

No 2971

Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(United States Printing Office--Washington: 1946)

Vol. II

Pages 812-13

Friday, November 30, 1945
Congress of the United States
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack

Washington, D. C.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILLS . . .

Mr. Gesell. Now, just how far, General, did this question of security go in this regard? To take an extreme case, assuming you had intercepted a message in which the Japanese said that they planned to attack Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December at dawn. I take it + am correct in assuming that that message would have been transmitted to Hawaii for their information?

General Miles. It would have been, by the Chief of Staff. I think that case is similar to the one which actually occurred on the morning of December 7. We didn't know where this attack was coming but we very much feared an attack would come coincident with the 1 p.m. delivery of the Japanese reply and my action then was to bring this to the notice of the Chief of Staff so that an additional warning would be sent out.

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Mr. Gearhart. . . . But, General Miles, things happened on the 6th of December which suddenly centered your attention upon Hawaii as a possible object of attack, did there not?

General Miles. Things happened on the morning of the 7th of December, sir, which centered my attention on the probable Japanese attack somewhere coincident with the delivery of the Japanese reply at 1 o'clock that day.

Mr. Gearhart. You are familiar with the so-called 14-part Japanese reply to the Hull message of November 26, are you not?

General Miles. I am, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When they speak of it as the 14-part message they are referring to the method the Japanese used in transmitting that message, are they not?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It came in in installments, in other words, rather than in a solid typed coded message; is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Thirteen parts of that message were received in Washington on the 6th day of December, were they not?

General Miles. On the late evening of the 6th they were received, sir.

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Mr. Gearhart. Do you know when the fourteenth part was received on the 7th of December?

General Miles. I understand that that was received fairly early on the morning of the 7th, at 7 or 8 o'clock. Again, I am not able to testify as to the accurate hour.

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Mr. Gearhart. You were impressed with the importance of that fourteenth part of the message, were you not?

General Miles. When I read it, I was very much impressed with the fourteenth part.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you make any out-of-the-ordinary directions in reference to its immediate delivery to the ones that were entitled to receive copies from an emissary from your division?

General Miles. It had been delivered to the recipients about coincidental with its delivery to me, with the exception of General Marshall with whom I was in touch either directly or through Colonel Bratton to get this information to him.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you make any special effort, by telephone or otherwise, or by calling at his office, to inform General Marshall of the receipt of that fourteenth part of the message?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Were you successful in contacting him?

General Miles. I was, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When did you inform him of the fourteenth part of the message?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I have written notes on my activities on the 6th and 7th which, perhaps for clarity and saving time, I might read.

My wife and I dined at the house of Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, then Chief of ONI. We were there from 8 p.m., until about 11 p.m. Shortly before we left, I think about 10:30 p.m., Commander Kramer came to the house, bringing with him a summary, I think, although it may have been the full translation of the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our note of November 26. This was the first knowledge I had that these 13 parts were in.

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Early on the morning of the 7th, Colonel Bratton called me at my house, told me that important information was in and that he was trying to get in touch with General Marshall. I asked Colonel Bratton to tell General Marshall that I would come out to Fort Myer to see him if he

desired. Either Colonel Bratton or I called General Gerow. These telephone messages were designed to effect a meeting of the Chief of Staff with General Gerow, Colonel, and myself, which subsequently took place in General Marshall's office.

I then went to my office. There I saw the full Japanese reply, and the 1 p.m. delivery message, and discussed them with Colonel Bratton. The latter message and the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply struck me immediately.

Soon arrangements had been made for us to be notified when General Marshall arrived. When so notified, I went to General Marshall's office. What took place in his office is best recalled by me in a memorandum I prepared for the Chief of Staff, dated December 15, 1941, subject: "Sunday Morning, December 7, 1941."

This is the memorandum that I refer to, as my recollection of what occurred.

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Memorandum for the Chief of Staff
Subject: Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

1. My recollection of what occurred in your office on that morning is as follows:

I found you alone in your office at about 11:25 a.m. We were almost immediately joined by Colonel Bratton, who brought in the Japanese reply and the Japanese directive that the reply be given to Secretary Hull at 1 p.m. that day.

You then read aloud the Japanese reply, which was of considerable length. You then asked what Colonel Bratton and I thought should be done about it, or what it signified. We said that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply--1 p.m.--an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand, but it might be any one or more of a number of other areas.

I urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, and to be on the alert. You then picked up the telephone and got Admiral Stark. You told him you thought we should send out warning as indicated above. After Admiral Stark replied, you put down the telephone and said that the Admiral did not think any further warnings necessary, since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Colonel Bratton and I nevertheless urged that warnings be sent.

You then wrote out the warnings message. There was some discussion as to whether the Philippines should be included or not, but I am not quite clear exactly when this discussion occurred. You again got Admiral Stark on the telephone and read the message to him. He apparently concurred, and asked that the naval forces be informed. You added that at the bottom of the message.

At about this time General Gerow and Colonel Bundy arrived. You asked us in succession, beginning with me, what we thought the Japanese reply and timing meant. I said that I thought it probably meant Thailand, but that the timing had some significance and warning messages should be sent. General Gerow and Colonels Bratton and Bundy concurred. The message in your handwriting was then given to Colonel Bratton to take immediately to the Message Center. (There was a little discussion here as to whether it should go to General Gerow's office for typing first, but time was then pressing and I gave it to Bratton for immediate delivery. General Gerow said as Bratton was leaving, "Tell them to give it first priority to the Philippines if there is a question of priority" or something to that effect.) Bratton returned in a few moments and you directed him to find out how long it would take for the delivery of those messages. Again he went to the Message Center and returned and reported to you that they would have them encoded in three minutes, on the air in eight, and in the hands of the recipients in (I think) twenty.

Colonel Bratton states that he looked at his watch on delivering your message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a.m. He further states that the Message Center gave him no intimation that all four messages would not go over Army radio direct to the four Army Headquarters.

Signed by me.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you remember when you first saw the full message of the 14 parts?

General Miles. I cannot identify the hour exactly, sir. I only know that I got down there to the office fairly early after this telephone conversation with Colonel Bratton, and I think that General Gerow, although of that I am not quite certain, and that I had considerable time to read the message and discuss it with Colonel Bratton before the arrival of the Chief of Staff.

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Mr. Gearhart. But the very use of 1 o'clock by the Japanese Government in directing their Ambassador and Envoy to present that at that hour certainly excited in the minds of every officer who saw that message much comment in respect to its possible meaning, did it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir. It was a very unusual request to make on a Secretary of State of a foreign power, that he receive a message at 1 o'clock on a Sunday afternoon.

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Mr. Gearhart. All right. What did 1 o'clock in Washington mean in Hawaii?

General Miles. I am trying to remember, Mr. Congressman but I do not remember that any of those places specifically were discussed, or that we related the 1 o'clock in Washington to any specific place. We thought the line of action would be Thailand, still thought it that morning, but we wanted our overseas departments and the west coast alerted, and it was an awful urgency about it

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General Miles. One o'clock, as we now know, meant about 7 o'clock, I think, in Hawaii.

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Mr. Gearhart. When was the conference completed insofar as the determination to send a message was concerned?

General Miles. I wrote on that same day, December 15, that Colonel Bratton looked at his watch on delivering General Marshall's message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a.m.

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TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. Mitchell (general counsel). General Gerow, will you state your present rank and station?

General Gerow. Leonard T. Gerow, lieutenant general; station, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

Mr. Mitchell. Were you in the War Plans Division in the War Department in 1941?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. When did you receive that assignment?

General Gerow. I reported, sir, in November 1940, and left the War Plans Division in February 1942.

Mr. Mitchell. You were head of the War Plans Division during that period?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans Division.

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Mr. Mitchell. Yes. You may. Just a part of the regulations relating to the War Plans Division.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
I quote paragraph 12:

War Plans Division, general duties:

a. The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the use in the theatre of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.

b. The War Plans Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning--

- (1) Location and armament of coast and land fortifications;
- (2) Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the national defense;
- (3) The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment

to be the duty of the Operations and Training Division);
(4) Actual operations in the theatre of war;
(5) Consultation with the Operations and Training Division and the Supply Division on major items of equipment.

Those are the responsibilities of War Plans Division, 1941, sir.

General Gerow. Well, the first time the 14-part message or the 1 p.m. message was in the office of the Chief of Staff on the morning of December 7th was about 11:30 o'clock.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL;
SPECIAL ENVOY TO CHINA

Friday, December 7, 1945

Mr. Mitchell. Now, when we closed last evening I had just asked you a question. I will repeat it now:
"Do you remember this diplomatic message from Tokyo to their Ambassadors here, what we call for short the 14 part message and the 1 P.M. message?"
Your answer was, "Yes, sir."
"Will you state in your own way just when you first knew about that and under what circumstances?"
And you got as far as saying: "I first was aware of this message when I reached the"--and then we adjourned.
Will you give us now the answer?

General Marshall. When I reached the office on the morning of Sunday, December the 7th.

On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about eight, and following the routine that I had carried out on previous Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter.

I think in one of the previous statements I made in this investigation of Pearl Harbor incidents that I said I probably rode at 8:30. Discussions with the orderlies and also evidence that I had seen of other individuals leads me purely by induction and not by definite memory to think that I must have ridden later; just what time I do not know; but between 9 o'clock and the time I went to the War Department I ate my breakfast, I probably looked at the Sunday papers and I went for a ride. . . .

My recollection beyond that is that while I was taking a shower, either as I went into the shower or while I was actually taking a shower, word came to me that Colonel Bratton had something important and wished to come out to Fort Myer. I sent word that I was coming to the War Department, so I finished my shower, dressed and left for the War Department.

My average time of taking a shower and dressing would be about 10 minutes, possibly less. As to what time I arrived at the War Department is a matter of conjecture; I have no recollection.

On my arrival there Colonel Bratton handed me these

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intercepts which included the 14 sections of the Japanese message, and I started reading them through. You recall it is a rather lengthy document and of such a nature that there were portions of it that I read twice.

When I reached the end of the document the next sheet was the 1 o'clock message of December 7.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message that directed the Ambassadors to deliver this thing at 1:30 p.m. Sunday to the American Government?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, that message. That, of course, was indicative to me, and all the others who came into the room, of some very definite action at 1:00 o'clock, because that 1:00 o'clock was Sunday and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State, all of which were rather unusual put together.

I think that I immediately called Admiral Stark on the phone, and found he had seen the message, and I proposed a message to our various commanders in the Pacific region, the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, that is the Panama Canal, and the west coast, which included Alaska. Admiral Stark felt that we might confuse them, because we had given them an alert and now we were adding something more to it.

I hung up the phone, which was the White House phone, and in longhand wrote out the message. My recollection was that he called me back. I am told now that the White House telephone records show that I called him back. I had no recollection of reading the message to him. I thought, on the contrary, he called me just as I finished the message, saving the last sentence.

However, one way or the other, there was a call or conversation between Stark and myself, the effect of which was he wished me to add to the message specifically "Show this to your Naval officers," which I did in longhand.

I then directed Colonel Bratton to take it immediately to the message center and start it. There was a proposal then that we have it typed. The decision was there was no time for typing, and Colonel Bratton left with the message.

On his return I questioned him as to the length of time involved and I couldnot make out whether or not he was talking about the time of encoding as well as the time of dispatching and the time of receipt, so I sent him back accompanied by Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of the immediate details of all Pacific affairs.

They came back and gave me the estimates of the time of deliveries in these various parts of the world. My recollection is that I sent at least Colonel Bundy back again, and I thought Colonel Bratton with him. I believe others state that there was no third trip. There were certainly two--my own recollection is there were three. However that may be, that was the procedure on the dispatching of the message.

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Mr. Mitchell. Then at least you did read the message and were in the act of preparing a warning by 11:30 or 11:40?

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Mr. Mitchell. That is correct, you
General Marshall. Yes, sir; 11:40 would be quite evidently the completion of it, because I had it all written except the last sentence.

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer now, as Exhibit 61, a photostat which reads as follows: "December 7, 1941." It is typed.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary,
General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army;

And the message is this:

Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

Marshall.

It has the signature of General Gerow on it. Has the committee a copy?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. And the committee will note that underneath it is a record:
"Radios as follows dispatched 11:52 AM, 12-7-41 by Code Room, WDMC."

General Marshall. War Department Message Center.

Mr. Mitchell. And another was dispatched 12:05 to Manila, another one to Hawaii at 12:17; the one to the Caribbean Command is blurred. It looks like 12:00 o'clock, and the one to the Fourth Army at San Francisco at 12:11.

Tuesday, December 11, 1945

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General Marshall. Senator, as I recall my testimony and as I recall the events a message came to my quarters as I was taking a shower or getting into a shower after riding that Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house to see me with an important message and I--

Senator Ferguson. Well, then--

Mr. Gesell: Let him finish, please.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Please go ahead and finish your answer.

General Marshall. That Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house, wished to come out to the house with an important message and I sent word that I would be out to the Department and I completed my shower and dressed and I believe I said that would probably take me about 10 minutes and then got in the car and drove down to the Department.

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Senator Ferguson. Which, as I understand it, was 7 or 10 more minutes?

General Marshall. I imagine about 7 minutes; yes.

Senator Ferguson. So that would be 17 minutes--

General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. (Continuing.) After you knew that Bratton wanted to get in touch with you--

General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You received this message?

General Marshall. No, sir. I will say that is all, I think, that-- well, you say "this message" meaning what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the 14 parts.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the 1 o'clock.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the destruction of the codes.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So that 17 minutes after you received notice from Bratton as far as you were concerned you received these messages?

General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that was on the Sunday morning?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; Sunday morning.

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