin		3	96.9%	86.4%
Bhutan	90.0%	16	83.5%	88.6%
Bolivia		1	99.0%	85.6%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	90.6%	29	70.1%	88.2%
Botswana	83.3%	0	100.0%	83.3%
Brazil		1	99.0%	85.6%
Brunei		0	100.0%	78.1%
Bulgaria		0	100.0%	88.6%
Burkina Faso	80.6%	8	91.8%	79.4%
Burundi		16	83.5%	81.7%
Cambodia		14	85.6%	88.8%
Cameroon		2	97.9%	83.6%
Canada		0	100.0%	88.9%
Cape Verde		16	83.5%	84.2%
Central African Republic		97	0.0%	*
Chad		8	91.8%	80.1%
Chile		2	97.9%	85.5%
China	69.7%	5	94.8%	68.6%

Important Votes and Adjusted Consensus (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	VOTING COINCIDENCE	ABSENCES		ADJUSTED COINCIDENCE
Colombia	82.4%	1	99.0%	82.2%
Comoros		97	0.0%	*
Congo		24	75.3%	90.3%
Costa Rica		24	75.3%	86.0%
Cote d'Ivoire		4	95.9%	85.8%
Croatia	93.9%	9	90.7%	93.5%
Cuba		3	96.9%	71.3%
Cyprus	85.3%	0	100.0%	85.3%
Czech Republic		0	100.0%	94.1%
DPR of Korea		25	74.2%	64.5%
Denmark	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
Djibouti		15	84.5%	81.9%
Dominica	90.6%	51	47.4%	85.3%
Dominican Republic		97	0.0%	*
Ecuador		0	100.0%	86.1%
Egypt		4	95.9%	83.9%
El Salvador		5	94.8%	90.9%
Equatorial Guinea	100.0%	43	55.7%	100.0%
Eritrea		25	74.2%	91.0%
Estonia	96.9%	5	94.8%	96.8%
Ethiopia		3	96.9%	83.5%
Fiji	86.7%	9	90.7%	85.7%
Finland	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
France	91.4%	2	97.9%	91.3%
Gabon	92.9%	7	92.8%	92.4%
Gambia	85.7%	78	19.6%	61.2%
Georgia	100.0%	2	97.9%	100.0%
Germany		0	100.0%	91.4%
Ghana		5	94.8%	74.9%
Greece	88.2%	0	100.0%	88.2%
Grenada	90.6%	51	47.4%	85.3%
Guatemala	96.4%	10	89.7%	96.1%
Guinea	84.4%	9	90.7%	83.3%
Guinea-Bissau	89.3%	24	75.3%	86.7%
Guyana	85.7%	0	100.0%	85.7%
Haiti	85.7%	9	90.7%	84.8%
Honduras	86.1%	1	99.0%	86.0%
Hungary	94.1%	5	94.8%	93.9%
Iceland	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
India	75.8%	0	100.0%	75.8%
Indonesia	74.3%	3	96.9%	73.8%

Important Votes and Adjusted Consensus (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	VOTING	ABSENCES		ADJUSTED COINCIDENCE
Iran	69.4%	9	90.7%	67.6%
Iraq	*	97	0.0%	*
Ireland		0	100.0%	88.9%
Israel	100.0%	1	99.0%	100.0%
Italy		1	99.0%	88.8%
Jamaica		1	99.0%	85.6%
Japan		1	99.0%	91.4%
Jordan		5	94.8%	83.3%
Kazakstan		0	100.0%	87.9%
Kenya	83.3%	0	100.0%	83.3%
Kuwait		7	92.8%	84.1%
Kyrgyzstan		41	57.7%	84.0%
Laos		14	85.6%	76.8%
Latvia		11	88.7%	96.7%
Lebanon		10	89.7%	76.5%
Lesotho		19	80.4%	79.1%
Liberia	*	97	0.0%	*
Libya		0	100.0%	66.7%
Liechtenstein		1	99.0%	88.8%
Lithuania		4	95.9%	94.0%
Luxembourg		0	100.0%	88.9%
Madagascar		33	66.0%	85.4%
Malawi		15	84.5%	80.4%
Malaysia		0	100.0%	78.8%
Maldives		5	94.8%	81.2%
Mali		9	90.7%	80.6%
Malta		0	100.0%	91.2%
Marshall Islands		2	97.9%	90.8%
Mauritania		9	90.7%	80.0%
Mauritius	88.2%	1	99.0%	88.2%
Mexico		0	100.0%	83.3%
Micronesia		1	99.0%	93.7%
Moldova	93.8%	4	95.9%	93.6%
Monaco	91.4%	6	93.8%	91.1%
Mongolia	85.7%	3	96.9%	85.4%
Morocco		10	89.7%	82.6%
Mozambique		26	73.2%	82.7%
Myanmar		1	99.0%	73.4%
Namibia		19	80.4%	78.3%
Nepal		3	96.9%	89.8%
Netherlands		0	100.0%	91.4%

Important Votes and Adjusted Consensus (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	VOTING	ARSENCES		ADJUSTED COINCIDENCE
			TIONNATE	
New Zealand	86.5%	0	100.0%	86.5%
Nicaragua		4	95.9%	84.9%
Niger		4	95.9%	80.7%
Nigeria		5	94.8%	71.8%
Norway		6	93.8%	91.1%
Oman		6	93.8%	80.4%
Pakistan		0	100.0%	76.5%
Palau		91	6.2%	*
Panama		0	100.0%	88.6%
Papua New Guinea		Ö	100.0%	81.8%
Paraguay		12	87.6%	84.5%
Peru		0	100.0%	85.7%
Philippines		0	100.0%	81.8%
Poland		2	97.9%	96.9%
Portugal		0	100.0%	88.6%
Qatar		8	91.8%	78.3%
Republic of Korea		5	94.8%	87.4%
Romania		2	97.9%	93.9%
Russia		0	100.0%	90.9%
Rwanda		32	67.0%	100.0%
St. Kitts and Nevis		83	14.4%	100.0%
		53	45.4%	85.0%
St. Lucia St. Vincent-Grenadines		53 78		91.2%
		1	19.6% 99.0%	83.7%
Samoa		75	22.7%	84.6%
San Marino		75 97		04.0%
Sao Tome and Principe	••		0.0%	90 99/
Saudi Arabia		8 9	91.8%	80.8%
Senegal		_	90.7%	83.3%
Seychelles		93	4.1%	47.6%
Sierra Leone		41	57.7%	82.0%
Singapore		0	100.0%	84.8%
Slovak Republic		0	100.0%	91.4%
Slovenia		2	97.9%	91.1%
Solomon Islands		2	97.9%	83.6%
Somalia	••	97	0.0%	
South Africa		0	100.0%	83.3%
Spain		0	100.0%	88.6%
Sri Lanka		0	100.0%	78.8%
Sudan		1	99.0%	67.4%
Suriname		2	97.9%	88.1%
Swaziland	87.5%	0	100.0%	87.5%

Important Votes and Adjusted Consensus (Cont'd)

	VOTING		PARTICIPA-	ADJUSTED
COUNTRY	COINCIDENCE	ABSENCES		
Sweden		0	100.0%	88.9%
Syria		13	86.6%	67.8%
Tajikistan		54	44.3%	100.0%
Thailand		1	99.0%	81.1%
TFYR Macedonia		1	99.0%	90.8%
Togo		0	100.0%	78.1%
Trinidad and Tobago		4	95.9%	84.9%
Tunisia		3	96.9%	81.4%
Turkey	90.9%	1	99.0%	90.8%
Turkmenistan		77	20.6%	81.9%
Uganda	81.8%	2	97.9%	81.6%
Ukraine		1	99.0%	87.4%
United Arab Emirates	83.9%	8	91.8%	82.9%
United Kingdom	94.3%	0	100.0%	94.3%
U.R. Tanzania		14	85.6%	77.6%
Uruguay	87.9%	0	100.0%	87.9%
Uzbekistan		65	33.0%	100.0%
Vanuatu	93.1%	23	76.3%	91.6%
Venezuela	85.7%	1	99.0%	85.6%
Vietnam	71.9%	13	86.6%	69.0%
Yemen	82.8%	19	80.4%	79.7%
Yugoslavia (S/M)	*	97	0.0%	*
Zaire		41	57.7%	92.7%
Zambia	82.9%	3	96.9%	82.5%
Zimbabwe	81.3%	6	93.8%	80.4%
Average	86.8%		84.6%	85.3%

COUNTRY	VOTING COINCIDENCE	ABSENCES		ADJUSTED COINCIDENCE
Israel	100.0%	1	99.0%	100.0%
Georgia	100.0%	2	97.9%	100.0%
Rwanda	100.0%	32	67.0%	100.0%
Equatorial Guinea	100.0%	43	55.7%	100.0%
Tajikistan	100.0%	54	44.3%	100.0%
Uzbekistan	100.0%	65	33.0%	100.0%
St. Kitts and Nevis	100.0%	83	14.4%	100.0%

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COUNTRY	VOTING COINCIDENCE	ABSENCES		ADJUSTED COINCIDENCE
Poland	97.0%	2	97.9%	96.9%
Estonia	96.9%	5	94.8%	96.8%
Latvia	97.0%	11	88.7%	96.7%
Guatemala	96.4%	10	89.7%	96.1%
United Kingdom	94.3%	0	100.0%	94.3%
Czech Republic	94.1%	0	100.0%	94.1%
Lithuania	94.1%	4	95.9%	94.0%
Hungary	94.1%	5	94.8%	93.9%
Romania	93.9%	2	97.9%	93.9%
Micronesia	93.8%	1	99.0%	93.7%
Moldova	93.8%	4	95.9%	93.6%
Croatia	93.9%	9	90.7%	93.5%
Zaire	95.7%	41	57.7%	92.7%
Gabon	92.9%	7	92.8%	92.4%
Vanuatu	93.1%	23	76.3%	91.6%
Belgium	91.4%	0	100.0%	91.4%
Germany	91.4%	0	100.0%	91.4%
Netherlands	91.4%	0	100.0%	91.4%
Slovak Republic	91.4%	0	100.0%	91.4%
Japan	91.4%	1	99.0%	91.4%
France	91.4%	2	97.9%	91.3%
Malta	91.2%	0	100.0%	91.2%
St. Vincent-Grenadines	96.6%	78	19.6%	91.2%
Argentina	91.2%	1	99.0%	91.1%
Monaco	91.4%	6	93.8%	91.1%
Norway	91.4%	6	93.8%	91.1%
Slovenia	91.2%	2	97.9%	91.1%
Eritrea	92.9%	25	74.2%	91.0%
Russia		0	100.0%	90.9%
El Salvador		5	94.8%	90.9%
TFYR Macedonia		1	99.0%	90.8%
Turkey		1	99.0%	90.8%
Marshall Islands		2	97.9%	90.8%
Bahamas		5	94.8%	90.6%
Albania		7	92.8%	90.4%
Congo		24	75.3%	90.3%
Belarus		2	97.9%	90.2%
Nepal		3	96.9%	89.8%
Austria		0	100.0%	88.9%
Canada	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%

COUNTRY	VOTING COINCIDENCE	ABSENCES		ADJUSTED COINCIDENCE
Denmark	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
Finland	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
Iceland	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
Ireland	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
Luxembourg	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
Sweden	88.9%	0	100.0%	88.9%
Italy	88.9%	1	99.0%	88.8%
Liechtenstein	88.9%	1	99.0%	88.8%
Cambodia	90.0%	14	85.6%	88.8%
Bhutan	90.0%	16	83.5%	88.6%
Bulgaria	88.6%	0	100.0%	88.6%
Panama	88.6%	0	100.0%	88.6%
Portugal	88.6%	0	100.0%	88.6%
Spain	88.6%	0	100.0%	88.6%
Greece	88.2%	0	100.0%	88.2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	90.6%	29	70.1%	88.2%
Mauritius	88.2%	1	99.0%	88.2%
Suriname	88.2%	2	97.9%	88.1%
Kazakstan	87.9%	0	100.0%	87.9%
Uruguay	87.9%	0	100.0%	87.9%
Barbados		5	94.8%	87.8%
Armenia	87.9%	4	95.9%	87.5%
Swaziland	87.5%	0	100.0%	87.5%
Republic of Korea	87.9%	5	94.8%	87.4%
Ukraine	87.5%	1	99.0%	87.4%
Antigua and Barbuda	87.9%	10	89.7%	87.0%
Guinea-Bissau	89.3%	24	75.3%	86.7%
Angola	92.0%	44	54.6%	86.7%
Andorra	88.2%	19	80.4%	86.5%
Australia	86.5%	0	100.0%	86.5%
New Zealand	86.5%	0	100.0%	86.5%
Benin	86.7%	3	96.9%	86.4%
Ecuador	86.1%	0	100.0%	86.1%
Honduras		1	99.0%	86.0%
Costa Rica		24	75.3%	86.0%
Cote d'Ivoire		4	95.9%	85.8%
Guyana		0	100.0%	85.7%
Peru		0	100.0%	85.7%
Fiji		9	90.7%	85.7%
Belize	85.7%	1	99.0%	85.6%

COUNTRY	VOTING COINCIDENCE	ABSENCES		ADJUSTED COINCIDENCE
Bolivia	85.7%	1	99.0%	85.6%
Brazil	85.7%	1	99.0%	85.6%
Jamaica	85.7%	1	99.0%	85.6%
Venezuela	85.7%	1	99.0%	85.6%
Chile	85.7%	2	97.9%	85.5%
Mongolia	85.7%	3	96.9%	85.4%
Madagascar		33	66.0%	85.4%
Dominica	90.6%	51	47.4%	85.3%
Grenada	90.6%	51	47.4%	85.3%
Cyprus	85.3%	0	100.0%	85.3%
St. Lucia		53	45.4%	85.0%
Nicaragua	85.3%	4	95.9%	84.9%
Trinidad and Tobago		4	95.9%	84.9%
Singapore	84.8%	0	100.0%	84.8%
Haiti		9	90.7%	84.8%
San Marino		75	22.7%	84.6%
Paraguay	85.7%	12	87.6%	84.5%
Cape Verde		16	83.5%	84.2%
Kuwait	84.8%	7	92.8%	84.1%
Kyrgyzstan	89.3%	41	57.7%	84.0%
Egypt	84.4%	4	95.9%	83.9%
Samoa	83.8%	1	99.0%	83.7%
Cameroon	83.9%	2	97.9%	83.6%
Solomon Islands	83.8%	2	97.9%	83.6%
Ethiopia		3	96.9%	83.5%
Botswana		0	100.0%	83.3%
Kenya	83.3%	0	100.0%	83.3%
Mexico	83.3%	0	100.0%	83.3%
South Africa	83.3%	0	100.0%	83.3%
Guinea	84.4%	9	90.7%	83.3%
Senegal	84.4%	9	90.7%	83.3%
Jordan	83.9%	5	94.8%	83.3%
United Arab Emirates	83.9%	8	91.8%	82.9%
Mozambique	86.2%	26	73.2%	82.7%
Bahrain	83.9%	10	89.7%	82.6%
Morocco	83.9%	10	89.7%	82.6%
Zambia	82.9%	3	96.9%	82.5%
Colombia	82.4%	1	99.0%	82.2%
		4.4	== ===/	
Sierra Leone	88.5%	41	57.7%	82.0%

COUNTRY	VOTING COINCIDENCE	ABSENCES		ADJUSTED COINCIDENCE
Djibouti	83.9%	 15	84.5%	81.9%
Papua New Guinea		0	100.0%	81.8%
Philippines		0	100.0%	81.8%
Burundi		16	83.5%	81.7%
Uganda		2	97.9%	81.6%
Tunisia		3	96.9%	81.4%
Azerbaijan		18	81.4%	81.4%
Maldives	81.8%	5	94.8%	81.2%
Thailand	81.3%	1	99.0%	81.1%
Saudi Arabia	81.8%	8	91.8%	80.8%
Niger	81.3%	4	95.9%	80.7%
Algeria	81.8%	9	90.7%	80.6%
Mali		9	90.7%	80.6%
Oman	81.3%	6	93.8%	80.4%
Zimbabwe	81.3%	6	93.8%	80.4%
Malawi	82.4%	15	84.5%	80.4%
Chad	81.3%	8	91.8%	80.1%
Mauritania	81.3%	9	90.7%	80.0%
Yemen	82.8%	19	80.4%	79.7%
Burkina Faso	80.6%	8	91.8%	79.4%
_esotho	81.8%	19	80.4%	79.1%
Malaysia	78.8%	0	100.0%	78.8%
Sri Lanka	78.8%	0	100.0%	78.8%
Bangladesh	78.8%	1	99.0%	78.6%
Namibia	81.3%	19	80.4%	78.3%
Qatar	79.4%	8	91.8%	78.3%
Brunei	78.1%	0	100.0%	78.1%
Togo	78.1%	0	100.0%	78.1%
U.R. Tanzania	. 80.0%	14	85.6%	77.6%
Afghanistan	. 80.0%	17	82.5%	77.1%
Laos	. 79.3%	14	85.6%	76.8%
Pakistan	. 76.5%	0	100.0%	76.5%
Lebanon	. 78.1%	10	89.7%	76.5%
India	. 75.8%	0	100.0%	75.8%
Ghana	. 75.8%	5	94.8%	74.9%
Indonesia		3	96.9%	73.8%
Myanmar		1	99.0%	73.4%
Nigeria		5	94.8%	71.8%
Cuba		3	96.9%	71.3%
Vietnam	71.9%	13	86.6%	69.0%

COUNTRY	VOTING COINCIDENCE	ABSENCES	TION RATE	
China	69.7%	5	94.8%	68.6%
Syria	70.6%	13	86.6%	67.8%
Iran	69.4%	9	90.7%	67.6%
Sudan	67.6%	1	99.0%	67.4%
Libya	66.7%	0	100.0%	66.7%
DPR of Korea	71.0%	25	74.2%	64.5%
Gambia	85.7%	78	19.6%	61.2%
Seychelles	95.7%	93	4.1%	47.6%
Palau	*	91	6.2%	*
Central African Republic	*	97	0.0%	*
Comoros	*	97	0.0%	*
Dominican Republic	*	97	0.0%	*
Iraq	*	97	0.0%	*
Liberia	*	97	0.0%	*
Sao Tome and Principe	*	97	0.0%	*
Somalia	*	97	0.0%	*
Yugoslavia (S/M)	*	97	0.0%	*
Average	86.8%		84.6%	85.3%

In addition to the five Permanent Members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the Security Council in 1995 was composed of Argentina, Botswana, Czech Republic, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, and Rwanda. The following table summarizes the activity of the Security Council for the year, and compares it with the previous eight years.

Year	Meetings	Resolutions Considered	Resolutions Adopted	U.S. Vetoes
1995	130	67	66	1
1994	160	78	77	0
1993	171	95	93	0
1992	129	74	74	0
1991	53	42	42	0
1990	69	40	37	2
1989	69	25	20	5
1988	55	26	20	6
1987	49	15	13	2

The Security Council in 1995 maintained an active post-Cold War pace. While the number of formal meetings and the number of resolutions adopted were lower than the record set in 1993, there were more than in the Cold War years. During the year, the Council sustained its deep engagement in the world community's efforts to resolve conflicts, while becoming more selective in its actions to deal with international crises.

Of the 66 resolutions adopted by the Council, 3 were adopted without a vote and 57 won unanimous approval. The United States voted in favor of all 6 resolutions adopted without unanimous approval. The United States vetoed one resolution concerning East Jerusalem. No other negative votes were cast during 1995. There were only eight abstentions, five by Russia on resolutions concerning the former Yugoslavia, and three by China on the former Yugoslavia and Haiti.

The Security Council's attention in 1995 was dominated by the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Of the Council's 130 formal meetings during the year, 49 dealt with the volatile, rapidly changing situation in that area; 26 of the Council's 66 resolutions and 26 of its 63 presidential statements also concerned the situation there. This conflict dominated

the Council's peacekeeping agenda, drawing heavily on resources otherwise available for efforts in other parts of the world.

Other resolutions and statements by the Council addressed security concems in Africa, Cyprus, Georgia, Haiti, the Middle East, and Tajikistan. The Council, following a meeting in September at the foreign minister level to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, issued a statement calling for effective use of instruments for preventive action and for improved capacity to conduct effective peace-keeping operations. The Council also discussed stand-by arrangements for peacekeeping operations, transparency and effectiveness of consultations on such operations, and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states.

Council actions in peacekeeping activities are summarized in the following paragraphs. Each resolution is described later in this section.

The Former Yugoslavia: Ceasefire violations, Bosnian Serb aggression against "safe areas" followed by massive human rights violations, and attacks against and detention of UN peacekeeping personnel brought forth Council actions throughout the year. U.S. mediation at meetings in Dayton, Ohio, led to the initialling of a peace agreement in November and a formal signing in Paris in December. Following the agreement, the Council established an implementation force (IFOR) made up of NATO and non-NATO contingents under unified command authorized to use all necessary means to implement the agreement. This force will replace the UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR). The Council also established a UN civilian police force and a UN civilian office in Bosnia. Following the Dayton agreement, the Council ended the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, and it indefinitely suspended the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), effective upon withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces behind zones of separation.

Throughout the year, the Council expressed concern about reports of violations of international humanitarian law in the Bosnian "safe areas" and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The Council demanded access by international humanitarian agencies to persons detained or reported missing, condemned looting and destruction of property, and called on all sides not to lay mines. In March the Council reorganized UNPROFOR, establishing a separate operation in Croatia (UNCRO) to monitor the ceasefire agreement there, and renaming the force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In June the Council authorized an increase in UNPROFOR's troop strength to permit establishment of a rapid reaction capacity. In November the Council welcomed the agreement in Eastern Slavonia reached by Croatia and the local

Serb authorities; it declared its readiness to help establish a transitional administration and authorize a force to facilitate implementation.

Rwanda: The Council in February decided that the International Tribunal for Rwanda would have its seat in Arusha. Tanzania, and it urged states to arrest and detain persons in their territory against whom there is sufficient evidence that they were responsible for acts within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In June it extended the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to December 1995, authorized a reduction in the force level, and adjusted UNAMIR's mandate to include using its good offices to assist in achieving national reconciliation and providing other training and assistance. The Council called on countries neighboring Rwanda to ensure that arms were not transferred to Rwandan refugee camps on their territories, and it asked for support from all states for the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and rehabilitation of the Rwandan judicial system. In August the Council lifted restrictions on supply of arms to the Rwandan Govemment, but retained the arms embargo on non-government persons in Rwanda or in neighboring countries. In September the Council asked the Secretary General to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of arms flows to former Rwandan government forces. In December it adjusted UNAMIR's mandate to include assistance in repatriation of refugees. It also reduced the force level and granted a final extension of UNAMIR to terminate on March 8, 1996.

Liberia: The Council extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) several times during the year, while expressing concern that the Liberian parties had so far failed to reach agreement on the composition of the Council of State. The Council asked the Secretary General to base any decision to return UNOMIL to its authorized level on the existence of an effective ceasefire and on the ability of UNOMIL to carry out its mandate. In April the Council established a committee to investigate implementation of the arms embargo. The Council in June declared its intention not to renew the UNOMIL mandate in September unless the parties made substantial progress toward implementation of the agreements they had made, reestablished a ceasefire, disengaged their forces, and created a timetable for implementation of all other aspects of their agreements. In September, following steps toward peace taken by the warring factions, the Council extended the mandate of UNOMIL to January 31, 1996. It welcomed both the Secretary General's intention to increase the number of military observers for monitoring the ceasefire and disengagement of forces and his intention to enhance the relationship between UNOMIL and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It encouraged the Organization of African Unity to continue its post-conflict peace-building collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In November the Council adjusted the mandate of UNOMIL, as recommended by the Secretary General; UNOMIL was to use its good offices, investigate ceasefire violations, monitor compliance with peace agreements, assist in demobilization, support humanitarian assistance activities, investigate violations of human rights, and observe and verify the election process. The maximum number of military observers was set at 160.

Burundi: In January the Council denounced attempts to intimidate the coalition government established in line with Burundi's Convention of Government in September 1994, which constitutes the institutional framework for national reconciliation. The Council called upon all parties to refrain from violence and to support the government institutions. In subsequent statements, it condemned efforts to nullify the agreed power-sharing arrangements in the Convention of Government by undemocratic methods. The Council condemned the murders of government officials and deplored the ensuing ethnic killings that caused thousands to flee their homes.

Somalia: The Council stated in April, following withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping operation (UNOSOM II), that the international community could facilitate and assist, but not impose, a lasting political settlement. It supported the view that Somalia should not be abandoned by the United Nations and pledged continuing assistance to achieve a political settlement, provided that the Somalis themselves demonstrate a disposition to peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Council noted that the intervention of UNOSOM II and the humanitarian assistance given to Somalia had helped to save many lives and much property, mitigate general suffering, and contribute to the search for peace. Continuing lack of progress in the peace process and in national reconciliation, however, undermined UN objectives and prevented continuation of the operation beyond March 31. The Council welcomed the Secretary General's decision to maintain a small political office in the region, funded through the regular budget.

Western Sahara: The Council renewed the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) several times, the last time to January 31, 1996. Each time, it expressed concern about delays in the process to identify applicants eligible to vote in the referendum and the failure to implement the Settlement Plan. That plan calls for a referendum to enable the people of Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration with Morocco. In December the Council welcomed the Secretary General's decision to intensify consultations with Morocco and the Polisario to resolve their differences regarding the identification process. The Council asked the

Secretary General to provide options for it to consider, including withdrawal of MINURSO, if the consultations fail to produce an agreement.

<u>Sierra Leone:</u> The Council in late November called for an immediate end to the fighting and urged the Revolutionary United Front, whose attempt to overthrow the government in 1991 started the conflict, to use the Secretary General's good offices to facilitate negotiations. The Council also stressed the importance of a coordinated international humanitarian effort.

<u>Libya:</u> Council members, after consultations in March, July, and November to review the sanctions imposed against Libya, concluded that the necessary conditions to modify the sanctions did not exist.

Iraq: The Council in April (in a resolution cosponsored by the United States) authorized states, notwithstanding the embargo provisions of earlier resolutions, to permit the import of oil from Iraq of up to \$1 billion in value every 90 days, the proceeds of which would be paid into an escrow account and used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population. The authorization was for an initial period of 180 days, with periodic reviews of its implementation and with the prospect of renewal provided that its provisions were being satisfactorily implemented. The Council asked the Secretary General to report on whether Iraq had ensured the equitable distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs.

Middle East: The United States in May vetoed a proposed resolution that would have declared Israel's expropriation of land in East Jerusalem invalid. While not supporting the land expropriation, the United States sought to prevent the Council from declaring itself on a permanent-status issue (Jerusalem), in accordance with the long-held belief that the only path to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is direct talks between the parties. This was the first U.S. veto since 1990, also on a Middle East resolution. Israel later in May rescinded its expropriation of land in Jerusalem.

The Council in January and again in July extended the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), to January 31, 1996. In May and again in November the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) on the Syrian Golan Heights, to May 31, 1996.

Haiti: The Council in January determined that a secure and stable environment appropriate to the deployment of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) had been created (by the Multinational Force led by the United States). It authorized the Secretary General to recruit and deploy sufficient military and civilian personnel to allow UNMIH to assume the full range of its functions. It urged the Haitian Government, with the aid

of UNMIH and the international community, to establish without delay an effective national police force and to improve the functioning of its justice system. Upon extending UNMIH's mandate to February 29, 1996, the Council stated that it looked forward to assumption of office by a new, constitutionally elected government and the conclusion of the mandate at that time. In November the Council commended the Government of Haiti for holding local and legislative elections in a peaceful environment.

El Salvador: The Council in April affirmed that the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) would terminate as of April 30, 1995. It recognized with satisfaction that El Salvador had evolved from a country riven by conflict into a democratic and peaceful nation. ONUSAL was established in 1991 to monitor agreements concluded between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN rebels and then expanded to enable it to verify the 1992 peace agreement and later to observe the electoral process.

Cyprus: The Council extended the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in June and again in December, until June 30, 1996. At both meetings, it asked the Secretary General to keep the structure and strength of UNFICYP under review with a view to its possible restructuring. The Council expressed concern about the modernization and upgrading of military forces in Cyprus, the lack of progress toward reducing the number of foreign troops in the country, and the failure of the military forces on both sides to take the previously agreed upon confidence-building measures along the ceasefire lines. The Council urged tolerance and reconciliation between the two communities, and it welcomed the Secretary General's decision to continue contacts with the two leaders to find common ground for a resumption of direct talks. In December the Council welcomed the humanitarian review undertaken by UNFICYP with regard to living conditions.

Tajikistan: The Council in April expressed deep concern at the escalation of military activities on the border with Afghanistan and urged the parties to achieve national reconciliation by peaceful political means. It extended the mandate of the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in June and December, until June 15, 1996, provided that the ceasefire agreement remained in force and the parties remained committed to national reconciliation and promotion of democracy. The Council asked the Secretary General to report on his discussions with Afghan authorities regarding a possible deployment of a small number of UN personnel in northern Afghanistan. It urged further close cooperation between UNMOT, the Tajik parties, the peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the border

forces, and the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Georgia: The Council in January extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to May 15, 1995, asked the Secretary General to report in two months on the situation in Abkhazia in the Republic of Georgia, asked him to continue his efforts to achieve a comprehensive political settlement there, and called on the parties to make progress in their negotiations. In May the Council again extended the mandate of UNOMIG, to January 12, 1996, subject to review in the event of any changes that might be made in the mandate of the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Council expressed concern about the continued obstruction by Abkhaz authorities of the return of refugees and displaced persons, and noted that little progress had been made toward a political settlement.

Other Actions: The Council in April (in a resolution cosponsored by the United States) expressed its appreciation of the statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon states providing assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. The Council also gave assurances that it, and above all its permanent members, would act in the event non-nuclear-weapon states were the victim of, or were threatened by, aggression in which nuclear weapons were used.

The Council in January considered the Secretary General's recommendations for strengthening UN capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building. It discussed the creation of a standing institution of international mediators to be set up within the office of the Secretary General and addressed the importance of post-conflict peace-building efforts, the Secretary General's proposals on "micro-disarmament" aimed at countering the global proliferation of light weapons, a permanent regime to eliminate anti-personnel land mines, and economic transparency in the decision-making and sanctions review process.

In December the Council expressed strong support for the Secretary General's efforts to enhance UN capacity for the planning, rapid deployment, and effective support of peacekeeping operations. It encouraged member states to participate in stand-by arrangements for UN peacekeeping operations. It invited them to provide detailed information on elements they were prepared to make available to the United Nations.

The Council also held discussions in December on proposals to enhance further the transparency and effectiveness of its consultations on peacekeeping operations with troop-contributing countries. There

was much support for a more formal and institutionalized mechanism of consultations between troop contributors and the Council, to be achieved by establishing a subsidiary consultative Council organ at which meetings would be held well before the Council took decisions on the extension, modification, or termination of the mandate of a particular peacekeeping operation.

In addition to the large number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1995, the Council President issued 63 consensus statements during the year. This does not match the 80-90+ statements during 1992-1994, but it far exceeds the 21 issued in 1991. Of the 63 statements, the former Yugoslavia was the topic of 26 and Angola the subject of six. Others were on Rwanda and Tajikistan, four each; and one to three statements on Burundi, Georgia, Haiti, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Western Sahara, the Secretary General's Agenda for Peace report, and other subjects. All presidential statements were endorsed by the United States. The number of presidential statements has approximately matched the number of formal resolutions in recent years.

RESOLUTIONS

Substantive resolutions formally addressed by the Security Council in 1995 are listed and described below. They are organized by topic. Each listing provides the number of the resolution, date of the vote, results (Yes/No/Abstain), and a summary description. The descriptions, which include key elements of the resolutions, are composed of excerpts from the resolution language; "Security Council" is the subject of the verbs. The U.S. position, drawing on the statement made by the U.S. spokesman when the resolution was adopted, is given in the paragraph following the description of the resolution.

ANGOLA

S/Res/ 976 February 8 15(US)-0-0

Authorizes establishment of a peacekeeping operation, UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), to assist the parties in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation in Angola on the basis of the "Acordos de Paz", the Lusaka Protocol, and relevant Security Council resolutions, with an initial mandate until August 8, 1995, and with a maximum deployment of 7,000 military personnel, in addition to the 350 military observers and 260 police observers mentioned in the Secretary

General's report, with an appropriate number of international and local staff; authorizes the immediate deployment of planning and support elements; decides that the deployment of infantry units will take place on the basis of a report from the Secretary General that there is an effective cessation of hostilities; stresses the importance of a comprehensive mine clearance program; requests a monthly report from the Secretary General on progress in deployment of UNAVEM III; welcomes the Secretary General's intention to include human rights specialists in the political component of UNAVEM III; expresses the intention to review the UN role in Angola if the required cooperation of the parties is substantially delayed or not forthcoming; declares the intention to conclude the mission of UNAVEM III when the objectives of the Lusaka Protocol have been achieved in accordance with the schedule in the Protocol and with the expectation of its completion by February 1997; reaffirms the arms and oil embargo in Resolution 864 (1993); calls upon the Govemment of Angola to conclude a status of forces agreement with the United Nations no later than March 20, 1995; encourages the Secretary General to pursue urgently the offer of direct assistance to UNAVEM III by the Government of Angola; demands that all concerned in Angola take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of UN and other personnel deployed under UNAVEM III; and welcomes the presence of the delegation of the Organization of African Unity, and notes the need for its continued cooperation with the United Nations and the contribution that regional organizations can make to crisis management and conflict resolution.

The U.S. Representative described this resolution as an important step to support peace in Angola and the tide of democracy sweeping southern Africa. There was disturbing news that Dr. Savimbi was casting doubt on the Lusaka Protocol, which had brought an end to the long civil strife plaguing Angola. Any deployment of infantry units in UNAVEM III cannot proceed unless the Lusaka Protocol is being effectively implemented. The Angolan parties must be held to their commitment to complete the process of political reconciliation. The UN mission can assist this process, but it is up to the parties themselves to demonstrate by their actions the political will to fulfill the terms of the Lusaka Protocol. As seen in the past, the parties are sometimes reluctant to carry out their agreements, and this recalcitrance must end. The U.S. Government is determined to key its support for the operation in Angola to the actions of the Angolans, and will continue to support the operation if Angola is prepared to help offset its significant costs.

S/Res/1008 August 7 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III until February 8, 1996: commends the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) for their commitment to the peace process; expresses concern at the slow pace in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, in particular troop disengagement, demining, and the establishment of quartering areas; urges the parties to adhere strictly to the revised timetable on the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol; stresses the importance of the completion of the electoral process; calls upon the parties to adopt without further delay a comprehensive program for the formation of the new armed forces: urges the parties to end the renewed laying of mines and the unauthorized movement of troops; asks the Secretary General to continue deployment of UNAVEM III infantry units and accelerate it as conditions for sustaining and employing troops improve, with the objective of reaching full strength as soon as possible; notes with concern increasing levels of violence perpetrated by unaffiliated groups, and calls on all parties to seek to control and disarm these threats to the peace process; and authorizes the Secretary General to increase as appropriate the strength of UNAVEM III's human rights unit.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the U.S. Government strongly endorses the extension of the UNAVEM III mandate, an action that continues an effort which is succeeding. Contributing to this successful progress has been the regular personal contact between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, who should continue in this constructive vein. The United States has provided humanitarian and emergency assistance in the form of food aid and medical supplies, and wishes to help Angola develop its long-term economic potential and reduce its reliance upon emergency assistance. The United States also made an offer of bridging material and assistance for mine clearance because destroyed bridges and a number of mined areas had slowed movements of peacekeepers. The Angolan Government and UNITA must become involved to the greatest extent possible in clearing the areas they have mined. Besides aiding the peace process immediately by facilitating deployment of UNAVEM III troops, U.S. assistance will also help to clear crop lands to reduce the need for food aid and will give the Angolans the ability to conduct demining operations themselves for the long time required to eradicate this threat. U.S. assistance is merely a start when the magnitude of the problems facing Angola are considered, and the United States looks to other UN donor states to support demining and reconstruction activities. The success of the peace process will require the concerted efforts of the Angola Govemment, UNITA, the United Nations, donor governments, and Angola's friends and neighbors.

BURUNDI

S/Res/1012

August 28

15(US)-0-0

Asks the Secretary General to establish an international commission of inquiry with a mandate to (a) establish the facts relating to the assassination of the President of Burundi in 1993 and the massacres and other related serious acts of violence which followed, and (b) recommend measures of a legal, political, or administrative nature, and measures with regard to the bringing to justice of persons responsible for those acts, to prevent any repetition of deeds similar to those investigated by the commission: recommends that the commission be composed of five jurists who shall be selected by the Secretary General; calls upon states, relevant UN bodies, and international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession related to acts described above and to make such information available to the commission; calls upon the Burundi authorities and all states to cooperate fully with the commission; and asks the Secretary General to establish a trust fund to receive voluntary contributions as a supplement to financing the commission.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said that, in adopting this resolution to establish a commission of inquiry, the Council had voted to take a major step toward stability in Burundi, having firmly declared that the culture of impunity must be brought to an end. This action was taken in response to the initiative of the Burundi Government. The U.S. Government is deeply concerned about the precarious stability of Burundi, and acted out of humanitarian concern to stem the systematic, widespread, and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law that have plagued Burundi following the assassination in 1993 of the country's president. The U.S. Government supports the power-sharing agreement of September 1994, and deplores attempts to destabilize the situation or to foment violence. The U.S. Government provided funds for development aid, with a special focus on building stable and accountable democratic institutions. It is the U.S. hope and intent that the commission of inquiry will help to set Burundi firmly on the path to renewed peaceful and democratic governance along with respect for human rights. This commission will establish the facts related to the assassination and the massacres and other violence which followed, and will recommend measures to prevent any repetition of such deeds. The U.S. Government is convinced that the Government and people of Burundi strongly support creation of the commission, and believes this is an important step in the process of national reconciliation.

CYPRUS

S/Res/1000 June 23

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to December 31, 1995; asks the Secretary General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring, bearing in mind the possible implications of an agreement on the extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement; expresses concern about the modernization and upgrading of military forces in Cyprus and the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in Cyprus, and urges all concerned to commit themselves to such a reduction and to a reduction of defense spending in Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces; expresses concern also about the failure by the military authorities on both sides to take measures to prohibit along the ceasefire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone, and calls upon these authorities to enter into discussions with UNFICYP on this matter; regrets the failure to reach agreement on the extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other. and calls upon the military authorities on both sides to cooperate urgently with UNFICYP to this end; urges the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance and reconciliation between the two communities; and welcomes the Secretary General's decision to continue contacts with the two leaders to make every effort to find common ground for the basis for a resumption of direct talks.

S/Res/1032

December 19

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on June 30, 1996; asks the Secretary General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring; welcomes the humanitarian review undertaken by UNFICYP with regard to living conditions; expresses concern about the continuing modernization and upgrading of military forces and the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops, and urges all concerned to commit themselves to such a reduction and to a reduction of defense spending to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces; expresses concern also about the failure by the military authorities on both sides to take reciprocal measures to prohibit along the ceasefire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held

and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone; regrets the failure to reach agreement on the extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other, and calls upon the military authorities on both sides to cooperate urgently with UNFICYP to this end; welcomes the initiative of UNFICYP in organizing successful bicommunal events, urges the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance, confidence, and reconciliation between the two communities, and calls upon them to promote further bicommunal contacts and to remove obstacles to such contacts; and welcomes the Secretary General's decision to continue contacts with the two leaders to make every effort to find common ground for a resumption of direct talks

EL SALVADOR

S/Res/991 April 28 15(US)-0-0

Recognizing with satisfaction that El Salvador has evolved from a country riven by conflict into a democratic and peaceful nation: pays tribute to the accomplishments of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); welcomes the continued commitment of the Government and people of El Salvador to reconciliation, stabilization, and development of political life in El Salvador; urges the Government of El Salvador, the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) to accelerate the pace of implementation of the Peace Accords and to work together to achieve fulfillment of outstanding commitments in order to ensure the irreversibility of the peace process; and affirms that the mandate of ONUSAL will terminate as of April 30, 1995.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said this resolution marks an historic step for the people of El Salvador and for UN peacekeeping. The mandate of ONUSAL ends on April 30, bringing to a close one of the most successful peacekeeping operations ever authorized by the Security Council. Under ONUSAL's vigilance, the major goals set out in the 1992 peace accords have been accomplished. The FMLN participated in free, fair, and nonviolent elections in 1994 and is now the leading opposition political party, its military structure has been dismantled, and its weapons destroyed. Further, the Salvadoran armed forces have been reduced to one-third their wartime size, military officers have been removed for their past human rights abuses, a new police force has replaced the paramilitary security forces, about 19,000 people have received land, and thousands more have received education and training. The end of ONUSAL's exceptional work is a vote of confidence that the Salvadoran people can complete the peace accords without direct

international supervision. The Government of El Salvador and the FMLN have a solemn responsibility to implement fully the remaining chapters of the peace accord, which include those on the judicial system, the electoral system, and economic and social issues.

GEORGIA

S/Res/971 January 12 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until May 15, 1995; asks the Secretary General to report on the situation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, within two months; encourages the Secretary General to continue his efforts to achieve a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict; and calls upon the parties to make progress in negotiations under UN auspices and with the assistance of Russia as facilitator and with the participation of representatives of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The U.S. spokesman noted that there is an almost total absence of progress toward a political settlement of the conflict or toward the expeditious return of the tens of thousands of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Abkhazia. When the Council considers the future of UNOMIG in May, the U.S. Government will look closely and seriously at the entire situation to try to determine whether continuing this mission is justified. The Abkhaz party bears a strong burden of responsibility for the absence of progress. By declaring themselves a sovereign nation, Abkhaz leaders have violated their commitment to reach a mutually acceptable settlement with the Government of Georgia. The Security Council has shown that it is prepared to help, and it is now time for the parties to return to the table and achieve real progress toward a political settlement and the return of refugees and displaced persons.

S/Res/993 May 12 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG to January 12, 1996, subject to review in the event of any changes that may be made in the mandate of the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); expresses full support for the efforts of the Secretary General aimed at achieving a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, as well as for the efforts of the Russian Federation as facilitator; calls upon the parties to reach substantive progress in the negotiations; reiterates its call to the Abkhaz side to accelerate the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons; and calls upon the parties to honor

their commitments with regard to the security and freedom of movement of all UN and CIS personnel.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the United States and other Council members were concerned about the increasing number of violent incidents directed against innocent civilians and against members of UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force. Both parties to the conflict must take steps to rein in armed elements outside their control. UNOMIG will remain only as long as the Council is satisfied that the parties are doing their utmost to protect UNOMIG personnel. The Abkhaz party must cease its obstruction of refugee return, and both parties must work with the Secretary General's special envoy, with the active facilitation of the Russian Federation, toward a political settlement. U.S. support for the longer than usual 8-month extension does not mean greater satisfaction with the situation on the ground or in the negotiation process. Nor does it predict infinite willingness to extend UNOMIG if its presence is not contributing to progress toward a settlement. Rather, assuming the CIS heads of state approve an extension of the CIS peacekeeping operation until December 31, 1995, the Council will be in a better position in mid-January 1996 to make a decision on UNOMIG's future, knowing the disposition of the CIS operation. In the U.S. view, UNOMIG could be made even more effective. A review by the Secretary General of UNOMIG's budget and operations would be welcome, in light of the need to contain costs wherever possible. The U.S. Government is also interested in steps that could enhance the security of UNOMIG personnel. Also, UNOMIG should make better use of public information to promote the image of the United Nations as a helpful, neutral player. While the Abkhaz may have de facto control over a part of the Republic of Georgia, they do not have the rights of a sovereign state; UNOMIG's activity must be consistent with the position of the Council that it does not and will not accept Abkhaz independence.

HAITI

S/Res/975 January 30 14(US)-0-1

Determines that a secure and stable environment, appropriate to the deployment of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), exists in Haiti; authorizes the Secretary General to recruit and deploy military contingents, civilian police, and other civilian personnel sufficient to allow UNMIH to assume the full range of its functions; decides to extend the existing mandate of UNMIH for a period of six months, until July 31, 1995; authorizes the Secretary General to deploy in Haiti up to 6,000 troops and up to 900 civilian police officers; recognizes that the situation in Haiti remains fragile and urges the Government of Haiti, with the

assistance of UNMIH and the international community, to establish without delay an effective national police force and to improve the functioning of its justice system; and requests that the Secretary General apprise the Council of the modalities of the transition from the Multinational Force in Haiti (MNF) to UNMIH and to submit to the Council by April 15 a progress report on the deployment of UNMIH. (China abstained.)

The U.S. Representative noted that this resolution marks a planned, and important, point of transition in Haiti's journey from tyranny to democracy. The MNF has fulfilled its mission, and this resolution verifies that the transition to UNMIH will occur by the end of March. The U.S. Government is pleased to have led the MNF, and warmly thanks the other members who contributed to it. The efforts of the MNF and others have achieved welcome changes in Haiti. A secure and stable environment has been created, and now approaching is the second phase of the Council's strategy in Haiti: UNMIH can now be deployed to assist the Government of Haiti in assuring public order and establishing an environment conducive to free and fair elections. The U.S. Government is working hard to ensure a smooth transfer of responsibility. More than half of the military personnel and about one-third of the civilians in UNMIH will be veterans of the MNF. While Haiti is still by no means a tranquil land, and the capacity for violence remains, the UN force in Haiti has the power and will to respond. The future of Haiti rests—as it must—in Haitian hands: democratic institutions must be nurtured from within. The Council, by giving Haitians an opportunity to build a free country, have kept faith with the people of Haiti and with the cause of freedom.

S/Res/1007 July 31 15(US)-0-0

Commends UNMIH on its successful efforts to assist the Government of Haiti in sustaining a secure and stable environment; expresses thanks to UNMIH and the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) for their assistance with the municipal and legislative elections held on June 25, 1995; expresses deep concern with irregularities in the first round of the elections; welcomes the efforts of President Aristide to work toward national reconciliation; reaffirms the importance of a fully functioning national police force and revitalization of Haiti's system of justice; notes the key role played by the civilian police component of UNMIH in establishing such a police force; decides to extend the mandate of UNMIH for a period of seven months, and looks forward to the conclusion of UNMIH's mandate at that time and to the safe, secure, and orderly assumption of office by a new, constitutionally elected gov-

emment; and requests that the Secretary General report to the Council on progress at the mid-point of this mandate.

The U.S. Representative noted the great progress made by Haiti on its journey toward full, institutionalized democracy, following a long period of tyranny and abuse. The international community, with this resolution, renews its commitment to assist the people of Haiti on this journey by extending the mandate of UNMIH. UNMIH's contribution to the beginnings of a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Haiti fulfills the best aspirations of the community of nations. The recent election was a positive step toward consolidation of democracy. The planned transition from one elected government to another-an event Haiti had never seen—is another milestone on the journey of democracy. This transition has been made possible by the presence of UNMIH. UNMIH has made significant progress, and, with this extension, will be allowed to finish what it has started. The U.S. Government has cooperated extensively with efforts to train and equip the new Haitian national police force, a force urgently required for effective policing and related institution-building efforts. The current task is three-fold: to ensure completion of free and fair elections, to complete the creation of a professional civilian police force and an effective justice system, and to ensure coordination of effective technical and economic assistance to help Haiti rebuild. The U.S. Government is optimistic that a democratic Haiti, where peace is sustained, human rights are respected, and prosperity is possible, can be reached.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ELECTIONS

S/Res/979 March 9 Adopted Without Vote

Decides that the election to fill the vacancy on the International Court of Justice that occurred on the death of Judge Roberto Ago shall take place on June 21, 1995.

S/Res/980 March 22 Adopted Without Vote

Decides that the election to fill the vacancy on the Court that occurred on the resignation of Judge Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings shall take place on July 12, 1995.

S/Res/1018 November 7 Adopted Without Vote

Decides that the election to fill the vacancy on the Court that occurred on the death of Judge Andres Aguilar Mawdsley shall take place on February 28, 1996.

IRAQ

S/Res/986 April 14 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: authorizes states, notwithstanding provisions of Resolution 661 (1990), to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Irag sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding U.S. \$1 billion every 90 days for the purposes set out in this resolution and subject to the following conditions: (a) approval of each purchase by the Committee established by Resolution 661 (1990) and (b) payment of the full amount of each purchase directly by the purchaser into the escrow account to be established by the Secretary General; authorizes Turkey to permit import of additional petroleum originating in Iraq sufficient to meet the pipeline tariff charges for transport of Iragi petroleum; decides that the above provisions shall remain in force for an initial period of 180 days; decides to review the implementation of this resolution 90 days after entry into force and again prior to the end of the 180-day period, and expresses its intention to consider favorably the renewal of the provisions of this resolution, provided that those provisions are being satisfactorily implemented; directs the Committee established by Resolution 661 (1990) to monitor the sale of petroleum exported from Iraq; requests that the Secretary General establish an escrow account for the purposes of this resolution; decides that the funds in the escrow account shall be used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iragi population; authorizes states to permit export to Iraq of the parts and equipment that are essential for the safe operation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system in Iraq; and requests that the Secretary General report to the Council on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs.

The United States cosponsored this resolution. The U.S. Representative noted that the purpose of the resolution is to address humanitarian needs, not to meet political or other objectives. This resolution is not an easing or lifting of sanctions, but an exception to the sanctions regime for a specified purpose. Every effort was made in the drafting of the resolution to understand Iraq's concerns and to address them in a serious and open-minded way. It was the U.S. hope that Iraq's final position on this resolution would be taken on the basis of a calm mea-

surement of the benefits it offers to the Iraqi people. Sanctions, in the U.S. view, are a valuable tool for the Security Council to use when dealing with rogue states that refuse to live peaceably with their neighbors, but shares the concern expressed by many that sanctions not strike an unintended target. This resolution represents exactly the right compromise. If Iraq refuses to implement the resolution, it will be clear for all to see, and especially to the Iraqi people, that the blame for the suffering of the people of Iraq rests not with the Security Council, but with the Government in Baghdad.

LIBERIA

S/Res/972 January 13 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to April 13, 1995; expresses deep concern at the failure of the Liberian parties so far to reach agreement on the composition of the Council of State as stipulated in the Accra Agreement, and calls upon them to work together to implement that Agreement by upholding the ceasefire, resuming disarmament and demobilization of combatants, and implementing the other relevant aspects of the agreement in accordance with the timetable, including the prompt installation of the new Council of State; requests that the Secretary General base any decision to return UNOMIL and its civilian staff to the level authorized under Resolution 866 (1993) on the existence of an effective ceasefire and on the ability of UNOMIL to carry out its mandate; and commends the ongoing efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to further the Liberian peace process, and the commitment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to ensure the safety of UNOMIL military observers and civilian staff.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the U.S. was pleased to support extension of UNOMIL. It is now up to the Liberian people to demonstrate their commitment to peace by doing all in their power to implement fully the provisions of the peace agreement reached by the parties. The U.S. Government is concerned by the inability of the parties to agree on the composition of the new Council of State. UNOMIL has a critical role to play in monitoring the ceasefire, and, if the ceasefire holds, in monitoring the disarmament process, supervising demobilization of combatants, and reintegrating combatants into peaceful society.

S/Res/985 April 13 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIL until June 30, 1995; urges all Liberian parties to implement the Akosombo Agreement and the Accra Agreement by reestablishing an effective ceasefire, promptly installing the Council of State, and taking concrete steps toward implementation of the other provisions of the agreements; urges all states to comply fully with the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia, and to that end decides to establish a committee to: (a) seek information from all states regarding action taken on implementation of the embargo, (b) consider information on violations of the embargo and make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo, and (c) recommend measures in response to violations of the embargo; demands once more that all factions in Liberia strictly respect the status of personnel of ECOMOG and UNOMIL and of organizations delivering humanitarian assistance; and notes that the Council will consider the future of UNOMIL in light of a report by the Secretary General to be submitted to the Council by June 15.

The U.S. Representative said the United States is deeply concerned about the absence of progress in Liberia. The ceasefire has largely broken down, there are new reports of massacres and atrocities against civilians, and there are new movements of displaced persons in the country and across its borders. Primary responsibility for the continued bloodshed lies with the armed factions. The United States strongly urges that the ceasefire be restored promptly and that the factions act quickly to resolve their differences over the Council of State and to implement the accords. The United States continues to support fully the efforts of the ECOWAS Chairman to bring about a summit meeting of concerned states in the region on May 17, together with the faction leaders, and urges attendance at the summit and harmonization of policies, particularly to halt the flow of arms into Liberia. The United States supports UNOMIL, but continuing hostilities have not permitted it to carry out its mandate. The United States supports this limited extension of UNOMIL in the hope that the regional summit meeting will give real impetus to peace.

S/Res/1001 June 30 15(US)-0-0

Stresses that continued support by the international community for the peace process in Liberia, including the continued presence of UNOMIL, is contingent on immediate actions by the Liberian parties to resolve their differences peacefully and achieve national reconciliation; decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIL to September 15, 1995; urges the Liberian parties to use this period to make serious and sub-

stantial progress towards implementation of the Akosombo and Accra Agreements and specifically to install the Council of State, reestablish a ceasefire, disengage all forces, and create an agreed timetable and schedule for implementation of all other aspects of the agreements, in particular the disarmament process; declares its intention that UNOMIL's mandate will not be renewed by the Security Council on September 15, 1995, unless the above steps are complied with by that date: declares its readiness to consider restoring UNOMIL to its full strength if significant progress is achieved in the peace process; urges the ECOWAS ministers to reconvene a meeting of the Liberian parties and political leaders as soon as possible to resolve the outstanding issues of political settlement; urges UN member states to contribute to the UN Trust Fund for Liberia; reminds all states of their obligation to comply strictly with the arms embargo; urges ECOMOG to provide security for UNOMIL observers and civilian staff; demands that all factions in Liberia respect the status of ECOMOG and UNOMIL personnel, as well as organizations and agencies delivering humanitarian assistance; and urges the Organization of African Unity to continue its collaboration with ECOWAS in promoting peace.

The U.S. Representative said the U.S. Government supports this resolution despite deep disappointment about the progress of UNOMIL. The United States and others have labored hard to bring peace to Liberia. The U.S. Government has contributed the bulk of the money in the Trust Fund, and has appointed a special envoy to assist in the peace process. Sadly, the Liberian parties have not cooperated, but instead remain engaged in a brutal struggle for power that no faction can win. The international community sent UNOMIL to monitor a ceasefire, but the firing did not cease, and instead, UNOMIL troops have been abused and humiliated, and humanitarian workers, too, have been harassed and treated with inhumanity. The political future of Liberia depends on the willingness of the Liberian factions to compromise, but not one of the steps recommended has been carried out. The Council agreed, in this resolution, to one more extension of UNOMIL, at the urging of the states in the region that see a faint glimmer of hope, but the Liberians must understand that words will no longer be enough to convince the Council that they want peace. Unless by September 15 there is a real ceasefire, installation and assumption of real authority by a new Council of State, a serious commitment by all factions to disarmament and disengagement, and a specific schedule for the rest of the peace process, UNOMIL will end.

S/Res/1014 September 15 15(US)-0-0

Extends the mandate of UNOMIL to January 31, 1996; welcomes the intention of the Secretary General to increase the number of military observers for monitoring the ceasefire and disengagement of forces: welcomes also the Secretary General's intention to make recommendations concerning the new concept of operations of UNOMIL to enhance the relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG as well as aspects of disarmament and demobilization; urges states to contribute to the UN Trust Fund for Liberia and to provide financial, logistical, and other assistance in support of ECOMOG to enable it to carry out its mandate of encampment and disarmament of the Liberian factions; encourages states, in particular African countries, to consider providing troops to the expanded ECOMOG; stresses that continued support by the international community for the peace process in Liberia, including the continued participation of UNOMIL, is contingent on the continued commitment by the Liberian parties to resolve their differences peacefully and to achieve national reconciliation; reminds all states of their obligations to comply with the arms embargo; and encourages the Organization of African Unity to continue its post-conflict peace-building collaboration with ECOWAS in promoting the cause of peace in Liberia.

The U.S. Representative said the war and devastation of Liberia is a tragedy that has for too long plagued the people of that poor country and their neighbors. The agreement of the warring factions in recent weeks has renewed the hope for peace. The United States, warmly welcoming these positive developments, commends the efforts of the ECOWAS countries, in particular Ghana and Nigeria, as well as the Secretary General, his special representative, and the OAU for the substantial progress made. This resolution renewing the mandate of UNOMIL signals the Council's recognition that the warring factions have taken the important steps necessary to put their peace process back on track. Without that, the United States could not have endorsed further support of the UN observer mission. But there is still a long way to go, and the new Liberian transition government must build on the steps already taken. The Liberian factions and people must keep in mind that continuing international support is contingent on their demonstrating their commitment to resolve their differences peacefully, especially to observe the ceasefire. Liberia will need continued assistance to reestablish the social and institutional fabric of its society, a project to which the United States has contributed millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance and more millions for ECOMOG. Others are encouraged to help.

S/Res/1020 November 10 15(US)-0-0

Decides to adjust the mandate of UNOMIL, as recommended by the Secretary General, to be defined as follows: (a) to exercise its good offices to support efforts to implement the peace agreements, (b) to investigate violations of the ceasefire, (c) to monitor compliance with other military provisions of the peace agreements, including disengagement of forces, disarmament, and observance of the arms embargo, (d) to assist in maintenance of assembly sites and in implementation of a program of demobilization of combatants, (e) to support humanitarian assistance activities, (f) to investigate violations of human rights, and (g) to observe and verify the election process, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and ECOWAS; decides that the number of military observers should be a maximum of 160; welcomes the Secretary General's report concerning the new concept of operations for UNOMIL; calls upon the Liberian parties to respect and implement fully the agreements they have entered into, taking into account that restoration of peace and democracy in Liberia is primarily their responsibility; reiterates that continued support by the international community for the peace process is contingent on the continued commitment by the Liberian parties to achieve national reconciliation; reminds all states of their obligations to comply strictly with the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 788 (1992); calls on ECOMOG to provide security for UNOMIL observers and civilian staff; and asks the Secretary General to submit a progress report on the situation in Liberia by December 15.

The U.S. Representative described this resolution as an acknowledgment of the progress towards peace that is being made in Liberia. This resolution demonstrates the commitment of the international community to assist the Liberian people on their road to peace. The U.S. Government pledged \$75 million as an investment in peace in Liberia. The United States agrees that the demobilization of tens of thousands of combatants, for which the revised UNOMIL will have a major role, is critical to the peace process. The U.S. Government believes that international humanitarian agencies and nongovernmental organizations must be brought into the peace process as soon as possible because their expertise and resources will ease the burden on UNOMIL and will ensure that the entire process—from disarmament through demobilization to reintegration into society—is carried out in an efficient, speedy, and coordinated manner. In this context, the U.S. Government supports the Secretary General's intent to expand and strengthen coordination mechanisms, to appoint a UN humanitarian coordinator for the UN agencies, and to support the efforts of the wider humanitarian community. The United States will continue to look for ways to fund activities that will reduce the cost of UNOMIL, and will work closely with the

United Nations and UNOMIL to achieve an efficient and cost-effective implementation of the new UNOMIL mandate.

MIDDLE EAST

S/Res/974

January 30

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the present mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months, until July 31, 1995.

Not Adopted

May 17

14-1(US)-0

Confirms that the expropriation of land by Israel in East Jerusalem is invalid and in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions and provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention; calls upon the Government of Israel to rescind the expropriation orders and to refrain from such action in the future; expresses full support for the Middle East peace process and its achievements, including the Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993; and urges the parties to adhere to the provisions of the agreements reached and to follow up with the full implementation of those agreements.

The U.S. Representative said she cast this veto reluctantly, but without hesitation, on a matter of principle. The principle is that the only path to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is direct talks between the parties. The U.S. Government was compelled to oppose this resolution because the Council sought to declare itself on a permanent-status issue-Jerusalem-and thus violated this principle. The Security Council is not able-and should not seek-to try to resolve sensitive issues in the Middle East peace process: that is for the parties, who must live with the outcome of these negotiations. The United States has expressed the view that the Israeli notice to expropriate land in Jerusalem is unhelpful. Clearly, this Israeli decision does not move the peace process in the right direction. But by injecting the Council into this issue, this resolution would merely compound the problem. Instead, the Council should be encouraging the parties, and not acting in a way that is detrimental to the process. For the international community to be effective in its support of the process, the support must be discreet, maintaining a certain distance from the details of the negotiations. The United States did not vote against this resolution because of support for Israel's decision on land expropriation, and does not support that expropriation. (This was the first U.S.

veto since 1990, on another Middle East resolution. Israel later in May rescinded its expropriation of land in Jerusalem.)

S/Res/996 May 30 15(US)-0-0

Decides: to call upon the parties to implement Resolution 338 (1973) immediately; to renew the mandate of the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) for another period of six months, until November 30, 1995; and to request that the Secretary General submit, at the end of this period, a report on the development in this situation and the measures taken to implement Resolution 338.

S/Res/1006 July 28 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months, to January 31, 1996.

S/Res/1024 November 28 15(US)-0-0

Decides to renew the mandate of UNDOF for another six months, until May 31, 1996.

NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES

S/Res/984 April 11 15(US)-0-0

Takes note with appreciation of the statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon states (NWS); recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to receive assurances that the Security Council, and above all its NWS permanent members, will act immediately in accordance with the UN Charter in the event that such states are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used; recognizes that in case of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a NNWS party to the NPT, any state may bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Security Council to enable the Council to provide assistance to the victim; recognizes also that the NWSs will bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Council and seek Council action to assist the victim; notes the means available for assisting a victim, including investigation, measures to settle the dispute, and means to restore peace and security; invites member states, if a NNWS party to the NPT is a victim of aggression, to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific, or humanitarian assistance and affirms the Council's readiness to consider what measures are needed; expresses the intention to recommend procedures regarding compensation from the aggressor; welcomes the intention expressed by certain states that they will provide assistance to a victim of aggression; urges all states, as provided for in the NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, which remains a universal goal; and reaffirms the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, if an armed attack occurs against a UN member, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security.

The United States cosponsored this resolution. The U.S. Deputy Representative said this resolution represents an important step toward making the world safe from the use of nuclear weapons. This resolution incorporates assurances by the nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT to the non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to that treaty. In addition, the resolution elaborates a series of measures the Council will consider taking in the event of nuclear aggression. With the adoption of this resolution, these assurances are inscribed firmly in the UN framework. National declarations on negative security assurances are referred to in the resolution. These declarations are realistic, serious, and feasible—and highly responsive to the concerns expressed by non-nuclear-weapon states. The coordinated sponsorship by all permanent members of the Council, and the inclusion of both positive and negative assurances, are significant advances over the Council's efforts 25 years ago. The stable environment created by the NPT has helped make possible the security assurances in this resolution. The efficient functioning of the NPT's verification and monitoring mechanisms have been a fundamental element of global security for 25 years. That is why the assurances in this resolution are offered to states in full compliance with the NPT, and that is why the U.S. Government hopes this resolution will be seen by others as a further argument in favor of the indefinite extension of the NPT. If the NPT is permanent, and if it is fully complied with and is universal, these assurances become more meaningful. The United States reaffirms its commitment to good faith negotiations aiming toward nuclear disarmament. The U.S. Government is also actively involved in negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test ban, and looks forward to the negotiations to achieve a treaty on the cutoff of fissile material. President Clinton said in March that the NPT is the principal reason why the spread of nuclear weapons has not been more rapid or more extensive. It is the firm hope of the United States that others share the goal of supporting this valuable treaty and the entire non-proliferation regime.

RWANDA

S/Res/977 February 22

15(US)-0-0

Decides that, subject to conclusion of appropriate arrangements with Tanzania, the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have its seat at Arusha.

S/Res/978

February 27

15(US)-0-0

Urges states to arrest and detain persons found within their territory against whom there is sufficient evidence that they were responsible for acts within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and urges them to inform the Secretary General and the Prosecutor of the Tribunal of the identity of the persons detained and the nature of the crimes believed to have been committed; condemns all attacks against persons in the refugee camps near the borders of Rwanda and calls upon states to take appropriate steps to prevent such attacks; and urges states on whose territory serious acts of violence in the refugee camps have taken place, to arrest and detain persons against whom there is sufficient evidence that they have incited or participated in such acts, and to keep the Secretary General informed.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said it is important that persons suspected of leading the genocide in Rwanda or in countries neighboring Rwanda should be detained until the International Tribunal for Rwanda can investigate and make decisions about prosecution. Their detention, as called for in this resolution, would be a tangible sign of the commitment to holding individuals accountable for these atrocities and would thus improve prospects for reconciliation in Rwanda. Having defendants in custody would also enhance the credibility of the Tribunal. Arrest and detention of persons who have participated in attacks in the refugee camps would ameliorate the situation there, and arrest of those who threaten violence against refugees who attempt to return to Rwanda would remove one of the major impediments to voluntary return.

S/Res/989 April 24 15(US)-0-0

Establishes a list of 12 candidates for Judge of the International Tribunal for Rwanda in accordance with Article 12 of the Statute for the Tribunal.

S/Res/997 June 9 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) until December 8, 1995, and authorizes a reduction of the force level to 2,330 within three months and to 1,800 troops within four months: decides to maintain the current level of military observers and civilian police personnel; decides to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that it will (a) exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation, (b) assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees, (c) support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care, and demining, (d) assist in training of a national police force, and (e) contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of UN agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and humanitarian agencies in case of need; affirms that the restrictions imposed in Resolution 918 (1994) apply to arms and materiel to persons in the states neighboring Rwanda if they are for use within Rwanda; calls upon the states neighboring Rwanda to ensure that such arms and materiel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories; requests that the Secretary General consult the governments of neighboring countries on the possibility of deployment of UN military observers, including in the airfields in eastern Zaire, to monitor the sale or supply of arms and materiel; urges continued humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need; and calls upon states to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan judicial system.

The U.S. Representative, expressing strong U.S. support for Rwanda's efforts to become a peaceful, just, and open society, said the U.S. goal is to reconcile former combatants, promote justice for the victims of genocide, and set the Rwandan people on a path to a better future. UNAMIR continues to have a critical role to play in this effort. One of its main functions will be to assist the Rwandan Government in readying the country for the voluntary and safe return of refugees. The flow of arms to those in the refugee camps who seek to destabilize Rwanda must be investigated and curbed. The U.S. Government is particularly pleased that UNAMIR will contribute to the security of the personnel of the International Tribunal, whose role of bringing to justice those who planned and led the genocide in 1994 is crucial for the future

of Rwanda. Another part of the challenge that faces Rwanda is the development assistance that is required to achieve stability.

S/Res/1005 July 17 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that, notwith-standing the arms embargo restrictions imposed in Resolution 918 (1994), appropriate amounts of explosives intended exclusively for use in established humanitarian demining programs may be supplied to Rwanda upon application to and authorization by the Council's committee established by Resolution 918.

S/Res/1011 August 16 15(US)-0-0

(A) Asks the Secretary General to make recommendations to the Council on the establishment of a commission to investigate allegations of arms flows to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa; encourages the Secretary General to continue his consultations with the governments of neighboring states concerning deployment of UN military observers in the airfields and other transportation points in and around border crossing points. (B) Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that, with immediate effect and until September 1, 1996, the restrictions in Resolution 918 (1994) shall not apply with regard to the sale or supply of arms and materiel to the Government of Rwanda through named points of entry on a list to be supplied by the Rwandan Government to the Secretary General; decides also that on September 1, 1996, the restrictions on sale or supply of arms in Resolution 918 shall terminate unless the Council decides otherwise after its consideration of a report from the Secretary General; decides also that all states shall continue to prevent the sale or supply of arms and materiel to Rwanda or to persons in the states neighboring Rwanda if such sale or supply is for use within Rwanda, other than to the Government of Rwanda as specified above; decides also that no arms or materiel sold or supplied to the Government of Rwanda may be resold to or transferred to any neighboring state or person not in the service of the Rwandan Government: further decides that states shall notify all exports of arms to Rwanda to the committee established by Resolution 918, that the Government of Rwanda shall mark and register and notify to the committee all imports made by it of arms and materiel; and asks the Secretary General to report to the Council within 6 months and again within 12 months regarding the export of arms and materiel to the Government of Rwanda.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the U.S. Government had from the beginning supported the Rwandan Government's request to lift

the arms embargo. The Government of Rwanda faces a threat from extremists, in the militias and the former army, who will continue to be restricted from buying arms. With the adoption of this resolution, the Government of Rwanda will be better able to deter violent action by these groups or, if necessary, to defend the new society it is trying to build. But this step goes only part of the way toward normalizing the situation in Rwanda. The speedy establishment of a commission of inquiry into allegations of arms flows to former Rwandan armed forces is also necessary for the reduction of tension and the creation of a climate of trust. One key element in creating such a climate of trust is an immediate improvement in the overcrowded conditions of Rwandan prisons. There is concern about the humanitarian crisis caused by the detention of more than 50,000 prisoners. The Rwandan Government should reduce the prison population through the release of young and elderly prisoners wherever possible to alleviate the overcrowding. The Government of Rwanda should reduce the number of arrests to the absolute minimum, and should establish a functioning judiciary in Rwanda. beginning with naming a new supreme court.

S/Res/1013 September 7 15(US)-0-0

Asks the Secretary General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an International Commission of Inquiry to (a) collect information and investigate reports on sale or supply of arms and related materiel to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region of Africa in violation of Security Council resolutions, (b) investigate allegations that such forces are receiving military training in order to destabilize Rwanda, (c) identify parties aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition of arms by former Rwandan government forces, and (d) recommend measures to end the illegal flow of arms in the region; recommends that the Commission to be appointed by the Secretary General be composed of five to ten impartial and internationally respected persons, including legal, military, and police experts; calls upon states. UN bodies, and international humanitarian organizations and nongovernmental organizations to collate information in their possession relating to the mandate of the Commission and to make this information available as soon as possible; calls upon governments of the states in which the Commission will carry out its mandate to cooperate fully with the Commission, including providing information, giving free access to necessary establishments and places, and adopting measures to guarantee the safety and security of Commission members, their freedom of movement, and the necessary privileges and immunities; and encourages states to make voluntary contributions to the Secretary General's trust fund to supplement the financing of the Commission.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the criminals who committed genocide and other crimes against humanity seem now to be rearming. recruiting, and retraining their forces, with the assistance of persons outside Rwanda who are willing to flout the international prohibition contained in Security Council resolutions. With the adoption of this resolution, the Council is taking the steps necessary to enforce the arms embargo on the former Rwandan armed forces. Zaire's proposal to create a commission to investigate the flow of arms to the former Rwandan armed forces was an important step in the development of this resolution, which will make a significant contribution to the effort to maintain peace in Central Africa and create the conditions for the voluntary return of refugees in dignity and safety. The flow of illegal arms to the former Rwandan armed forces could fatally undermine the fragile stability and peace in the region and undermine the efforts of all those working so hard to improve the political, economic, and humanitarian situation. The Commissioners, therefore, should identify anyone or any group engaged in illicit arms traffic.

S/Res/1028 December 8 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a period of four days, expiring on December 12, 1995.

S/Res/1029 December 12 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a final period until March 8, 1996; decides also to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that it will (a) exercise its good offices to assist in achieving the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees and, to this end, support the Rwandan Government's efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through performance of monitoring tasks, (b) assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other agencies in providing logistical support for repatriation of refugees, and (c) contribute to providing protection of the International Tribunal for Rwanda; asks the Secretary General to reduce the force level of UNAMIR to 1,200 troops to carry out the above mandate; asks the Secretary General to reduce the number of military observers and support staff to 200; asks the Secretary General to initiate planning for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR after the expiration of the present mandate; asks the Secretary General to withdraw the Civilian Police component of UNAMIR; calls upon the Government of Rwanda to ensure that UNAMIR personnel and equipment scheduled to withdraw can do so in an orderly and safe manner; and asks the Secretary General to report to the Council by February 1,

1996, on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate and progress toward repatriation of refugees.

The U.S. Representative, noting the improved situation in Rwanda. said UNAMIR has been a factor in helping to foster a climate of security. UNAMIR can now play an important role in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees, hence the mandate of UNAMIR has been refocused on the tasks it can perform in this context. Another element in bringing about the return of the refugees and national reconciliation is the work of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. After a regrettably slow start, the Tribunal is on the verge of having an impact on the culture of impunity that permeates society. It is vitally important that the Tribunal have the sense of security needed to continue its impartial investigations and prosecutions, and the duties of UNAMIR must continue to include assisting in protection of the Tribunal's personnel and premises until alternate arrangements are operational. The international community should not abandon Rwanda following UNAMIR's departure in three months. A strong UN presence is needed to provide assistance in reconstruction, rehabilitation, justice, and political reconciliation. The last three months of UNAMIR's mandate should be used to put into place a nonmilitary logistics lifeline to sustain the various UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations, including the International Tribunal and the human rights field operations.

TAJIKISTAN

S/Res/999 June 16 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) until December 15, 1995, subject to the proviso that the ceasefire agreement of September 17, 1994, remains in force and the parties continue to be committed to an effective ceasefire, to national reconciliation, and to the promotion of democracy; asks the Secretary General to continue to pursue, through the good offices of his special envoy, efforts to speed up the progress towards national reconciliation; stresses the urgent need for the parties to achieve a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict; calls upon the parties to achieve substantive progress on fundamental institutional and political issues; calls upon the parties to agree to the early convening of a further round of inter-Tajik talks and to implement without delay all confidence-building measures agreed to at the previous round; urges the continuation of direct political dialogue between the President of Tajikistan and the leader of the Islamic Revival Movement of Tajikistan; stresses the urgency of the cessation of all hostile acts on the Tajik-Afghan border; asks the Secretary General to report on his discussions

with Afghan authorities regarding a possible deployment of a small number of UN personnel in northern Afghanistan; underlines the need to pursue the close cooperation already existing between UNMOT and the parties to the conflict, as well as its close liaison with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Peacekeeping Forces, with the border forces, and with the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Tajikistan; welcomes the obligation assumed by Tajikistan to assist the return and reintegration of refugees; and calls for greater contributions from states for humanitarian relief efforts.

The U.S. Representative, stating that the United States was pleased to support this resolution, said this mission demonstrates the flexibility of UN peacekeeping and its continued usefulness. With a small but influential presence, the United Nations has helped the parties maintain an effective ceasefire and lay the goundwork for political reconciliation. While the Council in this resolution has extended UNMOT's mandate, it has firmly and unambiguously linked that mandate to the existence of an effective ceasefire. UNMOT cannot function without a ceasefire, and the parties must lay down their arms or the Council may be forced to withdraw the mission. But a ceasefire is just a beginning, and the parties must move toward national reconciliation based on democratic principles. The United Nations, OSCE, and countries of the region stand ready to support and help implement an agreement, but the international community cannot make peace or move toward national reconciliation—it is the parties themselves who must take this responsibility.

S/Res/1030 December 14 15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNMOT until June 15, 1996, subject to the proviso that the Tehran Agreement of September 17, 1994, remains in force and the parties continue to be committed to an effective ceasefire, national reconciliation, and promotion of democracy; requests that the Secretary General continue to pursue, through the good offices of his special envoy and with the assistance of the countries and regional organizations acting as observers at the inter-Tajik talks, efforts to speed up the progress towards the establishment of a durable peace and national accord; regrets the slow rate of progress towards a political solution to the conflict, and emphasizes the need for the Tajik parties to take the opportunity of the continual round of talks in Ashgabat to reach a general agreement; calls on the parties to implement the confidence-building measures to which they have committed themselves; underlines the need to develop further close cooperation between UNMOT and the parties to the conflict, as well as

its close liaison with the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces, with the border forces, and with the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan; and welcomes the successful resettlement of the vast majority of internally displaced persons and refugees.

WESTERN SAHARA

S/Res/973 January 13 15(US)-0-0

Welcomes the fact that voter identification has begun and is continuing albeit at a slow pace; approves the expansion of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and expresses the hope that every effort will be made to deploy the observers necessary to complete the identification process; asks the Secretary General to report by March 31 on arrangements with regard to the logistic, personnel, and other resources required for deployment of MINURSO at full strength, on his final plans for implementing all elements of the Settlement Plan, and on the responses of the parties to his proposals to fulfill the UN mission; encourages the Secretary General to continue all possible efforts to create a propitious atmosphere conducive to a speedy and effective implementation of the Settlement Plan; expects to be able to confirm June 1, 1995, as the date for the start of the transitional period, with a view to holding the referendum in October 1995 and to bringing the mission to a successful conclusion shortly thereafter; decides that the mandate of MINURSO should continue to May 31, 1995; and decides to consider the possible extension of the mandate after May 31, 1995, on the basis of a further report from the Secretary General and in light of progress achieved toward holding the referendum and implementation of the Settlement Plan.

In a press statement, the U.S. Government said it was pleased to support this resolution, which sets the parties on a fixed course with dates certain to a resolution of their long-standing conflict. This resolution brings MINURSO under a renewable mandate, a step to which the U.S. Government attaches great importance; this is concrete action to assure a strict monitoring of MINURSO's progress, and it is a clear alert to the parties that the process must produce tangible results by the target dates or face the prospect of termination of the mission. The United States will support this effort as long as the parties to the conflict show they are unequivocally committed to it as well. MINURSO, like all other peacekeeping operations, must adhere to strict criteria of impartiality and must seize any and all cost containment opportunities.

S/Res/995 May 26 15(US)-0-0

Reiterates the Council's commitment to holding, without further delay, a free, fair, and impartial referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan which has been accepted by the two parties; commends the progress in identifying potential voters since the beginning of the year; expresses concern, however, that certain practices are hampering further progress toward the implementation of the Settlement Plan and underlines the need for the parties to heed the Secretary General's call on them to work with MINURSO in a spirit of cooperation; decides in this context, and with a view to accelerating the implementation of the Settlement Plan, to send a mission of the Council to the region; decides, therefore, to extend at this stage the present mandate of MINURSO until June 30, 1995; and decides to consider the further extension of the mandate of MINURSO beyond June 30, 1995, in the light of the Secretary General's report of May 19, 1995, and the report of the Council's mission referred to above.

In a press statement, the United States expressed its support for this resolution reiterating the Council's commitment to a free, fair, and impartial referendum. The United States fully expects the United Nations to set strict deadlines for the actions that must occur for this referendum to take place by early 1996. The United Nations and the parties to the dispute are expected to meet those deadlines. The report of the mission the Council has decided to dispatch to the region to learn the real prospects for holding a referendum by early 1996 will provide a basis to determine the future of this UN peacekeeping mission.

S/Res/1002 June 30 15(US)-0-0

Expresses concern that, given the complexity of the tasks to be performed and the continuing interruptions caused by the two parties, implementation of the Settlement Plan has been further delayed; calls upon the two parties to work with the Secretary General and MINURSO in a spirit of genuine cooperation to implement the Settlement Plan; stresses the need for the parties to refrain from any actions that hinder the implementation of the Settlement Plan, and calls upon them to reconsider recent decisions with a view to establishing confidence; endorses the Secretary General's benchmarks described in his report; endorses also the recommendations of the mission of the Council concerning the identification process and other aspects of the Settlement Plan; expects to be able, on the basis of a report by the Secretary General by September 10, 1995, to confirm November 15, 1995, as the start of the transitional period, to allow the referendum to take place early in 1996; decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO to September 30,

1995; and decides also to consider the possible extension of the mandate beyond that date on the basis of the Secretary General's report and in light of the progress achieved towards holding the referendum and implementing the Settlement Plan.

The United States, which cosponsored this resolution, issued a statement following its adoption. In the statement, the U.S. Government noted that it supported a solution of the Western Sahara dispute through a referendum organized by the United Nations. There have been considerable misgivings over the mission's prospects. Recent arrests of Saharawi youths by Morocco and the subsequent withdrawal by the Polisario from the identification process raise serious doubts about the willingness of the parties to commit fully to the resolution of this dispute. Reports by the Secretary General and the Council's mission raised serious concerns about the effectiveness of this peacekeeping mission. The U.S. Government remains committed to seeing a free and fair referendum take place under UN auspices, but the patience of the Council and the resources of UN member states have their limits. Without progress, the Council may have no choice but to terminate the mission at a subsequent review. In the current budgetary climate, neither the United States nor the United Nations can continue to pour resources into operations for which no end can be seen. If the parties to a dispute do not have the will to take full advantage of the resources made available to them, it must be concluded that they are not entitled to them. By adopting this further extension of the mandate, the Council has offered the parties sufficient time to prove unequivocally that they are committed to fulfilling their responsibilities in this undertaking, and if they do not do so, they should have no illusions about what will follow.

S/Res/1017 September 22 15(US)-0-0

Reiterates its commitment to the holding, without further delay, of a free, fair, and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan, which has been accepted by the parties; expresses disappointment that the parties have made insufficient progress towards the fulfillment of the Settlement Plan, including the identification process, the code of conduct, the release of political prisoners, the confinement of Polisario troops, and the arrangements for the reduction of Moroccan troops in the territory; calls upon the parties to abandon their insistence on strict reciprocity in the operation of the identification centers and to cease all other procrastinating actions which could further delay the holding of the referendum; decides to review the arrangements for the completion of the identification process on the basis of a report to be submitted by the Secretary General and to consider at that time any further neces-

sary measures which might need to be taken to ensure prompt completion of that process; decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until January 31, 1996, and takes note of the Secretary General's intention, if, before then, he considers that the conditions necessary for the start of the transitional period are not in place, to present the Council with alternative options for consideration, including the possibility of the withdrawal of MINURSO; requests that the Secretary General report by January 15, 1996, on progress achieved towards the implementation of the Settlement Plan, and to state in that report whether or not the transitional period will be able to begin by May 31, 1996; urges the Secretary General to examine ways of reducing the operational costs of MINURSO; supports the invitation by the General Assembly to member states to make voluntary contributions to MINURSO; and requests that the Secretary General consider establishment of a trust fund to receive such voluntary contributions.

In a press release following adoption of the resolution, the U.S. Government said it continued to believe the solution to the dispute in the Western Sahara is a free, fair, and impartial referendum by which the inhabitants of the territory can determine their future. The United States paid tribute to MINURSO, which, despite difficult conditions, has supervised the long-held ceasefire and has identified over 50,000 individuals as potential voters in the referendum. More could have been achieved were it not for the mutual distrust between the parties and the actions on both sides that delayed or prevented progress in some areas of the Settlement Plan. It is imperative that the parties cease any further provocative actions that could delay the referendum. The parties should not assume that the Council's patience is limitless, and they should note that the resolution makes absolutely clear the progress that must be achieved and when it must be achieved. At a time when shrinking resources must be allocated carefully, peacekeeping operations will have to be judged critically as to whether they are reaching their assigned goals. If the parties to the dispute do not demonstrate sufficient will to resolve the dispute, there is little more the United Nations can do, and if the parties do not seize this opportunity, it is they who must bear the consequences. The parties are urged to take advantage of this mandate renewal and fully commit themselves to the task at hand.

S/Res/1033 December 19 15(US)-0-0

Reiterates its commitment to the holding, without further delay, of a free, fair, and impartial referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan; welcomes the report of the Secretary General of November 24, 1995, as a useful

framework for his ongoing efforts aimed at accelerating and completing the identification process; welcomes the Secretary General's decision to intensify his consultations with the two parties to obtain their agreement to a plan to resolve differences hindering the timely completion of the identification process; asks the Secretary General to report to the Council on the results of those consultations on an urgent basis and, in the event those consultations fail to produce an agreement, to provide the Council with options for its consideration, including a program for the orderly withdrawal of MINURSO.

YUGOSLAVIA

This section lists resolutions concerning all areas included in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

S/Res/970 January 12 14(US)-0-1

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that the restrictions referred to in Resolution 943 of 1994 (on civilian passenger flights to and from Belgrade airport, passenger ferry service between Bar in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bari in Italy, and participation in sporting events and cultural exchanges) shall be suspended for a further period of 100 days; and decides that if at any time the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are not effectively implementing their decision to close their border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, this suspension of restrictions shall terminate. (Russia abstained.)

The U.S. Representative noted that the sanctions regime the Council has enacted over time is vital to the effort to persuade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Pale Serbs that a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Bosnia is in their interest. This resolution is an indication that the effort to persuade Belgrade to pressure the Pale Serbs to accept a just and viable peace has begun to show results. The U.S. Government's willingness to support this resolution was a direct result of the conclusion that the FRY Government in Belgrade has moved to implement its decision to close the border by making it less porous, a process it significantly augmented with new measures in recent weeks. But further efforts must be made to ensure that the border is more effectively closed, and the effectiveness of the closure will require continued vigilance by the international community and FRY officials.

S/Res/981 March 31 15(US)-0-0

Decides to establish the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) for a period ending on November 30, 1995; decides that UNCRO's mandate shall include: (a) performing the functions envisaged in the ceasefire agreement of March 29, 1994, between the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities, (b) facilitating implementation of the Economic Agreement of December 2, 1994, concluded under the auspices of the co-chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, (c) facilitating implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions, (d) assisting in controlling, by monitoring and reporting, the crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies, and weapons over the international borders between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and between Croatia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), (e) facilitating the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina through Croatia, and (f) monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula; decides that UNCRO shall be an interim arrangement to create conditions that will facilitate a negotiated settlement; decides that UN member states may take all necessary measures, in close coordination with the Secretary General and the UN Theater Force Commander, to extend close air support to Croatia in defense of UNCRO personnel; and demands that all parties refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against UNCRO.

The U.S. Deputy Representative, following adoption of Resolutions 981, 982, and 983, said that this resolution establishing UNCRO can be considered a constructive response to a complex, dangerous, and tangled situation. While it does not resolve the issues that divide Croatia, the continued international presence it provides for will keep open a window of opportunity within which the parties may negotiate to settle their differences. It is up to the parties to seize that opportunity, because a settlement cannot be imposed by the Council or any other outside force. (See additional comments at Resolutions 982 and 983 below.)

S/Res/982 March 31 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: approves the arrangements contained in the Secretary General's report of March 22; decides to extend the mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina to November 30, 1995; authorizes the Secretary General to redeploy all UNPROFOR personnel and assets from Croatia with the exception of those required for UNCRO; decides that UNPROFOR shall continue to perform the functions envisaged in the ceasefire agreement of March 29, 1994, and the economic agreement of December 2, 1994, between Croatia and the local Serb authorities,

and facilitate delivery of international humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina through Croatia until the deployment of UNCRO; demands that all parties refrain from acts of intimidation or violence against UNPROFOR; and calls upon the Bosnian parties to extend the ceasefire agreement and to negotiate an overall peaceful settlement on the basis of acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point.

The U.S. Deputy Representative, following adoption of Resolutions 981, 982, and 983, said the U.S. Government is determined to prevent a wider war in the Balkans and is proceeding in the hope that leaders in the region do not want such a war. Since UNPROFOR was created three years ago, it has performed a multitude of difficult tasks, saved hundreds of thousands of lives, and restrained-although sometimes has been unable to prevent-further aggression and violence. There has been understandable frustration on the part of the Governments of Croatia and Bosnia with UNPROFOR's limitations. But the withdrawal of the UN force from either country at this time is not a solution to those frustrations, but rather an invitation to a new round of intense violence that would cause further destruction of economic and social structures and leave thousands more dead. The U.S. Government supports continued diplomatic efforts through the Contact Group to discourage new fighting and to gain viable political settlements in both Croatia and Bosnia. The intransigence of the Bosnian Serb faction remains the major obstacle to peace, and renewed efforts to tighten sanctions against that faction are warranted. The current situation in Bosnia is unsatisfactory. and the alternative of withdrawal and renewed all-out war is worse. UNPROFOR in Bosnia has not achieved its mandates in full, but its presence, assisted at times by NATO enforcement measures, has saved lives. The ceasefire violations must be ended, the cessation of hostilities must be extended, the forces must be separated, and UNPROFOR troops should be interposed along the separation line. There is concern about the blatant violations of human rights by the Bosnian Serb party. Those guilty of such violations will be held personally responsible for their crimes. The presence of UN forces in Bosnia must contribute to political progress if it is to have meaning, and such progress is dependent on the will of the parties. The responsibility for failure thus far rests squarely on the Bosnian Serb party for its unwillingness to enter into negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan. By adopting these three resolutions, the Council has avoided an immediate and disastrous widening of the war. But diplomatic efforts must be continued on all fronts, while recognizing that the ultimate success or failure of those efforts will be determined—as they must—by the people of the region itself. (See additional comments at Resolutions 981 and 983.)

S/Res/983 March 31 15(US)-0-0

Approves the arrangements in the Secretary General's report of March 22; decides that UNPROFOR within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shall be known as the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) with the mandate set out in the Secretary General's report, and that the mandate shall continue until November 30, 1995; and urges UNPREDEP to continue the current cooperation between UNPROFOR and the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The U.S. Deputy Representative, following adoption of Resolutions 981, 982, and 983, said the name of the UN force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has changed, but its purpose—to deter the spread of the conflict—has not. The change acknowledges that the circumstances in the three countries where UNPROFOR forces have been deployed differ and specifically tailored mandates are required, but, by retaining important links among the forces, the Council recognizes that tensions and conflict in the region are closely connected and the efficiency of operations is essential. (See additional comments at Resolutions 981 and 982 above.)

S/Res/987 April 19 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: emphasizes once again the responsibility of the parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the security and safety of UNPROFOR and, in this context, demands again that all parties refrain from any act of intimidation or violence against UNPROFOR and its personnel; calls upon the Bosnian parties to agree to an extension of the agreements on a ceasefire and complete cessation of hostilities beyond April 30, 1995; and urges all parties to resume forthwith negotiations toward an overall peaceful settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point.

The U. S. Deputy Representative joined in expressing sorrow and anger at the murder of two French soldiers serving as peacekeepers in Bosnia. This resolution should serve to renew the resolve that the parties to the conflict in Bosnia must respect the status of UN personnel. It should prompt the Council to explore urgently the means by which UNPROFOR personnel might better defend themselves. And it should give new life to support for an extension of the Bosnian ceasefire. UN peacekeepers have difficult, perilous, and, too often, thankless tasks; they deserve the world's admiration and the Council's full support.

S/Res/988 April 21 13(US)-0-2

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that the restrictions referred to in Resolution 943 of 1994 (on civilian passenger flights to and from Belgrade airport, passenger ferry service between Bar in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bari in Italy, and participation in sporting events and cultural exchanges) shall be suspended until July 5, 1995; confirms that commodities and products shall not be carried on the permitted flights and ferry services; calls upon all states that allow these flights and ferry services to report to the Committee established by Resolution 724 (1991) on the controls adopted by them: calls on the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) to cooperate fully with the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), in particular in investigating alleged breaches of the closure of the border between the FRY and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls upon the FRY authorities to comply with their commitment to cooperate fully in the investigation of reports that helicopter flights may have crossed the border from the FRY to Bosnia; encourages the FRY authorities to reinstate the severance of international telecommunication links between the FRY and areas of Bosnia under control of Bosnian Serb forces; requests that every 30 days the Secretary General report to the Council on implementation of the FRY decision to close its border with Bosnia; asks the Secretary General to inform the Council immediately if he has evidence that the FRY is not implementing its border closure decision: and decides that, if at any time the Secretary General reports that the FRY is not implementing the border closure, the suspension of the above sanctions measures shall terminate on the fifth working day following the report, unless the Council decides to the contrary. (China and Russia abstained.)

The U.S. Representative said the U.S. Government welcomes successes in the border closure regime but has been frank about short-comings in its implementation. The United States believes that the authorities in Belgrade have not done enough to comply with their commitment to isolate the Bosnian Serbs. To ensure that the closure of the border is comprehensive, there is no stronger instrument than a fully-staffed and fully-funded ICFY Mission. Therefore, all UN members are strongly encouraged to increase their support for the ICFY Mission. This resolution is intended to close remaining loopholes in the border closure; the Belgrade authorities must not seek to circumvent the closure by illegally shipping goods through Serb-controlled parts of Croatia. This border closure is not an end in itself, but is to persuade the Pale Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan and map. Also, the authorities in Belgrade should understand that suspension of additional sanctions will depend on their willingness to take further steps toward

peace, most notably by recognizing the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within their internationally recognized borders. The members of the Council must keep in mind that the Council's credibility depends on its willingness to respond to provocations. When it comes to sanctions relief, the Council must remain vigilant to ensure that the Belgrade authorities deliver on their promises.

S/Res/990 April 28 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: approves the arrangements in the Secretary General's report for the implementation of the mandate of UNCRO; decides to authorize the deployment of UNCRO as set out in that report; calls upon the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities to cooperate fully with UNCRO in the implementation of its mandate; and calls upon the Government of Croatia once again to conclude expeditiously an agreement on the status of forces and of other personnel.

S/Res/992 May 11 15(US)-0-0

Decides that the use of the locks of the Iron Gates I system on the left bank of the Danube River by vessels (a) registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) or (b) in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the FRY shall be permitted; decides that this resolution shall come into force when preparations are completed for repairs to the locks on the right bank and shall remain in force for 60 days and for further periods of up to 60 days if required for completion of the repairs; requests that the Government of Romania monitor this use; and decides that use of the locks shall terminate if the Council receives substantiated evidence of a violation by FRY vessels of any of the relevant Council resolutions.

S/Res/994 May 17 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: demands that the parties complete without further delay the withdrawal of all their troops from the zones of separation in Croatia and refrain from any further violations of those zones; requests that the Secretary General make the necessary arrangements to ensure full deployment of UNCRO, after the withdrawal of the troops of the parties; demands that the status and the mandate of UNCRO, as well as the safety and security of its personnel, be respected; demands that the Government of Croatia respect fully the rights of the Serb population, including their freedom of movement, and

allow access to this population by international humanitarian organizations; asks the Secretary General to assess the humanitarian situation of the local Serb population; calls upon the parties to respect the Economic Agreement signed by them on December 2, 1994, and in particular to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway; demands that the parties refrain from taking any further military measures or actions that could lead to the escalation of the situation; and warns that, in the event of failure to comply with this demand, it will consider further steps needed to ensure such compliance.

The U.S. Representative said this resolution appropriately focuses on the future, on the Council's expectations of the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities. It acknowledges that the Government of Croatia has taken important steps in the signing of a status of forces agreement and in withdrawing a notable portion of its troops from the zones of separation. The Serb forces must withdraw and must not occupy positions from which Croatian Government forces have withdrawn. These and other actions by the parties will enable UNCRO to carry out its mandate in full and will create the conditions for a resumption of progress toward political resolution of this conflict that was inexcusably interrupted by recent actions of both parties. The only viable solution to the conflict is a negotiated settlement that will lead to the peaceful reintegration of the other three sectors into Croatia. That process will be immeasurably helped by Croatian actions that will show Croatian Serbs they have nothing to fear from reintegration.

S/Res/998 June 16 13(US)-0-2

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: demands that the Bosnian Serb forces release immediately and unconditionally all remaining detained UNPROFOR personnel, and further demands that all parties fully respect the safety of UNPROFOR personnel, and others engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and ensure their complete freedom of movement; emphasizes that there can be no military solution to the conflict, stresses the importance it attaches to vigorous pursuit of a political settlement, and reiterates its demand that the Bosnian Serb party accept the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point; calls upon the parties to agree without further delay to a ceasefire in Bosnia and Herzegovina; demands that all parties allow unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, to the safe areas; demands that the parties respect fully the status of the safe areas; underlines the need for a mutually agreed demilitarization of the safe areas; encourages the Secretary General to intensify efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the parties on the modalities for demilitarization; welcomes the letter of the Secretary General on the reinforcement of UNPROFOR and the establishment of a rapid reaction capacity to enable the UN Peace Forces (UNPF)/UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate; and decides to authorize an increase in UNPF/UNPROFOR personnel, acting under the present mandate, by up to 12,500 additional troops, the modalities of financing to be determined later. (China and Russia abstained.)

The U.S. Representative said the United States supports the establishment of a rapid reaction force within UNPROFOR and will materially support its deployment and its operations. UNPROFOR must be able to defend itself if it is to implement its mandate, and it is vital that UNPRO-FOR remain, and be effective, in Bosnia. UNPROFOR and NATO are striving to keep alive the possibility of a negotiated end to this conflict without further bloodshed, and they deserve protection. The U.S. Govemment supports the deployment of a rapid reaction force to provide that protection. The Bosnian Serbs are the party that has taken UN personnel hostage in gross violation of international law, committed the greatest violence against nonmilitary targets, obstructed the delivery of humanitarian supplies, and consistently rejected the Contact Group plan. The United States supported the rapid reaction force with the understanding that it would not be incurring any direct financial obligation. The United States is not now prepared, in a time of serious budgetary cutbacks, to pay the lion's share of the cost of expanding this force. The costs of the force should not be financed through the assessment process (in which the U.S. share is over 30 percent). The size and expense of UNPROFOR, the largest and most complex peacekeeping force the United Nations has ever mounted, affects the UN's ability to budget for its other peacekeeping operations. The normal assessment regime may not be adequate to support UNPROFOR. There must be an urgent reexamination of the way UNPROFOR is funded. There are other methods to finance a force of this kind, and these options should be discussed. Perhaps participating nations could take the lead in paying their own way, and forgoing reimbursement, and perhaps a voluntary fund could be established to help cover some of the costs.

S/Res/1003 July 5 14(US)-0-1

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that the suspension of certain embargo measures referred to in Resolution 943 (1994) shall continue until September 18, 1995; and renews the call for early mutual recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and urges the former to take this step. (Russia abstained.)

The U.S. Representative noted that, in the 275 days of limited sanctions relief extended to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) for its stated commitment to seal the border with Bosnia and to sever official contacts with the Bosnian Serbs, some improvement in the effectiveness of the border closure has been reported. These reports have also, however, continued to point out a number of shortcomings in Belgrade's willingness to implement fully its decision to isolate the Bosnian Serbs. It is those shortcomings that made the U.S. Government unwilling to accept an extension of 100 days, and to insist on 75 days. The goal of extending limited sanctions relief is to increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement of its conflict with the Bosnian Government based on the Contact Group plan. The U.S. Government continues to believe that an effectively enforced closure of the border between the FRY and the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs would help achieve that goal. But this Council will have to remain vigilant if the limited suspension of sanctions is to achieve its purpose and thereby remain justified. For this reason, the U.S. Government is disturbed by indications of increasing military cooperation between the Belgrade authorities and the Bosnian Serbs. Specifically, there are indications that the FRY authorities are rounding up draft-age Bosnian Serb males and returning them to Bosnia, providing financial assistance and equipment to the Bosnian Serb army, and cooperating with Bosnian Serb air defense systems. Such actions would violate Belgrade's commitment to isolate the Bosnian Serbs, and they raise serious doubts which, if not adequately clarified by Belgrade, would seriously weaken the case for continuing the limited suspension of sanctions. Such violations would undermine the Council's key objective of persuading the Bosnian Serbs that there is no reasonable alternative to a negotiated solution. These violations would also weaken the efforts to limit and contain the conflict in advance of a negotiated solution.

S/Res/1004 July 12 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: demands that the Bosnian Serb forces cease their offensive and withdraw from the safe area of Srebrenica immediately; demands also that the parties respect fully the status of the safe area of Srebrenica and the safety of UNPROFOR personnel, including their complete freedom of movement and resupply; demands that the Bosnian Serb forces release unharmed all detained UNPROFOR personnel; demands that all parties allow unimpeded access for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other international humanitarian agencies to Srebrenica to alleviate the plight of the

civilian population; and asks the Secretary General to use all resources available to him to restore the status of the safe area of Srebrenica.

The U.S. Representative said this resolution rightly condemns the offensive action by the Bosnian Serb forces against Srebrenica and UNPROFOR personnel. The exodus of tens of thousands of displaced persons and the brazen treatment of the Dutch peacekeepers fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the war crimes tribunal. This aggression and any future attacks will deepen the isolation of the Bosnian Serbs from the world community and distance them further from a settlement in Bosnia. While there is much talk of the failure of UNPROFOR and the Security Council and NATO, it is the Bosnian Serbs who have failed to comply with the most fundamental principles of international law and the legally binding demands of the Council. Even as the Council condemns the contempt of the Bosnian Serbs for the international community, it must acknowledge shortcomings in its efforts. This resolution must be the beginning of credible resolve in the Council, in the respective capitals, and on the ground in Bosnia to employ resources in the most effective manner possible to meet the humanitarian needs of Bosnian citizens and to achieve a lasting peace settlement. To achieve these ends, the U.S. Government firmly believes that UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia supported by the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). UNPROFOR has a difficult mission that requires tough decisions, and the U.S. Government believes the role of NATO will be vital to those decisions. Also, the U.S. Government supports full and speedy deployment of the RRF, and is prepared to provide necessary airlift and other logistical support for that purpose.

S/Res/1009 August 10 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: demands that the Government of Croatia cease immediately all military actions; demands further that the Government of Croatia (a) respect fully the rights of the local Serb population, including their right to remain, leave, or return in safety, (b) allow access to this population by international humanitarian organizations, and (c) create conditions conducive to the return of those persons who have left their homes; demands that the Government of Croatia fully respect the status of UN personnel, refrain from any attacks against them, bring to justice those responsible for any such attacks, and ensure the safety and freedom of movement of UN personnel at all times; urges the parties to exercise maximum restraint in and around Sector East; and reiterates its call for a negotiated settlement that guarantees the rights of all communities.

The U.S. Representative said the U.S. Government supports this resolution as an expression of continued commitment by the Council to

peace and to the relief of human suffering in the former Yugoslavia. The decision of the Government of Croatia to launch an offensive against the Krajina region is regrettable. The latest round of violence has produced vet another flow of civilian refugees. Protection of these civilians must be a priority for all parties, and the rights of Serbs who choose to remain in Croatia must also be respected. The U.S. Government expects the war crimes tribunal to investigate allegations of abuse against unarmed civilians, and will support fully the tribunal's work. The United States joins, as well, in condemning in strong terms the wrongful acts committed against UN peacekeeping forces. The statement of the Croatian representative committing to investigating these incidents is welcome. This resolution reminds Croatia of its obligation to create conditions conducive to the safe return of those persons who have left their homes. The events of the past week have not changed the overriding imperative for all parties in the former Yugoslavia, which is to cease the conduct of war and explore instead the options that exist for achieving peace. That is the one path towards real security, and it is the only way to bring the cycle of disruption and tragedy to an end. The U.S. Government categorically denies the allegation that it gave tactical advice or logistical support to the Croatian military operation. This baseless charge can only make it harder for the U.S. government to see the day when Serbia/Montenegro can rejoin the community of nations.

S/Res/1010 August 10 15(US)-0-0

Demands that the Bosnian Serb party give immediate access for representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other international agencies to persons displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa who are within the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, and that the Bosnian Serb party permit representatives of the ICRC to visit and register any persons detained against their will; also demands that the Bosnian Serb party respect fully the rights of all such detained persons and ensure their safety and urges that any persons detained be released; and reiterates that all those who commit violations of international humanitarian law will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts.

The U.S. Representative said that, despite the more recent military action in Croatia, the tragedy and outrages perpetrated earlier in Bosnia against Srebrenica and Zepa must not be forgotten. The magnitude of the suffering caused by these Bosnian Serb attacks was enormous. The events in Srebrenica and Zepa must not be forgotten because these are areas for which the Council assumed a special responsibility as UN-protected "safe areas." Tragically, the authority of the Council

and the good opinion of the world appear to mean little to the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. Some 10,000 civilians from Srebrenica and around 3,000 from Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. The Council has a responsibility to investigate, to obtain safe passage for those in hiding, good treatment and release for those detained, and registration and notification to families for those who died. And there is a responsibility to bring to justice those responsible for illegal and outrageous activities. There are strong grounds to believe that the Bosnian Serbs beat, raped, and murdered many of those fleeing the violence in Srebrenica. These dead were not killed in battle or by accident, but were systematically slaughtered on the instructions of the Bosnian Serb leadership. There are eyewitness accounts and U.S. intelligence data that provide compelling evidence of barbarous and systematic murder by the Bosnian Serbs. This resolution demands that the Bosnian Serbs give immediate access to persons displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa. Representatives from the appropriate international organizations are ready now to travel to the areas where those displaced by the violence are most likely to be. This resolution makes clear that the Bosnian Serbs have a responsibility to permit them safe passage and to allow them to do their jobs. The U.S. Government strongly supports this resolution. It is important that international attention be focused on the plight of the refugees. The crimes committed cannot be shrugged off as an inevitable side-effect of ethnic conflict or as legitimate tactics of war. True reconciliation will not be possible in this region until the perception of collective guilt for atrocities is expunged and personal responsibility is assigned.

S/Res/1015 September 15 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that the restrictions (on air travel, maritime traffic, sporting events, and cultural exchanges) and other measures in Resolution 943 (1994) shall be suspended until March 18, 1996; decides also that the arrangements referred to in Resolution 988 (1995) shall continue to apply; and reaffirms its decision to keep the situation closely under review and to consider further steps with regard to measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in light of further progress in the situation.

The U.S. Representative said the United States is particularly pleased that the cosponsors of this resolution include Russia, which plays such a critical role in the peace process. The U.S. Government is under no illusion that continued suspension of these sanctions is the key to peace, nor that the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and

Herzegovina is fully closed. But the United States is determined during this critical period of intensive negotiations to do everything possible to achieve a lasting peace and restore justice to the region. There are some fundamental points about this resolution. First, the sanctions that continue to be suspended are limited strictly to cultural and sports exchanges, and to restoration of passenger air transport to and from Belgrade and ferry service to the port of Bar. There is no suspension of economic sanctions, nor has sanctions relief been increased; there has simply been an extension of the existing relief for six months. Further sanctions relief must follow real steps toward peace, such as mutual recognition among the successor states to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Secondly, if there is noncompliance with the border closure by the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro, the suspension of sanctions terminates. This constitutes a core basis for the original U.S. decision to support the suspension, and for the decision today to support its extension. There are indications that Serbia and Montenegro assisted the Bosnian Serbs to restore military communications and air defense networks, as well as other military assistance, a question on which the U.S. Government remains focused. The Bosnian parties must negotiate in good faith, and despite the progress made in the past two weeks, the parties have taken only the first steps on the road to peace. The U.S. Government will do what it can to help, but the ultimate responsibility for deciding between peace or more war rests with the parties.

S/Res/1016 September 21 15(US)-0-0

Notes the assurances given by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the Government of Croatia regarding offensive actions in Western Bosnia and affirms the need for full compliance with the demands set out in the statement of September 18 of the Council's president; deplores the casualties suffered by the Danish peacekeepers, and demands that all parties fully respect the safety of UN personnel; calls upon all parties to refrain from hostile acts and to reach immediately a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities; demands that the parties negotiate in good faith on the basis of the Geneva Declaration of Principles of September 8, 1995; and reiterates that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

S/Res/1019 November 9 15(US)-0-0

Condemns violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in the former Yugoslavia and demands that all concerned comply fully with their obligations; reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian

Serb party give immediate and unimpeded access to representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the ICRC, and other international agencies to persons displaced and to persons detained or reported missing and to permit visits to detainees; reaffirms also its demand that the Bosnian Serb party respect fully the rights of all such persons, ensure their safety, and release them immediately; reaffirms the obligation of all parties to ensure complete freedom of movement of UN personnel and other relevant international organizations; demands that all detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina be closed; reaffirms its demand that the Government of Croatia put an end to violations of international humanitarian law and human rights; reiterates its demand that the Croatian Government respect fully the rights of the local Serb population, including their right to remain or return in safety; demands that all states and all parties to the conflict comply with obligations in Resolution 827 (1993) to cooperate fully with the International Tribunal; demands that all parties, and in particular the Bosnian Serb party, refrain from any action intended to destroy, alter, conceal, or damage any evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and that they preserve such evidence; and demands that all parties fully ensure the safety of UN personnel and cooperate fully with them.

The United States cosponsored this resolution. The U.S. Deputy Representative, noting that the proximity talks in Dayton, Ohio, had begun, said this is a time of hope for the former Yugoslavia. The recent exchange of prisoners between the Bosnian Serb side and the Bosnian Government is a reason for hope. Many thousands of innocent Bosnians were beaten, raped, and killed, and the Bosnian Serb forces committed mass murder. What happened in Srebrenica was a war crime of historic proportions reminiscent of events in Europe 50 years ago. These crimes must not go unpunished. The Bosnian Serb side must allow the International Tribunal access to the sites and individuals the Tribunal deems important, and they must allow international agencies to have access to the refugees displaced from the regions and ensure their safety. This resolution also rightfully addresses incidents that occurred in the Krajina after the Croatian offensive, and the Croatian Government must take steps to ensure the rights of all its citizens. But the different magnitude of the crimes committed by the Bosnian Serb forces must be recognized: the systematic and apparently planned nature of the atrocities is evidence of an active and astonishingly brutal policy.

S/Res/1021 November 22 14(US)-0-1

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that the embargo on weapons and military equipment imposed by Resolution

713 (1991) shall be terminated as follows, beginning from the day the Secretary General submits to the Council a report stating that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have formally signed the Peace Agreement: (a) all provisions of the embargo shall remain in place during the first 90 days, (b) during the second 90 days, all provisions of the embargo shall be terminated, except that the delivery of heavy weapons, ammunition for these weapons, mines, military aircraft, and helicopters shall continue to be prohibited until the arms control agreement referred to in Annex 1B (Agreement on Regional Stabilization) of the Peace Agreement has taken effect, and (c) after the 180th day and after the Secretary General has reported on implementation of the Agreement on Regional Stabilization, all provisions of the arms embargo terminate unless the Council decides otherwise. (Russia abstained.)

The United States cosponsored this resolution. See Resolution 1022 for the statement of the U.S. Representative.

S/Res/1022 November 22 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that the measures (arms embargo and economic sanctions) imposed by or reaffirmed in Resolutions 757 and 787 of 1992, 820 of 1993, 942 and 943 of 1994, and 988, 992, 1003, and 1015 of 1995 are suspended indefinitely with immediate effect except that the suspension shall not apply to the measures imposed on the Bosnian Serb party until all Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn behind the zones of separation, and any frozen and impounded funds or assets subject to claims shall be released only in accordance with applicable law; decides that this suspension shall terminate if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Bosnia Serb authorities fail significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement reached in Dayton, Ohio; decides that it will terminate the measures imposed in its resolution following the occurrence of the first free and fair elections provided for in the Peace Agreement, provided that the Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn from, and have continued to respect, the zones of separation; decides that frozen or impounded assets may be released except as provided above; and decides that the suspension or termination of obligations pursuant to this resolution is without prejudice to claims of successor states to funds and assets of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The United States cosponsored this resolution. The U.S. Representative described adoption of Resolutions 1021 and 1022 as the first concrete results reflecting the peace agreement reached by the parties in Dayton, Ohio. The lifting of the arms embargo and suspension of economic sanctions was a step toward peace and a measure of support for

the parties to ensure effective implementation of that agreement. It is only logical to lift the embargo against Bosnia, which was only trying to preserve its sovereignty, defend its people, and sign every peace agreement put before it. Today, that injustice and folly are being brought to an end. The plan now is to discourage an arms race, encourage a stable balance of military power, and nourish a conviction on all sides that negotiation, not confrontation, is the practical way to resolve disputes. To these ends, the agreement places restrictions on the military forces and heavy weapons of each party and calls for talks on measures to increase confidence that no side will seek to evade or take military advantage of this agreement. The suspension of economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro is conditional, and the sanctions will be reimposed if the Belgrade government fails to sign the peace agreement or if the Bosnian Serbs fail to meet their obligations under the agreement. Compliance with the requests and orders of the war crimes tribunal is an essential part of the implementation of the agreement. The sanctions now being lifted appear to have achieved their purpose of encouraging Serbia to choose the path of peace; this muchcriticized sanctions tool has proven critical in bringing about the agreement in Dayton and will continue to serve the cause of peace in the complicated task of implementing the agreement. The United States is prepared to help all those truly committed to peace. Also, the United States does not intend to release any assets of the former Yugoslavia until all assets are examined against possible claims by the successor states and against outstanding commercial or private claims. It is the U.S. view that no asset should be releasable until examined in these contexts.

S/Res/1023 November 22 15(US)-0-0

Welcomes the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (known as Sector East), signed on November 12, 1995, by Croatia and the local Serb representatives; recognizes the request in the Agreement to establish a transitional administration and to authorize an appropriate international force, stands ready to consider this request in order to facilitate implementation of the Agreement, and invites the Secretary General to maintain contact with all concerned in order to assist with work on this matter; stresses the need for Croatia and the local Serb party to refrain from any military activity or any measure that might hinder implementation of the transitional arrangements; and reminds the parties of their obligation to cooperate fully with the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) and ensure its safety and freedom of movement.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, which the U.S. Deputy Representative described as an important step that can build confidence between Croatians and Serbs. For the first time in the war, land was returned by negotiation rather than bloodshed. The agreement envisions a partnership respecting the rights of all ethnic groups while recognizing Croatian sovereignty. The intensive efforts of the U.S. ambassador and the UN mediator contributed to reaching the agreement. The efforts of the international community must continue before peace is finally established, and all residents of the regions need to learn again to live in trust. The efforts of the Council to establish and enforce sanctions, to authorize peacekeeping forces including the use of force when necessary, and to respond aggressively to human rights violations on all sides finally came to fruition with the agreement reached in Dayton, Ohio.

S/Res/1025 November 30 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: asks the Secretary General to submit a report no later than December 14, 1995, on establishment of a transitional administration and a transitional peacekeeping force to implement the provisions of the Basic Agreement on Sector East (Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium) in Croatia, including on the possibilities for assistance from Croatia in offsetting the costs of the operation; and decides that, in order to allow for the orderly establishment of the above mentioned operation, the mandate of UNCRO shall terminate after an interim period ending on January 15, 1996, or when the Council has decided on the deployment of the transitional peacekeeping force referred to above, whichever is sooner.

The United States cosponsored this resolution.

S/Res/1026 November 30 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR until January 31, 1996, pending further action by the Council with regard to the implementation of the Peace Agreement; and invites the Secretary General to submit reports to the Council regarding the necessary information and recommendations on implementation of the Peace Agreement to enable the Council to take a decision ensuring an orderly transfer of authority as envisaged in the Peace Agreement.

The United States cosponsored this resolution.

S/Res/1027 November 30

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP in the former Yugo-slav Republic of Macedonia until May 30, 1996; urges UNPREDEP to continue its cooperation with the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; calls on states to respond favorably to requests by the Secretary General for assistance to UNPREDEP; and asks the Secretary General to keep the Council informed of developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate of UNPREDEP and to submit a report by January 31, 1996.

The United States cosponsored this resolution.

S/Res/1031 December 15 15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: authorizes member states, acting through or in cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to establish a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) under unified command and control to implement the peace agreement; authorizes member states of IFOR to take all necessary measures to effect implementation of and ensure compliance with the peace agreement; stresses that the parties shall be held equally responsible for compliance with the agreement and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by IFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of the agreement; authorizes member states to take all necessary measures, at the request of IFOR, either in defense of IFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and recognizes the right of IFOR to take all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack; demands that the parties respect the security and freedom of movement of IFOR and other international personnel; recognizes that the parties have authorized IFOR to take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with the peace agreement; welcomes the agreement by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to adopt and put in place a program of elections for Bosnia and Herzegovina at the request of the parties; reaffirms that all states shall cooperate with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; welcomes the parties' commitment to securing to all persons the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms and welcomes the invitation by the parties to human rights organizations to monitor the human rights situation in the country; decides that, with effect from the day on which the Secretary General reports to the Council that the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR has taken place, the authority to take certain measures conferred upon states by Resolutions 770 and 781 (1992), 816, 836, and 844 (1993), and 958 (1994) shall be terminated, and that the provisions of Resolution 824 (1993)

and subsequent resolutions regarding safe areas shall also be terminated from the same date; endorses the establishment of a High Representative, who will monitor implementation of the peace agreement and mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to and coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies involved; decides, with a view to terminating IFOR one year after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR, to conduct a review by that date and decide whether IFOR should continue, based on the recommendations of the states participating in IFOR and the recommendation of the High Representative through the Secretary General; decides to act expeditiously on the recommendation of the Secretary General to establish a UN civilian police force; and authorizes IFOR to use all necessary means to assist in withdrawal of UNPROFOR.

The U.S. Representative, noting that in the past the Council had been unable to defend Bosnia and had not lifted the arms embargo to permit Bosnia to defend itself, said that, with the passage of this resolution, the Council can now talk about having done something for Bosnia. The Council helped Bosnia negotiate a peace agreement, is authorizing a powerful military force to implement that peace, and will enable Bosnia to ensure that peace when the forces leave. The decision of more than two dozen countries to contribute troops is welcome. The decision to send troops was difficult for the U.S. Government, as it was for others. Even when the mission is to save lives, those lives put at risk must always be borne in mind. The forces the United States is sending will be well equipped and well trained, and, if any forces in Bosnia attack, they will regret doing so, whether the forces attacked are American or any other nationality. IFOR's purpose is to make peace work, not to fight a war or to occupy a hostile country. There is a relationship between the parties' fulfillment of their obligation to cooperate fully with the international war crimes tribunal and the readiness of the international community to commit financial resources for reconstruction. It is important to implement the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. If the civilian challenges are not met, IFOR's military success will quickly fade and Bosnia's hopes for peace will remain unfulfilled. The United States will cooperate fully with the newly named High Representative in assuring a well coordinated and multi-faceted effort on the civilian side. Special attention must be given to holding democratic elections, ensuring respect for human rights, planning for the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, creating a professional police force, and initiating a comprehensive program of economic reconstruction; the United Nations will be deeply involved in many of these activities.

S/Res/1034 December 21 15(US)-0-0

Strongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, demands that all concerned comply fully with their obligations in this regard, and reiterates that all those who commit violations will be held individually responsible for such acts; condemns in particular the violations by Bosnian Serb and paramilitary forces in the areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka, and Sanski Most, showing a consistent pattern of summary executions, rape, mass expulsions, arbitrary detentions, forced labor, and large-scale disappearances; reiterates its strong support for the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in seeking access to displaced persons and to persons detained or reported missing and calls on all parties to comply with their commitments in respect of such access; reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party give immediate and unimpeded access to representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the ICRC, and other international agencies to persons displaced and to persons detained or reported missing, and that the Bosnian Serb party permit the ICRC to visit and register persons detained and to have access to any site it may deem important; takes note that the International Tribunal issued indictments against the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for their direct and individual responsibilities for atrocities committed against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995; underlines the urgent necessity for all the parties to enable the prosecutor of the International Tribunal to gather evidence necessary for the Tribunal to perform its task; stresses the obligations of all the parties to cooperate with and provide unrestricted access to relevant UN and other international organizations and institutions so as to facilitate their investigations; reiterates its demand that all parties, and in particular the Bosnian Serb party, refrain from any action intended to destroy, alter, conceal, or damage any evidence of violations, and that they preserve such evidence; reiterates its demand that all detention camps throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina be immediately closed; condemns the widespread looting and destruction of houses and other property, and demands that all sides immediately stop such actions, investigate them, and make sure those who violated the law be held individually responsible; demands that all sides refrain from laying mines; urges member states to continue to assist the efforts to alleviate the plight of refugees and displaced persons; and urges all parties to the conflicts to cooperate to create conditions conducive to repatriation and return of refugees and displaced persons in safety and dignity.

The United States cosponsored this resolution. The U.S. Representative said this resolution serves as a reminder of the urgency and necessity of the peace recently established. It is the hope of the U.S.

Government that the killings which occurred in Srebrenica, Zepa, Sanski Most, Banja Luka, and other locations occupied by the Bosnian Serbs will prove to be the last horrific chapters in a brutal and savage war. What happened in these places cannot be excused or minimized. nor can a distorted version of them be accepted. The responsibility for the atrocities is not in doubt; it rests with the Bosnian Serbs. The Secretary General's report underlines the importance of support for the work of the war crimes tribunal and the necessity for the parties to the peace agreement to cooperate with the tribunal. The Bosnian Serbs have not yet lived up to their word with respect to the tribunal. Measures to protect human rights are a central part of the Dayton agreement because. for four years, this Council has been confronted by massive violations of law and human dignity. The U.S. Government takes those measures very seriously, and it expects the parties to meet, in full, their obligation to assist in the implementation process. The parties are reminded that there will be consequences if they fail to do so.

S/Res/1035 December 21 15(US)-0-0

Decides to establish, for a period of one year from the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR, a UN civilian police force to be known as the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to be entrusted with the tasks set out in Annex II of the peace agreement and a UN Civilian Office with the responsibilities set out in the report of the Secretary General, and, to that end, endorses the arrangements set out in the Secretary General's report; notes with satisfaction that the IPTF and the UN Civilian Office will be under the authority of the Secretary General and subject to coordination and guidance by the High Representative; welcomes the Secretary General's intention to appoint a UN coordinator; and asks the Secretary General to submit a report to the Council at least every three months about the work of the IPTF and the Civilian Office.

VOTING SUMMARIES

The table below lists the votes of Security Council members on the 67 resolutions introduced in 1995. Resolutions on which a Security Council member voted No or abstained are indicated by number in parentheses. The U.S. veto was the only negative vote during the year. There were only eight abstentions: five by Russia and three by China; they were mostly on resolutions concerning the former Yugoslavia.

COUNTRY	YES	NO	ABSTAIN
United States	66	1*	0
Argentina	67	0	0
Botswana	67	0	0
China	64	0	3 (975, 988, 998)
Czech Republic	67	0	0
France	67	0	0
Germany	67	0	0
Honduras	67	0	0
Indonesia	67	0	0
Italy	67	0	0
Nigeria	67	0	0
Oman	67	0	0
Russia	62	0	5 (970, 988, 998,
			1003, 1021)
Rwanda	67	0	0
United Kingdom	67	0	0

^{*}Veto on a Middle East resolution on May 17.

In the following table, Security Council votes are tabulated on the same basis as overall votes for the General Assembly in this report, and voting coincidence percentages are calculated accordingly. Council members are ranked by coincidence with the United States. When the percentage is the same, members are ranked by the number of identical votes, and alphabetically when the number of votes is the same. It should be noted that group dynamics in the Security Council, whose 15 members frequently consult closely on issues before resolutions are presented for adoption, are quite different from those in the General Assembly.

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL (OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	
Argentina	66	1	0	98.5%
Botswana	66	1	0	98.5%
Czech Rep.	66	1	0	98.5%
France	66	1	0	98.5%
Germany	66	1	0	98.5%
Honduras	66	1	0	98.5%
Indonesia	66	1	0	98.5%
Italy	66	1	0	98.5%
Nigeria	66	1	0	98.5%
Oman	66	1	0	98.5%
Rwanda	66	1	0	98.5%
United Kingdo	m 66	1	0	98.5%
China	63	1	3	98.4%
Russia	61	1	5	98.4%
Average	65.4	1.0	0.6	98.5%

VI - COUNTRY LISTINGS

This section pulls together information contained in previous sections, and presents it by country for 184 UN members (all except the United States). They are listed in alphabetical order, with Democratic People's Republic of Korea under "D", Republic of Korea under "R", The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under "T", and United Republic of Tanzania under "U", as they are seated at the UN General Assembly. Western Samoa is known in the United Nations as Samoa and is listed under "S". Burma, now known as Myanmar, is listed under "M". Each country listing contains the following:

- Summary coincidence percentages drawn from Sections II, III, IV, and, for Security Council members, Section V. Coincidence percentages for selected issue categories are included; they are derived by the same methodology used for overall plenary votes.
 - Vote totals in the plenary and on the 15 important votes.
- Every vote on the 15 important votes (with the U.S. vote in parentheses for comparison). Symbols used here are Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, and X=Absent.
- Averages on important and overall votes of the UN regional group and other major groupings to which the country belongs. Averages on inclusion of consensus resolutions as additional identical votes are also noted.

AFGHANISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 31.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 82.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 25.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 77.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 46.7%

— Human Rights (14): 36.4% — Middle East (23): 6.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 20, Disagree 43, Abstain 5, Absent 15

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 6, Abstain 3, Absent 4

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ALBANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 69.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 72.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 90.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.6%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 43.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 41, Disagree 18, Abstain 18, Absent 6

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
İr	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ALGERIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 32.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 45.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 80.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 40.0%

— Human Rights (14): 71.4% — Middle East (23): 28.6%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 21, Disagree 43, Abstain 10, Absent 9

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	А
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ANDORRA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 75.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 91.7%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 42.9%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 39, Disagree 13, Abstain 15, Absent 16

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 1

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others .	. 72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ANGOLA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 36.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 33.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 86.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 43.5%

- Human Rights (14): 33.3% - Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 12, Disagree 21, Abstain 12, Absent 38

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 1, Disagree 2, Abstain 6, Absent 6

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 50.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 63.6%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 87.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 60.9%

— Human Rights (14): 91.7% — Middle East (23): 26.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 29, Disagree 29, Abstain 17, Absent 8

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plenary Votes	
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	. 63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ARGENTINA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 68.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 75.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.1%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 83.9%

S

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 53.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 44, Disagree 20, Abstain 19, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	А
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	А
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plenary Votes	
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ARMENIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 61.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 91.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 63.6%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 87.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 84.0%

— Human Rights (14): 81.8% — Middle East (23): 38.9%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 37, Disagree 23, Abstain 20, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 1

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		<u>Overall Plena</u>	<u>ry Votes</u>
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

AUSTRALIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 60.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 90.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 62.5%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 44.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 42, Disagree 28, Abstain 13, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 5, Abstain 0, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	. N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. Y
	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	. Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	. Y

		Overall Plenary Votes	
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Western European and Others	. 72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

AUSTRIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 72.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.6%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 48, Disagree 18, Abstain 17, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

AZERBAIJAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 52.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 89.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 44.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 70.0%

— Human Rights (14): 85.7% — Middle East (23): 15.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 24, Abstain 16, Absent 17

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 4

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	. Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	. Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. X
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	. A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	. X

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	. 76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
Islamic Conference	. 40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BAHAMAS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 52.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 72.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 90.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 64.5%

— Human Rights (14): 90.9% — Middle East (23): 42.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 34, Disagree 31, Abstain 15, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	А
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BAHRAIN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 37.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 44.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 82.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.6%

— Human Rights (14): 80.0% — Middle East (23): 21.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 43, Abstain 6, Absent 8

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 5, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Consensus</u>	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BANGLADESH

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 39.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 36.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 78.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 57.1% — Middle East (23): 23.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 29, Disagree 44, Abstain 10, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 7, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BARBADOS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 56.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 89.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 87.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 62.5%

— Human Rights (14): 90.9% — Middle East (23): 53.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 36, Disagree 28, Abstain 14, Absent 5

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0

lì	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	А
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
		Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overali Plena	ry votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BELARUS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 61.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 91.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 90.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 80.0%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 41.2%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 35, Disagree 22, Abstain 24, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 6, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	. A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	. A
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	. A
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BELGIUM

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 76.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 76.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 49, Disagree 15, Abstain 19, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	A
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BELIZE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 50.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 58.8%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 40.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 34, Disagree 33, Abstain 16, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BENIN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 38.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 86.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 51.5%

— Human Rights (14): 80.0% — Middle East (23): 18.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 42, Abstain 12, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 7, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	А

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BHUTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 48.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 87.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 62.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 80.0% — Middle East (23): 46.2%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 28, Disagree 30, Abstain 13, Absent 12

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 6, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	. Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	. Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. Y
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		<u>Overall Plena</u>	<u>ry Votes</u>
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BOLIVIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 45.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

— Human Rights (14): 91.7% — Middle East (23): 38.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 36, Disagree 43, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0

1. IAEA Report (Y)	lr	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y) Y 4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N) Y 5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N) A 6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) Y 7. Israeli Settlements (N) Y 8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) Y 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) Y 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) Y 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) Y 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) A		1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y) Y 4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N) Y 5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N) A 6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) Y 7. Israeli Settlements (N) Y 8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) Y 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) Y 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) Y 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) Y 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) A		2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)		3.		
5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)		4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) Y 7. Israeli Settlements (N)		5.		
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) Y 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) Y 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) Y 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) Y 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Y 14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) A		6.		
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) Y 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) Y 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) Y 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) Y 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Y 14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) A		7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) Y 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) Y 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) Y 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Y 14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) A		8.		
11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)		9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)		10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)		11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) A		12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
		13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
15. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y) Y		14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	А
		15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
lr Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 67.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 70.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 90.0%

- Human Rights (14): 88.9% - Middle East (23): 40.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 33, Disagree 16, Abstain 9, Absent 25

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 4

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	. 76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BOTSWANA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 57.1%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 83.3% — Middle East (23): 33.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 35, Disagree 41, Abstain 7, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 6, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
- In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BRAZIL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 41.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 46.7%

— Human Rights (14): 84.6% — Middle East (23): 38.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 30, Disagree 43, Abstain 9, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	. Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	. A
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 40.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 30.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 78.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 50.0% — Middle East (23): 22.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 30, Disagree 44, Abstain 9, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 7, Abstain 5, Absent 0

lr	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
		Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
		Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
		Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
		Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
		Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
		Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	<u>Consensus</u>	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
ASEAN	39.4%	85.0%	40.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BULGARIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 73.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 69.2%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 47, Disagree 17, Abstain 19, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	IAEA Report (Y)	
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BURKINA FASO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 33.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 82.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 33.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 79.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.6%

— Human Rights (14): 33.3% — Middle East (23): 25.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 23, Disagree 46, Abstain 7, Absent 7

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 6, Abstain 6, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. A
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

BURUNDI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 36.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 44.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 47.1%

— Human Rights (14): 50.0% — Middle East (23): 27.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 22, Disagree 39, Abstain 9, Absent 13

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 4, Absent 2

In	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CAMBODIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 48.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 87.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 62.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 51.4%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 50.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 29, Disagree 31, Abstain 11, Absent 12

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 5, Absent 2

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
I	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CAMEROON

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 38.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 44.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 51.4%

— Human Rights (14): 80.0% — Middle East (23): 23.5%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 27, Disagree 43, Abstain 11, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 6, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	. Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. A
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	. A
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CANADA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 73.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 96.4%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 50, Disagree 18, Abstain 15, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CAPE VERDE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 34.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 42.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 84.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 43.3%

- Human Rights (14): 66.7% - Middle East (23): 15.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 22, Disagree 41, Abstain 8, Absent 12

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 3

Important Issues (U	J.S. Votes)	VOTES
1. IAEA Report (\	/)	X
2. U.S. Embargo	of Cuba (N)	Y
3. Middle East Pe	ace Process (Y)	Y
4. Special Comm	ittee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5. Israeli Nuclear	Armament (N)	X
6. Political/Econo	mic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
7. Israeli Settleme	ents (N)	Y
8. Palestinian Sel	f-Determination (N)	Y
9. Periodic and G	enuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10. Human Rights	in Iran (Y)	A
	in Iraq (Y)	
	in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13. Human Rights	in Sudan (Y)	A
14. Human Rights	in Cuba (Y)	A
	in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
lı İ	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 0.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 83

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 15

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
lı .	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CHAD

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 38.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 40.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 80.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 50.0% — Middle East (23): 26.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 42, Abstain 7, Absent 8

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 1

In	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
		Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CHILE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 45.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

— Human Rights (14): 91.7% — Middle East (23): 33.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 36, Disagree 44, Abstain 2, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CHINA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 21.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 81.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 9.1%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 68.6%

Security Council Votes: 98.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 36.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 11.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 14, Disagree 51, Abstain 13, Absent 5

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 1, Disagree 10, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	A
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plenary Votes	
I	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

COLOMBIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 38.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 82.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 51.4%

— Human Rights (14): 75.0% — Middle East (23): 28.6%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 29, Disagree 46, Abstain 7, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 6, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

-		Overall Plena	ry Votes
İr	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

COMOROS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 0.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 83

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 15

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	X
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		<u>Overall Plena</u>	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CONGO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 41.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 90.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.5%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 30.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 22, Disagree 31, Abstain 9, Absent 21

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 2, Abstain 6, Absent 5

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	X
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

COSTA RICA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 47.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

- Human Rights (14): 88.9% - Middle East (23): 58.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 29, Disagree 32, Abstain 4, Absent 18

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 2

Important Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1. IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries	(N) Y
7. Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) .	Y
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plenary Votes	
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Consensus</u>	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

COTE D'IVOIRE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 40.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 42.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 51.4%

— Human Rights (14): 50.0% — Middle East (23): 30.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 39, Abstain 14, Absent 4

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 8, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CROATIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 75.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 81.8%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 93.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 87.0%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 46.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 39, Disagree 13, Abstain 22, Absent 9

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 2

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
I	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CUBA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 14.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 80.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 10.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 71.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 20.8%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 15.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 53, Abstain 18, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 1, Disagree 9, Abstain 4, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	А
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	А
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	А

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
I	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CYPRUS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 58.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.3%

— Human Rights (14): 83.3% — Middle East (23): 35.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 34, Disagree 39, Abstain 10, Absent 0

Votes on 15 important issues

Agree 7, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 0

		VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10	. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11	. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12	. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13	. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14	. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15	. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
ı	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

CZECH REPUBLIC

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 77.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 95.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 83.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 94.1%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 50.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 48, Disagree 14, Abstain 21, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 2, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

	Overall Plenary Votes		
li li	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 8.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 79.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 64.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 14.3%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 7.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 42, Abstain 14, Absent 23

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 9, Abstain 4, Absent 2

lı	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	N
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	А
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
		Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	А
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

DENMARK

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 72.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 49, Disagree 19, Abstain 15, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

S

		Overall Plena	ry votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
Nordic	72.5%	94.3%	75.3%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

DJIBOUTI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 31.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 81.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 44.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 40.0%

- Human Rights (14): 66.7% - Middle East (23): 21.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 21, Disagree 45, Abstain 2, Absent 15

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 5

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	X
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

DOMINICA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 87.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 70.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 44.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 14, Disagree 16, Abstain 10, Absent 43

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 3

i	mpo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean.	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 0.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 83

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 15

ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
IAEA Report (Y)	X
U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
Israeli Settlements (N)	X
Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	X
Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	X
Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X
	IAEA Report (Y) U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N) Middle East Peace Process (Y) Special Committee on Decolonization (N) Israeli Nuclear Armament (N) Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) Israeli Settlements (N) Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) Human Rights in Iran (Y) Human Rights in Iraq (Y) Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Human Rights in Cuba (Y)

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	. 63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ECUADOR

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 47.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 64.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

— Human Rights (14): 92.3% — Middle East (23): 44.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 36, Disagree 40, Abstain 7, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

EGYPT

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 33.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 41.9%

— Human Rights (14): 62.5% — Middle East (23): 25.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 23, Disagree 46, Abstain 13, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 5, Abstain 5, Absent 0

Imp	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N).	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
11	. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12	. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13	. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14	. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15	. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

EL SALVADOR

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 48.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 75.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 90.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 55.6%

— Human Rights (14): 91.7% — Middle East (23): 42.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 36, Disagree 39, Abstain 6, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

	Overall Plenary Votes		
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	. 63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 79.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 96.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 100%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 80.0%

— Human Rights (14): 75.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 19, Disagree 5, Abstain 22, Absent 37

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 0, Abstain 6, Absent 7

İr	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. X
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. X
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	. X
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. X
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	. X
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. A
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	. Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. A
		Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
		Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	. 43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ERITREA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 58.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 89.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 70.4%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 33.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 33, Disagree 23, Abstain 6, Absent 21

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 2, Abstain 4, Absent 5

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
African	. 43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ESTONIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 81.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 96.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 90.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 96.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.9%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 53.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 45, Disagree 10, Abstain 23, Absent 5

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 3

h	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	/OTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. A
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	. X
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. X
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	. X
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. Y
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	. Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	. Y
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	. Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ETHIOPIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 45.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 44.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 52.8%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 29.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 32, Disagree 38, Abstain 11, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 5, Absent 1

Important Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES	S
1. IAEA Report (Y)	Y	
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y	
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y	
4. Special Committee on Decoloniz	ation (N) Y	
5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A	
6. Political/Economic Coercion of D	eveloping Countries (N) Y	
7. Israeli Settlements (N)	Y	
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N	J) Y	
9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/[Democratization (Y) Y	
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A	
11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A	
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former	Yugoslavia (Y) A	
13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y	
14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)		
15. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)		

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	. 43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

FIJI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 50.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 63.3%

— Human Rights (14): 83.3% — Middle East (23): 35.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 31, Disagree 30, Abstain 16, Absent 6

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 3

Imp	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10	. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11	. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12	. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13	. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15	. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

FINLAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 79.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 95.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 49, Disagree 13, Abstain 21, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTE	S
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y	
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y	
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y	
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y	
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
Nordic	72.5%	94.3%	75.3%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

FRANCE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 76.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 76.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.3%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 100%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 41.2%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 50, Disagree 15, Abstain 17, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Important Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1. IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	A
5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (I	N (V
7. Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	<u>Consensus</u>	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GABON

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 39.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 92.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 52.9%

— Human Rights (14): 60.0% — Middle East (23): 26.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 25, Disagree 39, Abstain 12, Absent 7

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 2, Abstain 8, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTE:
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	А
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	А
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	А
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	А

S

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GAMBIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 33.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 33.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 61.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 37.5% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 6, Abstain 9, Absent 65

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 8

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GEORGIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 85.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 97.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 100%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 96.2%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 50.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 48, Disagree 8, Abstain 25, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 0, Abstain 5, Absent 1

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	N
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	A
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
1	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GERMANY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 76.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 76.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.4%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 50, Disagree 15, Abstain 18, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0

lr	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GHANA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 32.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 27.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 74.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 43.8%

— Human Rights (14): 33.3% — Middle East (23): 21.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 21, Disagree 43, Abstain 14, Absent 5

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 8, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	A
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	. 43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GREECE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 69.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 44.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 45, Disagree 20, Abstain 18, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0

lı	mpo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	A
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GRENADA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 60.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 91.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 70.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 85.7%

— Human Rights (14): 87.5% — Middle East (23): 63.6%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 17, Disagree 11, Abstain 14, Absent 41

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 2

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
lr	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GUATEMALA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 83.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 96.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 35.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 30, Disagree 35, Abstain 10, Absent 8

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 1, Abstain 6, Absent 3

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
ÎI	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GUINEA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 40.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

- Human Rights (14): 60.0% - Middle East (23): 26.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 28, Disagree 41, Abstain 5, Absent 9

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 5, Abstain 4, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	А
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	А
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GUINEA-BISSAU

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 36.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 86.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.5%

— Human Rights (14): 50.0% — Middle East (23): 16.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 20, Disagree 35, Abstain 8, Absent 20

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 6, Absent 3

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	А
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	А
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	А
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	А
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

GUYANA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 48.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 57.6%

- Human Rights (14): 84.6% - Middle East (23): 36.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 36, Disagree 38, Abstain 9, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	. Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	. Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. Y
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

HAITI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 39.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 84.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 77.8% — Middle East (23): 31.6%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 29, Disagree 44, Abstain 3, Absent 7

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plenary Votes	
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	. 63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

HONDURAS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 45.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 64.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

— Human Rights (14): 85.7% — Middle East (23): 38.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 37, Disagree 44, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

HUNGARY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 83.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 96.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 83.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 93.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 57.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 49, Disagree 10, Abstain 20, Absent 4

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 2, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ICELAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 75.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 49, Disagree 16, Abstain 18, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y.
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
Nordic	72.5%	94.3%	75.3%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

INDIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 17.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 81.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 27.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 75.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 16.7%

— Human Rights (14): 10.0% — Middle East (23): 25.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 11, Disagree 53, Abstain 19, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 8, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overali Piena	ry votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

INDONESIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 33.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 82.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 30.8%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 73.8%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 38.7%

— Human Rights (14): 36.4% — Middle East (23): 22.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 24, Disagree 48, Abstain 9, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 9, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Important Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1. IAEA Report (Y)	Υ
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Υ
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Υ
4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Υ
5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Υ
6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Υ
7. Israeli Settlements (N)	Υ
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Υ
9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Υ
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Ν
11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Α
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Υ
13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
15. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Α

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
ASEAN	39.4%	85.0%	40.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

IRAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 27.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 81.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 21.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 67.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 38.5%

- Human Rights (14): 30.8% - Middle East (23): 20.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 18, Disagree 48, Abstain 10, Absent 7

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 11, Abstain 1, Absent 0

li	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	N
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
		Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

IRAQ

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 0.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 83

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 15

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Χ
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Χ
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Χ
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Χ
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Χ
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Χ
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Χ
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Χ
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Χ
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		<u>Overall Plena</u>	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

IRELAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 69.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.6%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 44.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 46, Disagree 20, Abstain 17, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
lr Ir	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ISRAEL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 97.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 99.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 100%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.0%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 100%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 64, Disagree 2, Abstain 17, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 15, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	N
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	N
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	N
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	N
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important Votes	Including	Votes Only
Group Membership None	_votes_	Consensus	Only
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ITALY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 74.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.8%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 49, Disagree 17, Abstain 17, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

lr	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	N
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

JAMAICA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 50.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 87.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 58.8%

— Human Rights (14): 80.0% — Middle East (23): 42.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 36, Disagree 36, Abstain 11, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y.
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

S

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

JAPAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 75.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 76.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 90.9%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 46, Disagree 15, Abstain 22, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overail Plena	ry Votes
	important i	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	. 45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

JORDAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 38.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 44.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 51.4%

- Human Rights (14): 66.7% - Middle East (23): 25.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 28, Disagree 44, Abstain 8, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 5, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
İn	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

KAZAKSTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 60.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 91.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 63.6%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 87.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 71.4%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 41.2%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 38, Disagree 25, Abstain 20, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	. Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	. Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	. A
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

KENYA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 40.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 37.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.5%

— Human Rights (14): 33.3% — Middle East (23): 33.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 39, Abstain 18, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 7, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

KUWAIT

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 40.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 54.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 84.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 75.0% — Middle East (23): 28.6%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 30, Disagree 44, Abstain 4, Absent 5

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 2

Important Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1. IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries	(N) Y
7. Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

KYRGYZSTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 55.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 90.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 59.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 20.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 19, Disagree 15, Abstain 13, Absent 36

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 6, Absent 3

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

LAOS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 27.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 81.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 14.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 76.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 41.9%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 16.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 17, Disagree 46, Abstain 9, Absent 11

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 1, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 4

lı	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	A
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
		Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
		Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		<u>Overali Piena</u>	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

LATVIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 87.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 97.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 90.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 96.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 63.6%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 47, Disagree 7, Abstain 21, Absent 8

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 1

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	. X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	. Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	. Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	. Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
The state of the s	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	. 76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

LEBANON

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 25.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 82.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 30.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 76.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 30.8%

— Human Rights (14): 71.4% — Middle East (23): 11.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 16, Disagree 46, Abstain 11, Absent 10

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 7, Abstain 4, Absent 1

lı	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	N
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	. 45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	. 37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	. 40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

LESOTHO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 45.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 79.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

- Human Rights (14): 71.4% - Middle East (23): 50.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 30, Abstain 12, Absent 15

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Important Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1. IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (I	N) Y
7. Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
15. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
I	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

LIBERIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 0.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 83

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 15

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Х
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	X
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	. 43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

LIBYA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 22.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 80.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 14.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 66.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 36.7%

— Human Rights (14): 23.1% — Middle East (23): 13.6%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 16, Disagree 55, Abstain 12, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 12, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N).	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	N
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

LIECHTENSTEIN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 72.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.6%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 47, Disagree 18, Abstain 17, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

	Overall Plenary Votes		ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	. 72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

LITHUANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 81.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 95.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 83.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 94.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.9%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 50.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 47, Disagree 11, Abstain 21, Absent 4

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 2, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	A
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

LUXEMBOURG

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 74.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.3%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 50, Disagree 17, Abstain 16, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

ln	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
:	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
;	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
į	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
(6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
•	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
- 8	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MADAGASCAR

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 45.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 100%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 23, Disagree 28, Abstain 3, Absent 29

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 8

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MALAWI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 38.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 80.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 45.5%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 21.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 25, Disagree 40, Abstain 3, Absent 15

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 6, Abstain 1, Absent 2

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
lr Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MALAYSIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 39.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 36.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 78.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 47.2%

- Human Rights (14): 66.7% - Middle East (23): 22.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 28, Disagree 43, Abstain 12, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 7, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	А

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
ASEAN	39.4%	85.0%	40.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MALDIVES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 42.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 45.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 52.6%

— Human Rights (14): 71.4% — Middle East (23): 30.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 30, Disagree 41, Abstain 8, Absent 4

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 3, Absent 1

h	mpo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
		Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
		Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
		Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
		Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
		Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MALI

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 36.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 45.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 80.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 46.9%

- Human Rights (14): 71.4% - Middle East (23): 17.6%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 25, Disagree 44, Abstain 5, Absent 9

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MALTA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 68.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 75.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.6%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 40.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 45, Disagree 21, Abstain 17, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 0

lr	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	A
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MARSHALL ISLANDS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 65.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 72.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 90.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 58.3%

— Human Rights (14): 92.3% — Middle East (23): 80.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 41, Disagree 22, Abstain 18, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MAURITANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 38.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 40.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 80.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 51.4%

- Human Rights (14): 50.0% - Middle East (23): 26.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 27, Disagree 44, Abstain 5, Absent 7

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 1

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	А
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MAURITIUS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 43.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 84.6% — Middle East (23): 33.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 34, Disagree 45, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0

lı	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
		IAEA Report (Y)	
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
		Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MEXICO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 41.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 57.1%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 47.1%

— Human Rights (14): 84.6% — Middle East (23): 36.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 32, Disagree 45, Abstain 6, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 6, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	. 63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MICRONESIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 66.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 80.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 93.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 60.6%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 81.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 40, Disagree 20, Abstain 22, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 5, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	A
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MOLDOVA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 73.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 80.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 93.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.9%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 42.9%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 44, Disagree 16, Abstain 21, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 2, Abstain 4, Absent 1

Imp	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	A
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10	. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
-11	. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12	. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13	. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14	. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15	. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MONACO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 75.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 76.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 100%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 41.2%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 47, Disagree 15, Abstain 17, Absent 4

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
ı	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	. 72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MONGOLIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 47.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

- Human Rights (14): 90.9% - Middle East (23): 42.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 35, Disagree 38, Abstain 7, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0

li	mpo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
		Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MOROCCO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 40.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 44.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 82.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 53.1%

— Human Rights (14): 66.7% — Middle East (23): 16.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 38, Abstain 10, Absent 9

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 5, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	А
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MOZAMBIQUE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 41.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 42.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 82.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 52.8%

— Human Rights (14): 66.7% — Middle East (23): 36.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 23, Disagree 33, Abstain 6, Absent 21

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 3

lr	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
		Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

MYANMAR (BURMA)

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 25.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 82.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 25.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 73.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 37.0%

- Human Rights (14): 18.2% - Middle East (23): 21.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 17, Disagree 50, Abstain 15, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 9, Abstain 3, Absent 0

lr	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	А
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

NAMIBIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 40.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 78.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 47.1%

- Human Rights (14): 62.5% - Middle East (23): 33.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 28, Disagree 32, Abstain 9, Absent 14

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	А
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
African	. 43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

NEPAL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 62.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 89.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 52.8%

— Human Rights (14): 66.7% — Middle East (23): 27.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 32, Disagree 37, Abstain 12, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 6, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	. 45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

NETHERLANDS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 80.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 95.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 76.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.3%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 50, Disagree 12, Abstain 21, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

NEW ZEALAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 64.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 91.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 66.7%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 44.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 43, Disagree 24, Abstain 16, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 5, Abstain 0, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
I	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	. 72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

NICARAGUA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 58.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

- Human Rights (14): 90.9% - Middle East (23): 43.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 34, Disagree 39, Abstain 7, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 1

Imp	oortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10	D. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
1	1. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12	2. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13	3. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14	4. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15	5. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	А

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

NIGER

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 36.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 40.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 80.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 57.1% — Middle East (23): 21.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 46, Abstain 8, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 6, Abstain 5, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	А
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	А
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	А
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	А
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

S

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

NIGERIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 31.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 82.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 18.2%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 71.8%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 45.2%

- Human Rights (14): 16.7% - Middle East (23): 26.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 22, Disagree 48, Abstain 9, Absent 4

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 9, Abstain 2, Absent 2

lr	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
		Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	N
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

NORWAY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 79.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 95.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 76.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 53.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 47, Disagree 12, Abstain 19, Absent 5

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0

impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	A
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		<u>Overall Plena</u>	ry Votes
İn	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
Nordic	72.5%	94.3%	75.3%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

OMAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 35.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 40.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 80.4%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 47.1%

- Human Rights (14): 57.1% - Middle East (23): 20.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 25, Disagree 46, Abstain 7, Absent 5

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 6, Abstain 3, Absent 2

Imp	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10	. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11	. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	X
12	. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13	. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14	. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15	. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		<u>Overall Plena</u>	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

PAKISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 28.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 33.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 76.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 33.3%

— Human Rights (14): 36.4% — Middle East (23): 20.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 19, Disagree 48, Abstain 16, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 8, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. N
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

PALAU

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 66.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 78

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 1, Absent 14

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

	Overall Plenary Votes		ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	. 45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

PANAMA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 47.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 69.2%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

— Human Rights (14): 92.3% — Middle East (23): 42.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 37, Disagree 41, Abstain 5, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
l l	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 47.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 45.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 52.6%

— Human Rights (14): 85.7% — Middle East (23): 38.9%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 34, Disagree 38, Abstain 11, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 0

lm	portant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	. IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	. U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.		
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.		
6.		
7.	. Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
-10	0. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
- 1	1. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12	2. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
- 13	3. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14	4. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
1	5. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	А

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
I	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

PARAGUAY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 51.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 84.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 57.7%

— Human Rights (14): 92.3% — Middle East (23): 33.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 32, Disagree 30, Abstain 10, Absent 11

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 1

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

	Overall Plenary Votes		
î	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

PERU

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 60.6%

— Human Rights (14): 83.3% — Middle East (23): 40.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 34, Disagree 39, Abstain 10, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
İr	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

PHILIPPINES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 43.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 45.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 51.4%

— Human Rights (14): 80.0% — Middle East (23): 25.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 32, Disagree 41, Abstain 10, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	А
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	А
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
ASEAN	39.4%	85.0%	40.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

POLAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 77.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 90.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 96.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 53.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 48, Disagree 14, Abstain 19, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	. Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

PORTUGAL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 71.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 69.2%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 48, Disagree 19, Abstain 16, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	А
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

QATAR

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 32.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 81.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 41.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 78.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 43.8%

— Human Rights (14): 45.5% — Middle East (23): 20.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 24, Disagree 49, Abstain 3, Absent 7

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 7, Abstain 1, Absent 2

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	X
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry votes</u>
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 64.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 63.6%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 87.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 76.9%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 43.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 36, Disagree 20, Abstain 22, Absent 5

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	А
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	. 45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ROMANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 75.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 81.8%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 93.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 50.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 45, Disagree 15, Abstain 22, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 2, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Eastern European	. 76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

RUSSIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 73.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 72.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 90.9%

Security Council Votes: 98.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 80.0%

— Human Rights (14): 76.9% — Middle East (23): 87.5%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 38, Disagree 14, Abstain 31, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 0

lm	portant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1	. IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3	. Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4	. Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5	. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6	. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	А
7	'. Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8	B. Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	A
9	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
1	0. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
1	1. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
1	2. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	N
1	3. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
1	4. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
1	5. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		<u>Overall Plena</u>	<u>ry Votes</u>
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

RWANDA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 53.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 100%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

- Human Rights (14): 66.7% - Middle East (23): 100%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 25, Disagree 22, Abstain 11, Absent 25

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 0, Abstain 6, Absent 5

l	mpo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	А
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	А
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	А
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	А
		Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	А

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 83.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 97.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 100%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 83.3% — Middle East (23): 100%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 1, Abstain 8, Absent 69

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 0, Abstain 3, Absent 8

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

	Overall Plenary Votes		
I	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	. 63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ST. LUCIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 52.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 87.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 70.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 100%

— Human Rights (14): 84.6% — Middle East (23): 46.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 18, Disagree 16, Abstain 5, Absent 44

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 4

	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	. 63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 84.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 96.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 85.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.2%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 88.9% — Middle East (23): 100%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 11, Disagree 2, Abstain 6, Absent 64

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 1, Absent 7

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	А
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	. 63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

(WESTERN) SAMOA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 55.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 60.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 57.6%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 44.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 40, Disagree 32, Abstain 11, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 6, Abstain 0, Absent 0

lı	mpo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plenary Votes	
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SAN MARINO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 65.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 89.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 75.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 100%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 85.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 13, Disagree 7, Abstain 1, Absent 62

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 0, Absent 7

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plenary Votes	
ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 0.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 83

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 15

IAEA Report (Y) U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
	V
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Χ
6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Χ
7. Israeli Settlements (N)	Χ
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Χ
9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Χ
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Χ
11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Χ
14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	important i	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	. 43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SAUDI ARABIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 32.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 82.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 45.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 80.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 40.6%

— Human Rights (14): 62.5% — Middle East (23): 25.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 23, Disagree 47, Abstain 6, Absent 7

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 3, Absent 1

ln	npo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
;	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
(6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
į	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
		Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
ir ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SENEGAL

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 38.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 50.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 51.4%

— Human Rights (14): 71.4% — Middle East (23): 28.6%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 28, Disagree 45, Abstain 1, Absent 9

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 4

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	X
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SEYCHELLES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 25.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 76.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 47.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 1, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 79

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 1, Abstain 0, Absent 14

Importan	t Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1. IAE	A Report (Y)	X
2. U.S.	Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3. Midd	dle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4. Spe	cial Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5. Israe	eli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6. Polit	ical/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7. Israe	eli Settlements (N)	X
8. Pale	stinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9. Peri	odic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
10. Hum	nan Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11. Hum	nan Rights in Iraq (Y)	X
12. Hum	nan Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
13. Hum	nan Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
14. Hum	nan Rights in Cuba (Y)	X
15. Hum	nan Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	. 43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SIERRA LEONE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 30.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 25.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 82.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 42.1%

- Human Rights (14): 66.7% - Middle East (23): 12.5%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 11, Disagree 25, Abstain 11, Absent 36

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 1, Disagree 3, Abstain 5, Absent 6

li	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
		Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		<u>Overall Plena</u>	<u>ry Votes</u>
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SINGAPORE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 43.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 54.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 84.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

— Human Rights (14): 83.3% — Middle East (23): 35.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 31, Disagree 40, Abstain 12, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 5, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
ASEAN	39.4%	85.0%	40.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39,9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 76.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 94.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 76.9%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 48, Disagree 15, Abstain 20, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	<u>Consensus</u>	<u>Only</u>
Eastern European	. 76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SLOVENIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 78.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 95.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 75.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.9%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 45, Disagree 12, Abstain 25, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 55.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 60.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 58.8%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 44.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 40, Disagree 32, Abstain 10, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 6, Abstain 0, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

	Overall Plenary Votes		ry Votes
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	. 45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SOMALIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 0.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 83

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 15

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	X
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	X
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SOUTH AFRICA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 47.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 57.1%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 55.6%

— Human Rights (14): 84.6% — Middle East (23): 36.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 36, Disagree 40, Abstain 7, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 6, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
African	. 43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SPAIN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 70.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 69.2%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 44.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 47, Disagree 20, Abstain 16, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 9, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y .
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	А
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SRI LANKA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 36.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 36.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 78.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 43.8%

- Human Rights (14): 50.0% - Middle East (23): 23.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 25, Disagree 44, Abstain 14, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 7, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	А
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	А
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SUDAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 21.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 80.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 8.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 67.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 32.1%

- Human Rights (14): 23.1% - Middle East (23): 5.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 15, Disagree 54, Abstain 14, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 1, Disagree 11, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	А
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	A
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	N
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

S

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SURINAME

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 50.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 87.8%

Important Votes Only (15): 66.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 58.8%

— Human Rights (14): 88.9% — Middle East (23): 42.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 34, Disagree 34, Abstain 13, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
_10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SWAZILAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 50.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 88.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 60.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 87.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

— Human Rights (14): 75.0% — Middle East (23): 50.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 35, Disagree 34, Abstain 14, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.		
10.	. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

S

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85,2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SWEDEN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 71.2%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.6%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 47, Disagree 19, Abstain 17, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 10, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	N
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
Nordic	72.5%	94.3%	75.3%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

SYRIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 20.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 79.4%

Important Votes Only (15): 16.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 67.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 30.8%

— Human Rights (14): 27.3% — Middle East (23): 10.5%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 13, Disagree 52, Abstain 6, Absent 12

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 10, Abstain 2, Absent 1

imp	portant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	A
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.		
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.		
7.	, ,	
8.		
9.		
10	D. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	
	1. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	2. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
	3. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	4. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	5. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

TAJIKISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 91.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 98.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 100%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 85.7%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 100%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 21, Disagree 2, Abstain 16, Absent 44

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 0, Abstain 5, Absent 4

In	1po	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
;	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
:	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
(6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
•	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
1	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	A
!	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		<u>Overall Plena</u>	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	. 45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Islamic Conference	. 40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

THAILAND

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 40.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 40.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.6%

- Human Rights (14): 75.0% - Middle East (23): 25.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 28, Disagree 42, Abstain 12, Absent 1

Votes on 15 important issues

Agree 4, Disagree 6, Abstain 5, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

S

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
ASEAN	39.4%	85.0%	40.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 78.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 95.2%

Important Votes Only (15): 72.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 90.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 92.9%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 43.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 46, Disagree 13, Abstain 23, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Imp	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10	. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
-11	. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
	. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13	. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14	. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Y
15	. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

	Overall Plenary Votes		
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

TOGO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 34.3%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 30.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 78.1%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.6%

- Human Rights (14): 40.0% - Middle East (23): 26.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 24, Disagree 46, Abstain 13, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 3, Disagree 7, Abstain 5, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Υ .
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Υ
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Υ
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Υ
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Α .
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Α .
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	N

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
l l	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 48.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 87.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 58.3%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 57.6%

— Human Rights (14): 90.9% — Middle East (23): 35.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 33, Disagree 35, Abstain 12, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 1

lm	portant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1	. IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2	. U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3	. Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4	. Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5	. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6	. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7	. Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8	. Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
1	0. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
1	1. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
1.	2. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
1.	3. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
1.	4. Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	5. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

TUNISIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 36.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 45.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.6%

— Human Rights (14): 66.7% — Middle East (23): 21.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 46, Abstain 8, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	<u>Votes</u>	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

TURKEY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 70.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 72.7%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 90.8%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 93.1%

— Human Rights (14): 92.3% — Middle East (23): 35.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 48, Disagree 20, Abstain 14, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 1

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	A
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

TURKMENISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 76.5%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 93.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 81.3%

- Human Rights (14): 0.0% - Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 13, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 66

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 1, Abstain 0, Absent 14

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	<u>Consensus</u>	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

UGANDA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 40.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 45.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 81.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.5%

— Human Rights (14): 70.0% — Middle East (23): 22.2%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 28, Disagree 42, Abstain 11, Absent 2

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 0

ln	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

UKRAINE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 59.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 91.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 60.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 87.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 76.0%

— Human Rights (14): 100% — Middle East (23): 37.5%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 34, Disagree 23, Abstain 25, Absent 1

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 6, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 37.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 44.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 82.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 50.0%

— Human Rights (14): 66.7% — Middle East (23): 25.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 26, Disagree 43, Abstain 7, Absent 7

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 4, Absent 2

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	IAEA Report (Y)	V
	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolorization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

UNITED KINGDOM

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 85.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 96.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 84.6%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 94.3%

Security Council Votes: 98.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 100%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 47.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 57, Disagree 10, Abstain 16, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 11, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	A
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	N
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Y
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plenar	y Votes
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Western European and Others	72.5%	93.8%	73.2%
European Union	73.1%	94.1%	74.7%
NATO	73.6%	94.2%	75.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 35.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 25.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 77.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 41.4%

- Human Rights (14): 50.0% - Middle East (23): 11.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 20, Disagree 36, Abstain 17, Absent 10

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 6, Abstain 5, Absent 2

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	A
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	A

		Overali Plena	ry votes
Ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

URUGUAY

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 46.1%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 63.6%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 87.9%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 54.1%

— Human Rights (14): 83.3% — Middle East (23): 41.2%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 35, Disagree 41, Abstain 7, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	. Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. A
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. A
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
1	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

UZBEKISTAN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 85.7%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 97.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 100%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 100%

- Human Rights (14): 100% - Middle East (23): 33.3%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 12, Disagree 2, Abstain 14, Absent 55

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 0, Abstain 2, Absent 6

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	N
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	A
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	Y
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

VANUATU

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 40.4%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.7%

Important Votes Only (15): 71.4%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 91.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 43.8%

— Human Rights (14): 77.8% — Middle East (23): 16.7%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 23, Disagree 34, Abstain 6, Absent 20

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 5, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 6

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	A
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
	Important	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	. 46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	. 57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

VENEZUELA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 42.9%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

Important Votes Only (15): 61.5%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 52.8%

— Human Rights (14): 83.3% — Middle East (23): 38.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 33, Disagree 44, Abstain 6, Absent 0

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 8, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0

Imp	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Υ
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Υ
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Υ
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Υ
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Α
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Υ
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Υ
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Υ
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Υ
10). Human Rights in Iran (Y)	Υ
11	. Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Υ
	2. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	
13	B. Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Υ
14	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	Α
15	5. Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Υ

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
lr	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Latin American and Caribbean	63.6%	86.9%	47.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

VIETNAM

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 18.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 79.3%

Important Votes Only (15): 10.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 69.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 28.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 11.1%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 12, Disagree 52, Abstain 6, Absent 13

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 1, Disagree 9, Abstain 3, Absent 2

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	A
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	N
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	N
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

·		Overall Plena	ry Votes
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

YEMEN

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 33.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 82.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 28.6%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 79.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 43.8%

— Human Rights (14): 50.0% — Middle East (23): 11.8%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 22, Disagree 43, Abstain 1, Absent 17

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 2, Disagree 5, Abstain 0, Absent 8

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	Y
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	X
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	X
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
In	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
Asian	45.1%	85.5%	41.1%
Arab	37.1%	82.9%	33.0%
Islamic Conference	40.1%	84.5%	37.5%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 0.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 0.0%

— Human Rights (14): 0.0% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 83

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 15

Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	X
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	X
	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	
	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	

	Overall Plenary Votes		
li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	<u>Only</u>
Eastern European	76.9%	94.3%	73.9%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ZAIRE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 45.0%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 86.6%

Important Votes Only (15): 0.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 92.7%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 48.4%

— Human Rights (14): 33.3% — Middle East (23): 0.0%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 18, Disagree 22, Abstain 7, Absent 36

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 0, Disagree 1, Abstain 6, Absent 8

lt	npo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	X
	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	X
	4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	X
	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	A
	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	X
	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	X
	8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	X
	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
	10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	A
	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
	12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	A
		Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	A
	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	X

		Overall Plena	ry votes
lr ir	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ZAMBIA

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 44.6%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

Important Votes Only (15): 53.8%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 82.5%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 52.8%

- Human Rights (14): 80.0% - Middle East (23): 36.4%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 33, Disagree 41, Abstain 6, Absent 3

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 7, Disagree 6, Abstain 1, Absent 1

Impo	rtant Issues (U.S. Votes)	OTES
1.	IAEA Report (Y)	. Y
2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	. Y
3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	. Y
4.	Special Committee on Decolonization (N)	. Y
5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	. A
6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N)	. Y
7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	. Y
8.	Palestinian Self-Determination (N)	. Y
9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	. Y
10.	Human Rights in Iran (Y)	. Y
11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	Υ .
12.	Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	. X
13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	. Y
14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	. Y

		Overall Plena	ry Votes
lr	nportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%

ZIMBABWE

Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes Only (83): 36.8%

Overall Votes and 216 Consensus Resolutions: 84.1%

Important Votes Only (15): 40.0%

Important Votes and 22 Consensus Resolutions: 80.4%

Selected Issue Categories (No. of Votes): Arms Control (38): 46.9%

— Human Rights (14): 62.5% — Middle East (23): 22.2%

Votes on 83 Plenary Issues

Agree 25, Disagree 43, Abstain 11, Absent 4

Votes on 15 Important Issues

Agree 4, Disagree 6, Abstain 4, Absent 1

1. IAEA Report (Y)	Impo	ortant Issues (U.S. Votes)	VOTES
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y) Y 4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N) Y 5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N) X 6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) Y 7. Israeli Settlements (N) Y 8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) A 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) A 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) A 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) A 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Y 14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) N	1.	IAEA Report (Y)	Y
3. Middle East Peace Process (Y) Y 4. Special Committee on Decolonization (N) Y 5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N) X 6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) Y 7. Israeli Settlements (N) Y 8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) A 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) A 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) A 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) A 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Y 14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) N	2.	U.S. Embargo of Cuba (N)	Y
4. Special Committee on Decolorization (N) Y 5. Israeli Nuclear Armament (N) X 6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) Y 7. Israeli Settlements (N) Y 8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) A 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) A 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) A 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) A 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Y 14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) N	3.	Middle East Peace Process (Y)	Y
6. Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) Y 7. Israeli Settlements (N)	4.		
7. Israeli Settlements (N) Y 8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) A 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) A 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) A 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) A 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Y 14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) N	5.	Israeli Nuclear Armament (N)	X
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) A 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) A 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) A 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) A 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Y 14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) N	6.	Political/Economic Coercion of Developing Countries (N) .	Y
8. Palestinian Self-Determination (N) Y 9. Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y) A 10. Human Rights in Iran (Y) A 11. Human Rights in Iraq (Y) A 12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y) A 13. Human Rights in Sudan (Y) Y 14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) N	7.	Israeli Settlements (N)	Y
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y)			
10. Human Rights in Iran (Y)	9.	Periodic and Genuine Elections/Democratization (Y)	A
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	10.		
12. Human Rights in Parts of Former Yugoslavia (Y)	11.	Human Rights in Iraq (Y)	A
14. Human Rights in Cuba (Y) N			
	13.	Human Rights in Sudan (Y)	Y
	14.	Human Rights in Cuba (Y)	N
10. Human riigiko irriigona (1)	15.	Human Rights in Nigeria (Y)	Y

		Overall Plena	<u>ry Votes</u>
li li	mportant	Including	Votes
Group Membership	Votes	Consensus	Only
African	43.5%	85.1%	39.2%
Non-Aligned Movement	46.8%	85.2%	39.9%
All UN Members	57.9%	88.2%	50.6%





