

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

13 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. D. N. Sutton  
FROM : Lt. K. Steiner  
SUBJECT : Statements about Military Cooperation,  
including Submarine Warfare. Affidavit  
of NOMURA, Naokuni.

Your attention is invited to:

1. Exhibit 812 A (IPS Doc. 2312). These are the minutes of a discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6 March 1943. Only excerpts have been translated and introduced.

The parts ~~which~~ were not introduced contained references to the cooperation between Germany and Japan in regard to submarine warfare and in particular to the offer of two submarines to Japan.

According to this document Oshima stated that Japan wished to increase her submarine warfare and to make appropriate production plans. For this reason the Japanese Navy would appreciate it if she could get two sample submarines from Germany. Nomura's estimate for the time necessary for such production was one year or one and one-half years. Nomura strongly advocated such production plans. He had received a wire from Tokyo ordering his return. It seemed necessary that he should have a conference with Admiral Doenitz about all details before leaving.

In a <sup>second</sup> ~~certain~~ conference on the same day Ribbentrop informed Oshima that after consultation with the German Navy, the German Government was willing to grant one or two submarines to Japan. The German government would put these submarines at the disposal of Japan assuming that the Japanese Navy would start immediately with the mass production of submarines. Oshima declared that Japan was willing to do so. Ribbentrop suggested the dispatch of German experts as well as German officers with experience in submarine tactics. Details were to be worked out between Admiral Nomura and the German Admiral Meissel.

2.

( NOTE: Ribbentrop sent a telegram about this conference to OTT on 9 March 1943. I received copy of this telegram which I analyzed in the attached memorandum of 7 May 1947, Item 3).

2. Exhibit 839A (IPS Doc. 520) is an excerpt from notes about a conversation between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 18 April 1943. The document contains also notes on a conversation with Admiral Nomura which were not introduced.

The parts of this document which were not introduced contain references to the transfer of submarines and are almost identical with the contents of the telegram about this conference which Ribbentrop sent to Ott, copy of which we have and which is analyzed in my memorandum of 7 May 1947, Item 6.

The following is an analysis of the parts of the document dealing with the conversation with Admiral Nomura in the presence of Oshima on the same day. The occasion was the recall of Nomura to Tokyo. Nomura thanked Ribbentrop for the friendship and confidential cooperation granted to him during his stay in Germany and especially for the understanding and continuous assistance which Ribbentrop showed the Japanese Navy in all matters. Ribbentrop then stressed the importance of the transport problem and Nomura declared that he had frequently discussed the submarine question and cargo warfare with Admiral Fricke, with other persons in Navy headquarters, and with General Jodl. Japan had planned a major Naval action in the Indian Ocean last October. This plan was frustrated by the American attack on the Solomons. Since then the Japanese Navy has also come to the understanding that the cutting of enemy communications is of prime importance, thus changing her views about the use of submarines. Almost simultaneously with the discussions between Ribbentrop and Oshima regarding the necessity of cargo warfare conducted by Japan was the offer of Hitler of a grant of submarines for the Japanese Navy.

This fortunate coincidence led to the immediate start of submarine production in Japan. Ribbentrop remarked that a substantial submarine fleet is the best protection for Japan and the surest means for early victory. Nomura replied that the Japanese Navy had changed her views and would now use all her powers for cargo warfare. In answer to a question of Ribbentrop he declared that production of submarines would start before the end of the year. Later, he agreed once more with Ribbentrop

3.

that cargo warfare is most important and that the long communication lines of America are of great advantage for Germany and Japan. In saying farewell Ribbentrop expressed the hope for continued good cooperation in the interest of the common cause.

Lt. K. Steiner

7 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO : Mr. Frank S. Tavenner  
FROM : Lt. K. Steiner  
SUBJECT : Analysis of German documents.

The following is an analysis of German documents which I received and of which photostats are to the best of my knowledge not in our possession.

1. Telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott. Dated Berlin 26 June (1941). #917. This is an annex to another telegram of the same date which is IPS Doc. 4033-7, which has been introduced in evidence. Ribbentrop states that since an early collapse of the Russian resistance is expected his advice to the Japanese government to participate at an early date in the activities against the Soviet Union is now of particular importance. He kept Ambassador Oshima posted about the favorable military developments and advised him in the sense expressed above. He expresses the hope that Matsuoka's conviction that Japan would naturally participate in a conflict of Germany with Russia would soon be realized.

2. Telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott. Dated Berlin 2 October (1942). #2891. Ribbentrop reports about a conversation with Oshima regarding dispatch of a personal delegation of the Japanese Emperor which was not to be communicated to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. While such a dispatch seemed at first desirable investigations have shown that the technical difficulties and dangers involved make such an action not advisable at this time.

3. Telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott. Dated Berlin 9 March (1943). #684. Ribbentrop advises Ott of conferences between Hitler, Oshima and himself in which Oshima was informed about the military situation. The conferences dealt first with the operations against Russia which were described in a favorable light. A short report was also given about the

situation in North Africa, Greece and about the submarine warfare. In connection therewith an offer of one or two submarines was made to Japan with aim of giving Japan the benefit of the experiences of Germany in this field.

Oshima was informed that an attack of Japan against Russia may be of decisive importance for the war. The defeat of Russia is a vital question for Japan as well as for Germany. At present Russia is able to draw forces from Siberia to the European front and to receive American material via Vladivostok. If Japan has armor piercing weapons her attack against Russia would be decisive. Stalin would have to capitulate when attacked on two fronts. Compared with this fact the fight in China and on the other fronts loses in importance and could be finished much more easily and quickly once Russia is broken. Japan should consider whether it is correct to have Germany carry the fight by herself or to relieve her on the Russian front. The program for this year is a common attack on Russia from both sides. The program for next year common submarine warfare on all oceans. Oshima stated that he personally had always expressed the conviction that Japan would have to attack Russia. The situation in regard to such an attack is under consideration in Tokyo.

However, instructions which Oshima received from Tokyo in the meantime take a negative attitude to the question of a Japanese attack on Russia because such an attack is beyond the Japanese powers in the present situation. Under the circumstances such an attack would not be in the mutual interests of the Tri-Partite powers. Ribbentrop replied that Japan should be ready for new actions and Germany would expect her to deal decisive blows in another direction if she could not decide for an attack against Russia. Purely a defensive attitude would not be considered correct.

Oshima pointed out that Tokyo was afraid of dispersing Japanese forces too much but does not plan purely defensive attitude. A new attack against America and England is under consideration which may be in the direction of Indian Ocean. The offer regarding German submarines is gratefully accepted by Japan. Ribbentrop suggested that Admiral Nomura should discuss it with German Naval Headquarters.

*any conversations*

Instructs Ott not to begin negotiations regarding a Japanese attack on Russia at this time. He instructed further to urge Japan not to remain defensive but to initiate actions against the common enemy in accordance with public statements of General Tojo. The importance of Japanese participation in submarine warfare and of mass production of submarines for this purpose should be stressed.

4. Telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott. Dated Berlin 16 April (1943). #966. Ribbentrop advises Ott to oppose false rumors regarding peace feelers between Germany, England and America, which may have reached Japan via Europe. Germany is determined to exhaust the enemy by renewed attacks and anticipates an equally active strategy on the side of Japan.

5. Telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott. Dated Berlin 23 April (1943). No number. Ribbentrop informs Ott regarding conferences of Hitler with Mussolini, King Boris of Bulgaria, the ~~Russian~~ leader Antonscuc and the Hungarian Regent Horthy. Hitler expressed in these conferences, among other things, his determination to maintain a bridge head in Tunisia which would force the British to take the long road around the Cape of Good Hope if they wanted to reach the Orient. He has decided to continue the war against Russia unto victory. Further points of discussion were the submarine warfare, the attitude of Turkey and Spain, the question of oil deliveries and so forth.

Ribbentrop informed Oshima about the results of these conferences in a meeting the details of which are contained in the following telegram.

*Ott*

6. Telegram from Ribbentrop to Oshima. Dated Berlin 24 April 1943. #1047. This telegram contains the details of a conference between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 18 April. Ribbentrop discussed first the delivery of two German submarines to Japan, stressing the importance of the transportation question. If Japan could sink two or three hundred thousand tons of enemy shipping per month the enemy would have to sue for peace in short order. Successful submarine warfare is the best protection for the Japanese Island Empire.

Ribbentrop then discussed the situation on the Russian front, in Tunis, and so forth.

He then asks for the present intentions of Japan. The success of the Tri-Partite Pact depends on the fact that the three allies exert themselves simultaneously for the common victory. A hesitant attitude on the side of Japan is of no value for the common cause. He expresses the conviction that the Japanese government too would see the way to victory. A common offensive strategy. Oshima agreed to this.

Ribbentrop then discussed reports regarding the transportation of Siberian divisions to Russia's West front and regarding Japanese promises of neutrality to the Russians. He agrees with such promises if given for camouflage purposes; he advises them harmful if they correspond to the true attitude of Tokyo. Oshima denied that his government has made such promises and does not believe that Ambassador Sato could have given such promises on his own accord.

Ribbentrop pointed out that the opportunity for a Japanese attack on Russia is very favorable. However, if Japan feels that she is not in a position to attack Russia she would have to attack Britain or America, in which case a sea or land attack on India would be particularly welcomed. The domination of the Indian Ocean by Japan would be of great importance to Germany. He then denied all reports about the possibility of a negotiated peace with Russia. Oshima declared that he immediately opposed these rumors as soon as he was notified of their existence.

Ribbentrop then informed Oshima about the conferences of Hitler with Mussolini, Boris, Antonscue and Horthy. He stressed again the necessity for offensive action from the side of Japan.

Ribbentrop also had a conference with Admiral Nomura in which he stressed the importance of increased submarine production in Japan.

7. Telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott . Dated Berlin 7 October (1943). #2551. In a conference on 2 October Ribbentrop informed Oshima about reports regarding evacuation of Russian troops from the Far East.

He notified him furthermore of reports regarding secret agreement extending the non-aggression pact between Japan and Russia and asked Oshima whether Japan has given any promises to Russia which permit Russia to use her Far Eastern troops on the European front. Oshima denied any such promises or agreements.

Ribbentrop again pointed out that the evacuation of Russian troops offers a unique chance to Japan to realize her ambitions on the East Asiatic continent.

Oshima stressed that Japan could not fight a war simultaneously on the Southern front, in Burma, and in Siberia.

8. Telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott. Dated 7 September (1944). #2028. This is the 4th part of a telegram of at least six parts.

In a conference with Hitler and Ribbentrop Oshima discussed the Japanese suggestion of a separate peace between Germany and Russia. The discussion proceeding along similar lines as previous discussions between Shigemitsu and Ott. Hitler declared that there are no indications that Russia is prepared for an agreement with Germany. He asks the Japanese government not to undertake any actions in this direction. Oshima assured them Japan would fight together with Germany until victory and is ready to use her last troops since only one road is open to Japan and since she is prepared to travel this road to the end. Hitler expressed a conviction that Germany and Japan would remain victorious if such determination exists on both sides.

Lt. K. Steiner.



Resume by: Floyd W. Cunningham

NAME: NOMURA, Naokuni

To testify for: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

According to the subpoena request this witness will testify that Oshima had no part in the negotiations of the military agreements between Germany and Japan in 1942, that the Military Commission was inactive, and that there was no actual collaboration between Germany and Japan militarily. He will further testify as to the transfer of the U-boats, the affect of the Hitler decree concerning shipwrecked crews and kindred matters.

I. The witness is a career naval officer. He was born 15 May 1885, and graduated from the Naval Academy 20 November 1907 as a naval cadet.

II. His career in public life is as follows:

- 1 Dec. 1920: After promotions to rank of Lt. Comdr., was appointed staff officer of the 1st Submarine Flotilla.
- 10 Aug. 1922 to 25 Sept. 1924: Served in Germany
- 15 Jan. 1925: Assigned as Commander of the 16th Submarine Flotilla.
- 20 Oct. 1925: Assigned to the Department of the Material of the Navy.
- 10 Dec. 1928: Promoted to Captain. Appointed Captain of the Submarine Tender Chogei.
- 1 May 1929 to 1 June 1929: Naval attache to Japanese Embassy in Germany.
- 1931 - 1933: Captain of Heavy Cruiser HAGURO and Plane Carrier KAGA.
- 15 Nov. 1933: Appointed Commandant of the Naval Submarine School.
- 15 Nov. 1934: Appointed Rear Admiral.

15 Nov. 1934: Appointed Commander of the 2nd Submarine Flotilla.

15 Nov. 1935: Appointed Chief of the Staff Officers of the Combined Fleet, and concurrently Chief of the Staff Officers of the 1st Squadron.

1 Dec. 1936: Appointed Chief of the Third Department of the Naval General Staff Office.

25 Apr. 1938: Assigned to the Central Republic of China, being appointed Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy there.

15 Nov. 1938: Promoted to Vice-Admiral.

15 Mar. 1939: Assigned to Shanghai.

15 Nov. 1939: Appointed Commander in Chief of the 3rd Japanese Squadron to the China Seas.

30 Sept. 1940: Assigned to the Naval General Staff Office and concurrently to the Naval Office.

13 Nov. 1940 to 1 Mar. 1943: Served in Germany as Japanese member of Military Commission created by Tri-Partite Pact.

9 Aug. 1943: Appointed High Military Councillor.

20 Oct. 1943: Appointed Commander in Chief of Kure Naval Station.

1 Mar. 1944: Promoted to Admiral.

17 July 1944: Appointed Minister of Navy. (KOISO Cabinet)

22 July 1944: Appointed High Military Councillor.

2 Aug. 1944: Appointed Commander in Chief of Yokosuka Naval Station, and concurrently Commander in Chief of the Marine Protection Corps.

15 Sept. 1944: Appointed Commander in Chief of the Marine Protection Corps.

1 May 1945: Appointed High Military Councillor.

- 1 May 1945: Concurrently appointed Superintendent General of Marine Transportation.
- 15 Oct. 1945: Placed on the First Reserve List.
- 15 June 1946: Lost official status as naval officer as a result of the abrogation of the Ordinance Relating to the Status of Naval Officers by virtue of the Imperial Ordinance No. 322.

III. Decorations and Awards:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CLASS OF DECORATION</u>	<u>ACHIEVEMENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDING MINISTRY</u>
29 Apr. 1934	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	Navy Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class	China Incident	Navy Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	China Incident	Navy Ministry
9 Feb. 1940	Order of Verdienst Kreuz mit dem Stern Adler	Japanese-German Amity	Foreign Ministry
2 June 1943	Order of Gros Kreuz Adler	Japanese-German Amity	Foreign Ministry
10 Aug. 1944	Order of Eisen Kreuz, 1st Class	Japanese-German Amity	Foreign Ministry

(This is the Iron Cross. See important information under "General Information" below.)

*Iron cross* →

*see paper I sent down*  
*JWB*

Mr. Sutton

Steve working on  
data - sending what I  
have. Cunningham

NOMURA, Naokuni

Request by: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

Address: Tokyo, Steagaya-ku, Kitazawa

This witness was the Japanese member of Military Commission in Berlin 1940-1943. He was Navy Minister in 1945 in KOISO Cabinet.

Admiral Naokuni NOMURA: Member Supreme Military Council.

1885 May	Born Kagoshima Prefecture. Married Yoshiyo, daughter of Kiichiro Aomori.
1908	Graduated Naval Academy
*	Graduated Naval Staff College
1919-24	Resident Naval Officer in Germany, submarine research.
1929	Naval Attache, Embassy in Germany.
1930	Attended London Arms Conference.
*	Captain of H.I.M.S. Haguro and Kaga.
1934	Director, Submarine School.
*	Commander, Second Submarine Squadron.
*	Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet.
1936	Naval Attache, Embassy in China. Promoted to Vice Admiral; Chief Third Dept. Naval Staff Board.
1939 Dec.- 1940 Oct.	Commander in Chief, Japanese Fleet in North China.
1940-43	Member Japanese-German-Italian Joint Specialist Commission in Berlin.
1943 Aug.	Appointed member Supreme Military Council.
1943 Oct.	Commander in Chief, Kure Naval Station.
1944 March	Admiral.
1944 July	Navy Minister in Tojo Cabinet; appointed member Supreme Military Council.
1944 Aug.	Commander in Chief, Yokosuka Naval Station
1944 Sept.	Appointed Commander in Chief, Surface Escort Force (Sea Convoy)
1945 May 1	Relieved of above command; appointed member Supreme Military Council.
1945 May 3	Appointed Inspector General of Maritime Transportation.

Address: Unknown

A submarine expert, diplomat and administrator. Considered political rather than technical representative of Japanese Navy when at Berlin as Naval Attache. As head of Japanese Naval Mission in Berlin, reported to have played a leading role in negotiations which resulted in 1940 Tripartite Axis Pact. (105) During his stay in Germany, Nomura, wearing a German naval officer's uniform, was on board a submarine in an engagement in which an Allied ammunition ship was torpedoed. For this he received the Iron Cross, First Class. (106) On 17 July 1944 he entered the Tojo Cabinet as Navy Minister, but the Cabinet fell within a day or two after his appointment.

Relief from sea convoy command and appointment to Supreme Military council were part of drastic shakeup of high-ranking naval personnel announced by Japanese Navy Ministry on 1 May 1945.

*He did receive this in 1944*  
*JWB*

*Japanese Government officials*

9 June 1947

1937-45

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cunningham; Mr. Sutton  
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

*found by*  
*Military Intelligence Section - War Dept Work DC. (not dated)*  
1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.  
DEFENDANT - OSHIMA

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

NOMURA, Naokuni

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

*E P M*

Incl  
(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Admiral Naokuni NOMURA: Member Supreme Military Council.

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Address: Unknown

A submarine expert, diplomat and administrator. Considered political rather than technical representative of Japanese Navy when at Berlin as Naval Attache. As head of Japanese Naval Mission in Berlin, reported to have played a leading role in negotiations which resulted in 1940 Tripartite Axis Pact. (105) During his stay in Germany, Nomura, wearing a German naval officer's uniform, was on board a submarine in an engagement in which an Allied ammunition ship was torpedoed. For this he received the Iron Cross, First Class. (106) On 17 July 1944 he entered the Tojo Cabinet as Navy Minister, but the Cabinet fell within a day or two after his appointment.

Relief from sea convoy command and appointment to Supreme Military Council were part of drastic shakeup of high-ranking naval personnel announced by Japanese Navy Ministry on 1 May 1945.



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Def. Doc. No. 1606

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

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ask

Co-operation

AFFIDAVIT

by NOMURA Naokuni,  
No. 1, 2-chome, Kitazawa,  
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

(Born on 15 May, 1885)

I, the above named, after having duly sworn as shown in the separate paper in accordance with the form observed in Japan, do depose as follows:

1. German-Japanese Military Cooperation Before the Outbreak of the Pacific War.

When the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Alliance Pact was concluded I was appointed military committee member of the Mixed Technical Commission which had been set up in accordance with article 4 of the Pact, and in this capacity I left Tokyo for Germany in December, 1940. On my departure the Navy Minister's instructions were handed to me by Toyoda, Teijiro the Vice-minister of the navy. They read: "The Tripartite Alliance Pact aims at precluding a war with the United States, and, by improving our diplomatic relation with that country, it is to give an impetus to an early settlement of the Sino-Japanese Conflict."

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Such being the case, the primary duty of the Military Commissioner is to pass correct judgement from the military viewpoint on the question of 'whether or not an act of offense has been launched upon one of the parties of the alliance' as provided in Article 3 of the Pact. In view of the fact that this pact is for an alliance for defensive purposes care must be taken to avoid immatur~~ely~~ely reaching the decision that 'an act of offense has been committed' and thereby drawing this country into the abyss of a war. Since the final decision will be made in Tokyo, **the** problem must be handled with utmost caution and wisdom and all efforts must be exerted to investigate and report the real circumstances involved."

I arrived at Berlin on January 3, 1941, but the Mixed Commission was not inaugurated for a long time. In the meanwhile, the German government did not accord us due treatment as Commissioner, and all opportunities were denied us for opening official discussion. Consequently there was no occasion for us to deal with the question of 'whether or not an act of offence has been launched' or to submit a report to Tokyo on the question.

Although the Mixed Commission was hastily inaugurated after the outbreak of the Pacific War, it was not more than a perfunctory meeting and was held only two or three times in the earlier stage of its introduction, to be followed by no meeting at all later on. Under these circumstances the existence of the Commission was only nominal, though I continued to stay in Berlin in the capacity

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of Military Commissioner until March, 1943, when I was relieved of the office and left Germany for home. During my stay in Berlin I acted exclusively as military adviser to the Japanese ambassador there. However, with regard to problems concerning purely military operation, I consulted directly with the Military authorities concerned, thus making them clearly distinct from political matters. And even in the disposition of these military matters, our military commissioners acted merely as a liaison office between Tokyo and Berlin.

The only work in which the military commissioner had acted under explicit directions from Tokyo concerned the conclusion of the Military Agreement which was originated by the instruction of the Japanese Government given to him in January, 1942, i.e. immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War. No other direction was given from Tokyo at all.

During the period of the American-Japanese diplomatic talks, not even information relative to the above negotiation could be received by us from our Central Office. (T.N. Japanese Government in Tokyo). Aroused by loud talks in the air as reverberated through papers of neutral states I referred the matter to Tokyo more than once by telegraph, because of my great anxiety. As a response to my repeated inquiry, if I remember right, just a single answer was received some time in July or August of 1941 to the effect that the Japanese Government was conducting negotiations with the United States in strict conformity with the spirit

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document

of the Tripartite Alliance Pact which aimed solely at the prevention of the American participation in war and at the settlement of the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

2. Concerning the Military Agreement.

On January 19, 1942, Showa 17, shortly after the commencement of the Pacific War, the Military Agreement was concluded by Germany, Italy and Japan. Because this was purely a military accord among the Supreme Commands of the three powers, the Japanese ambassador took no part in the agreement. According to the provisions of the agreement, Japan was to destroy the enemy in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean east of Longitude 70 degrees east, and Germany and Italy were to destroy the enemy in the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean west of Longitude 70 degrees East. The basic idea of this accord was that the best coordinated operational result might be expected through independent activities of each navy in its respective designated area. Therefore each navy conducted its operations entirely under its own plans and abilities, apart from those of the colleague powers; and no special mutual talks were held for the coordination of the operational activities of the three. Though, of course, as will be mentioned later, there were several occasions when one party or another made proposals regarding a partner's methods of operation, as is naturally the case with a wartime alliance, these proposals were nothing but the expression of the desire of the party so proposing, all deciding authority over the actual conduct of the operations being always

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agreement  
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reserved by the party responsible for the operations.

3. Military Cooperation, including Submarine Warfare, after the Outbreak of the Pacific War.

Based on the information that around March or April, 1942 the United States had commenced transportation activities on a large scale to the North African theatre via the Cape of Good Hope, the navies of Germany and Italy made repeated proposals to the effect that they were desirous of seeing the Japanese navy intensify its activities in the Indian Ocean including offensive action against the American transportation activities and reinforce its forces strongly in this theatre. In this proposal, their desire was for a powerful reinforcement of the Japanese fleet in this theatre with strong surface vessels as the main strength rather than a mere encouragement of the submarine campaign as heretofore conducted by the Japanese navy.

Whenever these proposals were made I tried to persuade the German authorities on the basis of directions from Tokyo that the Japanese fleet were too fully occupied with the operations in other theaters to divert much of its strength to the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless the same proposal was repeated again and again with the increase of difficulty in maintaining the German military position in North Africa. In some cases they expressed their desire to have Japan at least strengthen the submarine forces in the Indian Ocean to a great extent. As a reply

to this sort of proposals I always explained to them assiduously that the Japanese submarines were being employed for the most part in operations of main fleet and that in view of the smallness of their number the dispersion of more submarines to the Indian theater on the part of Japan was very difficult.

Although I do not know what the German naval authorities expected of Japan in connection with Hitler's offer to Ambassador Oshima of the donation of two German submarines to Japan, but from what had been explained to us, it originated entirely in Hitler's own mind and was utterly unconditional. In return for this offer no request was made for more intensified submarine warfare on the part of Japan. The following are the Fuhrer's words as told me by Ambassador Oshima: "Lately the German submarines have been strikingly improved in their maneuverability and especially, underwater capacity. Hoping the Japanese navy will be benefited in her submarine construction, I wish to donate two of the new German submarines to Japan at this time." These words by the Fuhrer were carried in the ambassador's telegram addressed to Japan at that time; and a message from Tokyo in response to this telegram explicitly stated that Japan would accept with gratitude this Hitler's offer. Further, in the telegram I received from Tokyo in those days in connection with the bringing of these submarines to Japan, no allusion was made to such a subject as the encouragement of the submarine warfare; the naval authorities in Tokyo simply instructed me by telegram

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that, as the primary objective of bringing the German submarines to Japan lay in the contributory effect of these new submarines upon Japanese submarine-building technique three German submarine technicians should be brought to Japan with submarines. In short, as far as the Japanese navy and I myself were concerned, it was understood that the submarine offer was made solely along the line of the above mentioned words of Hitler and that no intensified activities of submarine warfare on our part was entailed condition in this offer, not to mention our acceptance of such request.

One of these two submarines was lost on the way to Japan, and only one safely reached her destination. However such a difficult problem as the improvement of our submarine construction techniques could not be solved in a short period. During the course of time, on the other hand, an opinion became prevalent, pressed by the need from the forces on the front, that this type of submarine with its inferior underwater speed would not meet our purpose and that an entirely new idea was instead needed in our submarine construction. Such being the case, these submarines brought about after all no practical benefit to Japanese submarine operations.

About such a policy as annihilating the crew-members of enemy vessels sunk by submarines, nothing was ever suggested to us by the Germans. I never heard of such a suggestion either from Ambassador Oshima from anyone else. On the occasion of the London Disarmament Conference which I attended as a member of

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the Japanese delegation, I myself personally participated in the discussion of the problem of how crew-members should be treated when their ships had been sunk by a submarine, accordingly, if I ever had heard talk of this kind, it would surely have remained in my memory. I have no memory of such talk. Of course no telegram was dispatched by me to our authorities in Tokyo regarding such subject.

On this 10 day of April, 1947  
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT NOMURA Naokuni (seal)

I, YASUDA, Shigeo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
at same place.

Witness: (signed) YASUDA Shigeo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

NOMURA Naokuni (seal)



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TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 26, 1947

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last ¶ of the affidavit

Oshima's interrogatory re

J.P.S. 8479

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no mention in Postcard 2  
Sept 1942 - no failure &  
more survivors of  
torpedo merchant ships



A correction on the last

statement which appears at p. 15188

is on ~~p. 15188~~ 15186

18 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. F.W. Cunningham, IPS attorney  
FROM : J. G. Lambert, Investigator, IPS  
SUBJECT : NOMURA, Naokuni

As per your request dated 11 June 1947 an effort has been made to obtain the complete information relative to the "incident" which resulted in the subject receiving the Iron Cross First Class.

A visit to the Navy Ministry (Demob. 2) resulted in a more complete personal history of the subject and a copy of this is enclosed. In discussing with the personnel of the 2nd Demob. the possibility of information on this subject being included in reports from the Japanese Military Mission to Germany (of which the subject was a member) the partially re-constructed reports of this mission came to light and although they do not contain the desired information a copy is attached.

A further effort to secure this information was made by sending a telegram to Washington DC to trace the origin and all available information in connection with the original statement in the MID publication. This information will be submitted as soon as it is received from Washington.

Copy to: Mr. Sutton

Incl  
(Described above)

*JGL*  
J. G. Lambert  
Investigator  
IPS. Investigative Section

No. 1

<u>Carrying equipments</u>			
English Radar in its early days (obtained in Germany)	G. --- J. Jul. 1941	Carried by a person returned from Germany	information only
Torpedo, type 91 - improved No. 2 with a plan	J. --- G. Mar. 1943	carried by sea	20
Stabilizer with a plan	J. --- G. Mar. 1943	carried by sea	2
Torpedo, type 91 - improved No. 3	J. --- G. Dec. 1944	carried by sea	1
Driving water drill head, type 2	J. --- G. Dec. 1944	carried by sea	1

No. 2

3. Technical experts sent to Germany relating to aviation  
(Supervision of the Aviation Headquarters)

From the time of the outbreak of war till April, 1944

Commander, technical	2
Lieut. Commander, technical	1
Lieut., technical	1
Engineer	2

(one of them was in Italy)

Person employed on the spot	2
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Class according to their duty:

body -- 2	engine -- 2	carrying equipment -- 3
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Those who were dispatched by submarine to relieve in April, 1944,  
and stayed till the end of the war.

Captain	1
Commander, technical	3

(one of them was in Italy; another was  
immediately transferred to the West)

Lieut. Commander, technical	2
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(one of them was concurrent)

Person employed on the spot	1
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Class according to their duty:

general -- 1	body -- 4
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(one of them was in Italy; another was  
immediately transferred to the West) engine -- 1

carrying equipment -- 1	wireless (concurrent) -- 1
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No. 5

Data for the Exchange of Technique  
between JAPAN and GERMANY.Readjustment Section,  
the Bureau of Naval  
Construction (13 Mar 1946)

Item	Time and Class	Measure	Remarks
Technique of the common shell, type 3	Autumn, '44 Japan-- Germany	Let known the construction and powers of the shell, type 3, which is used for the main armament of high-angle guns (which eject cluster) by telegram and at the same time offered the actual thing.	
Manufacturing technique of anti-aircraft fire-control installation	1941 G --- J	Rear-Admiral IRIFUNE and Captain MATSUC, were sent to study	
	Spring, '44	Capt. NAKAYAMA and 4 other civilian engineers were sent. The civilian engineers, however, were killed on a submarine on way and the technique could not be brought in.	
Technique of steel-manufacturing for a large calibre gun-barrel	Spring, '44 G --- J	Lt. Cdr. TAMAI and others were sent, but it was too late for the War.	
Torpedo (cell torpedo used for a submarine)	Summer, '43 G --- J	Received from a German submarine which entered KURE port.	It was the one which would be useful as a data to improve a torpedo, type 92, but the improvement was not realized.

Torpedo, (sound torpedo)	Summer, '44 G -- J	Received from a German submarine which entered PENAN Port.	Examined it at the KURE torpedo Experimental Dept., but it was adopted for /the Navy/ on account of our manufacturing capacity.
Torpedo, type 9.5	Summer, 1943 J --- G	Offered it to a German submarine at Penan (gratis)	Technical Captain IMAZATO was sent to Germany to undertake the task of teaching its technique.
Torpedo, type 91	At the beginning of 1943 J --- G	Carried by a German merchant ship	
Director for a submarine	Summer, of 1943 G --- J	Salvaged from a Japanese submarine which was sunk off Singapore while doing the voyage from Germany.	Directors and sight angle signalling apparatuses were installed on actual warships, trial manufacture having been finished at the NIPPON OPTICAL SHOP /NIPPON KOGAKU/ after investigation.
Above-mentioned director, sight angle signalling apparatus and automatic trailing apparatus of oblique headway angle	Summer, 1943 G -- J	Removed one which was fixed on a German submarine which entered Kure Port	About twenty directors were completed and fixed on submarine No. A; as to the sight angle signalling apparatuses, about forty of them were completed and fixed on submarines Nos. A and B Automatic trailing apparatuses were investigated by the AICHI Time-piece Manufacturing Co. and trial manufacture also was completed, but were not put into practical use.

Torpedo tube for submarines (plan only)	1944 G --- J	Transported by a German submarine.	The actual thing did not reach us on account of the German submarine's sinking while doing the voyage to /Japan/.
Air compressing pump, type 'Yu'	January, 1943 G -- J	- do. -	Lent one to each of the three companies, the MITSUI Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co., the OSAKA Machinery Industry Co. /OSAKA KIKO/ and the KOBE Iron Foundry /Kobe Seiko-Sho/ in order to investigate it. Much information was furnished, though not in general, for the improvement of powers and a manufacturing method.
Electric air compressing pump	- do. -	- do. -	Furnished a little information on manufacturing.
Technique relating to the automatic suspension apparatus for submarines	1944- 1945 J --- G	Sent Technical Comdr. TOMONAGA to Germany.	
Data of the plan for German building/high speed (under water) submarines	- do. - G --- J		
Plan for building Japanese high speed (under water) submarines	1943 J --- G	Transported	Did not reach /Germany/ on account of the sinking of the submarine on her way.
Technique of electric welding	- do. - G --- J	One explainer /dispatched/ taught it to us.	



December Bertz's /?/ internal combustion engine for torpedo-boats	About Jan., 1944 G --- J	Sent a technical engineer to acquire the technique
Water-turbine for destroyers and a plan for reduc- tion gear	uncertain G --- J	Transported
Two German submarines (tonnage 750)	About June, 1943 G --- J	Engineer Lange from the Mann Co. /Germany/ and engineer Schmidt from the Karl Schmidt Co. arrived in Japan (Aug 1943) They introduced the technique of manufacturing main machinery for sub- marines and shipbuilding

Drawn up by the request of the Investigation Section.  
2 copies were presented to Section Chief UEHARA  
1 copy was sent to Secretary /Timukan/ YOSHIDA for reference.

INFLUENCE OF JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY  
TRIPARTITE PACT ON ARMAMENTS OF  
JAPANESE NAVAL AIR FORCE

October, 1946

Section of Data Adjustment, Second Repatriation Board.

It is a fact that the armaments of the German Air Force before World War II had much for the Japanese naval air force to follow the example of them in both quality and quantity.

Therefore, immediately after the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Pact (December, 1940), military inspection parties for Germany were organized and ten people headed by Major General SAKAMAKI were sent in January 1941 from among the aviation circles, too.

These inspection parties returned home one by one since July of the same year. As the German-Soviet war broke out and the maritime communication with Germany fell into a harder condition, it became extremely difficult to get materials. In the last result, this tripartite pact contributed only a little directly to the armaments of the Japanese naval air force. The list of arms obtained from the German air force before and after the conclusion of the pact is as attached hereto. The explanation about those after the conclusion is as follows:-

1. Introduction of Technics of Quantitative Production of Aircrafts.

/Japan/ employed Mr. Pole, an engineer of the Menschel Company, and Mr. Schmidt, an engineer of the Heinkel Company, in order to introduce the German method of mass production. Especially the Heinkel Company planned to establish, under joint management with the Hitachi Aircraft Company, a factory suitable to quantitative production. But before the factor began to work, the war ended and it became useless.

2. Buying of the Right of Aircraft Production.

Japan obtained the rights of manufacturing such aircrafts as 'Heinkel', 'Junker', and 'Messerschmidt'. But no part of these machines served as a good model to Japanese naval aircraft plans. The Japanese Naval aircraft were built by the design peculiar to the Japanese Navy.

### 3. Wireless Equipment.

Wireless equipment of many kinds attached to the fighter 'Heinkel' and the bomber 'Junker' arrived by ship, but these served as mere reference and did not contribute to the Imperial Navy.

### 4. Machine-guns.

(a) 200 'Erikon' 20 m.m. machine-guns arrived in 1942, and 150 'Reinmetall' in 1941; it being the time when we ran short of machine guns, they made a great contribution to military preparations. These machine-guns, however, had been ordered prior to the conclusion of the Alliance.

(b) In 1943, 'Reinmetall' 13 m.m. from which our 13 m.m. machine gun derives its origin, arrived and proved of great use. What has proved of substantial use to us since the conclusion of the Alliance might be nothing but 13 m.m. 'Reinmetall'.

(c) The other machine-guns, serving only as mere specimens and gave no direct influence.

### 5. Bombing Sights.

We got 'Ratfe /?/' bombing sights and others, which were also no more than specimens.

### 6. Aerial Cameras.

We purchased some fixed aerial cameras, but they had been ordered before the conclusion of the Alliance.

### 7. Bombs.

We got several kinds of 'Rocket' bombs, which proved nothing but specimens; and as to 'mystery' bomb, only its information was received to no special avail.

(The end)

## Appendix

## List of Arms Received from German Air Force

## 1. Arms received before the Conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.

Classification	Names of Arms	Time	Transportation	Remarks
Airplanes	Heinkel. He 70	before 1936	by sea	
	Junker. Ju 160	- do -	- do -	
	Manufacturing right of He 118 (dive-bombing plane)	1936	- do -	Sent experts and made them acquire its technique
	He 112 (fighter)	1937	- do -	Bought 20 planes?
	Manufacturing right of He 119 (bomber)	1939	- do -	Despatched technical experts and made them acquire its technique, purchased one plane. Aviators also came from the Heinkel Company
	Manufacturing right of VDM propeller	1939		
	Manufacturing right of He 100 (fighter)	1940	- do -	Purchased two planes and aviators came from the Heinkel Company
	Manufacturing right of Buker and Jungmann training planes	1940	- do -	Despatched experts and made them acquire its technique
Carrying Arms	Various kinds of bursting bombs	1937	- do -	10 kilogramme - 50 250 " - 200 500 " - 100
	Bomb release mechanism	- do -	- do -	10 pieces
	Smoke-screen layers	- do -	- do -	10 pieces
	Neginsho's /T.N. phonetic/ bombing sights	1938	- do -	4 pieces
	Gerzbenko's /T.N. phonetic/ bombing sights	- do -	- do -	100 pieces needed on account of lack of manufacturing the 90 year type of sights for bombing

Carrying Arms	Aviation Observation glasses	1938	by sea	10
	Heginsko's bombing sights	1939	- do -	40
	Fixed air camera gun E.S.K. Type 2000	1939	- do -	2
	Flexible air camera gun R.M.K. Type 1000	1939	- do -	2
	Various kinds of bursting bombs	1941	- do -	1000 Kg, 1200 Kg, 1700 Kg, 10 respectively

2. After the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy

Airplanes	Purchased a patent of mass production technique from the Henschel Co.	1941		Employed engineer 'Paul'
	Purchased the manufacturing rights of the Heinkel	1942		Manufacturing machine not arrived
	Junker 88	1942	by sea	one plane
	Established the Junker- Hitachi Joint Company	1943		Employed engineer 'Schmidt'
	Parts of a pressure room of the Henschel Co.	1943	by sea	
	A map of a glider's target	1943		
	Manufacturing rights of Me. 163 and 262	1944	by sub- marine	Was sunk off Manira, plan explanatory only arrived
Carrying Arms	Radio telephone for fighter (made by the Telefunken)	1941	by sea	Attached to fighter Heinkel
	Fixed Air Camera, R.M.K. P10.	- do -	- do -	1
	Reinmetall 7.9 m.m. machine-gun	- do -	- do -	150
	Bomb sight Rotofe 7 B	- do -	- do -	1
	Radio direction finder for aircraft (Telefunken EZ4)	1942	by sea	Attached to Junker bomber
	Telegraphic instruments for aircraft	- do -	- do -	- do -

Fixed air camera, R.M.K., P 20	1942	by sea	4
Elicon /?/ 20 m.m. machine- gun	1942	by submarine	500
Fixed air camera RB 50 type	1942	by sea	30
- do -			
R 6 75 type	1942	- do -	5
Bomb sight for dive bombing RZA 1 type	1943	by submarine	3
Bomb sight Rotte 7 c	1943	- do -	3
- do -			
R.G. - 06	1943	- do -	1
Various rocket bombs	1943	by sea	500 kg., 1000 kg, and 1700 kg, 10 respectively
Reinmetall 13 m.m. machine-gun MG 131 type	1943	by submarine	6
- do - Ammunition	1943	- do -	ordinary armor- piercing, smoke tracer, and prac- tice bullets: 20 respectively
Mausa /?/ 20 m.m. machine-gun	1943	- do -	2
- do - ammunition	1943	- do -	Various kinds, 10 respectively
30 m.m. MK 103 type machine-gun	1944	- do -	not arrived
30 m.m. MK 108 type machine-gun	1944	- do -	not arrived
Reinmetall's remote control gun mounting	1944		1
50 m.m. machine-gun	1944		information receive
Mistery type bomb	1944		information arrived
Radio-operated gliding bomb armor-piercing bomb of 'Henshel' Co.	1944		- do -
Tri-shafts automatic operator Fire sight of the hand-wheel system fixed gun	1944		- do -
V No. 1 weapon	1944		- do -
B M gliding bomb	1944		- do -

Military Investigation Party sent to Germany

Rear Admiral	SAKAMAKI, Munetaka
Commander	KOBAYASHI, Toshindo
"	NAITO, Takeshi/?
It. Commander	MORINAGA, Kenzo
Captain, Engine	YOKOTA, Toshio
Commander, Engine	OTOMO, Hiroshi
"	MICHIBE, Tamotsu
Commander, Finance	INABA, Masa/?
1st Lieutenant, Constructor	NOMAGUCHI, Mitsuo

Ordered on December 21, 1940

Started in January, 1941

Returned in July, 1941

**Personal History**

**Full Name:** NOMURA, Naekuni (seal)  
**Parmanent Address:** No. 368, Yoshitoshi-mura, Hioki-Gun, Kagoshima-Ken.  
**Social status:** Commoner  
**Name of the former clan:** SATSUMA Clan.  
**Place of Birth:** No. 368, Yoshitoshi-mura, Hioki-Gun, Kagoshima-Ken.  
**Date of Birth:** May 15, 1885.

**Names of family and dates of their birth:**

Father	NOMURA, Saikichi, Born June 18, 1854 (Died, Dec 10, 1941)	
Mother	NOMURA, Fude	Jan 3 1865
Younger brother	NOMURA, Seiichi	Oct 10 1897
Wife	Aiyo (Married Sep 30 1913)	Dec 10 1890
Daughter	Kyoko	Feb 2 1927

Nov 18 1904	Ordered to enroll at the Naval Academy.	Naval Academy
Nov 20 1907	Graduated from the Naval Academy.	"
"	Commissioned Naval cadet.	Navy Ministry
"	Assigned to H.M.S. Itsukushima.	"
Jan 25 1908	Left Yokosuka on a training voyage to various ports of neighboring countries. Came back to Mitsuhamo on July 5.	
Jul 28 1908	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Itsukushima, and assigned to H.M.S. Kashima (the first reserve vessel).	"
Dec 25 1908	Commissioned second sub-lieutenant.	Cabinet.
"	Assigned to H.M.S. Kashima. (the first reserve vessel)	Navy Ministry.
Mar 1 1909	Granted the Senior Grade of the Eighth Court Rank.	Imperial Household Depart.



Apr 29 1909	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Kashima, and assigned to H.M.S. Yayoi.	Navy Ministry
May 25 1909	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Yayoi, and assigned to H.M.S. Kamikaze.	"
Nov 16 1909	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Kamikaze and assigned to the Yokosuka Marine Corps.	"
Dec 25 1909	Relieved of principal post.	"
Dec 25 1909	Ordered to enroll at the Naval Gunnery School as student the ordinary course.	"
Apr 20 1910	Relieved of enrollment at the Naval Gunnery School on graduation from the ordinary course, and ordered to enroll at the Naval Torpedo School, as student in the ordinary course.	"
Jul 30 1910	Relieved of enrollment at the Naval Torpedo School on graduation from the ordinary course.	"
"	Assigned to the Kure Marine Corps.	"
Sep 1 1910	Relieved of principal post and assigned to H.M.S. Aki.	"
Dec 1 "	Commissioned Sub-lieutenant.	Cabinet
Feb 20 1911	Granted the Junior Grade of the Seventh Court Rank.	Imperial Household Department
Mar 11 1911	H.M.S. Aki, was transferred to the first reserve.	
Oct 18 "	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Aki and assigned to H.M.S. Tatsuta (belonging to the Third Fleet, on patrol duty along the coast of South China); left Kure on Oct. 18, on board H.M.S. Chihaya.	Navy Ministry
Oct 24 1911	Embarked in H.M.S. Tatsuta at Hankow, China.	
Dec 11 "	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Tatsuta, and assigned to H.M.S. Chiyoda; left H.M.S. Tatsuta at Hankow on Dec 11 and embarked in H.M.S. Chiyoda on the same day (H.M.S. Chiyoda was on patrol duty along the coast of South China)	

Jan 22 1912	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Chiyoda, and assigned to H.M.S. Manshu; left H.M.S. Chiyoda on Jan. 22, and embarked in H.M.S. Manshu on the same day. (H.M.S. Chiyoda was at patrol duty along the coast of South China)	
Mar 28 1912	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Manshu, and assigned to the Third Fleet.	Navy Ministry
Mar 30 1912	Awarded the first grade pay.	"
Jul 4 1912	Ordered to conduct the duty of divisional commander under the captain of H.M.S. Niitaka (by the order of the Commander of the Third Fleet, NAWA)	"
Sep 27 1912	Relieved of principal post, and assigned to H.M.S. Aso. (the second reserve vessel), Left the previous duty on Oct 10 at Shanghai.	
Dec 1 1912	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Aso.	"
"	Ordered to enroll at the Naval Staff College as B class student.	"
May 30 1913	Made an application for marriage, and sanctioned on June 3.	
May 24 1913	Relieved of enrollment at the Naval Staff College on graduation from the B class course. Ordered to enroll at the Naval Torpedo School as student of the higher course.	"
Dec 1 1913	Promoted to Lieutenant.	Cabinet
"	Relieved of enrollment at the Naval Torpedo above course as School on graduation from the B class course.	Navy Ministry.
"	Assigned to H.M.S. Nenohi (embarked in H.M.S. Nenohi at Wufu on Dec 13, and arrived at Sasebo on Jan 20, 1914)	
Jan 30 1914	Granted the Senior Grade of the 7th Court Rank.	Imperial Household Department
Aug 23 "	The opening of a war against Germany.	
Sep 1 "	Left Kure, and engaged in war-time duty. H.M.S. Nenohi arrived at Port Hakujitsu on Nov. 21.	

Feb 18 1915	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Nenohi, and appointed member of the Equipment Department, the Bureau of Naval Construction.	Navy Ministry
"	Ordered to engage in the equipment of Destroyer Kashiwa.	Chief of the Bureau of Naval Construction
Mar 1 1915	Relieved of principal post and assigned to H.M.S. Kashiwa.	Navy Ministry
"	Appointed concurrently member of the Equipment Department, the Bureau of Naval Construction.	"
Apr 4 1915	Relieved of concurrent post.	"
Nov 7 1915	Decorated with the 5th Order of Merit with the Order of the Double Rays of the Rising Sun, and granted a sum of 700 yen (in recognition of distinguished service during the 1914-1915 War.	Bureau of Decoration
Nov 7 1915	Granted the War Medal in commemoration of the 1914-1915 War.	"
Nov 10 1915	Granted the Coronation Medal in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance No. 154.	"
Jan 1 1916	Was awarded the 2nd grade pay.	Naval Ministry
Apr 9 1916	Left Sasebo, and sailed for China. (on patrol duty)	"
Dec 1 1916	Relieved of assignment to H.M.S. Kashima, and appointed captain on board H.M.S. Shirakumo. (Came back to Sasebo, on Oct. 4 Arrived at Kilung, on Dec. 12) Embarked in H.M.S. Shirakumo, on Dec. 13)	
May 16 1917	Changed first name to Naokuni.	
Oct 24 1917	Left Mako, and sailed for China (on patrol duty) Came back to Mako on Nov. 11	
Dec 1 "	Relieved of principal post and appointed staff officer of the 2nd Squadron.	Navy Ministry
Dec 2 1917	Left Mako, and sailed for China.	
"	Awarded the 1st grade pay.	"
"	Ordered to act as the Commander of the 13th Destroyer Flotilla until Lieutenant-Commander	

Dec 2 1917	KAGEURA, Acting Commander of the Fotilla arrived at his post.	Mako Naval Depot.
Dec 14 1917	Relieved of the acting commander.	"
Feb 27 1918	Left Mako and sailed for China (on patrol duty) Came back to Sasebo on Mar. 3	
Jul 23 1918	Relieved of principal post and appointed staff officer of the 1st Squadron.	Navy Ministry
Aug 20 1918	Relieved of principal post and appointed staff officer of the 2nd Squadron.	"
Aug 27 1918	According to the Notification No. 2978, the period of one year was added to the war service term.	
Dec 1 1918	Relieved of principal post.	"
"	Ordered to enroll at the Naval Staff College as A class student.	"
Mar 31 1919	Granted the Junior Grade of the 6th Court Rank.	Dept. of Imp. H'hold
Sep 18 1919	Ordered to accompany the Judge for the Special Manoeuvre for 1919.	Navy Ministry
Dec 1 1919	Promoted to Lieutenant Commander.	Cabinet
Dec 1 1920	Relieved of enrollment at the Naval Staff college, on graduation from the A class course.	Navy Ministry
"	Awarded a long sword as an honour prize.	
"	Appointed staff officer of the First Submarine Squadron.	"
Nov 1 1920	Decorated with the 4th Order of Merit with the Minor Cordon of the Rising Sun, and granted a sum of 900 yen (in recognition of distinguished service during the 1915-1920 War)	Bureau of Decoration
"	Awarded the War Medal in commemoration of the 1914-1920 War.	"
Aug 19 1921	Left Sasebo, and sailed for Taingtao. (on patrol duty): came back to Kure on Aug. 10 (to take guard): on the 1st of Aug. came back	

Nov 26 1921	Relieved of principal post and appointed staff officer of the Naval General Staff.	Navy Ministry.
Nov 28 1921	Assigned to the 1st Division of the 1st Section.	Naval G. Staff office
Dec 10 1921	Concurrently appointed member of the Naval Training Main Department.	
Jan 10 1922	Concurrently appointed Member of the Technical Council of the Bureau of the Naval construction.	"
May 15 1922	Appointed Member of the Research Committee for Counter-measures against Submarine.	"
Nov 1 1920	Awarded the Victory Medal in accordance with the Ordinance re Victory Medal.	Bureau of Decoration
Aug 10 1922	Relieved of principal and concurrent posts, and ordered to serve in Germany.	Navy Ministry
Sep 4 1922	On being ordered to serve in Germany, left Tokyo on Sept 4, and embarked in S.S. Atsuta-maru at Kobe for Germany:	
May 15 1924	Granted the Senior Grade of the 6th Court Rank.	Dept of Imp. H'hold.
Sep 25 1924	Ordered to return home.	Navy Ministry
Oct 1 1924	The form of Transfer and Promotion writs was revised by virtue of the Notification Kaijin No. 79.	
Dec 1 1924	Promoted to Commander.	Cabinet
Dec 18 1924	Returned home.	
Jan 15 1925	Appointed Commander of the 16th Submarine Flotilla (relieved of the post on Oct. 24)	Navy Ministry
Oct 20 "	Relieved of principal post, and appointed staff-member of the Bureau of Naval Construction.	"
"	Assigned to the 3rd Division.	Bureau of Naval Construction
Dec 23 "	Appointed Member of the Committee for the Selection of Prize-winners for the Research Fund awarded by the Emperor.	Navy Ministry

Feb 1 1926	Appointed Member of the Committee for the Study of Military Provisions.	Navy Ministry
Mar 1 1925	Granted a sum of 100 yen in recognition of service in the expedition to the Russian territory.	"
Apr 15 1927	Appointed member of the Japanese delegation at the Naval Disarmament Conference in Geneva.	Cabinet
Sep 1 "	Appointed Judge of the Special Grand Manoeuvres for 1927.	Navy Ministry
Sep 8 "	Relieved of Judge of the Special Grand Manoeuvres for 1927.	"
Oct 21 "	Appointed Judge of the Special Grand Manoeuvres for 1927.	"
Sep 1 1928	Appointed Judge of the small naval manoeuvres for 1928.	"
Aug 27 "	Appointed Staff member attached to the Special Military Inspector.	"
Nov 2 "	Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.	Bureau of Decorations
Dec 10 "	Commissioned Captain.	Cabinet.
"	Appointed captain of H.M.S. Chogei. (the 2nd Fleet)	Navy Ministry
Mar 15 1929	Granted the Junior Grade of the 5th Court Rank.	Imperial House-hold Department
May 1 1929	Relieved of principal post.	Navy Ministry
"	Appointed Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Germany (Left Tokyo on June 8, left Moji on board of S.S. Kashima on June 22)	Cabinet
"	Concurrently appointed Ship building Inspector and Ordnance Inspector of the Bureau of Naval Construction and Ordnance Inspector of the Naval Air Headquarters.	Navy Ministry

Aug 7 1929	Ordered to keep control over the residentiaries in Germany, Relieved of the post on Aug. 8.	Navy Ministry.
Nov 12 1929	Appointed Member of the Japanese delegation at London the Naval Conference.	Cabinet
Nov 16 1928	Awarded the Coronation Medal in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance No. 188, 1928.	Bureau of Decorations
June 1 1931	Ordered to return home.	Navy Ministry
Oct 10 "	Relieved of principal post.	"
"	Relieved of concurrent post.	"
"	Appointed captain of H.M.S. Haguro (The 2nd Fleet. 2nd reserve ship-Dec. 1, 1932 assumed office on Oct. 28 resigned office on Feb 18 1933)	"
Oct 31 "	Awarded a set of silver cups.	Bureau of Decorations
Sep 17 "	Returned home.	
Dec 10 1 "	Reported (on Jul 23, 1932) that he succeeded father and became the head of the family as a result of father's death.	
Feb 14 1933	Appointed captain of H.M.S. Kaga (belonging to the Combined Fleet)	Navy Ministry
"	Granted a special salary while holding the office of Captain of the war ship 'KAGA' as long as the ship remains in service.	"
Oct 20 1933	Assigned to the Kure Naval Station.	"
Nov 15 "	Appointed Principal of the Sub-marine School.	
Dec 10 "	Granted Special Salary.	
May 1 1934	Granted the Senior Grade of the Fifth Court Rank.	The Depart. of the Imp. H.
Jul 1 "	Appointed Commander of the Third Sub-marine Squadron on the organization of the Grand Naval Manoeuvre Troops in 1934.	Navy Dept.

Nov 15 1934	Promoted to Rear-Admiral.	Cabinet
"	Appointed Commander of the Second Submarine Squadron.	Navy Department
Apr 29 1934	Decorated with the Third Order of merit with the Middle Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun and granted a sum of 800 yen in recognition of distinguished service during the 1931-34 Incident.	Board of Decorations
Apr 29 "	Bestowed the War-Medal of the 1931-34 Incident.	Board of Decorations
Nov 15 1935	Appointed Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet and concurrently Chief of Staff of the First Fleet.	Navy Dept.
Nov 18 1935	Ordered aboard the Flag ship 'YAMASHIRO'	
Feb 4 1936	Transferred from the 'YAMATO' to the 'NAGATO' by the change of the flagship.	"
Sep 21 1935	Received Medal conferred by the Emperor of Manchukuo in commemoration of His Majesty's MEMORATION MEDAL OF THE MANCHUKUO EM-VISIT TO JAPAN and granted permission to wear the medal.	Board of Decorations
Sep 26 1936	Appointed Chief of Staff of the Naval Review of the Special Grand Manuevres of 1936.	Navy Department
Nov 16 1936	Ordered to take an official trip to the Republic of China.	"
Nov 16 "	Assigned to the Naval General Staff.	Navy Dept.
Dec 1 "	Appointed Chief of the Third Department of the Naval General Staff.	"
"	Appointed member of the Investigation Committee for the South Sea Policies.	"
"	Appointed member of the Selection Board of Naval Cadets.	"
"	Appointed member of the Thought Investigation Committee.	"



Mar 18 1937	Ordered to take an official trip to the Republic of China and Manchukuo.	Navy Dept.
Oct 20 "	Ordered to take an official trip to Shanghai.	"
Nov 20 "	Appointed Naval Staff Officer of the Imperial Headquarters.	"
"	Appointed Chief of the Third Section of the Naval Staff Department.	"
Mar 29 1938	Appointed Member of the Investigation Committee for Distinguished Services of the Navy.	"
Apr 25 "	Relieved of Principal Post.	"
Apr 25 "	Relieved of post of the naval staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters.	"
"	Appointed Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in the Republic of China.	Cabinet
"	Concurrently and provisionally attached to the Headquarters of the Fleet in the China Area.	Navy Dept.
"	Appointed provisional Chief of the Navy special duty section.	"
Apr 30 "	Appointed member of Establishment Committee for the /KITA SHINA KAIHATSU KAISHA/ North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company /NAKA SHINA SHINKO KABU SHIKI KAISHA/	Cabinet
Mar 1 1934	Permitted to receive and to wear the decoration for meritorious services on the establishment of Manchukuo, conferred by the Emperor of Manchukuo.	Board of Decorations.
Jul 6 1938	Decorated with the Second Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.	"
Nov 15 1938	Promoted to Vice-Admiral.	Cabinet
Nov 8 "	Relieved of post of member of the Establishment Committee for the North China Development Company.	"

Dec 1 1938	Granted the Junior Grade of the Fourth Court Rank.	Dept. of the Imp. Household
Mar 15 1939	Relieved of the concurrent and provisional post of Attache to the Headquarters of the Fleet in the China Area.	Navy Dept.
"	Concurrently appointed naval attache in Shanghai.	"
Oct 26 1939	Relieved of principal post.	Cabinet
"	Relieved of concurrent post.	Navy Dept.
"	Assigned to the Naval General Staff.	"
Nov 15 "	Relieved of principal post.	
"	Appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Third Expeditionary Fleet to China arrived on Nov 22 1939	Appointed by His Majesty
Feb 9 1940	Permitted to receive and to wear the "Verdienst Kreuz mit dem Stern Adler" decoration conferred by the german Government.	Board of Decorations
Sep 30 1940	Assigned to the Naval General Staff and concurrently to the Navy Department.	Navy Dept.
Nov 13 1940	Ordered to take an official trip to Europe (left Tsuruga on Dec 6 on board the Amakusamaru)	"
Apr 29 "	Decorated with the Third Class Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite and the Grand Corden of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, and granted a sum. of 7000 yen in recognition of distinguished services in the China Incident.	Board of Decorations.
Apr 29 1940	Granted a war-medal of the China Incident.	"
Oct 27 1942	Permitted to receive and wear the "Premier classe Merit Militaire" decoration conferred by the Emperor of Bulgaria.	"
Jan 23 1941	Appointed Japanese delegate to the Japanese Germany - Italian Joint Special Committee held in Berlin.	Cabinet

Mar 1 1943	Relieved of the above.	Cabinet
Mar 1 "	Ordered to return home.	Navy Dept.
Jun 2 "	Permitted to receive and wear the "Gross Krenz Adler" decoration conferred by the German Government.	Board of Decorations
Aug 9 "	Appointed War councillor.	Appointment by the Emperor
"	Relieved of principal and concurrent posts.	Navy Dept.
Sep 1 "	Granted the Senior Grade of the fourth Court Rank.	Department of the Imp. Household
Oct 20 "	Relieved of principal post.	Navy Dept.
"	Appointed Commander-in-chief of Kure Naval Station.	Appointment by the Emperor
Mar 1 1944	Promoted to Admiral.	Cabinet
Jul 17 "	Relieved of principal post.	Navy Dept.
"	Appointed Minister of Navy.	Cabinet.
Jul 22 "	Relieved of principal post at own request.	"
"	Appointed War councillor.	Appointment by the Emperor
Aug 2 "	Relieved of principal post. Appointed Commander-in-chief of Yokosuka Naval Station, and concurrently commander-in-chief of convoy tasks. (arrived at post on Aug. 3, 1944 /Yokosuka Naval Station/)	Navy Dept. Appointment by the Emperor
"	Concurrently appointed member of Council of Admirals.	Navy Dept.
Sep 15 "	Relieved of principal and concurrent posts.	"
"	Appointed commander-in-chief of convoy tasks.	Appointment by the Emperor
May 1 1945	Relieved of principal post.	Navy Dept.

May 1 1945	Appointed War councillor.	Appointment by the Emperor
May 1 "	Concurrently appointed Inspector General of Marine Transportation.	Navy Dept.
Oct 10 "	Placed on the waiting list.	"
Oct 15 "	Placed on the reserve list.	"
Nov 23 "	Granted Senior Grade of the third Court Rank.	Department of the Imp. H'hold.
Nov 23 "	Was raised one grade of court rank as an act of grace from the Throne.	"
June 15 1946	Naval Officers' Limitation Ordinance was abolished by the Imperial ordinance No. 322 of the year 1945.	

23 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Cunningham  
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

OSHIMA

*Very Important*

WITNESS

NOMURA, Naokuni

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Radio report on info. requested re:  
German decoration

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

UNCLASSIFIED  
ROUTINE

23 June 1947

FROM: WAR (WDCID)

TO : SCAP

NR : WCL 27740

Reur Z 10944 of 17 June. Source of info is Berlin  
broadcast picked up in US 18 Jul 44. No further info or documentary  
evidence available.

NO SIG

MEMORANDUM

18 August 1947


TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton

FROM: Mr. F. W. Cunningham

SUBJECT: NOMURA, Naokuni - Witness for OSHIMA (Def. Document 1606)

I have reviewed your file and mine on this witness this morning. It appears that all available information is correlated in your file -- particularly in your memorandum of 17 June to Mr. Tavenner, in which you cover the field of suggested cross examination and proposed objection to the affidavit.

It occurs to me that if this witness were asked on cross examination from whom he received the decoration "Eisen Kreuz, First Class", and for what service he had rendered that he received it, it might be that he could be led into a falsification on which he could be discredited entirely by bringing out the fact that he received it while wearing the uniform of a German Naval officer on a submarine which sank the allied munitions ship as reflected by your file.



Floyd W. Cunningham, Attorney  
IPS

Def. Doc. # 1780

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: NOMURA, Naokuni

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I am a former Admiral of the Navy. On July 17, 1944, I replaced Navy Minister Admiral Shigetaro SHIMADA and assumed the portfolio of Navy Minister. At that time OKA, Takazumi was Director of Naval Affairs Bureau.

On July 16, 1944, before I entered the Cabinet, I had an interview with Prime Minister TOJO. He asked my opinion so I expressed the desire that someone from among the former Premiers, for instance such as Admiral YONAI should be requested to enter the Cabinet in order to strengthen the Cabinet.

On the 17th Premier TOJO sent a messenger to me and requested me to urge Admiral YONAI to enter the cabinet. I understood that the foregoing request of the Prime Minister was based on my interview had with Primer



Def. Doc. # 1780

TOJO on the 16th. I immediately dispatched OKA, on my behalf, to Admiral YONAI to convey the Prime Minister's message.

In about an hour OKA returned and stated that Admiral YONAI did not wish to enter the cabinet. OKA reported that Admiral YONAI desired to remain free from the Cabinet, but that he would be willing to resume active service and serve as a member of the Supreme War Council. Thereupon, I personally called on Admiral YONAI and discussed the foregoing matter.

In light of the foregoing it is clear that the idea of asking Admiral YONAI to enter the cabinet was solely my idea, and that OKA acted upon my orders.

With respect to such a matter the Director of Naval Affairs Bureau is subject to the orders of the Navy Minister, and can not act independently of his own free will.

On this 21st day of May, 1947

at Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ NOMURA, Naokuni (seal)

I, SOMIYA, Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo

Witness: /s/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ NOMURA, Naokuni (seal)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

12 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FROM: Commander C. T. Cole

SUBJECT : Defense Document #1606 (Affidavit of NOMURA, Naokuni)

1. As evidence of collaboration between Germany and Japan see following exhibits: ✓

- (1) Exhibit #570 - (Transcript p. 6,457) - OSHIMA in a conference with the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry on 22 February 1941 stated that Singapore must be seized from the sea and from the land, although he considered it necessary to take Hongkong first.
- (2) Exhibit #580 (Transcript p. 6,529) - OSHIMA promised Ribbentrop that he would procure maps of Singapore in order that Hitler, considered as the greatest expert on military questions at the time, could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore.
- (3) Prosecution Exhibit #1259 and #1260 (Transcript p. 11,214) affidavits of Otto KUEHN, a former member of the Nazi party who admitted that after visiting Japan in 1935 he went to Honolulu and in November and December 1941 gave KITA, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, various documents giving full details of U.S. Naval ships in Pearl Harbor.
- (4) Prosecution Exhibit #2106 (Transcript p. 15,187) an excerpt from the interrogation of OSHIMA contains an admission by him that Germany sent two submarines to Japan to aid in submarine warfare.
- (5) Exhibit #49 (Pros. Doc. #4018), the Military Agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan dated 18 January 1942, divided the world into zones of military operation. Japan was to destroy enemy shipping in the Pacific and Indian Ocean east of Longitude 70 degrees East and Germany and Italy were to destroy the enemy in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean west of Longitude 70 degrees East. Military cooperation is pledged in economic warfare, exchange of information, air communication, etc.

1. PS 2321 ~ Taiwan Engineers

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26559

\*

Direct Examination of NAOKUNI NOMURA  
By Mr. Roberts

26563

The witness stated that he lived in Tokyo. He identified Exhibit No. 3000 \* as his affidavit and verified it. Exhibit 3000 A is Certificate of Non Existence of Documents, which stated that the originals, duplicates and copies of the telegrams did not exist in the Demobilization Bureau II. All of these telegrams were kept there \* in the custody of the General Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry or in the Navy Minister's Secretariat or of the 1st Department of the Naval General Staff. They had to be kept for one year in the custody of the Telegraph Section of the Navy Ministry.

26564

In the U.S. air raids of May 1945, the bulk of the Navy Ministry Building was destroyed by fire and all the offices were reduced to ashes. All the original documents and duplicates and copies now missing are believed to have all been destroyed by fire on this occasion. The copies of the telegrams were destroyed by fire previous to the German capitulation.

26566

A certificate from the Naval Attache of the Embassy in Berlin \* stated that with the air raids on Berlin from November 1943 they burned important documents and telegrams, and in April 1945 they destroyed the rest of them by fire.

26568

The Affidavit stated \*that when the Tripartite Pact was concluded the witness was appointed military committee member of the Mixed Technical Commission set up under article 4 of the Pact and left Tokyo for Germany in December 1940. On his departure The Vice Minister of the Navy TOYODA handed him the navy minister's instructions which stated that the Tripartite Alliance Pact aimed at precluding a war with the United States and by improving diplomatic relations with the U.S. it would give an impetus to an early settlement of the China war. Such being the case, the primary duty of the Military Commissioner was to pass correct judgment from the military viewpoint on whether or not an act of offense had been launched upon one of the parties of the alliance. Since the pact was for defensive purposes, care had to be taken to avoid reaching an immature decision that an act of offense had been committed and thereby \* plunge Japan

26569

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into war. Since the final decision would be made in Tokyo the problem must be handled with utmost caution and wisdom and all efforts must be exerted to investigate and report the real circumstances.

The witness arrived in Berlin January 3 1941 but the Mixed Commission was not inaugurated for a long time. In the meantime, the German Govt did not accord them treatment as commissioners and all opportunities were denied for opening official discussions. There was no occasion to deal with the question of whether or not an act of offense had been launched or to submit a report.

26570 Although the Mixed Commission was hastily set up after the outbreak of the Pacific War, it was only a perfunctory meeting and met only two or three times, to be followed by no meetings at all later on. The existence of the Commission was only nominal. The witness remained in Berlin until March 1943 when he returned home. During his stay in Berlin he acted exclusively as military adviser to the Japanese Ambassador there. However, on problems of military operations, he consulted directly with the military authorities \* concerned, thus making them clearly distinct from political matters. In disposing of these military matters the military commissioners acted as liaison only.

The only work in which the commissioner had acted under explicit directions from Tokyo concerned the conclusion of the Military Agreement which was originated from central authorities, in January 1942. No other direction was given from Tokyo at all.

26571 During the period of the United States Japanese talks, no information relative to the negotiations could be received from Tokyo. He had referred the matter to Tokyo more than once because of his great anxiety but had received only a single answer in July or August 1941 to the \* effect that the Japanese Govt was negotiating with the United States in strict conformity with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact which aimed solely at the prevention of the American participation in war and to settle the China conflict.

In January 1942 the Military Agreement was concluded by Germany, Italy and Japan. Since this was purely a military accord the Ambassador took no part. According to its provisions, Japan was to destroy the enemy in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean east of Longitude 70 degrees east, and Germany and Italy were to

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26572

destroy the enemy in the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean west of Longitude 70 degrees east. The basic idea was that the best coordinated operational result might be expected through independent activities of each navy in its respective area. Each navy conducted its operations entirely under its own plans and abilities apart from its colleagues and no special mutual talks \* were held for operational activities. Although there were several occasions when one or the other made proposals on a partner's method of operations, the proposals were nothing but expressions of desire, the deciding authorities being the ones responsible.

26573

Based on the information that in March or April 1942 the United States had begun transportation activities on a large scale to the North African theatre via the Cape of Good Hope, the German and Italian navies made repeated proposals that they desired to see the Japanese Navy intensify its activities in the Indian Ocean, including offensive action against the American transportation. In this proposal they desired a powerful re-enforcement of the Japanese fleet with strong surface vessels as the main strength rather than merely encouraging \* submarine campaign theretofore conducted by the Japanese Navy. Whenever these proposals were made the witness tried to persuade the Germans on the basis of directions from Tokyo that the Japanese fleet was too busy in other theatres to divert much of its strength to the Indian Ocean.

The same proposal was repeated again and again with the increase of the Germans' difficulty in North Africa. In some cases the Germans expressed their desire to have Japan at least strengthen its submarine forces in the Indian Ocean. The witness always explained that the Japanese submarines were being used for the most part in main fleet operations and in view of the fewness of their number, dispersion of more submarines to the Indian theatre was very difficult.

26573

While he did not know what the German Navy expected of Japan in connection with Hitler's offer to OSHIMA of a gift of two German submarines to Japan, from what had been explained to him, it originated entirely in Hitler's mind and was utterly unconditional. \* No request was made for more intensive submarine

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warfare on the part of Japan. According to OSHIMA, Hitler stated that German submarines had been improved in maneuverability and underwater capacity. Hoping that Japan would be benefitted in submarine construction, he wanted to donate two of the new German submarines to Japan. These words were carried in OSHIMA's telegram at that time and the message from Tokyo in reply stated that Japan would accept with gratitude this offer. In the telegram the witness received from Tokyo in those days in connection with bringing these submarines to Japan, no allusion was made to encouraging the submarine warfare; the naval authorities in Tokyo simply instructed him that the primary object of bringing the German submarines to Japan was the contributory effect that they would have on Japanese submarine-building technique and three German submarine technicians should be brought with them. So far as the Japanese Navy and the witness were concerned it was understood that the offer was made solely \* along the lines of Hitler's words and no intensified submarine warfare was an entailed condition in the offer. //

One of the two submarines was lost en route and only one of the submarines reached its destination. However such a difficult problem as the improvement of submarine construction technique could not be solved in a short time. On the other hand, an opinion became prevalent that this type of submarine with its inferior underwater speed would not meet Japanese purposes and an entirely new idea was needed of submarine construction. There was therefore no practical benefit to Japanese submarine operations.

26576

As to the policy of annihilating the crew members of enemy vessels sunk by submarines, nothing was suggested by the Germans. He had never heard of such a suggestion from OSHIMA or anyone else. At the London Disarmament Conference the witness personally participated in the discussion of the problem of treatment \* of crew members when their ships were sunk by submarines. If he had heard talk of this kind he would have remembered it. No telegram was dispatched by him to Tokyo on this subject. ✓

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Direct Examination by Mr. SHIMANOUCI, counsel  
for OSHIMA

26577

\* The witness stated that the negotiations for the donation of the submarines to Japan from Germany, took place between OSHIMA and Ribbentrop about the 1st of March, 1943. OSHIMA called on Hitler and during that conversation Hitler made the statement quoted in the witness' affidavit. This meeting took place around the 26th, 27th or \* 28th of February, 1943.

26578

26579

He heard from OSHIMA of this talk and the Ambassador telegraphed to Tokyo and requested that the matter be notified to the Minister of the Navy. About four or five days after, around the 5th or 6th of March, the witness received a telegram from the Navy Minister which stated that the Navy would accept Hitler's offer with gratitude and requested that OSHIMA be asked to thank Hitler. The telegram included instructions to the witness to discuss with the German Naval authorities regarding the navigation of the submarines. Hitler was then not in Berlin and so OSHIMA called on Ribbentrop and asked him to convey the thanks.

26580

The question arose between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA for the first time on this occasion. He had heard of the contents of the negotiations between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA.\* There was no such talk as that about annihilating the crews of sunken merchantmen. He had never heard while in Germany that the German Navy had machine-gunned the survivors of sunken enemy merchant vessels.

26581

The witness was connected with the navigation of the two German submarines to Japan and returned on one of them. They had sunk Enemy merchantmen during the cruise. The submarine was under the command of German officers and was operated by German officers and crew. In addition to the witness \* Commander SUGITA of the Naval Medical Corps was along. Nothing was done to the survivors of the enemy merchantmen.

He had never heard from February through May of 1941 that OSHIMA had discussed with German authorities the problem of attacking Singapore or HongKong. He had never heard that OSHIMA had conversations on this subject with the Navy Ministry in Tokyo and he had never

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heard whether OSHIMA made such recommendations to the Tokyo Foreign Office of Naval Ministry.

26582

OSHIMA addressed his telegram \* for the Foreign Minister and when anything in the telegram involved questions of a military nature at the end he would request that the matter be communicated to the Navy Ministry or to the High Command. OSHIMA always showed the witness any telegrams he sent which had included military subjects. He had no recollection of seeing any telegram in which OSHIMA discussed attacks on Singapore or Hong Kong. The Naval Attache's office in Berlin had never received a copy of such a telegram.

There were occasions when the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin communicated direct with the Naval Ministry in Tokyo.

26583

The witness stated \* that in Berlin he was a Vice-Admiral. After his return to Japan he became Naval Minister.

26584

\* The instructions given to him on his leaving for Berlin were not in writing but were given to him orally.



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CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TAVENNER.

- 26585 \* The witness stated he did not definitely recall when the negotiations for the military agreement of January 18, 1942, began, but it was a day or two after he received his report on the battles of December 8 that negotiations were begun, on receiving a telegram.
- 26586 \* Before this there were no telegrams in connection with this matter. There were no preliminary talks. The telegrams were addressed to the witness and Lt.-Gen. HANZAI, the military attache, from the Navy Minister, War Minister, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staff. The instruction was signed jointly by the four heads.

Other than the fact that OSHIMA made contact for opening negotiations, he did nothing, since they were to be conducted by the witness and HANZAI with the German Military and Naval authorities, as per instructions. It was true that OSHIMA kept the Navy and Military informed on matters relating to them, and that he saw copies of the telegrams relating to such messages when they were sent.

- 26589 He had never seen \* any telegram from OSHIMA in which he threatened to resign in the event his views on the proposed military pact in 1939 were not carried out. There were no occasions when OSHIMA communicated directly with the Army or Navy Chiefs of Staff.

- 26590 \* The witness stated that he had received his instructions when he went to Berlin because of the fact that they were purely from memory. The witness said that the German submarine that brought him to Japan torpedoed merchant ships on the way out, about five or six hundred miles east of Madagascar off the coast of Africa. The name of the German Submarine was U-71, but he did not remember the name of the ship torpedoed. The survivors were in three or four lifeboats.

- 26592 There was only one night attack carried out in the Indian Ocean. The result was the attack was carried out in pitch dark and following the explosion the ship sunk and nothing remained. Two ships were sunk as a result of attacks from this submarine. No other attacks were carried out. From what he heard, these ships were just accidentally met with during the voyage. There was absolutely no contact with Japanese submarines in the Indian Ocean. The witness was then only a passenger, wearing a civilian suit. There were three technical Germans on board, \* but they were not naval. The crew remained for some time in Japan, but some returned to Germany little by little, while others went to work under German attaches in the south.

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26593 AS to the second submarine, it was sunk while en route from Germany to Japan. Japan sent a crew to take it over, but it was sunk en route. He thought that Japan had sent about thirty men to Germany for this. \* They were not trained in any secrets of submarine warfare, but were merely trained for a number of days on how to operate the submarine. He was shown some submarine bases, fortifications, and  
26594 air bases along the Belgium coast and elsewhere. \* He had never been aboard a German submarine prior to his trip to Japan.

26595 The ship sunk on the trip to Japan was American. When asked whether it was not true that the Japanese Navy sent U-boats to the Indian Ocean to prey on Allied commerce, the witness stated that Germany frequently expressed the desire that Japan increase its personnel and give more importance to actions in the Indian Ocean. Up to the time the witness returned, only two converted cruisers and four or five submarines were active in the Indian Ocean. They became active from about May, 1942. \* Japanese submarines were not increased over that number. There were constantly about four or five submarines assigned to that area and they were replaced frequently. He did not know what ships were replaced and when. No increase was ever made over and above the four or five submarines mentioned.

26596 When asked whether there was a change of policy in April, 1943, with regard to the use of submarines in attacking enemy shipping, he stated he did not know, because he never received any telegrams to the effect that there was any change in policy. He recalled \* that on April 18, 1943, just prior to his departure, he had a conference with Ribbentrop. When asked whether he recalled Ribbentrop explaining Hitler's policy about the value of big battleships as against U-boats, he stated that while in Berlin he was always concerned with a comparison in naval strength between themselves and the opposition. This was an  
26597 \* old Japanese naval tradition, and he recalled having said frequently that it was the mission of the submarine to attack and sink battleships, or as many as possible. He had no recollection of ever saying that the Japanese Navy would order all fighting forces, cruisers, torpedo-carrying aircraft, and the U-boat to wipe out enemy tonnage.

When asked whether it was not his conviction that tonnage war was the most important and that Japan's and Germany's great advantage was that the U. S. had to send its troops all over the seas to use them in battle, he stated it was always the conviction of the Japanese Navy that victory or defeat was to be determined by a battle between fleets, but he had never overlooked the importance of tonnage warfare during the last war.

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26598 When asked whether he had not stated that the Japanese Navy had sunk over a hundred thousand tons in half a month, and a number of U-boats had again left for operations outside the Persian Gulf, the witness stated at that time he did not receive any clear or definite reports from Tokyo on the tonnage sunk by Japan. \* He may have referred to the question of tonnage, but he did not recall saying anything about many Japanese submarines being sent to the Persian Gulf.

When asked whether a huge plan had not been involved to carry on extensive submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean, he stated that with reference to the frequent expressions of desire from Germany to intensify their activities and reinforce them in the Indian Ocean, he recalled that in the end of 1942, in November, he received a telegram from Tokyo that it was Japan's intention to do everything possible to reinforce its personnel in the Indian Ocean. He stated he had not discussed this matter with Admiral Fricke and General Jodl. He merely transmitted the message he received to these two men.

26599 On his departure, \* he expressed to Ribbentrop thanks for the offer of these two submarines. As he recalled, OSHIMA was not present then.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIMANOUCI.

26600 Asked why he had asked OSHIMA to contact the military authorities when he and BANZAI had received instructions from the army and navy, the witness stated \* that inasmuch as he and BANZAI got direct instructions from Tokyo, they thought of opening negotiations with the German military authorities in accordance with instructions. However, the Germans desired and it was their custom, for all matters relative to diplomacy to be conducted through the Ambassador and the Foreign Ministry. Upon receipt of their instructions, they reported to OSHIMA and asked him to see the Foreign Ministry to make arrangements so they could begin the negotiations. They thought that that was the proper respect to pay to a foreign country to which they were assigned.

RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TAVENNER.

26602 \* The witness stated that he was decorated by Hitler. He received the decoration without receiving any explanation.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIMANOUCI.

26603 \* The witness stated that OSHIMA had never directly telegraphed any messages to the War or Navy Ministers. If he had said "yes" to the question put to him by Mr. SHIMANOUCI, that was a misapprehension. He believed then that the question was, "Did he, the witness, communicate directly with the Navy Minister?"

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26612

Exhibit No. 3001 was admitted into evidence. It was an affidavit of the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, U. S. A., that the information of vessels constructed or under construction by the U. S. Navy \* as of December 7, 1941, and other information dated January 23, 1947, was prepared by Albert B. Ray, Production Analyst in charge of Ships Statistics Section of the Bureau of Ships. He had access to official records of the Navy, and the information was taken by him from such official records as part of his normal and regular duties, and the information contained therein from such official records was absolutely true and correct.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

MEMORANDUM

17 June 1947

TO : Mr. Frank S. Tavenner  
FROM : D. N. Sutton  
SUBJECT: Cross-examination of NOMURA, Naokuni  
Def. Doc. No. 1606

I. Military Agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan dated 18 January 1942. (Section 2 of the affidavit)

Who conducted the negotiations on behalf of Japan which preceded the execution of the military agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan dated 18 January 1942?

Over what period of time did these negotiations extend?

Where were they conducted?

Was Ambassador Oshima advised of the progress of these negotiations?

From whom did you receive instructions in connection with the preparation of this agreement?

Did you execute this agreement on behalf of Japan?

Note: The military agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan dated 18 January 1942, Exhibit 49, was read in evidence at R. 6681.

II. Military Cooperation Including Submarine Warfare after the Outbreak of the Pacific War. (Section 3 of the affidavit)

A. Cooperation between Germany and Japan.

Were there not frequent conferences between you, Admiral Fricke and other members of the German Naval Command, as well as with General Jodl, on the submarine question and the war against tonnage?

You state in Section 3 of your affidavit that Germany and Italy repeatedly proposed that the Japanese Navy intensify its activities in the Indian Ocean and that you tried to persuade the German authorities that the Japanese fleet was too fully occupied in other theaters to divert strength to the Indian Ocean. Was not a plan completed in October 1942 to undertake a large naval operation in the Indian Ocean?

And was not this plan frustrated at the time by the American attack off the Solomon Islands?

Did not you notify the members of the German Naval Command that in connection with the battle of the Solomon Islands and Gaudalcanal the greatest importance was to be attached to the cutting of enemy lines of communication and, consequently opinion on the employment of the U-boat arm had also changed?

And did not Ambassador Oshima about the same time conduct discussions with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop on the necessity of Japan conducting tonnage warfare?

Did not Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop explain to you in April 1943 the views of the Fuehrer on the subject of naval warfare and did he not tell you on that occasion that the Fuehrer considered the big battleship in its present form too vulnerable an object as it had constantly to be surrounded by a convoy of ships to protect it?

And did he not tell you that the American fleet would not enter into a large naval engagement?

And did he not likewise tell you that it was the Fuehrer's opinion that a big U-boat arm was the best protection for Japan and the surest means of winning the war quickly?

Did you agree with this change of policy which the Fuehrer suggested through Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop?

(If the answer to the above question is negative:

Did you not state that this change of policy was what was needed by the Japanese Navy, which up to that time had

concentrated only on sinking as many enemy battleships as possible?

And did you not state that the Japanese Navy would thereafter order all fighting forces, cruisers, torpedo carrying aircraft and the U-boat arm to wipe out enemy tonnage?

And did you not report that in half a month over 100,000 tons had been sunk and did you not further state that recently a number of U-boats left for operation outside the Persian Gulf?

Were not the discussions between you and the German Foreign Minister on 18 April 1943 held in the presence of Ambassador Oshima?

And did you not on this occasion thank the Foreign Minister for his "reliable cooperation and particularly for the deep understanding and constant assistance which he had shown toward the Japanese in all naval questions?"

And did not the Ambassador on that occasion express to you in the presence of Ambassador Oshima the "hope for further satisfactory cooperation in the interest of the common cause?"

Note: These questions are based on notes of the interview between Von Ribbentrop and Oshima held at Fushl on 18 April 1943, the latter part of which interview was attended by the witness NOMURA, IPS Doc. No. 52C, pages 9, 10 and 11. This document was introduced as Exhibit No. 839 for identification only, R. 8174. This portion of this document has not been introduced in evidence. If the witness substantially denies any of the foregoing questions, then the exact language of the document might be put to him and he be asked if that does not refresh his memory. (Page 4 of this document was introduced as Exhibit No. 839-A, R. 8175, in the Russian Phase of the case. It is not pertinent here.)

B. Donation of Two German Submarines to Japan.

You state in Section 3 of your affidavit that you do not know what the German Naval authorities expected of Japan in connection with Hitler's offer to Ambassador Oshima to donate two German submarines to Japan, and you further state that "in return for this offer no request was made for more intensified submarine warfare on the part of Japan."

Is it not a fact that the gift of the submarines was for the purpose of enabling Japan to effect the change of policy which had been suggested by the Fuehrer through Von Ribbentrop to you, to the end that the Japanese Navy would concentrate on wiping out enemy tonnage?

Did not Von Ribbentrop discuss with Oshima the matter of the importance of submarine warfare and the policy of strong cooperation between the Japanese Navy and the German Navy in the matter of submarine warfare?

And did not Von Ribbentrop at that time, March 1943, state that Germany would be willing to let Japan have its new type of submarine? (This question is based upon Exhibit No. 2106, R. 15186.)

Did you not handle details of the negotiations concerning the delivery of the two German submarines for Japan after this had been agreed upon between Von Ribbentrop and Oshima?

(If the answer to the above question is negative:

I read you an excerpt from the interrogation of the defendant Oshima, Exhibit No. 2106:

"Q. Directing your attention to March 1943, what was said by you and by him (Ribbentrop) in regard to the importance of the submarine warfare?

"A. I do not know whether it was this meeting or not, but I do recall where he suggested that Japan institute submarine warfare as Germany had been doing, and in this regard they would be willing to let us have a new type German submarine.

"Q. In fact they sent you two German submarines, did they not?

"A. Yes. The negotiations were done by me, but the details were handled by the Japanese Navy, and I believe that one of the submarines was sunk before arriving in Japan.



"Q. What officer of the Japanese Navy had charge of the negotiations?

"A. I believe it was Admiral Nomura. The actual matters dealing with military matters are not supposed to be handled by the Ambassador. I heard about this matter and the rest of it was handled by Admiral Nomura."

Does that refresh your memory?

Did not Von Ribbentrop urge Oshima to have Japan make more use of the submarine?

And was it not in this connection that Germany offered to give Japan the two submarines?

And did not Oshima convey this information to you as a representative of the Japanese Naval authorities?

(If the answer to the above question is negative or evasive, the following questions are suggested:

I quote you the following excerpts from the interrogation of the defendant Oshima, Exhibit No. 2106, and ask if these refresh your memory:

"Q. \* \* \* On the matter of policy Ribbentrop indicated to you that he was convinced that the submarine campaign alone could force a successful conclusion of the war along 1943 and perhaps 1944, did he not?

"A. I do not remember whether he said we could win by this alone, but I do know that he stressed the importance of submarine warfare as being very, very valuable.

"Q. And therefore urged that Japan make more use of the submarine?

"A. Yes, in general, he stated that we should make more and better use of our submarines, and in this regard offered to give us two submarines. If you wish, I will tell you some of the promises made between the two military branches."

On page 5 of this same exhibit, Oshima stated: " \* \* \* I do remember telling them\* about Germany's proposal to intensify submarine warfare and of their offer to give us two submarines."

\*(Nomura and Yokoi)

And on page 6 of this exhibit:

"Q. And further that you did convey that information to Japanese naval authorities?

"A. I conveyed to the Naval representatives the matter of the two submarines that they offered to give us, and the request that we intensify submarine warfare, but whether I actually spoke to them about this order that you are stressing I do not recall, as I never felt that the order was anything that should be followed. In this regard, I would wish that you speak to either Nomura or Yokoi to see whether I did convey this to them or not."

Did Ambassador Oshima discuss with you and Admiral Yokio in the early part of 1943 the increased production of Japanese submarines?

Did you receive a telegram around the first of March 1943 ordering you back to Japan?

Was your recall in connection with the submarine construction plan?

Did you discuss with Admiral Doenitz the plan for increased submarine construction?

Did not Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943, in an interview with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, state that the Japanese Navy had to revamp its construction program and would be grateful if it could obtain two submarines as models from the German Navy?

And did not Von Ribbentrop on that same date (6 March 1943) again summon Ambassador Oshima and explain to him that the German Government, after consultation with the Navy, was prepared to place one or two U-boats at the disposal of the Japanese Navy?

And was it not proposed at that time that you discuss the details of this matter with Admiral Meisel?

And did not the German Government offer these boats on condition that the Japanese Navy tackle immediately submarine construction on a large scale and carry mass production into effect?

And did not Ambassador Oshima state to Von Ribbentrop that the Japanese Government was prepared to do this?

Did Ambassador Oshima direct you to discuss the details of the transfer of these submarines with the German Navy?

Did you discuss the matter with the offices of the German Navy?

Note: These questions are based upon two portions of the record of the conference between Von Ribbentrop and Oshima held 6 March 1943, IPS Doc. 2312, being portions of the document which were not translated and, of course, not introduced in evidence. A part of this document was introduced as Exhibit 812-A, R. 8114. However, that portion is not pertinent here.

Trip on German Submarine - Decoration.

Questions might be laid upon the following:

The publication "Japanese Government Officials 1937-1945", prepared by Military Intelligence Section, War Department, Washington, D. C., undated, formerly classified as secret information, which classification has now been cancelled, a brief curriculum vitae of NOMURA, Naokuni with a short paragraph at the end from which the following sentences are quoted:

"During his stay in Germany, NOMURA, wearing a German naval officer's uniform, was on board a submarine in an engagement in which an Allied ammunition ship was torpedoed. For this he received the Iron Cross, First Class."

It is a fact that on 10 August 1944 Nomura was decorated with the "Order of Eisen Kreuz, 1st Class" on the recommendation of the Foreign Ministry and the achievement is recited as Japanese-German amity. (Other decorations received by this witness appear in the attached resumé prepared by Mr. Cunningham.)

If it is deemed proper to develop this line of cross-examination, the witness might be asked if he did not have occasion to visit German submarine nests; whether he inspected German submarines; whether he ever made a trip on a German submarine; and should his answers be favorable he might be asked what uniform he wore on that occasion and what, if anything, unusual occurred.

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF NOMURA, Naokuni,  
by Mr. Roberts.

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\* The witness identified and verified exhibit 3471 as his affidavit. The affidavit stated that on 17 \* July 1944, the witness replaced the accused SHIMADA as Navy Minister, at which time OKA was Director of the NAB. The day before he had an interview with TOJO, he asked his opinion, and the witness expressed the desire that one of the former premiers, such as YONAI, should be requested to enter the cabinet to strengthen it. On the 17th TOJO requested the witness to urge YONAI to enter the cabinet, and the witness understood this request was based on the interview. The witness sent OKA on his behalf to YONAI with the premier's message. OKA returned in an hour and stated that YONAI did not wish to enter the cabinet, but would be willing to assume active service and serve on the \* Supreme War Council. The idea of asking YONAI to enter the Cabinet was solely the idea of the witness, and OKA acted on his orders.

With respect to such a matter, the Director of the NAB was subject to the Navy Minister's orders, and could not act independently.

#### CROSS-EXAMINATION BY CAPTAIN ROBINSON.

The witness stated that he was the Japanese naval representative at Berlin while the accused OSHIMA was Ambassador, and he was also the Commissioner at Berlin on the German-Italian-Japanese Military Commission under the Tripartite Pact from 1940 until 1943.

33360

\* The witness stated that it could not be said he was an expert in regard to submarines, but had served as staff officer of a submarine squadron, and for one year was principal of a submarine school. It was his understanding that OKA likewise had served in connection with submarine schools. Asked if another common interest shared with OKA was politics, he replied that the only time he had ever been together with OKA politically was when he became Navy Minister.

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\* Reference was made to the affidavit where it was stated that about 17 July 1944 he sent OKA to YONAI to advise him that TOJO desired him to join the TOJO Cabinet, and about an hour later OKA returned and reported the results.

November 18, 1947

DEFENSE - OKA

NOMURA - Cross

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When asked if when he had a political mission of the highest level he called on OKA, he replied that when he received the message from TOJO he was occupied, and therefore sent OKA in his stead. OKA did not object to the assignment.

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Asked if both he and OKA favored a strong political party, such as IRAA, he replied that for the five years previous to his appointment as Navy Minister, he was not in TOKYO, \* and when he was called to Tokyo urgently had no knowledge of the situation there.

Asked if he did not keep in touch with the Nazi Party and its leaders while he was in Germany, he replied he was not in contact with them, but whenever a telegram came from Tokyo it was his duty to deliver it to them.

Asked if when Admiral Doenitz granted permission for him to return to Japan by submarine if he also provided that the new Nazi Party's group leader of the foreign division should accompany him, he replied his understanding was that they were merely fellow passengers. The name of this group leader was Spahn. Asked if upon Spahn's arrival he advised the witness and OKA and others in regard to methods to make the IRAA as strong as the Nazi Party, he replied he never talked with either OKA or Spahn on such matters.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ROBERTS.

33363

\* The witness stated he had met OKA from time to time since the days when he served on a submarine, but had never felt that OKA did things on his own other than matters on which he received orders.

Ex 8/2A

R 8014

MEMORANDUM

On the Discussion of the German Foreign Minister with Ambassador SATO on 6 March 1943

6 March 1943

Ambassador SATO reported that he had received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report to the German Foreign Minister, by order of his government, the following:

The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a mutual conference between the Japanese Government and Imperial Headquarters in which the question was exhaustively discussed and minutely probed. The result was the following:

The Japanese Government thoroughly recognized the danger which threatens from Russia and her full understanding for the desire of its German ally, that Japan, too, enters into the war against Russia. It is not possible for the Japanese Government, however, in view of her present war situation to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it is in the common interest, not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government will never disregard the Russian question.

The Japanese Government has the intention to once again, in the future, take the offensive on the other fronts.

In the declaration of the Ambassador, the German Foreign Minister asked how one conceived, in Tokyo, the future waging of the war. At present, Germany is to a great extent waging war against the common enemies, England and America, alone, while Japan is taking a rather defensive stand. However, it would be more in order if all the powers bound by the Tripartite Pact joined all their forces to jointly defeat not only England and America, but Russia as well. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One should not overstrain the German people's strength. In secret he is concerned that forces could be at work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion -- and who also propagate it -- that Germany would conclude the fight victoriously anyway, and Japan should therefore further consolidate herself before it would make further and supreme efforts.

The U.S.A. and England were pursuing the strategy that the Allies should at first turn all their strength against Germany and Italy alone, and had also expressed this in CASABLANCA completely openly as their program. Actuality has confirmed this until now. Unfortunately, Ambassador SATO in KUIBYSHEV has apparently delivered to the Russians in this matter the assurance of the absolute neutrality

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

See 2 attached further omitted from the translation

of Japan. However, we had to undergo the experience that on the Eastern Front -- especially in STALINGRAD also -- fresh Siberian division had fought. We would nevertheless attack the Russians again and again. The situation on the Eastern Front had stabilized itself and a stable German Front had been established except for a small, still existing, gap. However, at the same time we have to fight against England and America more or less by ourselves in Africa, in the air and on all the oceans as well.

Compared with this, Japan's share was small. Even the battle area in BURMA was small in comparison. Tokyo must therefore understand it when Germany raises the question of whether in the spirit of waging the joint war, it is the correct strategy for Japan not to make full use of her people's strength, while Germany's is strained to the limit. He would like to emphasize again that if Germany would ever become weak, Japan would find herself facing a world coalition which would consist not only of England, America and Russia, but the people's strength /VOLSKRAFT/ of all the countries on earth, as well as that of a bolshevized Europe. The question was therefore raised whether at this time so exceedingly decisive for the outcome of the war, the strength of the allies was properly distributed and was really being used in the spirit of a joint, total conduct of the war.

Ambassador OSHIMA answered that what decided the issue for Japan was whether she had sufficient forces and whether her armament capacity was sufficient in order to attack and defeat the Russians, in addition to the enemies Japan already has, without endangering her operations on the other fronts. Tokyo is afraid of splitting its forces. On the other hand Japan's attitude was in no way purely defensive and just waiting, but a new attack against the U.S.A. and the British will surely take place. Even though he has no detailed reports concerning this, he personally believes that this attack will come in the direction of the Indian Ocean. In any case, however, the belief in an inseparable mutual victory of the allies was a foregone conclusion for Tokyo.

\* \* \* \* \*

The German Foreign Minister commented at this point that an infraction of mutual trust was naturally completely out of the question, since this was unshakeable between Germany and Japan. In the matter of the inquiry which was brought up, it was solely a question of the joint conduct of the war, the strategy which is to be jointly carried out, that is, the proper use of the common strength. Germany entirely understands that Japan must first finish constructing her newly won bases and positions and must consolidate her forces. Japan had done this for a year and now



when Germany is bearing the brunt of the struggle, Japan should be in a position to be able to apply a new decisive blow against the common enemy. It was in no way a question of mutual trust, but he sometimes is concerned that Japan has the intention of consolidating her forces for yet another year and only later starting a new attack.

Upon this the Ambassador replied that he did not think so. The intentions of the military leaders in his fatherland were unknown to him; nevertheless, he knew that for a long time Japan had the intention of turning against Russia. But for the time being she evidently did not feel strong enough to do so. If one withdrew the front in the South and abandoned several islands to the enemy in order to shift all forces to the North, this could be possible. This would, however, mean a heavy defeat in the South. Both an advance to the South, and at the same time to the North was impossible for Japan.

\* \* \* \* \*

The German Foreign Minister then once more brought up the question of a Japanese attack on Russia, by stating that the struggle on the Burma Front as well as in the South was more of a maritime problem and that actually only a few land troops were being employed on all fronts, excepting China. The attack on Russia was therefore in the first place a matter for the Army and the consideration was whether the necessary forces were nevertheless ready for this. OCHIMA replied that the bulk of the Japanese Army was bound in China and on the Burma Front the forces were by no means insignificant either. If Japan should want to attack Russia, she would have to bring almost all the troops from the South into Manchuria. In any case, one did not have enough troops in order to be able to attack Russia with the firm prospect in an early victory. In case the Russians are the attackers, one is naturally armed. But for an attack on them, insufficient forces were ready.

At the end of March or early April of this year, a few officers, cloaked as couriers and Embassy Secretaries, will come here from Tokyo in order to deliver particulars concerning the situation and Japan's military forces and plans. He will be able to draw a better picture/of matters/ there when these have arrived. The ambassador emphasized again that Japan was unwilling to take up a defensive attitude.

\* \* \* \* \*

Concerning the division of strength on the Russo-Japanese front, the Ambassador remarked that the Japanese fighting forces were greatly inferior to those of the Russians. The Japanese General Staff has a very exact view over the state of the Red

*omitted  
in  
reading*

Fer Eastern Army, on the basis of a carefully expanded /ausgebaut/ spy net on the Russian side where many Koreans were working for them as spies. One has an exact idea of the position of the bunkers, the thickness of the bunkers, etc. ~~The general strength of the Russian Army amounts to 800,000 men.~~ It was quite natural that the Russians left so many troops at the frontier, as in the course of their history they had always until now made extremely unpleasant experiences with surprise attacks on the part of Japan. *Omitten*

Concerning our reports on Russia's imports from the U.S.A. via VLADIVOSTOK, OSHIMA thought that Japan allowed the Russians only one seaway, and that on this seaway all ships are searched for arms and ammunition. ~~The Japanese Government has no particulars concerning American~~ delivery of war materials over this way. However, it was known to him that the Americans were maintaining an airline from Alaska to Siberia. This goes from FAIRBANKS, ANADYR, JAKUTSK to KRASNOJARSK and some material, of value to the Russians, would certainly be delivered over it. *Omitten*

\* \* \* \* \*

In that the German Foreign Minister expressed the hope that Japan will soon be able to conduct an effective shipping war from her far advanced bases against the enemy lines of supply, and after Ambassador OSHIMA once again expressed his thanks for the German willingness in the name of his Government, the German Foreign Minister bid goodbye to the Ambassador

GOTTFRIEDSEN

Berlin, 9 March 1943

Portion omitted from the Translation

(Y)  
Doc. No. 2312

The GFM /German Foreign Minister/ summoned Ambassador Oshima once more the same day to explain to him that the German Government after consultation with the Navy was prepared to place one or two U-boats /TN: underlined on type-written original from which photostat was made/ at the disposal of the Japanese Navy. He proposed that Admiral Nomura discuss the details of this matter with Admiral Meissel. The German Government offered these boats on condition that the Japanese Navy tackle immediately submarine construction on a large scale and carry mass production into effect. The Ambassador explained that the Japanese Government was prepared to do this. The training of the crews would cause no special difficulties, since the training of a submarine crew for use against merchantmen was easier than such /TN training/ of the large Japanese submarine cruisers for sea operations. As for mass production, Oshima felt that this problem too, would surely be solved, since the smaller boats were quicker to build and did not require so many complicated installations as the boats hitherto built by them. The German Foreign Minister for his part pointed out that the submarine itself was fairly rapid to build, the principal difficulty lying in the construction of the engines. In order to be helpful to the Japanese Navy in the execution of the program it would certainly be possible to put German engineers at its disposal for the engine construction and also officers who had had sufficient experience in the tactical employ of the boats in the shipping war. Oshima explained that the Japanese Navy would surely be extraordinarily grateful for every bit of help and that he would now direct Admiral NOMURA to discuss the details of this question with the German Navy.

Have one copy in Japanese in <sup>original</sup> file

Sutton

EX 2106

INTERROGATION OF  
General Hiroshi OSHIMA

Date and time: 1 February 1946

\*\*\*\*\*

Questions by Captain Robinson:

- Q. You had various conversations, General, with Ribbentrop in regard to the naval activities of Germany and Japan?
- A. Naturally, I spoke to Ribbentrop about many matters, among which those that you refer to might have been included. However, actual Army matters and Navy matters were always handled by the respective attaches.
- Q. Directing your attention to March 1943, what was said by you and by him in regard to the importance of the submarine warfare?
- A. I do not know whether it was this meeting or not, but I do recall where he suggested that Japan institute submarine warfare as Germany had been doing, and in this regard they would be willing to let us have a new type German submarine.
- Q. In fact they sent you two German submarines, did they not?
- A. Yes. The negotiations were done by me, but the details were handled by the Japanese Navy, and I believe that one of the submarines was sunk before arriving in Japan.
- Q. What officer of the Japanese Navy had charge of the negotiations?
- A. I believe it was Admiral Nomura. The actual matters dealing with military matters are not supposed to be handled by the Ambassador. I heard about this matter and the rest of it was handled by Admiral Nomura.
- Q. However, he did discuss with you the matter of the importance of the submarine warfare and the policy of strong cooperation by the Japanese Navy with the German Navy in the matter of submarine warfare?
- A. Yes.
- Q. He also discussed with you the operating policy and orders under which the German and Japanese submarines would coordinate their efforts?
- A. No. That was not my duty. It was handled between the two Navies.
- Q. When I say policy, I don't mean how to run a ship, but I mean the policy with regard to dealing with merchant vessel crews, the desirability of having a strong aggressive policy which will determine the large outlines of the activities of the Japanese submarines along the same lines of those followed by the German submarines.
- A. Yes, I did discuss these matters, but it was not within my ken to say yes or no to the suggestions.

- Q. You would pass on suggestions to the Japanese naval authorities? That was Ribbentrop's request to you and you agreed to pass on information?
- A. Ribbentrop was able to speak to me about many matters dealing with tactics or military matters as the German set-up was such that he was permitted this maneuver. However, as you know, in Japan as a civil official I was not supposed to concern myself with tactics during the war and in this regard I bring up the matter of the Supreme Military prerogative.
- Q. I appreciate that. You were not giving orders to Japanese commanders of ships, but on the matter of policy Ribbentrop indicated to you that he was convinced that the submarine campaign alone could force a successful conclusion of the war along 1943 and perhaps 1944, did he not?
- A. I do not remember whether he said we could win by this alone, but I do know that he stressed the importance of submarine warfare as being very, very valuable.
- Q. And therefore urged that Japan make more use of the submarine?
- A. Yes, in general, he stated that we should make more and better use of our submarines, and in this regard offered to give us two submarines. If you wish, I will tell you some of the promises made between the two military branches. //
- Q. On account of the shortage of time, General, I should like to direct the answers a bit, and at the end I will be glad to take any general statement. Specifically, you stressed the importance of the submarine dealing with the merchant ship supply lines of the British and Americans, did you not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And he discussed with you the difficulty of cutting down not only the supply of merchant ships, but also of merchant sailors to man those ships, did he not?
- A. Yes, I definitely remember.
- Q. And he discussed with you the German U-Boat order of September 1942, in regard to failing to rescue survivors of torpedoed merchant vessels?
- A. Yes, I recall hearing that.
- Q. That order included a provision against taking measures for the rescue of the crews of torpedoed vessels?
- A. I recall definitely hearing that they were going to do the utmost to cut down the movement of merchant sailors, but I can not definitely say whether I heard it was an order of the German Navy or whether I heard this in 1942 or 1943.
- Q. The U-Boats were forbidden to pick up any survivors except the Captain and the 1st Engineer. Do you recall that detail of the order.

what

A. I do not know any such small details. All I recall hearing in 1942 or 1943 was that in the future they would not pick up any merchant survivors?

Q. And you recall further that the orders were to annihilate or destroy survivors?

A. I would not go so far as to say that, essentially it was that they would not rescue survivors.

Q. He was not recommending that to you as a policy for submarines?

A. That would be merely ordinary practice, not to rescue survivors. The only place where his orders would be important and therefore subject to a special policy statement by Ribbentrop would be in the fact that these special orders differed from ordinary practice in that the special orders provided for the complete destruction of the survivors of the merchant vessel's crew and passengers. I want the connection between this German order and the same order as followed by the Japanese.

A. I do think that the German order went so far as to say that. In fact, I naturally think so. The Japanese one, I do not know about. I believe that the Japanese would not put out such an order. And further, the newspapers have it that I favored this order, but that is not so. Of course, I did not tell Ribbentrop that he should stop doing this, as it wasn't any of my business, but I do say that I did not encourage it. Of course, as you know, this order was put out, but I believe that even among the Germans there were those who opposed it.

Q. And some who carried it out and executed it?

A. Admiral Gross, who was naval liaison officer to us, told me that he did not favor this order, as it was a blot on the honor of the Navy.

Q. Nevertheless, at the request of the Germans you did convey to the Japanese submarine authorities information of that operating policy, namely, complete destruction of personnel, as well as the ship?

A. I did tell it to the Naval Attache, but I have no recollection of having sent any despatches to Japan about this matter.

Q. The Naval Attache's name was what?

A. Whether it was Admiral Nomura or Admiral Yokoi I spoke to, I do not recall. Yokoi was the Naval Attache and a Rear Admiral, while Nomura was a Vice Admiral and member of the Naval Commission to Germany. I did definitely tell them that these matters had been brought up and the rest of it was up to the Japanese Navy.

Q. At what time and place did you make that statement to the Japanese representatives?

A. In Berlin immediately after the conference - but when that was I am not certain.

- Q. Did you check up with them later to find out whether or not they had followed up as requested by the Germans?
- A. I did not go into it any further and I further don't think there was any communication with Japan about this matter.
- Q. Did the Germans never ask you whether you had followed through or not?
- A. No. Although you probably know more about it than I do, I do not believe Japan did anything about it.
- Q. You know, do you not, that the United States State Department filed with the Japanese numerous protests because that precise policy was carried out against the crews of the United States merchant vessels?
- A. No, I do not recall any protests on that matter, although I am aware that they protested many times about the treatment of prisoners of war.
- Q. You never had any information following that date of the machine gunning of merchant seamen following the torpedoing by Japanese submarines of United States merchant ships?
- A. No. I have not heard anything of the sort.
- Q. And you did not know that an ultra-secret operating order was issued to Japanese submarine commanders on March 20, 1943, as well as on other dates, in which paragraphs b, item 4, provided "Do not stop with the sinking of enemy ships and cargoes. At the same time as you carry out the complete destruction of the crews of the ships, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about the enemy."
- A. No. I do not know of the order, and further, if there had been such an all-secret order it would not have come into the hands of a civil official such as me.
- Q. You do recognize in those words the same order of which you were informed by the Germans?
- A. Yes, they are alike. I believe that if such an order had been issued by the Japanese Navy they would have done it independently, for, as you know, the Japanese Army and Navy are not in the habit of taking suggestions from outside sources, and if Japan had followed the German suggestion on this and put out such an order a communication should have come to me saying that they had done so, but I received no such communication. I have not heard of there having been any communication and if there had been it would have gone with the Naval Attache to pass on to the German Navy.
- Q. Did the Germans hand you a copy of the order they had issued for such a situation? Your information was simply oral?
- A. Yes, that is all.

- Q. Do you know whether or not with these two submarines which Germany sent to Japan she also sent crews and specimen orders for use by the Japanese?
- A. No, I know nothing whatsoever about what happened subsequent to my talks, as it was all handled by the Navy.
- Q. Did the Germans draw particular attention to the necessity of Japanese submarines operating in the Indian Ocean against merchant shipping?
- A. The matter was not spoken of to me, but I do recall some talk of the German Navy having spoken to Admiral Nomura about this matter.
- Q. Did you later learn of the sinking of the United States Liberty Ship JEAN NICOLLET on 2 July 1944, in the Indian Ocean by a Japanese I-class submarine, in which sinking these tactics were carried out?
- A. I know nothing of it.
- Q. Did not Ribbentrop or other Germans later comment to you on the fact that their request to you for such a submarine campaign appeared to be bearing fruit?
- A. No. Further, I believe Japan was not very successful in her submarine warfare.
- Q. You are aware, are you not, of the boast of the Japanese authorities that they had practically wiped the Allied merchant shipping off the Indian Ocean? In 1943?
- A. I do not recall such a boast - did the Government say it?
- Q. That statement was made officially.
- A. I do not recall.
- Q. Did you ever discuss with any Japanese naval official this proposal by the Germans that Japan follow their practice of complete destruction of merchant ships and crews?
- A. No, I did not. Further I do not recall whether I discussed this matter at all with either Nomura or Yokoi. I do remember telling them about German's proposal to intensify submarine warfare and of their offer to give us two submarines. That is all and what occurred after that I do not know.
- Q. Two questions and I am through: 1. By "intensify submarine warfare" you include destruction of survivors of the torpedoed vessels, do you not?
- A. No. I do not believe this would be included in intensification of submarine warfare. I am not a naval expert, but I do not believe these tactics should be used.
- Q. What you believe and I believe does not make any difference. We have your statement of what the German proposal was, namely, the destruction of survivors of the crews. We have your statement that Ribbentrop and others did tell you that part of their submarine warfare had adopted a policy of destroying crews of torpedoed vessels, is that not correct?



- A. Yes, Ribbentrop did say that to me.
- Q. And further that you did convey that information to Japanese naval authorities?
- A. I conveyed to the Naval representatives the matter of the two submarines that they offered to give us, and the request that we intensify submarine warfare, but whether I actually spoke to them about this order that you are stressing I do not recall, as I never felt that the order was anything that should be followed. In this regard I would wish that you speak to either Nomura or Yokoi to see whether I did convey this to them or not.
- Q. I regard that as a reversal of your statement previously.
- A. I believe that this was what I told you originally.
- Q. Regardless of that, you say that you did not know what the actual practice of the Japanese submarine was; therefore, incidents such as the one I mentioned in the Indian Ocean may have occurred so far as your knowledge is concerned.
- A. No, I do not know whether such incidents occurred or not. I wish in this regard that you would see how the Japanese Ambassadors operate, as military and naval matters were not brought up to me.

Captain Robinson:

- I am sure that my questions based on these German records and Japanese records may refresh your memory. I cannot be back this afternoon, but if your memory is refreshed, I want you to tell Mr. Hyde, who will be here this afternoon, what these answers are and if you have a memorandum to give, I will be glad to have that statement by you.
- A. I believe that I have been telling you all I can within the ken of my knowledge and remembrance of events, and that I have been truthful in my answers. However, if there are certain specific instances that you wish me to recall, and you will name them, I will try to think them over and remember all that I can.
- Q. Just a matter of checking back on what we have said this morning.
- A. If you come tomorrow I will think it over then.
- Q. Maybe next week.
- A. I wish to explain this one fact; that in December 1941, a joint military commission was set up which decided matters of tactics and operations and I had no hand in this. Further, if Ribbentrop or someone like that told me something military, I passed this matter on to this military commission which went into details, and they are the ones who are responsible for the carrying out of the operations.

Q. What are their names?

A. These are the aforementioned NOMURA, YOKAI for the Navy, and Lt. Gen. BANZAI for the Army.

Q. The date of the appointment of this Commission?

A. About the middle of December 1941.

Q. And the place?

A. Berlin. All important matters were decided by them.

Q. Who were the German members?

A. I am not sure, but I believe it was Field Marshal Keitel, and probably Admiral Doenitz.



Norman  
Cross 4004

~~absence~~<sup>no</sup> of cooperation between German & Japan  
in conduct of the war

4 576

(a) Eskinas statement to Weigrocher Feb 41

the Hong Kong find the Singapore in Grand  
fly - He had energetically advocated  
the (A) view in Tokyo not a bit of  
offensively say

we  
witness  
occurred in  
Jan 41

Jan 29 March 1941

4 580

Did Ribbentrop discuss with Ashina the question  
of an attack by Japan on Singapore

Did he not ask Ashina from maps of Singapore  
in order that the Germans could advise Japan of the  
best method of attack on Singapore?

Hurd

+ Did he not state that German efforts were at  
the disposal of Japan to prepare plans for  
of line operations against British Malaya  
Singapore

4571

Did not inherently suggest Ashima  
on 23 Feb 1941 that Japan attack  
Singapore without declaration of war with  
lightning speed

J. 2

Did not Ashima reply that preparation  
for the occupation of S would  
be complete by the end of May  
(1941) & that the occupation of

R  
6463

J. 2

Hong Kong, the Philippines etc  
also been provided for in case  
of need.

R  
6464

Did not Ashima tell R. that he completely  
agreed with inherently line, thought  
that ~~Singapore should be there should~~

J. 3

o refine attack on Singapore

& was willing to do everything &  
execute this policy.

Here ? is based on 4571.

at R. J. 6464

24571 at/

(1) Said not Ribbentrop, Oshima agree that

-the closest cooperation in all spheres was necessary in the  
common purpose of the war ~~which Germany had already~~

26465

(2) Did not Oshima tell Ribbentrop that

he intended to set up a program with

the German representatives for intensification

of Japanese Propaganda

~~including~~ including news services, the press, ?

From IPS Document 2312, (part of which has already been introduced as Exhibit 812-A).

Photostat of Text of Record of Talk between German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and Japanese Ambassador OSHIMA, Hiroshi, at Berlin, 6 March 1943.  
Doc. No. 2312

In reference to the telegram from Tokyo delivered at the last conversation the German Foreign Minister then asked the Ambassador whether he had any new information from his government on the submarine question and what it really intended. OSHIMA answered that the Japanese government intended to step up the submarine shipping attacks and consequently would immediately set about the necessary preparations. The present Japanese submarines were not suited to shipping attacks, a fact which Admiral DOENITZ also confirmed after inspection of the Japanese boat at Lorient. The Japanese Navy therefore had to revamp its construction program and would be grateful if it could obtain two submarines as models from the German Navy. He had already spoken with Admirals NOMURA and YOKOI and they estimated the time necessary to build the boats at from one to one and a half years. NOMURA was one of the oldest and most experienced submarine officers in Japan; at a very early date he was commandant of the submarine school. He of all persons would support the new submarine construction. NOMURA had received a telegram a few days before ordering him back to Japan. They supposed that his recall was connected with the submarine construction plan. It was important that he fully discuss all the details with Admiral DOENITZ before his departure. The German Foreign Minister agreed on this and stated he would inform the Ambassador after he had spoken again himself with Admiral DOENITZ.

*one Paragraph omitted from the translation*

*There is a paper copy in the original file*

13 June 1947

Subject: NOMURA, Naokuni  
Def. Doc. No. 1606

Objections to the Affidavit

This affidavit contains references to documents which are not produced and no effort made to account for the failure to produce them. The portions of the affidavit to which this objection particularly applies are as follows:

- ① The written instructions prepared by the Navy Minister and delivered to the witness by Toyoda, the Vice Minister of the Navy, recited in Section 1 on pages 1 and 2 of the affidavit.
- ② The answer (obviously a telegram) from the Japanese Government in Tokyo to the witness in July or August 1941 reciting the manner and purpose of the negotiations being conducted between Japan and the U. S., being the last paragraph of Section 1 on pages 3 and 4 of the affidavit.
- ③ The telegram from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to the Foreign Office in Tokyo, the reply from Tokyo to this telegram, and the telegram received by the witness from Tokyo, the contents of which are recited near the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7 in Section 3 of the affidavit.

(R-6681) Objection is also made to that portion of Section 2 of the affidavit on page 4 which purports to give the provisions of the military agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan, dated 18 January 1942, since this is already in evidence, Exhibit 49, and which states what in the opinion of the witness was "the basic idea of this accord", since the opinion of the witness on this subject is quite immaterial.

D. N. Sutton

#520

Nomura, Narkimic Doc 520-A

Ex. 839

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2929-PS  
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

for identification only  
R 8174

Pencil note: Note by the Reich Foreign Minister  
23/43 Top Secret

Notes

go that further included in  
4 839A ref. 4 [ ]

on the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Oshima  
at Fushl on 18th April 1943.

TOP SECRET

Ambassador Oshima thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for the efforts he had made and for his support in connection with the execution of the U-boat plans, and stated that the first U-boat would sail about 10th May with Admiral Nomura on board. On his return to Tokio, the latter would be the chief person responsible for the U-boat construction programme. It was planned that four or five German engineers would be on board the first boat, which would be brought over by a German crew. The plan for the second boat was to send a Japanese crew to Germany, who, for a few weeks, were to study all the navigational details and all technical questions so that they would then be capable of navigating the U-boat to Japan themselves.

In reply, the Reich Foreign Minister expressed his conviction that the U-boat arm must be considered of quite exceptional significance to the winning of victory. Our experience in all theatres of war showed that success in this war depended primarily on the correct solution of the transport problem.

The supplying of our troops in Africa, which was, in fact, an affair for the Italians, had now been taken charge of by the German navy and, since then, the situation had improved. Our navy also solved the supply problem in the North Sea, in supplying our troops in Norway as far North as Narvik, where they had to deliver several million tons; our losses, however, were only 0.3 %, i.e. as good as none at all. Our enemies had the same problem - only much more acute - since they had first to transport all material over the ocean. We hoped to be able to torpedo the same amount if not more this year



- 2 -

as last year. If Japan, on her part, in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, were to add only 2-300,000 tons to the figures of these sinkings, our enemies would be forced, for this reason alone, to sue for peace. We were convinced that the naval conception hitherto existing, that the enemy could be really destroyed and brought low only with large battleships, was out of date. The battleship was a too vulnerable structure, which required innumerable other warships for her own protection every time she put out. With the employment of U-boats, Japan would be in an even more favourable position than Germany, since, in the many islands, she had a great number of bases at her disposal, whereas our U-boats always required the so-called "Milch-cows", the supply ships, when they were employed. A successful U-boat war would be the most convenient and safest way for Japan to protect her island Empire from all attacks by the enemy.

Ambassador Gshima confirmed that the Japanese navy had also reached this conclusion: Admiral Nomura would be able to give details of the intended plans.

Dealing then with the general war situation, the RAM stated how bad the Russian infantry now was. The number <sup>of</sup> deserters was continually on the increase and, in a few sectors, the morale of the Russians was so bad that they laid mines in front of their positions at night, withdrew their troops and did not send them back until daytime.

We would attempt to hold the Tunis bridge-head in any eventuality, as it was of great importance to us in preventing the enemy from passing freely through the Mediterranean. We were in every way equipped to deal with expected landings and the urgent question - which he intended to discuss quite frankly with the Ambassador - was, what our Ally, the Japanese Armed Forces were doing and intended to do.

The Ambassador replied that, as far as he knew, their position in the Indian Ocean and in the Solomon Islands had improved of late. In the Solomon Islands front, they would presumably remain more on the defensive so as to go over more to the offensive again towards the West - in the Indian Ocean. The army had had successes in Burma and further vigorous attacks would be made there.

The RAM emphasized the fact that our Tripartite Pact could be really strong and successful against the enemy only if the three Allies made the greatest effort for victory at the same moment. As he had already told the Ambassador several times, the main striking power of the Americans and the British was at present directed exclusively towards Germany, who also still had to conduct the war against Russia by herself alone. If, when one of the Allies is heavily engaged, the army of the other does not come to his aid, but merely waits, it has a bad effect on the combined operations. Intervention by the Japanese army could bring about a victory very quickly. We naturally did not know the intentions of the Japanese Government and of course we had firm faith that they also saw the road to victory only in the combined offensive conduct of the war. It was Hitler's genius that brought about the downfall of our opponents one by one in the first few weeks of the war and prevented them from ever making a combined attack. It was our task to continue the fight in such a way that, on our part, all Allies attacked simultaneously and to prevent our enemies from doing likewise and attacking the Tripartite Powers one by one and defeating them one after the other. Oshima was enthusiastic in his agreement with this point of view.

The RAM then stated that he again had to point to the reports on Japanese assurances to Russia concerning her continued neutrality. In any case, it was a fact that a large number of Siberian divisions were continually being taken from the East and thrown into the conflict on the Western front, and General Zeitzler, Chief of the General Staff, had mentioned this to him (the RAM) only a few days before. We would naturally quite understand if the Japanese Government, with assurances of this kind, were pursuing a definite purpose. Should, however, Sato, the Ambassador in Kuibyshev be furthering Tokyo's true intentions with his reassuring declarations, this would be the greatest risk for our combined conduct of the war. It was, of course, certain that the Russians would not attack Japan of their own accord, and, for this reason, of course, all assurances on the part of Japan to Russia were quite absurd and absolutely against our interests.

Ambassador Oshima here explained that his Government had certainly not given any such instructions to Kuibyshev and that he could not imagine that Ambassador Sato would have acted of his/<sup>own</sup>accord without such instructions.

(The RAM then emphasized once more that if Japan felt she was strong enough and possessed sufficient anti-tank weapons, this year would without any doubt present the most favorable opportunity for her to attack Russia, who would definitely never again be in such a weak position as she was now.)

4839A  
We had reliable information according to which the Russians had constructed a large number of airfields in the East from which they themselves as well as the Americans would one day certainly attack the Japanese Island Empire with their bomber squadrons. The Japanese estimate of the strength of the Russians as 800,000 men in Siberia, is, in our opinion, however, overestimated. Our estimate is only 250,000 men, who apart from that are second-class soldiers, since all the Siberian Divisions had already been battered by the German armies last winter. If, however, Japan was not in the position to beat the Russians quickly and decisively, it would be better for her not to attack. However, she would then under all circumstances have to launch an attack in some other place against the British or the Americans. Ambassador Oshima here explained that he did not know the plans of his Government but understood that for the last 20 Years all plans had been worked out by the General Staff for an attack on Russia and were still directed towards such an attack. If success in that direction, could in any way be foreseen, they would certainly attack. If, however, Japan did not do so now, she would certainly launch an attack against the Anglo-Americans. The risk on this side was becoming ever greater through the constant increase in their Air Force, which, therefore, had to be beaten ever anew. The Japanese Air Force had for a long time <sup>been</sup> inferior at the fronts, now, however, it had again caught up with this advantage and was on its part superior to the enemy. Fundamentally, he could, however, say that Japan throughout the whole of its history had never yet remained on the defensive in war.

- 5 -

The RAM then informed the Ambassador of the constant increase in the deliveries by the U.S.A. to Russia. Oshima stated that he knew such information, which emanated from official Japanese estimates, according to which the export amounted to ..... (Translator's note: figure obliterated in original document).

Unfortunately, this figure was erroneously communicated in reports to Europe as 500,000 tons, which, however, the Government has already corrected. If information was before the German Government according to which the Japanese authorities kept only a poor check on the ships entering Russian harbours, then he would again ask that this matter be taken up with Admiral Wennecker in Tokyo.

The RAM then finally mentioned reports which were circulating among various embassies in the Balkans, according to which, Germany had prepared a memorandum for a peace settlement with Russia. Such rumours were naturally absolutely absurd. We would never negotiate with the Russians, if only for the reason that Stalin would never be able to accept the conditions which we would have to impose upon him. If we gave the Russians only a short breathing space, it would be certain that another war would have to be waged in 5 years time. Also plans for the construction of an East Wall against the Russians were a Utopia. The only possibility for avoiding Bolshevistic danger was to weaken the strength of the Russian nation down to complete exhaustion.

To this Oshima stated that he knew that the Japanese Embassy in Sofia had reported to Tokyo rumours about a separate peace between Germany and Russia and he had arranged for all such telegrams from Sofia to be given to him and he, on his part, had immediately taken measures against this.

The RAM asked the Ambassador to adjust the matter regarding such absurd reports unequivocally with Tokyo. Many of these rumours unfortunately emanated from discussions conducted by the Rumanian Prime Minister, Mihai Antonescu. The Marshall had promised during his visit to put a stop to such discussions.

The RAM explained to the Ambassador that we now also had reliable reports about Eden's conferences in the U.S.A., according to which it was the definite